Advance unedited version Dam General 29 August 2018 Original; English Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its eighty-second session, 20-24 August 2018 Opinion No. 52/2018 concerning Xiyue Wang (Islamic Republic of Iran) I. 'l he Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991-?42 of the Commission on Human Rights, which extended and clari?ed the Working Group?s mandate in its resolution 199750. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 605251 and Human Rights Council decision 13102. the Council assumed the mandate of the Commission. The mandate of the Working Group was most recently extended for a three-year period in Council resolution 33.80 ofJD September 2016. 2. in accordance with its methods of work on 3 January 2018 the Working Group transmitted to the Government of the Islamic Republic of [ran a communication concerning Xiyue Wang. The Government replied to the communication on 3 May 20] 8. the Islamic Republic of iron is a party to the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3. The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases: When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the deprivation oi'hberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by articles the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and. insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12and 2'7 ot'the Covenant (category When the total or partial ofthc international norms relating to the right to a fair trial. established in the Universal Declaration ofi-Iuman Rights and in the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned. is ofsiiclt gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category Ill); When asylum seekers. immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy (category When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin. language, religion, economic condition, political or other opinion. gender. sexual orientation. disability, or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings (category V). Submissions the source 4. Mr. Wong is a 3?-year-old naturalised United States citizen who was bent in Beijing, China. lle usually resides itt New Jersey. United States of America. 5. According to the source, Mr. Wang is a doctoral student in the Department of History at Princeton University. His primary area of study is the history of Europe and Asia. Mr. Wang received a Bachelors degree from the University of Washington and a Masters degree from Harvard University in Russian and Eurasian studies. In September 20l3, he began his doctoral studies at Princeton University. At the time the Iranian authorities detained him in Tehran, Mr. Wang was preparing to begin his dissertation by researching local governance issues during the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods ol'historical Persia. a. In 2016, with the authorisation of the Iranian Government and the backing of his graduate program at Princeton University, Mr. Wang made two trips to iron on a student visa issued by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to pursue pre-dissertalion research. The ?rst trip, which Mr. Wang made to study Farsi at the Dehkhoda Lexicon Institute and International Centre for Persian Studies with the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ran from 25 January to It) March 2016 and passed without incident. However, the source reports that Mr. Wang became suspicrous that someone had hacked into his computer during that trip. On I May 20l6, Mr. Wang returned to lran in order to continue his language studies and to collect archival materials for potential use in his dissertation. Ilc planned to use Iran?s National Archives to conduct his research. The source states that Mr. Wang was open about the purpose of his historical research and that the Foreign Ministry of lran had approved his research plan. Princeton's Department of History made a grant to Mr. Wang to cover his travel, language classes and living expenses while in country. Mr. Wang also received an additional grant for the same purpose from Princeton?s Mossavar-Rahmani Centre for Iran and Persian Gull'Studics, a non-political academic program supporting research on the region. 8. According to the source, while Mr. Wang was in Iran, he requested permission to review two sets of historical documents pertaining to regional governance in the late imperial period ofthe Qajar Dynasty. The dates of the documents requested ranged from [880 to I92 I . Mr. Wang did not conduct any research on or request any documans pertaining to Iran?s contemporary history. None of the documents he selected for review were classi?ed. 9. he source reports that in communications with his dissertation supervisors and other Princeton University of?cials, Mr. Wang noted that a guard at the National Archives had expressed concern about his presence in the Arcluves building, and suggested that the authorities considered him to be a spy. However, Mr. Wang believed that he was safe because he had been authorised by the Iranian to pursue his studies and he was merely a scholar studying old archival documents of no relevance to national security. It). On July 2016, Mr. Wang told Princeton University of?cials that he would return to Princeton within ten days. He had previously expressed concern that the Iranian authorities might be monitoring his communications- On 21 July 20 I 6, four days after Mr. Wang noti?ed Princeton University of his plans, the Iranian Diplomatic Police requested a meeting with Mr. Wang and questioned him for four hours, without the presence oflegal counsel. The source alleges that, at that meeting. Mr. Wang's laptop and passport were confiscated and he was ordered to return to his apartment to await further instructions. The Diplomatic Police questioned him again a week later. During this period. Mr. Wang met with a local lawyer. He also attempted to communicate with Iranian diplomatic of?cials to explain the scholarly purposes of his stay in Iran. I I. On 7 August 2016, the Diplomatic Police asked Mr. Wang to meet them at the Azadi Hotel in 'I'ehran for further questioning. Later that day, Mr. Wang called his family and informed them that the Diplomatic Police were with hitn at his aparttnent and had instructed him to pack his belongings because tltey were going to take him to the airport so tltat Ite could retum to tile United States. Instead, on the same day. the police detained Mr. Wang and brought to Ward 209 of Evin Prison. The source alleges that no warrant was presented attd it is therefore not known wltat authority ordered Mr. Wang?s detention. The source also alleges that Mr. Wang was held incommumcado for seven days. and that his family attd his local lawyer did not know his whereabouts and only learned ofhis incarceration alter the local lawyer visited Iivitt I?rtson. 12. According to the source. Mr. Wang at least 18 days in solitary con?nement at Evin I'rison. Moreover. even after the local lawyer Icamed of Mr. Wang's whereabouts. Mr. Wang was not permitted to meet with his lawyer until 13 September 2016 - more thatt a month after his arrest - despite having submitted multiple requests to the court and the prison. The source claitns that Mr. Wang was repeatedly interrogated without access to legal counsel. The source also notes that. while botlt Iran and the United States are party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Iran did not notify either the United States or Switzerland (which represents the United States Govemment in Iran) that Mr. Wang had been detained. in violation of article 36 of the Convention. 14. further. the sottrce emphasizes that the Iranian Government waited more than ?ve ntonths before indictiag Mr. Wang. Between 1 I attd 13 December 20I6. an investigator judge held hearings during which Mr. Wang was questioned. On 22 January 2017. the judge referred Mr. Wang's case to Branch l5 of the Revolutionary Court. At that tinte. the Iranian Govemment fonttally charged Mr. Wang with espionage and ?collaboration with the hostile state of America against the Islantic Republic of Iran" under articles 501 and 508 of the Islamic Penal Code. 15. The source states that it is difficult to know what other provisions of law ntigltt have been invoked in the indictment because it was kept secret from all but Mr. Wang?s local lawyer. However. the indictment reportedly stated that Mr. Wang had been granted access to Iranian arcltivcs against the wishes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that he had gathered 3.000 pages of sensitive documents that were ttot relevant to his research. The indictment further stated that Mr. Wang sent those documents to entities seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran. which allegedly included Mr. Wang's dissertation supervisor at Princeton University. Finally. the indictment alleged that Mr. Wang?s dissertation adviser paid to Mr. Wang to hitn for his work. The source states that all of these allegations are false. 16. According to the source. Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court tried Mr. Wang in a closed session in violation of his due process rights. On 29 April 2017. the presiding judge ofthe Revolutionary Court found Mr. Wang guilty of tile espionage and collaboration charges and sentenced ltim to ten years' imprisonment. Mr. Wang?s local lawyer ?led an appeal. On August 20?. Branch 54 Revolutionary Court, sitting as a panel of three judges. denied Mr. Wang?s appeal. The one-page opinion did ttot explain the Court's reasons for dettying the appeal. other than stating that it agreed with the trial court?s sentence. IT. The source reports that Mr. Wang's detention, trial and conviction did not become public until July 2017. almost a year after his detention. when the Mizan News Agency. a publication with alleged lies to the Iranian judiciary. published an account of the allegations against The Mizan News Agency alleged that ?American research centers . . . send their representatives and professional spies to Iran to collect documents and materials" under the cover of legitimate scholarly activities. The supposed web of "spider connections" had. according to Ivlizan. deployed Mr. Wang to ?snea[k] into Iran" in order to collect ?classi?ed and highly classi?ed documents.? 18. The source alleges that the authorities have subjected Mr. Wang to cruel and degrading treatment that ltas seriously affected his health and endangered his life. Mr. Wang?s communications witlt his family while in prison reveal that lte is rapidly delerioralittg mentally. emotionally and physically after over two years of detentiott. l-le ltas lost weight and suffers cltest pain. severc back pain. fever. rash. headaches. vomiting. stomach acltes. severe tooth pain. foot injuries. artitritis. constipation. insomnia. and diarrhoea. Tlte source refers to a telephone call between Mr. Wang and his family on 21 March 2017 in which Mr. Wang. who at that point had been detained for 227 days. reported that he was suffering from back pain from sleeping on a hard floor and front itchy rashes all over his body. Three weeks later. he reported that his knees were so swollen and tltat he could not use the small toilet in his cell. The source also alleges that Mr. Wang is kept indoors for extended periods of time and does not see any natural light for up to a week at a time. Further. throughout the entire time of his detention. Mr. Wang ltas suffered front depression and has expressed suicidal thoughts to his family. After holding Mr. Wang in solitary con?nement and subjecting him to continuous questioning. tlte authorities allegedly placed him in a series of dirty. overcrowded and unhygienic cells in Ward 209. From March to August 2017. Mr. Wang was forced to sleep on the ?oorofa 20-square-ntetre cell with up to twenty-?ve other detainees. 20. According to the source. Mr. Wang has also been subjected to sudden and unexplained transfers between prison wards. On 14 March 2017. he was transferred back to Ward 209 front Ward 4. which houses ordinary prisoners. The source notes that conditions in Ward 209 are worse than those in Ward 4. and detainees in Ward 209 have been subjected to extended interrogation and solitary con?nement. Most recently. Mr. Wang was unexpectedly transferred to Ward 7. In addition. the source alleges that the authorities have ttot separated Mr. Wang front other detainees As a United States citizen. Mr. Wang was forced to share a cell with extremely hostile detainees. including one belonging to llte Taliban On l9 July 2017. Mr. Wang reported that he was beaten by ltis cellmates. On ti December 2017. a?er a transfer to Ward 7. Mr. Wang reported that a detainee belonging to the Taliban expressed his hatred of the United States and threatened to kill him. Although this incident was reported to the authorities. Mr. Wang remains in Ward 7. 22. The source infomts that substandard conditions in the prison. coupled with the and occasionally abuse that gttards and fellow prisoners have inflicted on Mr. Wang. have severely affected his physical and mental health. Despite his deteriorating condition. Mr. Wang receives only occasional visits from the prison physician who provides litnitcd treatment. Mr. Wang has not seen a dentist. On I I September 20 7. the court granted permission for Mr. Wang to be visited by a physician who can treat the medical issues that the prison doctor has not addressed. Nevertheless. Mr. Wang ltas not been granted an outside medical visit. despite multiple requests from the Swiss Embassy and his local lawyer. The source subntits that this violates the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment ofl?risoncrs (the Nelson Mandela Rules, 75). particularly rules 24. 25. 27 attd 30. 23. The source further subntits that the Swiss Embassy ltas been able to make only five consular visits to Mr. Wang and was not granted such a visit for over two weeks after his detention. Mr. Wang and his local lawyer ltave repeatedly requested that Mr. Wang be allowed access to books and clothing shipped to Iran by his family. but have faced resistance and refusals by the prosecutor and prison guards. Mr. Wang?s access to a varies according to ward transfers and the discretion of prison officials. 24. The sottrce adds that in November 2017. the Iranian state-run Channel 2 evening news ran a six-minute segment on the espionage accusations against Mr. Wang. alleging that the United States Government had assigned hint the topic for his Princeton dissertation and that he had collected 4.500 pages of documents to send to United States intelligence agencies. The segment interspersed these accusations with portions of a recorded interrogation of Mr. Wang. The source alleges that this interrogation took place after l8 days of solitary confinement. During the interrogation. Mr. Wang was allegedly surrounded by prison guards and faced enormous pressure to confess. 25. Finally. the source observes that although one domestic avenue for legal redress technically remains available - an extraordinary appeal with lran?s Supreme Court - this option is not genuinely available or an effective tncans ofredress fora United States national such as Mr. Wang. There is no realistic possibility that Mr. Wang could prevail in that court. Under general international law. a local remedy is considered ineffective ifthe remedy does not provide a reasonable possibility of redress. 26. Mr. Wang has now been ill detention for over two years since his arrest on 7 August 2016 and remains in Evin l?rison. The source submits that Mr. Wang?s detention is arbitrary according to categories I, ll. Ill and V. ntegorv I: fuck afiegni basis?n' the detention ill relation to category I. the source argues that the authorities arrested and detained Mr. Wang without providing a legal basis. in violation of Iran's international obligations. including under the Covenant. In particular. the Government violated articles 9(1) and (2) of the Covenant. as the authorities did not inform Mr. Wang of the reasons for ltis arrest or of any charges agaittst ltitn. The source concludes that the Iranian authorities failed to provide a legal basis for Mr. Wang?s arrest. noting that formal charges were not ?led against hint for live and a Italfmonths after his detention on 7 August 2016. 28. In addition. the source submits that the Government violated its obligation under article 9(3) ofthe Covenant by failing to bring Mr. Wang before a judge after his arrest and by holding Mr. Wang incommunicado for one week. Mr. Wang did not appear before the investigator judge until I December 2016. more than four months after his arrest. 29. Further, in relation to the length of Mr. Wang's prc-trial detention. the source observes that Mr. Wang's case was not referred to the Revolutionary Court until 22 January 2017. His ?rst appearance before Branch [5 of Revolutionary Court. where was eventually tried and couvrcted. was not until I I March 20?, more than seven months after his arrest. While international law does not set a strict limit on a "reasonable" period of pro-trial detention. the circumstances of this case support the ?nding that this protracted period of detention was not reasonable. llte sources notes that the Government has never offered any basis for the delay in issuing formal charges and adjudicating Mr. Wang?s case. 30. The source submits that when the authorities finally indicted Mr. Wang, lte was charged with the crime of espionage, which is a vague and overly broad charge historically used by the Government as a pretext for the detention of foreigners. This charge does ttot satisfy the requirement of the Covenant that the legal basis for detention be ?defined with sufficient precision to avoid overly bread or arbitrary interpretation or application . 3 . Further. Mr. Wang was convicted ol'espionagc and ofcooperation with a hostile State, without a legal basis under Iranian law. According to the source. there is no evidence that Mr. Wang cmmnitted the requisite acts to satisfy the elements of the crimes. as defined by articles 50] anti 508 of the Islamic Penal Code. Mr. Wang's research requests only covered documents produced between I380 and I921. and could ttot have contained any information relevant to ?national or intemational policies" of the ntodern Iranian state. In addition, the documents requested by Mr. Wang did not bear classified stamps that would have indicated sensitive content. The majority of the documents were newspaper clippings. meaning that at the time they were relevant. the information they contained was publicly available. Similarly. Mr. Wang did not cooperate with foreign states against Iran. as he received no funding from Iluman Rights Committee. General comment No. 35 on Article 9. Liberty and security of person. I6 December pant 22. Iv the United States Govemment for his research, and has never served in the United States military or otherwise been employed by the United States Government. Category H: exercise of?mdnmentnl rights 32. In relation to category II, the source submits tltat Mr. Wang's detention directly resulted from conduct that is protected by article 19 ofthe Covenant. Mr. Wang travelled to [ran to conduct dissertation research on nineteenth and early twentieth century Qajar and I?ahlavi governance. He was peacefully exercising his rigltt to seek and receive information for academic purposes in the form ol?historical records held by a public body. 33. Furthermore. the source notes that the records that Mr. Wang sought to review do not on their face implicate Iran?s national security interests. That is, Mr. Wang sought to review unclassi?ed historical records from more than 100 years ago. These documents do not contain any national security infonnation, are not pertinent to the operations of the contemporary Iranian Government, and were not classi?ed or labelled as such. The application of Iran's espionage law to Mr. Wang is not permissible under article 19(3) ol'the Covenant because it does not serve a legitimate interest, such as the protection of national security. ntegmy due process rights 34. In relation to category ill, the source submits that violations of the most basic standards of due process were evident througltout Mr. Wang's pre- and post-trial detention. Speci?cally, the source argues that Mr. Wang's pre-trial detention violated article 9 ofthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the Covenant. The authorities arrested Mr. Wang without informing hint of the reasons for his arrest or of any charges against him. No charges were ?led for five and a halfmonths after his initial arrest, during which time Mr. Wang was held in detention, including in solitary con?nement. Mr. Wang was not immediately brought before a judge, and was held for more than seven before his trial began. 35. The source also submits that Mr. Wang's trial violated article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 14(1) of the Covenant. Mr. Wang's hearing was neither fair our public, and the court was not independent and itnpanial. Mr. Wang was tried in the Revolutionary Court before a judge known for conducting political show trials and suspected of ties to the intelligence community, who does not qualify as impartial to a reasonable observer.2 36. Mr. Wang's right to a public hearing was also violated as his hearing was closed to the public. The source argues that the exclusion ofthe general public and Mr. Wang's United States-based attorneys from his trial cannot be justi?ed by the ovenant?s national security and public order exception, which has historically been invoked in cases of terrorist activity, leaks of classilied information and other major threats to public safety. Mr. Wang?s local lawyer was precluded from sharing information with his United States~bascd attorneys, which hindered their efforts to assist with his trial. Furthermore, his local lawyer was prevented from calling witnesses or speaking on Mr. Wang's belialfuntil the end oflhc trial. The source further submits that the Government violated article ll of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article l4(3) of the Covenant, as the limitations imposed by the judiciary. including extreme secrecy, made it impossible to present a proper defence. Only Mr. Wang's local lawyer was allowed access to the indictment and evidence against Mr. Wang. furthermore, the Revolutionary Court rejected Mr. Wang's request to retain experienced local counsel to assist with his defence, for reasons unknown. The source notes lliunan Rights ommittcc. General comment No. 32 on Article I4: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, l?lUC? 30032, 23 August 2007, para. A similar submission relating to the same judge was made by the source in relation to Opinion No. 44.9205, para. 13 (the source noted that the judge had been sanctioned by the European Union in 20] for human rights violations). - "tu- that the Court tnay have withheld some evidence collected by the intelligence Service from Mr. Wang?s local lawyer. making it impossible for Mr. Wang to properly contest the charges. 38. According to the source. the Iranian authorities violated articles 14(2) and g) of tlte Covenant by forcing Mr. Wang to sign a confession. in addition. the source argues that the substandard couditiotts of detention negatively affected Mr. Wang?s altility to prepare his defence. Categort' dit?r't't'ntinntimt 39. In relation to category V. the source argues that the detention of Mr. Wang was discriminatory and violated Iran?s human rights obligations under articles 2(1) and 26 ofthe Covenant. The prosecution of Mr. Wang. public statements by the lrattian judiciary. the pattern of nationality-based discrimination by iran. and the broader political context demonstrate that Mr. Wang's detention was motivated by his status as a United States citizen. Response ?rm: the Government 40. On 31 January 20t8. the Working Group transmitted the allegations from the source to the Goventment under its regular communication procedure. The Working Group requested the Government to provide. by 3 April 2018. detailed information about current situation of Mr. Wang. The Working Group also requested the Government to clarify the legal Mr. Wang's detention. as well as the compatibility of his detention with the lslatnic Republic of Iran?s obligations under international human rights law. The Working Group called upon the Government to ensure the physical and mental integrity of Mr. Wang. 0n 2 February 2018. the Government requested an extension of the deadline for response. The extension was granted with a new deadline set of 3 May 20m. The Government submitted its response on 3 May 20th. 42. In its response. the Government states that Mr. Wang had received a study visa front the Ministry of Science and Technology to study Persian at the Deltkhoda Institute. However. despite having been prohibited access to the requested documents and venues. Mr. Wang bribed some and illegally obtained access to archival documents in the national library, documents of lslautic Consultative Assembly (Parliament). and the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.? uttder the pretext of conductittg academic rcscarclt. 43. According to tlte Government. investigations revealed that Mr. Wang?s study had been used as a cover for generating an etltnic crisis in Iran. He was questioned by the police in relation to these criminal acts. On l7 August 20l6. Mr. Wang was charged in the lobby ofthe Azadi Hotel and a court order (No. 950056) was presented to him. He was able to immediately inform ltis family. Mr. Wang was informed of the charges against him at the titne of his arrest. The Government denies that Mr. Wang was given pemtission to return to the United States. Mr. Wang was taken to Evin Prison. a registered prison in Tehran. where he received a medical examination that revealed no problems with his health. 44. The Government notes that an order to hold a person in solitary con?nement is issued by a judge during tlte investigation in very limited cases in order to prevent collusion between the suspect and accomplices. According to article 175(4) of the Executive Order of the Prisons Organization. imprisonment in single units for up to 20 days is prescribed as a disciplinary punishment. A prisoner subject to such punishment enjoys the other rights of a prisoner. The regulations de?ne the terms of use of this punishment. which includes its use for persons charged with ten?orist offences or measures against national security. The Govemntent states that these records were sought by Mr. Wang titr ?comparative study of the governance of the two Governments of iron and llte Russian [Empire on the region and i study ot"?Turktnenia? in Russia and ?Turktnea Sahara" in Iran". 45. All legal provisions were carefully observed in the case of Mr. Wang whose few days of placement in solitary confinement was carried out under the supervision of the Prisons Organization and ill accordance with a judicial order. Solitary con?nement was ordered for tlte completion of the investigation to prevent collusion. During the short period of his solitary confinement. Mr. Wang's rights were observed. and he had access to a television. refrigerator. furniture. media and health facilities. do. In addition. the Swiss Embassy in Tehran was notified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a United States citizen had been arrested. The attorney at the Swiss Embassy was able to examine the progress ofthc case at the end of the ?rst week of Mr. Wang's detention. Mr. Wang met with the attorney on I3 September 2016. The Swiss Ambassador also met with Mr. Wang on 14 September 2016. and the Swiss authorities have met with Mr. Wang on five occasions. All legal requirements applicable to foreign nationals. including access to an interpreter and consular pmtection. have been observed. According to the Government. upon receiving a report from the police. Mr. Wang was summoned by the judicial authorities. Due to the necessity of completing the investigation. the order for Mr. Wang's arrest was renewed on a basis by the judicial authorities. The Govemment submits that the time taken to file the case was reasonable. 48. After the completion of the investigation on 7 January 20} 7. the bill of indictment was sent to the competent court to determine a time for the hearing. The preliminary indictment contained details of the alleged offences. including Mr. Wang?s contact with organisations seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran. It also detailed how Mr. Wang served those groups and received money for the collection of information and securing intelligence. The Government notes that access to the records of the libraries and archives mentioned in the source?s submission requires approval that Mr. Wang lacked. and he was officially prohibited from using the archives. However, he was able to gain access to the documents through bribery and his activities indicated the purposeful pursuit of acts ofespionage. 49. The court found Mr. Wang guilty and. in accordance with articles 215 and 508 ofthc Islamic Penal Code. sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. Mr. Wang was required to repay the funds that he had received for his illegal services. The Goveniment states that the requirements ofa fair trial were met. Article 352 of the Criminal Procedure Code anticipates that the court may. at its discretion. meet in camera. and if public security requires. Given that the charges against Mr. Wang involved espionage. the court held the trial in camera. St}. The decision was subsequently appealed and continued by the appellate court. On l2 August 2017. the three judges of the court of appeal stated that Mr. Wang did not provide substantiated reasons for the appeal. The court ofappcal found that the initial judgment had been issued in accordance with the evidence and in a reasoned and documented manner based on the some materials submitted by the defendant at trial and on appeal. The judiciary is not required to release the news of the arrest or trial of individuals. and the conviction of a person could be made public only after the issuance of the final verdict. 5 l. l'lte Government states that Mr. Wang enjoys all amenities similar to other prisoners. including food. air conditioning. media facilities. and telephone calls with his family. He has the appropriate medical and therapeutic facilities. Mr. Wang?s health is normal. apart front pro-existing skin allergies. Mr. Wang has some command of the Persian language and may contact other people in the prison. The Government provided a list of dates of Mr. Wang's contacts. visits and medical appointments. 52. The Government recalls that all prisons in Iran are under the direct control of prosecutors. particularly units where accused persons and those convicted of national security offences are held. The Department of Justice of each province conducts periodic and impromptu inspections. Further. the Prisons Organization is an independent body that operates under judicial supervision and is responsible for the treatment of prisoners. The Prisons Organization cannot accept anyone as a prisoner without a judicial order. In practice. a central supervisory board and provincial boards consider complaints and take action on allegations. and prison of licers receive the requisite training in managing prisoners. 53. According to the Government, efforts are being made to improve tlte hygiene, treatment and nutrition of prisoners throughout Iran. Free medical services are provided to prisoners and specialised medical services can be accessed outside prisons. Medical tests are required for all prisoners at least once a month. and the Nelson Mandela Rules are observed and. in some cases. exceeded. More specifically. Evin Prison has been visited by delegations from inside and outside Iran, with 45 resident ambassadors and diplomatic representatives in Tehran visiting Evin Prison on 5 July 2017. Positive statements about the conditions of the prison were reflected in the media. The observance of the of detainees in Ward 209 of I;vin Prison is closely monitored by the authorities. 54. The Government states that there has been no report of Mr. Wang suffering from any physical or illness. The Government acknowledges that tensions between prisoners occur, and that movements between wards take place, but emphasizes that Mr. Wang is satis?ed with his conditions in Evin Prison and has thanked the prison authorities in writing on two occasions. 55. In relation to the source?s submissions on the categories applied by the Working Group. the Govertunent argues that Mr. Wang's case involves illegal actions rather than activities protected under the Covenant that would fall within category II. In any event, the Government refers to permissible restrictions on rights antler the Covenant. such as restrictions that are necessary for the protection of national security under article l9(3). 56. In addition. the Government refers to its arguments on the legal basis of the charges, as well as the fair and impartial process applied to Mr. Wang. and submits that the case does not fall within category Ill. The Government denies the source?s allegation that Mr. Wang was forced to make a confession. The verdict against Mr. Wang was not issued solely on the basis of his confession. but was based on a large volunte of information placed before the courts. Furthermore. the Govemntent submits that since Mr. Wang's legal representatives were attomeys front the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. the source?s allegation that United States lawyers were not able to participate in Mr. Wang's defence is incorrect. Mr. Wang's lawyers had suflicient access to hint and the contents ofthe case, and were able to defend him. Finally. the Government states that legal proceedings were initiated in the present case regardless of the individual's nationality and that there is no Iranian law is applied equally to all defendants, including United States citizens, without exception. Farther in?mmttionji?wn the source 58. On 4 May 20I8, the Govemment's response was sent to the source. The source responded on 24 July 20 8. 59. The source submits that its original submission provided a comprehensive account of Mr. Wang's arrest. detention and wrongful conviction. Having established a prima facie case. the burden rests with the Government to rebut these claims. Instead, the Government ltas failed to explain how Mr. Wang had violated Iran?s espionage statutes, and made sweeping elaints about the amenities in Iran?s prisons, all without supporting documents. 60. The source emphasizes that Mr. Wang is a student who travelled to Iran to study Farsi and to research govemanee issues from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Mr. Wang clearly stated his intention to conduct research to the Iranian authorities before his visit. The source refers to correspondence between Princeton University and the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic oflran which stated the purpose oer. Wang's research. as well a letter of support for this research from the Dehkhoda Institute. The source points out that. far from concealing his purpose. Mr. Wang also wrote to the British Institute for Persian Studies thanking them for pulling him in contact witlt senior scholars at the relevant Iranian archival and library institutions. 61. In relation to the Government's assertion that Mr. Wang?s acadetnic research was ?a cover for ethnic crisis making in Iran". the source notes that Mr. Wang was only engaged in historical research and had no contact with ethnic groups inside or outside Iran. The source refers to the Government's claints that it obtained evidence that Mr. Wang was involved with groups ?us[ing] secret funds to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran" and that he ?received money for collecting of infonnation." If such evidence exists. the Govemment could and should Itavc submitted it (or at least a detailed description) with its response. Mr. Wang had no contacts with secret groups. no plans to take action against the Iranian Government. and received no money to collect information for any person or government. 62. The source reiterates its allegations in relation to categories I. II. and V. In relation to the lack of legal basis for the arrest and detention, the source emphasizes that. contrary to the Government?s claims. the Iranian authorities did not present Mr. Wang with formal charges or infona his family or the Swiss Embassy of his arrest. Mr. Wang told the Swiss Embassy that he was being taken to the airport. but he never arrived. Similarly. the authorities did not inform Mr. Wang's family. Princeton University. the Swiss Embassy. the United States Department of State. or his local lawyer of his location. It was only after his local lawyer made enquiries at Evin Prison that the authorities con?rmed that Mr. Wang was being held there. but they did not allow him to see or speak with Mr. Wang. The source points to admissions made by the Government. First. the Government conceded that Mr. Wang was held in solitary con?nement at Evin Prison. and it did not dispute that the solitary confinement lasted for 18 days. Second. the Government con?rmed that Mr. Wang did not meet with his local lawyer until 13 September 2016. more than a month after his arrest. Third. the Government conceded that Mr. Wang was not provided a consular visit until 14 September 20I6 and that Mr. Wang has only been permitted live consular visits in two years. Fourth. the Government admitted that the indictment was issued in January 2017. more titan five months alier Mr. Wang?s arrest. 64. According to the source. Mr. Wang was brought to trial and convicted in April 2017. after more than eight months in prison. Although Mr. Wang and his local lawyer did not learn ofhis conviction until the end oprril. it appears that he was convicted on 9 April 2017. a day after the conclusion of his trial. The response notes that Mr. Wang was convicted of violating articles 215 and 508 of the Islamic Penal Code. However. Mr. Wang and his local lawyer were told that he was convicted under articles 501 and 508. while the Iranian appeals court referred only to articles 215 and 508 in its judgment." The Govemment has failed to provide any evidence. either during the trial or in its response. to support its claim that Mr. Wang violated any of these three provisions. 65. The alleged that Mr. Wang ?was in contact with opposition organizations and groups of the Islamic Republic" and ?gain[ed] access to [certain] documents through bribery." which ?indicated the purposeful pursuit acts of espionage." However. the Government did not show at Mr. Wang?s trial or in its response that he had contact with any foreign government or opposition group. The Government appears to consider that Mr. Wang's communications with his Princeton dissertation adviser (a scholar specializing in Russian and Eurasian history} constituted cooperation with an opposition organisation or foreign government. Mr. Wang?s dissertation adviser has no involvement with Iranian opposition groups or contacts with any foreign governments relating to Iran. 66. Finally. the source reiterates that Mr. Wang has suffered for two years in deplorable detention conditions. Rather than demonstrate that it complied with the Covenant and the Nelson Mandela Rules. the Govcmment insists that Mr. Wang receives excellent tnedical The source specifically cites article ZIS of the Islamic Pena: Code. noting that it appears to describe what a eoun or prosecutor may do with confiscated treatment. '1 he Govenunent's claims in relation to conditions at [Evin Prison are not credible given the widespread condemnation of Iran?s most infamous prison. Mr. Wang has been subjected to entel, inhuman and degrading treatment throughout detention, which hindered his ability to mount a defence and remains a threat to his health and safety. Discussion 'l he Working Group thanks the source and the Government for their submissions. 68. In determining whether Mr. Wang's deprivation of liberty is arbitrary. the Working Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with cvidentiary issues. If the source has presented a prima facie case for breach of the international requirements constituting arbitrary detention. the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations. Mere assertions by the Government that lawful procedures have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the source's allegations I957, para. 69. The source alleges that the police did not present an arrest warrant and did not inl'omt Mr. Wang of the reasons for his arrest on 7 August 2016. "l he Government denies these allegations but has not provided any evidence to substantiate its assertions. According to article 9(1) ofthe Covenant, no one shall be deprived of liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. The Working Group finds that Mr. Wang was arrested without an arrest warrant and without being informed at that time of the reasons for his arrest. in violation of article 9(1) and (2) ofthe Covenant. Further. as the Government the indictment against Mr. Wang was issued in January 2017. live months after his arrest. Mr. Wang was therefore not informed of the charges against him, in violation ofartiele 9(2) of the Covenant. Accordingly, given that no arrest warrant was presented at the time ot?arrest. reasons for the arrest were not provided, and the charges were not noti?ed to Mr. Wang, the authorities have failed to establish a legal basis for his detention. 70. In addition, the Working Group finds that the Government violated article 9(3) of the Covenant by failing to bring Mr. Wang before ajudgc after his arrest and by holding him for one week. The stated that the detention order was renewed on a basis by a judicial authority. but there is no indication that Mr. Wang was brought before a coun until i December 20l6. more titan four months after his arrest. There is also no indication that Mr. Wang had any opportunity to bring proceedings to challenge his detention, in violation of article 9(4) of the Covenant. Judicial oversight of deprivation of liberty is a fundamental safeguard of personal liberty? and is essential in ensuring that detention has a legal basis. 7 - For these reasons, the Working Group finds that there was no legal basis for the arrest and detention of Mr. Wang. liis deprivation of liberty is arbitrary under category I. 72. The source further alleges that Mr. Wang was deprived of his liberty for peacefully exercising his right to freedom of expression under article i9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article i9 of the Covenant. The Government denies this allegation, insisting that Mr. Wang was detained for his illegal actions. '13. While the provided few details as to the precise charges brought against Mr. Wang. it appears from the appeal court judgment that Mr. Wang was convicted under articles 215 and 508 of the Islamic Penal Code. Mr. Wang appears to have received the maximum penalty under article 508, having been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Article 508 of the Islamic Penal Code provides- Sec l=nitcd Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived oi 'l'hcir Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court (the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines. para. 3. 6' ?Article 508. Anyone who cooperates by any means with foreign States against the Islamic Republic of Iran, if not considered as moltareh, shall be sentenced to one to ten years' imprisonment." 74. The Working Group recalls that the freedom of expression protected under international ltuman rights law includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds." ln present case, Mr. Wang ltad travelled to iron with the express purpose of conducting dissertation research on nineteenth and early twentieth century Qajar and Pahlavi governance. The Government did not explain in its response how Mr. Wang had cooperated with a foreign State (which. li'om the indictment, appears to be the United States) against the Islamic Republic oflran, nor how accessing historical archives relating to a period of govemance over IOO years ago could amount to an attempt to overthrow the Iranian Government. Accordingly, the Working Group ?nds that Mr. Wang was peacefully exercising his rigltt to seek and receive information for academic purposes the form of historical records held by a public body, and that this falls within the boundaries of the Freedom of expression. 75. The Government refers to permissible restrictions on the freedom of expression under article l9(3) of the Covenant, particularly for the protection ofnational security. However, Mr. Wang sought to review historical records, ittcludittg newspaper clippings produced between 1880 and 192]. The did not establish a clear connection between this activity and contemporary national security interests protected under article l9(3). Accordingly, the Working Group finds that the application of Iran?s espionage laws to Mr. Wang is not permissible under article of the Covenant because it does not serve a legitimate interest, such as the protection of national security. Similarly, the Government did not demonstrate why bringing cltargcs against Mr. Wang was a necessary and proportionate response to his alleged activities. 76. In any event, the Human Rights Council has called on States to refrain from imposing restrictions under article 19(3) which are not consistent with international ltuman rights law para. Moreover, as the Human Rights has stated: ?Extreme care must be taken by States parties to ensure that treason laws and similar provisions relating to national security, whether described as official secrets or sedition laws or otherwise. are crafted and applied in a manner that conl'omts to the strict requirements of paragraph 3. It is not compatible with paragraph 3, for instance, to invoke such laws to suppress or withhold from the public information of legitimate public mterest that does not harm national security or to prosecute researchers or others, for having disseminated such infomtation.?? 7?7. 'llte Working Group concludes that Mr. Wang has been deprived of his liberty as a result ofthe peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of expression under article 19 of the Universal Declaration ofl-luntan Rights and article l9 ofthe Covenant. His deprivation of liberty is arbitrary under category II. The Working Group refers this case to the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. 78. The Working Group considers that certain provisions of the Islamic Penal Code, particularly article 508, are so vague and overly broad that they could, as in the present case. result in penalties being imposed on individuals who ltad merely exercised their rights under international law. As the Working Group has stated, tlte principle of legality requires that criminal be formulated with suflietent precision so that the individual can access and See Human Rights Committee. General comment No. 3-1 on Article Freedoms of opinion and expression, September 20! l, paras. I I, Ibid, para. 30. understand the law, and regulate his or her conduct accordingly.3 In lltis case. the applteation of vague and overly broad provisions adds weight to the Working Group's conclusion that Mr. Wang's deprivation of liberty falls within category II. The Working Group considers that. in some circumstances. laws may be so vague and overly broad that it is impossible to invoke a legal basis justifying the deprivation of libeny. 79. Given its linding tltat the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Wang was arbitrary under category 11. the Working Group emphasizes tltat no trial of Mr. Wang should have taken place. However. he was tried by Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court in March 2017 and convicted on 9 April 2017. The Working Group considers that there were multiple violations ofhis right to a fair trial. as follows: The authorities failed to ittfonu Mr. Wang?s family and lawyer of his whereabouts following his arrest. in violation of principles 15. 16(1). 18 and 19 ofthe Body of Principles for the Protection ofAll Persons under Any Form of Detention or imprisonment. The authorities failed to notify the United States or Switzerland that Mr. Wang had been detained," in violation of article 36 of the l963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Govemment asserted that it noti?ed the Swiss Embassy oi'Mr. Wang?s arrest but provided no further details. The Swiss Embassy has only been permitted to make live consular visits to Mr. Wang and was not granted suclt a visit for over a month after his detention. in violation of rule 62 of the Nelson Mandela Rules. While the Government argued that all requirements applicable to foreign nationals were met. it conceded that Mr. Wang was not provided a consular visit until 14 September 2016 and that he had only been permitted five consular visits in two years. Mr. Wang was held in pro-trial detention for more than seven months until his first appearance before the Revolutionary Court on I 1 March 20 I 7. The Government did not challenge this allegation, arguing that the time taken to ?le the case was reasonable due to the need to complete llte investigation. According to article 9(3) of the Covenant. pre-trial detention should be the exception rather than the rule, and as short as possible. Seven was unreasonably long, given that no alternatives to detention appear to have been considered. Mr. Wang was held in solitary confinement for at least 18 days following his arrest. The Governntent stated that all legal procedures were observed during the ?few days? that it was necessary to hold Mr. Wong in solitary con?nement itt order to prevent possible collusion, but did not deny that it extended to 18 days. According to rule 45 of the Nelson Mandela Rules, the intposition of solitary con?nement must be accompanied by certain safeguards. That is. it ntust only be used in exceptional cases as a last resort, for as short a time as possible, and subject to independent review. These conditions do not appear to ltave been observed. Moreover. prolonged solitary confinement in excess of 15 consecutive days Is prohibited under rules 43(1)(h) and 44 of the Nelson Mandela Rules. Mr. Wang?s trial was closed, in violation of his right to a public hearing under article 14(1) of tlte Covenant. The Govemment confirmed that the trial was held in camera because it involved espionage chargesI noting that closed hearings are permitted if public security requires. The Government did not explain how Mr. Wang?s trial on espionage charges posed a threat to national security so serious that it warranted a closed hearing. Moreover, the essential ?ndings. evidence and reasons should ltave been made public in accordance with article 14(l) ofthe Covenant.?I See e.g Opinion No paras. ?JE-Itll. As noted in paragraph 13 above. Switzerland represents United States Govenuneat interests in Iran. See Human Rights Committee. General eotnment No. 32. para. The ltevolntionary Courts that tried Mr. Wang and heard his appeal do not meet the standards of an independent and tribunal under article 14(1) of the Covenant." (2) Mr. Wang was dettied access to legal couttsel. in violation of article l4(3)(b) of tlte Covenant. Following his arrest. Mr. Wang was interrogated without tlte presence of a lawyer and. as the Government continued. did not meet with his lawyer for more than a month after ltis arrest. Persons deprived oftheir liberty have the rigltt to legal assistance by counsel of their choice at any titnc during their detention, including immediately after their apprehension.? Mr. Wang's local lawyer was not penttitted to share information with his attorneys based in the United States. This restricted Mr. Wang?s ability to defend the case. given that lte allegedly cooperated with institutions in the United States attd the United States Mr. Wang was not permitted to hire experienced local legal counsel. Mr. Wang's local lawyer was prevented from calling witnesses or speaking on Mr. Wang's behalf the end of tlte trial. in violation of article attd of tlte Covenant. While the Government noted that Mr. Wang?s lawyers had suf?cient access to the contents oftlte case and were ahle to defend him. it did not speci?cally deny this allegation. Mr. Wang was forced to sign a confession following his solitary con?nement. The Government denles this allegation. and claims that the verdict against Mr. Wang was not issued solely on the basis of his confession but was based on other evidence. The burden is on the Govenunent to prove that Mr. Wang's statement was given freely,? and it has not done so. The Working Group considers that a forced confession taints the entire proceedings. regardless of whether other evidence was available to support the verdict.? as it violates the right to be presumed innocent under article of tlte Covenant and the right ttot to be compelled to confess guilt under article j) The overcrowded. and inltuntan conditions in which Mr. Wang has been detained ltave hindered his ability to participate in attd prepare his defence." lit). The Working Group concludes that the violations oftlte rigltt to a fair trial are of such gravity as to give Mr. Wang's deprivation ot'liberty an arbitrary character under category Ill. 81. in addition, the Working Group considers that the source ltas established a pritna facic case that Mr. Wang was detained because of ltis status as a foreign national. The Government denies this allegation. elainting tltat Iranian law is applied equally to all defendants. However, there are several factors that lead the Working Group to eottelude that Mr. Wang?s detention was motivated by the fact that he is a United States citizen. First. there is no evidence that Mr. Wang was present in Iran for any reason other than to pursue his dissertation research. Indeed, prior to his arrest. he had visited Iran from January to March 2016 without incident, and had informed the authorities of the purpose ofltis research. Second. the Working Group considers that it is no coincidence that the charges against Mr. Wang related to his Sec Report ofthe Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on its visit to the Islamic Republic of 2? June 2003. para (15. The Working Group considers that this ?nding regarding the Revolutionary Courts remains current. see Opinion No. "Will 8. para. 34. See UN Basic Principles and Guidelines. principle 9 and guideline 8. Sec Ihnltan Rights General comment No. 32. para. 4 I. See Opinion No para. 28. See Opinion No. 470th? para. 28. See also 3. para. 33; Opinion No. 9320?. para 5ft. relationship with academic institutions the United States.? Third. Mr. Wang?s sentence of ten years' imprisonment appears to be disproportionately heavy. as there was no evidence that had a criminal record. nor that he was intending to. or did in fact. conduct espionage or cause an ethnic crisis in Iran. 32. In its jurisprudence. the Working Group has repeatedly found a practice in Iran of targeting foreigrt nationals for detention.? The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran also recently recognised this patterrt. speci?cally referring to Mr. Wang's case and noting that current estimates suggest that at least 30 foreign and dual nationals have been imprisoned since 20i5." The Working Group considers that the present case is part of that pattern. Mr. Wang was deprived of his liberty on discriminatory grounds, that is. on tile basis of his national or social origin. in violation of articles 2 artd of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2( I and 26 of the Covenant. I-Iis deprivation of liberty is arbitrary according to category V. 83. Given the serious violations of Mr. Wang's rights. the Working Group refers this case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 84. The Working Group wishes to express its grave concern about Mr. Wang's health, which is reportedly deteriorating rapidly a?er two years ofdetention. Mr. Wang suffers from depression. and has expressed suicidal thoughts to his family. He has not received medical treatment that addresses his ongoing health issues. According to the source. Mr. Wang has also been subjected to cruel. and degrading treatment. including transfers between prison wards without explanation; threats and violence from other prisoners: intimidation artd physical abuse by prison guards; detention in deplorable conditions. and denial ofaceess to books and clothing shipped by his family. The Government denies tltese allegations, insisting that Mr. Wartg is in nomtal health and is satisfied with the conditions in levin Prison. The Government provided the dates of Mr. Wang's visits and medical appointments. Having taken into all available infonnation. the Working Group considers that tile Government did not provide convincing information or evidence in support of its claims. 85. In the view ofthe Working Group. Mr. Wang?s treatment falls short of the standards set out. inter alto. in mics I. 12-13. 24-25tire Nelson Mandela Rules. The Working Group urges the Government to immediately release Mr. Wang. and to ensure that he is urgently transferred to a hospital. The Working Group refers this case to the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel. inhuman or degrading treatment or punislunent. 86. This case is one of several cases brought before the Working Group in the last live years concerning the arbitrary deprivation of liberty in the Islamic Republic of Iran.? The Working Group notes that many ol'the cases involving Iran follow a familiar pattern of arrest and detention outside legal procedures; pro-trial detention with no access to judicial review; incommunicado detention and prolonged solitary con?nement; denial of access to The source refers to a Miran News Agency report in July 20]? about "American research centers" sending spies to Iran under the cover of seholariy activities. and tr Channel 2 news segment in November which alleged that the United States had chosen the topic oer. Wang?s dissertation. See e.g. Opinion Nos. 7:20?. See also Opinion Nos. 0212!?? {detention of an I Iranian national with Swedish residency} artd Stilltti?. 44:10?. 28:10?. l8r2ttl3 (detention of US nationals. some of whom also held Iranian nationality) See 5 March pants. (referring to these cases as emblematic examples of due process failings. as they commonly relate to the mere suspicion of anti-State activities with no detailed charges). The UN Secretary-General has also expressed coucem relating to the prosecution of foreign and dual nationals in Iran. including Mr. Wang. See at: February 20] 8. pants. 56-57. See eg. Opinion Nos. ??2018. 92520?. 4990?. 7.520?. SOQDIG. ZSIZOIO. ?Horns. ZKHDIJ and I8f20l3. ll': legal counsel; prosecution under vaguely worded criminal ofi'ences with inadequate evidence to support the allegations; a closed trial and appeal by courts lacking in independence; disproportionately harsh sentencing. torture and ill-treatment, and denial of medical care. The Working Group recalls that under certain circumstances, widespread or imprisomnent or other severe deprivation of liberty in violation of the rules of international law. may constitute crimes against humanity?? The Working Group would welcome the opponunity to work constructively with the Government to address the arbitrary deprivation of liberty in the lslarnic Republic of Iran. Given that a signi?cant period of time has passed since its most recent country visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran in February 2003, the Working Group considers that it is now an appropriate time to conduct another visit. The Working Group recalls that the Government issued a standing invitation to all thematic Special Procedures mandate holders on 24 July 2002. and awaits a positive response to its request to visit made on 10 August 20l6. 88. Given that the Islamic Republic of Iran?s human rights record will be reviewed during the third cycle of the Universal Periodic Review in November 20?, an opportunity exists for the Government to enhance its cooperation with the Special Procedures and to bring its laws into conformity with international human rights law. Disposition 89. In the light ol'the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion: The deprivation of liberty of Xiyue Wang. being in contravention ol?artieles 2. 7, 9, IO. ll(l) and IQ of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9, 14, 19 and 26 ofthe Intemntional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within categories I. II, and V. 90- The Working Group requests the Government of the lslamic Republic oflran to take the steps necessary to remedy the situation of Mr. Wang without delay and bring it into conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 91. The Working Group considers that. taking into account all the circumstances of the case. in particular the risk ofhann to Mr. Wang's health, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Wang immediately and accord him an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international law. 92. The Working Group urges the Govemment to ensure a full and independent investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Mr. Wang. including his alleged assault by other prisoners, and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of his rights. 93. The Working Group requests the Government to bring its laws, particularly article 508 of the Islamic Penal Code, into conformity with the recommendations made in the present opinion and with the commitments made by the Islamic Republic of Iran under international human rights law. 94. In accordance with paragraph 33(a) of its methods ofwork, the Working Group refers this case to: the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection ol?the right to freedom of opinion and expression, (ii) the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic ol'lrnn. and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Sec egg. Opinion No para. 22. 95. 'lhe Working Group requests tlte Government to disseminate the present opinion through all ataiiable means and as widely as possible. Follow-up procedure 96. In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up to the recommendations made in the present opinion. including: Whether Mr. Wang has been released and. on what date; Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Wang; Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr. Wang?s rights and, ifso. the outcome ol?tlte investigation; it!) Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to harmonise the laws and practices of the Islamic Republic of Iran with its international obligations in line with the present opinion; Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion. The Govemmcut is invited to inform the Working Group of any dif?culties it may have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and whether further technical assistance is required, for example. through a visit by the Working Group. 98. 'l he Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the above infonnatioa within six months of the date of the transmission of the present opinion. However. the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in foilow-up to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action would enable the Working Group to infonn the Human Rights Council of progress made in implementing its recommendations, as well as any failure to take action. 99. the Working Group recalls that the iluman Rights Council has encouraged all States to cooperate with the Working Group and requested them to take account of its views and, where necessary. to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, and to infomt the Working Group of the steps they have taken.2 [Adopted on 23 August 20?] Sec Human Rights Council Resolution 33530. 30 September 20 In, pants. 3 and 7.