



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

August 3, 2020

MR. JASON LEOPOLD
BUZZFEED NEWS
7TH FLOOR
1630 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20009

FOIPA Request No.: 1432673-000
Civil Action No.: 19-cv-01278
Subject: All 302's of individuals who were
questioned/interviewed by FBI Agents working for the
Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller

Dear Mr. Leopold:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find checked boxes under applicable statutes for the exemptions asserted to protect information exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the processed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely pursuant to applicable exemptions. An Explanation of Exemptions is enclosed to further explain justification for withheld information.

Section 552

☒ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☒ (b)(3)

Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure 6(e)

50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)

☐ (b)(4)

☒ (b)(5)

☒ (b)(6)

☒ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☒ (b)(7)(C)

☒ (b)(7)(D)

☒ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (k)(5)

☐ (k)(6)

☐ (k)(7)

800 pages were reviewed and 398 pages are being released.

☒ Deletions were made by the Department of Justice/Office of Information Policy.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request and the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☒ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].
- ☐ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. "Part 3" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Although your request is in litigation, we are required by law to provide you the following information:

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Please direct any further inquiries about this case to the Attorney representing the Government in this matter. Please use the FOIPA Request Number and/or Civil Action Number in all correspondence or inquiries concerning your request.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

Additional Information:

In response to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of Bates Stamped documents, FBI (19-cv-1278)-3764 through FBI (19-cv-1278)-4563. The enclosed documents represent the ninth interim release of information responsive to your request.

Additionally, included in this release are 2 pages of previously processed material. This material is being provided to you per a court order. This material consists of Baker 302's Bates 19-cv-177-1 through 2

Revisions were made to withholdings in documents previously released to you. Enclosed is an updated copy of Bates Stamped document FBI (19-cv-1278)-3456-3471.

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum includes information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records on individuals. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records. For questions regarding Parts 1, 2, or 3, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." Previously mentioned appeal and dispute resolution services are also available at the web address.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010))]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **National Security/Intelligence Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of national security and foreign intelligence records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and PA exemption (j)(2) as applicable to requests for records about individuals [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2); 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that national security or foreign intelligence records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching those systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. A reasonable search normally consists of a search for main files in the Central Records System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled and maintained by the FBI in the course of fulfilling law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization and encompasses the records of FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide and includes Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records. For additional information about our record searches visit www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/requesting-fbi-records.
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheets. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **The National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private citizens cannot request a name check.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Civil Action No.: 19-cv-1278 / 19-cv-1626

FOIA: 1432673-000 / 1433273-000

PDF Title:19-cv-1278 Release 9 Bates 3764-4563

Total Withheld Pages = 402

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 3769	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3770	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3771	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3772	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3773	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3774	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3775	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3776	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3842	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3843	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3844	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3845	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3846	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 3864	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3865	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3866	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3867	Referral/Consult

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
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FBI(19cv1278) 3912	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3913	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3914	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3915	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3916	b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3917	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3918	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3919	b5 per DOJ/OIP; b6; b7A; b7C; b7E

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 3920	b7A; b7E
FBI(19cv1278) 3921	Referral/Consult
FBI(19cv1278) 3922	Referral/Consult
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FBI(19cv1278) 3924	Referral/Consult
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
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Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/06/2017

GREG CRAIG was interviewed at the office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. Present for the interview was FBI Supervisory Special Agent Omer J. Meisel Special Counsel Attorneys Andrew Weissmann and Brian Richardson. Also present were CRAIG's attorneys Lawrence S. Spiegel and Julie A. Turner. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, CRAIG provided the following information:

Special Counsel Attorney Andrew Weissmann advised CRAIG that his participation in the interview was voluntary. CRAIG was also advised that he needed to be truthful in his answers and lying to a Federal agent could constitute a Federal crime. CRAIG acknowledged that he understood.

CRAIG received an email from Doug Schoen, who he previously knew from his work at the White House, inquiring whether CRAIG would be interested in taking on a project related to Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine. Subsequently, CRAIG and Schoen spoke via telephone while CRAIG was on the Acela train to New York and Schoen described the proposed project. The Ukrainian government was looking for a major U.S. law firm to conduct an investigation of Tymoshenko's trial and provide an opinion as to the fairness of the trial as well as determine whether there were any human rights violations. The Ukrainian government wanted the U.S. law firm to conduct a review utilizing western standards of due process. Western standards did not necessarily mean applying U.S. standards; rather, the review should utilize general western standards. Specifically, they wanted CRAIG's experience as a U.S. lawyer applying western standards. To clarify the difference to Special Counsel, CRAIG provided an example stating that not all western countries have jury trials. However, CRAIG conceded that he did not research any other western country legal standards when conducting his review and he relied on his knowledge of U.S. legal standards.

CRAIG stated the people in Ukraine wanted to have a document which would articulate what facts and procedures were used during the Tymoshenko trial, they wanted the report to be unbiased and they wanted the report to provide a credible assessment of the fairness of Tymoshenko's trial. The initial conversation with Schoen on the Acela was the most substantive

Investigation on 10/19/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 10/20/2017by Omer J Meisel

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conversation he had about the scope of the project during the entire engagement. CRAIG's main concern regarding whether to accept the project was that he wanted assurances that he would have complete independence in conducting his investigation and writing his report. CRAIG does not recall having any conversation about how the Ukrainian government would view the report or that they wanted the report to conclude specific things.

During the initial meeting, CRAIG stated that he thought the client was the government of Ukraine but he was not sure who or what agency within the government was the client. Subsequently, CRAIG concluded that the client was the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Paul Manafort's name may have come up during this initial conversation with Schoen but CRAIG is not sure. CRAIG was aware of who Manafort was and that he used to be at the firm of Back, Manafort, and Stone. CRAIG was aware that Manafort represented U.S. Republican candidates. CRAIG had heard that Manafort was an advisor to the president of Ukraine since approximately 2010 and that he was still the president's advisor. However, CRAIG had never previously met Manafort. CRAIG stated that his friend Bruce Jackson initially recommended CRAIG to Manafort.

Schoen told CRAIG that Victor Pinchuk was going to pay Skadden for his work. Pinchuk was a Ukrainian oligarch who was close to the Clintons. Schoen told CRAIG to estimate how much he wanted to charge for the engagement and Pinchuk would pay the price, but CRAIG would not be able to go back and ask for more money if the project went over this agreed upon price. Schoen told CRAIG that if he thought the project would cost three million dollars then he should ask for four million dollars. CRAIG followed Schoen's recommendation and charged four million dollars for the project. Schoen stated that Manafort worked with the Ukrainian government and that Manafort would call CRAIG to finalize the project.

CRAIG stated the Ukrainian government was supportive of the project but he does not know why Pinchuk was willing to pay for the project. CRAIG surmised that the Ukrainian president had something to do with it and that Pinchuk was paying on his behalf, but CRAIG did not know what if anything Pinchuk would receive as a benefit for paying for the project.

CRAIG told Schoen that he required complete control and independence over the project and that he needed complete access to prosecutors, witnesses, and judges. Access was critical and the Ukrainian government needed to be committed to help to the extent possible. Moreover, CRAIG stated that he would not do anything that would affect U.S. policy or trigger any FARA requirements.

CRAIG could not immediately commit to accept the proposed project because he needed to run a conflicts check within Skadden. CRAIG needed to obtain

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Skadden's concurrence because Skadden had an office in Russia and also had Russian clients.

After the initial telephone call with Schoen, CRAIG met Manafort in Washington, D.C. to discuss the potential project. Manafort and CRAIG discussed whether this was something that could actually be accomplished based on CRAIG's complete independence requirement. CRAIG understood that Manafort's role was the U.S. advisor to the Ukrainian president. CRAIG based this understanding on previous information he had that Manafort was responsible for suggested to the Ukrainian president to hire Skadden to work on a different project in 2011. Skadden was never retained to work on this other project.

CRAIG told Manafort that he would not engage in any political activities as defined in the FARA statute. CRAIG did not want to have to register under FARA because he did not want to be considered a foreign agent because it could prevent him from working for the U.S. government. CRAIG stated this was the rule when he was in the Clinton administration. CRAIG also did not think Skadden would want him to engage in work that would require him to register under FARA. CRAIG speculated that he probably provided Manafort with a list of things we would not do such as lobbying U. S. government officials about the report since this would trigger a FARA registration. CRAIG's understanding of FARA was anytime you represent foreign individuals, foreign governments, foreign parties or foreign corporations you need to be careful not to trigger the FARA requirements under the statute. Accordingly, CRAIG told Manafort he was only going to engage in legal work as it related to this project. CRAIG stated that it was clear that Manafort was fully aware of the FARA requirements during this conversation.

Schoen wanted CRAIG to meet with his principal, Pinchuk, and CRAIG wanted Manafort to set up meetings with representatives from the Ukrainian government so CRAIG would be satisfied that they understood and meet his requirements. However, CRAIG /Skadden needed to be paid before he would expend any resources on the project. Moreover, this would also demonstrate whether or not the Ukrainian government/Pinchuk were serious about the project. Initially, a date was set for CRAIG to travel to Ukraine to meet with the government and Pinchuk but it was subsequently postponed because he had not received any payment.

Eventually, Skadden was paid \$150,000 via third party payment, and CRAIG traveled to Ukraine. CRAIG stated that in the U.S. it was probably not allowed for a private third party to pay for a government contract. Initially, CRAIG provided Schoen with wire transfer instructions for payment. However, the third party payment was not made via wire transfer

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but a check from Schoen LLC. CRAIG did not think that Schoen was using his own money to pay for the project. Rather, Pinchuk provided Schoen the money and then Schoen wrote a check. CRAIG did not know why Pinchuk did not pay directly but he assumed that Schoen ended up writing the check because Pinchuk was not being responsive to requests for payment.

CRAIG met with Pinchuk twice during his first trip to Ukraine. CRAIG and Pinchuk discussed how payments would be made for the engagement and Pinchuk agreed to initially pay \$1.5 million USD. CRAIG was angry because his understanding was that he would receive two different payments of \$2 million USD for a total of \$4 million USD. CRAIG did not voice his objections to Pinchuk but did to Schoen. CRAIG believed that Pinchuk's involvement on the project, i.e. paying for the project, was on behalf of the Ukrainian president. Therefore, whenever payments for CRAIG's work was late, he would contact Manafort because Manafort was the conduit to the Ukrainian president.

After the first payment was made via check, subsequent payments were via wire transfers from offshore accounts. The first wire transfer was for \$2 million USD which came from a Cypriot account not in Pinchuk's name. CRAIG called Schoen who stated that Pinchuk advised that the money was coming from a Pinchuk entity called Black Seaview Limited. Manafort also told CRAIG the same thing. CRAIG was not surprised that the money came from Cyprus because he knew a lot of oligarchs used Cyprus banks but he did not know why they used Cyprus banks.

CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 000001-02 dated 05/02/2012 which was an invoice for professional services rendered to the Ukrainian MOJ c/o Schoen for \$13,760. CRAIG stated these payments were related to work CRAIG and his staff did in preparing for the initial trip to Ukraine. CRAIG was asked why if Pinchuk was paying for the Tymoshenko project did CRAIG/Skadden provide an invoice the MOJ. CRAIG stated that the MOJ was the client and Pinchuk was paying their bill.

Skadden received additional money from the Ukrainian government in 2013 after the project was completed. CRAIG stated that by the time the Ukrainian government approved the money for the project it was 2013 and CRAIG wanted to make sure the Ukrainian government understood that the payment was for work in 2012, and not work performed in 2013. CRAIG also wanted to make sure there was not a double billing issue, i.e. that there was a third party payer (Pinchuk) who paid Skadden's fees on behalf of the MOJ and then the MOJ also independently paid the same fee.

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CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 000004 which was an invoice for professional services rendered and expenses through April 30, 2012 in the amount of \$738,071.30. CRAIG stated that Schoen was the third party payer representing Pinchuk on behalf of the MOJ.

CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 007795, an email dated 03/25 /2013 from CRAIG to Manafort. This email is a reference to the amount of money Pinchuk already paid and CRAIG suggested to Manafort to go back to Pinchuk to see if he wanted to make a claim for reimbursement for money received by Skadden that they did not utilize for the project. CRAIG spoke to Schoen who stated that Pinchuk did not want the money back. Accordingly, Skadden had an excess of \$500,000 in their escrow account.

CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 000399-401, an email dated 04/12 /2012 from Manafort to CRAIG. CRAIG stated he met with Pinchuk who stated that he was told by the Ukrainian president's chief of staff to transfer \$1.5 million USD. CRAIG was upset because the agreement was for two transfers of four million USD. Accordingly, CRAIG sent the email expressing his displeasure to Manafort because he was the conduit to the Ukraine president and his chief of staff. CRAIG explained that if he had issues he needed to resolve with Pinchuk, his conduit was Schoen. Conversely, if he had issues he needed to resolve with the Ukrainian president and/or his chief of staff, his conduit was Manafort.

CRAIG stated that Pinchuk did not want the "world" to know about his involvement in the project and expected and was promised confidentiality. However, CRAIG is not sure he made the same promise to Pinchuk. Subsequently, Tymoshenko's attorney, Mr. Slattery, demanded to know how CRAIG/Skadden was being paid before he would grant CRAIG an interview with Tymoshenko. CRAIG recommended they tell Mr. Slattery that Pinchuk was paying Skadden but because Pinchuk was promised confidentiality, CRAIG told Mr. Slattery that they were paid by a third party and that he was not authorized to disclose who the third party was or how much they were being paid. Mr. Slattery wanted to know who paid for Skadden's services and raised the possibility that Tymoshenko would not cooperate with CRAIG's investigation unless he was provided the identity of the third party.

CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 000653, an email chain from June 2012. CRAIG stated that the email refreshed his recollection and that Manafort told him that the Ukrainian government had no issue with CRAIG releasing Pinchuk's name in the final report.

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In the final report CRAIG drafted he did not provide the amount of money Skadden was paid. CRAIG never spoke to anyone outside of Skadden about the decision not to put in how much they were paid nor was this discussed at any time with the Ukrainian government representatives or their conduits.

CRAIG was asked if people in Ukraine were asking how it was possible that Skadden was only being paid approximately \$13,000 for this project. CRAIG stated the issue was not a government contract procurement issue; rather the issue was who was actually paying Skadden. CRAIG was not concerned about a public perception problem that he might have within the Ukraine and did not recall speaking to anyone within the Ukraine government or Manafort about any government contract procurement issue.

CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 000649, an email chain dated 06/22/2012. CRAIG was asked by Special Counsel whether he was aware of or did he have any discussions about the legal limit for payment by the Ukrainian government. CRAIG stated that the email is from Tymoshenko's lawyer. Subsequently, CRAIG called Manafort about this email; however, he does not recall any discussions about any legal limitations on payment by the Ukrainian government. Nevertheless, CRAIG stated that he was aware of the Ukrainian government procurement limits (agent note: CRAIG's face turned red during this part of the interview, he pushed himself away from the table in his seat, and crossed his arms).

CRAIG stated that in his mind the client was the MOJ. Regarding any privilege issues, CRAIG did not give it much thought because he was conducting an investigation and interviewing prosecutors and witnesses, and the legal advice he was providing was the actual report he would eventually draft. CRAIG stated that his notes from the interviews would have been privileged because they were work product. CRAIG stated that the attorney-client privilege extended more broadly than just to the MOJ but he was not sure if Manafort would have been covered by the privilege. At the time, CRAIG was not thinking or discussing a common privilege between all the parties involved in the engagement.

Prior to working on the project, CRAIG had a limited understanding of Tymoshenko's prosecution. CRAIG did not know the details associated with the charges against her or the legal issues related to the Ukraine energy and gas prices. CRAIG stated that Ukraine was a highly politicized country and that one of the biggest issues within Ukraine was the Tymoshenko's prosecution. Within Skadden, some people viewed this project as a very exciting prospect and others thought that no matter what CRAIG's report concluded it would negatively impact Skadden's business prospects; especially in Russia. The people who viewed this engagement negatively felt that Skadden was in a no win situation because either they will be

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seen as pro-Tymoshenko or pro-Russia based on the results of the investigation. Skadden's Russia office held the latter view. CRAIG was not sure what the Russian government's view was on the Tymoshenko prosecution. CRAIG did not know what the U.S. Department of State or Hilary Clinton's view was on the Tymoshenko prosecution. Later, CRAIG found out that the U. S. Ambassador was pro-Tymoshenko.

There were four Ukrainian prosecutors who assisted CRAIG with the investigation and Manafort was the conduit between the Ukrainian government and CRAIG.

CRAIG had very little direct contact with Manafort during the investigation but once the investigation was concluded and the draft of the report was being written he had significantly more contact with Manafort.

Draft Report

Various people from the Ukrainian government provided comments to the draft report. However, CRAIG could not discern any specific motives the Ukrainian government had based on their comments. Generally, Manafort delivered the comments CRAIG received from the Ukrainian government including the MOJ. However, CRAIG did get some comments directly from Ukrainian government employees through email. Richard Gates and Konstantin Kilimnik did not play any role in providing comments.

CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 000642, an email chain dated 06 /22/2012 regarding a "draft statement". CRAIG stated that he was concerned that people would say that Manafort was responsible for the Skadden report and because Manafort worked for the Ukrainian president this would taint the report and potentially be viewed negatively.

CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 000147, Skadden preliminary engagement letter dated 02/20/2012. CRAIG was asked why the engagement letter stated "To Whom it May Concern". CRAIG stated that it was not specifically decided yet who the specific client was but it was generally understood that it was some part of the Ukrainian government. The scope portion of the letter was drafted based on information provided to CRAIG by Schoen and Manafort. The purpose of this engagement letter was to memorialize the preliminary engagement agreement and define the scope of the engagement. Nobody other than CRAIG signed the letter. "Third party payor" language in the engagement letter was the standard language Skadden used in their engagement letters.

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CRAIG stated there was no further efforts by him or Skadden to draft or execute another engagement letter between April 2012 and the next written engagement letter.

CRAIG was shown a letter drafted by Skadden to Helen Hunt, DOJ/NSD, dated 02/06/2013 (there were no bates numbers on this document) and CRAIG was directed to Attachment B which was the "Proposed Agreement in English dated April 10, 2012". CRAIG stated that this was the signed executed engagement letter. CRAIG did not recall why his "client declined to sign proposed English agreement because of concerns about confidentiality clause." Instead there was a fully signed engagement letter in Ukrainian and English signed by the MOJ (Attachment A in the Helen Hunt production). CRAIG did not include the language regarding third party payor because they already had it in the previous letter. CRAIG stated it was difficult to get the Ukrainian government to sign the English version of the engagement letter. CRAIG was not concerned about the client not signing the Attachment B engagement letter because he was requiring them to pay before he would start work on the project. CRAIG was not worried about utilizing the Attachment B engagement letter as a way to force the client to pay because he would not engage in any work on their behalf until he was paid.

CRAIG was referred to Attachment A "Ministry of Justice" and the reference to the cap on payments in the amount of 95,000 Ukrainian hryvnas. CRAIG stated that according to Skadden attorney Andrew Van der Swaan, who was the contact with the MOJ, this is the amount MOJ set aside for the project and to obtain additional funding would take additional time to obtain approval. CRAIG was not expecting to get paid by the MOJ; rather, he was getting paid by Pinchuk. CRAIG stated that Skadden did not enter into a written contract with Pinchuk or any other third party because Skadden would not perform any work until they were paid. CRAIG stated he never really thought of drafting a written contract with the third party, Pinchuk, who was was paying for the report. CRAIG felt comfortable with this arrangement because he was already paid \$2 million plus and extra \$150,000 by Pinchuk.

CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 000399 which is an email chain where Manafort advised CRAIG that CRAIG will get \$2 million. CRAIG stated he asked Manafort to get involved because the relationship with the president's chief of staff and Pinchuk was strained and Manafort was the conduit to the president.

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CRAIG was shown document bates stamped SAU 000398 which was an email chain between Manafort and CRAIG where Manafort advised that the \$2 million was wire transferred. CRAIG did not know what "VP picture was not full picture" meant.

CRAIG had virtually no contact with Gates while he was in the Ukraine. Regarding Kilimnik, CRAIG stated that during the 04/04/2012 trip to Ukraine, Kilimnik was "deputized" by Manafort to assist CRAIG and Skadden with their logistics in Ukraine. Initially, Manafort was going to take CRAIG to appointments with Ukrainian government officials. However, Kilimnik ended up escorting them. Kilimnik was very connected to Ukrainian government officials and CRAIG was very impressed with him. After the CRAIG's first trip to Ukraine where he laid out his plan for what they were going to do while in Ukraine on the project, Kilimnik no longer escorted them.

While in the Ukraine, CRAIG only saw Manafort a couple of times. During the time period CRAIG was in Ukraine, approximately 04/2012 - 08/2012, Manafort did not attend any of their meetings with Ukrainian government official or anyone else Skadden interviewed. CRAIG was operating on his own. Oleg (LNU) at the MOJ was the point of contact and assisted with setting up meetings and interviews. The only people who attended any witness interviews were CRAIG, Skadden employees, and the translator. CRAIG did meet Manafort in his hotel room at the Intercontinental in Kiev. Manafort's hotel room had an impressive computer system set up.

CRAIG was asked what considerations were taken into account to decide whether he would interview President Yanukovych. CRAIG stated that one of the provisions in the engagement letter stated that Skadden was not going to investigate whether Tymoshenko's prosecution was politically motivated. Skadden was only investigating whether there was selective prosecution. They looked to see if other similar cases were brought against politicians and if there was any precedence for such a prosecution. Skadden's investigation revealed that there were approximately 10-15 similar prosecutions previously brought against local politicians but not against a high ranking federal politician. Nobody outside of Skadden was consulted on whether they should interview the president. CRAIG did not have any conversations or input from MANAFORT about interviewing the president. Ultimately CRAIG concluded that there was no need to interview the president because he did not play a role in her imprisonment.

In August 2012, CRAIG had begun to finalize the report. CRAIG did not provide any insight to Manafort or Gates about what the report would say prior to the draft report being written. CRAIG was shown an email bates stamped SAU 000581-582. After reviewing the email, CRAIG stated that he

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Greg Craig, On 10/19/2017, Page 10 of 16

did not write the first paragraph on SAU 000582 and that the statement in the first paragraph did not happen. However, Skadden did accept comments from the Ukrainian government. Skadden did provide the Ukrainian government and Manafort with a draft of the report to provide their comments prior to finalizing the report. CRAIG stated that he received comments from both the Ukrainian government and Manafort. CRAIG utilized Manafort because he spoke English. This was a lengthy process.

CRAIG was shown an email bates stamped SAU 005723-5725. CRAIG was asked why comments would go to Gates. CRAIG stated that Gates and Kilimnik worked for Manafort and that they were conduits to provide Manafort with the material. CRAIG believed the comments provided to him were either from Manafort, someone acting on behalf of Manafort, or comments on behalf of President Yanukovych because Manafort was the conduit to the president.

CRAIG was shown an email bates stamped SAU 005750. CRAIG stated that initially the draft was sent to Manafort prior to the MOJ receiving a copy of the draft.

CRAIG stated that the attorney-client privilege did not extend to FTI. FTI wanted Skadden to retain them as a client but Skadden declined because Skadden wanted to keep their role very clean and not promoting their report. They wanted to insure the report was viewed as an independent unbiased investigation/report.

CRAIG was shown an email chain bates stamped SAU 005757-5759 and directed to the sentence "I didn't get Hawker's comments." on SAU 005757. CRAIG stated that Hawkers worked for FTI. FTI was retained by the MOJ to develop a world-wide media strategy related to the release of the Skadden report. Manafort set up a meeting in New York, New York with FTI and other stakeholders. Skadden's London office recommended four media strategy companies to Manafort, including FTI, who had offices with Europe. CRAIG stated he had never previously worked with or dealt with Hawker before this project. CRAIG stated that during this meeting Manafort was disappointed that Hawker viewed the Skadden report as validating Tymoshenko's position and Manafort was initially hopeful that the report would come out differently than it did. CRAIG did not recall what Manafort specifically said at this meeting. CRAIG's objective was to get everyone to read the report.

CRAIG was shown an email between Kilimnik and Van Der Swaan bates stamped SAU 05765. CRAIG thought he had previously seen this email. CRAIG stated there were a lot of comments being sent into Skadden attempting to get them to alter the report. CRAIG was directed to the statement "friends in Kiev" which CRAIG stated he took that to be a reference to the President Yanukovych. Regarding the comments Skadden received to the draft report,

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Greg Craig, On 10/19/2017, Page 11 of 16

their process was for the Skadden attorneys involved in the project to meet in CRAIG's office and obtain a consensus before making any suggested changes to the report.

CRAIG was shown an email chain dated 09/13/2012 bates stamped SAU 005786. CRAIG did not recall that he had a deadline he was trying to make. CRAIG stated that he wanted to get the report finalized and released as soon as possible because the longer the process took the greater potential the delay would negatively impact the report. CRAIG had conversations with Manafort about changes he wanted made to the report, but Manafort's changes were limited to a small number of issues.

CRAIG was shown an email chain bates stamped SAU 005786-5787 and directed to number 3 on SAU005787 which was written by Manafort and stated "It is important to have your report submitted to MoJ on Friday. . . The President told SL directly to tell me it must be done this week." CRAIG stated SL is a reference to the president's chief of staff. CRAIG stated that he did not have any verbal conversations with Manafort about this email. CRAIG stated he wanted to get the report issued as fast as possible.

CRAIG was shown documents stamped SAU 005854 and SAU027337. CRAIG stated that Tymoshenko's argument on selective prosecution was different than the MOJ prosecutor's office.

CRAIG was shown documents bates stamped SAU 027329-27335. CRAIG stated that the hand written notes on the document are his. Regarding "August 3, 2012" on SAU 027329, CRAIG stated that the August 3rd date seemed too early to him for sending out the final draft report to Manafort. CRAIG thought he sent the final draft at the end of August 2012. CRAIG stated that his hand written notes were contemporaneous notes of what Manafort was saying and that Manafort was expressing the views of the MOJ prosecutor's office. CRAIG stated the notes are about factual conclusions but that Manafort would not know those details. CRAIG stated that it was his practice to put the name of the person he was talking to when writing down notes. CRAIG stated that based on a review of his notes, Manafort was providing comments to CRAIG on behalf of the MOJ's prosecutor's office.

CRAIG was shown an email from Gates to CRAIG bates stamped SAU 006811. CRAIG stated Gates was providing him with additional comments and "BG" was a reference to the president and short for "Big Guy". Manafort also referred to the president as "BG". CRAIG stated that the statement "positive meeting today with the principal" had to be a reference to the president. CRAIG stated that the comments provided by Gates were on behalf of the president.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Greg Craig, On 10/19/2017, Page 12 of 16

CRAIG was shown an email bates stamped SAU 006827. CRAIG stated he was reporting back to Manafort what changes Skadden was willing to make to the report.

CRAIG was shown an email bates stamped SAU 006828. CRAIG stated "Hawker" was a reference to a meeting that was going to happen in New York, New York.

CRAIG was shown emails bates stamped SAU 006865-6889. CRAIG stated he probably has seen this email before but he has no specific recollection.

CRAIG was shown an email bates stamped SAU 007296. CRAIG stated this is an email between Kilimnik and Van Der Swaan.

CRAIG was shown an email string bates stamped SAU 007321-7323. CRAIG stated that these emails discuss additional comments to the report sent by Manafort.

CRAIG was shown an email sting bates stamped SAU 007324-7325. CRAIG stated this is an email between CRAIG and Manafort. CRAIG stated that in these emails, CRAIG was asking Manafort what was the problem with the report that led to the MOJ not accepting the report. CRAIG did not believe that the reasons provided by Manafort were persuasive enough to delay the release of the report. CRAIG was surprised that the "client" would not accept the report. CRAIG thought it was juvenile that the client would say they never received the report.

CRAIG could not remember who he communicated through when he wanted to communicate with the MOJ but he believes it was Van der Swaan.

CRAIG did not recall anyone at the Podesta Group calling to ask about the report. CRAIG stated that he had known Tony Podesta for a long time but he had never spoken to him about the report. CRAIG stated he knew Vin Weber. CRAIG previously worked on a project with Weber related to Egypt in 2012. During that time period, Weber told CRAIG that he was working with a Ukrainian client. Weber never asked CRAIG about the report.

CRAIG stated that the night before the Harvard Club meeting he had dinner with Hawker from FTI, but he does not recall much about what was discussed. The purpose of the Harvard Club meeting was to discuss with Manafort any last minute issues with the Skadden report prior to delivering it to the president's chief of staff in New York the next day. CRAIG remembered that the meeting took place but he did not remember the details of what was discussed. CRAIG was asked if he remembered seeing a document from FTI. CRAIG stated he did not remember spending a lot of time reading any document at the meeting or even seeing a document. CRAIG was

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Greg Craig, On 10/19/2017, Page 13 of 16

shown documents bates stamped SAU 006865-6889. CRAIG stated that now that he looks at the document, the first paragraph on SAU 006869 is a mischaracterization of Skadden's findings in the report. Regarding the assignments enumerated in 23 - 40 (SAU 006867), CRAIG stated he did not do any of those assignments.

CRAIG was shown documents labeled "Media Plan" bates stamped SAU 006797-6801. CRAIG stated he was concerned about this plan because how they categorized certain aspects of the plan. CRAIG stated that Hawker asked if he could help CRAIG get the report to David Sanger at the New York Times and CRAIG told him yes. CRAIG stated that two media outlets were reporting erroneous facts about the Skadden reports findings. CRAIG stated the only thing he did was deliver the Skadden report to Sanger and that all the other things the "Media Plan" states CRAIG would do were never done by CRAIG.

Regarding the release of the report in Ukraine, CRAIG stated he found out that there were erroneous press articles about the Skadden report. CRAIG did not have any knowledge or insight into how the Skadden report was rolled out by the Ukrainian government or what FTI did with respect to the Ukrainian roll out.

CRAIG was shown documents bates stamped SAU 007232-7233. Manafort and Hawker asked CRAIG if Skadden would be willing to provide one or two journalists with background on the Skadden report. Initially, CRAIG told it may be possible but then he reversed his decision and said he could not. CRAIG also told them that Van Der Swaan could not do it out of his Moscow office. CRAIG was directed to a portion of the email dated 09/24/2012 between Manafort and CRAIG (SAU 007233) which stated "briefing people like Fule and Durbin". CRAIG stated that Fule is a European politician and that briefing either Fule or Durbin would not be prohibited or constitute a trigger for FARA, but that he never spoke to either individual. CRAIG stated that Durbin called CRAIG once early in the Skadden's investigation and asked him about their investigation. CRAIG told Durbin it was too early to talk to him about his findings. Durbin asked CRAIG if he could call him back later to talk about the results of the report and CRAIG stated yes. However, Durbin never called CRAIG back.

CRAIG does not recall having any discussion with Manafort, Gates or Kilimnik about registering under FARA. CRAIG stated that his general understanding of FARA is that if you have a foreign government as a client and if you do any PR work in the U.S. or engage with any U.S. government representatives on behalf of the foreign government that you would have to register under FARA. CRAIG stated that when he first discussed with Manafort the possibility of working on the project he told Manafort that

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Greg Craig, On 10/19/2017, Page 14 of 16

he would not conduct any work that would trigger any FARA requirements. Manafort told CRAIG that he understood FARA requirements. CRAIG stated that when he provided Manafort the reference list of four potential firms to conduct PR work, he advised Manafort that any PR work conducted in the U.S. would require the firm to register under FARA.

CRAIG stated that he had a conversation with Gates where he told Gates that he was meeting with DOJ about the work he did on the report and that he was going to provide DOJ Skadden's view on FARA. CRAIG did not have a clear independent recollection of this; rather, it was based on a review of his Skadden billing records. CRAIG did not recall if he had a conversation with Gates about whether he or Skadden had to register under FARA.

CRAIG stated that he responded to three different newspaper articles which inaccurately reported the results of the Skadden report. CRAIG spoke to the journalists to correct their inaccurate reporting. CRAIG stated that when he corrected some of the inaccurate press he did not view that as conducting press relations on behalf of a foreign government. CRAIG was correcting the journalists on behalf of Skadden and not the Ukrainian government. CRAIG stated that Skadden's client would definitely meet the foreign government requirement for FARA but Skadden did not meet the lobbying element. CRAIG did not recall having any conversations with the DOJ's FARA unit unrelated to the Skadden report and he does not recall DOJ asking any questions about Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik or FTI.

CRAIG stated he did not know if anyone at FTI had any communications with any U.S. reporters about the inaccuracies about the results Skadden report. CRAIG did not know if anyone at FTI was speaking to U.S. government officials about the Skadden report. CRAIG stated he was not aware if Manafort, Gates, or Kilimnik conducted any lobbying to U.S. government representatives or U.S. press related to the Skadden report.

CRAIG was asked why FTI was hired when Mercury was already doing work on behalf of the ECFMU. CRAIG stated that FTI had a specific assignment regarding the release of the Skadden report. In 2016, when CRAIG became aware of the fact that Skadden was conducting work for Mercury on behalf of the Ukrainian government/ECFMU, he was surprised.

CRAIG's impression of Manafort was that Manafort had a different world view than CRAIG and did not think they could become friends. Manafort's understanding of Ukraine and Russian relations was "primitive". Manafort was always very focused on completing the assignment and CRAIG understood why someone would hire him to accomplish a tasking. Manafort was a "tough guy, a man's man". Manafort did not share a lot of information about himself. The last time CRAIG communicated with Manafort was via email in

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Greg Craig , On 10/19/2017 , Page 15 of 16

2013. CRAIG has not communicated with Gates or Kilimnik since the Skadden report was issued.

CRAIG received an email from someone believed to be a hacker that stated Manafort had \$5 million dollars in a bank in Cyprus and that CRAIG should call him back. CRAIG viewed this email as a threat. CRAIG referred the email to Skadden's General Counsel and then called Manafort to tell him about it.

CRAIG was involved in one meeting related to the ECFMU. Ken Gross at Skadden asked CRAIG if he would discuss FARA issues with him. CRAIG billed this conversation to the ECFMU which was reflected in CRAIG's billing records. This was the first time CRAIG had heard about the ECFMU and he never had any conversations with Manafort or Gates about ECFMU. CRAIG understood that Skadden's client was Mercury. CRAIG had never previously conducted any work for Mercury.

In 2016, CRAIG had three conversations with Gross about FARA. They discussed both legal issues and facts (Agent note: Based on the attorney-client privilege, no questions were asked by SCO regarding these conversations.) CRAIG believed Tyler Rosen, a Skadden associate, was also involved in these FARA conversations.

Early in CRAIG's career he registered under FARA and that is how he became familiar with the registration requirements. Throughout his career, FARA issues surfaced because he enjoyed working with international clients. When CRAIG worked at the White House, they would discuss FARA related to vetting candidates for positions at the White House.

CRAIG was shown a document bates stamped SAU 007243. CRAIG did not believe he reviewed this document prior to the Harvard Club meeting. Gates was not listed in this document as being an attendee but CRAIG was told that Gates was in fact act the meeting. CRAIG did not remember Gates being at the meeting.

CRAIG was shown a document bates stamped SAU 0000034. This was a billing reference to a call with Senator Durbin on 06/12/2012. CRAIG stated Senator Durbin called him.


CRAIG was shown a document bates stamped SAU 000055. This was a billing reference to a call with Senator Durbin on 07/31/201. CRAIG did not recall this communication.

CRAIG was shown a document bates stamped SAU 0000073. This was a billing reference to Durbin on 08/01/2012. CRAIG did not recall this communication. CRAIG recalled that Senator Durbin was interested in the

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Greg Craig, On 10/19/2017, Page 16 of 16

results of the Skadden report and when CRAIG was going to issue the report. Senator Durbin asked CRAIG if there was any chance the Skadden report would result in Tymoshenko's release. CRAIG told Senator Durbin that he did not know. CRAIG interpreted this exchange as Senator Durbin's theory that Skadden was brought in to write a report by the Ukrainian government as a way to either justify her release by the Ukrainian government or result in a new trial. CRAIG did not provide Senator Durbin any information about their investigation. This is potentially what the Durbin call and billing reference on 08/01/2012 was related to. Senator Durbin never contacted CRAIG again about the report and CRAIG never spoke to him after the Skadden report was released. CRAIG advised that he dealt with Senator Durbin during President Clinton's impeachment.

CRAIG stated that Manafort, as a representative of the Ukrainian president, was at a dinner party attended by U.S. government officials on 02/15/2011.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

On Thursday, August 17, 2017, [redacted] (father and son), telephone number [redacted] were interviewed at their place of business, [redacted] New York, New York by Senior Financial Investigator [redacted] and FBI Special Agent [redacted] Office of the Special Counsel. Also present for the interview was their attorney, [redacted] of the Clifford Law Offices, 120 N. LaSalle Street - Suite 3100, Chicago, IL, telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, the [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] business relationship with Paul Manafort dates back many years when [redacted]. The business relationship continued when [redacted]

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[redacted] Most, if not all, payments received from Manafort were received by way of wire transfer [redacted]. On occasion, Manafort would let the [redacted] know the name of the company where the wire transfer originated from. The [redacted] never really cared where the money originated from as long as they got paid. Manafort rarely paid for his orders on time.

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Investigation on 08/17/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/21/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of August 17, 2017, On 08/17/2017, Page 2 of 3

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Rick Gates was Manafort's assistant. The [redacted] would often deal with Gates when Manafort was unavailable. [redacted]

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The [redacted] never dealt directly with Manafort's personal bankers at First Republic Bank (FRB) and/or Nigro, Karlin, Segal, Feldstein and Bolno (NKSEB). All invoices were sent directly to Manafort and/or Gates.

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[redacted] purchased by Manafort was either for himself [redacted] [redacted] According to [redacted] did not work.

b6
b7C

Manafort also introduced the [redacted] to his [redacted] [redacted] described [redacted] as a "pompous full of shit asshole".

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b7C

The [redacted] did not recall the name [redacted] and said she was never a customer.

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SFI [redacted] furnished the [redacted] a summary of what is believed to be all wire transfers sent to [redacted] from accounts associated with Paul Manafort (copy attached). The [redacted] have already been in contact

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[REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] -

Continuation of FD-302 of August 17, 2017, On 08/17/2017, Page 3 of 3

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/27/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee and Andrew Weissmann. Present representing [redacted] were [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Investigation on 08/22/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/23/2018

by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]


(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of 08.22.2018, On 08/22/2018, Page 2 of 2

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[REDACTED] knew that Gates received direction from Paul Manafort. [REDACTED]
does not know who else may have instructed Gates or who else Gates may
have reported to.

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FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043
DATE: 06-10-2020

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/01/2018

(U) James M. Burnham was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office in Washington, D.C. Participating in this interview were FBI Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles III, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. Also present for this interview were Burnham's attorneys [REDACTED] office telephone [REDACTED] email address [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Burnham was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation and he acknowledged he understood. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the purpose of the interview, Burnham provided the following information:

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~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: National~~
~~Security Information SCG~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~

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Investigation on 11/03/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/06/2017

by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 2 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
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[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 3 of 23

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 4 of 23

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b7E(S) ~~(S//BF)~~ [redacted] Yates also said the FBI had talked to Flynn. [redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIPb1
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[redacted] Yates indicated Flynn told the FBI the same rendition that Pence and Priebus had represented to the media. [redacted]

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) [redacted] b1
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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S) b1
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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 5 of 23

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] Yates said it would not
be fair for DOJ to give the White House the information related to Flynn
and expect the White House not to act. [redacted]

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[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham, On 11/03/2017, Page 6 of 23

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
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[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 7 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

FBI(19cv1278)-3783

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 8 of 23

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

FBI(19cv1278)-3784

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 9 of 23

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

(S)

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b1
b3
b7E

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

FBI(19cv1278)-3785

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 10 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

FBI(19cv1278)-3786

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham, On 11/03/2017, Page 11 of 23March 20, 2017 HPSCI Hearing:b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP Boente told McGahn over the phone "this" cannot last and was not sustainable. Burnham thought Boente was referring to Comey in some way. b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 12 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 13 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham, On 11/03/2017, Page 14 of 23

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 15 of 23

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b6
b7C

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

FBI(19cv1278)-3791

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham, On 11/03/2017, Page 16 of 23b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb6
b7Cb5 Per DOJ/OIP Burnham knew the only line the President cared about was the line that said Comey advised the President on three separate occasions the President was not under investigation. b5 Per DOJ/OIPb1
b3
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (S)

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 17 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 18 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 19 of 23

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 20 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 21 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 22 of 23

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b6
b7C

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of James Burnham , On 11/03/2017 , Page 23 of 23

b5 Per DOJ/OIP


b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/24/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

(U) On 08/28/2018 Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] requested a voluntary interview and served the attached subpoena upon [redacted] at his residence at [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

(U) The below is an interview summary. It is not intended to be a verbatim account and does not memorialize all statements made during the interview.

b7E

(U) [redacted] did not want to volunteer for an interview without his attorney.


b6
b7C

Investigation on 08/28/2018 at [redacted] United States (, Other (Service of Subpoena))

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/04/2018

by [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/11/2019

Randy Credico, date of birth [REDACTED] social security number [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, 395 E Street S.W., Washington, D.C. in the presence of his attorney, [REDACTED]. Participating in the interview were Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED], SA [REDACTED] Intelligence Analyst (IA) [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie S. Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky, and District of Columbia Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, Credico provided the following information:

[Agent note: Prior to the start of the interview, Credico and his counsel were provided the opportunity to review [REDACTED]

Credico was reminded that it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an ongoing investigation, which he acknowledged.

Investigation on 12/06/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File #	Date drafted 12/09/2018
--------	-------------------------

by _____

FBI(19cv1278)-3801

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
Continuation of FD-302 of (12.06.2018), On 12/06/2018, Page 2 of 12

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
Continuation of FD-302 of (12.06.2018), On 12/06/2018, Page 3 of 12

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
Continuation of FD-302 of (12.06.2018), On 12/06/2018, Page 4 of 12

b6
b7A
b7C

b6
b7A
b7C

b6
b7A
b7C

b6
b7A
b7C

guests per show, but sometimes had only one.

b6
b7A
b7C

"Julian Assange talk about you last night"

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
(12.06.2018)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/06/2018, Page 5 of 12

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted] "Julian Assange has kryptonite on Hillary" [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
(12.06.2018)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/06/2018, Page 6 of 12

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
Continuation of FD-302 of (12.06.2018), On 12/06/2018, Page 7 of 12

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
Continuation of FD-302 of (12.06.2018), On 12/06/2018, Page 8 of 12

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED] October 1, 2016 that said
"big news Wednesday" and ") Hillary's campaign will die this week."

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
Continuation of FD-302 of (12.06.2018), On 12/06/2018, Page 9 of 12

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] "Off the Record Hillary
and her people are doing a full-court press they keep Assange from making
the next dump," [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Credico had not heard that from anyone and did not know why he
wrote it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
Continuation of FD-302 of (12.06.2018), On 12/06/2018, Page 10 of 12

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7E

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
Continuation of FD-302 of (12.06.2018), On 12/06/2018, Page 11 of 12

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) Interview of Randy Credico
Continuation of FD-302 of (12.06.2018) , On 12/06/2018 , Page 12 of 12

b6
b7C


b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7A
b7C

b6
b7C



b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/29/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] social security account number (SSAN) [redacted] was interviewed at 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY, 10278 on 08/29/2018 by Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie Rhee, and FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] was accompanied by his defense counsel [redacted] resides at [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] was advised his participation in the interview was voluntary and he could terminate the interview at any time. [redacted] was further advised that intentionally providing false statements to FBI Agents was a violation of federal law.

b6
b7Cb6
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/29/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/30/2018

by [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 2 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3814

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 3 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3815

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 4 of 14

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3816

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 5 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3817

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 6 of 14

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3818

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 7 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

** The interview was briefly adjourned to allow [REDACTED] and his attorney to speak privately **

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

** The interview was briefly adjourned to allow ASC Zelinsky and SASC Rhee to speak with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

*** [REDACTED] was given a few minutes alone with his defense counsel ***

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3819

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 8 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3820

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 9 of 14

b6
b7Cb6
b7CHPSCI Testimony - September - December 2017

[REDACTED] Stone gave testimony in front of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Stone subsequently told HPSCI Credico was his backchannel to WikiLeaks. [REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7Cb6
b7A
b7Cb6
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3821

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 10 of 14

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3822

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 11 of 14

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3823

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 12 of 14

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

b6
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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3824

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 13 of 14

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3825

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted] 08/29/2018 , On 08/29/2018 , Page 14 of 14

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/20/2018

On September 17 2018, via email, Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky obtained consent from [redacted] for Special Agent [redacted] to speak directly to [redacted] client, [redacted] with the purpose of providing instructive assistance in producing documents for a production to the Special Counsel's office. (A copy of this email is maintained in digital 1A)

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At approximately 7:45 PM EST on September 17 2018, SA [redacted] phoned [redacted] at [redacted]. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and identity of the interviewing agent, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Investigation on 09/17/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone, Email)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/19/2018

by [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic Interview of [Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 09/17/2018, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/29/2018

FEDERAL GRAND JURY INFORMATION

This document contains information pertaining to a federal grand jury proceeding. The information may not be disseminated within or outside the FBI, except as provided for under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3), wherein disclosure may be made to: (1) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's official duties; or (2) any government personnel that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's official duties.

(U) On 09/07/2018 Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and Senior Assistant Special Counsels Andrew Goldstein and Jeannie Rhee interviewed [REDACTED] in preparation for his Federal grand jury testimony. [REDACTED] attorney, [REDACTED] was also present. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing SA and the nature of the interview [REDACTED] provided the following:

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(U) [ASC Zelinsky reviewed [REDACTED] rights and obligations with regards to the Grand Jury.]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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b7CInvestigation on 09/07/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 09/10/2018by [REDACTED]b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/07/2018, Page 2 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/07/2018, Page 3 of 7

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(U)

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b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/07/2018, Page 4 of 7

[REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/07/2018, Page 5 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/07/2018, Page 6 of 7

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(U)

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b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/07/2018, Page 7 of 7

(U)

[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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(U)


[REDACTED]

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(U)

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/29/2018

[redacted] was interviewed at the FBI's New York Field Office, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Andrew Weissmann. [redacted] was present representing [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7Cb6
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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/10/2018 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/16/2018

by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]
08.10.2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 08/10/2018, Page 2 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3837

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of 08.10.2018

, On 08/10/2018 , Page 3 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-3838

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of 08.10.2018

, On 08/10/2018 , Page 4 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3839

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]
08.10.2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 08/10/2018, Page 5 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of 08.10.2018, On 08/10/2018, Page 6 of 6

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FBI(19cv1278)-3841

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/20/2018

Jason Fishbein, date of birth (DOB): [REDACTED] phone number [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] email addresses [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office (SCO), located at 395 E Street, SW, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, Special Agent [REDACTED] and Intelligence Analyst [REDACTED]. Fishbein was accompanied by his attorney [REDACTED]. ASC Zelinsky admonished Fishbein that the interview was voluntary; Fishbein could consult with his attorney at any time; and lying to the FBI is a crime which includes a material false statement and claiming to not remember something. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the purpose of the interview, Fishbein provided the following information:

Discussions regarding Special Counsel's Office contact:

Fishbein provided a list of people he had told about meeting with the SCO:

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Within the last month, [REDACTED] called and Fishbein assumed he must know about meeting with SCO. Fishbein did not recall [REDACTED] saying anything in particular that indicated he knew, but was under the impression that [REDACTED] did know. Fishbein thought [REDACTED] may have known possibly from [REDACTED]. Fishbein told [REDACTED] he was approached by SCO and they were fair. Fishbein mentioned ASC Zelinsky to [REDACTED] and said he felt none of the questions were manipulative. Fishbein does not recall providing any details about the questions asked. Fishbein thought he may have said that [REDACTED] name came up in the previous interview. Fishbein was impressed by [REDACTED] response of "we should answer the questions to the best of our ability." Fishbein did not believe that he told [REDACTED] that Fishbein told SCO about [REDACTED].

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Investigation on 11/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/19/2018

by [REDACTED]

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[redacted]

(U) Interview of Jason Fishbein 11/19
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 11/19/2018 , Page 2 of 5

[redacted] was an old friend of Fishbein who worked for [redacted]
[redacted] Fishbein had been pretty forthright with [redacted]
regarding his contact with SCO, but had not provided much detail. [redacted]
had interesting comments regarding the New York Times article about Roger
Stone and [redacted] having an acrimonious relationship. [redacted]
believed it was staged. [redacted] gave general advice regarding Fishbein's
contact with SCO, suggesting that Fishbein be entirely honest. [redacted]
said he had never spoken to Roger stone.

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Fishbein has had no additional conversations with [redacted] since the
information given during the last interview.

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[redacted] said that [redacted] a friend of Roger Stone, had
contacted him via Facebook and requested a meeting [redacted] Fishbein
asked [redacted] not to mention him, and [redacted] agreed not to.

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Fishbein asked [redacted] about Roger Stone, with whom [redacted]
[redacted] seemed to think it was a mess and wanted no
involvement.

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New York Times Article:

After the New York Times article that included a reference to Fishbein in
an email from Roger Stone to Steve Bannon, Chuck Ross contacted Fishbein
to ask for an interview or comment, to which Fishbein did not reply.
Otherwise Fishbein didn't think people had made the connection. Regarding
the email, Fishbein believed the idea of his being portrayed as Wikileaks's
attorney was ludicrous. Fishbein had never spoken with Roger Stone, but
Fishbein believed several people could have given his name to Stone -

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[redacted] Of those,
Fishbein believed it was most likely [redacted] because he had asked the
others and they all said "no." In addition, Fishbein believed [redacted] and
Stone were identical people who were politically aligned and both had
loose representations of the truth. Fishbein had not discussed the email
with [redacted] but had discussed it with most of the people on the list of
individuals who knew of his contact with SCO. If Fishbein had to guess, he
thought that [redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3889

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jason Fishbein 11/19
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 11/19/2018, Page 3 of 5

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3890

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jason Fishbein 11/19
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 11/19/2018 , Page 4 of 5

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b7C**Contact with Russians:**

Besides [REDACTED] who Fishbein thought may have been [REDACTED] Fishbein could not recall any Russians he had been in contact with regarding the campaign.

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Fishbein did recall that [REDACTED]

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There was no indication that [REDACTED] had any Russian government contacts.

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b7C**Mark Rich Pardon:**

[Agent Note: Fishbein was shown a redacted public document furnished through a FOIA request]

Fishbein did not remember ever seeing the document before or discussing it with anyone. [REDACTED]

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Administrative:

Fishbein and his attorney, [REDACTED] executed a proffer agreement with ASC Zelinsky, which is attached to this communication in a digital 1A. The original copy of the proffer letter will be maintained in a physical 1A.

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FBI(19cv1278)-3891

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jason Fishbein 11/19
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018, On 11/19/2018, Page 5 of 5


Fishbein stated that, through his counsel, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3892



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/27/2018

JASON FISHBEIN, date of birth (DOB): [REDACTED] was interviewed telephonically on his cellular phone number [REDACTED] after agents tried to interview him at his residence at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, FISHBEIN provided the following information:

[REDACTED]

FISHBEIN called the interviewing agent back shortly after and explained he had some time to talk. FISHBEIN said [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

When asked about [REDACTED] FISHBEIN explained

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/16/2018 at [REDACTED] United States (Phone)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/16/2018

by [REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic interview of Jason
Continuation of FD-302 of Fishbein on 08/16/2018, On 08/16/2018, Page 2 of 4

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FISHBEIN has a high regard for [REDACTED] and thought she displayed great integrity in their conversations. FISHBEIN got the impression she had been a confidant of [REDACTED] for many years.

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FBI(19cv1278)-3894

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic interview of Jason
Continuation of FD-302 of Fishbein on 08/16/2018 , On 08/16/2018 , Page 3 of 4

When asked if he ever worked for the DONALD J. TRUMP campaign, FISHBEIN said only as a [redacted] FISHBEIN explained he worked for [redacted] [redacted] and was asked to do research there into [redacted] FISHBEIN assumed the client for this was PAUL MANAFORT. FISHBEIN was part of a research team of [redacted] people who were tasked with researching a [redacted]

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[redacted] FISHBEIN explained this was a large volume of research in a short period of time and they produced approximately [redacted] [redacted] Because this was [redacted] [redacted] FISHBEIN assumed MANAFORT was the client. FISHBEIN [redacted] [redacted]

FISHBEIN also mentioned he knows [redacted] who is basically a friend of friends and is a politically involved nice guy. FISHBEIN said GUCCIFER 2.0 gave [redacted] documents because [redacted] asked for them. [redacted] responded to an online posting GUCCIFER 2.0 made and [redacted] asked for any information GUCCIFER 2.0 had on Florida. GUCCIFER 2.0 sent [redacted] a bunch of info on Florida. [redacted] never discussion how the information was obtained. FISHBEIN thinks he recalls [redacted] mentioning that GUCCIFER 2.0 asked [redacted] to setup a dropbox account. [redacted]

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FISHBEIN has no involvement with ROGER STONE and never met or spoke to STONE. FISHBEIN indicated he did not think very highly of STONE. FISHBEIN explained that FISHBEIN has not been to a Republican event in a long time.

When asked if [redacted]
[redacted] said he never did.

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[redacted]

[Note: After concluding the telephonic interview, the writer reached back out to FISHBEIN with follow up questions and FISHBEIN provided the information below.]

FISHBEIN has known [redacted] for years but they have never met. [redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-3895

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic interview of Jason

Continuation of FD-302 of Fishbein on 08/16/2018

, On 08/16/2018 , Page 4 of 4

[REDACTED]

FISHBEIN does not talk to [REDACTED] regularly. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


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b7A
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[REDACTED] FISHBEIN thought [REDACTED] would have definitely tipped his hat if he had any such information. [REDACTED] likes to feign having knowledge.

FISHBEIN got the impression [REDACTED] did have a relationship with PETER SMITH who was looking for this information. FISHBEIN believed they were coordinating because [REDACTED] and SMITH would say similar things and it seemed coordinated. FISHBEIN described SMITH as the guy who committed suicide.

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FBI(19cv1278)-3896



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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/27/2018

During a telephonic interview on 08/16/2018 of [redacted] date of birth (DOB): [redacted] agreed to meet Special Agent [redacted] the following week on 08/23/2018 at the FBI West Palm Resident Agency.


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In subsequent text message conversations between [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] asked for immunity and was provided a proffer letter. [redacted] later received a call from [redacted] attorney, [redacted] phone number [redacted] who asked to reschedule the meeting for after she had time to meet with [redacted] contact information was provided to Assistant Special Counsel Aaron Zelinsky.

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Attached via 1A are copies of the text messages and proffer letter.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/21/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/26/2018by [redacted]b6
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/03/2018

Cassandra FORD (FORD), date of birth [REDACTED] social security account number [REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED] was interviewed at the United States District Court, 333 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington DC. Special Counsel Attorneys Jeannie S. Rhee and Kyle Freeny were present and assisted with the interview. Attorney [REDACTED] represented FORD and was present during the interview. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing personnel, FORD provided the following information:

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At the initiation of the interview, FORD indicated that she created her Twitter account @Guccifer2 on June 16, 2016. FORD was shown a Twitter account registration information provided by Twitter for account Guccifer2 showing the date of creation as June 9, 2016. FORD stated that she did not create @Guccifer2 on June 9, 2016 and that Twitter was wrong. FORD added she would not have created @Guccifer2 on June 9, 2016, because there was no Guccifer 2.0 persona yet on June 9, 2016.

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FORD created twitter account @Guccifer2 on June 16, 2016, when the topic hashtag #Guccifer2 was trending on Twitter, because of recent revelations by Guccifer2 persona about the hack into the Democratic National Committee (DNC).

Prior to creating her @Guccifer2 twitter account, FORD recalled seeing a tweet from [REDACTED] discussing that no one has claimed and created a twitter account named Guccifer2. After seeing that tweet, FORD decided to create her own @Guccifer2 twitter account.

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On June 16, 2016, FORD understood and read that Guccifer2.0 was involved in hacking into the DNC. In creating her own twitter account @Guccifer2, FORD wanted to see if the account would be censored by Twitter, because of the notoriety of Guccifer2.0.

Investigation on 04/20/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 04/24/2018

by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Cassandra Ford, On 04/20/2018, Page 2 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Cassandra Ford, On 04/20/2018, Page 3 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Cassandra Ford, On 04/20/2018, Page 4 of 6

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FORD used the photo of Felix Dzerzhinsky as her Twitter profile photo. FORD read in the article on Smoking Gun that some of the documents released by Guccifer2.0 persona had the name of Dzerzhinsky in the metadata. FORD read about Dzerzhinsky on internet and thought that he had a "creative background."

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FORD was using a VPN service which allowed her to select the country of origin. FORD selected to make it appear to be coming from Russia.

FORD stated that she had read the night before this interview about ActBlue, because [REDACTED] tweeted about a class action law suit regarding ActBlue.

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FORD chose Volgograd time zone for the Twitter creation time in order to once again to appear to be Russian. [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Cassandra Ford , On 04/20/2018 , Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Cassandra Ford, On 04/20/2018, Page 6 of 6



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/10/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agents [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann. Present during the interview were counsel for [redacted] of Debevoise and Plimpton. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED] was advised that the interview was voluntary and if she chose to answer questions she needed to be honest in her answers as lying to a federal agent could constitute a federal crime. [REDACTED] acknowledged her understanding.

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Background

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Investigation on 05/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File #	Date drafted	05/04/2018
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	by _____
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 2 of 9

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b7CDTI

Debt to income ratio is the ratio of a borrowers income versus their debt. Different types of loans have different DTI thresholds. For example, "co-ops" have a 40% maximum DTI allowance and condominiums have a 45% maximum DTI allowance.

A borrower's income is determined by looking at their W2s, or tax returns if they are self employed. If a borrower is self employed and tax returns have not yet been filed, a profit loss statement (P&L) can be used. P&Ls can be prepared by the borrower. A borrower is expected to provide truthful and complete information on their P&L as Citizens Bank is relying in part on the borrower's representations for their lending decision.

A borrower's debt is determined by liabilities listed on their credit report and liabilities disclosed by the borrower on the loan questionnaire. A borrower is expected to disclose all liabilities on their loan questionnaire as Citizens Bank is relying on the borrower's representations in order to know the full picture of their debt. Some items do not show up on credit reports, such as personal loans, and that is why Citizens Bank requires the borrower to disclose all debt on the loan questionnaire.

For all properties owned by the borrower, they must submit mortgage statements, tax bills and homeowners insurance documents. The borrower's mortgage payment, plus their tax payment and insurance premium amount are all included in the borrower's debt calculation.

LTV

Loan to value is the ratio of the amount of the loan to value of the property. Different loan types have different LTV thresholds. Some loan programs require a borrower to maintain a certain LTV, or else they pay a higher interest rate and are required to maintain mortgage insurance.

In general, the most favorable loan type for a borrower is an owner occupied loan. [REDACTED] is not sure why this is the case.

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b7CManafort

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 05/03/2018, Page 3 of 9

[redacted] communicated with Manafort via email. [redacted] also communicated with Rick Gates, who [redacted] believed was Manafort's assistant, via email and phone. Manafort told [redacted] to reach out to Gates if she needed anything for the loan. Gates was authorized to speak to [redacted] on Manafort's behalf. [redacted] tried to copy Manafort on all communications with Gates.

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[redacted] or any accountants who worked for Manafort.

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Document 1 - Email [redacted]

[redacted] was shown an email thread between [redacted]

[redacted] dated [redacted]

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[redacted] was directed to [redacted] email which read as follows: [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] explained that borrowers are required to provide business tax returns for all businesses in which they have a 25% or more ownership interest. In addition, borrowers are required to provide K1s for all businesses, even if they own less than 25%.

Generally, loan officers do a "quick calculation" of the borrowers DTI before sending to the underwriter.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 05/03/2018, Page 4 of 9

The 1003 requires borrowers to disclose all debt. Even if the borrower had debt overseas, they would be expected to disclose it as part of their debt. If a borrower had assets overseas, such as bank accounts, they would not be required to disclose them unless they wanted to use those assets for qualification purposes. In order to use overseas assets for qualification purposes the assets would have to be transferred to the US.

Prior to sending a loan to underwriting, an initial 1003 is prepared and sent to Citizens Bank's Quality Control Department for auditing. The Quality Control Department ensures the information is correct according to the information obtained thus far. [REDACTED] has a 100% success rating, meaning 100% of [REDACTED] 1003s which have gone through the quality control process have been accurate.

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After the quality control process, the 1003 goes to loan processing and then underwriting. Underwriters are randomly assigned to loans by the Operations Department.

Document 3 - Email [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown an email thread between [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] dated [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] stated an owner occupied property cannot be rented, whereas a second home can be rented for up to six months only. [REDACTED] did not know why the bank had this threshold on how long a second home could be rented. [REDACTED] recently learned this threshold and did not believe she knew this guideline during [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the 29 Howard St. property and discovered it was for rent on a website called StreetEasy.com. [REDACTED]

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Document 6 - Email [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown an email from Manafort to [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] with the subject line, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated Citizens Bank required borrowers to provide a letter of explanation as to how they intended to use the proceeds of a cash out refinance. [REDACTED] did not know why this was required and was not aware of any prohibited uses. If a borrower were using the proceeds as a down

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 05/03/2018, Page 5 of 9

payment on another property and thereby acquiring additional debt, that additional debt would need to be factored into their DTI calculation.

Document 7 - Email [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown an email chain between [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and Manafort dated [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not have any recollection of communicating with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] during the loan process.

[REDACTED] explained if a business [REDACTED] underwriting
would reach out to the loan officer with the issue. From reading this
email, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was not sure what questions underwriting asked about the loan,
or its forgiveness. [REDACTED]

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b7C

Document 9 - Email [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown an email thread between Manafort, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] which had a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] attached. [REDACTED] reviewed the attached document and stated she
did not recognize it, but assumed [REDACTED]

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This particular loan had a lot of paperwork [REDACTED]

Document 12 - Email [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 05/03/2018, Page 6 of 9

[REDACTED] was shown an email from Manafort dated [REDACTED] which responded to an email from [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED]

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C

Document 17 - Email [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown an email from Gates to [REDACTED] and Manafort dated [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was directed to a portion of Gates' email which read, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated she understood Gates to be responding to her email from [REDACTED] in which [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was directed to a portion of the attachments to Gates email, specifically, [REDACTED]

On this document, [REDACTED]

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Document 18 - Email [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] to Gates and Manafort dated [REDACTED] which read as follows: [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 05/03/2018, Page 7 of 9

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[REDACTED] stated that it was not uncommon for insurance documents to include mortgages that were paid off. [REDACTED] has seen before when a borrower paid off their mortgage, but did not notify the insurance company or the insurance company did not remove the mortgage after it was paid off.

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[REDACTED] Gates after this email. [REDACTED] did not recall the exact conversation, but recalled in substance that Gates told [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was not concerned about this because she had seen this happen a number of times before.

Document 19 - Email [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Attached to the email was a document on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which read as follows: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was the insurance agent for Manafort's properties and [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] to resolve the issue of whether [REDACTED] Based upon the time stamp, [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED]

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b7C

Document 21 - Email [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown an email thread between [REDACTED] Manafort and Gates dated [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was directed to Manafort's email which read as follows: [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 05/03/2018, Page 8 of 9

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[redacted] recalled learning that the [redacted]

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Document 23 - Email [redacted]

[redacted] was shown an email from Gates to [redacted] and Manafort dated [redacted] which read as follows: [redacted]

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Attached to the email were [redacted]

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Based upon this information, [redacted]

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At the time of receiving this email and attachments, [redacted]

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Document 23A - Email [redacted]

[redacted] was shown an email from [redacted] dated [redacted] which read as follows: [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 05/03/2018, Page 9 of 9

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] stated [redacted] was confirming what Gates said in the previous email. [redacted]

[redacted]

Other

[redacted]

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b7C

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b7C

[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]


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[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/01/2017

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] cell telephone [redacted]
[redacted] address [redacted] was
interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. Also present
were [redacted] attorneys, [redacted]
from [redacted]
[redacted] Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie
S. Rhee; and Assistant Special Counsel L. Rush Atkinson. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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When she was [redacted] had almost no interaction
with the TRUMP ORGANIZATION. She has never had any one-on-one interaction
with DONALD TRUMP. She is very cordial with RHONA GRAFF but their
relationship is not personal. [redacted]
2011 with [redacted] and met ERIC TRUMP who was attending with [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] DONALD TRUMP. She
[redacted] recalled an episode at the
after party when the pageant was held at the Shrine in Los Angeles,
California. [redacted] where the party was
held. He told [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] has had no interaction with MICHAEL COHEN. She saw him at [redacted]
[redacted] but did not speak with him. COHEN and TRUMP were the only
representatives from the TRUMP ORGANIZATION at the meeting. [redacted] told
[redacted] of a time when [redacted] overheard COHEN talking to [redacted] and
[redacted]

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Investigation on 10/12/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/12/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 10/12/2017, Page 2 of 4

Prior to the pageant, TRUMP would have all of the contestants line up on stage and then he would ask them questions about each other. The venue was cleared for this except for a select few but it was recorded. [REDACTED]

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The selection of the venue for the Miss Universe Pageant ("the Pageant") [REDACTED] would cultivate relationships to find the sites and [REDACTED] would determine if the venue would work, was available, etc. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] when and where she was supposed to go for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [LAST NAME UNKNOWN (LNU)] and [FIRST NAME UNKNOWN] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] first met ROBERT GOLDSTONE in [REDACTED]

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GOLDSTONE has a public relations firm, OUI2, in New Jersey. [REDACTED] has no knowledge of his contacts in Russia. [REDACTED]

GOLDSTONE was involved with the negotiations of the contract between the AGALAROVs and [REDACTED] interacted with GOLDSTONE about the contract as did many others in [REDACTED]

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TRUMP was involved with the Pageant beginning in June 2013. TRUMP, EMIN AGALAROV, and ARAS AGALAROV were all at the Miss USA competition at Planet Hollywood in Las Vegas, Nevada. They did the announcement and contract signing on the stage. [REDACTED]

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While in Moscow for the Pageant, [REDACTED] LNU told MUO that they had to vacate the venue and their offices on October 30 - 31, 2013 because PUTIN wanted to hold a meeting at the venue with his ministers. [REDACTED] believed

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 10/12/2017, Page 3 of 4

only Russian government personnel were at the meeting. No one was allowed in the venue on October 31, 2013.

TRUMP arrived in Moscow late the day before the Pageant. [REDACTED]

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Since the Pageant, [REDACTED] has only seen [REDACTED] when he [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] There was no discussion about Russia. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of the June 2016 meeting with TRUMP, JR. until the news broke in 2017.

At some point later on the day of [REDACTED] said "They've hacked into HILLARY's [CLINTON] emails." [REDACTED] knew she was referring to the Russian but thought [REDACTED] meant CLINTON's 31,000 missing emails because it was in the news everyday. [REDACTED] recalled TRUMP asking the Russians to hack and find CLINTON's missing emails. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Up to that point, no one had mentioned the AGALAROVs and how they were close to PUTIN. ARAS AGALAROV was an oligarch and must have been connected to the government to be so successful. Additionally,

[REDACTED] could not recall the last time she had contact with GOLDSTONE.

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[REDACTED] was shown two emails and she provided the following information:


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FBI(19cv1278)-4057

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 10/12/2017, Page 4 of 4

- Email 1 dated [REDACTED] regarding a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had no recollection of the exchange but advised they were joking and being sarcastic. It was her understanding that a TRUMP - PUTIN meeting never occurred but that TRUMP wanted to meet PUTIN.
- Email 2 dated [REDACTED] regarding a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had no recollection of this email but advised they were probably just being silly. She stated [REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED] She did not think he worked for him anymore.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/14/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[redacted] previously identified, was interviewed pursuant to a Proffer Agreement dated August 31, 2017 by FBI Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann, and Assistant Special Counsel Prosecutor Brian Richardson. Present during the interview with [redacted] were her defense counsel, [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7CFARA or LDA

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 08/31/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/08/2017by [redacted]b6
b7A
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up Proffer , On 08/31/2017 , Page 2 of 11

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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By the time the [redacted] came around, [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up Proffer , On 08/31/2017 , Page 3 of 11

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] could not recall

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specifically from whom she heard this.

The LDA

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up Proffer , On 08/31/2017 , Page 4 of 11

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up Proffer [redacted], On 08/31/2017, Page 5 of 11

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] was the person who told [redacted] the report was coming out. [redacted] had received a call from [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Follow Up Proffer , On 08/31/2017 , Page 6 of 11

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Follow Up Proffer [redacted], On 08/31/2017, Page 7 of 11

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Other

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Follow Up Proffer , On 08/31/2017 , Page 8 of 11

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[REDACTED] regarding their requirement to file FARA or LDA. [REDACTED] assumed Gates and Manafort were political consultants and were not required to file. [REDACTED] does not recall having a discussion about this with anyone else. [REDACTED] believed it was Gates and Manafort's obligation to know whether or not they needed to file.

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[REDACTED] recalled a time when [REDACTED] which Gates deemed to be not helpful. [REDACTED] got mad at Gates when he tried to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not think she had any direct contact with Gates.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Follow Up Proffer [REDACTED], On 08/31/2017, Page 9 of 11

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not know why Gates reached out to [REDACTED] and did not know if [REDACTED] responded.

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[REDACTED] has not had contact with Paul Manafort since she saw him a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not recall ever speaking with Manafort directly during that time. [REDACTED] has not had contact with Manafort since.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Follow Up Proffer [REDACTED], On 08/31/2017, Page 10 of 11

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In general, a client may be opposed to filing FARA because of the transparency of their lobbying activities. Also, they may not want to

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Follow Up Proffer, On 08/31/2017, Page 11 of 11

public to know that various op-ed's sponsored and drafted by the entity are actually associated with the government.

[REDACTED]
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
Due Diligence

[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/08/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On Monday, July 31, 2017, [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] Present
for the interview were Senior Financial Investigator (SFI) [redacted]
[redacted] Office of the Special Counsel, and Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation - Office of the Inspector
General. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing SFI and
Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] furnished the following
information:

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The Manafortts have been a client of [redacted] since approximately
[redacted] Work performed for the Manafortts [redacted]

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Besides a nominal annual charge to [redacted]
[redacted] has not done much work for the Manafortts
since approximately [redacted] According to [redacted]

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The following documents were subsequently furnished by [redacted]

b6
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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on 07/31/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/07/2017

by [redacted]

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
UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [redacted] - July 31, 2017, On 07/31/2017, Page 2 of 2b6
b7C
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[redacted] said he started [redacted] approximately [redacted] years ago and the company was wholly-owned by himself until [redacted] were brought in as partners /owners. The Manafort's have never been investors in [redacted]

A copy of the documents furnished by [redacted] have been attached for the file, with the original documents enclosed in an FD-340 (1a envelope).

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4071



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/30/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security
account number [redacted] residence [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed telephonically by FBI Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Special Counsel
Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview was [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the
interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the
following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 12/06/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/18/2017by [redacted]b6
b7Cb6
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b7Cb6
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[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted], On 12/06/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/18/2019

On 10/25/2018, SA [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED], Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann, and attorneys from the US DOJ Public Integrity Section, James Mann, Nicole Lockart, [REDACTED] and Ryan Ellersick at the offices of GATES' counsel. Additionally, SA [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] were present telephonically. GATES was represented by his counsel Tom Greene. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, GATES provided the following information:

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b7C

[REDACTED]

GATES believed [REDACTED]

b6
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[REDACTED]

GATES met [REDACTED]

Inauguration

GATES had nothing to do with congressional events.

The Presidential Inauguration Committee (PIC) used donors, not underwriters, to sponsor events. Chevron, Microsoft, and others donated.

b6
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/25/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/16/2018

by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/25
/2018 PIN

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/25/2018, Page 2 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4075

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/25
/2018 PIN

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/25/2018, Page 3 of 6

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4076

[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/25
/2018 PIN

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/25/2018, Page 4 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4077

[Redacted]
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/25
/2018 PIN

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/25/2018, Page 5 of 6

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Other Work for [Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4078

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICK GATES 10/25

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2018 PIN

, On 10/25/2018 , Page 6 of 6

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b7C

[REDACTED]

GATES did not know anything related to [REDACTED] possible interactions with VTB Bank.

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[REDACTED] had a call with ERIK PRINCE about possible relationships. [REDACTED] said that he had known PRINCE for a long time. PRINCE wanted to have a TRUMP event at his farm, but GATES did not want to do it.

Miscellaneousb6
b7A
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[REDACTED]


GATES' lobbying firm, Konik Madison had looked at potential international clients and had hired an attorney to look at FARA. [NFI]

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[REDACTED] never asked GATES about his cooperation after the media announced that GATES was cooperating.

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FBI(19cv1278)-4079

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/14/2018

On 10/25/2018, SA [REDACTED] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann interviewed RICHARD GATES III at the offices of GATES' counsel. GATES' counsel, Tom Greene was present for the interview. GATES provided the following information:

b6
b7CDCI Group

GATES met some people from DCI Group while he was at G-Tech. [REDACTED] left G-TECH to work for DCI Group. DCI Group did grass roots work on the George Bush campaign.

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[REDACTED] were all associated with DCI Group.

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In 2016 and 2017, there had been discussion of PAUL MANAFORT being hired at DCI group because the firm did not have anyone working their who could cover Donald Trump. A lot of the people at DCI Group were loyal to MANAFORT.

In 2017, [REDACTED] told GATES that the interview of [REDACTED] was an issue for CHUCK GRASSLEY. [REDACTED] was GRASSLEY's guy. In the final conclusion, however, [REDACTED] nomination did not move forward because DIANE FEINSTEIN and GRASSLEY had made a deal.

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[REDACTED] to ROGER STONE.

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b7CUkraineb6
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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/25/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/06/2018

by [REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of on 10/25/2018 SCO

, On 10/25/2018 , Page 2 of 3

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Russia

The Republican position around the time of the election was that Russia's annexation of Crimea was bad. The Trump campaign did not have a position. The campaign employees believed Donald Trump's statement on Crimea would not have any effect.

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b7CMANAFORT's Work for Other Countriesb6
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b7Cb6
b7CMANAFORT Legal Feesb6
b7A
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4081

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of RICHARD GATES III

Continuation of FD-302 of on 10/25/2018 SCO

, On 10/25/2018 , Page 3 of 3

There had been a discussion of a joint legal defense fund, but that never happened.

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Miscellaneous

GATES had encountered [REDACTED] at some point in time. [REDACTED] was a business related to MANAFORT'S and [REDACTED]. The business had experienced legal issues between 2014 and 2015. GATES had no knowledge of [REDACTED]-related work in 2017.

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In late 2017, [REDACTED]

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MANAFORT and GATES understood [REDACTED]

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At one point in time, JARED KUSHNER had asked GATES to meet [REDACTED] (NFI).

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
EX 1

GATES' text message about a "WH war room" was a reference to STEVE BANNON's idea to handle several Public Relations crises by creating a strategic nerve-center to address them. This was after the Special Counsel's Office had been announced.

The recipients of the message were intended to be an advisory committee to handle MANAFORT's Public Relations hits and would have been separate from any efforts in the White House.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4082

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/07/2018

Richard William Gates III was interviewed by Assistant Special Agent in Charge [redacted] and Senior Special Counsel Attorneys Andrew Weissmann and Greg Andres. Gates' attorney, Tom Green of Sidley Austin LLP, was present. After being advised of the identity of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Gates provided the following information:

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b7C

[redacted]
Gates stated that [redacted] According to Gates, [redacted] [redacted] asked Gates to put him in touch with [redacted] [redacted] Gates had previously retained [redacted] following a recommendation from [redacted] Gates stated that [redacted]

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Gates stated that [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 04/11/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/28/2018by [redacted]b6
b7C
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of Richard William

Continuation of FD-302 of Gates III

, On 04/11/2018 , Page 2 of 2

Contacts:

Gates stated that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Prior to the indictments against Manafort and Gates, Manafort assembled a team of contacts to manage his message and "re-focus the narrative."

Included in this group were


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4084

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/26/2018

Richard William Gates III was interviewed by Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Senior Assistant Special Counsel (SASC) Greg Andres. Gates' attorney, Thomas Green of Sidley Austin LLP, was present. After being advised of the identity of the interviewees and the nature of the interview, Gates provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 04/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 04/18/2018

by [redacted]

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates Interview 04/18/2018 , On 04/18/2018 , Page 2 of 3

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4086

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates Interview 04/18/2018 , On 04/18/2018 , Page 3 of 3

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Administrative Note: There was a break from approximately 1:15pm to 1:45pm.

[REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

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Administrative Note: From approximately 2pm to 2:30pm SASC Andres went over general trial preparation background questions with Gates.

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FBI(19cv1278)-4087



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/04/2018

Richard William Gates III was interviewed by FBI Supervisory Special Agent [REDACTED] Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] and Senior Special Counsel Attorney Greg Andres. After being advised of the official identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, Gates provided the following information:

b6
b7CMichael Cohen

Michael Cohen did not have a formal role at the Republican National Convention (RNC) but made requests for a lot of tickets.

Cohen wanted Corey Lewandowski fired from the campaign. Cohen told Paul Manafort that he supported Lewandowski being fired.

Gates did not have any information regarding [REDACTED] and only heard about her in the news.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Investigation on 04/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 04/24/2018

by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Richard Gates


, On 04/18/2018 , Page 2 of 2

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b7CObama's Call to Yanukovych

In 2010, President Obama called Viktor Yanukovych to congratulate him on his 2010 presidential election victory. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Manafort spoke [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] as well. Manafort believed that if President Obama did this, it would legitimize the election results. Manafort strategy [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/01/2017

[redacted] DOB: [redacted] was interviewed at Paul Café located at 801 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC by ASAC [redacted] and SIA [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

b6
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[redacted] was home with his mother and brother when Donald J. Trump announced he was running for President of the United States. [redacted] mother shrieked when the news was announced. [redacted] immediately thought Trump would win the election, based on his announcement message.

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[redacted]

[redacted] sent an e-mail to the Trump campaign setting out his biography and expressed his interest in helping the campaign. [redacted]

[redacted]

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At the time [redacted] started working on the campaign, Corey Lewandowski was the principal boss of the operation. Lewandowski was assisted by an individual named Mike Glassner (ph). [redacted] stated that he did not interact with Lewandowski directly that often. Eventually, Lewandowski brought [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Investigation on 08/29/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/29/2017

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] on 8/29/2017

, On 08/29/2017 , Page 2 of 5

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Around the time of the primary elections Lewandowski left the campaign team and was replaced by Paul Manafort. The campaign team, under Manafort's leadership, moved to the remodeled 14th floor (this was actually the 6th floor) of Trump Tower. Manafort brought his own assistants onto the campaign, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Kelly Ann Conway [REDACTED] described a "revolving door" on the campaign team. People in the campaign started realizing [REDACTED] could get stuff done. At one point, Conway texted [REDACTED] At the time [REDACTED] didn't realize Conway was going to be the campaign manager. After Trump won the election it was not clear what Conway's role would be.

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During the transition period following the general election,

[REDACTED] General Michael Flynn.

[REDACTED] Flynn, upon being named designee for National Security Advisor, [REDACTED]

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The Presidential transition team was initially based at Trump Tower prior to relocating to Washington, D.C. Rick Dearborn was overall head of the transition team. Dearborn worked in conjunction with the transition team's executive board which included Flynn, Mike Pence, Jeff Sessions,

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FBI(19cv1278)-4091

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] on 8/29/2017, On 08/29/2017, Page 3 of 5

and possibly others. The transition team's Executive Board either met in person or had a conference call each morning to discuss the upcoming day.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] had with Flynn, he (Flynn) never mentioned taking direction on transition from anyone outside this executive board.

[REDACTED] was not involved in the process of how general policy direction was conveyed to or established for the transition team.

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[REDACTED] claimed to have no knowledge of how orders or directions were conveyed, though he stated that Reince Priebus "sort of" oversaw the daily agenda for the executive board.

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[REDACTED] stated that he had no information regarding the reported 11/30/2016 meeting at the Trump Tower involving Russian Ambassador Kislyak.

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By December 2016, [REDACTED] stated that the principal issues facing the transition team involved finding positions for people within the administration. He believed that current events drove transition team priorities, but insisted he was privy to none of these policy discussions.

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FBI(19cv1278)-4092

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] on 8/29/2017

, On 08/29/2017 , Page 4 of 5

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[REDACTED] However, he never attended any of the meetings, was never at the White House, and never heard anyone making a decision.

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Upon being asked the circumstances surrounding the December 2016 UN Security Council vote to condemn Israel, [REDACTED] indicated this was a tough question as he couldn't recall any discussions about this topic.

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[REDACTED] stated he was not included on any e-mails, phone calls, or meetings regarding this topic. [REDACTED]

Flynn went on vacation to the Dominican Republic in December 2016. McFarland assumed his role during that time. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Flynn took his own notes on 3x5 cards.

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[REDACTED] stated that his role had greatly diminished by this point and had solely learned of it from the news.

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[REDACTED] does not know anything about the meeting between Flynn and Russian Ambassador Kislyak. [REDACTED] stressed that he knows nothing about "the Russians." [REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4093

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] on 8/29/2017, On 08/29/2017, Page 5 of 5

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] described Flynn as "pretty self-sufficient." [Redacted]
[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Date of entry 11/16/2017

Jeffrey A. Getzel was approached at the offices of Getzel, Schiff & Pesce (GS&P), 100 Crossways Park West, Suite 403, Woodbury, NY 11797, telephone number [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the voluntary nature of the interview, Getzel provided the following information:

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Getzel stated that he wants to be cooperative and submit to an interview; however, for insurance purposes, he wanted to contact his attorney. Subsequently, the writer, Getzel and [REDACTED] met with attorney [REDACTED] cellular telephone number [REDACTED].

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 10/11/2017 at Woodbury, New York, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 10/19/2017by [REDACTED]b3
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/21/2017

JEFFREY A. GETZEL, Managing Partner at GETZEL SCHIFF & PESCE, LLP, was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Assistant Special Counsel Rush Atkinson, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Jeannie Rhee at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546. GETZEL was accompanied by his attorneys [REDACTED] [REDACTED] from [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, GETZEL provided the following information:

After becoming a CPA, GETZEL setup his own practice in Woodbury, New York, called GETZEL SCHIFF & PESCE, LLP (GSP).

GSP had five equity partners and two non-equity partners. In total, GSP employed approximately 19 individuals, with approximately eight of them being CPAs. [REDACTED] worked at GSP.

GSP's primary focus for its clients was income taxes. GSP provided some audit and litigation support as well. GSP had hundreds of clients, approximately 40 which GSP provided multiple services, such as income taxes and audit support. GSP's largest client had approximately \$150 million in revenues. GSP's main source of clients were in the real estate, taxi, and food and beverage industries. GSP partners shared clients.

MICHAEL COHEN was not a very significant client to GSP.

With respect to the taxi industry, GSP had four or five principal clients, [REDACTED] and COHEN. [REDACTED] used to be a GSP client.

Investigation on 11/02/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # Date drafted 11/06/2017

by SA

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel , On 11/02/2017 , Page 2 of 18

GETZEL managed GSP's client relationship with COHEN. COHEN was recommended to GETZEL by [REDACTED] Around the end of 2013, [REDACTED] told GETZEL to call COHEN. GETZEL met COHEN at COHEN's office at TRUMP TOWER in New York City. During the meeting, COHEN showed GETZEL his (COHEN's) tax return. COHEN told GETZEL that his accountant was starting to lose it a little, so COHEN was looking for a new accounting firm. GETZEL noted that COHEN's former accountant may have been ill.

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Other employees from GSP that had interactions with COHEN were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] worked on [REDACTED] and may have helped GETZEL with COHEN's annual tax returns. [REDACTED] was responsible for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was responsible for [REDACTED]

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GETZEL had in-person meetings with COHEN approximately two to three times per year. These meetings were typically regarding a substantive discussion regarding COHEN's taxes. GETZEL had more frequent telephone and email contact with COHEN. GETZEL did not recall text messaging with COHEN.

GETZEL recalled seeing COHEN in person in or about May 2017. COHEN had set up two new entities, MICHAEL D. COHEN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. (MDCPC) and ESSENTIAL CONSULTANTS, LLC. GETZEL met with COHEN to understand what his income might be from those entities. GETZEL met COHEN at his office, which was a law firm at ROCKEFELLER PLAZA.

GETZEL maintained COHEN's full portfolio of businesses from the beginning of his client relationship with COHEN. COHEN's businesses resulted in income from TRUMP ORGANIZATION, income from four or five real estate entities, and income from taxi medallion entities. Beginning in 2017, COHEN's business lines expanded with the organization of MDCPC and ESSENTIAL CONSULTANTS. GETZEL was not aware of COHEN having any foreign businesses.

COHEN referred [REDACTED] to GSP as a client, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] However, GSP did not retain [REDACTED] as a client. [REDACTED] as well as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were not clients of GSP, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] BO AND ABE REALTY LLC (BO AND ABE), which was a GSP client by way of COHEN. COHEN was a 50 percent partner in BO AND ABE.

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At the end of each year, COHEN sent GETZEL a binder of bank statements, credit card statements, car payments, etc. in order for GETZEL to prepare COHEN's tax return.

Recently, COHEN asked GETZEL to acquire a form from the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (TREASURY) that COHEN needed to file due to receiving monies from a foreign country. GETZEL acquired the form and filed it with TREASURY.

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When COHEN earned income through the BO AND ABE transaction, COHEN complained about the amount of taxes he had to pay. COHEN resented paying taxes more than most people GETZEL dealt with. In reference to the amount of taxes COHEN had to pay on the BO AND ABE transaction, COHEN told GETZEL something to the effect of, "I have lots of friends that make a lot more money that don't pay taxes." At the time, GETZEL recalled doing a comparison of COHEN's prior year taxes, noted that COHEN was very tax efficient, and that he should not be complaining.

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COHEN did not believe in paying quarterly estimated taxes. Even though it was required for COHEN, COHEN opted to not pay quarterly estimated taxes and just pay the penalties at the end of the year.

GETZEL noted that he would probably contact COHEN in 2018 regarding payroll for ESSENTIAL CONSULTANTS.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 6 of 18

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 7 of 18

COHEN may have gotten involved in the taxi medallion business through

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GSP did not have any clients in which [REDACTED] was a principal.

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GETZEL had never heard the name [REDACTED]

In or about 2008, GETZEL was introduced to the taxi medallion industry by [REDACTED] a banker for [REDACTED] which eventually became CAPITAL ONE. [REDACTED] had since left CAPITAL ONE, [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 8 of 18

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The [REDACTED] was a relatively small client for GSP, but GETZEL noted that they were a really nice [REDACTED]

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COHEN was a difficult client to deal with. COHEN did not pay his bills in a timely manner. However, COHEN had a significant position in the TRUMP ORGANIZATION, so in that regard, GETZEL respected COHEN. Additionally,

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 9 of 18

clients were not all that easy to obtain. COHEN also brought GSP [REDACTED] [REDACTED] which were great clients.

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GETZEL could not think of any red flags with respect to COHEN. There was nothing that gave GETZEL concern when dealing with COHEN as a client. However, GETZEL had not been representing COHEN for that long and did not have a lot of interactions with him.

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GETZEL noted that there was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In August 2014, COHEN's taxi medallion debt was pretty conservative. Banks were aggressive in loaning money to individuals with taxi medallions as collateral. In 2015, ride-sharing companies were introduced, such as UBER, which caused the value of taxi medallions to significantly decline. At the same time, COHEN [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] managed and operated COHEN's New York City taxi medallions. [REDACTED] made lease payments to COHEN, but [REDACTED] failed to pay the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) tax for operating the medallions, so COHEN received notifications from the MTA.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 10 of 18

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Since 2015, everyone in the taxi medallion industry has been struggling to determine the values of taxi medallions. There was virtually no market for taxi medallions. GETZEL did not have detailed conversations with COHEN about the value of his taxi medallions, but GETZEL generally discussed the topic with COHEN when preparing his May 2017 PFS. At the time GETZEL was preparing the May 2017 PFS, taxi fleet operators were ranging the value of taxi medallions somewhere between \$250,000 and \$600,000. Later in 2017, there was an auction in which a hedge fund purchased 40 something New York City taxi medallions, which GETZEL later used to determine market value.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 12 of 18

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When GETZEL first met COHEN, GETZEL advised COHEN about how to treat the shareholder loans from the taxi medallion entities to avoid the IRS treating the loans as distributions. Because COHEN was the owner of the taxi medallion entities, GETZEL told COHEN that the entities should be self-charging interest. GETZEL noted that it was just a paper transaction, with the liability to the medallion entity increasing by the amount of interest and the self-charged interest being reported as income to COHEN. However, GETZEL would have preferred COHEN actually pay the interest owed to the entities.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 13 of 18

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During a fairly recent conversation, within the last month to month and a half, [REDACTED] told GETZEL that COHEN was going to the White House and that COHEN needed to liquidate his assets. During a recent telephone conversation with [REDACTED] GETZEL was told that COHEN was looking to exit his position in the [REDACTED] property and wanted [REDACTED] for his share. COHEN's share in the property was approximately [REDACTED] percent and the most recent appraisal was around [REDACTED] for the property. GETZEL noted that the [REDACTED] property was subject to Tenants In Common (TIC) interests. TIC interests had a joint ownership agreement that allowed one member to force the sale of the property, regardless of ownership interest. [REDACTED] was insistent on the TIC interests provision because she was worried she might not get along with COHEN as a co-investor.

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ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attorney [REDACTED] were not present for the remainder of the interview.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 14 of 18

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Typically, TIC interests caused an individual's share in a partnership to be discounted by approximately 30 to 35 percent. The reasons were due to several factors: 1) a minority shareholder caused a discount for lack of marketability; 2) brokerage fees to sell a property discounted an individual's share in the partnership; and 3) an individual was subject to a partnership agreement, so he/she could not just go out and list a property for sale.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 15 of 18

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel , On 11/02/2017 , Page 16 of 18

Based on GETZEL's understanding of MDCPC, GETZEL believed the company did not have any real value. MDCPC had one client, the POTUS, who had a propensity for firing people. As such, MDCPC was not really a company COHEN could sell to anyone.

If GETZEL had more information about ESSENTIAL CONSULTANTS, he may have pushed harder to encourage COHEN to include his interest in the company on his PFS. If GETZEL knew ESSENTIAL CONSULTANTS had value and COHEN opted to not include it on his PFS, it may have caused GETZEL to walk away from the engagement. COHEN's PFS would have been misleading and would have caused GETZEL to be very concerned.

[REDACTED]

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As a result of [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] became GSP clients. The [REDACTED] were not happy with their accountant at the time and were concerned that their accountant would not be able to report [REDACTED] properly.

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COHEN received approximately [REDACTED] in commissions on the sale of [REDACTED] properties. At some point, COHEN talked [REDACTED] into a real estate consulting agreement. GETZEL believed COHEN had something to do with bringing buyers to the table for the [REDACTED] properties. GETZEL did not know who the buyers of the [REDACTED] properties were. GETZEL did not know how long [REDACTED] had been looking for buyers [REDACTED] was a real estate and estate attorney. GETZEL did not know how COHEN knew [REDACTED] but guessed it was through [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 17 of 18

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[redacted] practiced as a lawyer in New York. GETZEL did not know how COHEN and [redacted] knew each other. Regarding the [redacted] [redacted] charged significant fees to [redacted] but GETZEL did not know what the fees related to. [redacted] were represented by [redacted] throughout the transaction. GETZEL saw bills from [redacted]

BO AND ABE was a partnership between COHEN, [redacted] [redacted] COHEN was a 50 percent partner and the balance of the 50 percent was split between [redacted] BO AND ABE purchased an apartment in a TRUMP building in New York City when it was under

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jeffrey Getzel, On 11/02/2017, Page 18 of 18

construction. The purchase contract was flipped to a third party when the property was no longer under construction. As part of the transaction, COHEN loaned the buyer of the contract [REDACTED] in order to close the deal. The buyer signed a note with COHEN that included a significant interest rate. The buyer paid interest to COHEN monthly and subsequently paid off the note approximately 12 to 15 months later. While GETZEL did not recall seeing anything nefarious about the transaction, GETZEL noted it was odd to have a note payable from the seller to the buyer. GETZEL would think it was even stranger if the note to the buyer was uncollateralized, but GETZEL did not know if it was. COHEN made a substantial profit for flipping the BO AND ABE contract.

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GETZEL did not know anything about the buyer of the BO AND ABE contract. GETZEL was not involved in the transaction. GETZEL learned about the transaction and the note from COHEN to the buyer when GETZEL prepared COHEN's annual tax return. GETZEL did not recall any tax issues as a result of the transaction. However, the transaction caused significant taxable income to COHEN. COHEN was not pleased. It was in this context that COHEN said something to the effect of, "I have lots of friends that make a lot more money that don't pay taxes," as GETZEL previously noted.

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[REDACTED]

When GETZEL calculated COHEN's disbursement as a result of flipping the BO AND ABE contract, GETZEL calculated the amount differently than what COHEN had actually received. COHEN took more money than he was entitled to per the agreement with [REDACTED]. There may have been a side deal with [REDACTED] that GETZEL was unaware of. GETZEL reflected the amount COHEN actually received on COHEN's tax return, rather than the amount GETZEL calculated.

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COHEN was an extremely sharp individual. It would be hard for GETZEL to believe that COHEN did not understand certain concepts he discussed with COHEN, such as depreciation on an investment property. At COHEN's office in TRUMP ORGANIZATION, COHEN had a statue of himself with the words "Trump's pitbull" on it.

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: [REDACTED] are included in the attached 1A envelope.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/17/2017

On September 11, 2017, [REDACTED] social security number [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] home address [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Council located at 395 E Street, SW, Washington DC. In addition to the writer and SA [REDACTED] Senior Assistant Special Council Andrew Weissman (DOJ), Assistant Special Council Kyle Freeny (DOJ), and Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] (FBI) were part of the interview. Representing [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was advised to tell the truth, and lying to an FBI agent was a crime. [redacted] was also advised the interview was voluntary, and she could leave at any time. [redacted] could also take a break at any time, and confer with her attorneys if she felt the need.

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employed by First Republic Bank (FRB).

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FRB offers banking services of a traditional bank, but does not have tellers. The personal bankers sit at desks and welcome new clients and service existing clients. For clients in preferred banking, the client service team performs their banking transactions. The [redacted] client service team has approximately [redacted] people, headed by [redacted]. [redacted] has been with FRB for approximately [redacted].

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After approximately [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] a department in which FRB clients had a high net worth. As an
employee [REDACTED] spends more time going out to meet
busy clients. It was in this department [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Manafort was referred by [REDACTED] who was

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Investigation on 09/11/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 09/11/2017
by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/11/2017, Page 2 of 10

[REDACTED] referred by Rick Davis (Davis). [REDACTED] for FRB. [REDACTED] could not recall the conversation of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had periodic email contact with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A relationship manager is similar to a loan officer, and Manafort did not have a relationship manager until he obtained a loan from FRB. [REDACTED] Only when a client applied for a loan would their debt/income analysis be performed. [REDACTED] did not recall ever meeting with Manafort about his income.

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[REDACTED] has not had much to do with compliance, unless something was brought to her attention by the BSA compliance team. [REDACTED] did not look for compliance issues. [REDACTED] is not made aware of any transactions her clients perform, and does not get notification of any such activity. The only way [REDACTED] would know of any transactions would be from the client or another bank department, such as the transaction monitoring team, who would probably look at wires for suspicious activity. The transaction monitoring team did not have any contact with the clients. If [REDACTED] wanted to see the activity on one of her client's accounts, she would have to pull the information or conduct a search. If [REDACTED] ever came across anything that looked suspicious, she would report it to the BSA team.

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[REDACTED] eventually became [REDACTED] of FRB's [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The office in [REDACTED] grew quickly, and the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] specializes in "onboarding" and servicing client accounts. Onboarding is the process of transitioning a client into FRB. Suspicious accounts or activity were investigated during the onboarding process. [REDACTED] could not recall the onboarding process for Manafort. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"Inclearing" occurs when an item is presented for payment when there are insufficient funds. The account officer will make a determination on whether or not to pay the item, based upon the client's relationship and account status. If there are funds in another account to pay the item, the account officer would need to obtain approval to utilize these funds to pay the item. Contact with the clients occurred both over the phone and via email. Early on, either method was allowed to make these types of transactions; however, this changed over time, and now these transactions require an email from the client for record keeping purposes. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/11/2017, Page 3 of 10

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[REDACTED]

Manafort was a big client [REDACTED] but did not know how Manafort would have compared to other clients at FRB. As far as for the region, Manafort would be about average. Manafort was an easy client who was not too time consuming, and a pleasant person. [REDACTED] knew Manafort was a political consultant [REDACTED] and traveled quite a bit. [REDACTED] did not know why Manafort traveled so much, but knew Manafort

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

could not recall from where Manafort's money was being transferred. [REDACTED] knew Manafort's income to be derived from consulting and investments. [REDACTED] did not know Manafort's net worth or income, only his account balances.

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[REDACTED]

During the course of the interview, [REDACTED] was shown a binder with tabbed documents. The documents shown to [REDACTED] were scanned and made part of this document as 1A evidence. Only those items shown to [REDACTED] are attached to this document. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The BSA/AML department of FRB conducts the compliance training for FRB employees. Much of the training is provided to FRB employees via on-line. [REDACTED] could not recall what the training was like in 2005. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and the amount of scrutiny given to new clients could depend upon if they were referred or just a walk in client. Nowadays, the AML training is extensive. FRB does not do business with companies that conduct large

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/11/2017, Page 4 of 10

volumes of cash transactions. When Manafort came into FRB as a new client, [REDACTED] could recall with Manafort regarding Manafort's business was that it was connected to foreign countries, but nothing specific. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] felt FRB's business with Manafort was small compared to Manafort's total portfolio, and that Manafort had accounts at other banks, but [REDACTED] did not know any specifics. This is normal for many of [REDACTED] as it is rare for clients to bring in all of their business, but rather slowly transition over time. At some point, [REDACTED] inquired about the [REDACTED] but she did not recall the specifics of why. [REDACTED] may have been asked by one of her employees, and it probably happened when Manafort opened some accounts for his LLCs.

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FRB's [REDACTED] office is doing well, and represents approximately one-third of FRB's total business.

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[REDACTED] at FRB. [REDACTED] interacted with [REDACTED] about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would have periodic interaction with [REDACTED] as she was easier to contact [REDACTED] These interactions were typically via email, and [REDACTED] on emails she sent to [REDACTED] At some point, Manafort [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall when this was, or why Manafort did that.

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Manafort used FRB's bill paying services as well, and FRB employees [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] provided these services for Manafort. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Inclearing came up a few times, but [REDACTED] did not have much interaction with [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] regarding this. [REDACTED] did not have access to Manafort's general ledger.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/11/2017, Page 5 of 10

[REDACTED] could not recall ever speaking with Manafort's tax preparers. [REDACTED] did recognize the name of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] may have provided [REDACTED] with statements so he could prepare Manafort's tax returns.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] does not look at any SARs, nor does anyone on her team. [REDACTED] was unfamiliar with Section 314(b).

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[REDACTED] was asked about several accounts Manafort had with FRB, and the listing and her responses follow:

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Jesand: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Manafort funded the account.

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Davis Manafort Partners: This was one of the original accounts opened by Manafort. This account received funds from consulting fees of Manafort's business. [REDACTED] did not know about Manafort's work until she saw Manafort's connection to Ukraine during the presidential elections of 2016.

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DMP International, LLC: [REDACTED] but did not recall the purpose of it.

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[REDACTED] recalled the name, but could not recall this account.

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Daisy Manafort: [REDACTED] recalled the name, but could not recall this account.

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John Hannah: [REDACTED] could not recall this account.

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MC Brooklyn Holdings: This account was set up to facilitate a real estate purchase.

Loav Holdings: [REDACTED] recalled the name, but could not recall this account.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/11/2017, Page 6 of 10

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[REDACTED] reiterated she believed Manafort had accounts outside of FRB, but did not know where or with what banks. [REDACTED] was not aware of any foreign bank accounts held by Manafort, or any foreign bank accounts controlled by Manafort. [REDACTED] also did not have specifics on transactions conducted by Manafort with his FRB accounts.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/11/2017, Page 7 of 10

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[REDACTED] FRB's BSA/AML department.

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[REDACTED] advised there have been general instances where [REDACTED] has reported suspicious activity to FRB officials. [REDACTED] looks at suspicious activity with accounts.

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[REDACTED] was shown "Tab 21" which is a bank statement for Davis Manafort Partners [REDACTED] had access to client's accounts, but she would have to request them. [REDACTED] did not recognize Leviathon Advisors Limited (LAL) or Global Highway Limited (GHL). [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/11/2017, Page 8 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 09/11/2017, Page 9 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 09/11/2017, Page 10 of 10

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
[REDACTED] had never heard of the name Smythson.

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[REDACTED] recognized the name "Yanukovich" when asked, but she did not recall where she heard the name.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] work address [redacted]
[redacted] cellular
telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at his place of
employment. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing
agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Investigation on	08/16/2017	at	United States (In Person)
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File #	Date drafted	08/22/2017
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by

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[Redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

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[Redacted]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 08/16/2017, Page 2 of 2

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[Redacted] was served with a Federal Grand Jury subpoena, a copy of which is attached to this file as 1A evidence.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4127



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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/30/2018

On or around October 15, 2018, SA [redacted] SA [redacted] and Forensic Accountant [redacted] telephonically interviewed [redacted] in [redacted] and [redacted] was called on his cell phone. After being advised of the identities of the interview team, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Manafort became a client of [redacted] as a referral from [redacted]
[redacted] Manafort retained [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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At the conclusion of the interview, a subpoena was left with [redacted]
[redacted] A copy of the subpoena and interview notes are attached in a 1A.


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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/15/2018 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/17/2018

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/12/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agent [redacted] FBI Forensic Accountant [redacted] and Senior Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Andrew Weissmann. Present representing [redacted] was attorney [redacted]. ASC Weissmann first explained to [redacted] that although the interview was voluntary, it was a federal crime to lie. ASC Weissmann then reviewed the terms of a letter setting forth the agreement upon which [redacted] made himself available for interview. [redacted] signed the letter agreement. After being advised of the identities of interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED] an attorney, arranged a meeting between [REDACTED] and Paul Manafort.

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b7A
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 11/14/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File #	Date drafted	11/14/2018
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b7E

by		
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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[redacted]
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [redacted]
Continuation of FD-302 of 11.14.2018, On 11/14/2018, Page 2 of 2

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b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7Cb6
b7C


[redacted] reviewed a October 30, 2018 e-mail from [redacted]
[redacted] did not know of any note or loan to Manafort before
this e-mail. The month before, [redacted] had e-mailed the [redacted]
[redacted] to Manafort, [redacted] and Downing. [redacted] did not receive
any questions from Manafort or anyone else. Manafort and [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]
When [redacted] first agreed to [redacted]
asked whether Manafort had any foreign bank accounts. [redacted] copied
Downing on the e-mails. Downing assured [redacted] that Manafort had no
foreign bank accounts [redacted]
[redacted] specifically asked about LOAV Ltd. Downing said
that LOAV's accounts were inactive or had minimal balances.

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] As examples, [redacted] recalls Yankee tickets, meal expenses and
the transportation of a car. [redacted] told Manafort and [redacted] that the
expenses [redacted] did not get much pushback
from them.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4130



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/18/2018

At approximately, 8:50 a.m, agents parked near [REDACTED]. At approximately 9:06 a.m., [REDACTED] left his residence. [REDACTED] got into a [REDACTED] license plate [REDACTED] and drove away. Agents unsuccessfully tried to follow the vehicle. At approximately 9:25 a.m., Agents searched the area near [REDACTED] a possible business address for [REDACTED] and did not see the vehicle. At approximately 10:10 a.m, Agents returned to [REDACTED] residence. At approximately 11:35 a.m., [REDACTED] parked on the street near his residence. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED] was interviewed outside of his residence [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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b7C

[REDACTED] had observed Agents parked near his residence. [REDACTED] thought that Agents were insurance investigators watching his neighbor.

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[REDACTED] met Roger Stone around 2014. [REDACTED] to Stone. [REDACTED] has financially supported many Republican candidates for public office. [REDACTED]

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A few years ago, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The messages were usually about a news event or article related to Stone.

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b7C

[REDACTED] Agents because [REDACTED] Agents explained that [REDACTED] could choose to withhold information but if he chose to answer questions then he must answer

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b7C

Investigation on 05/29/2018 at Wayne, Pennsylvania, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/30/2018

by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/29/2018, Page 2 of 3

truthfully because it was a crime to lie to the FBI. [REDACTED] stated that he understood.

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b7Cb3
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[REDACTED] did not speak with [REDACTED] during the course of the investigation. [REDACTED] has never spoken with [REDACTED] does not know [REDACTED]

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b7Cb3
b6
b7A
b7Cb3
b6
b7A
b7Cb3
b6
b7A
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/29/2018, Page 3 of 3

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b3
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b7A
b7C

Agents served [REDACTED] with a subpoena requiring [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Agents also
served [REDACTED] with a subpoena for [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

A few minutes after Agents left, [REDACTED] walked quickly across the
street, [REDACTED] and asked Agents if he should call


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[REDACTED]

A copy of the document shown to [REDACTED] along with the subpoenas served
on him will be maintained in the 1-A section of this case file.

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
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/22/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at the
Special Counsel's Office, Washington, DC. [redacted]

[redacted]

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b7EInvestigation on 06/07/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/22/2018by [redacted]b6
b7C
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/09/2018

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted] was interviewed telephonically. Present for the interview were Senior Assistant Special Counsels (SASC) Jeannie Rhee and Andrew Goldstein, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, and Special Agent [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] advised he had recordings to provide the Special Counsel's Office (SCO) on dropbox and would send them via email.

[redacted] however [redacted] did acknowledge he had spoken with Jay Sekulow (Sekulow). The contact occurred after [redacted]

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[redacted] but said it could have occurred soon thereafter. [redacted] said Sekulow was the one who initiated contact [redacted] did not know how Sekulow knew to get in touch with [redacted]

[redacted] told Sekulow that [redacted] had reached out to [redacted] had declined to speak with them.

b6
b7C

Sekulow wanted to know [redacted] Sekulow did not indicate he had asked anyone else about the same set of topics. Sekulow did not indicate he had spoken with [redacted] Sekulow had brought up the [redacted]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 10/24/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/24/2018

by [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[redacted]
(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [redacted] 10/24
Continuation of FD-302 of /2018 , On 10/24/2018 , Page 2 of 3

b6
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[redacted] said Sekulow did not provide any information to [redacted]
[redacted]

Sekulow had concern for [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] said

Sekulow was okay with this answer. Sekulow was also concerned about whether or not [redacted]

[redacted] Sekulow also wanted to know [redacted]
[redacted] Sekulow asked [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Sekulow asked [redacted]

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[redacted] said he wanted to be totally truthful with the SCO. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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b7A
b7Cb6
b7C

Sekulow wanted to know who [redacted] within the Trump campaign. [redacted]
[redacted]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4136

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted] 10/24
/2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/24/2018, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4137

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/03/2017

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] who resides at [redacted] [redacted] telephone number [redacted] email address [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] in Washington, DC, by the writer and Special Agent (SA) [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] presently is employed by [redacted] Prior to that he was employed at [redacted]

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b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]b3
b6
b7A
b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]b3
b6
b7A
b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 07/27/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/01/2017

by [redacted]

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b6
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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/27/2017, Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED]

b3
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b7A
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b6
b7A
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] was shown [REDACTED] and provided the following comments. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4139

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED], On 07/27/2017, Page 3 of 3

[REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The interviewing agents showed [REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]


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(U//~~FOUO~~) At the conclusion of the interview, [REDACTED] was served with a subpoena from the Office of the Special Counsel.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4140



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/08/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann. Present during portions of the interview were Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres and Assistant Special Counsel Prosecutor Brian Richardson. Present for [redacted] were

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[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary. [redacted] was also told that if he chose to answer questions during the interview, he needed to be honest in those answers and that making false statements to the FBI and/or DOJ could constitute a federal crime.

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b7A
b7C

Investigation on 10/05/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/06/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 2 of 12

[redacted]

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b7C

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 3 of 12

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 4 of 12

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7A
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 5 of 12

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 6 of 12

[redacted]
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[redacted]
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[redacted]
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 7 of 12

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 8 of 12

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 9 of 12

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

b3
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 10 of 12

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 11 of 12

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Other

[redacted]

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b7A
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[redacted]

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[redacted]


b6
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[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/05/2017, Page 12 of 12

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/14/2018

[redacted] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. The interviewers were FBI Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] and Assistant Special Counsels (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee and Andrew Weissmann. Present representing [redacted] were [redacted]

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[redacted] After being advised of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7A
b7Cb6
b7A
b7Cb6
b7A
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Investigation on 08/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/03/2018by [redacted]b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]
08.02.2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 08/02/2018, Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

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b7A
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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4166

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]
08.02.2018

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 08/02/2018, Page 3 of 3

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/05/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres at the law offices of Debevoise and Plimpton located at 919 3rd Ave. 35th Floor, New York, New York. Present during the interview were counsel for [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Investigation on 11/17/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/18/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 11/17/2017, Page 2 of 11

DTI

DTI is calculated by taking a borrower's monthly debt obligations and dividing that by the borrower's monthly income. The purpose of calculating DTI is to determine if the borrower can afford the loan payments along with all of their other debt obligations. DTI ratios are material to the underwriter's decision to approve, deny or restructure a loan.

Different loan types and loan amounts have different DTI thresholds. [redacted] could not recall the specific thresholds for each loan type, but stated that even the most favorable loan terms would not allow for DTI over 50%, even if there was an exception.

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All of the borrower's obligations, such as, all mortgages, rent, credit card bills, homeowner's insurance, property taxes, homeowners association dues, car payments and any other revolving debt are included as debt for the purpose of the borrower's DTI.

DTI is calculated by using documents and information obtained from the borrower, such as the 1003 loan application, tax returns, pay stubs, W2s, Profit Loss Statements, Schedule of Real Estate Owned, homeowners insurance certificates, as well as documents obtained independently from the borrower, such as, tax transcripts, credit reports, CPA letters, and employment verification.

The borrower is required to disclose all properties owned on their 1003 loan application. In addition, [redacted] looks at the credit report and tax returns to see if any other addresses were associated with the borrower. A condition, or requirement, of the loan is for the borrower to provide a list of all properties owned and the cost of carrying those properties, to include mortgage payments, insurance, taxes and homeowners association dues.

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If the borrower did not disclose a property, [redacted] would not likely have a way of knowing about the property. If the borrower did not disclose a mortgage, [redacted] would usually be able to see the mortgage on the borrower's credit report or on the homeowners insurance certificate. If the mortgage was recently obtained, it might not be listed on the credit report. If the borrower had private loans or loans not secured by property, they may not appear on a credit report. [redacted] would rely on the borrower to disclose such loans on the 1003 loan application.

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Citizens Bank does not routinely run title searches on all of the borrower's properties, but rather, they only run a title search on the

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 11/17/2017, Page 3 of 11

subject property. Most borrowers do not want to pay the very expensive fees for title searches so they opt to provide copies of homeowners insurance certificates instead. Homeowners insurance certificates show mortgagee information if there is a mortgage against the property.

[redacted] stated the borrower is expected to provide accurate and complete information regarding their income and debt. The reason the borrower signs the 1003 loan application and disclosures is to ensure the borrower is providing accurate and complete information.

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LTV

LTV is a ratio defined by the amount of the loan versus the value of the collateral. The value of the collateral is defined by the appraisal value, or in the case of an initial purchase, the purchase price, whichever is lower.

Citizens Bank has LTV thresholds which vary depending on the loan type, occupancy and loan amount. The most favorable loan, such as the initial purchase of a primary residence would be eligible for a maximum of 80% LTV, or possibly 85% with an exception. Second homes and investment properties have lower LTV allowances as they are seen as more risky to the bank. The property type is also a factor in Citizens Bank's LTV calculation. For example, condominiums and co-ops have stricter rules than single family residences.

In general, the more risky the loan and the higher the loan amount requested, the lower the LTV.

Occupancy

A primary residence is defined as a property the borrower is living in.

A second home is a property owned by the borrower and lived in part time. The borrower is permitted to rent out their second home when they are not residing there, but Citizens Bank won't consider a property a second home if it is rented out more than a certain number of days per year. [redacted] could not recall that specific number.

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Income property is property the borrower primarily rents and makes income off.

Occupancy is material to the bank because many other factors are affected by occupancy type. Mainly, occupancy affects risk and risk affects LTV, DTI, interest rate and other loan factors.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 11/17/2017, Page 4 of 11

In addition to the 1003 loan application, the borrower signs an affidavit of occupancy indicating if the property is a primary residence, second home or income property. The bank relies on the borrower's truthfulness regarding occupancy.

[REDACTED] tries to determine if the occupancy claimed by the borrower "makes sense". For example, if the borrower's primary residence is far from their employment and they own other properties which are closer, [REDACTED] may question if the property is indeed their primary residence.

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Credit Reports

[REDACTED] primarily reviews credit reports for credit history, payment history, delinquencies or late payments, amount and type of debt incurred, additional addresses and recent inquiries.

[REDACTED] requires borrowers to explain any recent inquiries on their credit. The purpose of this is to determine if the borrower is acquiring new debt. This is a material fact to the bank because any new debt acquired by the borrower affects DTI. [REDACTED] relies on the borrower to honestly and completely disclose whether they are acquiring new debt.

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On occasions, after a loan closes, Citizens Bank will do a "soft pull" of a borrower's credit to see if they obtained any new credit since the loan closed. [REDACTED] is not sure what Citizens Bank does with this information.

Use of Proceeds

In a cash out refinance where the cash out requested exceeds \$500,000, Citizens Bank requires the borrower to explain the use of proceeds. The bank requires this information because they want to know if the borrower is using the cash out to acquire new debt. For example, if the borrower is using the cash out as a down payment on another property, this would affect the borrower's DTI.

[REDACTED] relies on the borrower's honesty and completeness in the signed letter of explanation to know how the proceeds are used.

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Homeowners Insurance Certificates

Homeowners insurance certificates are requested for each property the borrower owns. The bank requests these documents to determine any additional mortgage debt the borrower may have. This information is material to the [REDACTED] decision because additional mortgage debt affects DTI.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 11/17/2017, Page 5 of 11

[redacted] was not sure if the borrower provided the homeowners insurance certificates directly to the bank, of if the certificates were requested from the insurance company.

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[redacted] relied on the information provided to be truthful and complete.

Flow of Information

In the initial stages of a loan, information and documentation is typically gathered by the loan processor and provided to the underwriter. The documents are scanned and uploaded into Citizens Bank's online database. The underwriter has access to underlying documentation such as: 1003 loan applications, letters of explanation, 1008 loan summaries, loan disclosures, CPA letters, credit reports, schedules of real estate, insurance certificates, tax returns, profit loss statements and other income and asset documentation.

If the underwriter has additional questions or requires additional documentation, the loan processor or loan officer obtains that information and/or documentation from the borrower. Some of the information and/or documentation required by the underwriter is automatic to every loan and some is specific depending on the particular loan being underwritten.

If the loan requires an exception, the loan goes to the exception underwriting desk for review. Otherwise, the underwriter approves, denies, or restructures the loan. Restructuring a loan is common to try to make the deal work.

The borrower is required to sign the loan application, letters of explanation and other disclosures and affidavits to verify they are providing true and complete information to the bank.

Cash Out Refinances

In a cash out refinance, occupancy is an important factor to the bank as it determines risk. If the property is a primary residence, it is less risky than a second home. In turn, a second home is less risky than income property. People are more likely to repay the mortgage on their primary residence than on their rental properties.

Generally, the more risky a loan, the higher the interest rate, the lower the LTV and the lower the DTI threshold.

29 Howard St., New York

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 11/17/2017, Page 6 of 11

[REDACTED] on a cash out refinance for 29 Howard St., New York in which Paul Manafort was the borrower.

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[REDACTED] was shown an email thread dated February 5, 2016 between [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had been "pended" or put on hold for restructuring and additional documentation. A loan is typically pended for 72 hours, but that is not "a hard and fast rule". The reason the loan had been pended was because [REDACTED] failed the liquidity test.

The liquidity test is a way Citizens Bank determines if a business can sustain paying distributions to the borrower. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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If the borrower's source of income is not stable then the borrower's income is not stable. [REDACTED] typically looks for at least three years of continuance.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] For example, if there was an explanation which only affected the current year and there was otherwise a history of liquidity and an expectation of liquidity continuing into the future, [REDACTED] would consider that for an exception.

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The liquidity test was important to the loan [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 11/17/2017, Page 7 of 11

Document 2

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] explained that this document was used to calculate the borrower's income. The information was input by [REDACTED] but the source of the information was the borrower's business tax returns.

Ordinary income is the amount of money the business earned. Distribution income is the amount of money distributed by the business to the borrower. In this case, Manafort's business, DMP International LLC. [REDACTED]

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expected the borrower to disclose all debt, to include debt unsecured by property.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 11/17/2017, Page 8 of 11

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[REDACTED] was shown an email thread dated [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] regarding Manafort's property at [REDACTED] explained that properties held in LLCs are not always included in the borrower's schedule of real estate owned. However, if the borrower is personally liable for the mortgage, insurance, taxes and other fees associated with the property then it would be included in the schedule of real estate and debt calculation for the borrower.

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[REDACTED] was shown an email from [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was because the collateral was insufficient and the borrower wanted to close in the name of an LLC of which the borrower was not 100% owner. [REDACTED] suggested the loan become an investment transaction.

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[REDACTED] If it was an investment property, the maximum LTV would be 65% and the borrower would require an exception to do a cash out refinance.

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Ultimately, this loan was restructured.

[REDACTED] set conditions for the loan and relayed those to the loan officer or loan officer assistant, who would relay the conditions to the borrower.

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One of the conditions [REDACTED] set was proof that Manafort's other properties were owned free and clear. This was so [REDACTED] could

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 11/17/2017, Page 9 of 11

accurately determine DTI. This information was a requirement for the loan to close.

Document 6

[redacted] was shown an email thread dated February 26, 2016 between [redacted] and others at Citizens Bank.

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[redacted] was directed to [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] Telmar Investments loan was not factored in to the new calculations for DMP's liquidity. [redacted]
[redacted]

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In general, [redacted] was not comfortable with "updated" P&Ls. In cases which required an update or change to a P&L, [redacted] liked to get an explanation from the CPA directly. [redacted] wanted to make sure the reason for the update or change was because of a true mistake and not simply a change made to ensure the borrower could qualify.

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Regardless of who submitted the P&L, [redacted] expected the information contained therein to be accurate and complete.

In the case of year-to-date (YTD) P&Ls, only income already received could be included. [redacted] could not use projected P&Ls to factor borrower income. [redacted] thought it was possible to obtain an exception to use a projected P&L, but it was not normal. [redacted] stated if an exception were to be requested, the projected income would have to be supported by other documentation, such as a contract, or a sales order. [redacted] could not think of a time where she used a projected P&L.

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[redacted] would expect a P&L to contain income actually received to date unless otherwise specified.

Document 7

[redacted] was shown an email thread between [redacted] dated [redacted] recalled this was after the loan on Howard St. closed and [redacted] were working on another loan for Manafort.

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[redacted] reached out to [redacted] and asked her to explain the income calculations used on the Howard St. loan. At the time [redacted] was busy with other files so she reached out to her [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 11/17/2017, Page 10 of 11

[REDACTED] to see if she could assist [REDACTED] by reviewing the file. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the new loan for Manafort was being handled by
another underwriting department and therefore [REDACTED] could not review it.

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Had [REDACTED] known that Manafort had [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Had [REDACTED] known that Manafort [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] by providing materially false information to
Citizens Bank, she would have referred him to the fraud department and not
approved the loan. [REDACTED] stated that would have constituted fraud.

[REDACTED]

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Had [REDACTED] known Manafort had millions of dollars in other unsecured
loans, [REDACTED]

Had [REDACTED] known 29 Howard St. was not a second home, but rather was
used as an Airbnb rental, she may have tried to restructure the loan as an
investment transaction. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Were the loan to have been restructured as
an investment transaction, the interest rate would have been higher, the
loan amount would have been lower and the maximum DTI percentage would
have been lower.

[REDACTED]

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
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] Interview , On 11/17/2017 , Page 11 of 11

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/10/2018

[redacted] previously identified, was interview by FBI Special Agents [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann. Present during the interview were counsel for [redacted] [redacted] of Devbevoise and Plimpton. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was advised that her participation in the interview was voluntary and if she chose to answer questions she needed to do so truthfully as lying to a federal agent could constitute a federal crime. [redacted] acknowledged her understanding.

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[redacted]

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b7CGuidelines

Citizens Bank maintained underwriting guidelines for various factors related to loans. These guidelines provided thresholds for debt to income ratio (DTI), loan to value ratio (LTV) among other factors. When DTI, LTV, or another factor goes beyond the thresholds allowed, the underwriter looks for compensating factors to determine if an exception is needed.

When [redacted] begins working on a new loan, she pulls the most recently updated copy of the guidelines from Citizens Bank's intranet site. Guidelines are updated frequently so [redacted] makes sure she has the most recent version based upon the loan's application date. [redacted] believed the guidelines were created and updated by Citizens Bank's Resource Department.

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Citizens Bank's guidelines mirror the Fannie Mae guidelines for the most part, but with adjustments specific to Citizens Bank's loan

Investigation on 05/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/04/2018

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 2 of 8

types. [redacted] worked on Fannie Mae loans as well as portfolio loans and is aware of many similarities in the guidelines for these different types of loans.

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Occupancy

The guidelines address issues related to occupancy status of the property. [redacted] stated that guidelines are different if the property is a primary residence versus second home versus income/investment property versus mixed use. Unlike some guidelines which update frequently, occupancy related guidelines have not evolved much over the years [redacted]

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Occupancy status is determined by the borrower. The borrower tells Citizens Bank how the property is used in their loan application and then the borrower signs an Occupancy Affidavit to further certify how they intend to use the property.

[redacted] looks at the occupancy status to see if it "makes sense". [redacted] will look at the location of other properties owned by the borrower, the distance of the subject property from the borrower's work and other details to see if it "makes sense". If [redacted] questions the borrower's stated occupancy, she will request additional information such as a "Motivation Letter". A Motivation Letter is a letter in which the borrower explains why a property going to be used they way they say it's going to be used.

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Underwriters do not have direct contact with borrowers. Underwriters make requests in the form of conditions to loan officers and the loan officers talk to the borrowers. If requested, a Motivation Letter would be a condition of the loan. Without it, the loan could not move forward.

If after a Motivation Letter [redacted] still was not satisfied with the borrower's explanations about a property's intended occupancy, she would escalate the issue to her manager.

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[redacted] explained that sometimes a borrower will apply as one occupancy type, when in actuality, the property is a different occupancy type. For example, some people have apartments in Manhattan where they stay during the work week, but their home is actually outside the city. [redacted] would consider the apartment in Manhattan a second home as opposed to a primary residence.

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Similarly, sometimes people have second homes which they rent out when they're not staying there. Even if a borrower was receiving rental income from a property, it was still possible that the property could be a second

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 3 of 8

home. That said, it had to "make sense". If [redacted] saw rental income for a property designated as a second home, she would ask for further information from the borrower in the form of a Letter of Explanation. [redacted] would require the borrower to specify how the property is used.

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[redacted] was not sure if Citizens Bank's guidelines restricted the number of days a second home could be rented out before it had to be considered an investment property. Currently, Citizens Bank does not allow any lending on Airbnb properties. Prior to this guideline being in place, Airbnb properties were treated as investment properties and were considered more risky by Citizens Bank because they were dependent on sporadic income.

If a property was used as a rental, even a part time rental, and the borrower did not stay there, it would be an investment property. Primary residences could not be used as rentals.

New Debt

Prior to closing, [redacted] runs credit to see if any new inquiries have been made on the borrower's credit report. [redacted] then requires the borrower to certify that none of the new inquiries have resulted in new debt. The reason for this is that credit reports don't show new debt for 90 days. Citizens Bank is relying on the borrower to disclose new debt that may not have shown up on the credit report yet.

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Additionally, after closing, the Post Closing Department does a "soft pull" of the borrower's credit to see if the borrower has obtained any new debt.

Paul Manafort Loan

[redacted] used Paul Manafort's [redacted] tax returns along with his [redacted] P&L to determine income. [redacted] was required to use the [redacted] P&L to support the previous years' tax returns and understand current earnings. Since Manafort was self employed, [redacted] looked at Manafort's business returns and K1s to ensure Manafort's income was supported by the businesses' revenue.

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[redacted] also looked at all of Manafort's other real estate owned to help determine his debt. [redacted] requested homeowner's insurance documents to show Manafort's properties were mortgage free.

Generally, the homeowner's insurance documents are provided by the borrower directly to the loan officer, loan officer assistant or loan

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 4 of 8

processor. The loan officer, loan officer assistant or loan processor will then verify the information with the insurance agent if necessary.

explained that the borrower generally provides the insurance "dec" or declaration page which has a section to show if a mortgagee exists. These get uploaded to Citizens Bank's document repository and reviews them. If nothing is listed in the mortgagee section, asks the loan officer, loan officer assistant or loan processor to contact the insurance agent directly to verify there is indeed no mortgage.

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If were to find out a property, which was previously believed to be owned free and clear, had a mortgage, she would stop the loan process and refigure the DTI including the new debt.

Document 1 - Email

was shown an email thread between

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The topic of this email was that

If a business fails the liquidity test, the borrower's income from that business cannot be used. This can be resolved if the business's liabilities get written off or paid off. The business's CPA would have to verify this in a letter to the bank. The other way this issue could be resolved would be if the borrower had "guaranteed earnings". Guaranteed earnings are treated similarly to W2 income. However, to use guaranteed earnings, believed she would have to get an exception.

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did not believe she received any such additional information either.

was reviewed by manager as well as

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 5 of 8

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[REDACTED] Income Worksheet for Manafort's loan on 29 Howard St., New York.

[REDACTED] requested P&Ls for any business in which [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not know why she only needed to look at businesses in which [REDACTED] stated this threshold came from Citizens Bank's guidelines.

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The Income Worksheet was prepared using Manafort's tax return information. At the time [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 6 of 8

Document 3 - Email [redacted]

[redacted] was shown an email thread between [redacted] dated [redacted]

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[redacted] explained she was seeking an "ATP", or Authorization to Proceed, which is an exception. Specifically, [redacted] that she needed an ATP because [redacted]

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[redacted] noted these things because they were outside the guideline thresholds.

[redacted] was directed to the remainder of her email which read, [redacted]

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[redacted] assumed she received account statements or a letter from Manafort's CPA which showed this. [redacted] had to get an exception to be able to use [redacted] for this reason.

[redacted] was directed to [redacted] response to her email which read, [redacted]

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[redacted] was directed to [redacted] email on [redacted] which asked whether interest income from one of Manafort's businesses had been factored into the DTI calculations; noted that [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 7 of 8

[redacted] answered [redacted] email on the same day. [redacted] stated she was not sure if she could use interest income so she asked [redacted] As for [redacted] had already included this in her income calculations. [redacted]

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[redacted] followed up on [redacted] email by saying interest income could be used and that [redacted]

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[redacted] was going to research whether or not the fact that the property's title was in an LLC mattered if Manafort was responsible for the PITI.

Document 4 - [redacted] Screenshot

[redacted] was shown screenshots from the [redacted] which included communication with [redacted] from [redacted] stated this communication related to [redacted] trying to determine how to treat the [redacted] property's PITI obligation.

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[redacted] understanding was if the the property's title was in the borrower's name, or the borrower was responsible for the PITI, the debt counted against the borrower's DTI. If the business was responsible for the PITI, it would not count against the borrower's DTI.

Document 5 - [redacted] Screenshot

[redacted] was shown screenshots from the [redacted] which included communication with [redacted] from [redacted]

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Document 6 - Email [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 8 of 8

[redacted] was shown an email thread between [redacted] and others dated [redacted] wanted her to rush this file because Manafort was trying to meet a closing date.

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
Document 7 - Email [redacted]

[redacted] was shown an email thread between [redacted] dated [redacted]

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Other

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/07/2017

(U) On 07/06/2017, Supervisory Special Agent [REDACTED] and Special Agent [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) at CFR Headquarters at 58 E 68th Street, New York, NY. The interview was established through a series of phone conversations with [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the Special Agents and the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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(U) Carter PAGE

(U) Carter PAGE (PAGE) is a member of CFR and he completed a 1-year fellowship with CFR in the [REDACTED] may have met PAGE before in normal interactions with CFR, but PAGE is not a major player in foreign relations. [REDACTED] commented that PAGE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (AGENT COMMENT: Leslie Gleb was President of CFR from 1993-2003 END COMMENT). [REDACTED]

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Investigation on 07/06/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File #	Date drafted	07/06/2017
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by

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[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Council on Foreign
Relations

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 07/06/2017, Page 2 of 5

(U) [REDACTED] could not recall the names of the members of the advisory team. He additionally commented that none of them were known in the foreign relations community. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED] has had limited contact with PAGE including [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] All contacts were [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

explained that the CFR is non-partisan, but he balances non-partisanship and intellectual freedom. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED] only had individual interaction with PAGE because of his association to the TRUMP CAMPAIGN. Though PAGE was a member of CFR,
[REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(U) Interview of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Council on Foreign
Relations

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 07/06/2017, Page 3 of 5

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Ultimately, [REDACTED] felt the event was not remarkable, and he did not remember much, if anything, of what was said. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The only opportunity for a private conversation was 10 or so seconds during introductions.

(U) [REDACTED] could not recall everyone in attendance but would search for the roster of invitees and later provide it to the FBI. Unlike CFR events there was no sign-in roster circulated at the event. [REDACTED] recalled that someone from "Brookings" may have been in attendance, and Steve HADLEY (HADLEY) also attended. (AGENT COMMENT: Stephen HADLEY is a former National Security Advisor under President George W. Bush END COMMENT). [REDACTED] and HADLEY were [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Many of the attendees were associated to the HILLARY CLINTON CAMPAIGN (CLINTON CAMPAIGN). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not think that [REDACTED] was there, whom [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attended.

(U) PAGE attended [REDACTED] knew PAGE from previous interactions with the TRUMP CAMPAIGN, but he was unknown at the event. [REDACTED] may have had a short conversation with PAGE, but could not recall the substance. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] further elaborated that inviting PAGE was an investment in the future. Though [REDACTED] did not know how PAGE was invited; it could have been because PAGE was an "energy expert." However, [REDACTED] assumed the obvious answer was PAGE's association to the TRUMP CAMPAIGN. PAGE spoke towards the end of the event, but [REDACTED] could not recall what he said. [REDACTED] admitted being bored by that time. [REDACTED] took no notes, but believed that somebody there likely had taken notes. [REDACTED] could not recall if PAGE specifically discussed the leadership of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Council on Foreign
Relations

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 07/06/2017, Page 4 of 5

(U) When asked about a *politico.com* article in which the author quotes a "Russian Specialist" who spoke with PAGE, [REDACTED] could not identify any particular "Russian Specialist" that the article could have quoted.

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(U) When asked if the Nixon Center, or Center for National Interest was represented, [REDACTED] recalled that Dimitri could have been there. (AGENT COMMENT Dimitri Simes is the President and CEO of the Center for National Interest END COMMENT) [REDACTED] said that Dimitri could have been considered a Russian Specialist. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and described Dimitri as interesting with a big personality.

(U) Council on Foreign Relations

(U) CFR membership is life-long, except in instances of particular criminal activity or rare ethical issues. [REDACTED]

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(U) CFR has a program for individuals under 30 to gain 5-year memberships, and older individuals tend to become life-members. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] would provide anything the FBI needed but may request legal process. The CFR also maintains records of which events its members attend.

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED] met with Lieutenant General Michael FLYNN (FLYNN) during the transition [REDACTED] was surprised that FLYNN was more low-keyed than expected. [REDACTED] was led to believe that FLYNN was obsessed with Iran and Islam, however, the two barely discussed the topics.

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(U) Interview of


Council on Foreign

Continuation of FD-302 of Relations

, On 07/06/2017 , Page 5 of 5

(U) [] is in current contact with H R McMaster and Mattis. (AGENT
COMMENT National Security Advisor McMaster and Secretary of Defense
Mattis END COMMENT)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/20/2018

On May 10th 2018 2:30 PM, at the office of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's legal counsel, Perkins Coie, 700 Thirteenth Street Northwest, Suite 600, Washington, District of Columbia 20005, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at Hillary for America, was interviewed by employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance were Perkins Coie Attorney [REDACTED] Perkins Coie Attorney [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Management and Program Analyst [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Special Counsel Attorney Jessica Romero, and Special Counsel Attorney Heather Alpino. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, and purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] stated the following:

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[REDACTED] She volunteered for the campaign of Hillary for America (HFA) as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] While working as a volunteer [REDACTED] leveraged her personal devices for internet connectivity.

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After the New Hampshire primary election in early 2016, [REDACTED] began working full time for the campaign as an unpaid volunteer working as a [REDACTED] primary emails during 2016 were [REDACTED] She checked her email on personal and work computers; a MacBook Air and MacBook Pro. [REDACTED] also checked her personal email on her iPhone 6s and her work laptop provided by [REDACTED] During 2016, [REDACTED] estimated that she changed her password every three months, whenever the company enforced the password change policy. At the time, she was not leveraging two factor authentication on her accounts, but never shared her passwords with others.

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[REDACTED] recalled that she was spear-phished in March of 2016, around 6:00 AM in the morning, and that the spear email looked legit. She thought that it looked as if it was from Gmail, having the large "G" and all the colors of the Google logo. She clicked on the link that took her to a page to enter her old password and a new password, she then hit enter. After receiving the email, [REDACTED] thought something about it was suspicious, so she went to her laptop and called a friend. Her friend told her to look

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b7CInvestigation on 05/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/10/2018by [REDACTED]b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) INTERVIEW OF _____, On 05/10/2018, Page 2 of 2

at the extension of the URL where she realized it was not a legitimate email. After the fact, she received a lot of emails in Cyrillic and Spanish.

_____ found out that her emails were being leaked in late June 2016, _____ The Smoking Gun called _____ and informed her that Guccifer 2.0 had contacted him about leaked emails from _____ email account. _____ asked _____ if she wanted to comment for the story he was writing on the leaking of her emails. _____ posted some of the emails on The Smoking Gun prior to DCLeaks. _____ went on DCLeaks early on, but did not go through all of her emails, just clicking through a few.

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_____ felt that the leaking of her emails was a gross violation of privacy, _____ After the leak of her emails, _____ changed her bank accounts, contacted friends, and notified her boss that they would be seeing an article about her soon. Afterwards, she still volunteered for the campaign, even as she received harassing emails, calls, and twitter messages.

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[Agent Note: _____ was shown a series of printed emails and asked to verify their authenticity]

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
_____ recalled that she received the first in her Gmail account on March 15th 2016. She recognized the folks on the "To", "From", and "CC" lines.

_____ recognized the second email sent on February 20th 2016, recognizing the email and correspondents.

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_____ recognized the email sent on May 19th 2015 and recipients.

_____ recognized the email sent on February 16th 2016, including attachments attachments.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/13/2017

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] with a social security number of [redacted] and a telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at his residence located at [redacted]. [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] had been introduced to PAUL MANAFORT by [redacted] and [redacted].
[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] did not have a contract or SLA with MANAFORT or his businesses. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Investigation on 06/08/2017 at Apex, North Carolina, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 06/08/2017

by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED], On 06/08/2017, Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did occasional work for [REDACTED] but had never met him in-person.

[REDACTED]

Interviewing agents served [REDACTED] for the [REDACTED] (document attached to this EC as a 1A):

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 06/08/2017, Page 3 of 3

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/19/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at her
place of employment, [redacted]
[redacted] by Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing
Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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[redacted] currently possesses a black iPhone 7 with IMEI [redacted]
serial number [redacted] and telephone number [redacted] with service
through Verizon Wireless. She received this iPhone on [redacted] as
a replacement device.

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In [redacted] lost her phone after performing some yard work at
her home. [redacted] went to a local Verizon store and requested a
replacement phone as it was insured. The insurance provider, Asurion,
sent [redacted] a replacement phone. Shortly after receiving the replacement
phone, [redacted] discovered it was defective and the phone would not
ring. [redacted] contacted Asurion, who provided the above referenced iPhone
as a second replacement.

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[redacted] advised the interviewing Agents that she would consent to
having the iPhone searched, but was not willing to surrender the iPhone as
it was her only telephone and [redacted]

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[redacted] stated she had no knowledge of the previous owner of the
iPhone. [redacted] allowed Agents to examine the iPhone and confirm the IMEI
and serial number. Agents observed the word "Asurion" etched on the back
of the iPhone.

On [redacted] SA [redacted] and CART SA [redacted] met
with [redacted] again at her office. [redacted] provided the iPhone and written
consent to search the device. SA [redacted] conducted a forensic download of
the iPhone and provided the results to SA [redacted] The iPhone was returned
to [redacted]

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
Investigation on 10/04/2018 at [redacted] United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/10/2018

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 10/04/2018, Page 2 of 2

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/07/2017

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed telephonically on August 18, 2017. [redacted] was advised of the identity of interviewing Agents [redacted] and [redacted]. Also present on the phone were Assistant Special Counsel AARON ZELINSKY and [redacted] attorney, [redacted]. With his attorney present, [redacted] was advised that providing false statements to federal officers could constitute a federal crime. After being advised of the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] could not recall exactly when he joined the TRUMP campaign but guessed it was approximately [redacted] before the election or inauguration. [redacted] got involved because KEITH KELLOGG, [redacted] was supporting the TRUMP campaign. KELLOGG [redacted]

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[redacted] attended [redacted] event during the summer and a meeting at Trump Tower in New York. [redacted] probably attended [redacted] meetings for the campaign but hasn't done much since then. [redacted] also recalled attending a rally in [redacted] [redacted] talked to KELLOGG some during the transition and attended the inauguration. [redacted] mostly participated in the campaign [redacted] communicating with the team on occasion [redacted] KELLOGG and SAM CLOVIS. [redacted] doesn't recall having a supervisor or know who would be considered his supervisor.

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[redacted] role in the campaign was a [redacted] does not recall ever having any campaign-related discussions about Russia. During the meeting at Trump Tower, the discussions focused on ISIS and nuclear threats but [redacted] does not recall any conversations about Russia. TRUMP, KELLOGG, [redacted] K.T. MCFARLAND and JEFF SESSIONS were present at that national security meeting. [redacted] can't recall the date of that meeting but it was prior to the election and it was focused on topics related to national security. [redacted]

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Investigation on 08/18/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/19/2017

by [redacted]

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[redacted]
(U) Interview of [redacted] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2017, On 08/18/2017, Page 2 of 4

[redacted] also remembered an event [redacted] that he attended. That's where [redacted] met CLOVIS. [redacted] met CARTER PAGE at [redacted] but didn't remember meeting him. [redacted] told him about meeting PAGE there. This would have been before the election but [redacted] does not recall what they discussed.

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[redacted] had known MICHAEL FLYNN for a long time because [redacted]
[redacted] During the campaign they only exchanged greetings and didn't talk about national security matters. Russia never came up in their conversations. Their meetings were brief. [redacted] and FLYNN may have been on some calls together but [redacted] does not recall. [redacted] does not talk to FLYNN anymore and has not talked to him since the election.

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[redacted] indicated that he didn't hear mention of Russia in regards to the campaign until after the election.

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[redacted] occasionally talks to people he knows from the TRUMP team, including [redacted] and KEITH KELLOGG. [redacted] has been in the administration for about two to three weeks. [redacted]

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[redacted] KELLOGG has some position in the administration. [redacted] knows [redacted] well but hasn't spoken with him in the last month.

[redacted] was introduced to PAUL MANAFORT and exchanged a greeting but that's it. [redacted] doesn't recall attending any meetings with MANAFORT but he may have been at the meeting at Trump Tower. MANAFORT took over as the campaign manager. [redacted] is only aware of MANAFORT's Ukraine and Russia ties through what has been in the news. [redacted] does not know why MANAFORT left the campaign.

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[redacted] was asked about RICK DEARBORN at which point [redacted]
[redacted] DEARBORN as well and the questioning regarding DEARBORN ceased.

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[redacted] did not have any interactions with [redacted] but recognized his name.

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[redacted] recognized [redacted] name but could not recall talking to him. [redacted] may have met [redacted] but wasn't sure.

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[redacted] recognized [redacted] name but never had any interactions with him. [redacted] never exchanged emails with [redacted] to the best of his knowledge.

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[redacted]
(U) Interview of [redacted] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2017 , On 08/18/2017 , Page 3 of 4

[redacted] interacted with [redacted] one at KELLOGG's house. [redacted] did not recall PHARES being at the Trump Tower meeting. [redacted] talking about national security matters. PHARES was also a Security Adviser. They would talk in passing but [redacted] does not recall communicating via phone or email with PHARES.

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[redacted] had private phone conversations with CLOVIS discussing the campaign. [redacted] didn't know CLOVIS prior to the campaign. They never discussed Russia or the Ukraine. They talked about future meetings and information that would be important for TRUMP to know. [redacted] hasn't talked to CLOVIS for about six months.

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[redacted] met COREY LEWANDOWSKI and shook hands with him a couple times. LEWANDOWSKI was at the Trump Tower meeting or one of the other meetings. [redacted] is not aware of any phone calls he had with LEWANDOWSKI and did not recall exchanging any emails with him. LEWANDOWSKI was the campaign manager and was probably at the Value Voters Summit and the Trump Tower meetings. They usually just exchanged greetings.

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[redacted] remembers the name MATTHEW MILLER as being related to the campaign but that's it. [redacted] does not recall MILLER's role and never interacted with him.

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[redacted] doesn't know GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS and never met him. He might have heard PAPADOPOULOS' name. [redacted] asked if PAPADOPOULOS was the guy on television. His attorney asked if he was confusing him with GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS and [redacted] confirmed that was in fact who he was thinking of.

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[redacted] knows [redacted] and remembers [redacted] was present at the Trump Tower meeting. [redacted] and [redacted] talked about upcoming meetings and where the campaign was going. [redacted] They spoke maybe three to four times and [redacted] sat next to [redacted] at the Trump Tower meeting. They also saw each other at the inauguration. [redacted] [redacted] never met [redacted] prior to the campaign.

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KELLOGG [redacted]

[redacted] KELLOGG was the head of the transition team and also a Security Adviser. KELLOGG was on the campaign before [redacted] They never discussed matters related to Russia.

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[redacted] saw [redacted] at several meetings and talked to him on the phone about once or twice. [redacted] and [redacted] exchanged greetings and talked about what TRUMP should do in the future.

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[redacted]
(U) Interview of [redacted] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2017, On 08/18/2017, Page 4 of 4

[redacted] did not recognize the name [redacted] has seen
STEPHEN MILLER on television but that's it.

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[redacted] JEFF SESSIONS a couple times. [redacted] saw SESSIONS
at the Trump Tower meeting and at the rally in Philadelphia.

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[redacted] is not sure if he attended a meeting on March 31, 2016 at the
Trump International Hotel in D.C. [redacted] does not believe he attended
the foreign policy speech at the Mayflower hotel.

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[redacted] was brought on to the campaign [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] HARRELL was brought on to the campaign [redacted]
[redacted] called into some of the meetings. [redacted]
recalls [redacted] being on the phone a couple of times.

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
There were several emails sent out by the campaign. [redacted] utilized
email address [redacted] while he was on the campaign and did not
take any notes. He utilized phone number [redacted]

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[redacted] agreed to go back through his emails to search for documents
related to the campaign and/or Russia and provide any pertinent findings
to the interviewing Agents.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/22/2017

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed telephonically on August 28, 2017. [redacted] was advised of the identity of interviewing Agents [redacted] and [redacted]. Also present on the phone were Assistant Special Counsel AARON ZELINSKY, Intelligence Analyst [redacted] and [redacted] attorney, [redacted]. With his attorney present, [redacted] was reminded that providing false statements to federal officers could constitute a federal crime. After being advised of the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was asked if his review of documents was able to refresh his memory of GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS. [redacted] explained he didn't remember much about PAPADOPOULOS and couldn't recall physically meeting PAPADOPOULOS. [redacted] knows he saw PAPADOPOULOS at two events, including [redacted] [redacted] could not recall the other event. To the best of [redacted] recollection, his communications with PAPADOPOULOS were largely email. He does not recall any Skype calls with PAPADOPOULOS.

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[REDACTED] does not remember discussing Russia or PAPADOPOULOS' email about contact with Russia with other campaign members. [REDACTED] said SAM CLOVIS overcame PAPADOPOULOS' email with talk of NATO. Russia popped up a couple times in the campaign with regards to foreign policy. [REDACTED] recalls discussing ISIS but can't recall what specifically was discussed and can not recall discussing Russia in regards to ISIS.

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In regards to the foreign policy team meeting on March 31, 2016, [REDACTED] recalls asking CLOVIS [REDACTED] to call in to the meeting. The meeting was scheduled for 10am and to the best of [REDACTED] knowledge, [REDACTED] in. [REDACTED] thinks CLOVIS didn't want him [REDACTED] security issues. [REDACTED] doesn't recall talking to others about that meeting or getting a read-out and does not know if DONALD J. TRUMP was there.

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[redacted] was asked if [redacted] [redacted] was asked about an email between himself and [redacted] dated May 23, 2016 in which they

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Investigation on 08/28/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # _____ Date drafted 11/09/2017

by

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[redacted]
(U) Interview of [redacted] on 08/28
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2017, On 08/28/2017, Page 2 of 2

discussed having a phone call. [redacted] explained that he talked to [redacted] several times during the campaign and he remembers they talked about the campaign but doesn't recall much about their conversations.

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[redacted] was asked about an email from [redacted] on June 28, 2016 and a follow-up request [redacted] sent to [redacted] both of which were [redacted] In the email, [redacted] requested a slide deck. [redacted] and doesn't know if he got the slide deck he requested.

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[redacted] was asked about emails indicating that he and [redacted] had gone back and forth via email regarding Skype calls. [redacted] explained he [redacted] [redacted] thought his Skype ID was: [redacted] remembers one Skype call with the campaign but doesn't recall when it was, who it was with or what it was about.

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
[redacted] was asked if he had discussed his interview with anyone. He said he told [redacted] who asked if [redacted] had been contacted by the FBI. [redacted] said no one from the campaign has contacted him about being interviewed. [redacted] was [redacted]

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[redacted] was not involved in the campaign but attended one TRUMP event. [redacted] thought [redacted] attended the Values Voter Summit. [redacted] was asked why he told [redacted] He explained [redacted] is just someone he's known for a long time.

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FBI(19cv1278)-4225

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/24/2018

[redacted] was interviewed from the offices of [redacted]
[redacted] Washington, D.C. [redacted] appeared via
video from [redacted] offices at [redacted]. The
interviewers were FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Assistant Special
Counsel (ASC) Jeannie S. Rhee. Present representing [redacted] were [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] General Counsel. After being advised of the identities of the
interviewers and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the
following information:

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When [REDACTED] first met Manafort, it was at [REDACTED] does not recall the date. [REDACTED]

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Investigation on 08/23/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # Date drafted 08/23/2018

by _____

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]
08.23.2018

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/23/2018, Page 2 of 3

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[REDACTED] met Manafort two or three times [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] only had a few telephone conversations with Manafort.

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[REDACTED] gave the report to David Sanger of the New York Times.

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FBI(19cv1278)-4246

[REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of 08.23.2018, On 08/23/2018, Page 3 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4247



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/30/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres. Present during the interview was [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7CInvestigation on 12/04/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/05/2017by [redacted]b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 12/04/2017, Page 2 of 2

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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/29/2017

On Thursday, October 19, 2017, [redacted] was interviewed at his residence, [redacted] by Department of Justice Senior Financial Investigator [redacted] and FBI Special Agent [redacted] - Office of the Special Counsel. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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NOTE: [redacted] was being interviewed pursuant to being served a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena by the Office of the Special Counsel on October 5, 2017.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Investigation on 10/19/2017 at [redacted] United States (In Person)File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/20/2017by [redacted]b6
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[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] - October 19, 2017 , On 10/19/2017 , Page 2 of 3

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4253

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~LES~~) [Redacted] - October 19, 2017 , On 10/19/2017 , Page 3 of 3

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
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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/06/2017

[redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY) was interviewed by ASAC [redacted]
[redacted] and SSA [redacted] in Washington, D.C. After being advised of
the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview,
[redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY) provided the following information:

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
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Investigation on 07/24/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In
Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/05/2017

by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/20/2017

[redacted] born [redacted] social security account number [redacted]
[redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed
telephonically. Also present on the call were Special Counsel's Office
(SCO) attorney L. Rush Atkinson and Forensic Accountant [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent,
attorney and accountant, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Investigation on 09/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/13/2017

by [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [Redacted] 302, On 09/13/2017, Page 2 of 2


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/16/2018

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Greg Andres at the law offices of Deveboise and Plimpton located at 919 3rd Ave. 35th Floor, New York, New York. Present during the interview were attorneys for [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

Background

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] In a construction loan, Citizens Bank is determining the value of a property based upon how much the property will be worth when it is completed. It is material to Citizens Bank's decision that the borrower complete the property. The amount of the construction loan does not have to equal the cost of construction; however, if the amount of the loan is less than the cost of construction, the borrower is required to bring in the difference. The reason for this is so Citizens Bank can be sure there is enough money to complete construction on the property.

[redacted]

The construction budget generally comes from the general contractor, but it is signed by the borrower to ensure they agree with it.

Investigation on 12/01/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/03/2017

by [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/01/2017 , Page 2 of 4

Citizens Bank does not offer construction loans for rental properties. Citizens Bank only offers construction loans for primary residences and second homes. [REDACTED] did not believe Citizens Bank offered construction loans for properties the borrower intended to sell upon completion, but the was not 100% sure.

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[REDACTED] believed the amount of the loan and the pricing of the loan varied depending on if the property was a primary residence or second home. [REDACTED] did not know exactly what these changes were.

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It would be an important factor to [REDACTED] to know that the property against which the borrower is seeking a construction loan had other liens against it. All liens need to be paid off before the loan can close. In addition, the liens would need to be factored into the borrower's debt-to-income ratio (DTI).

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DTI is determined by the borrower's debt obligations versus their income. Included in the borrower's debt obligations were all mortgage payments, credit card payments and other loans. The maximum DTI allowed at Citizens Bank is 45%. A DTI exception can be obtained up to 50%. Citizens Bank does not approve any loans with a DTI over 50%.

The borrower is required to disclose all properties owned by them and any debt against those properties. The borrower is also required to disclose any personal loans or unsecured debt. Both of these types of debt obligations factor into the DTI calculation.

It would be an important factor in [REDACTED] to know if the property against which the borrower is seeking a construction loan was in default to another lender. This would indicate that the borrower was a higher risk to the bank. If the default was reflected in the borrower's credit report, it may also negatively affect the borrower's credit score.

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377 Union St., Brooklyn, New York

[REDACTED] for Paul Manafort on a property located at 377 Union St., Brooklyn, New York (Union St.). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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When determining DTI, [REDACTED] uses the average of the past two years tax returns. When [REDACTED] received Manafort's [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview [REDACTED], On 12/01/2017, Page 3 of 4

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A pend/denied loan is sent back to the Loan Officer for restructuring.

[REDACTED] was asked how the Loan Officer could have restructured this loan to make it work. [REDACTED] said the Loan Officer could have lowered the loan amount, had the borrower bring in cash to reduce the loan amount, showed the borrower paid off some outstanding debt to decrease the borrower's liabilities, or somehow restructured the interest rate to reduce the borrower's cost.

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[REDACTED]

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would only accept a year-to-date (YTD) P&L if it was audited by a CPA. Even in the case where a CPA-audited YTD P&L is submitted, [REDACTED] has to obtain Portfolio Exception Underwriting approval to utilize it in his income calculations.

Citizens Bank does not accept borrower-prepared P&Ls. The borrower can submit them, but they cannot be used by underwriting as a factor in the borrower's income calculations. Only CPA-audited P&Ls can be used and even then, only with an exception.

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P&Ls contain income already earned and received. Citizens Bank does not accept projected P&Ls, or P&Ls including income that is expected to be earned in the future. If a borrower provides a projected P&L, it must be disclosed that it is a projected P&L and not a YTD P&L.

Regardless of the type of P&L, [REDACTED] would expect the contents to be accurate and complete. Underwriters are relying on borrowers to provide accurate and complete information about their income and their debt.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that Citizens Bank's Legal Department was looking into issues related to Manafort's foreign businesses and transactions. After this, [REDACTED] never worked on the loan again.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] believed he may have had conversations with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview , On 12/01/2017 , Page 4 of 4

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[REDACTED] was asked if the mere fact that the borrower, or someone on the borrower's behalf was providing a false financial document was relevant to him. [REDACTED] stated he expected borrowers to provide honest information. Had [REDACTED] known the borrower was providing falsified documentation, he would have notified his manager.

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[REDACTED] stated it would be difficult for him to know for sure that the borrower was falsifying documentation. [REDACTED] was not sure he could deny a loan if he suspected the borrower was providing falsified documentation. [REDACTED] had never been in this scenario before. [REDACTED] stated he would notify his manager.


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[REDACTED] made the statement that "people regularly overstate their income" and he does not decline loans because of this fact alone.

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[REDACTED] was asked what the bank relied on to determine a self-employed borrower's income, assets and liabilities. [REDACTED] stated the bank relied on financial documents such as tax returns and P&Ls. [REDACTED] was asked if it would be material to bank's lending decision to know that the tax returns and/or P&Ls contained false information. [REDACTED] stated this was material. In the event a borrower provided false financial documentation, he would notify his manager. [REDACTED] would have to use the true information to determine the borrower's income calculations.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/23/2018

[REDACTED] previously identified, was interviewed by FBI Special Agents [REDACTED] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Andrew Weissmann. Present during the interview were counsel for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of Devbevoise and Plimpton. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED] was advised that his participation in the interview was voluntary and if he chose to answer questions he needed to do so truthfully as lying to a federal agent could constitute a federal crime. [REDACTED] acknowledged his understanding.

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[REDACTED] was asked if Citizens Bank placed any limitations on whether a [REDACTED] borrower could sell the subject property after construction was completed. [REDACTED] stated that Citizens Bank prohibits borrowers from selling the subject property within either six months or one year from the date of completion. Citizens Bank has this limitation because they do not want to lend to borrowers who are flipping properties. [REDACTED] was not sure why Citizens Bank did not want to lend to property flippers, but he assumed it was because property flipping was risky.

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Citizens Bank places various guidelines which underwriters adhere to when underwriting a loan. These guidelines are updated frequently and stored on a shared drive on Citizens Bank's intranet.

[REDACTED] runs a full title search on the subject property, but not on other properties owned by the borrower. The only time a full title search would be run on other properties owned by the borrower would be if there was some red flag and /or the loan was escalated to the fraud department.

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Investigation on 05/03/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # Date drafted 05/04/2018

by _____

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 2 of 5

Even though Citizens Bank does not run full title reports on other properties owned by the borrower, the borrower's liens against other properties are relevant to [REDACTED]. In order to know what liens the borrower has against other properties, Citizens Bank requires the borrower to provide mortgage statements, tax bills and homeowners insurance certifications for all other properties owned. These documents are generally provided by the borrower directly. In the event that the information is not clear on the insurance certificates, the loan officer may verify the information directly with the insurance company, but such direct verification is not standard practice.

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Paul Manafort's [REDACTED]

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The loan officer for Manafort's loan was [REDACTED] and the loan officer assistant was [REDACTED] communicated with both [REDACTED] via email. [REDACTED] did not believe he had phone conversations with [REDACTED] preferred to document everything in emails to avoid confusion of what was said.

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[REDACTED] had been notified by his Legal Department to cease working on the Manafort loan.

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[REDACTED] explained

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 3 of 5

that an unaudited P&L could not be used to qualify a borrower at a higher income amount. In order to use a P&L to increase a borrower's income for qualification purposes, that P&L would have to be audited by a CPA. Even if the P&L was audited by a CPA, [redacted] would only have been able to use it for income qualification purposes with an exception.

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An unaudited P&L could only be used to show stability of income.

[redacted] had never used an accrual based P&L. [redacted] was not sure how Citizens Bank dealt with accrual based P&Ls as he had never received one. [redacted] was not sure if Citizens Bank's guidelines addressed accrual based P&Ls.

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The Manafort loan never closed because Citizens Bank's Legal Department told [redacted] to cease working on it. [redacted] heard from [redacted] that the reason the Legal Department ceased the loan was because of "uncertainty" related to Manafort's foreign relationships. [redacted] did not have any information other than this.

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[redacted] had never had the Legal Department tell him to cease working on a loan before. [redacted] had heard of this happening with [redacted] but it was the first time it happened with one of his loans.

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Document 1 - Underwriter Coversheet Loan Summary

[redacted] was shown a document titled "Underwriter Coversheet - Loan Summary". [redacted] did not believe he had ever seen this document before.

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Document 2 - Email August 5, 2016

[redacted] was shown an email thread between [redacted] dated August 5, 2016 through August 8, 2016. [redacted] was directed to his email on August 5, 2016 which read, [redacted]

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[redacted] had a vague independent recollection of this email communication, but had reviewed his emails more recently to refresh his memory. [redacted] sent this email to notify [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 4 of 5

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[redacted] was shown an email from [redacted] dated August 17, 2016 which included an attachment and read as follows: [redacted]

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[redacted] See attached."

[redacted] recalled receiving this email, but he did not pay much attention to it because he had already heard from the Legal Department by this time.

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Reading the email now, [redacted] understood [redacted]

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Shortly after receiving this email, [redacted]

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[redacted] had never dealt with [redacted] before this loan and did not know if they were [redacted] did not have any personal experience with [redacted] There were some loan officers at Citizens Bank that [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] follow up interview , On 05/03/2018 , Page 5 of 5

encountered [redacted]

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[redacted] If need be, [redacted]


[redacted] This did not happen often, but it did happen.

[redacted] did not follow the 2016 news stories related to Manafort. [redacted] knew such news stories existed, but he did not follow them.

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[redacted] has not had any conversations, outside of with counsel, about 2017 or 2018 news stories related to Manafort being charged with bank fraud or other charges.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/05/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] e-mail address [redacted] was telephonically
interviewed. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing
Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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[Administrative note: [redacted] was previously interviewed on June 3,
2018 by [redacted]
contacted [redacted] via email to request a follow-up discussion.]

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Investigation on 07/09/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)


File # [redacted] Date drafted 09/23/2018

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Telephonic interview of [REDACTED], On 07/09/2018, Page 2 of 2

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/01/2019

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] place of birth [redacted]
[redacted] interviewed at the Special Counsel's
Office, Patriots Plaza 1, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20024. Present
during the interview were [redacted]
[redacted] Present from the FBI were FBI
Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]

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At the beginning of the interview, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC)
Lawrence R. Atkinson, provided the ground rules for the interview.

[redacted] was advised the interview was completely voluntary and that she
could discontinue it, take a break, or speak with her attorneys at any
time. [redacted] was further advised providing intentional false statements
to FBI Agents would be a violation of federal law.

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The Special Counsel's Office provided [redacted] with a proffer agreement
for this interview. Both [redacted] and [redacted] signed the agreement prior to
having any substantive discussions. A copy of the signed proffer agreement
is enclosed for the file as a digital 1A attachment to this FD-302. The
original will be maintained as a physical 1A item.

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Investigation on 11/30/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 12/05/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/30/2017, Page 2 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/30/2017, Page 3 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/30/2017, Page 4 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/30/2017, Page 5 of 7

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [Redacted], On 11/30/2017, Page 6 of 7

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
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/30/2017, Page 7 of 7

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b7C**ADMINISTRATIVE**

Enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302 are: 1) a copy of the proffer agreement provided to [REDACTED] and her attorneys, 2) original notes taken by SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] 3) a copy of the sketch provided by [REDACTED] 4) a copy of a letter received from [REDACTED] subsequent to this interview, 5) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] All of the original documents will be maintained in a physical 1A envelope.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/21/2017

[redacted] born [redacted] social security account number [redacted]
[redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] e-mail address [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at the U.S. Federal Courthouse in Washington, D.C. Also present during the interview were attorneys L. Rush Atkinson and Jeannie Rhee from the Office of the Special Counsel, as well as attorneys [redacted] telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] representing [redacted] After being advised of his rights, the nature of the interview, and the identities of the interviewing Agents and attorneys, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted]
[redacted] He has been employed by First Republic Bank (FRB) for the past [redacted] and is currently assigned to [redacted] office in New York City [redacted]
[redacted] was assigned to the [redacted] office in New York City as a [redacted]
[redacted] was primarily tasked with assisting clients with [redacted]
[redacted] took notes during many of his encounters with clients but did not maintain them. [redacted] never exchanged text messages with FRB customers.

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Michael Cohen, who worked for the Trump Organization, was a customer assigned to [redacted]
[redacted] assisted Cohen about [redacted] mostly with [redacted]
[redacted] described Cohen's personality as "a little aggressive."

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[redacted] recalled assisting Cohen in late October 2016 in opening the bank accounts for Cohen's newly established consulting company, Essential Consultants, LLC (EC). [redacted] was assigned to the matter by [redacted] and gathered the required information from Cohen [redacted]
[redacted] brought signature cards with him for Cohen to sign, as

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Investigation on 08/11/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

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File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/14/2017

by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~b3
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b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED], On 08/11/2017, Page 2 of 2

well as important "Know Your Customer" (KYC) information. KYC regulations require financial institutions to obtain certain information from clients prior to opening bank accounts, such as the expected purpose and use of the account, as well as a description of the expected size and frequency of transactions. KYC procedures are mandated by federal law and are meant to protect both the customer and the financial institution.

Cohen provided [REDACTED] with the formation documents for EC and presented himself as the owner and only signer. Cohen stated EC would be a real estate consulting company serving domestic, high net worth clients. Cohen was unsure what the size of his transactions would be but wanted to keep his income from EC separate and apart from his Trump Organization income. Cohen wanted the EC account opened quickly and used [REDACTED] as the business address for EC. Based upon [REDACTED] conversation with Cohen, [REDACTED] assigned the account a NAICS Code of "consulting."

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FRB uses a program called Flightpath to compile and track KYC disclosures and has a department within the bank tasked with reviewing these disclosures. [REDACTED] recalled that after initially inputting the KYC information into Flightpath for EC in October 2016, he was asked to supplement that information because it was deemed to be incomplete. [REDACTED] used his notes from his initial meeting with Cohen to later supplement the KYC information for EC.

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
[REDACTED] was provided with the attached wire transfer form relating to EC. [REDACTED] assisted Cohen with this wire transfer, which occurred the day after the EC account was opened. The purpose of the wire, which [REDACTED] listed as "retainer," was based upon information provided by Cohen.

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The attached documents were shown to [REDACTED] during the interview.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/12/2018

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Jason James Miller, DOB [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office (SCO), located at 395 E Street, SW, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were Senior Assistance Special Counsel (SASC) Jeannie Rhee, Assistant Special Counsel (ASC) Aaron Zelinsky, FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] FBI Intelligence Analyst [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was accompanied by his attorney, [REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED] cell phone number [REDACTED] and email address [REDACTED] from the law offices of Greenberg Traurig. Miller was advised the interview was entirely voluntary and that he could discontinue it at any time. Miller was further advised that intentionally providing false statements to FBI Agents was a violation of federal law. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing team and the purpose of the interview, Miller provided the following information:

2016 Presidential Campaign

Miller began work at the 2016 Donald J. Trump Presidential Campaign (Trump campaign) in the final week of June 2016, either the 29th or 30th when the "Bloomberg story popped." [Agent Note: On June 28, 2016, an article was published on Bloomberg.com titled, "Trump Hires Ex-Cruz Aide as Communications Adviser."]

Miller was brought onto the campaign as a senior communications advisor. Miller's duties included organizing the press shop and paid media communications. Miller advised he brought additional people from his previous firm to work for the campaign as contractors.

In and around the time Miller joined the campaign, in June 2016, Miller reported to Jared Kushner (Kushner), Donald Trump (Trump), Kellyanne Conway (Conway), and Paul Manafort (Manafort), who was the campaign chairman at the time. Miller said he later also reported to Stephen Bannon (Bannon).

Miller frequently spoke with Trump in the mornings at approximately 6:30 AM EST. Miller said these conversations occurred approximately five days per week. If it was a bad news day, Miller said he might have

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Investigation on 12/04/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/04/2018

by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jason Miller 12/04/2018 , On 12/04/2018 , Page 2 of 6

"chickened out" and not called Trump. On the calls, Miller and Trump would talk about the news of the day and Trump would ask for Miller's opinion on what to talk about. The calls lasted between 2 and 20 minutes. After the 6:30 AM call with Trump, Miller would then have a department wide call with the communications team at approximately 7:00 or 7:30 AM EST.

Miller was in a couple Trump family meetings during the August timeframe but said the family meeting concept never "codified". Miller said [redacted] who worked with Eric Trump, Donald Trump Jr., and sometimes Ivanka Trump. [redacted] etc. Miller thought family meetings were a waste of time because they were inward facing as opposed to outward facing.

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Miller did not recall any talk within the campaign around the time he joined regarding WikiLeaks. Once the WikiLeaks dumps started, Miller's job was to make sure as many people saw them as possible. Miller would ask individuals from the Republican National Committee (RNC) if there was anything contained in the releases that should be pushed out by the campaign.

During the end of June into early August 2016, Trump was focused on Hillary Clinton's deleted emails. Miller said Trump would often say "that's the real crime". Trump said everyone was talking about WikiLeaks but not the deletions. Miller thought Trump was trolling the media during the speech in which Trump said "Russia if you're listening...". The goal was to shift the media focus back onto Clinton's deleted emails. Miller recalled the communications team had to do "clean up" after the speech because Trump's aforementioned statement on Russia could have been perceived as encouragement to Russia. Trump said he wasn't encouraging anything, but needed to keep the focus on Clinton's criminal acts. Miller said Trump stated "they are out there somewhere". Any time Trump says "many people say" or "they say" these are more like catch phrases, not necessarily meaning Trump has been told something.

Miller was not aware of any attempts by the campaign to obtain Clinton's deleted emails. Miller said there was never a communications plan addressing "here's what's coming from Julian Assange".

The only type of conversation Miller could recall pertaining to WikiLeaks was a time when he spoke with [redacted] and asked for the RNC's help going through what WikiLeaks had released. [redacted] said yes. Miller did not recall the first time he asked the RNC for help in combing through the WikiLeaks dumps, but he knew for a fact one reach-out happened after the Podesta dumps occurred [Agent Note: On or about October 7, 2016, the first in a series of releases containing the personal emails of John

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[REDACTED]
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jason Miller 12/04/2018 , On 12/04/2018 , Page 3 of 6

Podesta were posted by WikiLeaks]. Miller recalled asking the RNC for help on things all the time. Miller said the campaign did not have a research department and any research the campaign did typically required the RNC's help.

In or around July 2016, prior to the WikiLeaks dumps on 07/22/2016, there was no strategy being built around information that might be released or leaked. At that time, Miller was trying to increase his staffing level from three people and prepare for the Republican National Convention. Miller did not recall any conversations in this time frame pertaining to Guccifer 2.0 or DCLeaks. Miller also did not recall any planning meetings regarding Guccifer 2.0 or DCLeaks.

Roger Stone

Miller said he crossed paths with the Trump orbit in 2011. At that time, there were talks about Miller potentially managing a Trump presidential campaign. Miller first realized Roger Stone (Stone) was in Trump's orbit during this timeframe.

In 2016, Miller had heard from a prominent national reporter that Stone had said Miller was a "good hire" by the Trump campaign. Miller said he did not have any natural allies coming from the outside of Trump's orbit so he thought it was a good thing Stone supported his hiring. When Miller first arrived on the campaign he had breakfast or lunch with Stone. It is possible this was the first time Miller met Stone in person. The goal of the meeting was to pick Stone's brain for advice on interacting with Trump. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Stone did not tell Miller about possible upcoming releases of information and Miller did not recall conversations regarding Clinton's missing 33,000 emails. Miller did not recall conversations with Stone regarding John Podesta.

Shortly after joining the campaign, Miller spoke to Stone by phone. The conversation was general in substance and consisted of statements like "hey how are you" and "good luck in your new position". Miller said Stone wanted Miller to view him as someone who should be let back into Trump's orbit. Miller would not take Stone's call every time Stone reached out. The topics of Stone's calls included press events with Danney Williams and advice that the campaign should focus on getting African American votes. Bannon later assigned Miller to placate Stone on Stone's request for an interview with Infowars.

Miller was told by campaign staff, specifically Hope Hicks (Hicks) and Kushner, that anyone no longer with the campaign was persona non grata.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jason Miller 12/04/2018 , On 12/04/2018 , Page 4 of 6

Miller was instructed not to over-share with these people. Miller said when Stone's name came up, people's eyes rolled. Miller did not recall Trump mentioning Stone. Manafort mentioned Stone once or twice in passing.

Miller recalled walking by Stone on the street during the Republican National Convention. There was a camera crew following Stone.

**** Miller was shown an email dated 08/08/2016 (Show Doc #1) ****

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**** The interview was suspended to allow Miller to speak with his attorney privately ****

**** After the break, Miller was shown an email dated 08/11/2016 (Show Doc #2)**

Miller did not recall sending the email shown to him by SCO investigators (Show Doc #2). Miller remembered placating Stone and staying on his good side. Miller never had a conversation with Stone about Stone being in touch with WikiLeaks. Miller said if something was in the news on a given day, he was talking about it. Miller did not know of and was not part of yet to be released dumps. Miller's job was to amplify and to make news bigger. Miller said he relied on the RNC to tell him what was in the dumps once they had been released.

Prior to October 7, 2016 Releases

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Miller did not know in advance of the Access Hollywood tape release on 10/07/2016 that it would be coming. Miller did not recall specific information information prior to 10/07/2016 regarding a "bombshell" tape. Miller did recall hearing stories about there potentially being a tape in which Trump used the "N-word". Miller said that on the morning on 10/07/2016 he was in New York. On this day, Miller went into the campaign

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jason Miller 12/04/2018 , On 12/04/2018 , Page 5 of 6

office for debate preparation on the 25th floor of Trump Tower. Miller said Sunday, 10/09/2016 was the date of the second debate in St. Louis, MO. Miller was part of a team doing a run-through with then-candidate Trump in preparation for the debate. The team included Chris Christie, Rudy Giuliani, and Kellyanne Conway. Miller said Hicks came into the room from somewhere else and showed him an email from David Fahrenthold (Fahrenthold) inquiring about the contents of a yet to be released Access Hollywood tape [Agent Note: David A. Fahrenthold is an American journalist who writes for the Washington Post]. Miller said they needed the tape, to which Fahrenthold pushed back. Fahrenthold gave a rough transcript and eventually sent the video in advance of the public release.

Miller said when the story finally "popped" he was in Trump Tower and going into damage control mode. Miller and his team were pulling campaign surrogates from television appearances because no one could give a good answer to questions regarding the tape. Miller and his team eventually pushed out a statement saying the statements in the tape amounted to "locker room talk". The campaign was being flooded with inquiries from political allies and reporters. Miller subsequently asked his RNC contacts for their top hits on Clinton and if anything good had come out of the WikiLeaks dumps of Podesta's emails later that day.

Miller did not recall where he was when the first WikiLeaks releases of Podesta's emails came out. Miller did not recall who told him about the dumps. Miller did not recall knowing something was coming. Miller recalled feeling like the campaign was "screwed" after the Access Hollywood tape came out.

Miller knew the WikiLeaks releases were negative news for the Clinton campaign and therefore wanted to amplify them. Miller asked his television team if they had any negative television ads ready to go. Miller said the "WikiLeaks stuff" was pushed hard over the days following the initial WikiLeaks releases on 10/07/2016.

Miller said there was an initial "oh shit" factor on 10/07/2016, but by Saturday, 10/08/2016, the communications team had formulated counter punches using the material WikiLeaks had put out. Miller did not recall hearing of anyone who affected the release of the WikiLeaks material after the Access Hollywood tape dropped. Miller did not recall anyone taking credit for the release of WikiLeaks information.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] On 10/09/2016, Miller took a flight to St. Louis, MO for the debate.

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
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jason Miller 12/04/2018 , On 12/04/2018 , Page 6 of 6

Miller said he wanted to be ready if WikiLeaks continued to "dribble stuff out". Miller knew there would be more from information he saw in the public domain.

Miller did not recall Clinton's emails coming up during his time on the Ted Cruz campaign.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/05/2017

On Wednesday, October 4, 2017, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was interviewed telephonically by Senior Financial Investigator (SFI)

[REDACTED] Office of the Special Counsel. After being advised

the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] furnished the following information:

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[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~Investigation on 10/04/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 10/05/2017by [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Interview - October 4, 2017, On 10/04/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/10/2017

FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(E)

Do not disseminate except as authorized by federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e).

On Wednesday, August 2, 2017, [REDACTED] was interviewed telephonically by Senior Financial Investigator (SFI) [REDACTED] Office of the Special Counsel. After being advised that a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena was emailed to him at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] furnished the following information:

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A copy of the Grand Jury Subpoena and Proof of Service have been attached for the file.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

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
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Investigation on 08/02/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone, Email)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/08/2017

by [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/14/2017

On Wednesday, September 13, 2017, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed
telephonically by Senior Financial Investigator (SFI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Office of the Special Counsel. After being advised the
purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] furnished the following information:

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ADMINISTRATIVE:

[REDACTED]


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Investigation on 09/13/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 09/14/2017

by [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 10/02/2017

On Thursday, September 21, 2017, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was interviewed telephonically
by Senior Financial Investigator (SFI) [REDACTED] Office of the
Special Counsel. After being advised the purpose of the interview,
[REDACTED] furnished the following information:

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Investigation on 09/21/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)


File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 10/02/2017

by [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/01/2017

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

interviewed regarding events surrounding [Redacted]

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[Redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP


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Investigation on 05/12/2017 at Washington , District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/12/2017

by [Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/17/2018

(U) On 05/11/2018 Special Agents [redacted] interviewed [redacted] [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(U) The 4/27/2016 Center for the National Interest (CNI) event utilized three rooms, the Senate Room, the State Room, and the East Room. The State and East Rooms were split by a floating wall and the stage with the East Room acting as a holding room. After the speech, people exited into the foyer and the luncheon was set up in the East Room.

(U) CNI also rented the Pennsylvania Room which was on the second floor. [redacted]

It is possible that staffers may have used it for storage, but because it was on the second floor it was not the most convenient to store large Audio /Visual (AV) equipment cases.

(U) [redacted] main point of contact for the event was [redacted] from the DONALD J. TRUMP (TRUMP) CAMPAIGN. [redacted] handled the AV for the event with an outside company. The outside company may have stored equipment on the second floor, but most of it was in the East Room.

(U) [redacted] also worked with PAUL SAUNDERS (SAUNDERS) from CNI and [redacted] spent some time with SAUNDERS during the event. SAUNDERS made clear to [redacted] the event was not the TRUMP CAMPAIGN's event and it was CNI hosting TRUMP as the speaker. However, on the day of the event, the TRUMP CAMPAIGN took over and coordinated directly with [redacted] for staging.

(U) Neither the TRUMP CAMPAIGN nor CNI rented any other rooms, including sleeping rooms, that day. If the TRUMP CAMPAIGN rented sleeping rooms, it would have been under a different contract or name.

(U) [redacted] dealt with the TRUMP CAMPAIGN on staging and requirements for the candidate. As an example, the TRUMP CAMPAIGN requested mirrors be available for the candidate. The TRUMP CAMPAIGN made no request for additional rooms. Hotel staff was barred from the East Room by Secret

Investigation on 05/11/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/14/2018

by [redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/11/2018, Page 2 of 2

Service until the candidate had left. [REDACTED] both spent most of the time that day dealing with the event staging and protestors in the hotel.

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(U) [REDACTED] did not see TRUMP, JARED KUSHNER, or then-SENATOR SESSIONS during the event.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/01/2017

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[redacted] was b6
interviewed regarding [redacted] b7C

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Investigation on 05/11/2017 at Washington , District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/14/2017

by [redacted]

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
[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 05/11/2017, Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/01/2017

On 05/15/2017, Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] was contacted by the [Redacted] who advised [Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Investigation on 05/15/2017 at Washington , District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/17/2017
by [Redacted]


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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Inventory - , On 05/15/2017 , Page 2 o b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/04/2017

JOE JIMENEZ, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of NOVARTIS AG (NOVARTIS), was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Forensic Accountant [REDACTED] and Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP (Cravath), 825 8th Avenue, New York, NY 10019. JIMENEZ was accompanied by NOVARTIS outside counsel, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, JIMENEZ provided the following information:

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

JIMENEZ was made CEO of NOVARTIS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Prior to being introduced to MICHAEL COHEN through a friend, JIMENEZ did not know who COHEN was.

During the 2016 United States (U.S.) Presidential campaign, both DONALD TRUMP and HILLARY CLINTON were targeting drug companies. The rhetoric was not favorable. TRUMP and CLINTON were saying drug prices needed to come down.

Investigation on 11/14/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/24/2017by [REDACTED]b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez , On 11/14/2017 , Page 2 of 13

On or about November 29, 2017, after TRUMP won the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, [REDACTED]

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JIMENEZ believed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] knew COHEN was setting up a consulting company. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez , On 11/14/2017 , Page 3 of 13

JIMENEZ did not know [REDACTED]

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NOVARTIS had a political consulting relationship with a company called TENEO. [REDACTED]

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The next time JIMENEZ spoke to COHEN was in or about January 2017. COHEN reached out to JIMENEZ and JIMENEZ subsequently returned COHEN's call. JIMENEZ did not have any contact with COHEN in December 2016. In the November/December 2016 time frame, NOVARTIS was working on policy proposals. NOVARTIS was pro-innovation, so the company was focused on policies such as outcome-based pricing and rebates for consumers. Also during this time frame, JIMENEZ was looking for other consultants. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez, On 11/14/2017, Page 4 of 13

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[REDACTED] JIMENEZ recalled thinking hiring COHEN seemed like a good idea. However, JIMENEZ did not seek COHEN out. It was COHEN that reached out to JIMENEZ to sell him on what COHEN could do for NOVARTIS.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez, On 11/14/2017, Page 5 of 13

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JIMENEZ explained outcomes-based pricing and rebates to COHEN.

JIMENEZ felt like COHEN wanted to help NOVARTIS

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez , On 11/14/2017 , Page 6 of 13

After COHEN sent JIMENEZ a consulting contract, JIMENEZ

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COHEN told JIMENEZ he wanted to keep the relationship with NOVARTIS confidential. A lot of consultants JIMENEZ worked with said the same thing. At the time JIMENEZ hired COHEN, JIMENEZ was not concerned about the confidentiality of NOVARTIS' relationship with COHEN. COHEN did not tell JIMENEZ who his other clients were, nor did JIMENEZ ask.

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JIMENEZ did not attend the March 1, 2017 in-person meeting in New York with COHEN.

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After the meeting with COHEN,

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez , On 11/14/2017 , Page 7 of 13

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JIMENEZ sometimes sent COHEN

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez, On 11/14/2017, Page 8 of 13

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez, On 11/14/2017, Page 9 of 13

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez , On 11/14/2017 , Page 10 of 13

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If JIMENEZ were to speak with someone at NOVARTIS regarding COHEN's idea about it was

However, JIMENEZ never spoke to

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COHEN's offer to do this made JIMENEZ feel like COHEN really wanted to be a consultant. JIMENEZ noted that

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez , On 11/14/2017 , Page 11 of 13

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COHEN was successful at what he did as an attorney. Additionally, COHEN was close to people in the TRUMP administration.

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Nothing ever came of this, but JIMENEZ indicated that had NOVARTIS been interested

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez , On 11/14/2017 , Page 12 of 13

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[REDACTED] During a conversation JIMENEZ had with COHEN, COHEN said [REDACTED]

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In September 2017, JIMENEZ wanted [REDACTED]

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The last time JIMENEZ spoke to COHEN was in or about September 2017. JIMENEZ and COHEN did not discuss JIMENEZ stepping down as CEO of NOVARTIS. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Even though it was publicly announced, JIMENEZ was not sure if COHEN knew JIMENEZ was stepping down. COHEN and JIMENEZ had not discussed it.

JIMENEZ and COHEN did not have any discussions about where the name ESSENTIAL CONSULTANTS came from. When JIMENEZ first spoke with COHEN, COHEN said he was creating a consulting company, so JIMENEZ assumed ESSENTIAL CONSULTANTS was the name COHEN chose.

COHEN never told JIMENEZ that NOVARTIS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] JIMENEZ and COHEN did not discuss COHEN's other clients.

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
Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Joe Jimenez, On 11/14/2017, Page 13 of 13

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JIMENEZ never met COHEN in person.

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: All emails and documents shown to JIMENEZ are included in the attached 1A envelope.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/23/2018

BRITTANY NICOLE KAISER (KAISER), date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED] social security account number (SSAN) [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Special Counsel's Office, located at 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC. KAISER's cell phone number is [REDACTED] was accompanied by her attorneys, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [REDACTED], FBI Intelligence Analyst (IA) [REDACTED], FBI IA [REDACTED], and Assistant Special Counsel LAWRENCE R. ATKINSON.

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ATKINSON instructed KAISER on the ground rules for the interview and advised the interview would not be recorded and hand written notes would be taken by both SA [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED]. KAISER was informed the interview was voluntary and she could take a break or speak with her counsel at any time. KAISER was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which she acknowledged.

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KAISER was provided with a proffer agreement for this interview. KAISER was then afforded the opportunity to discuss the proffer agreement with her attorneys. KAISER expressed she did not have any questions as to its contents. KAISER, [REDACTED] and ATKINSON signed the agreement, which was witnessed by SA [REDACTED].

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After being advised of the nature of the interview, KAISER provided the following information:

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b7EInvestigation on 07/18/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/14/2018by [REDACTED]b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Brittany Nicole Kaiser. , On 07/18/2018 , Page 2 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Brittany Nicole Kaiser. , On 07/18/2018 , Page 3 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Brittany Nicole Kaiser., On 07/18/2018, Page 4 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Brittany Nicole Kaiser. , On 07/18/2018 , Page 5 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Brittany Nicole Kaiser. , On 07/18/2018 , Page 6 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Brittany Nicole Kaiser., On 07/18/2018, Page 7 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Brittany Nicole Kaiser. , On 07/18/2018 , Page 8 of 10

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Brittany Nicole Kaiser., On 07/18/2018, Page 9 of 10

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
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Brittany Nicole Kaiser. , On 07/18/2018 , Page 10 of 10

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Enclosed for the file as digital 1A attachments to this FD-302 are: 1) the proffer agreement provided to KAISER; 2) a copy of a document representing notes that were taken during by SCO attorneys during a attorney proffer which took place prior to this interview. SA [REDACTED] was not present for the attorney proffer.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/12/2017

On May 3, 2017, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed at his place of
employment. Also present during the interview was financial investigator
[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the
following information:

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
Investigation on 05/03/2017 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/05/2017

by [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/27/2018

On February 5, 2018, SA [REDACTED] Special Counsel Prosecutor (SCP) Andrew Weissmann, and SCP Brian Richardson interviewed [REDACTED] at the Special Counsel's offices. [REDACTED] was represented by counsel. Before the start of the interview, [REDACTED] was advised that the interview was voluntary and that lying to federal investigators was against the law. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing team, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED]

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b7CGenesis of the Skadden Report and Initial FARA Review

[REDACTED] with GREG CRAIG and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] by CRAIG or [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] an
independent report about the prosecution of Yulia Tymoshenko. The project involved an analysis of Tymoshenko's prosecution under Western legal standards. This was [REDACTED] looking at the FARA law.

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[REDACTED]

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Investigation on 02/05/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 02/08/2018

by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED], On 02/05/2018, Page 2 of 7

[REDACTED] and/or CRAIG, [REDACTED] spoke to [REDACTED] who had more experience with FARA. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] agreed that FARA did not apply to the commission of an independent report. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had no recollection of any discussions about PR work related to the report. [REDACTED] explained that if lobbying the media had been described in the request for legal review, he would have examined the question more deeply.

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Writing and Releasing the Report

Not everyone was on the same page with regards to legal opinions in the report. It was difficult to understand Ukrainian law and Skadden needed to conduct interviews. [REDACTED] drafting the Skadden Report and as such he knew about the interviews they were conducting.

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Skadden was able to get transcripts from most of Tymosehko's trial but not all, so they relied on the interviews and documents supplied by Tymosehko. Additionally, the transcripts required translation which created a bottleneck in the process. The final report did not mention that full transcripts of the trial were never received.

[REDACTED] had no recollection of outreach to the New York Times prior to the release of the report.

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After publication, [REDACTED] recalled a number of inaccurate news stores about the report. Others at Skadden were frustrated and [REDACTED] recalled a collective desire to set the record straight.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED], On 02/05/2018, Page 3 of 7

[REDACTED]

There was not a clear understanding of Ukrainian law on the part of Skadden. The nature of the Prime Minister's powers was likewise not clearly understood. At one point in time, Skadden had requested general standards of Ukrainian law but what they received was not helpful.

The report would look at due process standards under a Western legal framework.

There was no effort made in the report to resolve factual disputes, only whether or not Tymoshenko had substantiated her claims. The report found that Tymoshenko had not substantiated her claims of selective prosecution. Skadden knew that selective prosecution charges would be scrutinized.

Comments from the government were passed through PAUL MANAFORT but did not come directly from MANAFORT. [REDACTED] remembered hearing MANAFORT's name and that he was working for the Government of Ukraine (GoU).

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[REDACTED]

Skadden received comments from GoU or others. These comments came through MANAFORT and Skadden was told that they were from Ukraine. Some comments were in English, and others were either in Russian or Ukrainian. [REDACTED] did not recall whether comments came from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the President, or someone else.

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[REDACTED] understood that MOJ was the client for the report.

[REDACTED] did not know RICHARD GATES or KONSTANTIN KILIMNIK.

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[REDACTED]
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b7EContinuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED], On 02/05/2018, Page 4 of 7

[REDACTED] did not recall information about wires, fees or sources of funds. [REDACTED] did understand, however, that part of their payment came from MOJ, and part came from someone else with a lot of money who was associated with Russia or Ukraine.

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[REDACTED] did not recall any discussions about the source of funds and fees being included in the report.

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[REDACTED] heard about a "Project 2" related to Ukraine work. He did not recall, however, what he thought it was at the time. At the time of the interview, [REDACTED] understood "Project 2" involved Skadden providing consultancy related to due process for a retrial of Tymoshenko.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not recall a media rollout plan.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [Redacted], On 02/05/2018, Page 5 of 7

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There had been a discussion about CRAIG responding to the news that and CRAIG.

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 did not recall responses on behalf of Skadden.

 did not recall sending the report to media or NGO's. He likewise did not recall any outreach to Albright or Durbin.

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 had anticipated more questions about the substance of the report.

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Both GoU and Tymoshenko's side had routinely lied about what happened in the trial. US accounts of the trial had been inaccurate. Kyiv Post reports seemed to be the most accurate.

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b7EContinuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED], On 02/05/2018, Page 7 of 7

GoU took the position that report vindicated them.

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[REDACTED] did not recall discussions regarding Ukrainian law experts.

CRAIG conveyed that nobody in the West knew what Tymoshenko's trial was about and wanted to get information out. Early on, there had been a conversation with CRAIG about what would happen if the report reached a negative conclusion. CRAIG responded that Ukraine had been beaten up so much at that point that anything would be better than its current status.

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[REDACTED]
Furthermore, Ukraine was the client and they could choose not to publish the report if they wished.

The Ukrainian officials did not understand the concept of an independent report and offered comments and feedback on the report.

[REDACTED] did not recall making distinctions among GoU officials at the time. Some of the comments were insistent and argumentative, reflecting a part of the report and identifying why it was wrong. CRAIG would receive the comments and [REDACTED]

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Comments were evaluated based on merit. Some comments were related to characterizing conclusions in different ways. VAN DER ZWAAN was more receptive to the GoU's requests to soften the report's language. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] CRAIG was in the middle between the two.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Skadden could only share drafts of the report with GoU.

[REDACTED] understood MANAFORT worked with the Ukrainian government so there were no perceived privilege issues related to sharing the report with him. Distinctions between MANAFORT and GoU were not considered.

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
In interviews, CRAIG would ask questions while [REDACTED] A laptop was used in some interviews. [REDACTED] did not recall taping any interviews.

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At the conclusion of the report, [REDACTED] attended a farewell dinner that included two Ministry of Justice officials, a translator, and a guitar player. [REDACTED] received knickknacks from his hosts, including a plastic clock that broke immediately. Everyone at the dinner gave a toast.

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FBI(19cv1278)-4360



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/19/2018

On May 10th 2018 10:00 AM, at the office of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's legal counsel, Perkins Coie, 700 Thirteenth Street Northwest, Suite 600, Washington, District of Columbia 20005, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Date of Birth (DOB) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed by employees of the Special Counsel's Office. In attendance were Perkins Coie Attorney [REDACTED] Perkins Coie Attorney [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation Management and Program Analyst [REDACTED] Special Counsel Attorney Jessica Romero, Special Counsel Attorney Lawrence Rush Atkinson V, and Special Counsel Attorney Heather Alpino. After being advised of the identity of the interview agents, and purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] stated the following:

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[REDACTED] was contracted by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) temporarily during [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] While contracted to the DCCC, [REDACTED] worked on the main floor of the DCCC located at 430 South Capitol St Southeast, Washington, District of Columbia, 20003. During the Summer of 2016, the DCCC and Democratic National Committee (DNC) shared a floor of the building. [REDACTED] mainly worked in a cubicle on the main floor, [REDACTED] although he did work from home on occasion. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There was another person in charge of the [REDACTED] team, who was comprised of approximately [REDACTED] or more persons.

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[REDACTED] did not work from home much, but did recall a day that the entire District of Columbia Metro system shut down and much of the office had to work from home. [REDACTED] also worked from home toward the end of his contract with the DCCC.

While working at DCCC, [REDACTED] worked on a few different projects, two of these projects used the Vertica server, hosted at the DNC, that contained voter polling information. The person that managed the Vertica server was [REDACTED]

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Investigation on 05/10/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED]-SM-2589105 Date drafted 05/10/2018

by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]-SM-2589105

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 05/10/2018, Page 2 of 2

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[REDACTED] In order to access the Vertica server, [REDACTED] would have to log into the DNC Virtual Private Network (VPN). [REDACTED] VPN credentials were different from his credentials to access the DCCC Windows domain. [REDACTED] also recollected that there was two factor authentication via a smart phone application. There was also another credential for the Vertica server that began with [REDACTED] however [REDACTED] could not recall the rest of the username. [REDACTED] stated that as far as he knows, the Vertica system was only comprised of a production server and had no testing or staging instances.

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[REDACTED] was assigned a laptop running Microsoft Windows by the DCCC, but it remained in the office at all times. As he was a contractor, he was not permitted to take his work assigned laptop home, whereas employees of the DCCC were permitted to do so. [REDACTED] did not share his work computer with any other employees. When working from home, he would use his personal Chromebook. [REDACTED] did not recall connecting via Remote Desktop Protocol to any DCCC or DNC computers from home through the VPN. [REDACTED] was not assigned a smart phone by the DCCC, but believed that he may have had the Microsoft Outlook application installed on his personal phone to access his DCCC email.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not recall any suspicious emails arriving in his inbox during the summer of 2016. However, [REDACTED] did recall an episode where the person [REDACTED] may have clicked on a spear-phishing email in April 2016. At that time, Technical Support came rushing in. [REDACTED] does not recall the man's name, only that he worked in political support.


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When asked if he recalled [REDACTED] stated that he recognized the name and may have interacted with her in regards to [REDACTED] He believed that [REDACTED] helped with administrative tasks.

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When asked if he recalled [REDACTED] stated that he did not recognize her name.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/19/2017

Larry Krantz was interviewed over the telephone on 07/17/2017 at approximately 12:41pm by Special Agent [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, KRANTZ provided the following information:

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(U) Larry Krantz informed writer that he met with Anatoli Samochornov who informed Krantz of his situation and his previous interactions with writer. Samochornov had elected to retain Krantz as his counsel. Krantz is a former Assistant U.S. Attorney who had previously worked with Andrew Weissman. Krantz currently works with the law firm Krantz-Berman, located in Manhattan, New York. His office telephone number was [REDACTED] and his cellular telephone number was [REDACTED]. At the time of the call, Krantz was not in his office and if the Special Counsel needed to reach him they could call his cellular telephone.


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Investigation on 07/14/2017 at New York, New York, United States (Phone)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 07/18/2017

by [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/21/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed telephonically on February 1, 2018 via contacting his cellular telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of interviewing Agent [redacted] and the nature of the interview. Agent [redacted] was present for the end portion of the interview. [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was asked who he has spoken with from the DONALD J. TRUMP Presidential Campaign (Campaign) since he was previously interviewed on August 11, 2017. [redacted] said he talks to [redacted] periodically and has talked to KEITH KELLOGG once since that time. [redacted] saw KELLOGG at a White House veterans signing ceremony. [redacted] exchanged text messages with COREY LEWANDOWSKI congratulating LEWANDOWSKI on his book. [redacted] has seen STEVE BANNON but could not recall if that was before or after [redacted]

[redacted] in August or September 2017. BANNON asked [redacted]

[redacted] told BANNON he would entertain the idea. [redacted] recalls one of BANNON's aides attending the meeting, as well. [redacted] did not recall the aide's name but described him [redacted]. [redacted] did not recognize [redacted] from the campaign. [redacted] also attended the meeting with BANNON. [redacted] offered to check his records regarding the specific date of the meeting and explained it was right before BANNON was fired.

[redacted] was asked about [redacted] and whether [redacted] was discussed at the meeting. [redacted] stated he met [redacted] years ago and [redacted] did not come up in the meeting with BANNON. [redacted] was asked if he recalled talking to anyone in the campaign about [redacted] didn't recall [redacted] ever coming up while [redacted] was involved in the campaign. [redacted] is not in contact with [redacted]

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Investigation on 02/01/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/05/2018

by [redacted]

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[redacted]
(U) Telephonic interview of [redacted]
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] on 02/01/2018, On 02/01/2018, Page 2 of 2

[redacted] was asked about GEORGE NADER. [redacted] explained that NADER's name came up at the meeting with BANNON and [redacted] met with NADER. BANNON had asked [redacted] to meet with NADER and [redacted]

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[redacted] recalls a business deal that came up [redacted] but did not recall the details. [redacted] said nothing ever happened from the potential business deal but they did have phone calls after the meeting. [redacted] was asked if NADER ever mentioned [redacted] did not recall talking about [redacted] thought it was just [redacted] NADER and [redacted]

[redacted] recalls hearing from someone that [redacted] doing business again but [redacted] does not recall who told him that or the details.


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[redacted] was asked if he had any other meetings with NADER. [redacted] thought he remembered running into NADER at a luncheon [redacted]

[redacted] doesn't recall where the luncheon was or who was there but thinks it was probably related to another potential business deal. [redacted] thought it might have been in Washington, D.C. at the coffee shop in the Trump Hotel. [redacted] thinks he was at the lunch to meet some business people [redacted] wanted to introduce [redacted] to. [redacted] thought this was last fall and nothing came of that business deal either.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/13/2018

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed at telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] were very interested and involved in the investigation of the 2012 Benghazi attack. [redacted] wanted to raise awareness of the upcoming trial of Khattala for his role in the Benghazi attack. [redacted] met with Steve Bannon. They discussed the Khattala trial and the role that Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood played in the Benghazi attack. Bannon said that George Nader could help with these issues. Bannon arranged a breakfast meeting between [redacted] and Nader.

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[redacted] had breakfast with Nader the next day. Nader spent the first thirty or more minutes of the breakfast explaining how great he was. Nader mentioned the names of many people with which he had contacts. Nader mentioned Erik Prince. Nader said that he attended a meeting in the Seychelles with Prince and MBZ. [redacted] cannot remember if Nader said what the Seychelles meeting was about, but it may have been the ongoing dispute that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had with Qatar. [redacted] does not recall Nader mentioning that a Russian was at the meeting. Nader ended breakfast by saying he would set up a meeting between [redacted]

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[redacted] had a lunch meeting with Nader and [redacted] to discuss an upcoming seminar or panel event that [redacted] was arranging. [redacted] does not recall for certain but the event may have focused on the Benghazi attack, Qatar support of the Muslim Brotherhood or other regional issues. [redacted] and two other guys arrived at the end of the lunch to pitch their work. [redacted] did not attend the event because of a scheduling conflict.


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Investigation on 02/02/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 02/02/2018

by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/09/2017

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed on August 11, 2017 at his business address at [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of interviewing Agents [redacted] and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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On the morning of August 11, 2017, at approximately 9:00a [redacted] [redacted] contacted [redacted] via telephone to inquire about his availability. [redacted] agreed to meet the interviewing agents at his office at 11:00am. Earlier that day, after hearing from the investigating agents, [redacted] from a Washington Post reporter, CAROL LEONNIG, phone number [redacted] who indicated she was doing an article about a Trump campaign meeting [redacted] was at and wanted to ask if he had any comments. [redacted] thought the timing was odd since we had just contacted him right before that call and he has not been contacted by reporters in a while.

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[redacted] indicated that he had been friends with Chris Stevens who died in Benghazi. [redacted] worked with the Benghazi Committee and [redacted] [redacted] had been at a meeting [redacted] attended and asked [redacted] if he would be interested in joining the campaign. [redacted] had known [redacted] for a couple years prior to becoming involved in the campaign. They knew each other through [redacted] told [redacted] to send in his resume. [redacted] initially said no, but later submitted his resume in approximately February 2016 and interviewed with SAM CLOVIS in Washington, D.C. shortly after. Then [redacted] received a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) from the campaign and signed it shortly after. [redacted] had a copy of the NDA [redacted] expressed concerns about violating the NDA by talking with investigators.

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Investigation on 08/11/2017 at Virginia Beach, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/21/2017
by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]
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(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2017, On 08/11/2017, Page 2 of 9

[REDACTED] indicated that there were two different versions of the Foreign Policy team, including the original group and then a later reconstituted group. The original team had 8 members, including 3 or 4 who were not announced. Only 4 members of the original group were retained for the reconstituted group.

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[REDACTED] recalls meeting the second foreign policy team at Trump Tower in New York. [REDACTED] recalls there were two press releases disclosing the initial group and thinks the second group met in early October. This group was also announced in the press and included MICHAEL FLYNN and KT MCFARLAND and totaled about 16 members.

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In the original foreign policy team, there were several retired military members including [REDACTED] KEITH KELLOGG, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The other members were [REDACTED] WALID PHARES, GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS and CARTER PAGE. [REDACTED] thinks [REDACTED] and PAGE may have served in the U.S. Navy.

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When [REDACTED] joined the campaign, CLOVIS was co-chair of the committee, COREY LEWANDOWSKI was the campaign advisor and HOPE HICKS handled communications. TRUMP was his own chair. [REDACTED] was a policy advisor for the campaign and had previously given advice to the Citizen's Commission on Benghazi. [REDACTED] had not met TRUMP when [REDACTED] was announced as a member of the foreign policy team.

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The team tried to meet weekly with whoever could make the meetings. It was hard to get together because they were spread out. [REDACTED] was in [REDACTED] and would sometimes call in. The headquarters for the first team was in Alexandria, VA and the second team was headquartered in Trump Tower. Sometimes they would meet at [REDACTED] in D.C. The campaign also rented space at a law firm near the Senate they could also use for meetings.

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JEFF SESSIONS would not meet in his office for campaign related meetings. SESSIONS was head of the foreign policy/national security team and was TRUMP's head advisor, kind of like the chair of the committee. The original eight team members reported to SESSIONS. In theory, they reported to TRUMP as advisors but in reality they more reported to SESSIONS. CLOVIS had a different role as co-chair and had more to do. The team would inform CLOVIS but he didn't come to all the meetings and largely deferred to SESSIONS.

J.D. GORDON worked as a "staffer" to SESSIONS. GORDON acted as SESSIONS' Executive Secretary for day-to-day campaign matters. GORDON had

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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] (U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 08/11/2017
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/11/2017, Page 3 of 9

his own space in the campaign's Alexandria office. GORDON handled a lot of the communications for the team. GORDON was never announced as one of TRUMP's advisors even though he wanted to be and thought he would be. GORDON was a writer and was tasked with press coordination and reviewing op-ed pieces, especially before the campaign hired a formal press coordinator.

[REDACTED] talked to [REDACTED] KELLOGG and [REDACTED] the most out of the members of the foreign policy team. [REDACTED] talked to CLOVIS more than SESSIONS. CLOVIS would work with [REDACTED] before [REDACTED] participated in a potentially hostile interview, like an MSNBC interview. When PAUL MANAFORT came in, CLOVIS and MANAFORT were like co-chairs. MANAFORT handled finances and shared duties with LEWANDOWSKI. Eventually, TRUMP stopped acting as the chair and MANAFORT pushed LEWANDOWSKI out. MANAFORT's job was to link the campaign and the Republican National Committee. LEWANDOWSKI left the campaign before the Republican National Convention (RNC) but was still involved in it from outside the campaign. MANAFORT was fired after the RNC but [REDACTED] does not know why.

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Campaign

TRUMP did not really use titles. He focused on the people instead of their titles. CLOVIS was involved in the campaign the whole time but his role ebbed and flowed and he mainly operated out of Iowa. CLOVIS was TED CRUZ's Iowa campaign manager but then flipped to TRUMP. CLOVIS worked with LEWANDOWSKI to win in New Hampshire and then came on board with the campaign.

[REDACTED] never met or talked to MANAFORT. MANAFORT may have started working with the campaign in May 2016. MANAFORT and LEWANDOWSKI shared a role in the campaign and CLOVIS took a backseat to them. MANAFORT was supposed to work on the Hill and with the Republican National Committee to mend fences. LEWANDOWSKI didn't have political connections to communicate with the establishment like MANAFORT did.

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Manafort, Papadopoulos and Page

[REDACTED] was concerned about MANAFORT due to his ties to foreign actors. MANAFORT had lingering law suits and was only bad news because he had too much baggage. MANAFORT was likely fired because of his connections to lawsuits and other baggage, including dealings with [REDACTED] (Unknown spelling). [REDACTED] never met or spoke with MANAFORT but thinks if anyone was going to be uncooperative about the investigation it would be MANAFORT.

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[REDACTED]
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(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of /2017 , On 08/11/2017 , Page 4 of 9

[REDACTED] mentioned that PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS also concerned him because they both came across as naive, motivated by self-interest and concerned with overseas finances. They were involved in energy and dealing with Russian businessmen. CLOVIS told PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS to stop but both of them went ahead and did what they were going to do anyway.

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PAPADOPOULOS in particular wanted to arrange meetings in London with relatives of PUTIN. [REDACTED] told CLOVIS this would only lead to trouble and potentially result in violations of the Logan Act. In approximately March or April 2016, CLOVIS agreed and tried to "shut it down." PAPADOPOULOS had sent emails to the team suggesting meeting with PUTIN's relatives. He may have mentioned it in a meeting but [REDACTED] first heard about it in an email. Around April 2016 is when PAPADOPOULOS emailed the group about the Russian meetings. CLOVIS sent an email indicating "not now" but didn't shut PAPADOPOULOS down. [REDACTED] told CLOVIS they should not pursue this and [REDACTED] does not know how it was relayed back to PAPADOPOULOS.

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PAPADOPOULOS went ahead with some meetings in London and spoke to the press. He was slammed in the British media for saying something controversial, so he was told to cease and desist. Of all the people in the campaign, [REDACTED] believes PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS were the only ones trying to establish contact with Russians. Nobody on the team was interested in meetings or outside engagement regarding Russia. PAGE gave a speech in Russia and PAPADOPOULOS pushed forward with his meetings. Eventually, PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS were no longer included in team emails.

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PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS were not present much at the D.C. meetings. [REDACTED] saw PAPADOPOULOS about 2 or 3 times. PAPADOPOULOS was based out of London. He would fly in from London. He was present for a couple meetings in the beginning but then faded away. PAGE faded away after the RNC. PAGE came under FBI investigation and "went bananas". He wrote a letter to COMEY about divesting himself from Gazprom. This was probably in the August timeframe and PAGE had a lower profile after this. PAGE talked about "establishing better relations with Russia" in meetings and during his speech in July. PAGE attended at least one meeting at [REDACTED] law office to tell the team he was leaving the campaign.

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[REDACTED] thinks these were attempts by PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS to show how important they were. They were naive and they were not getting paid, so they were doing their own business even though it wasn't compatible with the campaign. They eventually stopped coming to meetings and were pushed aside. PAPADOPOULOS was the first to go, fading away from the campaign until showing up at the RNC, where he was ostracized. PAPADOPOULOS was

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[redacted]
(U) Interview of [redacted] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2017, On 08/11/2017, Page 5 of 9

shut down by CLOVIS but [redacted] does not recall how he got shut down, whether it was an email or a phone call. [redacted] communicated his concerns to CLOVIS via email and based on CLOVIS' response [redacted] believes CLOVIS shut PAPADOPOULOS down on meeting with Russian officials. [redacted] thinks that may have been in April or May. [redacted] believes that GORDON also informed PAPADOPOULOS not to pursue meetings with Russia. CLOVIS had to counsel PAPADOPOULOS about trying to arrange meetings.

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PAGE sent an email saying he was leaving the campaign and he sent a letter formally removing himself from the campaign. PAGE had a meeting or speech in Russia, where he allowed people to think PAGE was TRUMP's right-hand man.

[redacted] is unsure how PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS got on the campaign. At that time, the campaign direction was to get to a better relationship with Russia but PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS were an embarrassment the way they were pursuing Russia. [redacted] did not elaborate on where that direction came from. [redacted] thought it was a conflict of interest for PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS to push Russia relations because of their energy business ties and a potential violation of the Logan Act. [redacted] had a gut feeling these guys were not leading the campaign in the right direction. When asked if anyone on the campaign team wanted them to move forward with these Russian contacts, [redacted] said no one wanted them to move forward. The campaign could have publicly fired PAGE and PAPADOPOULOS to prevent them from representing the campaign but instead the campaign publicly disassociated itself from them. [redacted] is not aware of anyone wanting them to move forward with their Russian contacts.

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The first foreign policy speech for the campaign was in Washington, D. C. PAPADOPOULOS was shut down before this and PAGE was shut down after this event. [redacted] doesn't know whether PAPADOPOULOS would be cooperative and PAGE is pretty naive. They both overplayed their hand, otherwise they would have been more successful by now.

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In TRUMP's world it is ok if jobs aren't filled. Policy is top-down. TRUMP makes a statement and his people are to execute it. PAPADOPOULOS and PAGE may have thought they were doing what TRUMP wanted. [redacted] can not recall if PAGE ever met TRUMP but does not think he did.

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Gordon, Phares and Sessions

GORDON wanted a job with the administration but never got one. [redacted] is not aware of anyone assisting GORDON with the GOP platform at the RNC. GORDON worked a lot with PHARES and did a lot for

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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2017, On 08/11/2017, Page 6 of 9

SESSIONS. Everyone wanted to talk to someone on the Foreign Policy team. SESSIONS would get calls and task them to PHARES or GORDON.

[REDACTED]

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SESSIONS was meticulous about not doing campaign work from his Senate office. SESSIONS never would have had a campaign meeting in his Senate office. It would have been out of line of his Senate duties.

SESSIONS was very scrupulous, but TRUMP doesn't understand why SESSIONS recused himself. It's a policy issue, so it had to be done.

Kellogg and Flynn

[REDACTED] said KELLOGG does not have any ties to Russia. KELLOGG was not as active in the media initially and became more active after the RNC. FLYNN had worked for KELLOGG, so the two of them were close. KELLOGG would sub for FLYNN if FLYNN could not make it to events. FLYNN told the team he could not fill the position because he had business to wrap up and then he was eventually named as a member of the second National Security team. FLYNN spoke at the RNC and then did some campaigning. At the RNC, FLYNN spoke as a retired military member supporting TRUMP, not as a campaign guy. FLYNN did not have any Russian connections but was working with a company to provide security for the Olympic games in Japan.

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[REDACTED] spoke with FLYNN a couple times before the election and more frequently after the election regarding staffing. FLYNN leaving is likely why [REDACTED] does not have a current job in the administration. [REDACTED] last texted FLYNN around the time that FLYNN was pushed out of the administration.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] did not have any Russian connections. [REDACTED] was also on the second National Security team and attended a meeting they had in New York. [REDACTED] recruited surrogates for the campaign. [REDACTED] does not recall any mention of Russia at the meeting in NY.

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[REDACTED] was not aware of [REDACTED] having any Russian connections. [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] advised PAGE to cease and desist.

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[redacted]
(U) Interview of [redacted] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] /2017, On 08/11/2017, Page 7 of 9

[redacted] did not have any Russian connections. [redacted] was more attuned to the Republican National Committee because of his political background. [redacted] tried and failed to enter Virginia politics. He was also on the transition team. [redacted] and [redacted] opted to drop the campaign to work on the transition team after TRUMP's nomination.

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Other Campaign Members and Details

STEPHEN MILLER, a former SESSIONS staffer, was a policy adviser then and still is. He writes speeches and stayed with the campaign until the end, along with HOPE HICKS.

[redacted] does not remember meeting JOHN MASHBURN but remembers the name. He was one of MANAFORT's guys. [redacted] thought GORDON worked for MASHBURN.

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The paid members of the campaign were LEWANDOWSKI, HICKS, and MILLER.

[redacted] expressed his thoughts on FLYNN by saying that getting fired for taking a call on a Sunday afternoon is not right.

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Republican National Convention (RNC)

During the RNC, there was a simultaneous State Department function going on at Case Western Reserve, both events being held in Cleveland. SESSIONS spoke at the State Department event as the featured speaker and [redacted] was there for his speech. It was hard to say if SESSIONS was there as a senator or a Trump advisor but he did speak about TRUMP's foreign policy. SESSIONS was mobbed when he came off the stage and left the event. [redacted] does not recall a handshake between SESSIONS and the Russian Ambassador. GORDON and PHARES also spoke at the event as part of a panel. There was a reception tied to the event but [redacted] did not attend the reception.

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SESSIONS and [redacted] also attended the RNC but not many people from the foreign policy team had badges. [redacted] can't recall if PHARES was at the RNC but thinks [redacted] was. SCHMITZ was there but through the Maryland delegation and not the campaign. [redacted] handled media at the event. GORDON was at the RNC and was assigned to work on the platform. GORDON got there a week early. His expenses were paid early on but then his trip was self-funded. When asked who decided that GORDON would be involved in the platform, [redacted] indicated RICK DEARBORN and MANAFORT would have made that decision.

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Transition Team and Administration

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[REDACTED]
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(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2017, On 08/11/2017, Page 8 of 9

[REDACTED] was on the transition team between RONALD REAGAN and GEORGE BUSH. There were two transition teams for TRUMP. The transition team starts right after the RNC and you can't be on both the campaign and transition team at the same time. [REDACTED] stayed on the campaign team. The next transition team starts after the election.

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TRUMP only had 25 paid staff to get the nomination. After the nomination, there were probably 75. [REDACTED] was never an official member of the team. He went to the inauguration and then went back to work. [REDACTED] has been interviewed for a job with the current administration but does not work with the current administration at this time. TRUMP's hardest supporters were shut out of the administration by the Republican National Committee establishment because of a deal cut with PRIEBUS who brought his own personnel guy in to the administration. They had many favors to repay the Committee. TRUMP gave PRIEBUS a chance but PRIEBUS didn't get the healthcare bill passed.

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March 31, 2016 Meeting

[REDACTED] was shown a photograph labeled "National Security Meeting TRUMP" and "Washington DC March 31 2016". [REDACTED] appeared to recognize the photo and said that was the first time he met TRUMP. The meeting was supposed to take place at a law office and the team was supposed to keep the meeting quiet, but word got out. The location was changed that morning and TRUMP decided to meet at the Trump Hotel, which was still under construction. It was a two hour meeting and was lead by SESSIONS. PAGE did not attend the meeting. [REDACTED] named everyone in the photo that he recognized and also listed people in attendance who are not in the photo as follows:

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From photograph around table - JEFF SESSIONS, J.D. GORDON, GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS, [REDACTED] An unnamed business man, DONALD TRUMP, WALID PHARES, KEITH KELLOGG, [REDACTED] Unknown Person, Unnamed Nuclear Expert, Unnamed Congressman from Florida who is on the Veterans Affairs Committee, Unnamed SESSIONS staffer

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At the meeting but not included in photograph - SAM CLOVIS, RICK DEARBORN, STEPHEN MILLER, HOPE HICKS, COREY LEWANDOWSKI

SESSIONS did a lead-in on the Foreign Policy issues at the meeting. [REDACTED] can not recall if PAPADOPOULOS discussed Russia at this meeting. PAPADOPOULOS said something "stupid." PAPADOPOULOS' statements during the meeting were more about energy than Russia but he might have mentioned Russia as it relates to energy. This meeting was the first time [REDACTED] met PAPADOPOULOS. [REDACTED] had previously talked to the team via

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[REDACTED]
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(U) Interview of [REDACTED] on 08/11
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] /2017, On 08/11/2017, Page 9 of 9

email. During the meeting, they discussed nuclear proliferation and Supreme Court matters. STEPHEN MILLER was writing a lot of the issues. There was also talk about NATO.

[REDACTED] did not recall PAPADOPOULOS or others talking about meeting with Russians at this meeting.

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[REDACTED] was asked if anyone on the team was assigned to establish communications with Russia, to which his response was no. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED] was asked if anyone on the team talked about Russia having the DNC emails. His response was that they had not. He explained Russia is a competitor not an enemy. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Other than previously discussed, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] could not recall other discussions with the campaign about meeting with the Russians.

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b7CMcCain and DNC Theoryb6
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

FBI(19cv1278)-4394



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/02/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Special Counsel Prosecutor Kyle Freeney. Present on the phone for [redacted] was [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing parties and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was advised that the interview was voluntary and if he chose to answer questions he needed to be honest in his responses as lying to an FBI agent could constitute a federal crime.

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[redacted]

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[redacted] The loan origination team communicates with brokers and borrowers to bring in loans. This team does some preliminary underwriting to determine if the loan fits into S3 Capital's model. The team then brings loans to [redacted] for review.

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[redacted] reviews the details of the loan and if he "likes" the loan, he issues a term sheet and obtains a deposit from the borrower. Once a deposit is obtained, [redacted] summarizes the loan and presents it to the investment committee. Once approved by S3 Capital's investment committee, "lawyers get involved" in the due diligence and underwriting process to close the loan.

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In the initial underwriting process, [redacted] looks at the value of the land and/or property as well as, the projected value of the project if it

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Investigation on 10/02/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 10/06/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview , On 10/02/2017 , Page 2 of 5

is a development. [redacted] also considers the loan to cost or loan to value which needs to be less than 75%. Since S3 Capital is an asset-based lender, [redacted] is primarily concerned with the collateral.

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[redacted] does considers some factors related to the borrower during the underwriting process, however, the factors considered and the importance of those factors varies depending on the complexity of the project. For example, if the project is a ground up construction, [redacted] would take a close look at the borrower's track record and the general contractor's track record. if the loan is simply a refinance on an already existing house, [redacted] would not focus on the borrower other than to run them for credit, bankruptcies, OFAC and Patriot Act searches.

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S3 Capital is a commercial lender, but [redacted] did not know why and did not know what that meant. [redacted] knew S3 Capital did not lend on primary residences, but he did not know why. [redacted] believed S3 Capital did lend against secondary residences if they were held in the name of a business entity. [redacted] knew S3 Capital would only lend to business entities and not individuals, but he did not know why.

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b7C174 Jobs Lane

[redacted] brought in the loan on 174 Jobs Lane, Bridgehampton (Jobs Ln.). [redacted] told [redacted] the borrower needed \$3.5 million quickly for an investment in Los Angeles. [redacted] said the borrower needed to close in 1-2 weeks and only needed the funds for a short duration.

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Generally, S3 Capital's loans are for a minimum duration of 6 months and maximum of 12 months. [redacted] recalled this borrower wanted a shorter term.

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[redacted]

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The use of proceeds is relevant to S3 Capital. S3 Capital's loans are expensive and they want to know why the borrower needs to money.

Initially, the borrower on this loan was Paul Manafort. The only time [redacted] spoke with Manafort was after the loan was paid in full and Manafort needed an interest statement for his CPA.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED] Interview, On 10/02/2017, Page 3 of 5

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[REDACTED] did not consider debt to income ratio relevant for this loan and did not look into the borrower's debt and/or income. [REDACTED] focused on the value of the property.

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Approximately 90% of S3 Capital's loans are personally guaranteed. Even when an individual is a personal guarantor, the only due diligence done on them is a litigation search, OFAC and Patriot search, credit check and review of real estate owned. The personal guarantor's income, assets and liabilities were not particularly relevant to S3 Capital.

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[REDACTED] read in the media that Manafort worked for the Trump Campaign.

[REDACTED] was shown a document identified by SPRUCE 00103-SPRUCE 00106, which was a Certification of Commercial Loan. [REDACTED] was familiar with this document as it was part of the loan documents. The document was an acknowledgement by the borrower that they knew the loan was a commercial loan and not a personal residential loan.

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[REDACTED] was directed to a portion of the first paragraph which read, "... the proceeds of the following described loan...are not for personal, family, household, farming or agricultural purposes but are for business and commercial purposes only." [REDACTED] did not know why this was important to S3 Capital. [REDACTED] thought this may have to do with regulations on S3 Capital as a commercial lender.

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[REDACTED] was asked if S3 Capital knew the borrower was going to use the proceeds of this loan for personal reasons, would that have affected their decision to lend. [REDACTED] did not know.

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[REDACTED] was directed to a portion of the first paragraph which read, "Neither borrower, nor any principals of Borrower, nor Guarantor shall reside at the property that is the subject of the above loan." [REDACTED] did not know why this provision was there.

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[REDACTED] thought the questions about use of proceeds and occupancy should be directed to S3 Capital's legal counsel. [REDACTED] was asked for his

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview, On 10/02/2017, Page 4 of 5

understanding of these guidelines [redacted]

[redacted] stated that he knew the property could not be a primary residence. [redacted] believed this had something to do with the fact that S3 Capital was not regulated as a personal mortgage lender.

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[redacted] was shown a document identified by SPRUCE 00097 - SPRUCE 00102. [redacted] was familiar with this document. This is an extension letter which is signed in case the loan reaches maturity and the borrower wants to extend for an additional 2 months.

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[redacted] was directed to paragraph (ii) which read, "Borrower and Guarantor shall each have suffered no material adverse financial event...". [redacted] stated that S3 Capital may not agree to extend the loan if the borrower had any type of financial problems. The borrower's financial problems were not necessarily relevant to the initial loan funding. [redacted] could not explain why this was.

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[redacted] was shown a document identified by SPRUCE 00314 - SPRUCE 00319, which is a Form 1003 Loan Application. [redacted] was familiar with the document. [redacted]

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[redacted] S3 Capital collects the schedule of real estate owned for every loan. For this particular loan, it was not that relevant as the loan was not for construction.

[redacted] was shown a document identified by SPRUCE 00320. [redacted] was familiar with this document [redacted] prepares an internal memo like this one for each loan funded. The purpose of this document is to summarize the loan for the bank which provides S3 Capital with credit lines.

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[redacted] explained that S3 Capital has credit lines at Bank of the Internet Federal (BoI). Once S3 Capital funds a loan, they send the loan details to BoI and BoI conducts their own underwriting. If BoI approved the loan, they reimburse S3 Capital up to 65% of the loan amount from the credit line.

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BoI's underwriting conditions are similar to S3 Capital's except their loan to value, or loan to cost ratio thresholds are lower.

[redacted] did not know why BoI required this internal memo as part of their underwriting process. The format of the memo, to include the paragraph headings were provided by BoI. [redacted] obtained the information contained in this internal memo from the internet and from [redacted] and [redacted] did not get this information from the borrower directly.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [redacted] Interview [redacted], On 10/02/2017, Page 5 of 5

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[redacted]
[redacted]
believed this was due to cutting and pasting from a previous memo.


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Regarding the borrower's use of proceeds, [redacted] never confirmed this directly with the borrower, the borrower's attorney [redacted].
[redacted] Regarding the reason for coming to S3 Capital, [redacted] was told by [redacted] that the borrower [redacted] and they were already in conversations with conventional lenders who would take out S3 Capital's loan in a couple months.

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[redacted] was shown a document identified by SPRUCE 00089 - SPRUCE 00091. [redacted] was familiar with this document as it was part of the loan documents. [redacted] was referred to paragraph 7 which read, "Borrower and Guarantor shall notify Lender immediately if Borrower or Guarantor discovers that any representations made by the Borrower or Guarantor to Lender in this Certificate or any information Borrower or Guarantor have furnished to Lender or any other party pursuant hereto with respect to the Loan is or has become incorrect or incomplete in any material respect." [redacted] understood this to mean that the borrower had to notify S3 Capital if anything changed or was incorrect.

S3 Capital would not know if the borrower was untruthful or incomplete in their representations. S3 Capital relied on the truthfulness of the borrower.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/03/2019

Jared Corey Kushner, date of birth [REDACTED], was interviewed at the Law Offices of Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20006. The interviewers were Senior Assistant Special Counsels Andrew Goldstein, Andrew Weissmann and Zainab Ahmad; FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] [REDACTED] FBI Intelligence Analyst [REDACTED] and FBI Forensic Accountant [REDACTED]. Present representing Kushner were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. SASC Goldstein advised Kushner that the interview was being conducted under the same terms as the prior interview. SASC Goldstein advised Kushner that it was a crime to lie during the interview. SASC Goldstein explained that answering a question with "I don't recall," when you do recall, is a lie. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Kushner provided the following information:

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Investigation on 12/19/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/20/2018by [REDACTED]b6
b7C
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jared Kushner 12.19.2018 , On 12/19/2018 , Page 2 of 5

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jared Kushner 12.19.2018 , On 12/19/2018 , Page 3 of 5

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted] b5 per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jared Kushner 12.19.2018 , On 12/19/2018 , Page 4 of 5

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jared Kushner 12.19.2018 , On 12/19/2018 , Page 5 of 5


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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/07/2017

b5 per DOJ/OIP

On August 1, 2017, Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] interviewed
Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe regarding [redacted]

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McCabe

[redacted]
provided the following information:

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Investigation on 07/31/2017 at Washington , District Of Columbia, United States (In
Person)


File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/04/2017

by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
ON 06-25-2020

Date of entry 11/06/2017

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

On November 3, 2017 K.T. [REDACTED]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~
~~Derived From: National~~
~~Security Information SCG~~
~~Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~


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Investigation on 11/03/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/03/2017

by [REDACTED]

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FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 02-12-2020

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/12/2017

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Kathleen Troia "K.T." McFarland, date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (cell); [redacted] home) & [redacted] home) was interviewed by SA [redacted] & SSA [redacted] in her home at [redacted]. Also present for a substantial portion of the interview was [redacted] attorney [redacted] [redacted] telephone numbers [redacted] (cell) & [redacted] (office direct line). After the agents identified themselves and briefly described the purpose of the interview, they explained to McFarland the potential criminal consequences of lying to the FBI in the course of an investigation under 18 U.S.C. 1001. McFarland acknowledged that she understood and then brought up the case of Martha Stewart. McFarland then provided the following information:

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[redacted]

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Investigation on 08/29/2017 at [redacted] New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/30/2017

by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) K.T. McFarland interview, On 08/29/2017, Page 2 of 11

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) K.T. McFarland interview, On 08/29/2017, Page 3 of 11

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[REDACTED] b5 P

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) K.T. McFarland interview, On 08/29/2017, Page 5 of 11

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) K.T. McFarland interview, On 08/29/2017, Page 6 of 11

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) K.T. McFarland interview, On 08/29/2017, Page 7 of 11

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) K.T. McFarland interview, On 08/29/2017, Page 8 of 11

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(S)

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

FBI(19cv1278)-4420

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) K.T. McFarland interview, On 08/29/2017, Page 9 of 11

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~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) K.T. McFarland interview, On 08/29/2017, Page 10 of 11

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[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) K.T. McFarland interview, On 08/29/2017, Page 11 of 11

[Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/04/2019

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 01/25/2019 Special Agent [redacted] and Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] interviewed [redacted] (Subject Premises). [redacted] resides at [redacted] and he provided phone number [redacted] was located at the Subject Premises where the FBI executed a search warrant. SA [redacted] informed [redacted] he was not under arrest and he could leave the Subject Premises at any time. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]b6
b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]b6
b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]b6
b7C(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]b6
b7CUNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Investigation on 01/25/2019 at New York, New York, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 01/28/2019

by [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [REDACTED], On 01/25/2019, Page 2 of 2

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

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Post-Search

(U//~~FOUO~~) [SA [REDACTED] and SSA [REDACTED] were present for this portion of the interview]


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(U//~~FOUO~~) At the completion of the search, SA [REDACTED]

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FBI(19cv1278)-4450



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/01/2017

The Director's Chief of Staff James E. Rybicki was interviewed by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [Redacted] regarding inventory matters related to former Director James Comey. Rybicki provided the following information:

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[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

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Investigation on 05/18/2017 at Washington , District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [Redacted] Date drafted 05/21/2017

by [Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) James Rybicki - Six Documents, On 05/18/2017, Page 2 of 2

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
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b5 per DOJ/OIP



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/07/2017

On 07/31/2017, SSA [redacted] interviewed the FBI Director's Chief of Staff, James Rybicki, [redacted]

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[redacted] Rybicki provided the following information:

b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b5 per DOJ/OIP

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b7C

b5 per DOJ/OIP


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Investigation on 07/31/2017 at Washington , District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 08/04/2017

by [redacted]

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b7E



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/19/2017

[redacted] date of birth (DOB) [redacted] was interviewed over the telephone on 07/14/2017 at approximately 10:03am by Special Agent [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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(U) [redacted] informed writer that he was not at home. At the time, he was on his way to meet with a lawyer who may represent him. [redacted] stated reporters were at his house again that morning. Additionally, [redacted] admitted that when Agents first met [redacted] on Wednesday evening, 07/12/2017, [redacted]. As a result, he would like to meet with Agents today at approximately 1:00pm [redacted]. [redacted] would call Agents at approximately 11:30am to finalize their afternoon meeting and discuss his meeting with the attorney.


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Investigation on 07/14/2017 at [redacted] United States (Phone)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 07/19/2017

by [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/26/2017

Scott N. Schools, Associate Deputy Attorney General, direct office telephone [REDACTED] government mobile [REDACTED] was interviewed at his place of employment at the U.S. Department of Justice's Robert F. Kennedy Building, located at 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC. Also present for this interview was FBI Supervisory Special Agent [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Schools requested this interview prior to a scheduled interview with Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein. Having provided him with the identities of the interviewing agents, Schools provided the following information:

The U.S. Department of Justice was concerned that some of the material to be discussed with Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein fell within one or more privileges that may be exercised by the White House. Schools was attempting to discuss this matter with the newly established Special Counsel's Office to be led by Robert Mueller III. [REDACTED]

b5 per DOJ/OIP

Schools requested the concurrence of interviewing agents to attend the interview of Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein for the purpose of guiding Rosenstein on the issue of privilege, and interviewing agents expressed no objection.


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Investigation on 05/23/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 05/25/2017

by [REDACTED]

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FBI INFO

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2043

DATE: 06-24-2020

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 03/19/2018

(U) JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, was interviewed at Patriots Plaza I, 395 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20546 by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] Senior Counselor to the Special Counsel James L. Quarles, and Senior Assistant Special Counsel Andrew Goldstein. Accompanying SESSIONS was his attorney [REDACTED] [REDACTED] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing officials and the nature of the interview, SESSIONS provided the following information:

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(U) SESSIONS was advised it is a crime to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, which he acknowledged.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] (S)

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b7E~~Reason: 1.4(b)~~~~Derived From: National
Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 01/17/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 01/18/2018

by SA [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 2 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIPb6
b7C

(U) SESSIONS thought the CFR was very clear and decisive and it was apparent he should recuse. It would be a "very thin" argument to say it did not apply to him.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 3 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) On March 2, MCGAHN called SESSIONS and relayed that he (MCGAHN) had spoken to President TRUMP about the possibility of SESSIONS recusing himself, and TRUMP was not happy. b5 Per DOJ/OIP

SESSIONS recalled at
least two calls with MCGAHN that day.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

SESSIONS'
impression of TRUMP's reaction, based on the calls with the White House, was that TRUMP was very upset with SESSIONS and did not think he had done his duty as the Attorney General.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) At Mar-a-Lago later in the week of the recusal, TRUMP and SESSIONS spoke at the side of another meeting and TRUMP contrasted SESSIONS with [former Attorneys General] ERIC HOLDER and BOBBY KENNEDY. TRUMP also

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[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 4 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

suggested that SESSIONS could "un-recuse" from the investigation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TRUMP thought [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] if SESSIONS was in charge, the investigation would not [REDACTED] spin out of control. While HOLDER and KENNEDY had been criticized, they had developed a strategy to help the President where SESSIONS had not.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 5 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP
b5 Per DOJ/OIP
b5 Per DOJ/OIP
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 6 of 25
b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED]

(U) Following a briefing in the Oval Office on February 14, 2017, TRUMP indicated he wanted to speak to COMEY alone, so SESSIONS left the Oval Office with everyone else. [REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

SESSIONS was one of the last to leave the room. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) SESSIONS said COMEY's June 2017 testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with TRUMP were "pretty accurate." b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMEY told
SESSIONS he did not want to be alone with TRUMP [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 7 of 25

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 8 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) MAY 3, 2017

(U) On May 3, 2017, SESSIONS was at the White House for a meeting with TRUMP, MCGAHN, HUNT, asked how COMEY's testimony that day went.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

TRUMP was "hot" ab5 Per DOJ/OIP
SESSIONS because SESSIONS was recused.

SESSIONS responded he had no choice but to recuse and it was a mandatory move, not a discretionary one.

A Chinese leader had said to TRUMP he was sorry TRUMP was under investigation, and TRUMP took that as a signal that his authority was undermined by the investigation.

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[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 9 of 25

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) At the end of the day on May 3, SESSIONS knew TRUMP was very upset with COMEY but he did not think he had made a decision to terminate COMEY.

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 10 of 25

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] TRUMP said COMEY should be removed and asked
SESSIONS' and ROSENSTEIN's opinions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] ROSENSTEIN said the b5 Per DOJ/OIP
Russia investigation was not the basis of his recommendation so Russia
should not be mentioned. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 11 of 25

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(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 12 of 25

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[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 13 of 25

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL:

(U) The day the Special Counsel was appointed, SESSIONS was in the Oval Office with TRUMP, PENCE, and HUNT for the purpose of conducting FBI Director interviews. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] SESSIONS left and got on the phone with ROSENSTEIN. ROSENSTEIN told SESSIONS he had appointed ROBERT MUELLER as Special Counsel for the Russia investigation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SESSIONS had to go tell TRUMP about it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 14 of 25

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] TRUMP said something like "you
were supposed to protect me." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] At some point, SESSIONS said
he would resign and left the Oval Office. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] SESSIONS gave the resignation letter to TRUMP. TRUMP put it in his pocket [REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] TRUMP asked SESSIONS if he wanted to stay, and
SESSIONS responded it was up to TRUMP. They went back and forth like that
two or three times and SESSIONS finally said he wanted to stay but it was
still up to TRUMP. TRUMP said he wanted SESSIONS to stay.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 15 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) At some point in time in the summer of 2017, after the Special Counsel was appointed, TRUMP called SESSIONS at home and asked again if SESSIONS would un-recuse himself.

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

 TRUMP wanted to know if SESSIONS could un-recuse himself so he could investigate and prosecute CLINTON.

The gist of the discussion was TRUMP wanted SESSIONS to un-recuse from "all of it." SESSIONS listened but did not respond substantively to TRUMP.

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 16 of 25

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b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 17 of 25

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b7Cb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 18 of 25

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(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 19 of 25

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Sessions III

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 01/17/2018, Page 20 of 25

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[Redacted]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 21 of 25

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 22 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIPb5 Per DOJ/OIP

SESSIONS and KISLYAK spoke for a few minutes. SESSIONS did not recall anything of real substance during the conversation with KISLYAK, but he and KISLYAK may have said some things about U.S./Russia relations. SESSIONS believed he and KISLYAK would have exchanged pleasantries they both shared at the time about improving U.S./Russia relations.

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[REDACTED]

(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Continuation of FD-302 of Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 23 of 25

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) The next time SESSIONS recalled meeting KISLYAK was on September 8, 2016. [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

(U) Present for the September 8, 2016 meeting with KISLYAK was SESSIONS, LUFF, Colonel PETE LANDRUM, and one of SESSIONS' staffers. [REDACTED]

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] KISLYAK indicated to SESSIONS that the Russian government was responsive to the overtures TRUMP had laid out during his campaign. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SESSIONS felt like he was doing the TRUMP campaign a service by meeting with foreign Ambassadors, including KISLYAK.

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

After the U.S. Presidential election, CNI invited SESSIONS to a meeting with KISLYAK, which SESSIONS previously discussed. In addition to SESSIONS, the German Ambassador, the Governor of Alabama, and one other Ambassador were invited to the meeting. However, SESSIONS was in New York and was unable to attend.

[REDACTED] b5 Per DOJ/OIP

[REDACTED] so SESSIONS believed the foreign Ambassadors came to him for information about TRUMP and hoped SESSIONS would pass along information to TRUMP.

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(U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
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
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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of Jefferson Beauregard
Sessions III, On 01/17/2018, Page 25 of 25

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

b5 Per DOJ/OIP

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/19/2017

ALEX VAN DER ZWAAN (VAN DER ZWAAN), date of birth [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Office of the Special Counsel, Washington, D.C. Present for the interview were FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] and Special Counsel Attorney Andrew Weissmann. Also present were VAN DER ZWAAN's attorneys William Schwartz, Laura Grossfield Birger, and [REDACTED] with the law firm Cooley LLP. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the Proffer, VAN DER ZWAAN provided the following information:

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VAN DER ZWAAN was advised his participation in the Proffer was voluntary. VAN DER ZWAAN was also advised that he needed to be truthful in his answers and lying to a Federal agent could constitute a Federal crime. Additionally, the terms of the proffer agreement were explained to VAN DER ZWAAN, which he and his attorney signed and is attached hereto as a 1A.

VAN DER ZWAAN stated some of his prior statements to the FBI/Special Counsel were knowingly false. In particular, statements made about the last time he spoke with RICK GATES (GATES) and [REDACTED] In prior statements, VAN DER ZWAAN stated he last spoke to GATES in May 2016 [REDACTED] Likewise, VAN DER ZWAAN stated in his prior interview he last spoke to [REDACTED] in 2015. VAN DER ZWAAN, however, spoke to both GATES and [REDACTED] in September 2016 concerning the Ukraine [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Specifically, VAN DER ZWAAN stated on or about September 7, 2016 [REDACTED] he received a call from GATES on [REDACTED] VAN DER ZWAAN did not recall the subject or content of the conversation but remembered GATES telling him to contact [REDACTED] concerning Ukraine. After the call, GATES sent VAN DER ZWAAN [REDACTED] documents via the app Viber [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One of the [REDACTED] documents was a preliminary criminal complaint from Ukraine. VAN DER ZWAAN did not remember seeing his name or [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] VAN DER ZWAAN called [REDACTED] and recorded the conversation. After speaking with [REDACTED] he called [REDACTED] and made a partial recording of the conversation also. [REDACTED]

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A few days later, VAN DER ZWAAN spoke to GATES and recorded the conversation also. VAN DER ZWAAN did not recall any additional conversations with [REDACTED] after September 2016. VAN DER ZWAAN recalled speaking to GATES again later in 2016 but described the conversation as

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b7CInvestigation on 12/01/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/05/2017by [REDACTED]b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 2 of 16

[REDACTED] VAN DER ZWAAN did not have any additional contact with PAUL MANAFORT (MANAFORT).

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b6
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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan , On 12/01/2017 , Page 3 of 16

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 4 of 16

Other Recorded Communications

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Other Omissions

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 5 of 16

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Moonlighting/Freelance Legal Work

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 6 of 16

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 7 of 16

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 8 of 16

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Emails

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 9 of 16

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Final Report

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan , On 12/01/2017 , Page 10 of 16

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 11 of 16

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 12 of 16

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Non-Produced or Destroyed Documents

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Proffer of Alex Van Der Zwaan, On 12/01/2017, Page 13 of 16

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Hand Written Notes

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Media Communications

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 08/01/2017

[redacted] Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), FBI Director Protection Detail, was interviewed by SSA [redacted] regarding former Director James Comey's travel on the evening of May 10, 2017. [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] advised Comey, accompanied by members of his staff departed Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) at [redacted] Comey and staff arrived at Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA), at [redacted] Comey accompanied by members of his protection detail traveled directly to his residence and arrived at [redacted]

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[redacted] advised Comey was taken directly to his residence after arriving at DCA and at no time re-entered FBI Headquarters space.

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Staff members who accompanied Comey on the return trip from LAX to DCA:

Special Assistant to the Director [redacted]

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Special Assistant to the Director [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

Special Agent (SA) [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Electronic Technician [redacted]

Pilot [redacted]

Pilot [redacted]

Investigation on 05/11/2017 at Washington , District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 05/14/2017

by [redacted]

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