I . - I .I I per CLARK PRESIDENT To the Reader: Enclosed with this letter is one of four White Papers my campaign will release. This paper sets forth a proposal for improving American pros- pects for peace and security while reducing our military budget. The Founders of our country. people like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, advised us to cultivate peace and avoid entangling foreign alliances. As in so many other areas. our govern? ment in recent years has ignored the wisdom of the Founders. In recent years the U.S. government has attempted to manipulate the affairs of countries around the globe. It has propped up dictators-in the name of freedom and gone to war in the name of peace. Our military budget has soared, and more than 2 million Americans are currently on active duty in the armed services. What have these policies brought us? Throughout large parts-of the world, the United States is hated for its interference. 100,000 Americans have died in foreign conflicts since the end of World War II. Our taxes have soared and our economy has been crippled under the burden of our military Spending. And most important. we live under the constant threat of nuclear war . . I propose a new foreign policy for America it 15 an American foreign policy, based on the ideas of America's Founders and the realities of today's world. It is a policy of peace. free trade. and non?intervention. It 13 a policy that proposes broad economic and cultural contacts with other nations but that would keep the U.S. government out of the affairs of other countries and reorient the American military to the defense of the gnlted States. It is a policy of true internationallsm. an internationalism that accords other people and other nations the reSpect we want for ourselves. With such a policy -- devoted to defending the United States rather than intervening around the world -- we can make substantial cuts in ourzmilitary budget while making Americans more secure than they are at present. I am well aware that this foreign policy proposal puts me decidedly at odds with my opponents. .All three of my opponents are proposing an expanded U.S. military presence abroad and billions of dollars in new military spending. .As with every other problem in our society. their solution is to throw money at our foreign policy problems. Mine is to eramine the causes of the problem and to propose real solu? tions based on principle and common sense. If the American people have the opportunity to compare the foreign policy proposals of all four candidates. I believe that millions of them will choose my program of-peace and non-t intervention. I urge all Americans to support this principled. common? sense program. Together we can:move Am - erica towar . security. a peace and Sincerely, WM 'Ed Clark ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This White Paper was drafted by a Task Force on Foreign and Military Policy consisting of the following persons: Bruce Bartlett David Cortright Jay Hilgartner Earl C. Ravenal, Chairman James J. Treires It was co?ordinated and edited by Earl C. Ravenal, professor of international relations at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, former Defense Department Analyst, and author of numerous books and articles on foreign and military policy. It was further reviewed by David Boaz and Edward' H. Crane of the Clark for President staff. 1. Introduction: A Libertarian Foreign Policy, 2. The Shape of the World and the U.S.-Soviet Balance, 5 3. America's Attitude Toward Europe, 10 4. Approaches to the.Middle East Israel and the Arab Peoples, l7 . The Persian Gulf and the Flow of Oil, 19 5. Problems in Asia An Overview. 22 Japan, 23 Korea, 23?24 China, 24_25 Southeast.Asia, 25?25 The Subcontinent, 25 Conclusion, 27 6. The Treatment of the Third World, 23 7. Notes on the International Economy, 35 8. The Logic of National Security, 38 The Strategic Nuclear Balance, 40 Strategic Arms Control, 46 Conventional Forces and Non?Intervention, 48 Less Bang for the Buck, 57 Comprehensive Defense Budget Reductions, 58 9. Domestic Economic Conversion, 64 10. Epilogue: Toward a Non?Interventionist Foreign Policy, 65 1. Introduction: A_Libertarian Foreign Poligy_ For too many years American foreign policy has not served the true interests of the American people. Our foreign policy has been directed primarily toward the interests of other nations, to the detriment of our own-?and ultimately theirs. We have gotten away from the foreign policy of America's Founders. George Washington told us to have with other nations "as little political conduct as possible." Thomas Jefferson gave us this succinct outline of our role in the world: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations - entangling alliances with none." A.policy of intervention, entangling alliances, and war, the Founders were convinced, would bring about a massive, expensive, and war?torn government, resembling those of the Old World to which our new and shining republic now' stood in stark contrast. There were many differences between our nation and the Empires of Europe, but this was the most important: They were military machines, dedicated to the restless search for national power and glory. Ours was consecrated to a different end: the preservation of the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of individual men and women. Just as a foreign policy of intervention, imperialism, and war was natural to the European powers?it was what they were all about?so one of non-intervention, respect for other peoples, and peace was natural to our republic. But in recent years we have ignored the teachings of Washington and Jefferson, and the lessons of history. We have attempted to manipulate foreign peoples throughout the world, promoting governments "friendly" to undefined "American interests," rather than allowing people to form their own. In the name of "free enterprise" we have propped up dictators who are "anti-Communist," while these dicta- torial regimes, and our support of them, are the greatest single factor undermining the credibility of capitalism throughout the Third World. We have actively intervened, through diplomatic, economic, and military means, to pro? tect American business interests abroad, instead of pursuing a policy of free trade and noninterference that would allow firms to invest in other nations at their own risk We have used American arms, troops, covert operations by the CIA, the management of international trade, and a host of other methods to try to shape world events to our liking. And we have failed. we went to war in Europe in 1941 to save it from Nazi enslavement, yet today much of Europe is under the domination of communism. We went to war to protect South Korea from communist invasion, yet today that country remains a dictatorship, lacking many of the freedoms we we were trying to save. And we squandered fifty thousand . American lives??not to mention over a million Vietnamese lives -?and almost half a trillion dollars of American wealth to save South Vietnam from communist takeover, yet today Vietnam is a unified and expansionist communist state. Even the flawed and partial successes that are claimed by some have _had a brief and unstable existence. Our foreign policy failures and misdirections have not been confined to the battlefield. We have lost the respect of almost every nation in the world, especially in the so-called Third World, through other kinds of interventions, such.as covert actions of the Central Intelligence Agency, heavy- handed diplomatic pressures by U.S. presidents, and clumsy efforts to buy loyalty through extensive foreign economic and military aid, usually directed to propping up dictator? ships that proclaim.their opposition to communism while repressing individual liberty in ways that differ little from those of the communists. In perpetrating these failures, both of the major American political parties have had a share. Indeed, the perilous" state of American foreign policy has been a consequence of the duopoly of politics, up to now, in the United States, just as it has been a consequence of their common presumption of government action and interference in all spheres of human activity. Libertarians ascribe a good part of the troubles of the United States and the world, on both sides of the Cold war, to these false presumptions;.and they intend to reverse them. For American foreign policy need not be the way it is. During most of our history we avoided the petty conflicts that have been almostcontinuous in Europeanwhistory. Even as a fledgling nation, we gained respect because we confined- our relations with other nations to those necessary for trade and commerce. Although the United States did not always adhere strictly to the principles laid down in President Washington's Farewell Address, we did, by and large, avoid involvement in the political??and thus the military??affairs of other nations. and radically after World War II, when we entered into literally hundreds of alliances and treaties which involved the United States intimately in the politicai affairs of almost every other nation in the world. the United States was unquestionably .Aft War II . . er Worl th, militarily and economic- the most powerful nation on ear . . ally. Only the United States, among the major industria nations, totally escaped the destruction of war: no foreign soldier or bomb touched American soil. And the United States had exclusive possession of the most powerful weapon.0n earth?? the atom bomb. One would have thought that such advantages, correctly perceived and intelligently deployed, would usher in a golden age of American foreign policy. Yet one can find no comparable period of history in which things have gone worse for the United States. In our sometimes hysterical efforts to stop communism at all cost, we succeeded very little and very tranSiently: and in the process alienated, in one way or another, most other nations. And if one is to believe the reports from Freedom House, Amnesty International, and other respected private organizations, the status of individual freedom in the world has declined steadily since World War II. It is not that American foreign policyemakers consciously intended that their actions lead to the opposite'of what they publicly espoused. It is just that there are limits to what any nation can do to influence the behavior of others. Although the Soviet empire has held together far longer than most people expected, nationalisms are straining even the immense power of the Soviet police state to maintain the semblance of unity. If Soviet methods cannot even maintain adequate control over the republics within the Russian orbit, how could the United States exercise political control over the behavior of foreign nations through the use of aid or covert action? The irony--and the tragedy-?is that the United States, by interfering actively in the affairs of other nations, has discredited itself as a champion of freedom. .A nation that was conceived in revolution, the United States has supported so many counter?revolutionary Rhee in Korea, Diem in South Vietnam, the Shah of Iran, Somoza of Nicaragua?-that the people of the nonaligned nations see little difference between the United States and the Soviet Union. Libertarians reject the great aberration of the past thirty? five or forty years from the original American tradition of diplomacy. We believe that the Soviet Union would have been less successful in extending its influence and control if the United States had recognized the right of all people to self?determination, rather than bloating our force structure and defense budget and designing them more for embroiling ourselves in foreign conflicts than for defending ourselves from any realistic threat.' The bedrock of a Libertarian foreign policy is non?inter- vention: disengagement of our troops and bases from foreign countries: withdrawal from our defensive treaties and other nations, or draining them of their shutting down the covert ering Operations hannels and lawful an end to all alliances with content of military commitment; actions and intrusive intelligence?gath of the C. I. A. and relying on normal means to acquire necessary information; official foreign aid, which does nothing permanent or* really effective to help other countries; elimination.of all. trade barriers and opening our doors to the world's goods, labor, and capital; and ending all coercive inter?d vention in the affairs of other nations. Such a policy would demonstrate the true commitment of the United States to the freedom of all people, and would do far_more to advance the legitimate aims of American foreign policy than has the interventionism of the past thirtyh five or forty years. 2. The Shape of_the World and_the U.S.-Soviet Balance The case for non -intervention is based on the moral principles of peace and respect for other peoples and is consistent with the evolving international system, which presents increasing challenges and temptations but also imposes greater costs and risks for less ample and less secure gains. The case is also made with the realization that our own domestic system-- social. economic, political--imposes constraints that are becoming tighter and more troublesome for any American leader who dreams of policies of global intervention. The world, and our own system. will increasingly have to be taken as "given." and American foreign policy will increasingly have to adjust and conform. We can identify several characteristics of the emerging inter? national state of affairs: The first is the high probability of continuing troubles. such as embargoes, expropriations. coups. revolution, externally supported subversions, thrusts by impatient irredentist states, and calculated probes of our defense perimeters. A second tendency is increasing interdependence; but this will mean problems that will be aggravated to the point where they become threats to the security of nations. demanding, but not suggesting, solutions. Third, there will be no adjustment mechanisms to resolve these problems in a binding or authoritative way: no over? arching international organization or even balance?of-power mechanism will dispense or provide just and stable solutions. Fourth, interventions in the future will take the form of unilateral incursions rather than collaborative police actions. Fifth. the world of the future will be characterized by even greater diffusion of power than we have already experienced. A.dozen or a dozen-and-a?half nations, including regional powers, will assert, and sometimes successfully defend, their influence. Limits will become evident in existing military alliances and other groupings: force, whether nuclear? strategic or conventional or sub-conventional. will be increasingly vitiated and ineffective; even the two present superpowers will be reduced to more regional scope. The sixth condition that will complicate international order is the incoherence of domestic support, not just in our country but to a certain extent in all: this lack of public support might not prevent intervention. but it will critically inhibit its prosecution. The overall point that emerges from this analysis is that the 'world that is shaping up will require even a nation such as ours to adjust and to hedge, rather than hope to intervene with military force or heavy diplomatic manipulation in an attempt to control its environment. Simply. the cost?benefit ratio of exercises of control is tilting: It is costing more to achieve even the dubious goals of American policy- makers. And this situation has little to do specifically with "the Russians.? Current politically motivated and shallowly rhetorical attempts to focus American support and American energies by invoking "the Soviet threat" are not so much factually wrong as grossly irrelevant. Historically, the entire sweep of U.S.?Soviet relations is punctuated by attempts by the United States to alter or supplant the Soviet government. Following the Bolshevik revolution, the United States, along with several other nations, sent troops to Russia in an effort to overthrow the Russian leadership. After World War II, in which the Soviets suffered the greatest losses and damage of any participant, the United States alone possessed the atom bomb, and implied the posSibility of using it against the Soviet Union. In recent years, the United States has restricted trade with the Soviet Union. twice embargoing grain exports, while refusing to ratify SALT II, a treaty in our own interests as much as the Soviets. .American politicians have often sought high elective posts by rattling sabers against the Soviet Union. The Soviet system is not an attractive:model for the rest of the world, particularly the developing nations. It is losing out to a reformed and resurgent free?market model all over the world. But America's response to this phenomenon should not be a revival of militant and delusive anti?communism-- such as the pronuncements of President Carter and his national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. America's experience with sweeping anti-communism has carried heavy costs. The Korean War left 34,000 Americans dead, 103,000 wounded, and a legacy of $70 billion in direct expenses. The Vietnam War cost us 47.000 dead. 304,000 wounded. and about $120 billion in direct burdens-?perhaps as much as $450 billion in total, current?value expense. A significant portion of the U.S. economy is engaged in supplying weapons, a fact that many economists blame for lower productivity in our economy. And throughout most of the postwar period the United States has maintained a military draft, a fundamental violation of individual liberty. This is not to say that Soviet political conduct has been benign or that the Soviet arms buildup has been fictitious. The actions and the motives of the Soviet state have presented serious puzzles. In the case of the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a host of disparate motives has been ascribed-? some obscurer most reprehensible by any fair international standards. The same analysis applies to the Soviet political intervention and intensified aid in the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. The Soviet Union has earned its reputation as a predator, as people from Lithuania to Afghanistan will attest, bUt it is a cautious Predator. It has not launched bold or sweeping offensives far from its own borders. We should realistically recognize the limited nature of the Soviet threat, but we should acknowledge that a threat does exist. No doubt, in certain areas the United States--and those private organizations whose interests could be seriously affected?-ought to hedge, in important ways, against had, even "worst," cases. But we need to ask ourselves what the true nature of the Soviet "threat" is and whether our reaction has been rational or exaggerated and misplaced. It is clear, for example, that the United States has consistently developed more strategic weaponry than necessary for pure defense. Some argue that a "military?industrial complex" drives our govern- ment to produce weaponry to prop up companies that could not survive by producing consumer goods. (Though this thesis has perhaps borne more than its share of intellectual freight, there is some truth in it.) Others argue that the United States has sought a first?strike capability against the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. (And it is true that the United States has acquired significant counterforce ability?-that is, the ability to hit Soviet military targets, including their nuclear weapons, particularly in a conflict in Europe, and indeed such use is an essential element in the "nuclear umbrella" that we purport to hold over allies and other strategic objects?-the "extended deterrence" we maintain, as opposed to the pure deterrence of a Soviet nuclear strike against our own homeland. And of course the recent "Presidential Directive 59" would appear to affirm the re- targeting of our nuclear force to a counterforce position.) Libertarians believe that the United States should renounce offensive intentions and doctrines, withdraw its forces from around the world, and concentrate on the defense of the United States itself. .As much as 70 percent of our defense budget is attributable to the defense of other nations, however we may misguidedly equate such defense with our own. As a result, allied countries such as West Germany and particularly Japan are able to spend far less than we do on defense, as a percentage of gross national product. In addition to phasing out military commitments in other regions of the world, there are numerous other changes that would reduce defense spending, while maintaining protection against any conceivable direct threat to American lives and property. One action would be the elimination of our land?based nuclear missiles-?particularly as they become vulnerable to a pre- emptive first strike by the Soviets. It has been pointed out that land-based missiles make the continental United States a prime target of any potential attack. In any case, the present "triad" of separate nuclear systems??actually about to become a "tetrad" with the impending deployment of long- range land-based U.S. cruise missiles in Europe??is not necessary as a strategic deterrent; a died of systems-?sea? based missiles and air-launched medium-range cruise would be more than sufficient to deter a Soviet attac . an would be far less provocative and unstable a force. What is needed is not so much a change in attitude toward the Soviet Union--that might not even be necessary--as a fundamental rethinking of American military strategy and the requisites of American security. We need realism about the actions and motives of the Soviet Union. but we must be. sober about our own capabilities; the "net assessment is still not so unfavorable to American interestsT?particularly if we take the forces of China into our reckoning. we should concentrate on the defense of the United States. phase out our defensive alliances with other nations. withdraw- our troops and close our bases on foreign soil. and pare down the defense establishment to what is truly required to defend the territory and political integrity of the United States and the lives and domestic property of its citizens. Such a position has often been labeled "isolationist." But labels are not the point-?and are fraught with misleading connotations. In.fact. such a policy would allow the United States to conduct a more truly international foreign policy than it has been able to do since world War II. 'Our obsessive anti-communism has often forced us to support governments that are as hostile to our political values as are the communists. It has also caused us to meddle in the domestic affairs of other nations. both overtly and covertly. .And it has caused the U.S. government to take domestic actions in the name of national security that are totally contrary to the Constitution- such as wiretapping. assassinations. and spying on 0.5. citizens. In many dimensions. anti-communism has been a corruption. This does not mean that Liberatarians are neutral about communist-political tenets or Soviet aggression. Libertarians are fundamentally opposed to communism. as they are to socialism. fascism. and all forms of government that rest on coercion. But the central question remains. excluSively to the pro? tection and preservation of a pluralistic and free American society. not the imposition of our values on exportation of American power that wish to have them with the United States. and to strive for at least correct and useful diplomatic relations with all others: to impose our will on none. and to maintain a 'modest and purely defensive military establishment_ Such a policy?-essentially one of neutralityc-has. of courSe. been characteristic of smaller nations; but it is feasible and beneficial especially for a major nation such as the United States. Certainly the very opposite can - contrary foreign policy that the United States has pursued Since'World War II under both Republican and Democratic administrations. 'We spend vastly more on defense than we did thirty?five years ago. yet we feel??and are-?less secure. 'We have spent billions on foreign aid. yet respect for America has declined. We have had an overtly anti?communist foreign policy since a few years after World War II. yet in many areas communists have made gains. .And we have rationalized our wasteful and destructive actions in the name of devotion to individual libertyIr while taking measures that are its antithesis. Certainly. with regard to the principal axis of America's foreign and national security policy, our relationship with the Soviet Union. it is time for a change. 10 3. It is true that Europe in many ways is the most important American interest or the largest collection of interests of individual Americans and their private organizations. But to say that is not to support America's commitment to the defense of Europe. It does not justify the expense, the risk, or the necessity of continu1ng the Atlantic alliance in the same form as in the past three decades. Insofar as we can define a "national" interest at all, Europe is America's most weighty commitment--at least reckoned in the military resources we now expend and devote to that area. Europe is by far the largest claim on our defensive resources??though, curiously, hardly anyone counts its full cost,or even knows how to count it. To compute the cost to Americans of Europe or of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), we have to include all the combat units-? even those located in the United States?-that are kept_ primarily for a conflict in Europe. And we must assign to them.their full share of "combat support" and Pentagon over- head. When we do that, we see that in Fiscal Year 1981 alone, the cost of NATO will be no less than $83 billion (out of the $159 billion requested for defense by the Carter administration)--half of our entire defense budget. That means that, over the next decade, conservatively projecting the present rate of military spending, we will have laid out a trillion and a half dollars just to defend the European countries. That is a nice piece of global redistribution, or a nice international transfer payment-?in this case fro?'the mildly affluent here to our wealthy cousins across the Atlantic. Another way of representing the bulk of Europe in our present defense calculations is this: A potential war in Europe accounts for at least twelve of the present nineteen active land divisions we keep in our peacetime force structure. In addition, Europe is responsible for much of our strategic nuclear forces, because of the "extended deterrence" or "nuclear umbrella" that we purport to hold over Europe. And it is certain that we would not care as much, or spend as much, for the North Atlantic sea lanes, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, or even Africa if it were not for our commitment to Europe. of course, not all of the $83 billion a year that we are spending on Europe could or should be saved, or saved instantaneously. But toward the end of a phased reduction, if we were to adopt a non?protective attitude toward Europe, the forces we still for the time being point toward the 11 Atlantic could be costing us two-thirds less than they will if we keep on our present course; and that means cumulative savings, over a decade, of $700 billion. Of course, . exorbitant cost in itself doesn't argue for junking a commit- ment?-if it were an absolutely vital and irreP}aceabl? component of our own national security. That is the issue with regard to Europe, of course; but Libertarians do not accept that prOposition. Moreover, would Americans continue to accept the risks and costs of our commitment to Europe and NATO if they knew the whole cost and the full extent of the risks to themselves and their homeland entailed by this commitment and our present policies for its defense? ?Would they continue to bear these costs and risks if they were fully aware of the disabilities that already cripple the Atlantic alliance? Or if they were presented with a reckoning that demonstrated that the European countries themselves could generate and project a formidable self-defense without the aid of the United States? The answer is that the American people would hardly continue to protect an affluent Europe from its enemies, if they were more aware of the costs of the permanent'U.S. troop presence, the unbalanced distribution of alliance burdens, and the periodic courting of nuclear destruction of our own cities for the sake of cementing deterrence in central Europe. The Atlantic alliance is beset??indeed, has been beset from. its very inception??with strategic contradictions that disabde the alliance and render the American commitment, particularly of nuclear support, unreliable in a crisis (despite the danger that an American president might actually use nuclear weapons). Europeans know this, but understandably see no profit in inviting open discussion. (Though France long ago acted on its suspicion of American inconstancy, constructing its own autonomous nuclear deterrent, and opting partially out of the institutional structure of NATO in 1965, under President De Gaulle.) NATO is already gravely impaired by differences in strategic concept that are fundamental and long?standing; disputes about burden-sharing that have never been resolved (European countries routinely pay a quarter to a half less than the United States in terms of the portion of their gross national product going to defense); irreconcilable antagonisms of pairs of nations such as Greece and Turkey (let alone the political and economic disintegration of the and the possible rise again, after a brief re Eurocommunism in such key countries as Italy, France, Spain (not formally a NATO country), and Portugal, that would undermine NATO bases and deployments as well common strategy and diplomacy and the economic st: - uctur on which the Atlantic relationship rest5_ es latter nation): prieve, of Indeed, NATO's entire thirty?two?year history, since its foundation in 1949, has been marked by crises. "Disarray? is a term that was virtually invented to describe the NATO alliance. The matter goes far deeper than periodic 12 failures of "consultation" with our allies. There are deep?seated causes. We have seen the fragmentation of the original plan for common European defense, the EDP, in 1954:_ the Suez crisis of 1956: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: the divergent reactions of the Atlantic allies to the Mideast war of October 1973 and the ensuing oil embargo and rapid price increases by the OPEC cartel: and now Europe's grudging response to U.S. calls for a united front to coerce Iran and answer Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Underlying all these crises is the inability of the Atlantic allies to resolve the fundamental divergence in strategic conceptions: How to defend Europe? At whose expense? 0n 'whose ground? With what weapons? The basic strategic flaw in the Atlantic alliance is the simple fact that, thirty-two years after the foundation of NATO. the defense of Western Europe still rests on the proposition that an American president will invite the destruction of our cities and the incineration of 100 million of his fellow citizens to repel a Soviet incursion or resist a Soviet ultimatum.in Western Europe. It is the ineluctable fact that we dare not risk the use of our fundamental means of protection: strategic nuclear weapons. Ironically, America's overt war plan has always been the first use of nuclear weapons, "if necessary," to defend Europe. Thus America constantly threatens to turn local defeat in Europe into global holocaust. The word that encapsulates this is "coupling." This means that. for deterrence in Europe to work, the escalatory chain from.troops and tanks to American intercontinental nuclear 'weapons must be unbroken. But the root of NATO's problem.is the suspicion by Europeans that the United States will always put time and distance between the outbreak of war in Europe and the need to resort to its own ultimate strategic nuclear 'weapon, with the attendant risk of inviting the destruction of America's homeland. Much of NATO's attention now is devoted to the problem of or theater nuclear forces. At Brussels in December 1979, NATO's foreign ministers tentatively decided to allow the deployment in Western Europe, starting in 1983. of 180 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 Tomahawk ground- launched cruise missiles. These are more than the ordinary "tactical" nuclear weapons, since, for the first time, such weapons stationed on West European soil would be capable of hitting all of the European part of the Soviet Union. True, Europe--especially Germany??initially invited this American deployment of the 83?20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles. But the underlying question is: WOuld the American Pershings and Tomahawks really help Europe create an independent deterrent to the Soviet intermediate?range missiles (since the weapons would still be under exclusive Smerican control)? And would these new weapons therefore really create an additional layer of defense for the United 13 I 1 States? These propositions are hardly likely. must face the further question: ?Uni: Ehzipihese new i wea ons in the first place? The answer I thegter nuclear systems are not an implement 1 strength; they are a symbol of Europe 3 distrus "extended deterrence." . i It.is hypocritical for Democrats and Republicans to bigme each other for this or that failure of the.Atlantlc a iance. In fact, the crisis and the disabilities are part of the fabric of fact, of all alliances of sovereign nations in an age of nuclear parity. Consequently, clever planners canit apply band?aids even expensive ones -- to patch up i NATO's tactical deficiencies: because the problems represent 1 contradictions that grow out of the nature of America protective relationship with Europe. are endemic in the Alliance itself. and will not disappear until i the replacement of the entire structure of NATO and the dissolution of the American commitment of its own national existence to defend Europe. 1 Various groups have proposed remedies in an attempt to overcome the strategic disabilities of NATO and to prolong the American posture of defensive protection of Europe. These remedies have taken a half-dozen classic forms. But none is satisF factory. All encounter obstacles or embody contradictions or political and strategic impossibilities. The first. most common, alternative is to tinker with the: status quor altering the deployments and configur rations of American and allied forces??in short, "quick. I fixes." Quite naturally. that is the policy of the present. as well as the past half-dozen, administrations. Quick fixes comprise such items as rapid deployment of troops and I tactical air; more airlift and sealift; the prepositioning of military equipment in Europe; common communications. intelligence, logistics. and command and control of units; 1 the interoperability and standardization of equipment: thicker deployment of anti-tank weapons; and procedures to activate European reserves. Though in many cases these measures are intelligently conceived and energetically I pursued, the "quick fixes" are not as quick or cheap as their sponsors sometimes pretend. Moreover. the deficiencies of NATO's strategic posture are more serious and fundamental 1 than a few tactical moves can remedy. (And it is currently out of the question-?even if it made sense??that the American Congress and publicf despite the momentary hawkish sentiment that we are witnessing. would actually support a more extensive commitment to strengthening the alliance. if they had to stare at the actual costs and additional responsibilities.) Another approach to remedying NATO's deficiencies is to revive the old Atlanticist dream of "true But even if one could imagine the attainme the capacity for JOlht and equal contributions and defensive responSibilites, it is unlikely that the United States military or Congress or Public would accept a truly equal partnership." nt by Europe of 14 role by Europeans in the command and strategic direction of the alliance; we would not commit U. 5. forces to a true allied commands?and properly so. Another proposed remedy is to go beyond partnership to the "devolution" of substantial defensive capability and respons1b11- ity on the European allies. including nuclear arms and the authority to use them. But this solution would not work. Even if we could_ imagine the essential requisite, joint nuclear targeting by Britain and France and perhaps even West Germany the formula of devol- ution embodies an insupportable contradiction for the United States: involvement without control. Actually. some sort of devolution may well occur in the longer run: but it will not be as orderly and neatly managed a process as its sponsors intend or imply. Even if Europe were to attain its own means of defense-*which might be a desirable outcome from a European point of view, and also an American point of view??this would imply the decommitment, not the continued commitment, of the United States to the defense of Western Europe. In short, even if it were to succeed, devolution would precipitateIr or formalize, American decoupling from Europe. That brings us to the consideration of policies that would entail degrees and types of American disengagement from Europe. Two of these schemes have been considered and have been found wanting. One is Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which have been negotiated between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Vienna for the better part of a decade. Currently the negotiations are hung up on divergent approaches by the Soviets and the Americans toward the residual balance of forces in central Europe, and by a dispute about the starting figure for Warsaw Pact forces from which the reductions are to be counted. Another scheme for-partial reduction of forces was the so?called "Mansfield" reSolution or amendment, which was introduced for eight sessions of Congress between 1963 and 1975. But this particular proposal would never have withdrawn more than half or two?thirds of our troops in Europe, and would have left untouched the seven or so divisions kept in the United States primarily for the defense of Europe; and none of these forces were scheduled to be removed from the force structure. Thus the Mansfield proposal would have made a very small dent in the now?$83 billion we spend on NATO. Moreover, it would have retained the U. S. commitment to come to Europe's defense, creating perhaps the most dangerous imbalance of all: continued commitment without adequate defensive means. Libertarians favor-?and consider almost inevitable in the longer run??a more consistent version of unilateral American disengagement, in which the United States would shed, over time, the responsibilites and implications, as well as the burdens, of alliance. We would stake out a direction for the gradual devolution of defensive responsibilities to the European states themselves, but would would not harbor illusions about an orderly and sufficient substitution of capabilities by our allies, or about a continued exercise of American control over their decisions. Of course.'during such a disengagementr we would preserve a constructive atmosphere of 15 consultation. But the matter goes far beyond atmosphei?ci? Our overall objective would be to reduce Europe Eiong we dependence on us, just as we would change the assumP ational are now making about the significance of Europe in our strategy and defensive calculations. The program outlined here cannot fairly be called an abandon; ment of Europe. 'Citizens and private groups and governmenta authorities in the United States would continue to cooperate closely in every functional category except the political- Hdlitary: trade and monetary arrangements and banking; environs rental measures and conferences; discussions of relationships with Third World countries; approaches to food and_populat1on: restriction of arms transfers, both nuclear and conventional; and examination of waystxicontain dangerous nuclear technology; But some might object: Wouldn't Europe be ever- run or dominated by the Soviet Union? The question breaks down into tow: invasion and "Finlandization." ZFirst of all, could Europe repel, and therefore deter, attack? ?We must keep in.mind that the chances that the Russions might seize the opportunity of an American withdrawl to attck Europe are extremely small. A would-be aggressor must cal:- culate, not whether he will win a war, but whether it will. be worth it in.terms of his net gains after all the destruction.is over and above what he can gain without war. Could the Russians digest, pacify, Europe? Or even any significant individual. European country? The answer is doubtful. One could make the: case that Europe whether united or even as separate states could conduct its own competent defense. 'Western Europe al- together would be, in theory, the second most powerful entjiar in the world more powerful than the Soviet Union, and in, some respects even than the United States. Even now, in comp- arison with both the United States and the Soviet Union, western. EMIepe has greater population (400 million), Equivalent economic potential trillion in gross national prod of military manpower (3 million active plus a reserves), a competitive military technology, nuclear forces of Britain and France. This ar Ehe probability of European unity-?indeed, ragmentation is the most likely rediction. can't get together, the separate Eations of EuBut even 1f they midable military opponents??or, les. and the respectable gument does_not imply continued political Second, as for "Finlandization," eve a Finland. It is a large, populous, rich, indus socially whole, politically resolute country, that would have far more than nuisance value. E?ml?ltary force with its wall?to?wall urbanization, is a natural tankf: es, Germany, the Germans chose to defend tenaciously, the Russians rap. If be able to push to the Rhine in three days, as in the Eggigegiggly 16 imaginations and scenarios of certain retired NATO generals. Thus, Germany could confidently reject Soviet political . pressures that carried the further implied threat of hostile action. The overall point is that an American withdrawal from NATO would not be a stark rejection of Europe. or an open invitation to defeat for the United States at the hands of the Soviets. It would have to be seen more as an adjustment--to the inevit? able strategic compartmentalization of the international system. and an attempt to gain an interval of peace and security in a nuclear age. It would be to recognize a different role for the United States in the very different type of international system that is shaping up. The main point. however. is that a strategic disengagement from Europe would produce a net increase in the security of the United States and its citizens and their property. precisely by decoupling the defense of Europe from the security of the United States. 17 4. Approaches to the Middle East Israel and the Arab Peo les The Middle East contains two distinct. yet related arenas for possible conflict and the possible involvment of the United States. The first is the Eastern Mediterranean, the cockpit of the struggle between Israel and the surrounding Arab powers and peoples (though now with the significant deletion of Egypt, at least temporarily). The other is the Persian Gulf. The dramatic diplomatic and political events of the past half? decade, including the Sadat visit to Jerusalem.in 1978 and the "Camp David process," have not changed the logic of the situation, especially for U. S. diplomacy (for we must view this situation, from the standpoint of any of the nations or peoples in the region, however our sympathies might be variously attracted). The trouble 'with the "Camp David process" is not so much that it was a separ? ate peace, but that, in so many ways, it has turned out not to-be a separate peace. It is revealed as highly conditional and general, turning on justice for the Palestinians, even settlement of the East Jerusalem question. What this means is that the United States, because it has incorporated all these questions in the framework of Camp David, and because it has implicated itself wholly in the negotiating process,_is a hostage to the ambitions, wishes, and 'whims of a host of local politicians, national remnants, and fanatic groups. Most of the "mainstream" schemes to solve the problems of the Middle East rely too much on the offices and guarantees of the United States and not enough on the will of the parties to the conflict. This was certainly true of Kissinger's "step?hy-step" diplomacy, which came to a dead-end in the second?stage Sinai dis- engagement of October 1975. It has been equally true of the "comprehensive" proposals that have been floated by the Carter administration, which have coupled U. 5. pressure on Israel to relinquish territory and accept a Palestinian state on the West Bank with explicit U. S. guarantees for Israel. Both Kissinger's detachment of Egypt from the Eastern bloc and his "expulsion" of the Soviets from the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Camp David process have fostered expensive American protection of both Egypt and Israel, and have sealed the dependence of these states on U. S. diplomacy and arms and warped the independent will of these nations and their leaders to perfect the peace process by themselves. They now play every shot off the wall of Washington instead of directly to each other. 13 Of course, many in the United States foreign policy establishment?- both intellectuals and members of the administration and.even. cmitics-?favor this intensified involvement of the UH1t9d States in the fate and fortunes of the Middle East. Some have even. proposed the placement of military bases (we already have several quasi?bases in Egypt) and the stationing of.Amerlcan combat units in Israel, the Sinai, and Egypt. The flaw in these proposals is that they would create abject dependence by both Israel and. various Arab nations or factions on the diplomacy and guarantees of the United States, precisely when American popular support for further political and military involvement in this area is wearing thin. That means the the United States can promise, but it cannot reliably deliver on its guarantees, because the guarantees of its Executive Branch have no widespread and specific basis in American public support or sentiment. This set of facts has two altemm- native consequences: First, since Israel cannot ultimately trust American guarantees of military and diplomatic support, it continue to obstruct and hedge against American diplomatic: pressure. Second, the United States will apply less than suffic- ient coercion to Israel, precisely because it is not willing to compensate Israel sufficiently, and Israel will probably reject concess1ons that depend on compensatory moves by the United States that have such shallow public support and are therefore so un- reliable. The poignant conclusion is that there may not be any comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict that U. S.wdiplomacy can. easily or prudently bring about. There are just some hard choices for all the parties to the situation-?choices that th tried, so far, to elude. ey have all The United States must resolve its present multi le objectives?-by dropping them. At present it seeEs rate the Soviets' strategic designs to penetrate the;?iddle and perpetuate their "expulsion" from the area; (2) r- as the position of Israel: (3) maintain decisive ipfiserve on the diplomacy of both Israel and the moderatehArab uence region; (4) insure its access to oil. maintain these objectives (even if they dictory) is heavy. It starts with a slic of to 30 billion a year, and includes igniting a conflict that could further esc In view of the heavy liabilities of our present policies the United States should move awa - - . from fUther res on peace, stability, and justice in the Middle for' to disengage from the area. This is not to . ould move eiFher toward Or aw?ay from Israel Dr the Ara-Ea :aken a5 a :?Shiftll third a neutral -- solution. Ultimat p'wers. It 15 a of the world will have to be without the intruslo . States. We should avOid particularly 0f the United lateral, bilateral, or multilateral, . able to deliver, and avoid creati not be able to fulfill. ng the appreciable risk of alate to nuclear war. 19 It should be an American objective to encourage Israel and Egypt to make the hard choices for themselves, and to reduce our own coercive and costly dominating role, which has come to include grant aid to Israel and Egypt, and shipments of increasingly sophisticated and potent arms. (U. S. aid just to support the peace treaty in May 1979 came to a pachage worth $4.8 billion for Fiscal Year 1980 alone, in addition to the further burden, over the next several years,.of modernizing Egypt's military forces.) we should abstain from impo51ng agreements, whether substantive or cosmetic. Such a course would also mean buffering ourselves against the economic impact of a future war or of the hostility of certain Middle Eastern countries. The Persian Gulf and the_Flow of Oil Mention of the possible cutoff of oil raises a set of issues_ pertaining to the second arena in the Middle East: the Per51an Gulf. Both in Iran, previously, and now in Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states, the United States has been supporting basically unstable, politically fragile regimes, and has been drawn into the conflicts that attach to the fates of these countries. Iran furnishes more than a footnote to the discussion. .A long history of American involvement with the Shah led to the Islamic revolution, the elevation of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the seizing of the American embassy and the hostages in retaliation for our alleged failure to deliver the Shah and his property up to the processes of Islamic retributory justice. No military actions-like the April rescue mission?can be considered acceptable. The important point is that the real tangible interests and private activities of Americans are scarcely touched--except conceivably unfavorably--by these diplomatic games.at the so?called "official" level. It would be ill-advised to attempt further unilateral coercive operations, arbitrary restrictions on private trade, or attempts to strong?arm allies into parallel activities against their own interest and better judgement. The American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the blustering "Carter Doctrine," another great leap forward in the extension of America's security perimeter. In this case, the United States has added an-area halfway around the world to its -security turf, has acquired another extensive, open-ended commit- ment of American arms and lives, and has once again put its own fate at the disposal of Soyiet initiative. The near?term tangible effects are a significant increase in the already bloated U. S. defense budget, further political support for eight- to ten?percent real annual increases in defense spending, and further rational- ization for the 110,000-man Rapid Deployment Force. 20 Speculation has abounded in academic and policy-making Circles about Soviet motives for the invasion of Afghanistan-?whether an unjustified power reach toward warm water ports. Gulf Ojl supplies. and the energy lifeline of the West; or an intris? ically "defensive" move to insulate the Soviet state against Moslem unrest and preserve a friendly regime on its borders. Was it. in short, "aggression" or "paranoia"? Indeed: most discussion has seemed to center on this question. as if lt- held the key to America's proper response. The Soviet action was reprehensible, in terms of the liberties of the Afghan people and reSpect for international law. But Soviet motives are largely irrelevant to America's situation and prospects. What matters is the American response: whether it is to be an extension. justified or not. welcome or not. of American arms; or an intelligent adjustment to our new situation~-not just the regional one, but the global situation that is evolving. That situation can be characterized overall as a diffusion of power. Such an adjustment on our part would undoubtedly result in somer American strategic "losses." But if these regional setbacks are routinely or rhetorically regarded by ambitious American politi- cians as national humiliations or intolerable national dangers. they will inevitably pitch the United States into periodic wars. On the other hand. if this diagnosis of the diffusion of power in the is accurate?-and trends seem.to be unfolding that support this interpretation-?then the Soviet Union also will not profit ultimately. any more than the United States can maintain the zenith of its post?World War II position in the world. Therefore, "Afghanistan" should be read neutrally as a symbol of what is happening in the world and as an indication of the need for American foreign policy to adjust to these conditions. not to spend ever more resources and'risk ever more American lives in an attempt to reverse these tendencies and to control the conduct of the rest of the world. As for continued access to the oil of the Middle East, this is a tangible interest for Americas and will be at - - decades. until substitute production, either nii?i?ciiglzgizga?r other sources. can be brought on stream. But if we cannot dominate the present sources of' our economic necessities including energY: we must be prepared to substitute and hedge. But this does not mean central planning or forced conservation. Actually such substitution and hedging and conservation are being undertaken: in an impreSSive way. by individuals and private organizations - As a result. the American economy as a whole is adjusting to the Steep rises in the cost of oil (which actually are-valuable if somewhat premature._Signals of the scarcity and depletion that loom in a more distant future.) What we are seeing is evidence that the price mechanism. if allowed to operate??even in a partially controlled way! as at the moment?-will mediate between "shortages" and consumption and bring them into line. as well as provide incentives for the private develo - sources and technologies; pment 0f alternative 1 I I I 21 is the freest operation of the market, with its information and incentives, and the least possible politicization of the economic mechanism. Unfortunately, both of the other political parties, and all of the other candidates, differ very little in their commitment to politicize the econ- omics of energy, both international and domestic. They would -assert governmental control and inject national interest and national power into the situation, with destructive consequences for all. In short, they would establish "linkage" between energy and geopolitics. What we need, in short, Quite the contrary, the key to resolving the problems of both energy and the Middle East is to deflink oil and politics. Certainly we should not try to preserve our very real interest in this area by force or military threat. Waging or even risking nuclear war to preserve access to countries and their resources is not an appropriate foreign policy for the last two decades of the twentieth century. One of the first orders of business is to let energy flow on its own terms--to get politics and strategy (indeed, to get the government in all its aSpects) out of the regulation of energy supplies, abroad and at home. The United States has failed in the Middle East by trying to enforce "comprehensive" solutions that would dissolve contradictions for ourselves and absolve local parties from the choices only they can make. we have tried to achieve both peace and justice, and we have mixed politics and economics. Peace alone, and oil alone, are hard enough to secure. We certainly lack the encompass? ing wisdom to establish justice and construct a durable political framework for the area. The United States should lessen its involvement in this area which, of all the regional situations, currently has the most potential to bring us into nuclear confront- ation with the Soviet Union. We do not need to "solve" the problems of the Middle East, in the usual sense, but rather to dis? solve them. 22 5. Problemglin_Asia An Overview Certainly a wide range of outcomes could occur in Asian situations. But the point is that hardly any plausible outcome would damage American vital interests or justify American intervention by force or the preparation and maintenance of any capability for that. And in any case, most of this range of outcomes is beyond the control of the United States. There-is a corresponding artificiality in the rationalisations offered for the continuing exercise of American power in Asia. American officials have to strain to find new justifications for leftover deploymentsIr military transfers. and commitments??concepts such as "stability." and "influence." 'Wide changes have taken place in the Asian political configuration since the late 1960's and early 1970's. Two of the major struct- ural changes are these: (1) The United States is now largely in a fluid and remote offshore stance (with the notable exception of Korea); and (2) dynamic triangular politics have long since superseded the static regional bipolar confrontation between the United States and China. The result is a much "looser" situation in Asia. Some of the particular developments are: the rise of the Soviet Union to the position again of principal antagonist. particularly in Northeast Asia: the exercise by Japan of a more independent diplomacy; the disintegration of the American alliance system.in East Asia; the failure of any superpower to dominate the region strategically in the aftermath of the era of predominant American power. There has been a revival of fragmented conflicts in various sub-regions, not in every case related to each other: the Soviet Union and China; North and South Korea; the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan; China and Vietnam; Thailand and its communist neighbors; Indonesia and the Philli- pines; China and India: India and Pakistan. There are also continuing insurgencies in Thailand. Malaysia, the Phillippines, and Burma. The characteristic point about virtually all of these situations in Asia is that there is little the United States could do that would be effective. To say this is to say something more general about the international system. In Asia. as elsewhere. we are seeing the progressive confinement of the superpowers to tighter and more restricted geographical spheres. Though it is not apparent to all. this encompassing point applies to the Soviet Union as well as to the United States. To comment on the proper American response, it might be useful to take a look at the various separate theaters of action in Asia. 23 Japan The United States need not fear Japan's assumption of more diplomatic independence. With regard to Japanese defens1ve capabilities, that country should not be constantly pushed by American statesman to assume a "larger regional role in Asia, involving increased defense budgets, offenSive forces, wider-ranging naval patrols, and espeCially nuclear weapons. Left to itself, even without the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States, it is far from inevitable that Japan would develop and deploy nuclear weapons. The Japanese perpetually_ express the belief that such a course would be counterproductive for Japan itself. As for the controversies in other dimensions between the United States and Japan, and the conflicting interest that are develop- ing in the areas of money, trade, and investment, these are quite normal within the world of developed capitalist countries. Japanese export competition, even if it is state-favored, is basically the product of organization, intelligence, and drive, and is not inimical, to say the least, to the interests of individual American consumers. Rather than contemplating pro- tectionist barriers, the American government should take this competition as a useful spur to the revitalization of our own productive base. - gorea With regard to Korea, President Carter's early plan to remove the bulk of American ground forces by 1932 was predictably reversed early in his presidency. Only 674 men were ever with- drawn from the country. And our nuclear weapons??some 900 war- heads??remain. In any case, this plan was never really a disengagement, but rather an attempt at a more aseptic involvement. it would have left a powerful naval striking force inl?hgoziza.and Moreover, the withdrawal was bought at the price of more than $2 billion of additional arms transfers and the strong reaffirm? ation of our defense to South Korea. We should be very wary of such falsel schemes. considering a real alter realizing that our commitment to Kore objective strategic necessity, but of even if intelligence estimates of the strength of North forces have recently been revised sharply upwards, the figgEan balance on the peninsula, even without the American troops still I favors a successful defense by South Korea . . or city, against North Korean attack. I th Of its capital y.conceived "withdrawal" native, we should start by a is the result, not of historical accident. And 24 The standard "liberal" approach has always been to threaten partial American military withdrawal in order to coerce pol- itical "reforms," or the semblance of them, from the South Korean government. This theme was heard constantly in the time of President Park, before his assassination last year; and we are hearing it again with Park's successor, the current military dictator, General Chun Doo Hwan. But American troop deployments should not be considered a reward for palatable political behavior. Conversely, troop withdrawals should not be considered a punishment for failing to emulate Western democratic forms. There is no hard strategic reason for the continuation of deployment of.American troops (now about 39,000) in Korea or the continuation of the Mutual*Defense Treaty concluded in 1953. China In addressing the problem of China, we should avoid the intricate calculations and the geopolitical games now fashionable in the washington strategic community. The playing of the "China card" was begun, of course, by the Republican administration of Nixon and Kissinger in 1971: it was continued in the Ford administrat? ion; and now this has been enthusiastically embraced by the Carter?Brzezinski regime, which is caught up in the enterprise of "triangular politics," attempting to influence Chinese behavior, particularly toward the Soviet Union, through the transfer of arms, military intelligence, and technology. Certainly the initial contacts with China were constructive; and the process of normalization of relations, not entirely perfected yet, should be pursued. 'We should remove legal obstacles to trade and investment, with American entrepreneurs, traders, and investors making their own calculations of profit and risk. But these things should not be done with a view to tilting the global or regional political?military balance. Among other things, we simply don't understand Chinese internal politics with sufficient depth or precision to premise American moves minutely on their presumed effects on Chinese decision?making. The occasions for a backfiring of such approaches, with China, or China's Asian neighbors, or the Soviet Union, are multiple. In particular, professions of a comm- unity of strategic interest with China, such as those of Vice President Mondale and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in their trips to China over the past year, are not to our country's advantage and should be avoided. ?With regard to Taiwan, there is nothing wrong with continuing our mutually beneficial trading and cultural connections. It was correct for the United States to drop its formal security ties with Ta1wan?-and it only remains for the United States to relinq? uish also often?expressed "interest" in a "peaceful" settle? ment of the dispute between the two Chinas in the Taiwan Strait. 25 Our insistence that this is an "international" matter, allowing the continuing intrusion of American diplomacy and military threat, reassures on one, is offensive tot Beijing, and is unnecessary to the core of American in eres in the area. In fact, Taiwan can defend itself unaided . aGainst mainland China for the foreseeable future: and China is making no plans for the recovery of province by force. Needless to say, there is also no reason for discriminatory and invidious treatment favoring China over the Soviet Union in Most Favored Nation trade relations. we ought to be drop? ping any restrictions on trade??universally, globally--and allowing our commercial firms to deal on terms of equality and freedom with all agencies, private and governmental, in any accordance with various forecasts and hopes. But the p01nt 15 not to exploit the partially mythical "China trade" that has intrigued two centuries of American traders and polit1c1ans, but rather to respect the open-ended principle of freedom.of commerce, unhampered and undistorted by the political or geopolitical concerns of state. Southeast Asia In view of Vietnamls aggressive conduct in Indochina, and now* more widely in Southeast Asia against Thailand, and in view' of Vietnam's breaches of the Paris accords of January 1973, it it quite proper that the United States not extend the several hundred million dollars of economic assistance ?promised" in the accords. There is a case to be made, however, for normalization, as soon as comfortable, with Vietnam. This has nothing to do with bestow- ing an accolade on that nation or assuaging guilt feelings from should be part of our philosphy of interstate relations, and recognition of a government should not be construed to imply approval. A certain minimum (and sometimes that would also be the maximum) of diplomatic contact should be maintained as a rule, so that it would not encourage, by exaggerated symbolism, any expectations regarding the substantive content of relations between the peoples and the private or public interests in either country. In short, these matters between states, as with so many other aspects of international relations, should be put on a basis of neutrality and pragmatism. Further in Southeast Asia, the current Vietnamese robe . 3 across the border of Thailand to strike at the-base campspef the 26 Promise of greater American assistance to Thailand. This kind of reflex should be avoided. Millenary problems between traditional enemies--even if they carry a somewhat different political meaning in our generation-?ought to be 'worked out in the long course of history between the antag? onists, without the intrusion of American concern and presence. Finally, with regard to South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh), a correct American policy would be the cliche "low profile? that Washington professes to have maintained from December 1971, the time of the detachment of East Bengal from Pakistan and the famous American "tilt" toward Pakistan, until December 1979, the date of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. ?We should acquiesce 1n, and make the best of, regional dispostions, whether they come about by force or diplomacy or influence. 'Unfortunately, the American pretense of a low profile was mostly a pretense. The seventies were marked by a naval buildup in the Indian Ocean, and the fortification of the mid-Indian Ocean base Diego Garcia, acquired in conjunction with the-British in 1965. Both of those moves were rationalized as responses to an increase in Soviet ship movements in the Indian Ocean. Now, especially after Afghanistan, a dramatically increasing American presence in this ocean is excused by the alleged need to defend the approach- es to the Persian Gulf. There is a scramble for allies and regional bases, for naval forces and for staging for rapid deploy- ment forces, under the aegis of the "Carter Doctrine." Diego- Garcia is slated for major development (perhaps over a billion dollars). And the foundations of a separate "numbered" Indian Ocean Fleet are being put in place, or at least strenously asserted. Such expansive moves, into an area of relatively low intrinsic .American interest, should be discouraged. Admittedly, the interest -of certain friendly countries, such as Japan and those of western Europe, in the peaceful and unimpeded flow of oil across these waters is a matter of concern. But it remains to be demonstrated how this flow can be assured by force or threat of arms. In an era of nuclear geopolitics, it would be more than anachion? o1 istic??possibly fatal??to make insurance_of the flow of dependent on the risk of general war. 27 Conclusion The payoff question for the'united?States. indgha?o?iviEEOf the various situations in Asia, is: what to . A benign and useful formula might be: (1) Strive for peaceful access to all the sub-regions of where access is denied or threatened, choose peace ra er* than insistence on access. (2) Practice war?avoidance, rather than thejpresent relianc: on bluster in a vain effort to reinforce deterrence present and possible challengers. (3) Move to a posture of non-intervention, severing rather than frantically reinforcing alliance connections. (4) Execute a withdrawal of American forces from the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean to a point no farther west than Guam, abandoning the means and the facilities as well as the intention and the pretext for re?intervention in the affairs of Asia. (5) Refrain from replacing our presence with presumed proxies, (6) Do all this. as in other cases, in a phased manner, over no more than five years. with diplomatic tact and imagina- ion, and full consultation and candor. But this is, of course. not the program of the Carter administr?r tiona any more than it has been of any other Am tion. This administration has taken every occas' or not, to reiterate the ritual incantation that the States is "a Pacific power." If this were only a vac nltEd evident definition. there might be no particular harm But if 1t implies continued American intervention, for intervention. in disputes on the mainland of A5 shore Asian Sltuations. then it well as expensive. We should re from this momentary historic role and ambitio in it. 28 6. The Treatment of the Third world With continued state intervention, the poorest countries in the world have remained desperately poor, and the perceived gap between them and the rich countries grows wider. Yet most of the solutions offered by establishment sources-? by both major parties and by all other candidates--are more of the same. For most governments in the world, the political and economic policies that prevail are moving backwards, to the protectionist policies and trade wars and state control of resources and labor that exemplified the age of mercantiliam, and in some reapects even feudalism. Unguestionably, the poorer countries of the Third World-- or:more properly their societies and people??have real problems and real needs. But most of the current solutions-- some that they themselves generate, others that their leaders have been taught by the West to seek, still others that are offered or imposed by the larger powers??are not constructive. Perhaps nowhere is this backward movement more apparent than in the call, in Nairobi two years ago by representatives of the Third World governments, for a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO). NIEO, a program for international economic planning, embraces a number of demands. It is based on the historically false premise that the economic growth of the developed countries occurred at the expense of the less developed countries and therefore the Third World needs "comp- ensation" for the "discriminatory" operation of the present economic order; and that foreign direct investment and the activiities of multinational corporations in the Third World should be greatly reduced, in favor of direct transfers to Third World governments (and other related measures, such as commodity stabilization funds and debt rescheduling or remission). Before we go into the effects of these policies, it should be pointed out that those countries collectively known as the "Third world" are a far more heterogeneous group than the developed countries. There is great diversity of economic conditions, productivity, and mutual interests. A number of Third World countries, particularly those in the Middle East and Latin America, have actually progessed more rapidly than has the United States or Great Britain, while others, the so?called "Fourth World," remain in abject poverty. A number of Third World coun? tries are at war with each other, or are in a state of acute confrontation: India and Pakistan, Morocco and Algeria, Ethiopia and Somalia, to name a few. If there is any one thing that seems to bring the Third World governments together as a single interest, it is their guest for aid and credit form.the the developed countries of the North. 29 Certainly, the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East have many reasons to critic1ze the eXPlOlt? ations of their countries by the developed nations. But this exploitationand harm are caused by state 1nterventlon and manipulation, not private economic activity: where that occurs without government support or coercion. TodaY: American guns and credit to Latin American governments perpetuate the land?holding oligarchies, discourega peaceful reform, and encourage political oppression. The people 0? Africa are still paying dearly for certain Europeen C?i?nlal practices of the nineteenth century: Whole African tribes and peoples were murdered, displaced, or enslaved, often forced into labor for a white land?holding aristocracy. INew African nations were created piecemeal, with no recognition of traditional tribal boundaries, their borders arbitrarily drawn by European administrators and politicians years ago. Today, European colonial oppression has been replaced by dictatorships again underwritten by credit and arms from the United States, Europe, or the Soviet Union. Southeast A51a lies in ruins, the result of French colonial practice and twenty years of American military intervention??but also the genocidal practices of the current indigenous Southeast Asian dictatorships. For many years, the developed countries have turned a blind to the cultures, economies, and political structures of the peoples of other countries in the quest toh exploit by force those countries' resources. At first glance, the demand that the developed countries (DCs) compensate the Third world with capital and resource transfers has strong humanitarian appeal. With people starving in Subw Saharan Africa, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, it is difficult to turn down appeals for "aid." However, government foreign "aid" programs do nothing to alleviate world poverty. This is because such aid does not go to the poor but to their rulers, whose spending policies are determined by their own personal and political interests. Such aid is used to increase patronage, to purchase the security apparatus to buttress:their rule, to build impressive government works projects, or to provide goods at profit to the black markets created by their centrally planned economies. Even if an "ideal" program existed, where goods purchased by tax monies from the developed countries went directly to the poor the results would still be counterproductive for recipients as well as, of emirse, givers. Real wealth lies in the production of goods and services. Even such "ideal" government foreign aid would not be production but forced transfer through taxation from one people to another. The more taxes confiscated the less taxpayers in the donor countries have to spend on eithef domestic or imported goods. The less they Spend on imports the oorer become those aid-recipient countries that are heavily regiant on exports to the deveIOped countries. Thus, for the reci ie ts such "aid"-dumPEd at 10? cripples domestic markets and I makes them reliant on imports for basic necessities As an example, within a decade after the U. S. Department of A ricult re began an aggressive "aid" policy to Iran, the country fegl fromu 30 producing 90 percent of its food requirement to less than 50 percent. (As will be described laterr this is no accident of U. 8. foreign aid policy). With government foreign aid. everyone in both the donor and recipient countries loses-- except for the ruling classes or special interests. The roots of NIEO proposals include the fallacious assumption that because natural resources in the world are finite. somehow the potential wealth of the world has a finite limit. Therefore. the argument goes, developed countries such as the United States and Europe are depriving lesser-developed countries of their "fair share" of the pie by their disproport- ionate use of the earth's resources. While there is certainly a finite amount of oil, coal. magnesium. etc. in the earth. mankind has a long way to go before exhausting these substances. Long before we exhaust themr technological breakthroughs will yield new opportunities and_we will be tapping the resources of the sea bottom and the planetary bodies. Left alone. free market prices will direct resources to those areas of the world where they are most in demand and provide incentives for tech? nological advancement and resource conservation. But again, real wealth arises from the production of goods and services and has little to do with the amount of resources within any single country. The prosperous free ports of Hong Kong and Singapore. with dense populations (in some areas of Hong Kong. 400,000 per square mile) and very few natural resources. are dramatic examples of this fact. The same logic applies to commodity stabilization schemes. They interfere with. and sometimes obscure. incentives to produce truly needed commodities. They raise prices artificially for the world's consumers. And they perpetuate distortions and post- pone adjustments in the producing countries' economies, by reinforcing false investment patterns. .Appeals from Third World governments for the-forcible redistrib? ution of wealth are often cynical diversionary tactics. For the greatest obstacles to prosperity for many of the peoples of the Third World are the very governments that rule over them. Production can continue and thus real wealth expand as long as people are free to produce and profit fully from their labors. Forcible intervention in the marketplace. in the form of taxes, regulations. or transfer programs. destroys the ability and incentive to produce. Thus. there is a direct relationship between the extent of poverty and unemployment in any country and the . degree of government intervention in that country's economy. This is why the wealthier nations of the Third World are those with relatively freer economies, while the poorer countries, such as Pakistan, Mozambique. and Zaire (India is doing much better these days). are those with centrally located economies. Centrally lanned economies in lesser?developed countries. fueled by foreign "aid" from the DCs. result in a politicization of all aspects of life. As political power is used more and more to increase patronage and allocate resources. political power becomes the only thing worth having in the first instance. Productive individuals 31 ll will either leave the country (as in the so-called brain drain") or will seek political power rather than pursu1:g_ productive labor. Violations of property rights are anfi libertarian in themselves and lead to the suppre551on 0 other civil liberties. When the state owns, controls, or allocates economic resources, the allocation of newsprint - for example - becomes a political dec1s1on, and such resources will be (and have been in innumerable cases) withheld from dissidents and those without political influence._ Thus, centrally planned economies are marked by oppre531on. P?ilt-l ical struggle, and economic decay. But the New lnternationa Economic Order is not the solution. It offers little that is new. It presents the same rehash of rationalizations. albeit rather more sophisticated, for the political control of human beings. A curious but distressing point is that the underlying philos? ophy and assumptions embodied in NIEO are accepted by the governments of nearly all countries. including the UnltEd States. This is exemplified in the current Law of the Sea Conference. where the major conflict among nations is not about the underlying approach but merely about the division of spoils. The seas and the ocean floor are the last great untapped wilderness on earth. with enormous potential for? mineral wealth.and food. But what threatens the efficient. utilization.of this wilderness is the view. held by virtually all governments attending the Conference. that the seas are: the "common heritage of mankind" and should therefore be con- trolled by politicians-and bureaucrats through a United Nations regulatory body. Again the accepted policy is state ownership and control of wealth and labor on a superficial humanitarian pretext. 'The legacy of the "common heritage" concept, however. is a tragic one. Resources. whether in the land, air, or sea. that are. in theory. owned by everyone are owned by no one. Under common ownership. the benefits of using the resource go directly to the individ al user while the negative costs.are user to exploit a commonly owned resource to the fullest. be- fore the next user can profit. Destructive exploitation and antifconservationlst practices abound. Government planners are no different. Assailed from all sides by government and cor- porate state interests, the U.N. ocean resources planner will have every incentive to advance h' is employment by givin in to spec1al interests and very little incentive to maintaingthe full capital value of the Se Co fe enc Ecean resourcesreaty in its present form. the same tragedy 0: the commons that encouraged the depletionrof the ocean is eries will become the law for min area covering three-guarte erals, too, in an rs of the earth's surface A ain the solution lies away form state ownership and controlgof I resources. Instead of internationalizin . . the ocean fl or the Unlted States ShGUld pursue a policy that recognizes the rights of individuals and private organizations to "homestead? area5 of the ocean and see bottom for mining, fishing,:mariculture 32 PIOjects, scientific study, and conservation. Ocean resources would be used and managed prudently as each private owner would have the incentive to maintain the full capital value of his Property. Instead of a polluted, unproductive area under com- mon ownership, the seas could become dynamic and productive regions. With respect to foreign aid, American political parties have differed in practice much less than in rhetoric. Both Republi- cans and Democrats would bleed massive amounts of American resources to fill the "needs" of other countries that have mis- managed their economies and have funneled large portions of their national wealth into military adventures and domestic repression. Economic and military aid to the underdeveloped countries actually promotes central economic planning and, in the process, secures the rule of dictatorial regimes abroad, as it promotes inflation and unemployment at home. Foreign countries receive tax-subsidized goods and credit through a host of U.S. or U.S.?supported agencies, principally the Department of Agriculture and the Export?Import Bank, and through U.S. participation in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such official transfer programs have several effects. Direct aid, in the form of commodities and other goods, dumped on the markets of other countries, retards the local in- dustries of the recipient countries, which find it difficult to compete with the cheap goods, and thereby increases reliance on imports. Through extensive aid programs, the Third World has thus become addicted to food exports from the DCs. Transfer and credit programs to foreign industry and governments then provide dollars to purchase exports from American business. All foreign "aid" programs combined, then, amount to little more than a very expensive welfare package for big business. Some argue that agencies such as the Export?Import Bank are self? supporting, receiving no tax monies or subsidies. But the original capital stock for the Ex?Im Bank, a U.S.?owned corpor- ation -- some $1 billion was paid for from the U.S. Treasury, and on this the bank is currently authorized to borrow up to $6 billion. The indirect subsidy occurs because the Ex-Im Bank can borrow, mostly from the government, at government bond rates and lend at a rate lower than that in the export finance market. Such aid is often advocated as a way to secure American jobs. This is like saying that it is beneficidal to have your property stolen so long as the thief returns part of the loot. Government aid programs are financed by taxes. The higher the taxes, the less money is available in the private sector to purchase goods and invest in ij?creating enterprises. The net result of government aid, then, is to increase unemployment in the United States as well. 33 rams is Another rationale for government to insure political and economic "stability' in the recipient countries. For the U.S. government, "stability" means venting Third World countries from drifting into thedSoEiet sphere of influence. Foreign aid is seen as a metho bribing Third World governments to follow the political in- terests of the U.S. government. Naturally. Third World regimes play this theme to the hilt. threatening to turn to the Soviet Union whenever there is talk of reducing foreign . economic and military aid. This leads to some bizarre poliCies. where the United States has funded both sides of a conflict (for example Turkey vs. Greece. to the tune of $7 b111}0n and $5 billion respectively) and has shared military aid with the Soviet Union to 17 Third World countries. For all of this aid. the United States and the Soviet Union maintain very little ?stability" in world events. .After extenSive'U.S. aid to the dictatorships of the shah of Iran and Somoza in Nicara? gua. popular revolutions have taken power and installed anti- American governments. Growing anti-Americanism in South Korea and Zaire results from the same U.S. policy. Past U.S. aid to Vietnam, Israel. and South Africa has tended rather to isolate America from the Third World and encouraged Third world countries to turn to the Soviet Union for aid. But. on balance. the Soviet Union has fared no better. having lost. influence in Egypt. the Sudan. Iraq and Somalia after trans- ferring massive amounts of resources. Indeed. Soviet influence. as measured by adherence to Soviet policy. trade and arms agree- ments. and Soviet presence in the Third WorLd. has declined since its height in the late 1950s. .Marxist ideology has failed to supplant Moslem.nationalism in Africa and the.Middle Easti The world. with its diversity of cultures. traditions. religions. is impossible for the ruling clique of any one country to control. Most governments of the Third World have. in fact. made it clear at the meetings of the recent Islamic conference in Islamabad that they want no interference by either of the superpowers. The American people would be incensed if they knew first?hand the human suffering their tax dollars have bonght. Support for the repressive governments of Suleyman Demirel in Turkey. Mobutu in Zaire. Suharto in Indonesia. "Baby Doc" Duvalier in Haiti. and General Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea to name a There is an alternative to the planned governmental chaos engendered by these disastrous "aid" policies. It is the spontaneous order of a free society. For the peoples of the underdeveloped countries. America must serve as an example We should remove restrictions from our own i l' i Omestlc abolish.immigration laws. eliminate restrictions and exports. and pursue a foreign policy of non?' . in the affairs of other countires. Individuals 34 to do business abroad. but at their own expense and risk. The Ex-Im Bank and Department of Agriculture subsidy pro- grams. and foreign assistance programs should be discon- tinued. U.S. financial support. on its present basis, for the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should be withdrawn. Private organizations such as the Red Cross or religious funds are effective means of bypassing antagonistic and Corrupt governments to deliver needed aid directly to the world's poor. The reduction of taxes and regulations in our own_economy would leave more money in the private sector available for humanitarian concerns. The people of the world need a new political philosophy -- one that will address the injustices of dictatorial regimesIr both fascist and communist. The American Revolution of 1776 embodied such a new philosophy. The libertarian principles contained in the Declaration of Independence swept away the remnants of feudalism, mercantilism. and theocracy in America and replaced them with a recognition of human liberty, freedom of speech and press, free trade, and the separation of church and state. The same can be done for the citizens of the Third_ 'World, burdened and oppressed by governments. The right of all people to be free to govern their own lives is a universal revolutionary principle. Libertarian land reform policies - granting full ownership of land to those who have worked it for centuries under the control of feudal masters - should be applied.in those countries whose people remain subjugated by landrholding aristocracies. Laws and edicts restricting trade, commerce, and civil liberties and perpetuating poverty and oppression should be swept aside. The path to peace. pros- perity. and justice for all the peoples of the world lies not in more controls and subjugation. but in freedom. 35 7. Notes on the International_Economy Free trade is the fundamental principle of the Libertarian approach to international economic relations. Goods, capi? tal, and labor should have mobility among the nations of the world. Such a policy will ultimately be to the benefit of all. Today many question the desirability of even the hobbled free trade practiced by the United States. It is said that the United States should restrict the importation of many cate- gories of foreign goods notably automobiles, steel, textiles, and electronics in order to protect American jobs. Similarly, it is said that the United States should restrict the immigration of Vietnamese, Cuban, Haitian, and Mexican refugees, because. this too costs American jobs. It is tragic that American labor unions should be in the forefront of efforts to restrict trade and immigration, when not too many years ago unions were the staunchest advocates of free trade and free mobility of labor. The change is explained largely by the fact that U.S. policies have reduced economic growth to such an extent that people are driven to such xeno? phobic attitudes. In reality, foreign trade creates jobs, and immigrants are a source of wealth, not poverty. Opponents of trade and immi- gration assume that if people didn't buy a foreign good, they would buy the comparable domestically produced good, even though it might cost more and be of inferior quality. They also assume that whenever an immigrant gets a job this nec- essarily displaces a native American from that job. But the fact is that in many cases the foreign goods are cheaper and of higher quality than domestically produced goods. And immi- grants often do work for which native Americans cannot be found. Further, immigrants create new demand as well as new supply. This increases the market for goods and therefore the demand for labor. No sales would be created by trade barriers and no jobs created by immigration barriers. We are just as badly off as we would be otherwise. In recent years, one of the greatest impediments to trade has been the declining value of the dollar. The declining value of the dollar at home and overseas results from one cause: debasement of the currency by U.S. monetary authorities. When? ever monetary authorities create money to cover budget deficits or simply through the expansion of the Federal Reserve's money 36 SUpply, this reduces the value of all other dollars held by U.S. citizens or foreigners, constituting a breach of faith with those who accepted the dollars at face value and an immoral transfer of wealth. Therefore, Libertarians favor the issuance of currencies, public and private, that would be. soundly based. This would insure their purchaSing power in domestic and international trade and would restrain govern- mental monetary authorities from creating money in response to domestic political considerations. With the importance of OPEC in today's international economy, many people believe that free trade is no longer desirable, even if it once was. But OPEC exists only because the U.S. government has artificially restricted the production of energy in the United States by price controls and other reg- ualtions. Furthermore, the impact of OPEC on the domestic economy is grossly exaggerated by politicians eager to seek scapegoats for their own failures. The total value of petro~ leum imports into the United States constitutes about 2.5 percent of our gross national product hardly enough to eXplain double?digit inflation under any theory -- and certainly not enough to justify going to war. The present ill-conceived effort to gain energy self-sufficiency by pumping billions of dollars into exotic fuel-development will only cause consumers to pay higher prices for energy than if a free mar- ket prevailed. It is ironic that those nations that actually suffer the most from OPEC's oil monopoly are not the:major industrialized nations, but the less?developed countries of the Third World. The plight of these poor nations is a cause for international concern, but the billions of dollars of international economic aid given out by the United States each year do nothing real or lasting to help these nations. Because foreign aid is a government-to?government transfer, our efforts ultimately end by building up the governments of recipient nations, rather than building up their economies. Such aid has not even been successful in terms of creating support for the United States: since most aid recipients resent the paternalism and inter- ference in their domestic affairs. Ultimately, we would do more to help these nations by opening our doors to their trade and standing as an example to them. Another point has to do with trade sanctions, such as the measures the United States has lately applied to Iran and to the Soviet Union to punish them for their unlawful or aggressive actions. With regard to the Soviet Union, trade sanctions will not have the intended political effect, and will actually have gounterproductive_economic effects in the longer run. The tes autarky. A fairlY . . conom such as that of the Soviet Union, can and will eventually Zeplace the im- port of even highly technological goods with th enous capability to produce them. The Soviet Union h:s13:;g this in the case of certain types of computers and gas and oil exploration equipment. Also it should not be forgotten that: 37 even in the case of goods with a considerable technological content, trade is not a one-way street. We have imported and licensed production processes for some highly sophis- ticated products, which have proved to have considerable utility in the United States. Finally, we should note the intimate connection between free trade and peace, which the great free traders, Cobden and Bright, actually considered synonymous. Almost all wars have had important economic origins; more often than not, goods or people were not free to travel between nations. As Bismark once said, when goods cannot cross borders, armies will. And many thinkers such as Joseph Schumpeter and William Graham Sumner have pointed out that free trade removes most economic incentives for war, since two nations with borders open to goods, labor, and capital are, in an economic sense, one nation. Of course, these arguments can be exaggerated. Free trade cannot eliminate war. But it would unquestionably lead to a more prosperous world economy and remove one important set of causes of war. Although a free trade system works best when all abide by it, U.S. policy should not be contingent on the actions of other nations. Although we should work for the mutual reduction of trade barriers wherever possible, even a unilateral free trade policy would be in the best interest of Americans, providing them with better' goods at lower prices. 38 3. The Logic of_?ational Security Foreign policy and national security are Closely related. The basic issue--always present, though sometimes under the surface of the debate-?is the avoidance of direct conflict be- tween the United States and any antagonist that has sufficient nuclear force to destroy a significant part of our homeland. At present, the only such antagonist is the Soviet Union (but that situation could change). Most people would agree with that proposition. A more controversial one, that bears on the question of limited war, is that we should not even edge near the substantial possibility of nuclear confrontation. The avoidance of nuclear war is better achieved by also avoiding lower- level regional conflicts, since escalation to nuclear war is more likely from.a situation of regional conflict than from a situation of disengagement. For the past decade or so, it has been fashionable in American foreign policy circles to assert that the purpose of our national security policy is to preserve certain American "values." That may be true, if (1) we concentrate on preserving them, not pro- jecting them into the world; and (2) we define our "values," equating them essentially with our political indepen- dence and the safety of our citizens and their domestic (not foreign} property. The trouble for our national security policy stems from the fact that a succession of American governments has attempted to assert a far more ambitious list of goals than that, and to enforce them upon a good part of the rest of the world. That is entirely too extensive a mission for our country, and ultimately for its armed forces. The more we contrive or contract to manipulate or defend in the world, the greater will be our exposure to conflict. The logic of national security runs from foreign policy through "national" strategy, then military strategies: from there to tactics and doctrines, force structures, and major weapons systems; and finally to defenSe budgets. Before addressing the composition of U.S. forces and the size of the military budget, an examination must be made of the "mission requirements" that determine these capabilities. Any alternative budget must begin with an explicit redefinition of the fundamental mission of the armed forces. A libertarian foreign and military policy empha- sizes the legitimate purpose of our armed forces as one of defense of the United States?-our people, property, and freedom. The U.S. 39 government should not involve American soldiers and taxpayeis in foreign conflicts. Nor is it appropriate or gust to ris destruction of our people in a.nuclear conflict in the name 0 defending foreign governments. Therefore, the goals of U.S. military policy should be to: . -?defend the people of the United States, and our liberty and property, -?deter and prevent nuclear war, and ??reduce sources of international tenSion that could lead to war. . This is a more precise and limited definition of U..S military purpose than is traditionally offered. It Specifically_r?JECtS the concept of being the world's policeman. This definition_ also renounces intervention and confrontation and seeks to dis? entangle the United States from dominating or unilateral comm1t? ments that can lead to unwarranted foreign military adventures. The existing policy assumptions??that the United States should be prepared to fight 1-1/2 wars simultaneously and that it stands as the primary military guardian of Europe and much of the rest of the world-?are unrealistic and contrary to American national security interests. Political influence in the world does not rest with military capabilities'alone. Equally important are the state of 'a nation's economy-?particularly its industrial capacity-?and its domestic social harmony. To the extent that excessive military spending erodes industrial competitiveness and exacerbates social divisions at home, it reduces Mexican strength. Moreover, the use of military force often has severe limits in achieving a particular political goal. Over $10 billion of arms sales to Iran could not prevent a revolution by unarmed masses. America's deployment of half a million troops and its unleashing of the heaviest bombing in the history of warfare were unable to achieve victory in Vietnam. Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has not quashed resistance to the government in Ka . 40 The Strategic_Nuclear Balance The greatest national security threat to the United States is the risk of nuclear war. The dominant fact of the nuclear age is that no nation, regardless of how much it spends on arms, can defend itself against strategic nuclear attack. Between 200 and 400 0.8. nuclear bombs could destroy the entire Soviet Union. A similar number of Soviet bombs could annihilate the United States. Nothing either side does can alter these fundamental facts. The overriding fact about the strategic nuclear balance, however, is that it is not "sensitive" to swings in numbers, within very wide limits. This has to do with the logic of incentives. hawkish ones?- can't just cite statistics about throw?weight and other indices of comparative strength. They must couple them with some credible scenarios. And when they try to do that, we see that a superiority in some index or other would not, in itself, give the Soviets an incentive to initiate or even threaten nuclear war, any more than our advantage would give us such an incentive. This does not mean, however, that certain characteristics of the nuclear forces of either antagonist cannot create instability and danger. -And that is the situation that we face today. The threat of nuclear war is increasing. This is not only because of the sharp rise in the number of nuclear weapons, but also because of the "limited war" doctrine and technology impelling both sides to a first strike capability. The pursuit of technical and military superiority is fruitless and leads to an endless arms race and a steadily mounting threat of war. The present return to the nuclear P0110195 6f the Cold War is particularly dangerous and must be halted. Negotiating limits on nuclear weapons is too important to be sacrificed to presidential politics or public pique over Russian bullying in Afghanistan. The claim of Soviet nuclear superiority??so often made by anxious and urgent hawks?-is not grounded in thorough analysis, and is certainly not true across the board. The United States has over 9,200 strategic nuclear weapons (that is, separately targetable warheads), compared to approxi?ately 6,000 for the Soviet Union. Even though Soviet numbers are increasing, perhaps more rapidly than those of the United States, and even though the Soviets may have a lead in some indices of strategic nuclear "power" (such as throw-weight or gross megatonnage or even "equivalent -megatonnage"), such measures are not relevant to questions of 41 war and peace, destruction and survival. .A few qg?tgtgi?iefrom official sources can document these points. In Horold Statement of January 29, l980, Secretary of Defenset ato destro Brown said: "The hypothetical ability of the Sovie :h same thin even 90 percent or more of our ICBM warheads is not as a disarming first strike nor even, by itself, amagorSSEV:Et military vulnerability of our ea "c I mean an increased probability of a Soviet surprise attack. another place, he said: "It is simply a that from.th:fsta3d? point of responsible policymakers the United States hasbsuldere a major loss of leverage because of the SoViet nuclear ui_ up? a golden age of American nuclear superior}tY ever ex1ste sober decision?makers starting with President Eisenhower never thought so at the time." Though.these official statements?~as all of them do??have mis? leading overtones, the general point is clear. There can be no Soviet "superiority" in the face of tens of thousands of Amer- ican strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. There are no: winners in the nuclear age. Certain policy recommendations flow from these considerations. In general, the present nuclear forces, perm- ticularly first?strike development, should be halted immediately. This policy would amount to a "cease?fire in place," a morator- ium on further increase. The present enlargement of the strategic triad (land missiles, submarine missiles, and aircraft) shouldi be halted. Actually, it should be noted, American nuclear forces have four legs, not three?-the fourth being the so?called. Theater Nuclear Forces deployed forward near the Soviet Uniom. Though defined as tactical, these several thousand carriere, aircraft-, and landrbased weapons pose a direct nuclear threat. to the Soviet territory and are thus strategic in effect_ Additions to these systems should also be halted Soviet Union. Perhaps the best current diplomatic moving toward such a policy is not, at the moment, SALT (which is mired in the U.S. Congress and has become an integral part of the 1980 presidential campaign), but the Comprehensive Test Ban.Treaty (CTB). This treaty has been the subject of extensive Soviet?American negotitions and could ea Sily be revived and strengthened as a means of mOVing toward a freeze on further. nuclear escalation. MK. The top candidate for cuts (and pro land-based ICBM's will become vulnerable . . . . - strike in the mid-1980s._ This "vulnerabilitinRgisian fl?5t actually suSpect. however, in the face of practicglmigzlliorld 42 considerations, such as the untested technical ability of large numbers of Russian warheads to target precisely our Minuteman silos, and the capability of U.S. air and submarine strategic forces to retaliate with devastating force. -The United States has 5,000 sea?based warheads aboard 41 submarines. As President Carter said in his State of the Union address: "Just one of our relatively invulnerable Poseidon enough war? heads to destroy every large and medium city in the Soviet Union." An alternative longurange strategy of phasing out land?based missiles was proposed by General Maxwell Taylor several years ago, and has been supported by many credible defense experts. Among other objections to the MX, the shell?game logic of shut- tling 200 missiles among 4,600 garages scattered through the Great Basin of Nevada?Utah relies on the SALT II ceiling on Soviet warheads. If no SALT limits are adopted, the whole logic of the MX becomes questionable. The potential need to double the system by 1989 without SALT II was acknowledged by Dr. William Perry, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in a press briefing on September 7, 1979. The General Accounting Office has asked the Secretary of Defense to address unresolved problems concerning: (1) cost (the Air Force estimate of $56 billion does not include warheads); (2) schedule: (3) performance; (4) legal obstacles to land use: (5) cement and construction materials impact on the Western states: and (6) the effect of all of these if there is no SALT II agreement. The Simon Amendment to cut MK basing funds received 152 votes on May 15, 1980. This iS'another indication of the unpopularity of the MX system. The entire MX system should be scuttled, along with other potentially vulnerable land?based missile systems. This policy would lead to a "diad rather than the present "triad" of strate? gic nuclear weapons systems. Relying on air and sea-based nu? clear weapons would reduce and delay tendencies toward first- strike capability and thereby lower nuclear war tensions. Land? based missiles also make the land area of the United States a primary target for Soviet missiles; elimination of land?based missiles would make American citizens safer. Cutting the MX would produce total savings in FY 1981 of $1.6 billion. In FY 1982, the savings from anticipated costs would be $2.3 billion. ICBM_Improvement?. At the same time, the Administration has been proceeding with introduction of the more accurate and powerful marklZ-A warhead in the present Minuteman missiles. This program is a first?strike accuracy measure that is unnecessary for deterrence purposes. Although much of the modernization program has been completed, the remaining efforts can and should be halted. This would save $179 million in FY 1981. 43 TTident. The Trident program continues to be nuclear weapons initiative. with costs in FY 1931 0 - (for the submarine and the Trident I misSile). The t' on. budget contains funding for the beginning of construc iil the ninth submarine (even though the first boat has sti no gone through sea trials). The Trident could be significantly cut back and'SlD?ifE'd- While submarine?based nuclear weapons are less destabilizing than land? based missiles (less vulnerable, less accurate): the present . Trident program provides an unnecessary expansion of destructive capability. The present Polaris and Poseidon fleet of 41 sub?I . marine?launched missiles is in the realm of first?strike capability and thus is extremely dangerous. The program is slated to cost $7.5 to 8.5 billion over the next ten to twenty years. ?It should be cancelled in its entirety. This would save $36 million in FY 1931 and much larger sums in the years ahead. Tomahawk Cruise Missile. This year Congress has authorized the Navy to purchase?106 new Tomahawk cruise missiles for deployment on attack submarines. This will transform these submarines for the first time into strategic weapons. According to present plans, 88 cruise missiles will be deployed on ll attack submarines by 1933. The Tomahawk is also capable of deployment by 1983. Because of the extreme accuracy of these cruise missiles and the intractable difficulties such weapons pose for arms verification (they are. tiny and can carry conventional or nuclear warheads), this, program should be halted. Such action would save over $250 million in FY 1981, and.much-more in years to come. Manned homer/Strategic Weapons Launcher De$pite cancellation of the B-1 bomber. funding continues for various versions of a new manned bomber. The Administration has urged research on an alter- native to the B-1, while the House Armed Services Committee has recommended $200 million for development of a "Strategic Wee Launcher" (basically an aerial platform for launchin cruisp n3 missiles). These and other proposals for a new strat: ic craft are unnecessary. The present 13?52 fleet (now quippz?r with attack missiles, 20 per plane. and recentl upgraded) can deliver thousands of warheads on gh?nosdernized and for years to come and is more than suffi Union cie - . deterrent. The 13?52 is also designed to nt to provide a credible ing the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, range system that. in effect, as a component of our strategic deterrent . to replace the 3-52 at this time in that rile-CBS! we don't need All new bomber development or be halted. The savings from this approximately $200 million. 44 Eheater Nuclear Forces Ground-Launched Cruise_Missiles fourth leg of the nuclear arsenal, usually ignored in dis- Cussions of strategic weapons, has become highly controversial. Under pressure from the Carter Administration and the government Of West Germany, the NATO alliance approved, in December 1979, the deployment of 572 new nuclear missiles in Europe. These weapons -- 464 and 108 Pershing IIs will vastly improve the accuracy, destructive power, and range of U. S. theater nuclear weapons. The Pershing rockets, for example, will be able to strike Moscow from West Germany in approximately eight minutes flying time. The accuracy and verification difficulties of the cruise missiles also contribute to strategic instability. These weapons are un? necessary and dangerous and should not be deployed. The savings from their elimination in FY 1981 would-be $333 million. Anti?Ballistic Missile_Defense. Partly because of the MX program (which may require and ABM to compensate for the system's inability to assure absolute invulnerability for land?based missiles). re? search and development on ABM systems is continuing. ABMs are receiving renewed attention despite the fact that such systems are prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty, and despite the opinion of numerous independent experts and scientists that ABMs simply cannot work. There are three major problems with the ABM systems which have been considered so far: There is no good evidence to suggest- that they will work. They are extremely expensive, and they are potentially very destabilizing, in that they may encourage American officials to consider nuclear war more thinkable or cause Soviet officials to launch an attack before the system is in operation. Nevertheless, we should not rule out consideration of defensive systems. It would be possible to construct such a system.in con? junction with a clear policy of disengagement from.world trouble spots and moves toward disarmament. Such a_po1icy should reassure the Soviets that construction of the system was not designed to facilitate a nuclear attack. Put in such a context, a defensive weapons system could be considered if it was effective, was re- latively inexpensive, and was designed to protect population centers rather than missile silos. In the absence of such a context of disengagement, the 1972 treaty should be maintained and strengthened. Once a non-interventionist policy is implemented, the treaty will no longer be necessary and a defensive weapons system could be considered. For the present, the Pentagon's request of $385 million for such programs in FY 1981 should be rejected. AntiTSatellite Weapons; These weapons do not carry nuclear war- heads, but they directly affect strategic capability by posing a threat to the satellites that provide surveillance and assist mis51le guidance. Much has been made of alleged Soviet advantages in this area, but Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General David Jones has conceded that Soviet systems are deficient "in terms of the number they can launch and the types of U. S. satellites they can go against." American programs in this area are provocative and unnecessary and should be greatly reduced. Potential savings in FY 1981 would be $100 million. 45 Weapons Complex Restoration. In order to Pr?du?3: th: {?2179 22:: ,000 nuclear warheads that will be needed in e_c mi Y3 th for the MX, Trident, cruise, and other new strategl? weapon major capital restoration Department of Energy is in the midst of a . ing weapons production capac1ty. program, to expand and improve exist ?k This program is designed for the production of first-strl weaponry scalation of nuclear fire- and for an unwarranted and dan erous for a sav1ng of $94 million power. It should be cancelled entirely, in FY 1981. (This saving, as well as the followulg one, would come strictly out of the Department of Energy budget.) DOE Warhead Production. The Department of Energy will spend $3.4 billion in FY Iggl i371 percent of its budget) on military programs. Part of this is for new, unnecessary nuclear weapons. Much of this additional production could and should be cancelled, for an estimated 1981 saving of $1.5 billion. The remainder should be transferred to the Department of Defense. Civil Defense. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, persist that a society can survive nuclear war and that civil defense preparations have strategic significance. The Civil Defense program should be cancelled, for a saving in FY 1981 of $120 million. 46 Etrabegic Arms gontrol Real security in the nuclear age can come only through arms limitation. The highest national security priority should be negotiations and independent initiatives to re- duce and eventally eliminate nuclear war threats. To date, nearly all arms control negotiations and agreements between the superpowers have been fundamentally flawed. They do not limit the arms race; they merely codify it. They are a form of mutual expansion. This does not mean that the limitation of arms should not be an object of our policy. We should continue our negotiations with the Soviets, but we should aim at genuine agreements that contain provisions for actual substative disarmament. But the formal "arms control" process to date has certain inherent flaws: It imr plies an explicit and semi?public bargaining forum. where political posturing rather than hard negotiating often occurs; formal agreements carry the expectation of effective inspection and even policing, and these procedures have inhibited agree? ments. just as they imply the possibility of war to prevent war; and. above all. the formal process implies reciprocity. It is precisely these conditions that have made it hard to achieve progress in the regulation of arms competition, and. even where agreements have been reaches. have given rise to recriminations and accusations of cheating. We need not equate formal "arms control" with all efforts at the limitation of arms. let alone with disarmament. While continuing to bargain, we need to concentrate on the merits of independent (even unreciprocated) initiatives in reducing our own arms acquisition. This is essentially a third position. different from that of the "hawks" and the ?doves." It holds that the authentic purposes of arms control stability. deterrence. and morality can be best served, not by force expansion as the hawks urge, not by the rigid reciprocal bar- gaining on which the liberal doves pin their hopes. but by moves of independent restraint. Proposals of independent restraint have_been made before. but only as gambits, bait. to be cancelled or reversed if they are not reciprocated. Genuine independent moves would have to make strategic sense in themselves. so that they could be sustained whether or not they were reciprocated by the other nuclear superpower. We have to be clear about our purposes and about the logic of arms restraint. We should attempt to restrict the targeting of civilians without increasing the likelihood of nuclear war. We should specify the targeting of strictly military objectives. but avoid counterforce in the specific sense of targeting mis- sile silos (which would be a destabilizing doctrine). 47 The recently announced or leaked stratngIOf the . Carter Administration, the so-called "PreSidential Directive 59," does not satisfy these purposes. It speCifies a greater proportion of targeting military objectives, but its targets are not bases but military silos. The targeting of misSile silos is a mistake for two reasons. First, it is enormously wasteful.and expensive because huge additional numbers of warheads are required to overcome the heavy protection pro- vided for Soviet missile silos. Second, and more important, it de?stabilizes the balance of power because it may cause the Soviet Union to fear an American first strike and thus possibly to launch an attack of its own. What is needed is not the administration's counterforce strategy but a counter- military (or counter?combatant) strategy of targeting'military objectives other than missile silos -- bases, airfields, military production facilities. and the like. This would clearly not be a first?strike strategy. but would be a suffi? cient deterrent to discourage a Soviet strike. Such restricted targeting would be accompanied by a pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons,'which would be unilateral if no reciprocity could be obtained. Strategic stability would be enhanced_by reducing incentives for an adversary to strike at our nuclear force (since, of course, an adversary's first strike would.logically have to be a counterforce strike), We would accomplish this by moving to a died of forces, instead of the present triad. eliminating our fixed land?based mdssiles as they become vulnerable to enemy attack, and not replacing them.with movable or multiple-based missiles such as the MK. We would not make this move hastily, but only as we developed the technology to insure accurate coverage of equivalent tar- gets with our undersea weapons systems. (This minimally re- quisite degree of accuracy is not designed to enable us to wage a preemptive strike against Soviet missiles but to con- fine collateral damage as closely to legitimate military tar- gets as possible.) Among other things. we would need to solve the "command-and-control" problem. the problem.of sending fool- proof orders and receiving timely information from.submarines on station. This move from triad to diad is not a form of "unilateral disarmament"_in the careless pejorative sense of the word The new posture would enhance strategic stabil' incentives for an adversary to strike It is an illustration that. in the control are as follows: 48 The SALT process must be viewed objectively and Critically. Limited agreement is perhaps better than un- restrained rivalry, but the contents of the SALT II treaty are inadequate from an arms reduction perspective. The SALT treaty should be ratified, but not at the expense of concessions to Congressional hawks. President Carter's attempts to gain support for SALT by "buying off" potential Opponents with military spending increases were not justified, and SALT is not worth that price. We should ratify the SALT treaty as it stands and move immediately to negotiate a real arms?reduction agreement with the Soviet Union. Comprehensive Test Ban. The only justification for making the effort to ratify SALT II would be if this could lead immediately to much more meaningful arms limitation through the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This should be the highest disarmament priority. It provides a direct route to a mora- torium on further increases in nuclear arsenals, and has the additional advantage of having already received substantial official government attention from both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Russians have made important con- cessions in recent years, agreeing to halt peaceful explosions and to allow on?site inspection. These gestures were never answered by the United States. They should be pursued, so this treaty can be swiftly concluded. European Theater Nuclear4Weapons. Urgent diplomatic attention should also be directed to European negotiations for a freeze and reduction of theater nuclear forces. The West German pro- posal of Helmut Schmidt, while not halting preparations for the deployment of the Pershing IIs and the cruise missiles, nevertheless offers at least the promise of freezing actual deployment pending negotiations for mutual reductions of medium?range systems. This significant initiative, which the United States initially clumsily rejected, should be supported, as the first step toward larger negotiations for nuclear force reductions in Europe. Conventional Forces and Non-Intervention? The vast bulk of our force structure consists of (non?strategic? nuclear) forces. And the largest portion of these conventional forces, over half of the entire military budget, is for NATO. The payroll alone for U.S. troops stationed in Europe is over $6 billion a year. In general, the United States maintains over 490,000 troops abroad, including 330,000 in Europe and over 100,000 in the Pacific. These are forces for intervention and so-called forward defense. They are, in effect, "trip wires" that insure that regional conflicts in Europe, Korea, the Philippines, Turkey, or elsewhere would quickly involve the United States in war. The recent tensions surrounding the in South Korea illustrate this point: the 39,000 U.S. 49 I ive troops stationed in Korea are hostages to the repress politics of the ruling military clique become involved in local conflicts that a on U.S. security. In general, the U.S. role as world policeman, astt22-233221an of security in countries all over the globeour security interest and in fact cou into unwanted conflict. in ervention is fre uently the cause of regional instability,qcertainly not its cure. The assumption that the United States (or the Soviet_Union) can?l or should involve itself in every local problem in the worl is a relic from the past age of colonialism. .Most of the peoples in the developing nations are strongly and militantly . opposed to such great power intrusion (notwithstanding the preferences of U.S.?imposed military dictators). The intro_ duction of the great powers into regional conflicts can only exacerbate and inflame local tensions and increase the like- lihood of major war. The U.S. presence in Europe also increases the likelihood that a regional conflict would lead to direct superpower con-_ frontation, with the added risk of nuclear war. American armies in Western Europe, like those of the Soviet Union in the East, are instruments of political leverage over the internal affairs of the host countries. If a major goal of'U.S. foreign.and. military policy is the prevention of nuclear war, our present policy of deploying massive military forces (including a large: number of theater nuclear weapons) in.Europe contradicts this declared aimi To the extent that these forces increase the: likelihood of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, they increase the probability of nuclear war. It.is also_important to note that the United States carries a disproportionate share of the responsibility for European defense. _The United States spends over 5 1/2 percent of its gross national product on arms, compared to an average oi' 3 1/2 percentrfor our 13 NATO allies. 'West Germany the largest NATO power in Europe, spends under 4 percent of its- GNP on its military. These inequities exi that many Common Market countries are now i and economic condition than the United Stat to approve greater spending may reflect a more 9 Europe. for example with the Carter Administration's revival of salient featuresgof th a 0 i I with the Sov1et Union despite profound differe?czgt?g: relath?' policy issues. The fundamental question is- .r many we are supposed to be defending do of the risk, why are we continuing to - - I ma military posture in Europe? lntain our present 50 The Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area has become a special priority for American military attention.. The.military force expansion in the Indian Ocean that 13 now underway rapresents a peculiarly dangerous form of American inter? vention. In recent months,r the United States has maintained an armada of 31 ships (including 2 aircraft carriers) and 20.000 sailors off the Persian Gulf. The Rapid Deployment Force is also being trained primarily for use in this area. The expansion of the base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean is also accelerating. The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced in early April that they are studying a plan to spend_over $1 billion over the next several years to enlarge this base. In addition, the United States is negotiating for new military bases in Oman. Kenya, and Somalia. Talks are also underway concerning the possible construction of a major carrier port in the West Australian city of Perth. The long-term goal is a permanent U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean. backed by a new series of military installations. This new and unprecedented U.S. commitment to policing the Indian Ocean is directly related to the drive to renew con- scription. The U.S. Navy (which shoulders the primary res? ponsibility for this policy) is already suffering personnel shortages. and these will increase as new ships and commitments are added. The House Armed Services Committee, for example, -added four new ships and reactivated two older ones in its military authorization bill. thereby increasing naval manpower needs. The overall force levels for the Navy in FY 1981 are scheduled to be nearly 10,000 more than in 1980. Said the Committee: "Because the Navy is operating a sizable task force in the Indian Ocean the existing personnel shortages have become exacerbated." These shortages will strengthen arguments for a return to the draft. It is significant that the first member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to publicly advocate renewed conscription was the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Thomas Hayward. Recommended policy moves in the area of general purpose (or conventional) forces take the form of force structure and weapons systems proposals. Recommendations for force structure cuts are as follows: Nithdrawls from_Europe. Even a minor reduction in our com- mitment to Europe would allow American manpower levels to be lowered by 90,000. This would amount to the combat and related slices of two Army divisions and one or more Air Force wings. The annual savings from a reduction and deactivation of just 90,000 troops in Europe would be $1.2 billion. Of course. there would be further related cuts in the combat support. sustaining support. and general overhead that is realted to these troops that would be withdrawn and deactiv? ated; and the other active units we keep in Europe could also be removed and deleted from the force structure, as well as a considerable portion of those units we keep in the United States primarily for combat in Europe. These aspects of force re? duction will be discussed below. The proposed reductions in 51 troops would be accompanied by deletions of theater nuclear forces. These reductions could be unilateral. But they Sh?Ul? Pei conducted in conjunction with a concerted diplomatic initia? tive to seek similar reductions from the Soviet Union. The announcement of an initial withdrawl of U.S. troops might be combined with an invitation to the Soviet Union to enter into serious negotiations for mutual reductions. Such ne? gotiations should avoid the pitfalls that have beset the . . Mutualand Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks the difference in perspective on residual forces, and the more recent dispute about the starting figure for Warsaw Pact troOps. But our program for troop withdrawal from Europe should not be mortgaged to the hope of eventual progress in mutual force Ireduction talks with the Russians. It makes sense in.1tself, and should be pursued independently. Withdrawl from Asia. Present U.S. force commitments in Asia are By and?large in support of repressive dictatorships (especially in Korea and the Philippines). The alleged imr portance to Japan's security of the troops we keep in the Western Pacific (46.000 in Japan itself and the rest of the 100,000 throughout.the area) has been greatly exaggeratedd Japan is more than capable of defending itself if the need arises. Simplistic scenarios of the Soviet menace are unr realistic, especially in light of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the vulnerability of Russia's long supply lines across Siberia. The more than 100,000 Army. Air Force. Navy, and.Marine troops we keep in Asia can and should be withdrawn and disbanded from the force structure. The annual savings from such a move would be $1.4 billion in immediate. direct costs. (Again. as in the case of forces in and for EurOpe, these do not represent the totality of the forces the United States main- tains both in and for Asia, and correspondin 1 th cuts do not exhaust the possibilities for comprehensive reductions of our forces for.Asia are indicated below.) Othe?_hanpower Savings In addition to the savin that co reductions in our force gtructure cutbacks in the personnel area can be realized thro ?ml? efficiency and fairness. One form of abuse fre ug Simp by the National Taxpayers Union is "double?d. 52 on such additional retirement income for A $20.000 ceiling $1 billion annually. such personnel would save Further efficiencies could come through lowering officer? enlisted ratios to pre-Vietnam levels (this would save $200 million annually) and cutting new Civilian hiring by the Pentagon (this would save $400 million annually.) The second category of general purpose forces where con- Siderable savings are possible is the procurement of cov- ventional weapons systems. The largest capital expenditures in the military budget are for the acquisition of new con?- ventional arms. The total procurement budget for FY 1931 is $40.6 billion. (This includes some funding for strategic programs as well.) The House and Senate Armed Services Committees have increased that sum, which represented the Administration request. Conventional weapons spending now slated for FY 1981 includes: $17 billion for aircraftr $7 billion for missiles, and over $8 billion for new ships (the latter are the House Armed Services Committee figures). This massive upgrading of U.S. forces is wasteful and un- necessary, and could be substantially scaled down. especially if the force reductions recommended elsewhere were implemented. Vast financial savings could be realized through the deferment or cancellation of many of the present large?scale procurement programs. The number of specific procurement programs that could be reduced or eliminated is too large for consideration here. A precise figure for the potential dollar savings from sub- stantial cutbacksis hard to determine; but a reasonable estimate (in the context of the initial force reductions recommended for Europe and the Pacific) would be $8 billion annually. with additional savings in future years as other reductions take effect. Listed below are a few of the most expensive and controversial conventional weapons systems now being deployed or developed. with recommendations for potential reductions: r?lB Naval_Fighter. The is one of the most expensive items in the entire military budget. Full-scale production is beginning this year, with an anticipated total expenditure in FY 1981 of $1.7 billion. This program is plagued with numerous cost and performance difficulties. The estimated cost of the entire 1,366?plane program hasx?sen 125 percent in the last five years, with unit costs jumping 25 percent in the last year alone. Moreover. the GAO has raised serious questions about the plane's reliability and performance. The GAO has critiCized the Navy for rushing into production on the program. saying that the result could be "increased costs and a poSSibly ineffective aircraft." Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) 53 has urged a halt to the program because the Ell-1121135113.; inferior to other designs and because it comrru. Sircraft to continued production and operation of large a tailed carriers. The program should be severely cur for a saving in FY 1981 of $1.5 billion. F-14. DeSpite numerous problems with cost and performance, procurement of the F-14 continues at a high rate. The House Armed Services Committee has recommended the expenditureof $927 million in FY 1981. The F-l4 has skyrocketed in price and now costs nearly $30 million each. The program has been criticized as a bailout for the financially troubled Grumman Corporation. It should be drastically curtailed. Potential savings are $500 million for FY 1981. Air Force procurement of the troublesome and ex? pensive F-15 also continues, with a scheduled 1981 expenditure of $743 million. The unit cost of these planes has also risen dramatically and is now approximately $24 million. Production of the should be reduced, and cheaper alternatives (the costs ?only" about $10 million per unit) should be de- veloped. Potential savings for FY 1981 would be $350 million. Advanced Attack Helico ter (AAH) . The Army is beginning full- We. AAH this year, despite the fact that the Cobra helicopter it is designed to replace is still being produced and is adequate to meet combat require- ments. The GAO has questioned whether the AAH will be more effective than the Cobra (deSpite a considerably higher price) and has called for further study and testing. The production decision on the MH should be indefinitel dafer saving in FY 1981 of $200 million. red, for a eration of missile design these missiles among substantial savings. tifia programs 15 the Army's Patriot missile Theb?:t:?o:list1?:?e air missile to replace many performance failures and It has been plagued With Services Committee reported . an out - ls unworkable and unnecessar Of ten misses. The system apped in its 54 Main Battle Tank This is the first bailout. The has certain positive features (such as a laser range finder that greatly improves accuracy). but it is also a costly. potentially unworkable monster. and it should be thoroughly reassessed. The GAO has sharply criticized the performance ability of the tank's turbine engines and has recommended a slower rate of development until the bugs are eliminated. The program should be substantially reduced from the requested 1931 production rate of 569 tanks. The potential savings from a slower development rate in FY 1981 could be $500 million. Infantr Fightin _ehicle stem This system. de- s1gned ?extremely expensive and unnecessarily complicated attempt to provide greater mobility to infantry troops. The Congressional Budget Office says that FVS costs per vehicle have doubled in the last year. and that cheaper alternatives are available. This program should be halted. for a FY 1981 saving of $460 million. 55 Shipbuilding. The Administration has requested authorisatlog in FY_19Slmfor the construction of 16 new ships: at a 0 $6.2 billion. The House Armed Services Committee added to the authorization of four new ships and two reactivations. bringing the total shipbuilding budget to over $3 Arguments for this naval buildup are usually based on allega? tions of Soviet naval superiority. However. the United States and the Western allies have a substantial naval advantage over the Soviet Union and have no need for further expans1on. Cone gressional Budget Office figures on the naval balance are as follows: U.S. and Allies Soviet Union Attack submarines 259 263 Aircraft and helicopter carriers 34 4 Escorts of over 1,000 tons 658 321 In general. the United States has a huge lead over the Soviet Union in ship tonnage and the number of major capital vessels. The Soviets have a.larger total number of ships tmaking comr parative figures seem alarming) but 45 percent of these Soviet vessels are small patrol class ships of under 1,000 tons disb- placement. Furthermore. the Soviets are severely hampered by a lack.of overseas naval bases and easily accessible ice?free domestic ports. The present frenetic naval buildup is thus totally unnecessary. more important. it is an invitation to foreign intervention and war. since such naval forces are the primary instrument for' projecting U.S. power abroad. The buildup of the.American Navy in the Indian Ocean is a dangerous case in point. This naval expansion should be halted and a more orderly pace of gradual modernization put in its place. A more rational shipbuilding program would allow for the cancellation or defer- ment of numerous ships now under construction. These would include: Nuclear.Attack Submarines. 3 more are being authorized for FY 1981 (35 are already authorized). Eliminate these new ships and slow the rate of . nd others. Savings for FY 1931: $1 on Aegis C1ass_Cruisers. 2 more are be FY 1981 (forma total of 4). duction of the two already un for FY 1981: $1.5 billion. 56 Guided Missile Frigates. 6 more are being authorized. They can be slowed and partially eliminated. Po- tential savings in FY 1931: $750 million. gmphihious Assault Ships. The first of 6 planned ships 's being authorized in FY 1931--more to follow. These are primarily to support intervention against armed opponents. They should be eliminated, for savings in 1981 of $380 million. 57 Less Bang for __the Buck_ for a eneral note on the effiCiency ggliaci :Eeiilffeof our gresent conventional armed forces. The current tendency toward the procurement of multiple models of high technology ("gold-plated") weaponry giners military capability. The proliferation of weapogz seggns four new jet fighters. the agd_ . are being developed at the same time) and thea_ 1t10n of multiple performance specifications (particularly in electronic imaging and tracking) have greatly increased the unit cost of new weapons. New fighters. tanks. or are now often three or four times the cost of the systems they are replacing. For example, eachiF-14 costs nearly' $30 million. compared to $2.6.million for the F74. The MmY's new tank will cost nearly $1.8 million. more than.four times the price of the Because of these price increases, the United States ends up buying fewer numbers of more expensive weapons and gets less military' capability despite higher budgets. These exorbitant procurement expenditures also detract from the funds available for the Operation and Maintenance of existing forces. It is much flashier (and more profitable to military contractors) to fund a new jet fighter than to buy additional spare parts. Nobody becomes a general by recommending more maintenance. But the need for suf? ficient Operation and Maintenance funding has become a major national security issue. Glaring deficiencies now plague forces. Part of the savings realized through the reduc? tions we are proposing couldbe redirected to the upkeep and maintenance of the weapons we now possess. (Of "course. the drastically reduced forces we recommend would also require much lower operation and maintenance funds.) Another problem area that is being neglected in the rush.to purchase new weapons is the all-volunteer force. specifically the shortages of skilled professionals and the widespread re- cruitment fraud. Efforts to resolve these problems could also defuse current pressures for a return to the draft Since at least part of the argument for reviving conscription concerns the alleged failings of the volunteer force. Hal- practice is particularly widespread. One study discussed in the House Armed Services Committee Defense.Authorization re? port found 5 percent of the Army's recruiters and 8.4 percent of the Navy's recruiters uilt of . tests. Cheating on enlistment . that milit - - - involuntary servitude. ary conscriptlon ls . It is unconstitutional un Thirteenth.Amendment, it is COmPIetely inimical tgeihzhe 58 fundamental American principle of individual liberty, and it can never be considered an acceptable policy. In any case, the personnel problems faced by the armed forces do not stem from the all-volunteer force. The shortage 0f skilled professionals, particularly in the Navy, will not be solved by a return to the draft. Indeed, the House Armed Services report stated that "the reinstitution of conscription may make it more difficult to solve these deficiencies." In order to attract and keep the skilled professionals a modern force needs, we must be willing to pay competitive wages. Such a policy will not cost very 'much: perhaps up to $1 billion annually to improve the Pay of some 100,000 personnel. Of course, the much lower overall force levels recommended in this White Paper would greatly alleviate the present presumed "manpower shortage" and would allow the continuation of an all?volunteer force, 'with improved levels of average competence. Comprehensive Defense_Budget Reductions "We are now almost in a position to translate our new prin? ciples of foreign policy and our suggestions on reducing the force structure and cutting major weapons-systems into some important changes in America's defense budget. But first, let us consider the defense budget put forward by the present Administration, and some of its implications. The FY 1981 military-budget, as requested by the Carter Administration, is $159 billion (in total obligational author? ity). This represents a 5 percent increase, over the rate of inflation, from the'FY 1980 defense budget of $139 billion. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees have recommended an even larger increase. The House request is $161 billion; the Senate request is $164 billion. The arms budget has been increasing above the rate of inflation every year since 1976. The total increase over the last four years has been $63 billion (in current dollars). The future outlook for the defense budget is for continued and accelerated increases. The five-year budget submitted by Secretary of Defense Brown shows a 25.4 percent real in? crease above expected inflation between now and 1985, with the budget in 1985 reaching a figure of $248 billion: FY 1981 $159 billion FY 1982 $180 billion FY 1983 $201 billion FY 1984 $224 billion FY 1985 $248 billion 59 High.as they sound, those figures are conservative._ A less friendly (but probably more realistle) prOJectleerld assuming a less optimistic rate of inflatien, would yie 1985 defense spending of as much as $329 billion. These increases are almost certain to occur, given the cur- rent direction of arms policy. The Research end Development budget, for example, increased in real terms in 1931 by 13 Percent (the House Armed Services Committee has an even greater increase), from $13.5 billion to $16.7 billion. And this RED budget contains funding for new weapons that will enter production in.coming years, causing even steeper? increases later. Other factors that will impel arms expen- ditures higher include the present buildup of military forces in the Indian Ocean (of which we have seen+only the beginning), the Plan to increase the number of Navy ships, and the of new military bases in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. Our analysis of the defense budget suggests two ways which are complementary and_consistent with each other, as well as being alternative -- to calculate reductions in defense spending. The first is the conclusion of thewdetailed analysis already conducted above, considering specific elements of the force structure and.specific major weapons systems and arms projects. Such an.analysis yields the following summary of possible savings, all in terms of the.Fiscal'Year 1981 defense budget (even though.perhaps only half-or at most two-thirds of the savings could actually be realized in that year even. if they were adopted): billion Troop reductions/withdrawls, Europe and-Asia 2.6" Other manpower efficiencies 1.6 MK out 1.6 Other strategic weapons'cuts 4_39 Conventional weapon cuts . 4.01 'Shipbuilding cuts 3_53 I TOTAL ?17.83 A more comprehensive analysis starts with an a defense budget, indicating the functional and purposes of the large blocks of U.S. how a non?interventionist foreign pol itself into greatly reduced force re purposes and various regions. natomy of the geographic forces and considering 1ey would translate quirements for various 60 The entire defense budget of $159 billion can be allocated to either "strategic" (nuclear) forces or "general purpose" (conventional) forces. And general purpose forces (those forces that do not deter or mitigate direct attacks by the Soviets or others on our homeland) in turn can be identified with geographical re- gions where we have commitments. It is in this way that foreign policy and defense budgets are linked. The linkages 'might not be meticulously precise, but forces must be for something. General purpose forces take up about 78 percent of the entire defense budget: for FY 1981, $124 billion out of the total requested authorization of $159 billion. The regional allo- cations of general purpose forces are: Europe with its "southern flank", the Middle East, $83 billion: Asia $25 billion: the rest of the world and the strategic reserve $16 billion. This allocation of costs assumes that, if we cut missions and correspondingly cut combat forces associated ?with those missions, we would also take "full slices" in- cluding support units and overhead out of the defense budget. Of course, support costs and overheads do not diminish auto? matically with cuts in the more obvious combat forces. They must be decreased by decision. 'When we view the horizon of defense budget cuts in this way, and if we base our force calculations on a non?interventionist foreign policy, we find that we could defend our essential security and our core values with a much smaller and tighter force structure than we now have. Such a force structure would provide the following general purpose forces: 8 land divisions (6 Army and 2 Marine), l9 tactical air wing equiva- lents (11 Air Force, 2 Marine which are equal to 4, and 4 Navy), with 6 carrier task forces. ?With the addition of a diad of strategic nuclear deterrent forces (submarines and stand-off bombers), it would require 1,250,000 men and women (Army 390,000, Air Force 360,000, Navy 370,000, Marine Corps 130,000). The total defense budget, at the end of a period of adjustment, would be about $90 billion a year, in FY 1981 dollars. In contrast, the Administration is asking, for FY 1981: forces: 2,059,000 men: and $159 billion. What emerges from this analysis is that we could save 40 to 45 percent of our defense budget. At the end of half a decade we would be spending $98 billion a yeardecade this could be reduced further to $90 billion (in 1981 dollars, or $150 billion, assuming the same optimis- tic rate of inflation, 6 percent, used by Harold Brown in his projection), while projections of the Administration's figures 61 $434 billion would yield a defense budget in that 3168125058 13 billion I I I (the optimistic calculation) or as muc have (if we dare to assmue the rates of inflation that we been experiencing) - The cumulative decade would be: our forces, $1.5 trillion. tion's program, on an optimistic calculation, the Administration's program, on somewhat more assumptions about inflation, $4.2 trillion. These differences are not just impressive: they are startling. And the point is that, even with the immense sawings that our program could achieve, this country and its essential interests and values would be well defended. A suggested and feasible series of defense budgets would be as follows: Resulting (FY 1981 bil.) Ini_t_i_ate__guts* Realize _Cu_ts* Defense Budget FY 1931 13. 9. 150- FY 1982 .32. 18.+16. 125. FY 1983 6. 18.+32.+3. 106. 4. 101. FY 1985 etc. etc. 98. FY 1986 96. FY 1937 94 FY 1933 92should be kept in mind - - . would be only about 50 perce ?d in any year 62 -A_table describing the allocation of defense dollars. land divi- 310n5. tactical air wings, and naval carrier forces to functions and regions is as follows (figures are present forces/proposed forces). Tactical Naval bil. Land Air Carrier .Area (EX 19311 Divisions Wings Task Forces EurOPe. 33./31. 11-2/3 19-1/3 6/3 .Atlantic 3?1 3 7-2 3 Asia. pacific 25./17. 4/2 14/6 - 6/3 Other. Strate- 16./16. 3+1[3 19?2/3: gic Reserve 2?2/3 5?1/3 TOTAL GENERAL 124./64. 19/3 44/19 12/5 PURPOSE FORCES Strategic 35./26. Nuclear Forces TOTAL 159./90. Reciprocity by the_Soviet Union The troop withdrawls and weapons cutbacks outlined above stand on their own merits. They are in the interest of the United States. and they should be pursued unilaterally if necessary. Nevertheless. such initiatives offer an excellent opportunity for encouraging reciprocity by the Soviet Union. We can turn world public opinion around. as it has been changing somewhat already. The United States will be recognized as a superpower engaged in initiatives for peace -- withdrawing its forces from around the world, reducing its nuclear arsenal. and lessening the risk of nuclear holocaust. The Soviet Union will be under great pressure to reCiprocate. .As we withdraw troops from Europe. we can call upon the USSR to withdraw its troops. We can join with the French and the Islamic nations in calling for the withdrawl of both superpowers from the .Middle East. We can call for Soviet arms reductions -when we are clearly reducing our own nuclear arsenal. If the Soviets reciprocate on these matters. of course. the world -will be an even safer and more peaceful place. The nations of the -world will be able to solve their own problems without superpower involvement. and the people of the world will find the risk of nuclear war greatly reduced. If the Soviets do not reciprocate, they will be viewed by the world as an aggressive nation. Their 'military position will not improve, and their influence will de- cline dramatically. World public opinion will turn strongly 63 against the USSR. In either case, the United States 1will find its reSpect and legitimate influence in the world greatly enhanced. This opportunity to call for reciprocal troop WithdranS and arms reduction by the Soviet Union is a great benefit of our program of non?intervention. But, as we pointed out above, these programs stand on their own merits. Raciprocity should he pursued, but we must move forward with our own disengagement and arms reduction regardless Of whether the Soviet Union matches them. 64 9. Domestic Economic Conversion The U. 5. defense budget could be cut by 40 to 45 percent without significantly increasing the risk to our essential security. But after three decades of alternating cold and hot war, with military budgets during that time totalling 'well over $2 trillion, a peace-oriented American economy would require some drastic changes. What would happen to 'the millions of Americans, in and out4of the armed forces. who now derive their income from the military establishment? The common-sense answer is that these people and resources 'would be put to work producing the goods and services, private and public, that make life better for all Americans. For historical reasons, however, many Americans doubt that this would happen. During the 1930's, thousands of factories and farms lay idle while millions of families were reduced to bare subsistence through drastic wage cuts and massive unemployment. The ex- plosion of production that made victory in world war II possible showed clearly that the nation's productive power had not been well adapted to meet the needs of the people. After'world War II, in what was perhaps the sharpest demobilization in world history, the U. S. economy adjusted quickly, without major governmental intervention, and established the foundations for the sustained boom of the 1950's and the first half of the 1960's. The postwar economic success of Japan shows that a well-coordin? ated free enterprise economy can attain full employment without high military spending. Yet millions of Americans cling to the belief that a large cut in the military budget would plunge the country into recession or even depression. This deep?seated fear must be removed if progress is to be made in stopping the arms race and restoring the U. 5. economic strength. In the wake of the tax revolt, widespresd sentiment for cutting federal expenditures and relieving tax burdens has made itself felt on Capitol Hill. Since the Pentagon gets the biggest piece of the pie, one would expect that the budget-cutters -would want to take a long, hard look at military spending. 65 But logical consistency is not much in evidence 1n ?0n9:3551?tr just as it has not shown itself to be very evident in a. forms and the rhetoric of the major politicaljpartlesa of those who speak of cutting federal also want to' beef up the military budget. In the continuing battle between the military spenders and the social spenders for more federal. dollars, the only sure loser is the taxpayer and the non- military, consumer?serving private sector that supports the whole shaky structure, It is no accident that the United States now finds itself in a position of preeminence in weapons design. Large and increa51ng federally financed research and development have made U. S. aircraft, missiles, and submarines unquestionably the world's best. But the effects on the U. 3. economy of this concentration on the military sector have not been healthy. Rapid advances in weapons technology have been accompanied by a sharp reduc- tion in technological innovation in civilian industries. As the Washington Post reported, "Something's Happened to Yankee Ingenuity". Foreign manufactured goods, once restricted to expensive luxuries, now account for a significant share of the consumer goods sold in the American mass market. The productivity of many U. S. consumer goods producers. has failed to keep pace with major foreign competitors. Whatever else it may have accomplished, the militari that has developed over the last two decades has fai vide sustained full employment, healthy growth, or creases in the average standard of living. the United States finds itself with neither security nor the kind of civilian prosperity envy of the world. Reversing this decline wi changes in the organization of the-nations's consistent with America's herita by the misguided presumptions of the . . in national affairs. ?f military predomnance zed economy led to pro- steady in- As we enter the 1980's, greater military that was once the 11 require basic 66 In the years since World War II, big Pentagon budgets and pro? curement contracts have brought into American manufacturing industry a number of military concepts and practices which un- dermine efficiency and destroy competitive vigor. Designing products for maximum performance without regard to cost, writing contracts that guarantee profits through "change ordersf, claims litigation, and a variety of other devices that trans- form fixed price contracts into cost?plus contracts--these are some of the consequences of an alliance of military men and Private weapons manufacturers. EmPhasis on military strength by a succession of presidents and _the participation of most of the major manufacturing corporations in some part of the defense business have focused much of the nation's top technical and managerial talent on military pro- duction. One result has been a decline in the prestige, influ- ence, and competence of manufacturers who serve consumer goods :markets. Conglomerate managers with close government connections, such as Harold Geneen of ITT, Roy Ash, formerly of Litton, and G.'William.Miller, formerly of Textron, have replaced the Henry iFords and.Andrew Carnegies as folk heroes of American industry. In the process, many Americans have forgotten that it is the nation's farms, mines, and civilian goods factories that underc gird the entire economy. If the present military emphasis continues, it will not be long before U. S. military strength itself begins to wane-?regardless of how high the military budget is pushed?-because the production_base on which it rests is deteriorating. To reverse the destructive trend of the past three decades, the United States should move to restore its manufacturing industries to a climate of free enterprise. There is no reason other than bad economic policies and attitudes for the dangerous decline in American productivity. It is not to be assumed, however, that reconversion of our economy from.its present state of militariza? tion to a healthy orientation toward production of needed goods and services depends on government "planning". Thousands of private American firms can adjust to demilitarization, as they adjust to any other shift in taste, technology, and supply. That process of adjustment is diffuse and largely private, and can hardly be dictated by a clique of remote bureaucrats. It should be kept in mind that job creation is entirely the function of private business??and largely small and mediumrsized business, at that. Last year more than 4 million new jobs were created in the private sector, but fewer than were in the 2,000 largest U. 5. companies. The many small businesses that 67 perform this function would perform it even better if defense spending were cut. and if the government did not interfere in the adjustment process. A constructive attitude toward economic conversion would provide a greater degree of econom1c_security for most Americans and a continuation of the gradual improve? ments in the standard of living that have characterized most of our history. This means less unemployment and more production. Maximum employment in wealth-creating activities always provides the greatest prosperity. Not only will more goods and services be produced, but the number of citizens receiving income for their wort in productive non-government activities will also be at a maximum. Recognition by political leaders that unemployment is created to a large extent by federal economic policies would be an important step toward sensible alternatives to current policy. If much of the $159 billion now slated for the Pentagon were returned to the taxpayers, it would not only generate new em- ployment but would also increase the production of civilian goods and services. The pursuit of maximum military power over gradually eroded our primary source of strengtle]e 3:325:12: economy. If the United States is to maintain the soundn nf its soc1ety--which is its real reserve of security--th ess 0 must'end its preoccupation with military matters and sin lt- minding the store. There are other ways for nations aigtsocieties I l' to lose "power" than through losin . . a . . Economic stagnation is one of them. ary comPEtltlon' 68 10. Epilogue:l Toward For more than thirty years, since the inception of the Cold War, the United States has operated under the sway of a_general "Paradigm? that can be described in two components: deterrence and alliance. Deterrence works mostly at the level of strategic nuclear arms, but it also applies to regional contests: it in- cludes nuclear "umbrellas" and the threat of first use of nuclear 'weapons, and it implies "essential the Soviet_ Union at all levels of military potential. Alliance translates into forward defense; it includes troop deployments, bases, military assistance, proxy regimes, security commitments, the export of repressive technology, and an intereSt in political "stability". Of course, these two components, deterrence and alliance, have been mixed in various proportions over the past three decades. ZBut the basic paradigm has scarcely been challenged during that time. unless this paradigm.is substantially altered, we will be condemned to periodic exercises of "brinkmanship", credi? bility-enhancing regional confrontations, and limited wars-- and to the hovering threat of_global nuclear destruction. So we have to challenge both of the underpinnings of this de- structive but pervasive and durable paradigm: deterrence and alliance. "we have to challenge the very idea of military balance--not whether we are currently enjoying such a balance, but whether we need a military balance at all, as opposed to the more limited notions of strategic stability and basic security, 'which are quite essentail. We must also challenge the doctrine of forward defense, in the name of which we have acquired, directly or indirectly, close to a hundred allies and clients around the world. We can no longer afford all the old cliches, the tradi- tional pretexts or excuses for an American global posture. Even the invocation of "human rights" should not require these national exertions, which have been so destructive of the very values they purport to defend. There may well be many "fallen torches"-- endangered causes, threatened values-~lying around the world (as James Schlesinger used to remind us): but this must not imply that the United States has to pick up these sputtering flames. It is time to realize that even the most sympathetic activities, the most worthy causes, are not free. As in all things, there 69 is a price to be paid; and that price'has been_growing higher. It is time to think of the most restricted perimeter we maintain to protect that core of essential Americandvilliuesaf that must be preserved: our political integrity an of our citizens and their domestic property. Clearly, we need a counter to the destructive'f0r61gn paradigm that has reigned unchallenged for thirtY'Yea-rs- The essence of this counter?paradigm would be war?avoidance and self-reliance. In a word, now-intervention must be established as the broad premise for American foreign and military Foal-103!- A non-interventionist approach would base our foreign policy and our military program on the stringent, minimal requirements of defending our own national existence and integrity. There might well be continuing troubles in the world. But we would no longer consider peace to be seamless and indivisible. Interactions with other nations, groups, and interests in the world would continue--would intensify. and multiply, no doubt. But we would no longer try to "manage interdependence" by controlling the'conduct of others; we would, rather, hedge against the conditions we could not control, and protect our securityr by reduc1ng vulnerabilities to the practical minimum. In short, we would opt for the realityr of ad'ustm than the illusion of control. 3 ent rather Ilg'CLARK PRESIDENT 2300 Wisconsin Ave.. NW. Washington. D. C. 20007 [202] 333-8263