Report

Final Report on Crime Reduction Strategies for the Memphis Police Department

Prepared for:

Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

Attention:

Commissioner Bill Gibbons
President
Memphis Shelby Crime Commission
600 Jefferson Avenue
Memphis, TN 38105

June 27, 2017

Restricted Use Warning

K2 Intelligence

Contents

1. Background

On June 29, 2016, the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission engaged K2 Intelligence to provide strategic advice on policing matters in the City of Memphis. In particular, K2 was tasked with developing recommendations for the Memphis Police Department regarding effective strategies for combatting increasingly high levels of murder and other violent crimes.

1.1. Methodology

During the following months, the K2 team conducted several site visits to Memphis. These visits included multiple meetings with Mayor Strickland, Memphis Police Department Director Rallings and his command staff, and the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission.

Meetings arranged by Memphis Shelby Crime Commission President Bill Gibbons and Vice President Harold Collins provided us with the insights of a cross section of the Memphis community including clergy, business leaders and community representatives. Meetings with Shelby County District Attorney Amy Weirich and Shelby County Sheriff Bill Oldham provided a valuable perspective on the larger criminal justice issues in Memphis.

In addition to our meetings with the MPD command staff, the K2 team conducted ride-alongs with MPD patrol officers, visited the MPD Real Time Crime Center and the MPD Training Academy, and conducted extensive interviews with the MPD Homicide Bureau, Gang Unit, Domestic Violence Unit and Crime Analysis Unit. We also attended an MPD TRAC meeting (Tracking for Responsibility, Accountability and Credibility) and debriefed with Precinct Commanders.

1.1.1. Phase 1

In conformance with our agreement, we provided the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission with a Phase 1 forty-five day draft report and a ninety day final report (reports attached) providing high level strategic recommendations for reducing violent crime in Memphis.

1.1.2. Phase 2

For Phase 2, we provided a Memphis Gang Strategy Proposal (attached) which provides specific recommendations for establishing an effective path toward reducing the unacceptable level of gang violence in Memphis.

To assist the MPD in its process of considering the various recommendations from each of our reports, we developed a consolidated list of 60 recommendations (attached) covering such issues as: murder, gang violence, shooting incidents, domestic violence, staffing, recruitment, training, management accountability, crime analysis, social media intelligence analysis, crime prevention and community engagement.

1.1.3. Conclusion

In this Final Report, we provide a prioritized set of the recommendations we believe are most important, and critical to the MPD's success in reducing the violence that plagues Memphis.

2. Five Critical Actions for MPD to Reduce Violent Crime

The priority recommendations are grouped into five categories: 1. Gang Enforcement, 2. Department Staffing, 3. Management Accountability, 4. Data and Intelligence Analysis and 5. Gang Prevention.

2.1. Gang Enforcement

While the MPD and its partners in the Multi-Agency Gang Unit field a professional and dedicated effort to combat gang violence in Memphis, it is insufficient for the task. As described in our Memphis Gang Strategy Proposal, significant new resources for the Gang Unit are required. We believe the current staffing of 21 (9 officers in the Gang Response Team and 12 investigators) should be increased to a total of at least 72. We arrive at 72 by increasing the Gang Response Team (GRT) from 9 to 36 and the Investigator cadre from 12 to 36. The GRT is currently deployed on one 8 hour shift five days a week. Memphis gangs operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. By creating four City-wide teams of 9 officers each (36), the MPD will be able to counter gang activity whenever it occurs. By increasing the investigative cadre from 12 to 36, the MPD will be able to engage in the systematic debriefing of apprehended gang members, initiate new cases in a more strategic way, adopt advanced investigative techniques to exploit gang members' use of social media, and deploy a Major Case team to target the gangs posing the greatest threat to the safety of Memphis. While we understand the severe staffing limitations confronting the MPD, we believe this recommendation should be implemented immediately through redeployment from less critical assignments. It should not await the results of the zero-based staffing analysis described below.

2.2. Department Staffing

The Memphis Police Department has experienced significant attrition in recent years. Current staffing has dropped below 1,950 officers. City and MPD officials cite a need for between 2,300 and 2,600 officers, noting higher staffing levels in previous years when crime was lower. This issue has generated considerable interest by the media, elected

officials and community groups. What has been absent from the debate has been a recent and comprehensive zero-based MPD staffing analysis. By examining the staffing level of every unit in the Department today, and determining if legitimate workload demands can be met more efficiently, savings can be achieved. By determining the true staffing requirements needed to provide a safe city for the people of Memphis, a credible MPD staffing target can be established and serve as a catalyst for public support. While there's little doubt that Memphis needs many more police officers, there can be no certainty about the exact number until a careful, accurate and objective staffing analysis is completed.

2.3. Management Accountability

The MPD has been conducting TRAC (Tracking for Responsibility, Accountability and Credibility) meetings as part of its Blue CRUSH program since 2005. The TRAC meeting process is not living up to its potential and should be refreshed. It needs to be led by a newly appointed full-time Chief Crime Strategist, who has the authority and stature in the organization to drive all crime reduction efforts and hold other commanders accountable. The TRAC meetings should be held at Police Headquarters (rather than hosted by precincts) as a potent symbol of its accountability function. Meetings should focus on selected precincts for intensive questioning and analysis, rather than have rote, superficial and unquestioned presentations from all precincts. Even in the most accomplished organizations there will be deficiencies and missed opportunities. An effective management accountability process can turn these into learning opportunities and lead to creative solutions.

2.4. Data and Intelligence Analysis

A prerequisite for effective crime reduction strategies is the collection and analysis of relevant data. This is particularly true regarding gang violence. The MPD's commitment to crime data analysis was evident in the establishment of the Blue CRUSH program over a decade ago and its adoption of the NYPD's Real Time Crime Center model. However, there are areas where enhancements can be made. For example, the MPD does not

currently include shooting incidents or shooting victims among its key crime indicators. Data on shootings is essential for the development and evaluation of violent crime strategies and the effective deployment of resources. It needs to be broken out from the larger, undifferentiated category of Aggravated Assault. Each shooting incident must be viewed with the urgency and attention of a murder, which it could easily have been. Without this critical information, the MPD is missing opportunities to reduce the unacceptable level of gun violence in Memphis. Developing more complete information about gangs is also essential. Social media monitoring and analysis can be very effective in developing enterprise cases against violent gangs. While the MPD has made some strides in this area, much more can be done. We recommend the expanded development of gang intelligence through social media monitoring by trained intelligence analysts and investigators. While current and accurate crime data is essential for the MPD, it is also of great value to the public at large. In the interest of transparency, we recommend the regular weekly public release of crime data (including shooting data) by precinct on the MPD website. An informed populace is better able to partner effectively with the police in crime prevention efforts.

2.5. Gang Prevention

The ultimate goal of police crime fighting activity is the prevention of additional crimes and the cost of further victimization. To that end, crime prevention and particularly gang violence prevention efforts should be a high priority. The MPD should undertake a variety of promising gang prevention strategies to complement their enforcement efforts. Accepting that there is no single panacea for preventing a young person's involvement in criminal gangs, the MPD should engage with clergy, community leaders, schools and parents in devising effective interventions. Clergy members are often willing to serve as credible intermediaries in stemming retaliatory gang violence. Parents and guardians can be more effective in guiding young people away from violence when they are provided awareness training about the signs of gang involvement. School personnel are often very knowledgeable about gang dynamics and can be valuable partners in violence

prevention. Group violence intervention programs have been reported to be effective in some communities. As Memphis Operation Safe Community 3 designs its local version of this program, it should also design an independent evaluation in order to learn what works best and adjust the program accordingly.

3. Appendix A – Phase 1 Interim Report

Memphis Police Department Consultation

Prepared for:

Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

Attention:

Commissioner Bill Gibbons

State of Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security

312 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, 25th Floor

Nashville, TN 37243

August 11, 2016

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1. Background

The Memphis Shelby Crime Commission has hired K2 Intelligence to provide strategic consulting and advisory services on policing matters to the City of Memphis. These services include strategic advice concerning public safety issues and assessments of key operational and management steps that can be taken by the Memphis Police Department (MPD) to implement recommended strategies. The focus of this engagement is on steps to reduce violent crime in Memphis, e.g., homicide, robbery, rape and aggravated assault.

1.1. Initial Site Visit and Meetings

The K2 team consisting of Raymond W. Kelly, Michael Farrell and David Kelly visited Memphis on July 26-27, 2016 for introductory meetings and briefings. During this visit the K2 team met with the following officials:

- Mayor Jim Strickland, City of Memphis
- Commissioner Bill Gibbons, State of Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security and Memphis Shelby Crime Commission
- Blair Taylor, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission
- Harold Collins, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission
- Johnnie Moore, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission
- Interim Director Michael W. Rallings, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- Deputy Director Mike Ryall, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- Deputy Chief Terry Landrum, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- Deputy Chief Michael Hardy, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- Major Caroline J. Mason, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- Major Lambert Ross, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- Lieutenant Alan Ruhl, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- Lieutenant Darren M. Goods, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- Lieutenant Tony Mullins, City of Memphis Division of Police Services

- Sergeant Joe Parry, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- John F. Williams, City of Memphis Division of Police Services
- Alex Smith, City of Memphis Chief Human Resources Officer (by phone)

These meetings focused on a variety of topics relevant to the crime situation in Memphis including staffing levels, recruitment and retention in the Division of Police Services; structure and organization of the Division of Police Services; crime rate trends, crime reporting and crime analysis including the Real Time Crime Center and Blue Crush; identifiable motives behind violent crimes including criminal homicides and aggravated assaults; gang involvement in violent crimes; and gang enforcement and investigation programs.

During the evening of our visit we participated in three ride-alongs with uniformed Memphis Police Department patrol units. Ride-alongs were conducted in the Crump, Raines and Mount Moriah precincts from approximately 8:30 to 11:00pm.

1.2. First Impressions

The crime rate in Memphis is very high. There is a disproportionate amount of violent crime for a city of this size. With a population of approximately 650,000, Memphis is currently experiencing a crime rate on par with Detroit and Baltimore, two similarly sized cities with historically high crime rates. Detroit currently records just under 2,000 violent crimes per 100,000 residents, the highest rate in the nation; Memphis is a close second with about 1,740 violent crimes per 100,000 residents.

Memphis has experienced high crime rates before. The rate surged in 1996 and again in 2006. Both times the rate was reduced through public safety initiatives. The creation of the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission in 1997 and the creation of Blue Crush and Operation: Safe Community in 2006 led to significant crime decreases following those surges. Another violent crime surge has been underway since 2011 with large increases in murder and aggravated assault.

During our initial meetings, it quickly became clear that the public officials, police officers and supervisors and citizens we met with all care deeply about Memphis and are committed to reversing this latest violent crime surge. While it is too early for us to offer specific detailed recommendations for reducing the violent crime rate in Memphis, we have developed several high level strategic recommendations. This interim report contains those recommendations and also describes how we intend to develop specific detailed recommendations as this study progresses.

2. High-Level Strategic Recommendations

2.1. Homicide/Shooting Reduction

The Memphis Police Department should develop a comprehensive homicide/shooting reduction strategy. This strategy should be informed by the results of enhanced crime analysis efforts. In order to develop such a strategy, MPD needs to conduct a deep analysis of each shooting and homicide in order to understand the motives and other relevant factors associated with each incident. This strategy should be developed and managed at the Deputy Chief level within the department with the full and visible support of the Director.

Understanding where and why shootings and homicides are occurring is a critically important first step. The results of this analysis should drive patrol deployments and specialty unit operations. For example, if the analysis shows a large number of drug-related shootings in an area, that should result in increased high-visibility deployment of uniformed officers in that area. In addition, narcotics enforcement activity in that area should be analyzed alongside the homicide/shooting data. For example, if it was shown that most narcotics unit arrests in this area typically occur between 8pm and midnight, but most drug-related shootings in the area occur after midnight, then an adjustment in narcotics unit enforcement activity would be warranted.

The basic elements of this strategy should include:

- Hot-spot policing deployments focused on mapped areas of concentrated violence with mapping to include all relevant details such as time of day and motive
- Focus on illegal firearms possession and trafficking by both patrol and specialty units. This is an enforcement area where everyone needs to be "in the game." Specialty units utilizing undercover officers and informants should target illegal gun sales and trafficking while patrol and anti-crime units focus on arresting individuals carrying illegally possessed firearms.

In addition, the homicide/shooting strategy should include community involvement since community support is needed for this type of policing strategy to be effective. MPD should develop violence intervention tactics in conjunction with clergy and community leaders in the affected areas. These tactics should be designed to provide alternate means to resolve disputes other than violence.

In addition, MPD should foster coordination with social service, education, housing and health-care agencies to enhance the effectiveness of violence reduction efforts. This would mimic aspects of the NOLA for Life program in New Orleans.

The homicide/shooting reduction strategy described above would undoubtedly overlap with strategies to reduce violence associated with gangs and domestic incidents, which are discussed below.

2.2. Gang Investigation and Enforcement

It appears that gang activity is a driving force behind much of the violent crime in Memphis. It was reported to us that MPD had previously estimated that about 20% of murders in Memphis were gang-related, but that a more recent analysis estimated that number to be more like 50 – 60%. Controlling gang activity in Memphis will go a long way towards reducing violent crime in Memphis.

MPD should develop an intelligence-driven gang enforcement and investigation strategy. The key to successful gang activity suppression is intelligence. In our meeting with MPD Gang Unit personnel, it was clear that members of the unit are familiar with the various gang identities and rivalries within the city and that they know many of the key players. What is needed is to institutionalize this knowledge and to organize it so as to support criminal enterprise prosecutions.

The goal should be to develop a program to map out the names, membership, turf, relationships, criminal enterprises and lexicon of each formal and informal gang operating in Memphis. This type of information can be obtained through intensive social media

monitoring and analysis and consistent, targeted debriefing of gang members whenever they are in contact with police personnel. This information should be organized into gang or "set" books with organization charts, photos, nicknames and aliases, criminal histories, criminal activities and rivalries. These books should be constantly updated and made available to all personnel involved in gang enforcement and investigation.

In order to be most effective, the gang strategy should be focused on developing enterprise-level racketeering cases for prosecution. This can only be achieved with an intelligence-focused strategy. This strategy should range from low-level enforcement pressure designed to increase contacts and gain intelligence to high-level arrests in which multiple gang members are arrested in operations based on documented criminal activity. The elements needed to develop this enhanced anti-gang strategy include:

- Increased staffing for the Gang Unit
- Intensive monitoring and analysis of social media
- Consistent uniformed enforcement at known gang locations
- Focus on dismantling gang organizations through enterprise-level prosecutions
- MPD legal counsel to guide case development
- Prevention and diversion efforts for younger gang members

2.3. Domestic Violence Follow-up and Investigation

Domestic violence can be a significant factor in murder and aggravated assault cases. Although domestic violence crimes often occur behind closed doors, out of the public eye, there are ways for police activity to reduce the numbers of these crimes. MPD should examine and enhance its domestic violence follow-up and investigation strategy.

The goal should be to develop a comprehensive strategy that integrates the efforts of patrol officers, investigators, domestic violence prevention programs and victims' support service providers to deter and arrest offenders as well as providing protection and support

to victims. Through this type of strategy it should be possible to identify at-risk households and intervene before domestic crimes become more serious.

This domestic violence reduction strategy should include elements like the assignment of designated, trained domestic violence officers and detectives in each precinct. These officers and detectives should focus on domestic violence cases and become familiar with the at-risk households within their precincts of assignment. This familiarity and continuity would produce more effective intervention and support for victims. One tool that can be effective for this effort is mandatory follow up in domestic violence cases. This follow up could take the form of mandatory home visits by domestic violence officers and detectives within certain time frames when complaints are filed. This helps ensure that these cases do not "fall through the cracks" and provides additional opportunities to make support services referrals and apprehend offenders.

2.4. Community Policing

MPD should explore ways to reinvigorate its community policing efforts. In coordination with Blue Crush and the Compstat process, precinct commanders' problem solving efforts should be focused on violent crime reduction and ways in which community involvement can support those efforts. A key component should be to establish a formal meeting schedule for joint police–community problem solving sessions (e.g., Precinct Community Council, community boards, etc.). Police officials can improve their understanding of the problems that cause concern to the communities they serve through these types of meetings. As with the gang enforcement and investigation strategy described above, effective community policing efforts can improve the flow of useful intelligence into the department. It can also lead directly to greater support from the community for police department enforcement activities and initiatives. We also recommend exploring ways to leverage 311 call data to identify repeat problem locations and correlate that with 911 call data. This can produce police response that is more efficient and more attuned to community concerns.

2.5. Staffing Level

The Memphis Police Department (MPD) currently stands at about 2,000 sworn officers. This represents a significant reduction from its peak staffing level of about 2,400 in 2011. There appears to be general acceptance within MPD that this reduced staffing level is at least partially responsible for the current violent crime rate increase and that MPD will not be able to achieve significant violent crime rate reductions without increased staffing.

This reduced headcount did not happen by design. Benefit cuts enacted under the last administration have made the MPD job much less attractive to officers compared with other departments in the area. In addition, the anti-police movement that has become prominent nationwide over the past two years may have led some officers to reconsider their career choices and may be negatively impacting recruitment. Mayor Strickland and the leadership of the police department are committed to increasing the headcount through recruitment and retention initiatives.

We certainly agree that the current situation should not be allowed to continue. MPD has recently been unable to hire as many officers as the budget would allow and significantly more officers than usual are leaving the department. The department continues to shrink. This attrition can negatively impact morale within the ranks and can impair the department's ability to mount needed anti-crime initiatives.

For these reasons, we support taking steps to stabilize the sworn officer headcount at the current levels. However, we question whether the goal should be to return staffing to the 2,400 level. In our discussions with members of the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission we learned that the 2,400 headcount was not based on a detailed staffing analysis. Hiring police officers and maintaining high staffing levels is expensive. Rather than simply working to restore staffing to the 2,400 level, we recommend conducting a zero-based staffing analysis[1] to determine the appropriate staffing level for each unit within the

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[1] The NYPD had its highest staffing level in 2001 when it had approximately 41,000 uniformed officers. That number has since declined to approximately 35,000. During this period of declining headcount, the NYPD undertook extensive counterterrorism duties that resulted in the reassignment of approximately 1,000 officers to counterterrorism duties. Despite the declining headcount and the added counterterrorism deployments, the department achieved significant crime reductions during this period. The NYPD conducted a zero-based staffing analysis

department and for the department as a whole. This analysis will determine not only how many police officers the MPD should employ optimally, but also whether personnel are allocated throughout the department in alignment with the department's strategic goals.

This type of zero-based staffing analysis is not a quick process. The rapid attrition currently afflicting the department needs to be stemmed. We recommend moving ahead with the development and implementation of recruitment and retention initiatives in the short term while conducting the staffing analysis to determine a sound ultimate staffing goal.

The right number for the MPD might be 2,400, but it also could be higher or lower. The staffing analysis will help determine that. The analysis will also provide a firm basis for any revenue requests that may be made to support added staffing.

2.5.1. Recruitment

We recommend that MPD and the city's Chief Human Resources Officer should continue to work together to improve recruitment to reach a diverse set of police officer candidates. This initiative should also explore ways to reach candidates who are more likely to successfully complete training.

2.5.2. Retention

We recommend conducting formalized exit interviews with MPD personnel who voluntarily separate from the department in order to learn what factors are driving the large number of separations. It is apparent that the benefits cuts continue to be a factor, but it is also possible that opportunities for promotion and transfer may be affecting morale and retention of incumbent officers. We recommend examining the rank structure and promotion process as well as the transfer process to see how they are perceived by members of the department and how those perceptions may affect the retention rate.

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when murders peaked in 1990 that helped determine the appropriate staffing levels throughout the department. That provided the basis for continual adjustments based on changing rime conditions and budget analysis. Rather than "down-sizing," we referred to this process as "right-sizing" the department.

2.5.3. Training

There appears to be a fairly high failure rate in the MPD training academy. We recommend reviewing the curriculum and standards to understand what drives the failure rate. It is possible that the failure rate stems from some combination of poorly prepared recruits and unnecessarily high standards. The curriculum and graduation standards should be based on a current job analysis. A job analysis examines the tasks performed by incumbent police officers in terms of frequency and importance in order to determine the minimum physical and academic standards necessary to successfully perform the job. Hiring and training standards should be in alignment with the results of the job analysis.

2.6. Crime Reporting

Everyone we spoke with from Mayor Strickland to members of the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission to the leadership of MPD stressed the importance of maintaining accurate crime statistics. We certainly agree with this goal. In reviewing Memphis crime statistics, however, we noticed some potential areas for improvement in crime recording and reporting. For example, we noticed that crime statistics are not uniform across different reporting venues. This leads to confusion when different reports show different numbers of crimes for a particular type of offense during the same reporting period. Some of these discrepancies may be due to the use of different crime reporting methods including NIBRS, UCR and the Tennessee Criminal Code. We recommend that MPD should develop a method to achieve uniformity in crime statistics for Memphis. We also recommend reconfiguring the crime reporting system to remove certain anomalies we observed such as the inclusion of justifiable homicides in the crime statistics.

We also recommend reviewing the crime reporting process within MPD with the goal of ensuring that crime reporting truly is accurate. All reported crimes should be reported, but no crime should be recorded at a higher level of severity than is warranted by the facts. In order to reach this goal, we recommend examining how officers are trained to report crimes. This would include a review of the legal curriculum in the training academy.

We also recommend examining the department's process for reporting and recording crimes. For example, is there supervisory review of a complaint report before the report is finalized or is the final decision left to the reporting officer? And, is there a quality assurance process under which an external unit audits samples of precinct crime reports for accuracy?

There is nothing to suggest that the crime statistics maintained by MPD are inaccurate. The goal for the police department should be simply to ensure that they are as accurate as possible. Given the high number of crimes committed in Memphis, it would be unacceptable for the statistics to be distorted by inaccurate reporting.

2.7. Crime Analysis

Crime analysis is an essential part of crime reduction. The successful Blue Crush initiative is based on data-driven policing. This initiative should be taken to the next level so that improved data and analysis can lead to more effective deployment of personnel. We recommend that MPD should examine its crime analysis system to ensure that it is generating all relevant data and that the data generated is being used effectively. We recommend that following areas for inquiry regarding crime analysis:

- Increase analysis regarding motives and relationships involved with crimes like murder and aggravated assault
- Conduct detailed analysis of aggravated assault cases to identify underlying trends e.g., domestic violence involvement, use of firearms, gang-related, school-related, licensed premises, etc.
- Track shootings as a separate category within aggravated assault
- Crime mapping to include location, time of day and motive
- The utilization of crime analysis results in the Compstat process, for deployment of personnel and at roll call briefings

3. Summary and Next Steps

This interim Phase 1 report contains several high-level strategic goals and recommendations for reducing violent crime in Memphis. It is based on our review of publicly available information regarding crime and law enforcement in Memphis, data provided by the Memphis Police Department and our meetings with members of the Memphis Shelby Crime Commissioner, Mayor Strickland and the leadership of the Memphis Police Department. These Phase 1 goals will be valuable in setting the agenda for MPD as it moves forward under Director Rallings, whose previous status as interim Director has been changed to permanent Director. This report will be refined in the coming weeks as we continue our dialogue with the relevant parties so that a final Phase 1 report can be delivered.

In order to fully achieve these goals, however, additional study must be done so that we can work with Director Rallings to develop actionable plans for implementation. Whereas the first phase of this engagement is focused on broad strategic goals and recommendations, the second phase will focus on more detailed examinations and plans for implementing the strategic recommendations. In order to accomplish the second phase, we will schedule additional visits to address the issues discussed in this report. The things we plan to accomplish on future visits include:

- Visit the Real Time Crime Center

- Meet with crime analysis personnel regarding: classification, auditing and analytic products

- Get detailed briefing on MPD staffing by unit

- Attend a Compstat meeting

- Meet with the Gang Unit

- Meet with the Homicide Bureau

- Visit with the Domestic Violence Unit

- Visit the training academy

- Meet with City HR (Alex Smith) re: recruitment/retention initiatives

- Meet with interested and informed stakeholders, including: MPA President Mike Williams, former Mayor Willie Herenton and Professor Richard Janikowski

We would like to address the topics described in this report in a systematic manner. It would be most beneficial to schedule future visits thematically so we are able to focus our inquiries on specific areas of policing. For example, we would meet with crime analysis personnel, visit the Real Time Crime Center and attend a Compstat meeting during the time when we are focused on crime reporting and crime analysis. Another visit would focus on meetings with the Gang Unit, Homicide Bureau and Domestic Violence Unit. Another would focus on visiting the training academy and meeting with relevant officials such as Alex Smith and Mike Williams regarding personnel issues.

We would like to make this an iterative, collaborative process between our team and MPD. That means that we would share our observations and preliminary recommendations with the appropriate personnel as our work proceeds. This process will allow us to develop a set of practical, workable solutions that incorporate input from the MPD personnel directly involved in the issues being studied. We will balance this input with our experience to produce the Phase 2 implementation plan.

All things considered, we see the crime situation facing Memphis as being "solvable." We do not propose that the solutions will be easy, but we do think there are concrete steps that can be taken to address the issues Memphis is facing including violent crime reduction, MPD staffing, crime reporting and analysis and community relations. None of these issues are completely independent of the others. We expect that incremental improvements in things like staffing, crime reporting and analysis, gang enforcement and investigation, domestic violence investigation and follow up and community policing can produce meaningful reductions in the overall violent crime rate for the city.

4. Appendix B – Phase 1 Final Report

Phase 1 Final Report

Memphis Police Department Consultation

Prepared for:

Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

Attention:

Commissioner Bill Gibbons

President, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

600 Jefferson Avenue, #400

Memphis, TN 38105

September 30, 2016

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On August 11, 2016, we provided the first interim report to the Commission. That report described our initial findings and high-level strategic recommendations for addressing violent crime in Memphis. The major areas addressed in the first interim report included:

- Homicide/Shooting Reduction
- Gang Investigation and Enforcement
- Domestic Violence Follow-up and Investigation
- Community Policing
- Staffing (including recruitment, retention and training)
- Crime Reporting
- Crime Analysis

Since that report was delivered, we have made two additional visits to Memphis. These visits focused on homicide investigations, gang enforcement and investigations, crime analysis and staffing.

This report contains updated findings and recommendations and is intended to inform the upcoming Operation Safe Community plan to be released in October 2016.

1.1. Site Visits and Meetings

On August 25-26, 2016, Michael Farrell and Ed Conlon visited with members of the Memphis Police Department (MPD) Homicide Unit including Major Caroline Mason and

Lieutenant Tony Mullins. The K2 team also visited the MPD Real Time Crime Center where they met with Major Lambert Ross, Lieutenant Max, Lieutenant Joseph Patty and Civilian Crime Analyst Lana Murphy

On September 6-7, 2016, the full K2 team including Raymond W. Kelly, Michael Farrell, David Kelly and Ed Conlon visited Memphis. Members of the team met with the following individuals and groups:

- Mayor Jim Strickland

- Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

- City of Memphis Chief HR Officer Alex Smith

- Pitt Hyde

- Reverend Keith Norman

- MPD Homicide Unit

- MPD Gang Unit

- MPD Training Academy including Employment Unit and Recruitment Unit

The meetings with Mayor Strickland, the Commission and other officials focused on crime reduction and staffing, including recruitment and retention efforts. The meetings with the MPD Homicide Unit and the MPD Gang Unit focused on learning how these units operate, identifying challenges they face in achieving their respective missions and identifying possible solutions that might improve their effectiveness. The meeting with the MPD Training Academy focused on the recruitment and hiring processes. Findings and recommendations follow this section.

2. Homicide/Shooting Reduction

The following report draws on an analysis of data provided by the Homicide Bureau of the Memphis Police Department, as well as site visits conducted on August 25-26 and September 5-6, 2016. Interviews were conducted with Deputy Director Mike Ryall, Assistant Chief Sharonda Hampton, Lt. Colonel Kurt Philipps, Lt. Colonel Caroline Mason, and Lt. Anthony Mullins.

As of September 10, the city of Memphis has seen 156 total homicides and 146 criminal homicides, a 54% increase over the previous year. 74% of all homicides are listed as solved. Those two figures represent the extraordinary challenges faced by the MPD Homicide Bureau, and the extraordinary efforts undertaken to meet it. Before the recent rise in murders, Memphis already had a homicide rate well above the national average. In 2014, the national homicide rate was 4.5 per 100,000 people[2]; Memphis had a rate of 21.4 per 100,000.[3] This year's annualized rate is 32 per 100,000. According to a 2008 FBI study, the average homicide investigator handles five new investigations per year.[4] As of September 6, Memphis Homicide had thirteen investigators. While the staffing levels have fluctuated and will continue to do so, investigators have been assigned as many as fifteen cases so far, while solving over three quarters of them, well above the national average for case clearance, which was 64.5% in 2014.[5]

In addition to financial and staffing constraints, the Homicide Bureau operates in a geographic and demographic environment that presents its own unique difficulties. One investigator said that Memphis is "a rural area with urban problems." The low population density means that there are fewer pedestrians, and hence fewer witnesses, than in many urban environments; the preponderance of low-density housing correlates with a lower number of CCTV cameras. One fifth of this year's homicides have been determined to be the result of robberies, an unusually high proportion. (Nationally, the rate of robbery

[2] https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-4
[3] https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-6
[4] https://leb.fbi.gov/2008-pdfs/leb-february-2008
[5] https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/clearances/browse-by/national-data

homicides has held at around five percent[6].) Traditionally, these cases are among the most challenging to solve, given the lack or relationship between victim and offender.

2.1. Casework

The casework reviewed showed investigations that were conducted with energy, professionalism, and attention to detail. One investigator noted on a supplement (Homicide #79) that there was a three-minute discrepancy between the time-stamp on crime scene video footage and real time. Another homicide (#37) required the management of three separate outdoor crime scenes extending almost two miles apart. In a third case, (#126) involving a gang-related robbery, a review of videotape led investigators to discount the positive identification of a suspect by three separate witnesses. The investigators subsequently identified and obtained confessions from two suspects, exculpating an innocent man. An interrogation observed was conducted with persistence and skill.

2.2. Staffing

Department support for the Homicide Bureau has been significant in certain areas, such as an exemption from the "bid" system, through which the eligibility of police officers and sergeants for specialized assignments is primarily determined by seniority. Homicide has been allowed to develop its own criteria for candidate selection, including minimum standards for investigative experience and an interview process. Investigators are given take-home cars, and afforded unlimited overtime. Cooperation with the Gang Unit is described as efficient and abundant, as is support from the General Investigation Bureaus. According to Col. Mason, the Real Time Crime Center provides timely and detailed information to investigators at the scene from an abundance of sources, including police documents, social media, and military records.

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[6] https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/expanded-homicide-data/expanded_homicide_data_table_12_murder_circumstances_2010-2014.xls

The turnover in both labor and management has been considerable, however, and is unlikely to be conducive to continuing high standards of performance. During the August visit, then-acting Col. Mason supervised Homicide and Sex Crimes; by September, she had been promoted and reassigned to night-duty supervision within Investigative Services. Lt. Mullins, who is one of two team commanders, has been in his position since April. His predecessor lasted two months. In Lt. Mullins view, the turnover in investigative personnel has led to losses in permissions for databases such as LexisNexis, VICAP, and public utilities. (Officers on Temporary Assignment are not eligible to use certain databases, and obtaining permissions for new permanent members of the squad can be time-consuming). Supervisory obligations, such as requiring that an arrest warrant be filed, were sometimes overlooked in the transition. Under the schedule he shares with his colleague, Lt. Morgan, weekends are alternated monthly, with one lieutenant and his team getting Wednesday and Thursday off, the other Saturday and Sunday. Those transitioning from Wednesday/Thursday to the weekends can take a day off for a five-day weekend, but the reverse entails a nine-day workweek. In addition to responding to crime scenes at all hours---there have been, on average, three homicides every five days this year---the lieutenants are obliged to prepare a considerable amount of material in response to press and plaintiff counsel requests. During site visits with Lt. Mullins on September 5th and 6th, he had remained on duty throughout.

A review of the 156 homicides which had occurred by September 10 showed that they had been assigned to twenty different investigators, an average of 7.8 per person. Six of the investigators are no longer with the bureau: three due to promotion, two due to temporary assignments having expired, and one through transfer. Three others are no longer handling new investigations, as they have been assigned to administration or cold case. Four investigators that remain are on temporary assignment, and one of them is on limited duty due to an injury. Of the seven sergeants expected to remain in the bureau for the foreseeable future, six have handled almost half of the new cases (76 out of 156) that have come in to the bureau so far this year. By September 10, two had been assigned 11 cases, two 13, one 14, and one 15. When such a small number of people

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are undertaking so much, the numbers describe both a high level of professional dedication and a dangerous institutional fragility.

2.2.1. Rank Structure

While the addition of personnel is an obvious remedy, consideration should be given to alterations in schedule and structure. At present, the term "detective" is an honorific for police officers serving in an investigative capacity. Many cities have a separate detective rank, with several "grades" equivalent in salary to next-level supervisors. The creation of such a rank would allow those sergeants who wish to remain as investigators the opportunity to do so without forgoing career advancement. At present, the Homicide Bureau works steady day shifts, though in practice they are working at all hours. Members of the bureau should be surveyed as to whether alternative schedules, such as the creation of a 4x12 shift, or the extension of the workday to allow additional days off, would be more productive.

2.3. Crime Analysis

In terms of improved data collection, homicides and non-fatal shootings should be analyzed in greater detail, along the lines of the eight-page NYPD report that we provided to Col. Mason and Lt. Mullins. In addition to a more fine-grained social portrait of victims and offenders, the NYPD form requires information on secondary motives, allowing useful distinctions to be made between the robbery-homicide of a storekeeper and that of a drug dealer.

At present, non-fatal shootings are investigated by the General Investigative Bureau unit in each station. The department is considering restoration of the Violent Felony Bureau to investigate non-fatal shootings and other violent felony crimes. Both the perpetrators and the victims of these crimes overlap with those of Homicide, whose caseload is overwhelmingly related to gun violence. A city-wide Violent Felony Bureau co-located with the Homicide Bureau would facilitate information-sharing and assist other

department units, from Gang to patrol, in the development of crime suppression strategies. We support this proposal.

Finally, the present classification of homicide investigations as "solved" or "unsolved" should be replaced with standard federal Uniform Crime Report (UCR) terms such as "clearance," etc. Several cases (Homicides #96, #113, #132) are listed, at the time of this review, as solved, with perpetrators identified but unapprehended, though arrest warrants have been issued. Under UCR, clearances are by arrest or by "exceptional means," defined as follows:

> A case in which some element beyond law enforcement control prevents filing of formal charges against the offender. Agencies can clear an offense exceptionally if they can answer all of the following in the affirmative. (1) Has the investigation definitely established the identity of the offender? (2) Is there enough information to support an arrest, charge, and turning over to the court for prosecution? (3) Is the exact location of the offender known so that the subject could be taken into custody now? (4) Is there some reason outside law enforcement control that precludes arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender (for example, suicide, deathbed confession, double murder, etc.)?[7]

We also recommend using the UCR term "murder" for criminal homicides and publicly reporting the murder count rather than counting all homicides. We understand that this change in reporting could be viewed as an attempt to show a lower number for this serious crime, but it would actually be a move to be consistent with UCR. The shift in terminology would assist in the accuracy of the data, and aid in its analysis.

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[7] https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/clearances

3. Gang Investigation and Enforcement

Gangs figure prominently in Memphis's substantial homicide tally. As of September 10, 2016, the year-to-date homicide total was 156 with 146 deemed to be criminal homicides and 10 to be justified. The total homicide count represents a 37% increase over the same time period in 2015; the criminal homicide count represents a 54% increase. Of the total number of homicides so far this year, 62 (40%) of the victims were gang members and 26 (17%) involved suspects who were gang members.[8]

It is important to note that the fact that a homicide features a gang member as the victim or suspect does not mean that the homicide is *gang motivated*. The term *gang motivated* indicates that the motive for the homicide was directly related to the business of the gang. As of September 16, 2016 the MPD had classified 22 (14%) of the first 156 homicides as *gang motivated*.[9] [10] However, many others are classified as *gang related*, meaning simply that gang members were involved as victim or suspect, but the motives were not related to gang business. While this distinction is important for some purposes, a gang related killing is no less serious than one that is gang motivated. The large number of gang members involved in homicides, either as victims or perpetrators suggests a possible avenue of approach for reducing the homicide total.

3.1. Multi-Agency Gang Unit

The anti-gang efforts in Memphis law enforcement are concentrated in the Multi-Agency Gang Unit (MGU) which was formed in 2011. This is a task force that includes the Memphis Police Department (MPD), the Shelby County Sherriff's Office (SCSO), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The full time staffing of the unit totals 24, distributed as follows:

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[8] Memphis Police Department Homicide Bureau report dated 9/10/2016
[9] Memphis Police Department Homicide Bureau report dated 9/16/16
[10] The determination of motive in homicide cases is imprecise and subject to change. Many of the homicide cases in Memphis that we reviewed were initially determined to have robbery or an argument as the motive, but were later changed to gang motivated based on newly acquired information. The motives for 16 homicides were changed from "robbery," "argument" or "unknown" to "gang" on the 9/16/16 homicide report.

- One MPD lieutenant (Operations Commander)

- One MPD sergeant

- Twelve MPD police officers

- One SCSO lieutenant (Assistant Commander)

- Two SCSO sergeants

- Six SCSO deputies

- One Bartlett Police Department officer

Two federal agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (one special agent) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) (five special agents) are officially listed as full-time members of the MGU, but do not actually provide personnel on a full-time basis. Other agencies provide personnel on a part-time basis including the United States Marshal Service (one Deputy US Marshal), Shelby County District Attorney General (eight assistant district attorneys), United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Tennessee (one Assistant US Attorney), Shelby County Sherriff's Office Homeland Security (one investigator), Tennessee Department of Corrections (one investigator) and United States Department of Homeland Security/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (one investigator).

The mission of the Multi-Agency Gang Unit is to dismantle and disrupt criminal gangs by conducting long term investigations. These investigation focus on wide ranging gang activities, particularly involving guns and drugs. Techniques include the use of undercover police officers, confidential informants and Title III wiretaps.

This is a regional multi-agency team, so the team's activities extend beyond Memphis to include Shelby County and surrounding areas. However, it is estimated that 95% of the unit's activities are focused in Memphis.[11]

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[11] Interview with Lt. Darren M. Goods, 9/6/16

3.1.1. Prosecution

The MGU works closely with the office of the Shelby County District Attorney General (SCDAG) to coordinate effective prosecution of cases involving gang members. One practice that is used by SCDAG is vertical prosecution in which one prosecutor is assigned responsibility for a case from intake to appeal. This is an effective practice that is particularly appropriate for prosecuting gang cases. The assistant district attorney (ADA) assigned to each case can become thoroughly familiar with the facts and witnesses as well as with the defendant's history. MGU detectives are better able to maintain involvement with a case in a vertical prosecution system.

SCDAG prosecutors work with MGU investigators to petition courts to issue injunctions against gang activity within certain specified geographic zones in Memphis. When a gang member is arrested within an injunction zone, the prosecutor who presented the petition to the court handles the case through the vertical prosecution process, providing excellent continuity.

The MGU also works with the US Attorney's Office for the Western District of Tennessee on cases that can be prosecuted in federal court rather than state court.

3.1.2. Gang Homicide Response Team

MGU personnel respond to all homicides that appear to be possibly gang related. MGU sends two investigators to respond to all homicide scenes when notified by Homicide Bureau investigators on scene that either the victim or suspect appears to be a gang member. The responding MGU investigators have the authority to request additional MGU resources without waiting to reach a supervisor if necessary. This practice gets experienced gang investigators involved in possibly gang related or gang motivated homicides at the earliest possible time. This provides early warning of potential retaliatory actions that may occur in response to the instant homicide. This early MGU response gives MPD the potential to prevent or deter retaliation attacks through deployments and other activities. It also allows MGU personnel to provide important gang related background information to Homicide Bureau detectives early in the investigation.

3.1.3. Gang Alternative and Prevention (GAP)

While the MGU provides important investigative and enforcement activities with regards to gangs, it is also part of a budding effort to counter gang recruitment activities and help young people escape from gangs. The goal is to identify young people who may be gang members who want to leave the gang and young people who may be at risk of being recruited into a gang.

Young people join gangs for various reasons. In some cases it may be to help support their family financially or to fill a leadership role in the young person's life. The Gang Alternative and Prevention (GAP) program seeks to identify the reasons applicable to a particular young person and then marshal the appropriate social services to provide what is needed. Assistance could come in the form of money to pay utility bills or counseling to help a family deal with a drug addicted parent. The GAP program identifies what is needed in each case through interviewing the young person and family members. The goal is to provide wrap-around services to families in need in order to help their youth avoid the lure of the gangs.

MGU investigators identify young people they may be able to help through their normal interactions on the job and they also get referrals from juvenile court. MGU officers serve as mentors for some young people in need. In addition to working with young people and their families, in some cases MGU investigators will meet with an adult member of the gang (an OG) the young person belongs to or is being recruited into in an effort to convince the OG to release the gang's hold on the young person. This has been shown to be successful.

GAP was born out of a recognition that, "*Memphis cannot arrest its way out of its gang problem.*"[12] While enforcement is certainly part of the solution it is not the entire solution. GAP can be viewed as a supply-side approach to the Memphis gang problem.

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[12] Interview with Lt. Darren Goods, September 23, 2016

This idea originated within the Memphis Police Department Gang Unit. The program is currently being led by the Shelby County District Attorney General's Office. The program does not have dedicated funding, nor does it have full-time personnel. The MGU and SCDAG personnel currently involved are trying to develop a successful model that will justify funding and the hiring of a full-time director for the GAP program.

3.1.3.1. Recommendations

We recommend increased and formalized support for the GAP program. This is an excellent approach for reducing gang membership by providing at-risk young people with a viable alternative to the gang lifestyle. Programs like this that serve to strengthen families and the communities they live in have the potential to break the cycle of generational gang membership. This could be an excellent application for private sector funding.

3.1.4. Gang Response Team

The MGU also coordinates the activities of the MPD Gang Response Team (GRT). This unit consists of one MPD sergeant and eleven MPD police officers who are assigned to the unit on a temporary basis. New officers are rotated into the unit every 90 days as the incumbents are transferred back to patrol assignments. The GRT is a street level enforcement unit focused on areas of gang activity. The unit currently works in nine wards, three each in the Tillman, Mt. Moriah and Old Allen stations. The wards for GRT assignment are chosen based on crime and gang violence data. The focus is on wards with the highest number of robberies and aggravated assaults, particularly those in which shots were fired. We have reviewed daily and monthly activity reports for the GRT. The level of activity is truly impressive for such a small unit. It is clear that the GRT is an essential component of the anti-gang strategy in Memphis.

GRT officers work in a modified uniform (tactical style BDU pants and MPD t-shirts) and their work is proactive. Rather than wait for assignment from the dispatcher, GRT officers patrol high crime areas with the goal of identifying and interdicting criminal activity by

gang members. This is a highly valuable program that mirrors an anti-gang tactic that was used successfully by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) as part of Operation Crew Cut. This type of targeted enforcement is designed to increase the number of contacts between the police and gang members with an emphasis on enforcement. During arrest processing at the station house or while issuing a citation on the street, officers debrief gang members in order to obtain intelligence related to gang membership, hierarchy and activities.

MPD utilizes a two-page form for recording and submitting information obtained from debriefings. This form is titled **Memphis Police Department / Organized Crime Unit / Criminal Intelligence Submission** (Revision Date 10-04-2004). This form includes a set of criteria with point values that is used to determine whether a subject is a confirmed gang member. This criminal intelligence information is provided to the MGU to support and advance its long-term investigations.

The rotation of officers in and out of the GRT every 90 days has benefits and detriments. The major detriment is that the rotation likely decreases the effectiveness of the unit since each group of newly assigned officers needs time to learn about gang membership and activities before they reach a high level of effectiveness. There is a chance that officers are rotated out just as they become more effective at gang interdiction. However, a major benefit to the rotation is that the patrol force continually gains officers who are experienced and knowledgeable about gangs and who can take and apply that knowledge in their regular patrol activities.

3.1.4.1. Recommendations

The GRT is a highly valuable program that should be expanded. This is one area where a modest investment of personnel could have a significant impact in combatting gangs and reducing violent crime in Memphis. Currently the GRT operates 3pm to 11pm with Sundays and Mondays off. So, out of 21 shifts per week, only 5 feature GRT officers out on the street.

We recommend expanding this program to cover at least 15 shifts per week. This would mean adding two additional GRT squads so there would be a total of three GRT squads working each week, each working on a different shift. The day tour and late tour GRT squads could operate with lower staffing levels than the current squad due to lower street activity and crime during those tours. The tours for these new GRT squads should overlap with the existing 3pm x 11pm shift. For example, 10am x 6pm for the day squad and 9pm x 5am for the overnight squad. This would provide time for the squad going off duty to brief the oncoming squad of any new developments. It would also provide periods with extra staffing for surge operations that may be appropriate at certain times. The goal is to keep the pressure on the gangs and to develop continuity in directed enforcement activities from one tour to the next.

We also recommend retaining a number of experienced officers on each GRT squad while continuing to rotate patrol officers into and out of the GRTs. This cadre of experienced officers would guide and train the newly assigned GRT officers, maintaining a higher level of effectiveness for the program. Also, the creation of some permanent positions within the GRT program could serve as a career path to assignment to the Multi-Agency Gang Unit. This would ensure that experienced officers with gang expertise are available to fill any vacancies that arise in the MGU.

3.2. Facilities and Funding

The Multi-Agency Gang Unit exists as a hybrid unit between the Memphis Police Department and the Shelby County Sherriff's Office. The MGU currently works out of space that is provided by the Shelby County Sherriff's Office and *the MGU pays rent to SCSO even though SCSO personnel are members of the unit*. The unit has no tax levy funded operating budget. MPD pays the salaries and benefits for the MPD officers assigned to the unit and provides vehicles. The same is true for the Shelby Country Sherriff's Office and other agencies that participate full or part time. MGU pays its rent and other expenses from its meager operating budget which is funded through forfeiture proceedings and some grants. Although the MGU does occasionally seize funds and

other property through asset forfeiture operations, it is often unable to utilize those assets for gang related enforcement activities. Tennessee State law requires that any money seized in connection with illegal drug sales can only be used by law enforcement for drug related enforcement activities.[13] Generally, gang enforcement activities are not allowed. The MGU has insufficient funding to pay towards confidential informants, undercover gun purchases or other things that could support and enhance its operations.

Despite having good success with investigations involving Title III wiretaps, the MGU does not have its own wire room. Wiretaps are generally part of long-term investigations that are resource intensive and that require confidentiality. A wiretap must be run out of a facility with the right equipment and dedicated personnel where confidentiality can be maintained and distractions avoided. MGU currently borrows time in wirerooms from either MPD Organized Crime Unit or the Shelby County Sherriff's Office. This access is not continuous and is not always available when needed.

3.2.1. Recommendations

We recommend that the Multi-Agency Gang Unit should be allocated dedicated office space. Ideally, space could be allocated in the former Donnelly J. Hill State Office Building on Civic Center Plaza when the MPD moves it headquarters there. This would put the MGU is close proximity to other MPD units such as the Homicide Bureau and Organized Crime Unit with which the MGU must frequently coordinate activities. This space should be equipped with a wireroom dedicated for use by the MGU for gang-related investigations. In addition, this location should have sufficient space for additional desks to facilitate the increased participation of personnel from other agencies.

A dedicated operating budget for the MGU should be established from tax levy money to provide funding for other than personnel services (OTPS) expenses. An operating budget would enable MGU to have funding for things like paying confidential informants and conducting undercover operations.

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[13] Tennessee Code Annotated: TCA 39-17-420(a)(1)

3.3. Gang Investigations

MGU conducts high-level medium to long-term investigations into gang activities. In future visits we want to review investigative case files to see the way in which intelligence gathered from sources such as GRT and patrol personnel, graffiti and social media are incorporated into gang investigations.

4. Staffing

The Memphis Police Department is facing severe staffing shortages. The department is shrinking as retirements and resignations have increased over normal levels and hiring has not kept pace. The Department currently employs about 2,000 sworn officers across all ranks. This is down from approximately 2,413 as recently as 2012. Many officials within the department consider 2,400 to be the required staffing level. This number, however, is based on comparison with other similar sized cities, not on a detailed zero-based staffing analysis. We cannot say at this point what the right number is for the MPD, but we can safely say that 2,000 appears to be too low. Certainly the department will be hard-pressed to achieve reductions in violent crime if the staffing level continues to fall. So, while we do recommend that a zero-based staffing study should be conducted, we do not think the department can wait for that result. Immediate steps should be taken to stem the attrition and stabilize the headcount. That will require concerted efforts at retention and recruitment. We met with Alex Smith, the Chief HR Officer for the City of Memphis and the Memphis Police Department Employment Unit to discuss these issues.

4.1. Recruitment and Hiring

The MPD generally aims to hire 100 police officers per Training Academy class. The department has recently been unable to meet that goal. Indeed, the class scheduled to begin in September 2016 will have 59 recruits, 19 of which are already employed by the department as Police Service Technicians (PST). The MPD Employment Unit has enhanced its recruitment efforts with a new campaign called "Best in Blue" that was launched in June of 2016. This includes a proactive advertising campaign with television spots, mass transit advertisements and highway billboards. The campaign also includes a social media component (Facebook, Twitter and Instagram) in order to reach more young people. Recruiters focus on local colleges and military bases; they also make media appearances. Recruitment efforts are designed to achieve diversity in the recruit class.

The results of this recruitment campaign appear to be good. As of September 7, 2016 the department had received approximately 1,446 applications since the campaign was launched. Of those approximately 464 (32%) had failed the initial vetting process. The initial vetting involves questions pertaining to criminal history, drug use and basic qualifications (citizenship, education, etc.) Still, there were approximately 600 scheduled for the physical agility test which is the next step in the hiring process after the application and vetting questionnaire. The scheduling of the physical agility test was pending for the balance of the applicants. The standards for the physical agility test have been relaxed a bit. The passing time for the 1.5 mile run was extended to 16 minutes and 30 seconds from 15 minutes.

The modification to the physical agility test should help MPD get more recruits into the Training Academy. That is a good start, but there is another obstacle to the hiring process. The Training Academy reports an attrition rate of approximately 22%. This is a high rate that serves to exacerbate the department's already damaging staffing problem. Clearly, there will never be a 100% graduation rate, nor should there be. The culling process that occurs in the Training Academy is both inevitable and desirable. We are not suggesting that standards should be lowered, but rather that recruits should be given more opportunities to pass exams and meet standards. The current policy is that recruits are terminated upon failing three exams in the Training Academy. This threshold was formerly two exams so this change should help lower the attrition rate. Still, the department should consider providing more opportunities for recruits to receive directed supplementary training to help them pass exams they have failed. This would be a way to protect the investment the department has already made in these recruits and it would also help increase the graduation rate. The NYPD has a provision to hold-over recruits who are not qualified to graduate with their class either because of failure on exams or medical issues. We recommend that the MPD Training Academy should consider instituting a similar hold-over policy for recruits.

Most recruits who fail to graduate have trouble with firearms qualification and/or law exams. We recommend that the curricula in these subjects should be examined to ensure that they are appropriately job-based. Adjustments to the curricula may be warranted for these subjects; appropriate adjustments could lower the failure rates.

Regarding knowledge of the law, for example, police officers on the street generally do not need to know specific degrees and subdivision of criminal offenses. It is sufficient for them to know the basic elements of criminal offenses so they can make arrests as warranted. Degrees and subdivisions can be easily looked up during arrest processing at the station house. We understand that one professor from a local university has been responsible for the MPD Training Academy's law curriculum for decades. Without questioning this professor's legal knowledge and experience, we suggest that MPD should convene a panel to review the law curriculum to ensure that it is appropriately job-based. It is possible that MPD recruits are receiving a higher level of legal training than is necessary for them to perform their jobs effectively. Revising the curriculum could reduce the failure rate on law exams and produce a higher graduation rate for the Academy without compromising the performance of police officers on the street.

MPD firearms training appears to be quite rigorous. This is certainly appropriate as the power to use deadly force is one of the most significant responsibilities a police officer holds. However, the Tennessee Police Officer Standards and Training (POST) requirements establish 75% as the minimum score for firearms qualification. The MPD Training Academy requires 80% for qualification. This is another area where a minor adjustment to training standards could yield a higher graduation rate. We recommend studying the scores of recruits who have failed firearms qualification. It is possible that a minor adjustment in the passing score down from 80% could reduce the attrition rate. 75% is the minimum possible passing score due to Tennessee POST standards, but it might not be necessary to reduce passing to that level. A score somewhere between 75% and 80% might produce a significant change in attrition.

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In addition, it is likely that, as with most police firearms training, many failures occur due to a poor hit rate at the 25-yard distance. Most police involved shootings occur within 15 yards and the hit rate in qualification courses is much higher at that distance. The Tennessee POST requirements for firearms qualification state that shots "shall not be fired beyond 25 yards." POST does not appear to require that a firearms qualification course includes firing from a 25-yard distance, merely that that distance not be exceeded. Given the unlikelihood of shootings at this distance and the generally poor performance by police officers at this distance, some firearms trainers recommend removing 25-yard shooting from the basic qualification requirements and instead requiring a 100% hit rate from 15 yards and within. Under this model, recruits would still be trained to shoot at the 25-yard distance, but that distance would not be part of the qualification course. This represents another adjustment that could be made to the MPD recruit training curricula and graduation requirements in order to yield a higher graduation rate without significantly altering standards.

Finally, MPD requires all recruits to qualify with a Sig Sauer model P229R semi-automatic pistol. This is the standard handgun for MPD. This is a large-frame handgun that may be difficult for people with smaller hands to handle effectively. Other comparable weapons such as the Glock 19 may be better suited to people with smaller hands. MPD should consider expanding the list of authorized service weapons so that recruits can choose the weapon that fits them best.

5. Future Topics

5.1. Domestic Violence

Domestic violence incidents often account for a large number of assaults, aggravated assaults and homicides. These incidents tend to escalate in terms of the level of violence. Many policies and programs have been established to deal with domestic violence when it starts, with the goal of preventing escalation to more serious incidents. Programs include must-arrest policies, victims' advocacy services, restraining orders and no-plea prosecution policies. Mandatory follow up in domestic violence cases within specified time frames by specially trained police officers and detectives can be an effective way to reduce escalation and repeated incidents within a family. Reducing domestic violence can go a long way towards reducing aggravated assaults. In a future visit, we would like to meet with the MPD Domestic Violence Unit and General Investigative Bureau criminal investigators to learn how MPD approaches domestic violence and what programs and policies are in place.

5.2. Crime Reporting and Crime Analysis

The Memphis Police Department in its partnership with the University of Memphis has developed the Blue Crush initiative based on data-driven policing. Blue Crush is similar to the NYPD CompStat program which uses crime mapping and data analysis to drive the deployment of police personnel and resources. The detailed analysis of crime reporting data forms the foundation of current policing strategies. Indeed, Memphis saw impressive results with Blue Crush when it was first implemented in the 2005 – 2006 timeframe.

In a future visit we would like to meet with the Crime Analysis Unit to learn in detail how the department is analyzing crime data – what data is being analyzed and compared and what questions are being asked? In particular, we would like to look at detailed analysis of aggravated assault statistics since this crime is a driver of the violent crime rate in Memphis. For example, based on what we have seen, it appears that non-fatal shootings

are not tracked separately from aggravated assaults and are not subject to the same level of analysis as homicides. We want to ensure that crime data is being analyzed in the most useful and effective manner.

We want to attend an MPD CompStat meeting to see firsthand how crime analysis data is being used to drive deployments and develop crime reduction strategies. In working to reduce the violent crime rate, understanding where and why shootings and homicides are occurring is a critically important first step. The results of this analysis should drive patrol deployments and specialty unit operations. For example, if the analysis shows a large number of drug-related shootings in an area, that should result in increased high-visibility deployment of uniformed officers in that area. In addition, narcotics enforcement activity in that area should be analyzed alongside the homicide/shooting data. For example, if it was shown that most narcotics unit arrests in this area typically occur between 8pm and midnight, but most drug-related shootings in the area occur after midnight, then an adjustment in narcotics unit enforcement activity would be warranted.

5.3. Community Policing

Community support is vital to any policing strategy. It is important for police officials to develop strong relationships with community leaders and concerned citizens. We have discussed ways to foster community involvement through practices like holding regularly scheduled precinct or station management team meetings to include police officials and community leaders. It is also important for good relationships to exist at the patrol officer level so that residents and merchants know and trust the officers that patrol their neighborhoods and are willing to share information with them. In a future visit, we want to meet with members from Community Outreach Program and any other units that have a role in community policing in order to understand the depth and breadth of community policing efforts in Memphis.

5.4. Gang Investigations

MGU conducts high-level medium to long-term investigations into gang activities. In future visits we want to review investigative case files to see the way in which intelligence gathered from sources such as GRT and patrol personnel, graffiti and social media are incorporated into gang investigations.

6. Summary

This interim report contains detailed recommendations in three major areas, Homicide/Shooting Reduction, Gang Investigation and Enforcement and Staffing.

For Homicide/Shooting Reduction we recommend:

- Increasing and stabilizing the staffing of the Homicide Bureau
- Creating a discretionary grade promotion system within the sergeant/investigator rank so there is a career path for officers who want to remain as investigators rather than becoming supervisors
- Analyze homicides and non-fatal shootings in greater detail
- Recreate the Violent Felony Bureau
- Conform to Uniform Crime Reporting terminology for case status

For Gang Investigation and Enforcement we recommend:

- Increase and formalize financial support for the Gang Alternative and Prevention program (GAP); this could be an appropriate use of private sector funding
- Expand the Gang Response Team (GRT) to cover additional shifts each week; make GRT a career path to the Gang Unit by retaining some officers within the GRT rather than rotating them out
- Identify and procure new office space for the Multi-Agency Gang Unit (MGU) so there is room for additional personnel and a dedicated wire room
- Create an operating budget for the MGU funded with tax-levy money so the unit can engage in a full range of investigative activities without depending on funding from asset seizure and grants

For Staffing we recommend:

- Revise the MPD Training Academy policy so that a third failed exam does not result in termination; implement a hold-over policy for recruits who are unable to graduate on time due to academic or medical issues

- Examine the law and firearms curricula and testing/qualification standards to ensure that they are appropriately job-related; consider revising curricula and standards to increase the graduation rate
- Expand the list of authorized service weapons to include smaller frame semi-automatic pistols that can be more easily handled by people with smaller hands

We understand that it is difficult for MPD to increase staffing as recommended for the Homicide Bureau, Violent Felony Bureau and Gang Response Team. We recognize the severe attrition problem the department is presently facing. However, these units form the pointed tip of the spear in reducing the city's violent crime rate in Memphis, and we think that the city would see real benefits from increasing staffing in these areas. As of September 10 of this year, gang members made up 40% of the homicide victims and 17% of the suspects. And yet, only about 1% of MPD sworn personnel are assigned to anti-gang enforcement units. As mentioned previously, a zero-based staffing analysis can potentially uncover under-utilized personnel. This can make the allocation of additional personnel to these units more feasible. However, this type of analysis takes time. We highly recommend transferring personnel into these units in the short term even if this causes some pain or reduction in service in other areas.

It appears that the department's recruiting efforts through the Best in Blue campaign are producing results. Hopefully the department will be able to meet its goals for future recruit classes at the Training Academy. The first step is recruiting qualified people. The second, and no less important step is for the new recruits to graduate from the Training Academy so they can be deployed on the streets of Memphis. The attrition rate is high at 22%. We have identified two areas where the majority of failures occur, law and firearms. Graduation requirements and job standards should be based on a current job analysis. It may be possible to revise the curricula and qualification standards in these subjects to increase the graduation rate without reducing the effective quality of graduating officers.

While the recommendations in this report are generally more specific and operational than they are strategic, we think they provide concrete steps for moving forward with steps to reduce the violent crime rate in Memphis and should be considered as part of the new Operation Safe Community program being introduced this fall.

In future visits we would like to examine MPD's approach to domestic violence, crime reporting and crime analysis, and community policing. We will report on these areas in future interim reports.

5. Appendix C – Memphis Gang Strategy Proposal

Memphis Gang Strategy Proposal

Prepared for:

Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

Attention:

Commissioner Bill Gibbons

President

Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

600 Jefferson Avenue

Memphis, TN 38105

January 20, 2017

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Contents

1. INTRODUCTION

Gang violence in Memphis has become an epidemic. It is a public health crisis of the first order, taking hundreds of young lives, shattering families, and holding entire neighborhoods hostage to fear. There were 209 murders recorded in the city in 2016, the most in a generation. The Memphis homicide rate was 32 per 100,000 a higher rate than that of Chicago, which saw 28 per 100,000. While the soaring murder rate has commanded headlines, gang activity drives a host of other crimes, from robberies to drug sales to human trafficking. 81% of the homicides in Memphis in 2016 were gun-related, and non-fatal shootings typically occur at three to four times the rate of homicides. That the number of non-fatal shootings in Memphis last year was not readily available to K2 personnel points to one of the shortcomings in the present approach.

Memphis has had an entrenched gang problem since at least the 1980s, when the Gangster Disciples and Vice Lords moved down from Chicago. Other chapters from established national groups—Bloods, Crips, MS-13—followed suit. While traditional gangs with hierarchical structures, clearly-defined memberships, and engagement in profit-making crimes remain in operation, recent years have seen the emergence of many looser groups, known as hybrids, that form ad-hoc and shifting alliances as problems and opportunities present themselves. Violence is often spontaneous, or inspired by social media posts. Individuals may be part of more than one hybrid gang, and they might shift from one gang to another. The generational change from the traditional gangs to the fluid nature of the hybrids has drawn comparisons to the development of ISIS from Al Qaeda.

The urgency of the problem demands that it be given the highest priority. Though the commitment of resources we recommend is substantial, there are proven tactics in addressing gang activity, including community partnerships, social media monitoring, and intelligence-driven enforcement. With a cohesive strategy, implemented with rigor and care, a reduction in violence will follow.

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2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

No one knows exactly how many gang members there are in Memphis or anywhere else in the country. Nationally, gang membership is difficult to estimate, due to inconsistent reporting methods across jurisdictions. In 2015, the FBI counted 1.4 million gang members in the US; the National Gang Center estimate for 2012 was 850,000. A recent study by researchers at Sam Houston University argued that juvenile gang membership alone was over a million, a stable number with a vast amount of instability built into it: 400,000 juveniles cycled in and out of that population every year.

In classifying gang activity, the distinction is often made between "gang-related" and "gang-motivated" crimes. In the former, either the offender or the victim is a known gang member, but the crime itself is the result of a dispute, a robbery, or other matters. Gang members aren't just dangerous; they are in constant danger themselves. Acts of violence are often part of the initiation process, and any perception of threats or disrespect often prompt a violent response. "Gang-motivated" crimes are those caused by a collective agenda for one group to harm another, rather than an individual propensity to do harm. Most incidents of retaliatory violence should be viewed as such. It should be noted that these terms can only be applied to cases in which the motivations are known, and the clearance rate for aggravated assaults in 2013 was 30%, and for robberies, 20%. As such, the crimes that are currently classified as gang-motivated or gang-related represent a fraction of those being committed.

According to MPD homicide data, of the 228 total homicides in 2016, 72 of the victims were gang members (31.5%), as were 38 suspects (16.6%), with a total of 22 incidents (9.6%) classified as gang-motivated. While most victims were in their teens and twenties, thirteen were over thirty, and six were over forty. The oldest gang member to be killed was 56. The lower numbers for suspects and incident classifications can be explained in part because 69 of the killings are unsolved. Moreover, MPD doesn't allow for "secondary classifications," i.e., a robbery homicide that is the result of a gang initiation, which homicide investigators believe to be the case in at least one instance. While last year's

body count was extraordinary, the full impact of gang violence in Memphis is underestimated. Things are even worse than they seem.

3. THE CURRENT RESPONSE

The primary responsibility for gang investigations and enforcement is the Multi-Agency Gang Unit (MGU). When K2 interviewed investigators and supervisors of the MGU in November, twelve investigators from the Memphis Police Department and nine from the Shelby County Sheriff's Department were assigned. Since the spring of 2016, nine uniformed MPD officers also served on a ninety-day rotation as part of the Gang Response Team (GRT). The GRT conducts enforcement activity, and they can be deployed to a high school, for example, when there is a report of an impending fight; previously, investigators were taken off their cases to respond. A prosecutor from Shelby County was detailed to the unit, and FBI and ATF agents were in frequent contact. In terms of interagency cooperation and vertical prosecution models, the unit exemplifies current understandings of best practices. Information technology support is also effective, in that the RTCC delivers daily reports of gang database matches with all other police information systems, from arrests to traffic tickets to 911 calls. Though a fair amount of uncorroborated data comes through—"name hits" without dates of birth, for example— investigators are better off with having too much to read than too little.

Known gang members in Memphis are listed in the Targeted Active Gang (TAG) database, which contains the names of over 12,000 verified gang members and 194 gangs. The criteria for eligibility are those set by NCIC guidelines, requiring evidence that satisfies a weighted ten-point scale. Typically, this evidence comes from a variety of sources, including social media, officer observations, confidential informants, and admissions, of which those provided by corrections personnel are invaluable—a Crip who denies being a Crip to a cop will be more candid when faced with being housed in a cell block run by Bloods. The TAG system also includes 571 "security threats," who are individuals with a probable gang association, but have not met the threshold of evidence required by the ten-point scale. As such, TAG-identified individuals meet the strict standard required for prosecution enhancements for gang cases, but the system is inadequate in providing a full picture of gang activity from an intelligence perspective.

The accomplishments of MGU are impressive, as is its dedication. Its commanding officer, Major Darren Goods, is driven, experienced, and engaged, and the results of his leadership are tangible. One investigator, who had deep community ties from his years on patrol, assisted in the arrests of 21 violent felons in a two-week period, including six for murder. Another conducted an extremely labor-intensive, multiple-wiretap investigation of a gang leader who ordered the murder of another gang member. As the case was technically "closed," with the shooter under arrest, it would not have gotten the effort from Homicide that MGU was able to provide.

This investigation represents exactly what criminologist Anthony Braga and others discussed in the Kennedy School of Government's *New Perspectives in Policing,* which begins with this premise:

There is now a growing consensus that the police can control crime when they are focused on identifiable risks, such as crime hot spots, repeat victims and very active offenders, and when they use a range of tactics to address these ongoing problems... In the United States, these police innovations have been largely implemented by uniformed patrol officers rather than criminal investigators.

The report recommends that traditional investigations of specific past crimes—an inherently reactive undertaking—should be augmented by adaptive and intelligence-driven efforts to address the broader environments and enterprises from which major crimes are likely to arise. Simply put, the Homicide Bureau is solely concerned with past crimes; the Gang Unit is responsible for both past and future ones.

While a close working relationship between Homicide and MGU is necessary, at present, both are headed by Major Goods. Operationally, the two units fall under two separate administrative divisions. With Homicide, Major Goods reports to superior officers in Personal Crimes and Investigative Services; with MGU, he falls under both the Organized Crime Unit and Special Operations. While the arrangement might work in the short term with Major Goods in charge, a more coherent command structure must be considered for the future.

MGU personnel were asked about how cases were selected and prioritized. The response was that some were "noise-driven," or inspired by public attention to a particular incident, or "opportunity-driven," which is to say that a source of information presented a useful point of entry into the operations of a specific criminal enterprise. To choose workable cases is a rational approach, but the investment of scarce resources should be driven by a broader strategy. Asked if the Gang Injunction Zones were having an effect, the response was that coordination with patrol-based enforcement efforts was lacking. (In a TRAC meeting the next day, the Gang Injunction Zones were not mentioned by precinct commanders. Neither were non-fatal shootings or gang activity in general.)

The MGU faces several challenges, some of which are attributable to the staffing shortages endemic to the MPD. It rents inadequate space from the Shelby County Sheriff's Department, and lacks technical equipment of its own, including the means to store and analyze the vast amount of social media content that gang investigations require. Wiretap equipment for the aforementioned homicide investigation was borrowed. Current regulations only permit drug forfeiture funds to be spent on narcotics-related investigations; there is no budget for informants or gun buys, which are crucial to gang investigations. As it stands, the MGU can pay an informant to buy a vial of crack, but not a murder weapon. Many MGU members have not received the training required for them to testify as certified experts in social media evaluation for gang cases in court.

The nine members of the GRT rotate as a group, so that the learning curve is both collective and abrupt. The loss of new expertise is likely not offset by more widely dispersed awareness of gang issues in precincts when the assigned officers return to them. An immediate fix to the problem would be to assign GRT personnel in staggered shifts, although the redeployment of nine uniformed officers cannot be expected to have a meaningful effect.

Nor can the twelve MPD investigators permanently assigned to MGU. They represent 0.6% of the sworn officers of the department, and they face at least 12,000 gang members in 194 gangs.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the productive potential of MGU to address and prevent violent crime in Memphis, enhancement of its capabilities should be a paramount focus of the department. Our recommendations are as follows:

1. Designate a new Chief Crime Strategist, reporting to Director Rallings, to implement and oversee the new gang initiative. The strategist will set goals and be held responsible for their achievement, ensuring that activities are coordinated among the nine precinct commands as well as Investigative Services and Special Operations.

2. Increase the size of the Gang Unit to bring the MPD staffing from 21 to 72, equally divided between investigators and uniformed GRTs. The four new GRTs should be assigned permanently, instead of on ninety-day rotations. The expanded investigative component should also include a Major Case Team.

3. Focus on dismantling the most violent gangs through detailed analysis of gang intelligence and social media. TAG membership lists should be incorporated into detailed and dynamic maps of gang territory and gang- related criminal activity, with dedicated analysts using the most advanced technology.

4. Work with State and Federal prosecutors to develop effective conspiracy cases against the most notorious gangs. With the expected increase in cases, the unit will require additional dedicated prosecutors.

5. Work with the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission and the private sector to provide support for the enlarged Gang Unit, including the acquisition of adequate space, equipment, and funds for confidential informants.

6. Provide necessary training for new Gang Unit members prior to their assignment to assure the safety and appropriateness of their tactics and operations, as well as social media training for all personnel.

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7. Ensure that Precinct and MGU personnel provide continuous enforcement coverage in Gang Injunction Zones. The use of GPS bracelets, currently employed with high-risk domestic violence and sex crime offenders, should be explored.

8. Develop new accountability metrics for monitoring gang violence, particularly for non-fatal shootings, and provide management oversight at weekly TRAC meetings. Responsibility for suppression, prevention, and outreach must be shared by Gang and Patrol.

9. Enhance gang violence prevention through the planned Group Violence Intervention Initiative and the re-invigoration of the GREAT program, a school-based program on gang-related issues. Focused deterrence in the "CeaseFire" model must be carefully tailored to the specific conditions of Memphis, which include a diffuse dispersal of gang activity across a wide geographical area.

10. Leverage community support through gang awareness forums for parents and the establishment of clergy and community coalitions against gang violence. The leaders of these coalitions should be trained in law enforcement methods and limitations, consulted regularly, and briefed on local conditions in real time.

4.1. A NOTE ON IMPLEMEMTATION

Assigning sufficient personnel to the new gang initiative in an understaffed department will not be painless. Though the rate of attrition seems to have slowed, there will be no immediate surge in the number of police academy graduates, and the redirection of resources from non-emergency calls for service such as burglar alarms will not expand manpower capability in any dramatic or timely manner. However, the magnitude of the problem demands bold action.

For the GRTs, preference should be given to officers who have demonstrated ability in previous rotations on the teams. The selection process should be as rigorous as possible, within the limits of present work rules, and a recruitment campaign should be undertaken.

At present, the nine precincts each have task forces to address local conditions, and these might provide a suitable pool of candidates to draw upon. Though their loss will be felt, their enforcement targets will coincide with precinct hotspots. As far as investigators are concerned, the restructuring of other department units should be considered. For example, there are 36 MPD officers with the Special Traffic Investigative Services, as many as in Homicide and Gang combined. The Tennessee Highway Patrol can be requested to assist in their core responsibilities of DWI enforcement and the investigation of traffic fatalities.

K2 will work collaboratively with the MPD to identify opportunities for staff redeployment necessary for the gang initiative.

6. Appendix D – MPD Consolidated Recommendations

This list of consolidated recommendations for the Memphis Police Department was sent on March 30, 2017.

1.   Designate a new Chief Crime Strategist, reporting to Director Rallings, to implement and oversee the new gang initiative, as well as other crime strategies. The Chief Crime Strategist will set initiative implementation goals and be held responsible for their achievement.

2.   The new Chief Crime Strategist should take the lead role in TRAC meetings in order to provide a greater focus on violent crime. Additional TRAC meetings should be scheduled at Headquarters to focus solely on monitoring the effectiveness of the new gang initiative as it progresses.

3.   Increase the size of the Gang Unit to bring the MPD staffing from 21 to 72, equally divided between investigators and uniformed GRTs. The four new GRTs should be assigned permanently, instead of on ninety-day rotations. The expanded investigative component should also include a Major Case Team. A commensurate increase in supervisors and support staff for the Gang Unit will be required.

4.   Focus on dismantling the most violent gangs through detailed analysis of gang intelligence and social media. Social media savvy Police Officers (and perhaps PSTs) should be selected for this function.

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5.   TAG membership lists should be incorporated into detailed and dynamic maps of gang territory and gang- related criminal activity, with dedicated analysts using the most advanced technology.

6.   Work with State and Federal prosecutors to develop effective conspiracy cases against the most notorious gangs. With the expected increase in cases, the unit will require additional dedicated prosecutors.

7.   Work with the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission and the private sector to provide support for the enlarged Gang Unit, including the acquisition of adequate space, equipment, and funds for confidential informants.

8.   Provide necessary training for new Gang Unit members prior to their assignment to assure the safety and appropriateness of their tactics and operations, as well as social media training for all personnel.

9.   Ensure that Precinct and MGU personnel provide continuous enforcement coverage at gang locations and in Gang Injunction Zones. The Court ordered use of GPS bracelets for gang members, as currently employed with high-risk domestic violence and sex crime offenders, should be explored.

10.   Develop new accountability metrics for monitoring violent/gang crime at TRAC meetings. More complete data is needed for non-fatal shootings in general and for gang violence in particular.

11.   Through enhanced management oversight at weekly TRAC meetings, gang crime suppression and prevention activities should be closely coordinated among the nine Patrol Precincts and with Investigative Services and Special Operations. Particular focus should be placed on the Gang Injunction Zones.

12.   Enhance gang violence prevention through the planned Group Violence Intervention Initiative and the re-invigoration of the GREAT program, a school-based program on gang-related issues. Focused deterrence in the "CeaseFire" model must be carefully tailored to the specific conditions of Memphis, which include a diffuse dispersal of gang activity across a wide geographical area.

13.   Leverage community support through gang awareness forums for parents and the establishment of clergy and community coalitions against gang violence. The leaders of these coalitions should be trained in law enforcement methods and limitations, consulted regularly, and briefed on local conditions in real time.

14.   For staffing the GRTs, preference should be given to officers who have demonstrated ability in previous rotations on the teams.

15.   The nine precinct task forces currently address local crime (and gang) conditions. These task forces might provide a suitable pool of candidates to draw upon for expansion of the Gang Unit GRTs.

16.   In order to assign additional investigators to the Gang Unit, the restructuring of other department units should be considered. For example, there are 36 MPD officers with the Special Traffic Investigative Services, as many as in Homicide and Gang

combined. The Tennessee Highway Patrol can be requested to assist in their core responsibilities of DWI enforcement and the investigation of traffic fatalities.

17.   Gang intelligence information can be obtained through intensive social media monitoring and analysis, as well as through the consistent and thorough debriefing of gang members whenever they are in contact with police personnel.

18.   Gang information should be organized into individual gang or "set" books, complete with organization charts, photos, nicknames and aliases, criminal histories, criminal activities and rivalries.

19.   MPD legal counsel should be available to the Gang Unit to guide case development and serve as liaison to the District Attorney.

20.   Identify and procure new office space for the Multi-Agency Gang Unit (MGU) so there is sufficient room for the additional personnel, as well as for a dedicated wire room.

21.   Create an operating budget for the MGU with tax-levy funds, so the unit can engage in a full range of investigative activities without having to depend on sporadic funding from asset seizures and grants

22.   MPD needs to analyze each shooting and homicide more fully in order to get a better understanding of the motives and other relevant factors, and of the possible linkage between incidents.

23.   The results of ongoing homicide/shooting analysis should drive patrol deployments and specialty unit operations, including hot-spot policing deployments focused on mapped areas of concentrated violence.

24.   Consideration should be given to the reestablishment of the Violent Felony Bureau for the centralization, coordination and oversight of the investigations of violent crimes.

25.   Conform to FBI/UCR rules re case status, i.e. "cleared" rather than "solved"

26.   Murder and non-negligent manslaughter should be broken out from "Homicide" in accordance with FBI/UCR rules and become the standard indicator for the public and within the Department

27.   Shooting data (incidents and victims) should be broken out from Aggravated Assault, and analyzed separately by the Real Time Crime Center and reported publicly.

28.   Shooting incidents in every precinct must be addressed in every TRAC meeting by precinct commanders.

29.   Reports of "shots fired" should be mapped in conjunction with non-fatal shootings and homicides, based of 911 calls and other information.

30.   All firearms evidence, from recovered weapons to shell casings, must be secured regardless of the actual consequences of the assault, and analyzed for DNA and ballistics evidence.

31.   Consideration should be given to reestablishing the city-wide Felony Assault Team in order to centralize and prioritize shooting investigations.

32.   The domestic violence reduction strategy should include the assignment of designated, trained domestic violence officers and detectives in each precinct.

33.   There should be mandatory follow up home visits in domestic violence cases.

34.   Home visits should prioritize the client population who continue to make police reports, but decline prosecution.   Given the scarcity of police resources, trained volunteers and members of community-based organizations might be enlisted in this outreach.

35.   Efforts to engage at-risk populations, such as recent immigrants and the gay and lesbian community, should be expanded.

36.   Community and clergy-based liaisons should receive training in legal procedure regarding domestic violence as well as the availability of social services.

37.   No program of focused deterrence for high-risk DV offenders should be attempted before the planned focused deterrence effort to address gang violence is undertaken. The consequences of failure are too high for the MPD to attempt such a program without prior operational experience.

38.   MPD should develop violence intervention tactics in conjunction with clergy and community leaders in the affected areas.

39.   MPD should foster coordination with social service, education, housing and health-care agencies to enhance the effectiveness of violence reduction efforts.

40.   Prevention and diversion efforts should be emphasized for younger gang members who have not yet become fully involved in criminal activity.

41.   Precinct commanders' problem solving efforts should be focused on violent crime reduction and ways in which community involvement can support those efforts. A key component should be to establish a formal meeting schedule for joint police–community problem solving sessions (e.g., Precinct Community Council, community boards, etc.).

42.   Explore ways to leverage 311 call data to identify repeat problem locations and correlate that with 911 call data. This can produce police responses that are more efficient and more attuned to community concerns.

43.   Current crime statistics should be posted weekly on the Department's website in order to keep the public fully informed.

44.   Increase and formalize financial support for the Gang Alternative and Prevention program (GAP); this could be an appropriate use of private sector funding

45.   TRAC meetings should be conducted at Police HQ, rather than in the Precincts.

46.   TRAC meetings should be chaired by a Chief Crime Strategist who is supported by an analytic team.

47.   TRAC meetings should dedicate sufficient time (30+ min. each) to examine crime conditions thoroughly in a few Precincts (not 5-10 min. each for all Precincts).

48.   The current standardized TRAC presentation format misses important information (e.g. data on shootings) and should be revised

49.   There is currently a risk of spending too much time in each Precinct's TRAC presentation on "success stories"

50.   Most of the TRAC meeting should be dedicated to questions from the Chair about Precinct crime conditions and strategies, with in-depth analysis of illustrative cases (selected by the Chair)

51.   Special focus TRAC meetings, e.g. gang, domestic violence, narcotics, should be scheduled periodically

52.   Rather than simply working to restore staffing to the 2,400 level, MPD should conduct a zero-based staffing analysis to determine the appropriate staffing level for each unit within the department and for the department as a whole.

53.   MPD and the city's Chief Human Resources Officer should continue to work together to improve recruitment efforts to reach a more diverse set of police officer candidates.

54.   MPD should routinely conduct formalized exit interviews with MPD personnel who voluntarily separate from the department, in order to learn what factors are driving the large number of separations.

55.   MPD should examine the current rank structure and promotion process, as well as transfer procedures, to see how they are perceived by members of the department and how that may affect the retention rate.

56.   The rank of Sergeant should be reserved primarily for first-line supervision. Investigators should be Police Officers who are awarded the discretionary rank of Detective. There should be promotion opportunities within the investigative track through a Grade system (e.g. Detective 3rd Grade, 2nd Grade and 1st Grade).

57.   The staffing of the Homicide Bureau should be monitored carefully so that vacancies are filled promptly and caseloads kept to reasonable levels.

58.   Revise the MPD Training Academy policy so that a third failed exam does not necessarily result in termination. Consider implementation of a hold-over policy for recruits who are unable to graduate on time due to academic or medical issues.

59. Examine the law and firearms curricula and the testing/qualification standards to ensure that they are appropriately job-related. If appropriate, consider revising the curricula and standards in order to increase the Police Academy graduation rate.

60. In order to avoid unnecessary attrition from the Police Academy, consider expanding the list of authorized service weapons to include smaller frame semi-automatic pistols that can be more easily handled by people with smaller hands.