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UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RECEIVED
FBI/DOJ
JUL 1 2017
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

(U) ~~(S)~~ IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.
PERSON.

Docket Number:
17 - 679

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(U) ~~(S)~~ The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to conduct electronic surveillance and physical search, as described herein, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), §§ 1801-1812 and 1821-1829 (FISA or the Act).

50 U.S.C.
§ 1804(a)(1) and
823(a)(1)

1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is made by **Non-SES PII**, a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information officially furnished to SSA **PII**.

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Declassified by C28W34B64 on
3/6/2020- this redacted version
only

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Classification Determination Information

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

OI Tracking No. 147743

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(2) and
1823(a)(2)]

2. (U)(~~S~~) **Identity of the Target** The target of this application is Carter W. Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The status of the target was determined in or about June 2017 from information provided by the U.S. Department of State. The premises or property to be searched and the information, material, or property to be seized, reproduced, or altered are described in detail below.

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(3) and
1823(a)(3)]

3. (U)(~~S~~) **Statement of Facts** The United States relies upon the following facts and circumstances in support of this application.

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(3)(
A) and
1823(a)(3)(A)]

(U)a. (~~S~~) **The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power.**

(U) (~~S~~) The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power.

(U) (~~S~~) This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.

(U) (~~S~~) **The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).**

(U) ~~(S)~~ **The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia)** is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.

(U) ~~(S)~~ **Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation**

Foreign Power Statement for Russia

[REDACTED]

Foreign Power Statement for Russia

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Carter W. Page knowingly aids or abets other persons, who, pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of Russia, knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

I. (U) Overview.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ This application seeks renewed authority to conduct electronic surveillance and physical search of Carter Page. The FBI believes that Page has been the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government for a number of years and currently is acting as an unregistered agent of the Russian Government.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).¹ As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Although the election has concluded, for the reasons described below, the FBI believes that the Russian Government will continue attempting to use U.S.-based individuals, such as Page, to covertly influence U.S. foreign policy and to support the Russian Government's perception management efforts in violation of U.S. criminal law. The FBI expects that the collection requested herein will continue to produce foreign intelligence information that will assist the FBI in more fully understanding the capabilities, activities, plans,

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about November 8, 2016, Candidate #1 was elected President. Although Candidate #1 is now the President, in order to maintain the historical accuracy of the background information, unless otherwise stated, the original references to Candidate #1 and members of Candidate #1's campaign team will remain the same as in previous applications filed in this matter (*see* docket numbers 2016-1182, 2017-0052, and 2017-0375).

and intentions of the Russian Government to influence U.S. foreign policy. Such information will better enable the FBI and the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) to deter, disrupt, and defeat the Russian Government's and Page's activities in this regard.

II. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages in Influence Operations Against the United States.

(U) A. ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~(S//NF)~~ RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ During a September 2016 interview with an identified news organization, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The then DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation. The then DNI added that "it shouldn't come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can bring to bear in the same effort." Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC).² FBI investigation has determined that WikiLeaks obtained the DNC e-mails as a result of computer intrusions by malicious actors. There has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public."

Despite Russia's denial, Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ² ~~(S//NF)~~ According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multi-national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC officials. As noted herein, the **FBI** is investigating the role of the RIS in hacking into these accounts.

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED] In addition, according to an October 7, 2016 *Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security* (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is not new to Moscow – the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities. More recently, on December 29, 2016, the White House issued a statement that the U.S. President had ordered a number of actions in response to the Russian Government's aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential

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Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia took actions intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context, this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence U.S. and foreign elections, the information regarding Russia's role in hacking into the DNC, and the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter Page and others, the FBI believes that the Russian Government used an intelligence network, which consists of, among others, Russian Government officials, Russian state media, and elements of the RIS, to attempt to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Now that the election is over, the FBI believes that the Russian Government will continue to use this intelligence network to engage in perception management activities against the United States that are designed to influence U.S. foreign policy as well as U.S. public opinion of Russia.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI assesses that efforts by the Russian Government to attempt to undermine and influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election and conduct perception management activities against the United States have the effect of harming U.S. national security. As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

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Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U) B. ~~(S//NF)~~ **The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.**

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos³ and Carter Page (the target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team. Based on reporting from a friendly foreign government, Sensitive Informa

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED] the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign. In or about July 2016, the above-referenced friendly foreign government provided information to a [REDACTED].

US Government Official [REDACTED] regarding efforts made by the Russian

(U) ³ ~~(S)~~ Papadopoulos is a current subject of an FBI investigation.

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Government to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Specifically, according to this information, during a meeting in or about April 2016 between officials of the friendly foreign government and Papadopoulos, Foreign Government Third Party Equity

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Papadopoulos suggested that Candidate #1's campaign had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that Russia could assist with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to another candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #2). It was unclear whether Papadopoulos or the Russians were referring to material acquired publicly or through other means. It was also unclear from this reporting how Candidate #1's campaign reacted to the alleged Russian offer. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the FBI believes that Russia's efforts to influence U.S. policy were likely being coordinated between the RIS and Page, and possibly others.⁴

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] As discussed below, Page has established relationships with

(U) ⁴ ~~(S//NF)~~ As of March 2017, the FBI has conducted several interviews with Papadopoulos. During these interviews, Papadopoulos confirmed that he met with officials from the above-referenced friendly foreign government, but he denied that he discussed anything related to the Russian Government during these meetings. Based on the FBI's investigative efforts and some of the comments made by Papadopoulos, the FBI believes that Papadopoulos provided misleading or incomplete information to the FBI during the interviews.

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Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers, and was identified by source reporting as an intermediary with Russian leadership in "a well-developed conspiracy of co-operation" to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Although, as discussed below, Page no longer appears to be an advisor to the now President, **FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration**

[REDACTED]

III. (U)(~~S~~) Carter Page.

(U) A. (~~S~~) Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. According to Page's biography on GEC's website, Page is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and has a background in investment banking, and transactional experience in the energy and power sector, with specific experience in Russia, where

he was an advisor on key transactions for Gazprom.⁵ The FBI's investigation of Page has determined that he has had financial, political, and business ties with the Russian Government. The FBI believes that the Russian Government exploited these ties to solicit Page's cooperation with Russia's influence operations against the United States.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on the results of FBI investigation, which includes review of open source information and information provided by Page during interviews with the FBI, from approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia and worked as Chief Operating Officer for a U.S. investment firm (Firm #1). During this time, Page began business dealings with Gazprom and advised Gazprom on some of its largest deals and helped broker relationships with investors in both New York and London. In or about 2008, Page left Firm #1 and started GEC. According to GEC's website, GEC acts in an advisory role for individuals and organizations that wish to establish a business presence overseas. Since founding GEC, Page has mostly done advisory assignments, such as counseling foreign investors on buying assets in Russia.

(U) ⁵ ~~(S//NF)~~ According to information on Gazprom's website, Gazprom, which was established in Russia, is a global energy company that is among Russia's top four oil producers. Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to information provided by Page during a June 2009 interview with the FBI,⁶ shortly after Page's return to the U.S. in or about 2007, Page began a professional relationship with Aleksandr Bulatov.⁷ During the course of their relationship, which lasted about one year, Page offered to introduce Bulatov to his political and business contacts and provided a copy of Firm #1's annual report, which was not available through open sources at the time. **Sensitive Information**

[REDACTED] the FBI believes Bulatov likely requested the report from Page as part of the recruitment cycle and to further assess Page's openness to provide non-public information, which would also indicate Page's willingness to act as a source for the Russian Government. According to Page, his last contact with Bulatov was in or about August 2008, approximately two months after Bulatov returned to Moscow.

(U) ⁶ ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI conducted a series of interviews of Page to discuss his relationships with Aleksandr Bulatov and Victor Podobnyy, who, as discussed in detail below, **Sensitive Information**.

(U) ⁷ ~~(S//NF)~~ Bulatov is a **Sensitive Information** **[REDACTED]** Bulatov was a Russian diplomat who was assigned to the Trade Representation Office of the Russian Federation in New York City, NY from approximately 2004 - 2007. **Sensitive Information**

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to information provided by Page during a 2013 interview with the FBI, which was conducted to discuss his relationship with Victor Podobnyy, who, as discussed below, **Sensitive Information**, the FBI believes that, in or about January 2013, Page began a professional relationship with Podobnyy, likely after they met at an energy symposium in New York.

Podobnyy, a Russian citizen who was assigned to the Russian Federation Mission to the United Nations in New York City from approximately December 2012 to September 2013, **Sensitive Information**

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government). According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of

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Russia.⁸ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI believes that Page is one of the individuals that Podobnyy and Sporyshev attempted to recruit. As noted above, Page began a relationship with Podobnyy in or about January 2013. According to the complaint, in or about April 2013, Podobnyy and Sporyshev discussed Podobnyy's efforts to recruit "Male-1," who was working as a consultant in New York City, as an intelligence source. In or about March 2016, the FBI again interviewed Page about his relationship with Podobnyy. Based on information provided by Page during this interview, the FBI determined that Page's relationship with Podobnyy was primarily unidirectional, with Page largely providing Podobnyy open source information and contact introductions. During one interview, Page told the FBI that he approached a Russian Minister, who was surrounded by Russian officials/diplomats, and "in the

(U) ⁸ ~~(S//NF)~~ Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov's arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Buryakov was released on March 31, 2017.

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spirit of openness," Page informed the group that he was "Male-1" in the Buryakov complaint. The FBI believes that this information reveals that Page was targeted as part of an RIS recruitment operation and that Podobnyy had started the actual recruitment of Page by tasking him to respond to somewhat innocuous requests. The FBI also believes that Page knew that the RIS was attempting to recruit him by self-identifying as the individual named as "Male-1" in the complaint.

(U) B. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.**

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁹ In addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI confidential human source (Source #1),¹⁰ Sub-Source #1¹¹ reported that Page had a

(U) ⁹ ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI confirmed, **Sensitive Method** that Page traveled to Russia in July 2016.

(U) ¹⁰ ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1 is a **Foreign Government Third Party Equity** and was opened as an FBI source in or about October 2013. Source #1 has been compensated approximately \$95,000 by the FBI. **As discussed below in footnote 22, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1's unauthorized disclosure of information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source.** Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminate its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI. In addition to the specific information pertaining to Page reported in this application, Source #1 provided other information relating to the Russian Government's efforts to influence the election that do not directly pertain to Page, including the possibility of Russia also possessing a dossier on Candidate #1.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible. Moreover, because of outside corroborating circumstances discussed herein, such as the reporting from a friendly foreign government that a member of Candidate #1's team received a suggestion from Russia that Russia could assist with the release of information damaging to Candidate #2 and Russia's believed hack and subsequent leak of the DNC e-mails, the FBI assesses that Source #1's reporting contained herein is credible.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1 maintains a network of sub-sources, who, in many cases, utilize their own sub-sources. The source reporting in this application, which was provided to the FBI by Source #1, is derived primarily from a **Source Descriptive** [REDACTED], who uses a network of sub-sources. Thus, neither Source #1 nor the [REDACTED] had direct access to the information being reported by the sub-

secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.¹² Sub-Source ^{Sent} reported

sources identified herein (each sub-source will be separately identified herein based on the information provided by Source #1). The FBI has no control over the ^{Source Descriptive} [redacted] or any of the sub-sources used by the ^{Source Descriptive} [redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In an effort to further corroborate Source #1's reporting, the FBI has met with Source #1's ^{Source Descriptive} sub-source described immediately above. During these interviews, the FBI found the ^{Source Descriptive} sub-source to be truthful and cooperative. The ^{Source Descriptive} [redacted] The FBI is undertaking additional investigative steps to further corroborate the information provide by Source #1 and, where feasible, contact the sub-sources identified herein.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1 reported the information contained herein to the FBI over the course of several meetings with the FBI from in or about June 2016 through August 2016.

(U) ¹¹ ~~(S//NF)~~ ^{Source Descriptive} [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

(U) ¹² ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin – a key component to his current standing."

that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia. Although Sub-Source [redacted] reported that Page had reacted positively to the discussions, Sub-Source [redacted] commented that Page was generally non-committal in a response.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ As discussed below, the FBI believes that it has obtained additional information consistent with the above-described reporting from Sub-Source [redacted] that Page met with Sechin while Page was in Moscow in July 2016. Specifically, in or about June 2017, the FBI interviewed [redacted] and individual [redacted] who is closely tied to the president of the New Economic School in Moscow. During this interview, [redacted] the individual informed the FBI that an individual identified as Andrej Krickovic¹³ presented the idea of Page giving the New

[redacted] Sensitive Information [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] Sensitive Information [redacted]
[redacted] the FBI determined Sensitive Information [redacted]
[redacted] Krickovic had contact with Russian intelligence officers, Sensitive Information [redacted] The FBI believes [redacted] Sensitive Information [redacted] was attempting to recruit Krickovic to wittingly or unwittingly work for the RIS.

Economic School commencement address. Although individual [REDACTED] characterization of Page was negative, and the commencement speakers were typically heads of state and Nobel Laureates, nevertheless individual [REDACTED] said they invited Page because Page was "[Candidate #1's] Russia-guy." individual [REDACTED] also informed the FBI that Sensitive Information [REDACTED] of Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow, and while individual [REDACTED] individual [REDACTED] recalled an instance where Page was picked-up in a chauffeured car and that it was rumored at that time that Page had met with Igor Sechin.

(U) ~~(S//XNF)~~ Second, according to Source #1, Sub-Source [REDACTED] reported that, in or about July 2016, an official close to S. Ivanov, who the FBI assesses to be Sergey Ivanov, the Head of the Russian Presidential Administration, confided to a compatriot that Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin], a

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Source Descriptive [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

senior colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA [assessed to be a reference to the Russian Presidential Administration], had met secretly with Page and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or "kompromat"¹⁵ that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it being released to Candidate #1's campaign.¹⁶ According to reporting from Sub-Source [REDACTED] this dossier had been compiled by the RIS over many years, dating back to the 1990s. Further, according to Sub-Source [REDACTED] this dossier was, by the direct instructions of Russian President Putin, controlled exclusively by Senior Kremlin

(U) ¹⁵ ~~(S)~~ Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

(U) ¹⁶ ~~(S//NF)~~ As noted above, in or about April 2016, Papadopoulos suggested, during a meeting with a friendly foreign government, that Russia could assist with the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Candidate #2. The FBI assesses that Divyekin planned to offer the "kompromat" to Page during their July 2016 meeting to further influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election by providing derogatory information about Candidate #2 to Candidate #1's campaign.

■ Source Descriptive

[REDACTED]

■ Source Descriptive

[REDACTED]

Spokesman Dmitry Peskov. Accordingly, the FBI assesses that Divyekin received direction by the Russian Government to disclose the nature and existence of the dossier to Page. In or about June 2016, Sub-Source [REDACTED] reported that the Kremlin had been feeding information to Candidate #1's campaign for an extended period of time. Sub-Source [REDACTED] also reported that the Kremlin had been feeding information

[REDACTED]
■ Source Descriptive [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
■ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Source Descriptive [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) (~~S//NF~~) Of note Sensitive Information [REDACTED] denies having any compromising information regarding the President. Sensitive Information [REDACTED] states that aides to the President [REDACTED] reject this individual's claims to have had close access to the President.

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to Candidate #1's campaign for an extended period of time and added that the information had reportedly been "very helpful." The FBI assesses the information funneled by the Russians to Page was likely part of Russia's efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to information provided by Sub-Source [REDACTED] there was "a well-developed conspiracy of co-operation between them [assessed to be individuals involved in Candidate #1's campaign] and the Russian leadership." Sub-Source [REDACTED] reported that the conspiracy was being managed by Candidate #1's then campaign manager, who was using, among others, foreign policy advisor Carter Page as an intermediary. Sub-Source [REDACTED] further reported that the Russian regime had been behind the above-described disclosure of DNC e-mail messages to WikiLeaks. Sub-Source [REDACTED] reported that WikiLeaks was used to create "plausible deniability," and that the operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of Candidate #1's team, which the FBI assessed to include at least Page. In return, according to Sub-Source [REDACTED] Candidate #1's team, which the FBI assessed to include at least Page, agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI is investigating what, if any, of the reporting discussed herein and in Source Descriptive [REDACTED] can be attributed to the identified individual.

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and to raise U.S./NATO defense commitments in the Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine.

(U) (~~TS//NF~~) Notably, following Page's July 2016 meeting with Sechin during which he discussed prospects for lifting Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia, a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1's foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people

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sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter Page. Thus, the FBI assesses that, following Page's meetings in Russia, Page helped influence Political Party #1 and Candidate #1's campaign to alter their platforms to be more sympathetic to Russia.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In addition to the foregoing, in or about August 2016, Sub-Source [REDACTED] reported that the above-described leak of the DNC e-mails to WikiLeaks had been done, at least in part, as an attempt to swing supporters of an identified individual, who had been running against Candidate #2 for their political party's nomination, away from Candidate #2 and to Candidate #1. Sub-Source [REDACTED] reported that this objective had been conceived and promoted by, among others, Page, who had discussed the objective directly with Sub-Source [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] Based on reporting from another FBI confidential human source (Source #2),²¹ as well as information obtained through [REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

²¹ [REDACTED]
Sensitive Information [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration Specifically, on or about August 20, 2016, Page met with Source #2 **Sensitive Information**, which meeting was consensually monitored and recorded. During the course of their meeting, Source #2 discussed the 1980 "October Surprise" [in context, the FBI believes this refers to the conspiracy theory that, in October 1980, a candidate for U.S. President conspired with Iran to beat his opponent in the election by making a deal with Iran by which Iran would continue to hold hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran until after the election]. Page claimed that there would be a "different October surprise" this year. Later, according to Source #2, **[REDACTED]**

Sensitive Information **[REDACTED]**

[REDACTED] Page responded, "No well I – well I want to have the conspiracy theory about the, uh, the Ru- the next email dump with these, uh 33 thousand, you know."

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ **[REDACTED]** **FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration**

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

IV. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

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Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.²²

(U) ²² ~~(S)~~ As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI. Given that the information contained in the September 23rd News Article generally matches the information about Page that Source #1 discovered during his/her research, the FBI assesses that Source #1's business associate or the law firm that hired the business associate likely provided this information to the press. The FBI also assesses that whoever gave the information to the press stated that the information was provided by a "well-placed Western intelligence source." The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.

(U) ~~(S)~~ In or about late October 2016, however, after the FBI Director sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1's concerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI//X~~

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate #1's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign

herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1's reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI closed Source #1 as an active source.

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign" Although it appears that Candidate #1's campaign was attempting to publicly distance itself from Page, the FBI assesses, based on the totality of circumstances described herein, that Page was engaged in efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy on behalf of the Russian Government.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss any "final" questions the FBI may have.²³

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction." Similar to the above-noted comments from officials with Candidate #1's campaign, the FBI believes that Page's comments were self-serving and, based on the source reporting described above, untrue. At the time, notwithstanding public comments from officials affiliated with Candidate #1's campaign that distanced the campaign from Page, Page's public denial about the accusations in the September 23rd News Article, and Page's subsequent statement about taking a leave of absence from his

(U) ²³ ~~(S//NF)~~ As discussed below, the FBI conducted a series of interviews with Page in or around March 2017.

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

work with the campaign, because Page was one of the first identified foreign policy advisors for Candidate #1's campaign, the FBI believes that Page likely established close relationships with other members of Candidate #1's campaign and likely would have continued to have access to members of Candidate #1's campaign, which he could exploit to attempt to exert influence on foreign policy matters, regardless of whatever formal role he played in the campaign.

V. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Additional Interactions with Source #2.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about October 17, 2016, Page met with Source #2, which meeting the FBI consensually monitored and recorded. According to the FBI's review of the recorded conversation, Source #2 made general inquiries about the media reporting regarding Page's contacts with Russian officials. Although Page did not provide any specific details to refute, dispel, or clarify the media reporting, he made vague statements that minimized his activities. Page also made general statements about a perceived conspiracy against him mounted by the media. However, notwithstanding these vague and general statements, Page admitted that he has had a "longstanding constructive relationship with the Russians, going back, throughout my life." In addition to this statement, Page made comments that lead the FBI to believe Page continues to be closely tied to Russian officials. Specifically, Page mentioned a foreign policy think tank project (but did not disclose the specifics

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

of the project to Source #2). With respect to funding the project, Page said, "I don't want to say there'd be an open checkbook, but the Russians would definitely [fund it] ... but, that has its pros and cons, right?" The FBI believes this statement reflects Page's belief that he has significant relationships with Russian officials who will provide financial support for this foreign policy project.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ During this meeting with Source #2, Page said that he was no longer officially affiliated with Candidate #1's campaign, but added that he may be appearing in a television interview within the next week when he travels to the United Kingdom. According to Page, the interview was to discuss the potential change in U.S. foreign policy as it pertains to Russia and Syria if Candidate #1 won the election. Accordingly, although Page claimed that he was no longer officially affiliated with the campaign, the FBI assesses that Page continued to coordinate with the Russian Government, and perhaps others, in efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy.

VI. (U) Additional Investigative Results.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED] Now that the 2016 U.S. Presidential election is over, the FBI believes that Russia will shift its focus from the short-term goal of influencing the election to engaging in long-term perception management activities that are directed by the Russian Government. [REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

(U) A. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page [REDACTED] Meeting with Russian Officials in July 2016.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] Although Page publicly, and in interviews with the FBI, has denied meeting with Sechin and Divyekin during his July 2016 trip to Moscow,

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) B. ~~(S)~~ Page's Security Conscious Behavior.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] The FBI believes that Page may have taken steps to destroy evidence of his involvement with Russian efforts to undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. During the above-referenced March 2017 interviews, Page informed the FBI that, in or about mid-October 2016, his cell phone had been accidentally destroyed and that as a result he lost all of

[REDACTED] communications Sensitive Information [REDACTED] Specifically,
Page said that he dropped his cell phone while crossing a street, but did not
realize that he had dropped the cell phone until after it was run-over by a vehicle.
The FBI finds this suspicious because this is around the same time that Page was
being explicitly referenced in media reports as possibly being investigated for his
ties to Russia. FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) (S//NF) [REDACTED] FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

²⁴ Sensitive Information [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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~~FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

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~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//USA~~

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about June 2017, the FBI interviewed Klimentov. During this interview, Klimentov revealed that he believed that Page was in Moscow for only two and a half days on the July 2016 trip.²⁵ When asked if he was aware of any meeting between Page and Sechin, Klimentov said that he did not think it was likely that the two met. Notwithstanding Klimentov's statement that he does not think that Page met with Sechin during Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow, the FBI believes, based on the above-described information provided by Sensitive Information that it was rumored that Page met with Sechin, that Page and Sechin likely met prior to the time that Page joined Klimentov at the New Economic School.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] The FBI also assesses that Klimentov does not know about all of the meetings that Page had when he was in Moscow in July 2016. For example, during the FBI's interview of Klimentov, the FBI asked him if he had any knowledge about a meeting between Page and Arkadiy Dvorkovich, who is the Russian Deputy Prime Minister. Klimentov said that he knew Page attempted to schedule a meeting with the New Economic School board, which would have included Dvorkovich, but the meeting never took place. Klimentov told the FBI that he had no memory of any meeting between Page and Dvorkovich. [REDACTED]

²⁵ Sensitive Method

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

(U) C. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's International Travel.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the FBI believes that the RIS and Page may have previously met face-to-face. According to the FBI's Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Based on information developed through its ongoing investigation, the FBI believes that Page works in the New York City metropolitan area, and, Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

~~Sensitive Information~~. Additionally, the FBI's ongoing investigation has revealed that Page has moved out of his ~~Sensitive Information~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~. Thus, the FBI assesses that the New York City metropolitan area provides the RIS and Russian officials with a viable area to clandestinely meet with Page.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~Sensitive Information~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~[REDACTED]~~ The FBI assesses, based on Page's self-admitted meetings with ~~[REDACTED]~~ ^{FISA-Acquired Informant} ~~[REDACTED]~~ " during his July

2016 travel to Russia, that he has already displayed a willingness to use his international travel to meet with Russian officials. FBI investigation has revealed that Page traveled internationally at least three times since October 2016. First, Page traveled to the United Kingdom and South Africa on or about October 22 – November 3, 2016. Second, and more notably because the travel occurred after the conclusion of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Page traveled to Moscow in or about December 2016. Third, Page traveled to Singapore in or about February 2017. As discussed below, during at least two of these trips, the FBI believes that Page met with Russian Government officials.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI conducted a series of interviews with Page in or about March 2017. During the course of these interviews, Page discussed his December 2016 travel to Moscow. Page informed the FBI that, during this trip, he unexpectedly met the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkadiy Dvorkovich. According to Page, Dvorkovich is on the Board of the New Economic School and, like Page, Dvorkovich delivered remarks at the New Economic School graduation in July 2016. Page stated that Dvorkovich congratulated Page for Candidate #1's election and asked how to connect for future cooperation. [REDACTED]

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED], the FBI believes that Dvorkovich's request to connect for "future cooperation" reveals Russia's continued interest in using Page as an influence agent.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) (~~S//NF~~) In addition, during his interviews with the FBI, Page also revealed that he had traveled to Singapore to participate in the 2017 Gazprom Investor Day, which occurred on February 28, 2017. Page disclosed that while he was at the Gazprom Investor Day, **Sensitive Information** and they scheduled a breakfast in New York, NY for later in March [2017]. According to Page, he thought that the breakfast meeting would be about future business ventures, but there was no specific agenda. As with Dvorkovich's outreach, the FBI assesses that **[REDACTED]** is interested in continuing to develop a relationship with Page in order to use Page as an influence agent for or on behalf of Russia. The FBI also assesses that "future business ventures" may include ventures with Page that the Russian Government could exploit to engage in influence operations against the United States, like the proposed think tank discussed immediately below.

²⁶ **Sensitive Information**

[REDACTED] The FBI assesses that this is likely the same individual who Page interacted with in Singapore.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) According to information on its website, Gazprombank was founded by Gazprom to provide banking services for gas industry enterprises. The authorized capital of Gazprombank is divided into ordinary shares, Type A preferred shares, and Type B preferred shares. The Russian Federation owns 100% of the Type A preferred shares and the State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency owns 100% of the Type B preferred shares.

(U) D. ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~XXXX~~ Page's Russian-Funded Think Tank.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~XXXX~~ As discussed above, Page appeared to be interested in establishing a Russian-funded think tank. Page approached Source #2 about being part of this project, and, as mentioned above, told Source #2 that the Russians would be willing to fund it. According to more recent reporting from Source #2, who met with Page shortly after Page's return from Moscow in or about December 2016, Source #2 asked Page for additional information regarding the financials for the proposed think tank. According to Source #2, Page initially attempted to distance the think tank from Russian funding. When Source #2 reminded Page of his previous statement regarding the "open checkbook," Page did not refute his previous comment and provided some reassurance to Source #2 about the likelihood of Russian financial support. The FBI assesses that Page's attempts to downplay Russian funding for the think tank can be attributed to Page likely trying to distance himself from Russia due to media reporting that continues to tie Page to Russia, Page's desire to appear to be separate and independent, or perhaps Page was instructed by Russian officials during his recent meetings with them that he should not discuss any possible Russian financial involvement.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on more recent information developed through its ongoing investigation of Page, the FBI now assesses that Page is no longer interested in establishing a think tank, likely due to the lack of funding.

E. ~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~ FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~ FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

(U) (~~S//XXIX~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ **FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration**, the FBI assesses that Page continues to have access to senior U.S. Government officials. Moreover, the FBI further assesses that Page is attempting to downplay his contacts with the Russian Government and to dispel the controversy surrounding him, so as to make him more viable as a foreign policy expert who will be in a position, due to his continued contacts with senior U.S. Government officials, to influence U.S. foreign policy towards Russia.

(U) F. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Perception Management Efforts.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ **FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration**

[REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

(U) G. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Letter to the U.S. Department of Justice.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or around February 2017, Page sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page claimed was "severe election fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of [Candidate #2's] campaign and their political allies last year." In his letter, Page claims that he has

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not directly supported a political campaign since September 2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of Candidate #2's campaign based on fictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in Moscow had no connection to the U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd News Article that Page met with two senior Russian officials (i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscow in July 2016 to give the commencement address at the New Economic School, which Page claims is "false evidence," to Candidate #2's campaign. Page further claims that the information relied on by Candidate #2's campaign, certain members of the U.S. Congress, and the media are lies that were completely fabricated by Candidate #2's paid consultants and private investigators. Notwithstanding Page's assertions that the claims against him are false, baseless, and completely fabricated, based on information developed by the FBI through its ongoing investigation of Page that is described herein, the FBI believes that Page's claims in this letter are self-serving and untrue.

(U) H. ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI's Interviews of Page.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about March 2017, the FBI met with Page for a series of interviews. At the start of these interviews, Page provided the FBI with a written outline of the facts and events he believed to be pertinent to the FBI's investigation.

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

The FBI assesses that Page was not completely forthcoming during his interviews. For example, one of the topics Page covered with his prepared comments was his previous experience with Evgeny Buryakov, Igor Sporyshev, and Victor Podobnyy [these individuals are discussed above on pgs. 15-17]. In a reference to the Buryakov complaint, Page stated that "nobody knows that I'm Male-1 in this report," and also added that he never told anyone about this. As discussed above however, during a March 2016 interview with the FBI regarding his relationship with Podobnyy, Page told the FBI that he informed a group of Russian officials that he (Page) was "Male-1" in the Buryakov complaint. Thus, during the March 2017 interview, the FBI specifically asked Page if he told any colleague that he (Page) was "Male-1." In response, Page stated that there was a conversation with a Russian Government official at the United Nations General Assembly. The FBI again asked Page if he had told anyone that he was "Male-1." Page responded that he "forgot the exact statement."

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Additionally, the FBI questioned Page about his previous relationship with Aleksandr Bulatov. [As discussed above, Bulatov is believed to be **Sensitive Information**; during a June 2009 interview with the FBI, Page stated that he formed a professional relationship with Bulatov in or around 2007-2008.] Initially, Page claimed to not recall the name, but after further FBI questioning and

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

looking in his phone contact list, Page claimed that he and Bulatov may have had lunch in New York.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ At a later point in the interviews, after the FBI explained to Page how Page could be viewed as having a source-handler or co-optee relationship with the Russian intelligence officers, Page claimed that he believed that he was "on the books," but that he only provided the Russian intelligence officers with "immaterial non-public" information. Page further explained, "the more immaterial non-public information I give them, the better for this country." In the context of this part of the interview, during which the FBI was specifically discussing [REDACTED] intelligence officers and their patterns of recruitment, the FBI assesses that Page was referring to the [REDACTED] when he said that he was "on the books." Although the FBI asked Page to explain any current contact he had with any possible Russian intelligence officers, Page would only discuss the time frame 2008 to 2013.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~XXXX~~ Also during the interviews, Page denied ever meeting with Sechin or Divyekin, but, as discussed above, admitted to meeting with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkadiy Dvorkovich. The FBI assesses Page made this disclosure because it was publicly known that Dvorkovich was at the July 2016 graduation and that the two would have likely interacted at that time. Also, because Dvorkovich is the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, the FBI assesses that Page, by making this

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admission, believed he could explain the media claims that Page met with Russian officials in July 2016.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ With respect to Page's associations with Russian officials, the FBI believes that Page's strategy during these interviews was to initially deny an inculpatory allegation regarding such associations until Page could determine the extent of the FBI's knowledge. If the FBI appeared to know more about the allegation, the FBI believes that Page would then make a partial admission but also downplay its importance.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ For example, Page downplayed his interactions with Dvorkovich during his March 2017 interviews with the FBI. During these interviews, Page characterized his interaction with Dvorkovich in July 2016 as a simple introduction in passing and a brief handshake. FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration
[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's strategy of initially denying an inculpatory allegation regarding his associations and then making a partial admission also appears to be Page's approach to interviews he has conducted with the news media. For example, in or about February 2017, Page was interviewed by a national news organization and was asked specifically if he had any meetings last year with Russian officials in Russia or elsewhere. Page replied that he had no meetings but may have greeted a few people as they walked by him at the graduation [in context, a reference to the commencement ceremony at the New Economic School]. Then, in or about March 2017, Page was interviewed by a different national news organization and was

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

directly asked if he had met with the Russian Ambassador to the United States in July 2016 during a political function held in Cleveland, OH. Initially, Page said he would not comment on meetings that took place there due to confidentiality rules. The interviewer continued to press this line of questions, and Page eventually admitted that he talked "off-the-record" with the Russian Ambassador.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) During these March 2017 interviews, the FBI also questioned Page about the above-referenced reports from August 2016 that Candidate #1's campaign worked to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces [this matter is discussed above on pgs. 25-26]. According to Page, he had no part in the campaign's decision. Page stated that an identified individual (who previously served as manager of Candidate #1's campaign) more likely than not recommended the "pro-Russian" changes. As the FBI believes that Page also holds pro-Russian views and appears to still have been a member of Candidate #1's campaign in August 2016, the FBI assesses that Page may have been downplaying his role in advocating for the change to Political Party #1's platform.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) Finally, during these interviews, the FBI questioned Page about his removal from Candidate #1's campaign. According to Page, on or about September 24, 2016, Page was told by an identified member of Candidate #1's campaign that

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Page was no longer part of the campaign. However, Page added that another identified member of the campaign told Page that he would still be in the "orbit" of the campaign. **FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ **FISA-Acquired Information Subject to Sequestration**

[REDACTED] the FBI believes this may be the result of multiple factors, such as the media exposure that Page has received in relation to the FBI's investigation into allegations of Russian Government interference into the 2016 U.S. Presidential election as well as multiple media reports from in or about April 2017 that the FBI obtained a FISA warrant to surveil Page. Additionally, based on Page's history of willingness to assist Russian IOs, which as discussed above the FBI believes began as early as 2007 (see page 14), and his comment to the FBI that he believes he is "on the [REDACTED] books," the FBI believes that Page remains favorable to future RIS taskings.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ The FBI also notes that Page continues to be active in meeting with media outlets to promote his theories of how U.S. foreign policy should be adjusted with regard to Russia and also to refute claims of his involvement with Russian Government efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. [REDACTED]

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The FBI believes this approach is important because, from the Russian Government's point-of-view, it continues to keep the controversy of the election in the front of the American and world media, which has the effect of undermining the integrity of the U.S. electoral process and weakening the effectiveness of the current U.S. Administration. The FBI believes Page also may be seeking media attention in order to maintain momentum for potential book contracts.

(U)
VII. ~~(S)~~ Facilities Used by Page.

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

²⁹ Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information



~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

VIII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating and conspiring with the Russian Government, to include elements of the RIS, to influence public opinion and affect the course of the U.S. Government. Based on the foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that Page knowingly aids or abets other persons, who, pursuant to the

direction of an intelligence service or network of Russia, knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ As the activities discussed herein involve Page aiding, abetting, or conspiring with Russian Government officials and elements of the RIS in clandestine intelligence activities, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United States, including 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 951 (Agents of Foreign Governments), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 612, et seq. (Foreign Agents Registration Act).

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[50 U.S.C.
§ 1823(a)(3)(B)]

(U) b. ~~(S)~~ The premises or property to be searched contains foreign intelligence information.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The premises or property to be searched contains foreign intelligence information, in that investigation by the FBI has determined that there is probable cause to believe that Page is an agent of Russia, a foreign power, all as described

herein. Based upon its investigations of this foreign power and its agents, the FBI believes that this target maintains information, material, and/or property related to such activities secreted in the premises or property specified herein. Thus, the FBI expects that foreign intelligence information, such as that described herein, will be contained in the premises or property to be searched.

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(3)(B)
and
1823(a)(3)(C)]

(U) c. ~~(S)~~ The facilities or places at which electronic surveillance will be directed, and the premises or property to be searched.

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//ISA~~

Sensitive Information [Redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//ISA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(4)
and
1823(a)(4)]

4.(U~~S~~) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow its [REDACTED]

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(5)
and
1823(a)(5)]

5. (U)~~(S)~~ Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(6)(A)-
(E)
and
1823(a)(6)(A)-(E)]

6. (U) ~~(S)~~ Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the President as a certifying official in Executive Order Numbers 12139 (electronic surveillance) and 12949 (physical search), as amended, is set forth below.

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

(U) ~~(S)~~ The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a

violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at least a significant purpose of this request for electronic surveillance and physical search is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation of this target.

[50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)]

[REDACTED] isive Information [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(8) and 1823(a)(8)]

8.(U)(~~S~~) Facts Concerning Previous Applications Previous applications made to and approved by this Court for authorities under the Act regarding the target, facilities, places, premises or property targeted herein, are as follows:

three combined applications for electronic surveillance and physical search. The most recent application was filed in docket number 2017-0375.

(50 U.S.C.
§ 1824(d))
(50 U.S.C.
§ 1804(a)(9))

9. (U) ~~(S)~~ Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also, 50 U.S.C. § 1824(d))

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested. The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended. Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period of ninety (90) days.

[Redacted] Sensitive Information [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

Sensitive Information

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

Sensitive Information
[Redacted text block]

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information [redacted]
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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

(U) (S) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

(U) (S) Carter W. Page:

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
TOP SECRET//NOFORN//ISA

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Sensitive Information

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(j)]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[Sec 50 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d)(2)(C)]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information

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Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

(U) VERIFICATION

(U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 1746 on 06/28/2017.

Non-SES PII
[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

(U) CERTIFICATION

(U) (S) I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to the electronic surveillance and physical search requested in this verified application targeting **Carter W. Page**, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows:

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(6)(A)
and
1823(a)(6)(A)]

(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is foreign intelligence information.

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(6)(B)
and
1823(a)(6)(B)]

(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is **not** to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign intelligence crimes.

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(6)(C)
and
1823(a)(6)(C)]

(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques.

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(6)(D)
and
1823(a)(6)(D)]

(U) (D) (S) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i.e.,

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

[50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(6)(E)
and
1823(a)(6)(E)]

(U) (E) (S) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

(U) (S) Foreign Intelligence Information The foreign intelligence information sought through the authorities requested herein is the type specified herein because it may, among other things, enable the U.S. Government to:

Sensitive Information [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FSA~~

Sensitive Information [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FSA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Potential for Use in Criminal Proceedings Another purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain information which may assist at some future time in the criminal prosecution of Page or others, including possibly U.S. persons. Such assistance may include:

(1) obtaining information to support a prosecution, or a legitimate threat of prosecution, of Page for federal foreign intelligence-related criminal offenses, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 951 (Agents of Foreign Governments), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 612, et seq. (Foreign Agents Registration Act); and/or

(2) obtaining information to support prosecutions of others, including U.S. persons, for federal foreign intelligence-related criminal offenses.

(U) (S) Limitations of Normal Investigative Techniques Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Information



~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//NSA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//NSA~~

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]


(U) (S) In short, none of these normal investigative techniques, or others like them, can provide the same kind of information, with the same reliability and safety, as the authorities requested herein.

(U) (S) Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

(U) ~~(S)~~ Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation



Andrew G. McCabe
Deputy Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Michael Pompeo
Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency

Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence

Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence

06/28/2017
Date

Rex Tillerson
Secretary of State

John J. Sullivan
Deputy Secretary of State

James N. Mattis
Secretary of Defense

H.R. McMaster
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (S) I find that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.

Sensitive Information


[REDACTED]

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(Sensitive Information)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



Rod J. Rosenstein
Deputy Attorney General of the United States

6/29/17
Date

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//SI~~

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

(U)(S) WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted,

Non-SES PII

Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN//FISA~~

~~XXXXXX~~
~~SECRET~~

Filed
United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

JUN 29 2017

LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.
PERSON

Docket Number:

17 - 679

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 and 1821-1829 (FISA or the Act), for an order and warrant (hereinafter "order") for **electronic surveillance and physical search**, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows:

50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(a)(1) and
824(a)(1)

2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General;

50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(a)(2) and
824(a)(2)

3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe that:

~~XXXXXX~~
~~SECRET~~

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
Derived from:

Classification Determination Information

Declassify on:
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Declassified by C28W34B64 on 3/6/2020
This redacted version only

~~SECRET~~

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E);

(B) as specified herein, the facilities or places at which electronic surveillance will be directed are being used or are about to be used by, and the premises or property to be searched is or is about to be owned, used, possessed by, or is in transit to or from, this target;

50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(a)(3) and
824(a)(3)]

4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures under 50 U.S.C §§ 1801(h) and 1821(4);

50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(a)(4) and
824(a)(4)]

5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1823, and the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis of the statements made under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(E) and 1823(a)(6)(E), and any other information furnished under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(c) and 1823(c).

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

~~SECRET~~

-2-

~~SECRET~~

50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(c)(1) and
824(c)(1))

1. The United States is authorized to conduct electronic surveillance and physical search of the target as follows; provided that the electronic surveillance shall be directed only at the facilities and places described below, using for each only the means specified below for such particular facility or place, and the physical search shall be conducted only of the premises or property described below, using for each only the manner specified below for such particular premises or property.

Sensitive Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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See 50 U.S.C.
1842(d)(2)(C)]

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§ 1805(c)(1)(C)
and
824(c)(1)(C)

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1805(c)(1)(D)

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50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(c)(1)(E)
and
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6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(c)(2)(A)
and
824(c)(2)(A)

As to all information acquired through the authorities approved herein, the FBI shall [REDACTED]

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2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

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50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(c)(2)(B)-
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nd
824(c)(2)(B)-(D))

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10 U.S.C.
1824(c)(2)(E)]

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2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

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This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires at 3:00 p.m. Eastern Time
on the 22nd day of September, 2017.

Signed _____ 06-29-2017 P12:41 Eastern Time
Date Time



RAYMOND J. DEARIE
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

[Redacted] Deputy Clerk,
FISC, certify that this document
is a true and correct copy of the
original.
[Redacted]

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