A STRATEGIC ECONOMY OF FORCE

JULY 2017
Afghanistan is an Expensive Disaster for the U.S.

- As of 2017, the Afghan War has cost the USG 15 years, 2,389 U.S. military lives, 20,049 U.S. military wounded, and $826 billion spent, not counting 1 Trillion dollars in Veteran Healthcare costs
  - Reputational damage with both allies and enemies: America is seen to be failing, and this empowers ALL enemies
- Costs to Afghanistan: 173,000 killed, including 31,000 civilians, 101 insider attacks (in which ANDSF personnel turned on fellow security forces), which killed 257 Afghans in a 20 month period in 2015 & 2016
- On average, 2,000 Afghan soldiers defect each month—in effect, the U.S. pays to build an army for its enemy
- The ANA is not yet capable of defending itself, and is rapidly losing territory to ISIS, AQ, the Haqqani Network, and the Taliban—who are now stronger than they were in 2001
- The U.S. cannot afford a failed state—nor can it afford its current expenditure to support a losing battle. The USG presently spends more on Afghanistan than the entire German Defense budget and next year more than the entire UK Defense Budget.
- We need a new approach to salvage a horribly run effort of America’s longest war and still prevent terrorism from being exported to our homeland.

“The definition of insanity is to do the same thing repeatedly and expect a different result”

Albert Einstein
Afghan Forces Have Little to Show For All Those Costs

- The ANSF is corrupt and weak:
  - Estimate that 40% of the security forces reportedly in Helmand do not exist
  - The U.S. is paying for “ghost soldiers”
  - U.S. military has lost visibility of ANSF forces below Brigade level allowing corruption and failed Afghan leadership to rot units wholesale.

- Afghanistan is approaching an early 1990’s implosion into Civil War.
  - This would cause complete state meltdown and enhance the positions of the 20 odd terrorist groups resident in country.

### Half of Afghanistan’s terrain is now a possible terrorist sanctuary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taliban Designation</th>
<th>% of Taliban Control</th>
<th>% of Districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Control</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>40-99%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Presence</td>
<td>10-39%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal Presence</td>
<td>1-9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Presence/Unknown</td>
<td>0%/Unknown</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

July 2017
The Terrorists are no longer afraid: Two daylight open air Victory parades with captured US equipment: May and June 2017

Above: The Taliban parades in the district center of Sangin in broad daylight UNAFRAID—a month after Op. Resolute Support denied Afghan forces had been defeated there Sangin, May 2017 60 miles NW of Kandahar Air Base

Ghazni, June 2017 75 Miles South of Kabul

July 2017
More Troops & More Money Are Not The Answer—That’s Been Tried Exhaustively

Though troops were drawn down from 2010 to 2014, DoD spend stayed high

Current DoD spend in Afghanistan is as high as it was in 2008, when there were 5X as many troops

It is not a matter of 10, 25 or 100,000 troops— the paradigm of their approach is clearly incorrect

Sources: Brookings Institution, DoD

July 2017
The Way Forward

Desired End State
- Deny terrorist sanctuary in AFG
- Bolster the legitimate Kabul Government that can be held accountable for Afghan terrain
- Constant pressure on Taliban, Al Qaeda and ISIS & terrorist groups resident in Afghanistan
- Government Corruption is reduced and moving toward self sustainment

- Afghanistan is effectively in bankruptcy
  - 60% of its total public expenditures are still funded by donors (mainly the U.S.)
  - The U.S. alone covered 90% of its total security expenditures in the same period

- The best way forward is analogous to a Chapter 11 reorganization
  - A designated trustee to preside over all U.S. policy in Afghanistan (& Pakistan)
  - Allow for Afghan political de-centralization the way it worked for Centuries
  - Bolster the Afghan security forces in a proven way
  - Focus on Afghanistan’s economic arteries, rather than its population centers
  - Deny the Taliban its sources of income
  - Develop a private sector to wean the government from dependence on donors
Recruit NATO SOF Veterans

Vett
Legal
Psych
Medical
Physical

Equip

Train

Deploy

INTEL

LIFE SUPPORT

MOBILITY

CAS

MAINTENANCE

AMMUNITION
Key Support needed for ANSF

1. **Long Term Battalion and below Mentors:** They would live, train and patrol alongside their Afghan Counterparts. Unlike the DOD model where troops rotate every 6-9 months, these mentors would stay with the same unit and region for years.

2. **Aviation Support:** Contractor provided Day/Night ISR/CAS/ Medevac/Lift and resupply needed by Air. Fixed wing and Helo. These aircraft would be considered Afghan Air Force with Afghans making any weapons decisions. Western pro pilots and mechanics ensure safety and reliability.

3. **ANSF Governance Support:** Combat Logistics and Base life support, Payroll and HR all need professionalization to ensure Units are supported in a timely and reliable manner. Must eliminate Ghost soldiers and rampant corruption destroying the ANSF from the inside.
Seamless Drawdown for U.S./NATO Forces

- Mentor and Air Projects start immediately and build capacity in parallel to US/NATO efforts.
  - Air Operations focus on supporting ANSF units in need of support and not conflicting with USAF/CT missions.
  - As ANSF Brigades demonstrate proven capability for independent operations, the assigned US/NATO units are cleared for reprioritized missions.
- This is the no risk method for transitioning home the US Conventional forces in Afghanistan
The Wollman Ice Rink Moment of the Trump Administration

- Afghanistan is effectively a failed state, despite a trillion dollars in spending - and another trillion in veterans’ health care costs yet to be paid.
- America cannot afford infinite spending, while American defeat emboldens every enemy, and makes America less safe, while Afghanistan remains a nucleus for terrorist organizations.
- This new approach—a “Strategic Economy of Force”—accomplishes the following:
  - Applies crushing pressure on all of the 20 terrorist organizations resident in Afghanistan & Pakistan—from ISIS and Al Qaeda to the Taliban & others: zero sanctuary for terrorists.
  - Prevents the collapse of the Kabul Government.
  - Minimizes U.S. casualty risks.
  - Mitigates political risk: the Afghan government is stabilized, terrain is recaptured, and corruption is reduced.
  - Costs are reduced significantly for a sustainable effort against terrorism. This costs less than 8% of what USG spends now.
  - Provides an off-ramp to the longest war in America’s history and a sustainable victory for America.