

FRIDAY AFTERNOON SESSION

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October 6, 1967

UPTON: I am told that our film has been rethreaded now and is ready to roll. I believe that Dr. Langham and Dr. Donaldson have suggested that we take the film next.

FREMONT-SMITH: Good.

UPTON: So if all is in order, let's proceed.

[Showing of film "Return to Bikini."] [Applause]

DUNHAM: Lauren, this isn't the way I heard the story. There was a movie I saw a few years ago that was announced to the public by Ian Fleming with a four-page spread in the London Sunday Times which showed little fish that had become disoriented, losing their way, trying to climb trees, which showed sea turtles who tried to find where to lay their eggs. They laid great quantities of eggs which were sterile and then couldn't find their way back to the sea. It showed piles and piles of tern eggs which were also sterile and very few terns. Now, which is the true story, sir?

DONALDSON: I don't think I've ever seen these people in Bikini. If they were there, it was at some time when we didn't happen to be about. But if they want to have a contest, I'll match my skin scars against theirs any day and coral cuts against theirs.

DUNHAM: This was supposed to be an authentic movie of the aftermath of the atomic bomb in Bikini. Maybe you selected different parts of the atoll.

DONALDSON: I think one would have to do more than select in this particular case because the real problem here about the fish that were supposedly displayed there is that in all the years we've worked there we've never seen these particular fish in this place because that particular kind of fish can't live in an atoll; they can't live in an atoll because the environment isn't right for them and I think even John

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1 Wolfe with his great accomplishments in environmental control
2 couldn't built a mangrove swamp out in Bikini without an out-
3 flow of fresh water.

4 We could relate this on and on but this sort of
5 popular release is nothing but disgusting.

6 TAYLOR: Who made that particular movie, do you re-
7 member?

8 DUNHAM: It was an-Italian movie. It had a lot of
9 other stuff in it. There were beautiful pictures, though. I
10 must admit there were beautiful pictures of wildlife. As
11 Lauren says, undoubtedly these ones of these mudskippers, as
12 they call them, were taken in the mangrove swamps somewhere
13 and there were lovely pictures of giant sea turtles laying eggs.
14 Again they're apparently authentic pictures.

15 FREMONT-SMITH: Maybe it was the photographer that
16 was disoriented; thought he was in Bikini but wasn't.

17 DUNHAM: That could be quite possible.

18 BUSTAD: Are there any natives now on Eniwetok and
19 Bikini or are there any residents there?

20 DONALDSON: There are no residents on Bikini. The
21 place is delightfully deserted. It's a place that one can go
22 to and become completely isolated from the outside world. The
23 native Bikini people were evacuated in the spring of 1946 and
24 moved to Rongerik. Rongerik was one of the islands downwind,
25 you recall, on the chart that Bob had on the board. We visited
26 Rongerik in the summer of 1947 and they were rather hard put
27 inasmuch as they had had a fire and burned off much of the
28 environment. They were limited in food supply because the
29 atoll they were living on was smaller than the one they had
30 left when they were evacuated. This was reported with some
31 force, as strong as we could make it, to the Trust Territory--
32 it wasn't Trust Territory at that time. The Navy had responsi-
33 bility, they moved them to Kwajalein and from Kwajalein they

1 moved them to Kili, a small island south of Kwajalein and
2 there they remained.

3 Now, the people from Eniwetok, on the other hand,
4 were evacuated to Ujelang, another island. They're not happy
5 with Ujelang, again because it's not their ancestral home.
6 It's a smaller island than Eniwetok and they would very much
7 like to go home. Of course, going home to them would be some-
8 thing as comparable with the atoll they left. This would
9 take a great deal of doing to restore one of these atolls to
10 a living environment for the Marshallese, not the fact that
11 life can go on there but that they base their economy on
12 coconuts, which is essential to their survival, which would
13 take maybe some 10 or 12 years to replenish and get the crop
14 going. Of course, each year it's postponed that means the
15 10 or 12 years are pushed back a bit farther.

16 Now, we who have worked there have many friends
17 among these people. We know them, as Bob and others who have
18 been out there know. We hope that it will be possible to get
19 them back home again. I think this is a blight on our national
20 record that we don't do something about getting them back.

21 CONARD: We certainly are trying to, aren't we?

22 DONALDSON: I have no knowledge of it.

23 TAYLOR: One gets the impression that the ebb and
24 flow of the sea plays at least a major role in restoring the
25 island, restoring the atolls to their states. Do you want to
26 say anything about the relevance to this, to a similar situa-
27 tion on land, for example, in Nevada?

28 DONALDSON: Again you go back to the three-dimensional
29 effect we talked about before and you have a completely dif-
30 ferent ecology, a completely different set of syndromes, of
31 areas that you are talking about.

32 UPTON: Maybe this is a logical point to shift them
33 to Dr. Langham's presentation, but we are dealing in this

1 case with a land problem. If there isn't further discussion
2 of the film, in order not to cut short Wright's presentation,
3 let's go ahead with that then.

4 LANGHAM: As a proper beginning I would like to
5 invite Merrill to pipe up with "incredible!" at any time he
6 feels the urge.

7 FREMONT-SMITH: Or even with "credible!"

8 BUSTAD: Are you restricting it to Merrill?

9 LANGHAM: Maybe I'm intimidating Merrill. I'm sure
10 I haven't the rest of you.

11 In listening to the discussions yesterday with re-
12 gard to the sociopsychological reactions among the Japanese,
13 I would just thinking about how the reporting of this in-
14 cident is so different from the things that Merrill was saying.
15 That was why he was saying "incredible" because my experience
16 has been quite different from Merrill's. The problem perhaps
17 we faced was not nearly as great, but I am sure that one can-
18 not help but think why the reactions of these two situations
19 was so different, and I have eliminated a few pictures that
20 deal with the details of the health physics and how we cleaned
21 up the mess and what we did in order that I can merely pre-
22 sent those things which I think have some bearing or which
23 point out some of the differences, and I'm sure that these
24 differences lie in the psychological reaction of the people.

25 Now, the question is why was the psychological re-
26 action so much different, because many of the problems were
27 quite the same. There was goof at both nations involved ad-
28 mitting there had been an accident that involved radioactive
29 material, just exactly as there was in the other case. There
30 was a serious economic problem in so far as the people in this
31 limited area were concerned.

32 FREMONT-SMITH: You mean the nations didn't admit
33 that there had been.

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1 LANGHAM: No. This was so typical.

2 FREMONT-SMITH: How long?

3 LANGHAM: It wasn't even funny.

4 FREMONT-SMITH: How long was it? Are you going to
5 come to that?

6 LANGHAM: Yes. I think it will be brought out in
7 the discussion rather strongly.

8 FREMONT-SMITH: Physically.

9 LANGHAM: Because I think this is one of the very
10 interesting points. In other words, I had none of the problems
11 Merrill had and I don't think it's that I'm that much better
12 than he is! [Laughter] Of course, I think the problem was
13 not nearly as great either.

14 Now I would like to show just a few slides to get
15 this show on the road, and I don't intend to make any long
16 speech but I want to set it up and then I want to see you
17 wrestle with why the problems I faced were different than the
18 ones that Merrill did.

19 [Slides] As all of you know, there was an incident
20 involving the loss of four nuclear weapons each rated in the
21 megaton class and it has attracted its share of publicity,
22 this being three examples. The Saturday Review gave it a great
23 play. There were two books written on it in this country and
24 an Englishman came out with a paperback within two months
25 after the incident was over. These two books are rather good
26 and they're not bad accounts of the incident if you'll give
27 of course, the author's privilege of introducing a little
28 trauma here and there.

29 Flora Lewis' "One of Our H-Bombs Is Missing" con-
30 centrated more on the sea search than the one that was 1
31 Schultz "The Bombs of Palomares" concentrated more on the
32 operation and went a little more deeply into the philoso-
33 and where and why than did Flora Lewis. They both relat:

1 are good books. There are mistakes, of course, like calling
 2 a scintillation counter an oscillation counter. It's obvious
 3 that Flora Lewis didn't know anything about how hydrogen bombs
 4 go off, and I read her manuscript before and when I sent in
 5 my corrections to her manuscript, they were all classified
 6 and she never got them! [Laughter] So if you want to know
 7 how a hydrogen works, Flora is not a very good authority be-
 8 cause she didn't get any help on this particular aspect. The
 9 English book is absolutely abominable. It gives everything
 10 wrong and it's the type of unfortunate thing that so frequent-
 11 ly occurs.

12 The Reader's Digest carried a very nice article on
 13 the incident.

14 I show this primarily to show where the incident
 15 occurred. It occurred about 40 kilometers from Grenada, about
 16 80 miles up the coast, the Mediterranean coast from Gibraltar,
 17 about 70 miles west of Cartagena and it occurred in a very
 18 remote area right on the Mediterranean shore.

19 The incident involved the refueling operation of
 20 one of six B-52's as part of Operation Chrome Dome. I imagine
 21 most of you know about Operation Chrome Dome.

22 FREMONT-SMITH: No.

23 LANGHAM: It's given in great detail in Flora's book
 24 as well as in Ted Schultz'. But since about 1962
 25 a certain percentage of the SAC B-52's have been airborne at
 26 all times carrying weapons, this being part of the deterring
 27 philosophy, meaning that if SAC was entirely wiped out, still
 28 a certain percentage of the SAC force would be able to zero
 29 in on its prescribed target. These flights were being made
 30 constantly and there was elaborate pains, of course, taken to
 31 see that Dr. Screen's philosophy could not predominate, that
 32 some person should not take the war into his own hands, and
 33 so forth.

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1 The final act of fusing the bomb was in the hands
2 of the President of the United States so there was no chance
3 of a mishap of that kind.

4 Flying nuclear weapons of the megaton class over
5 people's heads is serious business, of course, and so these
6 bombs have built into them safeguards which if you take a
7 multiplicity of combinations, the chance of one of them giving
8 a critical yield on an accidental situation like a plane crash
9 is probably about 10^{-7} . In other words, there is not one
10 chance in 10 million that a criticality could actually occur,
11 and this is because of combinations of interlocks, and so
12 forth, which would have to be thrown in the right sequence and
13 everything before you would have an armed weapon.

14 Essentially the United States has no agreement which
15 allows it to land a nuclear-carrying aircraft in any country
16 which is armed. These aircraft must take off in United States
17 soil, fly their route and return with and land in the United
18 States. So this means refueling operations at various points
19 along the route. And we have a refueling operation agreement
20 with the Spanish Government. The 16th Air Force was in charge
21 of the refueling planes which would take off from Spanish
22 territory, meet the bomber supposedly out over the Mediterranean
23 and refuel it, as you see going on here, and the bomber would
24 continue on its way. These, of course, were always called
25 practice flights. They could, of course, be changed from a
26 practice flight into the real thing by the right combination
27 of messages, including one from the President. So this is
28 Operation Chrome Doms.

29 As a result of the accident that occurred, Spain
30 immediately withdrew or requested that no more weapons be
31 flown over Spain, and Mr. McNamara I think has now just about
32 done away with Operation Chrome Dome. I don't think it's even
33 going on. If so, to a very limited extent at the present time.

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1 It was his idea that this had about outlived its usefulness;
2 that the intercontinental ballistic missile had replaced it.
3 And so Operation Chrome Dome was being phased out.

4 TAYLOR: Excuse me. Are you equating Operation
5 Chrome Dome with air alert? You mean he's decided to stop
6 all air alerts?

7 LANGHAM: No. He was stopping this type of operation
8 in which an armed bomber with a target in mind is flying a
9 practice flight in the direction of that target and then
10 turned around and coming back and this has been going on since
11 1962. This particular operation had been done 140,000 times
12 with nuclear weapons aboard without a single accident.

13 According to an Englishman who had a 8 millimeter
14 movie camera he saw the vapor trail overhead and when he looked
15 up he saw a big puff of smoke and fire, and this is blown up
16 from a 8 millimeter movie camera.

17 Immediately in the path of the falling debris was
18 the little village of Palomares; approximately 400 inhabitants.
19 Palomares had been there since the time of the Romans. In
20 Roman times they mined the nearby hills for lead, zinc and
21 various other minerals. At the turn of the century the mines
22 began to run out. Many of the people left Palomares, but a
23 few of the hardy citizens stayed behind growing tomatoes,
24 raising pigs, sheep, goats, alfalfa and other things, agri-
25 cultural products of that variety.

26 When something like this happens, of course, I mean
27 when the planes exploded, the four weapons came tumbling out
28 in all directions as well as pieces of airplane fell absolute-
29 ly all over the village. It was not too long that the dis-
30 appearance of the planes from the radar screens at the refuel-
31 ing station let them know that an accident had occurred.
32 There were two bombers on this run and two fueling planes.
33 The other bombers reported that the accident had occurred. So

1 the accident was known within a few minutes after it
2 occurred.

3 Immediately contacts with the area was established
4 by the 16th Air Force. The principal way to get there was
5 over a very narrow bad road or fly in by helicopter.

6 The first thing, of course, that one should do in
7 a situation of this kind is look for any indication of a
8 criticality yield and, indeed, this was done. So the first
9 group that flew in by helicopter looked to see if there had
10 been any indication of a criticality yield and then started
11 rounding up the injured and the dead. There were seven
12 American Air Force people killed and three injured. So they
13 rounded up the bodies and the injured and got them to the
14 hospitals and then the question, of course, came up of where
15 are these precious weapons, primarily because they included a
16 lot of secrets, so-called, of our weapon technology and so
17 this we must find at all costs.

18 Within two or three days a base camp was organized
19 on the shores of the Mediterranean which grew to house some 850
20 people before the operation was over. Almost immediately a
21 search was started on land with these people lining up
22 finger tip to finger tip and walking across the countryside
23 looking for something that looked like a nuclear weapon even
24 though, of course, nobody in the crowd had ever seen a
25 nuclear weapon. At least they thought they would recognize
26 an unusual object and reports. They searched 49 square miles
27 three times by this technique and part of that 49 square
28 miles they searched seven times trying to find the weapon.
29 The Bureau of Mines flew out a team which even inspected all
30 of the old mine shafts and all of the old wells just in case
31 the weapons had decided to drop in the holes. So the search
32 was on.

33

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It was obvious that some of the weapons could, or

1 one or two of them could have dropped in the sea. So the
2 Navy was brought in on the operation and within two or three
3 weeks the Navy Task Force had grown to 14 ships. They brought
4 in the ALVIN and the ALUMINAUT and the experimental devices
5 that are used for deep sea recovery and this turned out prob-
6 ably to be the greatest Navy exercise in deep sea salvaging
7 and recovery that has ever occurred.

8 Notice the sandy beach, because this is part of the
9 economic and psychological aspects of the territory. The mines
10 having run out, this was a depressed region. It has eight
11 miles of the most beautiful Mediterranean beach you could ever
12 see. All you would have to do was clean up some of the slag
13 dumps and things left by the miners and one would have a resort
14 possibility that could actually rival the French Riviera and
15 the Spanish Government had actually underway a developmental
16 program to develop this into one of the tourist resorts which
17 is doing so much now for the economy in Spain. And so you can
18 imagine the great concern of the Spanish Government that here
19 was this development and if there was a hydrogen bomb lurking
20 around somewhere just waiting to go off when you got there,
21 you might not come. And so this would have scuttled their
22 entire program to relieve this depressed area by making it a
23 tourist area.

24 After some time, within several hours, three of the
25 weapons were found. One was found in the dry river bed just
26 to our right on the screen there, right where the dry river
27 bed joins the Mediterranean. Palomares sits on the mesa about
28 a mile from the beach. Between Palomares and the beach are
29 the ruins of the smelters which have fallen into great decay
30 this actually, to show that the item had some political propa-
31 ganda, pictures of these wrecked and ruined smelters were
32 in the Iron Curtain country newspapers as part of the after-
33 math of the American accident. And not only was that of

1 international political flavor but the Nuclear Disarmament
2 Conference was meeting in Geneva at the time of the accident
3 and when it became known, even though it was not announced
4 officially by either the Spanish or the United States Govern-
5 ments, the Disarmament Conference, the Western blocs just
6 walked out and that was the end of the 1966 Nuclear Disarma-
7 ment Conference.

8 EISENBUD: The Western blocs walked out?

9 LANGHAM: The Eastern blocs.

10 EISENBUD: How long after the accident was that?

11 LANGHAM: They walked out immediately upon hearing
12 of the accident even though it was not reported that nuclear
13 weapons were involved. The Russians walked out of the Dis-
14 armament Conference and so it was disrupted. So this had
15 international political trauma as well, as much as did the
16 Japanese incident.

17 When they found the second weapon, it had com-
18 pletely overshot the village. I forgot to say the first
19 weapon, the one that fell in the dried river bed, one of the
20 chutes popped off, came out of the cannister, just about the
21 time it hit the ground and broke its fall and the weapon
22 sustained a dented nose and lost one fin. So this was picked up
23 by the helicopter, put on a truck bed and rolled away.

24 The second weapon complete overshot the village and
25 landed in the hills over to the left where the red spot is,
26 landed in the hills. The chute didn't deploy; it impacted
27 its full velocity in the side of the mountain. When the
28 high explosive charge in the warhead went off the plutonium
29 therein, of course, was converted to the oxide, a fine dust of
30 oxide, was thrown up with the dirt and bits and pieces of
31 bomb casing into the air, the wind was blowing down the valley
32 toward the village at about 30 knots. So the plutonium cloud
33 drifted down towards the little village of Palomares. **Stafford Wilson**
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1 The third weapon to be found impacted right in the
2 edge of the village, 100 yards from city hall. One part and
3 wing of the D-52 fell within 80 yards of a schoolyard where
4 there were 70 or 80 children playing. There are bits and
5 pieces of airplane all over this village. It was just ab-
6 solutely unbelievable that that much material could fall down
7 in a populated area and somebody not got hit. But nobody did.
8 In this case again the weapon impacted in a rock wall to a
9 man's tomato patch and it went off, the high explosive
10 charge, and the plutonium was thrown into a cloud which
11 drifted away from the village but down across their principal
12 agricultural area. Their prime cash crop was tomatoes, and
13 they get two crops a year. The last one they harvest about
14 the middle of January. And they were just waiting to get into
15 harvest their last crop of tomatoes and it wasn't quite time.
16 It incidentally happened to be a holiday for a patron saint
17 or something for this village. So religion enters into this.
18 Those of you who like to think of the theological aspects,
19 the statement was made "The hand of God was out in Palomares."
20 So there is even a religious connotation.

21 FREMONT-SMITH: The hand of God protecting the
22 village or punishing it?

23 LANGHAM: Protecting it, because this is the only
24 village that's had over 4 megatons of weapons dropped on it
25 and nobody got hurt. So it does look like the hand of God was
26 out, and this was what the Spanish thought, the people that
27 lived in this area.

28 In this case the contamination went down across their
29 principal cash crop, their fine ripened tomatoes, and so
30 economics are involved here. They have a fishing industry
31 also and there was a question of what about the fish? What
32 about the tomatoes? Exactly the same thing that Merrill was
33 talking about.

1 This is a picture of the family that was involved.
2 They are a very friendly, nice people. They like to have
3 their pictures taken. That was their principal mode of trans-
4 portation. Many of the tomato fields were fertilized with
5 soil that had been brought in in those baskets and the soil
6 has been brought in over the years to make the tomato field
7 a little better, and that was their principal mode of trans-
8 portation, at least there were a few people that had carts as
9 well.

10 Another example. Here is a family and the live-
11 stock always lived in the end room to the house and if the
12 family increased they built on another room for the livestock
13 and then turned the other room into an increased living
14 quarters. Plutonium counts probably of the order of two or
15 three thousand counts per minute per alpha probe area could
16 be measured in the front yard and there was 500 counts or
17 so sometimes on the living room floor inside the house.

18 DUNHAM: Is that the family doctor?

19 LANGHAM: That's one of the atomic Spanish AEC
20 colleagues and they were extremely knowledgeable and extremely
21 cooperative and they said, "We'll worry about the people;
22 you worry about the tomatoes and the contaminated fields and
23 all of that. We'll take care of our people," and they did
24 a beautiful job. Here was cooperation, as you see, that was
25 unbelievable and knowledgeable. There were only three or four
26 of these people, but the two principals had spent a year or
27 two in this country at Rochester and at Brookhaven and so
28 they knew something about what they were dealing with and
29 some people took it quite lightly.

30 Here you see the local barber who immediately picked
31 up his shaving mug, a coffee can full of water, a sponge and
32 a piece of soap and some scissors and moved right into the
33 mess hall area and started to set up his barber shop. And

1 the price of a shave was 10 pesetas, the price of a haircut
 2 was 10 pesetas, the price of a shave and a haircut was 10
 3 pesetas [laughter] and part of the humor was to get him out
 4 of the mess hall. They took some of those plywood boxes and
 5 built him a little enclosure about 100 yards away from the
 6 mess hall. He didn't like this very much because people
 7 couldn't see him practicing his trade. So he felt he desired
 8 to write a sign on the wall. So he had written "shave, hair-
 9 cut, everything, 10 pesetas." Some disgruntled G.I. had
 10 written right below the sign, "Everything but girls!" [Laughter]
 11 So I'm sure that the barber had never had so much business in
 12 his life. Even I got a haircut, you see.

13 If one looks away from the impact point of the third
 14 weapon to be found, he sees their principal agricultural area.
 15 You see one of the farmers in the background. He received the
 16 biggest settlement I think, which was something like \$16,000
 17 was the settlement with that particular one. Every home has
 18 one of those cactus hedgerows around it and you haven't had
 19 an experience yet unless you have tried to take contaminants
 20 out of hedgerows! [Laughter] In fact, it's better to plow
 21 it up and pay the man to do it himself. So this was the
 22 situation.

23 Here are their alfalfa and tomato fields. These
 24 tomato stocks or these tomato plants are trained gently by
 25 hand to grow up a tripod of stocks. They'll grow seven feet
 26 high and they were just loaded with fine ripened tomatoes and
 27 in January on the European market they bring a nice price. So
 28 this was what was going to keep them going until their next
 29 crop.

30 Here is the way their tomato patches looked in a
 31 little while because you could hold an alpha counter up to the
 32 tomato vines and get readings of 10, 15, 20,000 counts per
 33 minute. So what do you do in this case? Well, your first

1 thought is to get the stuff rigged up in a pile so that
2 the plutonium won't blow around and if there are some of you
3 that wonder why we worry about plutonium, it's known, of
4 course, that enough plutonium taken into the lung or the liver
5 or bone will produce cancer. We've done this hundreds of
6 times in animals. Plutonium, if taken in systemically is in-
7 deed bad. There's no doubt about that. And some people have
8 referred to it as the most toxic substance known to man. I
9 think this is erroneous, but you can get that belief by look-
10 ing into the industrial heightening tables at the maximum
11 tolerable levels of various things and when you get to pluton-
12 ium you'll find that plutonium-239 has one-half of a micro-
13 gram. That's one-half of a millionth of a gram as the maxi-
14 mum permissible body weight. If you're worrying about the
15 plutonium-238, it's 250 times over that still.

16 BUSTAD: I think that you should point out that
17 ingestion as such---

18 LANDHAM: I would, yes. But the whole idea, as I
19 said, is its systemic. The reason I don't think plutonium
20 shouldn't be given this terrible reputation is that it's
21 extremely difficult to get into your body and you can eat it
22 and absorb only about $3/1000$ of 1 per cent of what passes
23 through the gastrointestinal tract will be absorbed in the
24 blood. On the lung the absorption is a little bit higher
25 perhaps.

26 EISENBUD: I've heard a statement made many times.
27 I don't understand the basis for it since the maximum per-
28 missible body burden for radium is $1/10$ of a microgram.

29 LANGHAM: If we put it on the microcurie basis,
30 then it's $4/100$ of a microcurie as compared with $1/10$.
31 that on that basis it's still---

32 EISENBUD: Yes.

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33 LANGHAM: These are the tomato patches in a few

1 days. Tomatoes, vines, gain stocks and all were taken to
2 the edges of the field and hauled away to decide what to do
3 with later. So here's their cash crop lying by the side of
4 the road. Here is the economics of the picture comparable
5 to the Japanese.

6 UPTON: These weren't killed by radiation?

7 LANGHAM: These were killed by the Americans.

8 FREMONT-SMITH: At this time was there any knowledge
9 yet locally or internationally that---

10 LANGHAM: Yes, but neither country had admitted it.

11 FREMONT-SMITH: It was just known but not admitted?

12 LANGHAM: Yes. It leaked out very fast but neither
13 country would admit it. They admitted there was an accident,
14 an airplane accident but they wouldn't admit that any nuclear
15 materials or nuclear weapons were involved.

16 FREMONT-SMITH: Even though all of this was being
17 swept up?

18 LANGHAM: That's right.

19 DOBSON: Wright, what were the local people told,
20 in what detail and by whom were they informed of the nature
21 of the operation?

22 LANGHAM: They were informed by the Civil Guard who
23 seem. to crawl out of the woodwork in Spain any time some-
24 thing happens. They were told by these representatives of
25 the Spanish AEC and by our own people to stay out of the field
26 until we tell you to go in. And so they were excluded from
27 going into their fields where their tomatoes were about ready
28 to pick. Obviously this caused the usual bit of concern and
29 talk and gossip and why and pretty soon it began to get
30 around that there was a radioactive substance in the field.
31 So you begin to hear the villagers talking about radio-
32 activity. And their knowledge of radiation effects stemmed
33 from knowing ~~that~~ in Hiroshima and Nagasaki thousands of people

1 died from an atomic bomb and one was occasionally asked the
2 question whether as a matter of fact are we going to die? And
3 you told them no, and this satisfied them so they went away.
4 There was usual turmoil. Naturally this was a big field. It
5 was place where nothing had happened since the Romans and all
6 of a sudden everything seems to happen. And so visitors came
7 in from nearby villages even though there were 400 people ap-
8 proximately living there. The Spanish ended up monitoring
9 1800 people because it became quite a tourist attraction and
10 besides about everybody had a cousin or an uncle living in the
11 nearby towns, so cousin or uncle came over to check on them
12 to see if they were all right. So it was practically a tourist
13 resort.

14 FREMONT-SMITH: With no restriction on local travel?

15 LANGHAM: Not except right in certain areas where we
16 posted the Civil Guard and told the Civil Guard not to enter.

17 Here's one of those areas. This is the tomato patch.
18 You can see the crater, the hole blown in the rock wall in the
19 tomato patch and the gentleman who owned the tomato patch was
20 standing in the door of his home which is the white one in the
21 background. The blast from the explosion blew him down into
22 his living room floor, tore one door off the hinge and knocked
23 out one of his windows and that was the closest we came to
24 having a Spanish casualty. Seven Americans had already died
25 and eight more were killed flying in supplies to Sinavia to
26 help clean up the mess. So 15 Americans lost their lives. Not
27 a single Spanish life was lost.

28 EISENBUD: How soon after the event was it known to
29 the local residents that their crops would be bought?

30 LANGHAM: Probably 24 to 48 hours. I mean the first
31 thing they know of it they were restricted from going into their
32 fields.

33 EISENBUD: They were sure they would get a good

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1 price for their crop.

2 LANGHAM: Some of them had been overlooking in the
3 hole and looking at that funny object down in the hole and the
4 Frenchman claimed he got a radiation burn on his knee from
5 looking into the hole. He got down on one knee, looked into
6 the crater and then his knee got sore after that and he said
7 he had a radiation burn on his knee. Of course, this is
8 alpha activity and it got on his pants and we knew he
9 didn't have a radiation burn.

10 Here are some of the psychological aspects of this
11 problem. The manual says--and I helped write it--and it's
12 funny that you can never write a manual that can take into
13 consideration the actual event once it's happened. But the
14 manual says you determine the hazardous area and you stake it
15 off with red flags! [Laughter] So we actually did that. We
16 staked off the area with red flags. Unfortunately, the guy
17 who wrote the manual and many of us who made the decision
18 didn't know. Red is the color of the cape with which they
19 fight the bull and it has a far more significant meaning for
20 some reason to the Spaniard than it does to us. It means
21 danger to us, but for the Spaniard the red flag has a great
22 deal of meaning. So we quickly took down the red flags and
23 replaced them with white flags.

24 FREMONT-SMITH: What kind of a meaning? Did you
25 mean a dangerous meaning?

26 LANGHAM: Yes.

27 FREMONT-SMITH: Much worse than just ordinary
28 danger?

29 LANGHAM: Yes.

30 FREMONT-SMITH: Practically radioactive.

31 LANGHAM: They hardly knew what radioactivity was,
32 you see. To us a red flag means danger, "Don't enter," but
33 to them it means much more danger than it means to us, I guess.

1 FREMONT-SMITH: "Very dangerous. Don't enter at
2 all."

3 LANGHAM: Yes, "Or run the other way"; I don't know
4 except that the red flag created enough commotion and our
5 psychology friends can explain this, I think.

6 DUNHAM: I think Merrill's point about it having
7 political significance may be important.

8 EISENBUD: The red flag is what the Loyalists
9 carried during the Spanish Revolution.

10 LANGHAM: Yes. Maybe that did. All I know is that
11 we had to get the red flags down fast for some reason or
12 another. And this was all right and you can see the beginning
13 of the clean up and scraping up the plutonium contamination
14 where we felt it was present even though no agreements had been
15 made with the Spanish Government with what we would do with
16 regard to cleanup. In other words, this is going on starting
17 to do something about the situation even before there's any
18 agreement.

19 FREMONT-SMITH: Yes. Starting to occupy a bit of
20 Spain, so to speak, by the soil.

21 LANGHAM: Yes. By the time we were through with the
22 land operation, Palomares began to look like that. The houses
23 had been hosed down in many places; some of them had been
24 re-whitewashed. The fields had been plowed clean with the
25 exception of the irrigation ditches which we finally got the
26 Spanish to let us agree to leave because the soil is so bad
27 that it takes 10 years to stabilize an irrigation ditch and
28 if we would have stripped the vegetation at the irrigation
29 ditch we would have had a problem there. So the Spanish
30 agreed to let the irrigation ditches stay, and you'll notice
31 the field in the background has not been stripped. In other
32 words, we had agreement with the Spanish finally as to what
33 we would strip and what we would plow and what we would

1 Most of the respirators were surgical masks, and if it did
2 something for your psychology to wear one, you are privileged
3 to wear one. It wouldn't do you any good in the way of pro-
4 tection but if you felt better, we let you wear it. We ran
5 into such psychological problems. The manual says you will
6 dress up in coveralls, booties, cover your hair, wear a
7 respirator, wear gloves. That's what the manual says. So
8 some people tried to do this where you could find something
9 that resembled this type of equipment and before long you
10 found this caused consternation in the village. They said,
11 "How come you dress up like that and you let us walk around
12 in the village with our street clothes on?" And so even
13 little things like that that I never even thought of before
14 becomes a problem psychologically. Why shouldn't we be pro-
15 tecting them if we were doing all of this protection in the
16 area? So most of the time it would hardly meet the standards
17 of the health physics manuals the way this operation was done,
18 and I think it's fine because I think there was not anything
19 wrong with this operation. I think it seems wrong with the
20 manual.

21 EISENBUD: How soon after did you arrive?

22 LANGHAM: I guess I got there at about noon on the
23 third day, something like that.

24 FREMONT-SMITH: Where were you when you started?

25 LANGHAM: I was in Washington.

26 FREMONT-SMITH: A good place!

27 WARREN: Did you go home first?

28 LANGHAM: No, I didn't go home. They told me to
29 proceed to Madrid and I didn't even have a passport. I was
30 in Spain all this time without a passport and a pair of
31 pajamas and a shaving kit. They did sent me a little gear.
32 I only stayed five days and came home. I was home four days
33 and they sent me back for six weeks because when I got there

1 it was obvious there was no real health problem. This was
2 not a health problem. The psychology, economics, international
3 agreement, these are things with which I claim no competence
4 whatsoever. So at the end of five days I came home only to
5 be sent back, assigned to the American Embassy. So these
6 negotiations were started.

7 The Spanish wanted this pit finally lined with
8 asphalt, so this was agreed to. Then they decided that they
9 wanted a concrete slab put over it and a fence put around it
10 with the United States to take a lease on it. I kiddingly
11 asked them if they wanted the lease to run for five half-
12 lives, that would be 120,000 years. When the State Depart-
13 ment heard that we were contemplating building a monument to
14 this unfortunate incident, the explosion was much larger than
15 the one that occurred in Palomares! [Laughter] So we were
16 told to take this material out of Spain. So a barrel factory
17 was leased in Naples, put on 24-hour duty and in two weeks
18 produced 5000 steel drums which met the specifications that
19 if filled with soil and if dropped from a height of 50 feet
20 from a helicopter, they would not break open. So they met the
21 specifications. We started the barreling operation; we packed
22 up 4789 barrels of this material, hauled it down to the beach
23 and put it on board a freighter out in the Mediterranean off
24 shore away and then the question came up of, "Well, you have
25 it on a freighter. What do you do with it?" So the obvious
26 thing to do is to haul it off a few miles into the Mediter-
27 ranean and kick it overboard. Well, you'd be surprised how
28 many people can object to this! [Laughter] Mr. De Gaulle's
29 government just went right through the roof, as did everybody,
30 whether they owned even remotely a shore on the Mediterranean
31 or not. In fact people objected that had no coastline what-
32 soever on the Mediterranean. So the Spanish said, "Why don't
33 you take it three or four hundred miles out into the ocean

1 off the coast of Portugal and kick it off in the ocean?"
2 [Laughter] And you'd be surprised. Even our British friends
3 objected to that, to say nothing of Portugal. So the decision
4 was made to bring it home. [Laughter] And you may think
5 our problem ends there, but the Agricultural Department heard
6 about it and said, "That's Mediterranean fruit fly country
7 and you can't bring it in!" [Laughter] I tell that partly
8 as a joke. It so happens that the Agricultural Department
9 did object and they did say that we would first have to
10 sterilize it and they suggested ways and means of doing this
11 and then after a while they did agree that if it was brought
12 in and buried in the steel drums and buried to a depth of
13 20 feet, there would be no possibility of fruit fly larvae,
14 and so forth, getting to the surface.

15 FREMONT-SMITH: How about the Governor of the
16 receiving state?

17 LANGHAM: He didn't like it too much. So then it
18 ended up at Savannah River in the AEC's burial ground, and I
19 guess the Governor felt he couldn't protest too strongly. But
20 there were protests from that area of bringing this back into
21 the United States.

22 Some statement was made about how the State Depart-
23 ment's antiquated operation once in a while causes trouble.
24 The Ambassador, Angier Biddle Duke, who is very, very liked
25 by the Spanish people and he was a very competent person, but
26 it was just absolutely traumatic to see him try to do some-
27 thing, primarily because it just seemed that even the Ambassador
28 doesn't dare do anything, even give out a news release with-
29 out a check to Washington, and I think this thing could be
30 more simply done. I think Angier Biddle Duke could have
31 been much more of a help than he was if he had just been able
32 to.

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33 FREMONT-SMITH: Function.

1 LANGHAM: To initiate a bit of action himself.
2 And so this is the story except for a lot of details and
3 the psychology of the news releases; the many, many things
4 that I would much rather see or hear discussed here than have
5 you see a few more slides. In other words, I think the inter-
6 esting thing here was something that had all of the qualities
7 that the situation Merrill was talking about did. There was
8 never a panic or anything resembling it. There were little
9 flareups. There was a little hour or so's demonstration at
10 the University in Madrid which was nicely timed. They were
11 allowed to demonstrate and then they were told to quit, and
12 when they were told to quit, they did so. And there were a
13 few days when fish were not being bought. There was a little
14 rough time when any tomatoes from the south of Spain, whether
15 it came from Palomares or not, was not being picked up by the
16 distributor, the middleman. And some of you are not going to
17 like the conclusion that comes out of some of this.

18 In the high level meeting in which the Vice Presi-
19 dent of Spain participated, it was pointed out that their
20 distributors were not buying the tomatoes from the south. You
21 see, he's the middleman. He goes down and buys them and brings
22 them to the city. Now, he was afraid to buy them for fear
23 when he got to the city he wouldn't be able to sell them. So
24 they were more or less not buying tomatoes from that whole
25 area. And the hint was dropped to the Vice President, and
26 since the government licenses these people, the government
27 just said, "Those tomatoes are all right," which indeed they
28 were. "You fellows get back on the job and start buying
29 tomatoes." In three days there were more people down there
30 buying tomatoes than you could imagine.

31 Another thing that in the foul up over the release
32 of this information tells something, too, that Miss Root is
33 not going to like, I imagine. We had a bilateral piece of

1 paper that we actually handed to Munoz Grandes. This was
2 something that the State Department had agreed upon and we
3 were going to get this bilaterally released in which the
4 two governments simultaneously admitted that the accident had
5 involved nuclear weapons. Well, the old gentleman looked at
6 the piece of paper and it was a very benign little thing. It
7 had been completely emasculated, as you might expect, and
8 stuck it in his pocket. Three days later unilaterally, on
9 the second page of their leading newspaper came out a beauti-
10 ful article written by Otera, head of the Spanish AEC, in
11 which he told the details, what the situation was. It was
12 absolutely just the most magnificent bit of factual reporting
13 I've ever seen in my life and I came into the Embassy that
14 morning and the people were running up and down the halls and
15 one gentleman said, "We're having a meeting. Otera has blown
16 his top. The whole thing is out in the newspapers." And so
17 we had this big meeting, you see. The cat was now out of the
18 bag.

19 EISENBUD: On what day was this?

20 LANGHAM: This must have been the 1st of March,
21 somewhere along in there. It had occurred the 16th of January.

22 SCHULL: Six weeks.

23 LANGHAM: Yes, something like six weeks. I don't
24 know. I guess I don't have--I'm a little bit too whimsical
25 maybe for this business. Part of my job with the Embassy
26 was to read all the newspapers. I mean I could not read
27 Spanish but I would get translations of every little article
28 that I was to advise on whether it was technically accurate
29 and whether it reflected in any way on the American image.
30 And so they handed me this article. We went into this meet-
31 and they turned to me and said, "Langham, what about this
32 article?" And I said, "Gentlemen, it's wonderful. I wish
33 had written it myself," and you could just hear a pin drop

1 nobody laughed whatsoever, and I thought that was clever!
2 [Laughter] And it was a good one and I do wish I had written
3 it myself. But it just seems that when the American image is
4 involved, people have no sense of humor whatsoever.

5 FREMONT-SMITH: Did they send you home the next day?

6 LANGHAM: No, but I wasn't invited to go on Duke's
7 swimming party! [Laughter] In fact, I wasn't even invited
8 to advise him on that. I might have advised him not to do it
9 because it didn't I think accomplish anything but I think it
10 drew adverse criticism rather than accomplishing what was
11 intended. I've heard it criticized especially by the English.

12 FREMONT-SMITH: What was the criticism?

13 LANGHAM: The Ambassador and the Minister of Indus-
14 try went down to Palomares and had a press conference on the
15 beach, and he went in swimming even though the temperature
16 was 54 degrees and then they had a big news release, and so
17 forth, and this was a stunt to show people that we weren't
18 afraid, you see, that this wasn't going to hurt the tourism.
19 All of the government--I mean at any level of the government,
20 the greatest concern seemed to be "Are you going to find that
21 lost weapon?" Because of the possible impact that this could
22 presumably have on the development of this area for a tourist
23 resort. And it's going along fine. If anything, I think now
24 it has received a little added push. They're developing it
25 like crazy. The people seem to be back to normal. We're
26 following them to see if they have any plutonium in them. So
27 far it appears they do not, and I think this is an incident
28 which in terms of importance will not even be a grain in the
29 sand on the beaches in time.

30 FREMONT-SMITH: How long was it before the fourth
31 weapon was dredged up from the ocean?

32 LANGHAM: It was about nine weeks or so. They had
33 a terrible time finding it. Admiral Guest drew some criticism

1 because of the Spaniard who said he knew right where it went
2 down and, indeed, they found it right where he told them it
3 would be. But Admiral Guest came in and started a systematic
4 sea search in which he started from the beach with the men
5 and then he went to skin divers and then he went to hard hat
6 divers as he was going out. He was making a systematic search
7 of the entire bottom. They found old cannon balls, pieces of
8 airplanes, you just name it, and they found it and brought it
9 up. They literally searched the bottom of the sea systematic-
10 ally and then finally it got so deep that they had to get
11 experimental equipment like the ALVIN and the ALUMINAUT and
12 when they finally got this, they could then search the area
13 told them the bomb went down, and that's where they found it.
14 They got hold of it, lost it, and it slid down a little
15 further and they got hold of it again and finally got the
16 thing up. Of course, the criticism of the Admiral not search-
17 ing where the Spanish fisherman advised is unjust. The
18 Admiral had no capability to search at the depth where the
19 fisherman advised, and while waiting for deeper sea equipment
20 the Admiral and his staff felt it would be advisable to make
21 a systematic search of the shallower water in the event the
22 fisherman was wrong so that the shallow areas would have been
23 already searched.

24 Part of the good humor going on between the Navy
25 and the Air Force was the rule book says the person who has
26 custody of the weapon is responsible for the clean up and
27 the recovery in the event of an accident. So the question was
28 did the Navy on the first try have hold of it long enough
29 to establish custody? If so, they would have to pay the bill
30 thereafter! [Laughter]

31 FREMONT-SMITH: Did they?

32 LANGHAM: No. You never put one over on the Navy,
33 not even here! [Laughter] So I think the land operation

1 probably cost of the order of \$1,800,000 and the Navy charged
2 the Air Force \$5,200,000 for the sea search. There was x
3 number of dollars in banged-up weapons and three aircraft.
4 So the taxpayer probably inherited a bill, counting the cost
5 of the aircraft, approaching \$50 million. But not a single---

6 AYRES: Thirty of 50?

7 LANGHAM: Counting the one that crashed in the
8 mountain flying in supplies.

9 FREMONT-SMITH: A little less than Vietnam for one
10 day.

11 LANGHAM: Yes. Not even that.

12 WOLFE: That Spaniard that knew, was he a fisherman?

13 LANGHAM: He was a fisherman. He was the one that
14 pulled the pilot out of the sea. What happened, when the
15 plane broke up and this pilot and the bomb popped up, they
16 both popped their chutes immediately and this happened at
17 about 30,000 feet and there was a strong wind blowing. So
18 one bomb and the pilot drifted almost a five miles out to
19 sea and this fisherman swore that he saw two chutes and
20 that one of them, if it had a man on it, it was a dead man
21 and he kept trying to tell them where he saw the second chute.
22 He even drew them pictures. He said the chute was different.
23 And he had a SANDIA man come out and sketched the chutes, and
24 he said, "Now, sketch several chutes. Now, which one did you
25 see?" And the guy looked at them and said, "This is close to
26 it but it's not quite correct," and he corrected the guy's
27 drawing! [Laughter]

28 BUSTAD: Another interesting part of this is that
29 he described it to them and on one day he took them out to
30 where it was and then to test them he took them out to the
31 same place.

32 LANGHAM: Yes. This was his fishing ground. So
33 they doubted his credibility. So they said, "Now, you go

1 out where you said you saw the weapon." So they triangulated
2 in on him with all of their high-powered gear and got a fix
3 on him. Then the next day they would say, "We didn't get all
4 we wanted. You go out again," and he went to the same spot
5 within 200 feet.

6 FREMONT-SMITH: Good enough.

7 MILLER: Why would the chutes open for two but not
8 for four?

9 LANGHAM: The chutes were not supposed to open on
10 any of them unless it's signaled to do so, and what happened
11 is that the plane, evidently, when this plane fell apart,
12 I mean it must have been something because that plane was just
13 literally shredded and evidently these weapons got banged in
14 the chute cannister enough that it popped a lid off of a
15 couple of them and then it was a matter of aerodynamics
16 whether the chute was dragged out. They found the tail plate
17 off the chute cannister to the weapon that drifted out to sea.
18 They found the tail cap to the chute cannister and this is all
19 they could find anywhere.

20 DOBSON: Wright, in the early and less certain part
21 of the whole episode, when you got there was it difficult
22 to find out whether or not there was a health hazard?

23 LANGHAM: No. The monitoring team, of course, SAC
24 has a response crew. Albuquerque has a response crew. These
25 people were all arriving at about that time. There was the
26 usual meter problem. At one time we had 12 alpha meters, one
27 of which was working, and you can't do much monitoring with
28 one instrument. But the Spanish, believe it or not, had four
29 or five instruments. So the Spanish came in with their in-
30 struments and by the time I got there they already had a crude
31 outline of the levels.

32 DOBSON: The Spaniards had a better monitoring data
33 when you got there than the Americans had? Is that what

1 you mean?

2 LANGHAM: Not necessarily better but they had con-
3 tributed to the fact that there was quite a bit of data of
4 a preliminary nature by the time I got there. They could show
5 crude contour plots and where the accident occurred and what
6 way the wind was blowing in all of this.

7 DOBSON: How did you find out whether anybody had
8 a real snootful of this stuff?

9 LANGHAM: Largely on intuition. I mean within an
10 hour after I was there I was completely relaxed. This was one
11 of these situations where the circumstances were all just
12 right. If you do this again, you're in trouble because you've
13 had all your luck on this one. The wind was blowing right,
14 the people weren't in the field and pieces of the airplane
15 fell besides people but not on them. It's just one of these
16 things where everything broke right and there are, of course,
17 the lasting effects, as you might expect. From the psychologi-
18 cal point of view it may interest you that here was a community
19 in which there's no class distinction whatsoever and now there
20 is class distinction. The man who got compensated as opposed
21 to the man who didn't. The man who didn't is a forgotten
22 kind of a second class citizen, at least he feels that way.
23 So there's social stratification now where it didn't exist
24 before. One woman has been deathly sick ever since and, of
25 course, it's due to plutonium. This was the woman who was
26 standing in her front yard and a burning American body fell
27 right at her feet and she tried to put it out by scraping and
28 putting sand on it and she's been sick ever since and I think
29 if I had done that I would probably be sick, too. But, of
30 course, they think the logical thing in this is plutonium
31 making her sick because she was down in the dust scooping
32 up and so she must be full of plutonium and she'll not return
33 to her home. In other words, even though they cleaned up

1 place and got the dead bodies out of her front yard, she will
2 not return to her home. There are all of these things. Every
3 time an animal dies, of course, the question does come up.
4 There have been agitators in and the population will flare up
5 and there will be a little demonstration. Some of their own
6 authorities come in and quiet it down. So this is a game,
7 you see, and there are a lot of psychological implications to
8 all of this that I would just like to hear you people speak
9 about later on a bit.

10 SPEAR: Was there any period when the farmers were
11 looking out and seeing their prized cash crop being bulldozed
12 into piles and not having any idea that they would be com-
13 pensated for it?

14 LANGHAM: This was not done. In other words, one
15 of the things that I think has something to do with this
16 difference in the reaction: The Spaniard, believe it or not--
17 I don't know whether he likes it, but he respects his officials
18 and he believes them, and these Spanish AEC people came in
19 and they said, "Now, we may have to destroy your crops. Don't
20 worry about it. I'm sure you'll be paid."

21 "Fine." They believe their officials; they respect
22 their officials. Now I get in my remark here. This isn't
23 a country that at that time and still doesn't completely have
24 a free press! [Laughter] And when I was finally leaving,
25 my wife and I had gone back to the same place to eat for a
26 few weeks now, and she immediately started in the Berlitz
27 system and was taking Spanish. So she got to trying her
28 Spanish out on our waiter and he, of course, wouldn't let her
29 order in English; he would make her order in Spanish. So with
30 this we became great friends. When we were ready to leave,
31 I said to him, "You never asked why we were here. Has it ever
32 occurred to you?" He said, "No, no, no, not particularly. A
33 lot of people come here, a lot of nice people." I said,

1 "Well, we've been associated with Palomares, you know, this
2 weapons accident."

3 "Oh," he said, "yes, Palomares. It's somewhere down
4 on the coast." He said, "Yes, I saw something in the paper
5 like this but," he said, "we never get excited about anything
6 we read in the papers!" [Laughter] So their whole attitude
7 was fine. The only time you could find a head of steam was
8 with the Red Duchess, who's definitely a Communist, she's
9 three times a grandee. Franco can't even do anything with
10 her. He threw her in jail for 24 hours once but she's a real
11 agitator. She showed up down there with two doctors she had
12 hired herself to give these people physical exams; went on
13 taking blood samples on them, you see, strictly on her own,
14 and, of course, telling them that they had been mistreated,
15 they may be sick, they may be going to die. So then there was
16 a flare up in the community and so the Spanish officials and
17 authorities had to go down there and quiet this down. And they
18 quieted it down. The people will go up and down depending on
19 how much they're agitated and if you can just keep the agita-
20 tion low, the problem is low. And this seemed to not be the
21 situation at least in Japan. It just seems that there is al-
22 ways something agitating over there.

23 EISENBUD: There were a lot of differences, I think,
24 that are quite apparent. But one of them, as you asked me
25 to do, what about the press? How large a press corps did you
26 have? Did you have the foreign press?

27 LANGHAM: You had the foreign press, a few wandered
28 in and out.

29 EISENBUD: What was the total press corps at the
30 height of the excitement?

31 LANGHAM: You never knew. They just wandered in and
32 out. The people were too busy to give them any information.
33 So they wandered away again and then in fact much of the

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1 criticism of the way this was handled has come from the
2 press. I mean we were too busy. We didn't bother with them
3 and they got tired and went away. Furthermore, the sea
4 search stole the show, you see. I mean those H-bombs sitting
5 out there just ready to go off, they stole the show. So they
6 really didn't bother with us so much.

7 WOLFE: The gentleman, the fisherman who knew where
8 the bomb was, did he get a prize?

9 LANGHAM: He got money, he got a decoration. He
10 got his boat painted. Then a lawyer got a hold of him and
11 he's suing the American government for \$5 million.

12 MILLER: What for?

13 LANGHAM: He says the value of the weapon was at
14 least \$5 million. Well, that's inflated prices. I happen
15 to know that it didn't cost that much. Some lawyers got hold
16 of him and they're actually trying to file a suit that he
17 really saved the American government \$5 million.

18 BUSTAD: Another aspect of it that I heard and I
19 wanted to check it out with you. I heard that there was a
20 lot of discussion as to whether they should picture the weapon
21 after they retrieved it and decided for publicity purposes to
22 have it pictured. That might be interesting to get the back-
23 ground on that.

24 LANGHAM: Well, of course, the international propa-
25 ganda was that these stinking Americans just might sneak in
26 a dummy bomb on you and say, "See, we found it." So the ques-
27 tion was how would you prove that indeed you found it? So
28 they finally decided to actually let the photographers have a
29 crack at it and take its picture as they were bringing it up,
30 and so forth, and so this was done.

31 WOLFE: How did this accident start? Did the two
32 planes collide during the refueling operation?

33 LANGHAM: Yes, evidently. I'm sure this has been

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1 investigated by the military and by the Air Force at great
2 length and about the last word I think one heard was of a
3 man guiding the refueling pipe yelled at the pilot and said
4 he was approaching too fast. I don't know what happened,
5 but the plane broke in two, the bomber broke in two right in
6 the middle and there was a spilling of fuel and the tanker
7 exploded and everything exploded. I've heard that there's
8 been a real serious investigation of this accident but I think
9 the Air Force is not saying the specific details.

10 WOLFE: It's much too early for that. We won't get
11 that until 1980!

12 FREMONT-SMITH: Right.

13 UPTON: I think it's time for a break now, but Mrs.
14 Purcell, I believe has a couple of announcements.

15 [Announcements by Mrs. Purcell.]

16 UPTON: Shall we recess then for 15 minutes?

17 [After coffee break]

18 WYCKOFF: Wright, what's the name of that medal they
19 gave you for this operation?

20 LANGHAM: The name of what?

21 WYCKOFF: The medal they gave you for this operation.
22 Didn't they give you a medal?

23 LANGHAM: The Department of Defense Distinguished
24 Service Award.

25 FREMONT-SMITH: What? The Purple Heart?

26 LANGHAM: They gave me the Department of Defense
27 Distinguished Award as a decoration.

28 FREMONT-SMITH: Isn't that wonderful!

29 WARREN: Why don't you wear it with the ribbons and
30 everything! [Laughter]

31 FREMONT-SMITH: We are very proud.

32 WARREN: That was a very touchy assignment.

33 FREMONT-SMITH: In spite of the fact that you said

1 you wish you had written that! [Laughter]

2 AYRES: I think he was sorry they didn't ask him
3 on the swimming party.

4 FREMONT-SMITH: Exactly.

5 LANGHAM: Are we back in business?

6 FREMONT-SMITH: Apparently we are. We've got all
7 this on the record so far! [Laughter]

8 DUNHAM: Wright, did you or did you not write Otera's
9 articles for him?

10 LANGHAM: No, but this Dr. Serlano and Romasio
11 collaborated in the writing. They didn't tell me they were
12 doing it. I was in contact with them every day.

13 DUNHAM: You couldn't understand why they kept dis-
14 cussing the same thing all the time.

15 CONARD: Where did you get all the top soil to put
16 back on the land that you scraped off the earth?

17 LANGHAM: I don't know exactly myself where it did
18 come from because I was in Madrid most of the time during
19 that phase of it. But what they were going to do was to let
20 the farmers themselves pick the area they wanted it brought in
21 from. So they picked an area that wasn't too far away.

22 FREMONT-SMITH: You mean we don't have any USA soil
23 over there?

24 LANGHAM: No, it wasn't shipped from this country.
25 It was local soil that wasn't contaminated.

26 BUSTAD: I think one of the most disturbing things
27 about this whole thing is--and I guess it shows how naive I
28 am--many years ago when I was with General Electric Company
29 they decentralized and I had recently joined the University
30 California and I thought they were the last people in the
31 to decentralize and they are going through it now and I'm
32 shocked to find out that the State Department hasn't done
33 thing about decentralizing. This has become so evident in the
34

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1 last few days. It's very disturbing to me.

2 FREMONT-SMITH: And they have a tremendous built-in
3 resistance to change and this would be a change.

4 AYRES: They used to be more decentralized.

5 SPEAR: One of the disturbing things about it, if
6 I read this correctly, is that apparently the suppression of
7 news, the suppression of information was a very healthful
8 factor in holding down any kind of panic reaction; that if this
9 had been a more sophisticated local population they would not
10 have been as ready to accept the simple word, that, "you're
11 going to be all right, you'll be taken care of." This I find
12 disturbing.

13 ROOT: Well, they had had a controlled press in
14 Spain for so long that even if it got decontrolled people would
15 take a long time before they would begin to read it. Newspapers
16 in Spain are very rarely read because they are government
17 handouts and have been known to be for a great many years,
18 whereas in Japan, as Dr. Schull pointed out, there's the most
19 terrible competition for news. The newspapers themselves are
20 so rich that Yomiuri, for instance, has a whole pool of auto-
21 mobiles and when a reporter was taking me out, we just went
22 into the pool and commandeered a car with a chauffeur and went.
23 Period. You don't even have that in New York. And also they
24 send two or three reporters out on the same story so that
25 they can cut each other's throats and get the very best re-
26 port possible.

27 DUNHAM: The best in what sense?

28 ROOT: The best and the most detailed and the most
29 intimate pictures. They were piling in through the windows
30 in the hospital, where you're not even supposed to come in
31 without permission. They were climbing up the walls and fall-
32 ing into the windows to get pictures.

33 EISENBUD: They carry aluminum scaffolds with them. 4

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1 They will think nothing of just rigging a scaffold up to a
2 second story building and look in a window, and nobody stops
3 them! [Laughter]

4 WARREN: With a camera, too.

5 EISENBUD: Yes, with a camera. They use them in
6 crowds so that they can get up above the crowds and they just
7 rig them up and take them down. Frankly, I don't see, except
8 that this was--I see very few similarities between the two
9 incidents. You have a situation in one case where nobody was
10 hurt. In the other case you have 23 sick people. You have
11 a relatively unsophisticated country under strong essential
12 control in one case. In the other case you've got a highly
13 sophisticated scientific corps totally disorganized and all
14 seeing in the Japanese incident a first opportunity that they
15 have postwar for any kind of self-recognition, and they were
16 jockeying for power, as part of it all, of seeing who could
17 say the strongest anti-American things because this was a
18 kind of thing people wanted to hear at that particular time.
19 You had an AEC in Spain which they didn't have in Japan. You
20 had a Dr. Ramos whom we all know, who was very friendly. The
21 nearest counterpart to Ramos in Japan would be, I suppose,
22 Tsuzuki, who at least by reason of age and long accomplishment
23 was recognized as a senior person and he was fundamentally
24 anti-American for reasons which maybe Stafford Warren would
25 want to expand on. He was a former Japanese admiral who I
26 think in his later years came around for opportunistic
27 reasons to be friendly to us, but I think under it all was not.
28 You had a situation in which the barber found that business
29 was good. There must have been other people besides the
30 barbers that maybe benefited economically, whereas in Japan
31 all of a sudden the bottom dropped out of one of their major
32 industries.

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33 FREMONT-SMITH: It did also in Spain because all

37

1 the crops were lost.

2 EISENBUD: Within 24 hours after it was dropped,
3 Wright said that they had agreed to buy the crop.

4 FREMONT-SMITH: Yes, that is true.

5 EISENBUD: Which is a good thing. The crop is sold;
6 you don't have to worry about the spoiling, you don't have to
7 worry about finding a market.

8 DOBSON: Isn't perhaps the most enormous difference
9 the fact that perhaps the Japanese--and again one remembers
10 Jack's little introduction of the general social structure--
11 felt that there was something hazardous about fish. All
12 Japanese essentially look to fish for their sustenance.

13 EISENBUD: Yes.

14 DOBSON: And these so-called crops in the Palomares
15 thing were not, even a tomato crop of a country, which I would
16 differ a little bit, I think is not exactly unsophisticated,
17 was not the Spanish tomato crop but it was relatively a few
18 patches, so to speak. So there was not national threat.

19 EISENBUD: Yes.

20 DOBSON: Or imagined national threat.

21 WARREN: It wasn't there for a while until the
22 word went down from headquarters that they'd better buy up the
23 tomatoes in the south because there was nothing wrong with
24 them. It was there for a few days or so.

25 LANGHAM: Yes. You saw elements.

26 WARREN: Of the possibilities.

27 LANGHAM: You saw the elements of such a development
28 as you saw in Japan. That's the only thing I'll agree to.
29 This was of great economic importance for the local area. I
30 don't think it was of economic importance to the nation neces-
31 sarily except for tourism a bit, which was definitely concern-
32 ing the high officials of the government. But there was great
33 economic hardship brought to bear on the whole area in so far

1 as that goes. So that element was the same and you could see
2 indications of this causing considerable trouble but it was
3 kept so localized that it never attracted any attention par-
4 ticularly at all compared to what the Japanese did.

5 MILLET: I think the question of the relation of
6 the populous to the leaders is a terribly important thing
7 here and I think it is, and I was very, very much struck by
8 the statement that these persons believed in their leaders
9 and what happens in the case of panic. If the leader comes
10 out whom everybody trusts before the panic gets started and
11 says, "You're going to be all right, don't worry. Now you
12 go about your business, we'll take care of the crop for you,"
13 that's one kind of thing. But, on the other hand, in the
14 Japanese instance you've got some criminals here to begin
15 with and you've got a very dubious relationship between them
16 and the governing group in Japan, to say the least. So there
17 is a lot of psychological differences here that make it quite
18 clear that there would be a different kind of reaction, I
19 think.

20 FREMONT-SMITH: How did you mean criminals?

21 MILLET: These sailors who didn't want to come home
22 because they were going to get in trouble.

23 FREMONT-SMITH: I see. You mean because they had
24 been in jail before.

25 MILLET: They had been and these were all good
26 virtuous peasants.

27 ROOT: I think another thing, too, you've got very
28 little press information until it became absorbed in the search,
29 and that was widespread and everybody was with the drama of
30 it in Spain. In the Japanese incident you got no knowledge
31 of it at all until burned bodies came home. Then you got
32 worldwide reports and the whole horror part of it with no
33 explanation and no preparation which I think had a lot to do

1 with the global impact of it.

2 CASARETT: Certainly one large difference between
3 the two incidents is the previous experience on the receiving
4 end of nuclear weapons.

5 ROOT: Of course.

6 CASARETT: I should imagine the sensitization here
7 would be much greater in Japan.

8 FREMONT-SMITH: You mean if Hiroshima had been in
9 Spain, you would have expected an entirely different response?

10 CASARETT: Yes.

11 MILLER: Jack Shaw called it "anaphylactic shock,"
12 the Bikini experience.

13 ROOT: Yes.

14 WOLFE: Is there any record of anybody but the United
15 States dumping radioactive material or bombs or what not on
16 other nations?

17 LANGHAM: No.

18 WARREN: The Russian ^{like} fallouts, that's all. That's
19 not a weapon.

20 WOLFE: But there's been no large incidents. If
21 they had one we do not know about it yet. They would be slow
22 in letting it loose.

23 LANGHAM: This was a little bit of an unusual situa-
24 tion.

25 WOLFE: Yes. I just wondered why we're always
26 getting in the unusual situation.

27 ROOT: You know, another thing in here is this was
28 so obviously a terrible accident. You know, the first seven
29 pilots or seven of the crew were killed, Americans, and it was
30 an explosion in the air. There was hardly any deliberate
31 you know, guilt that can be pinned on a thing like that
32 whereas as far as the world knew the Bikini shot was a delib-
33 erately planned test without due regard--this is as far as

1 they knew--because there was no build-up and there was no
2 explanation of the circumstances. It was portrayed through-
3 out the world as simply a careless determination of the
4 sorcerer's apprentices and their governments to find out some-
5 thing regards of what it cost. I'm only giving you the press
6 repercussions and the impressions on people.

7 LANGHAM: Some of our friends in other countries
8 seemed to think that it's a bit of a deliberate act to be
9 flying over people's heads with things of this nature and
10 this came in for a great deal of international political
11 harangue as you might expect.

12 ROOT: Yes, you would get that.

13 TAYLOR: "The Sword of Damocles" talk was revived
14 for a while during the Palomares incident.

15 ROOT: Yes, that's true.

16 CONARD: Couldn't they have re-fueled over the
17 Mediterranean more rather than over this village?

18 LANGHAM: Yes. And in all probability this was
19 their instructions, but you've done this so many times and so
20 you make contact a little bit closer to shore than you had
21 expected. But you've done this many times before. So you'll
22 go ahead and refuel. I think this has been a big part of the
23 investigation on the part of the Air Force to quite an ex-
24 tent: Wasn't there actual human negligence or error on the
25 part of the crews? As far as I know, no action was taken.
26 It was just an unfortunate action, and to put two planes to-
27 gether at 30,000 feet is probably not something you always
28 do right on a set spot each time. I'm sure it has all been
29 hashed over very, very thoroughly by the Air Force.

30 WOLFE: Does Russia maintain a Chrome Dome, or what
31 did you call it? Stafford
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32 LANGHAM: Not that I know of. I think this is an
33 American innovation.

1 MILLER: There is a manual as to what to do in an
2 event like this but it's mainly regarding threats to health
3 and I suppose directs you as to procedures to be followed,
4 measurements, staking out contaminated areas and getting rid
5 of them. But can't there be perhaps not a manual but some
6 rules of thumb that could be devised to take care of the
7 psychological problems, political problems, the economic ones?
8 Is this something that should get some thought on the basis
9 of your experience?

10 LANGHAM: Well, I'm pretty sure it's getting
11 thought. It's just almost impossible to sit down and write
12 a manual that's going to fit a situation. You have to visual-
13 ize the situation and then you write the manual to fit it.

14 FREMONT-SMITH: This means every potential situation
15 the manual has to cover.

16 LANGHAM: Yes, and invariably it occurs where you
17 don't expect or under conditions you don't expect.

18 FREMONT-SMITH: And the manual would have to say
19 "Use good judgment."

20 LANGHAM: That's right. There's no manual for a
21 situation like this. For example, I finally ended up with
22 some dear, dear friends amongst the Spanish people. I mean
23 they are wonderful people, at least the ones I dealt with
24 and I have no reason to think that they all are not. But we
25 started out bargaining. Now, how much would we clean up?
26 And one of the gentlemen said, "Well, we think you should pick
27 up every atom of plutonium you dropped in Spain and remove it,"
28 to which I replied, "You know, of course, that's an impossi-
29 bility, don't you?" He says, "Yes, but it's a good position
30 to start from!" [Laughter] And then we made this decision
31 that if the contamination was above a certain level, the soil
32 and crops would be removed. And then if it was between other
33 levels the land would be plowed and then at the lower levels

1 it would be sprinkled and at still lower nothing would be
2 done with it. So we set a level at which plowing should
3 occur. No one really thought about it. I mean this was our
4 agreement. So when we got into this area back in the mountains
5 where the contaminated cloud had come down in the valley, it
6 was just sheer rocky mountainsides that were contaminated
7 above the level that we said that we would plow.

8 FREMONT-SMITH: You can't plow a mountain.

9 LANGHAM: So how do you plow a rocky mountain? So
10 we went to the Spanish with another problem. This was a rather
11 big crisis and the Spanish replied, "Well, as we recall, plow-
12 ing was your idea, so plow!" [Laughter] So it was finally
13 agreed in this case that they would elevate their standards
14 a bit and we would resurvey the whole area and if we found
15 areas contaminated above this newly agreed limit we would
16 actually work it in with pick and shovel and stir it around,
17 the idea being to get the plutonium beneath the ground so
18 that when it blew it wouldn't become an inhalation hazard by
19 resuspension, and some of these hillsides were pick-and-shovel-
20 worked into the soil instead of being plowed. They were
21 reasonable people.

22 Now, this doesn't mean they don't drive a hard
23 bargain. They took the recommendations that were first pro-
24 posed and essentially divided them by two and made us go to
25 one-half the level we had proposed. That's all right. You
26 certainly, if you're writing manuals--and I've written a few--
27 you know, you decide on what the standards of cleanup are.
28 But it comes as a bit of a shock to find out that if it's the
29 other fellow's backyard that you have dirtied up, maybe he
30 has something to say about the standards. You don't come in
31 and tell him, "You'll clean it up according to your's; you'll
32 clean it up according to his," and these people drove a hard
33 bargain, but they were nevertheless reasonable. And I had

1 a great respect for the Spanish AEC group. I think they
2 have some highly competent people. The only thing is the
3 whole Spanish AEC isn't as big as the group Chuck Dunham
4 used to have in the Division of Biology and Medicine alone.
5 I mean that's their whole AEC and yet in it they have a few
6 highly competent people.

7 WOLFE: Wouldn't it have been much cheaper to haul
8 soil in there and cover it over than to carry it out?

9 LANGHAM: Of course, it was carried out and then
10 fresh soil replaced on top of it. I think it's just as well,
11 right around the crater areas that that was removed. I mean
12 at least you know it's no longer there. They let us plow
13 under, you see, a lot of it and they asked us to give them a
14 soil followup program because we had plowed something with a
15 24,000 year half-life into their soil and I'm sure they would
16 have objected if you had just buried it there, too. They felt
17 happier about having it removed, and so do I, where the levels
18 were high.

19 UPTON: Will there be a followup of some kind?

20 LANGHAM: There is a followup program and this was
21 part of the bargain that we would set them up a followup pro-
22 gram.

23 UPTON: What are the objectives in the scope of
24 this?

25 LANGHAM: They've got a people's program, a soil's
26 program, a vegetation or a produce program, an air sampling
27 program, and they were extremely cute in the way they approached
28 you on this. They said, "Now, we've taken your advice and
29 we're sure that you have given us the right advice. Will you
30 please set us up with a program and equipment so we could
31 prove to our authorities we were right in following your
32 advice." So how do you turn a man down on something like
33 this? So they have a followup program, yes.

1 UPTON: Under their own auspices or do they
2 furnish advisers?

3 LANGHAM: This was very strong in their minds. They
4 wanted this to be their program with us providing the backup
5 and giving them the equipment, teaching them the techniques
6 which we've done, and occasionally advice and even let them
7 send people to this country. And I've had two or three of
8 them at Los Alamos already.

9 I think you'll find that Spain wants to get back
10 into the swing of things and they want above all to use this
11 to maintain a contact and they want contacts, and I would bet
12 that if you counted the number of friends we have now in
13 Spain as compared to what we had before this accident, we have
14 more friends there than we had before. This is an opportunity
15 for them to get outside contacts.

16 FREMONT-SMITH: That's why you got your medal!

17 LANGHAM: Well, I never quite figured why I got a
18 medal because this is a rather sober thing within itself.
19 What you find is circumstances place you in a position that
20 you can't get out of and you are the focal point of the effort
21 of an awful lot of people. So winning medals is just being
22 at the right place at the right time.

23 FREMONT-SMITH: I think making friends was the
24 crucial thing. That's why we have more friends. Anyway, I
25 think there's a very interesting comment, because I think we
26 don't have more friends probably--I'm not sure; am I right,
27 in Japan as a result of the thing there?

28 EISENBUD: I think that we had the same reaction
29 the scientific community. There are a lot of opportunists
30 among them. It was quite common during those first few years
31 for the younger people to sidle up to me and ask how they
32 could go about getting fellowships in the States or could
33 when I go back, send them some reprints and how could they

1 learn about a certain piece of equipment and, as Chuck will
2 recall, starting with Tsuzuki's visit to the States in May,
3 which was precipitated by this accident which had occurred
4 two months before, there was a long series of exchanges. We
5 had that radiobiology conference in the fall. The Division
6 of Biology and Medicine began to support research in Japan
7 and any number of the young people began to come to this
8 country as the result of that incident.

9 FREMONT-SMITH: So it was comparable in a way.

10 EISENBUD: So I think we really have the same types
11 of ties but this I think is a form of opportunism. I gave
12 these people, presented them with the first sodium iodide
13 crystal that they had ever seen and they appreciated it very
14 much. But I'm sure that we could not say that the same was
15 true at the level of the people where I think there are some
16 scars.

17 There was one other difference that I should mention,
18 and that is that at the height of the Japanese furor which
19 was, say, a week or two after the boat got into Japan--I think
20 it was the 26th of the month but I'm not sure; it might have
21 been a few days later--the AEC resumed testing in the Pacific
22 and all through that spring until the end of May there was a
23 series of tests and each one of those, of course, precipitated
24 new rumors and new concern and all through that spring there
25 were rumors of fishing boats that had been heavily irradiated
26 apart from the question of contaminated fish. They were
27 concerned, too, about the health of their fishermen.

28 FREMONT-SMITH: I didn't mean to interrupt you. I
29 think you were right in the middle when I made my remark.

30 LANGHAM: No. I thought I had finished.

31 MILLER: Merrill, when you went to Japan, what kind
32 of experts do you wish you had had with you that were not
33 available? I don't think of two offhand that sound as if they

1 might have helped you. One would have been a public relations
2 man experienced in this sort of thing and another might have
3 been one who knew Japanese culture exceedingly well.

4 EISENBUD: The Embassy presumably had this. I think
5 your Allison had a good feel for Japanese culture. As I re-
6 call, he spoke the language. As far as public relations was
7 concerned, this was controlled out of Washington. We held
8 an off-the-record briefing for the American press and this
9 was helpful in the way the news was reported in the States.
10 But we were not permitted to meet the Japanese press; Washington
11 would not let us. And we had no formal contact, no confronta-
12 tion with the Japanese press until the following November when
13 we had some very successful news conferences in which a lot
14 of this was rehashed, and I think it did some good. But all
15 through the period that he was in Japan, neither Ambassador
16 Allison nor myself met with the press. The only direct announce-
17 ments from the Americans were people that just were passing
18 through that had no relationship with the thing but felt that
19 they would like to be spokesman. All they did was muddy the
20 water.

21 MILLET: You had a very high level of camaraderie
22 between the American psychiatric and the Japanese profession,
23 too. I went over there for a short conference and brought
24 them back the next year and hosted them to go down to Mexico
25 for an international congress with the Mexicans. That's been
26 a very profitable experience for everybody.

27 EISENBUD: When it was all over, John Morton and I
28 decided to go to Eniwetok because he was interested in finding
29 out what he could about the natives there. Me and Bob Conard
30 and Chuck Dunham and others thought it was a secret that we
31 were leaving. Well, we learned in retrospect there really
32 weren't any secrets all through there, that almost every move
33 we made was pretty well known to the Japanese. But when I

1 gottthe airport, the whole scientific corps turned out to say
2 good-bye to us. My house is decorated from one end to the
3 other with lovely presents that were given to us, and I think
4 it was quite sincere.

5 SCHULL: I think one has to be careful in placing
6 too much emphasis upon that because courtesy in Japan is so
7 much a part of the custom. Everybody gets welcomed and sent
8 off, even people that you don't like. It's a reflection on
9 yourself not to do it.

10 WARREN: Is he supposed to give presents in return?

11 SCHULL: No, he doesn't.

12 WARREN: Reciprocated?

13 SCHULL: No. It seems to me as we talk increasingly
14 we are groping towards the idea that if there are answers to
15 be found to situations like this or predictive stands that one
16 might take, the answers have to be sought in the culture of
17 the country that's on the receiving end of one of these events,
18 and perhaps the ten years of historical events which had pre-
19 ceded the action itself--and Japan would certainly be a marvel-
20 ous illustration in this respect because it's more than just
21 the relationship of a defeated to a defeater in this particular
22 instance.

23 Japan's image of herself has been shaken to an ex-
24 tent that probably no contemporary country has had. This was
25 a nation that prided itself on the fact that they had never been
26 invaded, they had never lost a war. Their image was strong,
27 virile, and so on, and they were still groping around for
28 some kind of national identity. The Peace Treaty had been
29 signed three years earlier, not quite three years earlier but
30 almost. But for the average Japanese, he wasn't even aware
31 of that because there were still as many foreign troops in
32 his country in 1954 as there had been during most of the
33 occupation because it was being used as a staging area for

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1 Korea. So that he still really didn't have the kind of
2 identity, let's say, that the Spaniard has if one accepts
3 certain generalizations and they are obviously dangerous,
4 one's image of the Spaniard is of a sort of a stoic pride and
5 this is alleged to be one of his sins. The Japanese isn't of
6 that kind at all. If anything, it's a nation of people who
7 seem to need constant assurance. They seek self-assurance
8 at times, and I think it's still visible in their foreign
9 policy. Japan doesn't play the role in foreign policy today
10 that she should in view of the fact that they have 100 millions
11 of people and that they have one of the highest standards of
12 living in the Orient and are a powerful manufacturing nation.
13 But they are still hiding behind U.S. skirts. It's a conveni-
14 ent stance for them to take.

15 But to try to put all these things together and
16 think, well, now if this was to happen in France, what might
17 we predict about the French reaction? I don't think that there
18 was anything to be learned in Japan or possibly in the
19 Spanish situation that would be relevant except to seek the
20 answer in the culture.

21 FREMONT-SMITH: Right. Very nice statement because
22 I think this is one of the things we are weakest on, is seek-
23 ing answers in cultures.

24 LANGHAM: I wholeheartedly agree with that. I am
25 convinced if had this happened not far away in France, we
26 would be on our knees in front of De Gaulle even right now.
27 So I think what is found in the culture as well as the
28 national philosophy of these places and indeed what he says
29 about the Spaniard being a person of great pride; in fact, he
30 is, and I think probably part of their failure to make the
31 progress that they have that they can rely on this great pride
32 and do perhaps too much. I think you'll find that Spain is
33 changing and I think you're going to find Spain bidding once

1 more to become somebody in the family of nations. It's coming
2 slowly but definitely they are progressing and tourism is one
3 of their great commodities now. It's absolutely impossible
4 to get tourist accommodations during the season in the
5 vicinity of Madrid. So they are developing this as one of
6 their commodities, so to speak. It's why Palomares was a
7 rather important factor all related to the Vice President of
8 the country sitting down and finding out about this and once
9 he heard that there was no real health problem, his next
10 question was, "Are you going to find that lost bomb?"

11 SCHULL: There's at least one other important dif-
12 ference between the Japanese situation that I don't think has
13 been mentioned yet or if it has I've forgotten it. But it
14 has strong racial overtones in the Orient, which is not true
15 in Spain. Fortunately, both nations are Caucasians involved.
16 But there are racial problems in the Orient and this was
17 white against yellow and some of this was already I think
18 beginning to become apparent in Japan because I can remember
19 seeing the first of the bars that began to sprout in Tokyo
20 with signs on the doors that they don't want anyone except
21 Japanese business and this didn't used to be. I mean they
22 still exist, many of them, but they were beginning to draw
23 racial lines and racial distinctions that might not have been
24 as obvious of the problems that exist in our own country at
25 the moment but, nonetheless, these things were present in the
26 minds of some people.

27 ROOT: I think that's corroborated by the lack of
28 furor when the Chinese dropped their bomb, you know. I was
29 being attacked on all sides because I was being taken around
30 by a member of the press who had come. The Overseas Press
31 Club had invited a group of Japanese science writers as
32 guests. So that when I got back I got special treatment
33 the press. But going around with him, I was perhaps let

1 a little more to the anti-American hostility and I began to
2 get it from him and from the people in the newspaper and from
3 the professors that he took me to see. It became more and more
4 overt. And just at that time the Chinese bomb was exploded
5 and there was a kind of a concealed elation behind the expressed
6 fear of fallout and the expressed reaction. So that definitely
7 was a racial thing, I think.

8 PREMONT-SMITH: The notion that another yellow race
9 had gotten a bomb.

10 ROOT: Right. There's really great identification
11 with China as having done it.

12 MILLET: It seems to me there's a matter of nascent
13 pride in Japan. I think there's been tremendous pride in
14 the culture of Japan in the past. Think of their walking out
15 of the League of Nations meetings, for example, in the mili-
16 taristic days. It would seem to me rather that the State of
17 Germany is one where there is a lack of identification in
18 Germany at the present time completely. They are completely
19 split into two nations. They don't know how they can get
20 back into one. That's a genuine fear of loss of identity I
21 think there. I don't think there's any fear of loss of identi-
22 ty among the Japanese as far as I know.

23 SCHULL: I think you are wrong. It's of a different
24 kind than one sees in Europe. I think there's more of an
25 isolation of the young people in Japan from their elders than
26 there is even in our own country where there has been almost
27 a total rejection of the sense of value that the parents had.
28 The Children of the Sun and all that sort of business that has
29 characterized Japan in the last 15 years are things which their
30 parents are unable to cope with.

31 MILLET: Is that the same as identity? Would you
32 say that we have no identity of the Americans? We have a
33 loss of identity?

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1 SCHULL: I would say that in this case lack of a
2 national identity because the young people really don't
3 create the image that Japan has and they don't have much
4 identification with the older types.

5 MILLET: Yes.

6 SCHULL: And I'm still terribly uncertain about the
7 directions that they want to go. They pick up one fad after
8 another. I suppose they began to have their hippies even in
9 a sense even before we did. They didn't dress in the same way
10 but the student movement in Japan began in the years immedi-
11 ately following the war which range all over the map. The
12 Communist movement itself on the campus ranges from a main
13 stream of Sen Don Grand down to lesser and lesser streams,
14 some of whom find the Chinese much too liberal from their
15 point of view and they have isolated themselves from all of
16 the Communist currents except their own. This doesn't seem
17 to be much of an image that they can project for themselves
18 and though they have made tremendous progress in material
19 things, I'm not really sure that Japan has yet taken on some
20 of the self-assurance that she may have had. That was a
21 strongly religious nation and they could look toward their
22 Emperor as a figure. Sure he still exists, but the young
23 people don't think very much of him really. They are polite
24 but he doesn't have much pull, and the reaction is often I
25 think terribly difficult to get through.

26 A year or so ago we lived on a little island known
27 as Yawata in the western part of Kyushu and there were about
28 40,000 people living on this island and we were the only
29 foreigners on it. I take that back. There was a Korean on
30 the island also. But we were the only non-Japanese except for
31 this Korean on the island. There weren't ten people on the
32 island that could speak English well enough to carry on a
33 conversation with them. But we did manage to establish some

1 means of communication with a few of the families and you
2 could get some idea of the difficulties their children were
3 having. They are torn between wanting certain material things
4 that they see, trying to retain some sense of parent-child
5 relationship but not really respecting some of the values
6 that their parents have. They are a confused group of kids
7 and you have a suicide rate, if this is any measure of un-
8 certainty, Japan does not have to take a back seat to anyone
9 in terms of the number.

10 MILLET: How need to migrate is there in Japan?
11 How much desire to live in other countries and become citizens
12 of other countries?

13 SCHULL: The thrust today certainly is toward the :
14 big cities and there is some thrust elsewhere. It's kind of
15 a romantic idea, I think. There has been recruitment through-
16 out Japan, Kyushu in particular, for people to go to Brazil,
17 Colombia and several of the countries in South America, but
18 they are usually oversubscribed. There may come in 100
19 families, let's say, from an area, and 500 will volunteer,
20 but I think some of the thing is a fantasizing that's going on.
21 The interesting thing is that the movement to the cities that's
22 taking place in Japan. Our island, for example, between 1960,
23 when it had its census, national census in 1964, when we
24 censused it again, they lost about 10 per cent of its popula-
25 tion. And this was almost all at the expense of the young
26 people who were moving out. They simply could not take the
27 old form. The number of farms, for example, hadn't decreased
28 at all on the island. So that you weren't getting larger
29 farms growing out of this movement or anything like that. It
30 was just that with the mechanization that was beginning to
31 take place on Japanese farms, even though it was on a small
32 scale variety, you didn't need the manpower, and the first
33 inclination was to move to the city, and the movement would start

1 of wave-like lines;. They went from Yawata to Fukuoka , which
2 was the first city that they would encounter, and from there
3 this would be a stepping stone and the next city was Hiroshima
4 or Tokyo or some place like this.

5 It's an extremely difficult sort of situation to
6 try to, it seems, get hold of the thread, and I talked to
7 Bob Miller and some of the others. The interesting part about
8 the study of Japan in this context is not perhaps what we can
9 extrapolate but learning how one has weaved this complex cultural
10 fabric into which, if an answer lies, it is to be found, and
11 Japan may be more difficult for us to read because it is so
12 alien, than would be Spain or some other European country.

13 FREMONT-SMITH: Did you feel that the alienation of
14 the young people had started several years earlier in Japan
15 before it became evident over here?

16 SCHULL: Its' my impression, yes. At a time, let's
17 say, when our students at the University of Michigan were still
18 primarily interested in panty raids, the Japanese students
19 had begun to be more active politically, but then they have
20 a long tradition of political activity which doesn't exist
21 in the United States.

22 ROOT: Think of the students who made it impossible
23 for Eisenhower to take his visit over there. That was pretty
24 far back. And overturned the plane and demonstrated at the
25 airport:so that it was inadvisable for the President of the
26 United States to visit Japan, which is in great contrast to
27 the classic image of the Japanese that we have.

28 BUSTAD: The Japanese are going to be really con-
29 fused, especially the youngsters, if they go on down to
30 South Africa to Capetown where they have a lot of business
31 and find out they are considered whites there and they are
32 the only oriental that is considered a white. The rest of
33 them are not considered white! [Laughter]

1 MILLER: Merrill, Wright has said that there was a
2 headman who could issue a statement and that pacified the
3 people. You said that you talked to Dr. Tsuzuki because he
4 was the headman and he wasn't head enough. In retrospect who
5 could you have talked to that might have yielded greater

6 EISENBUD: I don't talk to Dr. Tsuzuki because I
7 thought he was the headman. He clearly wasn't. By the time
8 that I arrived there already had been constituted a committee
9 which was headed up by Kobayashi; who was, as I recall it,
10 a microbiologist and statistician from the National Institute
11 of Health. The only physician on the committee--there were
12 two. There was the head of Toyko Hospital whose name escapes
13 me and Dr. Maki Asumi, the radiologist, and the others were
14 geneticists and physicists and marine biologists, and it was
15 agreed between our Embassy and the Japanese Foreign Office
16 that all communications to the people would be through this
17 committee. This would have worked all right. We stuck to our
18 part of the bargain, which was made easy that even later on
19 when we wanted to hold press conferences, even the Ambassador
20 was not permitted to hold one. But while we were coming to
21 agreement as to what the facts were, the individual Japanese
22 scientists were going out on their own and vying for public
23 attention, and Tsuzuki in particular, was not a member of the
24 committee, was using his very prestigious position in Japan
25 to get to the press and there was just no way that it could
26 be done because this was obviously something that was going
27 on which I never understood, between Tsuzuki and the rest
28 of the medical community in Japan.

29 He finally left Japan and went to Geneva in the
30 middle of the furor, for which he was criticized because
31 said--could I go off the record on this?

32 [Off the record]

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33 MILLER: But the reason for containing unjust

1 fears, or even justified fears was that there was someone
2 to reassure the people in Spain and there was no one to re-
3 assure them in Japan. So apparently the situation was out of
4 control and could not possibly have been brought under control
5 under any circumstances even in retrospect.

6 EISENBUD: There are some things that a man with
7 political sensitivity just can't say. Just like during the
8 Korean war, if Truman had tried to settle the Korean war on
9 the terms it was finally settled on, I think he would have
10 been impeached, but I think Eisenhower at that time looked
11 very good. It was a right time to say something.

12 FREMONT-SMITH: A politically right time.

13 EISENBUD: A politically right time, and I think
14 that if Kobayashi, for example, had tried to make a statement
15 at that time which was reassuring, they would have found
16 another chairman for that committee. It's as simple as that.
17 Now, who they are I don't know. It might have been the
18 Foreign Office.

19 MILLER: What I was trying to get around to is
20 what happens if there's another such incident, whether it's
21 here or there or wherever it might be? It would seem to me
22 that one rule of thumb would be to try to get to somebody
23 that can reassure the people as to what the real circumstance
24 is. Is this not right? Isn't this the big difference between
25 you?

26 EISENBUD: That's right. That's why I think it's
27 important that in the nuclear field we maintain good contacts
28 with our counterpart overseas, and there are innumerable in-
29 stances where potential difficulties have been aborted by
30 just letters or short visits either from government to govern-
31 ment or by representatives. I could enumerate half a dozen.
32 But in Japan there was no organization. Japanese science at
33 that point was a pretty amorphous structure. You didn't

1 have an Atomic Energy Commission. Dr. Sukamoto, I don't
2 know where he was in those days. He is now the head of the
3 biological part of the AEC over there and if this incident
4 came up, he would be the man they would listen to, but I
5 don't know. There was no such person in those days.

6 Also I get the feeling--and I think that both you
7 and Jack would have better judgment on this perhaps than I--
8 but I get the feeling that Japanese medicine at that particular
9 stage had not yet emerged from the somewhat feudal structure
10 that existed prior to the war and for some time postwar. And
11 one reason was the physicians were not welcome on the Japanese
12 committees was that Tsuzuki was really the No. 2 man in Japanese
13 medicine and it was amazing, an amazing thing to see what
14 happened with Tsuzuki when his professor walked into the room,
15 which happened a few times. I've forgotten what his name was,
16 but this professor was the No. 1 and he was the one man that
17 could get Tsuzuki to be quiet. This didn't occur among the
18 geneticists or the physicists, the young men were coming to
19 the forefront and the old fellows were going off into industry
20 and they were becoming deans and, well, it's the normal course
21 of human events that we have around here. So that the people
22 we were dealing with from physics, lets say, or from genetics,
23 were a relatively young group of people with whom we could
24 communicate well, whereas there's a structure in medicine there
25 that these other disciplines found it difficult to deal with.

26 You may or may not agree with me on that.

27 FREMONT-SMITH: Isn't the implication of Dr. Miller's
28 question, which I think is a very good one, that the State
29 Department should have a very detailed study of cultural
30 anthropology of the cultures of all the different countries
31 and make this a primary concern of the State Department, which
32 they've done to some extent but not really and part of the
33 difficulty has been that our cultural attaches all over the

1 world are isolated in the embassies and in the little enclaves
2 and do not move into the people, live with the people, and
3 that we don't have a suggestion that had been made at the time
4 the conference for the State Department back in 1946 and early
5 '47, that there should be a systematic effort to put students
6 in cultural anthropology who are writing their theses, doing
7 their field work, in the field in association with embassies
8 in different countries but living among the people and with
9 a liaison both back to the State Department, both to their
10 university and back to the local embassy so that there would
11 be a constant feedback of cultural understanding which would
12 flow back both to the university and to the State Department.
13 These students would then be good candidates for cultural
14 attaches some years later. Actually I believe the Foreign
15 Service Institute does make some effort to give some cultural
16 anthropology to the Foreign Service people but in actuality
17 the cultural attaches who are supposed to be the people to do
18 this are by and large, unless it's coming in the last few years,
19 almost completely isolated from the community in which they
20 serve.

21 So I think that in a broad sense the question you
22 raised is if we are concerned with a variety of incidents
23 and we are going to have incidents, not all nuclear, but we
24 are going to have incidents with other countries all over the
25 world, if we're going to meet these incidents appropriately,
26 we've got to have a great deal of cultural insight with respect
27 to every other country that we can bring to the fore. How
28 do you meet this situation that has to do with Thailand and
29 their culture which is such-and-such, and it's going to be
30 quite different from meeting it in Spain?

31 MILLER: Yes. I think that, for one thing, the ad-
32 viser, the expert, might be able to tell you who can influence
33 the people and might be able to tell you that no one can and

1 that you need a second line of defense and what should that
2 be? I don't know what he would advise.

3 FREMONT-SMITH: But at least there should be a
4 current awareness of the cultural attitudes with respect to a
5 variety of things in any country with which we have any deal-
6 ings at all.

7 EISENBUD: It might be worth noting that shortly
8 after that Japanese episode both the State Department and AEC
9 had a scientific liaison in the Toyko Embassy. Of course,
10 this was done in other parts of the world as well. I don't
11 know whether we have anybody over there now. I presume we
12 do as a scientific attache.

13 FREMONT-SMITH: Yet a scientific attache is not a
14 cultural anthropologist. This is a different story. He'll be
15 an expert in physics, you see, or possibly in biochemistry
16 and in the social sciences I think they are very, very rare.
17 I think we had one in India and a couple of other places for
18 a short time and then this was caput. But the concept of
19 using social science insights and especially cultural anthro-
20 pology, which I think ought to be one of the key ones, I
21 don't think it's penetrated.

22 WARREN: You are aware of the upset in the anthro-
23 pologists association, weren't you, about their being used
24 as tools by the CIA?

25 FREMONT-SMITH: Yes, I know, and the story that was
26 in Peru, what was it called, Camelot, which raised an awful
27 mess. But there was also not a great deal of wisdom used, I
28 would think.

29 WARREN: No, that's right.

30 BRUES: You mean that even the cultural anthropologists
31 can have a colonial attitude when they go somewhere?

32 AYRES: I don't think the Camelot story has been
33 very well presented. Most people are not aware of what

1 really happened.

2 FREMONT-SMITH: Yes. I'm sure I am not.

3 WARREN: I think the anthropologists, too, have
4 calmed down about this. It wasn't quite as bad as they at
5 first thought.

6 AYRES: No. What you had was the graduate student at
7 the American University who happened to be a Communist or was
8 very nearly a Communist sympathizer. He somehow heard about
9 it because we do have a fairly open society, and he just made
10 the thing look altogether different than what it was.

11 FREMONT-SMITH: Yes, and it raised the dickens in
12 Congress.

13 AYRES: Yes. He got in touch directly with the
14 foreign press.

15 SCHULL: It's certainly interesting, though, in
16 Wright's case, where it seemed as though all circumstances
17 were contriving to get together in a very happy sort of frame
18 of reference. In Japan it was completely the opposite way.
19 The one organization that could conceivably have made a state-
20 ment, as Merrill talked to you about Dr. Kobayashi. I think
21 if he had made a statement at that time and tried to make a
22 forceful one, it's questionable how well it would have been
23 received by the Japanese public because the National Institutes
24 of Health of Japan at that time were still viewed essentially
25 as an occupation-created agency and so it didn't project itself
26 as a Japanese organization and the traditional spokesman had
27 been in the Japanese Science Council and in the NIH so that the
28 one contact we had used could not be used even if they had
29 prepared to make a statement.

30 EISENBUD: The medical schools were under the Ministry
31 of Education, the hospitals were under the Ministry of Health
32 and they were jockeying between the politicians in those
33 groups. It was a mess.

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1 DUNHAM: Frank, you made a statement to the effect
2 that the cultural attaches were isolated. Is this by job
3 or by simply the type of people that had been appointed?

4 FREMONT-SMITH: Well, I get the impression---

5 DUNHAM: I've seen this happen to science attaches.

6 FREMONT-SMITH: I get the impression that the whole
7 embassy group, the cultural attaches and the science attaches,
8 they all lived together, they all spoke English. They live
9 in special housing arrangements for them. I think this was
10 true in Germany, and they are not systematically organized
11 to live with the local people or even talk their language, and
12 this is talked about a lot, this isolation, and I'm not in a
13 position to know that it is true, but I have no reason to
14 believe it isn't true, that the whole enclave of the embassy,
15 the families, the children go to American schools to a large
16 extent, that are set up especially for them. So I think that
17 there is a failure to take advantage of the opportunity, and
18 I believe that this has been pointed out in quite contrast
19 to what the Soviet Union does, where they send their people
20 over who roll up their sleeves and speak the language and
21 mix with the people and live at the level of the people. It
22 would be very difficult for us to get Americans to go over
23 there and live at the level of the community at which they
24 are supposedly working.

25 DUNHAM: On the other hand, the British charge-
26 d'affaires in Peking conducted a seminar in Washington ten
27 years ago when he came back before he went to Harvard to do
28 some special studies and he pointed out that the Russians had
29 isolated themselves from the people and they were not allowing
30 their children to associate with the Chinese children. So
31 their approach is not uniform across the board.

32 FREMONT-SMITH: That's a comfort.

33 EISENBUD: They certainly have isolated themselves

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1 in New York and in Washington.

2 DUNHAM: Yes.

3 FREMONT-SMITH: Yes, but certainly the story has
4 been about that in the African nations and the Asian nations.
5 At least in the African nations they have kind of gotten
6 right in with the people.

7 EISENBUD: I would like to add that---

8 FREMONT-SMITH: I can be wrong on this. I'm talk-
9 ing from hearsay.

10 DUNHAM: I think these things are uneven and a lot
11 I think affects the personality of the people involved. I
12 say that I know of a science attache, and I won't say what
13 country he was in, who almost deliberately isolated himself
14 from the scientific community and expected it ought to come to
15 him and if you have a cultural attache of that type he isn't going
16 to learn anything. Even if he doesn't know the language, he
17 should be outgoing.

18 FREMONT-SMITH: But there had been a policy here at
19 the State Department with respect to this in order to encourage
20 in every possible way a relationship of these particular
21 attaches to the community.

22 DUNHAM: Yes.

23 TAYLOR: This is apropos of nuclear accidents, or
24 what?

25 FREMONT-SMITH: I'm talking about apropos of inter-
26 national relations of which nuclear accident is only one. We
27 spoke of what would we do in the future if we had an incident
28 in France and I'm raising the issue, what would we do in the
29 future with any kind of incident? We are bound to have a
30 conflict as we are having many right today. We are bound to
31 have conflicts with nations, and the way to deal with these
32 conflicts is to at least know as much as possible about the
33 culture and the attitude and the mood of the people and not

1 to be insensible.

2 EISENBUD: We've had many incidents of many kinds,
3 mostly of considerably less severity in terms of hurt but
4 potentially of sensitivity, equal sensitivity in relation to
5 people, and there was a period in the late 50's where there
6 was worldwide concern about fallout and the subject would come
7 up before parliaments all over the world. I had a number of
8 opportunities to visit capitols on short notice, I don't know,
9 maybe ten or fifteen of them around the world, to meet, and
10 I found that the guidance that I was getting from the State
11 Department people was good, and I think it was good in Japan.
12 I spent, oh, I guess nine or ten weeks there and I've had
13 many opportunities over the years to just reminisce with
14 Japanese friends now about this incident and I've thought
15 about it a great deal and I really can't think of a single
16 bad lead that they gave me. I think that their appraisals
17 of the people I would have to deal with were good. I think
18 they seemed to have a very good understanding of the Japanese
19 culture. A number of them had been there before the war and
20 a number of them had learned the language and a number of the
21 senior people did live in the Japanese community.

22 SCHULL: I would like to support Merrill on that
23 general statement. I think Japan has been one of the few
24 embassies to which we've tried consistently to appoint pro-
25 fessionals as witness the fact that all of our ambassadors
26 to Japan speak Japanese.

27 FREMONT-SMITH: Right, yes.

28 EISENBUD: Reischauer has a Japanese wife.

29 SCHULL: Right.

30 FREMONT-SMITH: Isn't this somewhat of an exception,
31 one of the few; right?

32 SCHULL: That's right. We even have been
33 fortunate to have science attaches. I can think of one

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1 in particular, Otto Leporte. But Leporte is a physicist
2 of competence. Probably one of the very few in the United
3 States who speaks Japanese well enough that he can really
4 communicate with them, and certainly at the cultural level
5 we've had a steady procession of outstanding people, Herbert
6 Passim and all the others. So that the competence was there
7 on the State Department side, I think.

8 FREMONT-SMITH: This is very good news.

9 BUSTAD: Your criticism, Merrill, isn't that when
10 you had criticism it was directed at the fact that he should
11 have been allowed to speak out?

12 EISENBUD: I think that if he had been allowed to
13 work out his arrangements with the Prime Minister then--who
14 incidentally told us he recalled saying, "Mr. Ambassador,"
15 he said--he spoke very good English--"Mr. Ambassador, it was
16 you folks who thought we ought to have a free press when we
17 were complaining about what the press was saying," which was
18 a very good point! [Laughter] This was their first experience
19 with a free press, at least their first decade of experience.
20 I think that Katayama and Allison could have worked out an
21 agreement which would have nipped this in the bud within the
22 first few days and I think that it would literally have bought
23 the good will of everybody from fishermen on to the rest.

24 FREMONT-SMITH: But it was the State Department
25 policy that prevented this?

26 EISENBUD: I can't speak for that.

27 FREMONT-SMITH: I assume it was.

28 EISENBUD: But I do know that there did seem to be
29 the kind of latitude in the field that was required in order
30 to work out the arrangements presumably.

31 BUSTAD: I vote for decentralization! [Laughter]

32 WOLFE: Right, when you were in Spain and you had
33 to make the decisions, did you have to go to the Ambassador

1 and then to Washington, and then all the way back before you
2 decided to plow or not plow or something like that?

3 LANGHAM: No. In so far as those decisions to do
4 things immediately were concerned, these were made by
5 General Wilson, head of the 16th Air Force in whose territory
6 this thing had occurred and in dealing with him you begin to
7 realize why he was a general. He certainly made decisions,
8 and his way of making a decision was to get the people around
9 him that he thought could advise him, listen to him, and when
10 they were through talking he made the decision. You see, that
11 was the experience the first week in the field.

12 Now, the second time I went back I was assigned to
13 the American Embassy. Now you found here that decisions in
14 which we were trying to get down to really get decisions,
15 what the final cleanup and compensation, and so forth, would
16 be, you found here that this now had to be checked all the
17 way back through Washington, and I think if there is one
18 thing that surprises me it's how dependent on Washington the
19 Embassy seems to be when it starts to make a decision, and
20 yet Duke was a highly respected man among the Spanish. Yet
21 as far as I know decisions must be stamped in Washington be-
22 fore action was taken. I just got the idea that there was
23 too much centralization of opinion. In other words, does it
24 do you a great deal of good to have a fine man in the field
25 that's respected if you give him no authority to do anything?
26 And I rather sensed this. Now, I could be wrong. The thing
27 that set me off on this was when Miss Root made the remark
28 about this, and this was really just what was bothering me
29 when I was there. It seemed that there was a rather clogged
30 some chain of command in so far as the American Embassy
31 concerned in a decision-making way and I rather gathered
32 Merrill, that you had said about the same thing.

33 EISENBUD: Yes. It was ridiculous. For example,

1 if I wanted to send a cable to John Bugher just telling him
2 that I was going to remain another week, this was a communi-
3 cation from the Ambassador to Secretary Dulles.

4 WOLFE: You don't just send one with a carbon copy?

5 EISENBUD: No.

6 TAYLOR: Isn't it true that every communication to-
7 day from the State Department to an overseas post is from the
8 Secretary of State, signed "Rusk"?

9 EISENBUD: It was when I was there.

10 TAYLOR: Every communication, even a transfer of a
11 clerk from one office to another.

12 DUNHAM: And vice versa.

13 SPEAR: You can always look down the lower left and
14 find out who it really came from, but it's signed "Rusk."

15 TAYLOR: Why go through this charade, or whatever
16 it was?

17 LANGHAM: I never sent a message. All of my messages
18 were sent by Duke. So you almost find yourself, I mean, this
19 fellow is the man who sends out messages. Evidently that's
20 his job.

21 WARREN: I can see a certain reason for this ad-
22 ministratively. The Ambassador is playing the hand of the
23 President really in his international relationships. So there
24 should be appropriate consultation. But something should be
25 allowed to the Ambassador for the use of his judgment in the
26 situations. The trouble is that the minute it's a nuclear
27 power, a sort of paralysis goes over everybody and particular-
28 ly those who are not scientists and are politicians or people
29 in the administrative hierarchy who are unfamiliar with the
30 situation, they just didn't dare move, and I imagine the
31 President's office called up Mr. Seaborg and he was consulted
32 on the question all the time and, of course, the Department
33 of Defense had to be consulted. So they had a small Cabinet

1 meeting about this, and this took a long time. Not that I'm
2 in favor of a complete block of responsibility, I am not. I
3 think there's a time and a place for it and the local man
4 ought to have enough sensitivity to his situation to be allowed
5 to meet what is really an emergency situation. Now, if his
6 judgment turns out to be wrong, then he should be jerked home
7 and he does it at his own peril, but a good man knows where
8 the perils are and what the goals are. Isn't that a beauti-
9 ful thought! [Laughter] It just doesn't work out quite this
10 way.

11 CONARD: I feel like I've been sitting in a State
12 Department briefing! [Laughter] I wonder really how rele-
13 vant some of this stuff is to nuclear warfare and the long-
14 range effects? We've laid an awful lot of stress on in-
15 cidents that have occurred in foreign countries and how we
16 might handle those in the future. But what about what would
17 happen in this country as an aftermath of the war and the
18 psychosocial reactions there? I think that's the real point
19 we have to get at.

20 FREMONT-SMITH: Start again nine o'clock tomorrow
21 morning.

22 MRS. PURCELL: Eight-thirty.

23 FREMONT-SMITH: Eight-thirty, excuse me. Thank you.

24 BURES: Eight-thirty in the morning. We'll meet at
25 eight-thirty in the morning.

26 Now, I have left notes for all of the regular group
27 and would like to have them remain here after five o'clock. We
28 want to have a little consultation.

29 [The session was adjourned at five o'clock.]

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