

**BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION
DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1214**

**In the Matter of)
Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC)
For Adjustment of Rates and Charges)
Applicable to Electric Service)
In North Carolina)**

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
JAMES VAN NOSTRAND
AND
TYLER FITCH
ON BEHALF OF
VOTE SOLAR**

FEBRUARY 18, 2020

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LIST OF EXHIBITS

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- JMV-TF-6: Comparison of Climate Risk Assessment
- JMV-TF-7: North Carolina Executive Order 80

1

1. INTRODUCTION

2

A. JAMES M. VAN NOSTRAND

3

Q. Please state your name, title and employer.

4

A. My name is James M. Van Nostrand. I am an Energy Policy Expert for EQ Research, a consulting firm based out of Cary, North Carolina. I am also a Professor of Law at the West Virginia University College of Law, where I teach energy and environmental law and Direct the Center for Energy and Sustainable Development.

5

6

7

8

Q. On whose behalf are you submitting this direct testimony?

9

A. I am submitting this testimony on behalf of Vote Solar.

10

Q. Please state your educational and professional experience.

11

A. Exhibit JMV-TF-1 sets forth my educational background and professional experience.

12

13

B. TYLER FITCH

14

Q. Please state your name, title, and employer.

15

A. My name is Tyler Fitch. I am Southeast Regulatory Manager for Vote Solar.

16

Q. On whose behalf are you submitting this direct testimony?

17

A. I am submitting this testimony on behalf of Vote Solar.

18

Q. Please state your educational and professional experience.

19

A. Exhibit JMV-TF-2 sets forth my educational background and professional experience.

20

21

C. OVERVIEW OF JOINT TESTIMONY

22

Q. Does each sponsoring witness adopt the whole of this testimony?

1 A. Yes. However, Mr. Fitch is not a lawyer and defers to Mr. Van Nostrand regarding
2 any portion of this testimony that could be perceived as requiring legal training to
3 answer.

4 **Q. Please summarize your testimony.**

5 A. This testimony focuses on the Company's proposed Grid Improvement Plan and its
6 request to recover the costs of the Plan through deferral to a regulatory asset. In
7 particular, our testimony examines the extent to which the Company has integrated
8 the impact of climate change-related risks in its Grid Improvement Plan. Since
9 2017, risks related to climate change have emerged as a material factor in electric
10 utility operations. Recent developments in climate risk assessment, scrutiny from
11 shareholders, and regulatory momentum underscore the need to manage these risks.
12 Given the exposure faced by the Company to climate change-related risks due to,
13 among other things, the vulnerability of physical assets to more frequent and intense
14 extreme weather events as well as the impact on its system associated with
15 increasing temperatures, prudent utility practice requires that these risks be
16 considered as part of any long plan for transmission and distribution investments.
17 Our testimony concludes that the Company's analysis of climate change-related
18 risks in connection with its Grid Improvement Plan is woefully inadequate, and it
19 is doubtful that the Company has sustained its burden of proof to demonstrate that
20 the proposed expenditures associated with the Plan are necessary and reasonable.
21 Our testimony concludes with several recommendations to improve the integration
22 of climate change-related risks in the Company's long-term system planning, as

1 well as a possible regulatory mechanism that would provide incentives for
2 implementation of these recommendations.

3 Our testimony reaches the following conclusions:

- 4 • Climate-related risks, emerging in many vectors, have a material and substantial
5 bearing on the Company's operations today and will continue to affect
6 operations in the future. Collaborative processes in North Carolina are currently
7 underway to assess these risks and their implications for the electric grid.
- 8 • The Company faces demonstrable physical risks from climate change and
9 increasing scrutiny on climate risk management from relevant financial
10 institutions.
- 11 • As a potential foundational investment for the 21st century grid, any grid
12 modernization plan should consider best climate resilience practices alongside
13 grid modernization best practices. This includes the fair assessment of
14 distributed energy resources as climate resilience and grid modernization
15 solutions.
- 16 • The Grid Improvement Plan, as filed, does not assess or respond to climate-
17 related risks, nor does it adhere to grid modernization best practices. As a result,
18 the Company's proposal does not provide enough information to indicate that
19 the Plan is a prudent investment.

20 Our testimony includes the following recommendations:

- 1 • The Commission should direct the Company to assess and manage climate-
- 2 related risks across its operations and assets, in accordance with prudent utility
- 3 practice.
- 4 • The Commission should make clear that it will apply this standard to Grid
- 5 Improvement Plan investments by the Company.
- 6 • The Commission should direct the Company to participate in ongoing
- 7 Department of Environmental Quality stakeholder processes around grid
- 8 modernization and integrate data, findings, and recommendations, into its grid
- 9 modernization investments. The Commission should further require that the
- 10 Company file a report by December 31, 2020 identifying any gaps in knowledge
- 11 that need to be filled through further collaboration.
- 12 • The Commission should require the Company to develop large distribution
- 13 investments such as the Grid Improvement Plan through an integrated
- 14 distribution planning (IDP) or integrated systems & operations planning (ISOP)
- 15 process moving forward.
- 16 • To the extent that Grid Improvement Plan projects are permitted deferred
- 17 recovery, the Commission should impose performance-based conditions on the
- 18 recovery of such deferred amounts in rates, such as through adjustments to the
- 19 weighted average cost of capital applied to the unamortized balance of deferred
- 20 amounts.

21 **Q. How is your testimony organized?**

22 A. The testimony is presented in several sections:

- 1 • **Section 2** provides context for the Grid Improvement Plan based on the
2 Company’s recent Power/Forward proposal, grid modernization best practices,
3 and the response of the Commission. It also describes Vote Solar’s experience
4 as a stakeholder in the Company’s Grid Improvement Plan stakeholder process.
- 5 • **Section 3** introduces the concept of climate-related risks, and demonstrates the
6 extent to which such risks are at play in the Company’s application. Section 3
7 includes a comprehensive review of the Company’s exposure to such risks and
8 best practices for managing them.
- 9 • **Section 4** identifies several policy and regulatory developments in North
10 Carolina that may have bearing on any grid modernization process.
- 11 • **Section 5** presents a review of the Grid Improvement Plan’s development based
12 on grid modernization and climate resilience best practices as well as ongoing
13 North Carolina developments.
- 14 • **Section 6** offers a specific discussion of the Company’s request for deferred
15 accounting, integrated systems planning, and the role of climate-related risks at
16 the Commission.
- 17 • **Section 7** briefly discusses ratepayer interests in light of climate-related risks.
- 18 • **Section 8** provides our conclusions and recommendations to the Commission.

1 **2. POWER/FORWARD, STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT, AND THE**
2 **DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRID IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

3 **Q. Does the Grid Improvement Plan represent the Company’s first proposed**
4 **comprehensive investment plan for its transmission and distribution**
5 **infrastructure?**

6 A. No. The Company proposed the Power/Forward program in its last rate case.

7 **Q. What was Power/Forward?**

8 A. Power/Forward was a 10-year, \$13 billion grid modernization plan for the Duke
9 Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress’s transmission and distribution system
10 proposed in the Company’s 2017 General Rate Case.¹ Like the Grid Improvement
11 Plan, the stated goals of Power/Forward included improving reliability and
12 integrating distributed resources, and projects included distribution line
13 undergrounding and a ‘self-optimizing’ grid.² The Company proposed a Grid
14 Reliability and Resiliency Rider or deferral into a regulatory asset for recovering
15 Power/Forward costs.³

16 **Q. What was Vote Solar’s role in that proceeding?**

17 A. Vote Solar’s then Regulatory Director, Dr. Caroline Golin, testified on behalf of
18 the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association in both the Duke Energy

¹ Direct Testimony of David B. Fountain on behalf of Duke Energy Carolinas, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Retrieved at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=fe5827ae-5c88-4efb-9860-959611a22791>.

² Direct Testimony of Robert M. Simpson III on behalf of Duke Energy Caorlinas, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=7d4ecffa-40c0-4e89-822d-5cd788b2fcf3>.

³ Direct Testimony of Jane L. McManeus on behalf of Duke Energy Carolinas, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=4701a724-c7aa-4ff0-bc30-1da295d6f57f>.

1 Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress proceedings. Her testimony assessed the
2 appropriate treatment of a capital-intensive proposal, the prudence of the
3 Power/Forward program (according to the program's overall cost-effectiveness)
4 and its satisfaction of grid modernization best practices, namely:

- 5 • Clear and Measurable Goals
- 6 • Stakeholder Engagement
- 7 • Integrated Distribution Planning
- 8 • Cost/Benefit Analysis⁴

9 Dr. Golin's assessment found that Power/Forward was not justified on an
10 economic or engineering basis and that it failed to implement any of the grid
11 modernization best practices listed above. Dr. Golin recommended that the
12 Commission deny the Company's proposal and proactively establish a separate
13 proceeding for a stakeholder-driven, staff-facilitated process for evaluating grid
14 modernization investments.⁵

15 **Q. Do you agree with Dr. Golin's identification of best practices and**
16 **establishment of a separate proceeding for grid modernization programs?**

⁴ Direct Testimony of Caroline Golin on Behalf of NCSEA, Docket No. E-2, Sub 1142. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=4dc8a933-d7c8-4ace-b9ab-e53b8e5690d5>.

⁵ Direct Testimony of Caroline Golin on Behalf of NCSEA, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Retrieved at [https://votesolar.org/files/2215/1741/2799/Direct Testimony of Caroline Golin 2.pdf](https://votesolar.org/files/2215/1741/2799/Direct%20Testimony%20of%20Caroline%20Golin%202.pdf).

1 A. We do. These best practices are supported by grid modernization experts who have
2 presented them across the Southeast and across the country.^{6,7,8,9}

3 **Q. What did the Commission find in its decision on the Power/Forward proposal?**

4 A. The Commission noted that, given that the Company controls the timing of the
5 investments and that regulatory lag has not been an issue for these types of
6 investments in the past, a rider would be inappropriate for grid investments.¹⁰

7 Further, the Commission found that the reasons cited by the Company to justify the
8 Program do not qualify as extraordinary:

9 The Commission finds and concludes that the reasons DEC says
10 underlie the need for Power Forward are not unique or extraordinary
11 to DEC, nor are they unique or extraordinary to North Carolina.
12 Weather, customer disruption, physical and cyber security, and
13 aging assets are all issues the Company... [has] to confront in the
14 normal course of providing electric service. The Commission
15 further finds that ... a number of the Power Forward programs and
16 projects ... are the kinds of activities in which the Company engages
17 or should engage on a routine and continuous basis. Therefore, the

⁶ Alvarez, P., & Stephens, D., (2019, January). Modernizing the Grid in the Public Interest: Getting a Smarter Grid at the Least Cost for South Carolina Customers. *GridLab*. Retrieved at http://gridlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/GridLab_SC_GridMod.pdf.

⁷ Aggarwal, S., & O'Boyle, M., (2017, February). Getting the Most out of Grid Modernization. Energy Innovation. Retrieved at <http://ipu.msu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Grid-Modernization-Metrics-and-Outcomes-2017.pdf>.

⁸ Migden-Ostrander, J., & Hauser, S., (2018, September). Grid Modernization and New Utility Business Model. *Regulatory Assistance Project & GridWise Alliance*. Presentation given to Clean Energy Legislative Academy. Retrieved at https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/rap_migden_cnee_legislator_academy_2018_sep_11.pdf.

⁹ Migden-Ostrander, J., Littell, D., Shipley, J., Kadoch, C., Sliger, J., (2018, February). Recommendations for Ohio's Power Forward Inquiry. *Regulatory Assistance Project*. Retrieved at <https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/rap-recommendations-ohio-power-forward-inquiry-2018-february-final2.pdf>.

¹⁰ Order Accepting Stipulation, Deciding Contested Issues, and Requiring Revenue Reduction, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146 et al. p. 142-145. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=80a5a760-f3e8-4c9a-a7a6-282d791f3f23>.

1 Commission must conclude that Power Forward costs are not
2 appropriate to be considered for deferral accounting.¹¹

3 While the Commission found arguments for a separate proceeding
4 “compelling,” it ultimately directed the Company to utilize existing dockets for grid
5 modernization proposals, of which one (the “Smart Grid Technology Plan” docket)
6 is no longer active. The Commission also directed the Company to “engage and
7 collaborate with stakeholders” to address issues raised in the proceeding.¹²

8 **Q. How did the Company engage and collaborate with stakeholders between the**
9 **conclusion of the previous rate case and this one?**

10 A. Since the last rate case, the Company held three in-person stakeholder workshops
11 that were facilitated by a third party and conducted a series of webinars. Company
12 Witness Oliver describes the objectives of the first stakeholder workshop as to
13 “[d]evelop understanding of proposed investments; hear and explore stakeholder
14 feedback; and support a collaborative process going forward.”¹³

15 **Q. In what capacity did Vote Solar participate in the Grid Improvement Plan**
16 **stakeholder process?**

17 A. Vote Solar participated in all three of the in-person stakeholder workshops held by
18 the Company and observed several of the Company’s webinars.

19 **Q. What is Vote Solar’s interest in the grid modernization broadly and the Grid**
20 **Improvement Plan specifically?**

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

¹³ Direct Testimony of Company Witness Jay W. Oliver (“Oliver Direct”), p. 47, ll. 3-5.

1 A. As with Dr. Golin's previous testimony, Vote Solar believes that decisions on how
2 states pursue grid modernization represent critical opportunities for our electric
3 grid. Done correctly, the modernization of the grid can enable a system where
4 customers see economic benefits, distributed energy resources are evaluated fairly,
5 innovative solutions have a chance to compete with traditional investments, the
6 grid's environmental impact is reduced, and energy service is more reliable and
7 resilient to shocks and stressors. An inappropriate grid modernization proposal,
8 however, could create more costs for customers than benefits, and could fail to
9 deliver on promised benefits. As the onset of climate-related risks affects the risk
10 profile for many grid stakeholders, the need to get grid modernization right is even
11 more urgent. Vote Solar participated in the stakeholder process in pursuit of a grid
12 modernization process in North Carolina that adheres to the best practices cited in
13 Dr. Golin's testimony and ultimately one that works toward a more dynamic,
14 resilient, and distributed grid.

15 **Q. Mr. Fitch, please characterize your experience as a stakeholder in this**
16 **collaboration process.**

17 A. I will characterize my direct experience as an in-person stakeholder in the third
18 workshop and webinars, and base my review of the first and second workshop on
19 pre-read packets and workshop readout reports provided as exhibits in this
20 proceeding by Witness Oliver. I found the stakeholder workshops valuable insofar
21 as they clarified the Company's justification of its proposal and provided an
22 opportunity for stakeholders to share perspectives and goals for a grid

1 modernization process. I cannot characterize the workshops as ‘collaborative,’ in
2 the true definitional sense of a process where stakeholders would be expected to
3 have more input on shaping the objectives or parameters of the process. In general,
4 the prevailing feeling during workshops was unidirectional information-sharing by
5 the Company. Stakeholders did not appear to play a role in choosing which
6 investments should be selected, or shaping the process by which the Grid
7 Improvement Plan was developed.

8 Relatedly, I was surprised to find that the Company invited stakeholder
9 input only after the Company had developed the Grid Improvement Plan.¹⁴ This
10 approach leaves stakeholders out of the most important elements of the grid
11 modernization process—defining a shared set of goals and criteria for success,
12 identifying possible solutions, and developing a process for selecting those
13 solutions. In effect, the Plan was ‘already baked’ by the time stakeholders were
14 given a chance to share ideas.

15 This procedural element may be a reason that management of climate-
16 related risks, an element that several stakeholders called for, was not included in
17 the Plan.¹⁵ The Company in fact explicitly stated that it intended to avoid the term
18 “climate change,” and the topic would be addressed only to the extent climate

¹⁴ Oliver Direct, p. 32, l. 14 to p. 33, l. 20.

¹⁵ Oliver Direct Ex. 13, p. 12.

1 change risks were captured as part of the megatrend identified as “Environmental
2 Trends” and “Impact of Weather Events.”¹⁶

3 **Q. Mr. Fitch, is it clear to what extent differences between programs proposed in**
4 **the Power/Forward and the Grid Improvement Plan were driven by**
5 **stakeholder input?**

6 A. No. Witness Oliver represents that the stakeholder process led to the Company’s
7 creation of the Megatrends,¹⁷ but the excerpt of the Commission’s 2018 order cited
8 above shows that several of these Megatrends were previously used to justify the
9 Power/Forward plan. In any case, the Plan’s similarity to Power/Forward (further
10 discussed below) would indicate that the Megatrends may operate in this case as a
11 *post hoc* justification.

12 Company Witness Oliver cites several other changes to the plan as
13 stakeholder-driven,¹⁸ but a review of the workshop readout demonstrates more
14 nuance at play: Integrated Volt-Var Control (“IVVC”) was added, but a similar
15 program was already in operation in DEP territory;¹⁹ targeted undergrounding was
16 reduced, but the workshop readout report described this project as changing
17 priority;²⁰ and the distribution hardening & resiliency program reduced in size, but
18 the term ‘distribution hardening’ does not appear in the workshop readout report.²¹

¹⁶ Oliver Direct, Ex. 13, p. 29.

¹⁷ Oliver Direct, p. 47, ll. 10-11.

¹⁸ Oliver Direct, p. 47, ll. 13-15.

¹⁹ Oliver Direct, Exhibit 12, p. 46.


²⁰ Oliver Direct, Exhibit 11, p. 12-13.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

1 **Q. Based on the workshop readout reports, what were other stakeholders’**
2 **responses to the stakeholder process?**

3 A. The Company rolled out its Grid Improvement Plan proposal at the second
4 stakeholder workshop in November 2018. The readout report registers that
5 stakeholders had a mixed, at best, view of the Plan, as shown in Figure 1. Key
6 takeaways from the workshop included a note that stakeholders asked the Company
7 to explicitly include climate change as a megatrend and to better understand the
8 DER-enablement implications of their proposal.²²

9 **Figure 1. Stakeholder Sentiment of Grid Improvement Plan.**²³



10 The third stakeholder workshop represented more of a ‘deep dive’ into the
11 cost-benefit methodology of several proposed programs, with the Company’s stated
12 intention to file a rate case application including a Grid Improvement Plan in the

²² Oliver Direct, Ex. 13, p. 12.

²³ Figure is directly taken from Oliver Direct, Ex. 13, p. 22.

1 next several months looming over the conversation.²⁴ At the last workshop before
2 the Plan’s submission to the Commission, the role of stakeholder input was still
3 unclear to stakeholders:

4 “Several stakeholders felt unclear about the impact from current
5 stakeholder engagement, and if/how stakeholder input has and will
6 be meaningfully used in the GIP riling. In response, many
7 stakeholders requested to see evidence and/or explicit explanations
8 demonstrating how stakeholder feedback has thus far been
9 incorporated.”²⁵

10 Of course, stakeholders at the Grid Improvement Plan workshops showed a
11 wide range of opinions and interests, and the summary above is not meant to be
12 comprehensive. It does, however, point to a trend of stakeholders (Vote Solar
13 included) finding that the process did not meaningfully incorporate stakeholder
14 input into proposed investments.

15 **Q. Mr. Fitch, did the stakeholder process the Company conducted in advance of**
16 **this rate case adhere to stakeholder best practices or a reasonable expectation**
17 **of engagement and collaboration?**

18 A. The stakeholder process did not allow stakeholders to set goals for the Plan or work
19 with the Company to identify criteria for evaluating solutions. Especially for the
20 third workshop, stakeholder input was not likely to alter the Company’s proposal
21 to the Commission. Although, to my knowledge, the Company has not committed
22 to a cyclical, ongoing stakeholder process, the potential for that type of process

²⁴ Oliver Direct, Ex. 16, p. 6: “Several stakeholders were skeptical about how a “clean slate” for stakeholder engagement could be realized after the filing this year.”

²⁵ Oliver Direct, Ex. 16., p. 5-6.

1 through the Company’s proposed phases is possible. Overall, however, the
2 stakeholder process did not adhere to these best practices.

3 **Q. Please compare the Company’s proposed Grid Improvement Plan to its**
4 **previous Power/Forward plan.**

5 A. The Company provided a comparison between the Grid Improvement Plan and
6 Power/Forward during its April 2019 webinar,²⁶ and provided a more precise
7 comparison between the programs in discovery.²⁷ Every program that made up
8 Power/Forward is represented in the Grid Improvement Plan, although the total
9 budgets for targeted undergrounding and “incremental distribution hardening &
10 resilience” have decreased substantially. Several new programs populate the GIP,
11 including security measures, IVVC, integrated systems & operations planning, and
12 support for energy storage and EVs. Even so, over 80% of the capital investment
13 that comprises the Grid Investment Plan is derived from projects that were also a
14 part of Power/Forward.²⁸ In a literal sense, then, the Grid Improvement Plan for the
15 most part comprises Power/Forward projects. The Grid Improvement Plan’s scope
16 is much smaller than Power/Forward’s (3 years versus 10 years), but the Company
17 has described at least one more “phase” of the Grid Improvement Plan.²⁹

²⁶ Oliver Direct, Ex. 14 p. 10.

²⁷ Company Response to NCSEA Data Request 3-7.

²⁸ *Ibid.* Investment in SOG, Incremental Transmission H&R, Transmission Bank Replacement, Oil Breaker Replacement, T&D Communications, Distribution System Automation, Transmission System Intelligence, and T&D Enterprise systems totals \$1.952 billion, which is ~84% of the \$2.3 billion budget.

²⁹ Oliver Direct, p. 51, ll. 1 to p. 52, ll. 16.

1 **Q. Mr. Fitch, how did the Company portray its Integrated Systems & Operations**
2 **Planning (“ISOP”) project in Company meetings and webinars?**

3 A. ISOP presentations³⁰ portrayed ISOP as a way to integrate planning processes
4 across generation, transmission, distribution, and customer services,³¹ and
5 identified capabilities of the Advanced Distribution Planning component of ISOP
6 to include “optimized selection of both traditional and non-traditional solutions.”³²

7 **Q. What appears to be the relationship between ISOP and the Grid Improvement**
8 **Plan?**

9 A. ISOP is as a identified component of the Grid Improvement Plan. It is not apparent
10 from the Company’s materials in what order Grid Improvement Plan projects will
11 be implemented, despite the clear value that the capabilities of ISOP, ADP, and
12 Morecast would bring toward identifying grid needs and placing solutions.

³⁰ Mr. Fitch reviewed Duke Energy’s presentation of ISOP to the Commission on August 28, 2019, and observed the ISOP webinar on January 30, 2020.

³¹ Duke Energy (2019, August), Integrated Systems & Operations Planning (ISOP) Technical Conference. *North Carolina Utilities Commission*, p. 5. Retrieved at: <https://www.duke-energy.com/ /media/pdfs/our-company/isop/isop-ncuc-conference-overview-rev0.pdf?la=en>.

³² Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC (2019, August). Response to Commission Questions in July 23, 2019 Order Docket No. E-100, Sub 157. Retrieved at <https://www.duke-energy.com/ /media/pdfs/our-company/isop/e100-sub157-decdep-response-to-ncuc-questions.pdf?la=en>.

1 **3. ONSET OF CLIMATE-RELATED RISK AND FUNDAMENTAL**
2 **CHANGES IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR**

3 **A. Introducing Climate-Related Risks**

4 **Q. Why is climate change relevant to the Company’s general rate case**
5 **application?**

6 A. In its response to Vote Solar’s motion to compel responses to discovery, the
7 Company stated that the words climate change or global warming do not appear in
8 its application,³³ and posited that the scope of this proceeding is “limited to the
9 costs, revenues, rates, and regulatory mechanisms reflected in its application.”³⁴

10 We agree. As we show below, climate-related risks clearly influence the costs,
11 revenues, rates, and regulatory mechanisms in the current application. Whether or
12 not the Company explicitly uses the term “climate-related” or “climate change” in
13 its application, the physical impacts of climate change and the regulatory and
14 societal responses to it have real, material implications for the Company and the
15 prudence of current proposals in its Application. The following are items in the
16 Company’s application and their climate-related risk implications:

- 17 • The Grid Improvement Plan purports to “mitigate the impact of major
18 storm events,”³⁵ “reinforce equipment in flood-prone areas,”³⁶ and
19 “support more rooftop solar, battery storage, electric vehicles, and
20 microgrids.”³⁷ Storm and flood risks are likely to change due to climate

³³ Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC’s Response to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery, p. 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 4.

³⁵ Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Application to Adjust Retail Rates, Request an Accounting Order, and to Consolidate Dockets (“DEC Application”). p. 9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

- 1 change,³⁸ and Executive Order 80³⁹ and the Clean Energy Plan,⁴⁰ both
2 of which cite climate-related risks as a driver, urge policy adoption that
3 are intended to increase customers' adoption of rooftop solar, battery
4 storage, electric vehicles and microgrids.
- 5 • Storm costs from Hurricanes Florence and Michael and Winter Storm
6 Diego.⁴¹ The frequency and intensity of those storms is increasing,
7 which the Company acknowledges.⁴² But if the Company does not
8 update storm preparation to account for this reality there will be
9 implications for the Company's assets⁴³ and the ability of its customers
10 to cope with the impacts of those storms.⁴⁴
 - 11 • Investments to upgrade Company assets to co-fire gas and coal.⁴⁵
12 Switching to lower-carbon fuels reduces regulatory climate-related risk
13 in the future. The application notes that when it explains that the
14 investments will "further reduce carbon emissions across the Carolinas
15 for the benefit of customers."⁴⁶
 - 16 • Accelerated depreciation for coal assets.⁴⁷ Again, this acts as a hedge
17 against potential climate regulation, and the application and Witness
18 DeMay argue that investing in cleaner energy sources is done "for the
19 benefit of [the Company's] customers."^{48,49}

³⁸ Kunkel, K., & Easterling, D., (2020, January). North Carolina Climate Science Report. Presentation given to North Carolina Climate Change Interagency Council, p. 28. Retrieved at <https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/climate-change/interagency-council/Jan-22-2020--Interagency-Climate-Council-presentation-rev.pdf>.

³⁹ State of North Carolina Exec. Order No. 80, (2018, October).

⁴⁰ North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, (2019, October), North Carolina Clean Energy Plan: Transitioning to a 21st Century Electricity System. Retrieved at: https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/files/NC_Clean_Energy_Plan_OCT_2019_.pdf.

⁴¹ DEC Application, p. 6.

⁴² *Ibid.* p. 9.

⁴³ Morehouse, C., (2020, January), Ameren, Xcel, Dominion, Duke among most at-risk from changing climate: Moody's. Retrieved at <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ameren-xcel-dominion-duke-among-most-at-risk-from-changing-climate-mood/570789/>.

⁴⁴ ConEdison (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study. p. 31. Retrieved at <https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf>.

⁴⁵ Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Application to Adjust Retail Rates, Request an Accounting Order, and to Consolidate Dockets ("DEC Application"). p. 5, #9.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 8.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Direct Testimony of Company Witness Stephen G. De May ("De May Direct"), p. 14, l. 6

- 1 • The Company reviews its approved return on equity.⁵⁰ Witness Hevert
2 does not mention that Moody’s credit opinions for the Company in 2018
3 and 2019 mention its “carbon transition risk,”⁵¹ thereby failing to
4 capture a recent significant pivot in how the financial industry views
5 climate-related risks.

6 These items show that the Company’s decisions today are influenced by
7 climate-related risks and affect the Company’s future exposure to those risks. We
8 will note that this is not an exhaustive list of climate-related risks to the Company.
9 Climate-related risks operate through multiple vectors beyond physical impacts and
10 are complex and inter-related. Avoidance of, or, conversely, engagement with,
11 these risks is very likely to impact the Company’s operations and financial position,
12 as we discuss below.

13 In response to discovery on how it manages climate-related risks, the
14 Company states that “[it], as well as its stakeholders, are unable to say with
15 certainty what the future impacts of climate change may or may not be.”⁵² This is
16 not a responsible or mainstream approach to risk management. As expressed by
17 State Street CEO Ronald O’Hanley in his recent statement to the *Wall Street*
18 *Journal* on climate-related risks:

19 “Does anyone know with certainty or precision what the scope and
20 pace of climate change might mean for long-term investments? No.
21 But that is the textbook definition of risk: More things can happen
22 than will happen.”⁵³

⁵⁰ DEC Application. p. 13.

⁵¹ Company Response to Public Staff Data Request 38-5.

⁵² Company Response to Volte Solar Data Request 3-24.

⁵³ O’Hanley, R., (2020, January). Sustainability Is Part of Good Risk Assessment. *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved at https://www.wsj.com/articles/sustainability-is-part-of-good-risk-assessment-11580413295#comments_sector.

1 As in any business, risk management is fundamental to prudent business
2 practice. As we demonstrate, the Company and Commission are better equipped
3 than ever before to consider climate change’s material risks.

4 **Q. What are climate-related risks?**

5 A. Climate-related risks refer to the potential negative impacts of climate change on a
6 firm or organization. Risks may emerge as a result of the physical shocks and
7 stresses of climate change (physical risks), or the social and economic response to
8 those impacts (transition risks). Importantly, the risks discussed here are those
9 borne by the firm alone, not by its customers or society as a whole. As such, the
10 climate-related risks described here are no different than any other business risk
11 that a firm might assess and manage in the course of prudent operation.

12 Due to the carbon emissions embedded in conventional electricity
13 generation and the nature of transmission and distribution infrastructure, electric
14 utilities are among the most vulnerable industries to climate-related risk.⁵⁴ Climate-
15 related risks that electric utilities face are categorized below:

- 16 • **Physical:** Impacts to assets and operations from physical climate impacts.
17 • **Financial:** Impacts to cost-of-capital due to climate-related exposure and
18 confidence in risk management.

⁵⁴ The Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosures identified the energy sector, including electric utilities, as one of four non-financial groups with “the highest likelihood of climate-related financial impacts.” Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures, (2017, June). Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosures. P. 16. Retrieved at: <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf>.

- 1 • **Economic:** Risk of stranded assets or decreased sales due to increased viability
2 of alternatives.
- 3 • **Regulatory:** Impacts to operating and capital costs from changing regulations.
- 4 • **Reputational:** Potential loss of goodwill due to perceived response to climate
5 change.

6 Although these categories are helpful for inventorying different types of
7 risk, climate-related risks are complex and interconnected.⁵⁵ It is for this reason that
8 understanding these risks as related to each other and specifically related to climate
9 change is important.

10 For each dimension of risk, we summarize the mechanism by which it
11 impacts utility operations, provide an overview of state-of-the-art efforts to
12 characterize the risk, and describe the Company’s potential exposure.

13 **Q. Does the broader business and financial community consider these risks**
14 **material? Has the perception or assessment of these risks changed since the**
15 **Company’s last rate case?**

16 **A.** While climate change and its attendant business risks may be a lightning rod topic
17 for some, Company witness DeMay observes—and we agree—that “[t]he energy
18 sector is in a period of transformation and profound change,” due to technological
19 advancements, environmental mandates, notions of resiliency, and changing
20 customer expectations.⁵⁶ Climate-related risks encapsulate these transformative

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵⁶ Direct Testimony of Company Witness Stephen G. Demay (“Demay Direct”), p. 5, ll. 18-21.

1 changes, and the industry has reached a tipping point since the Company’s last rate
2 case application in 2017. Six key developments are driving this transformation:

3 First, a common framework for understanding, disclosing, and managing
4 climate-related risks is emerging. At the request of the G20, the Financial Stability
5 Board formed the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”)
6 in 2015 to develop a universal framework for risk disclosure. The TCFD’s final
7 recommendations were published on June 15, 2017—just over a week after the
8 Commission opened a docket for the Company’s 2017 rate case.⁵⁷ Since then,
9 TCFD’s recommendations have become the international standard, adopted by
10 almost 800 organizations representing over \$118 trillion in assets.⁵⁸

11 Second, awareness of the here-and-now risks of climate change to electric
12 utilities—and the urgent need to mitigate those risks—have materialized since
13 2017. The California wildfires and related PG&E bankruptcy and large-scale public
14 service power shutoffs in response to fire risks have galvanized public conversation
15 about the role of electric utilities in mitigating climate impacts.⁵⁹ One Wall Street

⁵⁷ State of North Carolina Utilities Commission, Order Consolidating Dockets., Docket No. E-2, Sub 1142, E-2, Sub 1103 and E-7, Sub 1110. Retrieved here:

<https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=d7713362-d657-43f2-afd7-f01145dd294e>

⁵⁸ Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, (2019, May). 2019 Status Report. pp. 2. Retrieved at <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/tcfd-2019-status-report/>.

⁵⁹ Gold, R., (2019, January), PG&E: The First Climate-Change Bankruptcy, Probably Not the Last. *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wildfires-and-the-first-climate-change-bankruptcy-11547820006>.

1 Journal headline aptly summarizes the new orientation toward climate-related
2 damages: “For the Economy, Climate Risks are No Longer Theoretical.”⁶⁰

3 Public and private institutions have responded to these impacts. Since 2017,
4 seven US states made commitments to 100% renewable energy,⁶¹ and eleven of the
5 country’s largest utility holding companies, including Duke Energy, have
6 announced deep emissions reduction goals.⁶² In section 4, we address the related
7 developments in North Carolina policy, including Executive Order 80 and the
8 Clean Energy Plan, bring a similar awareness and anticipation of climate change’s
9 physical, social, and economic changes into this jurisdiction.

10 Third, major financial institutions are taking the onset of climate-related
11 risks seriously. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, understanding
12 the implications of these risks, created a climate-related financial risk
13 subcommittee to provide insights and recommendations to market regulators and
14 participants.⁶³ Larry Fink, CEO of the world’s largest asset manager BlackRock,
15 recently addressed climate-related risks as the driver of a “fundamental re-shaping

⁶⁰ Ip, G., (2019, January), For the Economy Climate Risks Are No Longer Theoretical. *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-the-economy-climate-risks-are-no-longer-theoretical-11579174209>.

⁶¹ UCLA Luskin Center for Innovation, (2019, November), Progress Toward 100% Clean Energy in Cities & States Across the US. Retrieved at <https://innovation.luskin.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/100-Clean-Energy-Progress-Report-UCLA-2.pdf>.

⁶² Gearino, D., (2019, October), Utilities Are Promising Net Zero Carbon Emissions, But Don’t Expect Big Changes Soon. *InsideClimateNews*. Retrieved at <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/15102019/utilities-zero-emissions-plans-urgency-coal-gas-duke-dte-xcel>.

⁶³ Litterman, R., (2019, December), Remarks to the Market Risk Advisory Committee. *U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission*. Retrieved at https://www.cftc.gov/media/3181/MRAC_Litterman121119/download.

1 of finance” in his annual letter to global CEOs.⁶⁴ Fink’s letter, and research from
2 BlackRock’s Investment Institute,⁶⁵ also contend that climate-risks are already
3 present in utility stocks, but they haven’t been adequately evaluated by investors.
4 As those risks become clearer, Fink writes, “In the near future—and sooner than
5 most anticipate—there will be a significant re-allocation of capital.”⁶⁶ BlackRock’s
6 position as one of the largest and most influential investors in the world lends
7 credence to these claims. Notably, BlackRock is the 2nd largest individual
8 shareholder in Duke Energy Corporation.

9 Institutional investors see managing climate-related risks as part of their
10 fiduciary duty to protect the long-term health of their investments. In February
11 2019, twenty of the world’s largest institutional investors, representing over \$1.8
12 trillion in assets, sent a letter to Duke Energy and other electric utilities indicating
13 that “As long-term investors, we view these [climate-related] risks as significant
14 and material,” and calling on firms to set a net-zero by 2050 goal over the next six
15 months.⁶⁷ Duke Energy Corporation published their net-zero by 2050 goal seven
16 months later, in September 2019.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Fink, L., (2020, January), A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance. *BlackRock*. Retrieved at:
<https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter>

⁶⁵ Bertolotti, A., Basu, D., Akallal, K., Deese, B., (2019, March), Climate Risk in the US Electric Utility Sector: A Case Study. *BlackRock Investment Institute*. Retrieved at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3347746.

⁶⁶ Fink, 2020.

⁶⁷ California Public Employees Retirement System et al., (2019, February). *Institutional Investor Statement Regarding Decarbonization of Electric Utilities*. Retrieved at
<https://www.climatemajority.us/investorstatement-20190228>.

⁶⁸ Duke Energy (2019, September). Duke Energy aims to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Retrieved at <https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/duke-energy-aims-to-achieve-net-zero-carbon-emissions-by-2050>.

1 Fourth, analytical capability to understand climate risks at a granular level
2 has improved by leaps and bounds in the last several years. Analysts are capable of
3 projecting climate-related risks and impacts on a single-county level.⁶⁹ One recent
4 study of electric utilities viewed risks on a plant-by-plant basis.⁷⁰ Credit rating
5 agencies Moody’s and S&P are increasing their in-house analytical capacity on this
6 front, and in January 2020 Moody’s released its first comprehensive assessment of
7 climate risk for electric utilities.⁷¹

8 Fifth, state regulatory regimes are developing best practices for
9 understanding vulnerability to climate-related risks and crafting specific
10 implementation plans for addressing them. After Superstorm Sandy, the New York
11 Public Service Commission convened a Grid Hardening & Resiliency
12 Collaborative to reach consensus on risks to the Con Edison system and approaches
13 to managing them—a move that has been hailed as a “nationwide model”^{72, 73} and

⁶⁹ Larsen, K., Larsen, J., Delgado, M., Herndon, W., Mohan, S. (2017, January) Assessing the Effect of Rising Temperatures: The Cost of Climate Change to the U.S. Power Sector. Rhodium Group, p. 10-19. Retrieved at https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/RHG_PowerSectorImpactsOfClimateChange_Jan2017-1.pdf.

⁷⁰ Bertolotti, et al. (2019).

⁷¹ For the convenience of the Commission, the complete Moody’s report is filed as a separate confidential exhibit (Exhibit JMV-TF-3-CONFIDENTIAL). All representations about the content of this confidential exhibit in this public (non-confidential) testimony are derived from existing public reporting.

⁷² Ralff-Douglas, K., (2016, June). Climate Adaptation in the Electric Sector: Vulnerability Assessments & Resiliency Plans. *California Public Utility Commission*, p. 5. Retrieved at [https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work/PPD_Work_Products_\(2014_forward\)/PPD%20-%20Climate%20Adaptation%20Plans.pdf](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work/PPD_Work_Products_(2014_forward)/PPD%20-%20Climate%20Adaptation%20Plans.pdf).

⁷³ Case 13-E-0030 *et al.*; Con Edison’s Electric, Gas, and Stream Rates -- Order Approving Electric, Gas, and Steam Rate Plans in Accord with Joint Proposal (2014, February). State of New York Public Service Commission. Retrieved at: [https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Final-Order-2014-02-21%20\(1\).pdf](https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Final-Order-2014-02-21%20(1).pdf).

1 an innovative approach⁷⁴ for managing climate-related risks. In partnership with
2 the collaborative, Con Edison released its Climate Change Vulnerability Study in
3 December 2019. This study represents a leap forward in its specificity, and the
4 utility will develop an implementation plan to address risks throughout 2020. A
5 copy of the Climate Change Vulnerability Study is provided as Exhibit JMV-TF-4.

6 Sixth, analysts and investors are urging firms to take action in the short-
7 term. The U.S. Global Change Research Project concludes that utilities are already
8 subject to climate-related physical risks.⁷⁵ The United Nations Principles for
9 Responsible Investment summarize the point succinctly: “Failure to consider all
10 longterm investment value drivers, including [environmental, social, and
11 governance] issues, is a failure of fiduciary duty.”⁷⁶

12 To recap, there is a common understanding of climate-related risks;
13 investors and the public are taking these risks seriously; new analytical tools render
14 climate risks understandable; a collaborative model for addressing risks exists; and
15 there is value to proactive action. Recognition of and management of these risks

⁷⁴ Columbia Law School, (2014, February). Center for Climate Change Law Helps Secure Novel Pact with Con Edison. Retrieved at: https://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2014/february2014/Con-Ed-climate-change-measures.

⁷⁵ Zamuda, C., et al. (2018). Energy Supply, Delivery, and Demand in *Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II*. U.S. Global Change Research Program, pp. 174-201. Doi: [10.7930/NCA4.2018.CH4](https://doi.org/10.7930/NCA4.2018.CH4).

⁷⁶ United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment (2019, November). Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century Final Report. Retrieved at: <https://www.unpri.org/fiduciary-duty-in-the-21st-century-final-report/4998.article#.Xc0f5YqtBhQ.twitter>.

1 will transform how utilities assess prudent planning and operations. These
2 developments also mean that firms and regulators now have the tools to act.

3 **Q. What materials have you reviewed in preparation of this testimony?**

4 A. We reviewed literature from the following categories to inform this testimony:

- 5 • Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Corporation statements on climate
6 change and climate-related risks;
- 7 • Decisions by North Carolina policymakers that might inform future climate-
8 related regulatory risk;
- 9 • Financial institution discussion and business decisions on climate-related risks;
- 10 • Guidance from financial advisory organizations on prudent business practice
11 around disclosing and managing climate-related risks;
- 12 • Research assessing the nature of climate-related risks and best practices on
13 avoiding them from top research organizations;
- 14 • Case studies of other electric utilities and utilities commissions weighing their
15 own response to climate-related risks.

16 In total, our review spanned 130 sources from 97 organizations. While the
17 review presented here is not exhaustive or universal, the documents assembled
18 paint a clear picture of the state of climate-related risks and the institutional
19 response to them. A list of sources consulted during the literature review is
20 available in Exhibit JMV-TF-5.

21 **B. Physical Risks**

1 **Q. Please define climate-related physical risks and describe how they are**
2 **expected to impact the electric utility industry.**

3 A. Climate-related physical risks are risks to assets or operations due to physical
4 phenomena impacted by climate change. These physical changes can manifest as
5 rising sea levels and flood risk, increasing ambient temperatures and heat waves,
6 changing precipitation patterns, and/or increasing frequency and intensity of
7 extreme weather events. Just as weather and climate have always affected the day-
8 to-day operations and long-term planning of electric utilities, the industry is already
9 affected by the changing climate at the generation, transmission, and distribution
10 levels.⁷⁷

11 Climate change impacts that will have the most substantial risk implications
12 for the electric industry are listed below.

- 13 • **Extreme Weather Events:** More frequent and severe but less predictable
14 storms (and, in coastal areas, attendant storm surges) will result in damage to
15 infrastructure and increases in storm damages. Ratepayers are likely to see
16 decreased reliability and the potential for long outages.
- 17 • **Increased Temperatures:** Increased ambient temperatures will reduce
18 performance and reliability of electricity infrastructure.⁷⁸ Customer demand is

⁷⁷ Zamuda, C., et al.

⁷⁸ Bertolotti et al., p. 5.

1 projected to increase as cooling loads increase, but become less predictable.⁷⁹

2 Longer, more intense heat waves present health risks for utility workers. High
3 temperature and high cooling load will present sustained stress to the grid.⁸⁰

4 • **Changes in Precipitation:** Although not necessarily applicable to the
5 Company's service territory, projected precipitation patterns as a result of
6 climate change are likely to lead to drier conditions in the southern and western
7 parts of the United States, with intermittent episodes of heavy precipitation.⁸¹

8 A lack of steady water supply could severely impede the operation of nuclear
9 and conventional thermal plants, which rely on an available stream of water for
10 cooling.⁸² Droughts may also increase the risk of wildfire, with clear and
11 present implications for utilities' transmission & distribution.⁸³

12 • **Sea-level Rise and Flooding:** Especially in combination with extreme weather
13 events, higher sea levels increase the risk of inundation for coastal assets.⁸⁴

14 While electricity infrastructure is designed to withstand a range of
15 conditions, future conditions are projected to reach outside of historical ranges.

16 Understanding and planning for future conditions, and not just relying on historical

⁷⁹ ConEdison (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study. p. 12. Retrieved at <https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf>.

⁸⁰ Larsen, K., Larsen, J., Delgado, M., Herndon, W., Mohan, S. (2017, January) Assessing the Effect of Rising Temperatures: The Cost of Climate Change to the U.S. Power Sector. Rhodium Group, p. 10-19. Retrieved at https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/RHG_PowerSectorImpactsOfClimateChange_Jan2017-1.pdf.

⁸¹ Nanavati, P., & Gundlach, J., (2016, September), The Electric Grid and its Regulators—FERC and State Public Utility Commissions. Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, p. 14.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁸³ Bertolotti et al, p. 4.

⁸⁴ Nanavati & Gundlach, pp. 19.

1 benchmarks, is becoming necessary to avoid premature asset replacement and
2 stranded assets.^{85,86}

3 Analysts estimate that these damages will add up for electric utilities. In a
4 review of the financial materiality of climate-related physical risks to electric
5 utilities, BlackRock Investment Institute placed the increased frequency and
6 severity of hurricanes as a “10” on a 1-10 scale.⁸⁷ Another estimate found that storm
7 damages were, on average, likely to increase by 23 percent to \$1.7 billion per year
8 by 2050.⁸⁸ Analysis is increasingly capable of looking at plant-level climate risks.⁸⁹

9 Insurers are increasingly exposed to risks of concurrent payments as the
10 incidence of climate-related events grows,. After California’s 2018 climate-
11 related⁹⁰ wildfire season, which included over 13,000 homes and businesses

⁸⁵ Chung, J., (2020, January). *Ameren, Xcel, Dominion, Duke among most at-risk from changing climate: Moody’s* (interview by Catherine Morehouse for Utility Dive).

⁸⁶ Kunkel, K., & Easterling, D., (2020, January). North Carolina Climate Science Report. Presentation given to North Carolina Climate Change Interagency Council, p. 33. Retrieved at <https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/climate-change/interagency-council/Jan-22-2020--Interagency-Climate-Council-presentation-rev.pdf>.

⁸⁷ BlackRock, (2019, April), Getting Physical: Scenario Analysis for Assessing Climate-Related Risks. p.17. Retrieved at <https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/literature/whitepaper/bii-physical-climate-risks-april-2019.pdf>.

⁸⁸ Brody, S., Rogers, M., Siccardo, G., (2019, April), Why, and how, utilities should start to manage climate-change risk. McKinsey & Company, p. 3. Retrieved at: <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/why-and-how-utilities-should-start-to-manage-climate-change-risk>.

⁸⁹ Bertolotti, et al.

⁹⁰ Shrimali, G. (2019, October). In California, More than 340,000 Lose Wildfire Insurance. *High Country News*. Retrieved at <https://www.hcn.org/articles/wildfire-in-california-more-than-340000-lose-wildfire-insurance>.

1 destroyed and 46,000 insurance claims,⁹¹ analysts were concerned that California
2 utilities might be “uninsurable.”⁹²

3 **Q. How will climate-related physical risks affect the Company specifically?**

4 A. The Company’s placement in North Carolina is determinative of its exposure to
5 climate-related risks. Although all utilities will be subject to the risks above,
6 Southeast utilities are particularly exposed to more frequent and severe storms and
7 hurricanes.⁹³

8 High-quality, in-depth studies of climate impacts in North Carolina
9 specifically are in progress. As directed by Section 9 of Governor Roy Cooper’s
10 Executive Order 80, leading North Carolina institutions are developing a North
11 Carolina Climate Science Report that assesses the state of the science and makes
12 projections for North-Carolina-specific impacts.⁹⁴ Preliminary findings from the
13 report indicate that, “[l]arge changes in North Carolina’s climate—much larger
14 than at any time in the state’s history—are *very likely* by the end of this century
15 under both the lower and higher [emissions] scenarios.”⁹⁵ Authors of the report
16 presenting to the North Carolina Climate Change Interagency Council found it is

⁹¹ Bernstein, S., & Barlyn, S., (2019, January). Insurance losses for California Wildfires top \$11.4 Billion. *Reuters*. Retrieved at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-fire-claims/insurance-losses-for-california-wildfires-top-114-billion-idUSKCN1PM2CF>.

⁹² Jaffe, A., Busby, J., Blackburn, J., Copeland, C., Law, S., Ogden, J., & Griffin, P., (2019, September). Impact of Climate Risk on the Energy System. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved at https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Impact%20of%20Climate%20Risk%20on%20the%20Energy%20System_0.pdf.

⁹³ Zamuda, C., et al.

⁹⁴ North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, (2019). NC Climate Science Report Development. Retrieved at <https://deq.nc.gov/nc-climate-science-report-development>.

⁹⁵ Kunkel, K., & Easterling, D., (2020, January).

1 “*very likely* [90-100% probability]” that NC temperatures will increase in all
2 seasons, extreme precipitation frequency and intensity will increase, and that heavy
3 precipitations accompanying hurricanes passing over North Carolina will increase.
4 As a result, climate design standards for North Carolina infrastructure will be
5 outdated by the middle of this century⁹⁶—likely within the design lifetime of
6 investments proposed under the Grid Improvement Plan. The North Carolina
7 Climate Risk Assessment and Resiliency Plan is moving through a rigorous peer
8 review process and will be finalized and submitted to the Governor by March 1,
9 2020.⁹⁷

10 Financial observers have already been paying careful attention to utilities’
11 climate-related physical risks. When S&P announced a negative outlook for Duke
12 Energy Corporation in 2019, it noted that “[t]he company also operates its utilities
13 in regions of the U.S. that are prone to frequent hurricanes, which could increase
14 the company’s risk exposure because climate change is intensifying the severity
15 and frequency of these natural disasters globally.”⁹⁸ Moody’s and S&P mentioned
16 hurricanes or named storms in ratings of the Company in each year 2017-2019.⁹⁹

17 Beyond broad characterizations, credit rating agencies are using
18 increasingly powerful analytical methods for understanding climate risks, finding

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ North Carolina Executive Order 80.


⁹⁸ S&P Global Ratings, (2019, May), Research Update: Duke Energy Corp. and Subs. Outlook Revised To Negative On Coal Ash Risks, Regulatory-Lag, And Project Delays. P. 4. Retrieved at Company Response to Public Staff Data Request 38-5.

⁹⁹ Company Response to Public Staff Data Request 38-5.

1 Duke Energy’s footprint in the Carolinas as exposed to climate-related risks.
2 Moody’s published their first review of climate-related risks for electric utilities in
3 January 2020 and found Duke Energy a top risk for hurricane threats.¹⁰⁰

4 Company materials submitted in this proceeding validate the reported
5 Moody’s findings. Figure 2 below disaggregates system average interruption
6 duration index (SAIDI) in regular operation and during Major Event Days, which
7 include but are not exclusively related to weather events.

8 **Figure 2: Duke Energy Carolinas System Average Interruption Duration Index**
9 **(SAIDI) with and without Major Event Days (MEDs)¹⁰¹**



10

11

¹⁰⁰ Morehouse, 2020.

¹⁰¹ Graph compiled using MED and non-MED SAIDI figures from Company Response to the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association (“NCSEA”) Data Request 2-8.

1 The Company’s SAIDI trend over the last ten years shows a relatively flat
2 SAIDI during normal operations, but increasing SAIDI impacts from major event
3 days. While the major event days’ occurrence is inherently stochastic, experts have
4 found a statistically significant increase in major event days over time.¹⁰² For
5 context, the average customer was without power for 250 minutes in 2018,¹⁰³ and
6 the cumulative improvement projected for phase one of the Grid Improvement Plan
7 will reduce SAIDI by 28.24 minutes per customer.¹⁰⁴

8 **C. Financial Risks**

9 **Q. Please define climate-related financial risks and summarize how they are**
10 **expected to impact the electric utilities industry.**

11 A. Climate-related financial risks refer to impacts on access to reliable and affordable
12 financing a firm might face due to climate change and the financial community’s
13 response to it. Financial risks can be difficult to disaggregate from other risks,
14 because financial institutions’ climate-related reasons for up- or down-grading a
15 firm will often be linked to other climate-related impacts (e.g. downgrading a
16 California utility due to exposure to wildfire risks). But the unique impacts of
17 financial actions, and specific pathways by which these risks are expressed (e.g.

¹⁰² Larsen, P., Sweeney, P., Hamachi-LaCommare, K., Eto, J., (2014, April). Exploring the Reliability of U.S Electric Utilities. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, p. 29. Retrieved at http://www.usaee.org/usaee2014/submissions/OnlineProceedings/IAEE_ConferencePaper_01Apr2014.pdf.

¹⁰³ US Energy Information Administration (“EIA”), (2018, April), “Average frequency and duration of electric distribution outages vary by states.” Retrieved at <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=35652>.

¹⁰⁴ Company response to Public Staff Data Request 36-5.

1 downgrades, disinvestment, votes against board members, changes to stock price),
2 merit treating financial risks as a separate category.

3 Investors are already paying special attention to electric utilities and their
4 responses to climate-related risks. The Climate Action 100+, a global group of
5 investors with over \$35 trillion under management, identified 32 electric utilities as
6 part of the hundred largest greenhouse gas emitters in the world.¹⁰⁵ Duke Energy
7 Corporation is listed as one of Climate Action 100+'s focus companies.

8 Credit ratings agencies have already integrated review of climate-risk, as a
9 part of environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) review, into their credit
10 ratings. S&P found in its lookback over ratings published 2015-2017 that
11 environment and climate (“E&C”) risks played an important role in over 700 cases,
12 and over 100 listed E&C risks as a key factor. Of cases where E&C risks were a
13 key factor, over 40% resulted in downgrades.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, S&P
14 demonstrates an opportunity to prudent energy & climate risk management—20
15 upgrades listed E&C issues as a key factor.¹⁰⁷

16 Investors like BlackRock and Morgan Stanley are also building analytical
17 capacity to understand the distribution of climate-related risks. BlackRock and the
18 Rhodium Group are using their plant-level climate risk findings to generate

¹⁰⁵ Climate Action 100+, (2019). *2019 Progress Report*. Retrieved at
<https://climateaction100.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/progressreport2019.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ Williams, J., & Wilkins, M., (2017, November), How Environmental And Climate Risks And Opportunities Factor Into Global Corporate Ratings – An Update. *S&P Global Ratings*. Retrieved at Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 5-2.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

1 company-level climate-risk indices.¹⁰⁸ Using those indices, they find that climate-
2 resilient utilities trade at a slight premium, while the most risk-exposed utilities
3 trade at a discount.¹⁰⁹ An academic analysis of the relationship between climate
4 risk, risk management, and financial health found similar results:

5 “We document a positive correlation between cost of debt and
6 carbon risk for firms [without awareness of climate risks]. Further,
7 this association is economically meaningful, with a one standard
8 deviation increase in carbon risk mapping into between a 38 and 62
9 basis point increase in the cost of debt. Equally, we find that the
10 penalty is effectively negated for firms exhibiting carbon risk
11 awareness.”¹¹⁰

12 **Q. How might climate-related financial risks affect the Company specifically?**

13 A. Duke Energy Corporation’s largest individual shareholders have taken strong
14 positions on risks related to climate change and their likely response. Table 1 below
15 demonstrates a selection of Duke Energy’s creditors and their position on climate
16 risks.

17 **Table 1: Selection of Duke Energy Investors and Positions on Climate Risk**

Shareholder	% Share of DUK	Climate-related Risk Position
Vanguard Group	8.19%*	“Many companies remain far beyond on their [climate-related risk] journey and have room to improve their disclosure and better educate their board on climate-related risks.” ¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Bertolotti et al.

¹⁰⁹ BlackRock, 2019.

¹¹⁰ Jung, J., Herbohn, K., Clarkson, P., (2018, July), “Carbon Risk, Carbon Risk Awareness, and the Cost of Debt Financing.” *Journal of Business Ethics*.

¹¹¹ Vanguard (2019). Investment Stewardship 2019 Annual Report.

Blackrock Fund Advisors	5.3%*	“In absence of robust disclosures, investors, including BlackRock, will increasingly conclude that companies are not adequately managing risk.” ¹¹²
State Street Advisors	5.15%*	<p>“The vast majority of companies are taking a short-term, tactical approach to climate risk; they are failing to identify the long-term threats and opportunities created by a shift to a low-carbon economy and to incorporate this thinking into their boards’ strategic planning.”¹¹³</p> <p>Sent a letter to boards (January 2020) advising they would “take appropriate voting action” against board members of major US firms if they rated poorly on SSGA’s ESG score and did not articulate how they would improve it.¹¹⁴</p>
New York City Employees’ Retirement System	**	Sent a letter to Duke Energy advocating for an ambitious climate goal. “This initiative makes clear that mobilizing for the planet goes hand-in-hand with protecting our pensions, and we need these commitments now.” ¹¹⁵

1
2

*: Top three individual investors

** : Investment share outside of top 10 are not published.

¹¹² Fink, 2020.

¹¹³ State Street Global Advisors, (2019, June), Climate-Related Disclosures in Oil and Gas, Mining, and Utilities: The Current State and Opportunities for Improvement. Retrieved at <https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2019/06/climate-disclosure-assesment.pdf>.

¹¹⁴ Wigglesworth, R., (2020, January), “State Street vows to turn up the heat on ESG standards.” *Financial Times*. Retrieved at <https://www.ft.com/content/cb1e2684-4152-11ea-a047-cae9bd51ceba>.

¹¹⁵ Kerber, R., (2019, February), “Big U.S. pension funds ask electric utilities for de-carbonization plans.” *Reuters*. Retrieved at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-utilities-investors/big-u-s-pension-funds-ask-electric-utilities-for-decarbonization-plans-idUSKCN1QH27D>.

1 Credit rating agencies Moody's and S&P mention climate-related physical,
2 regulatory, and economic risks in their updates on the Company and Duke Energy
3 Corporation.¹¹⁶ In and of themselves, the risks recorded in these updates may have
4 negative impacts on the Company's business operations. But the financial
5 community's awareness of these risks, and its potential reaction to those risks
6 through stock price movement, shareholder action, and changes to credit ratings,
7 present a unique challenge to the Company's business risks.

8 **D. Economic Risks**

9 **Q. Please define climate-related economic risks and summarize how they are**
10 **expected to impact the electric utilities industry.**

11 A. Climate-related economic risks are divided into technology risks and market risk.
12 Technology risks refer to exposure of a firm's assets and operations from disruptive
13 or innovative technologies that develop and mature through societal responses to
14 climate change. In the electric utility sector, the principal technology risk is that of
15 low- or no-carbon generation technologies like wind and solar displacing
16 conventional generation and therefore "stranding" those assets' ability to recover
17 their capital investment. As an example, NIPSCO and Tri-State recently recognized
18 and corrected for climate-related technology risk by committing to shut down

¹¹⁶ Company Response to Public Staff Data Request 38-5.

1 legacy coal assets in favor of a shift to renewables.^{117,118} Analyses sponsored by
2 both companies demonstrate the prudence of this decision: it will save money for
3 these companies and ultimately for ratepayers.

4 Market risk refers generally to risks created by markets adapting to climate
5 change. These risks are subtle and complex, especially in the energy sector, but one
6 illustration might be customers opting out of typical utility service to pursue
7 renewable options. Because of this complexity, this testimony will not analyze or
8 evaluate market risks.

9 Analysts have focused particular attention on technology risks and
10 opportunities for utilities operating legacy coal assets. One analysis by Energy
11 Innovation found that by 2025, new wind and solar would be less expensive than
12 running 70% of all coal assets in the United States.¹¹⁹ Subsequent studies from
13 Morgan Stanley and Moody's have corroborated those results.¹²⁰

14 The same principle applies to gas generation. A study from the Rocky
15 Mountain Institute found that a portfolio of clean energy technologies would deliver

¹¹⁷ McMahon, J., (2019, July), "In Conservative Indiana, Utility Chooses Renewables Over Gas As It Retires Coal Early." *Forbes*. Retrieved at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2019/07/02/mike-pences-indiana-chooses-renewables-over-gas-as-it-retires-coal-early/#7cb3265243b4>.

¹¹⁸ Best, A., (2020, January), "Tri-State CEO says wholesaler's clean energy transition will pay dividends." *Energy News Network*. Retrieved at: <https://energynews.us/2020/01/21/west/tri-state-ceo-says-wholesalers-clean-energy-transition-will-pay-dividends/>.

¹¹⁹ Gimon, E., O'Boyle, M., Clack, Ct., McKee, S., (2019, March), The Coal Cost Crossover: Economic Viability of Existing Coal Compared to New Local Wind and Solar Resources. *Energy Innovation and Vibrant Clean Energy*. Retrieved at https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Coal-Cost-Crossover_Energy-Innovation_VCE_FINAL.pdf.

¹²⁰ Smyth, J., (2019, December), "Financial analysts expect decarbonization will benefit utility ratepayers and shareholders." *Energy and Policy Institute*. Retrieved at: <https://www.energyandpolicy.org/financial-analysts-expect-decarbonization-will-benefit-utility-ratepayers-and-shareholders/>.

1 the same energy at a lower cost than 90% of gas-fired power plant capacity. The
2 report ends with a recommendation to state utility regulators: “[a]ccount for the
3 significant risk that uneconomic gas generation will increase customer rates.”¹²¹

4 **Q. How might climate-related economic risks affect the Company specifically?**

5 A. The same national trends identified regarding coal and gas assets also play out in
6 North Carolina. For coal assets, “[t]he trend is so strong that it is hard to imagine
7 Southeastern utilities not relying heavily on solar and complementary load shifting
8 resources to replace the coal and save customers money.”¹²²

9 In many cases, multiple climate-related trends can come together to cause
10 an economic shift—a shift that the Company is already acknowledging. In
11 describing the forces that led to the Company’s decision to retire several coal plants,
12 the Company cites the following trends:

- 13 • On-going price declines and efficiency improvements of potential
14 replacement including CTs, renewables and energy storage alternatives;
- 15 • Potential for increasing regulatory drivers including the release of the
16 NC DEQ Climate Plan, NC Executive Order 80, and NCUC 2018 IRP
17 Order requiring evaluation of accelerated coal plant retirements in
18 future IRPs; and

¹²¹ Teplin, C., Dyson, M., Engel, A., Glazer, G., (2019), The Growing Market for Clean Energy Portfolios: Economic Opportunities for a Shift from New Gas-Fired Generation to Clean Energy Across the United States Electricity Industry. *Rocky Mountain Institute*, <https://rmi.org/cep-reports>.

¹²² Gimon, et al.

- 1 • Potential for federal or state CO₂ legislation.¹²³

2 Credit rating analysts are paying special attention to the Company’s
3 climate-related economic risks. Moody’s 2019 credit rating for the Company found
4 that “[DEC] has a moderate carbon transition risk within the regulated utility sector
5 because, as an integrated utility, its generation ownership places it at a higher risk
6 profile than transmission and distribution companies.”¹²⁴

7 Informally, Duke Energy Corporation officials have responded to the
8 prospect of gas generation being outcompeted by renewables or inconsistent with a
9 carbon goal by floating shorter depreciation periods as short as 15 years for new
10 gas generation.¹²⁵ The necessary result of a shorter operating life, however, is faster
11 recovery of capital investment, driving higher annual costs and a higher average
12 cost per kilowatt-hour. Duke Energy’s potential decision to accelerate depreciation
13 and increase ratepayer costs for these plants is, itself, an example of climate-related
14 risks increasing costs for ratepayers. These higher costs also increase the likelihood
15 that renewables might be a more cost-effective option.

16 The risks of distributed generation referred to in Witness Hevert’s testimony
17 are examples of technology risk.¹²⁶ Hevert’s testimony does not, however, address
18 the Company’s reduced exposure to climate-related risks as renewables come onto

¹²³ Company Response to Tech Customers Data Request 3-26.

¹²⁴ Moody’s Investor Service, (2019, October), “Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC.” Retrieved at Company’s First Supplemental Response to Public Staff Data Request 38-5.

¹²⁵ Morehouse, C., (2019, October), Duke VP likens gas plant buildout strategy to 15-year home mortgage on path to zero carbon.” *Utility Dive*. Retrieved at <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-vp-likens-gas-plant-buildout-strategy-to-15-year-home-mortgage-on-path/565328/>.

¹²⁶ Hevert Direct,

1 the grid, or the potential of customer-owned distributed generation to reduce
2 exposure to climate risks and future carbon pricing. It is clear that distributed
3 energy resources offer resilience benefits, and actors at the state and federal level
4 are developing increasingly precise methods for valuing resiliency.¹²⁷

5 **E. Regulatory Risks**

6 **Q. Please define climate-related regulatory risks and summarize how they are**
7 **expected to impact the electric utilities industry.**

8 A. Climate-related regulatory risks refer to negative impacts on a given firm due to
9 policy changes that either seek to constrain actions that would exacerbate climate
10 change, or incentivize actions that would ameliorate its impacts. Given the
11 greenhouse gas emissions that have until recently been an inextricable part of the
12 electric utility industry, the clearest regulatory risk to electric utilities is constraints
13 on emissions or requirements to procure energy from renewable sources.

14 The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) uses a
15 framework called the Inevitable Policy Response (IPR) to understand regulatory
16 risk. This framework uses a more probabilistic model of climate policy: Instead of
17 using a scenario-based “climate policy” and “no climate policy” approach, IPR asks
18 when such a policy might be put in place. Using this framework, UNPRI found that
19 a two-degree policy scenario would on average lead to a 4% decrease in valuation

¹²⁷ National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, (2019, April). The Value of Resilience for Distributed Energy Resources: An Overview of Current Analytical Practices. Retrieved at: <https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/531AD059-9CC0-BAF6-127B-99BCB5F02198>.

1 for electric utilities. It also found electric utilities to have the widest variation in
2 valuation adjustment by firm (some firms decreasing in valuation by over 30%, and
3 others increasing by the same margin) of any sector analyzed.¹²⁸

4 Financial observers are paying close attention to firms' policy, legal, and
5 regulatory risks and their prudent management. S&P's lookback on the role of
6 environment & climate factors in their credit ratings found that physical risks were
7 the most cited type of risk, but policy risks were a close second—and the two of
8 them were drivers of S&P rating decisions more than all other listed climate-related
9 risks and opportunities combined.¹²⁹

10 **Q. How might climate-related regulatory risks affect the company specifically?**

11 A. Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions at the state or federal level would directly
12 impact the Company's operations and planning. As the single largest owner of coal
13 and gas generation capacity in 2018¹³⁰ and largest carbon emitter in the nation
14 among electric power producers in 2019,¹³¹ Duke Energy Corporation would likely
15 face a substantial regulatory burden from passage at any level. The share of
16 generation capacity served by conventional generation (coal and gas) for the
17 Company is approximately 50%, and according to its integrated resource plan that

¹²⁸ UN Principles for Responsible Investment (2019), Impacts of the Inevitable Policy Response on Equity Markets. Retrieved at <https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=9857>.

¹²⁹ Williams & Wilkins.

¹³⁰ Dholakia, G., (2019, December). Duke Energy tops operating US coal, gas capacity ownership. *S&P Global*. Retrieved at: <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/w4jueneo16bxoihg-p-fhya2>.

¹³¹ Van Atten, C., Saha, A., Hellgren, L., Langlois, T, (2019, June), Benchmarking Air Emissions of the 100 Largest Electric Power Producers in the United States. *MJ Bradley*. Retrieved at https://www.mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/Presentation_of_Results_2019.pdf.

1 figure would not decrease through 2034 (although the share of conventional
2 generation will shift from coal to gas).¹³²

3 Speculating on the likelihood of a federal climate policy is outside of the
4 scope of this testimony, but recent developments at the state level, as discussed
5 more in-depth in Section 4, set the stage for an increasing level of ambition
6 regarding greenhouse gas policy.

7 Preparation for uncertain outcomes is key to risk management and
8 particularly apt for understanding regulatory risks. The Company, for example,
9 already orients its planning around a tax on emissions beginning in 2025.¹³³ The
10 level of tax used in the Company's planning starts at one-eighth the level of the tax
11 proposed in September 2019 by the Climate Leadership Council, which counts
12 Exelon, ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, and Vistra as members.¹³⁴

13 **F. Reputational Risks**

14 **Q. Please define climate-related reputational risks and summarize how they are**
15 **expected to impact the electric utilities industry.**

16 **A.** Climate-related reputational risks represent those tied to “changing customer or
17 community perceptions of an organization's contribution to or detraction from the
18 transition to a lower-carbon economy.”¹³⁵ Electric utilities risk damage to their
19 reputation if their response to climate change is out of line with stakeholders’

¹³² Duke Energy Carolinas (2019, September), Integrated Resource Plan: Update Report. pp. 9, Chart 2-A.
Retrieved at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=40bbb323-936d-4f06-b0ba-7b7683a136de>.

¹³³ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 3-13.

¹³⁴ Climate Leadership Council (2019, September). Our Plan. Retrieved at <https://clcouncil.org/our-plan/>.

¹³⁵ TCFD [Recommendations](#), p. 6.

1 expectations, from inadequate storm repair to continued investment in conventional
2 electric generation technology without emissions controls.

3 Increasingly, electric utilities are managing their reputational risk by
4 making commitments or announcements to decrease their greenhouse gas
5 emissions. These announcements may increase goodwill, and potentially decrease
6 the likelihood of new regulatory regimes that might mandate a decrease in
7 emissions. At the same time, announcements in and of themselves introduce
8 reputational risks if firms do not appear to be honoring their public commitments.

9 **Q. How might climate-related reputational risks affect the Company specifically?**

10 A. A recent poll found North Carolina voters favor action to reduce carbon
11 emissions,¹³⁶ and Duke Energy Corporation's recent shareholder resolutions show
12 similar sentiment among the Company's shareholders.¹³⁷ As long as the Company's
13 operations emit carbon, it will likely be exposed to reputational risks. The Company
14 also faces scrutiny due to ongoing coal ash remediation issues.¹³⁸

15 Duke Energy Corporation announced its non-binding net-zero-by-2050
16 goal on September 17, 2019, establishing its presence in a growing cohort of large
17 utility holding companies with ambitious carbon goals.¹³⁹ As discussed above,

¹³⁶ Global Strategy Group (2019, October). Regulating North Carolina's Carbon Pollution: Research Findings Prepared by Global Strategy Group for EDF Action. P. 6. Retrieved at https://www.edfaction.org/sites/edactionfund.org/files/u141/nc_carbon_limits_survey_analysis.pdf.


¹³⁷ Duke Energy (2019). Shareholder Proposals. Retrieved at: <https://www.duke-energy.com/proxy/ /media/pdfs/our-company/investors/proxy/shareholder-proposal.pdf?la=en>.

¹³⁸ Sorg, L. (2020, January). DEQ, Duke Energy, community groups strike deal on largest coal ash cleanup in US. *NC Policy Watch*. Retrieved at: <http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2020/01/02/deq-duke-energy-community-groups-strike-deal-on-largest-coal-ash-cleanup-in-us/>.

¹³⁹ Gearino, D.

1 carbon announcements such as this one mitigate some reputational risks but
2 exacerbate others. Although the Corporation's goal is enterprise-wide, the
3 Company would presumably need to follow a similar emissions path for the
4 Corporation to meet its goals. However, the Company's projections in this case do
5 not show that the Company will achieve them. Figure 3 shows the Company's
6 projected carbon emissions as consistent with the IRP approach, in millions of tons
7 of CO2 emitted annually, compared to the emissions pathway needed to achieve
8 the Corporation's goals for DEC.

9 **Figure 3: DEC Projected Emissions versus Pathway Consistent with Corporate**
10 **Goals¹⁴⁰**



¹⁴⁰ Graph compiled using projected annual CO2 emissions from Company response to Vote Solar Data Request 3-13 and Duke Energy Corporation's September 17, 2019 net-zero carbon emissions announcement.

1 Thus, the emissions projected for purposes of this case do not comply with stated
2 goals. Worse, these projected carbon emissions are used to determine the value of
3 carbon reductions created by the Grid Improvement Plan in the Company's cost-
4 benefit analyses.¹⁴¹ The result of these two decisions is that the Grid Improvement
5 Plan's cost-benefit analysis is 'taking credit' for carbon reduction that would not
6 occur if the Company followed a path to achieving their carbon goal. The clear
7 disconnect between the Corporation's public communications and the Company's
8 statements in this proceeding represents a substantial reputational risk.

9 **G. Commission Consideration of Climate Risk**

10 **Q. Based on your review of the literature and financial statements, do you**
11 **conclude that these risks are material?**

12 A. Based on a review of the available literature, the Company's filings, and the
13 findings shown above, we assess climate-related risks are material to any electric
14 utility's investments, costs, and operations, and they are specifically material to the
15 Company in this proceeding.

16 **Q. Does this testimony represent a comprehensive evaluation of the company's**
17 **vulnerability to climate risks?**

18 A. No. A comprehensive assessment of the Company's climate-related risks and the
19 opportunities available in addressing those risks would require more operational
20 data than is available to the public, consensus from a range of stakeholders, and a

¹⁴¹ Oliver Direct, Ex. 7.

1 substantial analytical burden. The New York Storm Hardening & Resiliency
2 Collaborative and Con Edison's Climate Change Vulnerability Study represent best
3 practices in the climate-related risk field.

4 **Q. How might the Commission view the TCFD climate-related risk framework?**

5 A. As a regulator, the Commission has an important role to play in ensuring emergent
6 risks are managed. (In fact, World Bank case studies on utility climate adaptation
7 find that regulatory support is invaluable in incenting firms to act on long-term
8 risks.)¹⁴² At a minimum, the Commission may want to ensure that firms it regulates
9 are aware of these risks and that the expectations of management are clear. The
10 Commission could then support firms in meeting those expectations through
11 information sharing and regulatory innovation. The Commission could use the
12 TCFD framework as a tool-kit for categorizing risks and setting expectations for
13 prudent management.

14 **Q. In your view, is the management of climate-related risks a critical component**
15 **for keeping rates low for customers?**

16 A. Yes. Managing climate-related risks is and will be integral to minimizing the costs
17 imposed on customers associated with the impacts of climate change and ensuring
18 the provision of safe and adequate utility service. Like any other business risk, the

¹⁴² Audinet, P. (2014). Climate Risk Management Approaches in the Electricity Sector. *World Bank Group*. Retrieved at <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/metadata/publications/climate-risk-management-approaches-in-the-electricity-sector-lessons-from-early-adapters>.

1 prudent management of climate risk will minimize those cost to the Company and,
2 therefore, to customers.

3 Unlike other risks, however, customers are also directly exposed to climate-
4 related risks. Proactive action is necessary to ensure that customers are best
5 protected from climate-related risks and that they get reliable service when they
6 need it most. Managing climate-related risks is in the interest of the Company and
7 the public, a proposition the Company seems to accept based on its discovery
8 responses.¹⁴³

9 **Q. If the Commission or the Company adopted the climate-related risk**
10 **framework, would the Company be expected to undertake major changes in**
11 **its operations immediately?**

12 A. No. Climate-related risks would represent an additional input to the Company's
13 existing decision-making process. Decision-makers at the Company, and the
14 associated oversight by regulators, would still weigh risks and opportunities across
15 multiple dimensions when making business decisions.

16 **Q. Do climate-related risks justify an increase to the Company's evaluation of its**
17 **return on equity?**

18 A. No. First, climate-related risks may be described as "asymmetrical" risks—that is,
19 prudent management may avoid a loss of return on equity, but is less likely to secure
20 a higher return on equity. Experts at the Brattle Group have noted that these risks

¹⁴³ Company Response to the Center for Biological Diversity & Appalachian Voices ("CBD & AV") Data Requests 2-34.

1 are not suitable for addressing through a simple risk premium.¹⁴⁴ Second, exposure
2 of the Company to these risks is at least partially dependent on the actions it takes
3 in the operation and planning of its enterprise. Therefore, the risk for the Company
4 is only present to the extent that it pursues business decisions that ignore that risk.
5 The same experts at the Brattle group note that “It often may be easier to mitigate
6 a risk directly rather than to measure its marginal effect on the cost of capital.”¹⁴⁵
7 The California Public Utilities Commission addressed a similar issue with regard
8 to wildfire risk and concluded: “The standard set in *Bluefield* and *Hope* is that
9 investor-owned utilities should not be rewarded with an ROE that is inflated due to
10 imprudent actions.”¹⁴⁶

11 **H. Emerging Best Practices for Managing Climate-Related Risks**

12 **Q. Based on your review of the climate-related risk literature, have you identified**
13 **best practices for managing climate-related risks?**

14 A. Yes. The Task Force for Climate-Related Financial Disclosures recommends that
15 firms exposed to climate-related risks and opportunities embed their climate
16 strategy into the core of their business practices, then disclose how they do so to
17 investors. TCFD recommends that accountability for climate strategy be embedded
18 into the firm’s board and management governance structure; that the firm’s strategy

¹⁴⁴ Brattle Group, (2017), *Compensating Risk in Evolving Utility Business Models*. Pp. 14. Retrieved at https://brattlefiles.blob.core.windows.net/files/7264_compensating_risk_in_evolving_utility_business_models_august_2017.pdf.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁴⁶ California Public Utilities Commission, (2019, December). *Decision on Test Year 2020 Cost of Capital for the Major Energy Companies*. Application 19-04-014 et al. p. 36 (italics added). Retrieved at: <http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M322/K633/322633896.PDF>.

1 at all levels be informed by climate risks and scenario-based planning around
2 accelerated transitions; that risk management at all levels integrate climate-related
3 risks; and that the firm's reported metrics and targets include exposure to climate
4 risks and total carbon emissions.¹⁴⁷ As a non-financial sector with special exposure
5 to physical and transition risks, TCFD recommends additional disclosures for
6 electric utilities, including disclosure of internal carbon prices and capital
7 expenditures on low-carbon generation assets.¹⁴⁸

8 **Q. Do climate-related risks only apply to the Company's generation assets?**

9 A. No. In fact, climate-related risks span the whole of the Company's operations, from
10 generation to consumer programs. Investments within the Grid Improvement Plan,
11 for instance, are subject to climate-related physical risks (as we describe in Section
12 5). To the extent that the Grid Improvement Plan enables a transition to a de-
13 carbonized and resilient grid, the investments also have implications for the
14 Company's financial, economic, regulatory, and reputational risks.

15 **Q. How have electric utilities responded to the onset of climate-related physical**
16 **risks?**

¹⁴⁷ Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, (2017). Final Report: Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. Retrieved at: <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, (2017). Implementing the Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. Retrieved at: <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/FINAL-TCFD-Annex-Amended-121517.pdf>.

1 A. Even as early as 2014, electric utilities understood the need for guidance and
2 recommendations on resilience to climate-related physical risks,¹⁴⁹ and in 2015 the
3 US Department of Energy convened the *Partnership for Energy Sector Climate*
4 *Resilience*, a collaborative of 19 electric utilities supported by DOE in developing
5 best practices for understanding climate-related vulnerabilities and establishing
6 climate resilience.¹⁵⁰

7 The partnership's *Guide for Climate Change Resilience Planning* describes
8 a two-step process for resiliency. First, utilities should conduct a vulnerability
9 assessment to understand their exposure and sensitivity to climate risks. Second,
10 with the vulnerability assessment as an input, utilities can create a resilience plan
11 that responds to those identified vulnerabilities, reviewing a wide range of
12 resilience measures and using a systematic cost-benefit methodology that includes
13 appropriate co-benefits.¹⁵¹ This two-step process ensures that resiliency measures
14 are designed with granular, up-to-date, high-quality information on vulnerabilities;
15 use of a systematic cost-benefit analysis ensures that all resilience measures are
16 fairly evaluated.

¹⁴⁹ Edison Electric Institute, (2014, March). *Before and After the Storm: A compilation of recent studies, programs, and policies related to storm hardening and resiliency*. Retrieved at <https://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/electricreliability/mutualassistance/Documents/BeforeandAftertheStorm.pdf>.

¹⁵⁰ US Department of Energy, (2016, September). *Climate Change and the Electricity Sector: Guide for Climate Change Resilience Planning*. Retrieved at: https://toolkit.climate.gov/sites/default/files/Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Electricity%20Sector%20Guide%20for%20Climate%20Change%20Resilience%20Planning%20September%202016_0.pdf.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

1 **Q. Are there any examples or case studies of climate-informed planning best**
2 **practices being implemented?**

3 A. Yes. The work of the New York Storm Hardening & Resiliency Collaborative
4 (consisting of Con Edison, Department of Public Service Staff, the City of New
5 York, several environmental NGOs, and others) that emerged out of a settlement in
6 Con Edison's 2013 rate case represents a best practice in the industry. In its order
7 approving Con Edison and public staff's settlement the New York Public Service
8 Commission found that "The Con Edison Resiliency Collaborative has provided a
9 valuable focus for innovative approaches to the 21st century challenges to the utility
10 system, and its work should continue, in public where appropriate."¹⁵² The
11 Collaborative reviewed Con Edison's proposed storm hardening investments, and
12 also created a framework for climate vulnerability assessment, examined the
13 applicability of non-wires resiliency strategies, and developed a robust cost-benefit
14 analysis.¹⁵³

15 Con Edison's complete climate risk vulnerability study was published in
16 December 2019. The vulnerability study presents a comprehensive, forward-
17 looking assessment of physical risks of climate change (including, for example,
18 risks to workers due to higher frequency and intensity of heat waves) through an

¹⁵²Case 13-E-0030 *et al.*; Con Edison's Electric, Gas, and Stream Rates -- Order Approving Electric, Gas, and Steam Rate Plans in Accord with Joint Proposal (2014, February). State of New York Public Service Commission. Retrieved at: [https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Final-Order-2014-02-21%20\(1\).pdf](https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Final-Order-2014-02-21%20(1).pdf).

¹⁵³Case 13-E-0030 *et al.*; Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Storm Hardening and Resiliency Collaborative Phase Three Report. (2015, September).

1 integrated framework of physical climate impacts, risks to assets and operations,
2 and potential resilient solutions.¹⁵⁴ The study's use of the best available climate
3 science—analyzed through a transparent, risk-based approach and considering a
4 wide range of resilience solutions over the transmission and distribution system—
5 represents a step forward for the industry.¹⁵⁵ The follow-up Climate Change
6 Resilience Plan is due from Con Edison in December 2020.

7 **Q. Based on the material you have reviewed, have you identified best practices**
8 **for climate resilience?**

9 A. Yes, with one caveat. First and foremost, climate-related risk management in
10 electric utility distribution investments to date has focused exclusively on climate-
11 related physical risks, without integrating financial, economic, regulatory, or
12 reputational risks into risk assessment. Among the many co-benefits that enabling
13 renewable distributed energy resources provides, for example, is a hedge to a given
14 firm's regulatory and reputational risk.

15 Based on our review of emerging climate resilience plans, climate resilience
16 plans proceed through two steps:

- 17 • **Forward-looking, high-quality vulnerability assessment.** The U.S.
18 Department of Energy's North American Energy Resilience Model

¹⁵⁴ ConEdison, (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study. Retrieved at <https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf>.

¹⁵⁵ M.J. Bradley & Associates, (2019, December). Key Considerations for Electric Sector Climate Resilience Policy and Investments. Retrieved at https://www.mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/MJB%26A_KeyConsiderationsforClimateResiliencePolicyandInvestment.pdf.

1 urges utilities to “transition from the current reactive state-of-practice to
2 a new energy planning and operations paradigm in which we proactively
3 anticipate [damage], predict associated outages, and recommend
4 optimal mitigation strategies.”¹⁵⁶ Utilities need to understand their
5 exposure and vulnerability to climate-related risks before they can cost-
6 effectively address them. Climate resilience plans undergo vulnerability
7 studies that look at a wide variety of risks, integrate the most up-to-date
8 scientific work on the matter, and project impacts that these impacts
9 might into specific assets in the future. High-quality vulnerability
10 assessments both identify where largest need for intervention and
11 provide a value ‘cost’ input into the screen for solutions.

- 12 • **Informed, inclusive, and fair solution selection.** The process for
13 identifying and selecting solutions should be robust, to ensure a true ‘no-
14 regrets’ approach. Solutions screens should be informed by the utility’s
15 vulnerability assessment, and they should include a stakeholder-
16 informed wide range of traditional and non-traditional solutions.
17 Finally, utilities and stakeholders should work together and agree on a
18 cost-benefit methodology before considering any single intervention.

¹⁵⁶ ConEdison (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study. P. 63.

1 These steps are supported, in an optimal scenario, by collaboration with
2 stakeholders throughout the process, including while setting a scope and goals for
3 the climate resilience plan. Climate resilience plans are also iterative; as technology
4 develops and vulnerabilities change, resilience plans must be updated.

1 **4. DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA’S BUSINESS AND POLICY**
2 **ENVIRONMENT SINCE THE COMPANY’S MOST RECENT RATE CASE**

3 **Q. What policy developments, within North Carolina or with Duke Energy**
4 **Corporation, have occurred since the Company filed its last rate case?**

5 A. Three trends since 2017 are relevant to the Company’s climate-related risks. First,
6 state executive and regulatory agencies have announced or began new programs
7 with implications for the state’s electric utility industry. Second, Duke Energy
8 Corporation made its non-binding carbon reduction goal announcement in
9 September 2019. Third, ongoing, collaborative processes in North Carolina are
10 creating state-of-the-art climate vulnerability data with implications for designing
11 a more resilient electric grid for North Carolina.

12 **Q. Please describe Executive Order 80 (“EO 80”).**

13 A. In order to “build resilient communities and develop strategies to mitigate and
14 prepare for climate-related impacts in North Carolina,” Governor Cooper’s
15 Executive Order 80 pledges the state to, among other things, reduce statewide
16 emissions by 40% by 2025.¹⁵⁷ Importantly, the Executive Order directs several
17 executive agencies to develop plans for reducing emissions from the energy and
18 transportation sectors. An Interagency Council convened by the Executive Order
19 may also recommend new and updated goals and actions to meaningfully address
20 climate change. Executive Order 80 is provided as Exhibit JMV-TF-7.

21

¹⁵⁷ State of North Carolina Exec. Order No. 80, (2018, October).

1 **Q. Please describe the Clean Energy Plan (“CEP”).**

2 A. The Clean Energy Plan is a collaborative, stakeholder-driven plan to “foster and
3 encourage the utilization of clean energy resources,” developed by the Department
4 of Environmental Quality as directed by Executive Order 80.¹⁵⁸ After a year of
5 conducting workshops and soliciting input from a diverse range of stakeholders,
6 DEQ published its complete Clean Energy Plan in October 2019. The Clean Energy
7 Plan sets ambitious goals for the energy sector, then presents several pathways to
8 work toward those goals alongside short- and long-term actions over the next five
9 years to move along those pathways. While the CEP itself is a complex document
10 with six strategies and over 35 distinct recommendations, the key features of the
11 Plan are summarized in Table 2.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

1

Table 2. Key Features of the Clean Energy Plan¹⁵⁹

Goals	Key Recommendations	Relevant Stakeholders		
Reduce electric power sector emissions by 70% by 2030 and to net-zero by 2050;	Develop carbon reduction policy designs for retiring uneconomic coal; other market-based clean energy policy options	Legislature	NCUC	Governor's Office
Foster long-term energy affordability and price stability for residents and businesses;	Better align utility incentives with public interest, grid needs, and state policy.	State Agencies	Investor-Owned Utilities	Co-ops / Public Utilities
Accelerate clean energy innovation and deployment to create economic opportunities across the state	Modernize the grid to support clean energy resource adoption, resilience, other public interests.	Local Gvmnts	Academia	Business

2 **Q. What are the implications of Executive Order 80 and the Clean Energy Plan**
 3 **on the Company's climate-related risk?**

4 A. EO 80 and the CEP provide a meaningful signal for North Carolina regulatory
 5 agencies. They establish the procurement of clean energy and reduction of
 6 statewide emissions as a public policy objective and empower regulatory agencies
 7 to act in furtherance of that objective.

¹⁵⁹ North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, (2019, October), North Carolina Clean Energy Plan: Transitioning to a 21st Century Electricity System. Retrieved at: https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/files/NC_Clean_Energy_Plan_OCT_2019_.pdf.

1 It is important to note that neither EO 80 nor the CEP has binding, legal
2 enforceability for its goals. Nevertheless, the two actions may be seen as a
3 directional signal for the future of climate policy in North Carolina.

4 The Clean Energy Plan also invites investor-owned utilities to act as
5 partners in implementation. While it may be reasonable to see incipient carbon
6 regulations as a regulatory risk, the Company's participation may represent a
7 regulatory opportunity. Strategies B and C of the Clean Energy Plan seek to align
8 interests between stakeholders on the 21st century utility business model and the
9 future of utility system planning. By collaborating on innovative new regulatory
10 mechanisms with public stakeholders, the Company could actually reduce
11 regulatory lag and risks of other regulatory impacts to business operations.

12 DEQ's responsibility to develop a climate risk assessment and support
13 communities in developing resilience also has implications to the Company. To the
14 extent that electric system resiliency is a component of community resiliency, the
15 Company will necessarily be a relevant party in communities' adaptation and
16 resiliency plans.

17 Finally, EO 80 empowers the interagency council to recommend updated
18 goals to meaningfully address climate change as appropriate. Therefore, while
19 currently ongoing agency work in support of Executive Order 80 may already add
20 climate-related regulatory risk and opportunities, there is potential for on-going
21 long-term policy engagement between the Company and North Carolina executive
22 agencies.

1 **Q. Are there any public statements that the Company or its holding corporation**
2 **has made that might impact the Commission’s view of the Company’s**
3 **application?**

4 A. Duke Energy Corporation published its non-binding net-zero carbon announcement
5 on September 17, 2019.¹⁶⁰ In the announcement, the corporation projects it will
6 decrease carbon emissions by 50% by 2030, with a goal of net-zero carbon
7 emissions by 2050.

8 **Q. What are the implications of Duke Energy Corporation’s carbon**
9 **announcement on the Company’s climate-related risk?**

10 A. While the Company is not explicitly required to meet Duke Energy Corporation’s
11 goals, the goal’s ambitious timeline all but requires that the Company follow a
12 similar emissions pathway if Duke Energy Corporation is to achieve its goals. As
13 briefly discussed above, the carbon announcement shifts the Company’s risk
14 profile. While the urgency and regulatory burden of a regulatory or legislative
15 mandate may be decreased by Duke Energy Corporation’s commitment, Duke is
16 also liable to sustain reputational damage and potential regulatory blowback if it is
17 perceived to be missing its goals.

18 **Q. Are there ongoing processes to understand climate vulnerability and resiliency**
19 **to infrastructure in North Carolina?**

¹⁶⁰ “Duke Energy aims to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.” (2019, September), *Duke Energy News Center*. Retrieved at <https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/duke-energy-aims-to-achieve-net-zero-carbon-emissions-by-2050>.

1 A. Yes. Work is ongoing within two projects related to both infrastructure and climate
2 change currently underway in North Carolina, the results of which will be relevant
3 for the Company’s business operations. First, as directed by Executive Order 80,
4 the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality is currently developing a
5 North Carolina Risk Assessment and Resiliency Plan that will specifically address
6 built infrastructure. As a part of the Risk Assessment and Resiliency Plan, the North
7 Carolina Institute for Climate Research is developing a high-quality climate science
8 report that describes the physical impacts of climate change on North Carolina.¹⁶¹

9 Second, in part thanks to a grant from the US Department of Energy, the
10 North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, NC Department of
11 Environmental Quality, and UNC Charlotte’s Energy Production Infrastructure
12 Center are participating in a two-year joint research project called “Planning an
13 Affordable, Resilient, and Sustainable Grid in North Carolina.”¹⁶² Among other
14 things, the project will take stakeholder input, assess new metrics for evaluating
15 grid resiliency, and “enable a more decentralized, resilient grid.” Both of these
16 processes represent opportunities for the Company to meaningfully engage with
17 stakeholders who are generating meaningful, relevant information for a resilient,
18 21st century grid in North Carolina.

¹⁶¹ Kunkel, K., & Easterling, D.

¹⁶² N.C. Clean Energy Technology Center (2020, January). Planning an Affordable, Resilient, and Sustainable Grid in North Carolina. Retrieved at: <https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/2020/01/29/planning-an-affordable-resilient-and-sustainable-grid-in-north-carolina-2/>.

1 do not provide justification for a slate of distribution projects; rather, they
2 underscore the importance of getting our investments in the grid right. The 21st
3 century grid should be resilient to climate-related physical risks, but at the same
4 time it must enable a more dynamic, communicative, and distributed energy
5 system. And, being critical infrastructure for North Carolina, it must be reactive to
6 ongoing physical, regulatory, and technical developments in the state. It’s for this
7 reason that the Department of Environmental Quality combines “grid
8 modernization” and “grid resilience and flexibility” together in its Clean Energy
9 Plan.¹⁶³

10 The Grid Improvement Plan, then, must play multiple roles for the North
11 Carolina electric system. In the previous sections of this testimony, we have
12 explored best practices for grid modernization and climate resilience. We re-
13 produce those best practices, in no specific order, in Table 3 below:

14 **Table 3: Best Practices for Climate Resilience and Grid Modernization**

Climate Resilience	Grid Modernization
Forward-looking, high quality vulnerability assessment	Clear, Measurable Goals
	Integrated Distribution Planning
Informed, inclusive, and fair solutions selection	Stakeholder Engagement
	Cost/benefit analysis

¹⁶³ North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (2019, October). North Carolina Clean Energy Plan. P. 82. Retrieved at https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/climate-change/clean-energy-plan/NC_Clean_Energy_Plan_OCT_2019_.pdf.

1 **A. Grid Modernization**

2 **Q. Please review the Grid Improvement Plan against grid modernization best**
 3 **practices.**

4 **A. Our review of the Grid Improvement Plan against grid modernization best practices**
 5 **is summarized in Table 4, below:**

6 **Table 4. Grid Improvement Plan’s performance versus Grid Modernization Best**
 7 **Practices**

Best Practice	Grid Improvement Plan performance	Implications
Clear, measurable goals	Plan presents “Megatrends” but no measurable goals.	Unclear what ‘success’ looks like; no way to hold Company accountable; unclear benefits for ratepayers.
Integrated Distribution Planning	Plan will develop capability, but Phase I will not use it.	Plan does not adequately assess potential of NWAs; potential for sub-optimal investment.
Stakeholder Engagement	Company conducted several workshops; use of stakeholder input is not evident from application or stakeholder process.	Plan is less likely to incorporate a wide range of perspectives and value propositions
Cost-benefit analysis	Company does use cost-benefit analysis; no judgment of cost-benefit analysis in this testimony	No implications evaluated in this testimony

8 **Q. Please explain the assessment of the Grid Improvement Plan and its**
 9 **implications in Table 4.**

1 **A. Clear, Measurable Goals:** As a \$1.3 billion incremental investment in the grid
2 with inevitable ratepayer cost implications, the Grid Improvement Plan must
3 demonstrate that the benefit provided to customers is worth the cost. The best way
4 to do that is through clear, measurable goals and commitment to outcomes that
5 benefit all stakeholders. These keep expectations for all parties aligned, and
6 quantified goals allow stakeholders and regulators to track the Company’s progress
7 throughout the plan.

8 In lieu of stated goals, the Company offers its Megatrends¹⁶⁴ and
9 Implications.¹⁶⁵ The Megatrends represent actual trends that are playing out on the
10 grid, but we find their use alongside the Implications in this case to justify the Grid
11 Improvement Plan to be inappropriate. The Company’s analysis of the Megatrends
12 provides no systematic, quantitative understanding of their impacts on the grid—
13 thereby making effective ‘baselining’ impossible. Notwithstanding the lack of an
14 appropriate baseline, the Company does not set any goals for the Plan or metrics by
15 which the Company, regulators, stakeholders, or ratepayers could assess the
16 progress of the Plan or hold the Company accountable. The Company declines to
17 demonstrate how any given project within the Plan relates to the Megatrends.¹⁶⁶ In
18 light of the Plan’s similarity to Power/Forward, it is difficult to ascertain how the
19 development of the Plan was affected in any way by the Megatrends concept. In

¹⁶⁴ Oliver, Ex. 2.

¹⁶⁵ Oliver, Ex. 3.

¹⁶⁶ Company Response to CBD & AV Data Request 2-44.

1 this way, the Megatrends may act as a way to provide license to pursue
2 Power/Forward projects, rather than a representation of discrete problems that must
3 be addressed with targeted solutions.

4 **Integrated Distribution Planning (“IDP”):** Simply put, integrated
5 distribution planning is the element that enables utilities to “modernize” their grid.
6 The analytical capability that is a hallmark of IDP processes allows electric utilities
7 to understand grid operations at a more granular level, work with the distribution
8 grid as an integrated system, and as a result precisely take advantage of distributed
9 resources and place grid modernization solutions. The Company has proposed IDP
10 components as a part of the Grid Improvement Plan, but these components will be
11 pursued alongside, rather than in advance of, massive capital investment in the grid.
12 Pursuing \$1.3B in distribution-level investments¹⁶⁷ (just before these capabilities
13 are online) risks premature deployment of these assets and therefore a sub-optimal
14 cost-benefit for all stakeholders, including the Company.

15 **Stakeholder engagement:** Stakeholder engagement for the Grid
16 Improvement Plan has been reviewed above. The process executed by the Company
17 did not adhere to best practices for an effective process and appears to have
18 minimally incorporated stakeholder input.

¹⁶⁷ Oliver Direct, Ex. 10, p. 3.

1 **Cost-benefit analysis:** This review will not cover cost-benefit analysis in
2 depth. Similarly, cost-benefit analysis has not been the focus of this testimony and
3 will not be reviewed.

4 **Q. The Company claims that the projects included as part of the Grid**
5 **Improvement Plan are “no-regrets,” “foundational” projects. Do you agree**
6 **with that characterization?**

7 A. No. First, the “modernize” projects that Witness Oliver describes as
8 “foundational”¹⁶⁸ form just over a quarter of the total budget of the Plan.¹⁶⁹ Even
9 describing the Plan in the Company’s terms, it would be inappropriate to describe
10 the entire plan as “foundational.”

11 Second, many of the projects proposed under the Grid Improvement Plan
12 fall into what GridLab calls “geographical” projects—physical infrastructure
13 installed in specific geographical areas to extend some grid capability.¹⁷⁰ GridLab’s
14 report points out that the “need” to extend new capabilities to these areas should
15 emerge from a high-quality, risk-based assessment of vulnerability of current
16 operations. “Foundational” investments are those that make such a need assessment
17 possible, or enable the ‘capability’ that is being extended through geographical
18 investment. ISOP is the paramount example of a “foundational” investment. The
19 Company’s proposed Self-Optimizing Grid, for example, would not qualify as

¹⁶⁸ Oliver Direct, p. 33, l. 9.

¹⁶⁹ Oliver Direct Ex. 12, p. 97.

¹⁷⁰ Alvarez, P., & Stephens, D., p. 16.

1 “foundational.” Some of the projects categorized as “modernize” by the Company,
2 such as distribution system and transmission system automation, would also fall
3 into the “geographical” category.

4 **Q. Does the Company acknowledge that making investments without all**
5 **necessary information could lead to sub-optimal or imprudent investment?**

6 A. Yes. In a response to a stakeholder question, the Company responded that it was
7 confident “with 85% certainty” that ISOP would not render Grid Improvement Plan
8 investments obsolete.¹⁷¹ This figure was clearly not intended as a precise estimate,
9 but it provides a ballpark figure for potential losses. To put this number into context,
10 if 15 percent of GIP investment were rendered obsolete by ISOP capabilities, the
11 Grid Improvement Plan as proposed would immediately result in stranded
12 distribution assets worth just under \$200 million.¹⁷² The Company must take this
13 risk seriously, and its failure to do so in this proposal represents a major oversight.

14 **Q. Does the Grid Improvement Plan’s use of Megatrends and implications**
15 **represent a prudent management of climate-related risks?**

16 A. In short, no. The Company has failed to demonstrate how any specific projects
17 addresses climate-related impacts,¹⁷³ has shown that its interventions do not
18 consider the increasing impacts of climate change,¹⁷⁴ and its approach does not
19 acknowledge the interconnectedness of climate-related risks across generation,

¹⁷¹ Oliver Direct Ex. 13, p. 43.

¹⁷² Oliver Direct, Ex. 10, p. 3.

¹⁷³ Company Response to Vote Solar DR 3-4 and 3-5.

¹⁷⁴ Company Response to Vote Solar DR 3-16.

1 transmission, and distribution functions. Making new investments in distribution
2 infrastructure without a systematic assessment or climate-specific data gathering is
3 an insufficient response to climate-related risks. The Company’s current approach
4 of willful avoidance of climate analysis is inadequate, if not imprudent, and exposes
5 the currently proposed grid investments to unnecessary and manageable risks.

6 **B. Climate Resilience**

7 **Q. Please review the Grid Improvement Plan against grid modernization best**
8 **practices.**

9 A. Our review of the Grid Improvement Plan against climate resilience plan best
10 practices is summarized in Table 5, below.

11 **Table 5. Grid Improvement Plan’s performance versus Climate Resilience Best**
12 **Practices**

Best Practice	Grid Improvement Plan performance	Implications
Forward-looking, high-quality vulnerability assessment	Plan did not utilize any meaningful climate risk assessment.	Ongoing physical risks to grid assets and reliability; less cost-effective projects.
Informed, Inclusive, and Fair Solutions Selection	Plan uses a solutions-first approach and cost-benefit analysis developed after the fact.	Non-‘traditional’ alternatives likely excluded from Plan; missing potential co-benefits.

13 **Q. Does the Company explicitly acknowledge the presence of climate-related**
14 **risks or make any attempt to systematically manage them in its application or**
15 **in discovery?**

1 A. No. As noted above, the Company has represented that it has incorporated climate-
2 related risk only to the extent that it is included as part of the “Megatrends”
3 identified by the Company,¹⁷⁵ although it also stated that it is “without knowledge”
4 as to the role of climate change in weather events.¹⁷⁶

5 **Q. Please explain your assessment of the Grid Improvement Plan and the**
6 **implications of the Plan in Table 5.**

7 A. **High-quality Risk Assessment:** We conducted an in-depth comparison of risk
8 assessment and solution selection between the Grid Improvement Plan and Con
9 Edison’s Climate Change Vulnerability Study. The results of that comparison are
10 presented in Appendix JVN-TF-6. Con Edison’s climate vulnerability study
11 estimated that climate risks would cost the utility between \$1.3 and \$4.6 billion by
12 2050,¹⁷⁷ while the Company, for its part, has presented no quantitative risks of
13 climate-related risks. As an example of a potential risk identified by Con Edison
14 but ignored by the Company, Con Edison estimates that flood risks may exceed
15 design specifications by as early as 2030.¹⁷⁸ Duke Energy Carolinas’ flood risk
16 design specifications are roughly equivalent to Con Edison’s,¹⁷⁹ but it did not

¹⁷⁵ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-3, *via* Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-2 Supplemental.

¹⁷⁶ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1 – 3 Supplemental.

¹⁷⁷ Consolidated Edison Company of New York Inc. (“ConEd”), (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study (“ConEd Climate Study”). P. 4. Retrieved at <https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf>.

¹⁷⁸ ConEd Climate Study, p.5.

¹⁷⁹ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 3-16.

1 assess the potential that those specifications would become outdated or the material
2 risks to assets that would occur as a result.

3 The comparison shows that, compared to the industry standard and even a
4 reasonable understanding of climate-related risks, the Company did not complete
5 any systematic climate risk assessment to its assets or operations. There may be
6 individual examinations of factors that may be impacted by climate change, such
7 as flood risk, but those analyses are backward-looking and do not incorporate likely
8 future climate impacts.¹⁸⁰ The Company’s risk assessment is mostly represented by
9 the “Implications” of its Megatrends, which remain are simply too high-level and
10 qualitative to precisely design a programmatic intervention. In comparison, the Con
11 Edison Vulnerability Study pursued an asset-level risk screen, mirroring the
12 granularity of studies conducted by financial institutions and discussed earlier in
13 this testimony.¹⁸¹

14 Like any other business risk, when climate-related risks are not managed,
15 the Company (and therefore its customers) are more exposed to negative outcomes.
16 And, as we have discussed above, physical risks may spill over into insurance,
17 financial, reputational, or regulatory risks.

18 **Informed, Inclusive, and Fair Solutions Selection:** Witness Oliver
19 summarizes the process by which the Grid Improvement Plan was developed in his

¹⁸⁰ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 3-24.

¹⁸¹ Bertolotti et al.

1 testimony.¹⁸² The process was not conducted in collaboration with stakeholders;
2 beyond identifying the existence of the Megatrends, there are no stated goals;
3 solutions are not informed by high quality vulnerability assessment; selection
4 criteria are not defined, beyond vague programmatic terminology;¹⁸³ there is no
5 indication for how the geography or scale of any given intervention was decided;
6 ‘tools’ are a narrow range of traditional solutions; and cost-benefit was performed
7 after the fact, rather than designed in advance of the consideration of any particular
8 project and used as a screening tool.

9 This approach constrains what is possible under the Grid Improvement
10 Plan. It leaves very little room for assessment of co-benefits, pre-determines a
11 narrow set of potential solutions, and ignores non-wires or non-standard
12 alternatives.

13 **C. NC Context**

14 **Q. Does this process acknowledge the other, ongoing processes to quantify grid**
15 **vulnerability, modernize the electric system, or increase resilience in North**
16 **Carolina?**

17 A. No. Witness Oliver’s testimony does not mention “Clean Energy Plan” or
18 “Executive 80,” nor does it refer to either ongoing research project we discuss
19 above.¹⁸⁴ Although one of the identified Megatrends is “Environmental Trends” or

¹⁸² Oliver Direct, p. 32, l.19 – p. 33, l. 20.

¹⁸³ Oliver Direct, Ex. 5.

¹⁸⁴ Oliver Direct.

1 “Environmental Commitments,” its description of these environmental
2 commitments is exclusively backward-looking.¹⁸⁵ Discussion of environmental
3 commitments in Oliver Exhibit 4 do not mention the Clean Energy Plan or
4 Executive Order 80.

5 **Q. What are the implications of this omission?**

6 A. It’s an unfortunate disconnect between a potentially large investment of assets on
7 the grid through the Grid Improvement Plan, unfolding at the same time as many
8 simultaneous conversations are developing in the North Carolina policy
9 community. For the Company, not engaging with these processes misses an
10 opportunity to gain working knowledge that could inform the details of the Plan,
11 and increases the potential for obsolescence, stranded assets, or increased costs
12 because of an operations and communication disconnect between Company
13 practice and regulatory policy.

14 **D. Review Overall**

15 **Q. Do you see an opportunity for an effective grid modernization and climate
16 resiliency proposal at this time in North Carolina?**

17 A. Yes. We agree that recent trends are changing the way customers use the grid and,
18 as we demonstrate above, climate-related risks and opportunities will shape the
19 electric utility business moving into the future. At the same time, a natural synergy
20 exists between the Company’s engagement in integrated planning and circuit-level

¹⁸⁵ Oliver Direct, Exhibit 4.

1 analysis through ISOP and Advanced Distribution Planning and the vibrant policy
2 conversation in North Carolina discussing the very nature of the grid in the 21st
3 century. And, as we document in Section 2, best practices from other states and
4 proceedings are emerging to light the way toward a clear grid modernization and
5 climate resiliency plan that has benefits for all stakeholders. A truly collaborative
6 grid modernization process that creates goals and accountability in partnership with
7 stakeholders, gathers all of critical information (including climate-risk-related and
8 distribution operations information) needed for grid planning first, then selects
9 projects through an open and transparent process second could deliver substantial,
10 lasting benefits for all stakeholders.

11 **Q. Does the Grid Improvement Plan deliver on the potential for a well-designed**
12 **grid modernization or climate resilience plan?**

13 A. No. As we discussed above, the Company does not have the input from stakeholders
14 (including state executive agencies), climate-related factors, or distribution-level
15 analysis it needs to design a true no-regrets Plan. Partly as a result, the Plan does
16 not contain overall goals or tracking metrics that would allow stakeholders and
17 regulators to maintain reliability. Finally, instead of engaging in an open,
18 transparent assessment of solutions and investments (including non-wires
19 alternatives and distributed energy resources), the majority of the Plan consists of
20 solutions that were proposed under Power/Forward.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Company Response to NCSEA Data Request 3-7.

1 As a result, there is a massive potential opportunity cost for proceeding with
2 this plan. At a time when best practices are emerging from a changing national
3 landscape, the Company’s own sophisticated distribution planning capabilities are
4 coming online, and stakeholders are proactively pursuing deep, informed
5 engagement, the Company’s proposal does not take advantage of those
6 developments. The Company’s informal assessment of opportunity costs from
7 declining to inform their Plan with advanced distribution planning could be around
8 \$200 million, as described above.¹⁸⁷ Because the Company has not undertaken an
9 assessment of its climate risks, that opportunity cost remains unquantified.

10 **Q. Do you believe that a positive benefit-cost ratio is sufficient justification for**
11 **moving forward with any given project?**

12 A. No. Cost-benefit analyses answer the question, “How does this investment compare
13 to business-as-usual, or no intervention at all?” As stakeholders in the
14 modernization of the grid, the answer we should be more concerned with is “how
15 does this investment compare to a well-executed grid modernization and climate
16 resilience plan in the public interest?” Against this counterfactual, a project with a
17 positive benefit-to-cost ratio might still represent a missed opportunity. Because the
18 Company did not effectively pursue a climate vulnerability study, stakeholder
19 input, or integrated distribution planning, it lacks the information needed to conduct
20 such a comparison.

¹⁸⁷ Oliver Direct, Ex. 13, p. 43.

1 **Q. What role could distributed energy resources (DERs) play in grid**
2 **modernization and climate resilience?**

3 A. Distributed Energy Resources bring unique benefits to both grid modernization and
4 climate resilience program goals. A comprehensive grid modernization or climate
5 resilience plan should ensure that DERs are fully valued versus traditional
6 solutions.

7 In a climate resiliency context, DERs provide the critical service of
8 generating energy close to load. In cases such as extreme weather events when
9 distribution or transmission systems are not working at full capacity, “islandable”
10 DERs can continue to provide power to ratepayers.¹⁸⁸

11 In a grid modernization context, DERs may be able to fulfill distribution
12 system operational needs more cost effectively than traditional investments, or
13 defer the need for incremental investments in distribution assets. In this context,
14 DERs are often referred to as non-wires alternatives (NWAs) or non-traditional
15 solutions (NTS). A recent Duke Energy webinar demonstrating the anticipated
16 functionality of ISOP explained that ISOP analytical capability would be able to
17 weigh benefits of DERs versus traditional solutions and identify where NWAs
18 might be more cost-effective.¹⁸⁹ A typical deferred investment by NWAs is

¹⁸⁸ ConEd Climate Study, p. 49

¹⁸⁹ Duke Energy (2020, January). ISOP Stakeholder Webinar. Retrieved at: <https://www.duke-energy.com/media/pdfs/our-company/200062/isop-webinar-1-presentation.pdf?la=en>.

1 increased line capacity, which is a major component of the Self-Optimizing Grid
2 GIP project.¹⁹⁰

3 **Q. Do you believe the Grid Improvement Plan appropriately considered DERs**
4 **and NWAs in the development of potential solutions?**

5 A. No. DERs and NWAs are disruptive solutions, and they require proactive analysis
6 and planning to be fully valued in utility planning. First, the utility needs the data
7 to understand DER benefits. That includes both climate vulnerability, ascertained
8 through a vulnerability study as demonstrated above, and detailed distribution
9 operations data created through an integrated distribution planning process. Then,
10 the utility should use a systematic solutions selection process that incorporates
11 climate and distribution data, values co-benefits, and fairly values DERs against
12 traditional solutions.

13 The Company did not pursue these steps before developing the Grid
14 Improvement Plan. By pursuing its grid modernization planning in this manner, the
15 Company constrained the role of DERs in its Plan and likely lost potential cost-
16 effectiveness benefits for both the Company and its customers.

17 **Q. Are there any programs proposed in the Grid Improvement Plan that you**
18 **approve?**

19 A. Yes. The Integrated Systems & Operations Planning program is a truly innovative
20 program that could enable a more dynamic grid, and its Advanced Distribution

¹⁹⁰ Oliver, Ex. 10.

1 Planning and Morecast components both represent major steps forward in
2 analytical capacities for distribution planning. We support this program.

3 Similarly, IVVC is a program with a high benefit-to-cost ratio and many
4 clear benefits. We support the Company's investment in this program.

1 A. The strong presumption is that general rate proceedings are the primary forum for
2 evaluating the prudence of utility investments, updating the utility rate base to
3 reflect the addition of such investments, and capturing in rates the impact on
4 operating expenses, depreciation and return associated with such investments. In the
5 case of large capital investments, the use of an allowance for funds used during
6 construction (AFUDC) typically provides adequate compensation for a utility's
7 undertaking of significant multi-year investments. Through AFUDC, the utility is
8 allowed to capitalize the financing costs of such investments prior to their
9 completion and inclusion in rate base, with such capitalized costs being added to
10 the original investment upon which the utility is allowed to earn a return and which
11 is amortized over time through depreciation. This is the ordinary and routine
12 ratemaking process for large capital investments.

13 **Q. Why is the Company seeking extraordinary treatment for the GIP investments**
14 **made in years 2020 through 2022 in this case?**

15 A. The Company contends that costs related to the Grid Improvement Plan are “major,
16 non-routine investments, that produce substantial customer benefit,” and that this
17 description “meets the Commission’s traditional test for deferral.” Company
18 Witness McManeus also notes that absent deferral the Company will “experience a
19 significant adverse earnings impact.”¹⁹³ According to the Company’s testimony, in
20 the absence of the requested deferred accounting treatment, the “earnings

¹⁹³ McManeus Direct, p. 39, ll. 7-18.

1 degradation is expected to grow to over 100 basis points by 2022, the third year of
2 the plan.”¹⁹⁴

3 **Q. Is the relief sought in this case similar to the relief sought in the last case with**
4 **the Power/Forward grid investment and modernization initiative?**

5 A. Yes. As discussed above, in its previous rate case, the Company sought permission
6 to recover Power/Forward costs through either a bill rider or deferral into a
7 regulatory asset for similar cited reasons.¹⁹⁵

8 **Q. Why did the Commission deny extraordinary treatment of expenses incurred**
9 **outside of the test year in the previous rate case?**

10 A. As cited above, the Commission found that “the reasons DEC says underlie the
11 need to Power Forward are not unique or extraordinary... [they] are all issues the
12 Company [has] to confront in the normal course of providing electric service... A
13 number of the Power Forward programs ...are the kinds of activities in which the
14 Company engages or should engage on a routine and continuous basis.”¹⁹⁶

15 **Q. Are you aware of Senate Bill 559, which was passed by the North Carolina**
16 **General Assembly in 2019?**

17 A. Yes. My understanding of Senate Bill 559 is that a major feature cut from the bill
18 before it passed would have authorized utilities to request, and the Commission to
19 grant, multi-year rate plans.

¹⁹⁴ McManeus Direct, p. 39, ll. 12-14.

¹⁹⁵ Order Accepting Stipulation, Deciding Contested Issues, and Requiring Revenue Reduction, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146 et al. p. 142-145. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=80a5a760-f3e8-4c9a-a7a6-282d791f3f23>.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

1 **Q. Would a multi-year rate plan provide a means for addressing situation for**
2 **which the Company is seeking extraordinary relief for these GIP expenses**
3 **incurred outside of the test year?**

4 A. Yes. While the elements of a multi-year rate plan would typically be established
5 through the ratemaking process, a likely element would be the periodic updating of
6 the utility's rate base to reflect anticipated major capital investments, such as the
7 Grid Improvement Program. Allowing the utility to update its rate base to include
8 such investments (and the associated expenses) would go a long way towards
9 eliminating the impact of regulatory lag, which seems to be the primary motivation
10 in the Company's request for deferred accounting in this case. According to the
11 Company, in the absence of deferred accounting, its earned return on equity would
12 erode by 100 basis points by the end of the third year of the Grid Improvement
13 Plan. (Of course, that assumes the Company would not file more frequent rate cases
14 as a means of updating its rate base, which is another tool available to a utility to
15 minimize the impact of regulatory lag.)

16 **Q. Based on your knowledge of other states, do multi-year rate plans provide a**
17 **more appropriate basis for regulatory consideration of forward year**
18 **investments, such as those sought here?**

19 A. Multi-year rate plans are certainly one means of addressing the issue, assuming
20 there is the statutory authority for entering into such plans. (Even in the absence of
21 express statutory authority, it is sometimes possible for multi-year rate plans to be
22 implemented through agreement by all parties in a proceeding, as is commonly

1 done through settlements in rate cases involving the New York electric utilities.)
2 As part of a multi-year rate plan, I would expect to see a mechanism established
3 that would provide the same level of scrutiny for evaluating the prudence of forward
4 year investments. In other words, the traditional general rate case process provides
5 a good forum for closely scrutinizing the reasonableness of the expenditures and
6 whether the utility has borne its burden of proof in showing that it is undertaking
7 such investments in a manner that minimizes the long-term costs for its customers.
8 Any multi-year rate plan would need to include a process that includes these
9 essential protections for customers. We discuss this in the following section.

10 **Q. Why would a major, comprehensive grid investment scheme like GIP not fit**
11 **within a utility's ordinary course of seeking cost recovery through rate cases?**

12 A. It typically would, for the reasons stated above, and the Company has the burden
13 to show why the extraordinary remedy of deferred accounting is necessary. As
14 noted above, the Company's position is that the Grid Improvement Plan comprises
15 "major, non-routine investments, that produce substantial customer benefit," and
16 that its request "meets the Commission's traditional test for deferral." Whether or
17 not the Company's proposal is acceptable to the Commission, of course, is entirely
18 up to the Commission; as discussed below, the Commission has substantial
19 discretion in deciding whether or not to allow deferred accounting, and to define
20 the terms under which deferred accounting will be allowed.

1 **Q. When generation and transmission projects are proposed, which are often**
2 **multiple-year construction projects with long lead times, does the Commission**
3 **have a process for determining whether the project is necessary?**

4 A. Yes. It is fairly common for utilities to be required to secure a Certificate of Public
5 Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”), which requires the utility to demonstrate
6 that the generating or transmission project is necessary and that the costs are
7 reasonable. North Carolina has a similar requirement in the case of generating
8 plants (NC GS 110.1) and transmission lines (NC GS 62-105a).

9 **Q. Do major, comprehensive grid investment schemes like the GIP fall within a**
10 **regulatory gap?**

11 A. I think the Company has made a decent case that the current ratemaking
12 mechanisms available to it do not fit well with the type of projects comprising the
13 Grid Improvement Plan. As described in the Company’s testimony, most of the
14 projects included within the Grid Improvement do not, because of their magnitude
15 and duration, qualify for the AFUDC treatment that was mentioned earlier. There
16 will be some earnings erosion associated with implementing the Grid Improvement
17 Plan in the absence of deferred accounting or a multi-year rate plan that includes
18 periodic updating of the Company’s rate base. In addition to the earnings impacts,
19 there is probably a strong basis for providing a regulatory forum for evaluating and
20 approving a comprehensive multi-year program that does not fit neatly within the
21 standard general rate case.

1 **Q. Are major, comprehensive grid investment schemes like the GIP more**
2 **prevalent around the country in the last decade?**

3 A. Yes, there are several states that are moving towards a more comprehensive grid
4 planning process, given the fundamental changes that are underway in the electric
5 utility industry. For the most part, this process is necessary to accommodate the
6 expanded use of DERs given the failure of traditional planning processes to
7 integrate DERs into long-term planning (historically was based on one-way power
8 flows from the utility's large, centralized generating stations to end use customers).
9 Both California and New York are well down the path of requiring utilities to
10 engage with stakeholders in distribution system planning which, among other
11 things, identifies the opportunities for strategic deployment of DERs by third
12 parties that can result in lower costs to ratepayers over time. Another driver for
13 comprehensive grid planning is addressing the impacts of climate change, which
14 similarly requires a departure from the traditional planning model that was based
15 largely on historical trends in customer and load growth rather than considering the
16 impact of rising temperatures and sea level, and the increasing frequency of extreme
17 weather events.

18 **Q. Does a deferral accounting request, such as the Company has proposed here**
19 **for the GIP expenses incurred in the years 2020 through 2022, provide the**
20 **Commission the same opportunity to evaluate the reasonableness of the**
21 **proposed investments before they are built as a CPCN process?**

1 A. No. Deferred accounting, almost by its very nature, does not produce the same level
2 of regulatory scrutiny as is afforded by the traditional ratemaking processes of
3 general rate cases and the CPCN process.

4 **Q. Does the practice of using the extraordinary relief of deferral accounting for**
5 **the GIP shift risks to ratepayers?**

6 A. Yes. In general, ratepayers' interests are well-served by the reliance on traditional
7 general rate cases for setting rates, and the associated regulatory lag that produces
8 a strong incentive for a utility to hold down costs. Streamlining that process through
9 the use of deferred accounting reduces the regulatory oversight that results from the
10 general rate case process, and largely eliminates the economic incentive from
11 regulatory lag to hold down costs.

12 **Q. Going forward, do you have any recommendations for addressing this current**
13 **regulatory gap to provide better oversight of forward year investment schemes**
14 **for the Commission and steady revenue recovery for the Company?**

15 A. Yes. As discussed in the next section, we recommend a regulatory scheme that
16 involves (1) a rigorous planning process that, among other things, properly
17 integrates the impacts of climate change, and (2) addresses the Company's
18 legitimate concerns about rate recovery while providing strong incentives for the
19 Company to engage in a planning process that is geared toward minimizing the
20 costs borne by its customers over time (which necessarily requires the integration
21 of climate change impacts).

22 **B. Need for an Integrated System Planning Process**

1 **Q. You recommend a new, integrated system planning process to address the**
2 **regulatory gap that the Company is temporarily trying to fill with its**
3 **extraordinary deferral accounting request. Please describe that**
4 **recommendation.**

5 A. Future investments in the Company's grid must be subject to a process that
6 thoroughly considers the impacts of such investments in addressing, and
7 minimizing, climate change-related impacts. Given what we know about the impact
8 of past extreme weather events on the Company's system, it is imperative that any
9 future grid investment be evaluated in light of the Company's vulnerability to
10 climate-driven risks, and how such investments address those risks. Such an
11 analysis is essential if the Commission is to fulfill its obligation to minimize the
12 long-term rate impacts to the Company's customers, and to maximize the reliability
13 (at reasonable costs) of the electric service provided to the Company's customers.

14 **Q. Is there any precedent of a utility commission initiating such a process out of**
15 **a general rate case proceeding?**

16 A. Yes. The process with which we are most familiar is the Con Edison rate proceeding
17 in New York following Superstorm Sandy, which occurred in October 2012.

18 **Q. How is the Con Edison rate case example similar to the current case?**

19 A. Following Superstorm Sandy in October 2012, Con Edison in January 2013 filed a
20 massive general rate request proposing to "harden the utility's system" in response
21 to Con Edison's experience in coping with Superstorm Sandy. Among other things,
22 Con Edison promised to spend \$1 billion over the next four years to harden its

1 system in response to what it learned during Superstorm Sandy. In response, several
2 environmental organizations filed testimony as the “Clean Energy Parties” to
3 propose a different strategy, based on lessons learned in terms of “where the lights
4 stayed on” during Superstorm Sandy (i.e., areas served by microgrids and DERs).
5 Among other things, the Clean Energy Parties proposed that Con Edison’s proposed
6 grid expenditures be subjected to a rigorous examination of their resilience benefits,
7 by subjecting the expenditures to examination by a Storm Hardening and Resiliency
8 Collaborative. In other words, rather than following a “business as usual” approach
9 of spending money to harden the system in light of the most recent extreme weather
10 event, the utility was expected to evaluate its T&D expenditures in a manner that
11 would improve its grid resilience in light of climate change and the increasing
12 frequency of extreme weather events. That process ultimately led to the
13 development of the Climate Change Vulnerability Study, which was released by
14 Con Edison in December 2019, attached as Exhibit JMV-TF-4.

15 **Q. In what ways does the climate resilience grid investment strategy outlined in**
16 **the Con Edison Climate Change Vulnerability Study similar to the GIP?**

17 A. There is very little similarity to the rigorous process followed by Con Edison in its
18 Climate Change Vulnerability Study to the process followed by the Company in
19 developing its Grid Improvement Plan. In contrast to the Company’s failure to
20 consider the impact of likely trends with respect to temperature, sea level rise or
21 the frequency of extreme weather events, the Climate Change Vulnerability Study
22 performed by Con Edison considered the range of scenarios involving, among other

1 things, anticipated temperature, humidity and sea level increases, as well as the
2 frequency of extreme weather events, and evaluated the value of its grid
3 investments according to the resilience benefits that such investments would
4 provide to the grid.

5 **Q. Compared to the recommended grid investment strategy outlined in the Con**
6 **Edison report, does the GIP present a comprehensive strategy to approach**
7 **resiliency on a system-wide basis?**

8 A. No, the Company’s Grid Improvement Plan is woefully deficient with respect to
9 the integration of climate change impacts in its long-term planning, for the reasons
10 discussed in the preceding section.

11 **Q. Based on your experience, what process provides the best means to match the**
12 **state policy goals with the Company’s stated investment strategy and**
13 **objectives?**

14 A. As described in the preceding sections of this testimony, North Carolina has
15 recognized the imminent threat associated with climate change, and has articulated
16 broad policy objectives that are consistent with minimizing that threat—through
17 mitigation measures such as reduction in GHG emissions—as well as the measures
18 necessary to address adaptation to the “new normal” going forward. The
19 Company’s Grid Improvement Plan neither addresses the mitigation possibilities
20 nor the adaptation measures that are necessary to cope with climate change-related
21 risks through achieving increased resilience in the Company’s network.

22 **C. Prudency and Burden of Proof in Light of Climate-Related Risks**

1 **Q. What is the utility’s obligation to address the risks associated with climate**
2 **change in its rate filings?**

3 A. Nothing is different about the utility’s obligation to demonstrate that its actions—
4 as incorporated in its rate proposals—reflect the investments and expenditures that
5 result in the lowest costs to customers over time. In order to recover their proposed
6 expenditures in rates, utilities generally must demonstrate that they are prudently
7 managing their expenses, and proceeding down a path of making investments and
8 incurring expenditures that result in reasonable rates to customers over time. The
9 risks associated with climate change now need to be part of that ratemaking
10 equation. If utilities fail to take climate change risks into account, and continue to
11 make investments in T&D infrastructure or incur other expenditures that fail to
12 improve the resilience of the utility grid in the face of climate change, they run the
13 risk of having those investments disallowed as imprudent. As a matter of prudent
14 utility practice, utilities have the obligation to demonstrate that they have integrated
15 the risks associated with climate change into their long-term planning for T&D
16 investments, and the associated expenditures.

17 **Q. How does the threat of climate change affect the utility’s burden of proof in**
18 **rate proceedings?**

19 A. If a utility fails to demonstrate that it is proceeding down a path that takes climate
20 change-related risks into account and minimizes the costs to customers after taking
21 those associated climate change-related risks into account, their T&D investments
22 (and associated expenditures) are subject to disallowance. It is the “new normal”

1 with respect to prudent utility practice. It is no longer acceptable to expect to
2 recover in rates the investments that are made, if such investments are not mindful
3 of the impacts of climate change and are not designed to improve grid resilience in
4 light of such climate change.

5 **Q. How would you define adequate consideration of climate vulnerabilities?**

6 A. The Con Edison Climate Change Vulnerability Study probably represents the
7 current state of the art in demonstrating how an electric utility should integrate the
8 likely impacts of climate change in its long-term planning process. The extent to
9 which utilities should be expected to integrate the risks associated with climate
10 change in their long-term planning should depend on the circumstances unique to
11 each utility. In that regard, the Company faces an enhanced obligation to integrate
12 climate change into its long-term planning, given the extent to which the financial
13 community has identified the Company as having some of the greatest exposures
14 to climate change impacts of any electric utility in the country. Thus, the
15 Company's failure to integrate such impacts into its analysis affects not only the
16 level of operating costs it incurs over time, but also the capital costs borne by its
17 customers to the extent that the financial community perceives that the Company
18 is doing a poor job of managing those risks, and accordingly demands a higher cost
19 of capital for the costs of financing the Company's investments.

20 **Q. Are you aware of any processes underway in North Carolina that the**
21 **Company could utilize existing climate science and climate analytics to inform**
22 **its decision making?**

1 A. Yes. As noted above, there is a current proceeding at the North Carolina
2 Department of Environmental Quality—Phase 2 of the climate risk and resilience
3 group—that is relevant to the type of analysis that should be required of the
4 Company going forward. NCICS has performed a high-value granular analysis of
5 likely climate conditions in North Carolina through the remainder of the century
6 (publication pending). Through funding from the US Department of Energy, the
7 NC State Clean Energy Technology Center is hosting a collaborative process that
8 is going to look precisely at this issue.

9 **Q. Would it be reasonable for the Company to utilize the data and expertise**
10 **gathered from these various working groups to inform its own system**
11 **planning process with the best available climate science and scenario analysis**
12 **techniques?**

13 A. Yes. In fact, it would be unreasonable, and inconsistent with prudent utility
14 practice, for the Company to fail to incorporate these resources to help prioritize
15 strategies and investments to improve the resilience of the Company's network in
16 the face of increasing risks from climate change.

17 **Q. Did the Company perform any forward-looking analysis of climate-related**
18 **data to inform its recommended GIP investments?**

19 A. No. As described in the preceding section, the Company failed to take into account
20 what we currently know about possible scenarios regarding temperature, humidity,
21 precipitation, and sea level increases over time. It is irresponsible, and contrary to
22 prudent utility practice, to base long-term planning on historical trends that simply

1 do not reflect the new reality of the impacts of climate change going forward. And
2 the consequence of this failure would be to impose unnecessary costs on the
3 Company's customers, which would be disallowed in the typical ratemaking
4 process. The better outcome than relying on the end-loaded disallowance, of course,
5 is to require the Company to engage in a rigorous planning process that integrates
6 the impact of climate change.

7 **Q. Does this mean the Company's GIP fails to carry the burden of proof at this**
8 **time?**

9 A. No, there is not enough data available as of yet to determine if the Company made
10 the most prudent prioritization and investments in light of its actual, projected
11 climate risk. However, the failure to even attempt to quantify and identify its
12 climate vulnerabilities, in our view, dramatically increases the risk that these
13 investments could prove more costly to ratepayers over time than investments made
14 under a strategy that diligently considered and mitigates future climate
15 vulnerabilities.

16 **Q. If you are not recommending disallowance now based on the Company's**
17 **failure to consider climate risk, why should the Commission consider climate**
18 **risk as a necessary consideration to justify the prudence of these types of**
19 **climate-vulnerable infrastructure investments going forward?**

20 A. The risks are intensifying and the impacts are growing. The need to mitigate to be
21 cost-effective is growing. The visibility and confidence level of future climate data
22 are growing. Based on the standard of doing what a reasonable manager would do

1 based on what they know or *should know*, willful blindness to the reality of climate
2 change going forward cannot be a defense. The Company simply must do better if
3 it is to fulfill its fundamental obligation to engage in practices that result in the
4 lowest costs to its customers over time.

5 **D. Incentive Mechanisms to Encourage Integration of Climate-Related**
6 **Risks**

7 **Q. How can the Company be encouraged to integrate climate-related risks into**
8 **its long-term system planning?**

9 A. As noted above, the Commission has considerable discretion in deciding whether
10 or not to authorize deferred accounting treatment for the Company's Grid
11 Improvement Plan. The Commission previously rejected deferred accounting
12 treatment for the Company's proposed Power Forward program, which in many
13 ways is replicated by the Company's proposal in this case with respect to the Grid
14 Improvement Program. Notwithstanding the similarities, the Commission has the
15 authority to address any perceived deficiencies through a properly structured
16 incentive mechanism. We recommend consideration of a performance-based
17 incentive mechanism that would properly penalize or reward the Company for
18 integrating climate change-related risks into its long-term system planning.

19 **Q. What are the elements of this performance-based incentive mechanism?**

20 A. As noted earlier in this testimony, the Company is seeking to defer the investment
21 and costs related to its Grid Improvement Plan, and to earn a return equal to its
22 weighted average cost of capital (WACC) on the unamortized balance. The

1 Commission has the discretion to determine whether or not to grant the Company's
2 deferral request and, correspondingly, has the authority to impose conditions on
3 granting that request. We recommend that the Company's ability to earn its WACC
4 on the unamortized balance of Grid Improvement Plan investments be subject to a
5 performance-based incentive mechanism. In other words, the extent to which the
6 Company is allowed to earn its WACC should be a function of its success in
7 integrating climate change-related risks into its Grid Improvement Plan. We
8 propose that the portion of the WACC be weighted according to the Company's
9 success in achieving certain prescribed metrics that reflect the integration of climate
10 change-related risks into long-term system planning.

11 **Q. How would such an incentive mechanism operate?**

12 A. If the Company does a good job of meeting such metrics, it would be allowed to
13 earn its WACC on the unamortized balance. If the Company falls short, the return
14 it is allowed to earn on the unamortized balance would be less than its WACC. To
15 make the incentive mechanism symmetrical, the Company should have an
16 opportunity to earn a return greater than its WACC. In other words, the Company
17 should be rewarded to the extent that it does an exemplary job of integrating climate
18 change-related risks, and could earn a return in excess of its WACC upon exceeding
19 the prescribed metrics.

20 **Q. Is there precedent for such a performance-based mechanism?**

21 A. Yes. Under the Future Energy Jobs Act passed by the Illinois legislature in
22 December 2016, electric utilities in that state have the option of capitalizing the

1 investment they make in energy efficiency measures, and to amortize such
2 investment over the measures' useful lives. The return they earn on the unamortized
3 balance of such investments is subject to performance-based metrics that capture
4 the utilities' respective performance in achieving energy efficiency savings. The
5 performance-based incentives under the Future Energy Jobs Act operate to reward
6 utilities for exceeding their energy efficiency savings targets and to impose
7 penalties if they fall short.¹⁹⁷ Another example is the use of earnings adjustment
8 mechanisms by the New York Public Service Commission as part of its Reforming
9 the Energy Vision ("REV") programs. Under the "Track Two" Order in the REV
10 proceeding, a utility can be provided with incentives up to the dollar equivalent of
11 100 basis points of its return on equity based on their ability to implement various
12 measures that are consistent with REV objectives, such as facilitating
13 interconnection of DERs, increasing electric usage intensity (i.e. reducing peak and
14 improving load factor), encouraging customer engagement, and implementing
15 beneficial electrification programs (e.g., heat pumps) geared toward greenhouse gas
16 reductions.¹⁹⁸

17 **Q. What sort of metrics could be included in such a mechanism to capture the**
18 **Company's integration of climate change-related risks?**

¹⁹⁷ The Future Energy Jobs Bill (SB 2814) was enacted into law on December 7, 2016, as Public Act 99-0906, with an effective date of June 1, 2017.

¹⁹⁸ Case 14-M-0101, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework (May 19, 2016), pp. 53-93.

1 A. There are several measures that would reflect the improvement in the resilience of
2 the Company's network in the face of climate change risks, such as
3 (1) improvements in reliability-related statistics (e.g., SAIDI, SAIFI, or MAIFI),
4 (2) hosting capacity for DERs (measured in kW), (3) voltage reductions (measured
5 as average annual voltage by circuit), (4) demand response from time-varying rates
6 (measured in kW), (5) participation in time-varying rates (as a percentage of
7 customers), or (6) operational savings, measured in dollars or dollars per average
8 bill. These metrics would capture the sort of benefits that one should expect from
9 large investments in the Company's grid. These performance targets should be
10 quantifiable, not subjective; should include achievement dates; and be based on
11 outcomes, not processes.

12 **Q. How would this mechanism and these metrics be established?**

13 A. These issues are beyond the scope of this proceeding, and should be considered in
14 a subsequent proceeding on comprehensive and integrated grid planning. The
15 record in this case would simply not support a thorough evaluation consideration
16 of these issues, which would benefit from a full examination by all the interested
17 stakeholders.

1

7. CLIMATE RISK AND CUSTOMERS

2 **Q. How do customers figure into the discussion of utilities and climate risk?**

3 A. Customers are directly affected by the impacts of climate-related physical risks,
4 with respect to both the quality/reliability of their service and the costs of that
5 service. Upon the occurrence of an extreme weather event, customers' electric
6 service is subject to interruption for extended periods. Actions by the utility to
7 improve the resilience of the grid thus should reduce the adverse impacts on service
8 arising from extreme weather events. Similarly, integration of climate change-
9 related risks in the utility's long-term system planning should result in lower costs
10 for customers over time, as the utility will avoid or minimize investments in
11 facilities that are vulnerable to extreme weather events, thereby minimizing the
12 storm damage costs that ultimately are recovered in utility rates. The extent to
13 which utilities engage in resilience-related investments to reduce their climate-
14 related risks thus redound to the benefit of customers.

15 **Q. Are there particular groups that are expected to be more vulnerable to the**
16 **electric service-related impacts of climate change?**

17 A. Climate adaptation and vulnerability studies show that the most socially vulnerable
18 households today often bear the most exposure to climate-related risks.^{199,200} These

¹⁹⁹ Lynn, K., MacKendrick, K., & Donoghue, E., (2011, August). Social Vulnerability and Climate Change: Synthesis of Literature. *US Forest Service*. Retrieved at: https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr838.pdf.

²⁰⁰ U.S. Global Change Research Program (2016). The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United States: A Scientific Assessment. *Populations of Concern*. Retrieved at: <https://health2016.globalchange.gov/populations-concern>.

1 households often lack access to resources necessary to cope with climate-related
2 shocks and stresses. Specifically, low-income households and communities of
3 color²⁰¹—commonly referred to as “environmental justice communities”—and
4 those at home who are medically dependent on electricity²⁰² are especially likely to
5 be vulnerable to climate-related risks. Thus, the consequences of a utility’s failure
6 to integrate climate change-related risks into its long-term system planning will fall
7 disproportionately on segments of the population least capable of coping with the
8 impacts.

9 **Q. Are there potential customer programs that the Company could pursue**
10 **through ISOP, or otherwise, that could address the needs of their most**
11 **vulnerable customers and communities?**

12 A. Yes. As discussed above, DERs have unique resilience benefits in that they can
13 generate energy closest to where it is needed. With the right kind of forward-
14 looking planning, DERs could be deployed through ISOP or other resource
15 planning proceedings to equip these communities with the assets and resources to
16 withstand climate-related risks. Some examples of potential programs could be
17 storage “resilience hubs” in vulnerable neighborhoods, or behind-the-meter solar
18 plus storage programs for medically vulnerable ratepayers.

²⁰¹ Coffee, J. (2018, February). Climate Disasters Hurt the Poor the Most. Here’s What We Can Do About it. *Governing*. Retrieved at: <https://www.governing.com/commentary/col-disasters-disadvantaged-climate-justice.html>.

²⁰² Dominianni, C., Ahmed, M., Johnson, S., Blum, M., Ito, K., Lane, K., (2018, July). Power Outage Preparedness and Concern among Vulnerable New York City Residents. *Journal of Urban Health*. Retrieved at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6181821/>.

1 **Q. What are your recommendations to protect customers, and in particular low-**
2 **income customers, from the rate impacts associated with climate change-**
3 **related risk and grid resiliency strategies going forward?**

4 A. Ultimately, prudent management of climate-related risks by the utility should
5 produce the desired effect of minimizing rate impacts of climate-related risks and,
6 to the extent such risks are not managed prudently, regulators have a responsibility
7 to ensure that imprudent costs are not passed on to customers, whether low-income
8 or not. The Commission is uniquely situated to exercise its full range of options to
9 minimize rate impacts through, among other things, the period over which grid
10 resilience investments are amortized or how such costs are allocated to customer
11 classes.

12 Targeted climate resilience investments could also provide relief for low-
13 income customers. Solar plus storage investments, for example, could decrease
14 bills while ensuring resilience against climate impacts. Equitable access to such
15 measures, of course, is a challenge, and the Commission may wish to focus
16 particular attention to developing programs that facilitate access to such
17 investments by environmental justice communities.

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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Q. Based on your review of the Company’s filing and emerging electric utility trends, what conclusions do you reach in this testimony?

A. We reach the following conclusions:

- Climate-related risks, emerging in many vectors, have a material and substantial bearing on the Company’s operations today and will continue to affect operations in the future. Collaborative processes in North Carolina are at work today to assess these risks and their implications for the electric grid.
- The Company faces demonstrable physical risks from climate change and increasing scrutiny on climate risk management from relevant financial institutions.
- As a potential foundational investment for the 21st century grid, any grid modernization plan should consider best climate resilience practices alongside grid modernization best practices. This includes the fair assessment of distributed energy resources as climate resilience and grid modernization solutions.
- The Grid Transformation Plan, as filed, does not assess or respond to climate-related risks, nor does it adhere to grid modernization best practices. As a result, the Company’s proposal does not provide enough information to indicate that the Plan is a prudent investment.

Q. Based on your review of the Company’s filing and emerging electric utility trends, what recommendations do you make in this testimony?

- 1 A. We respectfully ask that the Commission should:
- 2 • Direct the Company to assess and manage climate-related risks across its
- 3 operations and assets, in accordance with prudent utility practice.
- 4 • Make clear that it will apply this standard to Grid Improvement Plan
- 5 investments by the Company.
- 6 • Direct the Company to participate in ongoing Department of Environmental
- 7 Quality stakeholder processes around grid modernization and integrate data,
- 8 findings, and recommendations, into its grid modernization investments. The
- 9 Commission should further require that the Company file a report by December
- 10 31, 2020 identifying any gaps in knowledge that need to be filled through
- 11 further collaboration.
- 12 • Require the Company to develop large distribution investments such as the Grid
- 13 Improvement Plan through an integrated distribution planning (IDP) or
- 14 integrated systems & operations planning (ISOP) process moving forward.
- 15 • To the extent that Grid Improvement Plan projects are permitted deferred
- 16 recovery, impose performance-based conditions on the recovery of such
- 17 deferred amounts in rates, such as through adjustments to the weighted average
- 18 cost of capital applied to the unamortized balance of deferred amounts.

19 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

20 A. Yes.