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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

THE TWO HUNDRED, an unincorporated
association of civil rights leaders, and
individuals JASON CORDOVA and LYNN
BROWN-SUMMERS,

Petitioners/Plaintiffs,

vs.

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING
AND RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA
NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY,
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, and
DOES 1-50.

Respondents/Defendants.

) Case No.: CIV-DS-1938432

) **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND**
) **AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF**
) **PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR**
) **PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

) Date: July 31, 2020
) Time: 10:00 a.m.
) Dept.: S26
) Judge: The Honorable David S. Cohn

) Complaint Filed: December 19, 2019
) Trial Date: None

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 While California’s most vulnerable minority residents are suffering disproportionately from
3 the pandemic, Respondents callously insist on enforcing as of July 1, 2020 regulations expanding the
4 California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), 14 Cal. Code of Reg. §15000, *et seq.* These
5 regulations vastly increase the cost of housing when “shelter” is the most urgent of the pandemic’s
6 necessities. As explained in detail in the 256-page Verified Amended Complaint (“Comp.”), the
7 challenged regulations make California’s notoriously costly housing even more expensive, and were
8 adopted in violation of the bedrock civil rights protections in the California and federal Constitutions,
9 as well as environmental, transportation and housing laws.
10

11 In this motion, Petitioners - civil rights association The Two Hundred, along with plaintiff-
12 residents of San Bernardino County - fervently request this court grant a preliminary injunction to
13 enjoin the implementation of part of one of these new CEQA regulations, which makes the act of
14 driving a car or pickup truck (even an electric vehicle), for even a single mile in even a carpool on an
15 existing road, a newly-invented “vehicle mile travelled” (“VMT”) “impact” to the environment.
16 Petitioners do not dispute that the regulation is valid inside the statutorily-authorized, miniscule
17 fraction of California that qualifies as a transit priority area (“TPA”), which is located within ½ mile
18 of frequent, “high quality” public transit service; however, Petitioners challenge the validity of Code
19 of Reg. §15064.3(a), (b)(1) (“VMT Regulation”) because it unlawfully applies to the majority of
20 California that is outside TPAs where public transit is non-existent or ineffective.
21

22 To place the limited geographic extent of TPAs in the context of urgent housing needs, in the
23 six county Southern California region, the state legislature and agency’s have determined that 1.34
24 million new housing units must be planned for and accommodated over the next eight years, which
25 includes about 800,000 housing units that the region (and its majority-minority residents) have long
26 needed but not built. Much of the new housing must also be affordable to lower income families.
27
28

1 Comp. ¶228; see also RJN¹, Ex. 1, p. 38-40. Less than 3% of all of that region is a TPA. RJN, Ex. 2,
2 fig. 2.0-29. The vast majority of TPAs are in Los Angeles and Orange counties, where housing costs
3 are among the highest in the state (and nation). *Id.* at fig. 2.0-10. TPAs are also located in existing
4 neighborhoods, so placing all or most of 1.34 million new housing units – no matter how tall the
5 building, or how tiny the apartment – would require the massive destruction and displacement of
6 existing communities, including homes occupied by minority Californians near “the tracks” – now
7 favored as transit. Respondents’ transit solution for 1.34 million new homes is a cost-prohibitive pipe
8 dream that will further worsen the housing crisis, which the state has declared disproportionately
9 impacts minorities and caused increased racial residential segregation. Gov. Code §§65589.5.

10
11 If allowed to go into effect, the VMT Regulation would also be immediately enforceable in
12 CEQA lawsuits challenging approved housing. Housing approved in existing neighborhoods has long
13 been the state’s top CEQA lawsuit target. Decl., ¶2, Ex. 23.² As acknowledged most recently by the
14 League of Cities, housing cannot be financed or built while CEQA lawsuits are pending. RJN, Ex. 2,
15 p. 4; RJN, Ex. 3. Housing delayed is housing denied, and Respondents’ have created a conflicting
16 morass that will enrich CEQA combatants, burden the courts, and harm minorities who need homes
17 affordable to middle and lower income households even more urgently in this pandemic.

18
19 The VMT Regulation (and a concurrently-adopted “underground” VMT Regulation) is also
20 replete with internal contradictions, and directly conflicts with other statutory mandates. Unless
21 enjoined, mandatory statewide enforcement of this new VMT Regulation outside TPAs will worsen
22 housing availability and affordability, thereby causing disparate harms to minority Californian.

23
24 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

25 **A. The Ideology of Elevating VMT Into A New, Stand-Alone CEQA “Impact” To**
26 **the Physical Environment Under CEQA**

27 The number and length of vehicular trips – VMT – has been used for decades in CEQA to

28

¹ Citation to “RJN” are to the Request for Judicial Notice, filed concurrently herewith.

² Citations to “Decl.” are to the Declaration of Jennifer Hernandez, filed concurrently herewith.

1 estimate tailpipe air pollution from vehicle trips resulting from the construction and occupancy of
2 new homes (and other projects). Longer trips over the same distance caused by traffic congestion
3 delays also cause more air pollution, and can impede the safety and efficiency of local roads and
4 highways. Before the VMT Regulation, CEQA mitigation was required to reduce significant excess
5 tailpipe emissions, and to improve roads and highways to reduce gridlock delays and safety hazards,
6 based on impacts that were calculated based on project VMT, much like project occupancy
7 information is used to calculate water demand and other population-based impact calculations.
8 Before the VMT Regulation, CEQA treated the act of driving a car like the act of living in a house,
9 having a child, or working at a job – a basic human activity. Under CEQA the basic human activity
10 of a new home resident travelling between destinations could conceivably cause a significant air,
11 congestion or safety impact, but simply driving – mobility – is not a CEQA impact. Comp., ¶¶72-73.
12

13 The VMT Regulation elevates VMT – car trips taken by residents, guests, vendors and
14 workers over the occupancy duration of a new home – as a stand-alone new “impact” to the
15 environment. Pickup trucks count as cars; VMT from larger trucks and buses do not count at all. This
16 is a radical departure from CEQA. As succinctly explained by a bi-partisan group of legislators::
17

18 “[t]he ideological approach of VMT is to get people to abandon their individual vehicles and
19 utilize multimodal transit opportunities such as walking, biking, and using public transit. The
20 regulation views road congestion as a good thing, since it slows down traffic and incentivizes
21 individuals to use alternate forms of transit. Improvements like road widening is considered a negative
22 impact on greenhouse gas reductions because it increases commuter speeds which the regulation
23 assumes will encourage people to drive longer distances. The new regulation advocates that
24 California go on a “road diet” and calls into question whether the voters understood this [road diet
25 mandate imposed by state environmental regulators] when they approved an increase in the gas tax.
26

27 The highest cost imposed by the VMT regulation is in areas farther away from job centers.
28 This is where housing can be produced at the lowest cost, and is the primary source of housing for
low and middle class Californians. However, measures to mitigate VMT, especially in rural areas,
significantly drive up the cost of residential development. VMT also disproportionately impacts low-
and middle-class Californians who are predominantly communities of color. . . .

Communities of color depend on cars more than non-protected classes to get to their jobs
which are often not at fixed locations served by transit (construction, farmworkers, janitors, etc.).
The VMT regulation will increase, not decrease, the cost of housing and will have its greatest impacts

1 on classes protected by the federal and state constitutions and a variety of federal and state laws
2 prohibiting housing discrimination. Moreover, [even] a \$1,000 increase in the cost of a home [to
3 mitigate VMT] eliminates 8,870 households from the ability to afford a home and puts the American
4 dream of homeownership – the primary method of establishing economic stability, community
5 participation and economic growth – further out of reach for those struggling to afford a home today.

6 During the COVID-19 health crisis, which has already produced dramatic reductions in VMT,
7 we believe that you should pause this regulation for cities and counties until a more equitable solution
8 can be achieved. Therefore, we respectfully request that you extend the implementation of the VMT
9 regulation for two years.” RJN, Ex. 4.

10 As Petitioner The 200 further explained in a similar plea:

11 “[t]he 2018 regulations expanding CEQA authorize imposing on purchasers of new homes
12 hundreds of thousands of dollars for vehicle miles travelled (VMT) mitigation fees – up to \$400,000
13 [per home]. These fees will disproportionately fall on prospective new home buyers who will be
14 communities of color who are forced to commute long distances because of failed housing policies
15 and land use regulations that stop housing production and infrastructure projects. This is unfair
16 because white families who already own their own homes and have identical VMTs will pay nothing.
17 Ultimately, these fees will force some families to other states that have higher per capita greenhouse
18 gas (GHG) emissions thereby increasing global warming. . . .

19 We support California’s commitment to be a global leader on climate change. However,
20 California’s minority communities should not become the collateral damage in the state’s war on
21 climate change.” Decl., ¶3, Ex. 24.

22 California is already a climate change leader in reducing GHG emissions: even though it was
23 (pre-COVID) the world’s fifth largest economy, it contributed less than 1% of global GHG. Comp.,
24 ¶83. This VMT ideology is the equivalent of making homes more expensive and homeownership
25 unattainable as the necessary solution to reducing smog, but President Obama confirmed that the
26 nation reduced tailpipe pollutants producing smog by 98% through cleaner cars and fuels, even as
27 national VMT increased. Respondents’ summarily reject cleaner cars or other solutions. Comp. ¶84.

28 In 2019, the Legislature reached the policy conclusion that solving the housing crisis with
housing affordable to middle and low income families was key to climate leadership: “An additional
consequence of the state’s cumulative housing shortage is a significant increase in greenhouse gas
emissions caused by the displacement and redirection of populations to states with greater housing
opportunities, particularly working- and middle-class households.” Gov’t Code §65589.5(a)(1)(I).

1 Respondents’ also rejected other, more cost-effective and less discriminatory GHG reduction
2 measures, even though the leader of Respondent OPR is now an academic endorsing replacement of
3 dung-burning, GHG spewing cook stoves in Africa as a very cost-effective GHG measure (Comp.
4 ¶276), household GHG estimation methodology lauded by the California Air Resources Board
5 correlates higher wealth households to higher GHG, effective forest management would reduce
6 massive GHG from forest fires and avoid catastrophic losses of life, property and habitat, and weeks
7 of skies choked with smoke and soot. Comp. ¶¶81, 276. These and other pleas to Respondents for
8 more equitable GHG reduction solutions have fallen on deaf ears, locked away in distant state offices.

9
10 **B. VMT and the COVID-19 Pandemic**

11 The immediacy and severity of the harms created by the VMT Regulation have increased
12 exponentially in the pandemic, with millions more unemployed adding to the housing crisis
13 experienced every day by the 37% of disparately minority families (pre-pandemic) that cannot
14 regularly meet basic monthly expenses due to high housing costs. RJN, Ex. 5. Minorities are also
15 disproportionately likely to become ill and die from COVID-19. RJN, Ex. 6. The pandemic has caused
16 scores of laws and regulations to be delayed or reconsidered – but Respondents’ insist on their July
17 1 VMT Regulation implementation, because why not make housing more expensive – inside high
18 density elevator buildings in TPAs – in a pandemic?
19

20 The mass transit VMT ideology is also directly contrary to pandemic health necessities, such as
21 the Center for Disease Control’s recommendation to avoid mass transit and instead “offer employees
22 incentives to use forms of transportation that minimize close contact with others, such as offering
23 reimbursement for parking for commuting to work alone or single-occupancy rides.” RJN, Ex. 7.
24 Transit ridership had already declined steadily pre-pandemic (RJN, Ex. 8), even as transit services
25 were expanded; transit ridership has collapsed by 65%-75% (Los Angeles) to 90% (San Francisco)
26 in the midst of the pandemic, and is not expected to return to even its depressed pre-pandemic levels
27
28

1 for the foreseeable future according to both UCLA transit scholars and other transit experts. Decl.
2 ¶¶5-8, Exs. 25-28.

3 **C. No Legislative Authorization for the VMT Regulation**

4 For more than ten years, the Legislature has considered – and uniformly rejected – legislation
5 requiring VMT reductions to achieve climate goal GHG reductions. For example, the first version of
6 Senate Bill (“SB”) 375 required VMT reductions, but this was immediately dropped and omitted from
7 the 2008 bill.³ In the absence of any Legislative mandate to reduce statewide VMT from new housing,
8 Respondent agencies instead unlawfully rely on SB 743. RJN, Ex. 9. Most of SB 743 eviscerated
9 judicial review under CEQA to assure timely development of the Kings Arena basketball stadium in
10 Sacramento. Comp., ¶304. A few add-on lines in a section titled “Modernization Of Transportation
11 Analysis For Transit-Oriented Infill Projects” directed Respondent OPR to eliminate traffic
12 congestion delay as a CEQA impact requiring roadway improvement mitigation, and adopt an
13 alternate CEQA impact which could be VMT, but *only* inside TPAs. Pub. Res. Code § 21099(b)(1)
14 (emphasis added); *see also* Decl., ¶9, Ex. 29. The VMT ideology in this add-on to the Kings Arena
15 legislation was that CEQA should not be used to require roadway improvements to reduce congestion
16 in neighborhoods with high frequency transit services and cities could instead plan those
17 neighborhoods to prioritize transit, bike and pedestrian transportation. One four-line subsection of SB
18 743 authorized, but did not require, Respondent OPR to adopt a new CEQA regulation to establish
19 “alternative metrics to the metrics used for traffic level of service transportation impacts outside
20 transit priority areas,” but this subsection did not authorize or reference VMT – and it obviously fell
21 outside the “Transit-Oriented Infill Project” purpose. Pub. Res. Code § 21099(c)(1). In fact, a
22 companion to the Kings Arena bill by the same author that expanded the “modernization” directive
23 beyond TPAs to infill areas not served by transit was also defeated. RJN, Ex. 10.
24
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28 ³ *Cf.* Sen. Bill 32 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as introduced on Dec. 1, 2014 *with* Stats. 2016, ch. 249 (S.B. 32).

1 The Legislature has continued to reject VMT reduction mandates. In 2017, SB 150 initially
2 required VMT reductions, but as enacted simply required a VMT study.⁴ That VMT study showed
3 that VMT had massively increased, not decreased, since the end of the Great Recession – and that
4 transit ridership sought by VMT ideologues had massively decreased. The Legislature again declined
5 to mandate VMT reductions outside TPAs in a 2019 bill that applied to the Coastal Zone (SB 986).

6
7 In short, each and every time the Legislature has been presented with a statewide VMT
8 reduction mandate (or reduction mandate outside transit served TPAs), the VMT ideology was
9 rejected. Scores of comment letters to Respondents documenting, with expert evidence, the
10 infeasibility and racially disparate impact of the VMT Regulation were ignored or summarily
11 dismissed during the rulemaking process, and the VMT ideology rejected by the Legislature morphed
12 into the VMT Regulation poised to become the law in all of California.

13
14 **E. Mandatory Procedural and Content Requirements for Adopting CEQA Regulations**

15 CEQA regulations must be adopted in compliance with Pub. Res. Code §21083(b), requiring
16 regulations to “specifically include criteria for public agencies to follow in determining whether or
17 not a proposed project may have a significant effect on the environment.”⁵ These criteria are referred
18 to as “significance thresholds” because impacts that exceed these “thresholds” are “significant” and
19 must be avoided or reduced to less than significant to the extent feasible. *Id.* at §§21002, 21081(a).

20
21 The adoption of CEQA regulations must comply with the Administrative Procedure Act
22 (“APA”), Gov. Code §11340, *et seq.* *Id.* at §21083. The APA requires in pertinent part that the
23 regulation is undergo a public notice and comment process and include an assessment of the “adverse
24 economic impact on California business enterprises **and individuals...**” *Id.* at §11346.3(a)(emphasis

25
26 ⁴ *Cf.* Sen. Bill 150 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced on Jan. 18, 2017 *with* Stats. 2017, ch. 646 (S.B. 150).

27 ⁵ Although called “CEQA guidelines” these are in fact Regulations “binding on all public agencies,” (14 Cal. Code
28 §1500), so must be adopted in compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act like other regulations, and are to be
afforded “great weight” – “except when . . . clearly unauthorized or erroneous under CEQA.” Laurel Heights
Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 391 n. 2.

1 added). CEQA regulations must also comply with several criteria, including:

2 (a) “Necessity” means the record of the rulemaking proceeding demonstrates by substantial
3 evidence the need for a regulation to effectuate the purpose of the statute, court decision, or
4 other provision of law that the regulation implements, interprets, or makes specific, taking

5 into account the totality of the record; Id. at §11349(a)
6 (b) “Authority” means the provision of law which permits or obligates the agency to adopt,

7 amend, or repeal a regulation; Id. at §11349(b)
8 (c) “Clarity” means written or displayed so that the meaning of the regulations will be easily

9 understood by those persons directly affected by them; Id. at §11349(c)
10 (d) “Consistency” means being in harmony with, and not in conflict with or contradictory to,

11 **D. Jurisdictional Limits of CEQA**

12 CEQA does not supersede or displace federal or state due process and equal protection
13 guarantees against government actions that result in disparate impacts to racial minorities. CEQA is
14 subordinate to the federal Fair Housing Act (which prohibits racial discrimination in housing caused
15 by government agency actions), the federal Clean Air Act (which protects people from excessive
16 levels of pollution including higher tailpipe emissions caused by intentionally worsening traffic
17 congestion), and federal transportation laws (which require efficient and safe roadways). CEQA also
18 does not supersede other state statutes, including state regional housing needs assessment (“RHNA”)
19 housing laws requiring cities and counties to adopt General Plans that allow for enough housing to
20 meet existing and eight years of future needs, at affordability levels that match the needs of the
21 community for market rate as well as low income housing, everywhere – not just TPAs. Comp. ¶¶474,
22 489, 505; Gov’t Code §65584 *et seq.*

23 **III. STANDARD FOR GRANTING A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE**
24 **JULY 1 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VMT REGULATION OUTSIDE TPAS**

25 A preliminary injunction may be granted based upon a verified complaint, such as Petitioners’
26 256-page Verified Complaint (adopted by reference). Civ. Proc. §527(a), (h). A preliminary
27 injunction requires it to be “reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits.”
28 San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., Inc. v. Sup. Ct., (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442. However,
it is unnecessary to show a likelihood of success on the merits as to all of its claims: a single claim is

1 sufficient. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, (9th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3d 1127, 1139. A
2 preliminary injunction also requires a balancing of the harms, *i.e.*, the comparative consequences of
3 the issuance and non-issuance of the injunction. Moorpark Homeowners’ Ass’n v. VRT, (1998) 63
4 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402; see Youngblood v. Wilcox, (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372-73. These
5 two showings operate on a sliding scale: “[T]he more likely it is that [the party seeking the injunction]
6 will ultimately prevail, the less severe must be the harm that they allege will occur if the injunction
7 does not issue.” King v. Meese, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1227. The court must exercise its discretion
8 “in favor of the party most likely to be injured ... If denial of an injunction would result in great harm
9 to the plaintiff, and the defendants would suffer little harm if it were granted, then it is an abuse of
10 discretion to fail to grant the preliminary injunction.” Robbins v. Sup.Ct., (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205.
11 An injunction may be issued is appropriate when the legality of a regulation is challenged. Conover
12 v. Hall, (1974) 11 Cal.3d 842, 850 (holding that Code Civil Procedure §526(b)(4) does not apply to
13 bar the issuance of a preliminary injunction when an unconstitutional or invalid statute or ordinance
14 is at issue “and that courts have full authority to enjoin the execution of such enactments.”) Finally,
15 the court must also consider the public interest in delaying implementation of the VMT Regulation
16 outside TPAs until the trial on the merits is completed. Tahoe Keys Prop. Owners’ Assn. v. State
17 Water Res. Control Bd., (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472–73.

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19
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21 **A. Petitioners Are Likely to Prevail on the Merits on Challenges to the VMT Regulation**

22 1. The VMT Regulation is not authorized by statute outside TPAs. The Legislature’s
23 consistent and ongoing rejection of VMT reduction mandates outside of TPAs, even after
24 confirmation that VMT had dramatically increased in the SB 150 report issued in 2018, demonstrates
25 that Respondents have no statutory authority to make a new home resident’s act of driving a mile
26 between a new house and work (or school, or soccer practice, or the hospital) an “impact” requiring
27 avoidance or mitigation under CEQA except in transit-oriented infill TPAs. Supra, Part II.C.
28

1 2. The economic assessment for the VMT Regulation omits the required analysis of its
2 economic impact on individuals in violation of Gov’t Code §11346.3(a). RJN, Ex. 10.

3 3. The VMT Regulation includes an unlawful significance threshold, stating that for land use
4 projects (including housing), “[p]rojects that decrease vehicle miles traveled in the project area
5 compared to existing conditions should be presumed to have a less than significant transportation
6 impact” if located just outside a TPA boundary. Guideline §15064.3(b)(1). Under the VMT
7 Regulation, construction of a single home that results in even a single new car trip causes a
8 “significant” VMT impact under CEQA. Thereby effectively establishing a “one molecule rule” (*i.e.*,
9 a project causing one unit of an impact), which has been expressly rejected both by reviewing courts
10 and Respondents. Cmty. for a Better Env’t v. Cal. Res. Agency, (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 120; *see*
11 *also*, RJN, Ex. 12, p. 23.

12 4. The VMT Regulation was also issued concurrently with a complex and contradictory VMT
13 regulatory “Technical Advisory” from Respondent OPR that “recommends” for statewide use
14 multiple and contradictory VMT significance thresholds (“VMT TA Regulation”). RJN, Ex. 13. In
15 conflict with the VMT Regulation’s “one molecule” threshold, the VMT TA regulation states that
16 unless new homes outside TPAs have 15% lower per capita VMT than the per capita VMT in existing
17 homes in the same city, or 15% lower than the existing per capita VMT from homes in a larger but
18 undefined “region,” then the VMT is significant – triggering avoidance or mitigation mandates under
19 CEQA. Id. at 15. The city versus regional VMT TA Regulation conflict with each other, and both
20 conflict with the APA-adopted threshold in the VMT Regulation itself. These contradictory,
21 conflicting thresholds violate both the mandate that CEQA regulations include clear criteria for
22 determining the significance of impacts (Pub. Res. Code §21083), and the requirements for clarity
23 and consistency (Gov’t. Code §11340 *et seq.*). Conflicting thresholds for VMT by the same CEQA
24 expert Respondent agency also create a morass of legal uncertainty for agencies, and judges, seeking
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1 to enforce CEQA.⁶

2 The VMT TA Regulation is also an unlawful “underground regulation” because it was not
3 adopted pursuant to the APA. Id. An agency “Technical Advisory” is in fact a “regulation” if it is
4 intended to establish a rule or standard of general application, and it is intended to implement,
5 interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by the agency. Id. at §11342.600. Further,
6 “no state agency shall issue, utilize, or attempt to enforce any guideline . . . which is a regulation . . .
7 unless the guideline . . . has been adopted as a regulation.” Id. at §11340.5. Because the VMT TA
8 Regulation bypassed the APA, it is invalid and unenforceable underground regulation. Clovis Unified
9 School Dist. v. Chiang, (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 794, 805. The VMT TA Regulation’s status as an
10 underground regulation was further cemented on April 13, 2020, when the California Department of
11 Transportation (“Caltrans”) released VMT guidance that expressly provides that Caltrans will
12 formally object to local agency CEQA practices or documents that do not use the VMT TA
13 regulation’s VMT reduction thresholds to assess and mitigate VMT impacts of projects located
14 outside of TPAs to achieve California’s GHG reduction climate goals. RJN, Ex. 14.

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16
17 Respondents also bypassed the APA mandate that this “guidance” be limited to implementing
18 existing law, and can in fact be implemented consistent with other statutory mandates. For example,
19 San Bernardino County determined, based on its own transportation expert analysis, that the 15%
20 VMT reduction threshold is not feasible throughout the vast majority of unincorporated San
21 Bernardino County, and in fact that the maximum achievable VMT reduction is only 4% below
22 existing VMT per household (i.e., a reduction from 20.5 to 19.7 VMT per household). RJN, Ex. 15,
23 p. 1, 5. Thus, in San Bernardino County, it is certain that no proposed housing project would have a
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26 ⁶ See, e.g., Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 933 (lead agency air
27 quality determinations upheld based on an applicable expert air district “guidance”); Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the
28 Env’t v. City of Santa Clarita, (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1047-1048 (acceptable to rely on OPR’s technical
advisory to calculate GHG emissions); Cleveland Nat’l Forest Found. v. San Diego Assn. of Gov’ts, (2014) 180
Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 582 (dissent)(reversed in part on unrelated matters)(lawful to rely on an OPR’s 2014 technical
advisory that sets forth “directions and step-by-step guidance aimed at assisting practitioners and lead agencies.”)

1 “less than significant” VMT impact under the VMT TA Regulation of 15% lower per capita VMT,
2 and certainly every occupied home will cause at least one new VMT in the “project area” and is
3 significant under the VMT Regulation. As detailed in the VMT TA Regulation, for housing with
4 significant (15% VMT threshold) impacts, agencies should adopt the alternative of “locat[ing] the
5 project in an area of the region that already exhibits low VMT.” RJN, Ex. 13, p. 28. However, San
6 Bernardino County is under state housing law mandates to authorize many thousands of thousands of
7 new homes that must be affordable to moderate as well as low income residents under RHNA housing
8 laws – and thwarting such new housing based on the Respondents’ intended implementation of the
9 VMT Regulation under CEQA violates state housing law. Gov’t Code §65583.

11 **B. The Balance of Harms Warrants Granting the Injunction**

12 The second prong in deciding Petitioners’ motion is the comparative balance of harm
13 Petitioners are likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm Respondents is
14 likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued. Common Cause v. Bd. of Supervisors,
15 (1989) 49 Cal. 432, 441-42. In other words, the court must consider whether Petitioners – and
16 California’s minorities – would suffer more harm in the meantime if an injunction were denied than
17 Respondents would suffer if it were granted. Butt v. State of Cal., (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 693-94.

19 California is in the grips of a pandemic, civil unrest, an economic recession, and an already
20 massive housing, homeless and poverty crisis. One of the only “benefits” of this catastrophic situation
21 is that VMT – and all forms of tailpipe emissions including GHG – have plummeted, which is the
22 policy objective Respondents purportedly seek to achieve with the VMT Regulation. And one more
23 benefit, also as described above, is that working from home – telework – has emerged as a productive
24 and accepted alternative for many office-based jobs, employers and experts agree that remote work
25 is effective, and various pre-pandemic California demonstrated that telework can reduce VMT by
26 between 60 and 90 percent. RJN, Ex. 16. The reality is that remote work, not the VMT transit-centric,
27 high cost housing in TPAs ideology, has already proven to be an effective GHG reduction strategy as

1 it relates to reducing personal automobile use. Further, the requested injunction explicitly respects
2 the Legislature’s decision to allow VMT to be a CEQA metric within TPAs – and thereby continues
3 to encourage transit-oriented infill housing as described in SB 743. RJN, Ex. 17. In short,
4 Respondents suffer no harm from issuance of a preliminary injunction against the statewide
5 implementation of the VMT Regulation outside TPAs.

6
7 Since local agencies are required to accommodate new housing under RHNA (instead of
8 openly defying such housing laws by shoving housing elsewhere in the” region” as endorsed in the
9 VMT TA regulation), the VMT Regulation imposes unlawful new VMT “mitigation” cost burdens
10 on new housing that conflicts with RHNA mandates that housing be affordable to moderate and low
11 income residents, as well as creating unlawful new barriers to housing and homeownership in
12 violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a). Comp., ¶¶461-472.

13
14 Mitigation of the VMT impact requires reducing VMT – reducing miles driven by someone,
15 somewhere – to offset or mitigate the “significant” VMT caused by the new home. However, as
16 documented in San Bernardino County (among others), the transportation choices available to the
17 resident of an existing home or new home will not and cannot be changed by building of a new home:
18 *i.e.*, residents of an existing home have the same transportation choices as residents of a new home
19 built nearby. Recognizing that VMT cannot effectively be reduced by a new home project, the VMT
20 TA Regulation states that “[b]ecause VMT is largely a regional impact, regional VMT-reduction
21 programs may be an appropriate form of mitigation” and that “[i]n lieu fees have been found to be
22 valid mitigation where there is both a commitment to pay fees and evidence that mitigation will
23 actually occur.” RJN, Ex. 13, p. 27.

24
25 In a series of VMT workshops, Respondent OPR showcased VMT fee projects such as
26 charging new homes fees to subsidize public transit, school buses, and bicycle rental services. RJN,
27 Ex. 18. One of the few quantified (by cost, and by avoided VMT) recommended VMT fees by LA
28

1 Metro to require new housing pay for transit passes for use by other people, elsewhere in the region,
2 to reduce regional VMT. RJN, Ex. 19. This proposal had two fatal flaws:

3 First, depending on whether the “one molecule” VMT Regulation (and which 15% VMT
4 threshold from the VMT TA regulation is used as a significance threshold), and making the heroic
5 assumption that today’s LA Metro Transit passes would remain the same price for a 30-year assumed
6 occupancy of a new home –the VMT mitigation fee for each new home approved by San Bernardino
7 county would be \$45,100 per home (assuming the least costly of the two 15% VMT TA regulation
8 thresholds) or \$403,800 per home if the VMT Regulation’s “one molecule” threshold is implemented.
9 Comp. ¶¶315-317. Before the VMT fees are added, new homes prices are affordable to the majority
10 of home purchasers in San Bernardino, which is currently minorities. RJN, Ex. 20; Ex. 21. If even
11 the lower of the two VMT fees were imposed, 19,538 families who could otherwise afford to purchase
12 home could no longer do so. Comp. ¶318.

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14
15 Second, to be a valid CEQA mitigation, the VMT fee actually needs to result in getting a lot
16 of people, somewhere, to drive significantly less miles. There is, however, no evidence that raising
17 new home prices to pay for transit passes actually reduces VMT anywhere. Transit ridership, even in
18 densely populated urban areas, had already declined precipitously pre-pandemic, with for example
19 the LA Metro system carrying approximately 120 million fewer riders in 2019 than in 1985, despite
20 LA Metro opening a huge rail system with six lines radiating from downtown. RJN, Ex. 1, p. 69. One
21 reason for the decline is that the average commuter in the greater Los Angeles region can reach 33
22 times more jobs by car as by transit in a 30 minute commute. RJN, Ex. 22, p. 13. It should,
23 accordingly, come as no surprise that no such “in lieu fee” VMT mitigation programs exists today.

24
25 By increasing the costs and CEQA litigation uncertainties for housing, the VMT Regulations
26 also violate the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §3613(a). The FHA authorizes any
27 “aggrieved person” to bring a fair-housing suit for a “discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. §
28

1 3613(a). It is unnecessary to establish an intent to discriminate under the FHA, the charging party
2 must only “prove the discriminatory impact at issue.” Pfaff v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev.,
3 (9th Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 739, 746 (citing Palmer v. U.S., (9th Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 534, 538). Valid
4 statistical evidence is admissible for this purpose. Id. As supported by statistical evidence in the
5 Complaint, the VMT Regulation disproportionately affects minorities by promoting new housing in
6 high-priced coastal job centers that are affordable to and disproportionately occupied by high-income
7 white households, and by concurrently making it unlawful or economically infeasible to build housing
8 that is affordable to and occupied primarily by minority households in inland Los Angeles and Bay
9 Area counties, and the Central Valley. Bluntly, this is a racist regulation that will to continue to
10 deprive minorities of affordable home ownership. Respondents defend their racist policy as a climate
11 and environmental necessity; it is not.

12
13 **IV. CONCLUSION**

14 The politics of powerful special interests have bypassed state legislators to impose their VMT
15 ideology on California’s most vulnerable minorities through the state’s most powerful anti-housing
16 litigation tool: CEQA. VMT ideologues that demand (other) people ride the bus and live their lives
17 as renters riding elevators to small apartments must also follow the rule of law however, as observed
18 by the immediate past president of the Sierra Club Board of Directors, the club’s first African
19 American president Aaron Green concluded: “White privilege and racism within the broader
20 environmental movement is existent and pervasive.” Decl., ¶10, Ex. 30. Racism must be rooted out,
21 even if camouflaged in green rhetoric and ideology. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners
22 respectfully request an order enjoining the VMT Regulation §15064.3(a) and (b)(1) from becoming
23 effective outside TPAs on July 1, 2020 until the merits of Petitioners’ Complaint are decided.

24
25 Dated: June 2, 2020

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27 _____
Jennifer L. Hernandez