



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

April 1, 2020

Austin Evers
American Oversight
1030 15th Street, NW
Suite B255
Washington, DC 20005

Via email: hart.wood@americanoversight.org

Re: HQ-2019-01418-F

Dear Mr. Evers:

This is a second partial response to request HQ-2019-01418-F that you sent to the Department of Energy (DOE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. In FOIA request HQ-2019-01418-F, you requested the following:

- 1) All email communications (including email messages, calendar invitations, and attachments thereto), text messages, and WhatsApp messages sent or received by Secretary Perry, as well as by any aide or other assistant who accompanied Secretary Perry to Ukraine on or about May 19-21, 2019, containing any of the following key terms:
 - a. Rudy
 - b. Giuliani
 - c. Giuiliani
 - d. Guliani
 - e. Hunter
 - f. Biden
 - g. Bidens
 - h. Burisma
 - i. Lutsenko
 - j. Syntyk
 - k. Crowdstrike
 - l. Toensing
 - m. diGenova
 - n. Fruman
 - o. Parnas
 - p. Kolomoisky
 - q. Kolomoysky
 - r. Shokin
 - s. Klitschko



t. DNC

Please produce all responsive records from May 10, 2019, through May 24, 2019.

- 2) Any guidance, directives, or memoranda issued to or by Secretary Perry with relation to former Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, and/or Burisma Holdings (also known as Burisma Group).

Please produce all responsive records from May 10, 2019, through May 24, 2019.

Your request was assigned to DOE's Office of the Executive Secretariat (ES) to conduct a search of its files for responsive documents.

The search started on October 18, 2019, which is the cutoff date for responsive documents. You received a first partial response to this request, HQ-2019-01238-F, and HQ-2020-00011-F on January 28, 2020 consisting of five (5) documents. Four of the documents were transferred in full and one of the documents was transferred in part to the Department of State for review and direct response to you. This letter serves as the second response for DOE. At this time, DOE has identified five additional (5) documents responsive to your request.

DOE has determined that four (4) of the documents contain equities of the Department of State. For this reason, four (4) documents are being transferred in part to the Department of State for review and direct response to you.

If you have any questions about the documents transferred to the Department of State, please contact the Department of State FOIA Requester Service Center (FRSC) via telephone at: (202) 261-8484.

Upon review, DOE has determined that certain information should be withheld from the documents pursuant to Exemptions 5, 6, and 7 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (b)(6), and (b)(7).

Exemption 5 protects from mandatory disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency..." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). Exemption 5 incorporates the deliberative process privilege and the attorney-client privilege. The deliberative process privilege protects recommendations, advice, and opinions that are part of the process by which agency decisions and policies are formulated. The information withheld under this privilege consists of inter-agency pre-decisional information.

Certain information withheld under Exemption 5 has been deemed pre-decisional and deliberative in nature, including draft versions of documents, talking points, pre-decisional discussions between DOE staff, and hyperlinks that would reveal deliberative

information. The DOE may consider these preliminary views as part of the process that will lead to the agency's final decision about these matters. The information does not represent a final agency position, and its release would compromise the deliberative process by which the government makes its decisions. Withholding this information protects the candor of intra and inter-agency communications, and prevents confusion to the public that could result from disclosing alternative rationales for agency decisions. Thus, these documents are being withheld in part under Exemption 5 of the FOIA.

With respect to the discretionary disclosure of deliberative information, the quality of agency decisions would be adversely affected if frank, written discussion of policy matters were inhibited by the knowledge that the content of such discussion might be made public. For this reason, DOE has determined that discretionary disclosure of the deliberative material is not in the public interest because foreseeable harm could result from such disclosure.

Exemption 6 is generally referred to as the "personal privacy" exemption; it provides that the disclosure requirements of FOIA do not apply to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). In applying Exemption 6, the DOE considered: 1) whether a significant privacy interest would be invaded; 2) whether the release of the information would further the public interest by shedding light on the operations or activities of the Government; and 3) whether in balancing the privacy interests against the public interest, disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.

The information withheld under Exemption 6 consists of travel and personal information, including cell phone numbers. This information qualifies as "similar files" because it is information in which an individual has a privacy interest. Moreover, releasing the information could subject the individuals to unwarranted or unsolicited communications. Since no public interest would be served by disclosing this information, and since there is a viable privacy interest that would be threatened by such disclosure, Exemption 6 authorizes withholding the information. Therefore, we have determined that the public interest in the information's release does not outweigh the overriding privacy interests in keeping it confidential.

Exemption 7 protects from disclosure "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" that fall within the purview of one or more of six enumerated categories. To qualify under Exemption 7, the information must have been compiled, either originally or at some later date, for a law enforcement purpose, which includes crime prevention and security measures, even if that is only one of the many purposes for compilation.

Exemption 7(C) provides that, "records of information compiled for law enforcement purposes" may be withheld from disclosure, but only to the extent that the production of such documents "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy...." In applying Exemption 7(C), DOE considered whether a significant privacy interest would be invaded, whether the release of the information would further

the public interest in shedding light on the operations or activities of the Government, and whether in balancing the privacy interests against the public interest, disclosure would constitute unwarranted invasion of privacy.

The information withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(C) consists of certain travel logistics and security detail information. This information, if known, could pose a serious safety risk to individuals or those to whom protection is being provided, and may result in an unwarranted invasion of their privacy. Releasing this information would reveal little about the operations or activities of the Government. Therefore, disclosure of this information could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and this information is being withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(C).

This satisfies the standard set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A) that agencies shall withhold information under FOIA “only if (I) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption . . . ; or (II) disclosure is prohibited by law” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A) also provides that whenever full disclosure of a record is not possible, agencies shall “consider whether partial disclosure of information is possible” Thus, we have determined that, in certain instances, a partial disclosure is proper.

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 1004.7(b)(2), I am the individual responsible for the determination to withhold the information described above. The FOIA requires that “any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). As a result, a redacted version of the documents is being released to you in accordance with 10 C.F.R. §1004.7(b)(3).

The FOIA provides for the assessment of fees for the processing of requests. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i); see also 10 C.F.R. § 1004.9(a). You were placed in the “other” category for fee purposes. Requesters in this category are entitled to two (2) free hours of search time and are provided 100 pages at no cost. In our letter dated October 7, 2019 for HQ-2019-01418-F, you were informed that your fee waiver request would be addressed if fees were expected to exceed \$15.00, the minimum amount at which DOE assesses fees. Since your fees are not expected to exceed \$15.00 for this request, no fees will be charged for processing this request.

You also requested expedited processing of your request. Your request for expedited processing was initially denied in our letter dated October 7, 2019. Upon reconsideration of our decision to deny expedited processing of your request, your request was granted in our letter dated November 22, 2019.

If you have any questions about the processing of the request or this letter, your attorney may contact Hilarie Snyder, Trial Attorney, at Hilarie.E.Snyder@usdoj.gov or 202-305-0747.

I appreciate the opportunity to assist you with this matter.

Sincerely,

Alexander C. Morris
Digitally signed by Alexander C. Morris
Date: 2020.04.01 12:39:19 -04'00'

Alexander C. Morris
FOIA Officer
Office of Public Information

INDEX

Request #: HQ-2019-01418-F

Second partial response to the request from Mr. Austin Evers:

In FOIA request HQ-2019-01418-F, you requested:

1) All email communications (including email messages, calendar invitations, and attachments thereto), text messages, and WhatsApp messages sent or received by Secretary Perry, as well as by any aide or other assistant who accompanied Secretary Perry to Ukraine on or about May 19-21, 2019, containing any of the following key terms:

- a. Rudy
- b. Giuliani
- c. Giuiliani
- d. Guliani
- e. Hunter
- f. Biden
- g. Bidens
- h. Burisma
- i. Lutsenko
- j. Syntyk
- k. Crowdstrike
- l. Toensing
- m. diGenova
- n. Fruman
- o. Parnas
- p. Kolomoisky
- q. Kolomoysky
- r. Shokin
- s. Klitschko
- t. DNC

Please produce all responsive records from May 10, 2019, through May 24, 2019.

2) Any guidance, directives, or memoranda issued to or by Secretary Perry with relation to former Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, and/or Burisma Holdings (also known as Burisma Group).

Please produce all responsive records from May 10, 2019, through May 24, 2019.

DOE has identified five (5) additional documents responsive to your request:

- Four (4) documents *are being released in part pursuant to Exemptions 5, 6, and 7, and transferred in part to the State Department.*

From: [Tumminia, Paul](#)
To: [Lockwood, Andrea](#); [Mapes, Thomas E.](#); [Buchan, Samuel](#); [Bell, Heather \(Embassy KYIV\)](#)
Cc: [Sandoli, Robert](#); [Lyon, Jennifer](#); [McKearin, Josh](#); [Noel, Emily E](#); [Paul Tumminia](#)
Subject: Ukraine S1 Papers
Date: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:34:23 PM
Attachments: [S1 Bilateral Meeting with Foreign Minister Klimkin.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Petro Poroshenko.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenksyy with US delegation.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenksyyawl.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Groysman.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Speaker Parubiy.docx](#)
[S1 Briefing memo on Baltics 3+1.docm](#)
[S1 Country Team Memo. Ukraine May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Dinner Meeting Memo Sondland and Sefcovic May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Meeting Memo DM Zerkal and DM Boyko.docx](#)
 Transfer to State Department
[UKR Ukraine Country Profile \(UPDATED\).docx](#)

All:

Here are the main papers for S1's trip to Ukraine beginning tomorrow. I followed the May 18 schedule and have a paper for each meeting. I have also included issue papers (for what its worth) in the folder. I think Sam can access remotely. I am adding two issue papers: ^{Transfer to State}Department and the country profile (which I think S1 likes)

I have sent the others to my gmail in case I cannot access remotely tomorrow.

Here is the Link (b) (5)

Paul Tumminia
Senior Advisor
Office of Europe and Eurasian Affairs
U.S. Department of Energy
Direct Dial: (202) 586-8036



EVENT: Meeting with Pavlo Klimkin, Minister of Foreign Affairs

DATE: Monday, May 20, 2019

TIME: TBD

LOCATION: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed

VISUALS: Choose an item.

SCENARIO: TBD

TBD Your meeting will begin.

TBD Your meeting will conclude.

PARTICIPANTS: Ukraine

Pavlo Klimkin (Paff-lo KLEEM- kihn), Minister of Foreign Affairs

- *Addressed as Mr. Minister or Minister Klimkin*

TBD

United States

Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*

Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

STAFF: Sam Buchan Senior Advisor, *Office of International Affairs*

PREVIOUS

INTERACTION: This is your third meeting with Minister Klimkin. You first met in Brussels in July 2018 during the U.S.-EU Energy Council. You also met with him during your visit to Ukraine in November 2018. .

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND: (b) (5)



(b) (5)



(b) (5)

BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood (IA-20)

STAFF SEC POC: Choose an item.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biography
2. Talking Points

Mr. Pavlo Klimkin - Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine



Mr. Pavlo Klimkin was born on 25 December 1967 in Kursk

1991 - graduated from Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Department of Aerophysics and Space Research, Master's degree in Physics and Mathematics

1991 - 1993 - research officer, National Academy of Science of Ukraine, Paton Welding Institute

1993 - 1997 - Attaché, Third, Second Secretary, Directorate-General for Arms Control and Disarmament, MFA of Ukraine

1997 - 2000 - Third, Second Secretary, Embassy of Ukraine in the Federal Republic of Germany (political, scientific and technical issues)

2000 - 2002 - First Secretary, Counselor, Department for Economic Cooperation, MFA of Ukraine

2002 - 2004 - Head of division for economic and sectoral cooperation with the EU, Department for European integration, MFA of Ukraine

2004 - 2008 - Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Ukraine to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

03.2008 - 04.2010 - Director of the EU Department, MFA of Ukraine

04.2010 - 04.2011 - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

04.2011 - 06.2012 - Deputy Minister, Head of Staff

06.2012 - 06.2014 - Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the Federal Republic of Germany

19.06.2014 - appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Fluent in English and German languages, basic knowledge of French and Spanish.



TALKING POINTS

Overview

- Mr. Minister I am very pleased to see you again in Kyiv.
- What are your plans after the inauguration? I hope that you will stay involved in Ukraine's political discourse and push for the implementation of the reform agenda.
- I understand that you might run for Parliament next fall?

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. What are your perspectives on how the new administration perceives the importance of reform?
- I hope that you will underscore to the new administration that the Department of Energy stands ready to work with the new team to help implement these changes. A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue

- In November 2018, I agreed to launch the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue with President Poroshenko, to cooperate on many of the energy issues facing Ukraine.
- We believe that the Dialogue would be a useful format for the Department of Energy to engage with your government at the highest level, to develop an engagement plan to move ahead with reforms, and to encourage more foreign direct investment into Ukraine.
- I know that you met with Deputy Secretary Brouillette. I would be interested to hear your perspectives on how we might re-invigorate the Dialogue under the new administration.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas



now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.

- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season.
- The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?
- How can the Department of Energy provide assistance?



EVENT: Meeting with Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine

DATE: Sunday May 19, 2019
TIME: 19:00 – 20:00 EET (EST+7)
LOCATION: Bankova

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed **VISUALS:** Choose an item.

SCENARIO: **TBD**
19:00 Your meeting will begin.
20:00 Your meeting will conclude.

PARTICIPANTS: **Ukraine**
Petro Poroshenko (Pet-ro Poor-oh-shen-koh), *President of Ukraine*
Addressed as Mr. President or President Poroshenko
TBD

United States
Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*
Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

STAFF: Sam Buchan, Senior Advisor, *Office of International Affairs*

PREVIOUS INTERACTION: This is your third meeting with President Poroshenko. You first met in Washington in June 2017. You also met with him in Ukraine in November 2018 where you agreed upon the creation of the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND: (b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Saturday, May 18, 2019

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING



(b) (5)

BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood (IA-20)

STAFF SEC POC: Choose an item.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biography
2. Talking Points

BIOGRAPHY

ATTACHMENT 1: Biography Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine



Petro Poroshenko was born in the city of Bolhrad, Odesa region, on September 26, 1965. Mr. Poroshenko is the fifth and current President of Ukraine and has been in office since 2014.

During the Euromaidan protests, between November 2013 and February 2014, Poroshenko actively supported the protests, including with financial support. This led to an upsurge of his popularity. Previously, he served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2008 to 2011, and as the Minister of Trade and Economic Development in 2013. From 2008 until 2013, Poroshenko headed the Council of Ukraine's National Bank.

Outside government, Poroshenko has been a prominent businessman with a lucrative career in acquiring and building assets. His most recognized business is Roshen, the large-scale confectionery company which has earned him the nickname of 'Chocolate King'

Higher education: 1982-1989 - Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Faculty of International Relations and International Law. Specialization: International Economic Relations.

Poroshenko speaks fluent Ukrainian, Russian, English and Romanian.

He is married and has two sons Oleksiy (1985) and Mykhailo (2001), as well as two daughters – Yevheniya (2000) and Oleksandra (2000).





Attachment 2

TALKING POINTS

Overview

- Mr. Minister I am very pleased to see you again in Kyiv.
- I am here as the Head of the U.S. delegation to affirm that Ukraine remains a close partner of the United States and we are committed to working with you to ensure the long-term energy security of your country.
- The United States strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and continued reform efforts.
- What are your plans after the inauguration? I hope that you will stay involved in Ukraine's political discourse and push for the implementation of the reform agenda.

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. What are your perspectives on how the new administration perceives the importance of reform?
- I hope that you will underscore to the new administration that the Department of Energy stands ready to work with the new team to help implement these changes. A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue

- In November 2018, we agreed to launch the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue Poroshenko, to cooperate on many of the energy issues facing Ukraine.
- We believe that the Dialogue would be a useful format for the Department of Energy to engage with your government at the highest level, to develop an engagement plan to move ahead with reforms, and to encourage more foreign direct investment into Ukraine.
- I would be interested to hear your perspectives on how we might re-invigorate the Dialogue under the new administration.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season



- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.
- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season.
- The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?
- How can the Department of Energy provide assistance?



EVENT: Meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the U.S. delegation

DATE: Monday, May 20, 2019

TIME: TBD

LOCATION: Bankova

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed

VISUALS: Choose an item.

SCENARIO: TBD

PARTICIPANTS: Ukraine

Volodymyr Zelenskyy (**Vol-o-de-mir Zel-ensk-ee**), *President of Ukraine*

- *Addressed as Mr. President or President Zelenskyy*

TBD

United States

Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*

Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

U.S. Delegation

Special Envoy Kurt Volker

Rob Portman, Senator (R-OH)

STAFF: Sam Buchan, Senior Advisor, *Office of International Affairs*

PREVIOUS

INTERACTION: You will meet with President Zelenskyy twice today. You will meet with him and the U.S. delegation and then you will have a private bilateral meeting with him with DOE representatives only.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND:



BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood (IA-20)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Saturday, May 18, 2019
STAFF SEC POC: Choose an item.



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biography
2. Talking Points

BIOGRAPHY

Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Vol-o-de-mir Sel-ensk-ee) *President of Ukraine*

Zelenskyy was born in the city of Kryviy Rih on January 25, 1978. While he was growing up, for four years he lived with his parents in the city of Erdenet, Mongolia. He also went to primary school there. After that, his family returned to Kryviy Rih where he studied at school No. 95 and undertook extensive English learning.



In 1995, he entered Kryviy Rih Institute of Economics, which is part of Kyiv National Economic University, where he received a law degree. He underwent a two-month internship during his time in the University.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy became famous in 1990s thanks to a highly-acclaimed KVN stand-up TV show. He was a member of various teams until he skyrocketed to his first big standup success with the launch in 1997 of a 95 Kvartal team. Soon the team entered the KVN's Major League.

In 2003, Zelenskyy's team left the League. In 2005, after a conflict with KVN, the Vechirniy Kvartal [Evening Quarter] TV show appeared on one of the Ukrainian channels. Soon, the program became the highest rated on Ukrainian TV in a comedy segment.

Later, Studio Kvartal-95 was launched. After that, Zelenskyy along with his partners launched a number of other successful TV projects. In 2008, he played one of the main roles in the Love in the Big City comedy, and later in its sequels released in 2010 and 2013. In 2011, a remake of The Office Romance Soviet-era film was released, where Zelenskyy also played a major role. Then he featured in the Rzhevsky against Napoleon comedy.

Zelenskyy also played the role of a Ukrainian teacher Vasyl Holoborodko, who suddenly became president, in a highly popular television series Servant of the People (three seasons have already been released).

No less successful and popular project by Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Studio Kvartal 95 is the comedy series Svaty [Matchmakers], which was recently banned in Ukraine, while one of its main actors, Russian national Fyodor Dobronravov, was banned from entering Ukraine for national security reasons.

Zelenskyy has been married to Olena Kiyashko since 2003. The couple's daughter Oleksandra was born in 2008. Their son Kyylo was born in early 2013.

Zelenskyy announced he would run for presidency in 2019 while addressing an audience during the Kvartal 95 New Year's Eve late night show on 1+1 TV channel. Later, the Servant of the People party nominated him as their presidential candidate. After that, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team actively took on social networks, publishing a series of appeals to Ukrainians and incumbent President Petro Poroshenko.

(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Saturday, May 18, 2019
(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING



TALKING POINTS

Overview

- Mr. President, I am very pleased to meet you. On behalf of the President of the United States and the American people, I would like to extend our best wishes to you as President of Ukraine.
- I am here as the Head of the U.S. delegation to affirm that Ukraine remains a close partner of the United States and we are committed to working with you to ensure the long-term energy security of your country.
- The United States strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and continued reform efforts.

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. We know how difficult these measure are in terms of political costs, but it is critical to ensure Ukraine's prosperity and energy security. It is crucial that you work with the IMF and World Bank on these issues.
- It is clear that your message of change and reform resonated with the people of Ukraine- (73% of the popular vote). I would encourage you and your team to capitalize on this enthusiasm and strong desire for change. The United States and the European Union stands ready to work with you to ensure that change and reform can be implemented. But you must be committed to make the hard choices on corruption and good governance reforms.
- The Department of Energy stands ready to work with you and your team to help implement these changes. A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.



- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season.
- The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?
- How could the U.S. Government provide assistance?

Potential Questions for the President:

- I would be interested to hear your perspectives regarding the security situation in eastern Ukraine. What is the likelihood that there will be some progress in resolving this impasse?
- In what other areas could the Department of Energy provide technical assistance to support your government? How could the United States, EU, and Canada, work with your government to ensure that these reforms continue to be implemented, particularly in the energy sector?



EVENT: Meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine

DATE: Monday, May 20, 2019
TIME: 15:00 – 17:00 EET (EST+7)
LOCATION: Bankova
PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed **VISUALS:** Choose an item.

SCENARIO: **TBD**
17:00 Your meeting will begin.
18:00 Your meeting will conclude.

PARTICIPANTS: **Ukraine**
Volodymyr Zelenskyy (**Vol-o-de-mir Zel-ensk-ee**), *President of Ukraine*
 • *Addressed as Mr. President or President Zelenskyy*
TBD

United States
Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*
Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

STAFF: Sam Buchan Senior Advisor, *Office of International Affairs*

PREVIOUS INTERACTION: This is your first meeting with President Zelenskyy. When he was the President-elect, you met with his advisors while you were in Brussels for the U.S.-EU LNG Event.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND:





BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood (IA-20)

STAFF SEC POC: Choose an item.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biography
2. Talking Points
3. U.S.-Ukraine Engagement Plan

BIOGRAPHY

Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Vol-o-de-mir Sel-ensk-ee) *President of Ukraine*

Zelenskyy was born in the city of Kryviy Rih on January 25, 1978. While he was growing up, for four years he lived with his parents in the city of Erdenet, Mongolia. He also went to primary school there. After that, his family returned to Kryviy Rih where he studied at school No. 95 and undertook extensive English learning.



In 1995, he entered Kryviy Rih Institute of Economics, which is part of Kyiv National Economic University, where he received a law degree. He underwent a two-month internship during his time in the University.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy became famous in 1990s thanks to a highly-acclaimed KVN stand-up TV show. He was a member of various teams until he skyrocketed to his first big standup success with the launch in 1997 of a 95 Kvartal team. Soon the team entered the KVN's Major League.

In 2003, Zelenskyy's team left the League. In 2005, after a conflict with KVN, the Vechirniy Kvartal [Evening Quarter] TV show appeared on one of the Ukrainian channels. Soon, the program became the highest rated on Ukrainian TV in a comedy segment.

Later, Studio Kvartal-95 was launched. After that, Zelenskyy along with his partners launched a number of other successful TV projects. In 2008, he played one of the main roles in the Love in the Big City comedy, and later in its sequels released in 2010 and 2013. In 2011, a remake of The Office Romance Soviet-era film was released, where Zelenskyy also played a major role. Then he featured in the Rzhevsky against Napoleon comedy.

Zelenskyy also played the role of a Ukrainian teacher Vasyl Holoborodko, who suddenly became president, in a highly popular television series Servant of the People (three seasons have already been released).

No less successful and popular project by Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Studio Kvartal 95 is the comedy series Svaty [Matchmakers], which was recently banned in Ukraine, while one of its main actors, Russian national Fyodor Dobronravov, was banned from entering Ukraine for national security reasons.

Zelenskyy has been married to Olena Kiyashko since 2003. The couple's daughter Oleksandra was born in 2008. Their son Kyrylo was born in early 2013.

Zelenskyy announced he would run for presidency in 2019 while addressing an audience during the Kvartal 95 New Year's Eve late night show on 1+1 TV channel. Later, the Servant of the People party nominated him as their presidential candidate. After that, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team actively took on social networks, publishing a series of appeals to Ukrainians and incumbent President Petro Poroshenko.

(b) (5)



OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Saturday, May 18, 2019
(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING



TALKING POINTS

Overview

- Mr. President, I am very pleased to meet you. On behalf of the President of the United States and the American people, I would like to extend our best wishes to you as President of Ukraine.
- I am here as the Head of the U.S. delegation to affirm that Ukraine remains a close partner of the United States and we are committed to working with you to ensure the long-term energy security of your country.
- The United States strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and continued reform efforts.

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. We know how difficult these measure are in terms of political costs, but it is critical to ensure Ukraine's prosperity and energy security. It is crucial that you work with the IMF and World Bank on these issues.
- It is clear that your message of change and reform resonated with the people of Ukraine- (73% of the popular vote). I would encourage you and your team to capitalize on this enthusiasm and strong desire for change. The United States and the European Union stands ready to work with you to ensure that change and reform can be implemented. But you must be committed to make the hard choices on corruption and good governance reforms.
- The Department of Energy stands ready to work with you and your team to help implement these changes. A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue

- In November 2018, I agreed to launch the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue with your predecessor, President Poroshenko, to cooperate on many of the energy issues facing Ukraine.
- We believe that the Dialogue would be a useful format for the Department of Energy to engage with your government at the highest level, to develop an engagement plan to move ahead with reforms, and to encourage more foreign direct investment into Ukraine.



- We hope that we can re-launch this Dialogue under your leadership. The Deputy Secretary will lead this Dialogue from the U.S. side.
- I would ask you to nominate a co-chair from your side to begin this critical work.

DOE Engagement (Critical Energy Issues)

- There are several critical issues that I believe your administration should address in the next coming weeks.
- It is essential that Ukraine demonstrate commitment to the norms of the Third Energy Package in order to demonstrate to the EU that Ukraine is a reliable energy partner.
- I encourage you to proceed with the unbundling of Naftogaz's gas transmission system. This is necessary for Ukraine's commitment to European energy norms.
- The dispute over unbundling is wasting critical time and weakening Ukraine's position in gas transit negotiations with Gazprom. We urge you to ensure Ukraine unbundles on time, and creates a new TSO that will be certifiable by the EU. It is equally crucial that the unbundling plan does not increase avenues for corruption and undue influence from any group
- Ukraine has been tremendously blessed with reserves of natural gas. I know that U.S. oil and gas companies are very interested in bringing expertise and know-how, but they remain wary of the investment climate. They are looking for signals that your government is committed to continuing critical reforms.
- We welcome Ukraine's efforts to increase gas production, including through oil and gas exploration production sharing agreements and license auctions. We urge Ukraine to ensure the tendering process is transparent and competitive, and in line with the recommendations of the business community.
- Diversifying your nuclear fuel supply away from Russia is extremely important for Ukraine's energy security. Westinghouse fuel supplies reduce Russian leverage over Ukraine.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a



winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.

- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season.
- The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?
- How can the Department of Energy provide assistance?

Potential Questions for the President:

- I would be interested to hear your perspectives regarding the security situation in eastern Ukraine. What is the likelihood that there will be some progress in resolving this impasse?
- In what other areas could the Department of Energy provide technical assistance to support your government? How could the United States, EU, and Canada, work with your government to ensure that these reforms continue to be implemented, particularly in the energy sector?



(b) (5)

DOE Engagement (past and current)

The Department of Energy (DOE) has had extensive engagement with Ukraine since Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, with particular focus on the country after the civil uprising known as the Maidan or the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. In that year, DOE provided critical support to assist the GOU to put in place emergency protocols for expected shortages for fuel during the 2014-2015 winter season. Since 2014, DOE has expanded cooperation and developed several areas of focus which are designed to implement reforms and enhance the country's energy security.

- *Cyber security.* DOE has provided technical assistance to the GOU to bolster cyber security training and awareness. DOE completed a cyber security training program in 2017-2018 that was aimed at cyber security professionals and government officials in the energy sector.
- *Nuclear fuel.* DOE provided \$70 million to diversify Ukraine's nuclear fuel supply, which serves to increase Ukraine's energy security and reduce dependence on Russia.
- *Civil nuke operations.* In the civil nuclear area, DOE has provided technical assistance for an outage optimization program which bolsters the efficiency of nuclear power units during scheduled maintenance.
- *Modernizing coal-fired power plants.* DOE has provided technical assistance to help Ukraine modernize its thermal power units and retrofit generation assets. Coal fleet modernization and retrofitting will allow Ukraine's plants to burn more readily available and cheaper G-grade coal, and to do so in a more efficient manner.
- *Winter Action Plan.* DOE, with Canadian and EU colleagues, prepared a plan in case of short



term cuts in gas supply. When Russia made such cuts in March 2018, Ukraine activated the emergency protocols of the plan, which minimized the impact of Russia's actions.

- *Resiliency Plan.* DOE led an international team of experts from the EU, Canada and several national laboratories to prepare a comprehensive medium term plan for enhancing the energy resilience of Ukraine. This National Energy Resilience Plan is undergoing final review and can be delivered to the Government of Ukraine at the first meeting of the SED.



EVENT: Meeting with Volodymyr Groysman, Prime Minister of Ukraine

DATE: Monday, May 20, 2019
TIME: 15:00 – 17:00 EET (EST+7)
LOCATION: Bankova

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed **VISUALS:** Choose an item.

SCENARIO: **TBD**
TBD Your meeting will begin.
TBD Your meeting will conclude.

PARTICIPANTS: **Ukraine**
Volodymyr Groysman (**Vol-o-de-mir Ha roy-smán**), *Prime Minister of Ukraine*
 • *Addressed as Mr. Prime Minister*
TBD

United States
Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*
Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

STAFF: Sam Buchan, Senior Advisor, Office of International Affairs

PREVIOUS INTERACTION: This is your first meeting with President Zelenskyy. When he was the President-elect, you met with his advisors while you were in Brussels for the U.S.-EU LNG Event.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND: (b) (5)

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING

(b) (5)



(b) (5)



BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood (IA-20)

STAFF SEC POC:

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biography
2. Talking Points
3. DOE Engagement in Ukraine

BIOGRAPHY



Attachment 1: Biography Volodymyr Groysman

Born in Vinnytsya on 20 January 1978. He completed Vinnytsya secondary school No 35 in 1994. Studied Law in the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management in 2000-2003.

Career

He began his career as a metal worker at the Shkolnyk private enterprise when he was 14 years old.

In 2002, he was elected a Vinnytsya city councilor and was as a deputy head of the permanent commission of the city council for human rights, law, councilors' performance and ethics.

In November 2005, he was elected the secretary of the Vinnytsya city council. After 25 November 2005, he was the acting mayor of Vinnytsya.

On 26 March 2006, Groysman was elected mayor of Vinnytsya. On 31 October 2010, he was re-elected as mayor with the record support of 77.8 per cent of votes. He was running on behalf of the Conscience of Ukraine party.

After the Euro-Maidan protests, on 27 January 2014, he was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of regional development, construction, housing and utilities. During the Crimea crisis, Volodymyr Groysman called on Crimean residents not to vote in the illegal referendum on 16 March 2015. He unambiguously described the Crimean events as Russia's military aggression and encroachment on the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

In July 2014, Volodymyr Groysman chaired the government commission investigating the crash of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 Boeing 777 in eastern Ukraine.

He is a vice-president of the Association of Ukrainian Cities for housing and utilities.

In the 2014 early parliamentary election, Groysman was No 4 on the list of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc.

On 27 November 2014, he was elected parliament speaker by 359 MPs.

On 14 April 2016, he was appointed prime minister of Ukraine.





Attachment 2

TALKING POINTS

Overview

- Mr. Prime Minister, I am very pleased to see you again. On behalf of the President of the United States and the American people, I am honored to lead the delegation to the inauguration of President Zelenskyy. I would like to extend our best wishes to you as President of Ukraine.
- I am here as the Head of the U.S. delegation to affirm that Ukraine remains a close partner of the United States and we are committed to working with you to ensure the long-term energy security of your country.
- The United States strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and continued reform efforts.

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. We know how difficult these measure are in terms of political costs, but it is critical to ensure Ukraine's prosperity and energy security. It is crucial that you work with the IMF and World Bank on these issues.
- It is clear that the message of change and reform resonated with the people of Ukraine. I would encourage you and your team to work with the new Presidential administration to carry out this enthusiasm and strong desire for change. The United States and the European Union stands ready to work with you to ensure that change and reform can be implemented. But you must be committed to make the hard choices on corruption and good governance reforms.
- The Department of Energy stands ready to work with you and your team to help implement these changes. A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

DOE Engagement (Critical Energy Issues)

- It is essential that Ukraine demonstrate commitment to the norms of the Third Energy Package in order to demonstrate to the EU that Ukraine is a reliable energy partner.
- I encourage you to proceed with the unbundling of Naftogaz's gas transmission system. This is necessary for Ukraine's commitment to European energy norms.



- The dispute over unbundling is wasting critical time and weakening Ukraine's position in gas transit negotiations with Gazprom. We urge you to ensure Ukraine unbundles on time, and creates a new TSO that will be certifiable by the EU. It is equally crucial that the unbundling plan does not increase avenues for corruption and undue influence from any group.
- Could we agree to work together on plan for unbundling with the European Commission to ensure adherence to EU directives? This is crucial if the new TSO is to be certified and gas volumes to Europe continue next winter.
- How can the Department of Energy and the U.S. government provide assistance?
- Ukraine has been tremendously blessed with reserves of natural gas. I know that U.S. oil and gas companies are very interested in bringing expertise and know-how, but they remain wary of the investment climate. They are looking for signals that your government is committed to continuing critical reforms.
- We welcome Ukraine's efforts to increase gas production, including through oil and gas exploration production sharing agreements and license auctions. We urge Ukraine to ensure the tendering process is transparent and competitive, and in line with the recommendations of the business community.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.
- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season. The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?
- How can the Department of Energy provide assistance?

DOE Engagement



DOE Engagement (past and current)

The Department of Energy (DOE) has had extensive engagement with Ukraine since Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, with particular focus on the country after the civil uprising known as the Maidan or the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. In that year, DOE provided critical support to assist the GOU to put in place emergency protocols for expected shortages for fuel during the 2014-2015 winter season. Since 2014, DOE has expanded cooperation and developed several areas of focus which are designed to implement reforms and enhance the country's energy security.

- *Cyber security.* DOE has provided technical assistance to the GOU to bolster cyber security training and awareness. DOE completed a cyber security training program in 2017-2018 that was aimed at cyber security professionals and government officials in the energy sector.
- *Nuclear fuel.* DOE provided \$70 million to diversify Ukraine's nuclear fuel supply, which serves to increase Ukraine's energy security and reduce dependence on Russia.
- *Civil nuke operations.* In the civil nuclear area, DOE has provided technical assistance for an outage optimization program which bolsters the efficiency of nuclear power units during scheduled maintenance.
- *Modernizing coal-fired power plants.* DOE has provided technical assistance to help Ukraine modernize its thermal power units and retrofit generation assets. Coal fleet modernization and retrofitting will allow Ukraine's plants to burn more readily available and cheaper G-grade coal, and to do so in a more efficient manner.
- *Winter Action Plan.* DOE, with Canadian and EU colleagues, prepared a plan in case of short term cuts in gas supply. When Russia made such cuts in March 2018, Ukraine activated the emergency protocols of the plan, which minimized the impact of Russia's actions.
- *Resiliency Plan.* DOE led an international team of experts from the EU, Canada and several national laboratories to prepare a comprehensive medium term plan for enhancing the energy resilience of Ukraine. This National Energy Resilience Plan is undergoing final review and can be delivered to the Government of Ukraine at the first meeting of the SED.



EVENT: **Meeting with Andriy Parubiy, Speaker of the Parliament**

DATE: Monday, May 20, 2019

TIME: TBD

LOCATION: Verkhovna Rada

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed

VISUALS: Choose an item.

SCENARIO: **TBD**

TBD Your meeting will begin.

TBD Your meeting will conclude.

PARTICIPANTS: **Ukraine**

Andriy Parubiy (An- DREE Pah-RU-Bee), Speaker of the Parliament

- *Addressed as Mr. Speaker*

TBD

United States

Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*

Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

STAFF: Sam Buchan, Senior Advisor, *Office of International Affairs*

PREVIOUS

INTERACTION: This is your second meeting with Speaker Parubiy. You first met with him when you visited Ukraine in November 2018.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND:





(b) (5)

BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood (IA-20)

STAFF SEC POC: Choose an item.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biography
2. Talking Points



Andriy Parubiy



Andriy Parubiy is a Ukrainian politician and Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) since April 2016. Prior to that, Andriy Parubiy was First Deputy Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, a position he held since January 2015. He was also a senior member of the People's Front party, and in the October 2014 elections occupied the #4 place on the party's electoral list.

Prior to the October 2014 elections, Parubiy briefly served as the Acting Secretary of National Security and Defense Council, before stepping down in August 2014 for undisclosed reasons. He was one of the leaders of the 2013-2014 anti-Yanukovich protest campaign and an active participant in pro-EU protests (EuroMaidan).

Parubiy was elected to the Rada as Our Ukraine nominee in 2007. In February 2012 he moved from Our Ukraine to Front of Change party led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk. After Front of Change merger with Tymoshenko-led Batkivshchyna (Motherland) party he was elected to the Rada in 2012 on the Batkivshchyna party list.

In 2002-2007 he was a member of the Lviv Oblast Council. His political views became more moderate during the 2004 anti-Yanukovich protests dubbed as the Orange Revolution. In November – December 2004 Parubiy ran the section of Orange Revolution camp located at the Ukrainian House in Kyiv. In 2005 he left Svoboda and joined Yushchenko-led Our Ukraine party.

From 1999 to 2004 Parubiy led SNP's youth branch, Patriot of Ukraine.

In 1994-1998 he served as a member of Lviv's City Council. In 1991 Parubiy was co-founder of far-right Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNP), which in 2004 changed its name to Svoboda. From 1990 to 1994 he was a member of the Lviv Oblast Council.

In 1988-1991 he actively participated in pro-independence movement and led Lviv-based nationalist youth organization Spadshchyna (Heritage).

(b) (6)

He was born on (b) (6)



TALKING POINTS

Overview

- Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to see you again in Kyiv.
- This is a very critical time for Ukraine. I hope that Parliament can work together with the new administration.
- I am here as the Head of the U.S. delegation to affirm that Ukraine remains a close partner of the United States and we are committed to working with you to ensure the long-term energy security of your country.
- The United States strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and continued reform efforts.

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. What are your perspectives on how the new administration perceives the importance of reform?

DOE Engagement (Critical Energy Issues)

- There are several critical issues that I believe should be addressed by the Parliament and the new administration.
- It is essential that Ukraine demonstrate commitment to the norms of the Third Energy Package in order to demonstrate to the EU that Ukraine is a reliable energy partner.
- I encourage you to proceed with the unbundling of Naftogaz's gas transmission system. This is necessary for Ukraine's commitment to European energy norms.
- The dispute over unbundling is wasting critical time and weakening Ukraine's position in gas transit negotiations with Gazprom. We urge you to ensure Ukraine unbundles on time, and creates a new TSO that will be certifiable by the EU. It is equally crucial that the unbundling plan does not increase avenues for corruption and undue influence from any group
- Ukraine has been tremendously blessed with reserves of natural gas. I know that U.S. oil and gas companies are very interested in bringing expertise and know-how, but they remain wary of the investment climate. They are looking for signals that your government is committed to continuing critical reforms.



- We welcome Ukraine's efforts to increase gas production, including through oil and gas exploration production sharing agreements and license auctions. We would like to work with Ukraine to ensure the tendering process is transparent and competitive, and in line with the recommendations of the business community.
- The Department of Energy would stand ready to help provide technical support to implement Production Sharing Agreements (PSA's).
- We would ask your support for the technical team which will be traveling to Ukraine and Poland in June to assess the viability of expanding interconnections with Poland.
- Diversifying your nuclear fuel supply away from Russia is extremely important for Ukraine's energy security. Westinghouse fuel supplies reduce Russian leverage over Ukraine.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.
- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season.
- The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?
- How can the Department of Energy provide assistance?



EVENT: Meeting with Presidents of Estonia (Kersti Kaljulaid), Latvia Raimonds Vējonis), and Lithuania (Dalia Grybauskaitė)

DATE: May 20, 2019

TIME: TBD

LOCATION: TBD

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed **VISUALS:** DOE Photographer

SCENARIO: TBD

PARTICIPANTS: Kersti Kaljulaid (Kir-stee Call-ju-laid), President of Estonia
 ➤ Addressed as *Madame President*
Raimonds Vējonis (Ray-monds Vey-yon-iss), President of Latvia
 ➤ Addressed as *Mr. President*
Dalia Grybauskaitė (Dal-ya Gree-bau-sky-tye), President of Lithuania
 ➤ Addressed as *Madame President*

Secretary Perry
Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*
Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

STAFF: Sam Buchan, Senior Advisor, *Office of International Affairs*

PREVIOUS INTERACTION: You met with all three Presidents in April 2018 during the Baltic Summit at the White House.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND:

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Saturday, May 18, 2019

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING



BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood, IA-21; Sam Buchan, IA-1

STAFF SEC POC: Choose an item.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biographies
2. Talking Points

Estonia: Kersti Kaljulaid (Kir-stee Call-ju-laid) *President of Estonia*



Kersti Kaljulaid was born on 30 December 1969 in Tartu. She graduated from the University of Tartu in 1992 in the field of genetics in the Faculty of Natural Sciences and completed master's studies in the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in 2001.

From 1994 to 1999, she worked in various Estonian companies: first, as the sales manager of telephone switchboards in Eesti Telefon, later in Hoiupank Markets and Hansapank Markets as an associate in investment banking.

From 1999 to 2002, Kersti Kaljulaid was Prime Minister Mart Laar's Economic Advisor. Her duties included organization of cooperation of the Office of the Prime Minister with Estonian central bank, the Ministry of Finance and ministries that had larger budgets, as well as coordination of relations with the International Monetary Fund and other financial institutions (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Nordic Investment Bank and World Bank). She participated in preparing the pension reform together with the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Social Affairs and advised the Prime Minister in annual budget negotiations held with other ministers.

From 2002 to 2004, Kersti Kaljulaid was the CFO and CEO of the Iru Power Plant of state-owned energy company Eesti Energia.

From 2004 to 2016 she was a Member of the European Court of Auditors. From 2004 to 2006 Kersti Kaljulaid organized the financial audit of the research and development funds of the budget of the European Union and from 2007 to 2010 she was responsible for the audit of the Structural Policies. From 2004 to 2007, she was the auditor of the Galileo project of the European Union. From 2010 to 2016 she coordinated the preparation of the Annual Report and State of Assurance of the European Court of Auditors. From 2005 to 2007, she was a member of the Europol Audit Committee and chaired the committee in 2007. From 2006 to 2008, she was the chair of the Administrative Affairs Committee of the Court of Auditors. From 2010 to 2014, she was responsible for the methodology and preparation of the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors. In 2016, she worked in the field of the agriculture audit.

In addition, Kersti Kaljulaid was a member of the Supervisory Board of the Estonian Genome Center from 2001 to 2004. She was also a member of the Advisory Board of the University of Tartu from 2009 to 2011 and the Council Chair of the University of Tartu from 2012 to 2016. Kersti Kaljulaid has been a co-author of the social-political radio talk show *Keskpäevatund* (Midday Hour) in radio station Kuku from 2002 to 2004 and the editor of the *Eurominutid* (Euro-minutes) radio show from 2007 to 2016 in the same station. Kersti Kaljulaid is married and has four children. She speaks English, French, and Finnish.

Latvia: Raimonds Vējonis (Ray-monds Vey-yon-iss)

President of Latvia

Raimonds Vējonis has been the President of Latvia since July 8, 2015. Before that, he was the Minister of Defense of Latvia and the Minister of Environmental Protection and Regional Development for almost nine years, and he was a MP of the Saeima (Latvian Parliament) as well.



He was born on June 15, 1966 in Pskov region, Russia, but he grew up in Sarkaņi rural district, Madona district. Vējonis obtained a Master degree in biology in 1995.

After mastering the first higher education, Vējonis became Deputy Director of Madona Regional Environmental Board and was also a member of Madona City Council from 1990 to 1993.

Raimonds Vējonis became the Director of newly established Greater Riga Regional Environmental Board in 1996.

After the elections of the 8th Saeima in 2002, he was the Minister of Environmental Protection, which he held for nine consecutive years. In 2014, he became the Minister of Defense of Latvia. During his political career, Vējonis has worked in the area of foreign policy and national development areas, as he has been the President and the Vice President of the Baltic Assembly, the Vice-President of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, and he has led the Baltic Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Saeima and the Latvian delegation to the Baltic Assembly. Raimonds Vējonis has been a Member of the National Security Committee, the Public Administration and Local Government Committee of the Saeima, as well as the Strategic Development Commission under the auspices of the President of Latvia. He has also led the Subcommittee on Monitoring the Drafting and Implementation of the National Development Plan. On July 8, 2015, Raimonds Vējonis officially became the President of Latvia. The Saeima elected Raimonds Vējonis as the President of Latvia in the fifth voting on June 3, when 55 MPs supported his candidacy.



Lithuania: Dalia Grybauskaitė (Dal-ya Gree-bau-sky-tye)

President of Lithuania

Dalia Grybauskaitė earned a degree in political economy from Leningrad University in 1983. In 1988, she defended her thesis at Moscow Academy of Public Sciences and received a doctoral degree in economics. In 1993, the Research Council of Lithuania granted her an academic degree of doctor of social sciences.



In 1983, she began working as scientific secretary at the society "Žinija" under the Academy of Sciences. She was Head of the Agriculture Division at Vilnius High Party School in 1983-1984, and later, from 1985 to 1990, a lecturer at the Department of Political Economy. In 1990-1991, she was scientific secretary at the Lithuanian Institute of Economics under the Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Lithuania.

In 1991, Grybauskaitė became a program director in Prime Minister's office. The same year, she was appointed Director of the European Department at the Ministry of International Economic Relations. In 1993, she served as Director of the Economic Relations Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1994, she was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Lithuanian Mission to the EU. From 1996-1999, Dalia Grybauskaitė acted as Minister Plenipotentiary at the Lithuanian Embassy in the United States. She served as Vice Finance Minister from 1999 to 2000, Vice Foreign Minister from 2000 to 2001, and Finance Minister from 2001 to 2004.

In 2004, Grybauskaitė was appointed EU Commissioner responsible for financial programming and budget. In 2005, she was elected Commissioner of the Year for her efforts to reform the EU budget. Grybauskaitė has served as the President of Lithuania since July 12, 2009.



TALKING POINTS

European Energy Security

- The United States strongly supports enhancing European energy security.
- An energy secure Europe serves as a strong partner for the United States in meeting global challenges.
- The United States is not simply seeking to eliminate Russian gas or electricity from the market. Russian gas and electricity can and should remain part of a diversified energy mix for Europe.
- Our priority is helping Europe minimize dependence upon a single supplier. The United States supports a pro-Europe energy security policy based on diversification of fuel types, supply sources (countries of origin), and delivery routes.

Electric Grid Synchronization with EU

- I understand that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have come to agreement on a way forward for synchronization.
- DOE stands ready to work with representatives from the Ministries of Latvia and Lithuania, as well as representatives from the other Baltic countries to analyze potential ways in which this synchronization could take place.
- DOE is also committed to working with stakeholders in Baltic States to expand training opportunities, help bolster cyber security defenses of critical energy infrastructure, and improve grid resiliency. We have ongoing technical cooperation in these areas.
- We understand that the Russian TSO will perform a test this week. Our lab experts from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory will provide monitoring support during the test. We might also provide support when your TSO's conduct their isolation test.
- I would be very interested to hear your perspectives regarding a path forward.
- Do you see a role for U.S. technologies in advancing this crucial step in linking the Baltic nations with Europe?



DOE Engagement in the Region

Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation

- Certainly, we would see these efforts under the framework of the Partnership, which I announced in Bucharest last year. P-TEC will allow DOE, and the U.S. government, to expand engagement across the region.
- DOE hopes to share expertise drawn from the National Laboratory complex to help partners and Allies enhance the energy security of critical infrastructure.

U.S.-Baltic Summit

- I would be very interested in hearing your perspectives and ideas on a Summit later this year.

U.S. LNG

- The United States is supportive of increased global and U.S. LNG trade.
- New sources of gas will provide more flexibility and optionality to gas markets; increase security of supply; and play a key role in bridging demand and moderating prices, especially to consuming countries that will be negotiating new contracts with pipeline exporters.
- We believe that our shale gas and U.S. LNG will play a role in EU energy diversification.
- Approximately 13 billion cubic feet per day (or 134 billion cubic meters per year or 100.1 MTPA (million tons per annum) of LNG) of natural gas export capacity is in various states of operation and construction across seven large scale LNG export projects.
- Three projects, Sabine Pass, Dominion Cove Point, and Corpus Christi, are operating, and their current export capacity is just under 5 billion cubic feet per day.
- Three projects, Cameron, Freeport, and Elba Island, are under construction and set to begin exporting later in 2019.
- On the sidelines of the Brussels U.S.-EU Energy Council High-Level Business to Business Forum on May 2, DOE also announced the signing of two long-term orders authorizing the export of U.S. LNG from Tellurian Inc.'s Driftwood LNG export facility to be built in Louisiana and Sempra Energy's



Port Arthur LNG export project to be built in Texas.

- I would be interested to hear your perspectives on the likelihood for the development of a regional gas market in the Baltics?

Nord Stream 2

- As you know, the U.S. Government has serious concerns on Nord Stream 2 and its potentially negative impact on Europe's energy security and on Ukraine's economic and national security. There is significant opposition in the U.S. Congress as well.
- U.S. opposition to Nord Stream 2 reflects our long-standing concern for European energy security, and pre-dates by many years the availability of U.S. LNG for export. U.S. LNG could play a role in Europe's own efforts to diversify its energy sector, but markets will determine the best destinations for U.S. LNG exports.
- If Gazprom is successful in cutting off gas transit to Europe via Ukraine, it will cause significant economic challenges in Ukraine and will also remove a significant disincentive for further Russian aggression.
- What do your governments see as the best path forward for countering, or eliminating, the concerns posed by Nord Stream 2?

Russia Sanctions (IF RAISED)

- The United States continues to take a measured and appropriate response to Russian malign activities against the United States and our partners and allies – to include sanctions. Our energy sector sanctions show Russia that it cannot act with impunity.
- Our policy with respect to Ukraine has not changed. Our policy is that Russia must fully implement its commitments to the Minsk agreements before we can begin to lift sanctions related to Russia's aggressive actions in eastern Ukraine. Russia must cease its occupation of Crimea before Crimea-related sanctions will be lifted.
- We have consulted and will continue to consult with our allies in an effort to ensure these sanctions support our important, common work toward resolving the conflict in Ukraine.



EVENT: **Country Team Meeting with Embassy Staff**

DATE: Monday May 20, 2019
TIME: TBD
LOCATION: Embassy of the United States

PURPOSE: To meet with Embassy staff and receive a short country briefing about Ukraine's political situation.

PRESS: Closed **VISUALS:** None

SCENARIO: TBD

PARTICIPANTS: **DOE**
Rick Perry, Secretary of Energy
Brian McCormack, Chief of Staff
Ted Garrish, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
Sam Buchan, Senior Advisor

Embassy of the United States

STAFF: None

PREVIOUS INTERACTION: None.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND:



BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood, IA-20

STAFF SEC POC: Choose an item.

ATTACHMENTS:



EVENT: Meeting with Ambassador Sondland and Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President for Energy Union, European Commission

DATE: Sunday May 19, 2019

TIME: 8:30PM-9:30PM

LOCATION: TBD

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed

VISUALS: None

SCENARIO: TBD

PARTICIPANTS: **European Union**

Maroš Šefčovič (**Ma-rosh Shef-cho-vich**), *Vice-President for Energy Union, European Commission*

➤ *Addressed as Mr. Šefčovič*

Ambassador Gordon Sondland, *Ambassador to the European Union*
Addressed as Mr. Ambassador

United States

Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*

Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

STAFF: Sam Buchan, *Senior Advisor, Office of International Affairs*

PREVIOUS

INTERACTION:

You have met Maroš Šefčovič a number of times, most recently in Brussels during the U.S.-EU Energy Council in May 2019 at the U.S.-EU LNG conference. You previously met with Mr. Šefčovič in Washington for a bilateral meeting and a U.S.-3 Seas Initiative event in June 2018. You also met on the margins of the eighth Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM8) in Beijing in June 2017. You first met in Washington in March 2017, and then spoke by phone in June 2017, to discuss energy reforms in Ukraine in advance of your meeting with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.

You have met Ambassador Sondland a number to times, most recently in Brussels for the U.S.-EU LNG Conference.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)



BACKGROUND:

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING

BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Jennifer Heullant, Paul Tumminia, and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Dash-1 or Delegated Authority.

STAFF SEC POC: Choose an item.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biography
2. Talking Points

BIOGRAPHY

Maroš Šefčovič (Ma-rosh Shef-cho-vich)

Vice-President for Energy Union, European Commission

Maroš Šefčovič is a Slovak diplomat and politician. Mr. Šefčovič currently as the Vice-President of the European Commission for the Energy Union (since 2014).

Mr. Šefčovič has been member of the European Commission since 2009, previously serving as the European Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture & Youth (2009 – 2010) and Vice-President of the European Commission for Interinstitutional Relations and Administration (2010 – 2014).

Mr. Šefčovič earned a Ph.D. in International Law from Comenius University in Bratislava.



Gordon Sondland

Ambassador of the United States of America to the European Union, U.S. Mission to the European Union

Gordon Sondland is the U.S. Representative to the European Union with the rank of Ambassador.

Ambassador Sondland is the Founder and CEO of Provenance Hotels, a national owner and operator of full-service boutique “lifestyle” hotels.

Ambassador Sondland’s community service includes positions on former Governor Ted Kulongoski’s (D-Oregon) transition team, as well as service on the Commission for White House Fellowships to which he was appointed by President George W. Bush.

In 1993, Ambassador Sondland co-founded the Gordon D. Sondland and Katherine J. Durant Foundation, which was established to “help families and boost communities.” The Foundation also contributes significantly to the Military Service Initiative program operated by the George W. Bush Presidential Center in Dallas.



TALKING POINTS

Ukraine Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. We know how difficult these measure are in terms of political costs, but it is critical to ensure Ukraine's prosperity and energy security.
- What are your thoughts on a joint U.S.-EU delegation to assess the current unbundling proposals?

Ukraine Gas Transit

- This winter season presents the most significant risk of a European gas crisis since Russia's invasion in 2014.
- Ukraine's fiscal situation may preclude the purchase and injections of the necessary gas supplies to prepare for the winter season. We are monitoring the situation closely.
- We hope to see progress in negotiations for a new long-term transit deal post 2019; I would be interested to hear your perspectives?
- What are your thoughts on the status of Ukraine's winter preparedness?
- How is the European Commission preparing for the possibility of a cut-off?

European Energy Security

- An energy secure Europe serves as a strong partner for the United States in meeting global challenges.
- Russia's position as a dominant supplier of natural gas to Europe has only deepened since the threat of a gas cut-off in 2014, rising from approximately 30 percent to 43 percent in 2017.
- The same extends to the nuclear power sector, where too many countries continue to rely on nuclear fuel from a single-supplier.
- Our priority is helping Europe minimize dependence upon a single supplier. The United States supports a pro-Europe energy security policy based on diversification of fuel types, supply sources (countries of origin), and delivery routes.



- European energy security over the longer term will depend on policy choices that create incentives for real improvement of infrastructure, real increases in diversification, and the production and efficient utilization of domestic energy resources and raw materials.
- The United States remains opposed to proposals for Nord Stream 2 and a multi-line Turk Stream to Europe as a continuation of a long-term strategy by Russia to cement and grow its dominance in European energy markets for both geopolitical reasons and State-owned commercial interests.
- I understand that the EU has significant interest in increasing the presence of U.S. industry in European energy markets to help drive diversification efforts.
- U.S. industry would see progress on this front as an important counter force to the assessed risk levels associated with business engagement, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.
- U.S. industry is unparalleled in many sectors, and energy and construction is among them, and creating an atmosphere in which risk taking is mitigated by the Commission's support would only help achieve the EU's energy goals.

Transatlantic Energy Cooperation

- We are working with countries in Central and Southeastern Europe on a very different vision for the region, one in which people are free to chart their own energy futures.
- We value the European Commission's support for the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC) as a new forum for cooperation that aligns well with your Energy Union Framework Strategy.
- I believe the Three Seas Initiative can serve as a transformative platform for engagement on transatlantic energy security. It can be a framework to "complete Europe" with a north-south corridor in energy, telecommunications and infrastructure.
- I understand that there are discussions underway for a transatlantic conference on SMRs under P-TEC and the U.S.-EU Energy Council. We plan to support the event at a high-level.



EVENT: Meeting with Olena Zerkal, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Natalia Boyko, Deputy Minister of Energy

DATE: Monday May 20, 2019

TIME: TBD

LOCATION: TBD

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed.

SCENARIO: TBD

PARTICIPANTS: **Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
Olena Zerkal (Ah-Lee-yen-a TSEHR kal) , *Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs*
Addressed as Deputy Minister Zerkal

Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry
Natalya Boyko (Na-Tal-Ya BOY-ko) *Deputy Minister of Energy*
Addressed as Deputy Minister Boyko

U.S.
Secretary Perry
Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*
Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

STAFF: Sam Buchan Senior Advisor, *Office of International Affairs*

PREVIOUS INTERACTION: You met Deputy Minister Zerkal when she introduced you at the Diplomatic Academy where you gave a speech during your visit in November 2018.

You met Deputy Minister Boyko when you visited the Trypilska plant and had a photo opportunity at the coal storage facility with the imported U.S. coal supplies.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)



(b) (5)

BACKGROUND:

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING

BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21
BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Rob Sandoli, IA-21

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biographies
2. Talking Points

ATTACHMENT 2: Biography **Olena Zerkal, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine**

Born on June 24, 1973 in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Education

In 1998 Kyiv graduated from National Taras Shevchenko University, Law Department, Master of Law. In 2008 graduated from the Institute for International Relations of Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University, Master of International economic relations.

In 2003 studied at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, “New Issues in Security Policy” training course.

In 2002-2005 attended TACIS Project “Legal Training in Ukraine: Kyiv and Selected Regions” – Educational program on EU Law” at the Institute for International Relations of Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University.



Professional activities

2001 – 2005 – Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, Director of Department of International Law

2005 – 2011 – Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, Director of State Department on Approximation of Legislation.

2011 – 2013 – Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, Director of Department on Liaison with State Authorities.

While in the Ministry of Justice, participated in a number of multi – and bilateral negotiations, i.a. in all rounds of negotiations between Ukraine and the EU on Association Agreement including free trade agreement, agreement on common aviation area, agreement on accession to the Energy Community, agreement of visa facilitation, etc. Was a member of a number of Ukraine’s delegations at the negotiations with the EU, UN, NATO and Council of Europe. Was responsible for overall coordination and planning the activities in the sphere of approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU standards, legal translation and expertise of draft laws, as well as cooperation with the EU in the spheres of justice, freedom and security etc.

2013 – 2014 – Senior Corporate Affairs Manager, British American Tobacco, Pryluki, Ukraine.

08.2014 – appointed as the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for the European Integration.

In August 2009, awarded honorary rank “Distinguished Lawyer of Ukraine”.

Author of the Ukrainian methodology of approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU standards, author of a number of research works on comparative analysis of Ukrainian legislation.

Speaks English. Has basic knowledge of French.

Has two sons.



Natalya Boyko
Deputy Minister for European Integration at Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine



- Previous Positions** Advisor at Administration of the President of Ukraine, Support Manager at National Reforms Council, Project Manager, Energy Reform at...
- Education** The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan - IEEJ/Japan International Cooperation Agency - JICA, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv



ATTACHMENT 2: Talking Points

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. We know how difficult these measure are in terms of political costs, but it is critical to ensure Ukraine's prosperity and energy security. It is crucial that you work with the IMF and World Bank on these issues.
- The United States and the European Union stands ready to work with you to ensure that change and reform can be implemented.
- A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

Naftogaz Unbundling/Corporate Governance

- I would be very interested to hear your perspectives on the crucial issues facing Ukraine and Naftogaz now. What is the status of the unbundling process for Naftogaz? What is the likelihood that this will be completed by the end of the year?
- What are your perspectives on the recent changes made to the corporate charter of Naftogaz? Why did the government make the changes to the charter? How could this be rectified?

Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season. What is the current level of natural gas which is in storage? How much do you feel Naftogaz will need to make it through the winter?
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?

Poland-Ukraine Interconnector Project

- I understand that you are seeking the United States help with the Poles regarding the Poland-Ukraine Interconnector Project. What are the current issues? What assistance are you looking from the United States?

STATE EQUITY

STATE EQUITY

STATE EQUITY

STATE EQUITY



Ukraine Country Fact Sheet

Background: Ukraine was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries was the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Weakened by internecine quarrels and Mongol invasions, Kyivan Rus was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cultural and religious legacy of Kyivan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism through subsequent centuries. A new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after an uprising against the Poles. Despite continuous Muscovite pressure, the Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for well over 100 years. During the latter part of the 18th century, most Ukrainian ethnographic territory was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine achieved a short-lived period of independence (1917-20), but was reconquered and endured a brutal Soviet rule that engineered two forced famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which over 8 million died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies were responsible for 7 to 8 million more deaths. Although Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, democracy and prosperity remained elusive as the legacy of state control and endemic corruption stalled efforts at economic reform, privatization, and civil liberties.

A peaceful mass protest referred to as the "Orange Revolution" in the closing months of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential election and to allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist slate under Viktor Yushchenko. Subsequent internal squabbles in the Yushchenko camp allowed his rival Viktor Yanukovich to stage a comeback in parliamentary (Rada) elections, become prime minister in August 2006, and be elected president in February 2010. In October 2012, Ukraine held Rada elections, widely criticized by Western observers as flawed due to use of government resources to favor ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment of opposition candidates. President Yanukovich's backtracking on a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU in November 2013 - in favor of closer economic ties with Russia - and subsequent use of force against students, civil society activists, and other civilians in favor of the agreement led to a three-month protest occupation of Kyiv's central square. The government's use of violence to break up the protest camp in February 2014 led to all out pitched battles, scores of deaths, international condemnation, and the president's abrupt departure for Russia. New elections in the spring allowed pro-West president Petro Poroshenko to assume office on 7 June 2014.

Shortly after Yanukovich's departure in late February 2014, Russian President Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a "referendum" was held regarding the integration of Crimea into



the Russian Federation. The "referendum" was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the U.S., and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia's purported annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the "referendum" as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Russia also continues to supply proxies in two of Ukraine's eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel resulting in an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russia proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 to end the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on package of measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk Agreements. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also meet regularly to facilitate implementation of the peace deal. More than 34,000 civilians have been killed or wounded in the fighting resulting from Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine.

Area: [Slightly smaller than Texas]

- total: 603,550 sq km
- land: 579,330 sq km
- water: 24,220 sq km
- global rank: 47

Population: [Approx. 1.15 times more populous than Texas]

- 44,033,874 (July 2017 est.), 32th in the world.
- Densest settlement in the eastern (Donbas) and western regions; notable concentrations in and around major urban areas of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovs'k, and Odesa.

Economy: [approximately one-tenth the size of Texas' economy]

Under the former Soviet Union, the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic had a strong economic base focused on agricultural output, a diversified heavy industry, and raw materials supply for other regions of the former USSR. Shortly after independence in August 1991, the Ukrainian Government liberalized most prices and erected a legal framework for privatization, but widespread resistance to reform within the government and the legislature soon stalled these efforts and led to some backtracking. Output by 1999 had fallen to less than 40% of the 1991 level. Ukrainian Government officials eliminated most tax and customs privileges in a March 2005 budget law, bringing more economic activity out of Ukraine's large shadow economy. From 2000 until mid-2008, Ukraine's economy was buoyant despite political turmoil between the prime minister and president. The economy contracted nearly 15% in 2009, among the worst economic performances in the world. In April 2010, Ukraine negotiated a price discount on Russian gas imports in exchange for extending Russia's lease on its naval base in Crimea.

Ukraine's oligarchs continued to dominate the economy and grew slowly from 2010 to 2013, as Ukraine remained behind peers in the region and among Europe's poorest. After former President Yanukovich fled the country during the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine's economy fell into crisis because of Russia's annexation of Crimea, military conflict in the eastern part of

the country, and a trade war with Russia, resulting in a 17% decline in GDP, inflation at nearly 60%, and dwindling foreign currency reserves.

The international community began efforts to stabilize the Ukrainian economy, including a March 2014 IMF assistance package of \$17.5 billion, of which Ukraine has received four disbursements, most recently in April 2017, bringing the total disbursed as of that date to approximately \$8.4 billion. Ukraine has made significant progress on reforms designed to make the country prosperous, democratic, and transparent, including creation of a national anti-corruption agency, overhaul of the banking sector, establishment of a transparent VAT refund system, and increased transparency in government procurement. But more improvements are needed, including fighting corruption, developing capital markets, improving the business environment to attract foreign investment, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and land reform. The fifth tranche of the IMF program, valued at \$1.9 billion, has been delayed due to lack of progress on outstanding reforms, including adjustment of gas tariffs to import parity levels and adoption of legislation establishing an independent anti-corruption court.

Russia's occupation of Crimea in March 2014 and ongoing aggression in eastern Ukraine have hurt economic growth. With the loss of a major portion of Ukraine's heavy industry in Donbas and ongoing violence, the economy contracted by 6.6% in 2014 and by 9.8% in 2015, but it returned to low growth in 2016 and 2017, reaching 2.3% and 2.0%, respectively, as key reforms took hold. Ukraine also redirected trade activity towards the EU following the implementation of a bilateral Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, displacing Russia as its largest trading partner. A prohibition on commercial trade with separatist-controlled territories in early 2017 has not impacted Ukraine's key industrial sectors as much as expected, largely because of favorable external conditions. Ukraine returned to international debt markets in September 2017, issuing a \$3 billion sovereign bond.

Exports: Ferrous and nonferrous metals, fuel and petroleum products, chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, and foodstuffs.

- \$36.85 billion (2017 est.)
- \$33.56 billion (2016 est.)

Partners: Russia 9.2%, Poland 6.5%, Turkey 5.6%, India 5.5%, Italy 5.2%, China 4.6%, Germany 4.3% (2017)

Imports: Energy, machinery and equipment, chemicals.

- \$44.42 billion (2017 est.)
- \$40.57 billion (2016 est.)

Partners: Russia 14.5%, China 11.3%, Germany 11.2%, Poland 7%, Belarus 6.7%, US 5.1% (2017)

Capital: Kyiv (Kiev) (**Note:** pronounced KEEYV)



Executive Branch:

Chief of state: President Petro Poroshenko (since 7 June 2014)

Head of Government: Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman (since 14 April 2016);
First Deputy Prime Minister Stepan KUBIV (since 14 April 2016)

Cabinet: Nominated by the prime minister, approved by the Verkhovna Rada

Elections/Appointments: President directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 31 March and 21 April 2019 (next to be held in March 2024); prime minister nominated by the president, confirmed by the Verkhovna Rada.

Election Results: First round results: percent of vote - Volodymyr ZELENSKY (Servant of the People) 30.2%, Petro POROSHENKO (BPP) 15.6%, Yuliya TYMOSHENKO (Fatherland) 13.4%, Yuriy BOYKO (independent) 11.7%, 35 other candidates 29.1%. Second round results: percent of vote - Volodymyr ZELENSKY (Servant of the People) 73.2%, Petro POROSHENKO (BPP) 24.5%. Note - ZELENSKY is to assume office by 3 June 2019.

Legislative Branch:

Unicameral Supreme Council or Verkhovna Rada (450 seats; 225 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 225 directly elected in a single nationwide constituency by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms). Next election to be held by 27 October 2019.

Judicial Branch:

Supreme Court of Ukraine or SCU (consists of 113 judges, with the possibility of up to 200, organized into civil, criminal, commercial, and administrative chambers, and a grand chamber); Constitutional Court (consists of 18 justices).

From: [Buchan, Samuel](#)
To: [Faseler, Hunter](#)
Cc: [Habansky, Sarah](#); [Staff Secretary](#)
Subject: Ukraine S1 Papers
Date: Sunday, May 19, 2019 12:31:12 AM
Attachments: [S1 Bilateral Meeting with Foreign Minister Klimkin.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Petro Poroshenko.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenksyy with US delegation.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenksyyawf.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Speaker Parubiy.docx](#)
[S1 Briefing memo on Baltics 3+1.docm](#)
[S1 Country Team Memo. Ukraine May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Dinner Meeting Memo Sondland and Sefcovic May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Meeting Memo DM Zerkal and DM Boyko.docx](#)
Transfer to State Department
[UKR Ukraine Country Profile \(UPDATED\).docx](#)

Hunter - As requested, attached are the outstanding papers for tomorrow, Monday, and Tuesday.

Let me know if you have any questions.

Best,
Sam

HQ-2019-01418-F

Duplicative Attachments Omitted.

Attachments Are Attached To Document 1.

From: [Mapes, Thomas E.](#)
To: [Buchan, Samuel](#); [Faseler, Hunter](#); [Johnson, Matthew J.](#)
Subject: FW: Ukraine S1 Papers
Date: Sunday, May 19, 2019 11:47:57 AM
Attachments: [S1 Bilateral Meeting with Foreign Minister Klimkin.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Petro Poroshenko.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenksyy with US delegation.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenksyyawl.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Grovsman.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Speaker Parubiy.docx](#)
[S1 Briefing memo on Baltics 3+1.docm](#)
[S1 Country Team Memo. Ukraine May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Dinner Meeting Memo Sondland and Sefcovic May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Meeting Memo DM Zerkal and DM Boyko.docx](#)
 Transfer to State Department
[UKR Ukraine Country Profile \(UPDATED\).docx](#)

these should all be good to go- unless sam has any issues

From: Tumminia, Paul <paul.tumminia@hq.doe.gov>
Date: Saturday, May 18, 2019, 5:34 PM
To: Lockwood, Andrea <andrea.lockwood@hq.doe.gov>, Mapes, Thomas E. <thomas.mapes@hq.doe.gov>, Buchan, Samuel <samuel.buchan@hq.doe.gov>, Bell, Heather (Embassy KYIV) <BellHR@state.gov>
Cc: Sandoli, Robert <robert.sandoli@hq.doe.gov>, Lyon, Jennifer <jennifer.lyon@hq.doe.gov>, McKearin, Josh <josh.mckearin@hq.doe.gov>, Noel, Emily E <emily.noel@hq.doe.gov>, Paul Tumminia (b) (6)
Subject: Ukraine S1 Papers

All:

Here are the main papers for S1's trip to Ukraine beginning tomorrow. I followed the May 18 schedule and have a paper for each meeting. I have also included issue papers (for what its worth) in the folder. I think Sam can access remotely. I am adding two issue papers, ^{Transfer to State} _{Department} and the country profile (which I think S1 likes)

I have sent the others to my gmail in case I cannot access remotely tomorrow.

Here is the Link: (b) (5)

Paul Tumminia
Senior Advisor
Office of Europe and Eurasian Affairs
U.S. Department of Energy
Direct Dial: (202) 586-8036

HQ-2019-01418-F

Duplicative Attachments Omitted.

Attachments Are Attached To Document 1.

From: [Faseler, Hunter](#)
To: [Perr \(b\) \(6\)](#); [cCormack, Brian](#); [Wilmot, Dan](#)
Cc: [Wallwork, Luke](#); [Staff Secretary](#); [Gerdes, Stan](#); [Almstead, Deidre](#); [Yuzon, Andrea](#); [O'Beirne, Fiona](#); [Hynes, Shaylyn](#); [Vande Beek, Dirk](#); [Turenne, William](#); [Love, Kelly](#); [Szymanski, Jessica](#); [Smith, Jake](#); [Buchan, Samuel](#); [Garrish, Theodore](#); [Myers, Robert V.](#)
Subject: eBook for Tuesday, May 21st
Date: Monday, May 20, 2019 5:06:46 PM
Attachments: [eBook for Tuesday, May 21st.pdf](#)

Good Evening,

Attached is the eBook for tomorrow. Given the fluid situation on the ground, staff will continue to update you throughout the day with additional materials and more complete information.

Thank you,
Hunter Faseler
Special Assistant
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of Energy
202.586.1212 (o)(b) (6) (m)

Table of Contents
S1 Visit to Kiev, Ukraine
Tuesday, May 21, 2019

Tab #	Title
TAB 01	Trip Schedule, Tuesday, May 21, 2019
KIEV, UKRAINE – May 21	
TAB 02	(T) Bilateral Meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy 1. Biographies 2. Talking Points 3. Ukraine Background Info.
TAB 03	Press Round Table 1. Remarks
TAB 04	Private Meeting with Ukraine Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman 1. Biography 2. Talking Points 3. DOE Engagement in Ukraine
TAB 05	Bilateral Meeting with Ukraine Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman 1. Talking Points 2. DOE Engagement in Ukraine
TAB 06	(T) Pull aside with CEO of Naftogaz, Andriy Kobolyev 1. Biography 2. Talking Points
TAB 07	Schedule for Wednesday, May 22, 2019
BACKGROUND PAPERS	
TAB A	Contact Sheet - Ukraine
TAB B	Country Profile – Ukraine
TAB C	(b) (5)
TAB D	U.S. Delegation Biographies
TAB E	(b) (5)
TAB F	
TAB G	
TAB H	
TAB I	
TAB J	
TAB K	
TAB L	
TAB M	
TAB N	
TAB O	
TAB P	General Talking Points – Ukraine Trip



5/20/2019 5:01 PM

Ukraine

Tuesday, May 21st:

TBDam Breakfast on Own
Location: Hyatt Regency, Kyiv

TBDam (T) Bilateral Meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky

Location: TBD
Room: TBD
Press: TBD
Set-up: TBD
Interpretation: TBD
Participants: US: S1, TBD
Ukraine: President Volodymyr Zelensky, TBD
Agenda: TBD

9:00am Media Prep
Location: Hyatt Regency, Kyiv
Room: (b) (6)

9:15am Press Round Table

Location: Hyatt Regency, Kyiv
Room: London
Press: Open
Set-up: Round Table
Interpretation: TBD
Participants: S1, TBD
*Agenda: 9:15am – S1 arrives at London room; proceeds to assigned seat
9:17am – S1 gives brief remarks
9:22am – S1 concludes remarks; Q&A begins
9:40am – Q&A concludes
9:45am – S1 departs for Cabinet of Ministers*

9:45am Depart for Cabinet of Ministers
Drive Time: 10 minutes
Manifest: S1, Brian

10:00am Private Meeting with Ukraine Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman

Location: Cabinet of Ministers
Room: Office of the Prime Minister
Press: Closed
Set-up: Private Meeting
Interpretation: Consecutive
Participants: US: S1, Sam, Alex Vindman (NSC)
Ukraine: Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, TBD
*Agenda: 10:00am – S1 arrives at the Prime Minister’s private office; proceeds to seat; Meeting begins
10:15am – Meeting concludes; S1 and Prime Minister Groysman move to TBD bilat room*



5/20/2019 5:01 PM

Ukraine

10:15am Bilateral Meeting with Ukraine Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman
Location: Cabinet of Ministers
Room: TBD Bilat Room
Press: Closed; Official Photog
Set-up: Conference table
Interpretation: Consecutive
Participants: US: S1, Brian, Ted, Sam, Alex Vindman
Ukraine: Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman; Vice PM for Energy, Volodymyr Kistion; Minister of Energy, Ihor Nasalyk; Minister of Cabinet of Ministers, Oleksandr Saienko; Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister, Bodenchuk Yuriy; Press Secretary, Vasyl Ryabchuk; Advisers to the Prime Minister: Serhij Popyk & Myroslav Koshelyuk
*Agenda: 10:15am – S1 and Prime Minister Groysman arrive at TBD bilat room
10:17am – Meeting begins
10:55am – Meeting concludes
11:00am – S1 moves to TBD*

TBDam (T) Pull aside with CEO of Naftogaz, Andriy Kobolyev
Location: TBD
Room: TBD
Press: Closed; Official Photog
Set-up: TBD
Interpretation: Consecutive
Participants: S1, Brian, Andriy Kobolyev, TBD
Agenda: TBD

TBDpm Depart for Hyatt Regency, Kyiv
Drive Time: 10 minutes
Manifest: S1, Brian

TBDpm Executive Time
Location: Hyatt Regency, Kyiv
Room: (b) (6)

12:15pm Depart for Kyiv Boryspil International Airport
Drive Time: 50 minutes
Manifest: S1, Brian

2:05pm Wheels Up Kyiv, Ukraine to Frankfurt, Germany
Flight: LH 1491
Flight Time: 2h 35m
Manifest: S1, Brian, Ted, Dirk, Sam, Jake, Jessica, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

3:40pm Wheels Down Frankfurt, Germany
Note: 1h 30m layover



5/20/2019 5:01 PM

Ukraine

5:10pm Wheels Up Frankfurt, Germany to Washington, DC (IAD)
Flight: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Flight Time: 8h 50m
Manifest: S1, Brian, Ted, Dirk, Sam, Jake, Jessica, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

8:00pm Wheels Down Washington, DC
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Depart for Residence
Drive Time: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Manifest: S1

(b) (6)
Arrive at Residence

RON Residence



EVENT: **Bilateral Meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy**

DATE: Tuesday, May 21, 2019

TIME: TBD EEST (ET+7)

LOCATION: TBD

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed **VISUALS:** None

SCENARIO: TBD Your meeting is scheduled to begin.

TBD Your meeting is scheduled to conclude.

PARTICIPANTS: **Ukraine**

Volodymyr Zelenskyy (**Vol-o-de-mir Zel-ensk-ee**), *President of Ukraine*

➤ *Addressed as Mr. President or President Zelenskyy*

Olena Zerkal (**Ah-Lee-yen-a TSEHR kal**), *Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs*

➤ *Addressed as Deputy Minister Zerkal*

U.S.

Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs (IA)*

Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*

STAFF: Sam Buchan, *Senior Advisor, IA*

PREVIOUS

INTERACTION: This is your second official meeting with President Zelenskyy. When he was the President-elect, you met with his advisors while you were in Brussels for the U.S.-EU LNG Event.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND:

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING



BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood (IA-20)

STAFF SEC POC: Hunter Faseler, Special Assistant

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biographies
2. Talking Points
3. Ukraine Background Info.

BIOGRAPHY

Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Vol-o-de-mir Sel-ensk-ee) *President of Ukraine*

Zelenskyy was born in the city of Kryviy Rih on January 25, 1978. While he was growing up, for four years he lived with his parents in the city of Erdenet, Mongolia. He also went to primary school there. After that, his family returned to Kryviy Rih where he studied at school No. 95 and undertook extensive English learning.



In 1995, he entered Kryviy Rih Institute of Economics, which is part of Kyiv National Economic University, where he received a law degree. He underwent a two-month internship during his time in the University.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy became famous in 1990s thanks to a highly-acclaimed KVN stand-up TV show. He was a member of various teams until he skyrocketed to his first big standup success with the launch in 1997 of a 95 Kvartal team. Soon the team entered the KVN's Major League.

In 2003, Zelenskyy's team left the League. In 2005, after a conflict with KVN, the Vechirniy Kvartal [Evening Quarter] TV show appeared on one of the Ukrainian channels. Soon, the program became the highest rated on Ukrainian TV in a comedy segment.

Later, Studio Kvartal-95 was launched. After that, Zelenskyy along with his partners launched a number of other successful TV projects. In 2008, he played one of the main roles in the Love in the Big City comedy, and later in its sequels released in 2010 and 2013. In 2011, a remake of The Office Romance Soviet-era film was released, where Zelenskyy also played a major role. Then he featured in the Rzhevsky against Napoleon comedy.

Zelenskyy also played the role of a Ukrainian teacher Vasyl Holoborodko, who suddenly became president, in a highly popular television series Servant of the People (three seasons have already been released).

No less successful and popular project by Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Studio Kvartal 95 is the comedy series Svaty [Matchmakers], which was recently banned in Ukraine, while one of its main actors, Russian national Fyodor Dobronravov, was banned from entering Ukraine for national security reasons.

Zelenskyy has been married to Olena Kiyashko since 2003. The couple's daughter Oleksandra was born in 2008. Their son Kyrylo was born in early 2013.

Zelenskyy announced he would run for presidency in 2019 while addressing an audience during the Kvartal 95 New Year's Eve late night show on 1+1 TV channel. Later, the Servant of the People party nominated him as their presidential candidate. After that, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team actively took on social networks, publishing a series of appeals to Ukrainians and incumbent President Petro Poroshenko.





(b) (5)

Olena Zerkal, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Born on June 24, 1973 in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Education

In 1998 Kyiv graduated from National Taras Shevchenko University, Law Department, Master of Law. In 2008 graduated from the Institute for International Relations of Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University, Master of International economic relations.

In 2003 studied at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, “New Issues in Security Policy” training course.

In 2002-2005 attended TACIS Project “Legal Training in Ukraine: Kyiv and Selected Regions” – Educational program on EU Law” at the Institute for International Relations of Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University.



Professional activities

2001 – 2005 – Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, Director of Department of International Law

2005 – 2011 – Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, Director of State Department on Approximation of Legislation.

2011 – 2013 – Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, Director of Department on Liaison with State Authorities.

While in the Ministry of Justice, participated in a number of multi – and bilateral negotiations, i.a. in all rounds of negotiations between Ukraine and the EU on Association Agreement including free trade agreement, agreement on common aviation area, agreement on accession to the Energy Community, agreement of visa facilitation, etc. Was a member of a number of Ukraine’s delegations at the negotiations with the EU, UN, NATO and Council of Europe. Was responsible for overall coordination and planning the activities in the sphere of approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU standards, legal translation and expertise of draft laws, as well as cooperation with the EU in the spheres of justice, freedom and security etc.

2013 – 2014 – Senior Corporate Affairs Manager, British American Tobacco, Pryluky, Ukraine.

08.2014 – appointed as the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for the European Integration.

In August 2009, awarded honorary rank “Distinguished Lawyer of Ukraine”.

Author of the Ukrainian methodology of approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU standards, author of a number of research works on comparative analysis of Ukrainian legislation.

Speaks English. Has basic knowledge of French.

Has two sons.



TALKING POINTS

Overview

- Mr. President, I am very pleased to meet you. On behalf of the President of the United States and the American people, I would like to extend our best wishes to you as President of Ukraine.
- I am here as the Head of the U.S. delegation to affirm that Ukraine remains a close partner of the United States and we are committed to working with you to ensure the long-term energy security of your country.
- The United States strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and continued reform efforts.

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. We know how difficult these measure are in terms of political costs, but it is critical to ensure Ukraine's prosperity and energy security. It is crucial that you work with the IMF and World Bank on these issues.
- It is clear that your message of change and reform resonated with the people of Ukraine- (73% of the popular vote). I would encourage you and your team to capitalize on this enthusiasm and strong desire for change. The United States and the European Union stands ready to work with you to ensure that change and reform can be implemented. But you must be committed to make the hard choices on corruption and good governance reforms.
- The Department of Energy stands ready to work with you and your team to help implement these changes. A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue

- In November 2018, I agreed to launch the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue with your predecessor, President Poroshenko, to cooperate on many of the energy issues facing Ukraine.
- We believe that the Dialogue would be a useful format for the Department of Energy to engage with your government at the highest level, to develop an engagement plan to move ahead with reforms, and to encourage more foreign direct investment into Ukraine.



- We hope that we can re-launch this Dialogue under your leadership. The Deputy Secretary will lead this Dialogue from the U.S. side.
- I would ask you to nominate a co-chair from your side to begin this critical work.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.
- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season.
- The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?
- How could the U.S. Government provide assistance?

DOE Engagement (Critical Energy Issues)

- There are several critical issues that I believe your administration should address in the next coming weeks.
- It is essential that Ukraine demonstrate commitment to the norms of the Third Energy Package in order to demonstrate to the EU that Ukraine is a reliable energy partner.
- I encourage you to proceed with the unbundling of Naftogaz's gas transmission system. This is necessary for Ukraine's commitment to European energy norms.
- The dispute over unbundling is wasting critical time and weakening Ukraine's position in gas transit negotiations with Gazprom. We urge you to ensure Ukraine



unbundles on time, and creates a new TSO that will be certifiable by the EU. It is equally crucial that the unbundling plan does not increase avenues for corruption and undue influence from any group

- Ukraine has been tremendously blessed with reserves of natural gas. I know that U.S. oil and gas companies are very interested in bringing expertise and know-how, but they remain wary of the investment climate. They are looking for signals that your government is committed to continuing critical reforms.
- We welcome Ukraine's efforts to increase gas production, including through oil and gas exploration production sharing agreements and license auctions. We urge Ukraine to ensure the tendering process is transparent and competitive, and in line with the recommendations of the business community.
- Diversifying your nuclear fuel supply away from Russia is extremely important for Ukraine's energy security. Westinghouse fuel supplies reduce Russian leverage over Ukraine.

Potential Questions for the President:

- I would be interested to hear your perspectives regarding the security situation in eastern Ukraine. What is the likelihood that there will be some progress in resolving this impasse?
- In what other areas could the Department of Energy provide technical assistance to support your government? How could the United States, EU, and Canada, work with your government to ensure that these reforms continue to be implemented, particularly in the energy sector?



DOE Engagement (past and current)

The Department of Energy (DOE) has had extensive engagement with Ukraine since Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, with particular focus on the country after the civil uprising known as the Maidan or the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. In that year, DOE provided critical support to assist the GOU to put in place emergency protocols for expected shortages for fuel during the 2014-2015 winter season. Since 2014, DOE has expanded cooperation and developed several areas of focus which are designed to implement reforms and enhance the country's energy security.

- *Cyber security.* DOE has provided technical assistance to the GOU to bolster cyber security training and awareness. DOE completed a cyber security training program in 2017-2018 that was aimed at cyber security professionals and government officials in the energy sector.
- *Nuclear fuel.* DOE provided \$70 million to diversify Ukraine's nuclear fuel supply, which serves to increase Ukraine's energy security and reduce dependence on Russia.
- *Civil nuke operations.* In the civil nuclear area, DOE has provided technical assistance for an outage optimization program which bolsters the efficiency of nuclear power units during scheduled maintenance.
- *Modernizing coal-fired power plants.* DOE has provided technical assistance to help Ukraine modernize its thermal power units and retrofit generation assets. Coal fleet modernization and retrofitting will allow Ukraine's plants to burn more readily available and cheaper G-grade coal, and to do so in a more efficient manner.
- *Winter Action Plan.* DOE, with Canadian and EU colleagues, prepared a plan in case of short term cuts in gas supply. When Russia made such cuts in March 2018, Ukraine activated the emergency protocols of the plan, which minimized the impact of Russia's actions.



- *Resiliency Plan.* DOE led an international team of experts from the EU, Canada and several national laboratories to prepare a comprehensive medium term plan for enhancing the energy resilience of Ukraine. This National Energy Resilience Plan is undergoing final review and can be delivered to the Government of Ukraine at the first meeting of the SED.



EVENT: Press Round Table

DATE: Tuesday, May 21, 2019
TIME: 9:00 AM – 9:45 AM EEST (ET +7)
LOCATION: Hyatt Regency-Kyiv; (b) (6)

PURPOSE: To reiterate U.S. support of Ukrainian freedom and the inauguration of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as President of Ukraine.

PRESS: Open **VISUALS:** External Photographer

SCENARIO:

9:00 AM	Your prep for the press round table is scheduled to begin.
9:12 AM	Prep concludes, and you proceed to London room.
9:15 AM	You arrive at London room and proceed to assigned seat.
9:17 AM	You give remarks.
9:22 AM	You conclude your remarks; Q&A begins.
9:40 AM	Q&A concludes.
9:45 AM	You depart for Cabinet of Ministers.

PARTICIPANTS: Ukrainian Media Outlets

STAFF: Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs (IA)*
Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff*
Dirk Vande Beek, *Director, Office of Public Affairs (PA)*
Sam Buchan, *Senior Advisor, IA*
Jessica Szymanski, *Deputy Press Secretary, PA*

STAFF SEC POC: Hunter Faseler, Special Assistant

ATTACHMENTS:
1. Remarks

Word Count: 316
Estimated Time: Under 4 Minutes

Press Statement for Secretary Perry
Kyiv, Ukraine
Monday, May 20, 2019

Good Morning everyone. It's been a pleasure and an honor to be here in Kyiv to lead the U.S. Delegation to meet with and to attend the inauguration of President Zelenskyy.

I know that I can speak for the members of this delegation which included: U.S. Special Representative to Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker, U.S. Ambassador to the EU Gordon Sondland, U.S. Senator Ron Johnson, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine Joseph Pennington, and Director of Eastern Europe & Russia for the National Security Council Alex Vindman when I say that we have all witnessed an important day for the nation of Ukraine.

Yesterday we celebrated one of the most powerful events of the modern world...the peaceful transition of power which is living proof that Ukraine remains a strong...stable... democracy...as well as a vital friend and ally of the United States and the West.

I also had the opportunity to meet with Chairman of the Verhovna Rada, Andriy Parubiy (**An- DREE Pah-RU-Bee**), as well as with the Presidents of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Republic of Georgia to discuss vital energy and national security issues.

It has been a wonderful trip. With that, I would like to open this roundtable up for some questions...



EVENT: **Private Meeting with Ukraine Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman**

DATE: Monday, May 20, 2019
TIME: 10:00 AM – 10:15 AM EEST (EST+7)
LOCATION: Cabinet of Ministries

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed **VISUALS:** None

SCENARIO: *Consecutive Interpretation*

10:00 AM You arrive at the Prime Minister's private office and proceed to seat; meeting begins.

10:15 AM Meeting concludes, and you and Prime Minister Groysman move to bilat room.

PARTICIPANTS: **Ukraine**
Volodymyr Groysman (**Vol-o-de-mir Ha-roy-sman**), *Prime Minister of Ukraine*
➤ *Addressed as Mr. Prime Minister*

U.S.
Alex Vindman, *Director for Eastern Europe & Russia, NSC*
Sam Buchan, *Senior Advisor, Office of International Affairs (IA)*

STAFF: None

PREVIOUS INTERACTION: This is your second meeting with Prime Minister Groysman. You met him during your visit to Ukraine in November 2018.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND: (b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Monday, May 20, 2019

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING







BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood (IA-20)

STAFF SEC POC: Hunter Faseler, Special Assistant

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biography
2. Talking Points
3. DOE Engagement in Ukraine

BIOGRAPHY



Volodymyr Groysman *Prime Minister of Ukraine*

Born in Vinnytsya on 20 January 1978. He completed Vinnytsya secondary school No 35 in 1994. Studied Law in the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management in 2000-2003.

Career

He began his career as a metal worker at the Shkolnyk private enterprise when he was 14 years old.

In 2002, he was elected a Vinnytsya city councilor and was as a deputy head of the permanent commission of the city council for human rights, law, councilors' performance and ethics.

In November 2005, he was elected the secretary of the Vinnytsya city council. After 25 November 2005, he was the acting mayor of Vinnytsya.

On 26 March 2006, Groysman was elected mayor of Vinnytsya. On 31 October 2010, he was re-elected as mayor with the record support of 77.8 per cent of votes. He was running on behalf of the Conscience of Ukraine party.

After the Euro-Maidan protests, on 27 January 2014, he was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of regional development, construction, housing and utilities. During the Crimea crisis, Volodymyr Groysman called on Crimean residents not to vote in the illegal referendum on 16 March 2015. He unambiguously described the Crimean events as Russia's military aggression and encroachment on the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

In July 2014, Volodymyr Groysman chaired the government commission investigating the crash of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 Boeing 777 in eastern Ukraine.

He is a vice-president of the Association of Ukrainian Cities for housing and utilities.

In the 2014 early parliamentary election, Groysman was No 4 on the list of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc.

On 27 November 2014, he was elected parliament speaker by 359 MPs.

On 14 April 2016, he was appointed prime minister of Ukraine.





Attachment 2

TALKING POINTS

Overview

- Mr. Prime Minister, I am very pleased to see you again. On behalf of the President of the United States and the American people, I am honored to lead the delegation to the inauguration of President Zelenskyy.
- I am here as the Head of the U.S. delegation to affirm that Ukraine remains a close partner of the United States and we are committed to working with you to ensure the long-term energy security of your country.
- The United States strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and continued reform efforts.

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. We know how difficult these measure are in terms of political costs, but it is critical to ensure Ukraine's prosperity and energy security. It is crucial that you work with the IMF and World Bank on these issues.
- It is clear that the message of change and reform resonated with the people of Ukraine. I would encourage you and your team to work with the new Presidential administration to carry out this enthusiasm and strong desire for change. The United States and the European Union stands ready to work with you to ensure that change and reform can be implemented. But you must be committed to make the hard choices on corruption and good governance reforms.
- The Department of Energy stands ready to work with you and your team to help implement these changes. A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

DOE Engagement (Critical Energy Issues)

- It is essential that Ukraine demonstrate commitment to the norms of the Third Energy Package in order to demonstrate to the EU that Ukraine is a reliable energy partner.
- I encourage you to proceed with the unbundling of Naftogaz's gas transmission system. This is necessary for Ukraine's commitment to European energy norms.
- The dispute over unbundling is wasting critical time and weakening Ukraine's



position in gas transit negotiations with Gazprom. We urge you to ensure Ukraine unbundles on time, and creates a new TSO that will be certifiable by the EU. It is equally crucial that the unbundling plan does not increase avenues for corruption and undue influence from any group.

- Could we agree to work together on plan for unbundling with the European Commission to ensure adherence to EU directives? This is crucial if the new TSO is to be certified and gas volumes to Europe continue next winter.
- How can the Department of Energy and the U.S. government provide assistance?
- Ukraine has been tremendously blessed with reserves of natural gas. I know that U.S. oil and gas companies are very interested in bringing expertise and know-how, but they remain wary of the investment climate. They are looking for signals that your government is committed to continuing critical reforms.
- We welcome Ukraine's efforts to increase gas production, including through oil and gas exploration production sharing agreements and license auctions. We urge Ukraine to ensure the tendering process is transparent and competitive, and in line with the recommendations of the business community.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.
- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season. The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?
- How can the Department of Energy provide assistance?

DOE Engagement



DOE Engagement (past and current)

The Department of Energy (DOE) has had extensive engagement with Ukraine since Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, with particular focus on the country after the civil uprising known as the Maidan or the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. In that year, DOE provided critical support to assist the GOU to put in place emergency protocols for expected shortages for fuel during the 2014-2015 winter season. Since 2014, DOE has expanded cooperation and developed several areas of focus which are designed to implement reforms and enhance the country's energy security.

- *Cyber security.* DOE has provided technical assistance to the GOU to bolster cyber security training and awareness. DOE completed a cyber security training program in 2017-2018 that was aimed at cyber security professionals and government officials in the energy sector.
- *Nuclear fuel.* DOE provided \$70 million to diversify Ukraine's nuclear fuel supply, which serves to increase Ukraine's energy security and reduce dependence on Russia.
- *Civil nuke operations.* In the civil nuclear area, DOE has provided technical assistance for an outage optimization program which bolsters the efficiency of nuclear power units during scheduled maintenance.
- *Modernizing coal-fired power plants.* DOE has provided technical assistance to help Ukraine modernize its thermal power units and retrofit generation assets. Coal fleet modernization and retrofitting will allow Ukraine's plants to burn more readily available and cheaper G-grade coal, and to do so in a more efficient manner.
- *Winter Action Plan.* DOE, with Canadian and EU colleagues, prepared a plan in case of short term cuts in gas supply. When Russia made such cuts in March 2018, Ukraine activated the emergency protocols of the plan, which minimized the impact of Russia's actions.
- *Resiliency Plan.* DOE led an international team of experts from the EU, Canada and several national laboratories to prepare a comprehensive medium term plan for enhancing the energy resilience of Ukraine. This National Energy Resilience Plan is undergoing final review and can be delivered to the Government of Ukraine at the first meeting of the SED.



EVENT: **Bilateral Meeting with Ukraine Prime Minister, Volodymyr Groysman**

DATE: Monday, May 20, 2019
TIME: 10:15 AM – 11:00 AM EEST (EST+7)
LOCATION: Cabinet of Ministries; TBD Bilat Room

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed **VISUALS:** External Photographer

SCENARIO: *Consecutive Interpretation*

- 10:15 AM You and Prime Minister Groysman arrive at the bilat room.
- 10:17 AM Meeting begins.
- 10:55 AM Meeting concludes.
- 11:00 AM You move to TBD.

PARTICIPANTS: **Ukraine**
Volodymyr Groysman (**Vol-o-de-mir Ha-roy-smán**), *Prime Minister of Ukraine*
 ➤ *Addressed as Mr. Prime Minister*
Volodymyr Kistion (**Vo-lo-duh-meer Kiss-tee-on**), *Vice Prime Minister for Energy*
Ihor Nasalyk (**Ee-hoar Na-sall-eek**), *Minister of Energy*
Oleksandr Saienko (**Oh-lex-an-der Sigh-en-koh**), *Minister of Cabinet of Ministers*
Yuriy Bodenchuk (**Your –ee Bow den-Chuck**), *Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister*
Vasyl Ryabchuk (**Va-sYI' Ryab-chUk**), *Press Secretary*
Myroslav Koshelyuk (**My-ros-IAv Ko-she-IIUk**), *Advisor to the Prime Minister*
Serhiy Popyk (**Ser-gIY PO-pyck**), *Advisor to the Prime Minister*

U.S.
Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs (IA)*
Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff*
Alex Vindman, *Director for Eastern Europe & Russia, NSC*
Sam Buchan, *Senior Advisor, Office of International Affairs (IA)*

STAFF: None

PREVIOUS INTERACTION: This is your second meeting with Prime Minister Groysman. You met him during your visit to Ukraine in November 2018.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Monday, May 20, 2019

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING

BACKGROUND: (b) (5)

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING



OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Monday, May 20, 2019



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Andrea Lockwood (IA-20)

STAFF SEC POC: Hunter Faseler, Special Assistant

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Talking Points
2. DOE Engagement in Ukraine



Attachment 1

TALKING POINTS

Overview

- Mr. Prime Minister, I am very pleased to see you again. On behalf of the President of the United States and the American people, I am honored to lead the delegation to the inauguration of President Zelenskyy.
- I am here as the Head of the U.S. delegation to affirm that Ukraine remains a close partner of the United States and we are committed to working with you to ensure the long-term energy security of your country.
- The United States strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and continued reform efforts.

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. We know how difficult these measures are in terms of political costs, but it is critical to ensure Ukraine's prosperity and energy security. It is crucial that you work with the IMF and World Bank on these issues.
- It is clear that the message of change and reform resonated with the people of Ukraine. I would encourage you and your team to work with the new Presidential administration to carry out this enthusiasm and strong desire for change. The United States and the European Union stand ready to work with you to ensure that change and reform can be implemented. But you must be committed to make the hard choices on corruption and good governance reforms.
- The Department of Energy stands ready to work with you and your team to help implement these changes. A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

DOE Engagement (Critical Energy Issues)

- It is essential that Ukraine demonstrate commitment to the norms of the Third Energy Package in order to demonstrate to the EU that Ukraine is a reliable energy partner.
- I encourage you to proceed with the unbundling of Naftogaz's gas transmission system. This is necessary for Ukraine's commitment to European energy norms.
- The dispute over unbundling is wasting critical time and weakening Ukraine's



position in gas transit negotiations with Gazprom. We urge you to ensure Ukraine unbundles on time, and creates a new TSO that will be certifiable by the EU. It is equally crucial that the unbundling plan does not increase avenues for corruption and undue influence from any group.

- Could we agree to work together on plan for unbundling with the European Commission to ensure adherence to EU directives? This is crucial if the new TSO is to be certified and gas volumes to Europe continue next winter.
- How can the Department of Energy and the U.S. government provide assistance?
- Ukraine has been tremendously blessed with reserves of natural gas. I know that U.S. oil and gas companies are very interested in bringing expertise and know-how, but they remain wary of the investment climate. They are looking for signals that your government is committed to continuing critical reforms.
- We welcome Ukraine's efforts to increase gas production, including through oil and gas exploration production sharing agreements and license auctions. We urge Ukraine to ensure the tendering process is transparent and competitive, and in line with the recommendations of the business community.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.
- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season. The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?
- How can the Department of Energy provide assistance?

DOE Engagement



DOE Engagement (past and current)

The Department of Energy (DOE) has had extensive engagement with Ukraine since Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, with particular focus on the country after the civil uprising known as the Maidan or the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. In that year, DOE provided critical support to assist the GOU to put in place emergency protocols for expected shortages for fuel during the 2014-2015 winter season. Since 2014, DOE has expanded cooperation and developed several areas of focus which are designed to implement reforms and enhance the country's energy security.

- *Cyber security.* DOE has provided technical assistance to the GOU to bolster cyber security training and awareness. DOE completed a cyber security training program in 2017-2018 that was aimed at cyber security professionals and government officials in the energy sector.
- *Nuclear fuel.* DOE provided \$70 million to diversify Ukraine's nuclear fuel supply, which serves to increase Ukraine's energy security and reduce dependence on Russia.
- *Civil nuke operations.* In the civil nuclear area, DOE has provided technical assistance for an outage optimization program which bolsters the efficiency of nuclear power units during scheduled maintenance.
- *Modernizing coal-fired power plants.* DOE has provided technical assistance to help Ukraine modernize its thermal power units and retrofit generation assets. Coal fleet modernization and retrofitting will allow Ukraine's plants to burn more readily available and cheaper G-grade coal, and to do so in a more efficient manner.
- *Winter Action Plan.* DOE, with Canadian and EU colleagues, prepared a plan in case of short term cuts in gas supply. When Russia made such cuts in March 2018, Ukraine activated the emergency protocols of the plan, which minimized the impact of Russia's actions.
- *Resiliency Plan.* DOE led an international team of experts from the EU, Canada and several national laboratories to prepare a comprehensive medium term plan for enhancing the energy resilience of Ukraine. This National Energy Resilience Plan is undergoing final review and can be delivered to the Government of Ukraine at the first meeting of the SED.



EVENT: Pull Aside with CEO of Naftogaz, Andriy Kobolyev

DATE: Tuesday May 21, 2019

TIME: TBD

LOCATION: TBD

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PRESS: Closed **VISUALS:** External Photographer

SCENARIO: TBD Your meeting is scheduled to begin.

TBD Your meeting is scheduled to conclude.

PARTICIPANTS: Andriy Kobolyev (**An DREE KO-Bo-lee -eff**), *CEO, Naftogaz*
➤ *Addressed as Mr. Kobolyev*

U.S.

Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary*

Ted Garrish, *Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs*

STAFF: Sam Buchan Senior Advisor, *Office of International Affairs*

PREVIOUS

INTERACTION: You met Andriy Kobolyev several times, most recently during your visit to Ukraine in November 2018. He participated in your meeting with Foreign Minister Klimkin and Prime Minister Groysman.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND: (b) (5)



(b) (5)

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING



(b) (5)

BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Paul Tumminia and Emily Noel, IA-21

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Rob Sandoli, IA-21 and Andrea Lockwood IA-20

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Biography
2. Talking Points

ATTACHMENT 1: Biography

Andriy Kobolyev

Chief Executive Officer, NAC Naftogaz of Ukraine

Mr. Kobolyev began his career at the international audit and consulting group PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC), where he specialized in strategic management and corporate transformation.

From 2002 till 2010 he worked at Naftogaz, rising from a chief specialist to adviser to the chairman.

Later Mr. Kobolyev co-founded AYA Capital investment banking group where he focused on debt and equity capital raising, debt restructuring and corporate reorganizations of large enterprises and holdings.

Mr. Kobolyev holds a Master's degree in International Economic Relations with honors from the Institute of International Relations at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv.





ATTACHMENT 2: Talking Points

Naftogaz Unbundling/Corporate Governance

- I would be very interested to hear your perspectives on the crucial issues facing Ukraine and Naftogaz now. What is the status of the unbundling process for Naftogaz? What is the likelihood that this will be completed by the end of the year?
- What are your perspectives on the recent changes made to the corporate charter of Naftogaz? Why did the government make the changes to the charter? How could this be rectified?

Attracting Investment into Ukraine's Gas Sector

- We welcome Ukraine's efforts to increase gas production, including through oil and gas exploration production sharing agreements and license auctions. We would like to work with Ukraine to ensure the tendering process is transparent and competitive, and in line with the recommendations of the business community.
- The Department of Energy would stand ready to help provide technical support to work with Naftogaz in attracting investment to develop brownfields.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- We are concerned that without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless you begin to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. Do you have government support to facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.
- The Department of Energy is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.
- If Ukraine fails to come to agreement with Russia for the purchase of natural gas, what contingency plans is the government putting in place to ensure sufficient gas for the winter?

How can the Department of Energy provide assistance?



Poland-Ukraine Interconnector Project

- I understand that you are seeking the United States help with the Poles regarding the Poland-Ukraine Interconnector Project. What are the current issues? What assistance are you looking from the United States?
- We would ask your support for the technical team which will be traveling to Ukraine and Poland in June to assess the viability of expanding interconnections with Poland.

May 22, 2019

Wednesday

12:00 AM - 12:00 AM

Ukraine

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Depart for HO

Drive Time: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Manifest: S1

9:05 AM - 9:35 AM

Morning Briefing -- S1 Secure Conference Room

9:45 AM - 10:15 AM

COS Time -- S1 Office

10:30 AM - 11:00 AM

TIMING TBD CI/IN Brief for Vancouver Travel -- S1 Secure Conference Room

11:30 AM - 12:00 PM

Piketon Update -- S1 Office

12:00 PM - 1:30 PM

Lunch/Read Time -- S1 Office

2:30 PM - 2:45 PM

Photo with Ingrid Kolb -- S1 Office

Presentation of 40 years of Government Service Certificate

3:10 PM - 3:25 PM

(T) Pre-brief: Meeting with Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham -- S1 Office

3:30 PM - 4:00 PM

(T) Meeting with Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham -- General Groves Conference Room

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Depart for Residence

Drive Time: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Manifest: S1

6:15 PM - 6:30 PM

Depart for Event

Drive Time: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Manifest: S1

6:30 PM - 9:00 PM

Personal Event

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(Time TBD) Depart for Residence

Drive Time: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Manifest: S1

May 22, 2019 Continued

Wednesday

9:30 PM - 9:30 PM

RON Residence



Ukraine

5/17/2019 6:05 PM

Contact Sheet: Kiev, Ukraine

Traveling Staff			
Name	Agency / Title	Cell Phone	Email
Secretary Perry	S1		
Brian McCormack	Chief of Staff	(b) (6)	Brian.McCormack@hq.doe.gov
Ted Garrish	Assistant Secretary, IA	(b) (6)	Theodore.Garrish@hq.doe.gov
Dirk Vande Beek	Director of Public Affairs	(b) (6)	Dirk.Vandebeek@hq.doe.gov
Jessica Szymanski	Associate Deputy Press Secretary	(b) (6)	Jessica.Szymanski@hq.doe.gov
Sam Buchan	Senior Advisor, IA	(b) (6)	Samuel.Buchan@hq.doe.gov
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Lead Security Detail	(b) (6)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Advance / Security:			
Name	Agency / Title	Cell Phone	Email
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Lead ADV Staff	(b) (6)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Lead ADV Security	(b) (6)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	ADV Security	(b) (6)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	ADV Security	(b) (6)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Control Officer / Embassy POC			
Name	Agency / Title	Cell Phone	Email
Heather Bell	Control Officer	(b) (6)	BellHR@state.gov
Alex Vindman	Director for Eastern Europe & Russia, NSC	(b) (6)	(b) (6)



Ukraine Country Fact Sheet

Background: Ukraine was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries was the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Weakened by internecine quarrels and Mongol invasions, Kyivan Rus was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cultural and religious legacy of Kyivan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism through subsequent centuries. A new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after an uprising against the Poles. Despite continuous Muscovite pressure, the Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for well over 100 years. During the latter part of the 18th century, most Ukrainian ethnographic territory was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine achieved a short-lived period of independence (1917-20), but was reconquered and endured a brutal Soviet rule that engineered two forced famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which over 8 million died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies were responsible for 7 to 8 million more deaths. Although Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, democracy and prosperity remained elusive as the legacy of state control and endemic corruption stalled efforts at economic reform, privatization, and civil liberties.

A peaceful mass protest referred to as the "Orange Revolution" in the closing months of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential election and to allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist slate under Viktor Yushchenko. Subsequent internal squabbles in the Yushchenko camp allowed his rival Viktor Yanukovich to stage a comeback in parliamentary (Rada) elections, become prime minister in August 2006, and be elected president in February 2010. In October 2012, Ukraine held Rada elections, widely criticized by Western observers as flawed due to use of government resources to favor ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment of opposition candidates. President Yanukovich's backtracking on a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU in November 2013 - in favor of closer economic ties with Russia - and subsequent use of force against students, civil society activists, and other civilians in favor of the agreement led to a three-month protest occupation of Kyiv's central square. The government's use of violence to break up the protest camp in February 2014 led to all out pitched battles, scores of deaths, international condemnation, and the president's abrupt departure for Russia. New elections in the spring allowed pro-West president Petro Poroshenko to assume office on 7 June 2014.

Shortly after Yanukovich's departure in late February 2014, Russian President Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula claiming the action was to protect ethnic Russians living there. Two weeks later, a "referendum" was held regarding the integration of Crimea into



the Russian Federation. The "referendum" was condemned as illegitimate by the Ukrainian Government, the EU, the U.S., and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In response to Russia's purported annexation of Crimea, 100 members of the UN passed UNGA resolution 68/262, rejecting the "referendum" as baseless and invalid and confirming the sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Russia also continues to supply proxies in two of Ukraine's eastern provinces with manpower, funding, and materiel resulting in an armed conflict with the Ukrainian Government. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Russia proxy republics signed the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum in September 2014 to end the conflict. However, this agreement failed to stop the fighting. In a renewed attempt to alleviate ongoing clashes, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany negotiated a follow-on package of measures in February 2015 to implement the Minsk Agreements. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also meet regularly to facilitate implementation of the peace deal. More than 34,000 civilians have been killed or wounded in the fighting resulting from Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine.

Area: [Slightly smaller than Texas]

- total: 603,550 sq km
- land: 579,330 sq km
- water: 24,220 sq km
- global rank: 47

Population: [Approx. 1.15 times more populous than Texas]

- 44,033,874 (July 2017 est.), 32th in the world.
- Densest settlement in the eastern (Donbas) and western regions; notable concentrations in and around major urban areas of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovs'k, and Odesa.

Economy: [approximately one-tenth the size of Texas' economy]

Under the former Soviet Union, the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic had a strong economic base focused on agricultural output, a diversified heavy industry, and raw materials supply for other regions of the former USSR. Shortly after independence in August 1991, the Ukrainian Government liberalized most prices and erected a legal framework for privatization, but widespread resistance to reform within the government and the legislature soon stalled these efforts and led to some backtracking. Output by 1999 had fallen to less than 40% of the 1991 level. Ukrainian Government officials eliminated most tax and customs privileges in a March 2005 budget law, bringing more economic activity out of Ukraine's large shadow economy. From 2000 until mid-2008, Ukraine's economy was buoyant despite political turmoil between the prime minister and president. The economy contracted nearly 15% in 2009, among the worst economic performances in the world. In April 2010, Ukraine negotiated a price discount on Russian gas imports in exchange for extending Russia's lease on its naval base in Crimea.

Ukraine's oligarchs continued to dominate the economy and grew slowly from 2010 to 2013, as Ukraine remained behind peers in the region and among Europe's poorest. After former President Yanukovich fled the country during the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine's economy fell into crisis because of Russia's annexation of Crimea, military conflict in the eastern part of

the country, and a trade war with Russia, resulting in a 17% decline in GDP, inflation at nearly 60%, and dwindling foreign currency reserves.

The international community began efforts to stabilize the Ukrainian economy, including a March 2014 IMF assistance package of \$17.5 billion, of which Ukraine has received four disbursements, most recently in April 2017, bringing the total disbursed as of that date to approximately \$8.4 billion. Ukraine has made significant progress on reforms designed to make the country prosperous, democratic, and transparent, including creation of a national anti-corruption agency, overhaul of the banking sector, establishment of a transparent VAT refund system, and increased transparency in government procurement. But more improvements are needed, including fighting corruption, developing capital markets, improving the business environment to attract foreign investment, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and land reform. The fifth tranche of the IMF program, valued at \$1.9 billion, has been delayed due to lack of progress on outstanding reforms, including adjustment of gas tariffs to import parity levels and adoption of legislation establishing an independent anti-corruption court.

Russia's occupation of Crimea in March 2014 and ongoing aggression in eastern Ukraine have hurt economic growth. With the loss of a major portion of Ukraine's heavy industry in Donbas and ongoing violence, the economy contracted by 6.6% in 2014 and by 9.8% in 2015, but it returned to low growth in 2016 and 2017, reaching 2.3% and 2.0%, respectively, as key reforms took hold. Ukraine also redirected trade activity towards the EU following the implementation of a bilateral Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, displacing Russia as its largest trading partner. A prohibition on commercial trade with separatist-controlled territories in early 2017 has not impacted Ukraine's key industrial sectors as much as expected, largely because of favorable external conditions. Ukraine returned to international debt markets in September 2017, issuing a \$3 billion sovereign bond.

Exports: Ferrous and nonferrous metals, fuel and petroleum products, chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, and foodstuffs.

- \$36.85 billion (2017 est.)
- \$33.56 billion (2016 est.)

Partners: Russia 9.2%, Poland 6.5%, Turkey 5.6%, India 5.5%, Italy 5.2%, China 4.6%, Germany 4.3% (2017)

Imports: Energy, machinery and equipment, chemicals.

- \$44.42 billion (2017 est.)
- \$40.57 billion (2016 est.)

Partners: Russia 14.5%, China 11.3%, Germany 11.2%, Poland 7%, Belarus 6.7%, US 5.1% (2017)

Capital: Kyiv (Kiev) (**Note:** pronounced KEEYV)



Executive Branch:

Chief of state: President Petro Poroshenko (since 7 June 2014)

Head of Government: Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman (since 14 April 2016);
First Deputy Prime Minister Stepan KUBIV (since 14 April 2016)

Cabinet: Nominated by the prime minister, approved by the Verkhovna Rada

Elections/Appointments: President directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 31 March and 21 April 2019 (next to be held in March 2024); prime minister nominated by the president, confirmed by the Verkhovna Rada.

Election Results: First round results: percent of vote - Volodymyr ZELENSKY (Servant of the People) 30.2%, Petro POROSHENKO (BPP) 15.6%, Yuliya TYMOSHENKO (Fatherland) 13.4%, Yuriy BOYKO (independent) 11.7%, 35 other candidates 29.1%. Second round results: percent of vote - Volodymyr ZELENSKY (Servant of the People) 73.2%, Petro POROSHENKO (BPP) 24.5%. Note - ZELENSKY is to assume office by 3 June 2019.

Legislative Branch:

Unicameral Supreme Council or Verkhovna Rada (450 seats; 225 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 225 directly elected in a single nationwide constituency by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms). Next election to be held by 27 October 2019.

Judicial Branch:

Supreme Court of Ukraine or SCU (consists of 113 judges, with the possibility of up to 200, organized into civil, criminal, commercial, and administrative chambers, and a grand chamber); Constitutional Court (consists of 18 justices).

STATE EQUITY

STATE EQUITY

STATE EQUITY

STATE EQUITY



SENATOR RON JOHNSON (R-WI)



Senate: since 2011
Next Election: 2022
Born: April 8, 1955 in
Mankato, Minnesota
Home: Oshkosh
Education: University of
Minnesota, B.S. 1977
(accounting), attended
1977-1979 (business
administration)
Profession: Plastics
manufacturing company
owner; shipping supply
company machine
operator; accountant
Religion: Lutheran
Family: Wife, Jane
Johnson; three children

COMMITTEES: (116th Congress)

- Budget
- Commerce, Science and Transportation
 - Science, Oceans, Fisheries and Weather
 - Security
 - Communications, Technology, Innovation and the Internet
 - Manufacturing, Trade and Consumer Protection
- Foreign Relations
 - Africa and Global Health Policy
 - East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy
 - *Europe and Regional Security Cooperation (Chairman)*
- *Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Chairman)*

BACKGROUND

Johnson used to run an Oshkosh, Wis., plastics manufacturing firm and in interviews, or when he questions witnesses before his committee, he frequently says either, “I come from a business background” or “I come from a manufacturing background.”

Johnson was born in Mankato, Minn., where his father was the treasurer for the Mankato Brewing Company. Before he was a teenager, the family moved to the suburbs of Minneapolis. Johnson lived at home and worked full-time while attending the University of Minnesota. He put his accounting degree to work while crunching numbers for Josten’s, the supplier of class rings and other school paraphernalia.

His career was boosted by the family of his wife, Jane. Johnson’s father-in-law, Howard Curler, co-founded a food-packaging company in Wisconsin in the 1950s. It was acquired by Bemis Co., a Minneapolis packaging business, and Curler became the CEO of Bemis in 1978. Johnson moved to Oshkosh, Wis., in 1979 to help launch a plastics manufacturing firm with his brother-in-law — early on, Bemis was their biggest client. The company, Pacur, now produces plastics used to package medical devices and food, among other things. The company was sold in 1986, with Johnson staying on as a manager; he bought it back in 1997. Johnson used part of his wealth to finance his 2010 campaign against Feingold, spending \$8.9 million of the campaign’s \$15.3 million total. Feingold’s campaign spent \$15.5 million.

Excerpts from CQ—© 2018 · CQ - Roll Call, Inc · All Rights Reserved.

POLITICAL HIGHLIGHTS

No previous office.

Selected Caucus and Special Organization Memberships: None



SENATOR RON JOHNSON (R-WI)

SPONSORED DOE-RELATED LEGISLATIONS (116th Congress)

- S Res 27- A resolution calling for a prompt multinational freedom of navigation operation in the Black Sea and urging the cancellation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline

UKRAINE-RELATED FACTS

- Sen. Johnson is a vice-chair of the Senate Ukraine Caucus
- Sen. Johnson issued a statement in late April 2019 congratulating Volodymyr Zelensky on his victory in the Ukrainian presidential election. ““Congratulations to Volodymyr Zelensky on his victory in Ukraine’s presidential election. I look forward to working with him to continue strengthening the relationship between our two nations.”

DOE FACILITIES/SITES IN WISCONSIN

- None

ISSUES OF INTEREST

- Homeland security
- Public sector unions

WISCONSIN ENERGY INFORMATION

- Wisconsin's industrial sector, including agriculture and the energy-intensive manufacture of food and beverage products, is the state's largest energy-consuming sector. In 2016, industry accounted for 33% of the state's end-use energy consumption.
- Coal is the leading fuel used for electricity generation in Wisconsin. In 2018, coal-fired power plants provided 49% of the state's net generation.
- Natural gas-fired power plants fueled 26% of Wisconsin's electricity generation in 2018, second only to coal, and almost three times more than its share a decade earlier.
- In 2018, 9% of Wisconsin's utility-scale net electricity generation came from renewable energy resources, including hydroelectric power, wind, biomass, and solar.
- In 2018, Wisconsin ranked seventh in the nation in ethanol production capacity, with facilities able to produce more than a half billion gallons annually.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, updated April 18, 2019

Kurt Volker

U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine

Ambassador Kurt Volker is an American diplomat who served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO and presently serves as the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine. Amb. Volker is a leading expert in U.S. foreign and national security policy with some 30 years of experience in a variety of government, academic, and private sector capacities. Ambassador Volker serves as Executive Director of The McCain Institute for International Leadership, a part of Arizona State University based in Washington, DC. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, and a Trustee of IAU College in Aix-en-Provence, France. He is a consultant to international business, a member of the Board of Directors of CG Funds Trust, and had previously served as Managing Director, International, for BGR Group. He has taught Transatlantic Relations at The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs. In July, 2017, Secretary of State Tillerson appointed Ambassador Volker as U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations.



Joseph Pennington

Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Ukraine

Joseph Pennington, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister-Counselor, is the Senior Advisor to the Ambassador on U.S. Assistance to Ukraine. He previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (2015-18), Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs (2015), and Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil, in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (2013-15). For his service in Erbil, Mr. Pennington received the Ryan C. Crocker Award for Outstanding Leadership in Expeditionary Diplomacy.



Mr. Pennington served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Prague, Czech Republic (2010-13) and held the same position in Yerevan, Armenia (2007-10). He worked as the U.S. Embassy Spokesman in Ankara, Turkey (2002-06), political-economic officer in Naples, Italy (2001-02), and headed the U.S. Embassy Branch Office in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina (2000-01). He served as an economic officer at the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo (1999-2000), and as political-economic officer at the U.S. Consulate in Adana, Turkey (1995-98), where his work was recognized with the Assistant Secretary's Award for Exceptional Achievement in the Field of Human Rights and Democracy. Mr. Pennington has also worked in the State Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 2019

(b) (5)





(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
May 2019
(b) (5)



SI BRIEFING



(b) (5)



(b) (5)

SI BRIEFING

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
May 2019

(b) (5)



SI BRIEFING

(b) (5)



S I BRIEFING

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 2019

(b) (5)



SI BRIEFING

(b) (5)



Q1 RRFENNG



(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
May 17, 2019



SI BRIEFING

(b) (5)



(b) (5)



(b) (5)

(b) (5)



SI BRIEFING

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 17, 2019

(b) (5)



SI BRIEFING

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 17, 2019

(b) (5)



SI BRIEFING

(b) (5)



S2 BRIEFING

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 2019

(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
May 2019
(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 2109

(b) (5)



S1 BRIEFING

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 2109

(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 2109

(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
May 2019



SI BRIEFING

(b) (5)



(b) (5)



(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 2019

(b) (5)



S1 BRIEFING

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
May 2019
(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

May 2019

(b) (5)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
May 2019
(b) (5)

(b) (5)



EVENT: **Congressional Brief: Uranium Transfers**

DATE: Sunday, May 19, 2019

PURPOSE: (b) (5)

PARTICIPANTS: Senator Ron Johnson, *Senior U.S. Senator from Wisconsin*

Brian McCormack, *Chief of Staff*

STAFF: None

PREVIOUS

INTERACTION: You have not previously met with Senator Johnson.

KEY ISSUES: (b) (5)

BACKGROUND

(b) (5)



BRIEFING PREPARED BY: Cheryl Moss Herman, NE-42

BRIEFING REVIEWED BY: Ed McGinnis, NE-1

STAFF SEC POC: Hunter Faseler, Special Assistant

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Talking Points

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
March 20, 2019
(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

March 20, 2019

(b) (5)



SECRETARIAL BRIEFING

General Talking Points

European Energy Security

- An energy secure Europe serves as a strong partner for the United States in meeting global challenges.
- Russia's position as a dominant supplier of natural gas to Europe has only deepened since the threat of a gas cut-off in 2014, rising from approximately 30 percent to 43 percent in 2017.
- The United States is not seeking to eliminate Russian gas or nuclear energy from the market. Russian energy can and should remain part of a diversified energy mix for Europe.
- Our priority is helping Europe minimize dependence upon a single supplier. The United States supports a pro-Europe energy security policy based on diversification of fuel types, supply sources (countries of origin), and delivery routes.
- The same extends to the nuclear power sector, where too many countries continue to rely on nuclear fuel from a single-supplier.
- The strength of Europe's Energy Union will depend on the right projects being built.
- Transatlantic energy security depends on policy choices that create incentives for real improvement of infrastructure, real increases in diversification, and the production and efficient utilization of domestic energy resources and raw materials.
- We are working with countries in Central and Southeastern Europe on a very different vision for the region, one in which people are free to chart their own energy futures.

European Energy Security and Nord Stream 2

- European energy security over the longer term will depend on policy choices that create incentives for real improvement of infrastructure, real increases in diversification, and the production and efficient utilization of domestic energy resources and raw materials.
- The United States remains opposed to proposals for Nord Stream 2 and a multi-line Turk Stream to Europe as a continuation of a long-term strategy by Russia to cement and grow its dominance in European energy markets for both geopolitical reasons and State-owned commercial interests.
- The same extends to the nuclear power sector, where too many countries continue to rely on nuclear fuel from a single-supplier.
- European dependence on Russian energy supplies has only increased since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, and the threat of another natural gas cut-off looms large.
- I understand that the EU has significant interest in increasing the presence of U.S. industry in European energy markets to help drive diversification efforts.
- The Commission has established a fund for Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) that is aimed at promoting private sector interest. Could you confirm that such funds are open to the inclusion of non-European industry, such as the U.S.
- As we discuss opportunities to increase transatlantic cooperation I believe this is a significant potential.
- U.S. industry would see progress on this front as an important counter force to the assessed risk levels associated with business engagement, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.
- U.S. industry is unparalleled in many sectors, and energy and construction is among them, and creating an atmosphere in which risk taking is mitigated by the Commission's support would only help achieve the EU's energy goals.

TurkStream and Nord Stream 2

- The United States remains opposed to proposals for Nord Stream 2 and a multi-line Turk Stream to Europe as a continuation of a long-term strategy by Russia to cement and grow its dominance in European energy markets for both geopolitical reasons and State-owned commercial interests.
- TurkStream does not represent source diversification. The intent of the project is to end gas transit through Ukraine, which would ultimately lead to the degradation of the Ukrainian gas transit system. That system is the largest, cheapest, and most effective route for Hungary's gas imports. We should work to preserve it.

Transatlantic Energy Cooperation

- We are working with countries in Central and Southeastern Europe on a very different vision for the region, one in which people are free to chart their own energy futures.
- We value the European Commission's support for the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC) as a new forum for cooperation that aligns well with your Energy Union Framework Strategy.
- I believe the Three Seas Initiative can serve as a transformative platform for engagement on transatlantic energy security. It can be a framework to "complete Europe" with a north-south corridor in energy, telecommunications and infrastructure.

Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC)

- As you know, I hosted the first P-TEC Ministerial and Investment Forum in Houston on March 14.
- I was very glad that Ukraine could participate.
- Participants in the Ministerial were unified on:
 - the necessity to reduce dependence on Russian energy;
 - the need for greater diversification of energy supplies, suppliers, and

- supply routes; and
- their willingness to cooperate on achieving greater energy security.
- Cybersecurity was identified as an especially high priority for cooperation.
- Interconnection of energy networks was viewed as both a success thus far and an area for continued work.
- More infrastructure is needed to further distribute energy across countries and regions from the point of import.
- We also heard from private financiers that aggregation of infrastructure projects is necessary for reducing risk and attracting financing from the capital markets.
- Following on the success of this first P-TEC Ministerial, my Department is planning for P-TEC working group meetings later in 2019 to execute on substantive work streams.

Ukraine (From Zelensky memo)

- I am here as the Head of the U.S. delegation to affirm that Ukraine remains a close partner of the United States and we are committed to working with you to ensure the long-term energy security of your country.
- The United States strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and continued reform efforts.

Energy Sector Reforms

- Ukraine has taken notable steps on reform, particularly in the energy sector. We know how difficult these measure are in terms of political costs, but it is critical to ensure Ukraine's prosperity and energy security. It is crucial that you work with the IMF and World Bank on these issues.
- It is clear that your message of change and reform resonated with the people of Ukraine- (73% of the popular vote). I would encourage you and your team to capitalize on this enthusiasm and strong desire for change. The United States and the European Union stands ready to work with you to

ensure that change and reform can be implemented. But you must be committed to make the hard choices on corruption and good governance reforms.

- The Department of Energy stands ready to work with you and your team to help implement these changes. A more transparent, rules-based, and competitive energy market is essential to Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security.

U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue

- In November 2018, I launched the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Energy Dialogue you're your predecessor, President Poroshenko to cooperate on many of the energy issues facing Ukraine.
- We believe that the Dialogue would be a useful format for the Department of Energy to engage with your government at the highest level, to develop an engagement plan to move ahead with reforms, and to encourage more foreign direct investment into Ukraine.
- We hope that we can continue to this Dialogue under your leadership. The Deputy Secretary will lead this Dialogue from the U.S. side.
- I would ask you to nominate a co-chair from your side to begin this critical work.

DOE Engagement (Critical Energy Issues)

- There are several critical issues which I believe your administration should address in the next coming weeks.
- It is essential that Ukraine demonstrate commitment to the norms of the Third Energy Package in order to demonstrate to the EU that Ukraine is a reliable energy partner.
- I encourage Ukraine to proceed with the unbundling of Naftogaz's gas transmission system. This is necessary for Ukraine's commitment to European energy norms.

- The dispute over unbundling is wasting critical time and weakening Ukraine's position in gas transit negotiations with Gazprom. We urge you to ensure Ukraine unbundles on time, and creates a new TSO that will be certifiable by the EU. It is equally crucial that the unbundling plan does not increase avenues for corruption and undue influence from any group
- Ukraine has been tremendously blessed with reserves of natural gas. I know that U.S. oil and gas companies are very interested in bringing expertise and know-how, but they remain wary of the investment climate. But they are looking for signals that your government is committed to continuing critical reforms.
- We welcome Ukraine's efforts to increase gas production, including through oil and gas exploration production sharing agreement and license auctions. We urge Ukraine to ensure the tendering process is transparent and competitive, and in line with the recommendations of the business community.
- Diversifying your nuclear fuel supply away from Russia is extremely important for Ukraine's energy security. Westinghouse fuel supplies reduce Russian leverage over Ukraine.

Preparations for Winter Heating Season

- The European Commission has expressed concerns about preparations that are currently underway to prepare for the winter heating season.
- Without a contract in place between Gazprom and Naftogaz, there is a potential for a winter gas shortage for Ukraine, unless the country begins to purchase and store gas now for the coming winter. We urge that the government facilitate Naftogaz's access to funding for these purchases.
- It is critical that the government of Ukraine takes immediate actions to prepare for the upcoming winter season, .
- The Department of Energy has been engaged with senior management of Naftogaz on this issue and is prepared to provide critical support to assist Ukraine on this issue, as we did in the 2014-2015 winter season.

U.S. LNG Exports

- The U.S. Government has authorized 23 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) (235 bcm/a) of natural gas for export. U.S. liquefaction capacity continues to expand, with three facilities already operational and three more new U.S. projects coming online by the end of 2019 increasing total U.S. liquefaction capacity to approximately 11 bcf/d (112 bcm/a).
- One additional project, Golden Pass LNG in Texas, recently announced its final investment decision (FID) and has begun construction.
- Four additional projects have been approved by both the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that represent a combined additional LNG export capacity of 7.6 Bcf/d (80 bcm/a).
- Finally, there are ten additional projects (and several terminal expansions) awaiting final action by FERC and DOE. Clearly, as new U.S. LNG export terminals come on line, U.S. exports will become even more attractive and cost competitive in the European gas market.
- Europe will benefit from these supplies. The EU emerged as the number one import destination for U.S. LNG exports in the fourth quarter of 2018 amid weakened prices in Asia markets. We are seeing the continuation of that into this year.
- This disproves the myth that LNG cannot compete with cheap pipeline gas. The fact is that prices will only come down as more companies enter and compete in the marketplace.
- We are also seeing countries like Poland reject Russian supplies altogether because they rightly see that dependence as a real threat to their national security and freedom.
- I look forward to joining you for the 1st U.S.-EU Energy Council High Level Business to Business Event.
- This represents a key deliverable in follow-up to President Juncker's commitment to President Trump in July 2018.

- The goal is to facilitate the expansion of large-scale U.S. LNG export supplies to Europe.
- I look forward to working together to achieve this goal, for our mutual benefit.

From: [Nersessian, Raffi K.](#)
To: [Tumminia, Paul](#); [Buchan, Samuel](#); [Lockwood, Andrea](#); [Sandoli, Robert](#)
Subject: Ukraine Upstream Auction Update
Date: Wednesday, May 22, 2019 4:18:27 PM

Greetings,

Some information for you on the upstream auction and gas storage.

Auctions: In early 2019, the Ukrainian government outlined plans to offer the rights to 42 blocks for oil and gas E&P blocks via public auctions and production-sharing agreement (PSA) tenders. In an effort to energize the upstream sector and boost domestic production, the government announced in December 2018 that it would hold public auctions on 6 March for the license rights to 10 prospective onshore blocks of varying size and resource potential.

The agency set minimum starting bids for each of the 10 licenses, with most blocks requiring bid winners to reprocess existing or acquire new seismic data for the block, as well as to drill one well. Results of the March auction only confirmed that the heightened political risk contributed to anemic interest from foreign players, with Majors that had entered Ukraine in 2010 conspicuously absent. Of the ten onshore blocks that were on offer, just three were awarded, all rights won by domestic operators. State-run UGV winning exploration acreage, as well as Ukrainian players Burisma and DTEK, all of which are in the Kharkiv and Poltava regions in the east.

Before the first round of public auctions – the first open competition for E&P license rights in Ukraine’s history – even took place, the government revealed plans to auction off a second set of licenses. Earlier in February, the State Agency for Geology and Subsoil Use published its list of blocks for the second auction, comprising seven licenses geographically dispersed around Ukraine. The auction is scheduled for 2 May, with bid submissions due the day beforehand. Shortly following the conclusion of the first round, on 14 March the government added a third auction planned for 18 June that will encompass nine exploration blocks. Unlike previous rounds, however, these blocks have not seen any exploration activity and therefore there are no resource estimates related to the prospective areas. An announcement of winners for another nine blocks that would operate under a PSA framework is expected in June; this is separate than the license rounds.

Gas Storage: As of May 19, the country had 10.56 Bcm in storage, a 20% gain from the start of the injection season in April and 17% more than the same day a year ago. Ukraine injected 142.5 MMcm into storage during May 18-19, the highest two-day injection volume since October 2015, just before the country ceased buying gas directly in Gazprom.

Let me know if you have any questions.

Thank You,
Raffi Nersessian
Europe & Eurasia Energy Security Analyst
Department of Energy
Phone: 202-586-5803



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

December 1, 2020

Austin Evers
American Oversight
1030 15th Street, NW
Suite B255
Washington, DC 20005

Via email: hart.wood@americanoversight.org

Re: HQ-2019-01418-F

Dear Mr. Evers:

This is a partial response to request HQ-2019-01418-F that you sent to the Department of Energy (DOE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. In FOIA request HQ-2019-01418-F, you requested the following:

- 1) All email communications (including email messages, calendar invitations, and attachments thereto), text messages, and WhatsApp messages sent or received by Secretary Perry, as well as by any aide or other assistant who accompanied Secretary Perry to Ukraine on or about May 19-21, 2019, containing any of the following key terms:
 - a. Rudy
 - b. Giuliani
 - c. Giuiliani
 - d. Guliani
 - e. Hunter
 - f. Biden
 - g. Bidens
 - h. Burisma
 - i. Lutsenko
 - j. Syntyk
 - k. Crowdstrike
 - l. Toensing
 - m. diGenova
 - n. Fruman
 - o. Parnas
 - p. Kolomoisky
 - q. Kolomoysky
 - r. Shokin
 - s. Klitschko



t. DNC

Please produce all responsive records from May 10, 2019, through May 24, 2019.

- 2) Any guidance, directives, or memoranda issued to or by Secretary Perry with relation to former Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, and/or Burisma Holdings (also known as Burisma Group).

Please produce all responsive records from May 10, 2019, through May 24, 2019.

Your request was assigned to DOE's Office of the Executive Secretariat (ES) to conduct a search of its files for responsive documents.

The search started on October 18, 2019, which is the cutoff date for responsive documents. You received a second partial response to this request on April 1, 2020, consisting of five (5) documents. DOE determined that four (4) of the documents contained equities of the Department of State (DOS). For this reason, four (4) documents were transferred in part to DOS for review.

These documents have now been reviewed by DOS, and DOS has provided DOE with its release determinations on its equities. The relevant pages of these documents are now being released to you with certain information withheld pursuant to Exemptions 5 and 6 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §552 (b)(5) and (b)(6).

This satisfies the standard set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A) that agencies shall withhold information under FOIA "only if (I) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption . . . ; or (II) disclosure is prohibited by law" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A) also provides that whenever full disclosure of a record is not possible, agencies shall "consider whether partial disclosure of information is possible" Thus, we have determined that, in certain instances, a partial disclosure is proper.

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 1004.7(b)(2), I am the individual responsible for the determination to withhold the information described above. The FOIA requires that "any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). As a result, a redacted version of the documents are being released to you in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 1004.7(b)(3).

If you have any questions about the processing of the request or this letter, your attorney may contact Hilarie Snyder, Trial Attorney, at Hilarie.E.Snyder@usdoj.gov or 202-305-0747.

I appreciate the opportunity to assist you with this matter.

Sincerely,
Alexander C. Morris
Alexander C. Morris
FOIA Officer
Office of Public Information

Digitally signed by
Alexander C. Morris
Date: 2020.12.01
12:21:29 -05'00'

Enclosures

INDEX

Request #: HQ-2019-01418-F

Partial response for Mr. Austin R. Evers for:

- 1) **All email communications (including email messages, calendar invitations, and attachments thereto), text messages, and WhatsApp messages sent or received by Secretary Perry, as well as by any aide or other assistant who accompanied Secretary Perry to Ukraine on or about May 19-21, 2019, containing any of the following key terms:**
 - a. Rudy
 - b. Giuliani
 - c. Giuiliani
 - d. Guliani
 - e. Hunter
 - f. Biden
 - g. Bidens
 - h. Burisma
 - i. Lutsenko
 - j. Syntyk
 - k. Crowdstrike
 - l. Toensing
 - m. diGenova
 - n. Fruman
 - o. Parnas
 - p. Kolomoisky
 - q. Kolomoysky
 - r. Shokin
 - s. Klitschko
 - t. DNC

Please produce all responsive records from May 10, 2019, through May 24, 2019.

- 2) **Any guidance, directives, or memoranda issued to or by Secretary Perry with relation to former Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, and/or Burisma Holdings (also known as Burisma Group).**

Please produce all responsive records from May 10, 2019, through May 24, 2019.

DOE is producing four (4) documents that have undergone consultation.

- Four (4) documents *from consult with DOS* are being released in part pursuant to Exemptions 5 and 6.

From: [Tumminia, Paul](#)
To: [Lockwood, Andrea](#); [Mapes, Thomas E.](#); [Buchan, Samuel](#); [Bell, Heather \(Embassy KYIV\)](#)
Cc: [Sandoli, Robert](#); [Lyon, Jennifer](#); [McKearin, Josh](#); [Noel, Emily E](#); [Paul Tumminia](#)
Subject: Ukraine S1 Papers
Date: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:34:23 PM
Attachments: [S1 Bilateral Meeting with Foreign Minister Klimkin.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Petro Poroshenko.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenksyy with US delegation.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenksyyaw1.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Groysman.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Speaker Parubiy.docx](#)
[S1 Briefing memo on Baltics 3+1.docm](#)
[S1 Country Team Memo, Ukraine May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Dinner Meeting Memo Sondland and Sevcovic May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Meeting Memo DM Zerkal and DM Boyko.docx](#)
[Embassy Scen setter.docx](#)
[UKR Ukraine Country Profile \(UPDATED\).docx](#)

All:

Here are the main papers for S1's trip to Ukraine beginning tomorrow. I followed the May 18 schedule and have a paper for each meeting. I have also included issue papers (for what its worth) in the folder. I think Sam can access remotely. I am adding two issue papers: the scenesetter and the country profile (which I think S1 likes)

I have sent the others to my gmail in case I cannot access remotely tomorrow.

Here is the Link (b) (5)

Paul Tumminia
Senior Advisor
Office of Europe and Eurasian Affairs
U.S. Department of Energy
Direct Dial: (202) 586-8036

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU

DeControlled

Action Office: POL, EXBS
Info Office: DAO_INFO, POL_INFO

MRN: [19 KYIV 806](#)
Date/DTG: May 17, 2019 / 171515Z MAY 19
From: AMEMBASSY KYIV
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UA
Captions: SENSITIVE
Subject: UKRAINE: Presidential Inauguration Scene Setter and Look Ahead

1. (SBU) Secretary Perry and members of the U.S. Presidential Delegation, Embassy Kyiv warmly welcomes you to Ukraine for President-elect Volodymyr Zelenskyy's inauguration. The May 20 ceremony will close the first of several consequential chapters following Zelenskyy's historic 48-point landslide victory April 21 in unprecedented free and fair elections, and will open the next chapter in which Zelenskyy will build his team and attempt to advance an ambitious agenda in a system in which more formal power resides with the Rada (parliament) and Cabinet than with the President. Jockeying for advantage in this year's parliamentary elections was the backdrop of the negotiations that resulted in the snap May 20 inauguration, which likely preserved for Zelenskyy the option of triggering early elections in late July rather than late October should he so choose. Zelenskyy is expected to announce his appointments for key security, foreign affairs, and justice posts soon after inauguration, the first public confirmation of his policy direction on key U.S. priorities. Initial indications of Zelenskyy's policies appear broadly favorable to U.S. interests, particularly on anti-corruption and justice reforms, and recent polls show Ukrainians are following Zelenskyy's lead. With Ukraine facing another historic opportunity to take major steps forward and in the process validate Zelenskyy's election night assertion that Ukraine's democracy can be a model for other post-Soviet countries in which "everything is possible" U.S. engagement and support remains critical.

Snap Inauguration Opens a New Chapter: Zelenskyy Versus the Old Rada

2. (SBU) The Rada voted May 16 to hold president-elect Volodymyr Zelenskyy's inauguration Monday, May 20 at 10:00 am. As required by the Constitution and past precedent, the president elect will be sworn in officially by the Chair of the Constitutional Court in the Rada chamber before the full parliament, with a small number of key international dignitaries observing from

the visitors' gallery. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Protocol, Rada leadership, and Zelenskyy team contacts all confirmed the May 16 official swearing-in would be the only inaugural event, laying to rest rumors of plans for a separate ceremonial inauguration to be scheduled at a later date to maximize international attendance. Immediately after the vote, Zelenskyy's communications director Dmytro Razumkov ridiculed the Rada for not selecting Zelenskyy's preferred date of Sunday, May 19. He criticized MPs for "annoying the Ukrainian people" by setting the date on a weekday, which could limit attendance by foreign VIPs and contribute to road traffic in Kyiv. While the date was only one day off Zelenskyy's preference of May 19, the message was clear: the old Rada was out of step and should heed Zelenskyy's overwhelming electoral mandate. It also created a pretext in the likely event the snap inauguration failed to meet expectations and the precedent of high-level international representation.

The Real Competition for Power Begins

3. (SBU) Posturing aside, Zelenskyy largely prevailed in the debate over the inauguration date, which itself was the first round in a high-stakes competition now underway with the legacy Rada over early elections, electoral reform, and the composition of a new government that will collectively determine whether Zelenskyy can translate his overwhelming electoral mandate into the consolidated institutional power necessary to implement his agenda. Ukraine's constitution places most power in the hands of the parliament, and its dual-executive system (President and Prime Minister) imposes significant checks on presidential power, requiring any president to command a parliamentary majority to advance a legislative agenda and appoint senior officials. The broad scope of President Poroshenko's powers was largely due to his ability to form and preserve a functional minority coalition government, which remarkably remained intact (with only one replacement of a prime minister) for the duration of his five-year term. In contrast, President Yushchenko was beholden to a fractious Rada and ultimately succumbed to competition with a strong Prime Minister Tymoshenko. Zelenskyy's ability to implement his ambitious agenda will depend largely on whether he can preserve a comparable level of presidential power that we have become accustomed to under Poroshenko, which in turn depends on commanding a Rada coalition of at least the scale and durability of Poroshenko's.

4. (SBU) Recent polls suggest a commanding Rada coalition is within Zelenskyy's grasp. A joint poll by the Rating Group, Center for Social Monitoring, and the Ukrainian Institute of Social Studies released May 16 shows Zelenskyy's Servant of the People party could receive up to 40 percent of the vote in the Rada elections, compared to about ten percent each for a rebooted Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP), Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna, consolidated pro-Russian parties, and other combined pro-reform parties (including Hrytsenko, Smeshko, Groyzman, and Vakarchuk), with ten percent distributed among small factions unlikely to surmount the five percent threshold required under current law to enter the Rada, and another 10 percent undetermined. If these proportions translated directly into Rada seats, Zelenskyy would lack an outright majority, but would have no shortage of options with which to form a majority coalition or collaborate in coalitions of convenience, and he would be unlikely to face any constellation of comparable opposing forces.

Snap Elections More Likely Despite Coalition Machinations, But Not Guaranteed

5. (SBU) The snap inauguration appeared to preserve the potential for Zelenskyy to call early Rada elections, maximizing his coattails and avoiding the dissipation of his political momentum in the months ahead of parliamentary elections currently scheduled for October 27. Contacts generally concurred that Zelenskyy had adequate legal authority should he so choose, albeit by means of a flimsy legal mechanism. A previous court case determined the current ruling Rada coalition had been non-existent since February 28 because it had since failed to prove it maintained the requisite 226 seats to constitute a majority. Zelenskyy and faction heads could cite this case as a legal basis to dismiss the Rada and call early elections 60 days hence, by late July. Such a decree would have to be issued in a narrow window after Zelenskyy's inauguration May 20 and prior to May 27, since the constitution forbids early elections within six months of the end of the Rada session November 27. Zelenskyy faces a difficult political decision: early elections enable his nascent Servant of the People party to ride a wave of unprecedented popular support, but deprive it of the time needed to build the kind of local campaign infrastructure necessary to perform in 226 single-member district elections in addition to the national party list contest.

6. (SBU) Established political parties – including BPP, Batkivshchyna, and Opposition Bloc – likely desire early elections to piggyback on the campaign infrastructure they already deployed for the presidential elections, but fading junior coalition partner People's Front is making a last stand. Poroshenko and aligned former officials will lack immunity from Zelenskyy's inauguration until they win Rada seats, an uncomfortable interval they likely wish to minimize. The 50 percent of the Rada comprised of single-member district MPs (elected in specific constituencies rather than on a national party list) were also rumored to desire early elections to minimize the opportunity to pass electoral reform that could eliminate their seats. A complication arose May 17, the morning after the inauguration date announcement, when junior coalition partner Peoples Front, in a ploy to weaken the legal case for early elections, announced it was leaving the coalition, triggering a constitutionally mandated 30-day consultation period to form a new coalition before early elections could be called, running out the clock on the narrow May 20-27 window. This move by the leadership of Peoples Front, a constellation of deeply unpopular officials with only 0.5 percent support and dim Rada prospects, is unlikely to undermine the legal basis of the popular president-elect's claim that a coalition did not exist anyway, but it may create legal complications.

Electoral Reform Appealing and In Play, But Unlikely

7. (SBU) In parallel with the question of early elections, Zelenskyy's team and other factions have been exploring the potential for electoral reform prior to Rada elections, with a move towards a closed-list full party system gaining steam. This system would rid Ukraine of the notoriously corrupt single member district MPs who often leverage local influence to buy their seats for the criminal immunity they confer, which in turn facilitates their corrupt practices. Leading international and civil society organizations, including the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), believed a closed-list party system could be implemented before October elections notwithstanding the European best practice of avoiding electoral reform within a year of an election. Zelenskyy senior advisor Ihor Bohdan recently told IFES that while an open-list party system was the best option in the long-run, it would be

too late to implement before October. He also speculated that a change to purely party list system that removes the single-member districts would not find sufficient support in the current Rada. The poor prospect of achieving such reforms ahead of the next Rada elections removed an incentive to forego early elections, but could be back in play if early elections are not called.

Composition of the Next Government And Zelenskyy's Agenda Hangs in the Balance

8. (SBU) The contest between Zelenskyy and the legacy Rada led by establishment politicians he defeated will dominate the political landscape for the next several months, and will not be resolved until a new Rada is elected, a coalition formed, and a prime minister and cabinet seated, which will determine Zelenskyy's ability to advance a coherent agenda. Zelenskyy's appointments will be a litmus test of his true intentions. Rumors about his potential choices appear favorable to a strong reform agenda, and his explanation for keeping his cards close to his chest to prevent regressive forces from undermining his candidates rings true. While the details of his policies remain sketchy, their broad outlines are generally favorable to U S interests. (b) (5)
(b) (5)

9. (SBU) Recent polls show Ukrainians are following Zelenskyy's lead. Asked to name the top five priorities for the new President, the top response was that he should submit to the Rada bills on lifting immunity from MPs, judges, and the President (53.7 percent). Substantial pluralities also favored ensuring stability of the national currency and banking system (33.7 percent) and an acceleration of investigations of high-profile corruption crimes (25.8 percent). At the same time, Zelenskyy's lack of specifics on the Minsk process and negotiations with Russia will be a challenge. The second most popular priority cited by Ukrainians was to start direct negotiations among Ukraine, Russia, and the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples' Republics (DPR and LPR) to achieve a ceasefire and return Donbas (40.9 percent). Only 13.1 percent favored increasing economic sanctions against Russia, and 9.9 percent favored intensifying talks on NATO membership, underscoring the desire to try something different from the Poroshenko years and the importance of continued U.S. engagement.

Signature:	YOVANOVITCH
<hr/>	
Drafted By:	KYIV (b) (6)
Cleared By:	POL: (b) (6)
Approved By:	EXEC: Pennington, Joseph S (Kyiv)
Released By:	KYIV (b) (6)
Info:	EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE ROUTINE
XMT:	ST PETERSBURG, AMCONSUL

Action Post: NONE
Dissemination Rule: POL, DAO_INFO, POL_INFO, EXBS

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU

From: [Buchan, Samuel](#)
To: [Faseler, Hunter](#)
Cc: [Habansky, Sarah; Staff Secretary](#)
Subject: Ukraine S1 Papers
Date: Sunday, May 19, 2019 12:31:12 AM
Attachments: [S1 Bilateral Meeting with Foreign Minister Klimkin.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Petro Poroshenko.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenskyy with US delegation.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenskyy.wml.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Speaker Parubiy.docx](#)
[S1 Briefing memo on Baltics 3+1.docm](#)
[S1 Country Team Memo, Ukraine May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Dinner Meeting Memo Sondland and Sefcovic May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Meeting Memo DM Zerkal and DM Boyko.docx](#)
[Embassy Scen setter.docx](#)
[UKR Ukraine Country Profile \(UPDATED\).docx](#)

Hunter - As requested, attached are the outstanding papers for tomorrow, Monday, and Tuesday.

Let me know if you have any questions.

Best,
Sam

From: [Mapes, Thomas E.](#)
To: [Buchan, Samuel](#); [Faseler, Hunter](#); [Johnson, Matthew J.](#)
Subject: FW: Ukraine S1 Papers
Date: Sunday, May 19, 2019 11:47:57 AM
Attachments: [S1 Bilateral Meeting with Foreign Minister Klimkin.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Petro Poroshenko.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenskyy with US delegation.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with President Zelenskyyawl.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Groysman.docx](#)
[S1 Bilateral Meeting with Speaker Parubiy.docx](#)
[S1 Briefing memo on Baltics 3+1.docm](#)
[S1 Country Team Memo. Ukraine May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Dinner Meeting Memo Sondland and Sefcovic May 2019.docm](#)
[S1 Meeting Memo DM Zerkal and DM Boyko.docx](#)
[Embassy Scen setter.docx](#)
[UKR Ukraine Country Profile \(UPDATED\).docx](#)

these should all be good to go- unless sam has any issues

From: Tumminia, Paul <paul.tumminia@hq.doe.gov>
Date: Saturday, May 18, 2019, 5:34 PM
To: Lockwood, Andrea <andrea.lockwood@hq.doe.gov>, Mapes, Thomas E. <thomas.mapes@hq.doe.gov>, Buchan, Samuel <samuel.buchan@hq.doe.gov>, Bell, Heather (Embassy KYIV) <(b) (6)>
Cc: Sandoli, Robert <robert.sandoli@hq.doe.gov>, Lyon, Jennifer <jennifer.lyon@hq.doe.gov>, McKearin, Josh <josh.mckearin@hq.doe.gov>, Noel, Emily E <emily.noel@hq.doe.gov>, Paul Tumminia <(b) (6)>
Subject: Ukraine S1 Papers

All:

Here are the main papers for S1's trip to Ukraine beginning tomorrow. I followed the May 18 schedule and have a paper for each meeting. I have also included issue papers (for what its worth) in the folder. I think Sam can access remotely. I am adding two issue papers: the scenesetter and the country profile (which I think S1 likes)

I have sent the others to my gmail in case I cannot access remotely tomorrow.

Here is the Link: (b) (5)

Paul Tumminia
Senior Advisor
Office of Europe and Eurasian Affairs
U.S. Department of Energy
Direct Dial: (202) 586-8036

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU

DeControlled

Action Office: POL, EXBS
Info Office: DAO_INFO, POL_INFO

MRN: [19 KYIV 806](#)
Date/DTG: May 17, 2019 / 171515Z MAY 19
From: AMEMBASSY KYIV
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UA
Captions: SENSITIVE
Subject: UKRAINE: Presidential Inauguration Scene Setter and Look Ahead

1. (SBU) Secretary Perry and members of the U.S. Presidential Delegation, Embassy Kyiv warmly welcomes you to Ukraine for President-elect Volodymyr Zelenskyy's inauguration. The May 20 ceremony will close the first of several consequential chapters following Zelenskyy's historic 48-point landslide victory April 21 in unprecedented free and fair elections, and will open the next chapter in which Zelenskyy will build his team and attempt to advance an ambitious agenda in a system in which more formal power resides with the Rada (parliament) and Cabinet than with the President. Jockeying for advantage in this year's parliamentary elections was the backdrop of the negotiations that resulted in the snap May 20 inauguration, which likely preserved for Zelenskyy the option of triggering early elections in late July rather than late October should he so choose. Zelenskyy is expected to announce his appointments for key security, foreign affairs, and justice posts soon after inauguration, the first public confirmation of his policy direction on key U.S. priorities. Initial indications of Zelenskyy's policies appear broadly favorable to U.S. interests, particularly on anti-corruption and justice reforms, and recent polls show Ukrainians are following Zelenskyy's lead. With Ukraine facing another historic opportunity to take major steps forward and in the process validate Zelenskyy's election night assertion that Ukraine's democracy can be a model for other post-Soviet countries in which "everything is possible" U.S. engagement and support remains critical.

Snap Inauguration Opens a New Chapter: Zelenskyy Versus the Old Rada

2. (SBU) The Rada voted May 16 to hold president-elect Volodymyr Zelenskyy's inauguration Monday, May 20 at 10:00 am. As required by the Constitution and past precedent, the president elect will be sworn in officially by the Chair of the Constitutional Court in the Rada chamber before the full parliament, with a small number of key international dignitaries observing from

the visitors' gallery. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Protocol, Rada leadership, and Zelenskyy team contacts all confirmed the May 16 official swearing-in would be the only inaugural event, laying to rest rumors of plans for a separate ceremonial inauguration to be scheduled at a later date to maximize international attendance. Immediately after the vote, Zelenskyy's communications director Dmytro Razumkov ridiculed the Rada for not selecting Zelenskyy's preferred date of Sunday, May 19. He criticized MPs for "annoying the Ukrainian people" by setting the date on a weekday, which could limit attendance by foreign VIPs and contribute to road traffic in Kyiv. While the date was only one day off Zelenskyy's preference of May 19, the message was clear: the old Rada was out of step and should heed Zelenskyy's overwhelming electoral mandate. It also created a pretext in the likely event the snap inauguration failed to meet expectations and the precedent of high-level international representation.

The Real Competition for Power Begins

3. (SBU) Posturing aside, Zelenskyy largely prevailed in the debate over the inauguration date, which itself was the first round in a high-stakes competition now underway with the legacy Rada over early elections, electoral reform, and the composition of a new government that will collectively determine whether Zelenskyy can translate his overwhelming electoral mandate into the consolidated institutional power necessary to implement his agenda. Ukraine's constitution places most power in the hands of the parliament, and its dual-executive system (President and Prime Minister) imposes significant checks on presidential power, requiring any president to command a parliamentary majority to advance a legislative agenda and appoint senior officials. The broad scope of President Poroshenko's powers was largely due to his ability to form and preserve a functional minority coalition government, which remarkably remained intact (with only one replacement of a prime minister) for the duration of his five-year term. In contrast, President Yushchenko was beholden to a fractious Rada and ultimately succumbed to competition with a strong Prime Minister Tymoshenko. Zelenskyy's ability to implement his ambitious agenda will depend largely on whether he can preserve a comparable level of presidential power that we have become accustomed to under Poroshenko, which in turn depends on commanding a Rada coalition of at least the scale and durability of Poroshenko's.

4. (SBU) Recent polls suggest a commanding Rada coalition is within Zelenskyy's grasp. A joint poll by the Rating Group, Center for Social Monitoring, and the Ukrainian Institute of Social Studies released May 16 shows Zelenskyy's Servant of the People party could receive up to 40 percent of the vote in the Rada elections, compared to about ten percent each for a rebooted Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP), Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna, consolidated pro-Russian parties, and other combined pro-reform parties (including Hrytsenko, Smeshko, Groyzman, and Vakarchuk), with ten percent distributed among small factions unlikely to surmount the five percent threshold required under current law to enter the Rada, and another 10 percent undetermined. If these proportions translated directly into Rada seats, Zelenskyy would lack an outright majority, but would have no shortage of options with which to form a majority coalition or collaborate in coalitions of convenience, and he would be unlikely to face any constellation of comparable opposing forces.

Snap Elections More Likely Despite Coalition Machinations, But Not Guaranteed

5. (SBU) The snap inauguration appeared to preserve the potential for Zelenskyy to call early Rada elections, maximizing his coattails and avoiding the dissipation of his political momentum in the months ahead of parliamentary elections currently scheduled for October 27. Contacts generally concurred that Zelenskyy had adequate legal authority should he so choose, albeit by means of a flimsy legal mechanism. A previous court case determined the current ruling Rada coalition had been non-existent since February 28 because it had since failed to prove it maintained the requisite 226 seats to constitute a majority. Zelenskyy and faction heads could cite this case as a legal basis to dismiss the Rada and call early elections 60 days hence, by late July. Such a decree would have to be issued in a narrow window after Zelenskyy's inauguration May 20 and prior to May 27, since the constitution forbids early elections within six months of the end of the Rada session November 27. Zelenskyy faces a difficult political decision: early elections enable his nascent Servant of the People party to ride a wave of unprecedented popular support, but deprive it of the time needed to build the kind of local campaign infrastructure necessary to perform in 226 single-member district elections in addition to the national party list contest.

6. (SBU) Established political parties – including BPP, Batkivshchyna, and Opposition Bloc – likely desire early elections to piggyback on the campaign infrastructure they already deployed for the presidential elections, but fading junior coalition partner People's Front is making a last stand. Poroshenko and aligned former officials will lack immunity from Zelenskyy's inauguration until they win Rada seats, an uncomfortable interval they likely wish to minimize. The 50 percent of the Rada comprised of single-member district MPs (elected in specific constituencies rather than on a national party list) were also rumored to desire early elections to minimize the opportunity to pass electoral reform that could eliminate their seats. A complication arose May 17, the morning after the inauguration date announcement, when junior coalition partner Peoples Front, in a ploy to weaken the legal case for early elections, announced it was leaving the coalition, triggering a constitutionally mandated 30-day consultation period to form a new coalition before early elections could be called, running out the clock on the narrow May 20-27 window. This move by the leadership of Peoples Front, a constellation of deeply unpopular officials with only 0.5 percent support and dim Rada prospects, is unlikely to undermine the legal basis of the popular president-elect's claim that a coalition did not exist anyway, but it may create legal complications.

Electoral Reform Appealing and In Play, But Unlikely

7. (SBU) In parallel with the question of early elections, Zelenskyy's team and other factions have been exploring the potential for electoral reform prior to Rada elections, with a move towards a closed-list full party system gaining steam. This system would rid Ukraine of the notoriously corrupt single member district MPs who often leverage local influence to buy their seats for the criminal immunity they confer, which in turn facilitates their corrupt practices. Leading international and civil society organizations, including the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), believed a closed-list party system could be implemented before October elections notwithstanding the European best practice of avoiding electoral reform within a year of an election. Zelenskyy senior advisor Ihor Bohdan recently told IFES that while an open-list party system was the best option in the long-run, it would be

too late to implement before October. He also speculated that a change to purely party list system that removes the single-member districts would not find sufficient support in the current Rada. The poor prospect of achieving such reforms ahead of the next Rada elections removed an incentive to forego early elections, but could be back in play if early elections are not called.

Composition of the Next Government And Zelenskyy's Agenda Hangs in the Balance

8. (SBU) The contest between Zelenskyy and the legacy Rada led by establishment politicians he defeated will dominate the political landscape for the next several months, and will not be resolved until a new Rada is elected, a coalition formed, and a prime minister and cabinet seated, which will determine Zelenskyy's ability to advance a coherent agenda. Zelenskyy's appointments will be a litmus test of his true intentions. Rumors about his potential choices appear favorable to a strong reform agenda, and his explanation for keeping his cards close to his chest to prevent regressive forces from undermining his candidates rings true. While the details of his policies remain sketchy, their broad outlines are generally favorable to U.S. interests. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

9. (SBU) Recent polls show Ukrainians are following Zelenskyy's lead. Asked to name the top five priorities for the new President, the top response was that he should submit to the Rada bills on lifting immunity from MPs, judges, and the President (53.7 percent). Substantial pluralities also favored ensuring stability of the national currency and banking system (33.7 percent) and an acceleration of investigations of high-profile corruption crimes (25.8 percent). At the same time, Zelenskyy's lack of specifics on the Minsk process and negotiations with Russia will be a challenge. The second most popular priority cited by Ukrainians was to start direct negotiations among Ukraine, Russia, and the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples' Republics (DPR and LPR) to achieve a ceasefire and return Donbas (40.9 percent). Only 13.1 percent favored increasing economic sanctions against Russia, and 9.9 percent favored intensifying talks on NATO membership, underscoring the desire to try something different from the Poroshenko years and the importance of continued U.S. engagement.

Signature:	YOVANOVITCH
Drafted By:	KYIV (b) (6)
Cleared By:	POL (b) (6)
Approved By:	EXEC:Penninton, Joseph S (Kviv)
Released By:	KYIV (b) (6)
Info:	EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE ROUTINE
XMT:	ST PETERSBURG, AMCONSUL

Action Post: NONE
Dissemination Rule: POL, DAO_INFO, POL_INFO, EXBS

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU