## DEATH OF A DETAINEE: April 27, 2005 CIA Inspector General report of investigation

\*These are the newly unredacted portions of the CIA Inspector General's report that probed the death of Gul Rahman, who died at a CIA black site in Afghanistan code-named COBALT, also known as the Salt Pit.

\*A version of this report was declassified by the CIA and turned over to VICE News in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit in June.

\*The CIA turned over another version of this report that contains these newly declassified details on November 3.

\*The highlighted portions mean only that part of the passage in the report has been newly declassified.

\*The page numbers reflect the PDF page numbers and not the page numbers of the report.

Page 6, paragraph 2, unredacted : psychologist/interrogator, Bruce Jessen

Page 6, paragraph 2, unredacted : training and experience during the four months

Page 6, paragraph 3, unredacted : prepared by Jessen

Page 8, paragraph 3, unredacted: This OIG investigation concludes that \_\_\_\_\_ treated Rahman harshly because of his alleged stature, lack of cooperation, pressure to break Rahman, and \_\_\_\_\_ inexperience with a committed interrogation resister. \_\_\_\_\_ approved or ordered

Page 9, paragraph 1, unredacted: Further \_\_\_\_\_ as a medical care provider,

Page 9, paragraph 4, unredacted: 14. In April 2002, \_\_\_\_\_ Station proposed the construction of a \_\_\_\_\_ detention facility \_\_\_\_\_ to meet the Station's requirement for "secure, safe, and separated handling of terrorist detainees." In June 2002, Headquarters' Counterterrorist Center (CTC) \_\_\_\_\_ approved the funds to establish the \_\_\_\_\_ detention facility \_\_\_\_\_. The facility was an Agency operation

Page 10, paragraph 2, unredacted: 16. \_\_\_\_\_ was secured by \_\_\_\_\_ guards and supported by a small \_\_\_\_\_\_ cooking/cleaning cadre \_\_\_\_\_. The guard force was divided with \_\_\_\_\_ guards working inside the facility, and the remainder securing the outside perimeter.

Page 10, paragraph 3, unredacted: 17. \_\_\_\_\_ had overall responsibility for the facility, and Agency staff officers and contractors traveled on temporary duty (TDY) \_\_\_\_\_ to conduct interrogations at the facility.

Page 13, paragraph 1, unredacted: He was targeted because of his role in Al-Qa'ida. Rahman was considered an Al-Qa'ida operative because he assisted the group. Being both a HIG member and an Al-Qa'ida operative is not inconsistent. \_\_\_\_\_\_ there is no formal definition of the term "operative." In Rahman's case, it would be similar to the term "facilitator."\_\_\_\_\_\_ viewed a facilitator as somewhat less involved than an operative.

Page 13, paragraph 2, unredacted: Four of the cells had a metal bar above eye level that ran between two walls to which detainees could be secured by their hands in a standing sleep-deprivation position. The facility's windows were covered to suppress outside light. Stereo speakers in the cellblock constantly played loud music to thwart any attempt to communicate between detainees.

Page 15, paragraph 3, unredacted: \_\_\_\_\_ characterized \_\_\_\_\_ as "so many accidents waiting to happen." For example, there could be an attack from the outside, the detainees could hurt themselves

Page 15, paragraph 4, unredacted: On an employee impact note, I have made it clear to all hands involved that the responsibility is mine alone, nothing more need be said on that, and I am and have been coordinating with appropriate senior hqs levels since the inception of this program.

Page 16, paragraph 1, unredacted: in his assignments as \_\_\_\_\_\_ site manager

Page 16, paragraph 2, unredacted: was also responsible for renditions to and from other countries and detainee transfers.

Page 17, paragraph 2, unredacted: being vigilant \_\_\_\_\_\_ to ensure there is no torture

Page 18, paragraph 2, unredacted: 43. According to \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_ 2002, a senior operations officer interrogated a particularly obstinate d\_\_\_\_\_\_. The officer drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately, became the model for \_\_\_\_\_\_ recalled that the proposal included use of darkness, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, and noise; the use of cold temperatures was not addressed. The response from Headquarters was that the proposal was acceptable, based on the fact that no permanent harm would result from any of the proposed measures. Prior to the death of Rahman, that cable from Headquarters served as the Station's guidance on what could be done in interrogations.

Page 19, paragraph 2, unredacted: 44. \_\_\_\_\_ explained that Station guidance was to adhere to the four techniques approved by Headquarters. Page 19, paragraph 3, unredacted: 45. \_\_\_\_\_ 2002, \_\_\_\_ submitted to Headquarters a proposed interrogation plan for the detainee at the \_\_\_\_\_. It requested "specific Headquarters concurrence and definitive CTC/Legal authority" to employ specified interrogation techniques with the detainee. It proposed sound disorientation, time deprivation, light deprivation, physical comfort level deprivation, lowering the quality of the detainee's food, and unpredictable round-the-clock interrogation that would lead to sleep deprivation. The cable offered a specific description of each of the proposed techniques. One specific proposal was,

Physical comfort level deprivation: With the use of a window air conditioner and a judicious provision/deprivation of warm clothing/blankets, believe we can increase [the detainee's] physical discomfort level to the point where we may lower his mental/trained resistance abilities.

Page 20, paragraph 1, unredacted: 48. A review of cables to or from \_\_\_\_\_ between \_\_\_\_ August and \_\_\_\_\_ November disclosed only one cable proposing additional interrogation methods for \_\_\_\_\_ detainees. This cable, written by Jessen for a different detainee, requested permission to apply "the following [moderate value target] interrogation pressures...as deemed appropriate by [Jessen],...isolation, sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation (sound masking), facial slap, body slap, attention grasp, and stress positions."

Page 21, paragraph 2, unredacted: When Agency officers came to conduct interviews or interrogations, the only guidance he provided them was how to get in and out of the facility securely. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that the interrogations enjoyed the freedom to do what they wanted. He did not possess a list of "do's and dont's" for interrogations.

Page 21, paragraph 3, unredacted: 50. The director of CTC - in written comments on the draft report endorsed by the DDO said that, at the time of Rahman's death, there was a lack of clear, applicable program guidance for operations to detain and interrogate terrorists captured on the battlefield. He stated,

[T]he opening of \_\_\_\_\_\_ in September 2002 came as a practical response to a clear-cut and urgent operational need. Unfortunately, \_\_\_\_\_\_ began operation while CIA was still in the process of establishing uniform and detailed program guidance on detention and interrogations practices, and prior to development of the structured, tightly controlled CTC detention and interrogation program managed by CTC...today. While that program - which was launched in November 2002 from a low base of experience, personnel, and overall expertise - also came together without well developed and detailed CIA policies on detention and interrogation, \_\_\_\_\_

Page 22, paragraph 2, unredacted: 52. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that it was his normal practice to meet all rendition aircraft flights \_\_\_\_\_\_ unless he needed to be elsewhere. however , he said he did not have a specific recollection of the rendition of Rahman \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_ November 2002. There was no lo logbook documenting the arrivals and departures of Agency personnel at the facility.

Page 22, paragraph 3, unredacted: 53. \_\_\_\_\_ contends that Rahman was the responsibility of Jessen. \_\_\_\_\_ was not certain whether Jessen was sent to \_\_\_\_\_\_ with Rahman or another case. Jeseen conducted several interrogation sessions with Rahman.

Page 22, paragraph 4, unredacted: 54. According to \_\_\_\_\_\_ Jessen met with Rahman every day. Those sessions were documented in a series of cables that \_\_\_\_\_\_ indicated were drafted by Jessen. \_\_\_\_\_\_ said he participated in some of the interrogations Jessen conducted but could not remember how many. When informed that a pre-death cable reported that Jessen conducted six sessions with Rahman, \_\_\_\_\_\_ estimated he participated in about three of those. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that he did not recall which interpreter participated in the interrogation sessions with Rahman. According to \_\_\_\_\_\_ after Jessen left \_\_\_\_\_\_ November 2002, Rahman became \_\_\_\_\_\_ case by default, adding that all of the detainees who were not being interrogated were under his general control.

Page 23, paragraph 5, unredacted: 55. Jessen, who holds a Ph. D in clinical psychology, was experienced from nearly two decades of work in the Department of Defense SERE program and had conducted interrogations of CIA's first high value detainee at a different location. Jessen explained that he was directed to go to \_\_\_\_\_\_ conduct an evaluation of another detainee, \_\_\_\_\_\_. While there, he evaluated several other detainees prepared interrogation plans, and forwarded them to Headquarters. \_\_\_\_\_\_ also asked Jessen to evaluate Rahman, described as a "hard case." Jessen said Rahman, got a lot of attention and he became the focus of \_\_\_\_\_\_ and the Station's High Value Target cell.

Page 23, paragraph 5, unredacted: 56. Jessen explained that \_\_\_\_\_asked Jessen to look at Rahman in addition to the other detainees Jessen was evaluating at \_\_\_\_\_. According to Jessen, \_\_\_\_\_ was responsible for all of the detainees that came to \_\_\_\_\_. When detainees arrived, it was \_\_\_\_\_\_ responsibility to interrogate them. When asked if Rahman was his case, Jessen responded, "Unequivocally, no." When informed that \_\_\_\_\_ asserted that Rahman was Jessen's case, Jessen averred that \_\_\_\_\_\_ was wrong.

Page 24, paragraph 1, unredacted: 57. According to a second independent contractor/psychologist/interrogator, (C) James Mitchell, came to \_\_\_\_\_\_ to work with another detainee during November. Mitchell participated in one of Jessen's sessions with Rahman. 31 Both psychologists left \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_ November 2002.

Page 24, paragraph 2, unredacted: 58. Mitchell stated that he observed \_\_\_\_\_\_ interrogate Rahman on one occasion for about 10 minutes; Rahman was uncooperative. Mitchell stated Rahman appeared healthy; however, he had scratches on his face, bruises on his ankles, and his wrists were black and blue. Mitchell requested that the PA examine Rahman's hands.

Page 24, paragraph 3, unredacted: 59. \_\_\_\_\_ described Rahman as a significant figure at \_\_\_\_\_ did not have an opportunity to interrogate Rahman and did not see him when he was alive. \_\_\_\_\_ was informed that Rahman was someone else's case, possibly \_\_\_\_\_.

Page 24, paragraph 4, unredacted: 60. \_\_\_\_\_ advised that she was in \_\_\_\_\_ when Rahman was detained there. She participated in his initial interrogation \_\_\_\_\_ and traveled to \_\_\_\_\_ after he was rendered there. \_\_\_\_\_ said she participated in an undetermined number of interrogations of Rahman but estimates it was fewer than 10. She participated with \_\_\_\_\_ and Jessen on two occasions. She estimated she participated in five interrogations of Rahman after Jessen left \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002. When asked who had the interrogation responsibility for Rahman, \_\_\_\_\_ responded, "no one in particular - so I guess \_\_\_\_\_ and me."

Page 25, paragraph 5, unredacted: 35. As mentioned earlier, four of the 20 cells at \_\_\_\_\_ were constructed with an iron bar across the top of the cell and secured to to walls. 36. Despite \_\_\_\_\_\_ contention, \_\_\_\_\_ recalled that Rahman was in a sleep deprivation vcell on \_\_\_\_ November 2002 when she checked on the detainees.

Page 26, paragraph 2, unredacted: The subsequent cable reporting Rahman's interrogation sessions described Jessen's impression

Page 26, paragraph 4, unredacted: Jessen said that Rahman's diaper and clothes...According to Jessen, Rahman was without his clothes more than he was with them.

Page 26, paragraph 5, unredacted: 67. The linguist, \_\_\_\_\_\_ explained that it was difficult for him to remember how often he assisted in Rahman's interrogation at \_\_\_\_\_\_ but estimated it was approximately five to seven times. He assisted \_\_\_\_\_\_ in the interrogation of two detainees, including Rahman. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that during the entire time he saw Rahman at \_\_\_\_\_\_ Rahman was either wearing a diaper or was naked below the waist. \_\_\_\_\_\_ said that he could not be precise about when Rahman wore a diaper as opposed to being naked, but his condition seemed to alternate from one to the other. The \_\_\_\_\_\_ shirt that Rahman wore was not sufficient to cover his genital area. Rahman was particularly concerned with being naked in front of \_\_\_\_\_\_ guards. Every time Rahman came to the interrogation room, he asked to be covered. \_\_\_\_\_\_ did not observe a supply of diapers at the \_\_\_\_\_\_ but it was evident to him that Rahman had received a replacement diaper at some juncture.

Page 27, paragraph 2, unredacted: 68. According to prior to the first interrogation session, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_stated that Rahman was a "really bad guy." \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ was present when Rahman was rendered to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and was present when Rahman was first interrogated at \_\_\_\_\_\_\_. That was either the night Rahman was rendered to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ or the succeeding day. The first interrogation session included \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Jessen, and possibly \_\_\_\_\_\_. The only other person \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ remembered being present during one of Rahman's interrogations was Mitchell. The interrogation sessions with Rahman were normally brief because of his unwillingness to cooperate. They were mostly around 15 minutes in duration; the longest one was one or two hours.

Page 27, paragraph 3, unredacted: 69. Jessen estimated that he interrogated Rahman two to four times. He employed an "insult slap" with Rahman once but determined it was only a minor irritant to Rahman and worthless as a continuing technique. Jessen occasionally observed \_\_\_\_\_\_ encounters with Rahman and said he was the hardest case in captivity that Jessen had ever observed. Even when Rahman was depleted psychologically, he would routinely respond that he was "fine" when asked about his condition. The only concession Rahman made was to admit his identity when it was clearly established and irrefutable.

Page 28, paragraph 2, unredacted: 70. Jessen prepared the interrogation plan for Rahman before departing \_\_\_\_\_\_ and noted that there was no quick fix to get him to cooperate. It would take a long time and it was necessary to keep up the pressure on Rahman and to provide medical assessments. Jessen did not foresee that the interrogation plan on Rahman would be implemented for some time, at least not until the Station was augmented by graduates of the interrogation classes. Jessen wrote in a cable dated \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002 as a part of the Interrogation Plan Recommendation:

It will be important to manage the [proposed interrogation] deprivations so as to allow [Rahman] adequate rest and nourishment so he remains coherent and capable of providing accurate information. The station physician should collaborate with the interrogation team to achieve this optimum balance. It is reasonable to expect two weeks or more of this regimen before significant movement occurs.

Page 28, paragraph 3, unredacted: 71. \_\_\_\_\_ described Rahman as "incredibly stalwart," and said he would not talk. \_\_\_\_\_ did not remember what clothes Rahman was wearing. \_\_\_\_\_added that Rahman would have been naked during the interrogation sessions. She said she is not certain, but believed that Rahman received clothes, a top and bottom, after Jessen departed \_\_\_\_\_.

Page 28, paragraph 4, unredacted: 72. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he is not certain how many detainees at \_\_\_\_\_\_ have been naked from the waist down. It depends upon how they are acting; "It may be needed to break them." It was used in Rahman's case to break him down to be more compliant. He was defiant and strong and made threats, according to \_\_\_\_\_.

Page 28, footnote 41, unredacted: According to a Headquarters cable sent \_\_\_\_\_\_ November 2002, the first interrogation course was scheduled to run from \_\_\_\_ November 2002, with 10 students scheduled to attend that session. \_\_\_\_\_ responded on \_\_\_\_ November 2002, with concurrence for a \_\_\_\_\_ interrogation team to travel to \_\_\_\_\_\_ following completion of the the course. Later, the senior interrogator in CTC wrote an e-mail regarding the request and noted in part,"...At least one of the guys they have in mind iS Gul Rahman, who is an Afghan, and I do not think he is truly a [High Value Target] or [a Medium Value Target.] "How do you think we should proceed on this?"

Page 28, footnote 42, unredacted: There was no Station physician, only Physicians' Assistants.

Page 29, paragraph 1, unredacted: depends upon how they are acting; "It may be needed to break them." It was used in Rahman's case to break him down to be more compliant. He was defiant and strong and made threats, according to \_\_\_\_\_.

Page 29, paragraph 2, unredacted: However, despite this official reporting, the PA who accompanied Rahman \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that neither he nor any other PA conducted physical examinations

Page 29, paragraph 3, unredacted : 74. On \_\_\_\_ November 2002, \_\_\_\_ Station reported by cable that \_\_\_\_\_ medics made \_\_\_\_\_ visits to evaluate the \_\_\_\_\_ detainees. \_\_\_\_\_ "approximately a fourth of the prisoners have one

Page 30, paragraph 2, unredacted: PA \_\_\_\_\_\_ advised that he visited \_\_\_\_\_\_ shortly after his \_\_\_\_\_ november 2002 arrival \_\_\_\_\_\_. The facility had opened since his prior assignment \_\_\_\_\_\_. He consulted with OMS by telephone and received guidance to treat the detainees at \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ if they are ill. \_\_\_\_\_\_ then examined the detainees, heard their health concerns, and tested their urine to determine if they had sufficient nourishment. \_\_\_\_\_\_ said he did not perform any arrival medical examination on Rahman or any other newly arrived detainee at \_\_\_\_\_\_ and was unaware of detainee arrivals and departures from the facility. \_\_\_\_\_\_ was confident he would remember if he had examined Rahman.

Page 30, paragraph 4, unredacted: According to \_\_\_\_\_\_ in an interview with the OIG, on a subsequent date, possibly \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002, he checked on the detainees and observed Rahman for the first time. \_\_\_\_\_\_ reported that Rahman was wearing a blue sweatshirt and blue sweatpants, and possibly socks, and was standing in his cell with his arm chained to a pin on the wall. \_\_\_\_\_\_ believed Rahman had abrasions on his wrists, similar to the other detainees. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that he did not know what language Rahman spoke, but Rahman indicated that he was okay and did not make any complaints. Consequently, according to \_\_\_\_\_\_ he did not examine Rahman nor test his urine and did not know if there were any abrasions beneath his clothes. \_\_\_\_\_\_ did not know of any medical contact with Rahman by the other two medical care providers at the Station.

Page 31, paragraph 2, unredacted: \_\_\_\_\_\_ recollection that Rahman was wearing sweatpants is at odds with others who spent considerable time at \_\_\_\_\_\_ during that period. No other interviewee mentioned that Rahman was wearing pants after his first couple of days. The guard commander said that Rahman's pants were removed after approximately three days and he was without pants. The deputy guard commander said that Rahman was naked most of the time. The interpreter, recalled that Rahman was naked below the waist or wore a diaper during his entire period of detention. \_\_\_\_\_ said that Rahman's clothes were removed early and he was naked or wore a diaper most of the time.

Page 33, paragraph 1, unredacted: That cable was prepared by Jessen and reported a mental status examination

Page 34, paragraph 2, unredacted: 85. Cold Conditions. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that on \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002, \_\_\_\_\_ was occupied with other duties and asked her to check on each detainee because it was getting cold. \_\_\_\_\_ went from cell to cell and gave apples to detainees. Also, she gave a few of them blankets and, if they did not have socks, she provided socks to them.

Page 35, paragraph 3, unredacted: 86 \_\_\_\_\_\_ did not provide a blanket, socks, or an apple to Rahman. She returned his apple to \_\_\_\_\_ and stated she did not know what \_\_\_\_\_ did with the apple but doubted he would have given it to Rahman because he was noncompliant. \_\_\_\_\_ said she saw all of the detainees, except Rahman. He was in one of

the sleep deprivation cells when she provided apples to the detainees. The other detainees she observed all wore sweatshirts and sweatpants and most had socks; none of the detainees was without clothes. Some wore wool knit sweaters on top of the sweatshirts.

Page 35, paragraph 4, unredacted: 87. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that it was very cold in \_\_\_\_\_\_ when he was there on a brief TDY and the issue of hypothermia crossed his mind as he saw Rahman wearing only socks and a diaper. He commented on the cold and hypothermia to the other Headquarters officer travelling with him, but not to \_\_\_\_\_\_ explained that he was at \_\_\_\_\_\_ observe and assumed that the officers there would realize it was cold and would not leave a prisoner unclothed for a long period. \_\_\_\_\_\_ had observed blankets in other cells and assumed Rahman would get a blanket soon. \_\_\_\_\_ recognized that someone could not be left naked for long without unwanted complications.

Page 35, paragraph 2, unredacted: 88. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled that both Rahman and another detainee complained about being cold. \_\_\_\_\_ did not approach \_\_\_\_\_\_ about the cold conditions atl land was not aware of anyone else doing so.

Page 35, paragraph 3, unredacted: 89. Jessen remembered it was cold in \_\_\_\_\_ prior to his departure on \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002. There were some electrical heaters in the cellblock area but none in the individual cells. Jessen remembered receiving a heater from \_\_\_\_\_ because the room was cold.

Page 36, paragraph 1, unredacted: 90. Within the \_\_\_\_\_ days of arriving in \_\_\_\_\_ November, a contract \_\_\_\_\_ linguist, \_\_\_\_\_ was assigned by \_\_\_\_\_ or his assistant, \_\_\_\_\_ to perform a daily check of the detainees in their cells at \_\_\_\_\_.

Page 36, paragraph 2, unredacted: 91. \_\_\_\_\_ remembered that sometime around \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002, \_\_\_\_\_ mentioned the temperature was dropping, it was getting cold, and they should try and keep the detainees warmer. It was a general statement made to a group including \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_ was also present during a discussion between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ about supplying warmer clothes.

Page 36, paragraph 3, unredacted: 92. A \_\_\_\_\_ contract linguist, \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he asked \_\_\_\_\_\_ a few days before Rahman died (probably on \_\_\_\_\_ November) at what temperature hypothermia occurred. \_\_\_\_\_ reportedly responded that he believed it occurred when the atmospheric temperature dropped to 58 degrees fahrenheit. According to \_\_\_\_\_ did not respond in a manner indicating he was going to do something about it; he just said "okay." \_\_\_\_\_ was certain, however, that \_\_\_\_\_ had heard him. \_\_\_\_\_ explained that he did not raise the issue of the cold with \_\_\_\_\_\_ because of anything he \_\_\_\_\_\_ heard about Rahman. Rather, it was based on what \_\_\_\_\_\_ observed with two other detainees he was working with, as well as the the fact that he was cold even when wearing a jacket.

Page 37, paragraph 2, unredacted: section 93 \_\_\_\_\_\_ told OIG that, based on his knowledge of thermodynamics and conductivity, if a person's body temperature drops to 95 degrees Fahrenheit, the brain would be impacted. At 90 degrees Fahrenheit the person will die. However, if the room temperature is 70 degrees Fahrenheit or above and a person is

sitting naked on the floor, the person will be all right. If the room temperature is 30 degrees Fahrenheit, a person could sit on the floor and be unaffected if he is clothed. \_\_\_\_\_\_ explained that he was aware that a concrete floor would suck the heat out of someone whowas sitting on the floor without pants. From his knowledge of thermodynamics, \_\_\_\_\_\_ opined that Rahman had only a 30 percent chance of surviving the night while sitting on the cold floor of his cell without any pants.

Page 37, paragraph 3, unredacted: \_\_\_\_\_\_ that after his first or second visit to \_\_\_\_\_ he mentioned the temperature at the facility to \_\_\_\_\_\_ told them that it was the cold in the facility, the prisoners were shivering, and it was not cold outside yet.

Page 37, paragraph 4, unredacted: \_\_\_\_\_\_ responded, "not really." When asked if he had a conversation with anyone about the temperature at \_\_\_\_\_\_ responded that he believed he told \_\_\_\_\_\_ that \_\_\_\_\_ had mentioned to someone that it was cold. \_\_\_\_\_\_ added that he did not remember the identity of the person with whom he discussed the issue of the cold temperature; "it could have been anyone." When asked what prompted his comment about the cold, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that it was starting to get cold. "I walked by and must have said it was getting cold." \_\_\_\_\_\_ said he had forgotten the comment; it was not a formal context. However \_\_\_\_\_\_ reminded him of his comment. When asked if this comment could have been made to \_\_\_\_\_\_ who had the responsibility for \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ responded, "It could have been [made to] anyone.

Page 38, paragraph 2, unredacted: 96. To assist \_\_\_\_\_\_ in remembering the identity of the person with whom he spoke about the cold condition in \_\_\_\_\_\_ read the interview report prepared by the DO Investigative Team \_\_\_\_\_\_ after the death of Rahman. \_\_\_\_\_\_ then observed, "I guess it could be \_\_\_\_\_\_ he would have been the most "likely officer." When asked to quantify that likelihood as a percentage, \_\_\_\_\_\_ responded it was 50 percent. \_\_\_\_\_\_ denied he told the two members of the DO Investigative Team that the detainees were shivering. When asked if cold was used as a technique at

\_\_\_\_\_responded, "Not that I know." He explained that he was more focused on the loud music there.

Page 38, paragraph 3, unredacted: 97. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled that, at the time of Rahman's death, \_\_\_\_\_ lamented that he previously raised the issue of the cold with someone at \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_ specifically said, "I told those people that they had to do something about the cold there." \_\_\_\_\_ said it was clear from the context that \_\_\_\_\_\_ was not referring to \_\_\_\_\_\_ some low-level person, but \_\_\_\_\_\_ did not identify whom he was describing.

Page 38, paragraph 4, unredacted: 98. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he has no recollection of having a conversation with \_\_\_\_\_ regarding the cold weather. However, \_\_\_\_ did recall \_\_\_\_\_ mentioning that he thought Rahman's death was induced by the cold.

Page 39, paragraph 1, unredacted: 99. According to \_\_\_\_\_\_ no one brought to his attention or to the front office any concerns about the cold. \_\_\_\_\_\_ said it was not apparent in talking with \_\_\_\_\_\_ that there was a problem with cold at \_\_\_\_\_.

Page 39, paragraph 2, unredacted: 101. Cold Showers. \_\_\_\_\_\_ who was present at \_\_\_\_\_\_ in November 2002, reported that she witnessed "the shower from hell" used on Rahman during his first week in detention. \_\_\_\_\_\_ asked Rahman his identity, and when he did not respond with his true name, Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the guards at \_\_\_\_\_\_ direction. Rahman was so cold that he could barely utter his alias. According to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ the entire process lasted no more than 20 minutes. It was intended to lower Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons. At the conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one of the four sleep deprivation cells where he was left shivering for hours or overnight with his hand chained over his head.

Page 39, paragraph 3, unredacted: 102. Jessen, who was present at \_\_\_\_\_ at the same time, recalled the guards administering a cold shower to Rahman as a "deprivation technique". Jessen subsequently checked on Rahman after he had been returned to his cell. Jessen detected that Rahman was showing the early stages of hypothermia and ordered the guards to give the detainee a blanket. \_\_\_\_\_\_ who interpreted for Rahman, also witnessed \_\_\_\_\_\_ order a cold shower for Rahman. Rahman was being uncooperative at the time, and \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated it was event that the cold shower was not being ordered for hygienic reasons.

Page 40, paragraph 2, unredacted: 103. A Bureau of Prisons officer, conducting training for the \_\_\_\_\_\_ guards at \_\_\_\_\_\_ witnessed a tall detainee wearing a blindfold and a diaper fastened by duct tape arrive at an unheated and cold area where the shower was located. The diaper was removed and discarded. The detainee was placed under the stream of the shower for approximately five minutes and he was shivering. Because of the detainee's height, a guard wearing rubber gloves stood on a stool to ensure the detainee was covered head to foot with the water spray. There was soap in a bucket, but it was not used. The BOP officer was informed that a contractor was coming to \_\_\_\_\_\_ that day to repair the water heater. There was no towel present; the detainee was dried with his shirt and then escorted back to the cell wearing a new diaper and his wet shirt. In the cell, the guards restrained the detainee's hands to a bar at the approximate height of his head. It occurred to the BOP officer that the cold shower might have been intended as a deprivation or interrogation technique.

Page 40, paragraph 3, unredacted: Rahman did not like the shower, but the guards were able to get him clean. was not certain if the BOP officers witnessed the showers.

Page 40, footnotes (65), unredacted: \_\_\_\_\_\_ BOP officer provided a similar account of the cold shower. He did not believe it was employed as an interrogation technique because the water heater was broken at the time.

Page 41, paragraph 2, unredacted: 106. According to \_\_\_\_\_ cold was not supposed to play a role in the interrogation. Cold was not a technique; it was a change of season. When

asked in February 2003, if cold was used as an interrogation technique, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ responded, ".not per se." He explained that physical and environmental discomfort was used to encourage the detainees to improve their environment. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ observed that cold is hard to define. He asked rhetorically, "How cold is cold? How cold is life threatening?" \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that Rahman was not given cold water. He stated that cold water continues to be employed at \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ however, showers were administered in a heated room. He stated there was no specific guidance on it from Headquarters, and \_\_\_\_\_\_ was left to its own discretion in the use of cold. \_\_\_\_\_\_asserted that there was a cable documenting the use of manipulation of the environment.

Page 41, paragraph 3, unredacted: 107. Hard Takedown. During the course of Rahman's autopsy, the Agency pathologist noted several abrasions on the body. Jessen, who was present during the first 10 days of Rahman's confinement, reported that, while in the company of \_\_\_\_\_\_ Jessen witnessed a team of four or five \_\_\_\_\_\_ officers execute a "hard takedown" on Rahman. According to Jessen, the team cut his clothes off; secured his hands with Mylar tape and put a hood over his head. They ran Rahman up and down the long corridor adjacent to his cell. A couple of times he stumbled and was momentarily dragged along the ground until they were able to get Rahman back on his feet. Rahman was slapped and punched in the stomach during this episode, but Jessen could determine that the officers were pulling their punches to limit the pain. Jessen said the takedown was rehearsed and professionally executed. The process took between three to five minutes, and Rahman was returned to his cell. Rahman had crusty contusions on his face, leg, and hands that looked bad, but nothing that required treatment. Jessen heard that other hard takedowns were also executed at \_\_\_\_\_\_. Three other officers who were present at the same time provided similar accounts of the incident.

Page 42, paragraph 2, unredacted: 108. Jessen saw a value in the hard takedown in order to make Rahman uncomfortable and experience a lack of control. Jessen recognized, however, that the technique was not approved and recommended to \_\_\_\_\_\_ that he obtain written approval for employing the technique.

Page 42, paragraph 3, unredacted: 110. \_\_\_\_\_ contended that he ordered the hard takedown on Rahman to make him think he was being taken to a different cell, \_\_\_\_\_.

Page 42, footnote, unredacted: According to one BOP officer who travelled to \_\_\_\_\_\_ before he departed to Washington D.C., a \_\_\_\_\_\_ supervisor, name unknown , requested that the BOP teach the hard takedown technique to the guards at \_\_\_\_\_\_. After the BOP team arrived \_\_\_\_\_\_ the request was not repeated, and BOP did not teach the technique.

Page 43, paragraph 2, unredacted: as well as the insult slap given to Rahman by Jessen.

Page 43, paragraph 4, unredacted: \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that, after completing the interrogation class, he understood that if he was going to do a hard takedown, he must report it to Headquarters.

Page 43, unredacted: footnote 71 According to \_\_\_\_\_ who led the DO Investigative Team, \_\_\_\_\_ was not forthcoming about the hard takedown. During two interviews with the DO Investigative Team, \_\_\_\_\_ reported that Rahman was pushed and shoved a bit. It was only after \_\_\_\_\_\_ interviewed Jessen that he learned of the.hard takedown. At that point, after two interviews with \_\_\_\_\_\_ did not see any purpose in recontacting \_\_\_\_\_\_ a third time to question him on this issue.

Page 44, paragraph 1, unredacted: section 114. When the \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002 \_\_\_\_\_\_ cable reporting the treatment of Rahman reached CTC, a senior CTC/Renditions Group officer forwarded this cable via an e-mail message to a CTC attorney. The officer highlighted part of the paragraph that reported, "Despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment, Rahman remains steadfast in maintaining his high resistance posture and demeanor." The CTC officer commented, "Another example of field interrogation using coercive techniques without authorization."

Page 44, paragraph 2, unredacted: 115. \_\_\_\_\_\_ a CTC attorney, stated that she was not familiar with the "hard takedown" technique and was not aware that this technique was used at \_\_\_\_\_\_. She explained that if \_\_\_\_\_\_ had sought approval to employ the hard takedown, intentionally cold conditions, and the short chain restraint, she would have responded that they were not available for approval since they did not fit the legal parameters. Although a cold shower for Rahman was an available technique, she would have recommended that it not be approved if \_\_\_\_\_\_ had provided all the relevant detail including that Rahman's cell was cold and he was not fully clothed.

Page 44, paragraph 3, unredacted: 116. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that he was generally familiar with the technique of hard takedowns. He asserted that it is authorized and believed it had been used one or more times at \_\_\_\_\_\_ in order to intimindate a detainee. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that he would not necessarily know if it had been used and did not consider it a serious enough handling technique to require Headquarters approval. When asked about the possibility that a detainee might have been dragged on the ground during the course of a hard takedown, \_\_\_\_\_\_ responded that he was unaware of that and did not understand the point of dragging someone along the corridor in \_\_\_\_\_\_.

Page 45, paragraph 1, unredacted: 117. \_\_\_\_\_ contended that he observed Rahman's dead body and the abrasions did not appear to be fresh. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he understood from that the abrasions on Rahman's shoulders predated his transfer to \_\_\_\_\_. However, after examining three postmortem photographs taken during the autopsy, \_\_\_\_\_ advised OIG that, in his professional judgment, the abrasion on Rahman's shoulder was between two and five days old. He estimated the abrasion on Rahman's hip as ranging from three or four days to a maximum seven days old.

Page 45, paragraph 2, unredacted: 118. Following his return to Headquarters subsequent to the autopsy, the pathologist learned that Rahman had been subjected to a technique that was used to disorient him and he had fallen; that was presumably the hard takedown. It was the pathologist's medical opinion that the abrasions on the shoulders and man's hip occurred

fairly simultaneously. He estimated they occurred from one to three days, at most, before Rahman's death and certainly did not occur two weeks before his death. The pathologist did not ask who assisted during the autopsy whether he had seen the abrasions prior to Rahman's death.

Page 45, paragraph 3, unredacted: The station medic inspected the body

Page 46, paragraph 1, unredacted: 121. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he drafted this cable. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he is familiar with this cable. He does not remember much of the contents of the cable, but the necessary documentation of circumstances of the death would be in the cable. It was drafted by \_\_\_\_\_ and released by \_\_\_\_\_ edited it for clarity, as was his custom for all cables he released from \_\_\_\_\_. He had no recollection regarding the substance of edits he made to the cable.

Page 46, paragraph 3, unredacted: 123. \_\_\_\_\_\_ recalled that he had one brief session with Rahman on November 2002, four days after Jessen left \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_. stated that this was based on Jessen's recommendation that Rahman be left alone and environmental deprivations continued. The purpose of the session in an interrogation room, according to \_\_\_\_\_\_ was just to check on Rahman to determine if he was more compliant. Rahman never went any further than admitting his identity. \_\_\_\_\_ did not recall if Rahman was wearing a diaper at that time but noted there would have been no reason to use a diaper because Rahman was not in a sleep deprivation cell.

Page 46, paragraph 4, unredacted: 124. \_\_\_\_\_ contended he has little specific recollection of the session on \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002. \_\_\_\_\_ also did not recall which interpreter was used in this session, but he would have used one, \_\_\_\_\_ to conduct an interrogation. \_\_\_\_\_ stated the session was neutral in tone and not confrontational. Accordingly, he would consider it a debriefing, not an interrogation.

Page 47, paragraph 2, unredacted: 125. \_\_\_\_\_\_ recalled that, during the last few days of his detention, Rahman did something that caused \_\_\_\_\_\_ to order the guards to give Rahman a sweatshirt and possibly some socks and to loosen his restraints. \_\_\_\_\_ stated Rahman must have been somewhat compliant because his hand restraints were removed. The fact that his wrists had pretty bad scabs on them was also a factor in having the restraints removed. According to \_\_\_\_\_\_ the sweatshirt was not the result of Rahman complaining of being cold or \_\_\_\_\_\_ surmising Rahman was cold because he saw Rahman shivering. They were in the interrogation room, which was relatively warm with two 1000-watt lights and an electric heater. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that he might have given Rahman the sweatshirt because it was getting cooler; \_\_\_\_\_\_ was trying to find a way to do something positive for Rahman. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ stated he did not recall having a conversation with anyone about the cold conditions at the time. He could not, however, discount the possibility that concerns raised by others might have played a role in his decision to give Rahman the sweatshirt. \_\_\_\_\_\_ explained that he did not prepare a cable as a result of the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ because not much happened.

Page 48, paragraph 2, unredacted: 127. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled that, on \_\_\_\_\_ November, he was \_\_\_\_\_ and was approached by a guard.

Page 48, paragraph 3, unredacted: 128. \_\_\_\_\_ did not recall whether \_\_\_\_\_ were present at \_\_\_\_\_\_ when Rahman threw his food. He did not specifically recall telling others about the incident but acknowledged that he may have told \_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, who would have had an interest in the case.

Page 48, paragraph 4, unredacted: 129. \_\_\_\_\_\_ approached \_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002, between 1500 and 1800 hours, according to \_\_\_\_\_\_ was laughing and revealed that Rahman had been violent in his cell, threatened the guards , and had thrown his food. \_\_\_\_\_\_ added that he would take care of it. \_\_\_\_\_\_ interpreted this as a lighthearted comment and assumed \_\_\_\_\_\_ was laughing because no detainee had done this previously. \_\_\_\_\_\_ further assumed that when \_\_\_\_\_\_ said he would take care of it, he meant he would have the cell cleaned and Rahman chained. \_\_\_\_\_\_ believed he departed \_\_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_ shortly following the comment by \_\_\_\_\_\_ did not recall for certain whether \_\_\_\_\_\_ came back \_\_\_\_\_\_ with him or remained at \_\_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_ did not recall a discussion of the Rahman incident on \_\_\_\_\_\_ November 2002.

Page 49, paragraph 2, unredacted: 130. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled that, approximately a day before Rahman's death, \_\_\_\_\_ casually mentioned Rahman had thrown his food and defecation bucket at the guards. To her, this appeared to be a normal update on Rahman. \_\_\_\_\_ interpreted \_\_\_\_\_\_ tone as indicative that the throwing of the items was "not a big deal," but rather an indication of Rahman's stature of being hardcore. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_ did not mention that Rahman had threatened the guards. She did not remember \_\_\_\_\_ being present during this discussion.

Page 50, paragraph 4, unredacted: 135. According to \_\_\_\_\_\_ it was evident to him during this investigation that \_\_\_\_\_\_ directed how Rahman was to be treated and interrogated. The guards would not have chained Rahman without being instructed to do so. \_\_\_\_\_. Anything that happened to Rahman would have come through \_\_\_\_\_\_

Page 51, paragraph 2, unredacted: 136. \_\_\_\_\_ the BOP officers explained that \_\_\_\_\_ taught the use of a short chain to the guards and mentioned it as an alternative method of securing a prisoner. \_\_\_\_\_ BOP officer said "short chaining" is used by BOP officers in cases where the inmate has been violent or kicks at the guards and would never be used for an inmate who threw food at a guard. The guards practiced the technique for approximately an hour and were told to practice all the techniques in the evening on each other. According to the BOP officers, they did not offer any scenarios for 'the use of the short chain, that is, under what circumstances it should be used; they simply taught the technique.

Page 51, paragraph 3, unredacted: 137. \_\_\_\_\_who assisted \_\_\_\_\_at \_\_\_\_from late September to early December 2002, and had considerable contacts with the guards, stated that the \_\_\_\_\_\_guards used a form of short shackling prior to the arrival of the BOP officers. The original technique involved chaining both the hands and the feet to the wall. The wall hook was less than two feet from the floor. The detainee would have to sit on the-floor of the cell with his arm elevated and bent. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he saw Rahman short chained in his cell. He never say any other detainee placed in that position.

Page 52, paragraph 3, unredacted: 139. According to the two TDY officers who were present at \_\_\_\_\_ when Rahman was reported dead, he was lying on his side; his hands were shackled together as were his feet. His hands were then secured to his feet and his feet were chained to a grate on the wall with a six- to 12-inch chain.

Page 54, paragraph 1, unredacted: 143. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he is hesitant to conclude that hypothermia was the cause of Rahman's death. He is not convinced that there were not other unspecified medical conditions that existed with Rahman that contributed to his death. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that it is hard for him to square with hypothermia as the cause of the death since Rahman was alive throughout the night.

## Page 54, paragraph 3, unredacted: protect the Agency in the event they were beaten or otherwise mistreated \_\_\_\_\_\_ prior to rendition.

Page 55, paragraph 3, unredacted: \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated he delivered tissue samples and histologies (microscopic examination of structure of the tissues) to government laboratories. From the toxicology and laboratory studies, he learned there were no traces of cyanide, opiates, truth serums, or poisons. He said he was "99.9 percent" certain that the cause of death was hypothermia and asserted that, if Rahman's death had occurred in the United States, it would have been listed as death by hypothermia. \_\_\_\_\_\_ stated that, from a clinical perspective, he is skeptical of the accuracy of the reporting of the time of death. He believes the account of the guards that Rahman was shivering at 0800 "does not fit."

Page 56, paragraph 1, unredacted: On \_\_\_\_\_ November 2002, prior to departing \_\_\_\_\_\_ sent an e-mail message to his supervisors \_\_\_\_\_\_ which was forwarded to the DDO and Associate DDO. The e-mail reported in part:

which is where our Subject was house, is a newly constructed concrete facility that has no heating or cooling. Temperatures have recently dropped into the thirties at night. Having walked through the facility in the afternoon, it was still very cold. Most prisoners are fully clothed, however this prisoner was somewhat difficult to handle and uncooperative. He had thrown his food and had threatened to kill the guards. As punishment his pants were taken from him. He had not worn pants (meaning he was naked from the waste [*sic*] down) for several days. There was no carpeting or matting on the floor, which means that he was shackled, his naked body sat against bare concrete.

Page 58, paragraph 1, unredacted: 153. A senior CTC operations office stated that when he was at \_\_\_\_\_\_ between 13 September and 3 October 2002, offered to fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while the operations officer was interviewing a detainee who was thought to be withholding information. reportedly , \_\_\_\_\_ staged the incident, which included screaming and yelling outside the cell by other CIA officers and \_\_\_\_\_ guards. When the guards moved the detainee from the

interrogation room, they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee, lying motionless on the ground and made to appear as if he had been shot to death. The operations officer added that \_\_\_\_\_ openly discussed his plan for the mock execution for several days prior to and after the event with \_\_\_\_\_ station officers.

Page 58, paragraph 2, unredacted: 154. Station officer \_\_\_\_\_ recounted that around \_\_\_\_\_ 2002, she heard that this same senior CTC operations officer staged a mock execution. She was not present but understood it went badly; she was told that it was transparently a ruse and no benefit was derived from it.

Page 58, paragraph 3, unredacted: An IC who led a CTC review of procedures at \_\_\_\_\_\_ after Rahman's death stated that \_\_\_\_\_\_ described staging a mock execution of a detainee. Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the "body" in the aftermath of the ruse "sang like a bird."

Page 59, paragraph 3, unredacted: 158. When asked about the possibility that handguns had been used as props or mock executions had been staged at \_\_\_\_\_\_ responded, "We don't do that ... there's none of that."\_\_\_\_\_ said he would be surprised if someone said that a gun was used; it was not part of an interrogation technique. He explained that handguns were not allowed in the vicinity of detainees, for fear that the weapons could be taken away or turned on the interrogators.

Page 59, paragraph 4, unredacted: 159. Upon further discussion, \_\_\_\_\_ revealed that approximately four days before his interview with OIG, \_\_\_\_\_ told \_\_\_\_\_ of an instance when \_\_\_\_\_ conducted a mock execution at \_\_\_\_\_ in approximately \_\_\_\_\_ 2002. Reportedly, the firearm was discharged outside of the building, and it was done because the detainee reportedly possessed critical threat information. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he did not hear of a similar act occurring at \_\_\_\_\_\_ subsequently.

Page 66, paragraph 4, unredacted: As a medical care provider, he should have advocated more humane treatment for Rahman