

EXHIBIT 1



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

VENONA

PART # 1 OF 1

PAGES AVAILABLE THIS PART 74

VENONA

FBI DOCUMENTS OF HISTORIC INTEREST
RE VENONA THAT ARE REFERENCED IN
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN'S BOOK "SECRECY"

~~TOP SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd
FROM : Mr. Belmont
SUBJECT: [redacted] ESPIONAGE - R [redacted] (u)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE [redacted] MAY 15, 1990 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to briefly summarize the important investigative developments in this case and individuals closely related thereto, based on [redacted] information.

INTRODUCTION:

[redacted] (s) has been able to furnish to us certain fairly detailed information regarding MEB (Soviet Intelligence) activities in the United States in the period April, 1944, through March, 1945. The [redacted] information indicates the extensive use of cover names by the MEB which often makes identifications difficult where we have little information available from the source. In the following material an effort has been made to break down the information from [redacted] into individual networks, particularly in those instances where we previously had investigated certain ramifications of the Soviet espionage activity in this country.

THE SILVERMASTER NETWORK (u)

The [redacted] (s) information deals in part with the operations of the MEB in their recruitment and use of personnel in various Government agencies previously known to us through our investigation in the Nathan Gregory Silvermaster case. The individuals positively or tentatively identified from [redacted] include Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Helen Silvermaster, Ludwig Ullman, Bela Gold, Sonia Gold, Victor Parlo, Elizabeth Bentley, Jacob Golos, Harry Magdoff, Peter Rhodes, Allen Rosenberg, Harold Glasser, Anatoli B. Gromov, Joseph Katz, and Vladimir S. Pravdin, all of whom were implicated in the information furnished to us by Elizabeth Bentley.

In addition to the foregoing, we have a considerable number of individuals attached to the same network, identified only through cover names, whom we are attempting by investigation to identify. The most important of these is an individual by the cover name of Albert, who, from the [redacted] information, operated

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(106)
(Per NSA LTR DTD 7/1/57)

Special Agent in Charge

Classified by [redacted]
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R.L. [redacted] (u)

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above Silvermaster and was in contact with MGB officials of the New York Soviet Consulate. We have an active investigation in progress to identify Albert, and he will undoubtedly prove to be one of the unidentified principals of Bentley, whom we have not been able to identify based on the information provided by her. (S)

THE ALTSCHULER NETWORK (S)(u)

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You will recall that we have conducted an extensive investigation in the Lydia Altschuler, was., etal, Internal Security - R case concerning an espionage network involving cipher messages in secret ink exchanged between persons in the New York City area and persons in Mexico City and South America. The secret ink messages dealt primarily with the efforts of the espionage parallel to free Frank Jacson, Trotsky's killer, who was imprisoned in Mexico City. You may recall that there were eight messages in the Altschuler traffic which we were never able to decipher because we could not find the book used in the encipherment. From ~~the~~ information we identified this book as "Una Excursion a los Indios Ranqueles," a paper-bound edition published in Argentina. Through this identification our Cryptographic Laboratory has just finished the decipherment of seven of the eight remaining messages intercepted in the Altschuler case. These messages extend the ramifications of the espionage parallel we knew in the Altschuler case and one message shows the network was, in 1943, setting up a radio station in Argentina. One of the messages sets forth that the same code was to be used by the station as in the Altschuler case, and gives the frequency to be used and the time of intended operations. We are attempting to develop whether there is in existence traffic intercepted from such a station. There is some indication that such traffic will be in existence available through either the Armed Forces Security Agency or the FCC. (S)

It is also of considerable interest to note that the radio stations set up at the Soviet Consulates in New York City and San Francisco transmitted messages in code, and among the intercepts available in connection with these two transmitters there have been found intercepts of a station operating on at least one of the frequencies and using one of the call letters set forth in the secret ink messages. A preliminary examination by our Cryptographic Laboratory indicates that we will be able to decipher at least one of these messages, but it is not possible to accurately predict whether we will be able to tie this in with the South American station. As soon as the Cryptographic Laboratory finishes their work this entire matter will be reviewed and analyzed for you and submitted to the Field for further investigation. (S)(u)

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(S) In addition to the foregoing, we have identified through [redacted] two individuals, Floyd C. Miller and Robert Menaker, who were Soviet espionage agents used in the infiltration of the Socialist Workers Party (Trotskyites). Miller was used in connection with the continued infiltration by the Soviets of Mrs. Natalia Trotsky's household in Mexico City. Menaker had been in South America as a representative of the Midland Export Company, a firm operated by Michael Burd. Through a review of the Bureau's files on Burd we developed the identities of two persons, Nicholas and Maria Fisher, who were, in 1944, attempting to enter the United States in transit to Mexico from the Soviet Union. These two persons are undoubtedly identical with persons named by [redacted] as "The Pair" (Cheta). It might be noted that their application to pass in transit through the United States was denied by the Interdepartmental Visa Committee. Further investigation is being actively conducted to determine if these persons did succeed in entering the Western Hemisphere at some other time. We also are investigating to determine the ramifications of the possible use of the Midland Export Company as a Soviet espionage cover. It might be noted that the Midland Export Company did come to our attention in connection with our investigation in the Altschuler case. We are actively investigating this matter to develop its full potentialities.

THE MOCASE (S) (u)

Through [redacted] (S) information we determined that Boris Morros' cover name was Frost (which is the English equivalent of Moroz in Russian, although the Soviets used the name as Frost). Alfred K. Stern, according to [redacted] (S) was designated under the cover name of Louis, and a memorandum prepared by him obtained by us through investigative efforts in February, 1945, was summarized in the [redacted] information and sent by the MGB in New York City to Moscow. While the above has not assisted materially our efforts in investigating the Mocasé, it does furnish corroborative information to that furnished by our informant, Morros.

(S) In addition to the foregoing, there is information from [redacted] regarding a person designated by the cover name of Aida who was working in 1944 for the United Palestine Appeal and the MGB desired to place her with the Committee of Jewish Writers and Artists in New York City where they thought she would be of greater use to them. A tentative identification of this individual has been made as Esther Trebach Rand, who has been implicated in the espionage network in the Mocasé and she is a contact of Jack Soble. We are conducting investigation in an attempt to verify the tentative identification of Rand.

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[KALIBR] (S) (u)

We are currently attempting, through investigation, to identify an employee of MEB at Los Alamos in 1944, designated by the cover names of Kalibr and Schmel. The known facts regarding this individual, from [redacted] are that he was to be contacted near Los Alamos in the latter part of November, 1944, by one Osa. It was later reported that he had been contacted and was willing to assist the MEB. It was also reported that he arrived in New York City on leave in early January, 1945. We originally thought he might be Luis W. Alvarez, a prominent physician now employed at the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley, California, but upon the receipt of the information from the source that the individual had arrived in New York City in early January, 1945, we determined that Alvarez was not there at that time. We are conducting an intensive investigation to develop this individual's identity, hampered by the fact that certain leave records at Los Alamos have been destroyed. We are also, through investigation, attempting to identify Osa. (S) (u)

A [THEODORE ALVIN HALL and SAVILLE SAX] (S) (u)

Recent information from [redacted] (S) reflects that Theodore Hall, in November, 1944, was in New York City, where he was in contact with Saville Sax. Hall, at that time, was employed by MEB at Los Alamos. At the recommendation of Sax, Hall agreed to supply to Soviet Intelligence information concerning work being done at Los Alamos. Hall delivered to Beck (unidentified) certain information, and Sax contacted an official at the Soviet Consulate and delivered to him certain information. Based on the foregoing, an intensive investigation has been instituted. (S) (u)

Theodore Alvin Hall, who is identical with the Hall mentioned in the [redacted] information, presently is employed at the University of Chicago (at the Institute of Nuclear Physics). (S) (u)

Sax also is residing in Chicago, where he is operating a mimeographing business. (S) (u)

Further investigation is being conducted to determine the current activities of these individuals and to identify Beck. (S) (u)

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JUDITH COPLON (S)(u)

As you know, the [redacted] (S) information enabled our identification of Coplon as a Soviet espionage agent. Two other individuals were involved with Coplon in her espionage activity in 1944, one being Marian Davis, now Marian D. Berdecio, who is married and living in Mexico City. She formerly was employed by OWI and by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. We have a pending investigation on Berdecio. The second individual who actually recruited Coplon was Flora Don Wovschin, who presently is married and is believed to be in the Soviet Union. She formerly was employed by OWI and by the State Department. Her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Knos Wicher, are presently in the United States and we are investigating them not only to determine whether they have any connections with Soviet espionage, but also in order that we may learn if Wovschin returns to the United States.

PAUL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS (S)(u)

Our investigation of Fuchs was initiated on information from [redacted] (S) We are currently attempting to identify Fuchs' American espionage contact, "Goose," who not only apparently operated Fuchs while Fuchs was in the United States, but also apparently was to operate Abraham Brotzman, designated by the MCB under the cover name of "Constructor." Brotzman presently is operating a consulting engineering firm in New York City, and instructions have been issued to interview him and various of his associates in an effort to identify "Goose." You will recall that Brotzman was named by Bentley as having furnished information to her in 1940 — a fact admitted in interview by Brotzman. A brief fully detailing the various aspects of this investigation has been submitted for your information.

AMADEO SABATINI (S)(u)

The [redacted] (S) information sets forth the attempts by the MCB to reactivate a person designated by the name of Mik in Los Angeles in June, 1944. The information sets forth that Mik had ceased operations in behalf of a Soviet espionage contact because he was under surveillance by the FBI. He was being recontacted by a Soviet agent designated under the cover names of Douglas and Iks. Mik has been positively identified as Amadeo Sabatini, who has been interviewed and is, to a certain extent, cooperative with us, although he is not willing to furnish us any information.

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which he does not think we know. Sabatini admits espionage in behalf of Gregori Kheifets, a former official at the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. However, Sabatini claims that his recontact in June, 1944, was by Kheifets, while we know definitely that it was not Kheifets and was the individual Douglas. Sabatini also was the cutout between Kheifets and Jones Orin York, an aircraft employee, in 1943, whom we have tentatively identified in the [redacted] information under the cover name of Iglu. York recently admitted his espionage activities (on 4/10/50) in an interview with our agents, and has admitted that he was active from 1937 until 1943. You will recall that he has named as one of his earlier espionage contacts William Wolf Weisband, a present employee of the Armed Forces Security Agency.

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We are attempting, through investigation to identify Douglas, and we have issued instructions to the New York Office to interview [redacted] a Czechoslovakian whom we believe to be identical with Mariya mentioned in the information provided by [redacted] (S) She was being operated by Douglas. If the interview with her is successful we hope to learn the identity of Douglas.

ANDREI IVANOVICH SCHEVCHENKO (S)(u)

You will recall that we conducted an extensive investigation regarding the espionage activities of Andrei Ivanovich Schevchenko, who, in 1943, was attached to the Bell Aircraft Plant at Niagara Falls, New York, as the head Soviet Inspector of that plant. Schevchenko later became Vice President of the Amtorg Trading Corporation. The information from [redacted] reflects that Schevchenko was designated under the cover name of Arseniy and he apparently occupied an important position in the MGB apparatus operating in the United States. It is also of interest to note that both of our double-agent informants, Loren G. Haas and Leona Franey, are mentioned in the information furnished to us by [redacted] and it appears that the MGB believed them to be reliable.

Another individual in this particular network who is mentioned is Vladimir M. Masurin, who also was attached to the Soviet Inspector's Office at the Bell Aircraft Plant in Niagara Falls, and who apparently was recruited by the MGB after he arrived at the plant. It might be noted that we did develop information in the Schevchenko case which indicated that Masurin was operating as a sub-agent for Schevchenko.

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Another individual that we investigated to some extent in connection with the Schevchenko case was Vladimir Morkovin, who was employed at the Ball Aircraft Corporation, Niagara Falls, New York, as a Research Aerodynamicist. Our investigation showed he was in contact with Schevchenko. He was designated in the information from [redacted] under the cover name of Author. Morkovin left his employment at Ball Aircraft in August, 1946, and in January, 1947, took employment at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he presently is working in the Aeronautical Engineering Department, this department having had contracts with the Navy and with the Air Force. We presently are conducting an active investigation concerning Morkovin.

Another individual who was associated with Schevchenko, according to our investigation of him, and who is also mentioned in [redacted] information, is William Pinsky. Pinsky was employed by the Curtis Wright Corporation in Williamsville, New York, on December 22, 1942, in the Aeronautical Engineering Department. He held this position through 1944 and was noted to be in contact with Schevchenko on several occasions. He was designated by the NSB under the cover name of Cork. Instructions have been issued for a current investigation of Pinsky.

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VIKTOR ANDREEVICH KRAVCHENKO (u)

You will recall that in the Spring of 1944 Kravchenko defected from his position with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C. The information from [redacted] reflects that thereafter he was designated by the cover name of Komar by the NSB and they were active in determining his activities and associates. They had a woman designated by the cover name of Oia who was to travel from Washington, D. C., to New York City to establish contact with Lydia Estrin, the mistress of David Dallin, both of whom were active in Russian Social Democratic circles and were assisting Kravchenko. We have not been successful in identifying Oia to date, although we have conducted an extensive investigation in this respect. It also was reported that Oia was acquainted with Laura Peabody Cunningham and the Soviets knew that she was employed by the Naval Communications. We have interviewed Cunningham who is now married to a man by the name of Testoules, and she is still employed by Naval Communications. There is no definite information to the effect that she was ever used by the NSB. We also have interviewed Alexei Stoopsanov who apparently was acquainted with

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both Cunningham and Ols. Stoopnikov has furnished us certain information which has assisted us in our investigation, but has not definitely enabled us to identify Ols. Stoopnikov presently is a State Department employee, working as a guard attached to the American Embassy in Ottawa, Canada.

Another individual who was infiltrating the Russian Social Democratic group which was assisting Kravchenko, was a person designated by the cover name of Tulip. It also appears that he was active in Trotskyite circles. Because of the lack of identifying information concerning him, we have not been successful in identifying him to date, although an active investigation is being carried out.

HENRY A. WALLACE (u)

The information from [redacted] (S) reflects that the Soviets were using two individuals who apparently held positions high in the United States Government and were close acquaintances of Henry A. Wallace in 1944. One of these individuals was designated under the cover name of Jurist and we have not succeeded in identifying him to date. He apparently was in a position to furnish high level information to the Soviets involving such persons as President Roosevelt, Henry A. Wallace, Cordell Hull, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Jurist, on April 29, 1944, furnished to the Soviets the information that Vice President Wallace was to go to China, and it is noted that Wallace actually left for China on May 20, 1944. Jurist apparently was a little afraid of his position in the Government because of his cooperation with the MGB, and stated that an exposure of his connections would lead to a political scandal and might have an effect on the coming elections.

One suspect who has been considered for Jurist is Samuel Irving Rosenman, who was an assistant to President Roosevelt in 1944. However, it might be noted that Rosenman is mentioned by the MGB, according to [redacted] (S) by his real name on one occasion and it has been noted that the MGB, once it designates a man by a cover name, thereafter uses the cover name to the exclusion of the individual's real name at all times.

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Another individual who apparently was close to Wallace, and who is mentioned in the information from [redacted] was an individual designated by the cover name of Frank. Frank was reported to be considering resigning from the State Department as of July 22, 1944, for "personal reasons." The identity of Frank has not been developed to date in view of the fact that the only available information is to the effect that he was well acquainted with Wallace and was to resign as of that date. However, it is interesting to note that Laurence Duggan (deceased), mentioned by Whittaker Chambers and Keda Massing, did resign from the State Department in the latter part of July, 1944. We have investigations in progress to identify both Jurist and Frank.

ALGER HISS (S) (u)

According to [redacted] (S) on March 30, 1945, Anatoli B. Gromov, First Secretary and MGB representative at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., informed his Moscow headquarters that Ales had, for some years, been the leader of a little group working for Soviet Military Intelligence. It was stated that this group was composed mainly of Ales' relatives and that the group, which apparently was centered in the State Department, was working mainly on developing military information only and the information from the State Department interested them very little. It was stated that Ales, after the Yalta conference, had been in touch with a high Soviet official whom Ales implied was Comrade Vishinsky who thanked Ales on behalf of Soviet Military Intelligence. It would appear likely that this individual is Alger Hiss in view of the fact that he was in the State Department and the information from Chambers indicated that his wife, Priscilla, was active in Soviet espionage and he also had a brother, Donald, in the State Department. It also is to be noted that Hiss did attend the Yalta conference as a special adviser to President Roosevelt, and he would, of course, have conferred with high officials of other nations attending the conference. An attempt is being made by analysis of the available information to verify this identification.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY (S) (u)

The [redacted] (S) information reflects that the Soviets were able to make extensive use of the Communist Party, USA, both for recruitment and for checking on various individuals regarding whom the MGB wanted information. Earl Browder was known by the MGB under the cover name [redacted]

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of Bulavoy, and Browder was cognizant of the Soviet activity in the infiltration of various United States Government agencies. There is also some indication in [redacted] information that he knew of other activity on the part of the MGB. We are attempting, through investigation, to identify an individual designated by the cover name of Echo who appears, according to [redacted] to have occupied a responsible position in the Communist Party and to have been used in various ways by the MGB.

MGB SOVIET OFFICIALS (u)

It is not possible, in a memorandum of this length, to detail the information available from [redacted] regarding MGB officials attached to official and semi-official Soviet establishments in the United States. However, certain interesting observations can be made on the basis of [redacted] material. An individual by the name of May was directing the MGB espionage activity which was stemming from the Soviet Consulate in New York City. He undoubtedly was the Legal Resident Agent for the MGB at that Consulate. However, he directed activities which are outside the New York area, reaching to the West Coast, to Los Alamos, and even to Washington, D. C. He has not been identified, and it appears possible that the cover name of May is for the position of Legal Resident Agent rather than for one individual. If this is true, then Vassili Zubilin would probably have been May up until Zubilin's departure from the United States in the latter part of August, 1944. You will recall that Zubilin was attached as a Second Secretary to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., but spent a considerable amount of time in New York City. According to [redacted] information, under May, the Legal Resident Agent, there were individuals in official or semi-official Soviet positions who were designated as "cadre men." These individuals apparently headed various individual networks which were being operated by the MGB in the United States. We have not identified all of these individuals, but have succeeded in identifying a few of them. One of the more important ones was Vladimir S. Pravdin, the former head of the Tass News Agency in New York City. Pravdin was in contact with a number of American correspondents, apparently both on an open and clandestine basis. Among his contacts were persons such as Johannes Steale, Richard Lanterbach, and Stephen Laird. We are conducting investigations on all of these individuals. It is to be

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noted that Laird is presently employed by CBS. Another individual who has been identified with reasonable certainty is Mikhail Chaliapin, who was, in 1944, attached to the Soviet Consulate in New York City, and we had previously conducted investigation concerning him in connection with the Altschuler network during 1943 and 1944. Another individual who was heading a particular network was an individual designated by the cover name of Shtok. This individual may be identical with Seman Markovich Semenov, who was attached to the Amtorg Trading Corporation in 1943 and 1944. Semenov was the subject of an extensive investigation prior to his departure for the Soviet Union in September, 1944. (S)

The Legal Resident Agent at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., following his arrival in the United States in September, 1944, was Anatoli Gromov who, you will recall, we identified in connection with the Silvermaster case. According to [redacted] Gromov, who was designated under the cover name of VETIN, was to take over the activities of the Government network following his arrival. In addition to the individuals mentioned heretofore who were MGB agents attached to official establishments, there is a considerable number that we have not identified to date and there are others who occupied relatively minor positions who have been identified. All of these individuals identified by us have departed from the United States. We are attempting to develop to the fullest possible extent the activities of these individuals even though they have returned to the Soviet Union because their information gives us a fuller insight into MGB activities in this country. (S) (u)

OTHER IDENTIFICATIONS (u)

A brief mention is being made of certain other identifications which have been made from the information supplied by [redacted] (S) (u)

Charles Davila, an individual active in Roumanian circles in the United States, was designated by the MGB under the cover name of Dekar. He apparently was cooperating with the MGB in connection with their interest in Roumanian affairs in 1944. He is being actively investigated. (S) (u)

Roman Moczulski, in 1944, was employed by the Polish Telegraphic Agency, and was being recruited, according to [redacted] by the MGB. He is the subject of a pending investigation. (S) (u)

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Sava N. Kosanovic, Yugoslavian Ambassador to the United States, was designated by the MGB under the cover name of Kolo and he apparently was cooperating with the MGB. Kosanovic is the subject of investigation in connection with Yugoslavian Activities in the United States. (S)(u)

Ivan Subasic who, in 1945, formed a coalition government with Tito in Yugoslavia, was being used by the MGB in 1944 in the United States. He was designated under the cover name of Sares. He is presently in Yugoslavia. (S)(u)

[redacted] in 1944, was in the United States as a French refugee and was active on the newspaper "France-Amerique." The MGB was in contact with him, according to [redacted] and was making arrangements for his future use in connection with his pending departure for Algiers, North Africa. He is presently believed to be in France. (S)(u)

Anton S. Ivancic who, in 1944, was the President of a Yugoslav seaman's club in New York City, was active in behalf of the MGB, and they made arrangements for his being contacted in London upon his return to London. It is to be noted that Ivancic later returned to Yugoslavia where he was killed in an accident, the accident reportedly being a planned affair. The investigation on him has been closed. (S)(u)

RECOMMENDATION

The information contained in this memorandum has been set forth in order to briefly summarize for you the important investigative developments. The [redacted] case is being used as a control file to insure that the individual cases growing out of the information from [redacted] (S) are promptly and vigorously handled. It is contemplated that from time to time memoranda such as this will be prepared in order that the entire picture with respect to the instant investigation will be available to you. (S)(u)

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Very important to press all angles. Please bring this memo up to date from time to time for my information. (u)

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: L. F. Boardman

FROM: A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: ~~_____~~ (S)
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: Feb. 1, 1956

CC - Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Boardman
Tully
B.A. Wells

RETURN TO BELMONT FOR FILING
File in 1734

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Purpose of attached summary is to consider possibilities of using ~~_____~~ information for prosecution. In order to view this matter in its proper perspective it was believed necessary to set forth exactly what ~~_____~~ information is as well as to briefly review the origin and history of how the Bureau came to receive this traffic. Consequently, the attached summary is divided into four parts as follows:

- I. EXPLANATION AND HISTORY OF ~~_____~~ INFORMATION (S)
- II. WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF ~~_____~~ INFORMATION?
- III. NATURE OF ~~_____~~ MESSAGES AND USE OF COVER NAMES (S)
- IV. PROSECUTION
 - A. Advantages
 - B. Disadvantages
 - C. Communications Intelligence Restrictions
 - D. Political Implications
 - E. International Implications
 - F. Effects on Pending Cases

There is no question that justice would be properly served if Judith Coplon and the Silvermaster-Perlo groups could be successfully prosecuted for their crimes against the United States. The introduction into evidence of ~~_____~~ information could be the turning point in the successful prosecution of these subjects; however, a careful study of all factors involved compels the conclusion that it would not be in the best interests of the U.S. or the Bureau to attempt to use ~~_____~~ information for prosecution: 1) the question of law involved—whether or not the ~~_____~~ information would be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule; 2) the fragmentary nature of the messages and the extensive use of cover names therein make positive identifications of the subjects difficult; 3) the severe restrictions surrounding the mention of communications intelligence data and the anticipated objections from the National Security Agency, the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board and perhaps the National Security Council against public disclosure of U.S. efforts and successes in the communications intelligence field.

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Enclosure

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Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

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4) the resultant damage to U.S. efforts in this field if the Soviets learn of the degree of success in breaking their codes during the 1940's; 5) the political implications in this an election year; 6) the international repercussions and resultant Soviet propaganda when it is disclosed that the U.S. intercepted and worked on breaking Soviet coded messages when the countries were allied against the Axis; and 7) the effects on pending espionage cases which are based on [redacted] information. These factors weigh heavily against using [redacted] information for prosecution. ~~(S)~~ (u)

Based on information developed from [redacted] traffic, there has been prosecution of Judith Coplon, Valentin Gubitchev, Emil Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, Alfred Dean Slack, Abraham Brothman, Miriam Moskowitz, David Greenglass, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Morton Sobell and William Perl. All of these cases were investigations instituted by us directly or indirectly from [redacted] information. These prosecutions were instituted without using [redacted] information in court. ~~(S)~~ (u)

RECOMMENDATION:

It is believed that we should continue this policy. ~~(S)~~ (u)

I agree
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(X) TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES OF USING [REDACTED] INFORMATION FOR PROSECUTION (S)

(X) I. EXPLANATION AND HISTORY OF [REDACTED] INFORMATION (S)

[REDACTED] (S) is a small group of cryptographers attached to National Security Agency (NSA) who work on deciphering certain Soviet intelligence messages covering the period 1942-46. These Soviet messages are made up of telegrams and cables and radio messages sent between Soviet intelligence operators in the United States and Moscow. Consequently, this material falls within the category of communications intelligence information and as such it is subject to the most stringent regulations governing dissemination on a "need-to-know" basis. These messages would seem to fall into the same category as teletypes from a field office to the Bureau (in code) and detailed reports were undoubtedly being sent by the MGB (Soviet Intelligence Service) in the diplomatic pouch. The usual Russian method in concealing the text of these messages is to first translate the Russian plain text into code by using a code book and then apply a one-time cipher pad to the code, thus making it practically impossible to recover the message. Interceptions of the [REDACTED] (S) messages were made by the U. S. Army. The intercepted messages consist of a series of numbers. These numbers are placed on work sheets by [REDACTED] and efforts are then made to arrive at the additive (the enciphering process). Once the additive is correctly determined the message can be read by using the MGB code book which has been partially reconstructed by NSA. The chief problem is to develop the additive. This requires painstaking effort by experienced cryptographers who can also translate Russian. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (S) work on this problem and work sheets have been made up by [REDACTED] and sent to [REDACTED] (S). Also, [REDACTED] (S) has a man in England working with [REDACTED] (S). In turn, [REDACTED] (S) have a cryptographer working full-time at [REDACTED] (S).

The first report received by the Bureau on MGB deciphered traffic was received from Army Security Agency (predecessor of NSA) 4/16/48. Colonel L.E. Forney, Intelligence (S)

Classified by [REDACTED] / [REDACTED]
Declassify on: OADR 8/1/85

(S) - Appropriate Agency

[REDACTED] (S)
ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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Division of the Army, advised at that time that the messages given to the Bureau were dated 1944 but the decodes had just been accomplished. Col. Forney advised that the fact that the Army had been able to break into Russian traffic was to be held very closely by the Bureau. The initial decodes also had been distributed to the Navy which was also working on decoding Russian traffic at that time. The Navy in turn informed CIA about the initial decodes. Since that time, however (until May 1952 when CIA began getting [redacted] information), this traffic has not been published, as is other communications intelligence traffic which is distributed to the authorized consumers, but kept on work sheets for security purposes. It was made available only to the Bureau and [redacted]. Some initial decodes of this Russian traffic were fragmentary and full of gaps. Col. Forney felt that the Bureau by studying the messages and conducting investigations would be able to develop information which would assist the Army cryptographers in reading additional unrecovered portions of the messages. The Army stated these messages were part of an MGB system and subsequent study has confirmed that opinion. (S)

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(u) II. WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF [REDACTED] (S) INFORMATION? *

From April 1948 until May 1952 the Bureau was the only U. S. agency, other than NSA, aware of this Russian MGB traffic. During that time [REDACTED] were working on the traffic in conjunction with [REDACTED] and, consequently, we know [REDACTED] were aware of

this traffic. In June 1948 Col. Forney advised that the Navy and Air Force should not be notified of the existence of [REDACTED] (S) information. In May 1952, through the insistence and pressure put on NSA by General Walter Bedell Smith, then head of CIA, that agency was given access to [REDACTED] information and has received and worked on it since that time. Although the Navy, Air Force and State are members of the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and as such are entitled to receive [REDACTED] information, they have not received it to date, except those original decodes which were given to the Navy in April 1948. Thereafter, the Navy was not given any other decodes. (S)

In rare cases where consideration is given to dissemination of [REDACTED] information by the Bureau, clearance is first obtained from NSA and if no objection is raised by that agency the information is paraphrased to protect the source. The information can then be given only to one cleared to receive communications intelligence material. Very few people in the Government are so cleared. (S)

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(u) VII. NATURE OF [REDACTED] (S) MESSAGES AND USE OF COVER NAMES (S)

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The messages [REDACTED] (S) furnishes the Bureau are, for the most part, very fragmentary and full of gaps. Some parts of the messages can never be recovered again because during the actual intercept the complete message was not obtained. Other portions can be recovered only through the skill of the cryptographers and with the Bureau's assistance. Frequently, through an examination of the messages and from a review of Bureau files, the Bureau can offer suspects for individuals involved. When [REDACTED] (S) breaks out a part of the message and reads it to the point where it is determined that reference is being made to certain information derived from U.S. Government records or documents, the Bureau conducts investigation to locate such records or documents. When located, these records are furnished to [REDACTED] (S) and if it turns out to be the correct document, [REDACTED] (S) uses it as a "crib" and thus is able to read previously unrecovered portions of the message. It must be realized that the [REDACTED] (S) cryptographers make certain assumptions as to meanings when deciphering these messages and thereafter the proper translation of Russian idioms can become a problem. It is for such reasons that [REDACTED] (S) has indicated that almost anything included in a translation of one of these deciphered messages may in the future be radically revised. (S)

Another very important factor to be considered when discussing the accuracy of these deciphered messages is the extensive use of cover names noted in this traffic. Once an individual was considered for recruitment as an agent by the Soviets, sufficient background data on him was sent to headquarters in Moscow. Thereafter, he was given a cover name and his true name was not mentioned again. This makes positive identifications most difficult since we seldom receive the initial message which states that agent "so and so" (true name) will henceforth be known as "_____" (cover name). Also, cover names were changed rather frequently and the cover name "Henry" might apply to two different individuals, depending upon the date it was used. Cover names were used for places and organizations as well as for persons, as witnessed by the fact that New York City was "Tyre" and the FBI was "Kata." All of the above factors make difficult a correct reading of the messages and point up the tentative nature of many identifications. (S)

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For example, among the first messages we received in 1948 was one concerning an individual with the cover name "Antenna." The message was dated 5/5/48 and it set forth information indicating that "Antenna" was 25 years of age, a "fellow countryman" (member of CP, USA), lived in "Tyre" (New York), took a course at Cooper Union in 1940, worked in the Signal Corps at Ft. Monmouth, and had a wife named Ethel. We made a tentative identification of "Antenna" as Joseph Weichbrod since the background of Weichbrod corresponded with the information known about "Antenna." Weichbrod was about the right age, had a Communist background, lived in NYC, attended Cooper Union in 1939, worked at the Signal Corps, Ft. Monmouth, and his wife's name was Ethel. He was a good suspect for "Antenna" until sometime later when we definitely established through investigation that "Antenna" was Julius Rosenberg. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Cover names were used not only to designate Soviet agents but other people mentioned in the messages were given cover names. For example, "Kapitan" (Captain) was former President F.D. Roosevelt. A survey of the traffic as a whole suggests that a cover name like "Kapitan" serves a different purpose than cover names assigned to agents operating for the Soviets in an intelligence capacity. The latter type of cover names are presumably designed to protect the person of the agent directly. The "Kapitan" type of cover name merely obscures the sense and thereby affords indirect protection to the agent and at the same time is calculated to baffle foreign intelligence organizations as to just what intelligence is being transmitted. ~~(S)~~ (U)

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(u) (S) IV. PROSECUTION

It is conceivable that if we could use [redacted] (S) information in court the Government might successfully prosecute Judith Coplen and a number of the subjects in the Silvermaster and Perlo groups. It is also evident that a public disclosure of [redacted] (S) information would corroborate Elizabeth Bentley. (S)

Judith Coplen was not mentioned by name in the messages but the identifying information set forth in the [redacted] (S) traffic, dated July 1944 and Jan. 1945, concerning the individual designated by the cover name "Sima" made it certain that "Sima" was Judith Coplen. Our subsequent investigation added additional evidence when it was determined that Coplen was still operating as a Soviet espionage agent in 1949 when she was observed in contact with her Soviet superior, Valentin Gubitchev. (S) (TS)

The [redacted] (S) information tends to fall into certain divisions corresponding to a considerable extent to the divisions apparent in the Silvermaster-Perlo cases. From the data set forth in the messages and from our knowledge of the Silvermaster and Perlo groups, as furnished by Elizabeth Bentley, it appears that Silvermaster is identical with the individual in [redacted] (S) designated by the cover name "Robert." It also appears that "Donald" is William Ludwig Ulman; that Bentley herself is "Good Girl" and "Myrna"; whereas Helen Silvermaster appears to be "Dora"; Abraham George Silverman fits "Aileron" and Jake Golos appears identical with "Zouk." Others in the Silvermaster group have been tentatively identified with individuals designated by cover names in the [redacted] (S) material. (S) (TS)

The Perlo group fits into the [redacted] (S) information when we examine the following message of 5/13/44: (S) (TS)

(S) (u) "Mayor" (unidentified) in NYC personally prepared a report to MGB headquarters in Moscow advising that some unspecified action had been taken regarding "Good Girl" (Bentley) in accordance with instructions of "Helmsman" (Earl Browder). "Mayor" then made reference to winter and also to "Magdoff-Kant" (probably Harry Magdoff). This latter reference was then followed by a statement that in "Good Girl's" opinion "they" are reliable. It was also mentioned that no one had interested himself in their possibilities.

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(u) The name "Stern" (unidentified) was mentioned and it was then reported that "Balder" (Victor Perlo), "Flumb" (Charles Kramer), "Ted" (Edward Fitzgerald) and "Kant" (Harry Magdoff) would take turns coming to NY every two weeks. "Mayer" said "Flumb" and "Ted" knew "Pal" (Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, whose cover name was later changed to "Robert").

With reference to the foregoing, it is to be recalled that Elizabeth Bentley advised that Jacob Golos informed her he had made contact with a group in Washington, D. C., through Earl Browder. After the death of Golos in 1943, two meetings were arranged with this group in 1944. The first meeting was arranged by Browder and is believed to have been held on 2/27/44. The meetings were held in the apartment of John Abt in NYC and Bentley was introduced to four individuals identified as Victor Perlo, Charles Kramer, Harry Magdoff and Edward Fitzgerald. (S)(u)

(S) As can be seen from the above, if the [redacted] messages (and there are several of them) could be introduced into evidence their contents, along with the testimony of Elizabeth Bentley, might convict a number of Silvermaster and Perlo subjects. (S)(u)

(u) (S) 4. Advantages (S)

A The advantages of using [redacted] information for prosecutive benefits (assuming it would be admitted into evidence) are obvious. It would corroborate Elizabeth Bentley and enable the Government to convict a number of subjects such as Judith Coplan and Silvermaster, whose continued freedom from prosecution is a sin against justice. Public disclosure of these messages would vindicate the Bureau in the matter of the confidence we placed in Elizabeth Bentley's testimony. At the same time, the disadvantages of using [redacted] information publicly or in a prosecution appear overwhelming. (S)

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(u) B. Disadvantages

In the first place, we do not know if the deciphered messages would be admitted into evidence and if they were not, that would abruptly end any hope for prosecution. It is believed that the defense attorney would immediately move that the message be excluded, based on the hearsay evidence rule. He would probably claim that neither the person who sent the message (Soviet official) nor the person who received it (Soviet official) was available to testify and thus the contents of the message were purely hearsay as it related to the defendants. Consequently, in order to overcome such a motion it would be necessary to rely upon their admission through the use of expert testimony of those who intercepted the messages and those cryptographers who deciphered the messages. A question of law is involved herein. It is believed that the messages probably could be introduced in evidence on the basis of exception to the hearsay evidence rule to the effect that the expert testimony was sufficient to establish the authenticity of the documents and they were the best evidence available. ~~(S)~~ (u)

Assuming that the messages could be introduced in evidence, we then have a question of identity. The fragmentary nature of the messages themselves, the assumptions made by the cryptographers in breaking the messages, and the questionable interpretations and translations involved, plus the extensive use of cover names for persons and places, make the problem of positive identification extremely difficult. Here, again, reliance would have to be placed on the expert testimony of the cryptographers and it appears that the case would be entirely circumstantial. ~~(S)~~ (u)

A | Assuming further that the testimony of the Government's cryptographers were accepted as part of the Government's case, the defense probably would be granted authority by the court to have private cryptographers hired by the defense examine the messages as well as the work sheets of the Government's cryptographers. Also, in view of the fragmentary nature of the majority of these messages, the defense would make a request to have its cryptographers examine those messages which ~~has~~ been unsuccessful in breaking and which are not in evidence on the premise that such messages, if decoded, could exonerate their clients. This would lead to the exposure of Government techniques and practices in the cryptograph field to unauthorized persons and thus compromise the Government's efforts in the communications intelligence field. Also, this course of action would act to the Bureau's disadvantage since the additional messages would spotlight individuals on whom the Bureau has pending investigations. ~~(S)~~ (u)

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In addition to the question of law involved, there are a number of other factors which weigh against the use of [redacted] information in court. These factors are most important from the Bureau's standpoint. (S)

(U) (S) C. Communications Intelligence Restrictions

[redacted] information is communications intelligence information and, consequently, it is all classified "Top Sec" and is strictly controlled. Reference to the existence of communications intelligence either directly or indirectly must be avoided except among those to whom the information is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. Dissemination of communications intelligence material is not on a "need-to-know" basis and the [redacted] material has been restricted even more so than other communications intelligence data since it has not been published and distributed to USCIB consumers, other than the FBI and, more recently, CIA. Before any decision could be made on using [redacted] information in court the messages would have to be declassified. Such declassification would, of course, have to be passed on by USCIB and it appears evident that the approval would also have to come from the Special Committee of the National Security Council for Communications Intelligence and, as a matter of fact, it probably would necessitate approval of the President. At the same time, it appears that [redacted] would have to be notified since [redacted] data has been decrypted through the joint efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom. In the Lauchlin Currie case when we considered the possibilities of prosecution, General Canine of NSA indicated it would be highly inadvisable to reveal U.S. efforts to break the Russian code. It is believed that NSA would strongly object to any attempt to use [redacted] information in court since to do so would reveal to the Soviets the degree of success the U.S. had in breaking the Soviet code which was used during 1943-46. In addition, this knowledge by the Soviets of the degree of success the U.S. had in breaking their code might work to the disadvantage of NSA in its current efforts to break the Russian codes. (S)

(U) (S) D. Political Implications

It is believed that disclosure of existence of [redacted] information at this time would probably place the Bureau right in the middle of a violent political war. This is an election year and the Republicans would undoubtedly use disclosure of the [redacted] information to emphasize the degree of [redacted] (S)

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infiltration by Communists and Soviet agents into the U.S. Government during the 1940's when the Democrats were in power. At the same time, the Democrats would probably strike back by claiming that the FBI had withheld this information from the proper officials during the Democratic administration and at the same time would salvage what credit they could by claiming that the messages were intercepted and deciphered during the course of their administration and under their guidance. The Bureau would be right in the middle.

(u) F. International Implications

The Russians would undoubtedly scream that the U.S. had been expending money and manpower on intercepting and breaking the Russian code during the time the two countries were allied against a common enemy. Its propoganda machine would work overtime proving that this was evidence that the U.S. never acted in good faith during the war. Also, while no written record has been located in Bureau files to verify this it has been stated by NSA officials that during the war Soviet diplomats in the U.S. were granted permission to use Army radi facilities at the Pentagon to send messages to Moscow. It has been stated that President Roosevelt granted this permission and accompanied it with the promise to the Soviets that their messages would not be intercepted or interfered with by U.S. authorities. Here, again, the Soviets would villify the U.S. as an unfaithful ally and false friend.

(u) F. Effects on Pending Cases

A The Bureau is currently investigating about 100 cases on individuals either mentioned in ~~the~~ traffic or having some connection therewith. In addition, some of the subjects in the Mccase are mentioned in the ~~the~~ traffic. The public revelation of our knowledge of this traffic and the individuals involved therein probably would cause some of these individuals who may be still operating for the Soviets to discontinue their activities and possibly disappear. The effects on these pending cases would be difficult to assess at this time.

(u) [Handwritten notes and signatures in a box, including "WHS", "ERT", and "G..."]

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(u) Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman
FROM : A. H. Belmont
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)
ESPIONAGE XR

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DATE: November 26, 1955

Classified by [REDACTED] (u)
Declassify on: OADR [REDACTED] (u)

SYNOPSIS:

We have brought up to date the summary entitled, "Operations of the MGB Residency at New York, 1944-45" on the basis of [REDACTED] information. Revised pages have been inserted in copies maintained at the Bureau. The Appendix to this Summary contains write-ups on each of the individuals who have been identified from [REDACTED] information or investigation arising therefrom. A total of 208 persons have been identified as having been active in Soviet intelligence operations for the MGB in the United States and a chart breaking this figure down is set forth in this memorandum. This memorandum was initially prepared for the Director on 10-26-50 and was brought up to date every 6 months until October, 1955. It was approved in April, 1956, this memorandum be brought up to date on an annual basis. It is noted that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is also brought up to date at the same time annually and includes substantially the same information included in this summary and appendix with the exception of the [REDACTED] cover names. This summary includes 10 additional identifications made during the past year. Our experience has shown that the information being obtained from [REDACTED] is diminishing and it is anticipated that additional identifications will be made less frequently than in the past. For this reason as well as the fact that the [REDACTED] includes substantially the same information, it is believed that the annual process of bringing this memorandum up to date be discontinued. However, as identifications are made, individual write-ups will be prepared and inserted into this summary and appendix in order that it will be current at all times.

ACTION:

If you approve, in the future the annual process of bringing up to date this summary will be discontinued and additional inserts will be prepared as identifications are made. (u)

White
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568 50/60
709/025 8925
(Per NSA LTR. DTD. 7/6/97)

JPL:jdb
(5) [REDACTED] (S)
1 - Boardman
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Lee

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EX-132

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EX-132

Memorandum to Mr. Boardman

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Re: [redacted] (S)

DETAILS:

The [redacted] summary was originally prepared for the Director on 10-26-50 and it was designed to give an over-all view of the MGB (Soviet intelligence) based on information by [redacted] (S). This source has been able to furnish us information regarding MGB operations in the 1940's. The main limitations on this information are that in many instances it is fragmentary and further, the Soviet extensive use of code names has made identifications difficult. (S)

Based on the investigations from [redacted] (S) information we have identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activities who have at one time been active in the United States or which activity has had some United States ramifications. Of this number we already had received information from other sources indicating espionage involvement on the part of 87 of these persons. However, 119 persons were not previously known to us as being involved in espionage and have been identified through investigation in this case.

A chart explaining these figures in more detail is set out

SOVIET ESPIONAGE AGENTS IN [redacted] CASE (S)

Total Number Involved in Soviet Espionage	206
Number Previously Known to Us from Other Information	87
Number Not Previously Known to Us	<u>119</u> 206
Soviet Officials Not Now in United States	61
Other Persons Not Now in United States	40
Persons Deceased	11
(Burd, Duggan, Golos, ^a . Ivancic, Kournakoff, Lauterbach, Malisoff, Sabatini, Staple, White, ^b . Briggs)	
Persons Now Cooperative with Us	14
(Bentley, ^c . D. Greenglass, ^d . R. Greenglass, Black, Elitcher, Gold, ^e . Menaker, Miller, Moczulski, Morros, ^f : Jack Soble, Myra Soble, York, [redacted])	

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Memorandum to Mr. Boardman

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Re: [redacted] (S)

Persons Who Have Been Prosecuted 15
 (Brothman, Coplon, Fuchs, G. Gold,
 Greenglass, Gubitchev, H. Moskowitz,
 J. Rosenberg, E. Rosenberg, Slack,
 Sobell, Jack Soble, Myra Soble,
 Perl, Hiss)

Persons Involved in Silvermaster Network 29
 Persons Involved in Mccase 5
 Other Persons Now in United States 43 218

Less Those Counted Twice, Described Below 12 206

- a. Golos was also involved in Silvermaster network.
- b. White was also involved in Silvermaster network.
- c. Bentley was also involved in Silvermaster network.
- d. David Greenglass was also prosecuted.
- e. Gold was also prosecuted.
- f. Morros is also involved in Mccase.
- g. Fuchs also counted in those not now in United States.
- h. Gubitchev also counted as Soviet official.

In the Spring of 1954, [redacted] (S) began furnishing data concerning the activities of the MGB in San Francisco during the 1940's. [redacted] (S) advised there are about 400 messages which they believe they might be able to read in whole or in part. These messages cover San Francisco-Moscow traffic and are in the 1943-1946 period. To date, we have received 172 of these messages and we are pressing [redacted] (S) for more material since we believe we can identify more Soviet agents who operated in the United States from this link. [redacted] (S) has advised this traffic is extremely difficult to read. (S)

All phases of this matter are being closely followed and close supervision afforded to all cases in the field. Continuous research through Bureau files is being conducted to identify other agents and we are alert to the need of capitalizing on the information available to us to penetrate any presently operating Soviet espionage network. (S) (u)

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