
UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



FINAL REPORT OF FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Issued by:

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December 5, 2024

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Table of Contents

Introduction	5
Executive Summary	6
Background	9
Secret Service Advance Planning	9
Crooks Conducts Reconnaissance	17
July 13: Law Enforcement Arrives at the Butler Farm Show Grounds	18
Snipers Take Positions	19
Separate USSS Security Room and Local Command Post Open	20
USSS Attempts to Bring C-UAS Online	21
Medical and Technical Issues	23
Protectee Arrives	24
Timeline of Crooks’ Movements on July 13	24
Law Enforcement Photographs Crooks and Sees Rangefinder	27
Secret Service, State, and Local Law Enforcement are Alerted	32
Officers Respond to Search for Crooks	36
Crooks Moves to AGR Roof.....	37
Law Enforcement Sees Crooks is Armed	41
Shots Fired	43
Local Officer Returns Fire and USSS Counter-Sniper Neutralizes Crooks	44
Immediate Aftermath	46
Butler, PA: Security Failures and Recommendations	48
Failures in Planning	48
1. Failure to Secure the AGR Complex	48
2. Line of Sight Failures.....	64
3. Lack of Adequate Assets and Manpower.....	69
4. Failure to Share Threat Intelligence.....	74
5. Failure to Launch C-UAS	79
Failures in Execution	87
1. Fragmented Communications and Separate Command Posts	87
2. Escalations and Missed Opportunities to Intervene.....	97

Failures of Leadership.....	99
1. Inadequate Training	99
2. Failure to Delineate Roles and Responsibilities	106
Aftermath	114
1. Chronology of Immediate Aftermath.....	114
2. Autopsy & Toxicology Reports	119
FBI Investigation	123
Task Force Visit to FBI Quantico Labs.....	128
1. Rifle.....	128
2. Cartridge Casings and Bullet Fragments	128
3. Bullet Trajectories.....	128
4. IEDs	129
5. Drone.....	129
West Palm Beach, FL: Findings and Recommendations	131
Status of Investigations	132
Missteps	133
Additional Recommendations.....	135
Conclusion	140
Appendix I: Table of Names.....	141
Appendix II: Investigative Summary.....	147
Appendix III: Timeline of Task Force Activities	152
Appendix IV: Key Outstanding Requests to Agencies.....	157
Appendix V: Timeline of Key Events (Butler Rally).....	161
Appendix VI: Related House Resolutions.....	177

Introduction

A would-be assassin attempted to take the life of Donald J. Trump on July 13, 2024, during a campaign event in Butler, Pennsylvania. The bullets meant for President-elect Trump tragically claimed the life of an attendee, Corey Comperatore, and gravely wounded attendees David Dutch and James Copenhaver. A U.S. Secret Service (USSS or Secret Service) counter-sniper and a Butler County Emergency Services Unit (Butler ESU) operator returned fire and eliminated the shooter. Secret Service special agents stationed on and near the event stage covered former President Trump and extracted him from the site.¹ He escaped with non-life-threatening injuries.

Approximately two months later, there was a second attempt to assassinate the former President in West Palm Beach, Florida. On September 15, 2024, a USSS Special Agent scouting the area ahead of former President Trump at Trump International Golf Club discovered another would-be assassin lying in wait just outside of the fence line at the perimeter of the property. The perpetrator was arrested after fleeing the scene when the Special Agent engaged with gunfire. No one was harmed.

On July 24, 2024, in the wake of the attempt on the former President's life in Butler, Pennsylvania, the House of Representatives unanimously passed House Resolution 1367, creating the bipartisan Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump (Task Force) to investigate the facts and circumstances leading up to and on July 13, 2024.² The Task Force, led by Chairman Mike Kelly and Ranking Member Jason Crow, was directed to investigate all actions by any agency, department, officer, or employee of the federal government, as well as state and local law enforcement (LLE) or any other state or local government or private entities or individuals, related to the attempted assassination of Donald J. Trump on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania. The House of Representatives subsequently expanded the Task Force's authority through House Resolution 1470, directing the Task Force to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the second assassination attempt in Florida.

House Resolution 1367 directed the Task Force to "issue a final report of its findings" to the House no later than December 13, 2024. Pursuant to H. Res. 1367, this is the Task Force's final report.

¹ Hereinafter, when describing the events of July 13, 2024, and the days leading up to the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, and the events of September 15, 2024, the Task Force will refer to President-elect Trump as former President Trump or the former President, as he was during those periods.

² Establishing the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, H.Res. 1367, 118th Cong. (2024).

Executive Summary

Over the course of less than five months, the Task Force interviewed witnesses, obtained and analyzed evidence, and held hearings on the assassination attempts in Pennsylvania and Florida. The full record of evidence clearly shows failures in advance planning by the Secret Service and its law enforcement partners in the days before the July 13 campaign event in Butler, Pennsylvania, and failures in execution on the day of the event itself. The Task Force's investigation also identified preexisting conditions and leadership failures that set the stage for tragedy.

The Task Force found that the tragic and shocking events in Butler, Pennsylvania were preventable and should not have happened. There was not, however, a singular moment or decision that allowed Thomas Matthew Crooks to nearly assassinate the former President. The various failures in planning, execution, and leadership on and before July 13, 2024, and the preexisting conditions that undermined the effectiveness of the human and material assets deployed that day, coalesced to create an environment in which the former President—and everyone at the campaign event—were exposed to grave danger. Conversely, the events that transpired on September 15, 2024, in West Palm Beach, Florida, demonstrated how properly executed protective measures can foil an attempted assassination.

* * *

The Task Force identified several decision points that, if handled differently, could have prevented Crooks from firing eight shots at the Butler rally stage. Foremost, the failure to secure a recognized high-risk area immediately adjacent to the venue—specifically the American Glass Research (AGR) grounds and building complex—gave rise to several vulnerabilities that eventually allowed Crooks to evade law enforcement, climb on and traverse the roof of the AGR complex, and open fire. Despite its proximity to a main road, clear sight lines to the stage, and elevated position, the Secret Service allowed a crowd that was not screened by USSS or other law enforcement to gather at the fence line separating the secured area and the AGR complex. The presence of the crowd outside the secured area made Crooks more difficult to interdict as his behavior became increasingly suspicious.

The consequences of failing to secure the AGR property in the first place were compounded by the fact that the area was not sufficiently monitored or patrolled to deter threats. The Secret Service did not provide clear guidance to its state and local partners about which entity was responsible for the area. An expressed lack of manpower and assets was not sufficiently addressed, resulting in coverage gaps on the ground. Further, local snipers on the property understood their responsibility to be overwatch of the crowd and venue, not the area outside the secure perimeter where Crooks loitered and prepared, believing that area to have been secured by Secret Service counter-snipers and patrol units. The result of that misunderstanding was that the local sniper team posted in the windows of one of the AGR buildings was not positioned to monitor the area directly

underneath the windows or the roofs. While another local sniper team stationed on the opposite side of the venue did have line of sight to the AGR property, they similarly did not believe they were responsible for monitoring the area and did not do so.

These issues were compounded by failures that arose on the day of the event. Technology meant to supplement venue security was out of commission for hours. A fragmented communication structure and poor decision-making prevented vital information from reaching pertinent law enforcement personnel. These technology and communication breakdowns hindered law enforcement's pursuit of Crooks and caused missed opportunities to intervene. The breakdowns also interrupted the flow of information that should have been passed to Secret Service personnel with the ability to remove the former President from the stage. Moreover, relevant threat information known by members of the intelligence community was not escalated to key personnel working the rally.

The failures that led to the tragic events of July 13 were not entirely isolated to the campaign event itself, or the days preceding it. Preexisting issues in leadership and training created an environment in which the specific failures identified above could occur. Secret Service personnel with little to no experience in advance planning roles were given significant responsibility, despite the July 13 event being held at a higher-risk outdoor venue with many line of sight issues, in addition to specific intelligence about a long-range threat. Further, some of the Secret Service agents in significant advance planning roles did not clearly understand the delineation of their responsibilities.

Pursuant to its mandate, the Task Force herein issues a series of recommendations to prevent future security lapses. In addition to 25 specific recommendations related to issues that directly led to the security failures in Butler on July 13, which are included at the end of each section of this report, the Task Force identified 11 general recommendations related to leadership, training, and agency resources to enhance the Secret Service's capacity to fulfill its zero fail protective mission (see Additional Recommendations section).

With respect to capacity, Congress must ensure that the Secret Service determines ways to strengthen its capabilities and reduce the strain on its resources. The USSS should evaluate its budget, staffing, and personnel retention challenges and advise Congress as to specific needs. Enhanced training should be provided for any non-USSS federal personnel on-site. USSS may also benefit from reducing the number of individuals it protects. Congress must consider whether the Secret Service's investigative obligations can effectively coexist with its primary protective mission, and whether the agency's investigative functions should remain within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

With respect to operations, Congress must ensure that the USSS enhances its sense of responsibility for the mission by assigning the agency full ownership of security planning for high-profile events (not just those aspects within the secure perimeter). Congress must also conduct oversight to ensure that the USSS implements security redundancies to avoid operational failures

in high-pressure moments. To make oversight of the USSS oversight more effective, Congress should require that on-site USSS radio transmissions are recorded and that there is a formal escalation process for security-related disagreements at events. Relatedly, Congress must do more to make clear through its Article I authorities that Article II criminal investigations do not supersede or prohibit access to information pursuant to congressional investigations, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) should be prepared to efficiently assist with congressional investigations to ensure Congress has access to all the information necessary to effectively legislate.

* * *

These findings and recommendations are based on an array of evidence. The Task Force obtained information from federal, state, and local sources, including but not limited to:

- Briefings from the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF);
- Forty-six transcribed witness interviews of federal, state, and LLE officials;
- Four state and local witnesses and one former USSS agent who testified at a Task Force hearing on September 26, 2024;
- The Acting Director's testimony at a Task Force hearing on December 5, 2024;
- Walkthroughs of the campaign event location in Butler, Pennsylvania and the place of confrontation at Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Florida; and
- An evidence presentation at the FBI laboratory in Quantico, Virginia.

The Task Force was given access to more than 18,000 pages of documents in response to requests to federal, state, and local agencies. Chairman Kelly also issued five subpoenas to obtain sensitive documents from local agencies in Pennsylvania and testimony from ATF employees.

The testimony obtained by the Task Force related to the events of July 13 and September 15 was conflicting at times. The DOJ also withheld information from the Task Force related to ongoing investigations. Despite those limitations, the Task Force reached the findings and recommendations contained herein on a bipartisan basis, with a high degree of confidence.

Background

On Tuesday, July 2, 2024, the Secret Service's Donald Trump Division (DTD) notified the Secret Service Pittsburgh Field Office (PIT) about a potential visit by former President Trump on July 13.³ PIT Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge (ATSAIC) **ATSAIC PIT** began assigning personnel to the event based on agent availability.⁴ On Wednesday, July 3, DTD confirmed the visit.⁵ The site and schedule were still to be determined.⁶ PIT Senior Special Agent **Lead Advance** was assigned as Lead Advance Agent to the visit.⁷ The campaign event was announced to the public on July 3.⁸ On Thursday, July 4, DTD confirmed that the visit would take place at the Butler Farm Show.⁹

Butler Farm Show, Inc. (Butler Farm Show), in Butler County, Pennsylvania, is situated in both Connoquenessing and Butler Townships.¹⁰ The Butler Farm Show property spans more than 100 acres, with at least seven entrances that are open to the public.¹¹ Parts of the grounds are surrounded by approximately four-feet to six-feet tall chain link fences.¹² The Butler Farm Show is private property but open for public use.¹³ During the 2020 campaign, then-President Trump hosted an event in Butler, Pennsylvania, on October 31, 2020, at a different venue—the Pittsburgh-Butler Regional Airport.¹⁴

Secret Service Advance Planning

On Friday, July 5, PIT sent an email to state and local counterparts inviting them to a police meeting on Monday, July 8, at 1:00 p.m. to discuss the visit.¹⁵ PIT Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) **SAIC PIT** called representatives from the Butler County Sheriff's Office, Butler Township Police

³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴ Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge **ATSAIC PIT**, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 22-23 (Oct. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff).

⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁰ *Butler County, PA: Parcel and Tax Map*, Butler Cty., PA. Mapping Dep't (last visited Nov. 26, 2024), <https://geo.co.butler.pa.us/portal/apps/experiencebuilder/experience/?id=357cedf86df14148b371aba27f8296b4>.

¹¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ *'We Win Pennsylvania, We Win It All': President Trump Rallies Supporters In Butler County*, CBS News, <https://www.cbsnews.com/pittsburgh/news/trump-rally-in-butler-county/> (last visited Dec. 1, 2024).

¹⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Department (BTPD), Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), and Butler County Department of Emergency Services (Butler DES) to verbally invite them.¹⁶ A PIT Special Agent sent an email invitation that afternoon.¹⁷ DTD Special Agent [redacted] Site Agent was assigned to be the Site Agent, and the Secret Service Technical Security Division (TSD) assigned Technical Security Investigator (TSI) [redacted] TSI Agent to be the TSD advance agent.¹⁸ Secret Service leadership assigned Special Agent [redacted] CAT Lead as the Counter Assault Team (CAT) advance for the rally.¹⁹

On Saturday, July 6, PIT Senior Special Agent [redacted] Site Counterpart was assigned to be the Site Counterpart.²⁰ PIT assigned the roles of Lead Advance Agent and Site Counterpart based on their experience with the Secret Service.²¹

Roles and Responsibilities on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania²²	
Role:	Assigned to:
Special Agent in Charge PIT	[redacted] SAIC PIT
Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge PIT	[redacted] ATSAIC PIT
Special Agent in Charge DTD	[redacted] SAIC DTD
Assistant Special Agent in Charge DTD	[redacted] ASAIC DTD
Lead Advance Agent/Transportation Advance Agent	[redacted] Lead Advance (PIT)
Site Agent	[redacted] Site Agent (DTD)
Site Counterpart	[redacted] Site Counterpart (PIT)
Site Protective Intelligence Agent	[redacted] Site PI (PHX)
Protective Intelligence Advance Agent	[redacted] PI Advance (PIT)
Counter Assault Team (CAT) Leader	[redacted] CAT Lead
CAT Operator	[redacted] CAT Op.
Secret Service Security Room Supervisor	[redacted] Sec. Room Sup. (BUF)
Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems Operator (C-UAS)	[redacted] C-UAS Op. (DTD)
Counter-sniper Response Team Agent	[redacted] CS Resp. (OKC)
Counter-sniper Team Lead	[redacted] CS TL
Counter-sniper Sergeant Technician	[redacted] CS Sgt. Tech.
Counter-sniper Technician	[redacted] CS Tech.
Technical Security Investigator	[redacted] TSI Agent
Post-stander at the motorcade entrance	[redacted] USSS Post 1 (PHX)
OPO Assistant Director	[redacted] OPO Asst. Dir.

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 009965, 010028 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 010004 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²¹ *Id.*

²² This table shows agents assigned for key roles and is not comprehensive of all Secret Service personnel. For a more complete list, see Appendix.

On Monday, July 8, at 10:00 a.m., Special Agents [Lead Advance] [Site Counterpart] and [Site Agent] conducted a site walkthrough with Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (hereinafter, campaign) staff and Butler Farm Show personnel, during which they discussed numerous aspects of the site including stage location and line of site mitigation.²³ At 1:00 p.m., the police meeting to discuss the visit commenced with representatives from Butler Emergency Services Unit (ESU), BTPD, PSP, Butler County Sheriff's Office, and Butler DES.²⁴ The police meeting included a discussion of the site, the security perimeter, and the motorcade route.²⁵ Butler ESU Deputy Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 2] attended the meeting and received Special Agent [CAT Lead] contact information.²⁶ Special Agent [CAT Lead] testified that this exchange of contact information was for the purpose of conducting a "telephonic" advance and that he was "told to do every advance telephonically because of manpower."²⁷

In the morning on Tuesday, July 9, the Secret Service, campaign staff, and airport personnel conducted an airport walkthrough for the visit.²⁸ Secret Service and PSP established motorcade routes.²⁹ Separately, DTD requested counter-sniper assets from the Secret Service Special Operations Division (SOD) due to a long-range threat from a foreign state actor that was not specific to the rally on July 13.³⁰ Around the same time as the DTD request, Senior Special Agent [Lead Advance] called Butler ESU Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], and according to Commander [Butler ESU Com] she "asked if we had sniper assets with our team," "asked if we could provide two sniper teams for the rally," and "explained that they would not have their normal assets for this rally that they normally have available."³¹ Commander [Butler ESU C] said he would check and confirm that Butler ESU could provide sniper assets.³² Separately and prior to when Commander [Butler ESU C] did, the USSS SOD approved DTD's request for counter-sniper assets, and Technician [CS TL] was assigned as counter-sniper advance support.³³

²³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367-68 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁴ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, House Committee Overview Presentation, 2 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Dir. [Butler DES Dir.], Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs., Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 11 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁶ Dep. Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 2], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 13-14 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁷ Special Agent [CAT Lead] U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 24 (Oct. 10, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁹ *Id.*; Sr. Special Agent [Lead Advance], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 82 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368, 002130-31 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³¹ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Butler ESU Assist Request Timeline - [Butler ESU C] 1 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³² *Id.*

³³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 002129-30 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Special Agents **Lead Advance**, **Site Agent** and **Site Counterpart** and PSP troopers discussed motorcade arrival and departure and lines of sight issues with the campaign staff.³⁴ PSP Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** spoke with campaign staff about using a third party's large farm equipment to mitigate those issues, which Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** recalled was declined at that time because "the equipment was too large, too big for the venue."³⁵

Later, on July 9, Special Agents **Lead Advance**, **Site Agent** and **Site Counterpart** also met with Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** and Butler DES Director **Butler DES Dir.** to review a map of the site at the PSP Barracks in Butler.³⁶ The meeting lasted "around an hour or so" to discuss the to discuss the placement of police posts and life and fire safety assets.³⁷

During the meeting, the group discussed the AGR property—a complex of buildings, parking areas, and open spaces next to the Butler Farm Show. Senior Special Agent **Lead Advance** testified that her understanding from this meeting, which she said was relayed by Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** was that the main AGR building would be "[c]losed, secured," with "a police presence in the area of [the AGR] complex, those buildings, to be able to deter and mitigate people from accessing the buildings."³⁸ Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** similarly testified that Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** said "that the business was going to be shut down, and he talked to the owner, and that it would be -- the business would be locked, secured, and posted."³⁹

PSP Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** testified that he did not recall making that remark. He told the Task Force "[t]here was no discussion of any, like, physical postings at that point [...] [T]here was no notes."⁴⁰ Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** testified that he provided all of the assets that USSS requested, and that "it was never

³⁴ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁵ *Id.*; Lt. **PSP Lt. 1**, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 52 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Lt. **PSP Lt. 1**, Penn. State Police Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 55 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Dir. **Butler DES Dir.**, Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 41 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). Others such as Butler County Emergency Services Management Department employee **Butler DES Employee**, Butler County Sheriff Mike Slupe, and Pennsylvania State Police Lieutenant **PSP Lt. 2** are recalled as having attended. The facts and attendance described, however, are limited to the people who the Task Force interviewed.

³⁷ Dir. **Butler DES Dir.**, Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 15-16 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent **Lead Advance**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 83-84 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁸ Sr. Special Agent **Lead Advance**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 86-87 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁹ Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 73 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁰ Lt. **PSP Lt. 1**, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 22 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

mentioned to me to cover that [AGR] building, and if I would have been asked to cover it, I had the resources.”⁴¹

Secret Service scheduled a walkthrough to take place on Thursday, July 11, at 10:00 a.m.⁴² Special Agent **Site Agent** circulated pictures of the site to other DTD special agents with proposed locations for magnetometers, the stage, and the crowd.⁴³ Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** testified that he was unaware of Butler ESU’s role for the rally as of July 9.⁴⁴ A Butler ESU document obtained by the Task Force indicates that at this time, “PA State Police forwards the first map ESU received for the rally venue. This map was sent to the US Secret Service and the Butler County Emergency Services Director before being forwarded to ESU.”⁴⁵

On Wednesday, July 10, USSS counter-sniper assets and TSD arrived in Pittsburgh.⁴⁶ Secret Service advance personnel and PIT SAIC **SAIC PIT** walked the Butler Farm Show grounds for a manpower walkthrough, which precedes a manpower request to Secret Service Headquarters in order to assess what human resources should be requested.⁴⁷ SAIC **SAIC PIT** testified that he recommended three additional post standers beyond those the advance agents initially intended to request.⁴⁸ He also testified that he asked about AGR and was told by advance agents that “roving police posts” would cover the property, that it would be “close[d] down for the day,” that there would be a patrol car to block the parking lot, that there would be police in the double-fence between the Butler Farm Show grounds and the AGR property, that there would be various obstructions to lines of sight, and that there would be counter-snipers.⁴⁹ Secret Service personnel then submitted the manpower request for approval.⁵⁰ The justification accompanying the request stated that the request was “scrutinized by the Advance Team and Pittsburgh FO SAIC **SAIC PIT** **SAIC PIT** in an effort to minimize required manpower.”⁵¹

⁴¹ *Id.* at 58.

⁴² Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 009951-57 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁴ Lt. **PSP Lt. 1**, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 71 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁵ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, House Committee Overview Presentation, 4 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ Special Agent in Charge **SAIC PIT**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 62-63 (Oct. 25, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 63.

⁵⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 010017 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

The manpower request included twenty-two post standers—six Secret Service special agents and sixteen DHS Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agents—a role that ranged in missions from ensuring motorcade access to manning magnetometers.⁵²

Site post instructions explicitly assigned four agents to rove the grounds, three of which were partnered with a total of four counterparts from either state or local police.⁵³ One post stander would monitor the space between the airport parking lot and the main magnetometer checkpoint.⁵⁴ This agent had one state counterpart and one local counterpart.⁵⁵ One agent would serve as relief and response, which meant taking the place of post standers who needed to go on breaks.⁵⁶ One counter-sniper response (CSR) agent would serve as relief until one hour before the former President's arrival and then perform CSR duties.⁵⁷ The CSR agent, Special Agent [REDACTED] CS Resp. [REDACTED] CS Resp. [REDACTED] from the Oklahoma City Field Office, had one state counterpart, PSP Trooper [REDACTED] PSP Trp. 2 [REDACTED].⁵⁸ One agent would serve the role of site Protective Intelligence (PI).⁵⁹ This agent, Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI [REDACTED] from the Phoenix Field Office, had one state counterpart, PSP Trooper [REDACTED] PSP Trp. 3 [REDACTED].⁶⁰ Several Secret Service witnesses testified that the role of site PIs is to interview suspicious persons.⁶¹ Secret Service assigned these four roving teams to cover 15,000-20,000 attendees on a 100-acre property.⁶²

⁵² Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 000219-25, 10016 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 000222-23, 010017-19 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁴ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 000222 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 000223 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [REDACTED] CS Resp. [REDACTED], Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 16-17 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁷ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 000223 (2024) (on file with the Task Force). Secret Service policy states that the purpose of CSR is to investigate suspicious activities observed by counter-sniper teams, and further, that CSR should be solely dedicated to counter-sniper teams. Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 000125 (2024) (on file with the Task Force). According to Secret Service policy, activity like a person on a roof would warrant CSR activation. Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 000125 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 000223 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [REDACTED] CS Resp. [REDACTED], Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 58 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 000223 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁰ *Id.*; Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI [REDACTED], Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 23 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶¹ Technician [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 169 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. [REDACTED], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 104 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶² Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 010019 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

On Thursday, July 11, at 10:00 a.m., Secret Service personnel met with local police, fire, EMS, and tactical groups at the site.⁶³ They discussed the security perimeter as a group.⁶⁴ Butler ESU Deputy Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm.] was assigned to embed with the USSS counter-assault team (CAT).⁶⁵ Secret Service personnel further discussed options to mitigate line of sight issues with campaign staff on that day.⁶⁶

Following the meeting, participants broke into smaller groups based on responsibilities at the event.⁶⁷ Secret Service and state and local police walked the perimeter of the site to finalize and assign law enforcement posts.⁶⁸ Regarding conversations with Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] PSP Lt. [PSP Lt. 1] testified, “when we walked that property [. . .] we walked right past that fence line, and they never said anything about me putting a car over there.”⁶⁹ BTPD Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1] recalled that PSP Lt. [PSP Lt. 1] asked if Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1] could provide a patrol car in the AGR parking lot, to which Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1] replied, “No, I don’t have enough men to do this. I cannot do that.”⁷⁰ Based on those discussions, Special Agents [Lead Advance] [Site Agent] and [Site Counterpart] testified that they expected more patrol around AGR.⁷¹

This was the last meeting between the Secret Service and state and local counterparts related to the security plan.

On Friday, July 12, at 11:00 a.m., Secret Service personnel met with campaign staff.⁷² They further discussed line of sight concerns.⁷³ The discussion covered the possibility that large farm equipment could be used to block lines of sight from the AGR property—it was agreed to place a combine at the 3 o’clock position.⁷⁴ The Secret Service Candidate Nominations Section circulated

⁶³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁴ *Id.*

⁶⁵ Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 2], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 18-19 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁷ *Id.*

⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁹ Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 58 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁰ Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷¹ Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 140 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [Lead Advance], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 87 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 73 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷² Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001369 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷³ *Id.*

⁷⁴ *Id.*; Ass’t Special Agent in Charge [ASAIC DTD], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 110 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

final paperwork to all DTD shift personnel and advance planning personnel at approximately 5:00 p.m.⁷⁵ Site construction continued Friday and into the early hours of Saturday, July 13.⁷⁶ Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] worked with PSP Lt. [PSP Lt. 1] to tow unauthorized vehicles at the site.⁷⁷ The Secret Service conducted another walkthrough.⁷⁸ The DTD ATSAIC received an email including slides from the police meeting, which included pictures of the site.⁷⁹

On July 12, Butler ESU completed its operations plan. According to this plan, Butler ESU would be assisted by the Beaver County ESU (Beaver ESU) and Washington County SWAT (Washington SWAT).⁸⁰ On the east side of the Butler Farm Show grounds near Brady Paul Lane and Meridian Road, Butler ESU CAT and [LES] (LES) assets would be positioned behind the barns situated behind former President Trump, and there would be a Butler County command post near the local Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) lodge.⁸¹ Members of the CAT would be “dedicated” and would “not deviate from their mission.”⁸² Snipers, who came from Butler, Beaver, and Washington teams, would be located in the grandstand, press box, and AGR.⁸³ The plan divided the Butler Farm Show grounds into seven sectors of responsibility, and almost all teams would be on the property, inside the secure perimeter.⁸⁴ The local sniper team positioned in the main AGR building would be outside the perimeter.⁸⁵ Sniper teams and Beaver ESU team leaders were issued a Butler County radio, and a radio was set aside for the Secret Service.⁸⁶

Commander [Butler ESU C] testified that he did not send the Butler ESU plan to anyone with Secret Service.⁸⁷ He testified that the Secret Service did not ask for the plan.⁸⁸ He testified that this was normal, in his view, based on previous engagements between Butler ESU and the Drug Enforcement Administration, another federal agency.⁸⁹

⁷⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 010031 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001369 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 09976-90 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁰ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally 7-13-24 Final OP-Plan Updated, 13 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸¹ *Id.* at 2.

⁸² *Id.* at 10.

⁸³ *Id.* at 12.

⁸⁴ *Id.* at 11.

⁸⁵ *Id.* at 12.

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 20; Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 122-23 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁷ Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 80 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸ *Id.*

⁸⁹ *Id.* at 80-81.

Also on July 12, PSP completed its operations plan for itself and the Butler County Sheriff's Office, which was a partner entity for the event.⁹⁰ PSP Trooper **PSP Trp. 1** and Butler County Sheriff's Deputy **Sheriff's Deputy** were the only planned patrol presence near the AGR property—they were stationed in a grassy area between the chain link fences that marked the perimeter of the Butler Farm Show property and the AGR property.⁹¹

Between July 11 and the event, BTPD completed its operations plan.⁹² The plan directed officers to “keep their intersection clear when Trump’s motorcade is arriving and departing,” which included managing traffic and congestion.⁹³

Crooks Conducts Reconnaissance

On Friday, July 5, Crooks searched “when is the DNC convention” and “when is the RNC in 2024.”⁹⁴ The next day, July 6, Crooks registered to attend the rally in Butler and searched for “how far away was oswald from kennedy,” “butler farm show grounds,” and “where will trump speak from at butler farm show,” among other topics.⁹⁵

On Sunday, July 7, Crooks traveled from his home to the Butler Farm Show grounds, parked his vehicle near the grounds, walked a portion of the exterior fence, returned to his vehicle, and then departed the immediate area.⁹⁶ He also drove his vehicle in the vicinity of the Butler Farm Show and the AGR property, before departing the area.⁹⁷ He subsequently drove toward his family’s home in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania.⁹⁸

On Monday, July 8, Crooks conducted an internet search for “AGR International.”⁹⁹ On July 9, Crooks conducted internet searches for “butler farm show photos” and “agr international.”¹⁰⁰ On Wednesday, July 10, Crooks searched “weather in Butler” and purchased a SwissGear backpack at a store in Bethel Park.¹⁰¹

⁹⁰ Lt. **PSP Lt. 1**, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 32 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹¹ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs – Final 8.14.24, 47-48 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Deputy Sheriff **Sheriff's Deputy**, Butler Co. Sheriff's Off., Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 13 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹² Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1**, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 20-21 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹³ Production to Task Force, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Trump Operational Plan BTPD scan, 1 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1**, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 32 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁴ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Timeline Related to Thomas Crooks: 03 July 2024 – 13 July 2024, 1 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁵ *Id.*

⁹⁶ *Id.*

⁹⁷ *Id.*

⁹⁸ *Id.*

⁹⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰⁰ *Id.*

¹⁰¹ *Id.*

On July 12, the day before the rally, Crooks visited a local gun range—Clairton Sportsman Club in Clairton, Pennsylvania.¹⁰²

July 13: Law Enforcement Arrives at the Butler Farm Show Grounds

Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] arrived at the Butler Farm Show grounds around 8:00 a.m. on July 13.¹⁰³ Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] observed spectators already in line for the rally.¹⁰⁴ She drove around the property in a golf cart to assess the site, unlock gates, and wait for Butler Farm Show personnel to unlock the buildings.¹⁰⁵ Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] also set up the Security Room.¹⁰⁶

At 9:00 or 9:30 a.m., Butler ESU hosted an operational brief for its assets, with assets from Beaver ESU and Washington SWAT.¹⁰⁷ Commander [Butler ESU C] and Butler ESU [Butler ESU CAT TL 1] led the meeting.¹⁰⁸ After the brief, “assets were released to prepare equipment and stage, with instructions that all assets were to be in position with the goal of being operational by 1100hrs.”¹⁰⁹

At 10:00 a.m., Special Agents [Site Agent] and [Site Counterpart] hosted a manpower briefing for Secret Service post standers.¹¹⁰ The meeting was a bit longer than usual to provide additional guidance to HSI special agents.¹¹¹ The post standers assumed their posts by 11:00 a.m.¹¹²

Special Agents [Site Agent] and [Site Counterpart] split up the post standers to drop them off at their assigned locations.¹¹³ They later checked in on post standers to confirm their understanding of their

¹⁰² *Id.*

¹⁰³ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 122 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* at 123.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

¹⁰⁷ *Id.*

¹⁰⁸ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Butler ESU Assist Request Timeline - [Butler ESU], 3 (2024) (on file with the Task Force). Another document says that the briefing took place at 9:30 a.m. Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, House Committee Overview Presentation, 11 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁰⁹ Dep. Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 49 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 90-91 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹¹⁰ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Butler ESU Assist Request Timeline - [Butler ESU], 3 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹¹¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001369 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ Special Agent [CS Resp.], Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 30-31 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

duties.¹¹⁴ At 10:30 a.m., Butler ESU was operational in the local command trailer.¹¹⁵ At 12:30 p.m., the Secret Service opened the venue to event staff and vendors.¹¹⁶ At 1:00 p.m., the magnetometer screening commenced for the general public.¹¹⁷

Secret Service did not arrange or attend any meetings with state and local counterparts on the day of the event.

Snipers Take Positions

At 12:56 p.m., Technician [CS TL] received a text from Butler ESU Sniper Team Lead [Butler ESU Snip. TL] advising that they were in position and had three snipers in the AGR building.¹¹⁸ Butler ESU [Butler ESU Sniper], Beaver ESU [Beaver ESU Snip. ATL]—and, for part of the day until the early afternoon, Beaver ESU Sniper Team Lead (TL) [Beaver ESU Snip. TL]—were positioned inside the main AGR building.¹¹⁹

Between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., Technician [CS TL] visited the Security Room and met with CSR Special Agent [CS Resp.]¹²⁰ Technician [CS TL] and Special Agent [CS Resp.] conducted a radio check and reviewed counter-sniper grids prepared for the event.¹²¹

Shortly after 1:42 p.m., Technician [CS TL] and Butler ESU Sniper TL [Butler ESU Snip. TL] met, during which Technician [CS TL] shared a packet of information, and said, “this is what we are doing. This is how we’re looking at it. This is what we do to figure out threats. And how we announce them to each other.”¹²² Butler ESU TL [Butler ESU Snip. TL] was with other local snipers in the stadium area on the opposite side of the rally stage from the AGR complex.¹²³ Technician [CS TL] never met with the local snipers in the AGR building.¹²⁴

¹¹⁴ Special Agent [USSS Post. 1] Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 46-47 (Oct. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 46 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹¹⁵ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, House Committee Overview Presentation, 11 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹¹⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001369 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹¹⁷ *Id.*

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

¹¹⁹ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally 7-13-24 Final OP-Plan Updated, 19 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Team Lead [Beaver ESU Snip. TL], Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 73 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹²⁰ Technician [CS TL], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 104 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹²¹ *Id.* at 104-105.

¹²² Team Lead [Butler ESU Snip. TL], Butler ESU Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 58, 62-63 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹²³ *Id.* at 52-53.

¹²⁴ Team Lead [Beaver ESU Snip. TL], Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 15 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

TL **Butler ESU Snip. TL** mentioned that a local radio was available for Technician **CS TL** use.¹²⁵ Technician **CS TL** never retrieved the local radio. He testified that after the meeting, he became distracted by issues of radio interference and did not pick up the local radio as a result.¹²⁶

Technician **CS TL** testified that he recalled the counter-sniper team taking position on the roof around 5:00 p.m. and that the “aim” is for **LES**.¹²⁷

Separate USSS Security Room and Local Command Post Open

USSS housed its central communications and planned for its central command to be inside the rally site Security Room.¹²⁸ USSS SAIC (Buffalo) **Sec. Room Sup.** reported to the Security Room, where he was joined by Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** PSP Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** and several Butler Farm Show staff. SAIC **Sec. Room** testified that the only agency that he “knew specifically that was there on site was the Pennsylvania State Police,” and that he was unaware that LLE set up a separate command center until at “some point during the day, it became apparent that the State Police representative who was in the command post with me was talking on the phone with people somewhere else.”¹²⁹

SAIC **Sec. Room** had his cell phone, his “handheld radio, and what we call a **LES** or a **LES** radio, which is essentially just a slightly more powerful handheld radio.”¹³⁰ Each radio was set to a different USSS channel.¹³¹ The Security Room had tables in the middle of the room, with SAIC **Sec. Room** in between Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** and Sgt. **PSP Sgt.**¹³² **Butler DES Dir.**, Director of Butler County DES, was also in the Security Room before leaving around 4:30 p.m. and being replaced by a local fire chief.¹³³ Between six and ten personnel were present in the USSS Security Room at any given point.¹³⁴ Because the Security Room also had a restroom and refreshments, different USSS personnel stopped by throughout the day to take breaks.¹³⁵

¹²⁵ Technician **CS TL**, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 105 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹²⁶ *Id.* at 104-106.

¹²⁷ *Id.* at 111.

¹²⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 000220, 010017 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹²⁹ Special Agent in Charge **Sec. Room Sup.**, Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 52-53 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹³⁰ *Id.* at 23.

¹³¹ *Id.* at 26.

¹³² *Id.* at 77, 113.

¹³³ Dir. **Butler DES Dir.**, Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 51-52 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹³⁴ Special Agent in Charge **Sec. Room Sup.**, Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 26 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹³⁵ *Id.* at 121. (“The site supervisors was in and out of the security room. Both site agents were in and out of the security room. The PI lead advance, once the motorcade was there, and his counterpart were in and out of the security room. Multiple post standers in and out on their relief. Uniform Division officers in and out on their relief.”).

There was a local trailer operating as a second command center.¹³⁶ The following leaders from the LLE entities were present in the local trailer: Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU; Deputy Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1], Butler ESU; [Butler DES Tech], Butler County DES; Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1], BTPD; and Sergeant [Sheriff's Sgt.], Butler County Sheriff's Office.¹³⁷ Sgt. [Sheriff's Sgt.] and Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1] sat on one side of the trailer while Commander [Butler ESU Cor] Deputy Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1] and [Butler DES] sat on the other side of the trailer.¹³⁸ Each representative listened to their radio channel for communications between and among colleagues from their respective law enforcement entities.¹³⁹ Additionally, Commander [Butler ESU C] listened to the BTPD channel and had a PSP radio.¹⁴⁰ Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] and Lt. [PSP Lt. 1] each testified that they were under the impression that the trailer would only be used for medical emergencies, and Special Agent [Site Agent] said she thought it was for line of sight mitigation.¹⁴¹

Before the former President arrived, LLE officers noticed that the PSP radio in the local trailer was not functioning and that some officers were having issues with the cellular signal.¹⁴² Commander [Butler ESU Cor] who happened to have personal familiarity with PSP Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] successfully relied on his cell phone to pass along information from local officers to PSP and USSS.¹⁴³

USSS Attempts to Bring C-UAS Online

Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testified to the Task Force that a counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) detection system was deployed to the rally on July 13, 2024.¹⁴⁴ The C-UAS system was purchased from [LES] and equipped with [LES] that the system

¹³⁶ Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 16 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹³⁷ Sgt. [Sheriff's Sgt.], Butler Co. Sheriff's Off., Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 8 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 45 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹³⁸ Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep't Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 40-41 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹³⁹ Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 141 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 39 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁴⁰ Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 133, 141 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁴¹ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 128 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 16 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 162 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁴² Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 133-35 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁴³ *Id.* at 47-46, 150-51.

¹⁴⁴ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 29 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

could detect within the temporary flight restriction in place for the event.¹⁴⁵ This **LES** covers a significant portion of the consumer drone market, including the brand used by Crooks.¹⁴⁶ Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** testified that if a drone is detected, the detection system sends a text message alert to phone numbers programmed into the system.¹⁴⁷ Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** programmed several agents' phone numbers into the system.¹⁴⁸ Once an agent receives an alert, an agent may deploy to pursue the drone pilot for questioning.¹⁴⁹ Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** testified that at a previous event, for instance, a detected drone evidenced a recreational flight pattern and did not warrant agent deployment.¹⁵⁰

Around 11:30 a.m., Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** notified Special Agent **Site Agent** that the C-UAS detection system was inoperable.¹⁵¹ **C-UAS Op.** spent most of the morning and early afternoon going in and out of the Security Room while troubleshooting with tech support via a 1-800 number.¹⁵² Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** testified that he did not carry spare parts for the detection system and successfully used the system last in **LES**, but did not at any point test the system after leaving **LES** prior to the Butler event.¹⁵³

At approximately 3:51 p.m., Crooks flew a drone approximately 200 yards from the Butler Farm Show grounds for around 11 minutes.¹⁵⁴ The drone and controller were later found in his car; analysis did not reveal any photos or videos taken by the drone on the day of the rally, but the Task Force confirmed that he was live streaming and would have been able to view the feed on the controller, and could have viewed the podium and surrounding area where the former President was to be speaking later that day.¹⁵⁵

The detection system became operable around 4:30 p.m., almost an hour too late to detect Crooks' drone.¹⁵⁶ Prior to shots fired, the detection system gave no alerts.¹⁵⁷ Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** testified that the Secret Service now requires agents to test C-UAS capabilities prior to the post-stander brief.¹⁵⁸

¹⁴⁵ *Id.* at 39-40, 42, 59, 80.

¹⁴⁶ *Id.* at 39-40, 80.

¹⁴⁷ *Id.* at 71.

¹⁴⁸ *Id.*

¹⁴⁹ *Id.* at 47-48.

¹⁵⁰ *Id.*

¹⁵¹ *Id.* at 86.

¹⁵² *Id.* at 76-78.

¹⁵³ *Id.* at 64.

¹⁵⁴ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Timeline Related to Thomas Crooks: 03 July 2024 – 13 July 2024, 1 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁵⁵ Briefing by the Fed. Bureau of Investigation: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. (Nov. 18, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

¹⁵⁶ Special Agent **C-UAS Op.**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 80 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁵⁷ *Id.* at 86.

¹⁵⁸ *Id.* at 76.

Medical and Technical Issues

At 1:00 p.m., the magnetometers opened to the public.¹⁵⁹ The temperature reached about 95 degrees Fahrenheit, and hundreds of attendees experienced heat-related medical events.¹⁶⁰ USSS personnel helped transport attendees in the crowd, including some who were waiting outside in line to medical tents.¹⁶¹ For those who had not gone through magnetometers, USSS personnel scanned them before they were released from the medical tent.¹⁶² There were multiple texts between USSS personnel about line lengths and medical issues.¹⁶³

Several LLE officers and USSS personnel reported having connection issues with their cellular devices.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, the USSS and PSP radio systems were malfunctioning for some users, including a USSS radio channel picking up communications from an event in Pittsburgh, where another USSS protectee—First Lady Jill Biden (FLOTUS)—gave remarks.¹⁶⁵ After consulting with PIT SAIC [REDACTED], SAIC [REDACTED] decided to change the radio channel used by the post standers.¹⁶⁶ Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI sent an email to post standers directing them to switch to a different channel.¹⁶⁷

¹⁵⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001369 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁶⁰ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 181 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Dir. [REDACTED] Butler DES Dir., Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 52-53 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁶¹ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI, Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 43 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁶² Ass't to the Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] ATSAIC PIT, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 55-56 (Oct. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁶³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 009888-91, 009893, 009897-009905, 009914-15, 009922, 009936-37, 009941-43 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁶⁴ Lt. [REDACTED] BTPD Lt. 1, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 42 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [REDACTED] USSS Post 1, Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 46-47 (Oct. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 46 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁶⁵ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 131 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁶⁶ Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Sec. Room Sup., Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 77, 113 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁶⁷ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 0002235 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Protectee Arrives

SAIC SAIC PIT and Senior Special Agent Lead Advance traveled with the motorcade from the airport to the Butler grounds.¹⁶⁸ Former President Trump left the airport at 4:27 p.m. and arrived at the Butler Farm Show at 5:33 p.m.¹⁶⁹

Timeline of Crooks' Movements on July 13

Around 9:30 a.m., Crooks purchased a 5'5" ladder from a store in Bethel Park.¹⁷⁰ At around 11:00 a.m., he drove his vehicle in the vicinity of the Butler Farm Show grounds.¹⁷¹ He stayed about 70 minutes, and then returned home.¹⁷² At approximately 1:30 p.m., Crooks' father gave him the rifle that would later be used in the assassination attempt.¹⁷³ The firearm was legally transferred to Crooks by his father the year prior.¹⁷⁴ Crooks told his father that he was going to the local gun range, as he had done many times previously.¹⁷⁵ Crooks then bought 50 rounds of ammunition between 1:47 p.m. and 1:55 p.m.¹⁷⁶

At 3:48 p.m., Crooks returned to the vicinity of the Butler Farm Show grounds.¹⁷⁷ At approximately 3:50 p.m., Crooks flew a drone over the site for 11 minutes.¹⁷⁸ The drone's flight path would have positioned the drone's cameras to show Crooks a view of the stage and podium approximately 200 yards away.¹⁷⁹ Around 4:26 p.m., digital evidence showed Crooks near the Butler Farm Show's airstrip, walking past a row of vendors outside the secure perimeter approximately a half mile away from the AGR property.¹⁸⁰

¹⁶⁸ Special Agent in Charge SAIC PIT, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 89 (Oct. 25, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent Lead Advance, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 16 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁶⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 0001370 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁷⁰ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Timeline Related to Thomas Crooks: 03 July 2024 – 13 July 2024, 1 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁷¹ *Id.*

¹⁷² Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff)

¹⁷³ *Id.*

¹⁷⁴ *Id.*

¹⁷⁵ *Id.*

¹⁷⁶ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Timeline Related to Thomas Crooks: 03 July 2024 – 13 July 2024, 1 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁷⁷ *Id.*

¹⁷⁸ *Id.*

¹⁷⁹ Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff).

¹⁸⁰ Production to Task Force, Fed Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Update 8.28.24, 3-4 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Three LLE officers first noticed Crooks at approximately 5:00 p.m.¹⁸¹ These observations were made independently, and based upon each officer's experience, Crooks' behavior and manner were suspicious. For instance, **Butler ESU Op. 2**, a member of the Butler ESU **LES** saw Crooks in the 4:30 - 5:00 p.m. timeframe.¹⁸² **Butler ESU Op. 2** was stationed inside the secure perimeter near the barns behind the stage, but he was able to see Crooks as **Butler ESU Op. 2** looked out toward the AGR property.¹⁸³ He stated:

When I first observed him, he was seated on, coincidentally, the concrete wall that he was photographed to be sitting on. He came and went from that position multiple times. I - lack of a better term is I identified this person as not paying attention to the venue, not paying attention to anyone around him. He was secluded off to himself where the crowds they were - anybody else that was there was either trying to seek shade, they had maybe a lawn chair with them, they are dressed in a way that would basically signify some form of participation in the rally. A lot of them were up against the outer perimeter fence line. And, again, one of these isolated individuals was drawn way back to the corner of the AGR building, secluded, playing on the phone.¹⁸⁴

Butler ESU Op. 2 also observed Crooks looking at the sniper teams that were positioned inside the AGR complex. **Butler ESU Op. 2** testified:

I observed that [Crooks] was looking up at my sniper elements, or what I believed he believed was our sniper elements, because there was open windows -- well, as much as they could open -- and then, again, would kind of come and go. And it really appeared to me that he had absolutely zero interest in anything that was happening inside the fence.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 85 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sniper **Butler ESU Sniper**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATU**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 78 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).


¹⁸² Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 85 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁸³ *Id.* at 82-83, 86.

¹⁸⁴ *Id.* at 86.

¹⁸⁵ *Id.* at 87.

Figure 1: Positions of Crooks and Snipers at 1710 (created by Butler ESU)



Butler ESU Sniper, a sniper from Butler ESU stationed inside the AGR complex, similarly observed Crooks behaving suspiciously slightly prior to 5:00 p.m.¹⁸⁶ He testified to the Task Force:

What I observed Crooks doing was - to me he looked, he stood out. He was walking around the grassy area between AGR and the secondary fence line, kept looking up, looking at the building. One point that is what raised my suspicion is he was looking directly at the window I was positioned at [...] He, like I said, he looked up at the window I was positioned at and kept looking at it. He walked directly towards the window and underneath of it up against the building to the point where I couldn't see him. That made me feel as though he was looking or could -was potentially looking at the window to see if there was somebody inside the building. And when he went up against the building to where I couldn't look down on him, I found that to be very suspicious.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ Sniper **Butler ESU Sniper**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁸⁷ *Id.* at 33.

Butler ESU Sniper testified that he then lost sight of Crooks, and approached Sniper Assistant Team Leader (ATL) **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**, a Beaver ESU sniper also in the AGR complex, to ask if he had seen someone matching that description. **Butler ESU Sniper** stated:

So what had happened was I had observed him. When he disappeared along the lower edge of the building, I couldn't see where he went any further. I walked over and spoke to **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** and I asked him if he had seen this individual. And I described him with the long hair, gray T shirt, khaki shorts. At that time [Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**] had not observed him.¹⁸⁸

Finally, Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** stated that he first saw Crooks slightly after 5:00 p.m.¹⁸⁹ Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** testified:

So I was kind of moving around the building a little bit on binocular glass and doing the observation, and I had moved from the room that I was in into the hallway and was standing where TL **Beaver ESU Snip. TL** was positioned prior [to his departure from the site at 1619]. As I was just looking out at the crowd, I noticed an individual that was walking pretty close to the building, kind of looking up and down the building, and just thought it was odd.¹⁹⁰

Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** stated that he then lost sight of Crooks, but that **Butler ESU Sniper** saw him shortly thereafter and alerted Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**.¹⁹¹ ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** confirmed with **Butler ESU Sniper** that they had seen the same individual by comparing Crooks' clothing and hair, and they both began to search for Crooks.¹⁹²

Law Enforcement Photographs Crooks and Sees Rangefinder

Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** saw Crooks again and took two photographs of him. He testified about the sequence of events:

Beaver ESU Snip. ATL

And as I brought my binoculars down, I just happened to look down and I was like, 'There he is.' He was sitting directly below me.

¹⁸⁸ *Id.* at 34.

¹⁸⁹ Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 78 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁹⁰ *Id.*

¹⁹¹ *Id.* at 78-79.

¹⁹² *Id.* at 79.

TF STAFF: This is from the southwestern corner of that second building?

Beaver ESU Snip. ATL

Yes. And there is, like, a little wall that's about two and a half, three feet high, and he was just sitting on it. I'm like, 'Well, there he is.' So I don't know why. Maybe the opportunity and because he was so close. I'm like, I got my phone. I just pulled out the picture. The first one is the one of his back. That was the first picture that I took. And then the second picture is the one -- because I took the first one. I'm like, 'Come on, man. Turn your head. Turn your head.' And then, finally, he turned, and then I took that second one, which was the side view.¹⁹³

Similarly, **Butler ESU Sniper** testified that Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** showed him the photographs of Crooks, and **Butler ESU Sniper** identified him as the person he had seen looking at the AGR building. **Butler ESU Sniper** stated:

A short time [after I first saw Crooks] [Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**] tells me that he does see the individual I described. So I walk back over to [Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**], and at that point [Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**] had showed me -- he had taken two photographs of Crooks. I identified him as that was the individual I was describing earlier. At that time he was sitting on the concrete wall at the southwestern edge of the AGR complex that we were in scrolling through his phone.¹⁹⁴

Butler ESU Sniper returned to his post, and at approximately 5:10 p.m., Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** yelled, "[**Butler ESU Sniper**], he's out here again. He has a rangefinder."¹⁹⁵ **Butler ESU Sniper** sent a series of text messages to Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2** at 5:15 p.m. that included a

¹⁹³ *Id.* at 81.

¹⁹⁴ Sniper **Butler ESU Sniper**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 34 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁹⁵ *Id.* at 36. In his interview with the Task Force, Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** seemed to recall first seeing the rangefinder several minutes later, perhaps after 5:30, but contemporaneous messages in possession of the Task Force that are described in this report indicate that the rangefinder was known to **Butler ESU Sniper** no later than 5:15 PM, suggesting that Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** had likely informed **Butler ESU Sniper** of the rangefinder by that time.

description of Crooks.¹⁹⁶ The final message stated: “He has a range finder.”¹⁹⁷ Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2** stated that he did not see those text messages until approximately 5:40 p.m.¹⁹⁸

Figure 2: Text Messages from Butler ESU (5:15 p.m.)



ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** testified that he used his binoculars to observe Crooks and saw him use a rangefinder. He stated:

I noticed he was on a cellphone, and I was sitting there with binoculars. So I zoom in on his cellphone, and I could tell that he's looking at news feeds. Which particular ones, I don't know, but he he's scrolling through news feeds on his phone. So then he takes his phone and he puts it in his pocket, and he pulls out -- it's a rangefinder, but he pulls out a rangefinder and he starts looking. At first, I'm like -- I'm looking -- I'm like, is this a rangefinder, or is that binoculars? So I grabbed my binoculars and I zoomed in again, and I noticed -- I'm like that's a rangefinder. So, you know, when I noticed him looking through this rangefinder he was looking towards the stage and kind of just in different areas, general areas, looking out but in the direction of the stage. I was like, yeah, this is not right.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ Sniper **Butler ESU Sniper**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 36 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁹⁷ *Id.* at 61; Production to the Task Force, Butler ESU, Text messages from Butler ESU Sniper **Butler ESU Sniper** to Butler ESU Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2**, (July 13, 2024, 5:15 p.m.) (on file with the Task Force).


¹⁹⁸ Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 84-85 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

¹⁹⁹ Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 108 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** then went to look for Crooks, moving around the AGR second floor.²⁰⁰ ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** observed a bicycle and a backpack that seemed suspicious, although the FBI subsequently confirmed those items did not belong to Crooks.²⁰¹ Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** stated that he photographed the bicycle and backpack at approximately 5:25 p.m.²⁰² He testified:

So I went over there and was still looking around for this individual, and I had noticed over across the property there was a bike sitting there with a backpack and it was underneath the tree. And just from moving around earlier in the day, I didn't remember seeing that. So after seeing him and then after seeing that, it was like, eh. I thought it was kind of strange, so I took a picture of.²⁰³

Figure 3: Photograph by Beaver ESU



During this period, Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2** had been conducting surveillance outside the AGR complex with binoculars.²⁰⁴ Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2** observed Crooks moving in and out of sight near the edges of the AGR complex. Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2** testified to the Task Force:

TF STAFF: Now, you said you occasionally lose sight of him, he looked like he was going around the building and

²⁰⁰ *Id.* at 101.

²⁰¹ Press Release, *Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt*, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jul. 19, 2024).

²⁰² Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 97 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁰³ *Id.* at 101.

²⁰⁴ Operator **Butler ESU Op. 2**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 74-75 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

then he would come back. At some point you -- you did see the text messages with the photos that were sent by [Butler ESU Sniper]; right?

Butler ESU Op. 2

Yeah. Prior to that, I received three text messages from Sniper [Butler ESU Sniper] inside the building, and because he's -- we had a kind of a text back and forth where he was kind of observing that I was watching that area—

TF STAFF: Right.

Butler ESU Op. 2

-- with a set of binoculars --

TF STAFF: Right.

Butler ESU Op. 2

-- so these text messages returned and pretty much were saying, 'Are you watching this guy up against our building? Long hair, gray T-shirt, white shorts. He has a rangefinder.'

TF STAFF: Right.

Butler ESU Op. 2

So, obviously, as soon as I seen that series of messages, I presume or know exactly who he is referring to.²⁰⁵

[Butler ESU Sniper] testified that he continued to search for Crooks from 5:15 p.m. to approximately 5:40 p.m.²⁰⁶ At approximately 5:39 p.m., [Butler ESU Sniper] received a call from a Butler ESU Operator in response to the text messages from the Butler ESU Sniper.²⁰⁷ Following this call, [Butler ESU Sniper] and ATL [Beaver ESU Snip. ATL] reported their observations of Crooks to law enforcement leadership.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵ *Id.* at 93.

²⁰⁶ Sniper [Butler ESU Sniper], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 36-39 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁰⁷ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Screenshot of call logs from Butler ESU Operator [Butler ESU Op. 2] to Butler ESU Sniper [Butler ESU Sniper] (Jul. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁰⁸ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024, Sheet 2, Rows 220, 241 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Secret Service, State, and Local Law Enforcement are Alerted

At 5:38 p.m., Sniper ATL Beaver ESU Snip. ATL sent a text message along with the photographs of Crooks to a group of local snipers.²⁰⁹ The message stated: “Kid learning [sic] around building we are in. AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking towards stage. FYI. If you wanna notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him. Also a bike with a backpack sitting next to it in rear of building that was not seen earlier.”²¹⁰ ATL Beaver ESU Snip. ATL testified that he meant to type “lurking” instead of “learning.”²¹¹

Figure 4: Text Messages from Beaver ESU (5:38 p.m.)²¹²



²⁰⁹ Production to Task Force, Beaver ESU, Congressional Briefing, Slide 47 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²¹⁰ *Id.* at Slide 48.

²¹¹ Sniper Ass't Team Lead Beaver ESU Snip. ATL, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 110 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²¹² Production to Task Force, Beaver ESU, Congressional Briefing, Slides 47-48 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Over the course of approximately 13 minutes, from 5:38 to 5:51 p.m., a series of calls and messages about Crooks' description and movements reached the Secret Service.

At 5:38 p.m., BTPD Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** received the text message from ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** with the photos of Crooks.²¹³ Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** subsequently shared information about the suspicious individual with the Secret Service Special Agent stationed at his post (the Brady Paul Lane entrance for arrival and departure of the former President's motorcade).²¹⁴ That agent testified to the Task Force that after receiving the information from Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** he heard a transmission over his partner's local radio seeming to confirm that the Secret Service was aware of Crooks and was searching for him and "one of the teams respond[ing], saying something along the lines of, 'copy that.'"²¹⁵ The agent further testified that he did not reach out to the Security Room because Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** said "that the Secret Service was aware of it, and that we were looking for him as well."²¹⁶ To date, this is the only USSS agent who testified to hearing radio transmissions of any kind related to Crooks prior to the point immediately before shots were fired.

At 5:42 p.m., the Butler ESU Sniper Team Leader phoned a description of Crooks to Butler ESU Commander **Butler ESU Comm.** in the local command post.²¹⁷ The Sniper Team Leader gave Crooks' description, described his use of a rangefinder, and advised that he was located near AGR at that time.²¹⁸ At 5:44 p.m., Commander **Butler ESU C** called PSP Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** who was in the USSS Security Room, to relay this information.²¹⁹ Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** stated that he verbally communicated this information to USSS personnel in the Security Room while still on the phone with **Butler ESU Co.**²²⁰ Commander **Butler ESU C** also stated that he heard Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** immediately relay this information to others in the Security Room during their phone call.²²¹

²¹³ Production to Task Force, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Incident #24-03435, Incident Report, 13 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²¹⁴ Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1**, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²¹⁵ Special Agent **USSS Post 1**, Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 53 (Oct. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²¹⁶ *Id.* at 52; Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** was interviewed prior to the Task Force's interview with the Special Agent, and Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** did not recount this or similar comments during his interview with the Task Force.

²¹⁷ Team Lead **Butler ESU Snip. TL**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 76-77 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²¹⁸ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, H. Comm. Overview Presentation, 12 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²¹⁹ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, Recorded Administrative Interview Before Penn. State Police, 00:10:52 (Jul. 20, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to the Task Force, Butler ESU, H. Comm. Overview Presentation, 13 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²²⁰ *Id.*

²²¹ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, House Committee Overview Presentation, 13 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

LLE also forwarded the message and photos of Crooks to USSS Counter-sniper Team Leader [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED] CS TL responded “Roger. I’ll notify teams on AGR side[.]”²²³ At 5:52 p.m., [REDACTED] CS TL sent an email to the rest of the USSS Counter-sniper Team with the subject “Local CS BOLO,” containing two photos of Crooks and the description provided by the local sniper in his text.²²⁴ “BOLO” stood for “be on the lookout.”²²⁵ The email instructed the USSS Counter-sniper Team that if the individual was spotted, to contact USSS PI or to “go direct with security room.”²²⁶

At 5:45 p.m., Commander [REDACTED] Butler ESU stated on the OPS-4 radio channel—used by the ESU sniper teams—that “PSP and Sheriffs should be en route,” although the extent to which officers from those entities deployed at that time is unclear. At 5:47 p.m., he received the photographs of Crooks and forwarded them to Sgt. [REDACTED] PSP Sgt. due to issues with cell service, they did not immediately go through.²²⁷ Sgt. [REDACTED] PSP Sgt. eventually received the photographs of Crooks, and forwarded them at 5:51 p.m. to Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. in the Security Room.²²⁸

BTPD personnel may not have been present in the local command post at that time, which may have impacted their awareness of this information.²²⁹ There is also currently no evidence to suggest this information was relayed to the USSS DTD agents near the stage, or to the USSS agents in charge of rally security. At a Task Force hearing on September 26, 2024, former USSS Special Agent Patrick Sullivan testified that:

What should have happened, in my opinion, is when the suspicious person was identified, the detail leader and the shift agent should have been told there's an issue we're working, a suspicious person. And then at that point, it was probably -- probably would be inappropriate to remove the President from the stage. But the detail leader should know there's an issue. I may have to react quicker. So,

²²² Sniper Ass’t Team Lead [REDACTED] Beaver ESU Snip. ATU, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 79 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001370 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²²³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001416 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²²⁴ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001417-19 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²²⁵ E.g., U.S. Secret Service Media Relations, *Secret Service Arrests Michael Arega at White House for Making Felony Threats*, U.S. SECRET SERV. (Nov. 6, 2017) (“the Secret Service Protective Intelligence Division was notified to be on the lookout (BOLO)”).

²²⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001417 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²²⁷ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024, Sheet 2, Row 227 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, H. Comm. Overview Presentation, 13 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²²⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001920-001921(2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²²⁹ Production to Task Force, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Incident #24-03435, Incident Report (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

at a minimum, when there's a suspicious person, the detail leader and the shift agent should be told there's an issue.²³⁰

Shortly after the photos of Crooks circulated on the text message chain, Sniper ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** observed Crooks again, but there did not appear to be any law enforcement personnel searching for Crooks in or around the AGR complex.²³¹ ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** saw Crooks had returned to the picnic table with a backpack near him on the ground. Crooks soon “took off running.”²³² ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** “yell[ed] across the second floor to **Butler ESU Sniper** that now Crooks is at a picnic table with a backpack.”²³³ ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** testified to the Task Force:

TF STAFF: So now we're at 6:00. You reported this in. At this point have you seen any kind of law enforcement on foot outside the building looking for this guy?

Beaver ESU Snip. ATL No.

TF STAFF: When do you first see people start looking for this guy?

Beaver ESU Snip. ATL So at about 6:06, 6:07-ish, as I was moving around the building that I was in, I seen Crooks [...]

* * *

Beaver ESU Snip. ATL And when I looked out, I noticed that Crooks was standing out beside that picnic table and there was a backpack sitting on the ground.

TF STAFF: Okay?

Beaver ESU Snip. ATL When I looked, I seen him. He grabbed that backpack, and then he took off running.²³⁴

* * *

²³⁰ *The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service's Reliance on State and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump*, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024).

²³¹ Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 130 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²³² *Id.* at 125.

²³³ Sniper **Butler ESU Sniper**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 40 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²³⁴ Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 124 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

TF STAFF: So you saw him at the picnic table, and you saw him run with the backpack?

Beaver ESU Snp. ATL Yes.

TF STAFF: But then when he turned the corner, you couldn't see him any longer?

Beaver ESU Snp. ATL Yeah. Once he went in between the buildings, I could not see him anymore. And at that point I had then radioed to communication command. I said, Hey, suspect spotted rear of building. Grabbed the backpack and ran in between the buildings.²³⁵

Officers Respond to Search for Crooks

BTPD personnel in the vicinity of the AGR complex responded to calls over the radio that described the escalating situation related to Crooks' behavior and movements. Patrolman BTPD Patrol testified to the Task Force that several officers in the area left their posts to look for Crooks. He stated:

At that point there was another radio transmission. They were looking for him at the AGR building. [A Butler Township PD officer] departed. He was in a patrol unit, in a patrol vehicle. He left and drove towards the AGR building, which would have been northwest of my location, and I started walking in the area where I was posted. Then another radio transmission came that they last seen him walking towards Sheetz by the AGR building, which would have been towards where my location was. So at that point I started -- between my intersection to southwest, say, there's a tree line. So I started searching that area.²³⁶

Other LLE personnel in the vicinity of the AGR complex responded to the calls over the radio related to Crooks. Butler County Sheriff's Deputy Sheriff's Deputy attempted to locate Crooks beginning around 5:46 p.m. There were also two undercover PSP troopers walking around the AGR complex and property looking for Crooks.²³⁷ They had been dispatched by another PSP

²³⁵ *Id.*

²³⁶ Patrolman BTPD Patrol 2, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 33 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²³⁷ Trooper Joseph Fchet, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Penn. State Police and the FBI, 6 (July 23, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Trooper PSP Trp. 5, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Penn. State Police, 3 (Aug. 9, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

trooper, but they were only given a brief description of Crooks, and did not receive a photograph of him in time to assist in their search.²³⁸

Between 6:00 and 6:09 p.m.—minutes before the former President took the stage—several additional USSS personnel entered the Security Room, including Senior Special Agent Site Counterpart PIT SAIC SAIC PIT, and others.²³⁹ These personnel were not made aware of the ongoing search for Crooks.²⁴⁰

Crooks Moves to AGR Roof

According to the FBI, Crooks parked his vehicle on Whitestown Road in the vicinity of AGR and returned to his vehicle several times between 4:44 p.m. and 5:47 p.m.²⁴¹ Crooks used his vehicle to store improvised explosive devices and the drone that he flew earlier.²⁴² Footage obtained from a local business also shows Crooks climbed to the roof via A/C units in an alcove of the building in the AGR complex at approximately 6:05 p.m.²⁴³ Video from a local business, PSP dash camera footage, and police body camera footage show Crooks' movement across multiple AGR complex roofs between 6:05 and 6:08 p.m.²⁴⁴ Bystanders also saw Crooks pulling himself up to the roof and taking position.²⁴⁵ Several called the police, while others attempted to get the attention of police on the ground.

²³⁸ Trooper PSP Trp. 3, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Penn. State Police and the FBI, 5-6 (July 23, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²³⁹ Special Agent in Charge Sec. Room Sup., Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 121 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁴⁰ *Id.* at 121-22.

²⁴¹ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Timeline Related to Thomas Crooks: 03 July 2024 – 13 July 2024, 1 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff).

²⁴² *Id.*

²⁴³ Remarks as prepared for delivery, FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent in Charge's Remarks to Media on Updates to the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt Investigation, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁴⁴ *Id.*

²⁴⁵ *See, e.g., Video: Shooter seen by some attendees at least one minute before Trump was shot*, CNN, <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/15/us/video/shooter-seen-by-attendees-one-minute-before-trump-shot-digvid> (last visited Oct. 17, 2024).

Figure 5: Photo of the alcove and A/C unit by which Crooks gained access to the AGR roof²⁴⁶



In response to reports over the radio of a suspicious person, Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 2] left his post and approached the AGR complex.²⁴⁷ As he neared it, Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 2] observed Crooks on the roof of the AGR complex from Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 2] position near the tree line, which was at least 100 yards from the buildings.²⁴⁸ Upon seeing Crooks, Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 2] continued to move towards the AGR complex, but he lost sight of Crooks.²⁴⁹ Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 2] testified to the Task Force that he did not see any USSS personnel near the AGR complex at this point.²⁵⁰ Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 2] radioed the information—that “someone’s on the roof”—to all officers in the area.²⁵¹ Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 2] testified to the Task Force:

TF STAFF: Okay, sir. When you approached the AGR building, did you see anyone on the roof?

²⁴⁶ Photo taken by Task Force Staff during visit to the site.

²⁴⁷ Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 2], Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 32 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁴⁸ *Id.* at 34.

²⁴⁹ *Id.* at 70.

²⁵⁰ *Id.* at 32.

²⁵¹ *Id.* at 33.

BTPD Patrol 2

I did.

TF STAFF:

[I]t is our understanding, [Butler Township PD Witness 2], that at 6:08 p.m., you [...] radioed that somebody was on the roof and that there was someone on the roof with white shorts. Do you recall making this transmission?

BTPD Patrol 2

I do, yes.

TF STAFF:

And where were you when you made this transmission?

BTPD Patrol 2

I would have been in the power line, walking up the tree line. A good hundred plus yards away from the building.

TF STAFF:

And did the person that you saw on the roof match the description of the suspicious individual that had been ID'd over the radio moments prior?

BTPD Patrol 2

Yes.

TF STAFF:

When you saw someone on the roof, sir, what did you then do?

BTPD Patrol 2

I made a radio transmission that the male was on the roof. Someone's on the roof.²⁵²

From his location in a patrol car in the AGR complex parking lot, BTPD Det. [BTPD Detective] heard the call from Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 2] over the radio.²⁵³ Det. [BTPD Detective] told the Task Force that he was posted on the road near the AGR complex for traffic control.²⁵⁴ There was no traffic at his post, so Det. [BTPD Detective] departed the post to assist with locating the suspicious individual when he heard about it over the radio.²⁵⁵ Det. [BTPD Detective] arrived in his patrol car and parked at the water tower near the AGR complex, next to a PSP trooper.²⁵⁶

²⁵² *Id.*

²⁵³ Det. [BTPD Detective], Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 23 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁵⁴ *Id.* at 58-59.

²⁵⁵ *Id.*

²⁵⁶ *Id.* at 16.

Concurrently, at 6:09 p.m., Commander **Butler ESU C** called Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** in the USSS Security Room to update him that a suspicious person was now on the roof of the AGR complex.²⁵⁷

Det. **BTPD Detective** was discussing the report of a suspicious male with the PSP trooper parked next to him when he spotted Crooks moving across the AGR roofs.²⁵⁸ He testified to the Task Force that he saw a “male [who] appeared to have a gray shirt or a light shirt on running from the north end of the building to the south end of the building towards the fence of the outer perimeter of the rally.”²⁵⁹ Det. **BTPD Detective** did not see a weapon. He testified to the Task Force:

I’m watching this male go across the roof. At no point did I see a firearm or see him armed, to be honest. I just thought getting up there, I was going to run into a civilian that was trying to get away. And at no point did anybody else there yell out firearm or make it clear to me that, you know, he was armed before getting up there.²⁶⁰

Det. **BTPD Detective** lost sight of Crooks when a tree blocked his line of sight to the roof. He testified to the Task Force:

So the trooper and I arrive at the southeast corner of the AGR building. And as I was coming as I was approaching the AGR building, I could still see the male running and there was, I want to say, a tree or a bush, but it's a pretty large tree that covers above the roof, and that's where I lost sight of him.²⁶¹

Prior to Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 2** transmission that Crooks was on the AGR roof, Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3** checked with Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** in-person and learned about the suspicious person.²⁶² Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3** then searched the water tower area and returned to Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1**.²⁶³ At the time, Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** was standing next to a USSS special agent.²⁶⁴ Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3** told the Task Force that the USSS special agent said, “if you find him, we’ll talk to

²⁵⁷ Sgt. **PSP Sgt.**, Penn. State Police, Recorded Administrative Interview Before Penn. State Police, 00:26:40 (Jul. 20, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, H. Comm. Overview Presentation, 16 (2024) (on file with the Task Force). It does not appear that any related communications were transmitted over the ESU radio channel, which would have reached ESU personnel located inside the AGR complex.

²⁵⁸ Det. **BTPD Detective**, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 16 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁵⁹ *Id.*

²⁶⁰ *Id.* at 23.

²⁶¹ *Id.* at 17.

²⁶² Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3**, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁶³ *Id.* 18-19.

²⁶⁴ *Id.* at 20.

him.”²⁶⁵ Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3** proceeded to search around the AGR property, when he heard Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 2** transmission.²⁶⁶

Meanwhile, Det. **BTPD Detective** had decided to pursue Crooks on the AGR roof and exited his patrol car.²⁶⁷ As he moved towards the AGR complex, he encountered Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3**, who helped raise Det. **BTPD Detective** onto the roof.²⁶⁸ Det. **BTPD Detective** testified to the Task Force:

From there, I was able to pull my hands to my chest. And as I began to try to, how I describe it is, like, getting out of a pool with your hands, like pushing up, my head is coming up, and luckily for me, I'm looking left as that happens. And that is when I first view Crooks on the rooftop.

I see Crooks facing downrange towards the stage, but his eyes are back at me as I'm coming up. And I would say, like, his facial expressions was surprised. His eyes were very big, like, what are you doing up here?²⁶⁹

Law Enforcement Sees Crooks is Armed

Det. **BTPD Detective** saw Crooks' weapon for the first time when Crooks turned and pointed the rifle at him. Det. **BTPD Detective** testified to the Task Force that he also saw that Crooks had a backpack and extra magazines of ammunition for a long gun. When Crooks turned to aim his rifle at Det. **BTPD Detective**, he fell to the ground and immediately radioed that the suspicious person on the roof was armed. Det. **BTPD Detective** stated:

And from there, he just slowly turned on his waist, like-- he was proned out like this, and he kind of slowly turned around. And as I came up, that's when he pointed his firearm in my face. And at that time, I could see, you know, he had a bookbag with him, I could see mags. I knew he had a long gun, like an AR platform. And as I'm coming up and he's got the gun pointed at me, I don't know if I reach for my gun, if I slip, but all I know from that point is I'm looking at him, and all my weight is on my, like, arms, my hands, and I don't have a grip. As you can tell by the video, it's just my fingertips. And I have no support from the bottom from **BTPD Patrol 3** anymore. The next thing I know is, I'm smack against the

²⁶⁵ *Id.*

²⁶⁶ *Id.* at 20-22.

²⁶⁷ Det. **BTPD Detective**, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 16-17 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁶⁸ *Id.* at 17.

²⁶⁹ *Id.* at 18.

ground and fall. Yeah. And from there, I just start yelling out to the guys that are there, I yell on the radio right away. I start saying, you know, South end, He's got a long gun, Male on the roof. I just kept repeating, He's got a gun, He's got a long gun. I'm telling the guys that are around, like, He's right up there, guns up, eyes up, still screaming on the radio.²⁷⁰

Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3** similarly testified to the Task Force that Det. **BTPD Detective** immediately began alerting that the person on the roof of the AGR complex was armed with an assault rifle. Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3** stated: “I try to get him up to the roof. He's kind of on the side, however he is up there. He comes back down screaming, “THERE'S AN AR! AN AR! A GUY WITH AN AR!”²⁷¹

To date, the Task Force has not received any evidence to suggest that message reached the former President’s USSS detail prior to shots fired.

Some Secret Service personnel, however, were increasingly aware that a situation was unfolding on the AGR property. At 6:11 p.m., Special Agent **Site Agent** called Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** for more information after Special Agent **Site Agent** and ASAIC **ASAIC DTD** heard a radio communication about local officers working something in the “3 o’clock” direction.²⁷² Technician **CS TL** observed police officers moving urgently toward the 3 o’clock, including at least one officer with his weapon drawn.²⁷³ He did not communicate this observation over the radio.²⁷⁴

In response to a question during a transcribed interview as to how he would have reacted to this information, Special Agent **ASAIC DTD**, the Second Supervisor and detail agent for the former President’s detail, stated that he would have rushed the stage before Crooks took a shot.²⁷⁵

Civilians on the AGR property were also becoming increasingly aware of Crooks at this point. Sniper ATL **Beaver ESUS** testified to the Task Force that he saw the crowd—which had gathered to watch the rally—turn away from the stage and face the AGR complex after the former President

²⁷⁰ *Id.*

²⁷¹ Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3**, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 26 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁷² Special Agent **Site Agent**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 210 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Ass’t Special Agent in Charge **ASAIC DTD**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 97 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁷³ Technician **CS TL**, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 134 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁷⁴ *Id.* at 135.

²⁷⁵ Ass’t Special Agent in Charge **ASAIC DTD**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 130 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

had started his speech.²⁷⁶ ATL **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL** assumed the crowd had turned to watch law enforcement engage Crooks on the roof.²⁷⁷

Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** was in the Security Room and turned to SAIC **Sec. Room 3** to inquire about what SAIC **Sec. Room 3** knew.²⁷⁸ Before Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** could pass along any information, she heard gunshots.²⁷⁹

Shots Fired

At 6:11 p.m., Crooks fired eight rounds before being fatally shot.²⁸⁰ Several USSS Special Agents immediately rushed the stage to cover the former President.²⁸¹ The evidence shows Crooks was on the roof for approximately six minutes prior to the shooting, between 6:05 and 6:11 p.m.²⁸²

²⁷⁶ Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 139-40 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁷⁷ *Id.* at 139.

²⁷⁸ Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart** Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 139 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).


²⁷⁹ *Id.*

²⁸⁰ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Timeline Related to Thomas Crooks: 03 July 2024 – 13 July 2024, 1 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., HTF 000003 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁸¹ Ass't Special Agent in Charge **ASAIC DTD**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 98 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁸² Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Timeline Related to Thomas Crooks: 03 July 2024 – 13 July 2024, 1 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Figure 6: Overall Positioning, created by Beaver ESU



Local Officer Returns Fire and USSS Counter-Sniper Neutralizes Crooks

Butler ESU CAT Team Lead (CAT TL) **Butler ESU CAT TL 2** testified to the Task Force that he was the first law enforcement officer to return fire at Crooks.²⁸³ That shot may have caused Crooks to stop firing. CAT TL **Butler ESU CAT TL 2** was posted on the Butler Farm Show property near the stage.²⁸⁴ When he heard Crooks fire an initial volley of three shots, CAT TL **Butler ESU CAT TL 2** located Crooks on the roof of the AGR complex.²⁸⁵ He fired a single shot from a standing position at Crooks, who was in a prone position on the roof.²⁸⁶ CAT TL **Butler ESU CAT TL 2** told the Task Force that he believes his shot hit Crooks.²⁸⁷ To date, the bullet fired by CAT TL **Butler ESU CAT TL 2** at Crooks has not been recovered, and no recovered bullet fragments have been confirmed as attributable to his shot. The USSS Counter-sniper, **CS Sgt. Tech.**, who fired the shot that killed Crooks, testified that he only became aware that a LLE officer fired a shot toward Crooks through media reports after the fact.²⁸⁸ USSS CS **CS Sgt. Tech.** described the moments immediately preceding his own shot as follows:

²⁸³ CAT Team Lead **Butler ESU CAT TL 2**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31-33 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁸⁴ *Id.* at 13.

²⁸⁵ *Id.* at 31.

²⁸⁶ *Id.* at 33.

²⁸⁷ *Id.* at 32.

²⁸⁸ Sergeant Technician **CS Sgt. Tech.**, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 40 (Nov. 20, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

TF STAFF: And as you are seeing Mr. Crooks through your rifle scope, did you see him fire any shots, or did you only see him after he was done firing shots?

CS Sgt. Tech. I didn't yeah. It must have been after.

TF STAFF: Okay. And then as you are, again, looking at him through your rifle scope before you fire your weapon, did it appear that Mr. Crooks was in any sort of distress, injured, anything of that nature?

CS Sgt. Tech. It didn't appear so.

TF STAFF: What was he doing?

CS Sgt. Tech. It still looked like he was aiming out in his rifle. And from what I could tell, it was on his right shoulder facing out, and he was down like he was aiming through it. So it looked like he was attempting to fire again.

TF STAFF: Okay. And did it look like he was having any issues or malfunctions with his weapon--or it looked like he was in a position to shoot?

CS Sgt. Tech. He was in a position to shoot.²⁸⁹

Shortly before Crooks fired, USSS counter-snipers CS TL and CS Sgt. Tech. had their rifles up on the tripod facing the direction of the AGR complex because they saw police running.²⁹⁰ After hearing shots fired, CS TL immediately got down on his rifle and looked through the rifle's optic to determine where the shots were coming from.²⁹¹ CS Sgt. Tech. said, "I got him."²⁹² When asked what he observed, CS Sgt. Tech. stated:

So basically, what I observed, after the shot was fired I got into my rifle, looked through the scope. And I noticed that he was he wasn't a high – he wasn't--it wasn't like a high silhouette off the peak. He was just it was a low profile on the peak where I could basically just make out, like I said, the tops of his shoulders and his head. And I could see his weapon.

²⁸⁹ *Id.* at 101.

²⁹⁰ Technician CS TL, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 136-37 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁹¹ *Id.* at 137.

²⁹² *Id.*

When I fired my shot, he disappeared from my from my sight. After taking my shot, I immediately went ahead and put another live round into the weapon if I had to take a follow up shot. And he didn't come back.²⁹³

CS Sgt. Tech. shot killed Crooks.²⁹⁴ After determining that the shooter was down and that tactical units were on the roof, CS Sgt. Tech. and CS TL stayed in their positions because they “didn’t know if that was a diversion, if there was another shooter.”²⁹⁵ CS Sgt. Tech. and CS TL stayed on site while the other USSS counter-sniper team went to LES before eventually departing to the airport.²⁹⁶

Det. BTPD Detective—after falling from the roof—ran to retrieve his rifle from his patrol car.²⁹⁷ Det. BTPD Detective returned to the AGR complex moments after Crooks was neutralized and made his way onto the roof.²⁹⁸ Footage from Det. BTPD Detective’s bodycam shows he and a USSS special agent interacted briefly on the roof, where the USSS special agent remarked that Secret Service counter-snipers fired the shot that killed Crooks.²⁹⁹

Immediate Aftermath

Crooks’ bullets, which were intended for the former President, struck attendees Corey Comperatore, David Dutch, and James Copenhaver. Mr. Comperatore tragically succumbed to the wounds he sustained.

Former President Trump, upon feeling a bullet graze his right ear, dropped to the stage and took cover. Secret Service agents immediately rushed the stage to form a ‘LES’ over him.³⁰⁰ DTD ASAIC ASAIC DTD recalls seeing “a dark liquid pooling in front of [the former President].”³⁰¹ Upon hearing “[s]hooter down, shooter down,” the agents began to move the former

²⁹³ Sergeant Technician CS Sgt. Tech., U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 37 (Nov. 20, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁹⁴ Production to task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI Update 8.28.24, 2 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Autopsy Report, 2 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Crooks Investigator Narrative, 2 (Jul. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁹⁵ Technician CS TL, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 137-38 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁹⁶ *Id.* at 138.

²⁹⁷ Det. BTPD Detective, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 19 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

²⁹⁸ *Id.* at 20.

²⁹⁹ Butler Eagle, Trump Rally Body Cam Footage - Video 3, YOUTUBE, 25:23-25:32 (last visited Nov. 27, 2024) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAEdTCEY8B0&t=1s>.

³⁰⁰ Ass’t Special Agent in Charge ASAIC DTD, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 120 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁰¹ *Id.*

President off the stage to evacuate him from the Butler Farm Show.³⁰² Secret Service protocol, as DTD ASAIC [redacted] put it, is to “get [the protectee] out of there and not let some guy like Crooks decide the future for everybody that wants to vote for him.”³⁰³ Agents are trained to cover the protectee and maintain the body bunker to shield from any subsequent attacks.³⁰⁴ Despite protocol—and despite not knowing if additional threats remained—the former President instructed the agents to “wait,” stood, raised his fist, and addressed the crowd, yelling “Fight! Fight! Fight!”³⁰⁵

Figure 7: Former President Trump moments after a would-be assassin's bullet struck his ear.³⁰⁶



DTD ASAIC [redacted] recalling those moments, testified that he had never trained for a scenario where a protectee tries to stay in the face of a potentially imminent threat.³⁰⁷ DTD ASAIC [redacted] continued that “[u]sually, after they experience something like this, they want to leave.”³⁰⁸

Personnel from the FBI and ATF were dispatched to the Butler Farm Show grounds shortly thereafter to begin an investigation into the shooting and surrounding events. Additionally, PSP dispatched investigative personnel to conduct a parallel investigation related to the events of July 13.

³⁰² *Id.*

³⁰³ *Id.* at 122.

³⁰⁴ *Id.* at 121.

³⁰⁵ *Id.* at 120.

³⁰⁶ Photo by Evan Vucci, ASSOC.PRESS (Jul. 13, 2024).

³⁰⁷ Ass't Special Agent in Charge [redacted], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 121 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); USSS may wish to examine the extent to which its body bunker training covers all possible scenarios.

³⁰⁸ Ass't Special Agent in Charge [redacted], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 121 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Butler, PA: Security Failures and Recommendations

Failures in Planning

1. Failure to Secure the AGR Complex

Why it matters:	The failure to secure the AGR complex, adjacent and to the north of the Butler Farm Show grounds where the July 13 event was held, allowed Thomas Crooks to loiter among a crowd and then scale and traverse rooftops to a firing position before he was ever confronted by a law enforcement officer.
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a. The Secret Service did not ensure the AGR buildings and grounds were secure.

Due to the presence of a double fence line separating the AGR complex from the rally site, the Secret Service considered the complex to be outside the secure perimeter.³⁰⁹ Given its close proximity to the venue, the AGR complex was a focal point of discussion in the days leading up to the event. LLE personnel testified that concerns about the security of the AGR complex were communicated to the Secret Service in those preceding days.³¹⁰ BTPD Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** (who also serves as a Butler ESU Assistant Team Leader) testified that he relayed explicit concerns to the Secret Service about the need for law enforcement coverage on the ground around the AGR complex, and that LLE entities did not have the resources to fulfill that need.³¹¹ Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1** testified that, in response to his concerns, Secret Service assured him “we understand, we copy, we’ll take care of it,” though USSS personnel testified that they do not recall this conversation.³¹²

³⁰⁹ See, e.g., Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 54 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³¹⁰ Dep. Commander **Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 34 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1**, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 11 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³¹¹ Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1**, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 11, 38-39 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³¹² *Id.* **BTPD Patrol 1** did not identify the Secret Service agent who made this statement to him and Secret Service personnel the Task Force interviewed did not recall **BTPD Patrol 1** questions nor the response. See, e.g., Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 111 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). PSP Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** did not recall hearing any concerns from **BTPD Patrol 1** during a joint walkthrough. Lt. **PSP Lt. 1**, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 37 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

The general practice of the Secret Service is to assign its agents to focus on the area inside the secure perimeter.³¹³ With the AGR complex outside of the secure perimeter, Secret Service deferred to its state and LLE partners to cover the facility and surrounding area.³¹⁴ However, due to the Secret Service’s failure to confirm with their state and local counterparts that the AGR complex would, in fact, be secured with assets assigned to guard the area, there were no patrol members of federal, state, or local agencies monitoring the AGR complex from which Crooks fired on July 13.³¹⁵ Further, the AGR complex was not sufficiently covered by Secret Service counter-snipers, and it was understood by the local tactical units to be outside of their area of responsibility.

Figure 8: ESU Positioning and Overwatch Sight Lines, created by Beaver ESU³¹⁶



³¹³ Ass’t Dir. **OPO Asst. Dir.**, Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 49 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³¹⁴ Sr. Special Agent **Lead Advance**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 106 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³¹⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Site Post Instructions, Bates 000219-000225 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³¹⁶ Production to Task Force, Beaver ESU, Congressional Briefing, 50 (Jul. 26, 2024) (on file with Task Force).

b. State and LLE patrol units did not secure the AGR complex.

Contrary to Secret Service expectations, neither state nor LLE had vehicles or patrol personnel posted in the AGR complex parking lot or along the adjacent road. There were no officers otherwise responsible for keeping passersby off the property.

As reflected in the PSP Operations Plan, PSP troopers and the Butler County Sheriff's Office deputies were posted at four locations along the fence line separating the AGR complex from the campaign event site.³¹⁷ Those law enforcement personnel were instructed to park their vehicles in between the two fences separating the AGR complex and the site to ensure "no foot traffic or access."³¹⁸ They were not charged with watching the AGR complex or keeping the area around it free of vehicles and pedestrians.³¹⁹ Rather, their focus was on maintaining the integrity of the fence line itself and ensuring that spectators did not cross into the site.³²⁰ Given the crowds that did gather along the fence line on July 13, officers at those posts were indeed focused on attempts to disperse the crowds and intervene in disputes, including at least one between rallygoers and the AGR complex owner.³²¹

³¹⁷ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, Pennsylvania State Police Operations Plan, Bates PSP_0009-0018, PSP_0012 (2024) (on file with Task Force).


³¹⁸ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, Pennsylvania State Police Operations Plan, Bates PSP_0009-0018, PSP_0013 (2024) (on file with Task Force).

³¹⁹ Lt. **PSP Lt. 1**, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 35 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³²⁰ *Id.*

³²¹ Deputy **Sheriff's Deputy**, Butler Co. Sheriff's Office, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 25-26 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Figure 9: PSP and Butler County Sheriff's Office Posts³²²



BTPD personnel were also in the vicinity of the AGR complex, but did not have a mandate to secure the area.³²³ BTPD Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1] recalled PSP [PSP Lt. 1] asking whether BTPD could

³²² Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, Pennsylvania State Police Operations Plan, Bates PSP_0009-0018, PSP_0012 (2024) (on file with Task Force). Color annotations added by Task Force with pink area depicting AGR Complex and yellow-highlighted numbers indicating PSP and Butler Sheriff's Office posts along fence line.

³²³ The AGR Complex is within the Butler Township Police Department's general jurisdiction, but they were not in charge of ensuring that the AGR Complex was closed off to visitors on July 13. The fence line where PSP at the Butler

provide the manpower to post officers in the AGR parking lot, and Lt. BTPD Lt. 1 replied that BTPD did not have the resources to do so.³²⁴ Instead, BTPD was providing traffic control at certain intersections near the site.³²⁵

c. The Secret Service was overly reliant on state and local representations related to securing the AGR complex.

Had the Secret Service known neither state nor LLE had secured that area, Senior Special Agent ^{Lead Advance} testified they would have placed Secret Service post standers there.³²⁶ However, in the days leading up to July 13, there was no agreement as to which law enforcement agency was in charge of securing the AGR complex, despite the repeated concerns expressed about its proximity to the site.³²⁷ In a timeline she drafted shortly after July 13, Senior Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} wrote that on July 9, 2024, she:

[D]iscussed the AGR building and how it was a concern. Lieutenant ^{PSP Lt. 1} said that he talked to the owner and coordinated it to be closed, locked and posted. There would be roving posts from Butler Township on the outer perimeters. No vehicle or foot traffic.³²⁸

Senior Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} testified to the Task Force that she understood from her discussion with PSP Lt. ^{PSP Lt. 1} that the AGR parking lots and buildings would not be accessible to the public. She stated that she expected:

[T]here would be patrol vehicles in the parking lots on each side [...] And then there was officers along the fence line [...] [T]he doors to the building were locked, nobody would be able to get in. It was secured with – it was secured so that nobody would be able to drive

County Sheriff's Office were posted was not within BTPD's jurisdiction. A majority of the Butler Farm Show Grounds fall within PSP's jurisdiction. Lt. ^{BTPD Lt. 1}, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 81 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Lt. ^{PSP Lt. 1}, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 19, 24 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³²⁴ Lt. ^{BTPD Lt. 1}, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³²⁵ Production to Task Force, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Butler Township Operation Plan (on file with Task Force); *see also* Lt. ^{BTPD Lt. 1}, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 10 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³²⁶ Sr. Special Agent ^{Lead Advance}, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 115-116 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); *See also* Sr. Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 110 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³²⁷ *See, e.g., The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service's Reliance on State and Local Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump*, 118th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2024). (statement of ^{BTPD Patrol 1}, Patrolman, Butler Twp. Police Dep't).

³²⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Advance Week Timeline, Bates 000794-000803, 000798 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

into the parking lots, and then that it would be posted with patrol units.³²⁹

Senior Special Agent **Lead Advance** similarly recalled that there would be a “police presence in the area of [the AGR] complex [...] to be able to deter and mitigate people from accessing the buildings.”³³⁰ The owner of the AGR Complex shared the understanding that the facility would be off limits to the public on July 13.³³¹

PSP Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** testified that he made no such statements to the Secret Service, though he conceded that he may have relayed his understanding from social media posts that the AGR parking lot would be closed.³³² He testified that the Secret Service did not ask him to post any troopers around the AGR complex, but had they done so, he would have.³³³

PSP Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** also rejected the notion that he was coordinating between Secret Service and LLE agencies.³³⁴ The Secret Service, however, understood him to be “[liaising] directly with those other local assets and other local jurisdictions because they had the relationships with them” and coordinating with those departments to create their operations plan.³³⁵ Ultimately, the PSP Operations Plan did reflect post assignments for PSP as well as the Butler County Sheriff’s Office, indicating some level of state and local coordination presented to the Secret Service.³³⁶

Whether or not Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** told Secret Service personnel that the AGR complex would be secure, the Secret Service relied too heavily on those representations and did not confirm with him which agency would be providing patrol units around the area, did not independently reach out to

³²⁹ Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart** Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 73, 105 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³³⁰ Sr. Special Agent **Lead Advance**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 87 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). Special Agent **Site Agent** however, thought there was a possibility of crowds gathering along the fence line. Special Agent **Site Agent**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 142 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³³¹ Deputy **Sheriff's Deputy**, Butler County Sheriff’s Office, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 25-26 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³³² Lt. **PSP Lt. 1**, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 62-63 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³³³ *Id.* at 24.

³³⁴ *Id.* at 43-44.

³³⁵ Sr. Special Agent **Lead Advance**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 104 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). *See also*, Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart** U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 166 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force) (When I first came into contact with Lieutenant **PSP Lt. 1** he said that he was the officer in charge of that site and they had the greatest presence and who we were working with, and they were also in charge of the transportation section and they're most knowledgeable in terms of how we operate. And then, as the advance progressed, he said that he was going to be implementing the other local townships into his security plan as well).

³³⁶ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, Pennsylvania State Police Operations Plan, Bates PSP_0009-0018, PSP_0012 (2024) (on file with Task Force).

the local agencies to confirm their posts around the AGR complex, and did not visually confirm those units were in place on July 13.³³⁷

d. Secret Service allowed local snipers to define their roles and select their positions, and did not perform due diligence.

Local snipers from Butler ESU understood their responsibility to be overwatch of the crowd and inside the venue itself for any threats.³³⁸ They did not understand that the Secret Service viewed their responsibility to include the AGR complex, which necessitated coverage by patrol officers on the ground and from Secret Service counter-snipers positioned on the barns behind the stage inside the secure perimeter.³³⁹ Despite Secret Service policy to “[p]rovide direction to local counterparts on how best to utilize their assets to prevent local counterparts from randomly placing teams in areas where they aren’t needed” and “[p]lace local [counter-sniper] teams in the best possible position for coverage,” the Secret Service was wholly deferential to Butler ESU and had knowledge of their plans for positioning.³⁴⁰

Based on Butler ESU’s understanding of its crowd overwatch role—which was informed by their day-to-day practices and not an instruction from the Secret Service—Butler ESU set out to determine where they would position their two sniper teams. On the night of July 9, prior to the arrival of Secret Service CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED] Patrolman [REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 1 (in his capacity as Butler ESU Assistant Team Leader), Butler ESU TL [REDACTED] Butler ESU Snip. TL, and Deputy Commander [REDACTED] Butler ESU Dep. C [REDACTED] performed an independent walkthrough of the AGR complex, finding that it was the closest building to the site with a high enough angle that would allow the local snipers to see the event crowd.³⁴¹ The local counter-snipers conducted a second walkthrough of the site itself and revisited the AGR complex on July 10, again unaccompanied by CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED]. Members of the Butler ESU team testified that they called CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED] to invite him to the walkthrough on July 10, and CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED] responded that there was no need and that he would touch base

³³⁷ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 106, 169-170 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³³⁸ Patrolman [REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 1, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 28 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Team Lead [REDACTED] Butler ESU Snip. TL, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31, 37, 56 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Dep. Commander [REDACTED] Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 38 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³³⁹ Team Lead [REDACTED] Butler ESU Snip. TL, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 37, 56, 103-104 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Dep. Commander [REDACTED] Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 44-45 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁴⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., UDS Internal Operating Procedures: Counter-sniper Team Advance Procedures, Bates 006298-006302, 006301 (June 12, 2023) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁴¹ Patrolman [REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 1, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 8, 28-29 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Team Lead [REDACTED] Butler ESU Snip. TL [REDACTED], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 46 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

later—despite Secret Service guidance to do advance work with local partners—as he had conducted his walkthrough earlier that day.³⁴² CSTL [REDACTED] had met with Butler ESU Commander [REDACTED] during that earlier walkthrough.³⁴³

Butler ESU decided to position one of their sniper teams in the grandstand area and place a second team inside the second-story windows in one building of the AGR complex. According to Butler ESU, there were several reasons they did not place a team on the roof of the AGR complex. First, this would have required the team to be responsible for 360-degree coverage, whereas if they were placed inside one of the AGR buildings, the doors to the building would be locked and the snipers could focus exclusively on the overwatch area in front of them.³⁴⁴ Second, placing a team on the roof may also have been of limited utility because a portion of their overwatch line of sight would be obstructed.³⁴⁵ Third, if the snipers had been stationed on the roof, they would have been visible to onlookers, and it was their practice to be covert and avoid being seen.³⁴⁶

The local snipers settled on placing a second team of local snipers in the announcer’s booth at the grandstand.³⁴⁷ From there, local snipers could see a majority of the AGR roofs including where Crooks was, but at a 380-yard distance.³⁴⁸ Butler ESU believed that distance to be inconsequential, however, given their understanding of their responsibility as crowd and venue overwatch, not coverage of buildings outside of the perimeter.³⁴⁹

The Butler ESU team discussed their selected locations with the Secret Service during the all-hands July 11 walkthrough. Along with Butler ESU Commander [REDACTED] the local snipers walked the grounds with CSTL [REDACTED] to confirm where the Butler ESU sniper and Secret Service counter-sniper locations would be.³⁵⁰ CSTL [REDACTED] did not question or otherwise provide

³⁴² Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Special Operations Division Advance Procedures – General, Bates 006391-006392, 006392 (2024) (on file with the Task Force) (“Throughout the advance and the visit, SOD Personnel will ensure that expectations as they relate to SOD’s operational plan are communicated to and understood by all federal, state, and local counterparts.”); Patrolman [REDACTED], Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 29 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Dep. Commander [REDACTED], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 15-16 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁴³ Technician [REDACTED], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 80-81 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁴⁴ Dep. Commander [REDACTED], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 39, 45 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁴⁵ Patrolman [REDACTED], Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 33, 37 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁴⁶ Team Lead [REDACTED], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 47, 52 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁴⁷ *Id.* at 35.

³⁴⁸ *Id.*

³⁴⁹ *Id.* at 35-36; Patrolman [REDACTED], Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 10, 54 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁵⁰ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally – Overview of Operations Planning and Execution, 6 (produced Aug. 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Dep. Commander [REDACTED], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 34, 81 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

feedback to the local snipers about their positions, including their decision to be inside the AGR complex instead of being on the roof.³⁵¹ TL [Butler ESU Snip. TL] testified:

[Secret Service] never physically or verbally said those are great positions or bad positions. But they had us marked in their -- the Secret Service counter-snipers documents, the packets that they gave us, they had the specific windows marked of where we were going to be and they never once questioned why were you in those windows. So we had to assume that they were okay with it, too, if they didn't question or state any concerns with it.³⁵²

CSTL [CS TL] confirmed there was no conversation between the Secret Service and Butler ESU about the strategy of putting local snipers inside the AGR building, rather than on the roof.³⁵³ He further testified that he knew from his first conversations with the local snipers where they were going to be located, and that he did not have any issues with where they had chosen.³⁵⁴ His main concern was friendly fire, *i.e.*, understanding where the local snipers would be located and how to identify them to prevent any confusion as to whether they posed a threat.³⁵⁵

While there is some disagreement as to precisely when Special Agent [Site Agent] and Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] became aware of the local sniper team's position inside the AGR building, rather than on the roof—Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 1] asserts he informed them during the July 11 walkthrough, as well as that ground patrol was needed, but neither Special Agent [Site Agent] nor Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] recalled the conversation—they did know the location at least as of later that day based on an email from CSTL [CS TL].³⁵⁶ Both recall noticing the placement and being concerned about it, but not raising those concerns or questioning the placement because it was not their area of expertise, deferring instead to CSTL [CS TL] judgment.³⁵⁷

And while the Secret Service knew Butler ESU's positions, the Task Force found a similar story to the patrol-side misunderstandings—in this instance about the role of the local snipers.

³⁵¹ Dep. Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 81 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁵² Team Lead [Butler ESU Snip. TL], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 130 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁵³ Technician [CS TL], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 55 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁵⁴ *Id.* at 29-30, 55-56.

³⁵⁵ *Id.* at 29, 44, 79.

³⁵⁶ Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 10, 35, 37, 41 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [Site Agent] [Site Agent] Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 137-138, 143 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 111, 113 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁵⁷ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 114 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 144 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Butler ESU understood overwatch of the venue to be their only responsibility, but CSTL [REDACTED] testified that he believed the local sniper team positioned in the grandstand to be looking beyond the crowd, to include the AGR complex.³⁵⁸ That understanding, however, was based on CSTL [REDACTED] assumption. [REDACTED] testified:


We did not have -- I did not lay out a specific ‘this is what I want you looking at’ area. But, when they provided that, I said, ‘Yes, you're looking in this direction, okay.’ But I didn't go with them in detail how far exact locations or any of the threat areas. They said they were looking in that direction, ‘Okay, that works. That makes sense you’re looking toward the venue.’³⁵⁹

Butler ESU TL [REDACTED] developed a map showing the coverage areas for his sniper teams, which explicitly excludes the AGR complex from any local sniper’s line of sight. He did not, however, share this image with CSTL [REDACTED] or Secret Service personnel.

³⁵⁸ Technician [REDACTED], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 50 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁵⁹ *Id.* at 51.

Figure 10: Sniper Teams Coverage Map³⁶⁰



CSTL [REDACTED] did not receive that map, did not specify where he wanted the Butler ESU team to look, and did not visit the AGR complex himself to check the lines of sight from the windows; accordingly, [REDACTED] testified that he expected the local snipers had a line of sight to the roof from which Crooks eventually shot.³⁶¹ [REDACTED] stated:

TF STAFF: [REDACTED] [REDACTED], did you have an understanding that the local posting of operators would also have line of sight on the AGR roof from that window from inside the AGR building or not?

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]: So, when looking at the cone of fire that they provided with me, not the AGR roof of the building they were in, because obviously they were in that

³⁶⁰ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally – Overview of Operations Planning and Execution, Butler Co. ESU, 7 (produced Aug. 2024) (on file with the Task Force). Red box and notation added by Task Force.

³⁶¹ Technician [REDACTED] [REDACTED], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 64-65, 69-70, 73-76, 83 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

building, but the roof to the side where the shooter actually was, I believed they had a line of sight to that area and would be able to cover it, not even on a long-range mitigation wave but an individual that's close within throwing distance, that they had an individual covered. So yes.³⁶²

Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 1] contests that understanding, testifying that during his conversations with the Secret Service on July 11, he pointed out which areas were dead spaces, outside of their responsibility, that the local snipers in the AGR building could not see.³⁶³

With one of the two local sniper teams having an obstructed view of the AGR complex, and neither Butler ESU sniper team directed to monitor it, they did not do so. The sniper in the grandstands, who did have a line of sight to the roof where Crooks was positioned, did not deviate from his assigned task to look in that direction in the moments before Crooks fired.³⁶⁴

e. Secret Service counter-snipers were imperfectly positioned to monitor the AGR complex.

Compounding the issue, the Secret Service counter-sniper teams were not appropriately focused on the AGR complex as a result of a poor division of responsibilities between the [LES 1 and 2] teams.³⁶⁵ While the two teams were generally responsible for the entire site, [LES 2] was assigned to primarily focus on the 12 to 3 o'clock areas as viewed from the stage, which included the entirety of the AGR complex.³⁶⁶ However, their view of the easternmost portion of the roof—where Crooks walked across and from which he fired—was almost entirely obscured by a tree just south of the AGR property.³⁶⁷

³⁶² *Id.* at 64-65.

³⁶³ Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 38 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁶⁴ Team Lead [Butler ESU Snip. TL], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 122, 124 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁶⁵ Technician [CS TL], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 106-108 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁶⁶ *Id.* at 107.

³⁶⁷ *Id.* at 66.

Figure 11: USSS counter-sniper team line of sight to the AGR Complex
*red arrow identifies tree blocking portion of AGR roof where Crooks was positioned



CSTL [CS TL] testified that he was aware of this tree obstruction when he gave [LES] 2 their assignment, but he failed to mention the obstruction to [LES] 2 or to instruct the [LES] 1 team to cover the obstructed area.³⁶⁸

Further complicating matters, CSTL [CS TL] has identified three different times when he first recognized that [LES] 2 had an obstructed view of the AGR roof. During a transcribed interview with the Task Force, CSTL [CS TL] identified his time on the barn roof on July 10 as the moment when he recognized the obstruction.³⁶⁹ During an interview with the Senate, [CS TL] identified his time spent on tactical paperwork, likely on the evening of July 10, as that moment.³⁷⁰ And his USSS Mission Assurance Report (MAR) interview suggests he may not have known there was an obstruction until after the incident on July 13.³⁷¹

Technician [CS Sgt. Tech] testified to the Task Force that he did not think CSTL [CS TL] knew there was a blind spot until after the incident on July 13:

[CS Sgt. Tech] So one of the things I was trying to get to is with the understanding you were talking about with the -- that blind spot, the blockage of that team, with that -- with the local

³⁶⁸ *Id.* at 68.

³⁶⁹ *Id.* at 66.

³⁷⁰ *Id.* at 32.

³⁷¹ Technician [CS TL], U.S. Secret Service, Mission Assurance Review Interview Before the U.S. Secret Service, 304-305 (2024) (viewed in-camera by Task Force staff).

team positioned in the second floor of the AGR building, they were able -- it was my understanding they would be able to cover that blind spot behind that tree that that team could not see. And that's what I was getting before, where if you have everybody working together, us along with the local departments, that everybody together would complete that protective bubble, that circle.

* * *

TF STAFF: So we're looking at a [LES] with AGR International in boxes [LES]. We see the tree obstructing the view. And during [CS TL] testimony with the task force, he indicated that he mitigated this sight line obstruction by posting [LES] 1 on the southern barn.

Did [CS TL] relay that to you, [CS Sgt. Tech.]?

[CS Sgt. Tech.] I don't recall him saying that.

TF STAFF: So he never let you know that he was posting [LES] 1 on the southern barn in order to mitigate this sight line obstruction?

* * *

[CS Sgt. Tech.] No. I don't remember any of -- him ever saying that.

* * *

TF STAFF: Did you get an impression in that conversation of whether [CS TL] was previously aware of that obstruction or whether he was learning about it for the first time in that conversation?

[CS Sgt. Tech.] It just seemed like he didn't know about it prior to.

TF STAFF: And what gave you that impression if you recall?

[CS Sgt. Tech.] I mean, there was no -- nothing was said that, you know, he knew it was a blind spot, and nothing was said by him that, you know, that we could see him and they couldn't.

USSS Counter-sniper [CS Tech.] testified that he first noticed the obstruction when he got on the barn roof but never talked about it with [CS TL].³⁷² He stated:

³⁷² Technician [CS Tech.] Jr., U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 29-30 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

TF STAFF: Did you mention this obstruction to team lead [CS TL] when you got up on the roof?

[CS Tech.] No, because it's assumed during the advanced planning process that [CS TL] would assume the post that he's expecting us to post on, so he would have recognized the line of sight issue and then planned accordingly to make sure that the AGR building was owned by locals, which he did.

CSTL [CS TL] also testified that upon receiving a BOLO from local snipers regarding Crooks at 5:45 p.m., he paid "specialized attention" to the AGR complex, and that he and [CS Sgt. Tech.] were paying "particularized attention" to the AGR building.³⁷³ However, CSTL [CS TL] did not see Crooks running on the roof and was unable to explain why that was the case.³⁷⁴ [CS Sgt. Tech.] testified that upon receiving a message from CSTL [CS TL] regarding Crooks at 5:51 p.m. Technician [CS Sgt. Tech.] checked the AGR area for an individual matching Crooks' description, and then turned his attention back to his team's assigned area, which did not include AGR.³⁷⁵ [CS Sgt. Tech.] and CSTL [CS TL] agree that their attention focused strongly on AGR at around 6:09 p.m., when Technician [CS Tech.] transmitted that "locals are working something at the 3 o'clock."³⁷⁶

It is difficult to discern the extent to which CSTL [CS TL] was aware of the obstruction or was looking toward AGR after 5:45 p.m., but the failure of [LES] 1 to see Crooks running across the roof, combined with the inability of [LES] 2 to see the roof, exacerbated an already-fraught security plan on July 13.

³⁷³ Technician [CS TL], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 142-43 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁷⁴ *Id.* at 151-52.

³⁷⁵ Sergeant Technician [CS Sgt. Tech.], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 103-105 (Nov. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁷⁶ *Id.* at 105; Technician [CS TL], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 155-156 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Recommendations Related to: Failure to Secure the AGR Complex

- 1. Consolidate all Operations Plans.** The Secret Service has the ultimate responsibility for securing the site for every protectee visit. The advance agents should therefore be aware of where every partner agency is posting personnel. Moving forward, the Secret Service should request copies of the operations plans of all law enforcement entities working the event and consolidate the assigned posts for each of the participating entities. For the July 13th event in Butler, the Secret Service advance agents did not have copies of all participating entities' operations plans, nor did they have copies of the locations of each officer providing security.
- 2. Consider Coverage Inside and Outside Secured Perimeter.** The Secret Service must maintain vigilance over state and local counterparts in ensuring the security of its protectees. As part of its zero fail Mission, the Secret Service should assess and address all security concerns both inside and outside of any event perimeter. While the Secret Service should consider support from local partners and their ability to secure areas surrounding an event, Secret Service must fully understand and verify the local assets available. Regardless of a location within or outside of any particular perimeter, the Secret Service must own responsibility for the security of the site, filling any gaps with its own personnel in the event that local counterparts are unable to provide adequate security or to the extent heightened security concerns demand Secret Service presence.

2. Line of Sight Failures

Why it matters: There was an unmitigated line of sight from the AGR complex to the stage, which was consequential for two reasons. First, Crooks was able to obtain a clear shot from the AGR roof to the stage where former President Trump stood. Second, the clear view of the stage through the fence attracted a crowd to the AGR property, which allowed Crooks to move freely and made it more difficult for law enforcement to locate him.

a. The Secret Service failed to mitigate a clear line of sight from the AGR roof to the stage.

The Secret Service is responsible for mitigating line of sight concerns at any protective site. While multiple entities including the USSS, former President Trump's campaign staff, and Butler Farm Show representatives had roles in building the Butler rally site, Special Agent [Site Agent] testified that it is the USSS's job "to provide the protection and secure the site."³⁷⁷

Line of sight concerns were discussed early in the advance process. For example, at a walkthrough of the site before the police meeting on July 8, Site Agents from the DTD and PIT

³⁷⁷ Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 26 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

joined Senior Special Agent ^{Lead Advance} to meet campaign staff and Butler Farm Show representatives.³⁷⁸ Lead Agent ^{Lead Advance} testified that the group discussed “that there were lots of line of sight concerns and that we would need to be addressing those as soon as possible.”³⁷⁹ Senior Special Agent ^{Lead Advance} also told the group that “the [DTD] second supervisor, when he came on Friday [July 12] for his walk-through, that he would be addressing [line of sight concerns and mitigation efforts] and he would be changing whatever he needed to change to address it.”³⁸⁰

Line of sight concerns were then discussed throughout the week. Senior Special Agent ^{Lead Advance} testified she had conversations with the campaign staff about mitigating lines of sight “all week, everyday.”³⁸¹ Senior Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} and Special Agent ^{Site Agent} also engaged in discussions with campaign staff throughout the week. Senior Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} testified that the USSS discussed line of sight concerns everyday with campaign staff, and throughout the week, she raised questions with campaign staff on what was going where to mitigate those concerns.³⁸² Specifically, Senior Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} testified she wanted to “put Penske trucks to mitigate line of sight [...] in the 3 o'clock area [...] [and the]10 o'clock area.”³⁸³ Senior Special Agent (SSA) ^{Site Counterpart} was also interested in using equipment, banners, flags, and tractors “to mitigate some of our line of sights.”³⁸⁴ However, Senior Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} testified that it was the Site Agent’s “responsibility to go up and make sure that it was the way she wanted it to be.”³⁸⁵

Line of sight mitigation efforts culminated with the DTD supervisor walkthrough on July 12. USSS supervisors ^{ASAIC DTD} and ^{CNOS Insp.} met Special Agent ^{Site Agent} and ^{Site Counterpart} for a walkthrough to explain preparations for the site.³⁸⁶ According to Senior Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} campaign staff were also involved at a point during this walkthrough.³⁸⁷ When ^{ASAIC DTD} took the stage to observe the site, he asked the group about mitigating the line of sight concerns from the AGR complex area.³⁸⁸ He testified:

³⁷⁸ Sr. Special Agent ^{Lead Advance}, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 39 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁷⁹ *Id.*

³⁸⁰ *Id.*

³⁸¹ *Id.* at 118.

³⁸² Sr. Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 80 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁸³ *Id.* at 91.

³⁸⁴ *Id.*

³⁸⁵ *Id.* at 96, 100. There may have been some confusion about which agent was responsible for line of sight issues. Despite feeling it was not her role, ^{Site Counterpart} appeared to lead line of sight mitigation efforts with campaign staff while testifying that ^{Site Agent} “should be the one that's negotiating all of this with the detail.”

³⁸⁶ Ass't Special Agent in Charge ^{ASAIC DTD}, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 63 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁸⁷ Sr. Special Agent ^{Site Counterpart} Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 96 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁸⁸ Ass't Special Agent in Charge ^{ASAIC DTD}, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 66 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

I said that they had some farm equipment they were going to use in that area of the red combine tractor. They were going to have fencing that separated, you know, the main site from not the main site. And then, they were going to have uniform police officers covering that 5 o'clock to past the 3 o'clock, or 2 o'clock and 1 o'clock area. So kind of that whole right side of the stage. They said that there was going to be a police presence [...] I believe I recall Agent [Site Agent] telling me she walked that area with the police and [...] had a plan for that area with the uniform presence.³⁸⁹

ASAIC [ASAIC DTD] also testified that when SSA [Lead Advance] joined the group during that walkthrough, or shortly after its conclusion, she “assured [him] that she had spoke to the counter-sniper team, that they were confident they could cover those buildings in addition [...] [T]hey had the [...] local counter-sniper team at that specific location as well.”³⁹⁰ The combination of police presence, fencing, and counter-snipers at and around the AGR complex appeared to have been approved by DTD supervisors following this walkthrough. By the evening on July 12, [ASAIC DTD] testified that “[t]he combine is good to go at the 3 [o’clock].”³⁹¹

No substantive changes to line of sight mitigation occurred on July 13, the day of the event. Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] testified “[f]rom my vantage point, when I got on to the site [on July 13], I could see that there was equipment there” by the AGR complex.³⁹² It also appeared that Special Agent [Site Agent] conducted due diligence with regards to line of sight prior to former President Trump’s arrival. For example, Special Agent [Site Agent] texted ASAIC [ASAIC DTD] a picture of a crane put in place to mitigate line of sight concerns at the 5 o’clock, to which ASAIC [ASAIC DTD] responded via text, “Looks much better.”³⁹³

Line of sight concerns appear to have been consistently discussed throughout the advance process, and a plan was in place to address them on July 13. Unfortunately, the plan was based on the flawed belief that local police would be in the area and that the local snipers and USSS Counter-snipers had a direct line of sight to that area.

b. The unmitigated view through the fence line attracted a crowd.

There was also a clear line of sight from the grounds around the AGR complex to the stage, which allowed a crowd of unscreened individuals to congregate and to view the event through a chain link fence.

³⁸⁹ *Id.*

³⁹⁰ *Id.*

³⁹¹ *Id.* at 110 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁹² Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 99 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁹³ Ass’t Special Agent in Charge [ASAIC DTD], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 90 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

The Secret Service could have mitigated the ground-level line of sight by lining the fence bordering the AGR complex with a black cloth or opaque material. This would have precluded individuals from seeing into the event, and therefore likely have prevented a crowd from gathering there.³⁹⁴ This would have made it far easier for law enforcement to identify, locate, and track Crooks. This remedy may have been discussed during the advance process. According to Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1**, who was there in his role as the Butler ESU Sniper ATL, CSTL **CS TL** suggested putting up opaque fencing during the July 11 walkthrough.³⁹⁵

While CSTL **CS TL** did not remember this exchange, the ESU Sniper Team Leader **Butler ESU Snip. TL** did recall having a conversation with ATL **BTPD Patrol 1** where that issue was discussed.³⁹⁶ He stated:

When [ATL **BTPD Patrol 1**] spoke with the Secret Service he told me later on that he spoke with [CSTL], as well, that day. And [CSTL] had told him that they usually would put a black screen of some kind up on a site that they felt might be a close threat to obscure any view into the event.³⁹⁷

The Butler ESU Deputy Commander, **Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1**, recalled a similar conversation with the CSTL **CS TL**. He testified:

And, once again, we aired some concerns about that big open area from the eastern approach, the tower, the woods, that side of the building all through up to the fences. And at that point [CSTL] **CS TL** -- and he said it in like a third person that he was informed or they were supposed to be putting a fencing or curtain translucent up across the fence. I didn't clarify which fence, but my impression how he's phrased it, he was told that there was going to be some sort of fencing put up.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁴ Witnesses gave varied estimates of this crowd, ranging from 80 to 300 people. *See* Deputy **Sheriff's Deputy**, Butler County Sheriff's Office, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 50 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sniper **Butler ESU Sniper**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 32 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sniper Ass't Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 77 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Team Lead **Beaver ESU**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 64 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁹⁵ Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1**, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 37-38 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁹⁶ Technician **CS TL**, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 58 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁹⁷ Team Lead **Butler ESU Snip. TL**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 38 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

³⁹⁸ Dep. Commander **Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 34 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Finally, BTPD Lt. [REDACTED] BTPD Lt. 1 also heard a discussion on opaque material for the fence, this time between a PSP trooper and the Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart though in their interviews with the Task Force, neither PSP Lt. [REDACTED] PSP Lt. 1 nor Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart recalled this exchange.³⁹⁹

On balance, the testimony suggests that opaque fencing was discussed by several law enforcement personnel and entities during the advance process. This simple and inexpensive mitigation tactic should have been implemented and would have made it much easier for law enforcement to locate and apprehend Crooks.

Recommendations Related to: Lines of Sight Failures

3. **Document All Line of Sight Vulnerabilities.** USSS Site Agents must identify all potential lines of sight to the protectee which a trained sniper could reasonably be expected to utilize, state how such lines of sight will be mitigated, and ensure that a supervisor has approved the mitigation strategy for each. The USSS CSTL must be given the opportunity to review the mitigation plan if counter-snipers are utilized for an event, and the mitigation plan should be shared with state and LLE no later than the final meeting prior to the arrival of the protectee.

³⁹⁹ Lt. [REDACTED] BTPD Lt. 1, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Lt. [REDACTED] PSP Lt. 1, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 70 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 163 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

3. Lack of Adequate Assets and Manpower

Why it matters:	A lack of USSS assets amidst the strain from the heightened operational pace of the national presidential campaigns, including two simultaneous high-profile protectee visits in Pennsylvania on July 13, created an environment in which Thomas Crooks exploited gaps in coverage to conduct reconnaissance, gain the high ground, and fire eight shots at the rally stage.
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a. There was a lack of adequate assets on July 13.

The threat realized on July 13 in Butler, Pennsylvania originated from the outer perimeter of the site. Crooks was able to loiter around the AGR complex before climbing up on the roof of a building located approximately 150 yards from where the former President was speaking. The Secret Service often utilizes a [REDACTED] LES on the [REDACTED] LES of events to identify individuals, like Crooks, who are [REDACTED] LES.⁴⁰⁰ This asset is called a counter-surveillance unit (CSU).⁴⁰¹ However, at the Butler rally on July 13, there was no Secret Service CSU, an asset designed to be utilized in that exact scenario.⁴⁰²

The Task Force reviewed advance paperwork prepared for the October 5, 2024, campaign rally, which revealed a robust plan to mitigate line of sight concerns for the former President's return visit to Butler after the first assassination attempt.⁴⁰³ Outside of numerous other improvements to the site's security plan, the Task Force observed that the added element of CSU generated significant paperwork for addressing concerns outside of the site's perimeter.⁴⁰⁴ This included vulnerability assessments of the AGR complex as well as documented mitigation efforts—notably missing from documents related to the July 13 event.⁴⁰⁵

There should have been a CSU for the July 13 event—a large outdoor rally with 15,000 expected attendees and an increased threat level. Indeed, Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart wrote after the event:

⁴⁰⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Strategic Intelligence and Information Manual CSD-04, Counter Surveillance Protective Advances, Bates 006306-006314, 006311 (Jul. 6, 2020) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁰¹ *Id.*


⁴⁰² Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Lead Advance, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 197-198 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁰³ U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Advance Documents for Oct. 5, 2024 Butler Rally (reviewed Nov. 21, 2024) (reviewed in-camera by Task Force staff).

⁴⁰⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁰⁵ *Id.*

Figure 12: Handwritten Notes, created by Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart**⁴⁰⁶



CSU - I'm a huge advocate of CSU
and was surprised when I was told
that's not an asset requested

Had a CSU been utilized, the team would have been outside the outer perimeter looking for threats in areas of concern and could have identified the AGR complex as an unmitigated risk to the former President, or may have spotted Crooks before he climbed on top of the building. There were three opportunities for CSU assets to have been requested or assigned for July 13.

First, CSU could have been proactively assigned to all former President Trump's outdoor rallies by the Secret Service Office of Protective Operations (OPO) staffing and logistics office. The increased threat picture, specifically knowledge of a long-range threat against former President Trump, led the OPO to proactively approve counter-snipers for all Trump outdoor events. That credible intelligence likely should have led the Directorate of Strategic Intelligence and Information, the directorate that owns CSU assets, to proactively assign or approve CSU for outdoor events.⁴⁰⁷

Second, despite the lack of blanket approval for a CSU, DTD could have requested the asset. FLOTUS, who also had an event in Western Pennsylvania on July 13, had a CSU at her indoor event.⁴⁰⁸ According to Senior Special Agent **FLOTUS Adv. Agent** when the Pittsburgh Field Office received notification of the FLOTUS pending visit, her detail sent a list of requested personnel and specifically mentioned CSU.⁴⁰⁹ Conversely, the DTD did not make a specific request for a CSU.⁴¹⁰ According to DTD ASAIC **ASAIC DTD** there was a presumption that the asset would not have been approved for a former President.⁴¹¹

Third, the advance team for the event could have requested the CSU during their advance planning to properly secure the site. The Secret Service utilizes an "advance" team to plan security both inside and outside designed perimeters, and to coordinate necessary arrangements and assets

⁴⁰⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Emp. Notes of Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart** Bates 000791 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁰⁷ Ass't Dir., **OPO Asst. Dir.**, Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 45 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁰⁸ Sr. Special Agent **FLOTUS Adv. Agent**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 41 (Oct. 24, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁰⁹ *Id.*

⁴¹⁰ Ass't Special Agent in Charge **ASAIC DTD**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 43 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴¹¹ *Id.*

for a protectee.⁴¹² According to the Site Agent Counterpart, she explicitly asked about requesting a CSU and was told by the Lead Agent that it was not a resource that would be allocated for a former President.⁴¹³ The Lead Agent had previously spent three weeks assigned to DTD operations, so she had a good understanding of what assets might be approved. Though the Secret Service maintains that a detail may request an asset at any time, when asked what the criteria was for which assets a protectee might get depending on their status, former OPO Assistant Director **OPO Asst. Dir.** stated:

OPO Asst. Dir. Well, I think with the Donald Trump detail, we were very forward-leaning in providing him assets that a former would never have.

TF STAFF: So maybe -- you said, "a former would never have." So there has got to be some threshold for formers only get X.

OPO Asst. Dir. I shouldn't say "never have." But, traditionally -- I'll restate it. I haven't seen a former get this robust level of assets as long as I've been in the Secret Service, so -- which is a pretty long time. So, you know -- I mean, and that was from the get-go of him leaving office.⁴¹⁴

From interviews with special agents on the ground, it appears that the main factor in the decision to not request CSU was an assumption that the request would be denied due to the protectee's status as a former President at the time of the event. Notably, post-incident, on the evening of July 13, 2024, the Counter Surveillance Directorate (CSD) at the USSS indicated that they had the manpower to support DTD events. Specifically, "if asked, we are ready to start sending a CSD advance agent on future DTD trips as requested by the detail."⁴¹⁵ Additionally, the former OPO Assistant Director told the Task Force that if requested, the CSU "could have been sourced either from the Counter Surveillance Division, and if that wasn't available, it probably could have been sourced locally through the INV or investigative program."⁴¹⁶

⁴¹² Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-03, Protective Advance, Bates 006166-006181, 006166 (Mar. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴¹³ Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart** Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 21 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). The Lead Agent for the rally believed that the protective intelligence advance had arranged for the Pennsylvania State Police to fulfill the role with a 2-man team on the outer perimeter. Sr. Special Agent **Lead Advance**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 197-198 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴¹⁴ Ass't Dir. **OPO Asst. Dir.**, Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 26 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴¹⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 0002820 (Jul. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴¹⁶ Ass't Dir. **OPO Asst. Dir.**, Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 100 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Due to the unique nature of former President Trump’s protective status at the time of the July 13 event—being both a former President and a candidate—OPO made two unprecedented decisions in regard to assets allocated to him compared to other former Presidents.⁴¹⁷ However, during the advance planning of the July 13 event, there was a widespread assumption that only certain roles were entitled to certain assets, leading the DTD and senior agents operating in Advance roles to not request a necessary asset to provide adequate protection.

b. The operational tempo and strain from the campaign season impacted manpower for July 13.

In addition to the lack of assets, the strain on manpower also impacted operations that day. The simultaneous advance for both FLOTUS Biden and former President Trump in the Pittsburgh area on July 13—approximately 40 miles apart—exacerbated the workload of the PIT staff. USSS PIT ATSAIC [REDACTED] indicated that while it is not common for two protectees to visit the same city for different events, it does happen on occasion.⁴¹⁸ When there are two events, leadership in the PIT looks at the available staff and assigns the agents to appropriate roles.⁴¹⁹ USSS ATSAIC [REDACTED] described how the assignment process worked: “We would look and see who's available, the experience level of the agents, and then assign them to appropriate roles.” [REDACTED] testified that “[w]e would never ask a junior agent, somebody that's been out of [...] training for a year or less to be the lead for either [former President Trump’s visit or the FLOTUS Biden visit].”⁴²⁰

PIT had three available agents who had the seniority and experience to serve as lead advance for both former President Trump’s event and the FLOTUS event—Special Agents [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED].⁴²¹ SSA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was designated as lead advance for former President Trump’s event, and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was designated as lead advance for the FLOTUS event. Along with the lead advance role, SSA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was tasked as the transportation lead for the Butler rally.⁴²² The OPO policy on protective advance operations allows for a lead advance agent to function in several roles simultaneously if the composition of the advance team requires it.⁴²³ However, the decision to task Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with two advance roles resulted in her being in the motorcade from the airport to the rally site instead of at the site as the Lead Agent.

⁴¹⁷ *Id.* at 87-90. Approval of a counter-assault team in April 2024 and approval of USSS counter-snipers at the beginning of July 2024.

⁴¹⁸ Ass’t to the Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 23 (Oct. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴¹⁹ *Id.*

⁴²⁰ *Id.*

⁴²¹ *Id.* at 25.

⁴²² Sr. Special Agent, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 20 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴²³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-03, Protective Advance, Bates 006166-006181, 006167 (Mar. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

ATSAIC [REDACTED] testified there is no difference in the baseline levels of manpower assigned for a FLOTUS or a candidate nominee.⁴²⁴ According to [REDACTED] either protectee would have received the same number of advance agents, depending on the number of sites involved in that protectee’s visit.⁴²⁵ During the advance planning of former President Trump’s event, PIT SAIC [REDACTED] recognized a shortage of manpower and requested additional personnel from other field offices and DHS HSI to secure the site.⁴²⁶ The former President’s event utilized 16 HSI personnel for his outdoor rally, while the FLOTUS had no HSI special agents assigned to her indoor event.⁴²⁷ According to Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI USSS had “been using their special agents to supplement post standing duties for the campaign.”⁴²⁸ The Secret Service also relies heavily on state and local law enforcement, including specialized assets such as snipers and counterassault teams, to fulfill its protective duties.⁴²⁹

Recommendations Related to: Assets and Manpower

4. **Implement written policy that clearly articulates a threat-based methodology for asset and resource approval.** The nature of the campaign event in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024—outdoors, in front of a large crowd, with an active [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED] from a [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED], among other risk characteristics—should have necessitated a specific protocol of mitigation assets. Instead, the Secret Service made ad hoc determinations as to the assets and manpower that were available to the planning team.
5. **Utilize USSS counter-surveillance assets for all large outdoor events.** The written policy should require counter-surveillance assets for all large outdoor events. Planners should not have to request those assets from Secret Service leadership, and should not be empowered

⁴²⁴ Ass’t to the Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] ATSAIC PIT [REDACTED], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 24 (Oct. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴²⁵ *Id.*

⁴²⁶ Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] SAIC PIT [REDACTED], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 56 (Oct. 25, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴²⁷ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] FLOTUS Adv. Agent [REDACTED], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 49 (Oct. 24, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 000015 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 000079 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴²⁸ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI [REDACTED], Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 18 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴²⁹ The Task Force received testimony that state and local assistance is essential to USSS’s ability to fulfill its protective mission. Ass’t Dir. [REDACTED] OPO Asst. Dir. [REDACTED], Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 28-29 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). The Task Force also received testimony that USSS personnel does not formally assess the capabilities of state and local law enforcement. Ass’t Dir. [REDACTED] OPO Asst. Dir. [REDACTED], Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 28-29 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sergeant Technician [REDACTED] CS Sgt. Tech. [REDACTED], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 55-56 (Nov. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). The Secret Service may wish to consider the extent to which this structure could pose challenges in future cases where state or local personnel vary in their capabilities in ways that are not immediately apparent.

to waive or decline to incorporate those assets into the operations plan for any large outdoor event.

4. Failure to Share Threat Intelligence

Why it matters: Agents in advance roles were not made aware of the heightened threat environment which led to the assignment of USSS Counter-snipers. Had they known, it might have changed how they planned to execute the event.

Prior to the campaign rally on July 13, there was knowledge in the intelligence community of a [REDACTED] LES against former President Trump by a [REDACTED] LES.⁴³⁰ While not specific to the campaign event on July 13, this type of threat could manifest at a large outdoor rally.⁴³¹ The credible intelligence was not shared with key members of the Secret Service team responsible for properly securing the rally site.⁴³² Senior leaders at the USSS were briefed on this intelligence, and in response to the threat, OPO approved counter-snipers for all of former President Trump's outdoor rallies moving forward—an asset not generally approved for former Presidents.⁴³³

DTD ASAIC [REDACTED] ASAIC DTD who was not formally read into the intelligence, received a phone call on July 8 at approximately 11:30 p.m. from his direct superior, Deputy Special Agent in Charge (DSAIC) [REDACTED] DSAIC DTD regarding a “larger credible threat” and was advised that that the assigned USSS “counter-sniper team will help us with that long range threat.”⁴³⁴ Additionally, [REDACTED] DSAIC DTD told [REDACTED] ASAIC DTD to be “more focused” on “line of sight issues.”⁴³⁵

⁴³⁰ Indep. Review Panel, Report of the Independent Review Panel on the July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, 10-11 (Oct. 15, 2024) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/24_1017_opa-Independent-Review-Panel-Final-Report-and-Accompanying-Materials.pdf. The Department of Homeland Security Independent Review Panel wrote, “In the lead-up to the rally, various Secret Service personnel were read into intelligence regarding a long range threat by a foreign state actor against former President Trump. While this intelligence was not specific to the Butler rally, the risk of the threat manifesting there was apparent—hence the provision of two Secret Service counter-sniper teams to staff the rally, for example.” (emphasis in original).

⁴³¹ Indep. Review Panel, Report of the Independent Review Panel on the July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, 11 (Oct. 15, 2024) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/24_1017_opa-Independent-Review-Panel-Final-Report-and-Accompanying-Materials.pdf.

⁴³² Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Lead Advance, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] SAIC PIT, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 36-37 (Oct. 25, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Agent, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 67 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Counterpart, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 89 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴³³ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Lead Advance, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 35 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴³⁴ Ass’t Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] ASAIC DTD, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 12 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴³⁵ *Id.* at 28-29, 51.

ASAIC [ASAIC DTD] testified that he spoke to Senior Special Agent [Lead Advance] the Lead Advance Agent for the Butler Rally, as well as Special Agent [Site Agent] the Site Agent for the rally, about this threat by phone on July 9.⁴³⁶ Senior Special Agent [Lead Advance] testified, “I received a call on the 9th about credible intelligence that he could not tell me what it was. I asked him to pass it on to my supervisor.”⁴³⁷ Senior Special Agent [Lead Advance] further testified, “The impression was that it was [LES] because there had been previous talks about that within political members” as there had been previous talk about [LES] in the context of “[o]ther political figures – besides Trump.”⁴³⁸ Special Agent [Site Agent] testified that she was not part of any conversations about specific threats the week leading up to July 13 but that she had historic knowledge of a threat from [LES] regarding “a drone attack planned at a golf course somewhere in Florida.”⁴³⁹

While a “general threat” was talked about at an unclassified level, specific intelligence that informed the Secret Service approval of the counter-sniper asset was not provided to the key individuals who were ultimately responsible for the security of the site.⁴⁴⁰ There was an assumption that if there was credible, specific intelligence, it would be shared with necessary supervisors and appropriate agents.⁴⁴¹

According to the then-Assistant Director of OPO [OPO Asst. Dir.], the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information Division “are the curators of that information, the subject matter experts, and they are going to ultimately determine what is appropriate to pass and not pass.”⁴⁴² With respect to the Secret Service process for sharing intelligence, then-Assistant Director [OPO Asst. D] testified:

The protective intelligence advance on the ground is the conduit between the Protective Intelligence Division and headquarters for the facilitation of any information that's relevant to any protective

⁴³⁶*Id.* at 51-53.

⁴³⁷ Sr. Special Agent [Lead Advance], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴³⁸ *Id.* at 174.

⁴³⁹ Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 65-67 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁴⁰ *Id.* at 67; Sr. Special Agent [Lead Advance], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent in Charge [SAIC PIT], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 36-37 (Oct. 25, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 89 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁴¹ Sr. Special Agent [Lead Advance], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 34-35 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁴² Ass't Dir. [OPO Asst. Dir.], Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 95 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

site, and they are going to be the one that determines how and what information is passed.⁴⁴³

In the lead up to the July 13 rally, the USSS Protective Intelligence Division did not inform former Special Agent [PI Advance] the Protective Intelligence Advance Agent for the event from the Pittsburgh Field Office, about the specific long-range threat against former President Trump.⁴⁴⁴ [PI Advance] testified that he called the Protective Intelligence Division on the morning of the rally and was not passed any information.⁴⁴⁵

Additionally, [PI Advance] testified that he received no specific intelligence from the FBI related to July 13.⁴⁴⁶ As the PI advance, he had sent a letter to the FBI on July 10 requesting any intelligence the FBI might have related to the July 13 rally, to which he did not recall whether he received a response.⁴⁴⁷ Site PI Senior Special Agent [Site PI] testified that in her experience FBI would only send a response if it had adverse intelligence.⁴⁴⁸

Several Secret Service personnel working the advance for the rally testified that it would have been helpful to have known about the specific threat against former President Trump as intelligence informs operations.⁴⁴⁹ Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] the Site Counterpart, wrote in her notes after July 13:

⁴⁴³ *Id.* at 94.

⁴⁴⁴ Special Agent [PI Advance] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 29, 58 (Oct. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁴⁵ *Id.*


⁴⁴⁶ *Id.* at 21, 28-29.

⁴⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁴⁸ Sr. Special Agent [Site PI], Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 99-100 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁴⁹ Sr. Special Agent [Lead Advance], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 33-35 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Technician [CS TL], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 97 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). The former Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations testified that “Intelligence has the ability to inform operations. It should not dictate operations, but it has the ability to inform operations.” Ass’t Dir. [OPO Asst. Dir.], Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 93 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Figure 13: Handwritten Notes, created by Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] 450



Threats - Why am I hearing that there were threats to the Site on TV
How can the SAC of our FO not know about any threats and why did they feel that only one part of SOD was sufficient to cover it instead of the entire package

When asked to discuss these notes, Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] testified that knowledge of this threat information could have “heightened the security” of the rally site, and could have “called for more bodies,” “more requests from locals” or more “conversations to be had with everybody on the ground,” “briefings,” and “meetings” and also call on personnel, “Let’s be on our best game.”⁴⁵¹

The Secret Service CSTL [CSTL], who was assigned to the rally due to the credible intelligence, did not receive any information on the threat regarding former President Trump.⁴⁵² He testified that as the CSTL, he is always going to approach the advance like there could be a threat, but the knowledge of a specific threat, “it does make you kind of, like, a little more alert of, Okay, we’ve got intel so I don’t know double-cross your -- triple-cross your Ts and then, you know, make it count.”⁴⁵³ He further stated:

[J]ust having the knowledge would have been extremely helpful [...] I would be aware that we have active, basically information that some things have--potentially happen. Yes, something could always potentially happen. But now we have [LES] coming from [LES] that something more than likely is going to happen . . . we’re always at 100 percent. Today we go even higher . . . we got to be on our A-game.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 000791 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁵¹ Sr. Special Agent, [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 90 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁵² Technician [CSTL], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 20 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁵³ *Id.* at 153.

⁴⁵⁴ *Id.* at 97-98.

SAIC PIT received no information from the FBI or Secret Service relating to a specific or credible threat relating to former President Trump.⁴⁵⁵ He testified that he did not know why he was not provided with information about this threat, and that there was no other time in which he learned about a credible threat to a protectee only after an event occurred.⁴⁵⁶ SAIC PIT testified that if he had been made aware of intelligence regarding a potential threat, he would have requested more specific information about the threat and may have pushed for the event to be moved indoors and requested more assets.⁴⁵⁷

Additionally, there appeared to be some confusion or disagreement involving roles and responsibilities for sharing this information. As mentioned above, Senior Special Agent Lead Advance testified she asked ASAIC ASAIC DTD to pass this threat information to SAIC SAIC PIT.⁴⁵⁸ However, ASAIC ASAIC DTD testified, “I specifically did not talk to him” and “she works for SAIC PIT”, and it would be my understanding that she should brief her boss” on what he passed along to her.⁴⁵⁹

Lastly, SSA Lead Advance testified that the Secret Service should also have passed this information to “appropriate working supervisors” for this event, in addition to the other agents.⁴⁶⁰ ASAIC DTD testified that the supervisors for the July 13 event were DTD Inspector CNOS Insp. and himself, both of whom were second supervisors; PIT SAIC SAIC PIT and PIT ATSAIC ATSAIC PIT, who was the site supervisor at the Butler rally site.⁴⁶¹

Credible and relevant intelligence was not passed to necessary Secret Service personnel. Had the advance team known about the intelligence, the mistakes and failures on July 13 may have been alleviated. Intelligence informs operations, and the decision not to share credible intelligence that could manifest at a site with the team making decisions on the ground is inexplicable.

Recommendation Related to: Failure to Share Threat Intelligence

- 6. Implement a policy on sharing relevant intelligence for an advance trip among the Protective Intelligence Division, the detail, and the relevant field office.** The list of individuals read into the threat intelligence should include working supervisors such as the

⁴⁵⁵ Special Agent in Charge SAIC PIT, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 36-37 (Oct. 25, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁵⁶ *Id.* at 83-84.

⁴⁵⁷ *Id.* at 83.

⁴⁵⁸ Sr. Special Agent Lead Advance, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁵⁹ Ass’t Special Agent in Charge ASAIC DTD, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 57 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁶⁰ Sr. Special Agent Lead Advance, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 35 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁶¹ Ass’t Special Agent in Charge ASAIC DTD, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 34, 62, 85 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

field office SAIC, the protective intelligence agent, the Lead Advance Agent, and the Site Agent to ensure proper assets are requested and vulnerabilities are mitigated.

5. Failure to Launch C-UAS

Why it matters: Secret Service procedures for Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) failed to flag nonoperational C-UAS assets and provide adequate recourse for remedying failures on the day of the rally. The failure to have operating C-UAS capabilities on-site on July 13 negated a potential early opportunity for law enforcement to identify Crooks as a potential threat when he used a personal drone to perform reconnaissance ahead of the rally.

a. The C-UAS operator on-site had limited training.

The Secret Service utilizes C-UAS, as well as drone technology, to provide additional security for protectees at events—particularly large-scale outdoor events. C-UAS technology includes a variety of assets for both detection and mitigation of aerial threats, such as the drone flown by Crooks ahead of the rally on July 13.

Ahead of the July 13 rally, Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op., a shift agent with the DTD, was selected to conduct necessary C-UAS advance work and operate the C-UAS equipment during the event. Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. was relatively new to operating C-UAS technology, having only been assigned C-UAS responsibilities in March 2024.⁴⁶² Prior to July 13, he served as a C-UAS operator at two protectee events and had successfully detected and mitigated drones at each event⁴⁶³

In addition to Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. limited operational experience, his C-UAS training was brief in scope.⁴⁶⁴ In fact, to Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. knowledge, there are no standard written guidelines for the DTD C-UAS role.⁴⁶⁵ Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. experience does not appear to be unique.

Although the Secret Service consolidated drone and C-UAS operations under the TSD in January 2024, the USSS does not have a standardized training program for C-UAS or for C-UAS advance work. As a result, it is not unusual for agents who perform C-UAS roles on protectee details to receive training from other members of the detail. In Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. case, he received in-person training from USSS Investigative Protection Officer (IPO), [REDACTED] DTD IPO, who was

⁴⁶² Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op., Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 11 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁶³ *Id.* at 47-48.

⁴⁶⁴ *Id.* at 14. (Indicating training was less than an hour).

⁴⁶⁵ U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Mission Assurance Report Interview of Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. (2024) (reviewed in-camera by Task Force staff).

also assigned to DTD.⁴⁶⁶ [REDACTED] DTD IPO provided Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. with training that consisted of approximately 30 minutes of an in-person demonstration. In addition, Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. completed approximately 30 minutes of online training.⁴⁶⁷ He was never trained on how to troubleshoot the C-UAS platform that he was assigned to use during the July 13 rally, and was only provided a technical support phone number by colleagues.⁴⁶⁸ At no time in his career did Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. ever shadow another agent during an active protection mission to observe how to use certain C-UAS systems.⁴⁶⁹

b. The Secret Service was unprepared for any C-UAS technical failure.

Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. first learned he was assigned to the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania approximately one week before the event. Prior to that point, Special Agent [REDACTED] DTD Agent 1 was assigned to work as the DTD C-UAS agent for the July 13 rally in Butler. In emails obtained by the Task Force sent by [REDACTED] DTD Agent 2 (DTD) on both July 3, 2024, and July 5, 2024, Special Agent [REDACTED] DTD Agent 1 name is listed as the DTD C-UAS agent assigned to the July 13 campaign event.⁴⁷⁰ In his testimony to the Task Force, Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. indicated he did not know why this substitution occurred.⁴⁷¹

On or about July 9, 2024, Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. retrieved the [REDACTED] LES system from [REDACTED] LES to use for the Butler rally.⁴⁷² At no time did Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. pick up any backup materials, cords, wires, or other pieces of technical equipment to bring to the Butler assignment. Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. received a call from TSI [REDACTED] TSI Agent on July 10, 2024.⁴⁷³ During this conversation, Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. requested [REDACTED] LES C-UAS mitigation assets from TSI [REDACTED] TSI Agent (1) the [REDACTED] LES system, which was [REDACTED] LES; and (2) an additional [REDACTED] LES to mitigate unauthorized drones. Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. requested the [REDACTED] LES from TSI [REDACTED] TSI Agent because DTD did not possess that asset.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁶⁶ Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op., Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 13-14 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁶⁷ *Id.* at 17; U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Mission Assurance Report Interview of Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. (2024) (reviewed in-camera by Task Force staff).

⁴⁶⁸ Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op., Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 16 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁶⁹ *Id.* at 14-15.

⁴⁷⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 003077 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁷¹ Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op., Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 25 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁷² U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Mission Assurance Report Interview of Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. (2024) (reviewed in-camera by Task Force staff).

⁴⁷³ *Id.*

⁴⁷⁴ *Id.*

Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testified that although he had not been trained on how to operate the [LES] system, he felt it was necessary for the event. Had the [LES] asset been approved, a member of TSD trained on the platform would have been assigned to work the July 13 rally.⁴⁷⁵ TSD subsequently denied this request for the two additional assets and TSI [TSI Agent] called [C-UAS Op.] to let him know the request was denied.⁴³⁶ According to Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testimony, the mitigation assets were being used at another site for a different protectee event.

Despite having the C-UAS detection system on site when he arrived on July 12, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testified that he did not test the C-UAS asset's detection capabilities at any point prior to the morning of the rally.⁴⁷⁶ Testing of this system, including set up, would have only taken approximately 30 minutes.⁴⁷⁷ When asked why, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testified that he had no reason to believe that the system would not work because it worked when he used it in [LES] [REDACTED] "two or three days before."⁴⁷⁸

In addition, although Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] brought the detection system with him to the rally, he did not bring the mitigation system with him. The mitigation system only arrived when former President Trump's motorcade arrived at the event around 5:33 p.m. As such, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] was unable to assign a Secret Service post stander at the Butler rally the collateral duty to operate the [LES] mitigation technology as part of the C-UAS response. This meant that aside from physically locating and interviewing a detected drone operator, the Secret Service lacked additional options to neutralize or mitigate a detected drone prior to the former President's arrival.

c. C-UAS advance work was fragmented.

As part of the advance work performed ahead of the July 13 rally, TSI [TSI Agent] conducted a TSD Outdoor Site Survey. Under the "Summary of Threats & Vulnerabilities" section, TSI [TSI Agent] noted that "[t]he site is located in an open farm area and is vulnerable to possible drone attacks with the limited amount C-UAS equipment on site."⁴⁷⁹ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testified that TSI [TSI Agent] never discussed this summary of threats with him before the rally, even though the threats listed directly related to drone attacks and concern regarding the limited amount of C-UAS

⁴⁷⁵ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁷⁶ *Id.* at 29-31; U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Mission Assurance Report Interview of Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] (2024) (reviewed in-camera by Task Force staff).

⁴⁷⁷ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 64-66 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁷⁸ *Id.* at 65-66.

⁴⁷⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 002048 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

equipment on site.⁴⁸⁰ In addition, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] did not coordinate with [TSI Agent] to survey the site and develop technical operational requirements.⁴⁸¹

C-UAS coordination with LLE personnel also appears to have been limited. Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testified that his only responsibility was to ascertain whether LLE intended to use drones and then to “[LES],” or [LES] those LLE drone assets. As part of the C-UAS advance process, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testified that there had been week-long discussions with state and LLE partners regarding the security plan and whether local C-UAS assets would be included. Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testified that he had no participation in those planning calls despite being the on-site C-UAS operator. Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] also testified that during these calls, it was decided that USSS would not utilize drone assets offered to it by LLE. Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] confirmed this with PSP Lt. [PSP Lt. 2] via text message on July 12.⁴⁸²

Although Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] testified it would have been “easy” to incorporate the use of a local drone into the USSS security plan, it was ultimately not done.⁴⁸³ [C-UAS Op.] testified he did not want to disrupt or add to the existing plan, and he did not feel he was in a position to accept LLE’s offer of drone assistance.⁴⁸⁴

On July 12, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] also received forwarded email correspondence from [USSS SOD] in the USSS SOD, with an attachment setting forth the Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) parameters for the day of July 13, including the window of time in which the TFR would be in place, [LES] – [LES].⁴⁸⁵ Although [C-UAS Op.] had no part in setting these parameters, he expressed concern regarding the window of time the TFR was in effect and that the expiration of the TFR while former President Trump was [LES] would be problematic.⁴⁸⁶ However, no changes were made to the TFR based on his concerns.

At 10:22 p.m. on July 12, 2024, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] sent an email to a group of individuals, including Senior Special Agent [Site PI] and others, stating, in part:

⁴⁸⁰ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 62 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁸¹ *Id.*

⁴⁸² Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001917-001918 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁸³ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 57 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁸⁴ *Id.* at 57-58.

⁴⁸⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 003187 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁸⁶ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 68 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

All-

A [REDACTED] TFR goes into effect at [REDACTED] hours and expire(s) at [REDACTED] hours. The TFR covers all unmanned aerial vehicles from ground level to [REDACTED] above ground level.

[REDACTED] Drone Detection Alerts

I will enter your mobile number into the drone detection notification system. If a drone is detected within a [REDACTED] radius of a protected site you will receive a text from the detection equipment called "[REDACTED]" which provides a Google map link to display where the drone pilot is located, this is happening in real time. Once you receive the text move towards the pilot if you get multiple alerts, respond to the pilot closes [sic] to the protected site. The objective is to contact the pilot and have them immediately recall and land the Drone.

The email also provided additional instructions regarding what identification information agents should collect and provide Special Agent [REDACTED] if they detained a drone pilot, as well as legal and other contact instructions.⁴⁸⁷ When asked why Special Agent [REDACTED] sent this email so late the evening prior to the event, he testified that he had instructed USSS personnel earlier that day during the walkthrough that at all times throughout the day, visual observation for drones should be conducted.⁴⁸⁸

d. C-UAS failures resulted in a lack of counter-drone capabilities prior to the Rally.

The C-UAS, specifically [REDACTED], brought to the July 13 rally experienced technical issues, rendering it inoperable during the time Crooks flew his drone around the Butler Farm Show complex at approximately 3:51 p.m. for 11 minutes.⁴⁸⁹ These technical issues were further exacerbated by the C-UAS operator's limited training and inability to troubleshoot the issues he encountered. Had the C-UAS system been operational earlier that day, it likely would have been able to geolocate Crooks when he flew his drone, and a Secret Service agent would then have been dispatched to detain and question him.

⁴⁸⁷ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 003059-3060 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁸⁸ Special Agent [REDACTED], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 71 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁸⁹ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Timeline of Events, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000381 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

e. Technical software issues.

Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] experienced technical issues as soon as he attempted to turn the C-UAS equipment on following a morning post-stander readiness briefing with Secret Service personnel at the Butler Farm Show complex.⁴⁹⁰ When his initial troubleshooting efforts failed, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] reached out to IPO [DTD IPO] with the DTD at 11:47 a.m. and 11:49 a.m. for assistance.⁴⁹¹ After IPO [DTD IPO] suggestion to shut the system down and power it back up did not work, IPO [DTD IPO] sent him the phone number of ATSAIC [ATSAIC TSD C-UAS] within the TSD C-UAS Branch Program.⁴⁹²

At 12:05 p.m., Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] contacted ATSAIC [ATSAIC TSD C-UAS] who passed along the phone number for [LES] tech support.⁴⁹³ Additionally, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] repositioned the C-UAS platform [LES] in an attempt to counteract potential interference from a [LES].⁴⁹⁴ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] initially called [LES] technical support at 12:12 p.m., but was unable to reach anyone and left a voicemail.⁴⁹⁵ [LES] technical support called him back after an hour, and Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] had several conversations to troubleshoot his connectivity issues. Eventually, the [LES] technical support suggested to Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] that the C-UAS may need a software update.⁴⁹⁶ Although the C-UAS tech support [LES] and [LES] to the C-UAS platform, the update failed to activate the platform.⁴⁹⁷

f. Physical cable issues.

After the software update failed to activate the C-UAS platform, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] received a call back from the manufacturer's technical support at 4:15 p.m.⁴⁹⁸ The technical

⁴⁹⁰ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 75-76 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁹¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Cellular Call Logs, Bates 0001916 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁹² Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 77-78 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Mission Assurance Report Interview of Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] (2024) (reviewed in-camera by Task Force staff).

⁴⁹³ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 78 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Mission Assurance Report Interview of Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] (2024) (reviewed in-camera by Task Force staff).

⁴⁹⁴ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 96 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁹⁵ U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Mission Assurance Report Interview of Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] (2024) (reviewed in-camera by Task Force staff).

⁴⁹⁶ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 97 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁴⁹⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁹⁸ *Id.*

support agent suggested that Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] swap out the ethernet cable that was connecting two components together because the two components were not “talking to each other.”⁴⁹⁹ Although Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] was unable to locate a substitute ethernet cable in the USSS Security Room, he was able to obtain an ethernet cable from the nearby Trump Campaign’s audio-visual personnel.⁵⁰⁰ After Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] swapped the ethernet cables out, the system activated at approximately 4:33 p.m. late that afternoon.⁵⁰¹

g. Communications failures.

As the C-UAS system remained nonoperational throughout the day, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] reached out to various Secret Service personnel to inform them that the C-UAS system was down. He contacted Special Agent [Site Agent] the Site Agent, and ASAIC [ASAIC DTD], to inform them that the system was down and may not be operable.⁵⁰²

Then, once Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] successfully activated the system at 4:33 p.m., he contacted Special Agent [Site Agent] and ASAIC [ASAIC DTD] to inform them that the platform had been fixed.⁵⁰³ However, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] did not inform several other advance or supervisory agents that the C-UAS platform was down. For example, Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] the Site Agent Counterpart to Special Agent [Site Agent] was never informed that the C-UAS platform was experiencing issues, nor was Senior Special Agent [Lead Advance] the Lead Advance Agent.⁵⁰⁴

Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] also never contacted TSI [TSI Agent] to inform him that the C-UAS platform was inoperable despite C-UAS equipment falling under TSD’s umbrella of responsibilities and expertise. However, even if Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] had reached out to TSI [TSI Agent] it is unclear how much assistance TSI [TSI Agent] would have been able to offer as he had not been formally trained on the C-UAS system and had only obtained unofficial experience with the platform in the field.⁵⁰⁵

Recommendations Related to: Failure to Launch C-UAS

- 7. Improve C-UAS mitigation strategies for when C-UAS or other drone systems fail.** Secret Service should put in place policies and procedures for C-UAS asset failure contingencies, to include certain requirements such as: 1) required testing of assets the day prior to an event; 2) the possession of backup materials, C-UAS operators should be

⁴⁹⁹ *Id.* at 97-98.

⁵⁰⁰ *Id.* at 80.

⁵⁰¹ *Id.*

⁵⁰² *Id.* at 97.

⁵⁰³ *Id.*

⁵⁰⁴ Production to the Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Handwritten Notes, Bates 000790 (Jul. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force) (“CUAS - Why wasn’t I told that it wasn’t working properly? What kind of training does he have and how many times has he operated the [LES] system?”).

⁵⁰⁵ Technical Security Investigator [TSI Agent] U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 33 (Oct. 10, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

required to carry as well as bring certain additional back up materials and parts to events; 3) creation of redundancies in the event of C-UAS asset failure; and 4) implementing standardized troubleshooting procedures.

8. **Implement and increase formalized training, certification, and cross-functional platform training for drone and C-UAS operators.** The Technology Security Division (TSD) should implement a comprehensive, service-wide formal training and certification process for all drone and C-UAS technologies, including a standardized “C-UAS advance checklist.” Additionally, cross-functional training should be established to enable any agent to assume a collateral duty as a drone or C-UAS operator if necessary. This training should also include a contingencies portion, which not only includes a section on troubleshooting C-UAS assets, but also backup materials and items the C-UAS agent should keep on hand in the event of an emergency. As part of the training program for C-UAS, operators should be required to participate in a program where they shadow another CUAS agent from the beginning of the advance process through the event to ascertain on-the-job experience and to obtain first-hand knowledge of what the CUAS process entails in a real-life scenario.

9. **Ensure that drone and C-UAS operators assigned to events have passed and maintained required training and certification as well as any necessary updates.** Special agents must be familiar with the equipment they employ and be prepared to address last minute or technical issues

10. **The DHS and USSS should consider utilizing Department of Defense (DOD) drone operators to supplement USSS efforts at protectee events under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act.** [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED], deploying DOD drone operators would free up other special agents for protectee duties, alleviate manpower strain, and enhance the effectiveness of surveillance operations.

11. **Congress should consider whether current legal authorities to mitigate credible threats posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) should be expanded.** The rapid expansion of the commercial UAS market has increased the threat of drone incursions at protectee events. Congress should consider legislative proposals that would responsibly extend and justifiably expand legal authorities to respond to credible threats all the while balanced by appropriate safeguards to protect Americans’ privacy, ensure aviation security, and allow for authorized commercial activity. For instance, Congress should consider authorizing DHS to establish a counter-UAS mitigation pilot program under which selected state and covered local law enforcement agencies may operate approved counter-UAS mitigation systems and mitigate unauthorized UAS operations on behalf of covered entities within their jurisdictions.

Failures in Execution

Why it matters: The fragmented communications structure and lack of timely information sharing resulted in missed opportunities for the Secret Service and its state and local partners to apprehend Crooks and make informed decisions about managing the protectee prior to shots fired.

1. Fragmented Communications and Separate Command Posts

Nearly every Secret Service and LLE officer present on July 13 testified to the Task Force that communications on site could have been better. When asked how best to prevent the tragedy of July 13 from happening again, Butler ESU Dep. Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm.] stated, “[o]ver the years of being in this business, whether it be fire, EMS, or law enforcement, you can always improve upon communication.”⁵⁰⁶

To mitigate communications issues at events, the USSS utilizes a Security Room. According to the Protective Operations policy manual, the Security Room is an on-site coordination and communications center.⁵⁰⁷ The idea is to have a representative from all entities involved in the event to ensure all entities can communicate with one another. USSS SAIC [Sec. Room S] who was stationed in the Security Room on July 13, stated that it is “really like an information relay station.”⁵⁰⁸

The Task Force has determined that the communications failures of July 13 can be attributed to several factors, including no unified command post, a lack of knowledge about which LLE partners should be in the USSS Security Room, and a lack of redundant communication methods between local and USSS tactical assets. At multiple points during the week leading up to the rally, the Secret Service advance team could have stepped in to clarify communications roles and responsibilities; however, that did not happen.

Based on conflicting testimony the Task Force has received from USSS, state, and LLE personnel, miscommunications appear to have started early in the planning process. On July 8, the Secret Service hosted a meeting with state and LLE as part of the advance planning process. USSS Senior Special Agent [Lead Advance] stated that during the meeting, she invited and requested all state and LLE partners to join the USSS in the Security Room during the rally.⁵⁰⁹ However, PSP Lt. [PSP Lt. 1] who was at the meeting, did not hear Senior Special Agent [Lead Advance] or anyone else from the Secret Service invite or request state or LLE join the Security Room.⁵¹⁰ Butler County DES Director

⁵⁰⁶ Dep. Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 78 (Sep. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁰⁷ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-08, Communications, Bates 6249-6253 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁰⁸ Special Agent in Charge [Sec. Room Sup.], Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 22 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁰⁹ Sr. Special Agent [Lead Advance], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 74 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵¹⁰ Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 10 (Nov. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Butler DES Dir., also at the meeting, stated that he did not recall LLE being invited to the Security Room either.⁵¹¹

In addition, later in the week, the Secret Service hosted a walkthrough of the rally location to determine security postings for USSS personnel and state and LLE assets. According to BTPD Lt. BTPD Lt. 1 one of the meeting attendees, although the walkthrough started in the building that the USSS planned to use for the July 13 Security Room, there was never an invitation or request to state and LLE to have a presence in the Security Room.

The lack of collaboration between USSS, state, and LLE regarding which agencies would be present in the Security Room led to inadequate representation from local security partners. In addition, due to LLE being under the impression that they would not be in the Security Room, Dir. Butler DES Dir. decided to provide the Butler County command post trailer, hereafter “local command post” for LLE use.⁵¹²

A lack of coordination between the Secret Service and LLE led to confusion regarding the local command post’s role on July 13. USSS Senior Special Agent Lead Advance and Special Agent Site Agent stated that when they learned about the local command post, they wanted to use it to mitigate line of sight concerns.⁵¹³ PSP Lt. PSP Lt. 1 testified that in addition to hearing conversations about the local command post being used for line of sight concerns, he also thought the local command trailer was being used for medical personnel at the rally, and that was why PSP was not planning to have a trooper in the local command post.⁵¹⁴

To help facilitate information sharing, PSP placed one of their portable radios in the local command post, which operated on separate frequencies from LLE; however, LLE realized the PSP handheld radio was not working.⁵¹⁵ As a result, when the local command post needed to exchange information with the Security Room, Butler ESU Commander Butler ESU C would call PSP Sgt. PSP Sgt. who was stationed in the Security Room.⁵¹⁶ Sgt. PSP Sgt. would then relay the information to others within the Security Room.⁵¹⁷ While this solution allowed information to pass from the local

⁵¹¹ Dir. Butler DES Dir., Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 28 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵¹² *Id.*

⁵¹³ Sr. Special Agent Lead Advance, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 113 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent Site Agent, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 162 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵¹⁴ Lt. PSP Lt. 1, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 13, 16 (Nov. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵¹⁵ *Id.* at 31; Butler DES Tech, Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 74 (Sep. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵¹⁶ Commander Butler ESU Comm., Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 132 (Sep. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵¹⁷ Special Agent in Charge Sec. Room Sup., Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 54-55 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

command post to the Security Room, a unified command post would have allowed for faster real-time updates of all security partners, especially during an emergency incident.

This became evident in the minutes leading up to Crooks firing at former President Trump and audience members. USSS SAIC [Sec. Room S] who was stationed in the Security Room, stated that at approximately 5:51 p.m., Sgt. PSP Sgt. relayed that locals were looking for a suspicious person.⁵¹⁸ Between then and when Crooks fired the first shot at 6:11 p.m., LLE provided constant updates over the radio.⁵¹⁹ However, due to the lack of LLE in the Security Room, the updates provided by Butler ESU Commander [Butler ESU C] to Sgt. PSP Sgt. via phone were slower than direct radio traffic and did not always reach all necessary individuals in the Security Room.

For instance, Sgt. PSP Sgt. stated that he relayed information about Crooks being seen on the roof of the AGR complex to SAIC [Sec. Room S] and others in the Security Room.⁵²⁰ However, SAIC [Sec. Room S] stated that he “never heard man on a roof” and that the only update he received after 5:51 p.m. was shortly before shots were fired when counter-sniper CS Tech. transmitted over his radio, “security room from LES . Locals are working something at the 3 o'clock, approximately 200 yards out.”⁵²¹ However, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] heard the update about the suspicious person on the roof.⁵²² Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] explained that SAIC [Sec. Room S] was in between Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] and PSP Sgt. PSP Sgt. and that SAIC [Sec. Room S] and PSP Sgt. made eye contact when PSP Sgt. PSP Sgt. provided the man on the roof update.⁵²³ Having all relevant LLE assets present in the Security Room would have reduced the likelihood that essential information was lost or delayed in critical moments on July 13.

When asked about communications failures on July 13, [OPO Asst. Dir.], the then-Assistant Director for the OPO, who was not at the rally, stated:

From what was told to me subsequent to the event from different conversations that I had with people and what I could observe, the security room seemed to lack the representation of a unified

⁵¹⁸ *Id.* at 75-76.

⁵¹⁹ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024 (Jul. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵²⁰ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, Recorded Interview of Penn. State Police PSP Sgt. (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵²¹ Special Agent in Charge [Sec. Room Sup.], Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 25 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Technician [CS Tech.], Jr., U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 70 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵²² Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 113 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵²³ *Id.* at 113-114.

command element with the requisite number of agencies in the security room that, in my opinion, should have been there.⁵²⁴

After July 13, the Secret Service updated the Protective Operations policy manual, section OPO-08, Communication, to include a section about staffing other law enforcement command posts. The Task Force understands that the agency now requires that any secondary command post that state or LLE establishes be staffed by a supervisory or senior-level special agent to ensure proper communication between the two command posts.⁵²⁵

a. A lack of radio communications between USSS counter-sniper and local sniper teams undermined the effort to engage Crooks.

In addition to the lack of a unified command post and disjointed information sharing, the USSS counter-sniper team was supposed to have radio communications with local sniper teams. On the morning of July 13, CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL was told by local snipers that a LLE radio was available for him to use for the day.⁵²⁶ However, CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL testified to the Task Force that he did not pick up the LLE radio due to issues with his USSS-issued radio.⁵²⁷ While CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL could communicate with local snipers via text messages and phone calls, these methods of communication can be significantly slower than radio communications, and there was no redundant method should cell service fail.

b. Secret Service personnel did not share situational information among themselves in a timely manner.

On July 13, the Secret Service utilized three radio channels for agency communications.⁵²⁸ The three channels had specific user groups so that certain information could be passed to only the group that may need it. The first channel was for [REDACTED] LES, comprised of USSS and HSI special agents who were stationary and in place [REDACTED] LES. The second channel was for [REDACTED] LES, which was the USSS special agents who [REDACTED] LES. Finally, the third channel was for the [REDACTED] LES teams. This multichannel system is not uncommon, given the number of USSS and HSI personnel on-site for large protectee events, and is one of the reasons for a single USSS Security

⁵²⁴ Ass't Dir. OPO Asst. Dir., Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 73 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵²⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-08, Communications, Bates 6249-6253 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵²⁶ Technician [REDACTED] CS TL, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 103 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵²⁷ *Id.* at 105. [REDACTED] CS TL suggested in his MAR interview that he was not aware of the opportunity to obtain a local radio at the time of that interview, which raises a possible conflict with his Task Force testimony. [REDACTED] CS Sgt. Tech testified to the Task Force that switching his radio frequency was a relatively brief process, raising a further question regarding the extent to which the change in frequency prevented [REDACTED] CS TL from obtaining a local radio. Sergeant Technician [REDACTED] CS Sgt. Tech, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 66 (Nov. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵²⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., July 13 Paperwork and Operations Plans, Bates 000001-000084, 000155-000162 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Room—to ensure that all relevant parties receive relevant information in real-time regardless of which radio channel they may be utilizing.

Despite the USSS Security Room being in place on July 13, critical information was not relayed broadly to USSS personnel. **OPO Asst. Dir.**, the then USSS Assistant Director for OPO, who was not at the rally, stated, “[a]t Butler there certainly seemed to be an appearance of siloed communications.”⁵²⁹ Starting at approximately 5:45 p.m., USSS personnel began learning of the suspicious person near the AGR complex who had been previously spotted with a rangefinder.⁵³⁰ By the time the first shots were fired, approximately nine individuals from the USSS were aware of a suspicious person. Yet, no one from the USSS in proximity to former President Trump knew this information.

At 5:45 p.m., CSTL **CS TL** received a text message and photos from a LLE sniper regarding a suspicious person near the AGR building.⁵³¹ At 5:52 p.m., CSTL **CS TL** emailed the other three USSS counter-snipers with information about the suspicious person.⁵³² At this time, all four USSS counter-snipers were aware of a suspicious person. However, the USSS counter-snipers did not inform anyone else about this update, despite CSTL **CS TL** telling the other three counter-sniper team members to notify PI or the Security Room if the suspicious person was spotted.

Figure 14: Message to **CS TL** from ESU sniper

Date: Saturday, July 13, 2024 5:45:28 PM
Kid learning around building we are in. AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a range finder looking towards stage. FYI. If you wanna notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him. Also a bike with backpack sitting next to it in rear of building that was not seen earlier.


⁵²⁹ Ass’t Dir. **OPO Asst. Dir.**, Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 76 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵³⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., EmailProd_set1_001395.001483, Bates 1412 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵³¹ *Id.*

⁵³² *Id.*

Figure 15: Message from [REDACTED] CS TL to USSS Counter-Sniper Team Members



The first time the USSS Security Room became aware of a suspicious person was at 5:51 p.m. when PSP Sgt. [REDACTED] PSP Sgt. relayed the information to SAIC [REDACTED] Sec. Room 3 and Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op.⁴⁹³ Shortly after relaying the information, Sgt. [REDACTED] PSP Sgt. sent photos of the suspicious person to Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. so that the images could be sent to USSS CSR Special Agent [REDACTED] CS Resp.⁵³³

However, Special Agent [REDACTED] USSS Post 1 who was partnered with BTPD Patrolman [REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 1 at the motorcade entrance of the rally location, learned of a suspicious person sometime after 5:30 p.m.⁵³⁴ Patrolman [REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 1 received a photo and message regarding the suspicious person, which he relayed to Special Agent [REDACTED] USSS Post 1.⁵³⁵ Special Agent [REDACTED] USSS Post 1 stated that upon hearing this, he asked Patrolman [REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 1 if the Secret Service was aware, to which Patrolman [REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 1 replied that yes, the “command post is aware.”⁵³⁶ Therefore, Special Agent [REDACTED] USSS Post 1 did not feel he needed to relay the information to the Security Room. It is possible that due to the existence of both the Security Room and the local command post, Patrolman [REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 1 assumed that if the local command post was aware of the suspicious person, then the Secret Service was as well—unaware himself that the USSS was in a separate Security Room.

The only other USSS personnel to learn of a suspicious person near the AGR building was Senior Special Agent, who was the site PI on July 13. Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI stated that she learned of the suspicious person between 5:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m. from a PSP trooper she was partnered with.⁵³⁷ When Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI learned of a suspicious person, she and two PSP troopers went to the fence line separating the rally location from the AGR property to search for the person.⁵³⁸ At approximately 5:47 p.m., while Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI was

⁵³³ Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] Sec. Room Sup., Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 83 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵³⁴ Special Agent [REDACTED] USSS Post 1, Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 52 (Oct. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵³⁵ *Id.*

⁵³⁶ *Id.* at 53.

⁵³⁷ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI, Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 68 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵³⁸ *Id.*

by the fence line, a member of Butler ESU alerted her a second time of a suspicious person.⁵³⁹ Senior Special Agent [Site PI] did not notify the Security Room about the suspicious person either time that she was alerted by state and LLE. Senior Special Agent [Site PI] stated that she was under the impression that the Security Room was aware of the suspicious person due to phone conversations she witnessed with the PSP trooper she was partnered with.⁵⁴⁰

In all four instances of Secret Service personnel being alerted to a suspicious person near the AGR complex, each individual failed to share the information broadly. Additionally, Senior Special Agent [Site PI], Special Agent [USSS Post 1] and CSTL [CS TL] failed to alert the Security Room of the information. While Senior Special Agent [Site PI] did inform Special Agent [PI Advance] while he was in the Security Room, she did not inform designated Security Room USSS personnel, and [PI Advance] did not escalate the information he received. The only time the information about a suspicious person was broadly shared by USSS personnel was by Counter-sniper [CS Tech.] shortly before shots were fired. Counter-sniper [CS Tech.] transmitted over his radio, “security room from [LES]. Locals are working something at the 3 o'clock, approximately 200 yards out.”⁵⁴¹ This radio transmission led Special Agent [Site Agent] to call Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] to inquire about the situation that locals were working at the 3 o'clock; it was during that call that shots were fired.⁵⁴²

By 5:52 p.m.—almost 20 minutes before the first shots were fired—at least nine Secret Service personnel were aware of a suspicious person near the AGR complex who had been previously seen with a rangefinder. This included SAIC [Sec. Room S] who was stationed in the Security Room and testified to the Task Force that his job on July 13 was to relay information.⁵⁴³ Had information been shared more broadly with USSS personnel, post standers would have had awareness to watch for the suspicious person, and former President Trump’s protective detail would have had critical situational awareness to make informed protective decisions.

c. PSP did not clarify the limitations of its communications with local partners, resulting in ineffective communication between state and local entities.

In addition to USSS, there were four law enforcement entities operating on different radio frequencies: PSP; Butler ESU; BTPD; and the Butler County Sheriff’s Office.⁵⁴⁴ Additionally,

⁵³⁹ *Id.* at 73.

⁵⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁵⁴¹ Technician [CS Tech.], Jr., U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 70 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁴² Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 210 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁴³ Special Agent in Charge [Sec. Room Sup.], Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 22 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁴⁴ Dir. [Butler DES Dir.], Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 22, (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 14 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Butler DES and medical personnel used a different radio channel.⁵⁴⁵ The LLE entities were able to listen to each other's channels, including scanning to hear multiple local channels simultaneously.⁵⁴⁶ However, LLE was unable to listen to PSP communications via LLE radios, nor could PSP listen to LLE radio channels.⁵⁴⁷

PSP knew which LLE entities would be supporting security for the rally, understood that law enforcement should be in the Security Room, and believed that the local command post would be used for medical services.⁵⁴⁸ PSP provided a PSP radio for the local command post to ensure LLE knew when the motorcade was en route.⁵⁴⁹ However, before the motorcade arrived, LLE representatives realized the PSP handheld radio was not working.⁵⁵⁰ Despite attempting to troubleshoot the issue, the radio remained inoperable.⁵⁵¹ In addition to communications throughout the week leading up to the rally, PSP met in person with USSS on July 8, July 9, and July 11.⁵⁵² Despite this, the Secret Service was unaware that there was no interoperability between LLE and PSP.⁵⁵³ The USSS Site Agent Counterpart and Security Room Agent assumed that PSP Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] was able to listen to LLE communications on the radio.⁵⁵⁴ Notably, the site agents both expected all law enforcement entities to be present in the Security Room.⁵⁵⁵

Additionally, during the pursuit of Crooks, Butler ESU Commander [Butler ESU C] attempted to manage radio channels for ESU tactical and BTPD, while also calling PSP Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] to provide updates.⁵⁵⁶ BTPD Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1], who would typically handle the BTPD radio channel, left the

⁵⁴⁵ Dir. [Butler DES Dir.], Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 22 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁴⁶ Sgt. [Sheriff's Sgt.], Butler Co. Sheriff's Office, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 10 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 15 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). "Scanning" allows radio users to listen to multiple channels at once. When scanning, any communications over the user's primary channel takes priority if there is overlap.

⁵⁴⁷ Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 77 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁴⁸ *Id.* at 9, 10, 14, 16.

⁵⁴⁹ *Id.* at 31.

⁵⁵⁰ [Butler DES Tech.], Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 74 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵⁵² Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 46 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁵³ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 167-168 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁵⁴ *Id.* at 167; Special Agent in Charge [Sec. Room Sup.], Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 52-53 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁵⁵ Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 226 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 128 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁵⁶ Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 173-174 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

local command post and was not present to coordinate with Commander [Butler ESU Co.]⁵⁵⁷ When BTPD reported that Crooks was on the roof, Commander [Butler ESU Co.] updated PSP—who in turn informed the Secret Service in the Security Room—but did not update the ESU channel that included the snipers inside AGR who could have looked out the window to see Crooks.⁵⁵⁸

d. Connectivity, capacity, and interoperability issues.

During the rally, Secret Service personnel used radios and agency-issued cellular devices. State law enforcement personnel used radios, work-issued cellular devices, and personal cellular devices. LLE used phone calls, SMS, the Signal application, and email on their cellular devices.⁵⁵⁹ A prime example of the communications fragmentation is that ESU snipers set up a text chain that incorporated Beaver ESU, but a separate ESU text chain was also used despite Beaver not being included.⁵⁶⁰

The law enforcement radios had issues throughout the day, including the PSP radio in the local command post malfunctioning and at least one USSS post stander not receiving some messages.⁵⁶¹ Additionally, the USSS post stander radio channel received bleed-over communications from the FLOTUS visit that occurred in Pittsburgh on July 13, resulting in USSS post standers needing to change radio frequencies at approximately 4:28 p.m. in order to avoid

⁵⁵⁷ Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 49-50, 69-70 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Commander [Butler ESU Co.], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 173 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁵⁸ Although SAIC [Sec. Room] who was physically positioned between Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] and PSP Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] at the time, said that he “never heard [the] man on a roof” update from Sgt. [PSP Sgt.]. Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] told the Task Force that he heard it. Further, Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] told the Task Force that he saw SAIC [Sec. Room] and Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] make eye contact when Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] provided the man on roof update. Special Agent in Charge [Sec. Room Sup.], Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 24-25 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], U.S. Secret Service Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 108-109 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 180:8-16 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁵⁹ Patrolman [BTPD Patrol 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 18-19, 69 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sgt. [Sheriff's Sgt.], Butler Co. Sheriff's Office, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 14 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); [Butler DES Tech.], Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 72 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁶⁰ Commander [Butler ESU Comm.], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 175 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁶¹ Lt. [BTPD Lt. 1], Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 42 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [USSS Post 1], Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 46-47 (Oct. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 46 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

overlapping radio traffic.⁵⁶² This “obvious bleed over” was not uncommon and “wasn’t a surprise necessarily” to SAIC BUF [redacted] but was significant enough to change how USSS communicated in Butler.⁵⁶³

USSS also did not provide a signal booster that had been used in the past to mitigate issues with cellular service.⁵⁶⁴ Law enforcement personnel across all entities reported having cellular connectivity issues on the day of the rally.⁵⁶⁵ Calls and texts were delayed, resulting in some agencies resorting to email when trying to share images of Crooks.⁵⁶⁶ However, law enforcement personnel with FirstNet cellular service did not have notable interference with their connectivity.⁵⁶⁷

To ensure that they were not missing a message, LLE needed to monitor their radio, phone calls, SMS, email, and Signal application, while USSS needed to monitor radio, phone calls, SMS, and email, all while attempting to perform other critical job functions. This fragmentation and lack of interoperability was ineffective and likely contributed to law enforcement not stopping Crooks sooner.

Recommendations Related to: Failures in Execution

12. **The USSS needs to make every effort to ensure representatives from all state and LLE agencies assisting with security for a protectee event are in a unified security room.** While the OPO-08 policy update is a step in the right direction, a unified security room helps ensure real-time information sharing among all security partners.
13. **The USSS should ensure that all state and LLE partners have a communications plan in place for protectee events and a USSS special agent should be designated to collect**

⁵⁶² Sr. Special Agent [redacted] Site Counterpart, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 131 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent in Charge [redacted] Sec. Room Sup., Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 70 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁶³ Special Agent in Charge [redacted] Sec. Room Sup., Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 128 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁶⁴ Commander [redacted] Butler ESU Comm., Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 134 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁶⁵ Lt. [redacted] BTPD Lt. 1, Butler Twp. Police, Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 41 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sgt. [redacted] Sheriff’s Sgt., Butler Co. Sheriff’s Office, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 13 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Commander [redacted] Butler ESU Comm., Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 153 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [redacted] Site Agent, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 190 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Lt. [redacted] PSP Lt. 1, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 40 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁶⁶ Sgt. [redacted] Sheriff’s Sgt., Butler Co. Sheriff’s Office, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 14 (Sept. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁶⁷ Commander [redacted] Butler ESU Comm., Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 134-135 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); [redacted] Butler DES Tech., Butler Co. Emergency Mgmt. Servs. Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 56-57 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

	and review those plans. This will help ensure communications between command post personnel and every law enforcement entity at the event.
14.	USSS should ensure that its personnel and its state and local partners all establish a hierarchy for method of communication and each entity alert its Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) when switching to a different medium. Generally, radios and government-issued devices should be used, with personal devices as a last resort. Also, it is helpful for state and LLE radios to have interoperability to be able to listen to other channels.
15.	To assist with any potential reviews and investigations, USSS should record all USSS radio communications. USSS should record its radio communications and preserve any written communications while prohibiting the use of encrypted messages apps (e.g., Signal) that do not preserve data. Given how video footage helps with providing clarity to the public, USSS should make it a best practice for post standers to use body-worn-cameras during events.
16.	USSS should assess already-available technology and examine ways to utilize it to improve their operations.

2. Escalations and Missed Opportunities to Intervene

Why it matters: Individual law enforcement officers missed several opportunities to locate and detain Crooks in the hour prior to the shooting.

The operational failures described above were compounded by several missed opportunities for individual law enforcement officers to locate and detain Crooks prior to the shooting. For example, Crooks was known to have a rangefinder as early as 5:10 p.m., but this was not reported to LLE leadership until approximately 5:38 p.m.⁵⁶⁸ Another costly delay occurred between 5:45 p.m., when the Butler ESU commander radioed that “PSP and Sheriffs [sic] should be en route,” and the actual mobilization of law enforcement officers, which did not occur until

⁵⁶⁸ Butler ESU Sniper [redacted] testified that he recalled seeing a rangefinder at about 5:10 p.m. Sniper [redacted], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 35 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). Beaver ESU Sniper Ass’t Team Lead [redacted] testified that he recalled seeing the range finder shortly before 5:38 p.m. Sniper [redacted], Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 110-111 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). Contemporaneous messages in possession of the Task Force that are described in this report indicate that the rangefinder was known to Butler ESU Sniper [redacted] as early as 5:15 PM. [redacted] may have informed [redacted] of the rangefinder around that time. iMessage features automatically note the general time at which a message is sent—in this case 5:15 p.m.—but require a user to swipe left on a message in order to know the exact time that a message is sent, a screenshot of which has not been made available to the Task Force.

closer to 6:00 p.m. as BTPD personnel left their traffic posts and converged on the AGR complex.⁵⁶⁹

LLE learned that Crooks was on the roof at around 6:08 p.m., when a BTPD officer reported Crooks' location over the radio.⁵⁷⁰ That transmission was heard by Butler ESU Commander [REDACTED] in the local command post, who then notified the PSP representative in the Security Room, PSP Sgt. [REDACTED] but did not inform the tactical units inside the AGR building, who may have been able to confront Crooks directly if they had known his location.⁵⁷¹ PSP Sgt. [REDACTED] relayed Crooks' location on the roof to USSS special agents present in the Security Room as soon as he received it.⁵⁷² Although there is some dispute about which of the USSS special agents heard the information in the Security Room, no USSS special agents notified the DTD shift, USSS counter-snipers, or anyone other than Special Agent [REDACTED] CS Resp. who was too far away to respond to the AGR complex in a timely manner.

During this sequence, USSS Special Agents [REDACTED] Site PI and [REDACTED] CS Resp. undertook their own searches for Crooks. [REDACTED] CS Resp. was under the mistaken impression that Crooks was inside the perimeter, and thus, they were searching in the wrong area.⁵⁷³ Additionally, the USSS counter-sniper team [REDACTED] LES 1, which had full visibility of the AGR roof (though they were not assigned to cover that space), may not have been looking at the AGR complex at all until approximately 6:09 or 6:10 p.m., and thus did not notice Crooks scaling the building or running across the roof.⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁶⁹ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024, Sheet 2, Row 227 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); As of 5:45, the law enforcement personnel on patrol closest to AGR were a PSP and BCSO pairing posted between the two fences separating the Butler Farm Show from AGR. Those personnel were not supposed to leave their posts, and as a result, they were not "en route" or otherwise moving at all. Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs – Final 8.14.24, 49 (2024) (on file with the Task Force). There were also two undercover PSP officers walking around the AGR complex and property prior to Crooks' ascension to the roof, although this fact was unknown to the snipers in AGR. Trooper [REDACTED] PSP Trp. 4, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Penn. State Police and the Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 6 (July 23, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Trooper [REDACTED] PSP Trp. 5, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Penn. State Police, 3 (Aug. 9, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). The undercover officers had been dispatched by another PSP Trooper, but they were only given a brief description of Crooks, and did not receive a photograph of him in time to assist in their search, which would have made it challenging for them to locate Crooks. Trooper [REDACTED] PSP Trp. 3, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Penn. State Police and the Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 5-6 (July 23, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁷⁰ Officer [REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 2, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 33 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁷¹ Commander [REDACTED] Butler ESU Comm., Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 179-80 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁷² Sgt. [REDACTED] PSP Sgt., Penn. State Police, Recorded Administrative Interview Before Penn. State Police, 00:27:34 (Jul. 20, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁷³ Special Agent [REDACTED] CS Resp., Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 95 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁷⁴ Sgt. Technician [REDACTED] CS Sgt. Tech., U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 30, 104-105, 108 (Nov. 20, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Finally, CSTL [REDACTED] observed LLE moving urgently at the 3 o'clock in the moments prior to the shooting, including at least one officer with his weapon drawn.⁵⁷⁵ This observation was never put over the radio. When asked how he would have reacted to this information, ASAIC [REDACTED] DTD Second Supervisor and detail agent, stated that he would have rushed the stage before Crooks took a shot.⁵⁷⁶

Many of these missed opportunities were linked to and exacerbated by the structural failures described elsewhere in this report, and the Task Force does not underestimate the challenge of making split-second decisions in an emergency situation. Nevertheless, these examples show that even with the flawed security structure at the rally site on July 13, there were several opportunities to locate and detain or apprehend Crooks that were unfortunately missed.

Failures of Leadership

1. Inadequate Training

Why it matters: The lack of consistent and uniform training contributed to several failures on July 13, including those by personnel in critical positions who did not execute key parts of their job. The agency's inability to troubleshoot the C-UAS system also reflects ineffective or inadequate training.

Several of the failures that occurred in the lead up to the Butler rally and on the day of the rally could have been prevented had Secret Service special agents received adequate training. While there is an extensive pipeline when entering the Secret Service, several witnesses testified that there is little training for collateral duties other than on-the-job training.⁵⁷⁷ When entering the Secret Service, special agents attend a year-long academy that covers a range of topics, such as legal issues, investigations, and protection.⁵⁷⁸ Also, "all recruits and incoming classes receive protective intelligence training."⁵⁷⁹

⁵⁷⁵ Technician [REDACTED] CS TL, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 166 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). CS Sgt. Tech. testified that this communication would have been Technician [REDACTED] CS TL responsibility, as [REDACTED] CS Sgt. Tech. was actively engaged on his weapon at the time.

⁵⁷⁶ Ass't Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] ASAIC DTD, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 130 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁷⁷ Special Agent [REDACTED] CS Resp., Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 12 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁷⁸ At the beginning of a Special Agent's career, they attend a special agent training course and, "all recruits and incoming classes receive protective intelligence training." Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI, Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 14 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁷⁹ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI, Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 14 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Assistant Director [OPO Asst. Dir.] testified that SAICs are “empowered” to coordinate training and to do on-the-job training and conduct tabletop exercises.⁵⁸⁰ SAICs are not required to obtain headquarters clearance for this type of training.⁵⁸¹ The lack of formalized training leads to many special agents being asked to fulfill collateral roles, like protective intelligence, C-UAS, and security room post standing, with little formal training.⁵⁸²

As discussed below, agents testified that they had different training than one another, which caused issues when they were working together (Site Agent vs. Site Counterpart), that they were unfamiliar with certain aspects of their training (CS Response), and that there was a need for updated training that reflects all likely scenarios that they might encounter (counter-sniper).⁵⁸³

a. The agent assigned to the Protective Intelligence Advance role was inexperienced and poorly trained for the role.

Intelligence relating to a protectee or a location can have a significant impact on the operational planning and execution of protective operations. The Secret Service has individuals who are full-time protective intelligence agents to conduct advances for specific individuals and will provide support for other protectees pending manpower availability.⁵⁸⁴ When a full-time protective intelligence agent is not available, “field offices will provide personnel to conduct PI advances for all other protectee travel in district.”⁵⁸⁵ The PI advance agent:

- Gathers, evaluates, and appropriately disseminates all relevant intelligence information related to the visit of a protectee;
- Coordinates with the field office SAIC and the Lead Advance Agent;
- Maintains communication with PID, other federal agencies, and LLE authorities;

⁵⁸⁰ Ass’t Dir., [OPO Asst. Dir.], Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 78 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁸¹ *Id.* at 78-79.

⁵⁸² Special Agent [PI Advance] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, (Oct. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). Special Agent in Charge [Sec. Room Sup.], Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 48 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁸³ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 74-75 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [CS Resp.], Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 49-50 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Technician [CS Tech.], Jr., U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 114 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁸⁴ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Strategic Intelligence and Information. PIA-01, Bates 006197 (Jul. 12, 2022) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁸⁵ *Id.*

- Coordinates the use of protective intelligence teams consisting off [of] Secret Service and LLE personnel at protectee sites; and
- Responds to and resolves protective intelligence matters.⁵⁸⁶

There was no full-time protective intelligence advance agent for the July 13 campaign rally, so the PIT assigned Special Agent [PI Advance] with that role. He testified that he had limited experience doing protective intelligence advances and that the only formal training that he received was during his time at the Secret Service Academy.⁵⁸⁷ When asked to provide an example of some of the on-the-job training that he had received to adequately fulfill the protective intelligence advance role, he could not provide any specific examples.⁵⁸⁸ He said the training consisted of, “just asking questions that need to be answered, working in partnership with agents that had more experience.”⁵⁸⁹

It is standard practice for a protective intelligence advance agent to set up a router—an e-mail chain with the rest of the advance team, to pass important and relevant information.⁵⁹⁰ Special Agent [PI Advance] testified that he could not recall whether he set up a protective intelligence router for July 13.⁵⁹¹ There was no evidence that he set up a router. Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] testified that based on her PI experience, if she were aware that law enforcement was looking for a suspicious person with a rangefinder, she would send a BOLO with a picture over the PI router.⁵⁹² She further testified that Special Agent [PI Advance] could have created a router at the time of the search, or at any time, or that he could have tasked someone to create that router.⁵⁹³ If he had, it is possible that DTD and other relevant personnel would have been made aware of the BOLO for Crooks.

Additionally, the PI advance is responsible for being with the protectee for all movements.⁵⁹⁴ Special Agent [PI Advance] was in the [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED] but moved away [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED] once he arrived at the Butler Farm Show.⁵⁹⁵ The Site PI agent testified that, “...unless there’s something specific that they require the advance agent for,

⁵⁸⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations. OPO-03, Bates 006169 (Mar. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁸⁷ Special Agent [PI Advance] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 18-19 (Oct. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁸⁸ *Id.* at 40-41.

⁵⁸⁹ *Id.* at 18-19.

⁵⁹⁰ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the S. Comm on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 80 (Aug. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁹¹ Special Agent [PI Advance] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 33 (Oct. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁹² Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 142-43 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁹³ *Id.*

⁵⁹⁴ Sr. Special Agent [Site PI], Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 84 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁹⁵ Special Agent [PI Advance] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 59 (Oct. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

it's not typical for the [REDACTED] LES to stray too far away [REDACTED] LES.”⁵⁹⁶ When the former President was rushed off stage and back into the motorcade, Special Agent [REDACTED] PI Advance was in the Security Room and missed the motorcade, leaving the former President without a PI advance.⁵⁹⁷ Again, had Special Agent [REDACTED] PI Advance properly fulfilled his role as the protective intelligence advance agent, he would have been near the former President when he received word at 6:05 p.m. of a suspicious person with a rangefinder and could have verbally passed the information to the DTD who could have pulled former President Trump off the stage. Additionally, he would not have been left at the Butler Farm Show grounds, leaving President-elect Trump without a protective intelligence agent during the aftermath of the assassination attempt.

Instead of ongoing and formal training for individuals who are fulfilling critical roles, the Secret Service relied on the concept of on-the-job training, which is subject to the experience level, teaching abilities, and eye for detail of whatever senior agent happens to be available.

b. A lack of training kept the C-UAS system offline during a crucial period.

The DTD had a C-UAS at the rally on July 13, but the system was not operational at critical moments because the special agent tasked to operate the technology had not been properly trained.

Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. did not receive thorough training in troubleshooting the C-UAS detection system, [REDACTED] LES. Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. only had a thirty-minute virtual training and a 30-minute in-person instruction by a more experienced agent in the use of the C-UAS system.⁵⁹⁸ Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. did not test the system between the last trip, where he successfully used it and the morning of the July 13 rally.⁵⁹⁹ Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. had difficulty identifying the cause of the C-UAS problems which delayed it being operational and missing the first opportunity to intervene in Crooks' plan.⁶⁰⁰ The lack of training created a situation where the operator lacked understanding and guidance, leading to a critical failure.

c. The Security Room Agent failed to ensure all entities were represented there.

The USSS Security Room is the communications and coordination center for a site.⁶⁰¹ Internal policy holds that it should be operated by experienced personnel and, “can be staffed by other high-level essential personnel, if necessary.”⁶⁰² The role of the agent in charge of the security room is to “run the radios, pass traffic, and to listen to the information that’s going back and forth

⁵⁹⁶ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED] Site PI, Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 84 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁹⁷ Special Agent [REDACTED] PI Advance, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 94 (Oct. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁹⁸ Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op., Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 12, 14 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁵⁹⁹ *Id.* at 64-66.

⁶⁰⁰ *Id.* at 78, 80-81.

⁶⁰¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-08, Communications, Bates 006249-006257, 006255 (Apr. 6, 2021) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁰² *Id.*

with the detail and be able to pass that relevant information.”⁶⁰³ The PIT SAIC intentionally put a senior special agent in the Security Room because he needed someone who could, “handle anything that might come up.”⁶⁰⁴

Former OPO Assistant Director [REDACTED] testified that no specific training is provided to learn how to operate a Security Room; rather he testified that that he thought it was “part of overall training” that one would receive from the USSS “training academy.”⁶⁰⁵ SAIC BUF [REDACTED] who operated the Security Room at the Butler rally site, testified that USSS has no specialized, command-post training, and that one would learn from “[o]bservation over time” and that “[F]rom working a site, you hear what the security room or the command post does” and “[Y]ou’ve witnessed enough of them, hopefully, over your career to know how they typically operate.”⁶⁰⁶ If [REDACTED] knew to check for all local entities in the Security Room, the communication about Crooks with a rangefinder would have likely made it to DTD in time to either prevent the former President from going on the stage or remove him prior to shots being fired.

d. A lack of uniform training caused misunderstandings among the advance planning team.

Due to different training and experience, some special agents had different views of their roles and responsibilities with regard to advance planning. Special Agent [REDACTED] the Site Agent for the Butler rally site, and Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] the Site Counterpart, had different understandings of their and one other’s roles in the lead up to and on July 13.⁶⁰⁷ Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] testified that the Site Agent is “in charge of that particular site.”⁶⁰⁸ In contrast to this, Special Agent [REDACTED] testified, “maybe I’ve seen or I’ve got different information from the detail that the field office is ultimately responsible because [the local field office is] doing the visit.”⁶⁰⁹

Special Agent [REDACTED] testified that when she was “Site Counterpart” at the Miami Field Office, “PPD [Presidential Protective Detail] or VPD [Vice-Presidential Protective Detail] will expect Miami will take over” i.e. “take responsibility of the site itself” and that the Miami Field

⁶⁰³ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 182 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁰⁴ Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 57 (Oct. 25, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁰⁵ Ass’t Dir. [REDACTED], Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 106 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁰⁶ Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED], Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 48 (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁰⁷ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent [REDACTED], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 74-75 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁰⁸ Sr. Special Agent [REDACTED], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁰⁹ Special Agent [REDACTED], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 75 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Office would have “full overall responsibility.”⁶¹⁰ This difference in perspective about the respective roles of the Site Agent and the Site Counterpart led to confusion regarding who was ultimately responsible for aspects of the Butler rally site on July 13.

e. The roles and responsibilities for counter-sniper response were unclear.

According to the Protective Operations manual, “[counter-sniper] response teams should be solely dedicated to positioned [counter-sniper] teams and immediately respond to suspicious activity in the area.”⁶¹¹ While CSR Special Agent **CS Resp.** testified this language was “familiar” and “believe[ed]” that he was shown this material in a course at the academy, he testified “it would be good to provide it every time you do a CS response as well.”⁶¹² However, Special Agent **CS Resp.** “didn’t talk to” CSTL Team Leader Technician **CS TL** at all throughout the entire event.⁶¹³ Rather, Special Agent **CS Resp.** testified that he worked with Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** who spoke to Special Agent **CS Resp.** by phone and asked him to look for a suspicious person with a rangefinder, and sent a photo of Crooks via text message.⁶¹⁴

Special Agent **CS Resp.** also worked with Site PI Senior Special Agent **Site PI** whom he encountered while searching for Crooks.⁶¹⁵ Special Agent **CS Resp.** testified that Senior Special Agent **Site PI** told him to move to a different area to search “so we’re not putting all the bodies in one area.”⁶¹⁶ Additionally, CSTL **CS TL** sent out an e-mail at 5:52 p.m. on July 13 with a photo of Crooks, issuing a local sniper be on the lookout alert, but he did not include Special Agent **CS Resp.** as a recipient.⁶¹⁷ **CS Resp.** testified that this was “upsetting” and that “[he] would be expected” to “be part of these emails and any other communications, period, regarding a situation like this.”⁶¹⁸

Moreover, when Special Agent **CS Resp.** became operational as CS Response—after previously serving as relief agent earlier in the day—he did not communicate his movements to Technician **CS TL**, Special Agent **Site Agent** or Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart**.⁶¹⁹ **CS Resp.** testified, “I was not informed that they want every movement.”⁶²⁰ However, the site post instructions for the Butler rally site, which **CS Resp.** received, instructed the CSR Agent to

⁶¹⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual SOD-08, Countersniper (CS) Team Overview, Responsibilities, and Qualifications, Bates 000125 (Nov. 29, 2023) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶¹² Special Agent **CS Resp.**, Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 49 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶¹³ *Id.* at 88.

⁶¹⁴ *Id.* at 64.

⁶¹⁵ *Id.* at 66-67.

⁶¹⁶ *Id.* at 67.

⁶¹⁷ *Id.* at 91.

⁶¹⁸ *Id.*

⁶¹⁹ *Id.* at 86-88.

⁶²⁰ *Id.* at 88.

“[n]otify the Site SA of any CS response,” i.e. Special Agent **Site Agent**⁶²¹ **CS Resp.** testified he did not notify Special Agent **Site Agent** of any counter-sniper responses or suspicious person activities he may have participated in, saying that “[he] did not reach out” because “[he] was under the impression she was in the security room, which is where all [his] calls came from.”⁶²²

f. USSS had to supplement coverage with inexperienced HSI personnel.

Site Counterpart Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** testified that the majority of the post standers at the Butler rally site on July 13 were HSI special agents.⁶²³ She testified that she wanted more Secret Service personnel because “it’s a little more challenging” working with HSI agents because “you’re having to explain the posts a lot more and you don’t know whether they even have worked with us before.”⁶²⁴

Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** testified that she heard that HSI agents receive “a 1-hour PowerPoint or something like that” before working a Secret Service detail, and that Secret Service would otherwise only provide the morning briefing the day of an event and the paperwork beforehand.⁶²⁵ While Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** testified that she was not concerned with using HSI agents at events she testified that she would have to do more work to provide “training and knowledge of how it all works” to HSI agents.

g. USSS lacks consistent, ongoing training for some protective operations roles.

For some specialized USSS roles, like the CAT, such ongoing training exists. For example, Special Agent **CAT Op.** testified that he received about **LES** days of CAT-specific training per year.⁶²⁶ However, Special Agent **CAT Op.** testified that while “[t]heoretically” he gets periodic training as a CAT member, whether he actually receives training “depends on [their] protective operations” which “takes precedence” but that he gets training when he is able to do so.⁶²⁷

According to former Asst. Dir. of OPO **OPO Asst. Dir.**, employees who go to DTD undergo small detail training (SDT) from the Directorate of Training, but this only occurs once.⁶²⁸ By contrast, **OPO Asst. Dir.** testified that PPD and VPD employees have cyclical opportunities to

⁶²¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., E-mail from USSS Special Agent **Site Agent** to USSS Special Agent **CS Resp.** and others, Bates 003326 (Jul. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Site Post Instructions, Bates 003342 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶²² Special Agent **CS Resp.**, Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 51 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶²³ Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 37 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶²⁴ *Id.*

⁶²⁵ *Id.* at 65.

⁶²⁶ Special Agent **CAT Op.**, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 19 (Oct. 4, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶²⁷ *Id.* at 17.

⁶²⁸ Ass’t Dir. **OPO Asst. Dir.**, Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 69 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

receive training at the RTC.⁶²⁹ Nevertheless, ASAIC [redacted] testified DTD SAIC [redacted] provides training opportunities for members of the DTD over and above SDT.⁶³⁰ While there is a robust training pipeline when agents enter the Secret Service, there is a lack of continuous training throughout Secret Service special agent's careers with respect to some protective operations roles. There is a culture and practice of expecting on-the-job training to teach and prepare agents to fulfill critical roles like Security Room Lead and PI Advance.

Understanding that the operational tempo is strenuous, the Secret Service needs to prioritize periodic training on protective operations during times when agents are available, and such training should take priority over investigative activities that are unrelated to protective operations.⁶³¹

Recommendations Related to: Inadequate Training	
17.	Prioritize periodic training on protective operations in order to ensure that agents stay current on their training, even during busy times. Many agents testified that when operational tempo is high, training often becomes a casualty.
18.	Provide more defined training curriculum and set specific requirements and timeframes for regular training. Many agents testified that they do not have set ongoing training standards.
19.	Work with HSI to ensure that HSI agents that participate in Secret Service-led protective operations receive training that is appropriate to the tasks that they are asked to support.

2. Failure to Delineate Roles and Responsibilities

Why it matters: Secret Service personnel did not clearly understand their roles or responsibilities for advance preparation or day-of coverage on July 13. Absent specific and complete guidance from Secret Service manuals, training, or supervisor input, individuals were left to define their own sets of responsibilities, which led to duplication of efforts, gaps in coverage, and a lack of ownership of the overall security of the July 13 rally. Thomas Crooks exploited areas where the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement were especially unclear.

⁶²⁹ *Id.*

⁶³⁰ Ass't Special Agent in Charge [redacted] ASAIC DTD, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 19 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶³¹ Indep. Review Panel, Report of the Independent Review Panel on the July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, 32 (Oct. 15, 2024) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/24_1017_opa-Independent-Review-Panel-Final-Report-and-Accompanying-Materials.pdf.

a. *Secret Service personnel did not have clear roles, responsibilities, or reporting lines.*

Among the Lead Agent, Site Agent, and Site Counterpart—the three agents in charge of advance planning for the primary site of the July 13 rally—there was no clear delineation of roles between the Site Agent and Site Counterpart. The Secret Service’s Protective Operations Manual confers upon the Site Agent responsibility for site security.⁶³² In no documents produced to the Task Force was there a definition of “Site Counterpart” nor a description of that agent’s responsibilities.⁶³³ The Lead Agent, Senior Special Agent [Redacted] described the two roles as a collective—“the Site Agents”—working together with the Site Counterpart from the Pittsburgh Field Office leading local counterpart coordination and the Site Agent providing a bridge back to the Donald Trump Detail.⁶³⁴

Special Agent [Redacted] acknowledged that it was her “responsibility solely” as the Site Agent for the Butler Farm Show site to design the security plan for the July 13 rally and coordinate the visit’s logistical aspects.⁶³⁵ She went on to hedge her role, however, by saying she shared these responsibilities with the Site Counterpart and that her understanding from the DTD was that she was there to assist the field office—a description that Senior Special Agent [Redacted] disagreed with, describing her role as one of support to the Site Agent.⁶³⁶

In her attempt to articulate her role as Site Agent to the Task Force, Special Agent [Redacted] described an understanding built on her experience in the Miami Field Office and working with the DTD, which may have differed from expectations of the PIT. For example, Special Agent [Redacted] testified that in her experience, the field office would supply a Site Agent, but on July 13, she was staffed as the Site Agent based on the practice of the DTD. She stated:

TF STAFF: [...] So is that part of your role, as you understood it?

[Redacted] That's -- that's what I'm saying about the difference when I was in the Miami Field Office, because when you're in charge of the site for an event, you're just overall person in charge of that site, because you're being assigned directly from the field office that you're going to be the site agent

⁶³² Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-06, Site Security, Bates 000097-000105, 000097 (on file with the Task Force).

⁶³³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-06, Site Security, Bates 000097-000105, 000097, 000102-103 (describing certain Site Agent responsibilities) and 000086 (describing certain Lead Advance Agent responsibilities) (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶³⁴ Sr. Special Agent [Redacted], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 18, 41-43 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶³⁵ Special Agent [Redacted], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 21, 40-41, 74 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force) (“As the site agent you have full responsibility of the site.”)

⁶³⁶ *Id.* at 21, 40-41, 168; Sr. Special Agent [Redacted], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 16 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

[...] So it is my understanding from talking, having conversations with DTD supervisors that [DTD] [...] is more like having a representation from their detail to provide the field office with the expectations from supervisors, like what to expect on game day, pretty much. You're assisting them with the planning and coordination, but not in charge overall of the event.⁶³⁷

Special Agent [Site Agent] acknowledged there was some level of confusion as to the division of responsibilities between herself and Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart].⁶³⁸ Despite these differing views as to the advance team leadership's roles, the Lead Agent, Site Agent, and Site Counterpart never came together at the outset of the July 13 planning to ensure they were on the same page as to each other's precise responsibilities.⁶³⁹ As a result of both confusion as to roles and failures to follow through on responsibilities, key aspects of the security plan were not thoroughly vetted:

- The Site Counterpart coordinated with some, but not all, local and state counterparts. The Site Agent did not share with her colleague all relevant local points of contact, and where the Site Counterpart did work with them, it was largely through the Pennsylvania State Police without directly speaking to LLE agencies.⁶⁴⁰
- The Site Agent never saw it within her responsibility to test the judgments of tactical experts—namely those of Technician [CS TL], the CSTL, in determining where he planned to place Secret Service counter-snipers and his deference to the Butler ESU team to determine their own sniper positioning.⁶⁴¹ To the extent the Site Counterpart did question those tactical assets, she did so selectively, and did not follow-up with the subject matter experts in charge to discuss how their decisions fit in the overall security planning.⁶⁴²

⁶³⁷ Special Agent [Site Agent] Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶³⁸ *Id.* at 73.

⁶³⁹ *Id.* at 11, 14. (“But when you go as representation from the detail in this case, you work with your counterparts, you work with the field office, and specific roles are not discussed at that point.”); Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 51 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁴⁰ *See, e.g.*, Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 107 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); *see also* “Failure to Secure The AGR Complex” Section.

⁶⁴¹ *See, e.g.*, Team Lead [Butler ESU Snip. TL], Butler Co. ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 130 (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); *See also* “Failure to Secure The AGR Complex” Section.

⁶⁴² Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 113-114 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- The Site Agent, despite appreciating that it was her responsibility to do so, did not ensure the Security Room was appropriately staffed and that all communication channels were being monitored.⁶⁴³

Adding to the muddled spheres of responsibility, there were differing accounts of the reporting lines: a supervisor in the PIT placed responsibility for event oversight solely with the DTD supervisors;⁶⁴⁴ others in the PIT understood there to be reporting lines to both the field office and detail;⁶⁴⁵ the DTD Operations Supervisor, who acted as the Second Supervisor for the July 13 event, said the Lead Agent needed to keep the field office informed while expecting the Site Agent to raise concerns to him as well as those on the ground;⁶⁴⁶ and the Site Agent saw her reporting obligations as flowing up to the Detail.⁶⁴⁷

In reporting up to those detail supervisors, the Site Agent did not appreciate the responsibility she had to present a thorough security plan. Instead, she expected that the supervisors—who had not been on site all week nor were they required to have been—would catch any errors and question every decision.⁶⁴⁸

Overlapping responsibilities and redundancies are critical to the Secret Service’s mission, but such overlaps must be created with intentionality and understood by those charged with carrying out the mission.⁶⁴⁹ Ultimately, the Site Agent did not take ownership of the security of the

⁶⁴³ Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 21, 40-41 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent in Charge [SAIC PIT], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 58 (Oct. 25, 2024) (on file with the Task Force) (“The site agent is responsible to make sure that all the entities are in the security room that are supposed to be there.” See also “Fragmented Communications and Separate Command Posts” section.

⁶⁴⁴ Special Agent in Charge [SAIC PIT], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 38 (Oct. 25, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁴⁵ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 51; (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Ass’t to the Special Agent in Charge [ATSAIC PIT], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 39 (Oct. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Sr. Special Agent [Lead Advance], Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁴⁶ Ass’t Special Agent in Charge [ASAIC DTD], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 87 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁴⁷ Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17, 58 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). (“I was not reporting directly to SAIC [SAIC PIT] [...] for this particular assignment. My direct interaction and contact was with ATSAIC [ASAIC DTD] as DTD supervisor [...]).

⁶⁴⁸ See, e.g., Special Agent [Site Agent], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 174-75 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force) (expecting DTD supervisors to bring line of sight concerns to her attention).

⁶⁴⁹ See, e.g., Ass’t Dir. [OPO Asst. Dir.], Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 20 (Nov. 8, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

entire site but rather deflected responsibility in an expectation that her counterpart and supervisors would fill any gaps in her duties.

b. The Secret Service failed to effectively delineate roles and responsibilities for state and local partners.

From Monday, July 8, through the day of the rally on Saturday, July 13, the Secret Service had limited coordination, did not share sufficient information, and failed to conduct a unified operational briefing with all state and LLE agencies assisting with event security. Additionally, members of the USSS advance team met primarily with PSP because they believed, though did not verify, that the state police were coordinating all LLE planning despite each local agency having differing assignments and operations plans.⁶⁵⁰ These failures by the USSS hindered state and LLE partners from properly planning their respective roles and made the responsibilities of all involved unclear.

In preparation for the rally, the USSS began collaborating with state and LLE agencies on July 8. The USSS hosted what it refers to as a “police meeting” where assisting police, fire, and other emergency responders meet with the agency advance team to discuss the upcoming protectee visit.⁶⁵¹ The police meeting, led by Senior Special Agent Lead Advance consisted of a presentation with minimal operational details—at least in part due to the Secret Service not yet having all pertinent details of the visit—despite the Secret Service Protective Operations policy manual, stating that the police meeting should discuss “additional personnel/asset requirements.”⁶⁵² Instead, it covered USSS advance team contact information, LES USSS personnel, and functions of the various USSS divisions that would be present during the rally.⁶⁵³ After the presentation, attendees split into four breakout groups: tactical units, transportation, the site, and protective intelligence.⁶⁵⁴ Local and state law enforcement also shared their contact information with USSS to facilitate ongoing planning throughout the week.⁶⁵⁵

During the presentation and breakout groups, the USSS did not cover specific staffing or asset requests for state and LLE agencies, which was not what state and LLE expected.⁶⁵⁶ Butler ESU Dep. Commander Butler ESU Dep. Comm who was at the police meeting, stated that the breakout session

⁶⁵⁰ See generally, “Failure to Secure The AGR Complex” Section.

⁶⁵¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-03, Protective Advance, Bates 006166–006181, 6177 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁵² CAT Team Lead Butler ESU CAT TL 1, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 10 (Sep. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-03, Protective Advance, Bates 006166–006181, 6177 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁵³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 1342 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁶⁵⁵ See, e.g., Sr. Special Agent Lead Advance, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 62-63 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁵⁶ Lt. PSP Lt. 1, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 12 (Nov. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

“was just a very quick, very short exchange of information.”⁶⁵⁷ PSP Lt. [PSP Lt. 1] who attended the police meeting, stated that he hoped there would be an opportunity to ask questions to guide his operational planning; however, the USSS did not provide essential details, such as where the stage would be located.⁶⁵⁸ Additionally, information regarding the location of the Security Room was not provided.⁶⁵⁹ Absent that information, the USSS and state and LLE were limited in properly planning for July 13.

On July 9, the Secret Service advance team and two PSP Lieutenants conducted a brief walkthrough of the rally location, followed by a meeting to discuss the site.⁶⁶⁰ PSP Lt. [PSP Lt. 1] who was part of the walkthrough, stated that no state or local security post assignments were discussed on Tuesday because they did not walk the entire rally location.⁶⁶¹ Lt. [PSP Lt. 1] testified that “we walked down to where the stage was at and then [...] we did walk back over to the hangars. And then we were up at the main gate and we left.”⁶⁶² Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] testified to the Task Force that certain aspects of the security plan began to come together during the post-walkthrough meeting; however, there were many unknowns about the site, for which reason “we were going to have to walk the perimeter to specifically address every area of concern.”⁶⁶³ That walkthrough occurred on Thursday, July 11.⁶⁶⁴

LLE partners were not present at the July 9 walkthrough. It is unclear if LLE was invited to the walkthrough or meeting.⁶⁶⁵ USSS Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] stated that she primarily communicated with PSP because the state police “was in control and in discussions with the other township's command to put the plan together.”⁶⁶⁶ Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] testified that PSP was “the lead agency in charge of the Butler Farm Show.”⁶⁶⁷ Despite Senior Special Agent [Site Counterpart] characterization of PSP, state police were not in charge. BTPD and Butler ESU drafted separate operations plans and were tasked with separate security assignments, though aspects of

⁶⁵⁷ Dep. Commander [Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 2], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 12-13 (Sep. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁵⁸ Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 11 (Nov. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁵⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 1351 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁶⁰ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 68 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁶¹ Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 20 (Nov. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁶² *Id.* at 21.

⁶⁶³ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 69 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁶⁴ *Id.*

⁶⁶⁵ Lt. [PSP Lt. 1], Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 20 (Nov. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁶⁶ Sr. Special Agent [Site Counterpart] Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 41 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁶⁷ *Id.*

those plans were also incorporated into PSP's Operations Plan.⁶⁶⁸ The only LLE agency the PSP directly coordinated with for security posts was the Butler County Sheriff's Office. The PSP operations plan included posts for both troopers and Butler County Sheriff's Office deputies.⁶⁶⁹ Even with the joint operations plan, PSP Lt. **PSP Lt. 1** did not consider himself in command of Butler County Sheriff's Office deputies on July 13 because Chief Deputy **Sheriff's Chief Deputy** was also on-site.⁶⁷⁰

It was not until Thursday, July 11, just two days before the rally, that the Secret Service coordinated with all state and LLE partners regarding security posts and staffing requirements.⁶⁷¹ However, at no point before, during, or after the Thursday walkthrough did state or LLE receive any operations plans, briefing materials, or written security post instructions from the USSS.⁶⁷² Critical information was not shared during the walkthrough, including:

- BTPD Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1** stated that the walk-through started in the building that the USSS planned to use as their Security Room; however, there was no discussion of who from state and LLE would be located in the room on July 13, nor was there an invite to be in the room—an allegation that Secret Service disputes.⁶⁷³
- Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1** stated that he informed USSS Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** that an officer from his agency would be posted at the Brady Paul Lane entrance of the rally location.⁶⁷⁴ Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** responded that a USSS agent would supplement the officer.⁶⁷⁵ Despite Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** relaying that information to Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1** he was never told that the motorcade would use that entrance.⁶⁷⁶
- Coverage of the AGR building was vaguely discussed; however, no definitive security plan was established. During the walkthrough, the USSS advance team did not discuss providing coverage of the AGR building with Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1** despite it being within his agency's jurisdiction.⁶⁷⁷ When PSP asked if BTPD would be able to post a squad car in

⁶⁶⁸ Production to Task Force, Butler Township Police Dep't, Trump operational plan BTPD scan (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally 7-13-24 Final OP-Plan Updated (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁶⁹ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁷⁰ Lt. **PSP Lt. 1**, Penn. State Police, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 46 (Nov. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁷¹ Special Agent **Site Agent**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 124 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁷² Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1**, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 30-31 (Sep. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁷³ *Id.* at 16-17.

⁶⁷⁴ *Id.* at 18.

⁶⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁶⁷⁶ *Id.* at 19.

⁶⁷⁷ *Id.* at 17.

the AGR's east parking lot, Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1** stated that his agency did not have the capacity to do so.⁶⁷⁸

No other walkthroughs, meetings, or briefings took place before or on the day of the rally on July 13 among the Secret Service and state or LLE partners. The Secret Service conducted a briefing for USSS and HSI personnel on the morning of the rally that state and LLE personnel were not invited to attend.⁶⁷⁹ According to an interview before PSP and the FBI, PSP Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** stationed in the USSS Security Room, went with Special Agent **C-UAS Op.** to the USSS morning briefing.⁶⁸⁰ According to Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** testimony, USSS Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** told Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** "Hey, you don't need to be here for this. This is just for Secret Service."⁶⁸¹ The Secret Service contradicts this allegation.⁶⁸² Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart** stated that she did not remember that conversation occurring.⁶⁸³ At least two other briefings took place on the morning of the rally, one hosted by Butler ESU, which included Beaver and Washington County tactical teams, and a separate briefing for BTPD officers.⁶⁸⁴

The USSS hosted only one planning meeting on July 8 and one walkthrough on July 11, which included all state and LLE partners. The lack of collaboration ultimately led to gaps in situational awareness for the USSS and state and LLE agencies. With operations plans from various agencies being drafted up until the night of July 12, the Secret Service and its state and local counterparts would have benefitted from daily unified check-ins and a final unified briefing in advance of the event to ensure each agency had a clear understanding of its role for the July 13 event and any gaps in coverage areas could have been addressed.

Recommendations Related to: Failure to Delineate Roles and Responsibilities

20. **Confirm key points of contact.** Early in the planning process, the USSS advance team needs to confirm the primary representative for each state and LLE agency and which agencies will be working jointly and independently drafting operations plans.

⁶⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁷⁹ Special Agent **Site Agent**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 54 (Oct. 30, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 00828-00832 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁸⁰ Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 127-128 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁸¹ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, Recorded Interview of Penn. State Police Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁸² *See, e.g.*, Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force). Sgt. **PSP Sgt.** did not make himself available to the Task Force for an interview.

⁶⁸³ Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 127-128 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁸⁴ *See, e.g.*, Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1**, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 23 (Sep. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Commander **Butler ESU Comm**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, (Sep. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

21. **Provide a unified briefing on the day of the event.** The USSS needs to provide a unified briefing either the day of a protectee visit or the day before, which includes at least one representative from all state and LLE agencies assisting with an event. Doing so will help eliminate gaps in situational awareness and ensure critical information is shared more broadly.
22. **Conduct mandatory pre-event meetings for key stakeholders on a daily basis.** Secret Service should also consider mandating daily “check-in” meetings in the days immediately before an event for all relevant state and local counterparts involved in event security.
23. **Secret Service must affirmatively state which USSS office or protective detail is the lead for an event.** This designation should be based on the event location, available resources, protectee threat assessment, and overall risk profile of an event. The protective detail and local field office should undoubtedly work together to complement each other’s strengths – the local field office may be better acquainted with a site and have relationships with LLE while a detail has insight into the protectee’s expectations – but the Secret Service must designate and document the single lead entity and reporting lines for an event.

Aftermath

Why it matters: The evening of Crooks’ death, two criminal investigations began. The Pennsylvania State Police and FBI agreed that the FBI would lead the collection of evidence to prevent conflict and redundancy. This decision made FBI, as a practical matter, the primary keeper of relevant evidence moving forward.

1. Chronology of Immediate Aftermath

Almost immediately after USSS Counter-sniper CS Sgt. Tech fired the shot that killed Crooks, a tactical ground element gained access to the roof of AGR building.⁶⁸⁵ Upon seeing that Crooks appeared to be deceased, Butler ESU ATL Butler ESU Op. ATL relayed over the radio, “[t]he shooter is down, he’s down hard.”⁶⁸⁶ An operator from Washington SWAT moved Crook’s gun, a black DPMS/Panther Arms semi-automatic rifle, approximately ten feet away from his body, and then helped to secure Crooks’ arms behind his back with flex cuffs.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸⁵ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 21 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Ass’t Team Leader Butler ESU Op. ATL, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 60-61 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁸⁶ Ass’t Team Leader Butler ESU Op. ATL, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 61 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁸⁷ *Id.* at 61-62; Det. BTPD Detective, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 21 (Sept. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Medic Beaver ESU M, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 54-55 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 17, 21 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

ATL ^{Butler ESU Op. ATL} called for a medic to come to the rooftop, whereby Beaver ESU medic ^{Beaver ESU Medic} pronounced Crooks deceased at 6:25 p.m.⁶⁸⁸ Additional LLE and Secret Service personnel arrived at the roof shortly thereafter.⁶⁸⁹ A Washington SWAT operator searched Crooks' pockets and pulled out a radio transmitter resembling a garage door opener, raising suspicions that Crooks possessed or placed an improvised explosive device (IED) in the area.⁶⁹⁰ Law enforcement subsequently summoned a bomb squad to assess the situation.⁶⁹¹ ATL ^{Butler ESU Op. ATL} testified that Allegheny County Police Department Bomb Squad (Allegheny EOD) responded, removed the battery from the radio transmitter, and left the roof.⁶⁹²

Shortly thereafter, law enforcement personnel on the roof were informed that a possible IED was found in the AGR building they were standing on top of.⁶⁹³ All personnel evacuated the roof and took cover.⁶⁹⁴ ATL ^{Butler ESU Op. ATL} estimates that approximately thirty minutes passed before an "all clear" was sounded.⁶⁹⁵ By that time, state and federal law enforcement agencies had arrived at the scene; LLE did not return to the roof.⁶⁹⁶ The FBI then assumed control of the crime scene from the Secret Service; the SAIC of the FBI Pittsburgh Field Office, **FBI SAIC PIT**, took command of the crime scene and subsequent response.⁶⁹⁷

Agents from the ATF ordered an immediate E-Trace for Crooks' rifle to be completed through the National Tracing Center.⁶⁹⁸ The resulting E-Trace Report led back to Crooks' father through his February 2013 purchase of the rifle.⁶⁹⁹ This led to the identification of Thomas Matthew Crooks as the suspect. At approximately 9:20 p.m., ATF special agents were instructed to prepare to travel to Crooks' residence.⁷⁰⁰

⁶⁸⁸ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Electronic Communication, Contact with Coroner's Office, 2 (Jul. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 11-12, 21 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁸⁹ Ass't Team Leader ^{Butler ESU Op. ATL}, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 64 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁹⁰ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 15, 17 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Beaver ESU, FPOTUS After Action, 6 (produced Aug. 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁹¹ Ass't Team Leader ^{Butler ESU Op. ATL}, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 65 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁹² *Id.*

⁶⁹³ *Id.* at 67; Medic **Beaver ESU Medic**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 56-57 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁹⁴ Ass't Team Leader ^{Butler ESU Op. ATL}, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 67 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁹⁵ *Id.* at 68.

⁶⁹⁶ *Id.*; Medic **Beaver ESU Medic**, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 57 (Sept. 11, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁹⁷ Kevin Rojek, Remarks by FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek at Press Briefing on the Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Jul. 29, 2024).

⁶⁹⁸ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 17 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁶⁹⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰⁰ Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Investigation, Report 5 (produced Nov. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

a. *Discovery of IEDs in Crooks' residence and vehicle.*

The entire area along Whitestown Road and the AGR complex was placed under a safety cordon while Explosives & Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams swept for IEDs.⁷⁰¹ Secret Service TSI [TSI Agent] connected with the local bomb squad sergeant to create a plan to search for the device.⁷⁰² TSI [TSI Agent] then deployed the military EOD and military K-9 assets assigned to the Butler campaign event to search the AGR building and the surrounding area.⁷⁰³ No IEDs were discovered in the AGR complex or the immediate vicinity.⁷⁰⁴

Bethel Park Police Department (BPPD) established covert surveillance of Crooks' residence at approximately 10:45 p.m. while the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) worked with the FBI on securing a search warrant for the residence.⁷⁰⁵ At 10:56 p.m., Crooks' father placed a 911 call regarding his son, stating that he had left earlier that afternoon with his rifle, claimed to be going to the local gun club, and uncharacteristically had not returned home.⁷⁰⁶ The 911 dispatcher escalated this information, which was then relayed to the ATF.⁷⁰⁷

ATF and PSP personnel approached Crooks' residence at approximately 11:40 p.m.⁷⁰⁸ After identifying themselves as law enforcement, Crooks' father exited the residence, stepped onto the front porch, and asked something to the effect of "*Is it true? CNN called me and told me that [redacted] shot Trump.*"⁷⁰⁹ Crooks' father then provided verbal consent for investigators to enter and search the residence, upon which ATF and PSP investigators initiated a protective sweep.⁷¹⁰ By 11:45 p.m., the investigators discovered suspected IED components and construction materials in Crooks' bedroom.⁷¹¹ All occupants of Crooks' residence and the neighboring homes were

⁷⁰¹ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 15 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁰² Technical Security Division Advance [TSI Agent] U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 92 (Oct. 10, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁰³ *Id.*

⁷⁰⁴ *Id.*

⁷⁰⁵ Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Investigation, Report 3, Report 5, (produced Nov. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁰⁶ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Detailed History for Police Event #P240610039 (Jul. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Investigation, Report 7 (produced Nov. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁰⁷ Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Investigation, Report 7 (produced Nov. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁰⁸ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 15 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms briefing to Task Force staff (Sept. 9, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force majority staff); Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Investigation, Report 5 (produced Nov. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁰⁹ Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Investigation, Report 3 (produced Nov. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷¹⁰ *Id.*

⁷¹¹ *Id.* at Report 2; Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 15-16 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

subsequently evacuated, and Allegheny EOD was notified.⁷¹² FBI special agents arrived on scene shortly thereafter and, together with ATF special agents, began to interview Crooks' father at 11:57 p.m.⁷¹³ During the interview, Crooks' father stated that he had previously sold the rifle to his son for \$500.⁷¹⁴

Using the description provided by Crooks' father, Allegheny EOD discovered Crooks' vehicle parked along Whitestown Road near the front of the AGR complex at approximately 12:30 a.m. on July 14.⁷¹⁵ Crooks' vehicle and the areas surrounding the AGR complex were then assessed for IEDs.⁷¹⁶ The Allegheny EOD personnel located a device in the trunk of Crooks' vehicle, which was determined to be a significant threat.⁷¹⁷ Other items discovered in Crooks' vehicle included a bottle of clear liquid and an ammunition storage box filled with a questionable mass that had a radio receiver attached to it.⁷¹⁸ Also found in the vehicle was a commercially-produced drone and a paired remote control.⁷¹⁹

Per the FBI, upon discovering the IEDs in Crooks' car, Allegheny EOD "robotically disassembled the devices" and "dumped the material in the street."⁷²⁰ Upon visually identifying two distinct materials, they took samples of each, tested them, and then burned the remainder with kerosene for safety.⁷²¹ The mass of these materials is therefore unknown.⁷²²

Allegheny EOD personnel traveled to Crooks' residence and removed the suspected IED from Crooks' bedroom at approximately 3:30 a.m. on July 14.⁷²³ They subsequently disarmed the device in the driveway of the residence.⁷²⁴ Upon reentering the home to conduct a final sweep, ATF agents took 34 photographs that were subsequently logged into the ATF evidence vault, but did not search for or seize evidence during this re-entry and assessment.⁷²⁵

⁷¹² Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Investigation, Report 3, Report 5, Report 6 (produced Nov. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷¹³ *Id.* at Report 3, Report 5.

⁷¹⁴ *Id.* at Report 3.

⁷¹⁵ *Id.* at Report 3, Report 8; Technical Security Division Advance TSI Agent U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 93 (Oct. 10, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 15 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷¹⁶ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 15 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷¹⁷ *Id.*

⁷¹⁸ *Id.*

⁷¹⁹ *Id.* at 17.

⁷²⁰ FBI Briefing in Quantico, Virginia to Task Force Members and Staff (Nov. 18, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff).

⁷²¹ *Id.*

⁷²² *Id.*

⁷²³ Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Investigation, Report 5, Report 10 (produced Nov. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷²⁴ *Id.* at Report 10.

⁷²⁵ *Id.*

b. Crime scene release and subsequent investigations.

Due to the nature of the incident and for jurisdictional considerations, command staff from PSP and the FBI conducted tandem investigations.⁷²⁶ However, to deconflict and prevent redundant reporting, the decision was made for PSP Forensic Services Unit personnel only to assist the FBI Evidence Response Team (FBI ERT) and not to collect, process, or photograph any evidence obtained.⁷²⁷

FBI ERT personnel photographed the scene and processed it for physical evidence.⁷²⁸ Eight 0.223 Remington/5.56mm rifle expended cartridge casings were found on the roof near Crooks' shooting position.⁷²⁹ In addition to Crooks' rifle, they seized the firearms of USSS CS [REDACTED] and Butler ESU CAT TL [REDACTED] to be analyzed by the FBI laboratory.⁷³⁰ Items submitted for trace evidence were sent to the FBI laboratories in Quantico, Virginia and Huntsville, Alabama.⁷³¹ The FBI's forensic examination of ballistic evidence found on the AGR roof was still ongoing at the time the Task Force visited the FBI laboratory.⁷³²

After rendering the scene safe, the FBI contacted the Butler County Coroner's Office to take custody of Crooks' body. The coroner subsequently removed Crooks' body from the scene during the early hours of July 14.⁷³³ The scene remained secured until the following morning so that additional FBI ERT personnel could arrive, process the scene, and collect evidence.⁷³⁴ The FBI and PSP released the crime scene at the Butler Farm Show grounds, and the AGR complex, to the property owners on a rolling basis, after collecting any items of evidentiary value.⁷³⁵ The FBI's process for releasing the AGR complex included cleaning the biological material from the AGR roof.⁷³⁶ The FBI completed the final release of the scene on July 20—seven days after the attack.⁷³⁷

⁷²⁶ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 15 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷²⁷ *Id.*

⁷²⁸ *Id.* at 13.

⁷²⁹ *Id.* at 17.

⁷³⁰ *Id.* at 12.

⁷³¹ *Id.*

⁷³² FBI Briefing in Quantico, Virginia to Task Force Members and Staff (Nov. 18, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff).

⁷³³ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 17 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Update 8.28.24, 2 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷³⁴ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 17 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷³⁵ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Update 8.28.24, 2 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷³⁶ *Id.*

⁷³⁷ *Id.*

2. Autopsy & Toxicology Reports

a. Autopsy logistics.

Due to the complexities and scope of the investigation, the Butler County Coroner's Office deferred to the Allegheny County Office of the Medical Examiner (Allegheny ME) to conduct the autopsy of Crooks, which was performed at 9:15 a.m. on July 14 and observed by FBI and PSP personnel.⁷³⁸ A secondary examination was performed on July 15 to collect additional evidence.⁷³⁹

After examinations concluded, the Butler County Coroner's Office consulted with the FBI to determine if there were any additional necessary investigative steps with respect to the body.⁷⁴⁰ The FBI determined there were not, and the FBI and PSP concurred with the Butler County Coroner's Office decision to release the remains to the subject's family.⁷⁴¹ Crooks' body was released to the funeral home on July 22.⁷⁴²

b. The autopsy and toxicology reports conclude Crooks died from a single gunshot wound to the head.

The Allegheny ME subsequently prepared autopsy and toxicology reports.⁷⁴³ The Autopsy Report was authored by Dr. [REDACTED], Chief Medical Examiner of the Allegheny ME, and published on August 5, 2024.⁷⁴⁴ It concludes that Crooks died as a result of a single gunshot wound to the head.⁷⁴⁵ All reviewable evidence collected from the AGR roof and the subject's body are consistent with the round fired by the Secret Service counter-sniper.⁷⁴⁶

⁷³⁸ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 17 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Autopsy Report, 3 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); FBI Update 8.28.24, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 3 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷³⁹ Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Crooks Investigator Narrative, 2 (Aug. 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁴⁰ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Update 8.28.24, 3 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁴¹ *Id.*

⁷⁴² Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Crooks Investigator Narrative, 2 (Aug. 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁴³ Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Autopsy Report, (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Toxicology Report, Forensic Laboratory Division (Jul. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁴⁴ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 49 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁴⁵ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Update 8.28.24, 2 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Autopsy Report, 2 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Crooks Investigator Narrative, 2 (Jul. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁴⁶ FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent in Charge's Remarks to Media on Updates to the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt Investigation, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Aug. 28, 2024).

The Autopsy Report describes a single entry wound on the upper left lip, and a corresponding exit wound in the right lateral neck.⁷⁴⁷ The bullet track is reported as a downward, backward, and rightward direction.⁷⁴⁸ The exit wound of the right lateral neck has an adjacent patterned abrasion, which is consistent with a rifle buttstock abrasion.⁷⁴⁹

The Autopsy Report describes a single re-entry and two re-exit wounds from fragments at the upper right back attributable to the same bullet.⁷⁵⁰ The wounds are consistent with a high-velocity bullet from a distant range.⁷⁵¹ A small copper-colored metal bullet jacket fragment was recovered from the upper right back during the autopsy.⁷⁵² The FBI has possession of the fragment.⁷⁵³

⁷⁴⁷ Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Autopsy Report, 1 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁴⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁴⁹ *Id.*; Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 49 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force)


⁷⁵⁰ Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Autopsy Report, 1, 7-8 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁵¹ *Id.* at 1.

⁷⁵² *Id.*

⁷⁵³ Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Evidence Transfer Report (Jul. 14, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Figure 15: Allegheny ME Evidence Envelope⁷⁵⁴



⁷⁵⁴ Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, ATF_7283 (Jul. 14, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

Figure 16: Bullet Fragment Recovered by Allegheny ME During Crooks Autopsy⁷⁵⁵



The Toxicology Report was published on July 22, 2024.⁷⁵⁶ The findings show negative results for alcohol and drugs of abuse, including controlled substances.⁷⁵⁷ Crooks' father denies that Crooks ever used illegal drugs and said Crooks was not known to be prescribed to any medication.⁷⁵⁸ However, Crooks' father described his son's mental health as declining.⁷⁵⁹ This is described in the PSP Officer Involved Shooting Report following interviews with Crooks' father.⁷⁶⁰

⁷⁵⁵ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000480 (Dec. 9, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁵⁶ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 49 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁵⁷ *Id.*; Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Autopsy Report, 1 (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Toxicology Report, Forensic Laboratory Division, 1 (Jul. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁵⁸ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 25 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Investigation, Report 3 (produced Nov. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁵⁹ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, General Offense Report, 13, 18 (Oct. 21, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁶⁰ *Id.* at 18.

Figure 17: PSP Interview Report

described his son's mental health as declining. CROOKS' father explained that within the last year he observed several instances of his son dancing in his bedroom throughout the night. He would occasionally see CROOKS talking to himself with his hands moving, which he expressed as uncommon and had become more prevalent after he had finished his last semester at Community College.

Crooks' bloodwork was positive for 1.7 mcg/dL antimony, 160 mcg/dL selenium, and 5.9 mcg/dL lead.⁷⁶¹ The only positive finding from the heavy metals panel which warranted further investigation was the concentration of lead, which was verified by repeat analysis.⁷⁶² According to the reference comments found on the heavy metals panel, the “blood reference level for adults is less than 5 mcg/dL” per the Centers for Disease and Control.⁷⁶³ Dr. Allegheny ME stated that the presence of lead could possibly be a result of the time Crooks spent at the firing range.⁷⁶⁴

FBI Investigation

Why it matters: The FBI conducted an investigation into the shooting but only shared a portion of that evidence with the Task Force. The evidence that has been shared with the Task Force is summarized here.

a. FBI's investigative use of 302s.

Federal, state, and LLE agencies commonly gather information and testimony from witnesses during interviews through various mediums, including audio, visual, and written formats.⁷⁶⁵ The FBI sometimes uses the “Interview Report Form FD-302”—commonly known as a “302”—which summarizes a witness or victim interview.⁷⁶⁶ The FBI will typically incorporate handwritten notes and recollections into the 302 following an interview.

The FBI ultimately conducted over 1,000 interviews with Secret Service personnel, state and LLE, and witnesses in the days, weeks, and months following July 13.⁷⁶⁷ As of the date of

⁷⁶¹ *Id.* at 49; Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Toxicology Report, Forensic Laboratory Division, 1 (Jul. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁶² *Id.*

⁷⁶³ Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner, Toxicology Report, Forensic Laboratory Division, 1 (Jul. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁶⁴ Briefing from Allegheny Co. Office of the Medical Examiner to Task Force Staff (Sept. 20, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff).

⁷⁶⁵ Michael S. Schmidt, *In Policy Change, Justice Dept. to Require Recording of Interrogations*, THE N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2024).

⁷⁶⁶ Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Minority Staff).

⁷⁶⁷ *Id.*; Remarks to Media on the Butler, Pennsylvania Assassination Attempt, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Aug. 28, 2024). Although the FBI conducted few interviews the evening of the shooting, the FBI justified

this report, the FBI provided the Task Force with access to only 81, out of over 1,000, witness 302s, comprising roughly 180 pages. These 302s vary in length, breadth, scope, and detail, and unfortunately contain significant redactions, which sometimes limited their usefulness to the Task Force.

b. Forensic evidence and related laboratory reports.

The FBI collected evidence from the crime scene at the Butler Farm Show complex and Crooks' residence and transported it to their crime labs in Quantico, Virginia, and Huntsville, Alabama, for analysis. This evidence included objects gathered from Crooks' body, the three rifles fired on July 13, associated bullets, casings, and fragments found around the crime scene, the IEDs and associated materials, remote controls, and a wireless drone. The FBI has since provided seventeen laboratory reports to the Task Force, including four forensic ballistics reports, one evidence report, and two explosives analysis reports.

c. Firearms analysis.

The FBI collected three firearms from the Butler Farm Show complex—one from Crooks, one from Butler ESU CAT TL [Butler ESU CAT TL 2], the Butler ESU CAT Team Leader who fired at Crooks, and one from CS Sgt. Tech., the Secret Service counter-sniper who fired the shot that killed Crooks.⁷⁶⁸ Crooks utilized a DPMS Panther Arms semiautomatic rifle on July 13.⁷⁶⁹ The rear part of the stock on Crooks' rifle was damaged, thought by the FBI to have been damaged through a projectile impact.⁷⁷⁰ A presumptive chemical test for lead performed on the impact area returned a positive result for lead.⁷⁷¹ Although the FBI did not determine the origin of that lead, the PSP concluded in their officer-involved shooting report that “[t]he buttstock of the rifle had a section of the plastic dislodged and missing from along the cheek piece, which was later determined to be a result of the USSS counter-sniper's projectile impact after traveling through Crooks' head.”⁷⁷² The FBI tested all three rifles and found them to be functional.⁷⁷³

that decision by stating that “they had no reason or intention to hold or detail any first responders, as the law enforcement community assembled in Butler was actively responding to public safety risks, and assisting with investigative activity throughout the night.” Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 28, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Minority Staff). This explains why some law enforcement personnel, such as the Secret Service counter-sniper technicians, were interviewed after July 13 – the counter-snipers accompanied former-President Trump to the hospital and conducted overwatch before departing to the airport to accompany the detail or make it to their next protectee event. Counter-Sniper Technician CS Tech., U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 108 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁶⁸ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Laboratory Report 2024-01571-8, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000167 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁶⁹ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000168 – 000169.

⁷⁷⁰ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000169.

⁷⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷⁷² Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, Homicide Intentional Report, 17 (Nov. 14, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁷³ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Laboratory Report 2024-01571-8, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000168 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

The FBI collected and matched a total of ten bullet cartridges to the three rifles it collected from Crooks, LLE, and Secret Service, which account for the ten total shots fired on July 13.⁷⁷⁴ Eight cartridges were found on the roof of AGR Building six, by Crooks' body, one cartridge was located in a field by the tents where the LLE officer fired at Crooks, and one cartridge was located by the Secret Service counter-sniper's perch on the south barn.⁷⁷⁵ All of the ammunition submitted was deemed to be functional.⁷⁷⁶

d. Bullet and bullet fragment analyses.

The FBI examined the bullet jackets, bullet fragments, bullet cores, ammunition, and magazines collected from the crime scene and attempted to match them to the three firearms collected from Crooks, the LLE officer, and the Secret Service counter-sniper. While the FBI was unable to match every piece of evidence to a specific firearm, it did eliminate from consideration some pieces of evidence from certain firearms. For example, the FBI identified two .223 caliber (5.56 mm) copper bullet jackets as having been fired through Crooks' rifle.⁷⁷⁷ One bullet fragment, despite having limited physical markings, was found to be consistent with the rifling characteristics of test rounds fired from the Secret Service counter-sniper rifle.⁷⁷⁸ Another bullet fragment, which also lacked distinct markings for comparison, had rifling characteristics similar to test rounds the FBI fired through Crooks' and the LLE rifles.⁷⁷⁹ While the FBI was unable to definitively determine which rifle fired that bullet fragment, they ruled out the Secret Service's firearm due to "differences in class characteristics."⁷⁸⁰

The FBI also identified two lead bullet cores that were consistent with a .223 caliber bullet.⁷⁸¹ An examination of the ammunition collected by the FBI found .223 Remington caliber cartridges with a federal ammunition headstamp, 5.56 NATO cartridges with an Advance Armament Corporation ammunition headstamp, and .223 Remington caliber cartridges with a Hornady ammunition headstamp.⁷⁸² The ammunition with the Hornady headstamp is consistent with Crooks' purchase of 50 rounds of Hornady .223 Remington caliber cartridges in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania on July 13 while en route to the rally.⁷⁸³

⁷⁷⁴ *Id.*

⁷⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁷⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷⁷ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Laboratory Report 2024-01571-22, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000176 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁷⁹ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000177.

⁷⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁷⁸¹ *Id.*

⁷⁸² *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000176.

⁷⁸³ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Timeline of Events, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000381 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

e. Shooting incident reconstruction analysis.

The FBI reconstructed the shooting to establish bullet trajectories for the 10 rounds fired on July 13.⁷⁸⁴ They successfully identified six of the 10 bullet trajectories.⁷⁸⁵ Specifically, the FBI identified all six trajectories as originating from the north of the stage in the direction of the AGR complex from which Crooks shot.⁷⁸⁶ Two trajectories, “T5” and “T6,” traveled over the stage, with one hitting the vinyl cover for a jumbo television screen trailer behind the right bleacher, and the other hitting the barn door of a green warehouse south of the stage and bleachers.⁷⁸⁷

The FBI was unable to link every identified hole or impact with a specific bullet or bullet fragment trajectory because of several limitations.⁷⁸⁸ For example, a bullet can produce several holes while traveling from motion to rest, and it can fragment when it “encounters an intervening object,” thereby producing additional trajectories.⁷⁸⁹ Additionally, identification can be more difficult if an object lacks clear perforation from a bullet or fragment, or if an object containing holes or impacts was moved from or within a crime scene.⁷⁹⁰ However, the FBI found that, aside from a bullet hole in a hat, all bullet holes and impacts the FBI identified originated from the north, toward the AGR complex.⁷⁹¹

f. IED composition analyses.

The FBI conducted a comprehensive analysis to determine the construction, functionality, and viability of the three IEDs and handheld remote transmitters found on Crooks’ body, in his vehicle, and in his bedroom.

According to the FBI analysis, the two IEDs found in Crooks’ car consisted of an ammo box, commercial wireless receiver, electric match, and a rolled cardboard tube inside the ammo box containing an explosive filler and explosive main charge.⁷⁹² Each IED also contained a fuzing, or initiation, system.⁷⁹³ The fuzing system was an “AlphaFire” receiver, a commonly sold item, and was attached to each bomb and could be set in “off”, “test”, or “arm” mode.⁷⁹⁴ These fuzing systems could be activated by a remote signal at least 1,000 feet away, or roughly 2,000 meters, per the manufacturer’s description.⁷⁹⁵ In comparison, the IED discovered in Crooks’ bedroom was

⁷⁸⁴ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Laboratory Report 2024-01571-35, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000182 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁸⁵ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000183.

⁷⁸⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁸⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁸⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁹⁰ *Id.*

⁷⁹¹ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000184.

⁷⁹² Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Laboratory Report 2024-01571-2, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000135, 000140, 000145, 000148 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁷⁹³ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000135, 000143.

⁷⁹⁴ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000140 – 000141, 000148 – 000150.

⁷⁹⁵ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000143.

only partially assembled and lacked a completed fuzing system.⁷⁹⁶ However, all three IEDs showed signs of having a “priming hole”, which is used by a bomb maker to insert the fuzing system’s initiator to directly contact the bomb’s energetic material.⁷⁹⁷

The FBI also analyzed the composition of the main explosive charge and explosive charge boosters. The main explosive charge consisted of ammonium nitrate prills, nitromethane, and smokeless powder, while the explosive charge booster consisted of nitromethane and smokeless powder.⁷⁹⁸ The components Crooks used to assemble the IEDs were legal to purchase and readily available online.⁷⁹⁹ The FBI stated that Crooks’ use of metal and hardened plastic containers showed that they were meant to be used as IEDs, because an explosion would cause the container to fragment upon detonation.⁸⁰⁰

The handheld remote transmitter found on Crooks’ body by LLE as they secured his person was “active” with a 9-volt battery and was set in the “off” position.⁸⁰¹ The transmitter was capable of activating multiple receivers with a single button when properly paired.⁸⁰² Three of Crooks’ receivers were paired with the transmitter.⁸⁰³

The FBI also examined the viability and functionality of the IEDs and handheld remote transmitter.⁸⁰⁴ The two IEDs found in Crooks’ vehicle were fully assembled and configured to be remotely detonated through activation by the handheld remote transmitter and had been paired with receivers adhered to the IEDs.⁸⁰⁵ According to the FBI, “[p]roperly assembled and initiated, a resulting explosion from these IEDs could cause property damage, personal injury, and/or death.”⁸⁰⁶ In contrast, while the IED found in Crooks’ bedroom was only partially assembled, not only had Crooks placed the necessary materials nearby to quickly complete the IED, but he had also pre-programmed the IED’s receiver and paired it to the same handheld remote transmitter connected to the two fully assembled IEDs.⁸⁰⁷

g. IED chemistry analyses.

The FBI examined the chemical composition of the two fully assembled IEDs found in Crooks’ vehicle and the partially assembled IED found in Crooks’ bedroom. This included analysis of trace chemicals from various locations inside the IEDs, including the container and explosive

⁷⁹⁶ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000135, 000152 – 000155.

⁷⁹⁷ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000139.

⁷⁹⁸ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000138.

⁷⁹⁹ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI Update 8.28.24 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁰⁰ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Laboratory Report 2024-01571-2, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000136 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁰¹ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000161.

⁸⁰² *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000163.

⁸⁰³ *Id.*

⁸⁰⁴ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000163, 000164.

⁸⁰⁵ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000136.

⁸⁰⁶ *Id.*

⁸⁰⁷ *Id.* at FBI-HTF-BTLR-000135 - 000136, 000152 – 000155.

charges.⁸⁰⁸ The FBI conducted a thermal susceptibility test, otherwise known as a “Flame Test”, on several energetic materials it identified, which produced a positive result.⁸⁰⁹ Several other tests of the chemicals present in the IEDs led the FBI to conclude that “some of these chemicals were identified as being able to produce a high explosive [...] when properly combined in the proper ratio.”⁸¹⁰

Task Force Visit to FBI Quantico Labs

Members and Task Force staff visited the FBI laboratories in Quantico, Virginia on November 18, 2024, to inspect select evidence and question the laboratory technicians who performed various tests. The evidence viewed included Crooks’ weapon, bullet fragments, cartridge casings, his backpack, drone and paired controller, the two fully assembled IEDs, a partially assembled IED, and the paired handheld remote-control transmitter.

1. Rifle

There was visible damage to the buttstock of Crooks’ rifle. An FBI subject matter expert told the Task Force he plans to recreate the damaged section of the Magpul buttstock from the broken pieces found on the AGR roof, which may shed more detailed information on how it was damaged. The FBI laboratory found traces of lead, consistent with the impact of a bullet or bullet fragment, on the broken buttstock.

2. Cartridge Casings and Bullet Fragments

The two available bullet fragments were those recovered from Crooks’ person and on the roof of a AGR building. The bullet fragment found on the roof of a AGR building tested positive for Crooks’ DNA. For the bullet recovered on the roof next to Crooks, although a microscopic comparison was inconclusive, the grooves on the fragment were consistent with the rifling characteristics of test rounds fired through the Secret Service rifle and not consistent with those fired by the LLE officer.

The FBI also completed metallurgic testing on the bullet fragments. An FBI expert told the Task Force that the corresponding report also details the physical characteristics of the bullet fragments, including weight and other measurements. The FBI provided the Task Force with a copy of this report on December 4, 2024. As such, this final report does not reflect those findings.

3. Bullet Trajectories

The FBI laboratory’s standard procedure for establishing bullet trajectory typically requires them to “works backwards” from each bullet impact in order to establish a trajectory. If there is no

⁸⁰⁸ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Laboratory Report 2024-01571-10, FBI-HTF-BTLR-000194 (Oct. 7, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁰⁹ *Id.*

⁸¹⁰ *Id.*

impact, the lab cannot establish a trajectory. The FBI subject matter experts stated that they do not perform trajectory analyses on bullets/fragments found in bodies because they are not static impact locations. Therefore, trajectories were not created for those bullets.

As noted in their report, an FBI expert identified six total trajectories with 35 places of impact. There were no impacts or fragmentation at the podium where former President Trump spoke, the bleacher area where Mr. Comperatore was standing at the time of the shooting, or the AGR roof. One of the bullets Crooks fired was not recovered.

4. IEDs

The receivers had three positions: “test”, “fire”, and “off.” The receivers were all in the ‘off’ position. The remote, which had ‘on’ and ‘off’ positions, was also in the ‘off’ position. Each of these would require manually changing the switch to turn on, and could not be switched on remotely.

The remote was paired to all three of the receivers (both of the fully built IEDs and the partially built found in Crooks’ bedroom). Had the equipment been turned on, Crooks had the ability to activate one at a time, or all paired, functional receivers simultaneously.

The component combination Crooks used was, per an FBI expert, unusual. Descriptions from the FBI subject matter expert included “overengineered,” concluding that Crooks’ “ambitions exceeded his capabilities,” and had “complexities that were not required and had failure points.” The FBI expert stated that Crooks was able to legally purchase many of his components and chemicals online, including the ammonium nitrate. The FBI subject matter expert confirmed that the components Crooks used to build the IEDs did not emit significant odors, and had he assembled them in his home, his family would not have noticed a smell.

The FBI conducted several explosive tests to gauge the potential impact of Crooks’ IEDs and presented their findings to the Task Force. Specifically, they showed video recreations of similar explosives to demonstrate their damage capabilities both inside of a trunk and in the open. Per the FBI, anyone within ten feet of the IEDs (had they been successfully detonated) would have immediately been killed.

5. Drone

Crooks utilized a commercially available DJI drone and paired handheld remote to conduct reconnaissance prior to the July 13 campaign rally. The drone camera was capable of tilting up and down. It was capable of zooming eight times the focal length.

The FBI was requested to recreate what Crooks may have seen in that final reconnaissance flight. The FBI purchased the same drone model, known as an “exemplar,” to gather certain information without disturbing the drone in evidence. They then successfully recovered electronic data from the drone and paired controller. This revealed thousands of data points, including pitch and speed. The FBI, in a novel approach, created an algorithm to read this data and visually recreate

it in a simulation video that they presented to the Task Force demonstrating possible points of view Crooks could have obtained by using his drone on July 13.

Per the electronic data FBI gathered, the controller had 13 flights logged in it. A “flight” would be logged into the drone’s system whenever the drone was activated or flown. The FBI noted that while eight flights and 20 unique images were pulled from Crooks’ drone, none of the images were from July 13. Crooks’ drone flight on July 13 was logged as Flight #17. Beginning at 3:51 p.m., Crooks flew his drone for 11 minutes 52 seconds.

West Palm Beach, FL: Findings and Recommendations

On the morning of September 15, 2024, former President Trump and a protective team of USSS personnel departed Mar-a-Lago to head to the Trump International Golf Club West Palm Beach.⁸¹¹ At approximately 1:30 p.m., former President Trump was on the **LES** hole of the golf course when a Secret Service site agent, who was riding along the fence line conducting a **LES** [REDACTED], noticed an individual by the fence line on the external perimeter by the **LES** green.⁸¹²

The agent first noticed the suspect, later identified as Ryan Wesley Routh, and then noticed the barrel of Routh's gun sticking through the fence line.⁸¹³ The special agent, who may have been as close as five feet away from Routh, immediately responded by firing shots toward the suspect.⁸¹⁴ It is believed six shots in total were fired; however, final ballistics are pending an ongoing FBI investigation.⁸¹⁵

The suspect then fled across **LES** [REDACTED], the multi-lane road that encircles the Trump International Golf Club, to his pre-positioned vehicle.⁸¹⁶ A bystander who, according to the Secret Service, heard the shots and witnessed Routh running to his vehicle, snapped a photo of Routh's license plate and provided it to one of the Secret Service special agents.⁸¹⁷ The special agent then provided the photo to LLE, who issued a BOLO to the real-time crime center.⁸¹⁸

Once shots were fired, the working shift agents immediately took steps to cover former President Trump and move him to a safe location.⁸¹⁹ Routh was apprehended approximately 44 minutes later at 2:14 p.m. by the Martin County Sheriff's Office while fleeing northbound on I-95 in Martin County.⁸²⁰

The crime scene was transferred to the FBI at 5:10 p.m. that day.⁸²¹

On September 15, 2024, the Secret Service utilized the protective methodology typically used for golf courses.⁸²² This methodology utilizes a layered approach with several rings of protection. As noted in the Secret Service's September 18, 2024, briefing to Task Force Members

⁸¹¹ Briefing by the U.S. Secret Serv.: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. (Sep. 18, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸¹² *Id.*

⁸¹³ *Id.*

⁸¹⁴ *Id.*; Briefing by the U. S. Secret Serv.: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong., West Palm Beach, Florida (Nov. 16, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸¹⁵ Briefing by the U. S. Secret Serv.: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. (Sep. 18, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸¹⁶ *Id.*

⁸¹⁷ *Id.*

⁸¹⁸ *Id.*

⁸¹⁹ *Id.*

⁸²⁰ *Id.*

⁸²¹ *Id.*

⁸²² *Id.*

and staff, the entire golf course [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED].⁸²³ Protection is affected and managed through a [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED].⁸²⁴

On September 15, the Secret Service indicated that there was already a strong security footprint in the form of an inner ring of protection around former President Trump: [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED]; a [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED], otherwise known as a “[REDACTED] LES [REDACTED];” a [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED]; a [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED]; a [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED]; as well as other assets not disclosed.⁸²⁵

The Secret Service noted in its September 18, briefing that the [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED] of a golf course is always the highest threat and that the agents are very much focused on these [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED] because of would-be snipers.⁸²⁶ The Secret Service also noted that Routh did not have a line of sight to former President Trump and that there was likely a distance in excess of 300 yards from Routh to the former President.⁸²⁷ It was also noted that there were trees between Routh’s position and the [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED] green.⁸²⁸

In addition to the numerous assets deployed by the Secret Service on September 15, the diligence of and successful scanning by the special agent conducting [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED] of former President Trump provided a critical line of defense to avert a disaster that day. The special agent’s quick response and decision to discharge his firearm in the direction of the threat prevented a potentially lethal or other dangerous scenario from occurring. According to information provided to the Task Force, the assailant, Routh, did not discharge his rifle or get any shots out in the direction of former President Trump. The Secret Service further indicated in its September 18, briefing that following the first assassination attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, the level of protection provided to former President Trump was commensurate with that of President Biden.⁸²⁹

Status of Investigations

The Secret Service is continuing to conduct its mission assurance review of the assassination attempt in West Palm Beach, Florida, the contents of which have not been shared with the Task Force.

⁸²³ *Id.*

⁸²⁴ *Id.*

⁸²⁵ *Id.*; Briefing by the U. S. Secret Serv.: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong., West Palm Beach, Florida (Nov. 16, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸²⁶ Briefing by the U. S. Secret Serv.: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. (Sep. 18, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸²⁷ *Id.*

⁸²⁸ *Id.*

⁸²⁹ *Id.*

On November 16, 2024, Task Force Chairman Kelly, as well as staff members from the Task Force, visited the site of the second assassination attempt at the Trump International Golf Club West Palm Beach.

The Task Force notes that as of the date of publication of this report, DHS, USSS, FBI, and ATF have not produced any documents responsive to the Task Force's requests regarding the preparation for, events of, and response to the second assassination attempt that occurred on September 15.

Missteps

Despite the Trump International Golf Club being surrounded by public roads and protected only by a chain-link fence, trees, and brush, the Secret Service did not implement the full scope of [REDACTED] LES prior to former President Trump's arrival on September 15, due to Secret Service stating that this was an [REDACTED] LES scheduled in the early hours of that morning.⁸³⁰ Unfortunately, the property was subject to critical vulnerabilities, particularly related to its outer perimeter, which the Secret Service had previously identified as a favorable position for potential snipers.⁸³¹ In fact, it has been publicly reported that the location at which Routh was ultimately encountered was known by photographers [REDACTED] LES

[REDACTED] ⁸³²

Secret Service representatives explained to the Task Force that [REDACTED] LES
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ⁸³³ In line with long-standing protocol, the Secret Service [REDACTED] LES

[REDACTED] ⁸³⁴ Although the Secret Service was notified at approximately 2:30 a.m. on September 15 that former President Trump intended to golf at approximately 12:30 p.m. that day, former President Trump made a last-minute request to leave for Trump International Golf Club just after 11:00 a.m., moving his anticipated arrival time up by an hour.⁸³⁵ Although LLE typically provides [REDACTED] LES support was not available due to the [REDACTED] LES nature of the visit. However, the Palm Beach Sheriff's Office began [REDACTED] LES

⁸³⁰ *Id.*

⁸³¹ *Id.*

⁸³² See e.g., Andrew Buncombe, *Trump's would-be assassin was found in spot used by paparazzi for years*, THE TELEGRAPH (Sep. 17, 2024).

⁸³³ Briefing by the U. S. Secret Serv.: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. (Sep. 18, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸³⁴ *Id.*

⁸³⁵ Briefing by the U. S. Secret Serv.: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. (Nov. 16, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., *HTF Brief, West Palm Beach Incident, September 15, 2024*, Presentation to Task Force, (Nov. 16, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

LES.⁸³⁶ The Task Force also understands that the Secret Service had previously used LES [REDACTED] when former President Trump was President, but had not utilized this asset since the former President left office.

Recommendations Related to: Assassination Attempt in West Palm Beach, Florida

24. **Implement a LES vehicle for use on a golf course.** Although not presently utilized, the Secret Service should consider the use of a LES vehicle or golf cart.
25. **Review protocols for sweeping golf courses.** The Secret Service should review its protocols for LES golf outings [REDACTED]. The Secret Service should consider: 1) the utility of regularly utilizing a UAV for reconnaissance in such sparsely occupied open areas and 2) analyze additional reliable, rapidly deployable, and/or mobile technologies that could further be used to supplement manpower for coverage of large open areas.
26. **Increase reliance on K9 sweeps.** K9 sweeps should be considered as practical, particularly in view of the Secret Service's robot K9 asset, which does not have the same practical limitations as a K9 with heat and other sensitivity.

⁸³⁶ Briefing by the U. S. Secret Serv.: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. (Sep. 18, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff); Briefing by the U. S. Secret Serv.: Briefing Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 118th Cong. (Oct. 9, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

Additional Recommendations

Recommendations for Secret Service/DHS:

27. **Record all radio transmissions and evaluate communications retention policies.** The Secret Service should record its radio transmissions for all protective events and should consider its overall approach to records retention, including maintaining SMS and email communications. On July 13, the Secret Service did not record its radio communications. The absence of radio logs or recordings significantly limits the ability to reconstruct events for either investigative or evaluative purposes. Acting Director Rowe testified to directing the Secret Service to record radio transmissions for such events going forward, but the agency's updated policies still condition radio recording for presidential nominee and certain other protectee events on staffing and equipment availability.⁸³⁷ To the extent that there are any technological limitations that prevent radio recordings or logs for all protective events, the Secret Service must prioritize addressing those challenges to enable this capability.
28. **Consider staffing redundancies for high pressure moments.** The Secret Service may consider additional staffing or flex posts to increase adaptability to evolving situations, but at the core of this recommendation is the suggestion to develop its contingency planning, particularly in chaotic and emergency situations, to ensure that personnel are available to respond to all communications and actions. The Task Force identified multiple instances in which Secret Service personnel reported they could not perform one function while attending to another urgent need. The agency should reassess its staffing of critical posts such as the Command Post or Security Room agent and counter-sniper teams, which may be more likely to have competing demands during critical response periods. Further, the number of roving posts such as CS Response, Site PI, and Relief agents should match the demands of an event site. The demands of an event situated on a 100-acre property with an anticipated 15,000 attendees well exceeded the capacity of only three agents, each with unique roles that state and local counterparts could augment but not replace.
29. **Develop and formalize process for escalating conflicts with protectee staff.** The Secret Service should implement a formal process by which personnel may raise concerns in their

⁸³⁷ *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump: Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs*, 118th Cong. (Jul. 30, 2024) (testimony of Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Director, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-08, Communications, Bates 006249-006253, 006252 (Aug. 20, 2024) (on file with the Task Force) ("Based on staffing and equipment availability, CIO will also record radio frequencies (Secret Service operational channels) for Presidential Elect, Vice Presidential Elect, Presidential Nominee, and Vice Presidential Nominee temporary post standers and operational shifts."); See also Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Protective Operations Manual OPO-08, Communications, Bates 006254-006257, 006256 (Apr. 6, 2021) (on file with the Task Force) (not addressing recordings for Presidential Elect, Vice Presidential Elect, Presidential Nominee, and Vice Presidential Nominee events).

planning with protectee staff. Over the course of our investigation, several members of the Secret Service expressed frustrations in negotiating with staff, regardless of political party or protectee.⁸³⁸ Ultimately the Secret Service is responsible for protectee security, but the agency may find itself working with staff who assert competing interests such as scheduling and optics. A formal process by which personnel may raise concerns in their dealings with protectee staff will empower agents to raise those issues to supervisors and leave Secret Service with a record of the dispute to evaluate should further issues arise. Any such documentation should be considered confidential and should be exempt from any public disclosure requests.

30. **Provide more robust training for non-USSS federal personnel on-site.** When assigned to USSS protective missions, non-USSS federal personnel have the same zero-fail mission as USSS personnel—to protect the protectee. DHS supported former President Trump’s July 13 event by providing HSI agents, but USSS personnel testified to the Task Force that these agents—and HSI agents generally—can be challenging to manage because “you’re having to explain the posts a lot more and you don’t know whether they even have worked with us before.”⁸³⁹ The Task Force obtained testimony that for July 13, HSI agents allegedly received “a 1-hour PowerPoint or something like that,” and that the USSS would otherwise only provide the morning briefing and the relevant paperwork on the day of an event.⁸⁴⁰ While the Task Force did not observe critical HSI agent failures on July 13 during the course of its investigation, the USSS failures that day demonstrate that trainings and preparations for non-USSS federal personnel must be strengthened and more robust for protective missions.

31. **Prioritize experience in assignment process.** Secret Service personnel must have an avenue to gain experience in protection details and in particular to be able to fulfill their responsibilities in advanced planning assignments. To develop that expertise, Secret Service should allow less-experienced personnel to participate in advance planning. However, high-risk protection events are not an appropriate setting for less experienced agents to gain on-the-job training in leadership roles. For high-risk events, such as the July 13 campaign event in Butler—an event that was outdoors, drew a large crowd, and featured one of the most prominent protectees—only agents with experience in advance planning should be assigned leading roles.

⁸³⁸ See, e.g., Special Agent **CAT Op.**, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 100-101 (Oct. 4, 2024) (on file with the Task Force) (“I think culturally there’s an issue with the Secret Service and White House or campaign or protectee staff and how that [...] dynamic plays out, and how it affects us being able to do our job [...] [Secret Service is] on the ground ready to work and staff is not there to pick sites to tell us where we’re going to be going”); Special Agent **CAT Lead**, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 100, 110 (Oct. 10, 2024) (on file with the Task Force) (“But I feel like that there needs to be things set in stone so that the Secret Service can do their job appropriately in a timely manner”).

⁸³⁹ Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart**, Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 37 (Oct. 17, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁴⁰ *Id.* at 65.

32. **In-person advance activities must include all relevant subject matter experts.** The Secret Service cites the strain on headcount and the heightened pace of the campaign season for not having all advance agents on the ground for the entire advance, with one aspect of work—the CAT advance—being performed over the phone. While the Task Force did not identify failures of the CAT advance team for this particular event, Secret Service should—and indeed already has—addressed the unnecessary risk of tactical advance agents not being on the ground to scope sites. All substantive advance decisions that require viewing the site should be made by somebody who has assessed the location in person.

Recommendations for Legislative Consideration by Congress:

33. **Review USSS budget, staffing, and retention.** Financial and personnel resources should never stand in the way of the USSS carrying out their critical protective mission. To the extent additional funding is needed, especially for technology and modernization, Congress, DHS, and the USSS should explore how to best achieve this end. Staying on the cutting edge of innovation is an especially critical priority given the events of July 13. However, the USSS must also consider ways to increase experienced personnel via both hiring and retention. The USSS and Congress should therefore look to identify approaches to make employment more sustainable and rewarding, both personally and professionally. Based upon the Task Force’s investigation, particular areas of note include reducing the pace of travel, ensuring overtime is properly compensated, and giving incentives for veteran agents to stay with the USSS beyond minimum retirement ages.

34. **Reduce the number of protectees.** The number of individuals being protected has greatly expanded, a resource demand which becomes further taxed during the longer and more intensive modern presidential campaign seasons. Additionally, because the USSS protects foreign dignitaries, there is a significant increase in work during the U.N. General Assembly, which occurs in September at the height of campaign season. As a result, Congress, DHS, and the USSS should jointly consider the protective role the USSS plays for foreign leaders and consider whether such duties can be transferred or abrogated in order to focus on the USSS’s primary duty: to protect the President and other critical U.S. leaders.

35. **Congress and the Secretary of Homeland Security should review the Secret Service’s investigative role.** Since the USSS’s inception, its mission has evolved to include both protective and investigative functions, including specific priorities involving fraud, financial crimes, and cybercrimes. These non-protective, investigative functions require systemic review because of the USSS’s stunning failure to protect President-elect Trump on July 13. While the Task Force recognizes the importance and past successes of USSS investigations, it recommends DHS and USSS explore policies and practices that would minimize the volume of USSS investigative work during campaign seasons in order to prioritize the protection of U.S. leaders and candidates running for office. The Secret

Service’s protective mission is at the core of the agency’s purpose—anything that distracts or diverts resources from the agency’s zero fail mission must be reconsidered. Accordingly, Congress, DHS, and the USSS should each consider the feasibility of permanently moving or temporarily moving USSS investigative functions to a different federal agency within or outside of DHS.

36. Evaluate whether Secret Service should remain inside the Department of Homeland Security. In 2003, USSS moved from its longstanding place organizationally housed inside the Department of the Treasury into the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For the last decade, USSS’s budget has represented only around 3 percent of its parent organization’s budget of over \$100 billion. DHS contains six component agencies larger than USSS – the largest, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) – has a budget ten times larger than that of USSS. Over this period of time, USSS has not benefited from stable leadership. It has had seven different directors since 2014 and only one who lasted three years on the job. The current structure potentially weakens USSS, a small but critically important agency, in advocating for its budget and other priorities inside a much larger entity. The failure in Butler was far from the first significant USSS failure in recent history, and it is fair to question whether USSS should continue to be housed within DHS. We suggest that the House Committee on Homeland Security should examine the pluses and minuses of USSS’s position housed inside DHS. A fresh look at whether USSS might benefit from the status of an independent agency, with more freedom to make budget requests and advocate for itself, would be a healthy discussion for former USSS leaders to have with Congress.

37. Congress should clarify its right to obtain law enforcement sensitive information. Congress regularly finds itself engaged in disputes with the Department of Justice (DOJ) over information relating to law enforcement investigations.⁸⁴¹ With respect to the assassination attempt in Butler, the Task Force’s requests for information were characterized by the FBI as implicating “significant law enforcement sensitivities,” and subsequent FBI disclosures were labeled as “extraordinary accommodation[s] unique to this matter.”⁸⁴² With respect to the assassination attempt in Florida, where the gunman was apprehended alive and awaits a likely prosecution, the FBI provided no documents in response to the Task Force’s request and provided only a single status briefing on September 25, 2024. The DOJ undoubtedly has an interest in preserving the integrity of its criminal investigations,⁸⁴³ and the Task Force appreciates the FBI’s willingness to provide

⁸⁴¹ See e.g., H. REPT. 116-105, at 9-11 (2019); H. REPT. 112-546, at 42 (2012); H. REPT. 105-728, at 16-18 (1998).

⁸⁴² The FBI produced documents to the Task Force by e-mailing individualized, web links to certain Task Force staff inviting them to an access-only (downloading forbidden) private, cloud-based, fire-sharing website on which these documents had been uploaded. Since the FBI prevented Task Force staff from downloading these documents, the Task Force does not actually have possession of these documents, and it is uncertain whether the House will retain access to these documents after the Task Force dissolves and Task Force staff e-mail addresses expire.

⁸⁴³ See Letter from Robert Raben, Ass’t Att’y Gen., to John Linder, Chairman, Subcomm. on Rules and Org. of the House, Comm. On Rules (Jan. 27, 2000) <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/linder.pdf>.

the Task Force with timely access to certain evidence gathered in the agency’s ongoing Butler investigation.⁸⁴⁴ Still, the attempt on the former President’s life in Florida is a matter in which the House and the nation as a whole have such a pronounced interest in not only understanding the facts and circumstances, but also in ensuring that Congress has adequate information to develop informed legislative proposals intended to decrease the likelihood of similar security failures from occurring in the future. Whether rooted in generalized “law enforcement sensitivities” or an indefinite “law enforcement privilege” that stems from the common law,⁸⁴⁵ the phrase “ongoing investigation” should not be treated as a magical incantation that disables Congress’ otherwise broad right of access to relevant information necessary for it to carry out its constitutional functions.⁸⁴⁶ The House may consider—through either legislation, chamber rule, or committee rule as deemed appropriate—reaffirming its own views on the scope of a committee’s right of access to information pertaining to an ongoing investigation held by a law enforcement agency, and/or establishing principles to help guide the accommodations process in the case of a dispute.

⁸⁴⁴ The types of law enforcement sensitive information obtained and protected by the Task Force (including FBI 302 interviews, USSS protective operations policies and procedures, and documents and testimony outlining sensitive and classified assets utilized by USSS) stand as an important precedent for future committees who seek to obtain access to similar information.

⁸⁴⁵ See ██████████, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB 11172, THE HUR TAPES AND THE PRESIDENT’S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, 2-3 (May 29, 2024).

⁸⁴⁶ *Hutcheson v. United States*, 369 U.S. 599, 618 (1962) (“[S]urely a congressional committee which is engaged in a legitimate legislative investigation need not grind to a halt whenever responses to its inquiries might potentially be harmful to a witness in some distinct proceeding, or when crime or wrongdoing is disclosed.”); *Sinclair v. United States*, 279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929) (holding that Congress’s constitutional authority to “require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power” may not be “abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use” in criminal prosecutions).

Conclusion

The Task Force and each of its Members condemns the horrific assault on President-elect Trump and extends condolences to James Copenhagen, David Dutch, and the family of Corey Comperatore. The events of July 13, 2024, were tragic and preventable, and the litany of related security failures are unacceptable. The Secret Service's zero fail mission allows no margin for error, let alone for the many errors described in this report.

The recommendations proposed by the Task Force are intended to prevent similar lapses in the future. It is our hope and expectation that DHS and the Secret Service will implement the reforms proposed by the Task Force voluntarily. The House Committees with relevant jurisdiction should monitor the Secret Service's progress, in coordination with the DHS Office of Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office. Relevant congressional committees should give serious consideration to implementing these reforms via legislation as well.

The relevant committees may also seek to address important questions that the Task Force did not fully examine. Foremost among them are the motivations of Thomas Crooks and Ryan Routh, which remain largely unknown. The American people (and in the case of Crooks, the victims and their families) deserve that information, and the Task Force expects the FBI, ATF, and DOJ to be more forthcoming in that regard going forward.

The fundamental principle that the American political process is free from violence underpins our system of representative democracy. The effectiveness of the Secret Service—as the agency responsible for protecting the country's highest elected officials—is therefore central to upholding the Nation's constitutional values. We hope that the Task Force's work, which has been fully bipartisan, leaves no doubt about the House of Representatives' commitment to preserving those values by strengthening the Secret Service and restoring its standing as the world's preeminent protective agency.

Appendix I: Table of Names

U.S. Secret Service

OPO Assistant Director **OPO Asst. Dir.**. Retired from the agency on September 13, 2024, but was formerly in charge of the Secret Service's Office of Protective Operations, which directs, plans, and implements policies and programs for the eleven protective divisions, including the Donald Trump Division.

Special Agent in Charge **SAIC PIT**. In charge of the Pittsburgh Field Office and was involved in the advance planning for former President Trump and FLOTUS July 13 visits to Pennsylvania.

Special Agent in Charge **SAIC DTD**. In charge of the Donald Trump Division and was one of the agents who created a body bunker around former President Trump after shots were fired.

Special Agent in Charge **Sec. Room Sup.**. In charge of the Buffalo Field Office and supervised the Secret Service Security Room, which was responsible for relaying radio communications during the July 13 campaign event.

Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge **ATSAIC PIT**. Second-in-command of the Pittsburgh Field Office at the time of the campaign event and involved in the advance planning for former President Trump and FLOTUS July 13 visits to Pennsylvania.

Assistant Special Agent in Charge **ASAIC DTD**. Second Supervisor for the Donald Trump Division during the advance planning and was one of the agents who created a body bunker around former President Trump after shots were fired.

Inspector **CNOS Insp.**. Inspector with the Secret Service's campaign arm, the Candidate Nomination Operation Services, assigned to shadow and assist Assistant Special Agent in Charge **ASAIC DTD** during the July 13 campaign event.

Senior Special Agent **Lead Advance**. Lead Advance Agent and Transportation Advance Agent from the Pittsburgh Field Office responsible for coordinating the July 13 advance planning team and security plan.

Senior Special Agent **Site Counterpart**. Site Counterpart Agent from the Pittsburgh Field Office responsible for coordinating the security plan for the Butler Farm Show site with Site Agent **Site Agent**

Senior Special Agent **Site PI**. Site Protective Intelligence Agent from the Phoenix Field Office responsible for responding to suspicious person reports and intelligence issues on July 13.

Special Agent [REDACTED] Site Agent. Site Agent from the Donald Trump Division responsible for coordinating the security plan for the Butler Farm Show site for the July 13 campaign event.

Special Agent [REDACTED] PI Advance. Formerly with the Pittsburgh Field Office; for former President Trump's July 13 visit, he was the Protective Intelligence Advance Agent responsible for conducting intelligence advance work to identify potential threats to the protectee and site.

Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op.. Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems Operator from the Donald Trump Division responsible for advance planning and operating the system during the July 13 event, despite several technical issues.

Special Agent [REDACTED] USSS Post 1. From the Phoenix Field Office, and assigned as the post-stander at the motorcade entrance of the Butler Farm Show on July 13 with Butler Township Patrolman

[REDACTED] BTPD Patrol 1

Special Agent [REDACTED] CS Resp.. Counter-sniper Response Team agent from the Oklahoma City Field Office responsible for addressing threats identified by the Counter-sniper Team at the July 13 event.

Special Agent [REDACTED] CAT Lead. Counter Assault Team Leader during the advance process and on July 13, provided critical response to evacuate former President Trump from the event venue.

Special Agent [REDACTED] CAT Op.. Counter Assault Team Operator on July 13, and provided critical response to evacuate former President Trump from the rally venue.

Senior Special Agent [REDACTED] FLOTUS Adv. Agent. Advance Agent from the Pittsburgh Field Office that helped organize the initial police planning meetings for former President Trump and FLOTUS July 13 visits to Pennsylvania.

Counter-sniper Sergeant [REDACTED] CS Sgt. Tech.. Counter-sniper team member on the South Barn by the event stage who neutralized the shooter on July 13.

Counter-sniper Technician [REDACTED] CS TL. Counter-sniper Team Leader on the South Barn by the event stage who was responsible for counter-sniper advance planning for the July 13 campaign event.

Counter-sniper Technician [REDACTED] CS Tech.. Counter-sniper team member on North Barn by the event stage on July 13.

Technical Security Investigator [REDACTED] TSI Agent. Handled advance planning on behalf of the Secret Service's Technical Security Division to identify potential explosive, chemical, and other threats in and around the Butler Farm Show for the July 13 event.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] **FBI SAIC PIT**. In charge of the FBI's Pittsburgh Field Office, and assumed responsibility for the Butler Farm Show crime scene following the July 13 assassination attempt.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

[REDACTED] **ATF Agent 1**. ATF [REDACTED] **LES** who assisted with coordinating the ATF's critical incident response functions on July 13.

[REDACTED] **ATF Agent 2**. ATF [REDACTED] **LES** who was one of the first members of law enforcement to respond the Crooks residence, where an IED was located.

Pennsylvania State Police

Lieutenant [REDACTED] **PSP Lt. 1**. PSP lead during the advance planning process, who worked closely with the Secret Service advance team and LLE, and on site during July 13.

Lieutenant [REDACTED] **PSP Lt. 2**. A PSP representative who worked closely with the Secret Service advance team to coordinate PSP resources.

Sergeant [REDACTED] **PSP Sgt.**. The PSP representative in the Secret Service Security Room that passed along critical information from the LLE command post about Crooks and his movements leading up to the shooting.

Trooper [REDACTED] **PSP Trp. 1**. A PSP post-stander who helped coordinate PSP response to search for Crooks by direction of Sgt. [REDACTED] **PSP Sgt.** in the Secret Service Security Room.

Trooper [REDACTED] **PSP Trp. 2**. PSP counterpart assigned to assist the Counter-sniper Response Team agent [REDACTED] **CS Resp.** during the July 13 campaign event.

Trooper [REDACTED] **PSP Trp. 3**. LLE counterpart assigned to assist the Site Protective Intelligence agent with suspicious person reports during the July 13 campaign event.

Butler County Sheriff's Office

Chief Deputy Sheriff's Chief Deputy. BCSO lead during the advance planning process, who worked with the Secret Service advance team and PSP Lt. PSP Lt. 1 in the advance planning process and was on site for July 13.

Sergeant Sheriff's Sgt.. Present in the local command post trailer to coordinate Sheriff's deputies assigned to the July 13 campaign event.

Deputy Sheriff's Deputy. Deputy who was stationed within the fence lines separating the event from the AGR complex and was assigned to watch the AGR-side fence for potential incursions.

Butler County ESU

Commander Butler ESU Comm.. In charge of Butler County ESU and, as such, participated in advance planning and was present in the local command post trailer to coordinate LLE assets assigned to the July 13 campaign event.

Deputy Commander Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1. Participated in the advance planning for local law tactical assets and assigned to support the local command post trailer for the latter half of the event.

Deputy Commander Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 2. Assisted with the event security planning for local tactical assets and was embedded with the Secret Service CAT team to provide support and communications linkage for the July 13 campaign event.

Sniper Team Leader Butler ESU Snip. TL. Participated in the advance planning for counter-sniper assets and drafted an "overwatch" chart to establish overlapping fields of coverage during the event.

Sniper Butler ESU Sniper. Assigned to the AGR building to provide sniper coverage of the July 13 campaign event and passed along early information about Crooks and his rangefinder to a member of the LES team stationed near the event stage.

LES Team Leader Butler ESU Op. ATL. In charge of the LES team who was part of the post-shooting response to secure the AGR building.

LES Operator Butler ESU Op. 2. A member of the LES team who noticed Crooks near the AGR building and was part of the post-shooting response to secure the AGR building.

CAT Team Leader Butler ESU CAT TL 2. Local CAT member located near the North Barn who fired one round toward Crooks, possibly causing Crooks to stop firing at former President Trump and the event attendees.

CAT Team Leader **Butler ESU CAT TL 1**. Was present at the campaign event advance planning meetings, and created the Butler Township and Butler ESU operational plans for the campaign event.

Beaver County ESU

Deputy Commander **Beaver ESU Dep. Comm.**. In-charge of Beaver County ESU which assisted Butler ESU for the July 13 campaign event, and led CAT team stationed by the entrance of the campaign event.

Sniper Assistant Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. ATL**. Assigned to the AGR building to provide sniper coverage of the July 13 campaign event, and was one of the first to notice Crooks and disseminate photos and a description to other law enforcement personnel around the July 13 campaign event.

Sniper Team Lead **Beaver ESU Snip. TL**. One of the three snipers assigned to post-up in the AGR building during the July 13 campaign event, and may have spotted Crooks as he wrapped up his assignment around 4:30 PM.

Medic **Beaver ESU Medic**. Assigned to the Beaver CAT team as a medic, and was one of the first to ascend the AGR building roof, shortly after pronouncing Crooks dead.

Butler Township Police Department

Lieutenant **BTPD Lt. 1**. Second-in-command of the local police presence in Butler Township, and provided advance planning assistance and communication coordination in the local command post trailer on July 13.

Detective **BTPD Detective**. A local police detective who proactively searched for Crooks and was partially lifted onto the AGR building rooftop, spotting Crooks and his rifle, before radioing out a warning at 1811 hours.

Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 3**. A local police officer who was not assigned to work the campaign event, but proactively left his post to search for Crooks, and helped lift Detective **BTPD Detective** onto the rooftop at 1811 hours to spot Crooks and his rifle.

Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 2**. Originally assigned to traffic duty near the AGR complex, he left his post to help search for Crooks, ultimately spotting him moving across the rooftops.

Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1**. Participated in the advancing planning in his capacity as Sniper Assistant Team Leader for Butler ESU, assisting with sniper operations plans, and worked the July

13 campaign event as an officer for the Butler Township Police Department, eventually disseminating information to other law enforcement officers while searching for Crooks.

Butler County Dept. of Emergency Services

Director [Butler DES Dir.]. Participated in the advance planning process, brought the local command post trailer for law enforcement to use during the campaign event, and acted as the LLE representative in the Secret Service Security Room for communications purposes on July 13.

Technology Specialist [Butler DES Tech.]. Participated in the advance planning walkthrough, and helped handle radio communications in the local command post trailer during the July 13 campaign event.

Appendix II: Investigative Summary

Hearings

- September 26, 2024 – Hearing: The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State and Local Law Enforcement.
- December 5, 2024 – Hearing: Secret Service Security Failures and The Attempts to Assassinate President-Elect Donald J. Trump.

Site Visits

- August 26, 2024 – Task Force visit to Butler, Pennsylvania
- November 16, 2024 – Task Force visit to West Palm Beach, Florida
- November 18, 2024 – Task Force visit to Quantico, Virginia

Reports

- October 21, 2024 – “Interim Staff Report: Investigating the Stunning Security Failures on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania”

Transcribed Interviews (46)

- U.S. Secret Service (20)
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (2)
- Pennsylvania State Police (1)
- Local Law Enforcement (23)

Document Productions

- U.S. Secret Service – Over 18,000 pages of documents in the Task Force’s possession, including SMS communications, email communications, internal policies, handwritten recollections, and presentation slides; over 350 pages that constitute the classified Mission Assurance Review and accompanying interviews made available for review
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives – Limited production including summaries of investigative reports
- Federal Bureau of Investigation – Documents including joint intelligence bulletin, correspondence coordinating visit by FLOTUS to Pittsburgh, public statements, classified documents, witness statements, lab reports, timeline related to Crooks, FBI Pittsburgh organizational chart, dispatch log regarding a 911 call from Crooks’ parents, evidence photos, communications regarding threat information and corresponding Secret Service counter-sniper response

- Pennsylvania State Police – Productions including squad car footage capturing Crooks’ movements on the AGR roof, interviews of personnel in the Security Room, undercover, and partnered with Secret Service agents for the event, PSP-Butler County Sheriff’s Office operational plan, General Office Report regarding return fire from USSS Counter-sniper and Butler County ESU Officer, email communications, Thomas Crooks timeline
- Allegheny County – Crooks’ final autopsy report and related documentation
- Beaver County ESU – Productions including evidence, an after-action report, and the response to the AGR roof after Crooks was neutralized
- Butler County Coroner – Crooks’ final autopsy report and related documentation
- Butler County Department of Emergency Services – Radio recordings on July 13 from channels Police 1, Police Ops 3, Police Ops 4, and Fire Ops 6; county official emails related to July 13 preparation and response
- Butler County ESU – Productions including after-action reports and timeline, operational plan, radio logs, and officer texts and call logs
- Butler County District Attorney – Letter finding no criminal culpability by USSS Counter-sniper or Butler County ESU Officer
- Butler Township Police Department – Productions including the operational plan and incident reports following the events of July 13

Briefings

- U.S. Secret Service
 - ✓ August 15, 2024 – Regarding an overview of events of July 13 in Butler, Pennsylvania
 - ✓ September 12, 2024 – Classified Member briefing regarding the Mission Assurance Review
 - ✓ September 17, 2024 – Regarding agency capabilities with radio communications
 - ✓ September 18, 2024 – Regarding an overview of events of September 15 in West Palm Beach, Florida
 - ✓ October 9, 2024 – Regarding agency capabilities with drones and C-UAS
 - ✓ October 28, 2024 – Regarding the agency’s security plan on October 5 in Butler, Pennsylvania
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
 - ✓ September 9, 2024 – Regarding the role of ATF on July 13
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
 - ✓ August 21, 2024 – Regarding an overview of Crooks’ actions leading up to and on July 13 in Butler, Pennsylvania
 - ✓ September 3, 2024 – Regarding the role of FBI on July 13
 - ✓ September 25, 2024 – Regarding findings of FBI from September 15
 - ✓ October 22, 2024 – Classified Member briefing regarding the **LES** ██████████ leading up to Butler and subsequent threat landscape

- Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General
 - ✓ September 16, 2024 – Regarding an overview of DHS OIG’s ongoing investigation into the events of July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania
- Allegheny County Chief Medical Examiner
 - ✓ September 20, 2024 – Regarding an overview of findings from Crooks’ autopsy

Subpoenas

- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
 - ✓ November 19, 2024 – Subpoena for Deposition to ATF **ATF Agent 1** seeking testimony regarding the agency’s participation in the investigation into Crooks
 - ✓ November 19, 2024 – Subpoena for Deposition to ATF **ATF Agent 2** seeking testimony regarding the agency’s participation in the investigation into Crooks
- Butler County Open Records Office
 - ✓ September 5, 2024 – Subpoena to Butler County Open Records Office regarding all documents and communications related to the July 13, 2024 campaign rally for President-elect Donald J. Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania
- Butler County Coroner
 - ✓ September 6, 2024 – Subpoena to the Butler County Coroner for documents relating to the autopsy of Crooks
- Butler County Emergency Services Department
 - ✓ September 5, 2024 – Subpoena to Butler County Emergency Services Department Director **Butler DES Dir.** for the recording of the radio transmissions related to the July 13, 2024 campaign rally for President-elect Donald J. Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania

Letters

- Department of Homeland Security
 - ✓ August 13, 2024 – Letter to Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas requesting “all documents and information that have been produced to date, to any committee of the House or Senate related to the attempted assassination of former President Donald J. Trump” as well as a briefing no later than August 16, 2024
 - ✓ August 28, 2024 – Letter to Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas seeking new documents and multiple transcribed interviews relevant to the Task Force's investigation into the events surrounding the attempted

assassination of the former president during a rally on July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania

- U.S. Secret Service
 - ✓ August 13, 2024 – Letter to Acting Director Ronald Rowe requesting “all documents and information that have been produced to date, to any committee of the House or Senate related to the attempted assassination of former President Donald J. Trump” as well as a briefing no later than August 16, 2024
 - ✓ August 28, 2024 – Letter to Acting Director Ronald Rowe seeking new documents and multiple transcribed interviews relevant to the Task Force's investigation into the events surrounding the attempted assassination of the former president during a rally on July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania

- Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Secret Service
 - ✓ October 4, 2024 – Letter to Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and Acting Director Ronald Rowe requesting “all records in the possession, custody, or control” of the Department of Homeland Security, the United States Secret Service, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to date, related to the September 15 event

- Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation
 - ✓ September 17, 2024 – Letter to Attorney General Merrick B. Garland and Director Christopher Wray requesting documents and interviews from the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the attempted assassination of Donald J. Trump on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania
 - ✓ October 4, 2024 – Letter to Attorney General Merrick B. Garland and Director Christopher Wray requesting “all records in the possession, custody, or control” of the Department of Homeland Security, the United States Secret Service, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to date, related to the September 15 event

- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
 - ✓ October 3, 2024 – Letter to Director Steven M. Dettelbach requesting documents and interviews regarding the assassination attempts on Donald J. Trump on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania, and on September 15, 2024, in West Palm Beach, Florida
 - ✓ November 6, 2024 – Letter to Director Steven M. Dettelbach and Acting Assistant Director Ann M. Vallandingham addressing the agency’s failure to schedule transcribed interviews with the Task Force and produce

requested documents and requesting an initial production of documents and dates for interviews with key employees no later than November 13, 2024

- Pennsylvania State Police

- ✓ September 9, 2024 – Letter to Colonel [REDACTED] PSP Col. [REDACTED] seeking all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including the planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence; documents and information relevant to any ongoing or completed criminal inquiries, investigations, or reports that have been completed by PSP related to the attempted assassination

- Local Law Enforcement

- ✓ September 3, 2024 – Letter to Butler Township Police Department Lt. [REDACTED] BTPD Lt. 1 [REDACTED] requesting transcribed interviews of officers and employees of the Butler Township Police Department and all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including Police Department planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence
- ✓ September 3, 2024 – Letter to Butler County Sheriff’s Office Sheriff Michael T. Slupe requesting transcribed interviews of officers and employees of the Butler County Sheriff’s Office and all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including Police Department planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence
- ✓ September 3, 2024 – Letter to Butler County Emergency Services Unit Commander [REDACTED] Butler ESU Comm. [REDACTED] requesting transcribed interviews of officers and employees of Butler County ESU and all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including ESU planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence
- ✓ September 3, 2024 – Letter to Beaver County District Attorney’s Office – Emergency Services Unit Commander [REDACTED] Beaver ESU Comm. [REDACTED] Requesting transcribed interviews of officers and employees of Beaver County ESU and all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including ESU planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence
- ✓ September 3, 2024 – Letter to Coroner [REDACTED] Butler Coroner [REDACTED], Butler County Office of the Coroner, and Chief Medical Examiner [REDACTED] Allegheny ME [REDACTED], Allegheny County Office of the Medical Examiner requesting documents and information related to the coroner’s report and autopsy report for Thomas Matthew Crooks

Appendix III: Timeline of Task Force Activities

- July 13, 2024 – Attempted Assassination of Former President Donald J. Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania
- July 24, 2024 – House Resolution 1367- Establishing the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump
- August 13, 2024 – Letter to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas requesting “all documents and information that have been produced to date, to any committee of the House or Senate related to the attempted assassination of former President Donald J. Trump” as well as a briefing no later than August 16, 2024
- August 13, 2024 – Letter to U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe requesting “all documents and information that have been produced to date, to any committee of the House or Senate related to the attempted assassination of former President Donald J. Trump” as well as a briefing no later than August 16, 2024
- August 15, 2024 – U.S. Secret Service briefing regarding an overview of events of July 13 in Butler, Pennsylvania
- August 21, 2024 – Federal Bureau of Investigation briefing regarding an overview of Crooks’ actions leading up to and on July 13 in Butler, Pennsylvania
- August 26, 2024 – Site Assessment in Butler, Pennsylvania
- August 28, 2024 – Letter to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas seeking new documents and multiple transcribed interviews relevant to the Task Force's investigation into the events surrounding the attempted assassination of the former president during a rally on July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania
- September 3, 2024 – Federal Bureau of Investigation briefing regarding the role of FBI on July 13
- September 3, 2024 – Letter to Butler Township Police Department Lt. **BTPD Lt. 1** requesting transcribed interviews of officers and employees of the Butler Township Police Department and all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including Police Department planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence
- September 3, 2024 – Letter to Butler County Sheriff’s Office Sheriff Michael T. Slupe requesting transcribed interviews of officers and employees of the Butler County Sheriff’s

Office and all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including Police Department planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence

- September 3, 2024 – Letter to Butler County Emergency Services Unit Commander **Butler ESU Comm.** requesting transcribed interviews of officers and employees of Butler County ESU and all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including ESU planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence
- September 3, 2024 – Letter to Beaver County District Attorney’s Office – Emergency Services Unit Commander **Beaver ESU Comm.** Requesting transcribed interviews of officers and employees of Beaver County ESU and all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including ESU planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence
- September 3, 2024 – Letter to Coroner **Butler Coroner**, Butler County Office of the Coroner, and Chief Medical Examiner **Allegheny ME**, Allegheny County Office of the Medical Examiner requesting documents and information related to the coroner’s report and autopsy report for Thomas Matthew Crooks
- September 5, 2024 – Subpoena to Butler County Open Records Office regarding all documents and communications related to the July 13, 2024 campaign rally for President-elect Donald J. Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania
- September 5, 2024 – Subpoena to Butler County Department of Emergency Services **Butler DES Dir.** for the recording of the radio transmissions related to the July 13, 2024 campaign rally for President-elect Donald J. Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania
- September 5-6, 2024 – Seven Transcribed Interviews in Pennsylvania
- September 9, 2024 – Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives briefing regarding the role of ATF on July 13
- September 9, 2024 – letter to Pennsylvania State Police Colonel **PSP Col.** seeking all documents and communications related to the Trump rally held on July 13, 2024, including the planning, participation, and post-event actions and correspondence; documents and information relevant to any ongoing or completed criminal inquiries, investigations, or reports that have been completed by PSP related to the attempted assassination
- September 12, 2024 – U.S. Secret Service classified Member briefing regarding the Mission Assurance Review

- September 11-13, 2024 – Sixteen Transcribed Interviews in Pennsylvania
- September 15, 2024 – Attempted Assassination of Former President Donald J. Trump at the Trump international Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Florida
- September 16, 2024 – Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General overview of its ongoing investigation
- September 17, 2024 – U.S. Secret Service briefing regarding agency capabilities with radio communications
- September 18, 2024 – U.S. Secret Service briefing regarding an overview of events of September 15 in West Palm Beach, Florida
- September 20, 2024 – House Resolution 1470 – Expansion of Jurisdiction of the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump.
- September 20, 2024 – Allegheny County Chief Medical Examiner briefing regarding overview of findings from Crooks’ autopsy
- September 25, 2024 – Federal Bureau of Investigation briefing regarding agency findings from September 15
- September 26, 2024 – Hearing: The Ongoing Investigation of the Butler, Pennsylvania Security Failure: The Secret Service’s Reliance on State and Local Law Enforcement
- October 3, 2024 – Letter to Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Director Steven M. Dettelbach requesting documents and interviews regarding the assassination attempts on Donald J. Trump on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania, and on September 15, 2024, in West Palm Beach, Florida
- October 4, 2024 – Letter to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe requesting “all records in the possession, custody, or control” of the Department of Homeland Security, the United States Secret Service, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to date, related to the September 15 event
- October 4-8, 2024 – Three USSS Personnel Transcribed Interviews
- October 9, 2024 – U.S. Secret Service briefing regarding agency capabilities with drones and C-UAS

- October 10-18 – Seven USSS Personnel Transcribed Interviews
- October 21, 2024 – “Interim Staff Report: Investigating the Stunning Security Failures on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania”
- October 22, 2024 – Two USSS Personnel Transcribed Interviews
- October 22, 2024 – Federal Bureau of Investigation classified Member briefing regarding the **LES** leading up to Butler and subsequent threat landscape
- October 25, 2024 – One USSS Personnel Transcribed Interview
- October 28, 2024 – U.S. Secret Service briefing regarding the agency’s security plan on October 5 in Butler, Pennsylvania
- October 30-November 5, 2024 – Three USSS Personnel Transcribed Interviews
- November 6, 2024 – Letter to Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Director Steven M. Dettelbach and Acting Assistant Director Ann M. Vallandingham addressing the agency’s failure to schedule transcribed interviews with the Task Force and produce requested documents and requesting an initial production of documents and dates for interviews with key employees no later than November 13, 2024
- November 8-12, 2024 – Two USSS Personnel Transcribed Interviews
- November 12, 2024 – One PSP Transcribed Interview
- November 15, 2024 – One USSS Personnel Transcribed Interview
- November 16, 2024 – Task Force Site Assessment in West Palm Beach, Florida
- November 18, 2024 – Task Force evidence review in Quantico, Virginia
- November 19, 2024 – Subpoena to ATF **ATF Agent 1** who participated in the agency’s response to the July 13 shooting in Butler, Pennsylvania, seeking testimony regarding the agency’s response
- November 19, 2024 – Subpoena to ATF **ATF Agent 2** seeking testimony regarding the response to the July 13 assassination attempt on President-elect Donald J. Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania

- November 20, 2024 – One USSS Personnel Transcribed Interview
- November 26, 2024 – Two ATF Transcribed Interviews
- December 5, 2024 – Hearing: Secret Service Security Failures and The Attempts To Assassinate President-Elect Donald J. Trump.

Appendix IV: Key Outstanding Requests to Agencies

USSS/Department of Homeland Security

The Secret Service provided significant cooperation in response to the Task Force's requests for information regarding the July 13 Butler, Pennsylvania, shooting. USSS made all individuals relevant to the July 13 event requested by the Task Force available for transcribed interviews in a timely manner and produced thousands of documents. However, DHS policies restricted certain important documents to in-camera review, and the overclassification of documents hindered the Task Force's investigation. USSS cooperation in response to the September 15 assassination attempt in West Palm Beach, Florida, was substantially limited to a timely briefing shortly after the shooting and later a guided visit of the scene where the assassination attempt and efforts to thwart it occurred.

Key outstanding requests to USSS/DHS:

- Outstanding transcripts from interviews conducted by DHS and USSS related to the July 13 event.
- All Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) that DHS or USSS have with other federal agencies (relevant to July 13)
- Descriptions of the number of USSS personnel assigned to various protective details
- Outstanding documents and communications concerning USSS and DHS personnel placed on any type of leave or altered status related to the events of July 13
- Documents, communications, and materials produced to the FBI referring or related to the September 15 event in West Palm Beach, Florida
- Transcripts and interviews conducted by DHS and USSS related to the September 15 event
- A list of all internal inquiries and/or reports underway related to the September 15 event
- Information relevant to September 15 referring or related to:
 - ⊗ USSS security plans for off-the-record movement of a candidate for President and a former President
 - ⊗ USSS communications structure for off-the-record movement of a candidate for President and a former President
 - ⊗ All changes to USSS policies and procedures implemented since the September 15 event
- All communications, including emails, text messages, phone logs, or other messaging services referring to the July 13 and September 15 events between or among USSS and various entities
- All U.S. Customs and Border Protection and DHS HSI documents, records, memoranda, interviews, communications and materials referring or related to Ryan Wesley Routh
- Transcribed interviews with key personnel relevant to the September 15 incident

DOJ and its relevant client agencies (FBI and ATF) provided limited cooperation in certain areas of the Task Force's investigation. The Task Force notes the FBI's cooperation included a site visit to laboratory facilities to inspect evidence recovered from the July 13 shooting, multiple laboratory reports, limited photos of evidence, and highly redacted interview reports related to the Butler shooting. The FBI, however, did not make any of the requested individuals available for transcribed interviews and never provided the Task Force with a comprehensive log of evidence (but did grant access to some limited evidence lists). It also declined to address repeated requests to provide digital analysis from Crooks' devices and online activity as well as other specific documentation repeatedly requested by the Task Force. FBI, citing an ongoing criminal prosecution, substantially refused to make documents or individuals related to the September 15 assassination attempt in West Palm Beach, Florida, available to the Task Force.

ATF, while playing a more limited role in response to the July 13 shooting, was substantially unhelpful in its response to Task Force requests with the exception of a last-minute agreement to make two ATF employees available for transcribed interviews only after the Task Force issued subpoenas for their depositions. ATF also refused repeated requests for document production and only after previously noted subpoenas were issued did it make a production of only 40 pages available to the Task Force. This represented only a small fraction of the information sought by the Task Force.

In addition, DOJ entities largely refused to provide physical copies of documents to the Task Force. DOJ insisted on making documents available through a virtual in-camera system that made them available for viewing by individuals approved by DOJ but blocking the ability to print, download, or organize these responsive materials. This system was onerous and unnecessarily inhibited the ability to share information with Members and the public.

Key outstanding requests to DOJ/FBI/ATF:

- An organizational chart showing the structural chains of command between or among teams involved in the criminal and/or counterterrorism investigations of the July 13 and September 15 events
- Communications, including emails, text messages, phone logs, or other messaging services, referring or related to the July 13 and September 15 events
- FD-302 forms and/or transcripts for witness interviews related to the July 13 event, including but not limited to the following witnesses:
 - ⊗ Thomas Matthew Crooks' immediate family⁸⁴⁷
 - ⊗ Allegheny Arms & Gun Works, including owners, employees, and customers

⁸⁴⁷ The Task Force notes that the ATF has not produced the interview recording of its interview with Thomas Crooks' parents at the family home the evening of July 13, 2024. The ATF provided an abridged summary of this interview in a Report of Investigation produced to the Task Force in-camera.

- ⊗ President-elect Donald J. Trump
 - ⊗ Employees of Donald J. Trump for President 2024, Inc.
 - ⊗ Clairton Sportsmen's Club owners and customers
- All documents and communications referring or related to:
 - ⊗ The FBI's identification of Crooks on July 13
 - ⊗ Crooks' use of encrypted messaging accounts
 - ⊗ Analysis of Crooks' electronic devices
 - ⊗ The crime scene of the July 13 event including Memorandum of Understanding with USSS and cleaning of the crime scene
 - ⊗ Any information concerning the intake, evaluation, examination, or disposition of Crooks' body, including but not limited to the release of his body to his family
 - ⊗ The identification of Routh on September 15
 - ⊗ Routh's use of encrypted messaging accounts
 - ⊗ Analysis of Routh's use of electronic devices
 - ⊗ Copies of all of Routh's correspondence including text messages, emails, and other communications recovered or in the possession of the FBI
 - ⊗ Ballistic analysis of all shots fired
 - ⊗ A log of all evidence related to the July 13 and September 15 events
- All intelligence related to threats to former President Trump that were considered active, ongoing, or unresolved between and including July 1-13 and on September 15
- A copy of all evidence obtained by the FBI related to the investigation of the July 13 event and Crooks, including but not limited to videos, recordings, encrypted messaging accounts, social media accounts, phones, computers, or other electronic devices
- All subpoenas and search warrants related to the July 13 and September 15 events
- All documents and information related to any potential connection between the two attempted assassinations on July 13 and September 15, 2024
- Transcribed interviews of key employees who worked on the response to the July 13 and September 15 events
- FD-302 forms and/or transcripts for witness interviews related to the September 15 event, including but not limited to the following witnesses:
 - ⊗ Ryan Wesley Routh's family members, friends, and colleagues
 - ⊗ President-elect Donald J. Trump
 - ⊗ Employees of Donald J. Trump for President 2024, Inc.
 - ⊗ Representatives or employees of Trump International Golf Club, West Palm Beach
- Copies of financial analyses being conducted by the FBI in connection with Routh
- A copy of all evidence obtained by the FBI related to the investigation of the September 15 event and Routh
- All FBI documents, records, memoranda, interviews, communications and materials referring or related to Ryan Wesley Routh

- Written policies and procedures sufficient to describe ATF's critical incident response process, including how and under what circumstances the critical incident response process is initiated.
- Documents sufficient to show all ATF personnel responsible for ATF's critical incident response functions on July 13, 2024, and September 15, 2024, as applicable, including but not limited to the response at the Butler Farm Show grounds and at the home of Matthew Crooks

Pennsylvania State Police

Pennsylvania State Police provided significant cooperation in response to the Task Force's requests for both documents and witnesses, with some notable exceptions.

Key outstanding requests to Pennsylvania State Police:

- Outstanding transcripts and recordings from interviews conducted by PSP related to the July 13 event
- Body worn camera footage from two specific PSP personnel related to the July 13 event
- A list of all internal PSP inquiries, investigations, and/or reports that are planned or ongoing related to the July 13 event
- Outstanding criminal inquiries, investigations, and/or reports that have been completed by PSP related to the July 13 event
- Any communications, including emails, text messages, phone logs, or communications from other messaging services related to the July 13 event, including but not limited to both internal PSP communications and external communications with other state, local, and federal law enforcement entities

Appendix V: Timeline of Key Events (Butler Rally)

July 2

- DTD Operations notified the Pittsburgh Field Office of a potential visit on July 13.⁸⁴⁸

July 3

- DTD Operations formally notified the Pittsburgh Field Office that former President Trump would visit Pennsylvania on July 13 for a campaign event.⁸⁴⁹
- An FBI Counterterrorism Division unit “became aware of concerning threat information directed at former President Trump.”⁸⁵⁰ Due to the classification level, the FBI and a USSS Special Agent met up in a SCIF to discuss the threat information.⁸⁵¹ The FBI suggested that the Special Agent ask his agency to consider providing counter-sniper assets to former President Trump, and the Special Agent agreed to see if that request was possible.⁸⁵²

July 4

- DTD Operations confirmed that the Butler Farm Show was selected as the July 13 campaign event site.⁸⁵³
- Crooks conducted internet searches for details relating to former President Trump’s campaign event.⁸⁵⁴

July 5

- Crooks conducted internet searches for “When is the DNC convention” and “When is the RNC in 2024.”⁸⁵⁵ He also searched for information about the Butler Farm Show and a nearby hospital.⁸⁵⁶

⁸⁴⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Timeline, Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁵⁰ Production to the Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000482 – 000486 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁵¹ *Id.*

⁸⁵² *Id.*

⁸⁵³ Production to the Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000381 – 000382 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff, (Aug. 28, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁸⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁸⁵⁶ *Id.*

- Pittsburgh Field Office Senior Special Agent **FLOTUS Adv. Agent** contacted PSP and Butler ESU representatives for assistance to help staff the July 13 event.⁸⁵⁷ He also invited them to an initial police planning meeting on July 8.⁸⁵⁸

July 6

- Crooks conducted internet searches for “How far was Oswald from Kennedy,” “Where will Trump speak from at Butler Farm Show,” “Butler Farm Show podium,” and “Butler Farm Show photos.”⁸⁵⁹ He also registered to attend the July 13 campaign event.⁸⁶⁰
- Secret Service established the advance personnel for former President Trump’s July 13 campaign event.⁸⁶¹

July 7

- 0948 – 1045: Crooks drove near the Butler Farm Show grounds and conducted a brief walkthrough near the exterior fence line before departing to examine the nearby AGR complex.⁸⁶²

July 8

- 1000: Secret Service advance team agents met with the campaign advance team leads for a walkthrough of the Butler Farm Show.⁸⁶³ Trump campaign staff provided information on some measures planned to mitigate line of sight concerns and advised on the potential stage location.⁸⁶⁴
- 1300 – 1400: Secret Service advance team agents hosted a police meeting with state and LLE representatives.⁸⁶⁵

July 9

⁸⁵⁷ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁸⁵⁹ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000381 – 000382 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 28, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸⁶⁰ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000381 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁶¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁶² Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000381 – 000382 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 28, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸⁶³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001367 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁶⁴ *Id.*

⁸⁶⁵ *Id.*; Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart** Timeline, Bates 000794 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- Crooks conducted internet searches for “ballistic calculator.”⁸⁶⁶
- Although the DTD Operations requested counter-sniper assets, the OPO leadership had previously decided to assign counter-sniper assets to former President Trump for all outdoor events going forward because of the credible threat intelligence.⁸⁶⁷
- Secret Service met PSP for a site walkthrough.⁸⁶⁸ Secret Service, PSP, and Trump campaign staff discussed line of sight issues and the possibility of using large farm equipment previously used by the Trump campaign in 2020.⁸⁶⁹
- 1132: Senior Special Agent **Lead Advance** contacted Butler ESU Commander **Butler ESU Comm.** and requested counter-sniper assets. Commander **Butler ESU Comm.** then requested assistance from Washington SWAT for additional sniper and operator assets.⁸⁷⁰
- DTD ASAIC **ASAIC DTD** called Pittsburgh Senior Special Agent **Lead Advance** and informed her that counter-sniper assets would be assigned to the campaign event due to credible threat intelligence.⁸⁷¹ ASAIC **ASAIC DTD** asked her to pass this along to her SAIC in the Pittsburgh Field Office.
- 1703: Senior Special Agent **Lead Advance** then called Butler ESU Commander **Butler ESU Comm.** back to inform him that the Secret Service would provide counter-sniper assets to the event.⁸⁷²
- 2015: Butler ESU Team Leader **Butler ESU Snip. TL**, Patrolman **BTPD Patrol 1**, and Deputy Commander **Butler ESU Dep. Comm. 1** performed an initial walkthrough of the Butler Farm Show to scout potential locations to deploy sniper teams for the campaign event.⁸⁷³
- 2217: Butler ESU Commander **Butler ESU Comm.** formally requested tactical assets from Pennsylvania Region 13 police departments to supplement Butler assets for the July 13 campaign event via Butler DES Director **Butler DES Dir.**⁸⁷⁴

⁸⁶⁶ Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 28, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸⁶⁷ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁶⁸ *Id.*; Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart** Timeline, Bates 000797 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁷⁰ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Butler ESU Assist Request Timeline (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁷¹ Sr. Special Agent **Lead Advance** Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 31 (Oct. 18, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Ass't Special Agent in Charge **ASAIC DTD**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 52-53 (Nov. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁷² Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Butler ESU Assist Request Timeline (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁷³ *Id.*

⁸⁷⁴ *Id.*

July 10

- Crooks conducted internet searches for “weather in Butler.”⁸⁷⁵
- Pittsburgh Special Agent/Intelligence Advance Agent **PI Advance** formally requested any intelligence relating to former President Trump’s July 13 campaign event from the FBI.⁸⁷⁶
- USSS CSTL **CS TL** and TSI **TSI Agent** traveled to Butler, Pennsylvania, and initiated their advance work.⁸⁷⁷
- 0925 – 0948: Crooks purchased a SwissGear backpack from a store in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania.⁸⁷⁸
- 1000 – 1045: Pittsburgh SAIC **SAIC PIT** and advance team agents conducted a manpower walkthrough at the Butler Farm Show and ran through the sequence of events near where the stage area would be.⁸⁷⁹
- 1023: DTD Operations requested **LES** additional C-UAS platforms, including another mitigation system and **LES** mitigation and detection system. However, Secret Service Operations denied both requests.⁸⁸⁰ Despite this, the DTD brought their own C-UAS detection and mitigation system to the event.
- 1600: Butler County ESU Team Leader **Butler ESU Snip. TL** conducted a follow-up walkthrough of the Butler Farm Show and identified four overlapping coverage areas for use by local counter-sniper assets.⁸⁸¹

⁸⁷⁵ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000381 – 000382 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 28, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁸⁷⁶ Special Agent **PI Advance** Pittsburgh Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 28 (Oct. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁷⁷ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁷⁸ Production to the Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000381 – 000382 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁷⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart** Timeline, Bates 000799-000800 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sr. Special Agent **Site Counterpart** Timeline, Bates 000798 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force); Special Agent **C-UAS Op.**, Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 29-30 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force); Technical Security Investigator **TSI Agent** **U.S. Secret Service**, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 33 (Oct. 10, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸¹ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Butler ESU Assist Request Timeline (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

July 11

- A Secret Service Special Agent/FBI Counterterrorism Liaison exchanged emails with their FBI counterparts, noting that the Secret Service had “turned on” [counter-snipers] for their protectee.⁸⁸²
- 1000: The USSS advance team conducted a walk-through of the Butler Farm Show with state and LLE to coordinate security assignments and assets.⁸⁸³ There was confusion between Secret Service and state and LLE as to who would cover the AGR complex.⁸⁸⁴ The Secret Service and Trump campaign staff had additional line of sight mitigation conversations.
- 1747: TSI [TSI Agent] submitted his TSD Outdoor Site Survey detailing potential threats and vulnerabilities at the Butler Farm Show.⁸⁸⁵

July 12

- 1100: The USSS advance team and Trump campaign staff met to discuss campaign event details and address line of sight concerns.⁸⁸⁶
- 1218: DTD C-UAS Operator [C-UAS Op.] talked with PSP Lt. [PSP Lt. 2] about PSP’s drones, which Lt. [PSP Lt. 2] offered the Secret Service to use at the campaign event.⁸⁸⁷ However, the Secret Service did not take PSP up on their offer to use these drones.
- 1443-1604: Crooks practiced shooting at a local gun range.⁸⁸⁸
- 1700: The USSS advance team conducted a walk-through to discuss security plans with the DTD Second Supervisor.⁸⁸⁹

⁸⁸² Production to the Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000482 – 000486 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Advance Timeline, Bates 001392 (on file with the Task Force); Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001368 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸⁴ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 37, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., TSI [TSI Agent] TSD Outdoor Site Survey Email, Bates 003376 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001369 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸⁷ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] Drone Text Messages, Bates 003100 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸⁸ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000381 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁸⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] Drone Text Messages, Bates 003100 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- 1946: Special Agent [Site Agent] emailed post stander information to the USSS and HSI personnel handling those assignments.⁸⁹⁰

July 13

- 0915: Butler ESU conducted a briefing for local tactical units.⁸⁹¹ Butler ESU, Beaver ESU, and Washington SWAT members were in attendance.
- 0926: Crooks purchased a 5.5-foot ladder at a local hardware store.⁸⁹²
- 0930: BTPD conducted a briefing for officers assisting with the campaign event.⁸⁹³
- 1000: The USSS conducted a briefing for USSS and HSI post standers.⁸⁹⁴
- 1059 – 1105: Crooks drove near the Butler Farm Show.⁸⁹⁵
- 1100: DTD C-UAS Operator [C-UAS Op.] attempted to activate the counter unmanned aerial system (C-UAS drone detection system).⁸⁹⁶ However, the system refused to function because of several technical issues, causing DTD C-UAS Operator [C-UAS Op.] to attempt to troubleshoot the problem.
- 1205 – 1212: DTD C-UAS Operator [C-UAS Op.] called an agent from the DTD for technical assistance before calling the program lead for the Secret Service’s C-UAS program. The program lead directed DTD C-UAS Operator [C-UAS Op.] to call the C-UAS detection system’s manufacturer for technical assistance.⁸⁹⁷
- 1230: The USSS opened the campaign event grounds to staff and vendors.⁸⁹⁸

⁸⁹⁰ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Post-Stander Instructions Email, Bates 000675 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁹¹ Briefing from Butler ESU to Task Force Members of Cong. (Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁹² Production to the Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000381 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁹³ Briefing from Butler Police Dep’t to Task Force Members of Cong. (Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁹⁴ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001369 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁹⁵ Production to the Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI-HTR-BTLR-000381 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁹⁶ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.], Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 75-76 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁸⁹⁷ *Id.* at 77-78.

⁸⁹⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- 1249: The USSS CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED] received a text from a local sniper saying they were “in position” and had snipers in the AGR building.⁸⁹⁹
- 1256: A USSS CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED] confirmed receipt of a local sniper’s text message and said they would meet.⁹⁰⁰
- 1300: The USSS opened magnetometers to screen the public attending the rally.⁹⁰¹
- 1330: Crooks obtained a firearm from his residence.⁹⁰²
- 1342: The Butler ESU sniper team leader texted USSS CSTL [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED] to meet for a briefing. [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED] and a second agency counter-sniper met with local snipers near the grandstands to brief one another on postings for the campaign event.⁹⁰³
- 1345: Crooks left his residence, telling his parents he was going to a local shooting range.⁹⁰⁴
- 1354: Crooks purchased 50 rounds of Hornady .223 Remington full metal jacket ammunition and proceeded to the campaign event location.⁹⁰⁵
- 1537: Crooks’ phone location data showed that he was in the vicinity of the “staging location.”⁹⁰⁶
- 1551: Crooks flew a drone approximately 200 yards from the farm show grounds for around 11 minutes.

⁸⁹⁹ *Id.*

⁹⁰⁰ *Id.*

⁹⁰¹ *Id.*

⁹⁰² Production to the Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force). According to the FBI, Crooks’ father gave him the firearm. Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Members of Cong., (Aug. 21, 2024). This has been misreported in public discourse and during congressional hearings as Crooks “taking” his father’s gun, including claims that Crooks took the firearm because it was unsafely stored. See, e.g., Examining the Assassination Attempt on July 13: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 118th Cong. (2024); Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, 118th Cong. 2 (Jul. 22, 2024) *available at* <https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/oversight-of-the-u-s-secret-service-and-the-attempted-assassination-of-president-donald-j-trump/>.

⁹⁰³ Technician [REDACTED] CS TL [REDACTED], U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 120-121 (Oct. 22, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁰⁴ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁰⁵ Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Members of Cong. (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁹⁰⁶ Production to the Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- 1620: The Federal Aviation Administration instituted a Temporary Flight Restriction over the Butler Farm Show [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED].⁹⁰⁷
- 1626: At this point, Crooks was located near the farm show airstrip and was walking past a row of vendors outside the secure perimeter approximately half a mile from the AGR complex.⁹⁰⁸
- 1633: DTD C-UAS Operator [REDACTED] C-UAS Op. swapped out an ethernet cable in the C-UAS detection system, which activated the system.⁹⁰⁹ He informed DTD Site Agent [REDACTED] Site Agent and DTD ASAIC [REDACTED] ASAIC DTD that the system was operational.
- 1700: PSP Trooper [REDACTED] PSP Trp. 1 contacted PSP Lt. [REDACTED] PSP Lt. 1 regarding several suspicious people loitering near the northern perimeter fence line. The initial focus was on two men in red and yellow shirts.⁹¹⁰
- 1710: Local snipers in the AGR complex reported that they saw Crooks walk past one of the AGR buildings and look up at the second-story windows.⁹¹¹
- 1714: Beaver ESU sniper [REDACTED] Beaver ESU S took photographs of Crooks by the AGR building.⁹¹²
- 1715: Butler County sniper [REDACTED] Butler ESU Sniper texted Butler ESU [REDACTED] LES [REDACTED] member [REDACTED] Butler ESU Op. stationed by the north barn adjacent to the event stage, about the Crooks with the rangefinder.⁹¹³ However, [REDACTED] Butler ESU Op. 2 did not see these text messages until roughly 25 to 30 minutes later.⁹¹⁴
- 1728: Beaver ESU sniper [REDACTED] Beaver ESU S took photos of a bike and backpack near the AGR building by a picnic table.⁹¹⁵ Although PSP initially attributed ownership to Crooks, law enforcement later confirmed that Crooks did not own them.

⁹⁰⁷ Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op., Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 52 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁰⁸ Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 28, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁹⁰⁹ Special Agent [REDACTED] C-UAS Op., Donald Trump Protective Division, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 80 (Nov. 15, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹¹⁰ Production to the Task Force, Penn. State Police, Recorded Interview of Lt. [REDACTED] PSP Lt. 1 Before Penn. State Police and Fed. Bureau of Investigation (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹¹¹ Production to the Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹¹² *Id.*

⁹¹³ Operator [REDACTED] Butler ESU Op. 2, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 95 (Sep. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹¹⁴ *Id.*

⁹¹⁵ Production to the Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- 1733: Former President Trump’s motorcade arrived at the rally.⁹¹⁶
- 1734: Beaver ESU sniper [REDACTED] sent his pictures of Crooks to several Butler ESU CAT and LES members.⁹¹⁷ These are the widely published photographs of the shooter wearing a grey shirt and facing away from the camera. When these photographs were received and viewed by each individual remains unclear, though at least one Butler ESU operator said that he received the pictures at about 1749.⁹¹⁸
- 1738: BTPD Patrolman [REDACTED] received the text message from ATL [REDACTED] with the photos of Crooks.⁹¹⁹ Patrolman [REDACTED] subsequently shared information about the suspicious individual with the Secret Service Special Agent stationed at his post (the Brady Paul Lane entrance for arrival and departure of the former President’s motorcade).⁹²⁰
- 1740: The Butler ESU sniper team leader responded to the Beaver ESU sniper [REDACTED] “Call it in to command and have a uniform check it out.”⁹²¹
 - BTPD Lt. [REDACTED] left the local command trailer to go to the VIP tent before going to the Brady Paul Lodge.⁹²²
- 1742: Beaver ESU sniper [REDACTED] radioed the local command post to report Crooks’ description, use of a rangefinder, and location around the AGR complex.⁹²³ Around the same time, the Butler ESU sniper team leader also phoned the description to the Butler ESU, Commander [REDACTED], in the local command post.⁹²⁴

⁹¹⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (on file with the Task Force).

⁹¹⁷ Production to the Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹¹⁸ Deputy Commander, [REDACTED], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 53 (Sep. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹¹⁹ Production to Task Force, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Incident #24-03435, Incident Report, 13 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹²⁰ Patrolman [REDACTED], Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, Transcribed Interview before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 17 (Sept. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹²¹ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹²² Production to Task Force, Butler Twp. Police Dep’t, BTPD 24-03435 Campaign Event (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹²³ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹²⁴ Sniper Team Leader, [REDACTED], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, (Sept. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- 1743: Butler ESU Commander [Butler ESU C] stated over the radio that someone from PSP or the Butler County Sheriff's Office would be sent to check out the suspicious person.⁹²⁵ It remains unclear whether anyone from those agencies was dispatched to the AGR complex to find the suspicious person.
- 1744: The PSP trooper stationed in the USSS Security Room received a phone call from a Butler ESU Commander [Butler ESU C] located in the local command trailer, relaying information about a suspicious person near the AGR building, described as "a young, white male, long hair with a range finder."⁹²⁶ The PSP trooper then relayed the information to a USSS Security Room Supervisor in the Security Room and then by phone to other PSP personnel.
- 1745: A Butler ESU sniper texted USSS CSTL [CS TL] with several text messages containing info about Crooks and his rangefinder, as well as the two pictures of Crooks that they took.⁹²⁷
- 1746: USSS CSTL [CS TL] responded to the Butler ESU sniper's text messages: "Roger. I'll notify teams on AGR side."⁹²⁸
- 1748: The Butler ESU sniper stated over the radio that he notified a USSS counter-sniper of the previously identified suspicious person.⁹²⁹ The FBI confirmed that the USSS counter-sniper teams were notified of a suspicious person, Crooks, around this time.⁹³⁰
- 1749: PSP Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] texted Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] a photo of Crooks.⁹³¹
- 1750: Site PI [Site PI] called USSS CSTL [CS TL] to inquire whether he had seen Crooks.⁹³²

⁹²⁵ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹²⁶ Production to Task Force, Penn. State Police, Recorded Interview of Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] Before Penn. State Police and Fed. Bureau of Investigation (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹²⁷ Sniper Team Leader, [Butler ESU Snip. TL], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 38 (Sep. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹²⁸ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹²⁹ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹³⁰ Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Task Force Staff (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff).

⁹³¹ Report of the Independent Review Panel on the July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, Appendix A (Oct. 15, 2024).

⁹³² Sr. Special Agent [Site PI], Phoenix Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 97 (Nov. 5, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- 1752: The USSS Security Room relays information about a suspicious person by email and text to the USSS Counter-sniper Response Team and Site Protective Intelligence.⁹³³ Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] sent at least one of the photos of Crooks to Special Agent [CS Resp.]⁹³⁴
- 1753: USSS CSTL [CS TL] emailed the other three counter-snipers with information about the suspicious person and previously received photos.⁹³⁵ At this point, all USSS Counter-snipers had been notified of the suspicious person near the AGR complex and received two photographs.⁹³⁶
 - Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] called Special Agent [CS Resp.] to discuss the photos of Crooks and initiate a search.⁹³⁷
 - Butler ESU [LES] Member [Butler ESU Op. 2] called Butler ESU Sniper [Butler ESU Sniper] to discuss the range finder texts that [Butler ESU Sniper] had sent to [Butler ESU Op. 2] at 1715.⁹³⁸
- 1754: BTPD personnel were informed about Crooks and the rangefinder sighting. Photos of Crooks were exchanged between some members of LLE, and several patrolmen proactively left their traffic posts to search for Crooks.⁹³⁹
- 1757: Special Agent [CS Resp.] called local Sniper Team Lead [Butler ESU Snip. TL] to obtain additional details regarding Crooks' location and movements.⁹⁴⁰ TL [Butler ESU Snip. TL] mentioned the 3 o'clock location to Special Agent [CS Resp.]
- 1759: Special Agent [CS Resp.] and his LLE counterpart encountered Site PI [Site PI] and her LLE counterpart and discussed the search for Crooks.⁹⁴¹ Site PI

⁹³³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (on file with the Task Force).

⁹³⁴ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 1922-1923 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹³⁵ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹³⁶ Briefing from U.S. Secret Service to Cong. Staff (Aug. 15, 2024).

⁹³⁷ Special Agent [CS Resp.], Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 65 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹³⁸ Operator [Butler ESU Op. 2], Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 85 (Sep. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹³⁹ Production to Task Force, Butler Township Police Dep't., BTPD 24-03435 Campaign Event (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁴⁰ Special Agent [CS Resp.], Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 67 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁴¹ *Id.* at 74.

Site PI then continued to look for Crooks while Special Agent CS Resp. returned to the left of the rally stage.⁹⁴²

- 1802: A Beaver ESU sniper stated over the radio that Crooks was “between the AGR buildings, he has a backpack, now he just went towards Sheetz.”⁹⁴³ Sheetz is located on the opposite side of the AGR buildings from the rally site. At this time, the Beaver ESU sniper lost sight of Crooks.⁹⁴⁴
- 1802: Former President Trump walked to the podium.⁹⁴⁵
- 1804: Special Agent CS Resp. texted a photo of Crooks to Site PI Site PI to help her search for him.
- 1805: Former President Trump began speaking.⁹⁴⁶ Crooks climbed to the roof of AGR, as revealed by security cameras from a nearby local business.⁹⁴⁷
- 1805 – 1808: Crooks moved across multiple AGR building roofs, which, according to the FBI, is confirmed by the local business video and PSP dash camera.⁹⁴⁸
- 1807: Site PI Site PI and PI Advance Agent PI Advance exchanged text messages about Crooks. PI Advance says, "Command post-PSP trooper said he may be walking towards Sheetz," Site PI responded, "Subject outside venue along fence line seen with a range finder."⁹⁴⁹
- 1808: A BTPD patrolman stated over the radio that someone was on the roof of one of the AGR buildings.⁹⁵⁰ Crooks was spotted by the patrolman as the officer walked through the nearby woods towards the AGR buildings, searching for a suspicious

⁹⁴² *Id.*

⁹⁴³ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁴⁴ Sniper Ass't Team Lead Beaver ESU Snip. ATL, Beaver ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 41 (Sep. 12, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁴⁵ Production to the Task Force, Penn. State Police, PSP Response to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Final 8.14.24, 54 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁴⁶ Briefing from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Members of Cong. (Aug. 21, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Majority Staff).

⁹⁴⁷ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Update 8.28.24 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁴⁸ *Id.* The Task Force received limited body-worn camera video footage and other video evidence. Therefore, the Task Force cannot rule out that additional video footage exists documenting Crooks' movements across the multiple AGR building roofs.

⁹⁴⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 005133 – 005134, 005136 – 005137 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁵⁰ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- person. This is also about the time that a small crowd near the AGR buildings started saying someone was on the roof.⁹⁵¹
- Site PI [Site PI] texted her LLE counterpart, “Command post PSP trooper said he may be walking towards Sheetz.”⁹⁵²
 - 1809: A PSP Trooper stationed near the water tower drove towards the AGR buildings along with another BTPD patrolman, each in their separate vehicles. Crooks can be seen moving across the roof of the AGR buildings in PSP dash camera video.
 - Butler ESU Commander [Butler ESU C] called PSP Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] in the Secret Service Security Room to inform him about the man on the roof. The PSP Trooper then informed the USSS Security Room Supervisor. Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] overheard Sgt. [PSP Sgt.] and reached out to Special Agent [CS Resp.]⁹⁵³
 - 1810: A USSS counter-sniper radioed that local police were working a problem at the 3 o’clock.⁹⁵⁴ LLE radio communications indicate that several officers were looking at the AGR complex roof at this time but could not see Crooks.⁹⁵⁵
 - DTD Special Agent [C-UAS Op.] called Special Agent [CS Resp.] and told him that LLE had spotted Crooks on the AGR rooftop.⁹⁵⁶ Special Agent [CS Resp.] then relayed this information to his LLE counterpart.⁹⁵⁷
 - 1811: A BTPD patrolman lifted another patrolman (the same one who had moved towards the AGR complex from the water tower at approximately 1809) to get a view of the roof. According to the elevated patrolman, and confirmed by PSP dash camera footage, he popped up, looked to his left, and saw Crooks. Crooks turned and pointed his weapon at the patrolman, who was holding himself up by his arms and fell off the

⁹⁵¹ Briefing from Butler Twp. Police Dep’t to Members of Cong. (Aug. 26, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁹⁵² Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 004401 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁵³ Special Agent [CS Resp.], Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 72 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁵⁴ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁵⁵ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁵⁶ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bates 1914 (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁵⁷ Special Agent [CS Resp.], Oklahoma City Field Office, U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 75 (Oct. 31, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

roof when he tried to reach for his service weapon. The patrolman then radioed that Crooks was armed.⁹⁵⁸

- The DTD Site Agent called her Site Counterpart with the Pittsburgh Field Office about the radio transmission at 1810 to ask what was going on at the 3 o'clock.⁹⁵⁹
- 18:11:32: Crooks fired three initial shots, with one round striking the former President's ear.⁹⁶⁰ Within three seconds, former President Trump is covered by his detail in a body bunker formation.⁹⁶¹
- 18:11:36: Crooks fired five more shots.⁹⁶² In response, a Butler ESU CAT member fired one round in the direction of Crooks.⁹⁶³
- 18:11:47: Approximately 15.5 seconds after Crooks' first shot, a USSS counter-sniper fired one round, killing Crooks.⁹⁶⁴
- 1812: A Butler sniper stated over the radio that the shooter was down.⁹⁶⁵ ATF critical response was initiated at this time.⁹⁶⁶
- 1814: Former President Trump is evacuated to Butler Memorial Hospital.⁹⁶⁷
- 1825: Crooks is pronounced dead by a Beaver ESU medic.⁹⁶⁸

⁹⁵⁸ Det. **BTPD Detective**, Butler Twp. Police Dep't, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 18, 19 (Sep. 6, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁵⁹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁶⁰ The Task Force did not review or seek to obtain President-elect Trump's medical records.

⁹⁶¹ *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, Joint Full Comm. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Aff. and the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 118th Cong. (Jul. 30, 2024).

⁹⁶² *Id.*

⁹⁶³ CAT Team Lead **Butler ESU CAT TL 2**, Butler ESU, Transcribed Interview Before the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump, 32 (Sep. 13, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁶⁴ *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, Joint Full Comm. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Aff. and the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 118th Cong. (Jul. 30, 2024).

⁹⁶⁵ Production to Task Force, Butler ESU, Presidential Rally Radio Timeline 7-13-2024 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁶⁶ Briefing from Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to Task Force Staff (Sep. 9, 2024) (notes on file with Task Force Staff).

⁹⁶⁷ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁶⁸ Production to Task Force, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Update 8.28.24 (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with the Task Force).

- 2007: ATF special agents requested a firearms trace for Crooks' weapon.⁹⁶⁹
- 2033: The ATF firearms trace results indicated Crooks' weapon was purchased from a retailer that has since closed. An additional trace was requested to determine the purchaser.⁹⁷⁰
- 2054: Former President Trump departed the hospital for the airport.⁹⁷¹
- 2115: Additional ATF trace results located the Firearms Transaction Record for Crooks' weapon, which listed his current address. ATF special agents began going to the Crooks residence upon obtaining this information.⁹⁷²
- 2230: The USSS handed investigative control of the site to the FBI per a memorandum of understanding on interim federal presence.⁹⁷³ PSP then worked with the FBI Evidence Response Team to secure the scene.
- 2330: After surveilling the Crooks residence, ATF special agents made contact with Crooks' parents. Shortly after, a search of the residence is conducted, and an IED is discovered in Crooks' bedroom.⁹⁷⁴

July 14

- 0030: Based on information gathered in the ATF's interview of Crooks' parents, the Allegheny EOD located Crooks' vehicle near the AGR complex. Upon examining the car, the Allegheny EOD identified two IEDs in the trunk. They collected samples of the materials used to build the IEDs and destroyed the remaining explosive materials.⁹⁷⁵
- 0330: The Allegheny EOD traveled to the Crooks residence and removed the IED found in Crooks' bedroom.⁹⁷⁶

⁹⁶⁹ Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bates 0001-0040 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁷⁰ *Id.*

⁹⁷¹ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁷² Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bates 0001-0040 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁷³ Production to Task Force, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Bates 001361 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁷⁴ Production to Task Force, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bates 0001-0040 (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁹⁷⁶ *Id.*

- 0753: The body of Crooks was brought to the Allegheny ME by the Butler County Coroner.⁹⁷⁷
- 1605: The Allegheny ME began the autopsy of Crooks.⁹⁷⁸ Several toxicology tests are conducted as well.

July 18

- FBI and PSP jointly agreed to release the crime scene after determining that the physical processing of the scene had been concluded.⁹⁷⁹

July 22

- 1100: Crooks' body is released to a representative of a local funeral home.⁹⁸⁰

⁹⁷⁷ Production to Task Force, Allegheny Co. Medical Examiner, Crooks Investigator Narrative (2024) (on file with the Task Force).

⁹⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁹⁷⁹ *Id.*

⁹⁸⁰ *Id.*

Appendix VI: Related House Resolutions

H. Res. 1367 In the House of Representatives, U. S.
July 24, 2024.

Resolved,

SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT; COMPOSITION.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is hereby established in the House of Representatives the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the “Task Force”).

(b) COMPOSITION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall be composed of not more than 13 Members, Delegates, or the Resident Commissioner appointed by the Speaker, not more than 6 of whom shall be appointed after consultation with the minority leader. The Speaker shall designate one member of the Task Force as its chair. A vacancy in the membership of the Task Force shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

(2) EX OFFICIO MEMBERS.—The Speaker and the minority leader shall be ex officio members of the Task Force but shall have no vote in the Task Force and may not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum. (3) DESIGNATION OF LEADERSHIP STAFF MEMBER.—The Speaker and the minority leader each may designate a leadership staff member to assist in their capacity as ex officio members, with the same access to Task Force meetings, hearings, briefings, and materials as employees of the Task Force and subject to the same security clearance and confidentiality requirements as employees of the Task Force, or as required to conduct the functions of the Task Force.

SEC. 2. JURISDICTION; FUNCTIONS.

(a) FUNCTIONS.—The functions of the Task Force shall be to—

(1) investigate and fully examine all actions by any agency, Department, officer, or employee of the federal government, as well as State and local law enforcement or any other State or local government or private entities or individuals, related to the attempted assassination of Donald J. Trump on July 13, 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania; and

(2) issue a final report of its findings to the House not later than December 13, 2024, including any recommendations for legislative reforms necessary to prevent future security lapses.

(b) INTERIM REPORTS.—In addition to any final report addressing the matters described in subsection (a), the Task Force may issue such interim reports as it deems necessary.

(c) UNCLASSIFIED FORM.—Any report issued by the Task Force shall be issued in unclassified form but may include a classified annex, a law enforcement-sensitive annex, or both.

SEC. 3. PROCEDURE.

(a) Notwithstanding clause 3(m) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Task Force is authorized to study the sources and methods of entities described in clause 11(b)(1)(A) of rule X insofar as such study is related to the matters described in section 2.

(b) Clause 11(b)(4), clause 11(e), and the first sentence of clause 11(f) of rule X shall apply to the Task Force.

(c) Except as specified in subsection (d), the Task Force shall have the authorities and responsibilities of, and shall be subject to the same limitations and restrictions as, a standing committee of the House, and shall be deemed a committee of the House for all purposes of law or rule.

(d)(1) Rules X and XI shall apply to the Task Force where not inconsistent with this subsection.

(2) Service on the Task Force shall not count against the limitations in clause 5(b)(2) of rule X.

(3) Clause 2(a) of rule XI shall not apply to the Task Force.

(4) Clause 2(g)(2)(D) of rule XI shall apply to the Task Force in the same manner as it applies to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

(5) Pursuant to clause 2(h) of rule XI, two members of the Task Force shall constitute a quorum for taking testimony or receiving evidence and one-third of the members of the Task Force shall constitute a quorum for taking any action other than one for which the presence of a majority of the Task Force is required.

(6) The chair of the Task Force, upon consultation with the ranking minority member, may authorize and issue subpoenas pursuant to clause 2(m) of rule XI in

the investigation and study conducted pursuant to section 2, including for the purpose of taking depositions.

(7)(A) The chair of the Task Force, upon consultation with the ranking minority member, may order the taking of depositions, including pursuant to subpoena, by a member or counsel of the Task Force, in the same manner as a standing committee pursuant to section 3(k)(1) of House Resolution 5, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress.

(B) Depositions taken under the authority prescribed in this paragraph shall be governed by the procedures submitted by the chair of the Committee on Rules for printing in the Congressional Record on January 10, 2023.

(8) Subpoenas authorized pursuant to this resolution may be signed by the chair of the Task Force or a designee.

(9) The chair of the Task Force may, after consultation with the ranking minority member, recognize—

(A) members of the Task Force to question a witness for periods longer than five minutes as though pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(B) of rule XI; and

(B) staff of the Task Force to question a witness as though pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(C) of rule XI.

(10) The chair of the Task Force may postpone further proceedings when a record vote is ordered on questions referenced in clause 2(h)(4) of rule XI, and may resume proceedings on such postponed questions at any time after reasonable notice. Notwithstanding any intervening order for the previous question, an underlying proposition shall remain subject to further debate or amendment to the same extent as when the question was postponed.

(11) The provisions of paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(12) of clause 4 of rule XI shall apply to the Task Force.

SEC. 4. RECORDS; STAFF; TRAVEL; FUNDING.

(a) Any committee of the House of Representatives having custody of records in any form relating to the matters described in section 2 shall transfer such records to the Task Force within 7 days of the adoption of this resolution. Such records shall become the records of the Task Force.

(b) The appointment and the compensation of staff for the Task Force shall be subject to regulations issued by the Committee on House Administration.

(c)(1) Staff of employing entities of the House or a joint committee may be detailed to the Task Force to carry out this resolution and shall be deemed to be staff of the Task Force.

(2) The Task Force may request the head of any Federal agency to detail, on a nonreimbursable basis, any of the personnel of the agency to the Task Force.

(d) Section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 4301(i)) shall apply with respect to the Task Force in the same manner as such section applies with respect to a standing committee, except that the selection of any consultant or organization under such section shall be subject to approval by the Speaker.

(e) There shall be paid out of the applicable accounts of the House of Representatives such sums as may be necessary for the expenses of the Task Force. Such payments shall be made on vouchers signed by the chair of the Task Force and approved in the manner directed by the Committee on House Administration. Amounts made available under this subsection shall be expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Committee on House Administration.

SEC. 5. TERMINATION; DISPOSITION OF RECORDS.

(a) TERMINATION.—The Task Force shall terminate 10 days after filing the final report required under section 2.

(b) DISPOSITION OF RECORDS.—Upon termination of the Task Force, the records of the Task Force shall become the records of such committee or committees designated by the Speaker.

H. Res. 1470 In the House of Representatives, U. S.,
September 20, 2024.

Resolved,

SECTION 1. EXPANSION OF JURISDICTION OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF DONALD J. TRUMP. Section 2(a)(1) of House Resolution 1367, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, is amended by inserting “and on September 15, 2024 in West Palm Beach, Florida” after “Pennsylvania”.