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CHRONOLOGY

1959

early

President Eisenhower orders the Special Group to meet at least once a week to consider all significant covert operations.

1/1/59

Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba.

11/2/59

In CD 692 (the CIA file on OSWALD) the following entry exists:  
(typed) "Mr. Papich would like to know what we know about this ex-Marine who recently defected in the USSR. 2 Nov. 1959  
(handwritten) "Mr. Papich was advised that we had no info on subject. 4 Nov. 1959 (note: SAM PAPICH is the FBI liaison with the CIA.)

10 or 11/59

The FBI opens a security file on OSWALD.

12/11/59

J. C. KING, chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division writes a memo to ALLEN DULLES, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), recommending the elimination of Cuban leaders. DULLES and RICHARD BISSELL, Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), approve.

92 (i) *Dulles' Approval of J. C. King's December 1959 Memorandum.*—On December 11, 1959, J. C. King, head of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to Dulles observing that a "far left" dictatorship now existed in Cuba which, "if" permitted to stand, will encourage similar actions against U.S. holdings in other Latin American countries.

One of King's four "Recommended Actions" was:

Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close of Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion Che Guevara, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present Government.

A handwritten note indicates that Dulles, with Bissell's concurrence, approved the recommendations.<sup>2</sup>

(2)

1960

1/13/60

First record of discussion of covert action against Cuba by the Special Group. (The Special Group was the part of the National Security Council which approved and/or reviewed "all" covert action operations.) DULLES emphasizes that "a quick elimination of CASTRO" was not even being contemplated by the CIA.

(ii) Dulles' January 1960 Statement to the Special Group.—On January 13, 1960, Allen Dulles, in what was apparently the first Special Group discussion of a covert program to overthrow Castro, emphasized that "a quick elimination of Castro" was not contemplated by the CIA.

93

3/9/60

(iii) Meetings in March 1960.—According to a memorandum of a meeting on March 9, 1960, J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, told the Task Force which was in charge of Cuban operations:

93

That the DCI is presenting a special policy paper to the NSC 5412 representatives. He mentioned growing evidence that certain of the "Heads" in the Castro government have been pushing for an attack on the U.S. Navy installation at Guantanamo Bay and said that an attack on the installation is in fact, possible.

3. Col. King stated " \* \* \* the \* \* \* less Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in \* \* \* which is highly unlikely—this operation can be a long draw \* \* \* present government will only be overthrown by the \* \* \* Record, March 9, 1960. (Emphasis added.)

Group discusses plans to overthrow CASTRO. Assassination not discuss.

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This date was circled in Oswald's notebook, found amid his possessions on November 22, 1963.

The record of the NSC meeting of March 10, 1960 (at which President Eisenhower was present), states that Admiral Arleigh Burke, in commenting on Allen Dulles' statement that the Cuba covert action plan was in preparation, "suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the Cuban leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro." According to the minutes of the Special Group meeting on March 14, 1960 (which

President Eisenhower did not attend), "there was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously."

115

(c) In addition to the Inspector General's Report (which concluded that it could not say that any assassination activity carried on during this period was responsive to Administration pressure), the documentary evidence shows that Castro's removal was discussed at two meetings of the National Security Council and the Special Group in March 1960. The minutes of these meetings indicate that the discussions involved a general consideration of a proposal to train a Cuban exile force to invade Cuba and an assessment that Castro's overthrow might result in a Communist takeover. Gray and Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 through 1962

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110

(3)

3/10/60 (cont'd)

George De Mohrenschildt travels to Washington, D.C., where he registers at the Statler Hilton.

3/11/60

De Mohrenschildt leaves the U.S. on a trip to France, Italy, England, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. His April '64 WC testimony is-hazy regarding the purposes of this trip.

3/14/60

Special group discusses the possible effect of the simultaneous disappearance of Cuban leaders. Assassination is not discussed.

On March 14, Dulles and J. C. King attended a Special Group meeting at the White House. The minutes state that:

93

There was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously. Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Dulles felt this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. Col. King said there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified. [Memo for the Record, March 15, 1960 (Emphasis

16.0 The record of the March 14 meeting states: "Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Dulles felt this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. Col. King said there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified."

~~scribble~~

3/1/60

72

(i) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image

Efforts against Castro did not begin with assassination attempts. From March through August 1960, during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. According to the 1967 Report of the CIA's Inspector General, an official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled discussing a scheme to spray Castro's broadcasting studio with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but the scheme was rejected because the chemi-

6/3/60

J. EDGAR HOOVER sends a memo to the State Department in which he expresses a fear that an imposter may be using OSWALD'S birth certificate in Russia.

6/10/60

HOOVER'S 6/10 memo is routed to the Soviet desk with a cover memo.

7/20/60

72

The first action against the life of a Cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is aware took place in 1960. A Cuban who had volunteered to assist the CIA in gathering intelligence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probably be in contact with Raul Castro. (Memo to Inspector General, 1/17/75) CIA Headquarters and field stations were requested to inform the Havana Station of any intelligence needs that the Cuban might fulfill. The case officer testified that he and the Cuban contemplated only acquiring intelligence information and that assassination was not proposed by them.<sup>2</sup> The cable from the Havana Station was received at Headquarters on the night of July 20. The duty officer, who was summoned to Headquarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy to Richard Bissell, CIA's Deputy Director for Plans and the man in charge of

7/24/60

CIA's covert action directorate. The duty officer also contacted J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division within the Directorate for Plans.<sup>3</sup>

Following their instructions, he sent a cable to the Havana Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possible removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at HQS." The cable inquired whether the Cuban was sufficiently motivated to risk "arranging an accident" involving Raul Castro and advised that the station could "at discretion contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details". Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment "after successful completion," but no advance payment was permitted because of the possibility that the Cuban was a double agent. According to the case officer, this cable represented "quite a departure from the conventional activities we'd been asked to handle."

73

8/16/60

(iii) *Poison Cigars*

A notation in the records of the Operations Division, CIA's Office of Medical Services, indicates that on August 16, 1960, an official was given a box of Castro's favorite cigars with instructions to treat them with lethal poison. (I. G. Report, p. 21).....

73

8/1/60

In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist members of the criminal underworld with gambling syndicate contacts to aid in assassinating Castro. The origin of the plot is uncertain. According to the 1967 Inspector General's Report,

Bissell recalls that the idea originated with J. C. King, then Chief of W. H. Division, although King now recalls having only had limited knowledge of such a plan and at a much later date—about mid-1962. (I. G. Report, p. 14)

74

Bissell testified that:

I remember a conversation which I would have put in early autumn or late summer between myself and Colonel Edwards [Director of the Office of Security], and I have some dim recollection of some earlier conversation I had had with Colonel J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, and the subject matter of both of those conversations was a capability to eliminate Castro if such action should be decided upon. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 19)

Sometime in late August or early September 1960, the Support Chief approached Maheu about the proposed operation. (O.C. 5/30/75, p. 9; Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 6) As Maheu recalls the conversation, the Support Chief asked him to contact John Rosselli, an underworld figure with possible gambling contacts in Las Vegas, to determine if he would participate in a plan to "dispose" of Castro.<sup>4</sup> (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 8) The Support Chief testified, on the other hand, that it was Maheu who raised the idea of using Rosselli. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 15-16)

75

81 160 (cont'd) Two of Ruby's acquaintances, Donald G. Lewis and John L. Mantia, come to Dallas from St. Louis to visit Ruby. Lewis and Ruby spend considerable time together. Mantia returns to Dallas in December.

9/8/60

A note found in Jack Ruby's car, following his arrest on November 24, 1963, lists several payments either received or disbursed by Ruby. What these payments were in regard to has never been resolved. This month has an entry (in Ruby's handwriting of course) which reads: "Sept. 1960 - \$500., Sept 8, 1960, - \$500." These payments total over \$5000. by February of 1961. See 22H p.509.

9/13/60

Oswald receives undesirable discharge from USMC.

9/14/60

The CIA SUPPORT CHIEF meets ROSSELLI, MAHEU, GIANCANA AND TRAFFICANTE at the Plaza Hotel in New York to begin plans to set up an assassination squad.

76

A meeting was arranged for Maheu and Rosselli with the Support Chief at the Plaza Hotel in New York. The Inspector General's Report placed the meeting on September 14, 1960. (I.G. Report, p. 16) Rosselli testified that he could not recall the precise date of the meeting, but that it had occurred during Castro's visit to the United Nations, which the New York Times Index places from September 18 through September 28, 1960. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 10)

9/21/60

The only recorded large deposit is made into the "S & R Inc." bank account of the Ruby brothers. This deposit, for \$3000.00, is made by Earl Ruby.

A check for \$2000. is drawn on the "S & R Inc." account on Sept. 21 (apparently by Earl Ruby) and a second check for \$1000. is drawn on Sept. 23.

9/24/60

76

During the week of September 24, 1960 the Support Chief, Maheu, and Rosselli met in Miami to work out the details of the operation. (O.C. 5/30/75, pp. 25-26; Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 12; I.G. Report, p. 18) Rosselli used the cover name "John Rawlston" and represented himself to the Cuban contacts as an agent of " \* \* \* some business interests of Wall Street that had \* \* \* nickel interests and properties around in Cuba, and I was getting financial assistance from them."

9/25/60

97

those events precisely. According to the Inspector General's Report, the Support Chief contacted Rosselli in early September 1960, and during the week of September 25, the Chief, Maheu, and Rosselli met with Giancana and Trafficante in Miami. (I.G. Report, pp. 18-19) Bissell testified about the sequence of events:

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Q. Well, before we came to the meeting [with Dulles], you had been informed prior to that, had you not, that contact had been made with the Mafia? Mr. BISSELL I had.

Q. Now were you informed that the Mafia had been given the go ahead to proceed with actual efforts to assassinate Castro?

BISSELL. Not that early, to my best recollection. I cannot date that at all well. I would suppose that it was within...

(6)

9/ /60

RICHARD BISSELL (DDP) orders SHEFFIELD EDWARDS (CIA Chief of Security) to develop a plan to kill CASTRO.

BISSELL and EDWARDS brief ALLEN DULLES and CHARLES CABELL, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), on the plan to kill CASTRO. DULLES and CABELL approve.

SHEFFIELD EDWARDS designates task of putting plan into operation to the CIA SUPPORT CHIEF who initiates contact with ROBERT MAHEU. MAHEU brings in JOHN ROSSELLI, who very quickly brings in SAM GIANCANA and SANTOS TRAFFACANTE.

75 According to Rosselli, he and Maheu met at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Beverly Hills in early September 1960. Rosselli testified that Maheu told him that "high government officials" needed his cooperation in getting rid of Castro, and that he asked him to help recruit Cubans to do the job. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 8) Maheu's recol-

76

(v) Briefing of Dulles on Use of Underworld Figures in September 1960.

94

(1) Evidence concerning what Dulles Was Told.—Bissell recalled that "in the latter part of September" there was "a meeting in which Col. Edwards and I briefed Mr. Dulles and General Cabell" about the plan to assassinate Castro. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 20) Bissell testified that "Colonel Edwards outlined in somewhat circumlocutions terms the plan that he had discussed with syndicate representatives." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 22) He stated that Edwards had said:

That contact had been made with [the underworld], that a plan had been prepared for their use, and I think he either said in as many words or strongly inferred that the plan would be put into effect unless at that time or subsequently he was told by Mr. Dulles that it should not be." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 22)<sup>1</sup>

95

Ruby meets Breck Wall for the first time. Ruby placed a long distance call to Wall (in Galveston) shortly after the assassination.

10/6/60

The De Mohrenschildts leave Dallas to begin their walking trip through Mexico to Panama. They have six-month visas for the trip.

A note made by Ruby which is found in his car, following his arrest on November 24, 1963, contains the following notation: "Oct. 6, 1960 - \$500;"

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10/7/60

1760

The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so potent that a person would die after putting one in his mouth. (I. G. Report, p. 22) The official reported that the cigars were ready on October 7, 1960;

73

10/11/60

<sup>1</sup> FBI reports reveal that Rosselli's expenses at the Knickerbocker Hotel, where he was registered from October 11 to 20, 1960, under the name of J. Rosselli.



7

10/18/60

J. EDGAR HOOVER sends a memo to BISSELL, J. WALTER YEAGLEY, Assistant Attorney General, and the military and State Dept. intelligence offices. The memo reports that SAM GIANCANA is telling his friends about a plot to kill CASTRO.

against Castro. An October 18, 1960 memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Bissell, stated that "a source whose reliability has not been tested" reported:

79

[D]uring recent conversations with several friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions. \* \* \* Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the "assassin" had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a "pill" in some drink or food of Castro's. (Memo, Hoover to DCI (Att: DDP), 10/18/60)

10/25/60

The Department of State requests any CIA information on a list of defectors. OSWALD is on the list.

10/31/60

A maid discovers the wiretap equipment in Las Vegas. The Las Vegas Sheriff's Office arrests BALLETTI. BALLETTI calls MAHEU in Miami, tying "MAHEU into this thing up to his ear". ROSSELLI goes BALLETTI'S bail. The FBI begins an investigation of the tap.

(iii) Las Vegas Wiretap

In late October 1960, Maheu arranged for a Florida investigator, Edward DuBois, to place an electronic "bug" in a room in Las Vegas. (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 36) \* DuBois' employee, Arthur J. Balletti, flew to Las Vegas and installed a tap on the phone. (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 38) The Support Chief characterized the ensuing events as a "Keystone Comedy act." (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 68). On October 31, 1960, Balletti, believing that the apartment would be vacant for the afternoon, left the wiretap equipment unattended. A maid discovered the equipment and notified the local sheriff, who arrested Balletti and brought him to the jail. Balletti called Maheu in Miami, tying "Maheu into this thing up to his ear." (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 36-37) Balletti's bail was paid by Rosselli. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 52)

77

126 After discovering the Las Vegas wiretap on October 31, 1960, the FBI commenced an investigation which quickly developed that Maheu and Giancana were involved in the case. In April 1961, Rosselli's involvement was discovered.

8

10/ /60 (1062)

MAHEU hires EDWARD DUBOIS, a Florida investigator, to place a bug in a room in Las Vegas. (The room appears to have been either GIANCANA'S or his girlfriend's.) ARTHUR J. BALLETTI, a DUBOIS employee, places the bug.

76

Maheu recalls that he first met "Sam Gold" (Giancana) after November 1960, when he was staying at the Fontainebleau Hotel. (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 17). Other evidence indicates that the meeting took place earlier. When they first went to Miami, Maheu and Rosselli shared at the Kennelworth Hotel (Maheu, 7/29/75, pp. 15-16); FBI records reveal that Maheu and Rosselli (alias J. A. Rollins) were registered at the Kennelworth from October 11-30. (FBI summary, p. 10). Giancana must have been involved in the operation during the October period at the Kennelworth because (1) the wiretap of the apartment, discussed *infra*, was made on October 30; (2) on October 18, the FBI sent a memorandum to Bissell stating that Giancana had been telling several people that he was involved in an assassination attempt against Castro. No reference is made to the CIA in this memorandum. (See *infra*, p. 79)

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Maheu handled the details of setting up the operation and keeping the Support Chief informed of developments. After Rosselli and Maheu had been in Miami for a short time, and certainly prior to October 18, Rosselli introduced Maheu to two individuals on whom

Rosselli intended to rely: "Sam Gold," who would serve as a "back-up man" (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 15), or "key" man (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 17), and "Joe," whom "Gold" said would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. (I.G., Report p. 19) The Support Chief, who was using the name "Jim Olds," said he had met "Sam" and "Joe" once, and then only briefly. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 26-29)

77

11/1/60

The note found in Ruby's car has the following notation for November: "November 1, 1960 \$550; November 10, 1960, \$500."

11/3/60

CABELL tells the Special Group that simultaneous action against the Cuban leaders "is beyond our (CIA's) capabilities.

The CIA makes an interim reply to the State Department's 10/25 request.

The evidence indicates that the meeting between Dulles, Bissell, Edwards, and Cabell occurred sometime "in the autumn" of 1960, probably in late September. The minutes of a meeting of the Special Group on November 3, 1960, reflect the following remarks:

Finally, Mr. [Livingston] Merchant [Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs] asked whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities. (Special Group Minutes, 11/3/60)

99

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When the question of "whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara" was subsequently raised at a Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, General Cabell reportedly said:

that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that (such action) is beyond our capabilities. (Minutes Special Group Meeting, November 3, 1960)

11/3/60 (cont'd)

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 116  
 116

Testimony varied as to the meaning of the phrase "direct positive action" and of General Cabell's response in the November 3, 1960 memorandum.  
 Gray testified that it could be taken to include assassination, but he did not know whether Mr. Merchant intended to refer to assassination or not. (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 9)  
 Parrott, the author of the memorandum, testified that, although he had no recollection of the November 3, 1960 meeting, it was his opinion, based on the context of weekly Special Group meetings and discussion in the fall of 1960, that this discussion centered on the possibility of a palace coup, as opposed to a paramilitary operation mounted from outside Cuba. General Cabell was indicating that "we simply do not have agents inside of Cuba to carry out this kind" of a coup. (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 19-21) Parrott also testified that the phrase "direct positive action" was not a euphemism, and that he did not employ euphemisms in Special Group records, except for references to the President.

11/21/60

The CIA makes a final reply to the State Department's 10/25 request.

11/25/60

112  
 According to the records of the Eisenhower Library, Dulles was alone with President Eisenhower on one occasion in the fall of 1960. That meeting lasted ten minutes and occurred on November 25, 1960. The record of the previous portion of the meeting attended by Gray indicates only that, in addition to discussion of operations in another country, "there was also some discussion of Cuba." (Memorandum, November 25, 1960, by Gordon Gray, of Meeting with the President, November 25, 1960, at 10:40 a.m.)

1/ /60

DULLES and BISSELL brief President-elect JOHN KENNEDY on the Bay of Pigs Operation (JMARC).

96  
 (vii) General Cabell's Remarks to the Special Group in November 1960.—Bissell and Edwards testified that Cabell was aware of the Castro plots (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 22; Edwards, 5/30/75, pp. 5-6)<sup>2</sup>

Mahon told the Committee that at that time, Hughes was becoming an important client, and that devoting time to the CIA's assassination plot was hindering his work for Hughes. He testified that shortly before the election in November 1960, while he was in Miami working on the assassination project, Hughes phoned and asked him to return to the West Coast. Mahon testified that since he did "not want to lose" Hughes as a client, he "definitely told him that the project was on behalf of the United States Government, that it included plans to dispose of Mr. Castro in connection with a pending invasion." (Mahon, 7/29/75, pp. 22-23)

120  
 In the latter part of November 1960, after the Presidential election, Dulles and Bissell jointly briefed President-elect Kennedy on "the most important details with respect to the operation which became the Bay of Pigs." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34) Bissell testified that he did not believe the ongoing assassination efforts were mentioned to the President-elect at that meeting. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 27, 35-36)

12/9/60

The CIA opens a 201 file on OSWALD. They will later tell the Warren Commission (WC) that it was opened as a result of the State Department's 10/25 request.

12/14/60

WIROUGE, a CIA assassin involved in Operation ZRRIFLE, tries to recruit QJWIN, another CIA assassin involved in ZRRIFLE, for "an execution squad".

late/1960

BISSELL orders WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence Staff, to work out a plan for an "executive action" contingency. This develops into ZRRIFLE.

(10)

1961

early

HARVEY ordered to set up ZRRIFLE.

The CIA Technical Support Division devises a deadly poison for use in the plot. ~~CASTRO~~

In early 1961, Harvey was assigned the responsibility for establishing a general capability within the CIA for disabling foreign leaders, including assassination as a "last resort." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 73; 83)

Harvey testified that the Executive Action capability was intended to include assassination. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35) His cryptic handwritten notes of the January 25/26 meetings, preserved at the CIA, contain phrases which suggest a discussion of assassination: "last resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness," "the magic button," and "never mention word assassination". Harvey confirmed 183

86 In early 1961, a CIA official met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine if the Cuban would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime. (I.G. Report, p. 78) The Cuban was referred to by the cryptonym AM/LASH. The meeting was inconclusive, but led to

late

HARVEY named to head Task Force W, the CIA working branch responsible for Operation MONGOOSE.

(3) CIA Organization for MONGOOSE

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In late 1961 or early 1962, William Harvey was put in charge of the CIA's Task Force W, the CIA unit for MONGOOSE Operations. Task Force W operated under guidance from the Special Group (Augmented) and employed a total of approximately 400 people at CIA headquarters and its Miami Station. McCone and Harvey were the principal CIA participants in Operation MONGOOSE. Although Helms attended only 7 of the 40 MONGOOSE meetings, he was significantly involved, and he testified that he "was as interested" in MONGOOSE as were Harvey and McCone. (Helms, 7/18/75, p. 10)

1/1/61

Oswald is in Minsk, Russia. An FBI memo states (on this date) that Oswald is thinking of return to the U.S. O

1/2/61

Lewis McWillie returns to the U.S. from Cuba. WC evidence indicates that he shortly thereafter went to Dallas to visit his close friend Ruby.

1/5/61

The note found in Ruby's car on 11/24/63 contains the following notation for January: "Jan 5, 1961 \$500." "Jan 30, 1961 \$500."

1/18/61

124

According to FBI memoranda dated December 21, 1960, and January 18, 1961, the Cuban was associated with anti-Castro activities financed by United States racketeers, including Santos Trafficante, who hoped to secure illegal monopolies in the event of Castro's overthrow. This same Cuban was subsequently used by Rosselli in the second passage of pills to Cuba in April 1962.

Rosselli testified that he represented himself to the Cubans as an agent of American

1/22/61

JOHN KENNEDY inaugurated.

1/25-26/61

HARVEY meets with JOSEPH SCHEIDER, Chief of the CIA Technical Services Division, and a recruiting officer to discuss creation of an executive action capability.

William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain" that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with two CIA officials: Joseph Scheider, who by then had become Chief of the Technical Services Division, and a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility of creating a capability within the Agency for "Executive Action." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52) After reviewing his notes of those meetings, Harvey testified that the meetings occurred after his initial discussion of Executive Action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early

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Bundy testified that he was never told that assassination efforts against Castro had been undertaken or that the CIA had used underworld figures for that purpose. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 63) He said that he had heard about "Executive Action \* \* \* some time in the early months of 1961" (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 4), but that since it had been presented to him as an untargeted capability, he did not "discourage or dissuade" the person who briefed him. (Bundy, 7/11/75, pp. 4, 7,

157

1/26/61

Marguerite Oswald travels to the State Dept. in Washington to seek information as to Oswald's whereabouts.

2/1/61

The State Department sends a message to the American Embassy in Moscow, inquiring as to Oswald's whereabouts and other info. on him.

2/5/61

Oswald requests the American Embassy in Moscow to return his passport to him, for potential travel.

2/6/61

A copy of the Wall Street Journal, from February 6, 1961, is found amid Clay Shaw's possessions following his arrest by Jim Garrison in March 1967.

(12)

Records of the TSD still extant when the I.G. Report was written in 1967 indicate that the pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to the Support Chief sometime thereafter.

10/61

50

2/13/61

TSD notes indicate that they were delivered to an unidentified person on February 13, 1961. (I. G. Report, p. 22) The record does not disclose whether an attempt was made to pass the cigars to Castro. 73

2/27/61

The FBI checks out Oswald's financial record with a credit association in Fort Worth, Texas.

2/28/61

The US Embassy in Moscow writes Oswald in Minsk, regarding passport matters.

2/ /61

50

(I.G. Report, pp. 25-26; O.C. 5/30/75, p. 43) The Support Chief received the pills from TSD, probably in February 1961, with assurances that they were lethal, and then gave them to Rosselli. (O.C.,

50

The record clearly establishes that the pills were given to a Cuban for delivery to the island some time prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion in mid-April 1961. There are discrepancies in the record, however, concerning whether one or two attempts were made during that period, and the precise date on which the passage[s] occurred. The Inspector General's Report states that in late February or March 1961, Rosselli reported to the Support Chief that the pills had been delivered to an official close to Castro who may have received kickbacks from the gambling interests. (I.G. Report, p. 23) The Report states that the official returned the pills after a few weeks, perhaps because he had lost his position in the Cuban Government, and thus access to Castro, before he received the pills. (I.G. Report, p. 28) The Report concludes that yet another attempt was made in April 1961, with the aid of a leading figure in the Cuban exile movement.

1/3/61

FBI report of an interview of SHEFFIELD EDWARDS in which EDWARDS says that DULLES was unaware of CIA use of Mafiosas, i.e., GIANCANNA.

3/5/61

Oswald receives the above letter. He sends a reply to the Embassy stating that he does not want to meet with them in Moscow because it is difficult for him to travel there from Minsk.

3/12/61

Oswald again writes the US Embassy, saying that he does not want to meet with them in Moscow. Some WC critics maintain that another letter written by the Embassy to Oswald sometime during this week has been suppressed. Oswald had referred to their "recent letter" in his of this date. Some WC critics maintain that this is in reference to a second Embassy letter sent after the Feb. 28 letter. There is no record of such a letter in WC files.

12/61 (cont'd)

82 The date of the Cuban operation is unclear. The Inspector General's Report places it in March-April 1961, prior to the Bay of Pigs. (I.G. Report, p. 29) Shimon's testimony puts it around March 12, 1961. Bissell testified that the effort against Castro was called off after the Bay of Pigs, (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 52) and Maheu testified that he had no involvement in the operation after the Bay of Pigs. (Maheu, 9/23/75, p. 50) The Support Chief however, was certain that it occurred during early 1962. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 47-48)

81 A different version of the delivery of the pills to the Cuban was given to the Committee by Joseph Shimon, a friend of Rosselli and Giancana who testified that he was present when the passage occurred. Shimon testified that he had accompanied Maheu to Miami to see the third Patterson-Johansson World Heavyweight Championship fight, which took place on March 12, 1961. (Shimon, 9/20/75, pp. 6-8) According to Shimon, he, Giancana, Rosselli, and Maheu shared a suite in the Fountainebleau Hotel. During a conversation, Maheu stated that he had a "contract" to assassinate Castro, and had been

67 provided with a "liquid" by the CIA to accomplish the task. (Shimon, 9/20/75, p. 9) Shimon testified that Maheu had said the liquid was to be put in Castro's food, that Castro would become ill and die after two or three days, and that an autopsy would not reveal what had killed him. (Shimon, 9/20/75, pp. 9-10)

3/21/61

The WC established that Jack Ruby went and opened his lockbox at the Merchants State Bank for the last time on this date. The box was empty when it was opened following Ruby's arrest.

3/25/61

118 <sup>1</sup>Prior to the Bay of Pigs, there were many meetings at which both the President and Dulles were present. The Presidential logs from the Kennedy Administration indicate only one meeting before the Bay of Pigs invasion at which the President and Allen Dulles may have met privately. This meeting took place on March 25, 1961. (There is no record of the meeting. We feel compelled to state that the fact of this meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any significance or relevance.)

3/31/61

HOOVER'S 6/3/60 memo regarding a possible OSWALD IMPOSTER is sent from one section of the State Department Passport Office to another with a cover memo that warned against re-issue of OSWALD'S passport unless it was delivered to him personally at the American Embassy in Moscow. (The cover memo was written by E.J. HICKEY, Deputy Chief of the Passport Office, and would eventually become CD 294J. There is no indication that HOOVER'S memo was ever given to the WC although HOWARD WILLENS has stated that he may have seen it.)

3/ /61

President KENNEDY expresses his opposition to assassination to GEORGE SMATHERS.

The De Mohrenschildts travel through Mexico on their walk to Panama. (They are in Guatemala during the Bay of Pigs.) The Bay of Pigs was of course partly planned from Guatemala, with E. Howard Hunt heading operations there at one point.

3 or 4/ /61

The pills are passed to MAHEU, who passes them to ROSSELLI, who passes them to Cubans to sneak into Cuba. The last two passes, at least, occur in Miami.

4/10/61

Marguerite Oswald is interviewed by the FBI. She tells them that Lee wants to return to US.

4/15-17/61

JMARC fails.

4/18/61

MAHEU tells the FBI that the Las Vegas tap was part of CIA anti-CASTRO activities and that his story would be verified by SHEFFIELD EDWARDS.

4/18~~2~~-20/61

126

b. 1961.—The first documentary evidence indicating alleged CIA involvement with the wiretap case is an FBI report dated April 20, 1961. The report stated that on April 18, 1961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap had played a part in a project "on behalf of the CIA relative to anti-Castro activities," a fact which could be verified by Sheffield Edwards, CIA's Director of Security.<sup>2</sup>

(Memo, Edwards to Attorney General, 5/14/62) FBI records indicate that on April 18, 1961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap involved the CIA, and suggested that Edwards be contacted. (Memo 4/20/61) Edwards subsequently informed the Bureau that the CIA would object to Maheu's prosecution because it might reveal sensitive information relating to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.<sup>2</sup>

79

4/19-20/61

President KENNEDY meets with Cubans who escaped from the JMARC fiasco. One of the exiles had been involved in smuggling the poison pills from the CIA/Mafia plot into Cuba.

A memorandum for the record in CIA files dated April 24, 1961, reflects that on April 19-20, in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy and other Administration officials, including Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with a translator and several members of Cuban groups involved in the Bay of Pigs. One of those Cuban exile leaders had been involved in the passage of poison pills to Cuba in March or April of that year;<sup>2</sup> there is no evidence that any of the other Cubans at the meeting were involved in or aware of the assassination plot, and it is unclear whether that particular Cuban realized that the plot in which he was involved was sponsored by the CIA.<sup>2</sup> The April 24 memorandum states that the atmosphere of the meeting reflected depression over the failure of the Bay of Pigs.

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courtesy THE AWP

124



4/22/61

President KENNEDY requests a re-evaluation of United States paramilitary practices and programs. He asks General MAXWELL TAYLOR and ROBERT KENNEDY to do the re-evaluation. This is the Taylor Board of Inquiry.

On April 22, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the President requested General Maxwell Taylor to conduct a reevaluation of "our practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which fall short of outright war." Taylor was to give special attention to Cuba (Letter to Maxwell Taylor, 4/22/61) and Robert Kennedy was to be his principal colleague in the effort. 135

4/24/61

A CIA memo for the record reports the 4/19-20 meetings between the President and the exiles. (Note: A former DDCI testified before the Church Committee in 1975 and said: "Memorandum for the Record have very little validity in fact.")

4/ /61

CIA/Mafia poison pill plot involving MAHEU, ROSSELLI, GIANCANA, AND TRAFFACANTE is unsuccessful in its Cuban phase.

ROSSELLI'S involvement in the Las Vegas wiretap is discovered by the FBI.

5/3/61

The FBI interviews SHEFFIELD EDWARDS re: the Las Vegas wiretap.

97

An FBI report of a May 3, 1961 interview with Edwards (in which Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as relating to "clandestine efforts against the Castro Government" with no mention of

Oswald is denied admission to Lumumba University where he had applied for enrollment as a student

98

An FBI report of a May 3, 1961 interview with Edwards (in which Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as relating to "clandestine efforts against the Castro Government" with no mention of assassination, and a copy of which was given to the Attorney General) stated:

Col. Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the Giancana-Mahen activity in behalf of CIA's program and Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Mahen in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell, in his recent briefings of Gen. Taylor and the Attorney General in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro. (FBI memorandum entitled, "Arthur James Ralletti, et al," May 22, 1961) (Emphasis added.)

Bissell said he was certain, however, that the statement regarding Dulles' knowledge about the operation was wrong, and testified:

Now it (the FBI memorandum) is just flatly contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified several times. Also, I submit it is quite implausible that I would have briefed General Taylor and the Attorney General—and incidentally, I have no recollection of briefing those two gentlemen except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen Dulles himself was a member—it is quite implausible that I would have briefed them on a matter which had been going on for some

7/5/61

Oswald writes his brother Robert about coming back to the US.

5/18/61

On May 18, 1961, the Taylor/Kennedy Board interviewed several Cuban exile leaders who had been involved in the Bay of Pigs, including the leaders who had cooperated in the assassination plot. The summary of that session states that the subject of the inquiry was the Bay of Pigs operation. Attorney General Robert Kennedy was present.

125

5/22/63-61

J. Edgar Hoover sends Attorney General Robert Kennedy a memo on CIA use of Sam Giancana. The memo reports that Edwards acknowledged the use of Giancana for "clandestine efforts against the Castro government", but Edwards denied any knowledge of Giancana's and Maheu's methods. Edwards did not reveal the objective of the operation. Edwards added that none of Giancana's efforts had been successful but "several of the plans still are working and may eventually pay off". The memo also reported that Richard Bissell had recently told Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor "that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro." Copies of this memo went to Deputy Attorney General B. R. White and Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division) Miller. Robert Kennedy wrote a note on his copy to Courtney Evans, the FBI-Justice liaison, which said: "I hope this will be followed up vigorously".

122

FBI Director Hoover sent the Attorney General a memorandum about the Las Vegas wiretap on May 22, 1961.<sup>2</sup> An attachment to that memorandum quoted Sheffield Edwards as saying that Bissell, in his "recent briefings" of Taylor and Kennedy "told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro."

The summary of Edwards' conversation with the FBI was accompanied by a cover memorandum from Hoover stating that Edwards had acknowledged the "attempted" use of Maheu and "hoodlum elements" by the CIA in "anti-Castro activities" but that the "purpose for placing the wiretap \* \* \* has not been determined \* \* \*" (FBI memo to Attorney General, 5/22/61) The memorandum also explained that Maheu had contacted Giancana in connection with the CIA program and CIA had requested that the information be handled on a "need-to-know" basis.<sup>3</sup>

126

According to a May 22, 1961, FBI memorandum, on May 3, 1961, Edwards told the FBI<sup>5</sup> that the CIA had relied on Giancana because of Giancana's contacts with gambling figures who might have sources for use "in connection with CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro government". Edwards reportedly said that "none of Giancana's efforts have materialized to date and that several of the plans still are working and may eventually 'pay off'". Edwards also stated that he

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<sup>2</sup>At the time Hoover sent the May 22, 1961, memorandum to the Attorney General, indicating that there was a CIA/Giancana link, Bureau files already contained another memorandum revealing that Giancana had earlier talked about an assassination attempt against Castro. This earlier memorandum dated October 15, 1960, did not reveal any Giancana/CIA connections, but anyone seeing the October 15 memorandum and knowing of the CIA's association with Giancana in a project "against Castro" should have realized the connection.

127

7/22/61

The summary of Edwards' statements to the FBI that was sent by Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy on May 22, 1961, stated, in part that:

Colonel Edwards advised that in connection with CIA's operation against Castro he personally contacted Robert Mabeu during the fall of 1960 for the purpose of using Mabeu as a "cut-out" in contacts with Sam Giancana, a known hoodlum in the Chicago area. Colonel Edwards said that since the underworld controlled gambling activities in Cuba under the Batista government, it was assumed that this element would still continue to have sources and contacts in Cuba which perhaps could be utilized successfully in connection with CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro government. As a result, Mabeu's services were solicited as a "cut-out" because of his possible entree into underworld circles. Mabeu obtained Sam Giancana's assistance in this regard and according to Edwards, Giancana gave every indication of cooperating through Mabeu in attempting to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba. Edwards added that none of Giancana's efforts have materialized to date and that several of the plans still are working and may eventually "pay off."

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Colonel Edwards related that he had no direct contact with Giancana; that Giancana's activities were completely "back stopped" by Mabeu and that Mabeu would frequently report Giancana's action and information to Edwards. No details or methods used by Mabeu or Giancana in accomplishing their missions were ever reported to Edwards. Colonel Edwards said that since this is "dirty business", he could not afford to have knowledge of the actions of Mabeu and Giancana in pursuit of any mission for CIA. Colonel Edwards added that he has neither given Mabeu any instruction to use technical installations of any type nor has the subject of technical installations ever come up between Edwards and Mabeu in connection with Giancana's activity.

Mr. Bissell, in his recent briefings of General Taylor and the Attorney General and in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation [the Taylor Board of Inquiry] told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro.

-125/61

The American Embassy receives a letter from Oswald.

-126/61

The American Embassy receives a letter from Oswald.

-131/61

Oswald again writes his brother Robert in Texas.

51/61

Nancy Perrin Rich begins work at Ruby's Carousel Club. She later tells the WC of a meeting she attended in Aug/Sept 1961 during which a large scale gunrunning operation to Cuba was planned. She states that Jack Ruby was present and was apparently the paymaster for the plan.

The examination of Bissell on whether he had discussed a pre-Bay of Pigs plot with the Attorney General or General Taylor and, if so, why he used such obscure and indirect language, elicited the following testimony:

122

Q. Did you, sometime in May of 1961 communicate the state of your awareness to the Attorney General in your briefing to him?

BISSELL. Well, there is a report which I was shown, I think it was last week, I believe it also came from the FBI, but I could be wrong about that, or indicating that I did, at that time in May, brief the Attorney General, and I think General Taylor to the effect that the Agency had been using—I don't know whether Giancana was mentioned by name, but in effect, the Underworld against the Castro regime.

Q. Did you tell them—they being the Attorney General and General Taylor—that this use included actual attempts to assassinate Mr. Castro?

BISSELL. I have no idea whether I did [.] I have no idea of the wording. I think it might quite possibly have been left in the more general terms of using the underworld against the Castro regime, or the leadership of the Castro regime.

(18)

13/61

Carlos Marcello secretly returns to the U.S., after having been deported by RFK. He is however found and detained by US authorities.

/6/61

A memo from Evans to Allen Belmont, Assistant to the Director (FBI), reports that a vigorous and full investigation of the tap is being conducted.

A memorandum from Evans to Allen Belmont, Assistant to the Director (FBI) dated June 6, 1961, stated:

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We checked with CIA and ascertained that CIA had used Mabeu as an intermediary in contacting Sam Giancana, the notorious Chicago hoodlum. This was in connection with anti-Castro activities. CIA, however, did not give any instructions to Mabeu to use any technical installations. In connection with this information received from CIA concerning their attempted utilization of the hoodlum element, CIA requested this information be handled on a "need-to-know" basis. We are conducting a full investigation in this wiretap case requested by the Department and the field has been instructed to press this investigation vigorously. Accordingly, the Attorney General will be orally assured that we are following up rigorously and the results of our investigation will be furnished to the Department promptly.

/13/61

The "Taylor Report" on the causes of the failure of JMARC is issued. The report makes no mention of the assassination plots. It recommends the reappraisal of covert action against Cuba "in the light of all presently known factors" and that "new guidance" be provided for the planning and operation of covert action programs.

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy convened a "court of inquiry" which reviewed "the causes of \*\*\* [the] failure" of the operation. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 42, 45) Robert Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, Allen Dulles, and Admiral Arleigh Burke comprised the Board. The "Taylor Report," issued on June 13, 1961 after the panel had examined the matter for several weeks, makes no mention of the assassination plot.

121

The resulting review concluded:

We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent of Communism and anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics. . . . It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military, economic and propaganda action against Castro. (Report to the President, 6/13/61, Memo No. 4, p. 8)

135

2/ /61

Lewis McWillie returns to Nevada from Florida. He spends the night in Dallas with Ruby. This was the first time they had seen each other since January 2.

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7/8/61

EDWARD LANSDALE, a CIA officer who will later become Chief of Operations for Operation MONGOOSE, writes a memo to President KENNEDY regarding the reassessment of Cuban policy. LANSDALE recommends more use of exiles, especially "professionals" and ex-CASTRO soldiers. LANSDALE also recommends the development of alternative Cuban leadership and the infiltration of exile guerrilla teams into Cuba.

7/10/61

The American Embassy in Moscow returns OSWALD's passport.

7/11/61

Secretary of State, DEAN RUSK, cables the American Embassy in Moscow expressing his appreciation for the careful handling of

the "involved" OSWALD case. RUSK also says that he assumes that the passport was returned to the same man it was originally issued to. This document eventually becomes CE 397.

7/21/61

A Special Group memo for the record reports that the basic objective regarding Cuba is to develop opposition to CASTRO and to "bring about a regime acceptable to the United States".

7/ 161

By July 1961, the Special Group had agreed that "the basic objective toward Cuba was to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the 135

8/16/61

The Assistant United States Attorney for Las Vegas expresses his reluctance to prosecute MAHEU and BALLETTI for the tap because of lack of evidence and possible CIA involvement.

126

Entries in the FBI files indicate that the FBI vigorously pursued its investigation of the wiretap case. However, on August 16, 1961, the Assistant United States Attorney in Las Vegas reported his reluctance to proceed with the case because of deficiencies in the evidence and his concern that CIA's alleged involvement might become known. The Department of Justice files indicate no activity between September 1961, when the FBI's investigation was concluded, and January 1962, when the question of prosecution in the case was brought up for reconsideration.

8/ 161

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courtesy THEAARC

According to Jim Garrison, David Ferrie, Gordon Novel, and Sergio Smith conspire during this month to steal explosives from a bunker in Louisiana. WC critics maintain this raid was probably tied to CIA activities.

August-September:

Nancy Perrin Rich states that the second of these Cuban gunrunning meetings was held "about" Sept. 6.

8/6/61

9/11/61

Mrs. Rich states that she thinks the third such meeting occurred on Sept. 11. She says 8 people were at this meeting, including Vito Genovese's son. She says she and her husband backed out of the proposed operation at this meeting.

9/18/61

The FBI interviews Oswald's brother Robert.

9/ /61

FBI concludes its investigation of the Las Vegas wiretap.

With the exception of this briefing, the FBI and Justice files indicate no other activity in the Balletti wiretap case from September 1961 through January 1962. There was no activity in the assassination effort involving underworld figures from April 1961 until mid-April 1962.

129

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<sup>2</sup> Although Castro closed the gambling casinos in Cuba when he first came to power, they were reopened for use by foreign tourists in late February 1959, and remained open until late September 1961.

According to the Assistant to the head of Task Force W, sometime early in the fall of 1961, Bissell was "chewed out in the Cabinet Room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime." (Assistant, 6/18/75, p. 8)

141

10/4/61

Oswald writes the US Embassy in Moscow./

10/5/61

National Security Memorandum 100 directs the State Department to study the alternatives that would be available to the United States in the eventuality of CASTRO's removal. The Department of Defense is directed to prepare a contingency plan for United States military intervention in that event.

(21)

015/61 (cont'd)

On October 5, 1961, McGeorge Bundy issued NSAM 100 entitled "Contingency Planning for Cuba." It was addressed to the Secretary of State and stated in full:

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency.

Special Group Secretary Parrott testified that the request for a plan reflected in his memorandum of October 5, 1961, and the reference in that memorandum to the "contingency that Castro would in some way or another be removed from the Cuban scene", reflected interest in a contingency study for Castro's removal, but by means "short of being killed." (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 83)

137

The De Mohrenschildts rent an apartment in Dallas.

10/6/61

The Special Group is informed of NSM 100 study and the preparation of an "overall plan for Cuban covert action". (the latter was apparently being prepared by TRACY BARNES, CIA Deputy Director of Plans, who handled all Cuban affairs in BISSELL's office.)

136

The Special Group Minutes of October 6, 1961, state that the Group was told that in addition to an overall plan for Cuban covert operations, "a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene" was in preparation. (Memorandum for the Record of Special Group meeting, 10/6/61) An October 5, 1961 Memorandum for the Record by Thomas Parrott, Secretary to the Special Group, states that Parrott informed the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs that "what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene." Parrott's memorandum stated that in preparing the plan, "the presence and positions of Raul (Castro) and Che Guevara must be taken into account." and that General Taylor had told Parrott he preferred "the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned" to the Assistant Secretary. This memorandum also said that "on the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned."

10/12/61

US Embassy writes Oswald, a CIA cable makes note of this communication.

10/ /61

A CIA national estimate done in conjunction with NSM 100 studies says that if CASTRO is removed then a Communist takeover of Cuba is the most likely result.

136

<sup>3</sup> The Inspector General apparently had access to an earlier draft of this intelligence estimate. (I.G. Report, p. 4) In reporting that many CIA officers interviewed in the I.G. investigation stressed that "elimination of the dominant figures in a government . . . will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government," the Report stated: "This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General Maxwell Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the position that . . ."

11/1/61

RICHARD GOODWIN, Presidential advisor, and LANSDALE recommend the creation of Operation MONGOOSE to President KENNEDY. GOODWIN and LANSDALE also recommend that ROBERT KENNEDY be named to head the operation.

(Oswald writes to Embassy again on Nov. 1)

11/2/61

138 On November 2, 1961, Goodwin had addressed an "eyes only" memorandum to the President and the Attorney General outlining a suggested organization for what became the MONGOOSE operation. Goodwin proposed five "staff components," including "intelligence collection," "guerrilla and underground," and "propaganda." The memorandum stated: "As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence from the Times and work on this one—although we should check with [OSIA Director] Ed Murrow and Dick Bissell." (Memo, Goodwin to the President and the Attorney General, 11/2/61, p. 2)

11/8/61

TAD SZULC meets with ROBERT KENNEDY regarding post-JMARC Cuba policy. Assassination is not mentioned. ROBERT KENNEDY asks him to meet with the President.

138 In early November 1961 Tad Szulc<sup>1</sup> was asked by Richard Goodwin, a Special Assistant to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney General Robert Kennedy on November 8 to discuss the situation in Cuba. The meeting was "off-the-record." Szulc attended as a friend of Goodwin's, and not as a reporter. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 24) During the meeting with Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on "the situation in Cuba following the [Bay of Pigs] invasion [and] the pros and cons of some different possible actions by the United States Government in that context." (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 25) According to Szulc the subject of assassination was not mentioned during this meeting. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 31)

At the close of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szulc to meet with the President. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 25)

11/9/61

TAD SZULC meets with JOHN KENNEDY who broaches the subject of assassination and then says that it will not be used. SZULC's contemporaneous notes say that JOHN KENNEDY said he was under tremendous pressure from his advisors to kill CASTRO. RICHARD GOODWIN is present.

138 The next day Szulc, accompanied by Goodwin, met with President Kennedy for over an hour in the Oval Office.<sup>2</sup> (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 25) Szulc recalled that the President discussed "a number of his views on Cuba in the wake

Goodwin recalled that, after President Kennedy asked Szulc for his reaction to the suggestion that Castro be assassinated, President Kennedy said, "well, that's the kind of thing I'm never going to do." (Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 3) Goodwin said that several days after the meeting he referred to the previous discussion of assassination and President Kennedy said "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets." (Goodwin, 7/18/75, pp. 4, 11)

139  
Nv  
61

11/13/61

The US Embassy sends a long reply to Oswald, concerning his recent letter. Oswald's visa and travel status are still the main topics of discussion.



1/15/61

LANSDALE writes a memo to ROBERT KENNEDY outlining his MONGOOSE proposal.

158

Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November 1961, in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with John Roselli as part of Project ZR/RIFLE. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 86; and 6/11/75, p. 19) Harvey's notes placed the meeting on November 15, 1961. (I.G. Report, p. 39), during the period in which Harvey was freed from his duties on another Agency staff and assumed direction of Task Force W which ran CIA activity against the Castro regime.

ident 11/1/61, p. 1) In a memorandum to Robert Kennedy outlining the MONGOOSE proposal, Lansdale stated that a "picture of the situation has emerged clearly enough to indicate what needs to be done and to support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba." (Memo, 11/15/61) 39

/16/61

WILLIAM HARVEY takes over an alive and ongoing Mafia plot from SHEFFIELD EDWARDS. BISSELL instructs HARVEY to run the plot as part of ZRRIFLE. HARVEY cuts MAHEU out of the plot and deals directly with JOHN ROSSELLI, establishing a close friendship. HARVEY told the Church Committee that he cut both MAHEU and GIANCANA out of the plot because they were "surplusage".

Harvey's notes reflect that Bissell asked him to take over the gambling syndicate operation from Edwards and that they discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE program to Cuba" on November 16, 1961. (I.G. Report, p. 39) Bissell confirmed that the conversation took 83

A few days after the meeting with Szulc and Goodwin, and some six weeks after the issuance of NSAM 100, President Kennedy delivered a speech at the University of Washington, in which he stated:

We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises. (Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 724)

11/29/61

JOHN MCCONE replaces DULLES as DCI.  
PAT CARTER replaces CABELL as DDCI.

11/30/61

President KENNEDY writes a memo to DEAN RUSK which records KENNEDY's decision to start MONGOOSE. The memo emphasizes that the Special Group (Augmented) is to be kept clearly informed of all MONGOOSE activities. In operation this required Task Force W to submit "specific detailed plans" for each Task Force project.

(29)

11/30/61 (cont'd)

144 In establishing the MONGOOSE Operation on November 30, 1961, President Kennedy had emphasized that the SGA should be "kept closely informed" of its activities. (Memorandum by the President, 11/30/61)

At the end of the month, President Kennedy issued a memorandum recording his decision to begin the MONGOOSE project to "use our available assets \* \* \* to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime." (Memo from the President to the Secretary of State, et al., 11/30/61) 139

11/ /61

A LANSDALE memo to ROBERT KENNEDY debunks the national estimate done in October.

162 (iii) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About the Assassination Plots.—McCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961. It was also in November 1961 that Bissell asked Harvey to assume operational control over the Castro plot involving underworld figures.

6/6/75, pp. 33, 44-45) He testified that he was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles, Bissell, Helms, or anyone else when he succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961 (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 99

12/2/61

144 \* Castro apparently first announced publicly that he was a "Marxist-Leninist" on December 2, 1961. (David Larson, Cuba Crisis of 1962, p. 304)  
\* As given testified this also covered four areas: subterfuge, economic conditions, troops.

12/5/61

The Immigration and Naturalization Service requests a file search on Lee Harvey OSWALD from the CIA. The reason for the request is OSWALD's attempt to leave Russia and return to the United States.

12/ /61

The Special Group (Augmented) is set up specifically as a control group to oversee MONGOOSE. The SG(A) is chaired by General MAXWELL TAYLOR. The members are MCGEORGE BUNDY, ALEXIS JOHNSON, ROSWELL GILPATRIC, JOHN MCCONE, LYMAN LEMNITZER, ROBERT KENNEDY, and, on occasion DEAN RUSK and ROBERT MCNAMARA.

125 \* Robert Kennedy was Attorney General from January 1961 until September 1964. During his tenure as Attorney General he had close ties not only to law enforcement agencies (FBI and Justice), but also to the CIA. He served on the Special Group (Augmented) which supervised Operation MONGOOSE from December 1961 through October 1962.

12/ /61 (cont'd)

EDWARD LANSDALE made Chief of Operations for Operation MONGOOSE and liaison with the Departments of State and Defense. (It should be noted at this point that MONGOOSE was an interdepartmental affair directed by a interdepartmental committee made up of high mucky-mucks from the various departments involved.)

Task Force W created as the CIA operational, or working, branch for Operation MONGOOSE.

WILLIAM HARVEY named to head Task Force W. (He is still running ZRRIFLE.)

The CIA's Miami Station (JMWAWE), the actual operations center for MONGOOSE, employees approximately 200 officers. Task Force W has 400 payroll employees in Washington and Miami.

1962

1/18/62

LANSDALE assigns 32 planning tasks to the agencies participating in MONGOOSE. The tasks range from intelligence gathering to sabotage and military intervention. The underlying strategy is to build up to an internal revolt in Cuba. LANSDALE wrote "My review does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you" on the copy of the assignment memo that went to ROBERT KENNEDY.

142 ( On January 18, 1962, Lansdale assigned 32 planning tasks to the agencies participating in MONGOOSE. In a memorandum to the working group members, Lansdale emphasized that "it is our job to put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a change from the business as usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a combat situation—where we have been given full command." (Lansdale memorandum, 1/20/62)

142 ( Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Attorney General Kennedy on January 18, 1962, with a handwritten note stating: "my review does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you; I felt you preferred informing the President privately." Lansdale testified that this sensitive work did not refer to assassinations and that he "never took up assassination with either the Attorney General or the President." He said that he could not precisely recall the nature of this "sensitive work" but that it might have involved a special trip he made under cover to meet Cuban leaders in Florida to assess their political strengths. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 30)

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FOUNDATION  
courtesy THE AARC

<sup>1</sup> The evidence showed, however, that there were occasions when the Attorney General dealt with officials involved in MONGOOSE without consulting General Taylor. For example (as discussed in detail in the section on MONGOOSE operations), on January 18, 1962, General Lansdale sent a copy of his MONGOOSE program review to Robert Kennedy with a cover memorandum indicating that the review was for the President's information only. 155

1/19/62

Special Group (Augmented) meets. Notes taken by RICHARD HELMS' Executive Assistant, GEORGE MCMANUS, say: "Conclusion overthrow of CASTRO possible... No time, money, effort --or manpower is to be spared." (Note: I do not know in what capacity HELMS or MCMANUS is involved in here. HELMS is not yet DDP and, I would assume, that MCMANUS is not yet his special assistant for Cuban affairs, although he may be. What was HELMS position at this point?)

On January 19, 1962, a meeting of principal MONGOOSE participants was held in Attorney General Kennedy's office. (McManus, 7/22/75, p. 6) Notes taken at the meeting by George McManus, Helms' Executive Assistant, contain the following passages:

Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible.

"... a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority in U.S. Gov[ernment]. No time, money, effort—or manpower is to be spared."  
"Yesterday... the President had indicated to him that the final chapter had not been written—it's got to be done and will be done." (McManus memo 1/19/62, p. 2)

141

On January 19, 1962, Lansdale added an additional task to those assigned on January 18. "Task 33" involved a plan to "incapacitate" Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by the use of chemical warfare means. Lansdale testified that the plan involved using nonlethal chemicals to sicken Cubans temporarily and keep them away from the fields for a 24-48 hour period "without ill effects." The task was initially approved for planning purposes with the notation that it would require "policy determination" before final approval. After a study showed the plan to be unfeasible, it was cancelled without ever being submitted to the SGA for debate. (Lansdale, 7/8/75 p. 29; SGA Minutes, 1/30/62, p. 1)

143

1/24/62

An earlier reference to use of gangster-type elements had appeared in a CIA memorandum for the SGA on January 24, 1962. Commenting on Task 3 of Lansdale's original 32 tasks (which called for planning for "defection of top Cuban government officials"), the CIA memorandum noted that planning for the task will "necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by intermediaries" and listed "crime syndicates" along with other groups as possible intermediaries. (CIA Memorandum, 1/24/62)

143

Oswald again writes to Embassy, regarding his wish to return to US.

1/25/62

Immigration and Naturalization Service memo (internal) reports that the CIA response to the request of 12/5/61 is that the CIA has no information on OSWALD, but they refer INS to the State Department.

1/27/62

142 In a memorandum to the Attorney General on January 27, 1962, Lansdale referred to the possibility that "we might uncork the touch-down play independently of the institutional program we are spur-

Lansdale testified that he was "very certain" that he never discussed a Castro assassination plan or proposal with Robert Kennedy or with President Kennedy. He said that he had asked Harvey for a plan without having discussed the matter with anyone:

Senator BAKER: \* \* \* did you originate this idea of laying on the CIA a requirement to report on the feasibility of the assassination of Castro or did someone else suggest that?

General LANSDALE: I did, as far as I recall.

Senator BAKER: Who did you discuss it with before you laid on that requirement?

General LANSDALE: I don't believe I discussed it with anyone.

Senator BAKER: Only with Harvey?

General LANSDALE: Only with Harvey.

Senator BAKER: Did you ever discuss it with Helms?

General LANSDALE: I might have, and I don't believe that I did. I think it was just with Harvey.

Senator BAKER: Did you ever discuss it with Robert Kennedy?

General LANSDALE: No, not that I recall.

Senator BAKER: With the President?

General LANSDALE: No. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, pp. 19-20)

1/29/62

"Our primary interest was in Giancana... apparently detective (Maheu) has some connection with Giancana but he claims was because CIA assignment in connection with Cuba--CIA has objected, may have to drop." (Note from head of the Administrative Regulations Division to the first and second assistants in the Criminal Division.)

c. 1962. A note of January 29, 1962, from the head of the Administrative Regulations Division to the first and second assistants in the Criminal Division stated:

Our primary interest was in Giancana \* \* \* apparently detective (Maheu) has some connection with Giancana but he claims was because of CIA assignment in connection with Cuba--CIA has objected, may have to drop.

125

1/30/62

The Special Group (Augmented) approves LANSDALE's tasks for planning purposes.

144

On January 30, 1962, the representative of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs on the MONGOOSE Working Group forwarded for Lansdale's consideration "a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the Cuban Communist Hierarchy." (Memo, Craig to Lansdale, 1/30/62) The concept titled Operation Bounty, was described as a "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive known Communists." Under the concept, leaflets would be dropped in Cuba listing rewards, which ranged from \$5,000 for an "informer" to \$100,000 for "government officials." A reward of "2¢" was listed for Castro. Lansdale testified that the 2¢ bounty was designed "to denigrate \* \* \* Castro in the eyes of the Cuban population." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 26) Lansdale said that he "tabled" this concept when he received it because "I did not think that it was something that should be seriously undertaken or supported further." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 26) He never brought Operation Bounty before the SGA.

1/31/62

Assistant Attorney General MILLER asks the FBI to again speak with SHEFFIELD EDWARDS regarding the prosecution of MAHEU.

2/7/62

An FBI memo to MILLER reports that EDWARDS has been contacted, and he does object to any prosecution in the tap case.

An Immigration and Naturalization Service document regarding MARINA OSWALD's visa petition says: "LEE HARVEY OSWALD on loan to SNA. 1-26-62"

~~2/17/62~~

An FBI memorandum dated February 24, 1962, set forth Miller's request that Edwards be reinterviewed about possible prosecutions in the Balletti case. A reply memorandum from the FBI to Miller on February 7, 1962, stated that Edwards had been contacted and that he objected to the prosecution.

129

2/17/62

Bissell served as DDP from January 1, 1959, to February 17, 1962. (President Kennedy decided to replace Dulles and Bissell because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 6-8). Helms, who had been Bissell's Deputy, succeeded Bissell in February 1962 as DDP. He was appointed DDCI in April 1965, and DCI in June 1966.

91

38-39). Bissell also said that there was in fact no assassination activity between the pre-Bay of Pigs/Rosselli operation and his departure from the Agency in February 1962.

141

pp. 12-13) He also testified that the operation "was not reactivated, in other words, no instructions went out to Rosselli or to others \* \* \* to renew the attempt, until after I had left the Agency in February 1962." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 52-53.) Harvey agreed that his conversa-

83

2/19/62

RICHARD HELMS replaces RICHARD BISSELL as DDP.

2/20/62

A LANSDALE memo details a six-phase schedule for MONGOOSE culminating in 10/62 with an open, internal revolt in Cuba. One phase, "resistance", included "attacks on...key leaders". LANSDALE recommended that this be handled as a "special target operation" and that it might be accomplished by the use of "gangster elements".

On February 20, Lansdale detailed a six-phase schedule for MONGOOSE, designed to culminate in October, 1962, with an "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." (Lansdale Memorandum, 2/20/62, p. 2) As one of the operations for this "Resistance" phase, Lansdale listed "attacks on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 151) Lansdale's plan stated:

143

This should be a "Special Target" operation \* \* \* Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police-G2 [intelligence] officials. (Id., p. 151) \*

2/27/62

On February 27, 1962, Hoover sent identical copies of a memorandum to the Attorney General and Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President. The memorandum stated that information developed in connection with a concentrated FBI investigation of John Rosselli revealed that Rosselli had been in contact with the President's

friend. The memorandum also reported that the individual was maintaining an association with Sam Giancana, described as "a prominent Chicago underworld figure." Hoover's memorandum also stated that a review of the telephone toll calls from the President's friend's residence revealed calls to the White House. The President's secretary ultimately received a copy of the memorandum and said she believed she would have shown it to the President.

129

130

21 162

102

Richard Helms replaced Bissell in February of 1962 and was subsequently briefed by Harvey on the existence of the assassination plots. Helms was Harvey's immediate superior and the person to whom he reported about the Castro plot activities.

(February 1962: CRC moves from Camp Street address in New Orleans)

3/2/62

LANSDALE memo states that MONGOOSE operations other than intelligence collection "must be inconspicuous (and) short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt".

While the Guidelines did state that covert actions would be undertaken concurrently with intelligence collection, these were to be on a scale "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt" in Cuba. The SGA stipulated that MONGOOSE action beyond the acquisition of intelligence "must be inconspicuous." (Lansdale Memo, 3/2/62)

147

Jack Ruby is called in to report on his finances to the Dallas IRS office. He makes several visits there.

3/5/62

The Special Group (Augmented) tables LANSDALE's MONGOOSE plans and orders him to restrict operations to intelligence collection.

144

Lansdale testified that early in the MONGOOSE operation he had suggested that working level representatives of the MONGOOSE agencies get in touch with "criminal elements" to obtain intelligence and for "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 104) Lansdale conceded that his proposal to recruit gangster elements for attacks on "key leaders" contemplated the targeted killing of individuals, in addition to the casualties that might occur in the course of the revolt itself. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 107) Lansdale's 33 plans were never approved for implementation by the SGA. As discussed below, the SGA tabled Lansdale's six phase plan altogether in February 1962, and directed him to plan for and conduct an intelligence collection plan only. (SGA Minutes, 3/5/62)

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(30)

3/5/62 (cont'd)

132

Helms stated that the SGA's control system for MONGOOSE was not intended to apply to assassination activity. (Helms, 7/18/75, p. 21) Helms stated that the SGA's decision on March 5, 1962, that major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence must receive advance approval referred to "rather specific items that the Special Group had on its agenda" from the outset of MONGOOSE (Helms, 7/18/75, p. 21) Helms said that since assassination was not among those

The SGA request for Helms to estimate "for each week as far into the next twelve months as possible \*\*\* the numbers and type of agents you will establish inside Cuba \*\*\* [and] brief descriptions \*\*\* of actions contemplated," is another example of the close control the SGA exercised over Operation MONGOOSE. (Memo, Lansdale to Helms, 3/5/62)

146

In early March 1962, the SGA recognized the need to begin "preliminary actions \*\*\* involving such things as spotting, assessing and training action-type agents" but the SGA agreed that it must "keep its hand tightly" on these actions. The SGA saw, however, that such control might not be completely effective and recognized that many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba would be of an all-purpose type; that is, they would be trained in paramilitary skills, as well as those of exclusively intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S., although every effort will be made to attempt such control." (SGA Minutes, 3/5/62) \*

3/6/62

Ruby goes to the Dallas IRS office

3/7/62

Oswald finally receives an undesirable discharge from USMC.

3/14/62

The Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE are issued. They emphasize SG(A) control and review. In effect any operation other than intelligence gathering had to have prior SG(A) approval of every minute detail.

In addition, the Guidelines for the MONGOOSE program emphasized the SGA's responsibility for control and prior approval of important operations:

The SGA is responsible for providing policy guidance to the [MONGOOSE] project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress. (Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE, March 14, 1962)

3/22/62

"In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE. The Guidelines dated March 14, 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the Guidelines." (SGA Memo for the Record, 3/16/62)

A note, dated March 22, 1962, appeared on the bottom of this memorandum and stated:

"This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the Group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the Guidelines."

Evidence before the Committee indicates that a close friend of President Kennedy had frequent contact with the President from the end of 1960 through mid-1962. FBI reports and testimony indicate that the President's friend was also a close friend of John Rosselli and Sam Giancana and saw them often during this same period.

129



3/22/62 (cont'd)

102

that person's connection with the President was again brought to Hoover's attention in a memorandum preparing him for a meeting with the President planned for March 22, 1962. Courtney Evans testified that Hoover generally required a detailed summary of information in the FBI files for drafting important memoranda or preparing for significant meetings. (Evans, 8/28/75, pp. 70, 72) The FBI files on Giancana then contained information disclosing Giancana's connection with the CIA as well as his involvement in assassination plotting. (Memoranda of 10/18/60 and 5/22/61)

On March 22, Hoover had a private luncheon with President Kennedy. There is no record of what transpired at that luncheon. According to the White House logs, the last telephone contact between the White House and the President's friend occurred a few hours after the luncheon.

Oswald writes to USMC about his discharge. Some WC critics say this letter reads as if it was written by someone else. Too polished.

On November 22, 1963, a blank legal sized piece of paper is found amid Oswald's possessions, with "March 22, 1962" stamped on it in purple ink.

3/23/62

J. EDGAR HOOVER memo to EDWARDS says: "The Criminal Division has now requested that the CIA specifically advise whether it would or would not object to the initiation of criminal prosecution against the subjects, BALLETTI, MAHEU, and the individual known as J.W. HARRISON for conspiracy to violate the 'Wire Tapping Statute'."

102

On March 23, 1962, the day immediately following his luncheon with the President, at which Rosselli and Giancana were presumably discussed, Hoover sent a memorandum to Edwards stating:

At the request of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, this matter was discussed with the CIA Director of Security on February 7, 1962, and we were advised that your agency would object to any prosecution which would necessitate the use of CIA personnel or CIA information. We were also informed that introduction of evidence concerning the CIA operation would be embarrassing to the Government.

The Criminal Division has now requested that CIA specifically advise whether it would or would not object to the initiation of criminal prosecution against the subjects, Balletti, Maheu, and the individual known as J. W. Harrison for conspiracy to violate the "Wire Tapping Statute."

\* The wiretap was placed on the telephone by Arthur J. Balletti. Arrangements for the tap were made by Maheu through his acquaintance, Edward DuBois. (FBI memo 3/23/62) See discussion, supra, pp. 77-79.

Oswald again writes Embassy. /

3/24/62

Ralph Paul, a close friend of Ruby, buys a \$6000. Cadillac.

1/28 or 29/62

Edwards meets with Sam Papich, FBI/CIA liaison, and tells him: "Any prosecution in the matter would endanger sensitive sources and methods used in a duly authorized intelligence project and would not be in the national interest".

1/21/62

Earl Ruby sends a telegram Havana. In his WC testimony, he is very evasive about it.

4/2/62

62 The President, thus notified, might then have inquired further of the CIA. The Presidential calendar indicates that the President had meetings at which most CIA officials witting of the assassination plot were present during the period from February 27 through April 2, 1962. All of those persons, however, have testified that the President never asked them about the assassination plot.

USMC writes to Oswald in Minsk

4/4/62

EDWARDS writes a memo for the record regarding the meeting with PAPICH. This is the source of the above quote.

A memorandum for the record of April 4, 1962, reflects that Edwards met with Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to the CIA, on March 28 or 29 and told Papich that: 131

Any prosecution in the matter would endanger sensitive sources and methods used in a duly authorized intelligence project and would not be in the national interest. (Edwards' memorandum, 4/4/62)

1/6/62

The CIA General Counsel (I would assume that this would be LAWRENCE HUSTON) writes a memo interpreting NSC 5412/2 (the document that vested responsibility for covert action in the CIA) making it clear that the CIA considered itself responsible for developing and carrying out plans and proposals for covert action.

4/8 or 9/62

A meeting to set up the second attempt on CASTRO between HARVEY, ROSSELLI, and the SUPPORT CHIEF, occurs. The meeting was arranged by EDWARDS.

85 Harvey, the Support Chief and Rosselli met for a second time in New York on April 8-9, 1962. (I.G. Report, p. 43) A notation made

11/9/62

US Embassy talks to Oswald by phone.

4/10/62

HOOVER writes a memo to MILLER reporting EDWARDS opposition to prosecution based on the possibility of "exposure of most sensitive information relating to the abortive Cuban invasion in April 1961", and the possible embarrassment of the United States government that would result from the exposure of that information."

HARVEY writes a memo to MCCONE complaining about the strict approval requirements imposed on his operations by the SG(A).

132

Houston testified that the operation was described to the Attorney General as an assassination attempt. (Houston, 6/2/75, p. 14) When interviewed for the Inspector General's Report in 1967, Edwards said he briefed Kennedy "all the way." (I.G. Report, p. 62a) A memorandum by Hoover of a conference with Kennedy on May 9, two days after the briefing states:

The Attorney General told me he wanted to advise me of a situation in the Giancana case which had considerably disturbed him. He stated a few days ago he had been advised by CIA that in connection with Giancana, CIA had hired Robert A. Maheu, a private detective in Washington, D.C., to approach Giancana with a proposition of paying \$150,000 to hire some gunmen to go into Cuba and to kill Castro. (Memorandum from Hoover, 4/10/62)

A memorandum for Assistant Attorney General Miller from Hoover dated April 10, 1962, stated that Edwards: 131

Has now advised that he has no desire to impose any restriction which might hinder efforts to prosecute any individual, but he is firmly convinced that prosecution of Maheu undoubtedly would lead to exposure of most sensitive information relating to the abortive Cuban invasion in April 1961, and would result in most damaging embarrassment to the U.S. Government. He added that in view of this, his agency objects to the prosecution of Maheu. (Memo, Hoover to Miller, 4/10/62)

To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the tight controls exercised by the Special Group and the present time-consuming coordination and briefing procedures should, if at all possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying. (Memo, Harvey to McCone, 4/10/62) 145

Oswald writes Robert that he is coming home.

4/11/62

Any proposal to supply arms and equipment to particular resistance groups inside Cuba was also required to "be submitted to the Special Group (Augmented) for decision *ad hoc*." (Lansdale Memo to the Special Group, 4/11/62, p. 1) These procedural requirements were operative at the time of Harvey's meeting with Rosselli in Miami. 147

4/16/62

LAWERNCE HUSTON, CIA General Counsel, meets with MILLER. MILLER says he envisions no problems in stopping the prosecution and does not want to know the "operational details" of the CIA use of GIANCANA. HUSTON offers to brief ROBERT KENNEDY.

16/62 (cont'd)

131

On April 16, 1962, Lawrence Houston, CIA General Counsel, met with Miller. Houston reported to Edwards that Miller envisioned "no major difficulty in stopping action for prosecution." Houston offered to brief the Attorney General, but said that he "doubted if we would want to give the full story to anyone else in the Department," and Miller did not desire to know the "operational details."

18/62

The Technical Services Division of the CIA delivers the second batch of poison pills to the SUPPORT CHIEF.

A notation made during this time in the files of the Technical Services Division indicates that four poison pills were given to the Support Chief on April 18, 1962. (I.G. Report, pp. 46-47)

19/62

While Harvey was still in Miami, Lansdale told the SGA that:

"Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit, more specific information on the status of agent training and operations should be made available." (Memorandum for the SGA, 4/19/62, p. 2)

153

20/62

HUSTON meets with MILLER'S FIRST ASSISTANT and requests that Justice not prosecute the tap case on the grounds of security. HUSTON again offers to brief ROBERT KENNEDY.

On April 20 Houston told Miller's first assistant that he was requesting Justice not to prosecute "on grounds of security," and asked to be informed if it was necessary to brief the Attorney General. (Memo, Houston to Edwards, 4/26/62) ✓✓

21/62

HARVEY passes the poison pills to ROSSELLI in Miami

The pills were passed to Harvey, who arrived in Miami on April 21, and found Rosselli already in touch with the same Cuban who had been involved in the pre-Bay of Pigs pill passage. (I.G. Report, p. 47) He gave the pills to Rosselli, ex-

24/62

MILLER advises ROBERT KENNEDY that prosecution of MAHEU would not be in the national interest. (Note: the final decision not to prosecute was evidently not made until after the briefing of ROBERT KENNEDY on 5/7.)

In a memo dated April 24, 1962, Herbert J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised the Attorney General that the "national interest" would preclude any prosecutions based upon the tap. Following a briefing of the Attorney General by the CIA, a decision was made not to prosecute.

79

4/26/62

HARVEY briefs MCCONE on Task Force W projects but not the assassination plots. (After all, they were part of ZRRIFLE.)

HUSTON memo the EDWARDS regarding the 4/16 and 4/20 meetings.

HUSTON tells CARTER, DDDP, that there is a case that which the CIA is asking Justice not to prosecute. No details are given.

SG(A) requests that HARVEY be present at the next meeting to brief them on Task Force W operations.

On April 26, 1962, Lansdale told the SGA that Harvey was in Florida "initiating a new series of agent infiltrations" and would return to Washington on April 30. (Memo for the SGA, 4/26/62, from Lansdale) At an SGA meeting on April 26, General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent activities."

155

154 (Memo for the Record, April 26, 1962, by McCone) The next day, McCone's assistant sent Harvey a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request and notifying him that McCone wanted to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to discuss the Task Force activities." (Memo for Action, Elder to Harvey, 4/27/62)

Harvey reported to the SGA as requested. He testified that he did not inform the SGA, or any individual outside the Agency, that he had given the poison pills to Rosselli. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 16) Harvey said he did not tell McCone about the poison pills when he briefed the Director because he did not believe it was necessary. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 17)

In the course of communications between the CIA and law enforcement agencies, CIA's general counsel, Lawrence Houston, wrote in a memorandum dated April 26, 1962:

106

I . . . briefed the DDCI in view of the possibility that the Attorney General might call him or the Director in the case. General Carter understood the situation and said in due time we might brief the Director. (Memo, Houston to Edwards, 4/26/62)

4/30/62

US Embassy receives an undated letter from Oswald - probably written within a week earlier. Some WC critics suggest it was not really written by him - they question the writing style of the first 5 paragraphs.

4/ /62

HARVEY initiates contact with ROSSELLI.

(ii) The Operation Is Reactivated

In early April 1962, Harvey, who testified that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms, (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 18), requested Edwards to put him in touch with Rosselli. (Edwards memo, 5/14/62) The Support Chief first introduced Harvey to Rosselli in Miami, where Harvey told Rosselli to maintain his Cuban contacts, but not to deal with Mabeu or Giancana, (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 50; Ros-

83

11/62 (cont'd)

General Charles Cabell served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under Dulles and continued into the early months of McCone's term. He was replaced as DDCI in April 1962 by General Marshall Carter. 91

General Marshall S. Carter was appointed Deputy Director of the CIA in mid-April 1962. When shown the Houston memorandum by the Committee, Carter testified that he did not recall the meeting with Houston, that he had not been told about the assassination plot during 107

Early in 1962, Harvey was appointed chief of Task Force W, CIA's action arm for MONGOOSE activities. In the latter part of April 1962, Harvey went to Miami where the CIA had its JM/WAVE station. Harvey testified that in addition to meeting with Rosselli and delivering the poison pills, his trip had other purposes totally unrelated to assassination: 153

... this was one of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of reviewing in toto ... the actual and potential operations at the Miami base ... and this covered the whole gamut from personnel administration, operational support in the way of small craft [and] so on ... (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 15-16)

62 Helms testified that he doubted that he was informed when Harvey gave poison pills to Rosselli and that he did not recall having authorized Castro's assassination by that means. He said, however, that he had authorized that assassination plot because "we felt that we were operating as we were supposed to operate, that these things if not specifically authorized, at least were authorized in general terms." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 61)

A William Harvey testified that he kept Helms informed of the operation involving the underworld at all stages. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 65-66) When interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Harvey said that he briefed Helms on his first meeting with Rosselli, and "thereafter he regularly briefed Helms on the status of the Castro operation." (I.G. Report, p. 41)

Helms' recollection was less certain. Helms did recall that he was briefed by Harvey when Harvey first contacted Rosselli in April 1962. He remembered that he "reluctantly" had approved the operation, but that he had no confidence that it would succeed. (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 23) 91

When asked if he authorized sending the poison pills to Florida, Helms testified: "I believe they were poison pills, and I don't recall necessarily approving them, but since Harvey alleges to have them and says that he took them to Miami, I must have authorized them in some fashion." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 44)

62 60 Helms testified that he never informed the SGA or any of its members that Harvey had given the pills to Rosselli in Miami "because to this day I do not recall Harvey ever having told me they were passed." (Helms, 7/18/75, p. 22)

62 When asked why he had not sought clarification from the Special Group, its members, or Robert Kennedy as to whether it was "in fact, the policy of the Government to actually kill Fidel Castro," Helms answered,

I don't know ... There is something about the whole chain of episodes in connection with this Rosselli business that I am simply not able to bring back in a coherent fashion. And there was something about the ineffectuality of all this, or the lack of conviction that anything ever happened, that I believe in the end made this thing simply collapse, disappear. And I don't recall what I was briefed on at

(1) *The Inspector General's Report.*—The concluding section of the Inspector General's Report advanced several possible responses to Drew Pearson's public charges about CIA links with the underworld. One question posed in the Inspector General's Report was: "Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?" The answer given was:

Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two (the attempt commencing in April 1962) was carried out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy Administration pressure to do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase. (I.G. Report, p. 132)

5/3/62

HARVEY briefs the SG(A) on "agent teams" and the "general field of intelligence". The assassination plots are not mentioned.

154 Harvey gave a progress report to the SGA on "agent teams" and the "general field of intelligence" when he reported to them following his trip to Miami. (Memo of SGA Meeting, 5/3/62) According to the minutes, Harvey reported that three agent teams had been infiltrated and that 72 actual or potential reporting sources were also in the place. The minutes of the May 3, 1962, SGA meeting make no mention of Harvey's assassination activities.

5/7/62

ROBERT KENNEDY meets with HELMS at 1:00 PM.

MAXWELL TAYLOR briefs President KENNEDY on HARVEY's 5/3 briefing.

HUSTON and EDWARDS brief ROBERT KENNEDY on the Mafia plot. (4:00 PM) They tell the Attorney General that the plots have been terminated. There is conflicting evidence as to whether ROBERT KENNEDY was told that the plots were terminated as of May 1961 or May 1962.

154 Shortly after the May 3 meeting, General Taylor gave the President what Taylor called a "routine briefing." (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 27) General Taylor's memorandum of that briefing makes no reference to Harvey's contacts with Rosselli or the delivery of pills and guns. (Memo for Record, May 7, 1962, by General Taylor) Taylor testified that he had never heard of Harvey's delivering pills to poison Castro,

104 On May 7, 1962, Edwards and the CIA's General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy on the operation involving underworld figures, describing it as terminated.

(b) Briefing of the Attorney General on May 7, 1962. An entry in Attorney General Kennedy's calendar for May 7, 1962, 131 states "1:00—Richard Helms." At 4:00 the Attorney General met

135 Edwards testified that at the time of the Kennedy briefing, he did not know that the CIA was still utilizing its underworld contacts, (Edwards, 5/30/75, p. 16) even though the operation had been re-activated under the Directorate of Plans, and in early April 1962, 134 poison pills had been given to Rosselli.

5/9/62

ROBERT KENNEDY prohibits CIA contact with the Mafia without first checking with the Justice Department.

ROBERT KENNEDY meets with J. EDGAR HOOVER.

132 On May 9, 1962, the Attorney General met with Director Hoover. Hoover prepared a memorandum for the record dated May 10, 1962, recounting what was said at that meeting.

(38)

5/10/62

HOOVER writes a memo regarding the 5/9 meeting. Records that the CIA was using GIANCANA in a plot to assassinate CASTRO.

In his memorandum of the meeting with the Attorney General two days after the briefing, Hoover recalled:

I expressed great astonishment at this in view of the bad reputation of Maheu and the horrible judgment in using a man of Giancana's background for such a project. The Attorney General shared the same views. (Memo from Hoover, 5/10/62) 133

\*The Hoover memorandum indicates two reasons for Attorney General Kennedy's displeasure. First, the CIA had put itself into a position where "it could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana or Maheu." Second, Hoover: "Stated as he [Kennedy] well knew the 'gutter gossip' was that the reason nothing had been done against Giancana was because of Giancana's close relationship with Frank Sinatra who, in turn, claimed to be a close friend of the Kennedy family. The Attorney General stated he realized this and it was for that reason that he was quite concerned when he received this information from CIA about Giancana and Maheu." (Sinatra is not the President's friend discussed in the preceding subsection.) 131

Hoover recorded that two days after the briefing, the Attorney General told him that:

He had asked CIA whether they had ever cleared their actions in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Department of Justice before they did so and he was advised by CIA they had not cleared these matters with the Department of Justice. He stated he then issued orders to CIA to never again in the future take such steps without first checking with the Department of Justice. (Memo from Hoover, 5/10/62) 131

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\*However, a memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover states that the Attorney General said he had been told by Edwards in 1962 that the "CIA admitted that they had assisted Maheu in making the installation." (Memo from Hoover, 5/10/62)  
In a conversation of Giancana's Joseph Shimon testified that Giancana had told him

US Embassy tells Oswald he can leave for US now. He writes to his mother and bro.

5/11/62

ROBERT KENNEDY requests EDWARDS formalize what he has told him by writing a memo on the 5/7 meeting.

134 On May 11 the Attorney General requested Edwards to prepare a memorandum of the May 7 briefing.

5/14/62

EDWARDS discusses the 5/7 meeting with WILLIAM HARVEY. The Church Committee said: "As a result of that conversation, EDWARDS prepared an internal memorandum for the record ... which falsely stated that the operation involving ROSSELLI was then being terminated. Church Committee Interim Report, p. 132. (Remember what CARTER said about memos for the record?) The memo also states that neither he nor the CIA knew of the Las Vegas bug in advance.

HARVEY briefs HELMS on EDWARDS meeting with ROBERT KENNEDY. HARVEY and HELMS decide not to brief MCCONE or CARTER on the assassination plots. (Note: Apparently ROBERT KENNEDY did not brief the heads of the CIA either.)

EDWARDS writes memo for ROBERT KENNEDY pursuant to his request on 5/11. This memo also says   
 to have been terminated.

MARY FERRELL FOUNDATION  
courtesy THEAAR



1.4/62 (cont'd)

(30)

132 Edwards, with Houston's assistance, prepared a memorandum dated May 14, 1962, relating what had transpired at the May 7 briefing. Also, on the same day, Edwards had a telephone conversation with William Harvey. As a result of that conversation, Edwards prepared an internal memorandum for the record dated May 14, 1962, which falsely stated that the operation involving Rosselli was then being terminated.

134 In the internal memorandum for the record dated May 14, 1962, written the same day as the memorandum of the Attorney General's briefing, Edwards stated:

On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject (Rosselli) for the future.

78 On the other hand, Edwards, in a May 14, 1962 memorandum for the Attorney General (discussed at length, *infra*, p. 131), stated that "At the time of the incident neither the Agency nor the undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation."<sup>2</sup>

97 On the other hand, Rosselli's testimony suggests that prior to the "latter part of September" 1960, Maheu had indicated that a large sum of money would be paid for Castro's death. (Rosselli, 6/28/75 p. 17) And in a memorandum dated May 14, 1962, Edwards indicated that the briefing of "senior officials" took place after the money had been offered.

134 As concluded by the CIA itself in the Inspector General's Report, Edwards' statement that he was not aware of these developments is implausible. In the memorandum of May 14, 1962, prepared for the Attorney General, Edwards stated that Harvey had asked him to arrange a contact with Rosselli, and that a meeting had been set for April 9. The Inspector General's Report observed:

When the Attorney General was briefed on 7 May, Edwards knew that Harvey had been introduced to Rosselli. He must also have known that his subordinate, the Support Chief, was in Miami and roughly for what purpose (although Edwards does not now recall this). (I.G. Report, p. 65)<sup>1</sup>

Harvey told the Inspector General that:

... on 14 May he briefed Helms on the meeting with the Attorney General, as told to him by Edwards. Harvey, too, advised against briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and states that Helms concurred in this. (I.G. Report, p. 65)

104 Harvey testified that he had probably told Helms:

Any briefing of the Director on the discussion with the Attorney General concerning this should come from Colonel Edwards and Larry Houston, the General Counsel, and not from the DDP unless we are asked. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 99)

96 Edwards' memorandum of the meeting indicated that he had said that after Rosselli and Giancana had been offered \$150,000, Edwards had "then briefed the proper senior officials of [the] Agency" (without specifying whom) and they had "duly orally approved."<sup>1</sup> It further states that "knowledge" of the project had been "kept to a total of six persons."<sup>2</sup>

5/18/62

FBI interviews Mrs. Robert Oswald.

MARY FERRELL

FOUND AT THE ARCHIVE

5/ 162 ROSSELLI passes the poison pills to Cubans for transportation to Cuba.

6/13/62

SPAS T. RAIKEN meets MARINA and LEE OSWALD in Hoboken, New Jersey and "helps" them through Immigration and Customs.

6/15/62

Marguerite Oswald later says that on this day, Lee told her "Not even Marina knows why I came home."

6/18/62

Oswald has ten pages of his Russian diary typed up by a secretary.

6/19-20/62

Oswald has more pages of his diary typed up.

5/21/62

ROSSELLI tells HARVEY that a 6 man team has been dispatched to Cuba.

84 ( Roselli kept Harvey informed of the operation's progress. Sometime in May 1962, he reported that the pills and guns had arrived in Cuba. (Harvey, p. 64; Roselli, 6/24/75, pp. 34, 42-43) On June 21, he told Harvey that the Cuban had dispatched a three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's report described the team's mission as "vague" and conjectured that the team would kill Castro or

6/22/62

The secretary who types the diary mentions it to a reporter, who in turn writes to Oswald about it.

6/26/62

FBI (Fain) interviews Oswald. He goes to their Dallas office. He refuses to take a lie detector test for them.

6/1/62

84 buffed. (I.G. Report, pp. 80, 82-83) When Case Officer 1 joined the operation in June 1962, his assignment was to ensure that AM/LASH would "stay in place and report to us." (Case Officer 1, 8/11/75, p. 38) At a meeting in the fall of 1963, AM/LASH 1 stated that he would remain in Cuba if he "could do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba" and expressed a desire to plan the "execution" of Fidel Castro. (Case Officer 1 Contact Report) The

150

ANNU. It was the only one to that office of operations. (Official, 9/18/75, p. 40) An official in the Western Hemisphere Division of the Directorate of Plans who was responsible for evaluating potential Cuban assets testified that in June or July 1962 he was told by his superior (either Harvey or Harvey's assistant) "Go see the Attorney General, he has something to talk about" (Official, 9/18/75, p. 25). The official said that he went to the Justice Department and was told by the Attorney General that: "He wanted to see a man who had contact with a small group of Cubans who had a plan for creating an insurrection, or something like that \* \* \* ." (Official, 9/18/75, p. 30) The contact recommended by the Attorney General, referred the official to five or six Cubans who claimed to have connections within Cuba and who requested weapons, money, and supplies to start an insurrection. The official said he reported to the Attorney General that the Cubans did not have a concrete plan; the Attorney General rejected the official's evaluation and ordered him to go to Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba "using whatever assets we could get to make contact with people inside Cuba, and start working and developing this particular group." (Official, 9/18/75, p. 34) When the official protested that the CIA had agreed not to work out of Guantanamo, the Attorney General responded, "we will see about that." The official said that he then reported his conversation with the Attorney General to Harvey, who replied: "There was a meeting about that this morning. I forgot to tell you about it. I will take care of it \* \* \* ." (Official, 9/18/75, p. 35) The official said that he had no further contact with the Attorney General or the Cubans.

8/62

General Lansdale submitted a MONGOOSE proposal for a "stepped-up Course B" that would involve operations to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." (Lansdale Memo for Special Group Augmented, 8/8/62) 163

10/62

ROBERT MCNAMARA suggests the "elimination or assassination of FIDEL" at a SG(A) meeting regarding planning for the second phase of Operation MONGOOSE. The SG(A) reacts by dropping it like a hot potatoe. It did not even make it into the minutes of the meeting. LANSDALE submits a proposal to use all possible pressure to overthrow CASTRO short of overt military action. This proposal was rejected in favor of a plan to cause an internal split between CASTRO and his Communist supporters. The CIA is instructed to develop a plan in line with this decision.

MONGOOSE Phase II begins.

During the MONGOOSE period, Harvey attended many SGA meetings as the CIA's representative. He testified that he never informed the SGA or any of its members of the ongoing assassination plots and that at no time was assassination discussed at any meetings, except the one on August 10, 1962. 153

Harvey attended an August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group Augmented. He testified that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara suggested at that meeting that the Special Group "consider the elimination or assassination of Fidel." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 30) 105

After the intelligence collection phase ended in August 1962, the SGA considered whether to adopt a "stepped-up Course B plus," which, in contrast to Phase I, was designed to inspire a revolt against the Castro regime. (Memo for the SGA from Lansdale, 8/8/62) The SGA initially decided against this course and in favor of a "CIA variant" on August 10, 1962. (Minutes of SGA Meeting, 8/10/62) The "CIA variant," which was proposed by McCone, posted limited actions to avoid inciting a revolt and sought a split between Castro and "old-line Communists" rather than Castro's overthrow. 147

Q. Why, if it is true that assassination idea was turned down on August 10, did you send out your memo on August 13?  
General LANSDALE. I don't recall that thoroughly, I don't remember the reasons why I would.  
Q. Is it your testimony that the August 10 meeting turned down assassinations as a subject to look into, and that you nevertheless asked Mr. Harvey to look into it?  
General LANSDALE. I guess it is, yes. The way you put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it. I don't know." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, pp. 123-124) 167

8/11/62

HARVEY briefs MCCONE on the 8/10 meeting and the question of assassination again comes up. Both HARVEY and MCCONE agree that the forum and form were wrong for raising the question. MCCONE tells HARVEY that he might end up getting himself "excommunicated" if he got involved in "something like this".

WALTER ELDAR, MCCONE's Executive Assistant, tells HELMS that the DCI is opposed to any use of assassination.

LANSDALE orders HARVEY to include an option for the "liquidation of leaders" in the plan for MONGOOSE Phase II.

The question of liquidating Cuban leaders was raised at a meeting of the SGA on August 10, 1962. On August 13, 1962, Lansdale directed Harvey to include in a proposed plan for Phase II of MONGOOSE, an option for the "liquidation of leaders." 161

At the outset, it should be noted that the documents and testimony about the meeting indicate that the discussion of assassination on August 10 was unrelated to the assassination activity undertaken by Harvey and Rosselli, or to any other plans or efforts to assassinate Castro. The Inspector General's Report states:

The subject (of a Castro assassination) was raised at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but is unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination. It did result in a MONGOOSE action memorandum by Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning liquidation of leaders. (I.G. Report, p. 118)

Lansdale stated that he had one brief conversation with Harvey after the August 13 memorandum in which Harvey stated "he would look into it \* \* \* see about developing some plans." Lansdale said that was the last he ever heard of the matter. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 124) 167

McCone testified that he called McNamara after receiving Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum and: 165

\* \* \* insisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn because no decision was made on this subject, and since no decision was made, then Lansdale was quite out of order in tasking the Central Intelligence Agency to consider the matter.\*

'14/62

HARVEY writes a memo to HELMS regarding the "inadmissability and stupidity" of putting in writing what LANSDALE had the previous day.

HARVEY verbally tells LANSDALE that the CIA "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it".

162 (2) Harvey's August 14, 1962 Memorandum

After receiving Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, Harvey wrote a memorandum to Helms. He attached a copy of the Lansdale memorandum, and noted that he had excised the words "including liquidation of leaders." Harvey's memorandum explained that:

The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." (Id.)

'15/62

MCCONE and MCNAMARA order the LANSDALE 8/13 memo withdrawn because no decision had been made and LANSDALE was out of order in assigning such a task to the CIA.

'15-19/62

Ylario Rojas Villanueva says he drove with a Cuban to Mexico, where they met Oswald and discuss some kind of covert plans. Villanueva later retracts this story.

8/16/62

FBI agent Fain meets Oswald and they talk in Fain's car.

8/20/62

General TAYLOR writes a memo to President KENNEDY favoring a more aggressive MONGOOSE. He says that CASTRO's overthrow is unlikely without direct military intervention. (didn't he have something to do with Viet Nam?)

On August 20, Taylor told the President that the SGA saw no likelihood that Castro's Government would be overturned by internal means without direct United States military intervention, and that the SGA favored a more aggressive MONGOOSE program.<sup>1</sup> (Memo, Taylor to the President, 8/20/62) On August 23, McGeorge Bundy issued NSC Memorandum No. 181, which stated that, at the President's directive, "the line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed." On August 30, the SGA instructed the CIA to submit a list of possible sabotage targets and noted that: "The Group, by reacting to this list, could define the limits within which the Agency could operate

147

8/23/62

MCGEORGE BUNDY issues National Security Council Memorandum 181 directing development of a plan for the second phase of MONGOOSE.

8/25-31/62

George Bouhe introduces the Oswalds to the De Mohrenschildts in Dallas. Bouhe claims that De Mohrenschildt checked with Walter Moore the Dallas FBI office before he would associate with Oswald. De Mohrenschildt also said that too.

8/26/62

The Oswalds go to Dallas from New Orleans to visit their friend George Bouhe.

8/28/62

Nancy Perrin Rich's husband kills himself - death from arsenic poisoning.

8/30/62

SG(A) orders the CIA to submit a list of possible sabotage targets in Cuba.

8/31/62

LANSDALE submits a memo defining tasks for MONGOOSE Phase II.

<sup>1</sup> There are references in the SGA records to attacks on Soviet personnel in Cuba. The record of the SGA meeting on September 9, 1962, states: "It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered." (SGA Minutes, 9/9/62)

Earlier, on August 31, 1962, Lansdale had included a task "to provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions" in a proposed projection of action for Phase II of MONGOOSE. (Memo to SGA, Action No. 47, 8/31/62) The Special Group thereafter decided, as a means of "emphasizing such activity," to replace that task with one to "cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel," and to note that "con

185

81 162

166

Elder also described a meeting held in his office with Helms shortly after the McCone/Harvey/Elder meeting. Elder stated:

Aug. 13  
'62  
?

I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Harvey that assassination could not be condoned and would not be approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement that it would be unthinkable to record in writing any consideration of assassination because it left the impression that the subject had received serious consideration by governmental policymakers, which it had not. Mr. Helms responded, "I understand." The point is that I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr. McCone's opposition to assassination. I know that Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation. (Elder Affidavit, 8/26/75, p. 2)

Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone on that occasion about the actual assassination operation involving Rosselli.

I would like to recast the time that this took place. This was August of '62. This was at the start of the so-called Missile Crisis . . . . A tentative decision had been made at that point that the only sensible thing to do with [the Rosselli operation] was to terminate it as rapidly and cleanly as it could be done . . . . I am sure that I had discussed with Rosselli, at least on a tentative basis, by August, the probable necessity of terminating this . . . .

146 The Kennedy Administration pressed the MONGOOSE operation with vigorous language. Although the collection of intelligence information was the central objective of MONGOOSE until August 1962, sabotage and paramilitary actions were also conducted, including a major sabotage operation aimed at a large Cuban copper mine. Lansdale described the sabotage acts as involving "blowing up bridges to

Jack Ruby makes three trips to New Orleans - ostensibly to recruit new strippers.

The De Mohrenschildts spend the entire month in Dallas.

17/62

HARVEY and ROSSELLI confer in Miami regarding the status of the plots.

84 Harvey met Rosselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. The Cuban was reported to be preparing to send in another three-man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Harvey was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine," were still "safe" in Cuba. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 103; J.G. Report p. 51)

9/9/62

Someone suggests attacks on Soviet personnel in Cuba at a SG(A) meeting.

9/11/62

HARVEY and ROSSELLI confer in Miami regarding the status of the plots.

9/12/62

LANSDALE writes a memo to TAYLOR, RUSK, and MCNAMARA assuring them that the CIA will consider attacks on Soviet personnel while planning Phase II.

De Mohrenschildt is in Dallas. He writes to Paul Raigorodsky about a Haitian venture.

1/4/62

146 /SGA approved in principle a proposed set of operations on September 14, 1962, Bundy  
... made it clear that this did not constitute a blanket approval of every item in the paper and that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example, will have to be presented in more detail on a case by case basis. (Memo of SGA Meeting, 9/14/62, p. 1)

1/15/62

Marina says her Russian friend Pavel Golovachev sent her some information about a play titled "A Man With a Rifle" She had previously written asking about it.

9/28/62

FBI learns that Oswald is subscribing to the "Worker."

9/1/62

Tom S. Palmer becomes head of the Dallas AGVA. On November 24, 1963, before Ruby kills Oswald, former AGVA head Conrad Brown calls Palmer's secretary and leaves a message for Jack Ruby: "tell him the letter would do us no good now" - Palmer testified that he didn't know what the message meant.

Oswald allegedly became an FBI informant this month, according to various allegations. At \$200. a month, #179.

Carlos Marcello allegedly threatens JFK in Louisiana. Spoke of having Kennedy shot.

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Donald P. Norton, who claims to have been a CIA operative since 1957, says he was sent this month from Atlanta to Mexico with \$50,000 for anti-Castro group which

10/4/62

ROBERT KENNEDY begins chairing SG(A).

the stepped-up Course B plan. At an SGA meeting on October 4, 1962, Robert Kennedy stated that the President "is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations." The Attorney

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10/7/62 Oswalds meet De Mohrenschildts after a concert in Dallas.

10/9/62 Oswald rents a postal box in Dallas - using a false address.

A note found in Ruby's apartment had the following notation:  
"American Airlines, Tuesday Oct 9 - 985, 11-11:30 AM"

This appears to refer to a flight landing in Dallas from New York.

10/14/62

The SG(A) approves a set of operations for MONGOOSE Phase II, reserving "sensitive ones such as sabotage" for approval on a case by case basis after more detailed presentation.

MONGOOSE framework. In response to this proposal, the SGA decided that "considerably more sabotage" should be undertaken, and that "all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime." (Minutes of SGA Meeting, 10/14/62, p. 3) \* However, on October 30,

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10/16/62

A HELMS memo for the record says that ROBERT KENNEDY has severely criticized MONGOOSE for the lack of anything but intelligence collection.

ROBERT KENNEDY institutes daily meetings with the working group representatives, i.e., HARVEY, LANSDALE, "and the other Agency members".

146

period of the Missile Crisis. Helms noted in a memorandum of a meeting on October 16, 1962, that Robert Kennedy, in expressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with MONGOOSE, "pointed out that [MONGOOSE] had been underway for a year \* \* \* that there had been no acts of sabotage and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice." (Memo by Helms, 10/16/62) A memo-

\* The SGA also decided on October 4, 1962, that Robert Kennedy would chair the Group meetings "for the time being." (Id., p. 3.) Subsequently, at a meeting on October 16, 1962 Robert Kennedy stated that he was going to give MONGOOSE "more personal attention" in view of the lack of progress and would hold daily meetings with the working group representatives, i.e., Lansdale, Harvey, and the other Agency members. (Memo of Meeting by Helms, 10/16/62, p. 1) Helms testified that he did not recall any such daily meetings with the Attorney General. He had the impression there may have been several at first but that then they ceased. (Helms, 7/17/75, pp. 54-55)

133



10/22-28/62

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS!!!!!!

HARVEY orders agent teams int<sup>9</sup> Cuba to support any United States military action that might occur. ROBERT KENNEDY takes "a great deal of exception" and MCCONE orders the mission halted. (WALTER ELDER would later tell the Church Committee that the effect of this was that HARVEY "earned another black mark as not being fully under control"

The Executive Committee established.

10/30/62

SG(A) orders a halt on all sabotage operations.

148 / 1962, the Special Group (Augmented) ordered a halt to all sabotage operations. (Lansdale Memo for the record, 10/30/62)<sup>1</sup>

10/1/62

Oct. '62 (Harvey testified that he had a "confrontation" with Robert Kennedy at the height of the Missile Crisis concerning Harvey's order that agent teams be sent into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. Harvey stated that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to this order and, as a result, McCone ordered Harvey to stop the agent operations (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 80-81). Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, similarly described this incident and stated that, although Harvey had attempted to get guidance from top officials during the Missile Crisis, Harvey "earned another black mark as not being fully under control." (Elder, 8/13/75, pp. 34-35)

The Cuban exile leader involved in the assassination plot may have seen the Attorney General on one further occasion shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. Rosselli testified that this Cuban

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11/ /62

MAXWELL TAYLOR appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Taylor served as Chairman of the SGA during the MONGOOSE Operation (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 12), and as President Kennedy's Military Representative and Intelligence Advisor after the Bay of Pigs until his appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1962. (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 11; Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 25) He, 155

In November 1962 the proposal for a major new covert action program to overthrow Castro was developed. The President's Assistant, Richard Goodwin, and General Edward Lansdale, who was experienced in counter-insurgency operations, played major staff roles in creating this program, which was named Operation MONGOOSE. 139

<sup>1</sup> A cover memorandum by Lansdale transmitting the CIA estimate to Robert Kennedy criticized the estimate's assessment that "it is highly improbable that an extensive popular uprising could be fomented" against Castro as a "conclusion of fact quite outside the area of intelligence." Lansdale stated that the estimate "seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose your program" (referring to the proposed overall MONGOOSE operation). (Memo, Lansdale to Robert Kennedy, 11/62, p. 1) As discussed in detail at p. 140, Lansdale's basic concept for the MONGOOSE program was to overthrow Castro through an internal revolt of the Cuban people. 137

late 1962

The Special Group (Augmented) dissolved.

The Special Group resumes its responsibility regarding covert action/Cuba.

Operation MONGOOSE disbanded.

~~The Cuban Coordinating Committee established at the State Department. It has the responsibility for developing covert action proposals.~~

The Standing Group replaces the Executive Committee in formulating Cuba policy. (This seems to be little more than a name change.) The members are ROBERT KENNEDY, ROBERT MCNAMARA, JOHN MCCONE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, and TED SORENSON.

1963

JANUARY to August

1/4/63

MCGEORGE BUNDY writes a memo to President KENNEDY suggesting exploration of possible communication with CASTRO.

1/26-27/63

Ruby travels to Wichita, Kan.

1/ /63

DESMOND FITZGERALD replaces HARVEY as the head of Task Force W which is renamed the Special Affairs Staff.

2/7/63

Ruby calls Houston, Tex. twice.

2/11/63

Ruby receives a call from Jackson, Kansas.

2/18/63

Ralph Paul buys a \$2200.00 cashier's check.

2/ /63

The Mafia plot is ended according to HARVEY.

1/24/64

The CIA tells the FBI liaison (still SAM PAPICH?) that there are no active plots against CASTRO.

3/18/63

Alpha 66 and the Second National Front of Escambray, Cuban exile groups, attack a Soviet vessel off the north coast of Cuba.

3/26/63

Commandos L-66 attack a Soviet vessel off Cuba.

(Note: the Chief of the JMWAVE, Miami CIA, station testified before the Church Committee that after these raids "the whole apparatus of government, Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization, FBI, CIA, were working together to try to keep these operations from going to Cuba".)

3/1/63

MAFIA - CIA plots AGAINST Castro and according to Rosselli.

4/3/63

The Special Group decides that Cuba sabotage operations are not worth the effort.

\* At an April 3, 1963 meeting on Cuba, Bundy stated that no sabotage operations were then underway because the Special Group "had decided . . . that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it." (Memorandum of Meeting on Cuba, 4/3/63)

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4/7/63

At the April 7 meeting, Rusk opposed sabotage raids because they were unproductive and had a "high noise level" that called attention to them. Rusk added he suspected the "Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of possibly wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U.S. involvement in order to increase that involvement." (Id, p. 2) McCone

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4/21/63

A MCGEORGE BUNDY memo to the Standing Group discusses possible new directions for American policy towards Cuba. Three possibilities are mentioned: 1) forcing a non-Communist solution by necessary means; 2) insisting on major but limited ends; or 3) moving in the direction of gradual accomodation.

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In his April 21 memorandum on "Cuban Alternatives" Bundy identified three possible alternatives: (1) forcing "a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means," (2) insisting on "major but limited ends," or (3) moving "in the direction of a gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro." (Bundy Memorandum, 4/21/63, p. 3) These alternatives were discussed at the Standing Group meetings on April 23 and May 28, 1963.

4/23/63

The Standing Group assigns the CIA Office of National Estimates the task of assessing possible developments in the event of CASTRO's death.

BUNDY's alternatives are discussed but no decisions/conclusions are made at the Standing Group meeting.

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(Memorandum, Bundy to the President, 1/4/63) Bundy's memorandum on "Cuba Alternatives" of April 23, 1963, also listed the "gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro" among policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, 4/21/63)

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4/23/63 (cont'd)

After the Standing Group's meeting on April 23, 1963, the CIA's Office of National Estimates was assigned the task of assessing possible developments if Castro should die. (Memorandum for Members of the Standing Group, 5/2/63) The resulting paper analyzed the

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5/28/63

The Standing Group discusses the Office of National Estimates response to the 4/23 assignment. They decide that the possibilities for favorable developments are "singularly unpromising" if CASTRO should die.

On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group discussed this paper. The Group decided that "all of the courses of action were singularly unpromising". (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963)

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172 The Standing Group again met on May 28, 1963. McCone argued for steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplemented by sabotage to "create a situation in Cuba in which it would be possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting to overthrow Castro." (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting,

6/3/63

The Special Group agrees with BUNDY regarding the usefulness of exploration of possible communication with Castro.

At a meeting on June 3, 1963, the Special Group agreed it would be a "useful endeavor" to explore "various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to Castro." (Memorandum of Special Group meeting, 6/6/63)

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6/19/63

President KENNEDY writes a memo to the Special Group which authorizes sabotage efforts, subject to the specific approval by the Special Group. The objective of the plan is not to overthrow CASTRO but to cause unrest, defections, etc.

During the first six months of 1963, little, if any, sabotage activity against Cuba was undertaken.<sup>1</sup> However, on June 19, 1963, following the Standing Group's discussion of Cuba policy in the spring, President Kennedy approved a sabotage program.<sup>2</sup> (Memorandum for the Special Group, 6/19/63) In contrast to the MONGOOSE program, which sought to build toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963 covert action program had a more limited objective, i.e., "to nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other byproducts of unrest." (id)

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<sup>1</sup>The sabotage program was directed at "four major segments of the Cuban economy: (1) electric power; (2) petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (3) railroad and highway transportation and (4) production and manufacturing. (Memorandum for the Special Group, June 19, 1963, p. 1.) Operations under this program were to be conducted by CIA-controlled Cuban agents from a United States island off Florida and were to complement a similar effort designed to "develop internal resistance elements which could carry out sabotage." (id)

173

6/19/63

HARVEY and ROSSELLI meet. HARVEY says that this is a going away dinner since he has been transferred overseas and will not be seeing much of his old friend JOHN ROSSELLI anymore.

1/63 (cont'd)

jc4

<sup>1</sup>The briefing is described *supra* at p. 131. According to the Inspector General's Report, Harvey and Rosselli had a farewell dinner before Harvey went on another assignment in June 1963. The meeting was observed by the FBI and Sam Pappich. The FBI liaison with the CIA, notified Harvey that FBI Director Hoover would be informed. Harvey asked Pappich to call him if he felt that Hoover would inform the Director about the incident.

7/31/63

The FBI raids a Cuban exile training base and weapons cache near New Orleans.

8/16/63

An article on the CIA use of GIANCANA appears in the Chicago Sun Times. MCCONE asks HELMS for an explanation. HELMS gives MCCONE a copy of the 5/14/62 memo from EDWARDS to ROBERT KENNEDY. The one that erroneously reported that the project had been terminated, remember? HELMS offers nothing further by way of explanation. WALTER ELDER is present at the meeting.

(v) *The August 1963 Briefing of McCone.*—An August 16, 1963, Chicago Sun Times article claimed that the CIA had had a connection with Giancana.<sup>2</sup> McCone asked Helms for a report about the article. McCone testified that when Helms came to see him, he brought the following memorandum: .107

1. Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May of 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that it had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year.

2. I spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening, and, in the absence of Mr. Rannerman on leave, I was with Colonel Edwards' assistance able to locate this copy. As far as I am aware, this is the only written information available on Agency relationships with subject. I hope that this will serve your purpose.

3. I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment. (Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana, from Helms, 8/16/63) \*

8/163

Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified that he had not known of the underworld operation until August 1963, after it had been terminated, and that in his opinion McCone did not learn of the operation prior to that time. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 15)<sup>2</sup> 101

<sup>2</sup> McCone testified that he first learned of the Rosselli operation in August 1963, long after it had been terminated. See discussion *infra*, pp. 107-108. 99

<sup>3</sup> In August 1963 Helms gave McCone a copy of Edwards' May 14, 1962 memorandum to the Attorney General. See discussion *infra* at p. 107. 101

(52)  
September

9/7/63

CIA case officers have their first meeting with AMLASH, a Cuban official named CUBELA, since the Missile Crisis. CUBELA, who is close to CASTRO, tells the case officers that he is interested in doing an "inside job" and awaits a plan of action from the United States.

CASTRO threatens United States leaders in an interview with DANIEL HARKER, an AP reporter.

9/18/63

UGARTE allegedly sees OSWALD at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

9/27/63

An unidentified man contacts the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and inquires about visas for Odessa. (CD 1084D)

OSWALD visits the Cuban Embassy and talks with SYLVIA DURAN. (WR 734)

OSWALD visits the Soviet Embassy and speaks with either Yatskov or Kostikov. (WR 734)

OSWALD Returns to the Cuban Embassy with passport photos; DURAN calls the Soviet Embassy; OSWALD argues with AZQUE, a Cuban Embassy official.

Soviet Embassy calls DURAN back. (HOCH, a critic, and others allege that these phone calls were taped by the CIA.)

9/28/63  
(Saturday)

OSWALD visits the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

DURAN contacts the Soviet Embassy and puts an American male on the phone. The American says, in "very poor Russian," that he will return shortly to the Soviet Embassy with his address.

The American evidently returns to the Soviet Embassy.

Oswald returns to the Cuban Embassy where DURAN tells him he has to get a Soviet visa. DURAN gives OSWALD her address.

9/ /63

WILLIAM ATWOOD, Special Advisor to the United States' United Nations delegation, begins a series of talks with the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. ROBERT KENNEDY encourages the effort. ATWOOD reports regularly to the White House and to ADLAI STEVENSON, United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

In the fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor to the United States Delegation to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 3) Atwood testified that from September until November 1963, he held a series of talks with the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations to discuss opening negotiations on an accommodation between Castro and the United States. Atwood said that at the outset he informed Robert Kennedy of these talks and was told that the effort "was worth pursuing." (Atwood, 7/10/75, pp. 5-9) Atwood said he regularly reported on the talks to the White House and to Adlai Stevenson, his superior at the United Nations. (Atwood, 7/10/75, pp. 6-7) Atwood stated that he was told

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At a meeting late in the fall of 1963, AM/LASH again raised the possibility of defecting, but indicated that he would be willing to continue working against the Castro Regime if he received firm assurances of American support. According to Case Officer 2, AM/LASH requested military supplies, a device with which to protect himself if his plots against Castro were discovered, and a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp. 48-49)

87

Fitzgerald met AM/LASH in late fall 1963 and promised him that the United States would support a coup against Castro. (Case

87

The Case Officer who took over the AM/LASH project in September 1963 recalled being briefed by Case Officer 1 on AM/LASH's belief that Castro's assassination was a necessary first step in a coup. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 26)

87

OCTOBER

10/1/63

OSWALD contacts the Soviet Military Attache and is referred to the Consulate in Mexico City.

OSWALD goes to the Soviet Embassy where he talks to the guard in "halting Russian". OSWALD reports a visit two days earlier and asks about a telegram.

PEDRO GUIITERREZ allegedly sees OSWALD leave the Cuban Embassy and get into a car which was subsequently traced to the DURAN'S.

10/2/63

OSWALD apparently leaves Mexico City.

10/3/63 Special Group approves nine Cuban operations.

A CIA memo dated 1/31/64 (CD 347) makes this the cut-off date for OSWALD leaving Mexico.

After initial approval, specific intelligence and sabotage operations were submitted to the Special Group for prior authorization. On October 3, 1963, the Special Group approved nine operations in Cuba, several of which involved sabotage. 173

10/4/63 CD 1287, an affidavit executed by HELMS, says that the picture of the Mexico Mystery Man, which still causes so much consternation, was taken on this day. (Hereinafter I will refer to the photo as the MMM photo.)

10/6/63 FBI Headquarters learns of OSWALDS contacts with the foreign embassies in Mexico. (Note: This is an entry in the chronology in the back of Book V of the Church Report. So far I can't explain it.)

10/9/63 Mexico City CIA Station cables CIA Headquarters regarding an American's visit to the Soviet Embassy, evidently identified the man as LEE HENRY OSWALD. This is CIA Item 1.

10/10/63 CIA Headquarters cables background information on OSWALD to the Mexico City Station (MCS) and tells them to pass the info in the 10/9 cable to the FBI and other "interested Federal agencies".

CIA MCS cables info to FBI, State, and Navy. This cable has the erroneous description (the 10/9 one probably did also) and repeats the name error. This is the infamous 10/10 cable.

An informant tells the FBI that the CIA is meeting with AMLASH.

10/11/63 Navy forwards its copy of the 10/10 cable to "G2-USMC".

10/18/63 CIA gives the FBI in Mexico City the info regarding the OSWALD/KOSTIKOV 9/28-contact.

The FBI begins an attempt to establish OSWALD's entry into Mexico and his whereabouts.

10/22/63 FBI Dallas Airtel to HQ reports that INS in Dallas has CIA info regarding OSWALD trip.

10/22/63 FBI HQ sends Legal Attache in Mexico a cable furnishing brief summary of data on OSWALD in FBI files.

10/23/63 CIA sends a supplementary telegram to Navy



10/24/63

The Special Group authorizes 13 major Cuban sabotage operations.

President KENNEDY meets JEAN DANIEL, a French journalist, who is in transit to Cuba. They discuss prospects for re-establishing United States-Cuba relations. KENNEDY asks DANIEL to report back to him.

174 Atwood said he believed that the only people who knew about his contacts with the Cubans were the President, Ambassador Averell Harriman, Ambassador Stevenson, Attorney General Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Bundy's assistant, and journalist Lisa Howard.<sup>1</sup> Atwood also testified that he arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel, to visit the White House prior to Daniel's scheduled trip to see Castro. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 19) (According to an article by Daniel in December 1963, Daniel met with President Kennedy on October 24, 1963. They discussed the prospects for reestablishing United States-Cuba relations and President Kennedy asked Daniel to report to him after seeing Castro.)<sup>2</sup>

On October 24, 1963, thirteen major sabotage operations, including the sabotage of an electric power plant, an oil refinery, and a sugar mill, were approved for the period from November 1963 through January 1964. (Memorandum, 7/11/75, CIA Review Staff to Select Committee, on "Approved CIA Covert Operations into Cuba")

10/25/63

The New Orleans FBI tells SA HOSTY in Dallas that another agency has learned that OSWALD contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City early in the month.

SA DEBRUEYS report on the New Orleans Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) is dated. It contains no mention of OSWALD's Mexican adventure.

10/29/63

The head of the CIA Special Affairs Staff, DESMOND FITZGERALD, meets AMLASH/CUBELA and represents himself as a personal representative of ROBERT KENNEDY. FITZGERALD tells AMLASH that the United States would support a Coup in Cuba.

10/31/63

SA KAACK's report on OSWALD notes that OSWALD has moved from New Orleans on 9/25/63 "ostensibly for Texas". The report does not mention the Mexican adventure.

(56)

101 163

113

Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer, served as Secretary of the Special Group from 1957 until October 1963. (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 4) Parrott stated that by virtue of this assignment, he was Allen Dulles' assistant in the Special Group. He came to know Dulles well, and gained an understanding of the Director's method of expression and his practice in dealing with the President. (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 13-14)

M

Desmond Fitzgerald met AM/LASH in October 1963, and represented to AM/LASH that he was the personal representative of Robert Kennedy. He gave AM/LASH assurances of full support should AM/LASH succeed in overthrowing Castro.

The 1967 Inspector General's Report states that, according to Fitzgerald, Helms and Fitzgerald discussed the planned meeting with AM/LASH, and Helms decided "it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for Fitzgerald to speak in his name." (I.G.

Each case officer testified that he did not ask AM/LASH to assassinate Castro. The record clearly reveals, however, that both officers were aware of his desire to take such action. A cable to Headquarters reporting on a 1963 meeting with AM/LASH stated:

57

Have no intention give AM/LASH physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative.

NOVEMBER

11/18/63

ATWOOD speaks by telephone to a member of CASTRO's staff expressing a desire to work out an agenda for preliminary negotiations at the United Nations. ATWOOD reports this to BUNDY who tells him that President KENNEDY wants to see him as soon as the agenda is worked out. (Question: Could the staff member have been CUBELA who we know was also working with E. HOWARD HUNT's main exile connection, MANUEL ARTIME?)

The FBI learns of OSWALD's letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington reporting his Mexican contacts.

EPSTEIN, author of Inquest, alleges (on p. 92) that the FBI received the MMM photo on this date with a report on OSWALD's contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. He is evidently quoting LIEBELER on this. I know of no other support for this allegation.

On November 18, 1963, Atwood spoke by telephone with a member of Castro's staff in Cuba. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 8) Pursuant to White House instructions, Atwood informed Castro's staff member that the United States favored preliminary negotiations at the United Nations (rather than in Cuba as proposed by the Cubans), and that the United States desired to work out an agenda for these talks. (Atwood, 7/10/75, pp. 8-9) Atwood reported this conversation to Bundy who told him that after the Cuban agenda was received, President Kennedy wanted to see Atwood to "decide what to say and whether to go or what we should do next." (*id.*, p. 9) Jean Daniel, the French journalist, met with Castro four days later on November 22, 1963, the same day AM/LASH was given the poison pen. On that same day, President Kennedy was assassinated. With the change of Administrations, Atwood's talks with the Cubans became less frequent, and eventually ceased early in 1964. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 10)

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11/22/63

President KENNEDY is assassinated in Dallas.

MCCONE requests all CIA material on OSWALD.

MCS cables CIA HQ to inform them of the October trip.

FBI HQ dispatches a cable to all field offices ordering utilization of all informants and to resolve all allegations.

A CIA Case Officer meets with AMLASH and gives him a poison pen and a promise of arms and support.

JEAN DANIEL meets with CASTRO.

MCS recognizes OSWALD's name and a search of their files turns up the MMM photo which is sent to the FBI in Dallas. A tape of a conversation at one of the Embassies was also sent.

72 The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22, 1963—the very day that President Kennedy was shot in Dallas—when a CIA official offered a poison pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same time an emissary from President Kennedy was meeting with Castro to explore the possibility of improved relations.

On November 22, 1963, Fitzgerald and the case officer met with AM/LASH and offered him the poison pen, recommending that he use Blackleaf-40, a deadly poison which is commercially available. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 112) The Inspector General's Report noted that "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent \* \* \* and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro." (I.G. Report, p. 94) 89

Although Fitzgerald and the case officer assured AM/LASH on November 22, 1963 that CIA would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted) the situation changed when the case officer and Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with AM/LASH changed and it was decided that we could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and would not aid AM/LASH in this attempt \* \* \*. AM/LASH was not informed of (this decision) until he was seen by the case officer in November, 1964. 89

11/23/63

J. EDGAR HOOVER sends a memo to J.J. ROWLEY, head of the Secret Service, transmitting the results of the FBI's investigation to date. It says, in part: "The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source had reported that an individual identified himself as LEE OSWALD, who contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring as to any messages. Special Agents of this Bureau, who have conversed with OSWALD in Dallas Texas, have observed photographs of the individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual was not LEE HARVEY OSWALD." (I do not know if the Warren Commission (WC) saw this report.)

MCCONE briefs President JOHNSON and MCGEORGE BUNDY on the Mexico City material.

The CIA Counter-Intelligence Staff, headed by JAMES ANGLETON, prepares a memo suggesting sinister implications of OSWALD's Mexico City contacts.

A CIA Desk Officer (possibly ARTHUR DOOLEY) is put in charge of the CIA investigation.

SYLVIA DURAN is arrested in spite of CIA attempts to prevent her arrest.

FBI HQ cables all field offices rescinding its 11/22 order to use all informants.

A CIA liaison officer cables three reports, and the supporting cables between MCS and CIA HQ, to ROBERT INMAN BOUCK, head of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service.

SA ODUM shows the MMM photo to MARGUERITE OSWALD.

Hoover forwarded an FBI memo to LBJ which detailed results of Bureau's preliminary investigation.

11/24/63

MCS cables CIA HQ all names of known contacts with "certain Soviet personnel". The list includes CUBELA.

MCCONE briefs President JOHNSON on CIA plans against Cuba.

JACK RUBY murders LEE HARVEY OSWALD.

The CIA prepares a summary of "relevant information on OSWALD. This summary says that their first information on OSWALD came from MCS on 10/9. It says that the MMM photo was found in a search of the MCS files on 11/22. It says that OSWALD entered Mexico on 9/27, probably by car. It sets forth OSWALD's visits to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City. There is no mention of the 10/10 description or name discrepancy.

11/25/63

UGARTE tells his story about seeing the money passed to OSWALD at the Cuban Embassy.

MCS cables HQ reminding them of CASTRO's threat on 9/7.

CIA internal memo reports that unidentified officers had an intelligence interest in OSWALD and the fact that the author had discussed the laying on of interviews. Refers to their interest "in the HARVEY story".

Ambassador MANN cables State Dept. saying that he and FBI and CIA representatives would like an "FBI officer thoroughly knowledgeable about all aspects of the U.S. end of the investigation be sent here to consult" so the Mexican station can do a thorough job. This is State Dept. Cable # 1182.

After a conference with the White House, Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr announced that a court of inquiry would be held by Texas. Carr named Leon Jaworski and Dean Robert G. Storey as special counsel.

11/26/63

MCCONE is instructed by President JOHNSON to make all CIA resources available to the FBI.

CIA HQ cables Europe and [redacted] stations for all information on the assassination, especially that from a particular sensitive source.

Assistant Attorney General KATZENBACH writes a memo to presidential advisor MOYERS regarding the importance of satisfying the public that the assassination was not a conspiracy.

State Dept. replies to cable # 1182 from THOMAS MANN, United States Ambassador to Mexico, reporting that the CIA and Justice concur with his recommendation but that HOOVER says the FBI representative has been given all the information available and another officer would add nothing of material importances. Cable ends with: "HOOVER suggests that if local FBI rep feels he needs additional assistance he make request to Washington through his channels."

Senator Everett M. Dirksen proposed that the Senate Judiciary Committee conduct a full investigation into the assassination.

11/27/63

One CIA station cables information recieved from the sensitive source.

FBI sends a supervisor to Mexico City to coordinate the investigation there.

Ambassador MANN cables the State Dept. through CIA channels making suggestions concerning the investigation.

ALEXIS JOHNSON cables MANN thanking him for his concern and informing him that the FBI is calling the shots. He is also told that his communication is to be with A. JOHNSON and RICHARD HELMS rather than with DEAN RUSK and JOHN MCCONE.

ALEXIS JOHNSON cables MANN telling him, basically, to quit having Mexicans arrested and urging initiatives on the Mexican government. The FBI will let him know if anything is needed.

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Congressman Charles E. Goodell proposed in the House that a Joint Committee composed of seven senators and seven reps., conduct an inquiry.

11/28/63

CIA HQ cables MCS to follow all leads.

CIA HQ cable to MCS warns that MANN may cause a "flap" with the Cubans.

Ambassador MANN cables State Dept. speculating about OSWALD and Russia, and Cuba and CASTRO.

Ambassador MANN sends another set of recommendations to the State Department.

ALEXIS JOHNSON cables MANN that the State Dept. and the FBI concur in his recommendations and has sent guidance to the FBI there.

11/29/63

President JOHNSON announces the formation of the Warren Commission after discussion with HOOVER.

LBJ told Hoover that although he wanted to get by on just the FBI report, the only way to stop the rash of investigations was to appoint a high level committee to evaluate the report. (Hoover memo )

11/30/63

The FBI reports that the CIA has no information on JACK RUBY as of 11/25.

MCCONE and President JOHNSON discuss Cuba and UGARTE story.

MANN cables State Dept. relaying fact that UGARTE has recanted in a "long confession".

LBJ created the Warren Commission by Executive Order 11130 "to ascertain, evaluate and report upon the facts relating to the assass." "The purposes of the Commission are to examine the evidence that may hereafter come to light or be uncovered by fed. or state authorities; to make such further investigation as the Commission finds desirable; to evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding such assass., including the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assass.; and to report to me its findings and conclusions."

11/30/63 (cont'd)

LBJ states in The Vantage Point that the idea of a national commission was first mentioned to him by Eugene Rostow (Yale Law School). Dean Rusk and columnist Joseph Alsop made the same recommendation. His considerations in forming the commission were:

- (1) it could not be an Executive Branch agency. It had to be "beyond pressure and above suspicion."
- (2) it was too large an issue for Texas authorities to handle alone
- (3) it had to be bi-partisan

DECEMBER

12/1/63

MCCONE, President JOHNSON, MCGEORGE BUNDY discuss UGARTE story.

CIA HQ cables MCS regarding a delayed Cubana Airlines flight.

12/2/63

MCCONE meets JOHNSON and BUNDY in the morning.

MCCONE has a CIA meeting regarding Cuba in the afternoon.

The New York Times prints a story about the MMM photo.

12/3/63

CIA HQ recieves information from MCS regarding a Cuban - American's travel on 11/23 and 11/27.

~~MANN cables State relaying that UGARTE has gone back to his original story and suggesting that the CIA and FBI interview him.~~

12/4/63

CIA HQ recieves report from a Cuban agent regarding meeting OSWALD.

An FBI internal memo from one Assistant Director to another, SULLIVAN to BELMONT, says there is no indication of foriegn involvement.



12/5/63

First meeting of Warren Commission:

Warren stated (p. 1 of transcript):

"Now I think our job here is essentially one for the evaluation of evidence as distinguished from being one of gathering evidence, and I believe that at the outset at least we can start with the premise that we can rely upon the reports of the various agencies that have been engaged in investigation of the matter, the FBI, the Secret Service, and others that I may not know about at the present time."

p.2- "...I do not believe it is necessary for us to have the power of subpoena."

p.12- agreed to pass on leads to FBI, followed by a discussion about press relations and also the Ruby trial. Then they went back to the subpoena issue. Also discussed the Texas court of inquiry. Unanimously decided to request Congress for subpoena power. Katzenbach was also present.

Russell: "...we want to avoid any witnesses just as long as we possibly can." Russell did not think the WC should hear witnesses and did not want the subpoena power.

Warren recommended Warren Olney as counsel. Russell moved to make a committee of Warren, McCloy, Dulles, and Ford to select a chief counsel. They agreed to meet that afternoon.

Russell: p.53- "Frankly, I don't know if I will ever feel the same to the President for putting me on this commission. I told him I didn't want to serve, and wouldn't serve, but I couldn't figure any way out of it."

Warren wrote to Carr requesting the Texas court of inquiry be stopped. Carr accepted.

The CIA completes a "preliminary biographical study on LEE HARVEY OSWALD".

12/6/63

Executive session of WC

1. Discussion of House resolution - whether to include request for immunity powers - decided to include.
2. Dulles distributed a summary pamphlet about what had been broadcast about the assass. from the CIA Foreign Broadcasting Information Service.
3. Discussed Rankin - moved to choose Rankin if Warren and McCloy agreed after checking him.
4. Discussed newspaper article somehow dealing with the FBI (vague).

2/9/63

The FBI completes a five volume report which contains little on OSWALD's Mexican adventure.

Katzenbach wrote each member of the WC recommending that the Commission immediately issue a press release stating that the FBI report clearly showed there was no international conspiracy and Oswald was a loner.

- 12/10/63 HOOVER receives a report from Inspector GALE on the handling of the OSWALD security case.
- MCCONE meets with staff regarding Cuba.
- 12/11/63 CD 1084, the FBI report of the Mexico investigation, is dated. It reveals that the FBI knew of the DURAN call to the Soviet Embassy at least as of this date and that the CIA may have known about it prior to 11/22.
- 12/12/63 MCS reports to CIA HQ that the FBI is pushing to wind up the investigation. (I guess so, their report is already written.)
- ~~12/13/63~~  
12/13/63 The Counter-intelligence Staff is ordered to continue the CIA investigation.
- ~~12/13/63~~  
12/16/63 Congress, in a Joint Resolution, empowered the Commission to subpoena witnesses and grant immunity. (WC never gave immunity.)
- 12/16/63 Executive session of WC
1. Administered oath.
  2. Discussed and adopted a resolution raised by Warren to get raw materials from investigative agencies on which they based their reports.
  3. Discussed staff planning. Resolved to hire Albert Jenner and Francis Adams.
  4. Discussed case generally and leaks to the media.
  5. Jackie Kennedy
- ~~12/20/63~~  
12/20/63 FBI investigative Reports began arriving at the WC's offices.
- 12/23/63 CD 78, an FBI report on OSWALD in Mexico City is dated. It says: CIA "is in possession of information coinciding with the dates when OSWALD was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities in that area....It is suggested that inquiry be made of the (CIA) should further information be desired".

12/28/63

(25)

Willens wrote a memo which proposed that investigation be divided into 5 separate areas and senior and junior lawyer would be assigned to each. Each would prepare a draft chapter. Areas were arranged on a descending scale of generality:

1. Basic Facts of Assassination
2. Identity of assassin
3. LHO's background and motives
4. Possible conspiratorial relationships LHO had

5. Death of LHO

6. (added later) Presidential Protection (The Tippet investigation was considered to be part of No. 2.) Memo also recommended that Marina be first witness.

After everyone organized into teams, Willens divided the FBI and SS reports into areas and gave them to the appropriate team.

Liebeler suggested there be at least one lawyer to read all reports. Rankin replied, "if time permitted."

12/ /63  
(LATE)

The CIA desk officer completes the CIA report of their investigation. The report is submitted to President JOHNSON. I have no indication that the WC recieved this document.

Willens and Rankin arranged for appointment of liaisons between WC and agencies.

1964  
JANUARY

1/3/64

CD 78 is submitted to the WC. (see 12/23/63)

1/8/64

The Secret Service informs the WC that it has 11 secret items from other agencies and suggests that a staff member look at them.

1/11/64

Reports that a bullet had struck the pavement and a bystander had been wounded by the ricochet was submitted to WC by Texas Attorney General. Report sent to Specter. SS requested by Specter in Feb. to investigate. Forrest Sorrels could not find bullet mark. But there was an FBI report of Dilliard interview (who had a photo of the mark) which had been given to Ball. Info did not reach Specter until he had finished investigation.

(66)

1/13/64

FBI Supplemental Report sent to WC.

1/20/64

First meeting with Commission staff. Warren attended and according to Eisenberg memo - 2/17/64 - Warren emphasized quenching rumors and precluding further speculation.

1/21/64

Executive session of WC-

1. Discussed staff.
2. Consultant discussion - Overholser - retired head of St. Elizabeth's Hospital - hired as consultant to advise on matters concerning the life of Oswald and Ruby - part-time.

3. Jim Davis and Goldberg also discussed. Russell brought up the subject of info available on the examination of Oswald in prison.
4. Discussed investigation of LHO's finances - stated that Treasury Dept. had assigned two investigators to the project.
5. Organization of work - Dulles indicated he wanted the items involving motive pulled together by one staff member and have one person assigned to study past assass. attempts. Rankin indicated he himself was performing the latter task.
6. Memo from each area and tentative deadline discussed - Warren did not want to end in middle of a campaign year - suggested June 1.
7. Ruby trial.
8. Discussed the possibility of dividing of areas among the WC members and McCloy brought up questions he had about the case - particularly autopsy and security questions, also where shots came from.
9. Discussed whether WC members were subject to subpoena for Ruby trial.
10. Discussed Marina Oswald and magazine article she was writing and Martin decided to interview Marina in D.C.

1/21/64 (cont'd)

11. Discussed examination procedure.  
Warren stated:  
"And whoever we examine will have his case studied very thoroughly by a member of the staff before there is any interrogation at all, and I thought that it would be better way to do it, to let the counsel examine the witnesses and we sit here as near like judges as the situation will permit...And I thought that in every case where we have lengthy interrogation we ought to have at least two Commissioners present."
12. Rankin gave WC a list of material received and visual aids and stated:  
"Now, we have, as Dulles said, piles of, about as high as the room of their raw material which in my conception you don't care to look at except where there is a particular dispute that you want to evaluate, and I thought that in each one of these areas, I will check out the evidence that is rejected in any case, where someone has claimed that they saw Oswald and it is established that there is nothing to the story, by two or three other witnesses or he admits finally that he didn't see him, that kind of a witness, we have that kind of stuff in there, too."
- 13-discussed hiring a handwriting and fingerprint consultant to check FBI.
- 14-Discussed discrepancy between FBI and Secret Service measurements.
- 15-Press relations.
- 16-Resolution passed delegating authority by Commission to General Counsel to handle administrative matters.
- 17-Discussed private members of the Commission and staff and special Government employees (possible conflict of interests).

'21/64 (cont'd)

- 18-Interview with Jackie Kennedy-decided to have Warren speak to her. Followed by a discussion off the record requested by Rankin. (pp. 63-73 deleted).
- 19-Whether to cremate remains of LHO.
- 20-Procedures to be followed by WC-resolution passed authorizing WC to issue subpoenas, to take testimony "and so forth."
- 21-Letter from John M. Thorne-Marina's Attorney-  
~~arranging date for testimony.~~

22-Mark Lane.

23-Oswald's personal effects-agreed they should not be returned.

24-Marina's story and testimony.

25-Denied request of D.A. Wade and Ruby's attorney for disclosure of investigating material.

26-Letter to Hoover about #24 (above) and letter to Lane.

27-Security Precaution

Rankin informed by Waggoner Carr that LHO had been a paid informant, Rankin told Warren. Emergency meeting held (5:30 pm); decided to have Carr and Wade come to D.C. immediately. (A-16)

(67)

1/23/64

JAMES ANGLETON, head of the CIA Counter-intelligence Staff, is placed in charge of CIA relations with the WC by HELMS, his immediate superior (DDP). Church Committee

Book V says: "It is important to note that Mr. ANGLETON testified he was often in contact with DULLES after the latter had left the Agency. ANGLETON testified that DULLES consulted with him before agreeing to President JOHNSONS request that he be on the Commission and that he was in frequent contact with DULLES. ANGLETON has also indicated that he and DULLES informally discussed the progress of the Commission's investigation and that DULLES consulted with him about further investigation the CIA could do...."

(Note: ANGLETON reportedly, Church Report Book IV, ran the CIS as his personal fiefdom. He maintained contact with the field offices thereby circumventing the standard routing procedure through the area divisions. The Special Affairs Staff had its own Counter-Intelligence Section and the reports did not get to the CIS and the people responsible for doing the assassination investigation, a CIS desk officer. I, personally, find this hard to believe.)

ANGLETON designates RAYMOND ROCCA as the CIA "point of record" for all matters relating to the assassination and the WC. (Note: ROCCA's counterpart at the FBI was ALAN BELMONT, who HOOVER made personally responsible for every scrap of information that went to the WC.)

1/24/64

Secret Service submitted 30 investigative reports to WC - one report contained interview with Hudkins.

Carr and Wade and Alexander flew to D.C. and met with Warren and Rankin. (A16,17)

1/27/64

Immigration and Naturalization file on OSWALD is given to the WC by the Justice Dept. It is designated CD 363. It does not have a copy of the 10/10 cable even though INS was one of the "interested Federal agencies" that MCS sent the cable to.

HAROLD FELDMAN writes an article in Nation referring to the New York Times article on 12/2/63 about the photo of "Ruby" shown to MARGUERITE OSWALD by SA ODUM. (MMM photo).

WC meeting decided to inform FBI of informant allegation. Redlich, Eisenberg, and Specter met with FBI

photographic expert, Lyndal Shaneyfelt, and Thomas Kelly, and Leo Gauthier to conduct frame-by-frame analysis of Z. film.

1/28/64

Rankin discussed informant allegation with Hoover and Hoover: assured Rankin that LHO had never been an informant.

1/31/64

CIA memo on OSWALD, entitled: "Information developed by the CIA on the activity of LEE HARVEY OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September --3 October 1963 w/att photograph of Valery Kostikov becomes CD 347.

1/ /64

ATWOOD lets talks with Cubans die out.

1st formal staff meeting-Rankin told lawyers that truth was only client and to gather facts without forming final conclusions and to not accept the FBI Summary Report as final. Warren was introduced. Rankin also told staff that field investigation would be delayed until completion of Ruby trial. Told staff to continue reading reports and told them to draw up preliminary plans for field investigations by March 1. (A-17)



FEBRUARY

2/3/64

WC recieves CD 347.

2/4/64

YURI NOSENKO, Deputy Director of the Soviet intelligence agency, KGB, in charge of American tourists, defects to the CIA. He brings OSWALD's file with him. HE was subsequently incarcerated by the CIA for 2 years. (EDDOWES, p. 20, alleges that the KGB file has not been examined by anyone outside of the CIA.)

The WC hears their first witness.

W. DAVID SLAWSON writes a memo to HOWARD P. WILLENS which is still withheld. It apparently had twelve questions regarding CD 347.

Warren Commission Hearings began first four days - interviewed Marina.

2/5/64

COLEMAN & SLAWSON write a memo to WILLENS supplementing the 2/4 memo by adding two additional questions for the CIA about OSWALD in Mexico. These two documents are still withheld.

2/6/64

~~Hoover submitted affidavit to WC stating that Oswald was not an informant. (A-37)~~

Staff meeting - lawyers requested Marina be questioned further - Rankin said Commission believed her and there would be no further questioning. Heated argument resulted and one lawyer threatened to resign. Rankin reportedly lost control of the meeting and there were few formal staff meetings after this one. (A-18)

2/7/64

HOOVER writes a letter to RANKIN regarding the 1/27 FELDMAN article. HOOVER says that the MMM photo was not JACK RUBY, but no further information was provided.

2/10/63<sup>64</sup>

THOMAS KARAMESSINES, HELMS deputy, talks with WILLENS about the MMM photo.

MARGUERITE OSWALD testifies about the MMM photo (It should be noted here that the WC has not yet connected this photo with Mexico City unless WILLENS found it out in his meeting with KARAMESSINES. This is doubtful in light of subsequent events.) but is not asked to identify a photo. (This leads PAUL HOCH to conclude that the WC did not have a copy on this date.)

2/11/63<sup>64</sup>

The FBI delivers a cropped MMM photo to the WC after a call from WILLENS to either HOOVER or JAMES J. MALLEY, FBI-WC liaison.

HOCH alleges that there is a letter, this date, RANKIN to HELMS, requesting additional investigation to fill in the gaps in OSWALD's Mexican adventure.

WILLENS drafts letters for RANKIN concerning the MMM photo. (see 2/12/64)

2/12/64

RANKIN letter (drafted by WILLENS) to KARAMESSINES requests an explanation of the circumstances obtaining and identity of the MMM photo. A copy of this letter did not go to SLAWSON .

RANKIN writes MCCONE requesting the information that the CIA has given other agencies but not the WC.

MARGUERITE OSWALD testifies that the MMM photo shown her on this date is trimmed differently than the one SA ODUM showed her.

RANKIN writes HOOVER thanking him for the picture and the 2/7 letter. This letter was drafted by WILLENS on 2/11 and says: "We have been informed by your representative and those of the (CIA) regarding the circumstances of this matter."

RANKIN writes a letter to MCCONE (drafted 2/5 by WILLENS with copies to STERN & SLAWSON) asking for the classified post-assassination reports given to the Secret Service by the CIA and for a report on and a copy of the pre-assassination file on OSWALD.

2/13/64

Hoover sent WC affidavits of ten FBI agents who had had contact with Oswald case, each denied Oswald was an informant.

2/14/64

SLAWSON writes a memo on Mexico City. This memo reports that the information in CD 347 (see 1/31) is ambiguous and that the CIA has been asked for a clarification. The memo does not repeat the information in the 10/10 cable regarding the erroneous description or name mistake. HOCH concludes that the CIA did not include that information in CD 347. We should examine CD 347.)

2/17/64

STERN memo to RANKIN includes a chronology. It also reports that the CIA file was opened on OSWALD on 12/9/60 in response to a State Department request for information on defectors.

2/19/64

CD 384, entitled: "Letter from RICHARD HELMS ... re Information developed by CIA on activity of LEE HARVEY OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September to 3 October 1963" dated and received by the WC. This is a partial reply to the 2/12 requests. It is still withheld.

WILLENS and SLAWSON draft a routine acknowledgment for CD 384.

2/20/64

The FBI in Mexico show photos to PEDRO GUTIERREZ VALENCIA who claims to have seen OSWALD leave the Cuban Embassy and get into a car with an unidentified man. (It would be interesting to know if they showed him a picture of SYLVIA DURAN's husband. GUITERREZ's story is much more plausible than UGARTE's and does not seem to get half the attention. The FBI report is CD 1084e.)

2/21/64

WC acknowledges receipt of CD 384.

CIA submits translations of DURAN interrogation reports. This is CD 426. It is a partial response to the 2/12 requests.

2/24/64

CD 556, an FBI report on GUITERREZ and the photos he was shown, is dated. (see 2/20 and 3/18)

WC executive session four members present.

1. disclosures by M. Oswald regarding LHO and Nixon. (Decided to have James Martin testify 2-27-64)

2. Security precautions response to Sec. Dillon's letter (no discussion of content).

3. Letters requesting info to Justice Dept., CIA, Treasury, and Police Commissioners approved.

4. Status of informant allegation-Rankin presented affidavits of agents, Hoover and interviews. Rankin said they had checked out Hudkins and all show negative. Rankin had requested an explanation of Hosty deletion.

5. Mr. Craig-adviser from ABA. Discussion off the record started by Dulles.

2/25/64

WC obtained original copy of ...Z film; from Life (A-14).

2/26/64

SA Robert Gemberling submitted an affidavit explaining why the FBI, in its 12-23-63 report, had deleted Hosty entry.

2/28/64

COLEMAN & SLAWSON write a memo on the INS file (CD 363) but they do not note that the Mexican material is missing, i.e., the 10/10 cable. How much did the WC know about the October communications at this point?

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The State Dept. gives the WC copies of correspondence between the Dept. and the American Embassy in Mexico that pertain to OSWALD.

3/4/64

Mark Lane testified-open hearing.

1/5/64

The WC receives a copy of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) file on OSWALD containing the 10/10 cable.

A CIA internal memo regarding the 2/12 request dated... (This may be an internal transmittal memo for the 3/6 response.)

It says, in part:

"We have a problem here for your determination. (Staff Officer) does not desire to respond directly to paragraph 2 of that letter (2/12) which made levy for our material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service since 23 November....Unless you feel otherwise, (Staff Officer) would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2." (Question: Could the Staff Officer have been ANGLETON? Could the memo be from ANGLETON or ROCCA to HELMS?

Did ANGLETON and DULLES confer on this?)

MAY 62  
3/3

3/6/64

HELMS responds (partially) to the 2/12 requests by transmitting the exact CIA file up to early October 1963. This is CD 692. CD 347 is included as 692g.

3/9/64

WILLENS sends CD 692 to RANKIN with an internal transmittal memo (which is heavily deleted by the CIA.) This memo says that the Secret Service would not release the materials requested in paragraph 2 of the 2/12 letter. (What happened to the suggestion to come on over and look at them?) It also reports a conversation in which HELMS tells WILLENS that the CIA has "certain unspecified problems" with the request. HELMS also said that some of the info had already been given to the WC and the rest of it was irrelevant matters or things "that had not checked out". HELMS said that he would prefer not to comply with the request. WILLENS says that is unacceptable and they will discuss it at their next meeting. WILLENS also notes that the 3rd paragraph of the letter requested, specifically, material added to the file between October 9 and November 22, 1963. The deleted portions are evidently suggestions on how to deal with the problem.

3/10/64

STERN writes a memo recomen<sup>d</sup>ing the acquisition of all FBI files on OSWALD and drafts a letter making the request. This eventually becomes the 52 questions.

3/11/64

HOOVER submits two photos. (Slawson drafts an acknowledgement on 3/17) It is not clear what these photos depicted.

3/12/64

A very important meeting between 6 WC staffers and 3 CIA men goes down. The following happens.

The RUBY investigative memo is handed to the CIA for comment, apparently with the understanding that they will research it and explore their own files.

HELMS informs them that a) two case officers would know for sure whether OSWALD was an agent; (This is very interesting, why just two officers, who were they, were they the only ones who had contact with OSWALD?); b) OSWALD was not an agent; and 3) The WC would just have to take his word for it on this point.

WILLENS asks about the MMM photo. It is not mentioned in the context of Mexico. HELMS says that they will check into it and get back to WILLENS! (The request was made on 2/12!)

HELMS explains the cut-off point of CD 692 by saying that the CIA excluded all materials relating to the 10/9 and 10/10 cables because they were summarized in CD 347. WILLENS tells HELMS that the staff needs more than the summary. A deal is struck whereby the CIA would provide a paraphrase of the controversial documents and a WC staffer would examine the original file to determine the accuracy of the paraphrases.

-----  
there is no indication that:

- a) the connection between the MMM photo and Mexico has been made.;
- b) that the WC staff has yet noticed the erroneous description in the 10/10 cable or the name problem.

3/14/64

Ruby trial ended.

3/16/64

The WC request a copy of the 10/10 cable from the CIA. (Haven't they found the copy in the ONI file yet? Why didn't they request a copy of the 10/9 cable?)

RANKIN writes to HELMS setting forth his understanding of the deal regarding the 2/12 request made at the 3/12 meeting. (STERN draft, 3/13)

Executive session - four members present - adopted resolution governing the questioning of witnesses by members of the Commission staff. Hearing - the question of where bullet 399 was found first arose when Specter was questioning Humes. Specter told Dulles that they had evidence bullet was found on Connally's stretcher. Also heard autopsy evidence.

An undated autopsy report was introduced into evidence.

3/18/64

FBI gives the WC description of the 3 photos shown GUTIERREZ in Mexico. (This may have tipped the WC as to the origin of the MMM Photo.) This is CD 556. (see 2/20) The report also says that Guterrez was shown 20 photos of "possible white male Americans who had been in Mexico City during September and October 1963, anyone of which could have been the American seen by him at the Embassy."

Willens, Ball, & Belin went to Dallas and laid groundwork for further investigation. Ball and Belin interviewed police officials and key witnesses.

Ball arranged appearances before W.C.

3/19/64

(18)  
RANKIN letter to HELMS asking for a response to the 3/12 RUBY memo/info request. "As you know this Commission is nearing the end of its investigation. We would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible whether you are in a position to comply with this request in the near future."

3/20/64

Ball and Belin conducted an off-the-record reconstruction of LHO's movements. Specter interviewed Tomlinson who stated bullet (399) was from a stretcher in front of Conally's. (A-77)

3/23/64

most of lawyers had, by this time, arrived in Dallas to conduct field investigations. Took depositions of witnesses whom the lawyers had selected after reading the investigative reports.

3/24/64

The CIA reveals the link between the MMM photo and Mexico City, kinda. They provide the 10/10 cables and the 11/23 messages to the Secret Service (were there others?). The Secret Service cables are in regard to photos of Embassy visitors. The CIA leaves it to the WC to put together. This is CD 631. The HELMS cover memo does not explicitly refer to any photo (and the connection to the MMM photo is not obvious from the cables) but HELMS does say, after discussing the MCS request for OSWALD Navy photos (which was not in the ONI file):

"Our conclusion that the photograph did not refer to OSWALD was based on press photos generally available on 23 November 1963."



1-24(64)(cont'd)

CD 674 is dated and recieved by the WC. It is a response to the 2/12 request for info given to the Secret Service. The cover memo and the Secret Service reports delivered on 11/23 are delivered. Attachment A refers to one photo of a visitor to the Cuban Embassy in mid=October. Attachment B refers to people leaving Mexico in early November with names similar to OSWALD. Attachment C refers to several photos of pepole known to frequent the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The cover memo says that attachments a and c refer to photos of the same person--"photographs of an unidentified man who visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies...during October and November 1963." It also refers to "the photographs of the unidentified man that are in our files." HELMS offers to show these photos to WILLENS or STERN, but says they are not related to OSWALD. HELMS dos not mention the MMM photo although an explanation of that photo was specifically requested in the 2/12 requests.

No more CIA documents sent to the WC pertain to the Mexico or MMM photo problems until 6/23.

3/26/64

COLEMAN is still puzzled about the MMM photo. He writes a memo on CD 631 (see 3/24) saying it is only a partial answer to the 3/16 request. "I hope that the complete answe<sup>re</sup> will give us the additional information we requested" . More specifically, he noted that he wanted mor info on what info the CIA had, how they got it and where they got it. COLEMAN also says that they are still trying to get an explanation of the MMM photo from the FBI and "I hope that paragraph four of the memorandum of 3/24/64 sent MR. RANKIN by the CIA is not the answer the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry."

WC sends the FBI 52 questions instead of requesting their files.

RANKIN requests the FBI provide information on pro and anti-CASTRO groups.

3/27/64

STERN writes a memo after examining the CIA OSWALD file. STERN reports that he saw printout from electronic data system and "There was no item listed which we have not been given either in full text or paraphrased." Stern requests a briefing on the Electronic Data Processing System.

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CORPORATION

127/64 (cont'd)

Also reports that he saw  
the cables from MGS to  
HQ T2: photos given to  
SS on 11/23/63. The 10/10  
cable. No mention of the  
1/2 cable is made. Materials  
after 11/23 NOT REVIEWED.

3/31/64

STERN writes a memo to SLAWSON in which he says:  
"I am planning to write to ONI to request an  
explanation of noticable delays in their  
performance of liaison functions." There is  
no record that I've been able to find that the  
letter was ever written or sent.

3/ 164  
(early)

1. Each team submitted a list of witnesses to Rankin.
  2. Each team sent questions that required further investigation to Willens, who forwarded them to FBI, CIA, SS.
  3. Drew up problems and plans of attack.
- Specter discussed time problem informally with Humes and Boswell - Humes suggested both men could have been shot by one bullet (All 5)

APRIL

4/1/64

ROCCA transmits to STERN, on a loan basis, a classified paper, "A National Name Index Network".

COLEMAN & SLAWSON draft a memo which recommends that PEDRO GUTIERREZ BALENCIA's statements "must...be given serious consideration."

4/7/64

President JOHNSON orders the Special Group to discontinue all sabotage operations against Cuba.

State Dept. cables Ambassador FREEMAN (Mexico) informing him of the pending visit by COLEMAN, SLAWSON & WILLENS. The cable tells him to let them have access to documents, which are listed in the cable, "which have been made available to the (WC) with concurrence of CIA and FBI". The cable also says that Embassy officials should cooperate in arranging meetings with Mexican officials should the WC staffers desire such meetings. (Note: as to the documents,

4/7/64  
(cont'd)

thing that they haven't already seen and this is what they have seen." But the staffers don't seem to be bothered by the MMM photo or the CIA cables after this visit. It would be interesting to know what went down.) A copy of this cable went to WINFIELD SCOTT, the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City. (Ambassadors come and go but the CIA is always there.)

According to the minutes of a Special Group meeting on April 7, 1964, President Johnson decided to discontinue the use of CIA-controlled sabotage raids against Cuba. (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, 4/7/64) A McCone memorandum indicated that in reaching that decision, President Johnson had abandoned the objective of Castro's overthrow.

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\* In a memorandum the day after President Johnson's decision to stop CIA-controlled sabotage operations, McCone stated: "the real issue to be considered at the meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement the policy (outlined in certain memoranda) or abandon the basic objective of bringing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed nature which might accomplish this objective". (Memorandum by McCone, 4/8/64)

177

4/8-13/64

SLAWSON, COLEMAN & WILLENS visit Mexico City. They confer with the CIA and FBI representatives. Apparently the MMM photo mix-up was explained to their satisfaction. Most of their dealings in Mexico City were evidently with WINFIELD SCOTT.

4/21/64

RANKIN writes HELMS requesting the specific results of the UGARTE polygraph. He also thanks HELMS for his help with the staff Mexico visit. (drafted by WILLENS 4/20)

4/24/64

RANKIN letter to HOOVER (drafted by WILLENS) requests investigation of several points, including a copy of the material sent to Ambassador THOMAS MANN shortly after the assassination. SA 1084 is the response to this. (see 6/12) CO

4/27/64

U.S. Army wound ballistics experts conducted further tests on the murder weapon. Specter supervised. (A-119)

4/30/64

RANKIN writes to MCCONE requesting an affidavit saying OSWALD was not an informant. He says that DULLES has already discussed this with him informally.

1/30/64

(82)

Executive Session - 4 members present

(1) Cooper suggested that the heads of the FBI & CIA testify about informant allegation; to call the head of State Dept. & officers who were in USSR at time of Oswald's stay there; to call writers of newspaper articles who claim to have info. that contradicts testimony; to have a delegation from WC go to Dallas.

(2) Rankin indicated Jenner was leaving May 10; Hubert on May 18 and they would work weekends.

(3) Rankin discussed cost of duplicating 300 depositions and states: "So I think we will make available to you, so you will know, in the report itself, what we consider the areas in the depositions that are important, and cite them to you. And then I think we could help to supplement that by either waiting for summaries or furnishing you any parts of the depositions that you want to look at, to see whether it supported what it was cited for." p. 5856

(4) Dulles: "Next I have the Marine period of Oswald. We are going into that today."

1/30/64

Rankin: "Yes. We have asked for additional proof in connection with that, in order to try to clear that question up."

(? What are they talking about?)

(5) Walker incident

(6) Dulles requested follow up on rumor that a man from Florida was on a ship with Oswald.

7. Re-examination of Marina

8. Secret Service testimony and info.

9. McCloy recommended interviewing Clinton Hill

10. Dulles recommended obtaining Buchanan's record from the FBI.

11. Recommendation about presidential protection.

12. Discussion of public opinion -

conspiracy (discussion off the record.) Question about DeMoren@schildt followed by discussion, off-record

13. Printing of final report - Warren

suggested not printing transcripts because of expense.

14. Report on investigation into Slan

Incident during Oswald's military service

--decided to have someone see if there

was anything worthy of further investigation.

15. Ruby developments - insanity

16. Proposed visit to Dallas - decided

McCloy & Dulles would go and anyone else who wanted to.

30/64

17. Autopsy pictures of JFK - Rankin felt some member of WC and a doctor should examine them.

18. Interview with Jackie Kennedy

19. Additional witnesses to be called.

Hosty, Fain, Quigley, Clinton Hill.

(Dulles wanted Marina to be called again.

Discussion about whether to call McCone or Hoover or RFK -- decided to ask them if they had any evidence of a conspiracy.

20. Weisman - Rankin presented FBI material.

21. Rankin had windshield there to be examined by WC (McCloy requested off-the-record discussion).

22. Presidential Protection - Chairman asked if anyone had anything to say - followed by a discussion off-the-record requested by Dulles.

4/164  
(EARLY)

(1) 1/2 of all depositions were taken

(2) Ball, assisted by Goldberg, Belin, Stern & Ely tried to establish Oswald's movements from time of assass. until arrest.

(3) Hubert and Griffin investigated Oswald's death.

(4) Liebeler and Jenner interviewed Oswald's acquaintances and relatives.

MARY FERRELL  
FOUNDATION  
CORPORATION OF THE AARC

(5) Specter and Redlich were concerned with Z film. Specter advanced hypothesis that both men were hit by 1 bullet -

(0)

4/6/64

Alan H. Belmont offered to leave Oswald's file at the Commission. Warren refused to accept the file. According to S. Stern, no independent check was made of it. (A 38)

5/14/64

MCCONE, HELMS and HOOVER testify before the WC.

(Note: In this regard CIA item 298, I haven't determined a date for it yet, states: "recent information... which originated with the (deleted) source (should) not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of its implications since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning.")

Hoover testified - stated LHO had no connection with FBI.

1/19/64

MCCONE responds to the 4/30 RANKIN affidavit request.

RANKIN letter to HELMS reaffirms request for information on JACK RUBY.

Executive Session - all present

1-Personnel - Eisenberg plans on leaving

June 1;

Hubert also plans on leaving June 1,

but will work weekends.

Redlich and Ball FBI reports-long discussion about Redlich.

Warren felt he should have opportunity to

defend himself. Russell, referring to

Redlich, stated, "But I didn't know he

(86)

5/20/64 RANKIN requests additional information on pro and anti-CASTRO groups from the FBI.

Rankin wrote Hoover requesting information on FPCC and other Cuban groups (C-63)

5/24/64

Rankin, Redlich, and Specter went to Dallas to supervise a reenactment of assassination.

5/28/64

LIEBELER asks JAMES MALLEY, FBI liaison, for a copy of the photo shown to MARGUERITE OSWALD and for an explanation of how the FBI got it and the circumstances of its display by ODUM.

5/1/64  
(EARLY)

Staff meeting - Rankin told lawyers to "wrap up" their investigations and to submit chapters by June 1.

(LATE)

Warren announced that volumes of testimony and evidence would not be published - too expensive. Lawyers protested to Rankin. Rankin called Sen. Russell. Congressional members thought the expense justified and agreed to publish. (A-24)

JUNE

6/1/64

Specter submitted chapter on the Facts of the Assass. (Area 1)

6/4/64

Executive Session - 4 members present - Ford brought up news articles. Objected to giving WC conclusions of lone assassin to press when the WC had not yet made any official conclusions. WC decided to make a statement.

6/5/64

Jackie Kennedy testified before Warren at her home.

6/7/64

Warren and Ford went to Dallas to hear testimony of Ruby. Also spent about 2 hrs. at assass. scene.



(81)

6/9/64

HOOVER letter to RANKIN (CD 1048) responding to LIEBELER's 5/ 28 request by submitting the copies of the MMM photo as they were shown to MARGUERITE OSWALD. The explanation requested is not included.

6/10/64

HELMS memo to MCCONE says that Agency officials have learned of several plots by exiles to assassinate CASTRO. Some of them are connected to the Mafia. Does not mention the CIA sponsored plots, but rather, he said that the CIA representatives had told the Cuban informants that such action would never be condoned. (Note: Can you imagine HELMS surprise on discovering such a dastardly thing? Could this be the information referred to in CIA Item 298?)

On June 10, 1964, Helms sent McCone a memorandum stating that Agency officials had learned of several plots by Cuban exiles to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders. (Memorandum, Helms to McCone, 6/10/64) According to the memorandum, several of the plots involved "people apparently associated with the Mafia" who had been offered \$150,000 by Cuban exiles to accomplish the deed. Helms' memorandum stated that the sources of the reports were parties to the plots who had presumably given this information to CIA officials with the expectation that they would receive legal immunity if the plots succeeded. (Id.)

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Helms' memorandum, however, did not mention any of the CIA assassination plots against Castro. To the contrary, it stated that "Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United

check further

6/11/64

HOOVER sends WC a summary of Cuban groups from FBI field offices (but not of info at HQ) and informs them of the CIA and Army interest in the groups.

Hoover responded to Rankin's May 20th request and sent a letter with 15 reports on named individuals and 46 memos on identified organizations. Hoover's letter directed the WC's attention to the fact that the CIA and Army might have pertinent info - no documentary evidence that WC pursued the matter. (C-64)

6/12/64

CD 1084 (see 12/11/63 and 4/24/64) is delivered to the WC.

6/17/64

WC announced it had completed hearings.

6/18/64

The Special Group discusses HELMS 6/10 "discovery" and refers it to J. EDGAR HOOVER for action. The CIA, through JOHN MCCONE, dissents from the decision because they think that the stories should not be taken seriously!

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McCone said in a Special Group Meeting on June 18, 1964, that he was "somewhat skeptical" and opposed additional investigation, but "others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention." (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, 6/18/64) McCone made a Memorandum of the June 18 meeting which indicated that he had dissented from the Special Group's decision. He had expressed his belief that the Special Group was "overly exercised," and that he was inclined to dismiss the matter as "Miami cocktail party talk." McCone noted, however, that the Special Group "was more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover." (Memorandum, 6/18/64, p. 1)

6/19/64

An internal CIA memo (Item 319) regarding info from a Cuban defector is written. This is probably the one that the Church Committee talks about who took the special plane from Mexico to Havana on 11/27. HOCH thinks that this is what CIA Item 298 refers to.

6/22/64

ROBERT KENNEDY informed of HELMS' 6/10 "discovery" and orders Justice Department investigation.

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The Special Group decided to transmit the reports to the Attorney General "as a matter of law enforcement," and when Robert Kennedy was so informed a few days later, he stated that the Justice Department would investigate. (Memorandum of Meeting, 6/22/64) The FBI then conducted an investigation and its results were submitted by McCone to the Special Group on August 19, 1964. (McCone to Bundy Memorandum, 8/19/64)

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<sup>1</sup> Howard Osborn, who became Director of the Office of Security in 1964, told the Committee that the DDP often drew upon personnel of the Office of Security, which was within a different directorate, because of the contacts and expertise that Security personnel developed in the field. This is an example of operations being carried out across formal organization lines. The fact that Bissell called on Edwards might indicate that Bissell had already formulated a plan and was relying on Edwards to put it in to practice.

6/27/64

WC announced that Report would not be released until after the Republican National Convention which began July 13.

6/30/64

RANKIN letter to HOOVER (drafted by LIEBELER on 6/26) asks for information of the cropping of the MMM photo, an explanation of how the FBI obtained the photo, and a statement from ODUM.

6/1/64

Willens and Redlich told Warren that some lawyers had not completed investigation and June 30 deadline was impossible. Warren reportedly lost his temper and demanded Willens close down investigation immediately. (A-25) Deadline was extended to July 15.

Ball turned in chapter on identification of the assassin. Redlich found Ball's chapter inadequate and rewrote it himself. (A-24)

Most of the lawyers left Washington and continued working on a part-time basis. All five senior lawyers returned to private practice and made virtually no contribution to writing the Report. Only Liebeler, Griffin, and Slawson continued to work full time. (A-25)

Staff had not questioned Sylvia Odio. Slawson concluded that LHO could not have been in Dallas. Liebeler reopened incident and reached opposite conclusion. Never resolved.

JULY

7/17/64

LIEBELER calls HELMS and requests an affidavit regarding the MMM photo.

7/20/64

Liebeler submitted chapter on LHO's motives. Redlich and Rankin thought it was too psychological and Goldberg was given the task of rewriting. (A-26)

7/21/64

COLEMAN calls the CIA and requests permission to publish the 10/10 cable.

7/22/64

SLAWSON writes a memo to COLEMAN relating the following: SLAWSON has received a call from DOOLEY at the CIA regarding COLEMAN's 7/21 request. DOOLEY says that the CIA can not allow the publication of the entire text of the 10/10 memo. DOOLEY suggests a paraphrase omitting the description and erroneous middle name. SLAWSON agrees and so it is done.

7/23/64

HELMS affidavit regarding the MMM photo is sent to the WC. This is CD 1287. I says that the CIA gave the photo to the FBI on 11/22/63 and that it was taken on 10/4/63 in Mexico City. The cover memo asks that the photo not be published because of the sensitivity of the source and publication "could be embarrassing to the individual involved who, as far as this agency is aware, had no connection with LEE HARVEY OSWALD or the assassination of President KENNEDY."

7/ / 64

Goldberg told Warren it was impossible to finish Report by July 15. Deadline extended to Aug. 1.

Dillard photo was forwarded to WC. Rankin requested FBI to locate the bullet marks and sent Liebler to interview James Tague. Colloquium with three psychiatrists concluded there was insufficient basis for drawing psychological conclusion about Oswald.

AUGUST

8/6/64

COLEMAN letter to SLAWSON asks why cables from MCS to CIA HQ reported the visit to the Soviet Embassy but not the Cuban. SLAWSON wrote in the margin: "I can explain". ??????

CD 1287 is returned to HELMS.

8/7/64

HELMS submits a less specific affidavit to replace CD 1287. This one says that the MMM photo was taken outside of the continental United States between 7/1/63 and 11/23/63.

8/12/64

A draft of Chapter 8 of what was to become the Warren Report, explained the erroneous

8/12/64  
(cont'd)

10/10 description: "It later developed that this was the description of another visitor to the Soviet Embassy and not OSWALD, and had been reported as pertaining to OSWALD by mistake." This was, evidently, the explanation of the picture that the WC got from the agencies. I wonder if it aroused their curiosity that such an innocent explanation was so hard to wrest from the agencies.

8/19/64

The FBI report in response to ROBERT KENNEDY's 6/22 order regarding HELMS' 6/10 "discovery" is submitted to the Special Group by MCCONE. (This should be an interesting document. Why did it go through CIA channels to get to the SG?)

8/ /64

Deadline extended to September. Pressure increased to complete Report so it could be released before presidential election.

-FBI established through spectrographic analysis that a bullet fragment had definitely struck the curb about 260' from President's car. (We did not investigate further.)

September

9/4/64

Galley proofs of final draft circulated among WC and staff for final comments. (A-27)

9/6/64

Liebeler submitted 26-page memo attacking the identity of the assassin chapter. Rankin did not want it. Liebeler insisted. Rankin immediately called Redlich to D.C. Most of Liebeler's criticisms were rejected. (A-27, 147)

9/7/64

Russell, Cooper, and Boggs went to Dallas to reexamine Marina. She changed her story and altered testimony. (A-27)

9/9/64

The FBI informs the White House and the acting Attorney General that the WC Report is seriously inaccurate in its treatment of the FBI.

9/11/64

RANKIN writes HELMS requesting CIA to acknowledge receipt of listed documents from the State Department pertaining to OSWALD.

9/15/64

KARAMESSINES writes to RANKIN responding to the 3/12 request for information on JACK RUBY by saying that the CIA has no information.

9/16/64

LORAN HALL allegedly tells the FBI that he, WILLIAM SEYMOUR & LAWRENC HOWARD were the people who visited SYLVIA ODIO. HALL was interviewed by SA BROWN.

9/18/64

HELMS responds to the 9/11/64 RANKIN request acknowledging receipt of State Dept documents going back to 11/59, that pertain to OSWALD. Kinda blows there story about opening the 201 file in 60 huh? And I remember from somewhere that ONI sent them some confidential stuff on OSWALD when he was being discharged from the Marines.)

WILLIAM SEYMOUR denies visiting SYLVIA ODIO.

Executive session - all present - discussed distribution of Report and the ending of the WC.

9/20/64

LAWRENCE HOWARD denies visiting SYLVIA ODIO; HALL recants

9/21/64

HOOVER informs the WC of HALL's story and of SEYMOUR & HOWARD's denials but not of HALL's recantation.

9/23/64  
9/24/64

S.A. Brown's #302's on LORAN Hall dated. Report submitted to LBJ.

9/25/64

The FBI receives a copy of the WC Report.

9/28/64

WR made public; WC dissolved itself.

9/30/64

Inspector GALE writes an internal FBI memo reviewing the Warren Report.

FBI agents are disciplined a second time for the handling of the OSWALD security case (and the WC?).

Misc.

1965

AM-LASH

Szalc

Ja

A CIA document dated January 3, 1965 states that B-1, in a lengthy interview with a case officer, said that he and AM/LASH had reached firm agreement on the following points:

1. B-1 is to provide AM/LASH with a silencer for the FAL; if this is impossible, B-1 is to cache in a designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several bombs, concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some other concealment device which he would be able to carry, and place next to Fidel Castro.
2. B-1 is to provide AM/LASH with escape routes controlled by B-1 and not by the Americans. The lack of confidence built up by the Bay of Pigs looms large.
3. B-1 is to prepare one of the western provinces, either Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandestine underground mechanism. This would be a fall back position and a safe area where men and weapons are available to the group.
4. B-1 is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH, will know B-1's location.
5. B-1 is to arrange for recognition by at least five Latin American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and a junta is formed. This junta will be established even though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive and may still be in control of part of the country. This is the reason AM/LASH requested that B-1 be able to establish some control over one of the provinces so that the junta can be formed in that location.
6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel, B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate that the raid was possible thanks to the information received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P". This will be AM/LASH's war name.

A CIA cable dated in early 1965 stated that B-1 had given AM/LASH a silencer and that AM/LASH had "small, highly concentrated explosives." Shortly afterwards, a CIA station cabled that AM/LASH would soon receive "one pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-1's secretary." A subsequent cable reported that "B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to AM/LASH." (I.G., Report p. 103)

In (June 1965) CIA terminated all contact with AM/LASH and his associates for reasons related to security. (I.G., Report pp. 104-105)