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131? ApprovedwFor Re.e 2005lg4?l It: 

WP

29 November 1976

NEEKHUUMWJW FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence?AQL F352

SUBJECT DCI Perspectives ?%%v;15P
7Fo 
(Hz?v

l. I would like to pass on a few personal thoughts to DDI for
possible inclusion in whatever they are drafting as your comments on
the Perspectives,? but thought I should check with you first.
Here goes:

a) The ?Perspectives" do not once mention the KGB or

the GED, or U.S. counterintelligence. As a fair amount of 
Community resources is dedicated to counterintelligence, 
the ?Perspectives? should include a brief paragraph on

this topic.

b) I have difficulties with the following sentence from

page 2: "They (the Soviets) will also favor the use of

state power in the economic, diplomatic, and conventional

military fields over the use of *revolutionary politics?

which, however, will continue to be exploited in favorable
situations.? This ignores covert action as a tool of Soviet

foreign policy, except for ?revolutionary politics,? which

is a vague term, and can be construed as implying only 
support to CP's and radical groups against constituted govern- 
ments. It would not necessarily comprise: Soviet use of the

Somalis vis-a?vis the the support, through the CUbans,

of the Manley regime in Jamaica; or attempts at manipulation

of nationalists groups in South Africa; for example. The

sentence could be rephrased to suggest that the Soviets will

use all means at their disposal?-diplomatic, economic,

military, and subversivemto advance their world-

wide interests and.weaken their adversaries.

c) It is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the ?Perspectives?
format, but there is a great deal of duplication of thought and
even of language between Parts I and II. For example: from
Part I, page 2: ?The Soviet Union and the U.S. will remain

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principal adversaries during the next five years.?

From Part II, page 11: ?The USSR will remain our

major intelligence target.? From Part I, page 5: ?In
western Europe the Northern developed states and the
more volatile nations of the Southern Tier thom does
that not include?) are undergoing critical changes."
From Part II, page 12: ?Western Europe will continue to
be an area of critical intelligence Some
condensation could be attempted.

d) If this is to be the "motherhood? document of the
country's foremost analytical and estimative intelligence
organization, it should be written in decent English.

I wonder what the new Administration will think of our
ability to convey intelligence clearly and concisely to
policymakers if their eyes fasten on this passage from

page 17: 

 

?Guidelines for Planning. The likelihood.remains high
that localized economic, social, political, and.military
events will interact with the real or perceived power
relationships of the major power blocs in ways whidh
will engage priority US national interests. This pre-
sages a busier substantive arena for the Intelligence
Community.?

 

 

 

 

WOuld not ?local crises which affect US interests will
probably require increasing attention from the Intelligence
Community" fill the bill? This dreary computerese infects
Part throughout, but you can find examples elsewhere such
as the, in my view, erroneous use of the word ?subsets? on

page 12. Could a skilled editor from, say, the NID Staff,

be asked to do a cleanup?

Would appreciate your comments.

 

 

 

 

R.E 
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