# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA

TERESA CRAWFORD, VASU	
ABHIRAMAN, LORETTA MIRANDOLA,	
ANITA TUCKER, DEMOCRATIC	
NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and	
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GEORGIA,	
INC.,	
Petitioners,	
	Civil Case No.
V.	
STATE ELECTION BOARD,	
STATE ELECTION BOARD,	
Respondent.	
1	

VERIFIED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

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#### INTRODUCTION

- 1. Just 42 days before the general election, the State Election Board ("SEB") has adopted a rule that the Attorney General has concluded is very likely unlawful and that the Secretary of State has cautioned strongly against. As explained below, the Attorney General and the Secretary of State are right, and this Court should swiftly block the rule's implementation before it can go into effect and wreak havoc on the general election.
- 2. The new "Hand Count Rule" adds an additional hurdle to Georgia's established process for collecting and tabulating ballots. At thousands of precincts across the state, trios of poll workers will be required to hand count the total number of voted Election Day ballots to verify that they match machine-calculated totals. If the poll workers identify an "inconsistency" between their count and the machine count (a term that is left undefined), they must "correct" it if possible (another term that is left undefined).
- 3. The Rule violates Georgia law for numerous reasons. It improperly adds a new requirement to the Election Code beyond what the General Assembly contemplated and conflicts with the statutes the General Assembly did enact—in particular, by shifting part of the responsibility to oversee the tabulation of ballots from the county board to workers at individual precincts. More broadly, SEB has exceeded its rulemaking authority, which is limited to rules and regulations that are "conducive to the fair, legal, and *orderly conduct* of primaries and elections" and "obtain uniformity." O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31(1), (2) (emphasis added). If the Hand Count Rule is allowed to go into effect, the general election will not be orderly and uniform—large counties will face significant delays in reporting vote counts, election officials will struggle to implement new procedures at the last minute, poll workers will not have been trained on the new Rule because it was adopted too late, and the security of the ballots themselves will be put at risk. Finally, SEB failed to follow the bedrock administrative law procedures that limit

unelected agencies' ability to unilaterally make policy—i.e., the requirement to provide notice before taking an action and the requirement to provide a contemporaneous statement of reasons for that action.

- 4. The Hand Count Rule is so improper on its face that both Georgia's chief elections officer and chief law enforcement officer felt compelled to speak out in opposition prior to the Rule's adoption. The Attorney General's office took the highly unusual step of explaining that the Hand Count Rule "very likely exceed[s] the Board's statutory authority and ... appear[s] to conflict with the statutes governing the conduct of elections." Ex. A at 1-2. Even beyond these problems, the Attorney General's office noted that "the passage of *any rules* concerning the conduct of elections are disfavored when implemented as close to an election as" the Hand Count Rule at issue here. *Id.* at 2.
- 5. The Secretary of State's office (via its General Counsel) similarly singled out the Hand Count Rule as one of the "most concerning rules under consideration," because it would "require tremendous personnel resources and time," "could lead to significant delays in reporting," and "needlessly introduce the risk of error, lost ballots, or fraud." Ex. B at 2. And, like the Attorney General, the Secretary's office warned that it is "[i]t is far too late in the election process for counties to implement new rules and procedures"—particularly when "many poll workers have already completed their required training." *Id.* at 1.
- 6. None of this could have come as a surprise to SEB, which—despite the Attorney General's and Secretary of State's opposition—adopted the Hand Count Rule by a 3-2 vote on September 20, 2024. Attached to the petition that initially proposed the Hand Count Rule was a message from the Secretary of State's office informing counties that having "poll workers hand"

count ballots at each polling location on election night is not something your poll workers should do" because it conflicted with the Election Code and raised "security" concerns. Ex. C at 9.

7. In sum, the Hand Count Rule is contrary to the Election Code, exceeds the Board's rulemaking authority (not least because it changes the rules of the game in the ninth inning) and violates foundational limits on agencies that are intended to avoid precisely the scenario here—an unelected body unilaterally making significant changes to the law without notice or explanation. To protect the sanctity of the state's laws and to prevent election night chaos, this Court should declare that the Hand Count Rule exceeds SEB's statutory authority and enjoin that rule from going into effect.

#### **PARTIES**

- 8. Petitioner Teresa K. Crawford is a duly appointed member of the five-member Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections, which is responsible for overseeing all elections for Fulton County. Ms. Crawford is one of the two nominees of the Fulton County Democratic Party. Ms. Crawford was sworn into office on July 8, 2021, and, as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(15)(B), took an oath of office affirming that she would, "at all times truly, impartially, and faithfully perform [her] duties *in accordance with Georgia laws*" (emphasis added).
- 9. Under Georgia law, "'[s]uperintendent' means: (A) [e]ither the judge of the probate court of a county or the county board of elections, the county board of elections and registration, the joint city-county board of elections, or the joint city-county board of elections and registration, if a county has such." O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(35).
- 10. The Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections is a "superintendent" under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(35), and is therefore bound by the computation, canvassing, and tabulation requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-70(9) and 21-2-493. As a superintendent,

the Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections is also responsible for ensuring the poll workers it employs comply with the Hand Count Rule.

- 11. Petitioner Vasu Abhiraman is a duly appointed member and serves as Vice Chair of the five-member DeKalb County Board of Registration and Elections, which is responsible for overseeing all elections for DeKalb County. Mr. Abhiraman is one of the two nominees of the DeKalb County Democratic Party, having been appointed to the position by the Chief Judge of the Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit in DeKalb County on June 26, 2023. Mr. Abhiraman was sworn into office on July 20, 2023, and, as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(15)(B), took an oath of office affirming that he would, "at all times truly, impartially, and faithfully perform [his] duties *in accordance with Georgia laws*" (emphasis added).
- 12. The DeKalb County Board of Registrations and Elections is a "superintendent" under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(35), and is therefore bound by the computation, canvassing, and tabulation requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-70(9) and 21-2-493. As a superintendent, the DeKalb County Board of Registrations and Elections is also responsible for ensuring the poll workers it employs comply with the Hand Count Rule.
- 13. Petitioner Loretta Mirandola is a duly appointed member of the five-member Gwinnett County Board of Registrations and Elections, which is responsible for overseeing all elections for Gwinnett County. Ms. Mirandola is one of the two appointees of the Gwinnett County Democratic Party, having been appointed to the position on November 8, 2023. Ms. Mirandola was sworn into office on December 26, 2023, and, as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(15)(B), took an oath of office affirming that she would, "at all times truly, impartially, and faithfully perform [her] duties *in accordance with Georgia laws*" (emphasis added).

- 14. The Gwinnett County Board of Registrations and Elections is a "superintendent" under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(35), and is therefore bound by the computation, canvassing, and tabulation requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-70(9) and 21-2-493. As a superintendent, the Gwinnett County Board of Registrations and Elections is also responsible for ensuring the poll workers it employs comply with the Hand Count Rule.
- 15. Petitioner Anita Tucker is a duly appointed member and serves as Assistant Secretary of the five-member Forsyth County Board of Voter Registrations & Elections, which is responsible for overseeing all elections for Forsyth County. Ms. Tucker is one of the two appointees of the Forsyth Democratic Party, having been appointed to the position on February 16, 2022. Ms. Tucker was sworn into office on March 1, 2022, and, as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(15)(B), took an oath of office affirming that she would, "at all times truly, impartially, and faithfully perform [her] duties *in accordance with Georgia laws*" (emphasis added).
- 16. The Forsyth County Board of Voter Registrations & Elections is a "superintendent" under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(35), and is therefore bound by the computation, canvassing, and tabulation requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-70(9) and 21-2-493. As a superintendent, the Forsyth County Board of Registrations and Elections is also responsible for ensuring the poll workers it employs comply with the Hand Count Rule.
- 17. Petitioner Democratic National Committee ("DNC") is the principal committee of the Democratic Party, dedicated to electing Democratic candidates and protecting voters' rights. DNC has a core interest in ensuring proper and legal administration of elections. That interest is harmed when ballots cast for Democratic candidates are lost or discarded through hand counts unauthorized by law. This interest is also harmed when election results from particular counties or precincts are improperly delayed, as will occur under the Hand Count Rule. Such delays

introduce opportunities for bad-faith actors to claim that fraud has affected election results—a result that would undermine public confidence in the results and in the election of Democratic candidates specifically. Finally, DNC's interests are harmed when ballots are left unsecured or removed from the chain of custody established by the General Assembly, as this introduces a real risk that the ballots will be tampered with or lost.

- 18. Petitioner Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. ("DPG") is a political party as defined by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(25), and is the official Democratic Party organization in Georgia. DPG is dedicated to electing Democratic candidates in the state and protecting Georgians' voting rights. As stated in its charter, DPG is "committed to the wisdom and efficacy of the will of the majority" and seeks to "protect and enhance political freedom of all people and to encourage the meaningful participation of all citizens within the framework of the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States and the State of Georgia." Charter and Bylaws of the Democratic Party of Georgia, Preamble (Aug. 28, 2021).
- administration of elections. That interest includes ensuring that ballots cast for Democratic candidates (including by DPG members) are securely handled and tabulated. That interest is harmed when, for example, ballots cast for Democratic candidates are lost or discarded through hand counts. This interest is also harmed when election results from particular counties or precincts are delayed, as will occur under the Hand Count Rule. Such delays introduce opportunities to claim that fraud has affected election results, undermining public confidence in the results and in the election of Democratic candidates specifically. Finally, DPG's interests are harmed when ballots are left unsecured or removed from the chain of custody established by the General Assembly, which introduces the risk that ballots will be tampered with or lost.

- 20. DPG has a further interest in ensuring that its members who serve as election officials (*e.g.*, election superintendents, as members of county Boards of Registration and Elections, and poll managers, assistant poll managers, and poll clerks) know their legal obligations with respect to their respective duties after polls close.
- 21. Respondent SEB is a Georgia state board and is attached for administrative purposes to the Secretary of State's office. SEB is an agency within the meaning of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). *See* O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-30 to -36. SEB is authorized "[t]o formulate, adopt, and promulgate [only] such rules and regulations," as are "consistent with law" and "as will be conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections." *Id.* § 21-2-31(2). SEB regularly conducts business in Fulton County at its principal office, 2 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, Suite 802, Floyd West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334.

#### **STANDING**

- 22. Petitioners reallege and incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 21 inclusive.
- 23. Petitioners Crawford, Abhiraman, Mirandola, and Tucker (collectively, "the Board Member Petitioners") each have standing because the relief sought would "guide and protect the *petitioner[s]* from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to" the interaction between the Hand Count Rule and their duty to comply with O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-436, 21-2-483, and 21-2-420, which do not authorize the required hand count. *Cobb County v. Floam*, 319 Ga. 89, 97 (2024) (emphasis in original). The Board Member Petitioners will also have to divert their time and resources to educating fellow election officials on the appropriate role of poll managers, assistant poll managers, and poll clerks after polls close, which will take time away from working on essential board functions.

- 24. The Board Member Petitioners separately each have standing because O.C.G.A. § 21-2-33.2 allows SEB to take over a county elections board if it determines that the county board violated three election laws or rules during the last two election cycles, or that there is clear and convincing evidence of "nonfeasance, malfeasance, or gross negligence" in two elections within two years. The Board Member Petitioners require immediate guidance on the interaction between the Hand Count Rule and their statutory duties to ensure that they do not run afoul of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-33.2, triggering a "strike" and risking an exercise of SEB's takeover authority. Avoiding a violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-436, 21-2-483, and 21-2-420—and, in turn, a strike under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-33.2—provides an additional reason that "the relief sought by" the Board Member Petitioners has "some *immediate legal effect on the parties' conduct*," *Perdue v. Barron*, 367 Ga. App. 157, 163 (2023) (emphasis in original).
- 25. DNC and DPG each have associational standing. The Georgia Supreme Court has explained that "associational standing permits an organization ... to sue on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." *Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v. Kemp*, 313 Ga. 375, 387 (2022). This three-part test is satisfied here because (1) DNC members who live and vote in Georgia have standing to sue SEB in their own right, as do DPG members who live and vote in the state (including the DPG-appointed election superintendents); (2) DNC and DPG each seek, through this litigation, to ensure that votes cast for Democratic candidates in November are properly secured and counted and that their members serving as election superintendents and poll workers know their legal obligations; and (3) neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested by petitioners require the

participation of either organization's members in this lawsuit, because both present purely legal issues.

- 26. In particular, DPG has associational standing to bring suit on behalf of its members because of the legal uncertainty introduced by the Hand Count Rule. This uncertainty includes whether and how DPG members currently serving on county Boards of Registration and Elections and as poll managers, assistant poll managers, and poll clerks can meet the requirements of the Hand Count Rule consistent with their statutory obligations.
- 27. DNC and DPG also each have standing independent from their members because each organization has been and will be injured directly by the Hand Count Rule.
- 28. First, DNC and DPG are injured when ballots containing votes for Democratic candidates are hand counted in violation of Georgia law. Hand counting will cause significant delays and may interfere with the election of Democratic candidates if ballots cast for such candidates are among those delayed, discarded, or lost during hand counts.
- 29. Second, DNC and DPG are injured when citizens are denied their fundamental right to vote. Each organization's mission is to ensure that citizens can exercise their political freedoms through meaningful participation in the framework of the U.S. Constitution. Ballots that are lost or discarded during hand counts are not counted. That denies the person who cast that ballot their fundamental right to vote.
- 30. Third, the confusion that the Hand Count Rule introduces has already caused and will continue to cause a diversion of DNC's and DPG's resources. When poll workers hand count ballots, DNC and DPG must each expend resources on monitoring the process to ensure that it is timely and securely completed, and that votes are properly counted—responsibilities that are not normally a part of either DNC's or DPG's mission. By the same token, time and

money spent on the Hand Count Rule (including responding to calls from voters and local officials confused about the rule's requirements) will deny those same resources to activities that are a core part of the DNC/DPG missions, *e.g.*, increasing Democratic voter turnout.

### JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 31. SEB is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Georgia Constitution Article VI, § 4, ¶I and O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10. Actions brought pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10 "shall be in accordance with Chapter 4 of Title 9, relating to declaratory judgments," including sections 9-4-2 and 9-4-3.
  - 32. Venue is proper under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-30, 21-2-30(j), and 50-13-10(b).

### **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

- A. Georgia's Process For Computation, Canvassing, And Tabulation
- 33. In enacting the Georgia Election Code, the General Assembly created a comprehensive, integrated system of election administration that ensures qualified voters cast proper votes and that such votes are accurately counted and officially reported on an expedited timeline. *See generally* O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-1 through 21-2-604. On knowledge and belief, the system created by the General Assembly has worked effectively and efficiently in avoiding errors and fraud.
- 34. All Georgia counties use a touch screen voting machine for in-person voting on Election Day. O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-300(a)(1)-(3); 21-2-2(7.1). When checking in at the polls, voters confirm their identity and receive a microchipped card with their specific ballot. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. § 183-1-12-.11(2)(a), (b). Voters take the card to a machine and insert it to display their ballot, then mark their selections on the screen. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. § 183-1-12-.11(2)(b). When finished, voters print a scanner ballot, then feed that ballot into a digital

- scanner. *Id.* The ballot is "cast" when scanned. *See id.* (after scanning the printed ballot reflecting voter's choices, voter returns access card to poll officer).
- 35. As relevant here, the Code provides that once ballots are cast and polling locations close, county superintendents must start the process of counting, canvassing, tabulating, and certifying Election Day votes. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(a); *see also id.* §§ 21-2-490 through 21-2-504. This continues until all ballots have been counted and tabulated, and the official results released to the public. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(a). Per a law enacted last year, superintendents *must* also report the total number of ballots cast within their jurisdiction to the Secretary of State and the public by 11:59 P.M. on Election Day. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-421.
- 36. Despite this challenging timeline, the superintendents' counting, canvassing, and tabulation of the official results cannot start until the poll manager for each precinct transmits the precinct election materials to the superintendent. The Code lays out specific sets of steps that the poll manager must follow before transmitting can begin.
- 37. In describing these steps, the Election Code at times distinguishes between precincts using "paper ballots" on the one hand, and precincts using automated devices like voting machines or optical scanners on the other. *Compare* O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-430 to 440 (paper ballots), *with*, *e.g.*, O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-450 to 457 (voting machines). Beginning with the 2020 election, no Georgia precincts may use "paper ballots" marked by hand for Election Day voting (with limited exceptions for emergencies and provisional ballots). *See* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300(a)(2) (requiring use of scanning ballots marked by electronic ballot markers); SEB Rule 183-1-12-.01; *Curling v. Raffensperger*, 50 F.4th 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2022). Although there are minor variations between the provisions governing automated devices, those differences are

immaterial here—for the reasons explained below, *nothing* in the statutes governing Georgia's current voting procedures permits the process required by the Hand Count Rule.<sup>1</sup>

- 38. For example, under the provisions governing optical scanners, the poll manager must "[u]pon the completion of voting ... prepare and sign a ballot recap form" that shows "(1) The number of valid ballots; (2) The number of spoiled and invalid ballots; and (3) The number of unused ballots." O.C.G.A. § 21-2-484. The recap form and any "defective, spoiled, and invalid ballots" are sealed in envelopes. *Id.* Those envelopes are placed in a separate envelope container that, "along with the voted ballots," is then "sealed by the manager" in a ballot container "so that it cannot be opened without breaking the seal." "The manager and one poll officer shall then deliver the ballot container and the envelope container, if applicable, to the tabulating machine center or other place designated by the superintendent and shall receive a receipt therefor." *Id.*
- 39. Once received at "the tabulating center, the seal on each container of ballots shall be inspected, and it shall be certified that the seal has not been broken before the container is opened." O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(c). "The ballots of each polling place shall be plainly identified and cannot be commingled with the ballots of other polling places." *Id.* After tabulation, the superintendent then completes and signs an additional ballot recap form. *Id.* § 21-2-483(d).

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All Georgia precincts now must use "electronic ballot markers" for election day voting. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300. Electronic ballot markers are required by statute to produce a "paper ballot" for security and transparency purposes. *Id.* § 21-2-300(a)(2). But the ballots produced by these machines are not "paper ballots" as defined in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-430 to 21-2-440 because they are not given to voters as blanks to be filled out. The Georgia Supreme Court has indicated that the statutes governing "paper ballots" can be applied to precincts using automated devices in one limited circumstance—where a candidate dies shortly before election. *See Rhoden v. Athens-Clarke County Board of Elections*, 310 Ga. 266, 269-271 (2020) (noting that Election Code provisions governing use of automated devices did not address how to treat the death of a candidate).

Finally, the "official returns of the votes cast on ballots at each polling place shall be printed by the tabulating machine," and the "returns thus prepared shall be certified and promptly posted." *Id.* § 21-2-483(h).

- 40. Similarly detailed provisions govern poll workers' duties with respect to other kinds of automated devices. *See, e.g.*, O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-454; 21-2-455; 21-2-456.
- 41. After the official precinct-level results are consolidated, tabulated, and certified, the county superintendent then transmits the results to the Secretary of State. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(a), (k).
- 42. Beyond the measures laid out above, the Code ensures that ballots are accurately counted by mandating that superintendents perform certain precinct-level cross-checks and instructing them on how to resolve any numerical discrepancies detected by those cross-checks. *See, e.g., id.* §§ 21-2-493(e)–(h). If there are discrepancies, a superintendent may order a recount or recanvass under certain circumstances before the superintendent proceeds with certification. *See* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-495.
- 43. During the county-level canvassing process, the superintendent reviews various pieces of precinct-level information, including the number of electors in each precinct, *see id*. § 21-2-493(b), the number of persons who voted in each precinct, *id*., the number of ballots cast in each precinct, *id*., the unsealed and sealed returns of votes from each precinct, *id*. §§ 21-2-493(g)–(h), and, for each precinct using automated devices, the records from the general returns showing the machine counters and the internal records showing the machine counters prior to the start of the election, *id*. § 21-2-493(f). The county superintendent is then tasked with "compar[ing] the registration figure with the certificates returned by the poll officers showing the number of persons who voted in each precinct or the number of ballots cast" and if there is a

discrepancy, to "investigate[]" the issue. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(b). If, for example, it appears that the vote total for any candidate or question exceeds the number of electors or the total number of persons who voted in the precinct, no votes shall be recorded until this investigation occurs. *Id*.

44. The computation, canvassing, and tabulation of official results must be completed as quickly as possible, because election officials must certify results "not later than 5:00 P.M. on the Monday following the date on which such election was held." O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(k). This year, that deadline falls on November 12, 2024.

## B. Georgia's Process For Securing Ballots And Chain Of Custody Requirements

- 45. The Election Code also ensures that proper votes cast by qualified voters are accurately counted and reported through a comprehensive security and chain-of-custody scheme. *See generally* O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-1 through 21-2-604.
- 46. For example, in elections where optical scanners are used, the General Assembly has provided that poll managers must seal ballot containers at individual precincts, then securely deliver those containers with another poll officer to a centralized tabulation center. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-484. Counting must be open to the public and performed only by persons under the direction of the superintendent. O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-483(a)-(b). Ballot containers are inspected at the tabulating center and "it shall be certified that the seal has not been broken before the container is opened." *Id.* § 21-2-483(c). The ballots of each polling place must be plainly identified and cannot be commingled with the ballots of other polling place ballot counting. *Id.* After tabulation of the votes, the superintendent completes and signs a ballot recap form showing the number of valid ballots, the number of spoiled and invalid ballots, and the number of unused ballots. *Id.* § 21-2-483(d).

47. Similarly, in elections where voting machines are used, as soon as the polls close, "the poll officers shall immediately lock and seal the operating lever or mechanism of the machine so that the voting and counting mechanism will be prevented from operation."

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-454(a). The poll officers then sign a certificate stating, among other things, that the machine was locked and sealed. *Id.* As soon as possible after the ballot count, the superintendent must have the voting machines placed in storage, where they will remain locked against voting for as long as may be necessary or advisable because of any existing or threatened contest over the result of the election. *Id.* § 21-2-457.

## C. Attacks On Voting Machines

- 48. While some advocates have suggested ballots should be counted by hand for accuracy reasons, studies have shown that ballot scanners are more accurate. *See, e.g.*, Orey et al., *How Ballot Tabulators Improve Elections*, Bipartisan Policy Center (Apr. 25, 2022), <a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/how-ballot-tabulators-improve-elections/">https://bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/how-ballot-tabulators-improve-elections/</a>; Goggin & Byrne, *An Examination of the Auditability of Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) Ballots* (Jan. 2007), <a href="https://accurate-voting.rice.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/evt07-goggin.pdf">https://accurate-voting.rice.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/08/evt07-goggin.pdf</a>. Election Experts Oppose Hand-Counting Ballots. Here's why, CBS News, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/pittsburgh/news/hand-counting-ballots-explained/">https://www.cbsnews.com/pittsburgh/news/hand-counting-ballots-explained/</a> (discussing study finding "poll workers who counted ballots by hand were off by as much as 8%").
- 49. The Secretary of State's office agrees, informing SEB that counting ballots by hand (which includes leaving them unsecured during hand counts) is much more likely to introduce "error, lost ballots, or fraud" than would occur if ballots scanners are used. *See* Ex. B at 2; *cf. Collier v. Board of Comm'rs*, 240 Ga. App. 605, 605-606 (1999) (county voting registrar removed from office for mishandling absentee ballots, including by opening them and accidentally leaving some in a desk drawer).

50. Indeed, a group of former elected officials and lawyers, including numerous Republicans, opposed the Hand Count Rule for this very reason. They explained that "[h]and counts are less accurate, more expensive, and slower than machine counts." Ex. D at 2 (emphasis omitted). Voting machines "can better handle the high-capacity workload of an election, and they excel at the 'tedious and repetitive tasks' with which humans generally struggle." *Id.* at 3. Voting machines are also "fully vetted," and certified for accuracy by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. *Id.* 

## D. The Origins Of The Hand Count Rule

- 51. On June 6, 2024, a member of the Fayette County Board of Elections named Sharlene Alexander filed a petition to amend SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5). *See generally* Ex. C. The petition proposed that SEB adopt a "long-standing tradition in Fayette County" of having "three sworn poll officials" hand count the total number of paper ballots and compare that total against the ballot "scanner['s] count." *Id.* at 4.
- 52. Ms. Alexander said that the petition was spurred by an October 2022 email from the Secretary of State's Elections Director instructing that "hav[ing] poll workers hand count ballots at each polling location on election night is not something your poll workers should do" based both on existing law and "to ensure maximum security for the voted ballots." Ex. C at 9 (emphasis added). The same email further instructed that the process of "removing ballots from ballot boxes and sealing them in transport containers.... should be done efficiently, transparently, and immediately after the poll." *Id*.
- 53. During a subsequent on-the-record discussion of her petition, Ms. Alexander stated that the hand count procedure in her county involved removing all the ballots from a ballot scanner and placing them in a "big pile." Ex. E at 221:1. Then, three poll workers start "pulling those ballots out of the pile" and "quickly" count them into "stacks of fifty." *Id.* at 221:2-4. The

stacks are then "push[ed]" to the next person to count the stack until all three poll workers have hand counted the same number of ballots. *Id.* at 221:6-8.

- 54. Ms. Sara Ghazal, an SEB member who voted against the Hand Count Rule, noted that most counties employing precinct-level hand counting had been plagued by problems and delays. *Id.* at 226:1-21.
- 55. On August 19, 2024, SEB member Janelle King proposed an oral amendment to Ms. Alexander's petition. Ex. F at 134:17-139:7.
- 56. Ms. King's additions allow the poll manager or assistant poll manager to start the hand count the day after election day (a determination left to their discretion) "and finish during the week designated for county certification." Ex. G at 3. She also proposed that "[i]f the counting of ballots takes place at any time or place other than the polling location, the supervisor of elections must immediately communicate the date, time, and place of such action with all candidates on the ballot and the county chair of both major political parties no later than 10:00 pm on Election Day." *Id*.
- 57. When SEB considered Ms. King's amendment on the record, Ms. King acknowledged that there were "valid concerns" regarding the Hand Count Rule, such as fatigue of poll workers, increased staffing, and increased costs. Ex. F at 134:7-16.

### E. Adoption of the Hand Count Rule

58. On August 21, 2024, SEB publicly posted the Hand Count Rule for notice and comment. Ex. G at 1. The text in the notice of proposed rulemaking tracks Ms. King's amendment exactly, and adds the material bolded below to Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5):

The poll manager and two witnesses who have been sworn as poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § § 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 shall unseal and open each scanner ballot box, remove the paper ballots from each ballot box, record the date and time that the ballot box was emptied and present to three sworn precinct poll officers to independently count the total number of ballots removed from the

scanner, sorting into stacks of 50 ballots, continuing until all of the ballots have been counted separately by each of the three poll officers. When all three poll officers arrive at the same total ballot count independently, they shall each sign a control document containing the polling place, ballot scanner serial number, election name, printed name with signature and date and time of the ballot hand count. If the numbers recorded on the precinct poll pads, ballot marking devices [BMDs] and scanner recap forms do not reconcile with the hand count ballot totals, the poll manager shall immediately determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken. A separate container shall be used for the hand counted paper ballots from each ballot box and the container shall be labelled with the polling place, ballot scanner serial number, the number assigned to the ballot scanner for that election, the scanner counts of the ballots from the tabulation tape, and the hand count ballot total as certified by the three poll officials. The container shall be sealed and signed by the poll manager and two of the three hand count poll officers such that it cannot be opened without breaking the seal. The poll manager and two witnesses shall sign a label affixed to the container indicating that it contains all the hand counted ballots from the indicated scanner box and no additional ballots.

#### *Id.* at 2.

- 59. These changes mean that (1) the poll manager and two poll officers in each precinct must hand count the total number of ballots, (2) reconcile their independent counts, (3) attest to an agreed hand count total, (4) compare the hand count total to that of the precinct poll pads, the ballot marking devices, and scanner recap forms, and, (5) if the counts do not reconcile, "immediately determine the reason for the inconsistency" and "correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken." Ex. G at 2.
- 60. The proposed rule also added four subsections to the end of Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5). Ex. G at 3. These subsections state that the "decision about when to start the process described in [the Hand Count Rule] is up to the Poll Manager or Assistant Poll Manager," authorize poll managers to begin the hand count process after election day when

scanners have more than 750 ballots, provide procedures for such post-election day counting, and require that post-election day counting occur at "the County election office." *Id*.

- 61. The rulemaking announcement stated that a "public hearing w[ould] be held on Friday, September 20" in order to "provide the public an opportunity to comment upon and provide input into the proposed rule amendments." Ex. G at 1.
- 62. A range of individuals and organizations submitted comments to SEB on the Hand Count Rule. The overwhelming majority of comments from county officials and voting rights experts opposed the enactment of the rule.
- 63. For example, on September 16, the Secretary of State's general counsel submitted a letter noting that the Secretary had "received an overwhelming number of comments from county election officials expressing concern about the [SEB] changing Georgia's election rules" shortly before an election and singling out the Hand Count Rule as one of "[t]he most concerning rules under consideration." Ex. B at 1-2. The Hand Count Rule, the Secretary's office explained, (1) "would require tremendous personnel resources and time," (2) "could lead to significant delays in reporting," (3) "would disrupt existing chain of custody protocols under the law" and (4) and "needlessly introduce the risk of error, lost ballots, or fraud." *Id.* at 2.
- 64. The very next day, the Georgia Association of Voter Registration and Election Officials (GAVREO)—which represents local election officials—sent a similar letter to SEB opposing the Hand Count Rule (among other proposed rules). Ex. H at 1. The letter emphasized that GAVREO had stepped in because the rules under consideration "are poorly written, inefficient, would not accomplish their stated goals, or go directly against state law." *Id.* In particular, GAVREO was concerned that the Hand Count Rule had the "potential to delay

results; set fatigued employees up for failure; and undermine ... confidence" in the outcome of the election. *Id.* at 2.

- 65. On September 19, 2024, the Georgia Attorney General's office took the extraordinary step of advising SEB that the Hand Count Rule was likely illegal and beyond the agency's authority. Ex. A at 4. The Attorney General explained that there are "no provisions in the statutes cited in support of these proposed rules that permit counting the number of ballots by hand at the precinct level prior to delivery to the election superintendent for tabulation." *Id.* at 6. The Hand Count Rule was thus not "tethered to any statute" and the "precise" kind of regulation "that agencies cannot do." *Id.* at 4.
- 66. The Attorney General also urged SEB not to adopt *any* new rules so close to the election. Ex. A. The Attorney General's Office warned that "the passage of any rules concerning the conduct of elections are disfavored when implemented ... close to an election" due to the heightened risk of "voter confusion." *Id.* at 2.
- [a similar] principle" when defending against challenges to laws close in time to elections. Ex. A at 2, citing In re Ga. Senate Bill 202, 622 F.Supp.3d 1312, 1343-44 (N.D. Ga. 2022) ("[State Defendants, which include the members of the State Election Board] argue that the Court should withhold relief under the *Purcell* doctrine and the Eleventh Circuit's application of that doctrine in *League* because in-person early voting for the general election will begin in mid-October, and a late change to the law will pose a significant risk of voter confusion and harm to the electoral process."). Ex. A at 2. The Attorney General's office thus advised SEB to "consider how the passage of any rules well-within the period where courts have agreed that *Purcell* applies may affect the application of the principle in the future." *Id*.

- submitted comments urging SEB to reject the proposed rule. Ex. I at 3. DPG stated that the Hand Count Rule "[is] ripe for human error, vulnerable to abuse, and would add considerably to the workload demanded of election workers." *Id.* DPG explained that the proposed rule did not account for a situation in which "election workers express fatigue or an inability to hand count votes on Election Day but the Poll Manager decides to initiate the process anyways." *Id.* at 4. DPG asked "[w]hat happens if the hand counts are not completed on time? Are those votes thrown out? Would the delay provide County Boards of Election with a pretext to vote against certification on the mistaken belief that they are entitled to do so as part of their 'reasonable inquiry' under the Board's recently adopted rules?" *Id.* And DPG explained that the Hand Count Rule provides county administrators "no time to implement and train workers on the[] new procedures." *Id.*
- 69. On September 20, 2024, SEB adopted the Hand Count Rule in a 3-2 vote. *See* Ex. J at 2.
- 70. In its comments, DPG had requested that SEB "issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against [the Hand Count Rule's] adoption and incorporate therein its reason for overruling the consideration urged against its adoption." Ex. I at 8. SEB failed to provide such a statement, even though it is expressly required by O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(a)(2) ("Upon adoption of a rule, the agency ... shall issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its adoption and incorporate therein its reason for overruling the consideration urged against its adoption.").

71. The Hand Count Rule becomes effective 20 days after it is filed with the Secretary of State's office, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-6(a). According to the Secretary of State's office, it could become effective as early as October 14, 2024. Ex. B at 1.

### THE HAND COUNT RULE IS INVALID

- 72. The Hand Count Rule is unlawful for multiple, independent reasons. First, it should be declared invalid because it has no basis in the Georgia Election Code. To the contrary, it improperly adds requirements to Georgia's comprehensive statutory scheme—requirements that also conflict with other parts of the Code. Second, SEB lacks the statutory authority to impose the Hand Count Rule because the rule is antithetical to the fair and orderly administration of the general election. Even beyond the sheer delay caused by imposing another step in the tabulation process, the Rule was adopted far too late in the election cycle and raises a serious risk that poll workers who have not had the opportunity to be properly trained will make mistakes—either causing further delay or, worse, losing or mishandling valid ballots. Third, in passing the Hand Count Rule, SEB improperly disregarded its procedural obligations under the Georgia APA to provide an adequate explanation for its ruling and sufficient advance notice of its intent to enact a new rule.
  - A. The Hand Count Rule Improperly Adds Requirements To The Election Code That Conflict With The General Assembly's Comprehensive Canvassing, Computation, And Tabulation Scheme
- 73. The comprehensive Georgia Election Code—which includes detailed processes regarding canvassing, computing, and tabulating ballots at the county and state levels—does not provide for hand counts at the precinct level in the manner contemplated by the Hand Count Rule. Adding such a requirement (and doing so in a manner in conflict with the statutory requirement that any new rule from SEB encourage fair and orderly elections) exceeds SEB's rulemaking authority.

- 1. The Hand Count Rule Adds Requirements That Go Beyond The Existing, Comprehensive Statutory Scheme For Canvassing, Computation, And Tabulation
- 74. Article III, Section I of the Georgia constitution provides that the legislative power of the state is vested exclusively in the General Assembly. SEB accordingly has "no inherent powers and no lawful right to act except as directed by the [enabling] statute." *South Co-operative Foundry Co. v. Drummond*, 76 Ga. App. 222, 224-25 (1947).
- 75. Here, SEB's authority to promulgate rules is limited "to carry[ing] into effect a law already passed" or otherwise "administer and effectuate an existing enactment of the General Assembly." *HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Roach*, 265 Ga. 501, 502 (1995); *see also Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Dillard*, 313 Ga.App. 782, 785 (2013) ("[A]n administrative rule which exceeds the scope of or is inconsistent with the authority of the statute upon which it is predicated is invalid.").
- 76. Nothing in the Election Code permits the kind of hand counting contemplated by the Hand Count Rule.
- 77. The Election Code specifies only two forms of hand counting prior to county superintendents' certification of results. The first occurs during the tabulation of *paper* ballots marked by hand—a process that, as discussed, has nothing to do with the automated devices affected by the Hand Count Rule, O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-435(c), 21-2-437(a). The second occurs at the tabulation center in those limited circumstances where a tabulating machine cannot read a ballot due to damage or unclear markings. *Id.* §§ 21-2-483(f), (g).
- 78. In enacting the Hand Count Rule, SEB engineered a third form of pre-certification hand counting with no statutory basis for doing so. While SEB's notice of proposed rulemaking cited three Election Code provisions as "authority" for the Hand Count Rule, see Ex. G at 3,

SEB provided no supporting explanation for this assertion and none of the provisions support its position.

- 79. *First*, SEB cited O.C.G.A. §21-2-483(a), which provides that in "elections in which optical scanners are used, the ballots shall be counted at the precinct or tabulating center under the direction of the superintendent." O.C.G.A. §21-2-483(a). It further provides that only persons "deputized by the superintendent" shall touch ballots, containers, papers, or machines used in the count. *Id*.
- 80. This provision is inapposite. While some machine scanning of ballots may be permitted at the precinct in cases where optical scanners are used, O.C.G.A. §21-2-483(a) provides that any such counting is under the direction of the *superintendent*, not a poll manager. More broadly, O.C.G.A. §21-2-483(c) envisions counting will take place at a tabulating center. O.C.G.A. §21-2-483(c) ("and the ballots shall be prepared for *processing by the tabulating machines*" (emphasis added)); *see also* Ex. A at 5 (Attorney General's office noting that Section 21-2-483 "details [counting] procedures *at* the tabulation center") (emphasis added).
- 81. Second, SEB cited O.C.G.A. § 21-2-436, but that statute is only applicable to precincts using paper ballots marked by hand. See also Ex. A at 6 (Attorney General's office noting that Section 21-2-436 "contemplates the duties of poll officers ... in precincts in which paper ballots are used, not ballot scanners or voting machines" (emphasis added)). The Hand Count Rule, in contrast, applies only to voting "conducted via ballots marked by electronic ballot markers and tabulated by ballot scanners" and "through the use of an optical scanning voting system." See Rule 183-1-12-.01.
- 82. *Third*, SEB cited O.C.G.A. §21-2-420(a), which states that "the poll officials in each precinct shall complete the required accounting and related documentation for the precinct

and shall advise the election superintendent of the total number of ballots cast at such precinct and the total number of provisional ballots cast." O.C.G.A. § 21-2-420(a). Nothing in the Election Code itself defines the "required accounting" so broadly as to encompass hand counting. In particular, as the Attorney General's office informed SEB, "neither the statutes that prescribe the duties of poll officers after the close of the polls for precincts using voting machines, *see* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-454, nor the precincts using optical scanners, *see* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-485, suggest that the General Assembly contemplated that a hand count of the ballots would be part of the "required accounting." *See* Ex. A at 6.

- 2. The Hand Count Rule Conflicts With Numerous Provisions Of The Comprehensive Statutory Scheme For Canvassing, Computation, And Tabulation
- 83. The Hand Count Rule is also in direct conflict with at least six Election Code provisions.
- 84. *First*, the Hand Count Rule requires that poll workers around the state create an election-related form—*i.e.*, a "control document" for recording the results of a hand count. *See* Rule 183-1-12-.12. But under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50(a)(5), only the Secretary of State has the authority to create "all blank forms" to be used in any election. *See* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50(a)(5); *see also* Ex. B at 1 (letter from Secretary's Office to SEB citing Section 21-2-50 for the proposition that "the form of the ballot is exclusively within the control of the Secretary of State under Georgia law.").
- 85. Second, the Hand Count Rule transfers a portion of the superintendent's statutory responsibilities over the computation and canvassing of the ballots, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(a), to poll managers. SEB—like any other agency—is not authorized to shift statutory responsibility from one official to another. See Dep't of Human Res. v. Anderson, 218 Ga. App. 528, 529 (1995) (regulation invalid where it purported to give court veto-power over certain Georgia

Department of Human Resources decisions that were left to the Department's discretion by statute).

- 86. Third, and relatedly, the Hand Count Rule interferes with county superintendents' authority to "compare the registration figure with the certificates returned by the poll officers showing the number of persons who voted in each precinct or the number of ballots cast" and if there is a discrepancy, to "investigate[]" the issue. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(b). This is because the Hand Count Rule requires poll managers to "immediately determine the reason for the inconsistency" in hand count totals and "correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken." Rule 183-1-12-.12. In other words, even if the Hand Count Rule could be read as maintaining the statutory balance of power between county superintendents and poll managers, it gives poll managers the first (and perhaps only) opportunity to address numerical inconsistencies in the ballot tallies.

  This is improper because that duty rests solely with county superintendents, not poll managers.

  O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(b).
- 87. Fourth, the Hand Count Rule conflicts with the statutory requirement that the superintendent report to the Secretary of State—and post in a public place—the "number of ballots cast at the polls on the day of the ... election" by "not later than 11:59 pm following the close of the polls on the day of a[n] ... election." O.C.G.A. § 21-2-421(a)(1) (emphasis added). In contrast, the Hand Count Rule requires only that Poll Managers and Assistant Poll Managers finish their count "during the week designated for county certification." Ex. G at 4. In other words, the Hand Count Rule purports to give poll workers the ability to (perhaps unintentionally) prevent the superintendent from timely notifying the Secretary and the public regarding the number of ballots received.

- 88. Fifth, the Hand Count Rule sets up a conflict with the statutory requirement that the superintendent finish computation and canvassing by 5:00 P.M. on the Monday following the election in order to certify the results. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-497. Again, the Hand Count Rule allows poll workers to finish their count "during the week designated for county certification." Ex. G at 4. If the hand counts are not completed until the end of that week (for example, in large counties), it may be impossible for the county superintendent to complete his or her statutorily-required tabulation by the certification deadline. This could result in the superintendent certifying results without ballots from precincts delayed by the hand count requirement—thereby denying voters their fundamental right to vote.
- 89. *Sixth*, the Hand Count Rule requires all poll managers and poll officers to handle ballots regardless of their relationship with the county supervisor. Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5). This cannot be squared with the requirement in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(a) that only those deputized by the superintendent may handle ballots. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(a).
  - B. The Hand Count Rule Exceeds SEB's Statutory Authority, Which Is Limited To Promulgating Rules That Promote "Fair ... And Orderly Conduct" And "Uniformity" During The Primaries And Elections
- 90. The Hand Count Rule does not just impermissibly add new requirements to existing law. It also is fundamentally inconsistent with the SEB's statutory obligation to enact rules that promote "fair ... and orderly conduct" and "uniformity" during the primaries and elections. O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31(1), (2).
- 91. For example, the Hand Count Rule's scope is unclear, as it does not specify what measures a poll manager may or should take to perform a correction. *See* Ex. G at 2–3. The term "correct" is amorphous and susceptible to numerous interpretations and abuses. The lack of clarity for how to "correct" discrepancies in a hand count poses a significant risk of inconsistencies across precincts, mishandling of ballots, failure to count ballots, and confusion

among poll managers. At a minimum, the failure to define the word "correct" means that the regulation is incomplete, and an incomplete regulation does not promote "orderly conduct" or "uniformity" in election administration.

- 92. The Hand Count Rule also imposes significant and unfair burdens on election workers. Ms. Alexander—the Fayette County resident who first suggested the Hand Count Rule—described a vote-counting process in her county that was little more than a scramble. In her own telling, a hand count would require "pull[ing] the ballots out of the scanner" and placing the ballots "in a big pile" from which three poll workers would "just start pulling those ballots out of the pile" to "quickly" count the ballots "into stacks of fifty." Ex. E at 220:22-221:4. Then the poll worker "would push them to the next person" who would re-count the stack and so on until all three poll workers had counted each stack and confirmed they had "hand-counted" the same number of ballots. *Id.* at 221:6-12.
- 93. The Hand Count Rule also undermines the comprehensive security and chain of custody scheme established by the General Assembly. The Hand Count Rule requires individual poll managers at thousands of locations across Georgia to open sealed ballot boxes, and then remove, reorganize, and pass around ballots. *See* Ex. G at 2; *see also* Ex. E at 220:25-221:13 (Alexander). Experience teaches that such unguided handling of ballots poses a substantial risk that the ballots will be lost or (perhaps inadvertently) tampered with. *Cf. Collier v. Bd. of Comm'rs*, 240 Ga. App. 605, 605-06 (1999). At a minimum, the ballots could be folded, torn, or otherwise damaged in a manner that makes future tabulation difficult (e.g., during a recount, if necessary).
- 94. Indeed, the Secretary of State's office has historically cautioned counties *not* to hand count ballots because "[i]n order to ensure maximum security for the voted ballots, poll

workers should not prolong the process of removing ballots from ballot boxes and sealing them in transport containers." Ex. C at 9. This process must instead "be done efficiently, transparently, and immediately after the polls have closed and votes have been cast." *Id.* The Hand Count Rule encourages the opposite, raising the prospect that ballots will be placed in a "big pile" outside of any secure storage, for potentially hours or days. Ex. E at 221:1.

- 95. As the Secretary of State's office has explained, "having poll workers handle ballots at polling locations after they have been voted introduces a new and significant risk to chain of custody procedures. Georgia law already has secure chain of custody protocols for handling ballots, and efforts to change these laws by unelected bureaucrats on the eve of the election introduces the opportunity for error, lost or stolen ballots, and fraud." SOS Release (Aug. 15, 2024), <a href="https://sos.ga.gov/news/raffensperger-defends-georgias-election-integrity-act-last-minute-changes-delaying-election">https://sos.ga.gov/news/raffensperger-defends-georgias-election-integrity-act-last-minute-changes-delaying-election</a>.
- 96. The many flaws in the Hand Count Rule have been made infinitely worse by the timing of its enactment—just six weeks before the November election. Barring judicial intervention, it will take effect as early as October 14, 2024—only 22 days before the election. See Ex. B at 1.
- 97. Federal courts have long recognized that election administration issues and basic fairness concerns generally weigh against making significant changes to the law in close proximity to elections. *See, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006); *see also DNC v. Wis. State Legis.*, 141 S. Ct. 28, 30 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting the danger posed by changing "longstanding election rules" shortly before or while voting is underway); *Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid*, 141 S. Ct. 732, 735 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Changing the rules in the middle of the game is bad enough. Such rule changes by officials who may lack

authority to do so is even worse."). Thus, for example, the Eleventh Circuit has invoked *Purcell* in barring changes to election rules for the City of Miami just "three months before ... voters go to the polls," *Grace, Inc. v. City of Miami*, 2023 WL 5286232, at \*1 (11th Cir. Aug. 4, 2023), and SEB itself has previously argued that "late change[s] to the [election] law ... pose a significant risk of voter confusion and harm to the electoral process." Ex. A at 2.

- 98. While *Purcell* binds only "lower *federal* courts," *Republican National Committee* v. *Democratic National Committee*, 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020) (emphasis added), its logic regarding the importance of avoiding voter confusion shortly before an election applies to the facts of this case.
- 99. Here, the Hand Count Rule changes longstanding election rules regarding the security, counting, canvassing, and tabulation of ballots. *See supra* pp. 25–29. And Georgia's Attorney General, Secretary of State, and local election officials alike have urged SEB to cease its last-minute rulemakings—including its passage of the Hand Count Rule—precisely because of the concerns raised under the *Purcell* doctrine.
- 100. The Secretary's office, for example, has stated that "[i]t is far too late in the election process for counties to implement new rules and procedures, and many poll workers have already completed their required training." Ex. B at 1. Similarly, the Attorney General's Office has cautioned against "the passage of any rules well-within the period where courts have agreed that *Purcell* applies. Ex. A at 2. And GAVREO requested a rulemaking pause because the "2024 General Election is less than 50 days away." Ex. H at 1.
- 101. Imposing onerous and untested procedures within a month of election day is not "conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections" under any meaning of the term. *See* O.C.G.A § 21-2-31(2).

- C. SEB Violated The Georgia APA By Failing To Provide An Explanation For The Hand Count Rule Or Proper Notice Of Its Intent To Adopt The Rule
  - 1. SEB Failed To Provide A Statement Of Reasons For Its Decision To Enact The Hand Count Rule
- 102. The Hand Count Rule is independently invalid because it violates a key notice and comment requirement embedded in the Georgia APA.
  - 103. The APA provides that, prior to the adoption of a rule:

The agency shall consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule. Upon adoption of a rule, the agency, *if requested to do so by an interested person* either prior to adoption or within 30 days thereafter, *shall issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its adoption and incorporate therein its reason for overruling the consideration* urged against its adoption.

- O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(a)(2) (emphases added).
- 104. Failure to comply with the statement of reasons requirements is fatal to any regulation. As the Court of Appeals held in *Outdoor Advertising Association of Georgia, Inc. v. Department of Transportation*, "[i]nasmuch as we have concluded that [the agency] violated mandated precepts of the APA in its attempt to adopt amendments to [its] rules and regulations, we must ... hold that the amendments are invalid." 186 Ga. App. 550, 554 (1988). The court expressly noted that one of the agency's failures was the violation of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(a)(2) "because the board did not consider the written and oral comments concerning the proposed amendments[.]" *Id*.
- 105. The same is true here. Petitioner DPG asked for its comments to be considered as to each challenged rule. *See* Ex. I. Nonetheless, SEB has not issued any statement as to why DPG's comments on the Hand Count Rule were disregarded. That failure requires invalidation of the Hand Count Rule.

## 2. SEB Did Not Provide Adequate Notice Of Its Vote On The Hand Count Rule

106. The Hand Count Rule is also invalid because it violates the Georgia APA's notice requirement:

No rule adopted after April 3, 1978, shall be valid unless adopted in *exact compliance* with subsections (a) and (e) of this Code section and in substantial compliance with the remainder of this Code section.

O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(d) (emphasis added).

- 107. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(a) provides that, prior to the adoption of a rule, the agency shall "[g]ive at least 30 days' notice of its intended action."
- 108. Failure to stringently comply with this requirement is fatal. Again, when an agency violates the Georgia APA "in [an] attempt to adopt amendments to [its] rules and regulations, ... the amendments are invalid. *Outdoor Advertising*, 186 Ga. App. at 554.
- 109. The *Outdoor Advertising* rule applies here. SEB's notice informed the public only that the September 20, 2024 meeting would provide "an opportunity to comment upon and provide input into the proposed rule amendments," including the Hand Count Rule. Ex. G at 1. Nothing in the notice suggested that SEB would actually reach a final decision on the Hand Count Rule at the September 20 hearing.

## COUNT I – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT THE HAND COUNT RULE IS INVALID

- 110. Petitioners reallege and incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 through 109 inclusive.
- 111. Because the Hand Count Rule conflicts with the General Assembly's comprehensive scheme for securing, counting, canvassing, and tabulating ballots and SEB lacks authority to displace or interfere with that legislative scheme, the Hand Count Rule is invalid.

  See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31 (SEB rulemaking must be "consistent with law").

- 112. Promulgating the Hand Count Rule on the eve of the election is also not "conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections," O.C.G.A § 21-2-31(2), and will cause confusion among both voters and election officials, *Grace*, 2023 WL 5286232, at \*1. Under the facts of this case, SEB lacks statutory authority to implement such sweeping changes with Election Day in sight—*i.e.*, after poll workers have been trained, election day procedures have been designed, and voters have begun casting ballots.
- 113. Separately, the Hand Count Rule is not authorized by statute because SEB neither "issue[d] a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its adoption and incorporate therein its reason for overruling the consideration urged against its adoption," nor "consider[ed] fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule." O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(a)(2).
- 114. Finally, the Hand Count Rule is not authorized by statute because SEB failed to give the statutorily required notice that it would vote on the Hand Count Rule at its September 20 meeting.
- 115. Petitioners therefore seek a declaration that the Hand Count Rule is invalid as contrary to law and violates Georgia's Administrative Procedure Act. See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10.
- 116. Petitioners face injury from the Hand Count Rule, and require relief to avoid the confusion, disorder, and burdens that have been and will continue to be caused by the Hand Count Rule.

#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

## WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully request that the Court:

- (1) Declare that the Hand Count Rule is invalid and an unlawful exercise of SEB's authority;
- (2) Declare that the Hand Count Rule fails to comply with the procedural requirements of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act;

- (3) Enter a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Hand Count Rule; and
- (4) Grant any other relief the Court deems necessary or proper.

Signatures follow on the next page.

#### Respectfully submitted this 30th day of September, 2024.

#### /s/ Manoj S. Varghese

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Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc.

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#### /s/ Kurt G. Kastorf

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<sup>\*</sup> Pro hac vice application forthcoming

# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA

TERESA CRAWFORD, VASU
ABHIRAMAN, LORETTA MIRANDOLA,
ANITA TUCKER, DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL COMMITTEE, and
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GEORGIA,
INC.,

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GEORGIA, INC.,	
Petitioners,	
v.	Civil Case No.
STATE ELECTION BOARD,	
Respondent.	

# **VERIFICATION OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF**

Comes now Kevin Olasanoye, who states as follows:

- 1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to provide this verification.
- 2. I am the Executive Director of the Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc., a Petitioner in this action.
- 3. I have authorized the filing of the foregoing Petition for Declaratory Relief on behalf of the Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc.
- 4. I have reviewed the foregoing Petition for Declaratory Relief, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, all the factual allegations contained therein are true and correct.

[Signatures appear on the following page]

This 294 day of September, 2024.

KEVIN OLASANOYE

**Executive Director** 

Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc.

Sworn to me and subscribed before me,

any C. Reed

this 29 day of September, 2024.

**NOTARY PUBLIC** 

My comutily status pires:

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#### GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF LAW

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR ATTORNEY GENERAL 40 Capitol Square SW Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300

www.law.ga.gov (404) 656-3300

#### **ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION**

September 19, 2024

#### MEMORANDUM:

TO: John Fervier

Chairman

State Election Board

FROM: Elizabeth Young

Senior Assistant Attorney General

RE: Request for Comments on Proposed Rules in Advance of September 20,

2024 State Election Board Meeting

\_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum is in response to the Board's request for comments from our office regarding the proposed rules to be considered by the Board at its September 20, 2024 meeting.

As an initial matter, this office does not typically engage in a broad review of an agency's proposed rules to ensure that the agency's proposed rules are consistent with law. As an administrative board with rulemaking authority, it is the Board's obligation to formulate its proposed rules to be consistent with law and conducive to the fair, legal and orderly conduct of primaries and elections. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(2). The Board should evaluate the legality of any proposed rule prior to publication and voting. Should the Board desire specific legal advice concerning any proposed rule or action, the Board should seek such advice in writing addressed to this office. This office cannot search through email correspondence to which it is simply copied to determine whether or not the Board has made a passing comment to seek legal advice on any particular topic. In addition, seeking unspecified comment on any proposed rule is unhelpful. In its request for legal advice, the Board should specify the matter upon which it seeks legal advice and ask a specific question to be answered through the Chair. This is the best manner in which to seek advice and allows this office to answer those questions on which the Board needs advice and avoids any misinterpretation of the Board's request and allows for an efficient and deliberate response.

In the instant matter, in an effort to assist the Board, we make this limited exception to our usual practice to offer the following expedited comments upon the rules proposed for State Election Board September 19, 2024 Page 2

consideration at the September 20 meeting based on the Board's request. We make this exception here because a review of the proposed rules reveals several issues including that several of the proposed rules, if passed, very likely exceed the Board's statutory authority and in some instances appear to conflict with the statutes governing the conduct of elections. Where such is the case, and as outlined below, the Board risks passing rules that may easily be challenged and determined to be invalid.

#### Please note the following:

As a general matter, the passage of any rules concerning the conduct of elections are disfavored when implemented as close to an election as the rules on the September 20 agenda. The United States Supreme Court in Purcell v. Gonzalez recognized that "[c]ourt orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase." 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006). Federal courts have thus generally refrained from enjoining state election laws in the months prior to an election. See Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also League of Women Voters of Florida, Inc. v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 32 F.4th 1363 (11th Cir. 2022) (Purcell applies when voting was set to begin in less than four months). The Board itself has utilized the *Purcell* principle in defense of certain Senate Bill 202 provisions. See In re Ga. Senate Bill 202, 622 F.Supp.3d 1312, 1343-44 (N.D. Ga. 2022) ("[State Defendants, which include the members of the State Election Board argue that the Court should withhold relief under the *Purcell* doctrine and the Eleventh Circuit's application of that doctrine in *League* because in-person early voting for the general election will begin in mid-October, and a late change to the law will pose a significant risk of voter confusion and harm to the electoral process."). Thus, the Board should also consider how the passage of any rules well-within the period where courts have agreed that *Purcell* applies may affect the application of the principle in the future.

# I. The Board's general rule-making power is limited to rules that do not exceed or conflict with the Georgia Election Code.

"[T]he General Assembly is empowered to enact laws of general application and then delegate to administrative officers or agencies the authority to make rules and regulations necessary to effectuate such laws." *Jackson v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners of Ga.*, 256 Ga. 264, 265 (1986). The test of validity of an administrative rule is twofold: (1) is it authorized by statute, and (2) is it reasonable? *Georgia Real Estate Comm. v. Accelerated Courses in Real Estate, Inc.*, 234 Ga. 30, 32-33 (1975).

The Board's power to adopt rules is solely derived from statutes passed by the General Assembly. The General Assembly has granted the Board authority to promulgate rules and regulations as will be conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections, *see* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(2); and further to promulgate rules and regulations to obtain uniformity in the practices and proceedings of superintendents, registrars,

State Election Board September 19, 2024 Page 3

deputy registrars, poll officers, and other officials, as well as the legality and purity in all primaries and elections. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(1).

However, a broad grant of statutory authority to promulgate rules is not an unlimited grant of authority. See Ga. Real Estate Comm'n v. Accelerated Courses in Real Estate, Inc., 234 Ga. 30, 32-33 (1975) (administrative rules must be both authorized by statute and reasonable) (discussing Eason v. Morrison, 181 Ga. 322 (1935)). Only the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to legislate. See HCA Health Services of Ga., Inc. v. Roach, 265 Ga. 501, 502 (1995). Although the General Assembly may grant "administrative authority to promulgate rules for the enforcement of the General Assembly's enactments" to agencies like the Board, the agency's authority can only extend to "adopt rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already passed" or otherwise "administer and effectuate an existing enactment of the General Assembly." Id. Thus, a regulation that adds extra requirements or procedure where the statute speaks plainly on a matter is inconsistent with the statute and may likely be subject to a legal challenge. See Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Anderson, 218 Ga. App. 528, 529 (1995) (agency regulation that added a requirement before a modification order of child support took effect was inconsistent with the clear authority of the statute).

Operating where there is *no* statute is also similarly impermissible: while agencies have implied powers "as a reasonably necessary to execute the express powers conferred," *Bentley v. State Bd. of Med. Examiners of Ga.*, 152 Ga. 836, 836 (1922), the Supreme Court of Georgia has recently warned that "for a government entity whose authority on the relevant point is purely a creature of statute, the absence of statutory authority is the absence of legal authority to act." *Camp v. Williams*, 314 Ga. 699, 709 (2022) (Bethel, J., concurring). *See also Gebrekidan v. City of Clarkston*, 298 Ga. 651, 654 (2016) ("[T]he General Assembly speaks through its silence as well as its words; the broad scope and reticulated nature of the statutory scheme indicate that the legislature meant not only to preclude local regulation of the various particular matters to which the general law directly speaks, but also to leave unregulated ... the matters left unregulated in the interstices of the general law.").

Thus, the Board's authority to promulgate rules and regulations is limited to the administration or effectuation of the statutes in the Georgia Election Code. The Board should therefore take all precaution to ensure that any rule adopted and promulgated by the Board neither conflicts with nor expands any statute; otherwise, the Board runs substantial risk of intruding upon the General Assembly's constitutional right to legislate. When such intrusion occurs, the Board rule is highly likely to be ruled invalid should it be challenged.

Finally, to the extent that a proposed rule merely mirrors the language of a statute without more, it does not accomplish anything. To the extent that a rule mirrors a statute but adds or alters the statute's requirements, the rule will likely be subject to an easy legal challenge.

### II. Proposed Rules

There are several proposed rules before the Board that appear to either impermissibly conflict with or otherwise expand the scope of Georgia statutes.

# 1. Proposed Rules <u>183-1-12-.01</u> and <u>183-1-12-.19</u>

These rules seek to change the form of the ballots and require that the Secretary of State and the counties post "freely accessible link[s]" to a list of electors prior to advance voting and maintain such data files for free download for a minimum of ten consecutive years, respectively. Thus, the proposed rules seek to direct actions that are, by statute, within the purview of the Secretary of State. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50(a)(1), (15); O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(c). As such, the proposed rules do not fall within the Board's regulatory power under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31 thus very likely exceeds the Board's scope of authority to promulgate.

# 2. Proposed Rule <u>183-1-13-.05</u>

This rule seeks to expand the enumerated locations where poll watchers may be designated beyond those places identified in the statute. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408(c), which the original rule, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-13-.05, tracks almost exactly, specifically provides that poll watchers may be designated by the superintendent to serve in "the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas as the superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center." Under the canon of statutory construction "expression *unius est exclusio alterius*" ("the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another"), a list of items in a statute is presumed to exclude items not specifically listed, and the omission of additional locations from the statute is regarded by the courts as deliberate. *See, e.g. Barnes v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 2024 Ga.App. LEXIS (Aug. 26, 2024).

The proposed rule goes beyond the statutorily-designated list of places a superintendent may decide to place poll watchers and instead supplants the superintendent's discretion with the Board's own. This too does not carry into effect a law already passed by the General Assembly but rather expands upon the statute; the rule, if adopted, would then very likely be subject to legal challenge as invalid.

#### 3. Proposed Rule **183-1-14-.11**

This rule goes beyond merely administering or effectuating an existing statute by adding additional requirements that would make it inconsistent with the statute. The proposed rule purports to require that absentee ballots be mailed "by United States Postal Service or other delivery service which offers tracking[.]" However, the General Assembly did not specify the use of tracking for the mailing of absentee ballots. *See* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-

State Election Board September 19, 2024 Page 5

384(a)(2) ("[T]he board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall *mail or issue* official absentee ballots to all eligible applicants....") (emphasis added).

The proposed rule further requires that county boards of registrars maintain as public record the tracking records for each ballot mailed to the electors. However, the Board has no authority to promulgate rules regarding the classification or retention of documents. *See* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31 (promulgate rules for the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of elections). Thus, promulgation of the rule would very likely go beyond the scope of the Board's authority and be subject to challenge as invalid

#### 4. Proposed Rule <u>183-1-12-.21</u>

This rule seeks to expand on the reporting requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-385(e). The statute already provides a fairly detailed process by which county boards of registrars or absentee ballot clerks must report information regarding the ballots issued, received, or rejected during the advance voting period. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-385(e). The proposed rule seeks to go beyond the statute to require, among other expansions, additional information regarding the substance of the ballots (i.e., the number of political party or nonpartisan ballots cast). However, the General Assembly did not include that information as information that must be reported pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-385(e). Accordingly, the rule, if promulgated, would similarly likely go beyond the scope of the statute and the Board's authority.

# 5. Proposed Rules <u>183-1-12-.12(a)(5)</u> and <u>183-1-14-.02(8)</u>, (13)

These rules refer to the process of hand-counting ballots on Election Day and during the advance voting period, respectively, to produce a vote total to compare to the ballot count produced by the ballot scanners. Crucially, these Proposed Rules purport to amend provisions to allow for hand-counting ballots at the precinct-level, which would appear to occur prior to submission to the election superintendent and consolidation and tabulation of the votes. *Compare* Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-12-.12(a) ("After the Polls Close") with Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-12-.12(b) ("Consolidation of Results"); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-14-.02(8) ("At the close of voting on any day during the advance voting period…); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-14-.02(13) ("The ballot scanner and ballot containers shall then be secured until time for the tabulation of votes.").

However, the statutes upon which these rules rely do not reflect any provision enacted by the General Assembly for the hand-counting of ballots prior to tabulation.

For example, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483 details procedures *at* the tabulation center: in primaries and elections in which optical scanners are used, after the seal on each container of ballots is inspected and verified as not having been broken, the container with the ballots is opened, the ballots are removed, "and the ballots shall be prepared for processing by the *tabulating machines*." O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(c) (emphasis added).

State Election Board September 19, 2024 Page 6

Then, "[u]pon completion of the tabulation of the votes, the superintendent shall cause to be completed and signed a ballot recap form[.]" O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(d). O.C.G.A. § 21-2-436 is similarly inapplicable; that statute contemplates the duties of the poll officers after the close of polls in precincts in which *paper ballots* are used, not ballot scanners or voting machines.

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-420(a) does provide that "the poll officials in each precinct shall complete the required accounting and related documentation for the precinct and shall advise the election superintendent of the total number of ballots cast at such precinct and the total number of provisional ballots cast." However, neither the statutes that prescribe the duties of poll officers after the close of the polls for precincts using voting machines, see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-454, nor the precincts using optical scanners, see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-485, suggest that the General Assembly contemplated that a hand-count of the ballots would be part of the "required accounting."

There are thus no provisions in the statutes cited in support of these proposed rules that permit counting the number of ballots by hand at the precinct level prior to delivery to the election superintendent for tabulation. Accordingly, these proposed rules are not tethered to any statute—and are, therefore, likely the precise type of impermissible legislation that agencies cannot do. See HCA Health Services of Ga., Inc., supra.

We hope that this expedited informal analysis is helpful to the Board. Should there be further questions directed to this office as described herein, we will endeavor to assist the Board further.

cc: Mrs. Sara Tindall Ghazal (via email correspondence)
Dr. Janice W. Johnston (via email correspondence)
Mr. Rick Jeffares (via email correspondence)
Mrs. Janelle King (via email correspondence)

Mr. Michael Coan (via email correspondence)

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# Office of the Secretary of State

Brad Raffensperger Charlene McGowan

SECRETARY OF STATE GENERAL COUNSEL

September 16, 2024

Mr. John Fervier Chairman, Georgia State Election Board jfervier.seb@gmail.com

Mr. Chairman,

This letter is in response to your request for comment from the Secretary's office on the 11 proposed new rules and 2 petitions on the agenda for the next State Election Board meeting on September 20, 2024. We have received an overwhelming number of comments from county election officials expressing concern about the Board changing Georgia's election rules and procedures with the General Election only 50 days away.

The Board should be mindful of upcoming deadlines. The deadline for counties to mail UOCAVA ballots is **September 21** and counties will begin mailing absentee ballots on **October 7**. Advanced voting starts on **October 15** and counties are conducting preparations for in-person voting such as logic & accuracy testing. The earliest possible date new rules could take effect if passed is **October 14**, which is **22 days** before the General Election when **Georgia voters will already be voting**.

It is far too late in the election process for counties to implement new rules and procedures, and many poll workers have already completed their required training. If the Board believes that rules changes are important for an election, the process should begin much sooner to allow for smooth implementation and training and include the input of election officials.

To underscore the absurdity of the timing of the Board's actions, the amendment to Rule 183-1-12-.01 would change the form of absentee/provisional/emergency ballots, which have **already been printed**, and counties will have already begun mailing absentee ballots to voters before any rule change would take effect. It is simply impossible to implement this change for 2024. And even if it were, the Board lacks the legal authority to pass this rule because the form of the ballot is exclusively within the control of the Secretary of State under Georgia law. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50(a)(1), (15).

The two petitions under consideration would similarly interfere with the Secretary's legal authority. The proposed amendments to Rule 183-1-12-.19 interfere with the Secretary of State's exclusive authority over the state's voter registration database and conflict with the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-110, § 21-2-111, and § 21-2-225.

The most concerning rules under consideration would require hand-counting of ballots for every day of advance voting (Rule 183-1-14-.02(8)) and on Election Day (Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5)). As election officials have repeatedly told the Board, these new procedures would require tremendous personnel resources and time, and could lead to significant delays in reporting. These new procedures would disrupt existing chain of custody protocols under the law and needlessly introduce the risk of error, lost ballots, or fraud. Election workers are prohibited from tabulating ballots before the close of the polls on Election Day, which would be compromised by the viewing and counting of ballots during advance voting. There are strict legal prohibitions against the tabulation and reporting of results during early processing of absentee by mail ballots. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386. There are no similar security and ballot secrecy controls in the proposed amendment to Rule 183-1-14-.02(8).

Other rules such as expanded poll watcher access and posting of certain reports on county websites are not objectionable, but we share the concerns of counties that there is insufficient time to implement and train elections workers on new policies now that they have already been trained. The General Assembly recently expanded poll watcher access with our support this past session with the passage of H.B. 1207. And the Elections Division already provides the absentee voter file and other data on the Secretary's website.

The U.S. Supreme Court's *Purcell* principle cautions that last-minute changes to election procedures harm both voters and elections officials in the orderly administration of an election. As Justice Kavanaugh wrote, it is a "bedrock tenet of election law" that "[w]hen an election is close at hand, the rules of the road must be clear and settled" to avoid "unfair consequences for candidates, political parties, and voters." *Merrill v. Milligan*, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022).

The Secretary's office would welcome the opportunity to return to the normal course of business of working with the Board and GAVREO on common-sense rules that benefit voters and are consistent with law, after the election. But for now, the Board should heed the words of Justice Kavanaugh and pause any further rulemaking to ensure that the rules are "clear and settled" and avoid "unfair consequences" in the 2024 General Election.

Sincerely,

Charlene S. McGowan

General Counsel

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# SHARLENE ALEXANDER

460 Anthony Drive, Tyrone GA 30290 CoachPatriot@pm.me (678) 458-4528

June 6, 2024

Georgia State Election Board 2 MLK Drive Suite 802 Floyd West Tower Atlanta, Georgia 30334

# PETITION FOR AMENDMENT TO ELECTION RULES (Hand Count of Ballots at the Precinct)

Mr. John Fervier, Chairman,

Mrs. Sara Tindall Ghazal.

Mrs. Janelle King,

Dr Janice W. Johnston,

Mr Rick Jeffares

This petition for amendment to an election rule enhances election integrity by providing a checkpoint outside of the electronic system, more accurate results, reducing the opportunity for collusion to sabotage election results and reducing Dominion and electronic voting system error complaints leading to 'stolen election' theories. As a Member of the Fayette County Board of Elections, and as a CPA and former Expert Trial Witness on Embezzlements, I believe this addition to the election process will greatly enhance the integrity of the outcome in each election.

# SHARLENE ALEXANDER

460 Anthony Drive, Tyrone GA 30290 CoachPatriot@pm.me (678) 458-4528

As such, I hereby submit this petition for your consideration according to SEB Rule 183-1-1-.01(3):

1. The name and post office address of the Petitioner:

Sharlene Alexander



2. The full text of the rule requested to be amended:

Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)5

"The poll manager and two witnesses who have been sworn as poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 shall unseal and open each scanner ballot box, remove the paper ballots from each ballot box, and place the paper ballots into a durable, portable, secure and sealable container to be provided for transport to the office of the election superintendent. A separate container shall be used for the paper ballots from each ballot box and the container shall be labelled with the polling place, ballot scanner serial number, the number assigned to the ballot scanner for that election, the count of the ballots from the tabulation tape, and the date and time that the ballot box was emptied. The container shall be sealed and signed by the poll manager and the same two witnesses such that it cannot be opened without breaking the seal. The poll manager and the two witnesses shall sign a label affixed to the container indicating that it contains all of the correct ballots from the indicated ballot box and no additional ballots."

#### TO BE AMENDED IN BOLD AND UNDERLINED TEXT:

"The poll manager and two witnesses who have been sworn as poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 shall unseal and open each

# SHARLENE ALEXANDER

460 Anthony Drive, Tyrone GA 30290 CoachPatriot@pm.me (678) 458-4528

scanner ballot box, remove the paper ballots from each ballot box, record the date and time that the ballot box was emptied and present to three sworn precinct poll officers to independently count the total number of ballots removed from the scanner, sorting into stacks of 50 ballots, continuing until all of the ballots have been counted separately by each of the three poll officers. When all three poll officers arrive at the same total ballot count independently, they shall each sign a control document containing the polling place, ballot scanner serial number, election name, printed name with signature and date and time of the ballot hand count. If the numbers recorded on the precinct poll pads, ballot marking devices [BMDs] and scanner recap forms do not reconcile with the hand count ballot totals, the poll manager shall immediately determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken. A separate container shall be used for the hand counted paper ballots from each ballot box and the container shall be labelled with the polling place, ballot scanner serial number, the number assigned to the ballot scanner for that election, the scanner count of the ballots from the tabulation tape, and the hand count ballot total as certified by the three poll officials. The container shall be sealed and signed by the poll manager and two of the three hand count poll officers such that it cannot be opened without breaking the seal. The poll manager and two witnesses shall sign a label affixed to the container indicating that it contains all of the hand counted **ballots** from the indicated scanner box and no additional ballots.

#### 3. The reason such rule should be amended:

Prior to October 6, 2022, it was a long-standing tradition in Fayette County and other polling places that the paper ballots were removed from scanners at the precinct, the ballots were then hand counted by three sworn poll officials for total number of ballots removed from the scanner, then this hand counted total was reconciled against the scanner count to ensure that all cast ballots were accounted for. By performing this precinct hand count of totals only, any discrepancies can be immediately investigated with all parties, ballots, electronic voting systems remaining in the same space and the difference usually explained. The urgency of a need to reconcile counts immediately at the polling place are substantiated in SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)2, which states "If the numbers recorded on the recap form do not reconcile with each other, the poll manager shall immediately determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken." With this amendment, SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)2 would read "if the numbers recorded on the recap forms do not reconcile with each other and the total of hand counted paper ballots, the poll manager shall immediately determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken. The hand counted ballots are then sealed and transported by two people via chain-of-custody to the tabulation center.

This practice of hand counting the ballots at each precinct was halted in most counties when Blake Evans, Director of Elections at the Office of the Secretary of State issued an email memorandum on October 6, 2022 (attached). As a result of halting this process, the total ballots hand count is never reconciled against the scanner total and if a ballot count or recount were to occur sometime after the ballots leave the precinct, it may be difficult or impossible to determine the cause

of any discrepancy. In addition, SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)2 is subject to interpretation as to whether the poll manager is required to hand count the number of paper ballots removed from the scanner or simply report the number of printed ballots on the scanner screen or the totals tape.

The proposed amendment to rule Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)5 to require a hand count at each precinct to ensure that the number of ballots placed under seal for transport to the tabulation center matches the chain-of-custody results form, and if there is a discrepancy with the scanner total, then that discrepancy will be immediately investigated by elections officials.

#### 4. Any and all pertinent facts as to the Petitioner's interest in the matter.

The following vote tabulation errors and reported results could have been found and corrected if the above checks-and-balances hand count of total paper ballots were performed in every county:

1] November 3, 2020 Presidential Election in Fayette County cited by the State Elections Board for criminal investigation [SEB 21-197 transcript]: One memory card containing 2,760 ballots was left in an early voting precinct scanner and overlooked by the Elections Office. The original memory card had recorded close to 10,000 votes so a Dominion rep was called to replace the full card with a new one to complete the election cycle. The Dominion rep took the full memory card to the Elections Office [also in violation of chain-of-custody requiring two sworn poll officials to accompany the card]. The Elections Director had not experienced an election cycle where one scanner had multiple memory cards due to voter turnout so he didn't remember the second memory card since he had one for each of the 4 early voting precincts in his County. Had the total ballots removed from the scanner box been hand counted at the precinct this misplaced memory card error could have been avoided.

2] In Fayette County at an AIP [Early Voting] precinct on the last day of early voting, ballots were removed from the AIP scanner and the poll manager had the these ballots hand counted to ensure that all ballots were removed. This hand count was 1 less than the scanner total. Searching inside the scanner ballot box, one ballot was found sticking to the top of the ballot box [presumably due to static electricity.]

3] In the Fayette County General Primary on May 21, 2024, one precinct had a discrepancy in ballots that was discovered during audit. Two technicians sent to the warehouse found that the ballots in the write-in bin had not been retrieved from the scanner on Election Night.

In all of the above cases, had there been an independent hand-count of paper ballots removed from the scanner AT THE PRECINCT, these errors would have been found and corrected. As a past supervisor of audits, I have long believed that cross-check control procedures are just as applicable to ballots as dollars. The best check-and-balance process is one that is separate from the all of the electronic count recaps found on the various electronic voting machines at the polling places. This suggested independent hand count of ballots process better ensures that all ballots are accounted for, guards against reported result errors and collusion and can better silence the claims that poll pads, ballot scanners or BMD totals can be accessed remotely, manipulated, duplicate ballot batches scanned or contain software glitches and manipulation.

5. Any and all facts known to the Petitioner that might influence the decision of the Board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking, including identification of any parties who it is known will or may be affected by the amended rule.

All election officials in the State of Georgia who conduct elections, as well as Blake Evans, Director of Elections, who advises election officials and oversees training on the conduct of elections, will be affected by this rule amendment.

In particular, Superintendants responsible for training Poll Workers according to O.C.G.A. §21-2-70, and Poll Workers themselves will be required to execute the new procedure.

6. Citations of legal authorities which authorize, support, or require the action requested by the Petitioner.

O.C.G.A. §21-2-483(a) requires that ballots be counted at the precinct or tabulating center where optical scanners are used..

O.C.G.A. §21-2-436 requires, at the close of polls, that the number of votes be reconciled as shown on stubs and numbered list of voters, accounting for spoiled and returned ballots, rejected certificates and unused ballots, before these items are sealed; however, it fails to require that the actual number of paper ballots be reconciled prior to seal and transport. This hand count of total ballots is the only check-and-balance procedure separated from the current Dominion electronic voting system and direly needed to counter the many inconsistencies found across the state including missed memory cards, misplaced or lost paper ballots, duplicated ballot scans, errors in poll pad voter check-ins and BMD manipulation as shown by Professor Halderman in the recent Judge Tottenberg trial in Atlanta, GA.

O.C.G.A. §21-2-420(a) requires, at the close of polls, that the total number of ballots cast be reported to the election superintendant, but doesn't specify how that number is determined, *i.e.* whether it comes from the Poll Pads, the Scanners, or from counting the ballots themselves. While the Poll Pad and Scanner counts are required to be reconciled, there isn't a reconciliation of the ballots themselves at the polling place currently.

O.C.G.A. §21-2-420(a) further requires that the superintendant count the ballots at the tabulation center, where any discrepancies may be much more difficult to investigate.

I, Sharlene Alexander, personally appeared before the undersigned duly authorized to administer oaths, and on oath deposes that the facts stated in the Petition therein are true and accurate.

R	espe	ctfully	submitted	this

day of XIAAA

**\_**, 2024.

Sharlene Alexander

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME

this day of den

2024

Notary Public in and for Fayette County, Georgia

[Seal]

EXHABIT A

#### egale@darientel.net

From: DoNotReply@sos.ga.gov

Sent: Thursday, October 6, 2022 5:21 PM

To: DoNotReply@sos.ga.gov
Subject: The Buzz Post - Ballot Security

A new discussion has

been posted in The Buzz by Evans, Blake on 10/6/2022 5:10 PM

I know that many counties have received an email requesting that poll workers hand count ballots at polling places on election night. Deciding to have poll workers hand count ballots at each polling location on election night is not something your poll workers should do.

Please see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-420(a) which states:

"(a) After the time for the closing of the polls and the last elector voting, the poll officials in each precinct shall complete the required accounting and related documentation for the precinct and shall advise the election superintendent of the total number of bailots cast at such precinct and the total number of provisional ballots cast. The chief manager and at least one assistant manager shall post a copy of the tabulated results for the precinct on the door of the precinct and then immediately deliver all required documentation and election materials to the election superintendent. The election superintendent shall then ensure that such ballots are processed, counted, and tabulated as soon as possible and shall not cease such count and tabulation until all such ballots are counted and tabulated."

Also, SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12 states: "The poll manager and two witnesses who have been sworn as poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. 21-2 94 and 21-2-95 shall unseal and open each ballot box, remove the paper ballots from each ballot box, and place the paper ballots into a durable, portable, secure and sealable container to be provided for transport to the office of the election superintendent."

In order to ensure maximum security for the voted ballots, poll workers should not prolong the process of removing ballots from ballot boxes and sealing them in transport containers. This process should be done efficiently, transparently, and immediately after the polls have closed and votes have been cast. Members of the public can observe the process.

If you have any further questions regarding the law on this matter, please consult with your county attorney with this guidance in mind.

Blake Evans, Elections Director

If you would like to opt out of receiving email notifications for this discussion, click here.

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September 24, 2024

Governor Brian P. Kemp 206 Washington Street Suite 203, State Capitol Atlanta, GA 30334

Attorney General Chris Carr 40 Capitol Square, SW Atlanta, GA 30334

Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger 214 State Capitol Atlanta, GA 30334

Dear Governor Kemp, Attorney General Carr, and Secretary of State Raffensperger:

As Republican, conservative, and independent lawyers and former elected or appointed officials nationwide and in Georgia, we are writing to follow up on <u>our letter dated September 5, 2024</u>. We previously noted that the actions of Georgia State Election Board members Rick Jeffares, Janice Johnston, and Janelle King raised the most profound ethics and legal concerns.

On Friday, September 20, 2024, the concerns that compelled us to write to you less than three weeks ago grew more profound. These same three board members passed a rule, by a 3-2 vote, requiring counties to hand-count the number of ballots at the precinct level. This three-member Board majority exceeded its legal authority by voting on and passing this ill-conceived hand-count rule, which is flatly contrary to applicable law. The consequences of this rule, if implemented, will be severe for the State of Georgia and its citizens. We respectfully urge you to take immediate remedial action.

In our <u>original September 5th letter</u>, we detailed several instances in which these members have previously compromised the impartiality of the Board. We emphasized that their actions, combined with their publicly known support for former President Donald Trump's campaign, raise significant doubts about their ability to carry out their duties in a fair and unbiased manner. We urged you to act under O.C.G.A. § 45-10-4 by convening a hearing and receiving evidence of these concerns and, if necessary, removing these members from office. We remain steadfast in our belief that in order to safeguard our Republic, states must maintain public trust in the integrity of our elections by tallying votes and certifying election results without partisan influence.

Then on September 20 came the new rule. It provides that three sworn poll officers in every precinct must count the number of paper ballots in every ballot box for purposes of comparison with the number of ballots that the ballot scanner yields. On the day before these three board members voted to enact this new rule, Attorney General Carr rightly submitted a September 19, 2024, memorandum to the Board that raised serious concerns about the legality of several proposed election rules, including this hand-count rule, warning that the rules exceed the State Election Board's statutory authority and conflict with the Georgia Election Code. Specifically, the Attorney General highlighted that the now-enacted hand-count rule has (i) no basis in state law and (ii) could face successful legal challenges, including for violating the doctrine that changes in election rules should not be made close to an election given the need for adequate time for training and to put election procedures in place. Likewise, the Board's nonpartisan chair, John Fervier, has raised concerns that the hand-count has "put [the Board] in legal jeopardy."

Multiple local elections officials testified in opposition to the new rule, including because imposing it at this late date could throw the election into chaos. For example, Ethan Compton, Irwin County elections supervisor, <u>stated</u> that "[o]ver 200 pages of election code and rules have been implemented since 2020" and "[w]e have practiced on them, we have trained, we are prepared, we are ready. Do not change this at the last second."

Senior state officials also share the view that hand-counting could have disastrous consequences for the election and that the hand-count rule is legally dubious. Secretary of State Raffensperger has <u>stated</u> that "[t]hese misguided, last-minute changes from unelected bureaucrats who have never run an election and seem to reject the advice of anyone who ever has could cause serious problems in an election that otherwise will be secure and accurate." The three-person Board majority's directive for hand counting ballots also risks delaying certification, which could prevent Georgia from certifying election returns by December 11, 2024, as required by the Electoral Count Reform Act. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5(a)(1), (7).

It is clear that the Board must refrain from enacting rules that do not comport with the standards set by the legislature and stick to its proper role of promoting the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of elections.

Not only is the hand-count rule an unauthorized exercise of the Board's statutorily limited authority and legally precluded because it conflicts with state law, it is also fatally flawed as a policy matter. Hand counts are less accurate, more expensive, and slower than machine counts. In Osage County, Missouri, for example, the County Clerk has stated that, after conducting a full hand count in April 2023, her office "intend[ed] to move forward with [their] tabulation machines for upcoming elections" because if she "were to continue hand counting[,] it would cost [Osage County] more in time, money, [] volunteers, and accuracy of votes." In Kerr County, Texas, the Kerr County Republican Party Chairman and election judge Paul Zohlen has spoken in support of the county continuing to use machine counting, not hand counts, because the

former is more accurate and would be less costly and time intensive. In fact, <u>a 2020 hand recount</u> in Fulton County—a single county—cost Georgia taxpayers more than \$400,000.

Voting machines are undoubtedly <u>more accurate</u> than full hand counts because they can better handle the high-capacity workload of an election, and they excel at the "tedious and repetitive tasks" with which humans generally struggle. Indeed, voting machines are fully vetted. Every voting machine must pass a test requiring them to accurately count at least 10 million votes before being <u>certified</u> by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. And these certified machines <u>produce</u> comprehensive records that election officials use to verify results through multiple layers of review. This is confirmed by major research <u>studies</u>.

Accordingly, we urge you to address the conduct of these three Election Board members and reverse the unlawful actions that they took on September 20th, including enacting the hand-count rule. We remain confident that you will continue to uphold the same principles of fairness and nonpartisanship that guided your actions following the 2020 election.

Sincerely,

Donald Ayer, Deputy Attorney General under President George H.W. Bush (1989-1990)

Arne Carlson, Governor of Minnesota (R) (1991-1999)

Ty Cobb, Special Counsel to President Donald J. Trump (2017-2018)

Tom Coleman, Representative of the Sixth Congressional District of Missouri (R) (1976-1993)

Natalie Crawford, Executive Director of Georgia First, former Vice-Chair and Chair of the Habersham County Commission (R) (2015-2020)

Mickey Edwards, Representative of the Fifth Congressional District of Oklahoma (R) (1977-1993)

Shannon Ferguson, Senior Policy Analyst and Strategic Communications Director at Georgia First

Stuart Gerson, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division under President George H. W. Bush; Acting Attorney General of the United States under President Bill Clinton (1989–1993)

Phil Lacovara, Counsel to the Special Prosecutor, Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office (1973-1974); Deputy Solicitor General under President Richard Nixon (1972-1973)

Richard Painter, Associate Counsel to President George W. Bush (2005-2007)

Carter Phillips, Assistant to the Solicitor General under President Ronald Reagan (1981-1984)

Trevor Potter, Chairman of the United States Federal Election Commission (1992-1995)

Reid Ribble, Representative of the 8th Congressional District of Minnesota (R) (2011-2017)

Claudine Schneider, Representative of the 2nd Congressional District of Rhode Island (R) (1981-1991)

Nancy Temple, Partner at Katten & Temple LLP

Zachary Wamp, Representative of the 3rd Congressional District of Tennessee (R) (1995-2011)

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2	THE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE STATE OF GEORGIA
3	STATE OF GHOROTA
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6	IN THE MATTER OF:
7	STATE ELECTION BOARD MEETING
8	Georgia State Capitol, Room 341
9	Atlanta, Georgia
10	Tuesday, July 9, 2024
11	Atlanta, Georgia
12	8:30 a.m.
13	
14	APPEARANCE OF THE PANEL
15	
16	John Fervier, Acting Chair
17	Sara Tindall Ghazal
18	Janice Johnston
19	Janelle King
20	Rick Jeffares
21	
22	
23	
24	Mary K McMahan, CCR, 2757
25	STEVEN RAY GREEN COURT REPORTING LLC Atlanta, Georgia 30324 (404)733-6070
	(303) 700 70

1	Transcript Legend
2	[sic] - Exactly as said.
3	(ph) - Exact spelling unknown.
4	Break in speech continuity.
5	Indicates halting speech, unfinished sentence or
6	omission of word(s) when reading.
7	
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#### PROCEEDINGS

MR. FERVIER: Good morning. For those of you that don't know me, my name is John Fervier.

I'm the chairman of the state election board.

I'm joined by our other election board members here today.

I want to introduce our newest member,

Janelle King, who just joined the board recently.

We're glad to have her.

We have a very heavy agenda today, and so I want to go ahead and get started. I want to thank everybody for being here. I know there wasn't enough room for everybody, and hopefully the people that had to go to the overflow room are comfortable and can hear and see everything appropriately.

The purpose of today's meeting is to hear petitions for rules changes, and we will hear those after public comment and a few other changes.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair.

MR. FERVIER: Yes?

DR. JOHNSTON: (off microphone) I'd like to make a motion to amend the agenda and add new business. Do I do it now or after the invocation

and the pledge? 1 MR. FERVIER: After the invocation and 2 pledge and approval of the minutes. 3 DR. JOHNSTON: (off microphone) Before the 4 5 approval of the minutes. MR. FERVIER: Okay. 6 7 We will start with the invocation and Pledge 8 of Allegiance. 9 Member Jeffares, if you would lead us in the 10 invocation, please. 11 (Invocation) MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston, would you 12 13 lead us in the Pledge of Allegiance, please. DR. JOHNSTON: Yes. 14 (Pledge of Allegiance) 15 DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, I'd like to make a 16 17 motion to amend the agenda and add new business. 18 I move to amend the agenda concerning 19 SEB2023-025. I move that the board provide an 20 opportunity for a response from the complainants' representatives to the board and that the board 21 then consider the best course of action. 22 MR. JEFFARES: Second. 23 24 MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston, that question

is ruled out of order. The case 2023-025 has

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been heard and adjudicated by this board in a previous hearing.

In order for that case to be reconsidered, it would have to be reconsidered by the prevailing parties which consisted of member Ed Lindsay and member Sara Ghazal. And neither one of those have made a motion to reconsider that case. Therefore your motion is ruled out of order.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, I move to appeal the decision of the chair.

MS. KING: Second.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and an appeal to reconsider the decision of the chair. The chair would like to offer an intervening motion. An intervening motion would be to retire to executive session for the purpose of discovery -- discussing potential litigation regarding that case.

Is there a second?

MS. GHAZAL: Second.

MR. FERVIER: There is a motion and a second on an intervening motion to retire to executive session to discuss potential litigation concerning case 2023-025.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, a complete investigation is absolutely necessary to help Fulton County and prevent the recurrence of the same problems for the 2024 election.

One may say that this case has been heard and decided, but it has not. The complainants have not been heard. Fulton County stated they were still looking for required election documents.

The initial and partial hearing of the investigation suggested an incomplete investigation. The exhibits were not provided to the board. Disinformation of applicable law concerning ballot image retention was repeated by the Secretary of State, the investigative report, and the respondent's representative. Misleading conclusions concerning duplicate counted ballots were given by the Secretary of State representative.

There are suggestions that Carter Jones and the performance review board looked into these matters previously. Those were not investigations nor were they focused on the complaint of Mr. Rossi and Mr. Moncla.

One may say that the complainants cannot be

heard. Mr. Rossi and his representatives have never been heard. There's no precedent or rule currently concerning this -- this practice. In fact, there has been 20 years' practice of hearing from complainants until the practice was changed without consent or vote of this board less than two years ago, about the time this complaint was filed.

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Administrative Procedures, Title 50, chapter 13, section 13, paragraph (a)(c) states that all parties have to be heard. It says opportunity shall be afforded to all parties to be represented by legal counsel and to respond and present evidence on all issues involved.

I would like to hear that. HAVA requires that hearings must take place within 90 days of filing a complaint. This board certainly did not perform up to that standard. One might say, Oh, this cannot be heard because there's double jeopardy or res judicata. This is not a criminal case. Double jeopardy only applies to legal matters as determined by a court.

The state election board does not have the authority to charge anyone for a crime. The board may only refer to the Attorney General or

the District Attorney for investigation and adjudication.

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One might also say there's a statute of limitations. There is no statute of limitations for this investigation. It needs to be completed and thoroughly investigated. FEC says there's a statute of limitation for federal election crimes for four years but is longer if the investigation is ongoing.

The request to move to executive session does not apply to this case. We do not have pending litigation nor is there an issue of personnel to discuss which are the parameters for retiring to executive session. Executive session is not warranted at this time.

I've heard threats that this might cause a lawsuit. About what? Hearing from the complainants? Investigating an incomplete investigation? There is not sufficient evidence from the investigation to date to identify what needs to be monitored in the 2024 general election.

MR. FERVIER: The chair respectfully requests that the members consider adjourning to executive session to consider this and any

pending legal matters. We will now take a vote 1 2 on the motion to adjourn to executive session. We have a motion and a second. All those in 3 favor of adjourning to executive session signify 4 5 by saying aye. THE BOARD MEMBERS: 6 Aye. 7 MR. FERVIER: Aye? 8 MR. JEFFARES: Aye. 9 MR. FERVIER: The chair votes aye. All 10 those opposed? 11 DR. JOHNSTON: 12 MS. KING: No. MR. FERVIER: The motion carries three to 13 14 two. This board will adjourn to executive session to discussing matters concerning this. 15 (Executive session from 8:52 until 9:57 16 17 a.m.) 18 MR. FERVIER: The state election board will 19 now return to order. 20 Member Johnston, we have a motion on the 21 Would you like to restate your motion? DR. JOHNSTON: I make a motion to provide 22 consideration of case 2023-025 to allow the 23 24 respondents -- I'm sorry the complainants'

representatives to have time to speak during

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public comments for additional minutes of 15 minutes each for each respondent, or -- I'm sorry complainant or their representative or an expert that they may have available for this meeting.

Additionally I make a motion for new

2.1

Additionally I make a motion for new business in consideration of additional research concerning the deficiencies found in case 2023-025 concerning missing documents, duplicated counted votes, and missing ballot images.

MS. GHAZAL: (off microphone) Point of order.

MR. FERVIER: Point of order.

MS. GHAZAL: (off microphone) Those were two separate motions. They have to be considered separately.

MR. FERVIER: Yes, I was going to do that.

We'll consider the first motion. The first motion is to allow the complainants 15 minutes during public comment to be able to make their statements. Is there a second?

MS. KING: Second.

MR. FERVIER: Having a motion and a second to allow the complainants 15 minutes during open comment to make their statement, any discussion?

Hearing no discussion, all those signify by

saying aye. 1 2 THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye. MR. FERVIER: Any nays? Hearing no nays, 3 motion carries. 4 Do you have a second -- do you have a second 5 6 motion, Dr. Johnston? 7 I've been told we need an additional 8 overflow room. So Room 125 is now open for 9 overflow. Room 125 is now open for overflow. 10 Member Jeffares? 11 MR. JEFFARES: (off microphone) Yes. 12 like to make an amendment to the second on this motion that we're fixing to vote on that it be 13 14 moved to the August meeting. 15 MR. FERVIER: Let's make the motion, then you can make an amendment to it. 16 17 DR. JOHNSTON: I make a mo -- make a motion as new business to consider SEB case 2023-025 to 18 19 provide additional research into the deficiencies 20 of missing documents, missing ballot images, and duplicated counted votes. 21 22 MS. KING: Second. 23 MR. JEFFARES: Mr. Chairman, if I could, I'd 24 like to amend that that we move that to the

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August meeting.

1	MR. FERVIER: We have a motion an amended
2	motion to defer the original motion to the August
3	meeting. Do we have a second on the amendment?
4	MS. KING: About the 15 minutes?
5	MR. FERVIER: No. The motion she just made
6	to do additional research on the allegations made
7	in case 2023-025.
8	There's an amendment by member Jeffares to
9	defer that motion to the August 6th meeting. Is
10	there a second for member Jeffares?
11	DR. JOHNSTON: Second.
12	MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second
13	to defer the original motion to further research
14	on the 2023-025 case to the August 6th meeting.
15	Have a motion and a second, any discussion?
16	MS. GHAZAL: Point of order. If the
17	original movement movant agreed to the
18	postponement
19	MR. FERVIER: She seconded it.
20	MS. GHAZAL: Correct. So does that not
21	simply amend the original motion?
22	MR. FERVIER: It does amend it.
23	MS. GHAZAL: Okay.
24	MR. FERVIER: Yes.
25	MS. GHAZAL: So the motion on the on the

floor is to add an agenda item for the August meeting.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. GHAZAL: Okay. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: So the motion on the floor is to add an agenda item for the August 6th meeting to consider further investigation of cases related to -- further investigation of the 2023-025 case. And we have a second. Any further discussion?

MS. KING: I don't understand why we're moving this to August when we -- and I -- no, I mean, I just want to understand because from my understanding this has been heard quite a few times. I've been told that. So where I'm a little confused, being the new board member, is that I -- number one, I do want to hear from the people, but then secondly, I just don't understand why we need to further progress it. I thought that was the problem -- right? -- that we keep wanting to keep talking about it. So why not just do it now?

MR. FERVIER: Any other comments from the board?

MS. GHAZAL: (off microphone) Reopening

investigation on a case that has already been 1 2 closed, that violates the U.S. Constitution. It violates several --3 (Cross-talking) 4 5 MS. KING: (indiscernible) further --MS. GHAZAL: We --6 7 (Gavel sounding) 8 MS. GHAZAL: My understanding of the motion 9 was to further investigate a case that has been 10 closed: case 2023-025. Is that -- is that a 11 correct understanding of the motion? MR. FERVIER: The motion is to --12 13 MS. KING: Research. I thought we said 14 research. MR. FERVIER: -- research the allegations --15 16 MS. KING: Right. 17 MR. FERVIER: -- made in --18 MS. GHAZAL: Pursuant to --19 MR. FERVIER: -- pursuant to --20 MS. GHAZAL: -- that case. MR. FERVIER: Yes. 21 MS. GHAZAL: That case has been closed. 22 23 MS. KING: Well, here's the thing. Here --24 here's where I am. As a new board member -- and

I've read through this and I have questions.

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I think what -- what our board member, Dr. Jan, is asking us to do is just to have a little bit more further research. Let's just research this a little bit more and make sure that we address the areas where we're confused.

- MS. GHAZAL: Research pursuant to a case that has been closed is -- it -- we cannot do that today without notice to the respondent as a -- as a preliminary matter.
- MS. KING: So that's why we're moving it to
  August?
- DR. JOHNSTON: It appears that there are conflicting legal opinions regarding further research of this case or how it may be accomplished that I would recommend that we obtain independent legal counsel in order to address these conflicting opinions and bring it back for August the August meeting.
- MS. KING: Is that a motion? That's your
  motion?
- MR. FERVIER: We -- we have another -- we have a preceding motion. The preceding motion was to move consideration of research on 2023-025 to be considered at the August meeting -- and that motion was seconded -- which would give us

time to further research the legalities of doing that.

MS. KING: And then we're going to add another motion -- right? -- after this one to -- forgive me, y'all, because I'm new, but are you going to add another motion on top of this -- well, after this is done, we're going to add another motion to bring in her our own legal? Like the -- that's the second motion, right?

**DR. JOHNSTON:** I'm sorry?

MS. KING: That's the -- that's going to be the next motion, right? So if we move this to -- this -- let's be clear. If we move this to August, I want to make sure we're moving it to August because we're going to actually do our research and are going to consider bringing in our own independent attorney or legal team. Is that what we're -- is that what we're agreeing to?

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. KING: Okay, all right. I can handle that.

MR. FERVIER: Any discussion from the board? So basically the motion's been made to defer further research into the allegations made

concerning the 2020 election to the August 6th meeting. It was seconded.

Hearing no further discussion, all those board members in favor signify by saying aye.

THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: Any nays?

MS. GHAZAL: (off microphone) Nay.

MR. FERVIER: The motion carries three to one.

Anything else, member Johnston?

We will now proceed with public comment. I would like to -- public comment will -- each individual will have two minutes with the exception of the previous motion that would allow respondents to the 2023-025 case -- Mr. Rossi, I believe is here -- would have 15 minutes for his public comment. Everybody else would have two minutes for the public comment section.

I would ask the audience to please be respectful of everybody. You're going to hear differing opinions that you may not like. That doesn't mean that we have to be disrespectful to people. Everybody has an opinion. Everybody gets to state their opinion. I just ask you to please be just respectful. At the end of your

two minutes, the gavel will be lightly tapped as such, letting you know that your two minutes is up.

I would also ask that we please not repeat the same thing over and over and over again. If you have comments that have been previously heard and you want -- just want to reiterate them, just say, you know, I just also want to support the comment that's previously been made so that we can move on. We have a very -- a lot of petitions here today. So I just ask for your -- your patience and please be respectful.

Our executive director Mike Coan will call the individuals up. We'll just start at the top of the list. There are 56 -- 57 people to speak. So this will -- and at some point we'll take a recess in the middle of it, so ...

MR. COAN: (off microphone) Welcome,
everybody. Is my mic on? (microphone on) Okay,
got it.

Do you have something?

DR. JOHNSTON: At what point will we have
the complainants speak?

MR. FERVIER: Mr. Rossi is listed number 8.

MR. COAN: Yes, he's number 8.

MR. FERVIER: It depends how long the prior 1 2 complainants speak. (Unidentified speakers in the audience 3 speaking inaudibly.) 4 MR. FERVIER: Well, that wouldn't be fair to 5 the rest of the people that have already signed 6 7 up, so he is listed number 8. He'll --8 approximately 16 minutes. 9 (Unidentified speakers in the audience 10 speaking inaudibly.) 11 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes. (Unidentified speakers in the audience 12 13 speaking inaudibly.) 14 DR. JOHNSTON: The agreement that --15 Mr. Chairman, if I understood, was that there would be 15 minutes for both complainants or 16 17 their -- their representative. 18 (Unidentified speakers in the audience 19 speaking inaudibly.) 20 DR. JOHNSTON: Would -- would it be 2.1 appropriate to say that -- to provide that this 22 will happen at 11:00? That -- that both -- does 23 this ... 24 MR. FERVIER: Do you want to set an 11:00? 25 DR. JOHNSTON: 11:00. And allow the other

people that have signed to other ...

(Unidentified speakers in the audience speaking inaudibly.)

MR. FERVIER: You're up at 11:00.

DR. JOHNSTON: 11:00. Thank you.

MS. KING: (off microphone) (indiscernible)

MR. COAN: Yeah, two people can get 15 minutes.

## PUBLIC COMMENTS

Okay. We're starting with public comments. We have Rachel Lastinger, and Marisa Pyle on deck. That's the way we want to operate this thing and make it as quickly as we can and efficient as we can. But, Rachel ...

MS. LASTINGER: (inaudible)

MR. FERVIER: Wait. Wait just a minute.

Let's -- let's figure this out real quick here.

MS. LASTINGER: There we go. Okay. Thank you. Sorry.

Good morning. My name is Rachel Lastinger.

I'm the associate director of the Voter Access

Project of the ACLU of Georgia. We work to

ensure voting is easy and accessible for all

Georgians, and I'm here to address some of the

petitions today.

I want to speak in support of the petition submitted by United for Protect Democracy that will provide additional much needed guidance on voter challenges. More than 3,000 voters have already had their voter eligibility challenged in advance of the November elections and close to 1,000 have been upheld with many more awaiting a hearing.

2.1

My team attended hearings and witnessed lengthy discussions amongst board members aiming to interpret the code. The election code is incredibly vague in its directives to county boards on how to handle voter challenges, forcing board members to develop their own interpretations at the discretion of the county attorney. This leads to a reality where each county is implementing differing policies on voter challenges, leading to different outcomes for similarly situated voters based solely on their county of residence.

There's a strong potential for voter challenges to be wrongfully upheld, potentially disenfranchising a large number of voters. We have also seen a lack of clear directors -- directives lead to election office staff taking

on work to gather evidence on all these voter challenges. This is not required of them by law and is not a good use of the already minimal resources available to our election offices.

We know that more voter challengers will be submitted, and I'm urging you to pass this petition and use your petition -- your position as state board members to assist the county boards in making confident and sustain accurate decisions on voter challenges.

And just briefly I want to urge you to dismiss the petition submitted by Sharlene Alexander that adds extra procedures and duties to local election officials, requiring them to hand-count ballots in the precincts. This petition requires a large input of financial resources and staff time, neither of which our counties can spare right now.

And I urge you to dismiss the petition from Salleigh Grubbs related to the role of county boards and the certification process. This will slow the certification process which only gives voters a reason to doubt the results. This does not lead to an increase in trust for voters.

In your decisions today, I ask that you

prioritize Georgia voters. Voting in our nation is a right and not a privilege. I hope that today you'll continue to put the rights of Georgia voters first. Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Rachel.

Next up is Marisa Pyle and on deck is David Sumrall.

MS. PYLE: Hi, board members. My name is
Marisa Pyle. I'm a senior democracy defense
manager at All Voting is Local Action. I'm here
today to testify in opposition to the proposed
rule to amend Georgia election certification
requirements.

This rule, originally proposed by the Election Research Institute before the state election board's May meeting and resubmitted by Salleigh Grubbs presents a deep threat to Georgia's counties' abilities to conduct and certify elections.

Firstly, by opening the door to election officials to reject certification subjectively, this proposal directly contravenes existing case law in Georgia statute as it speaks of Georgia's certification requirements. Certification under Georgia statute is not discretionary nor is it

affected by error or even by fraud. As legal remedies in other venues, like election contests, recounts and audits remain as options.

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In Thompson v Talmadge, decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1947, the court found that officials are not authorized to exercise any discretion but were simply performing the ministerial act of disclosing to the public the official election results.

And further O.C.G.A. 21-2-493, subsection
(i) clarifies that evidence of error or fraud
should not stop the canvass and certification
process because of the additional
post-certification remedies available. Making
this unclear will not only lead to costly
litigation, it also threatens the clarity and
trustworthiness of election results.

Delaying or refusing certification of elections based on unfounded allegations allows -- only further erodes trust in the system and allows the possibility of election sabotage.

Second, however, are also the true motivations of this petition and the actors bringing it. The Election Research Institute, the originator of this proposal is operated by an

individual who helped conduct the Cyber Ninja's audit in Arizona. They tried and failed to prove election fraud, as well as the author of the disinformation field report that has led to multiple states withdrawing from ERIC, an instrumental tool to maintaining voter rolls across states.

Despite its resubmission, it is still merely verbatim the rule ERI originally proposed. I bring that up to illustrate that these are not individuals asking in good faith for this rule. This is an attempt to weaken our democratic norms that contradicts existing case law as well as judicial precedent.

The board exists to do the opposite and to enact policies that will strengthen our election system both for voters and for election officials themselves, and I ask you to reject this proposal. Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Marisa, for your comments.

Next up is David Sumrall with William Bush on deck.

MR. SUMRALL: My name is David Sumrall, elector from Bibb County, Georgia, and I come

before you to request the Georgia Board of Elections to give guidance to county board of elections on adjudicating voter challenges.

I've submitted another investigation request. This follows up the May investigation request I submitted. July 1, I submitted these vote -- three voter challenges to Bibb County Board of Elections, totaling 243 voters. The first challenge of 45 voters registered in UPS stores and post office was accepted on a three to two partisan vote with the at-large independent board member voting to accept the challenge.

The second challenge of 47 voters on the Bibb County voter roll who had voted in North Carolina as proven by printed North Carolina voter records was denied on a three to two partisan vote.

The third challenge of -- of 451 voters who had voted in other states as identified by Eagle AI and verified by 60 printed Florida voter registration records was also denied. The board did not deny the credibility of the evidence. As in my previous May voter challenge, a board member argued that they could not accept the challenge because of the requirement in the

Federal Voter Registration Act.

In May they denied the challenge because they argued that they could not change the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election. This time they argued that federal law required signed forms from the challenged voters requesting that their voter registration be canceled. They ignored the part of the law that the federal law only applies to eligible voters and they ignored the state law including SB-189.

These challenged voters are not eligible to vote in Georgia because they have registered to vote and even voted in another state.

Registering to vote in another state alone makes them ineligible to vote in Georgia. The Bibb County Election Board's interpretation of federal and state law makes voter challenges practically useless because of the requirement to get a signed statement that is too difficult to overcome. Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

Next up we have Mr. Bush and on deck Sam Carnline.

MR. BUSH: My name is William Ware Bush. I

am an eighth generation Georgian from a long line of military officers who fought over the last 250 years for Georgia and the U.S. Constitution. My sister is Mary Norwood. She ran for mayor of Atlanta twice. Both times she had victory stolen from her. We submitted evidence of malfeasance to the Secretary of State's office after each election. Nothing was done. Election integrity in Georgia for me is personal.

After the chaos and the debacle of the 2020 presidential election over the last four and a half years, I'm proud to have gotten to know Garland Favorito as a friend. I know the courageous David Cross. I am in awe of the persistent work of Joe Rossi. And on the national stage, I've had conversations with David Clemens, Brian Kennedy of the Claremont Institute. Last week I had dinner with the great American hero John Eastman.

From all of the interactions, discussions, research augmented by the evidence in the Curling case and the recent article by Liz Harrington, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that any political entity that uses an electronic voting machine does so solely to control, rig, and steal

elections.

The phrase "biblical world view" has recently rentered -- reentered the lexicon of politics. I have a biblical world view. God has put the five of you on this board at this time in this place on this day for one overarching purpose, to remove the scourge of electronic voting machines from the Georgia elections by taking a forceful principle stand with the Secretary of State's Office and the legislature.

As goes Georgia goes the nation, as goes the nation goes the world. I pray you will not be found wanting on this momentous effort.

MR. COAN: Thank you.

MR. BUSH: God bless you, God bless the great state of Georgia, and God bless the United States of America.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Mr. Bush.

Next up we have Sam Carnline. On deck is Kim Brooks.

MR. CARNLINE: Thank you for the opportunity to speak to y'all today. Sam Carnline, Grady County, where we go -- grow peanuts, pecans, cotton, pine trees. You can make a lot of paper ballots out of the pine trees we grow in Grady

County.

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Board, I would like for y'all to know that I wrote a resolution to the Georgia GOP. It was passed unanimously, and I'd like to share that with you. (reading): Whereas, the Georgia State Election Board discussed case SEB2023-025 on May 7, 2024, outlining over a hundred and forty violations of the Georgia Election Code by Fulton County in the November 2020 election; and whereas, state election board member Dr. Jan Johnston detailed 17,852 certified votes lacking ballot images or unidentified sources, 20,713 votes with no identifiable source tabulator, failure to properly amend election records and audit totals; whereas, Dr. Johnston motioned to amend records, invalidate or authenticate problematic votes, refer evidence for investigation, and recommend monitors for 2024 Fulton elections; and whereas, the state election board failed to enforce election laws and address these irregularities, therefore, be it resolved that the Georgia Republican Party expresses grave concerns over the twenty -- 2020 Fulton County election irregularities, supports Dr. Johnston's motions to address these violations, calls for

reprimand of the state election board for failure to uphold laws, demands the Georgia Attorney General investigate these matters, recommends stringent 2024 election monitoring in Fulton County.

Be it further resolved to distribute this resolution as a press release to all media and provide copies to Georgia's governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, General Assembly, et cetera.

Board, ignoring evidence of election law violations by people in authority -- Fulton County, the Secretary of State and his office, and on this board -- because the election is already over is like ignoring a murder because the victim is already dead. That is from Boyd Parks. Thank you very much.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Sam.

Next up we have Kim Brooks and on deck we have Michael Opitz.

MS. BROOKS: My name is Kim Brooks. The Georgia Nerds is a team of data analysts across the states that exclusively analyze secretary of state files. We've discovered criminal manipulation in every federal election and all

the way through our recent primary. Nothing has changed. And it appears to be consistent with a violation of 18 USC 1031, major crimes against the United States and we the people of Georgia.

We fully understand that this is not just about Fulton County. The theft is occurring in all hundred and fifty-nine counties. We discovered identity theft on Georgian's being committed by our own government against us.

Many times this is through the department of drivers services. This, in and of itself, should be an investigation into both offices immediately.

We discovered criminal manipulation in the official list of electors where the registrants appear like they registered in time to vote, but thousands are packed in after the deadline and they vote. We have the receipts. We've proven in-person real votes are being swapped by fake absentee ballots: cast -- votes cast on ballots that the county had already canceled, ballots -- votes cast on ballots that were never mailed back in. We have people checking in to the KNOWiNK poll pad that aren't even on the voter roll which is an impossibility.

We've proven that the recent 2024 primary should never have been certified. We have patterns. Those patterns are being repeated in 2020, 2022, in the recent primary. Nothing has changed. We expect this board to investigate the Secretary of State and his office for the cover-up of the crimes in the system that commits identity theft on us the Georgians.

We are concer -- you should be concerned that if you don't act before 2024, it already can't be certified. You need to read 18 USC 2382 and 84. Consider yourself served.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Kim.

Next up we have Michael Opitz and on deck we have Joe Rossi.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mr. Rossi will be here at 11:00.

MR. COAN: Okay. So I'll skip that one. Joe. Okay, very good.

All right. Next on deck will be Bob -- I'm at the mercy of handwriting --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Coovert.

MR. COAN: I'm going to say Coovert.
Coovert? All right.

MR. OPITZ: I'm Michael Opitz, president of

the Madison Forum. Recently the Georgia State Election Board reviewed case SEB2023-025 which found over 140 violations of Georgia Election Code by Fulton County in the 2020 election. They recommended a criminal investigation. Board member Dr. Janice Johnston said the election should not have been certified.

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The rest -- the best the board could do was reprimand Fulton County and appoint a monitor. Really? The Georgia GOP's state committee also reprimanded the board and demanded action from the Attorney General. It's unclear if the board will reopen the case. Hopefully from this morning it will.

The Lovell vs Raffensperger case, the plaintiffs argued that Georgia election officials failed to follow laws, duties regarding elections. Two amicus briefs were filed as evidence. The Coovert brief showed that the Secretary of State never conducted a 2020 machine audit as claimed. The Brooks-Strahl brief found evidence of massive synthetic identity theft and voter roll manipulation over the past ten years. The manipulation continued into 2022 and is happening now in 2024, involving tens of

thousands of fraudulent voter roll changes summarized in the fraud report.

We are living in dangerous times, and we know there is massive voter fraud in Georgia not even counting millions of noncitizens voting without legal restraint. So now I ask, do you have any honor and integrity to defend free and fair elections in Georgia and the United States? The despots in totalitarian countries throughout modern history have manipulated the votes of millions of people, and they have died.

Stalin said it matters not who votes, only who counts the votes. So I ask you the question. How will history remember each of you as we watch our elections become meaningless? Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Michael.

Next up we have Bob Coovert, and on deck is Jason Frazier.

MR. COOVERT: Good morning. Bob Coovert from Gilmer County. I know we have some new board members. I wanted to be sure to share that your duties are Georgia law, O.C.G.A. 21-2-31. And in your first duty as board members, which we all respect, it says: As well as legally verify the legality and purity of all primaries and

elections. That's what we've been talking about with Joe Rossi's case.

It's your responsibility to verify the legality and the purity. Now, I'll tell you two month -- or I'm sorry, two weeks after Joe went and spoke to the governor, I went and spoke to the governor, and I shared 28 allegations of crimes against the citizens of Georgia by the Secretary of State and his office.

I worked with Evan Meyers, his executive deputy -- or his deputy executive counsel for two months. They didn't find any problems with the evidence we gave them. He referred it to then-Inspector General Scott McAfee. I worked with Scott McAfee for two months.

Scott called me one day and he said: You know, Bob, I'm going to go after one of these 28 -- 26 allegations. I said: Scott, how are you going to drop the rest of them? He says: I can only go after this one. And it was the Pro V&V audit which we all know never took place.

And then I gave Scott McAfee the open records requests from the six counties that they said the audits took place, and -- and, of course, the audits didn't take place in any of

the counties. And guess what happened when I gave that stuff to the Inspector General? He stopped talking to me. The Inspector General is now a superior court judge.

I went to a district attorney in the Appalachian circuit. I shared the same information with her. Guess what? She stopped talking to me. She is now a superior court judge.

So if any of you guys are looking on how to become a judge, I've got a fast track.

So you are going to be influenced in your positions. You are influenced at this very moment. I just hope you seek the truth, follow the truth, and follow the Georgia law that's written on your behalf. Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Bob.

Next up we have Jason Frazier with Earl Ferguson on deck.

MS. FRAZIER: We're flipping. Jason and I
are flipping, so ...

MR. COAN: Okay. Very good.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay. Lucia Frazier.

So Fulton County in 2022, over 10,000 duplicate registrations were submitted, and that

should never happen. And they were submitted by a regular citizen. And they were approved by the Fulton registrar as needing to be removed. So this is very obvious, super obvious low-hanging fruit that happened in 2022. And it's obvious that no maintenance was being done.

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And besides that, there were even other buckets above that where there were commercial addresses on registrations. And that's not allowed. So again it's obvious no maintenance is being done in Fulton County.

So I bring your attention to the rule that was talked about earlier about challenges. And bring your attention to the need that voter rolls need to be maintained. And the need -- and the reality that the counties aren't doing it, many counties are not. And Fulton is not.

And the rule as written is completely unnecessary. All the citizens that participated in this have followed the law and provided excellent data to the county registrars. And it's really making it harder for the county registrar to clean their rolls. A rule about database management might be more beneficial because they're not doing that. And it's

already -- it's being done privately everywhere. It's easy to do, but -- it's so easy to do and they're not doing it. So there's an issue with that.

One of the lines in this rule -- I don't know if you noticed -- says they don't want it to be done as filed as part of a system -- systematic inquiry. That's ridiculous. The registrars should be using systematic to look at these irregularities. And now you're saying citizens shouldn't when they're challenging. That is a tool. The government shouldn't have a tool that the citizens don't.

So you need to recognize everything that dismantles our government as created by the Constitution and stand firm against it. Thank you very much.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Lucia.

Next up we have Earl Ferguson. On deck is Sandra Burchardt.

MR. FERGUSON: Members of the board and fellow paying -- taxpayers, I'm Earl Ferguson. I challenge Georgia registrations of people who have moved to other states and registered to vote there.

The AJC is listening. I am not taking away anybody's right to vote. These people are gone in -- in the end of 2020, I submitted about several hundred challenges of people who had moved to North Carolina and voted there. Those were approved a hundred percent by our Fulton County Registration and Election Board.

In December of 2023, I submitted the same type of challenge, again people who had moved to North Carolina or registered to vote there. It was denied by the Fulton County Registration board with two of the same members that are — that supported me two years earlier. Why is this happening? I've submitted — I submit a challenge to SEB. It should be processed on this issue. But why is this happening?

If you are looking for opportunities to do fraudulent voting, what would you do? You would try to find a registered -- a registration where the people are no longer there and are not going to use it. And that is what is happening.

Because of its refusal to clean its rolls, Fulton now has substantially more registered voters than it has people who are eligible. A hundred percent of eligible voters is all but impossible.

We have about a hundred and ten and that includes a lot of illegal immigrants.

The board's -- the county board's June meeting they approved procedures for addressing voter challenges. To my surprise these procedures put in plain language how Fulton is violating Georgia and federal laws to justify their refusal to remove ineligible voters. They refused to let me comment. So I have submitted my challenge -- my comments here to the state election board. Thank you very much.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Earl. I appreciate you.

Next up we have Jason Frazier.

MR. FRAZIER: Good morning. My name is -good morning. My name is Jason Frazier. First
off, I wanted to thank Dr. Johnston for all
you're doing. And Ms. King, welcome. I
definitely am proud of how you're speaking today
and voting so far. So thank you.

So next I wanted to talk about why are we even being charged for voter rolls in the state of Georgia? I mean, other states don't, adjacent states don't. Fulton -- or the state of Florida rather, they send me a CD every month. Granted

it's a CD, we don't really use those. But at least they give them to me and it's free. Other states do. North Carolina is free. And why did Georgia decide to raise their prices? Even DC -- I mean, I agree with very little that comes out of DC, but DC, send an open record request and they send you the voter roll for free. It's amazing. So I guess we can agree with something in DC.

So moving on, every county, I also believe, needs some guidance on how to handle voter challenges. I was in the -- the Forsyth challenge last week -- it was the last week or the week before -- and essentially they said there wasn't enough data.

Well, I saw the data. The data is these people that were challenged moved to Florida, moved to North Carolina, moved to other states. We gave them their registration ID from the other states. They filed an NCOA that said they moved to that state. A lot of them had voted from that state. And then because they were saying there wasn't enough evidence, I happened to bring my Florida CD that the secretary of state mails to my house. The man challenging these

registrations brought it up to them, and they said: No, no, no. We can't take outside data sources.

So they said the data's no good. But yet they don't want the data, which clearly tells me they just don't want to do their job.

21-2-220(a) says it is their job. They're failing to do their job. And then they are refusing to -- to even look at data.

So essentially, as you've been hearing, they dance around what excuse is the good excuse for the day. So that's why we need guidance for all these counties. We have one set of laws in this state. There shouldn't be a hundred and fifty-nine ways to handle a voter registration challenge, especially for people that moved out of state and registered out of state. Those are pretty cut and dry.

So they're -- they're just not doing it. So anyway that's the long and short of it. And I hope you will ignore that first petition that's on the list because clearly we need something done. Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Jason. Appreciate your comments.

Sandra Burchardt is next. And then on deck we will have Liz Throop.

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MS. BURCHARDT: My name is Sandra Burchardt.

I am a woman of prayer. I am a woman of passion.

I have a passion for truth. I have a passion for the people that died to give me the right to vote. And my right has been violated. Every voter in this room has been violated.

I saw a table covered with a skirt that miraculously revealed ballots. This video was seen all over the world. And the ballots were hidden for what reason I don't know. This was in the 2020 election. I became passionate. I said I've got to do something. Even though I am just one person, I care.

So I watched the Senate ethics committee in the state of Georgia, and I heard people that came from all over our state to say: We saw it happen. We saw the corruption. Please listen.

I saw -- I sat in the courtroom, and I watched the voting machines that we are required to pay for, that are rigged, and that we have to pay the maintenance on these machines, that look at a QR code and give us a vote that we may not have had.

And so I care, and I pray, and I hope that enough people on this board that also pray and care about truth and justice and are willing to take a stand for everybody not only in this room and not only in this state but in this country. Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Sandra, for your comments.

Next up is Liz Throop and on deck Leo Smith.

MS. THROOP: Hi, thank you. I'm Liz Throop. It's time for the SEB to adopt mandatory security reporting rules.

In April, a company who does business with the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, various branches of the armed forces, and crucial intelligence bodies had data stolen by a Serbian hacking group. The stolen data included personal information, password hashes, and coordinates and addresses of several government officials.

The same group attacked the Colonial Pipeline which had shut -- had to shut down fuel lines across the Southeast in 2021. That attack started with a breached password.

In June of 2023, a Russian ransomware group

attacked a file transfer tool and it spread to entities that use the tool, including British Airways, the BBC, and the province of Nova Scotia.

Of course it's embarrassing for institutions to admit they fall -- that they have fallen prey to such attacks, but mitigation usually depends on it.

This body has long been aware of the 2021
Coffee County insider attack. You have
considered rules to address security breaches and
promised to take action. Hacks can affect all
159 counties who use the exact same software and
hardware to conduct elections. Hacks can also
affect any vendors that the Secretary of State
and counties exchange software with or data with.
It's time to adopt mandatory security reporting
rules. Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Liz.

Next up we have Leo Smith. On deck is Kristin Nabers. Thank you.

MR. SMITH: Thank you. My name is Leo Smith. I'm here on -- today on behalf of the Democracy Task Force with the American Bar Association. I am not a lawyer, but I'm here

representing several lawyers -- and if they would stand in that first row -- because lawyers are voters and they need representation too, right?

And these are good lawyers, coming together across partisanship to support a democratic republic where we can still win based on the hard grit, the dint of our efforts, where people don't jump in as rulemakers and put a thumb on the scale.

My daughter just got back from Oregon as a track athlete where she missed Olympics by inches. She dust the sand off of herself and she got up and said: I'm going to keep trying.

Because she trusted that there was a governance board called the Olympic Committee that would maintain rule of law so that her effort would never be in vain, that she knew that people like you who agreed to serve on that governance board would create a fair, trusted, playing space so that when grit and determination is put on the line that they know that they could risk -- whisking -- risking their sweat again.

And that's what we want you to do. And we, the American Bar Association's Democracy Task

Force, several citizens across difference are

coming together to hand you our hand of support and with other people in this room to say that we want you to reflect the values of hard-working Georgians who want the rule of law so they -- they know when they pull that ballot, when they've made that effort based on contests that were fair and representative of Georgia's values that that contest had no imprint of partisanship.

So we thank you for your work, for all that you have done and all that we will do.

And we thank you for creating even policy, Chairman, that will speed up the decision-making time so that my daughter, when she brushes off the sand, she can say: My effort will be quickly decided.

Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Leo. Appreciate your comments.

Next -- next up is Kristin Nabers. On deck is Joseph Kirk.

MS. NABERS: Hello, Board. My name is
Kristin Nabers. I'm the state director for All
Voting is Local Action. Today I'll be speaking
on two proposals that are actually on the agenda.

First, I wish to address Mr. Cross's

proposal to require that mailed ballots be sent by restricted and tracked mail which requires the voter to show ID and sign when they receive their ballot.

Restricted mail is incredibly expensive with rates starting around \$13 per piece, is only available in conjunction with certified and re -- or registered mail. Tracking is an additional cost. So even if the counties got a reduced rate somehow, there's no way they could handle the financial burden of sending out hundreds of thousands of mail ballots through this method.

Furthermore because this mail is highly secured and is processed manually, the postal service specifically warns that it's slow and not recommended for anything where speed of delivery is important. In ballots, obviously, speed of delivery is important.

To require voters to show ID and sign at the point of delivery will likely put a ballot -- a burden on voters and create barriers.

Historically disenfranchised communities may be disproportionately impacted, especially voters with disabilities who may not be able to provide the signature or black voters who vote by mail at

higher rates.

Voting should be made more accessible not less, and adding these steps to a system that already works and has worked for many elections is unnecessary and could open up the state to any number of lawsuits.

Mr. Cross's petition would effectively cripple vote by mail in the state of Georgia, and we urge you to reject this proposal today.

I also wanted to address Ms. Marks's petition regarding hand-counting for recounts.

Over the past eight months, I've spent over 40 hours observing hand counts in multiple counties.

As you might expect, they're incredibly slow. They're far less reliable than machine counts. In every instance any discrepancies between the counts -- and there have been many discrepancies -- have been traced back to a human error, not a machine one.

Hand-counting is a boring, monotonous task. Human beings are not good at boring, monotonous tasks.

This -- this proposal mentions concerns over the voting machine's programming, but that is exactly what the risk-limiting audit, which

compares the human readable text to the machine count in a limited number of ballots, is designed to detect. If the RLA finds the problem, the officials have the option to order a hand recount.

Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Kristin. Thank you for your comments, Kristin.

Next up is Joseph Kirk. On deck is Michael Gordon.

MR. KIRK: I want to thank y'all for having us. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the election supervisor from Bartow County. I'm also the president-elect of GAVREO, the Georgia Association of Voter Registration Election Officials, and I'm here today to speak on the organization's behalf. I have other members here with me, prepared to speak on specific rules.

Would y'all mind standing up real quick.

So hopefully they -- we have time to hear from all of them. My rule that I'm focused on is the one about certification.

So broadly, first, certification is -- is a -- an indication, a statement, or system comparison that the end of the process is

complete. There's not a lot of discretion there in terms of the results. There's investigations that go into them, but in the process we have to certify that all the folks do their job.

So like I said, it's a system comparison.

We compare how many people -- how many ballots

were cast, how many people were eligible, how

many people were checked in. And if there's a

discrepancy, we investigate it. If we can

determine what caused the error -- say there's a

batch missing or a batch was double-scanned, we

can do a recount and correct those results.

But if we can't explain what the discrepancy is, we still have to certify. We don't have the discretion to say we're not going to count the results from, say, a whole precinct. It's part of the investigation but not the end -- not the end result. The courts can't take over until we certify.

So with all that in mind, we are opposed to the rule proposed by Ms. Grubbs. The meeting in there starts way too early. And it seems to give board members privileges that are reserved for the superintendent. Just like y'all are members of the state election board and as a whole you

have a lot of authority but as members not quite as much, same is true for our boards.

A single member can't go into an office and demand the rights reserved to the entire board without the rest of the board acting in concert. So you couldn't say -- go in and say, Give me everything you have on this, and demand to see it right then. It's also on them to be sure any kind of investigation starts early enough to be done.

We are firmly in support of the rule from the chair. We appreciate you submitting it. And we propo -- we support the rule y'all posted from the state election board with one specific change, to take out the phrase "after reasonable inquiry." That's addressed in the code and does not need to be in the definition of certification.

Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Joseph, for your comments.

All right, next up we have Michael Gordon.

On Dave -- on deck is David Ross.

MR. GORDON: Michael Gordon, Fulton County resident.

Welcome, Janelle. Thank you for your willingness to serve the people of Georgia.

Governing by consent requires honest and secure elections which requires clean voter rolls. The Georgia General Assembly passed a law to allow unlimited voter roll challenges for a good reason. Our voter rolls are notoriously bloated and inaccurate.

A proposed "United to Protect Democracy" rule would make it easier for the board of registrars to dismiss many voter challenges which would make it less likely that our voter rolls would be cleaned up, which is required by law.

First of all, we are a republic not a democracy. So why would we take seriously a proposed rule from an organization that views Georgia as a democracy? Their petition reasoning states that citizen challenges are rarely successful, using unreliable methodologies and incomplete, error-prone data. They're complaining about the targeting of inactive voters and wasting precious resources. This is complete nonsense. If the registrars would do their job properly, there would be no need for so many challenges.

Let's take a look at their claim: targeting inactive voters. Today inactive voters who show up at the voting -- polling locations are allowed to vote just like active voters. They need to be removed. Unreliable methodologies, incomplete data. Today we -- citizens have challenged voter records from -- voter roll records with dead people, PO Boxes, UPS stores, and other businesses. People have moved and they actually registered in other states. All these records are supposed to be removed by law and in many cases they are not. This is the error not the challengers.

And finally, wasting precious resources.

Cleaning the voter rolls is their job. That's what they're supposed to do. If it's a burden, then they should quit. All right. Most counties are grateful for the help. Only large counties -- a few large counties are complaining. We should stop rewarding them and replace them.

Oh, okay. Thank you. Vote no on that rule.

Thank you.

MR. COAN: Appreciate your comments.

Next up we have David Ross. On deck we have Matt Rowenszak.

MR. ROSS: Mr. Chairman, members of the board, I'm Dave Ross from Atlanta. I'm here to support election policies to ensure -- that ensure that we make voting as easy and accessible as possible.

Our next election begins in 14 short weeks from today. As you consider proposals that are before you today and in August, I trust that your paramount goal and hope that your paramount goal is to adopt policies that help as many eligible voters as possible to vote as easy as possible without creating voter confusion, without undermining voters in -- voters' confidence in the voting process and particularly without creating unnecessary and new burdens on the thousands of elected -- on election officials throughout the state who as we speak are getting ready for the November election.

As you have heard, there are several petitions being heard today that, in fact, will create voter confusion, will undermine voter confidence, and will create significant burdens on our county elected officials who are here and are speaking before you today.

We have a reliable election process, and I

commend our county election officials and you to keep in mind that they bear the brunt of implementing and communicating any changes you make, often at significant costs to the counties and under tight deadlines.

Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, David.

Next up we have Matt Rowenczak, and on deck is Brian Dunn.

MR. ROWENCZAK: Hi, good morning, Board.

Mr. Chair, at the last SEB meeting, this body decided to appoint monitors to Fulton County for the 2024 election due to the numerous election violations and discrepancies from 2020. A wise decision. What was not wise was your decision to put forth a proposal behind the backs of your fellow board members after the meeting.

On June 13th, towards the end of a Fulton
County Board of Elections meeting, the chairman,
Cathy Woolard, a prior Fair Fight Action
lobbyist, super nonpartisan, brings forth a
monitor proposal from Ryan Germany to cost Fulton
County taxpayers a hundred and sixty thousand
dollars. Interestingly, she mentions that she
had discussed this -- she had discussed this

proposal with you and Mr. Germany.

Since the act of creating this absurd proposal, here are some red flags maybe you should have considered. This body voted for the monitors, so why was this proposal not shared with your fellow board members. Then you chose Ryan Germany, when he was part of the corruption in the SOS office when those election violations occurred and continued to deny that they existed. He lied and deceived the public.

Another name on the list was Jesse Harris who also worked for our corrupt Secretary of State and instructed Fulton County that homeless voters could register to vote at an intersection. Prior to that, Mr. Harris worked for Fulton County for about a year until he was let go for allegedly falsifying his résumé.

There were hardly any forensic experts, no process engineers, no certified fraud examiners, no cybersecurity expert or other reliable independent professionals.

In summary, the proposal suggests that you didn't do your homework at a minimum, all on the backs of Fulton County taxpayers. This competes with the sloppiness and wasteful spending of the

Carter Center audit from Fulton County of 2022 1 2 where folks lounged around, played on their iPads 3 and got paid on our backs. Let's just say we are not impressed. 4 5 assume you didn't approach your career this way. Georgians are tired of this shady and lazy 6 7 behavior. And when it comes to our elections, 8 folks like to preach about how important they 9 are. Well, then show us. 10 MR. COAN: Thank you, Brian[sic]. 11 Next up we have Brian Dunn. On deck is 12 Kevin Muldowney. MR. DUNN: Kevin's not here. 13 14

MR. COAN: He's not here?

MR. DUNN: Yeah, he -- he left.

MR. COAN: Okay.

MR. DUNN: He had to go.

Thank you. MR. COAN:

So next on deck will be Cliff Hobbs.

Thank you.

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MR. DUNN: Brian Dunn, Fulton County resident. Questions: What's the point of voting machines? Does it make elections more secure? It makes them less secure. Does it give us results faster? No, it does not. Does it reduce our costs? Obviously not. Paper is pretty cheap. And by the way, when we use voting machines, it still creates paper. You don't even save paper in most cases. Does it give you results faster? No, it does not.

We are asking, with all the complaints from Puerto Rico, hundreds of complaints, and throughout the United States, thousands of complaints, why do we have them? We have never heard anyone explain the point of machines unless they are designed for the purpose of throwing an election.

Jeff Fulgham provided evidence to the FBI Atlanta field office. They not only failed to investigate, but Jeff personally confirmed that somebody was directing agents to steer evidence to the Georgia SOS and SEB, who themselves covered up evidence.

Evidence he provided suggests that the fake duplicate batches included in Fulton hand-count -- official Fulton hand-count were intentionally altered so the auditing software, known as Arlo VotingWorks, won't recognize a fake duplicate. Keep in mind that the SEB case 2021-181 later concluded in June of 2023 that

these were indeed duplicates, in other words, fake.

But they covered up the evidence, any evidence suggesting intent. These duplicates added 6,000 gross fake votes to the Fulton hand-count. There was fraud in the 2020 election and it was covered up. These machines are not faster, cheaper, or more reliable. So what's the reason?

This is the biggest question in the world because of our entire -- our entire way of living will depend on this election being credible. And we don't think that this coming election is going to be credible. We think there's going to be massive cheating.

Now Jeff filed a lawsuit against the Ware County Georgia Board of Elections for answers, answers explaining how nearly 1 percent of their ballots were scanned for the second time five days after certification. This is unacceptable. Georgia SEB is required to keep all elections honest, safe, and secure. We demand that we get rid of these machines.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Brian, for your comments.

Next up we have Cliff Hobbs. And then we're going to switch back and have Joe Rossi come up.

So, Joe, if you're here, come on and get ready. Be on deck. Thank you.

MR. HOBBS: Well, I'm the last one. I'll make it nice and short. I'm a Georgia resident. I have been for all my life. I live in Hall County now, lived in Fulton County for many, many years.

I have voted since the 60s, and I always trusted what happened until 2020. And I've learned that -- that a lot of corruption went on. You guys, I think if you just look at the evidence, use common sense, and figure out that there was a lot of wrong things that happened.

You know, I know all you people are appointed. Are you accountable to somebody that appointed you or are you accountable to the people of the state of Georgia? You know, you're -- you've got to -- you've got to go home and sleep at night. If you, you know, know that there's things that are wrong, voter rolls that are dirty, I mean, how -- how does it -- in a state -- in a county that has more people that are on the voter rolls than live in the county,

something's wrong. If it smells like it's bad,
if it tastes like it's bad, it looks like it's
bad, chances are pretty good that it's bad.

I'm just asking you, please, please use your
common sense and do what's right for the people
of Georgia. You know, I'm an older guy. I got
grandkids, though, that are coming along in

this -- in this state, and I worry about, you know, what their future's going to be.

Just please use your common sense and do what's right. You know, voter rolls are -- they're bad. They need to be changed and updated.

Thank you very much.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Cliff. Appreciate your comments.

All right, next up is Joe Rossi.

And, Joe, you've got 15 minutes to share with us --

MR. ROSSI: (speaking inaudibly in the gallery with microphone turned off) Yes, I'd like to first of all thank the chairman of the board

MR. COAN: You want to come on up? And -MR. ROSSI: (speaking inaudibly in the

gallery with microphone turned off) (inaudible)

I'd like to (inaudible) my time and (inaudible)

and on behalf of my co-complainant, Kevin Moncla,
who will be (inaudible) at this time (inaudible)

MR. COAN: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Favorito, do you want to take the stand and ...

MR. FAVORITO: (speaking inaudibly in the gallery with microphone turned off)

MR. COAN: I've got one. Thank you. Got one for Sara? You got it? You want me to give it -- got it?

All right, Garland, you ready?

MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir. Thank you. It's an honor to be here today to talk to you about what I believe is to be the most important case in this election board history.

This is four allegations and all of the other complaints combined. Since I have been attending election board meetings in 20 years.

I'd like to start with the diagram that you have in front of you. It's on the second and third page. The first thing I think is the most important to understand. I think we can all agree on here's how the system works. How do you

get from a ballot to a certified vote? The ballot is initially scanned and an analysis is performed as you can see in your diagram. The analysis is -- would either be through the ICC scanner if it's an absentee ballot or it will be through the QR code analysis from ICP scanner at the precincts for in-person voting.

The scanners create DVD cast vote records,
TIF ballot images, SHA hash file authentications
which I think we'll go into in more detail. And
in the process, there is -- are tabulator tapes
created for the in-person voting, batch
reconciliation for absentee ballots, as you see
in the diagram. Those batches are uploaded and
produce a batches-loaded report. And then they
are published with the certified votes to clear
the elections in (indiscernible).

That's the process and the flow of how an election is conducted. You did not get that at the last meeting, and I think that's important to understand. These are the election records that are created during that process.

However, at the last meeting, the Secretary of State's legal counsel stated that ballot images, batch-loaded reports, and tabulator tapes

played no role in the actual tabulation of results in an election. That's blatantly false. Tabulation depends on ballot images. Votes can only be published for ballots shown in batches-loaded reports. And published in-person votes must have corresponding tabulator tapes.

So what would a proper investigation have been? A proper investigation would've looked at all source ballot election records for original hand-count audits, machine recount results, and that would include starting from the official paper ballots, which no one has yet seen, the TIF ballot images, the SHA hash authentication files which authenticates those images, the DVD cast vote records, in-person tabulator tapes, absentee ballot reconciliation forms, batches-uploaded reports, and certified election results.

All of those make a package. It's -- it's a beautiful process and they should all reconcile. In this case the complainants have said that they don't reconcile. All of those should've been considered. However, we heard in the last meeting that SHA files, which authenticate the ballot images, which is used in tabulation, was not part of the investigation. It should've

been. Therefore the investigation was conducted on a false precinct.

SHA files authenticate the actual ballot images that are tabulated. And any legitimate investigation should have analyzed all those source records. And I can tell you that based on 40 years of my information technology experience and 20 years of voting system technology research.

Fulton County, the complaint -- let's go to the complaint. The complaint itself alleges that up to 58,924 votes on ballots have no source justification. That is 17,852 ballots have no original or recount ballot images. So how did they get into the certified votes if there was no image? We -- I just showed you the process. You have to have an image for every ballot that's voted.

The allegations are 3,125 ballots were double-scanned and their votes were double-counted. I'm going to explain to you how we know that. And they'll go further into that with Mr. Davis.

20,713 in-person votes are from ballots that had no original tabulator tapes. It's still

unexplained. 17,235 certified votes were backfilled after this certification deadline into the election results and despite they have no original scan logs.

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Those are the allegations. The Secretary of State's legal counsel said that missing documentation for about 32,000 votes were for the recount. Then they are claiming that the -- this complaint was only for the recount, and that explained it was for both the recount and the original because there's discrepancies in both counts. And that's why this investigation should -- this investigation should've been far more thorough.

Moving on to -- lead investigator for the complaint said that it's important to note that throughout the complaint, the complainants erroneously conflated the number of total ballots cast and the total votes counted in the presidential election. That's simply not true.

He went on to explain the fact that under votes could occur. But the complainants -- first of all, each vote has to have a corresponding ballot and associated record. And the complainants are alleging that there are more

votes and ballot records, not less. So the argument that the lead investigator made, then, is disingenuous.

Moving on to the Governor Kemp study,
Governor Kemp's study, which was based on
Mr. Rossi's work as well as Mr. Cross's here -his study was found that there was an extra 6,653
ballots in the hand-count audit that were used to
match the original results. You keep hearing
that the originals ought to match but that's how
they match, as Mr. Rossi has explained.

Fulton has already admitted that the -- that they violated rule 83 -- 183-1-15-.04 regarding the audits.

So again moving on, the Secretary of State's legal counsel told you at the last meeting that all three counts confirm the results of the presidential contest in 2020. That's simply not true according to Governor Kemp's own report. His study confirmed that.

So I wanted just to mention, to move on down to what is actually missing. Well, over 1 million ballot record images are missing as of right now and still unexplained. That includes over 380,000 original in-person ballot images,

512,000 SHA files authentication, 17,852 missing early vote recount ballot images. The others were for the original count, but in the recount those votes are missing as well as their corresponding SHA file, 17,852; 20,713 original and recount ballots are missing tabulation records; 17,234 ballots were backloaded -- they don't have scan logs -- and 16,198 for the recount; 17234 was for the original count as you see on your documentation there.

Why is all this missing information important? Because state and federal law require all primary and election documents shall be preserved for a period of either 22 months federally or 24 months by the state, state law. That's O.C.G.A. 21-2-73 and USC 20701 which you have before you.

The lead investigator, however, said that the preservation of ballot images was not required in 2020. In reality it was. I just cited federal and state statutes that he apparently was not aware of.

So ballot images are clearly election records, and they have to be preserved. And these were missing before the retention period

ever started, based on open records requests that were filed within those two-years' periods.

Finally we get to the case of double-scanned and double-counted ballots. All 3,125 double-scanned ballots have audit marks that show that they were processed by the system and they have cast vote records showing that they were double-counted. And in fact, Dr. Stark in his Curling v Raffensperger declaration on March 3, 2022, said: I can confirm from the cast vote records these identical ballot images were actually counted in the tabulation multiple times.

And yet the Secretary of State's legal counsel said what cannot be decided conclusively or confirmed conclusively is whether or not those duplicate ballots were in the tabulated result.

I'm giving you the evidence and expert testimony above and beyond mine that says that they were, in fact, double-counted. That's clear.

And finally we get to the ballots. The ballots have been concealed from the public -- I'm talking about the actual physical ballots -- for over three years. They have to be examined to resolve these claims. Fulton County has

refused for three and half years and even hired criminal defense attorneys to help us avoid getting public access to the ballots. To -- so they have fought against us for three and a half years and that would've simply cleared all this matter up three years ago if we had just seen the ballots.

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We urge the board to get those ballots. The Secretary of State's legal counsel actually filed an amicus brief for the Attorney General, advocating to keep the ballots secret. So she is conflicted and should not have been presenting this case in the first place. That brief contained false arguments, and I have a legal response that we made back at the time. I will include that in the record today for you.

She withheld all that information from the state election board when she said: We know that there are not missing votes because we have the paper ballots that document these votes for this election. Well, she has them, but she's not letting anybody see them, including this board who is entitled to them as well as we the people of the state of Georgia.

These ballots are now unsealed by a court

order. In our case, the Favorito v Wan case, you have access to them if you want those ballots right now. We have submitted an open records request for them and Fulton County is still avoiding complying with the open records request law.

An investigation would have uncovered many, many other things. There are no explanations.

None of the explanations we heard at the last meeting make -- make technical sense. I have not been able to confirm anything of -- of substance in the last investigation, and this is why we need a real investigation into this issue.

There are -- I know I brought this up -over a hundred and fifty process violations. But
a real investigation would've also discovered
that the election day tabulator tapes are
unsigned for 12,000 ballots despite state law,
and the early voting tabulator tapes are unsigned
for 314,000 ballots despite state law.

In addition, most of the memory cards were opened on one tabulator, removed, and closed out on another tabulator, thus breaking the chain of custody for the memory card itself.

So those are some of the things that we

believe you should be concerned about. Most importantly, she has -- the Secretary of State's legal counsel said nothing about this changes the results of the election. We don't know. We don't know whether the results change or not, but that's not the issue. The issue is what -- you know, what happened to the ballots? What do we need to do to preserve the 2024 election, secure it so that this doesn't happen again?

So a few questions that I think the people here deserve answers to: What were the real vote totals in 2020? Why does Fulton's election process have so many missing ballot records and reporting errors? That would be your responsibility to investigate. But most importantly, why we're here, is how can these problems be prevented for the 2024 election? We can't secure the 2024 election unless we understand what happened in 2020 and 2022. And that's why we're here.

Basically the Secretary of State's legal counsel also said that the investigation has confirmed what we already knew and there's nothing new that we have learned as a result of this investigation. If that was true, why didn't

she present to you what I just presented to you? She should've presented to -- to you.

And let's be honest here, the Secretary of State office is conflicted because any bad reflection on Fulton County is a bad reflection on them. And that is why the state election board needs to be completely independent. I know that you've had a lot of issues with that, but we need to have independent investigators, independent attorneys. And we certainly have been supporting the legislature on that.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes -- I think I'm probably about out of time, but I wanted to say -- say thank you to Joe. Joe Rossi and Kevin Moncla have carried this banner for three and a half years.

I'm honored to be selected to represent you.

I'm honored to be here to talk about this case. I'm happy to take any questions that you may have.

MR. COAN: Mr. Favorito, do you plan on taking the full 15 minutes because you're at 14 minutes already? So ...

MR. FAVORITO: I -- I think that I am done.
I think I'm done if there's no questions.

MR. COAN: I mean, you've still got another minute if you want it to do whatever you want to do with it. I just want to let you know. You've got one minute. So --

MR. FAVORITO: Well, let me just introduce the next -- Harry MacDougald, I believe, is going to come up and represent Mr. Moncla. Two of the -- two of the experts will be backing us up.

We have three experts here today. Clay Parikh has amazing credentials -- you have that on your chart -- as well as Phillip Davis who is a tremendous ballot-image analyst with 30 years of experience. He's been looking at the ballots for three and a half years.

So thank you. I'm glad I concluded in the appropriate time. So thank you very much, Mr. Coan.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Garland, for your comments.

MR. FERVIER: The -- the chair -- the chair has had a request for a board member to handle a personal issue. So we will --

Do I have a motion to take a short recess?

MS. GHAZAL: (indiscernible)

MR. FERVIER: Is there a second?

1	MR. JEFFARES: Second.
2	MR. FERVIER: Motion and a second. All in
3	favor, signify by saying aye.
4	THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.
5	MR. FERVIER: So moved. We'll take a
6	approximately a ten-minute recess and restart.
7	(Recess from 11:18 until 11:44 a.m.)
8	MR. FERVIER: We're only a couple hours
9	behind schedule. So if everybody will just agree
10	to speak faster when you make your comments, I'm
11	sure that we can get somewhere back to schedule
12	tomorrow.
13	MR. COAN: Okay, we ready?
14	MR. FERVIER: Yep.
15	MR. COAN: Okay. All righty. With no
16	further ado, we're going to start off and I
17	cannot we have Jennifer Gray on starting
18	off and I need to find my readers and
19	Janice Grant. Oh, I'm sorry.
20	MR. FERVIER: Mr. MacDougald.
21	MR.COAN: Oh, is he
22	MR. FERVIER: Yes.
23	MR.COAN: Mr. MacDougald
24	MR. FERVIER: Yeah, yeah.
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MR.COAN: -- before them?

MR. FERVIER: Yeah. 1 2 MR.COAN: Okay. Oh, I didn't know that. Okay. I apologize. 3 4 It's all yours. MR. MACDOUGALD: (off microphone) My name is 5 6 Harry Mac --7 MR. FERVIER: Wait. Wait just a minute. 8 MR. MACDOUGALD: (speaking inaudibly with 9 microphone turned off) 10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mic. 11 MR.COAN: We're working on it. 12 MR. FERVIER: Got it. MR.COAN: Go ahead. 13 14 MR. MACDOUGALD: My name is Harry 15 MacDougald. I represent Kevin Moncla in this 16 proceeding. We appreciate the opportunity to 17 present rebuttal to the presentation that was 18 made to the board on May 7th. 19 Through witnesses, I will present on three 20 topics. First, the existence and handling of duplicates in the second machine count in Fulton 21 22 County; second, the question of missing ballot 23 images in Fulton County; and, third, the complete 24 breakdown of the process controls or 25 chain-of-custody controls in the election in

Fulton and why that matters.

Rebuttal on these three points is necessary to correct the presentation that was made to this board on May 7th. The bottom line is that they told you things on those three topics — duplicate ballots, missing ballot images, and chain-of-custody documents — that are simply not accurate. The problems are much more serious, profound, and widespread than they would have you believe.

The board needs to understand this topic, all three of these topics, in order to craft an appropriate response, an appropriate remedy for elections going forward.

A big part of this board's job is to instill public confidence in elections, and getting to the bottom of these matters is essential to that task as you have yourself seen in the response of the audience. Confidence is not instilled when documented problems are swept under the rug.

Exhibit 11 in the Secretary of State's presentation, for example, is the linchpin of their analysis of the missing ballot images. But for some reason, they do not want to actually exhibit that exhibit.

Our witnesses will be Phillip Davis on the 1 2 question of duplicate ballots. He will be appearing by phone -- it'll be a little bit 3 awkward, but please hang with me -- and Mr. Clay 4 5 Parikh who is here to testify live. And they will describe in brief terms what they know, how 6 7 they know it, and why it matters. 8 So at this point, I'd like to call 9 Mr. Phillip Davis by telephone. 10 Mr. Davis, are you able to hear us? 11 MR. DAVIS: I can hear you.

MR. MACDOUGALD: Very good. State your name, sir.

MR. DAVIS: Phillip Davis.

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MR. MACDOUGALD: How are you employed?

MR. DAVIS: I -- I am employed by First Advantage of Atlanta, Georgia.

MR. MACDOUGALD: And do you have any particular areas of technical expertise?

MR. DAVIS: I'm a software developer of 35 years with a math degree from University of Texas at Arlington, and I specialize in fingerprint identification and analysis.

MR. MACDOUGALD: Have you spent any time analyzing the Georgia election in 2020?

1	MR. DAVIS: I spent three and a half years
2	investigating the ballots and cast vote records
3	for Georgia.
4	MR. MACDOUGALD: Have you been compensated
5	for any of that work?
6	MR. DAVIS: I have not.
7	MR. MACDOUGALD: Have you undertaken an
8	analysis to determine whether there were any
9	duplicate ballot images in Fulton County?
10	MR. DAVIS: Yes. My analysis was on the
11	recount compared to the original count.
12	MR. MACDOUGALD: All right.
13	MR. DAVIS: After investigating over 70
14	counties, I found 8,110 duplicate ballots for the
15	entire state.
16	MR. MACDOUGALD: In the 70 counties you've
17	looked at?
18	MR. DAVIS: That is correct.
19	MR. MACDOUGALD: And how many did you find
20	in Fulton County?
21	MR. DAVIS: In Fulton County specifically, I
22	found 550 duplicate ballots in the original
23	count, 3,930 in the second count.
24	MR. MACDOUGALD: Can you briefly describe
25	and I mean brief how you carried out this

analysis?

MR. DAVIS: Absolutely. I grafted all the cast vote records. I pulled up the first three characters of everyone who was voted for, creating a type of fingerprint of that pattern, a voting fingerprint. I then compared the number of occurrences of that pattern in the first count and the second count and looked at the differences in those occurrences.

When the occurrences were one extra in a recount, and they were in a sequence, those become ballots I would look at. I would then pull up all those ballots and then compare them to the other ones in that same occurrence to see if I can find any extra ballots or any missing ballots.

- MR. MACDOUGALD: And so through this method, you identified ballots to visually examine and then visually examined them yourself?
- MR. DAVIS: That is correct. Myself and a few other people did all of this analysis.
- MR. MACDOUGALD: Did you have anyone check
  your work?
- MR. DAVIS: Yes. I had a second person do it completely independently from me, using the

same tools -- his name was Joseph Marolda(ph) -- and then we combined the results at the finish.

MR. MACDOUGALD: All right, sir. Now of these 3,930 duplicate ballots in Fulton County in machine count 2, were those ballots actually counted?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, they were.

MR. MACDOUGALD: And how do you know that?

MR. DAVIS: When you -- we go from the cast vote record. The cast vote record had 528,777 ballots entered. When you compare it to the election night reporting, it was exactly the same number of ballots for both the original and the recount.

MR. MACDOUGALD: All right, sir. And why does that indicate they were actually counted?

MR. DAVIS: Because the double-counted ballots are in the cast vote records. You can go to cast vote records, view those double ballots, view the images those ballots were based upon, and all the numbers add up equal.

MR. MACDOUGALD: All right, sir. Have you undertaken any analysis of how the ballots that were duplicated came to be in the duplicate batch?

1	MR. DAVIS: Yes, I have.
2	MR. MACDOUGALD: All right.
3	MR. DAVIS: I found the original ballots and
4	the source ballots that they came from.
5	MR. MACDOUGALD: Okay. And you prepared a
6	slide deck of your for a presentation of your
7	findings?
8	MR. DAVIS: That is correct. I have every
9	single duplicated ballot or double ballots in the
10	slide deck under original source image.
11	MR. MACDOUGALD: All right, sir. And I have
12	distributed to the board a printout of your slide
13	deck, and I'd like to ask you in particular about
14	page 5, which they're not numbered but it would
15	be tabulator 794. And it's the
16	MR. DAVIS: Yes.
17	MR. MACDOUGALD: fifth page. And can you
18	
19	MR. DAVIS: Right.
20	MR. MACDOUGALD: describe for the board
21	what we're seeing here?
22	MR. DAVIS: On this page, we'll see that
23	they took batches from tabulator 794, batches 8
24	through 11. They brought it to tabulator 791.
25	They then started grabbing pieces of those of

four batches. And with those four pieces, they made brand-new batches for tabulator 794. Some of the ballots were in reverse order. They were from multiple batches.

In the very first one you can see that they took batch 22, 20 ballots in reverse; batch 23, four ballots in normal order; batch 20, 10 ballots in reverse; batch 23, 5 more ballots and so on.

- MR. MACDOUGALD: All right. So --
- MR. DAVIS: And this kind of repeats over and over for tabular 794.
- MR. MACDOUGALD: And the next page presents similar findings for tabulator 794?
- MR. DAVIS: Right. You see the exact same
  pattern repeated with a different set of ballots.
  - MR. MACDOUGALD: And the next --
- MR. DAVIS: So once again, they got ballots from tabulator 791, they grabbed four sets of batches, they then created brand-new batches by picking and choosing pieces out of those other batches to make the new batches.
- MR. MACDOUGALD: And the next page, the same
  thing?
  - MR. DAVIS: Correct.

1	MR. MACDOUGALD: Okay.
2	MR. DAVIS: That would be tabulator 794,
3	batches 20 through 26.
4	MR. MACDOUGALD: All right.
5	MR. DAVIS: Once again
6	MR. MACDOUGALD: Phillip
7	MR. DAVIS: exact same pattern
8	(indiscernible)
9	MR. MACDOUGALD: I have to cut you off.
10	Phillip, I have to cut you off because my time is
11	short and I have another witness.
12	Thank you very much unless the members of
13	the board have any questions for Mr. Davis.
14	All right then. At this point, I would call
15	Mr. Clay Parikh. And the way we'll have to do
16	this is for him to stand up here with me.
17	Tell the board who you are.
18	MR. PARIKH: I'm Clay Parikh. I'm a
19	cybersecurity expert with over 20 years
20	experience. I have a master's in cybersecurity.
21	My undergrad's in computer science. And I've
22	also worked in the voting system test labs for
23	nine years.
24	MR. MACDOUGALD: Have you testified before

as an expert on these topics?

1	MR. PARIKH: Yes, I have.
2	MR. MACDOUGALD: You attended the May 7th
3	hearing before this court?
4	MR. PARIKH: Yes, I did.
5	MR. MACDOUGALD: Have you analyzed the issue
6	of the machine missing ballot images in
7	machine count 2 in Fulton County as presented in
8	the Rossi-Moncla complaint?
9	MR. PARIKH: Yes, I have.
10	MR. MACDOUGALD: Are there in are there,
11	in fact, votes for which there are no ballot
12	images in that second machine count in Fulton
13	County?
14	MR. PARIKH: Yes, there are.
15	MR. MACDOUGALD: And and how do you know
16	that?
17	MR. PARIKH: Because they're not in the CVR.
18	MR. MACDOUGALD: On the Dominion Voting
19	Systems machines, is the vote counted from the
20	physical ballot or an image of the ballot?
21	MR. PARIKH: The vote is counted from the
22	image. The way it happens is your paper ballot's
23	inserted, whether it comes from an accessible
24	machine or a regular hand-marked ballot. A
25	picture is taken. That picture is analyzed by

it's other vendors as well. 2 MR. MACDOUGALD: So that's just the inherent 3 nature of the -- of the system? 4 5 MR. PARIKH: Yes, it is. MR. MACDOUGALD: All right, sir. Now in 6 7 light of that, how is it possible for there to be 8 a vote counted for which there is no ballot 9 images? 10 MR. PARIKH: That should not happen and 11 should not happen because the image should be 12 saved as part of the chain of custody when the 13 ballot is assessed. MR. MACDOUGALD: And the number of missing 14 ballot images in machine count 2 in Fulton County 15 16 is what? 17 MR. PARIKH: I believe it's 17,800 and 18 something. 19 All right, sir. MR. MACDOUGALD: 20 just mentioned the term "chain of custody." What does that mean in the election context? 21 MR. PARIKH: The chain of custody is 22 23 basically following the path that guaranteed that 24 the integrity of the data of the vote is exactly 25 as it is.

the software. And it's just not the Dominions,

1

You start with a sheet of paper, the ballot. That's marked. There's a picture taken. That's part of the chain of custody. Then there's what's called a SHA file which is that integrity of said image that's taken. And as it goes through, goes onto a USB disk or SDK card, gets transferred to a database and then is transferred.

Every step along that path until the final results are published is considered the chain of custody. And as a forensic investigator myself, every part of that chain of custody has to be preserved.

- MR. MACDOUGALD: All right. All right, sir. In Fulton County in 2020, were there any issues with the chain of custody?
- MR. PARIKH: There were multiple issues with the chain of custody.
- MR. MACDOUGALD: What is the significance of that, if any, in light of the issues that we see with duplicated ballots and missing ballot images?
- MR. PARIKH: One, you do not know the integrity of the -- of the ballot images that do exist without a SHA file because you do not know

if it's tampered with. Those missing the SHA files are in the same predicament because you don't know the integrity of the file, whether it's manipulated. And it's been demonstrated in DEF CON in 2019 the ballot images can be manipulated almost instantaneously, and it's been proven.

MR. MACDOUGALD: All right, sir. One of the issues that's discussed in the Rossi-Moncla complaint is missing tabulator tapes. What is the significance of that, if any?

MR. PARIKH: That is one of the audit controls that is part of the process in the chain of custody. Therefore you're getting the actual appliance, in this case the ICPs or the ICCs. The tabulator prints out its report, then the data is transferred along the chain on the U -- on the SDK card or USB and then into the machine. Each one of these reports is part of the chain of custody.

MR. MACDOUGALD: All right. Now, it was shown in the complaint and in the factual rebuttal dated June 13th, prepared by Mr. Moncla, that a number of tabulator tapes for different precincts were printed on machines that had the

identical serial number. What is the significance of that, if any, from a chain-of-custody standpoint?

MR. PARIKH: There's no data integrity to the data that was on those cards because the projective counter on the tabulator, the serial number, has to be maintained. It's the system that's supposed to close out and create that tape and record everything. When you have -- move the cards, that means security seals were broken and there's all other kinds of chain-of-custody issues.

MR. MACDOUGALD: All right, sir. Now, we sometimes hear the term "reconciliation" in the election context: reconciliation of votes, ballots, and voters. Can you describe the significance of that and whether that was followed in Fulton County?

MR. PARIKH: Reconciliation is very important. And again it has to include every piece of the chain of custody and -- and every step along the process. And it -- it definitely was not followed in Fulton County.

MR. MACDOUGALD: All right. Thank you very much.

So I've got less than a minute.

2.1

In closing, for remedial measures, there needs to be an independent monitor, an independent investigation. You cannot rely on the investigative reports given to you by the Secretary of State's Office. They are sweeping things under the rug. You get an independent investigator and you've got a better chance to find out what happened.

And there needs to be very prompt if not night-of or next-day disclosure of the reconciliation records on a precinct-by-precinct basis so that the public can double-check the work of the county which has been proven to be grossly deficient in multiple respects.

Thank you very much.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, I have a question of Mr. Parikh.

Mr. Parikh, some of the ballot images were provided to me at the Secretary of State's Office at great inconvenience. But as I looked at those, I saw thousands -- hundreds of thousands of ballot images with no SHA files. Is there an -- an implication to that or a concern, a security concern with ballot images that have no

SHA files attached to them?

MR. PARIKH: There's a major security concern. And the fact that they're missing and if you do -- if you add that in addition to with the missing images, these are things that cannot happen from a secure mechanical or technical malfunction. These had to be forethought things that were done. Because that's not the way a system would be corrupted and lose SHA images.

And -- and might I add that -- no disrespect to you, ma'am, but I don't think you're technically qualified to look at this Exhibit 11. If this is in the read room, you need somebody like myself or Phillip Davis who can look at additional information and meta data to examine and make sure that the files are legitimate.

DR. JOHNSTON: Thank you. Just one more.

If a -- if a data card is removed from the scanner before the end of the election, before the closing and it's tabulated, is that vulnerable to altering? Is there some security vulnerability to a data card that is removed from the original scanner and maybe at some other time closed out or tabulated on a different scanner?

MR. PARIKH: There are multiple ones. So

I'm going to try to keep this brief. One, from a technical perspective, those cards were nowhere close to full capacity. That's what's astounded me from the minute I've analyzed this data, is why they were removed. Because there was no need for -- from a storage capacity.

Two, to break the seal on a tabulator and move it and when there wasn't a tabulator malfunction, again, would be the only reason that you would do it for continuity of operations.

And -- and that would only be done, of course, with record keeping. So to move them -- right? -- from one system to another, was it placed in a security sealed bag so you know that it wasn't tampered with when it was moved to the other tabulator?

There -- there's a thousand issues that could go on. Because once the system's removed, it should be properly taken to EMS or a reporting manager and that data uploaded.

MR.COAN: Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: We'll go back to regular order for the public comment. May I remind you there's a two-minute time limit on each speaker. If you have previously heard somebody make substantially

similar comments to which you are prepared to make, then I ask that you please just confirm that and be very brief. So thank you very much.

MR.COAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Okay next up on the list, we have Barbara
Hartman, and on deck we have -- looks like Susie
Bradshaw, I believe.

MS. HARTMAN: (speaking indiscernibly from gallery with microphone turned off). All right, let me start talking now. After what I just heard, probably what I have to say is not going to do anything, but I'll try. But I want to challenge y'all to -- we've sat here for hours. We know there is fraud that's happening. Who's accountable? When are y'all going to hold people accountable so it does not happen again? I'd like an answer.

(from the podium) And another answer I would like is why does our Secretary of State not allow these ballots to be inspected? What is he hiding? And it's up to you all to get those ballots inspected and have transparency and not let this continue on. So we have faith in you, and we want that to happen.

How many minutes -- how many seconds do I

have left?

MR.COAN: Oh, no, you've got another minute and 15 seconds. So ...

MS. HARTMAN: All right. Barbara Hartman.

I've been a poll worker, poll manager for

probably 30 years, even though I don't look that

old. Okay. I was an auditor during the

recounting in the 2020 election.

I saw the unfolded absentee mailed-in ballots. Many came from nursing homes or care -- caregiving homes and they were not folded. But to be -- to be an original mailed-in ballot, it has to have a fold. It goes into the secrecy envelope and that goes into an outer envelope. These had no fold.

Okay. So we had the ability from John -from Judge Amero to inspect these ballots.

However, our Secretary of State Brad

Raffensperger filed an amicus brief to keep
these -- these votes, absentee ballots hidden.

Why is that? Sounds suspicious to me.

Okay. This board has the ability to have these ballots unsealed and inspected, and I strongly encourage you as board members to allow inspection of the ballots before they are

physically destroyed. And I don't know if they haven't already been destroyed. But under a court order, I understand that they have to be saved.

Now, when are we going to hold these folks accountable? What's going to happen? Are we all wasting our time sitting here? Sounds like it if we don't do something to stop it.

And I challenged the governor. He says no fraud, waving his finger in my face. And I said, Yes, there was. I filed an affidavit. I saw what I saw. And he yells at me: Prove it, prove it, prove it, prove it. I should've said: No, you prove to me that there was no fraud. And he could not do that, I'm sure.

But anyway, that's it. Thank you.

MR.COAN: Thank you, Barbara. Appreciate your comments.

Next up is Susan Bradshaw, and on deck is Kathleen Hamill.

MS. BRADSHAW: Hi. My name is Ginger
Bradshaw. And I'll be honest with you, my
original comments have gone out the window.

After hearing this two present -- 15-minute
presentations, they should've been all day long

presentations. I think if anyone in this room can doubt that there were not huge, tremendous, rearing, roaring errors in Fulton County counting and tabulation, you need to go to the loony bin.

I'm sorry. And I just want to challenge all of you to get aside from your -- who appointed you, what side of the aisle you fall on, and look at the truth. Because you know who we have to all face is God Almighty. Whether you believe in him or not doesn't mean he doesn't exist. And so he is who you've got to face.

So I would listen to these men of integrity
-- They were so impressive. You could tell that
they knew what they were doing -- and do the
right thing.

That it's taken this long to get this much information in the public square is appalling.

Our courts -- I don't even want to go there.

There are issues there. But there's no reason to have an issue here because we're free to speak.

They made a great presentation. And we're all -- and I couldn't follow everything they did, but I got the gist of it, that everything didn't add up.

And so I just encourage you, board members,

you're not responsible all for what happened in the past. I know -- I know a lot of you are new, but just please do the right thing. Thank you.

MR.COAN: Thank you, Ginger. Appreciate your comments.

Next up is Kathleen Hamill, and on deck we have Stefan Bartelski

MS. HAMILL: Thank you. Distinguished chair, distinguished members of the board, my name is Kathleen Hamilll, and I am here today as a member of the American Bar Association Task Force for American Democracy.

We are committed, broadly speaking, to election integrity, the rule of law, and trusted elections. We seek to help ensure that our elections are orderly, fair, secure, and legal. We also seek to inform voters on the processes and verification measures that election officials already follow. While there might be some instances, of course, of mistakes, which we all know, we are committed to supporting election officials in any way that they might need.

I am here today. I'm an attorney. I am a Fulton County resident. I am as well here to support the petition that seeks to amend

183-1-12-.12 and that is the SEB rule on tabulating results.

2.1

This is an important petition, I think. It lists the universe of documents that election boards may consider prior to certification. I do think that this petition will be very helpful not only to election staff members because it will inform them of the documents that they need to prepare in advance of certification, but it will also help those election board members in order to let them know what documents to expect during the certification.

It is noteworthy that this petition as well correctly points out that county election superintendents still have to certify results even if discrepancies exist, because that is what allows candidates to move to filing an election contest in court should they so decide.

I would like to briefly mention that I think along with the other clarifying language this petition is helpful. It includes references to statutory provisions and relevant official code of the Georgia Annotated Title 21, chapter 2, article 12, section 493(b) in particular.

And I would just like to also say that we

are as the American Bar Association Task Force for American Democracy seeking to provide helpful recommendations to closely watch these proceedings to know that we are here as public citizens, as lawyers who have a professional responsibility not only to the U.S. Constitution but the rule of law.

And I would like to thank you all for what must be one of the most difficult jobs in this country at this time. Thank you.

MR.COAN: Time for one question.

MS. HAMILL: Yes.

And I'd like to say welcome to Janelle King. It's so nice to see your face.

MS. KING: Thank you. Thank you. Quick question.

MS. HAMILL: Yes.

MS. KING: When it comes to certifying -this may be a completely ignorant question, so
just forgive me -- are they -- they're certifying
that the election that took place happened or are
they certifying that the election that took place
was correct?

MS. HAMILL: It's a process. Certification marks the culmination of a process that the steps

were followed to reach that final point. And if they are any discrepancies, they may be investigated and they should be investigated.

We want to also make voting easy and fraud difficult.

MS. KING: So you're -- but you're saying it should be investigated after certification.

MS. HAMILL: They -- they are investigated at every -- the verification processes along the way help to ensure that it is a trusted process and the courts play an important role. They can hear evidence and they can do a lot more important investigation and determination. So it is a multifaceted process.

I appreciate your question and your engagement. I look forward to further continuing the conversation. And thank you very much.

MR.COAN: Thank you, Kathleen. Appreciate your comments.

Next up is Stefan Bartelski, and on deck is Bill Henderson. Is Bill still here?

MR. BARTOWSKY: Good afternoon, board. My name is Stefan Bartelski. I'm a voter from Forsyth County. I am also a nonpartisan election integrity advocate, and I have been volunteering

my time to provide information to our election board in Forsyth County regarding possible ineligible registrations as mentioned earlier by one of -- one of the other speakers.

I want to look a little bit forward. We've heard a lot today about all of the things that are wrong with our current election process. But I want to look forward and hone in on one thing. There is a rule change petition number one where there are suggestions to make the job of us volunteers more difficult. And I want to speak out against that.

An earlier speaker also told us that with regard to hand-counting -- I'll paraphrase the words, but basically that humans make mistakes and we should take the result of the computers. Yet in petition number one, effectively, they are trying to tell us that we cannot use computers to find registrations to challenge because the computers can't be trusted. Which one is it? Can we trust the computers or not?

Thank you.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Mr. Bartelski.

Next up is Bill Henderson. On deck is -- wow. That looks like Pamela Eckhardt. Pamela

Eckhardt.

2.1

MR. HENDERSON: Well, good afternoon. I just want to tell you a couple instances of things that were found by private citizens like us, okay? Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-224, the last day you can register to vote or change your registration address prior to an election is approximately 30 days. In the November 2020 election, the last day to register was October 5, 2020.

Per the Secretary of State's files, we have found over 9300 registrants that first appeared in the November voter role with a backdated registration date of October 5th or before that. They did not exist on October 5th. This is criminal manipulation of an official list of electors in a federal election.

Of these registrants with -- with fake backdated registration dates, 3700 were credited with a vote and all these votes are unlawful. If you drill down to the November voter roll and just look at the registration IDs that were registered on November 3, 2020, they found 3,000 -- over 3,000 registrants that show a registration and date added of 11/3/2020 and

several hundred of them received credit for voting.

First, it's implausible to believe that election officials were adding thousands of -thousands on the voter rolls on election day.
And it is unlawful for any of them to actually vote. As you might imagine, the votes were cast in person on election day. Are these even real people? Or are they registrants just inserted into the count? But it gets worse.

We found over 1300 registrants that registered after November 3, 2020, that received credit for voting in the election. How is this even possible?

The same pattern of criminally manipulating the official list of electors has been found around the 2022 election and the recent 2024 primary. Nothing has changed. This data is found across multiple counties in the state. These are all unlawful votes. Where do these registrants come from? They definitely do not appear to be real.

We demand -- we the people demand an investigation into the Secretary of State's Office, and we need to have accountability for

violations like this.

Thank you.

MR.COAN: Thank you, Bill, for your comments.

Next up is Pamela Eckhardt, and on deck is Maria Gavio.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Gaudio.

MR.COAN: Between my eyesight and
handwriting, it's -- it's tough. I apologize.

MS. ECKHARDT: My name is Pamela Eckhardt, and I go by Phoebe often.

The Lord looked down from heaven upon the children of men to see if there were any that did seek God. They are altogether become filthy.

There's none that doeth good. No, not one. Have all the workers of iniquity no knowledge who eat up my people like bread and call not upon the Lord? There were they in great fear, for God is in the generation of the righteous.

God sees everything. He sees every decision, and he hears every word spoken, and he keeps records. One day each person will stand before Almighty God and give an account. He knows every intent of the heart, every thought of every heart.

Every day we and you have a chance to make right and good decisions for all people, even the weak and the destitute. You have a chance, a decision and decisions to make. We are watching. But more important, God is watching, and your decisions will be recorded for a later time.

Make a decision you will be proud of on that day, please.

MR.COAN: Thank you, Pamela, for your comments.

Maria's up next, and we have Jennifer Gray is on deck.

MS. GAUDIO: Maria Gaudio, Fulton County. I was shocked to learn that ballots are only being preserved for 22 to 24 months. The medical board and most of the other health professional boards require that we hold our records for ten years. The IRS requires six-year hold, and the Social Security Administration holds their records indefinitely.

I would think that a rule could be made by this board, just like other boards, to extend the length that our records be held. My vote is my property that you are -- you have a fiduciary responsibility to hold my vote until at least

it's accounted properly which they have not been going back at least to 2020.

I think that policies and procedures need to be consistent. We need to have quality control of our elections from county to county, just like walking into a Waffle House and having a very delicious pecan waffle. No matter which Waffle House you go to, it's just as delicious. North, south, and middle Georgia. And I think that it's much more difficult to make a waffle than it is to check off a ballot on a paper ballot.

I would hope that the selection of monitors is more transparent. We certainly don't want anybody like Ryan Germany, Jesse Harris, certainly not the Carter Center who had been shown to be incompetent, involved in coverups and extremely partisan.

I would hope that in the future that being transparent to the people -- I really don't appreciate the maneuver this morning where y'all went into a private session because, you know, I -- I appreciate your hard work -- and I know that this is voluntary and not paid -- however, our tax dollars are providing for this to happen, and we need to be kept abreast of everything. We

1	are just so suspicious. You have to understand
2	that our elections have been compromised for so
3	long, so many times that we need transparency,
4	folks.
5	But I appreciate your service. Thank you so
6	much.
7	MR.COAN: Thank you, Maria. I appreciate
8	your comments.
9	Next up is Jennifer Gray. On deck is Janet
10	Grant.
11	(Unidentified speakers in the audience
12	speaking inaudibly.)
13	MR.COAN: I'm sorry, say it again.
14	(Unidentified speakers in the audience
15	speaking inaudibly.)
16	MR. FERVIER: Who's up, Mike?
17	MR.COAN: We have Jennifer Gray up next and
18	then Janet Grant.
19	MR. FERVIER: Is Jennifer here?
20	(Unidentified speakers in the audience
21	speaking inaudibly.)
22	MR. FERVIER: Okay. I greatly appreciate
23	your brevity. Thank you.
24	MR.COAN: (indiscernible) Okay. Janet?
25	Okay, on deck is William Parker, please.

MS. GRANT: I'm sorry, I haven't declined.

Good morning or good -- good afternoon. My name is Janet Grant, and I'm a registered voter in DeKalb County and have served as a poll worker there for the last five years. I was initially a poll manager and currently am an area poll manager responsible for 10 precincts.

I'm here today to express my concern about most of the rule changes that are proposed today. Other than the proposed rules for dealing with voter challenges, which really provide much needed guidance to our county election boards, I'm concerned that the focus and time of this board has been spent on proposals that only make election administration more complex and fail to actually improve the voting process.

On the ground this is contributing to increasing difficulty recruiting and retaining poll workers, in particular poll managers who have to deal with this complexity, and takes the focus of county boards and election officials off the actual administration and improvement of elections.

In my role as a poll manager, I have never had a concern about someone voting that was not

eligible. Instead my concern has been for eligible voters that have not been able to vote or can cast only a provisional vote that I know is not going to be counted for issues like that 18-year-old girl, first-time voter, who only had a high school ID; a voter who moved two blocks over and was now in a different county; or a voter who came to the wrong precinct before 5 p.m. on their way to work and had no time to go to the correct precinct.

I would really encourage those of you that have questions and -- about elections to volunteer to serve as a poll worker. We need you. We need you to serve your community, and I'm convinced that you will find all the checks and balances that there are already in the election process.

And I encourage the board to use your power to not be distracted by proposals that don't improve access to the ballot or administrations of elections in Georgia.

Thank you.

MR.COAN: Thank you. Appreciate your comments.

Next up is William Parker. On deck is David

Cross. William Parker is next. Is William Parker here? Hearing none, moving on.

David Cross, you're up.

MR. FERVIER: We appreciate William's
brevity too.

MR. CROSS: Thank you, board members. I appreciate y'all being here today. Want you to look at the number of people that are here today. In this room, the two overflow rooms right now, it's gotta be just clearly apparent that people just don't trust the process, that -- that people feel like there's no transparency.

We still have no ballots that we can view in the Favorito v Fulton case. Curling v Raffensperger is now seven years old, and a decision should've been rendered months ago. And it's clear that justice is being hindered.

Governor Kemp is the most powerful person in Georgia. If I were playing a chess match against him, it would be like playing against somebody who has three queens on the chessboard because he controls the executive branch, he makes judicial appointments, and he has legislators who represent him when the legislature's in session. It seems clear to me that people in positions in

our state are being manipulated to hinder transparency in order to maintain power.

My proposed rule changes in May regarding printing ballots -- emergency ballots on salmon-colored stock was rebuffed by member Ghazal, and rightly so, due to voter privacy.

And after further consideration I propose a very simple -- simple change so that one ballot is printed for emergency -- so that instead of having one ballot printed for emergency provisional, absentee, there is one ballot is printed for absentee ballots and one that is separate for emergency provisional and continues in the same -- same ballot stock.

The reason why is so that we can recognize those differences when we're -- when we're scanning -- looking at scanned images of ballots.

The point of the proposed rule is to enhance chain of custody in ballots. My proposed rule change regarding meaningful observation by poll watchers was given to you at the May meeting, but it can simply be amended to allow poll watchers to within 2 feet of election machines and materials except for personally identifiable information. And watchers may not touch machines

or ballots. Allow one poll watcher from each party into central tabulation to have access to within 2 feet of election machines and processors of absentee ballots. Watchers may not touch machines or ballots. The point is election integrity.

Finishing up. Dishonest politicians on both sides benefit from maladministered elections.

The state capitol is supposed to be the house created by the people and for the people. If there were no concerns in elections, there would be ten people here today on this hot July day.

I beg you to take heed of the number of citizens here today and put the security and accuracy of our elections first.

MR.COAN: Next up on the list is Tom Talbot.

Is Tom still here?

MR. TALBOT: (off microphone) Yeah, I'm
here.

MR.COAN: Tom? Okay, very good.

On deck we have Tim Wesselman. Very good, okay.

MR. TALBOT: Good afternoon. Tom Talbot,
Hall County. This is the third time I have the
privilege speak to the board. I appreciate what

you do. I think you have a burden that most people wouldn't want.

The last couple of times I asked the question: How many facts do you need to see before you actually do something? More facts have been presented today than any time in the two previous meetings I've attended, which -- which brings me to four basic words: trust, transparency, credibility, and leadership.

You've been entrusted by the state of

Georgia and its citizens to do a job that is so

very important. The credibility issue -- and

I -- I spoke with Ms. Johnston about this

previously. In my mind, you are like a baseball

umpire. You are calling balls and strikes. It's

either a ball or it's a strike. There is no gray

area because you have to make a decision. That's

why you're here.

Next is leadership. Everybody here, everybody in the state, why does it take years to have action? You, in my mind, are the group that should bring credibility, transparency, and everything to our state election laws. You also have to act when you find cause and need to act.

That's what everybody here wants, is they

want accountability. They want you to call balls and strikes, and they want you to act. Next thing is leadership to -- when you go home at night and you can say -- and you look yourself in the mirror -- did I do right? Did I do wrong? Did I make it better or did I make it worse? Because at the heart of hearts, you have to live with yourself and your decisions. And as they say -- and this is an old term -- don't confuse me with the facts, my mind is already made up. Thank you.

MR.COAN: Thank you, Tom.

Next up is Tim Wesselman. On deck is Holly Kesler. Is Holly here? Okay, very good. Thank you.

MR. WESSELMAN: Good afternoon. I'd like to thank the chairman of the board for taking the time to hear from everybody. We had an intense start this morning and the chairman said everybody's going to be heard, and I greatly appreciate that.

My name is Tim Wesselman. I live in Albany, Georgia. I've always voted, but in Albany I think about for the last 15 years, I've walked those two blocks or drove those two blocks to my

precinct, went into Sherwood Acres Elementary, and whatever the new rule was, I followed it, you know? Over that time, I've had to start handing them my ID. And then I go to this computer and I get this piece of paper and I carry my paper ballot and I feed it into the document -- I feed it in the machine, and then the election folks say: Hey, look, there's your vote.

I know my vote's secure. I know the 150 million Americans who voted in 2020 all believe their vote was a legitimate vote and -- and we shouldn't be up here telling 80 million Americans they lied. That's -- that's just not the case.

Now, y'all have some proposals before you that are coming just 14 weeks before the election, asking that some rural voters might have to pay \$14 for the right to vote. We don't charge people in America to vote. We don't do that. I hear a lot about election fraud, but we've had 60 court cases and more. The Fulton County results have been reviewed three times. We're three and a half years after the fact and we're getting told that we need to look at this one more time. We need to follow the rule of

law.

Today we've had public comment attempt to turn into an evidentiary hearing without a respondent present. We heard opinion today. I'm very proud of my words, but they're just opinion. When I tell you that 4,300 voters have been removed from the Dougherty County rolls since May, yeah that's -- I got county election results to -- but it's also my opinion.

MR.COAN: Thank you, sir.

MR. WESSELMAN: Please make voting clear, easy, and fair.

MR.COAN: Thank you. Thank you, Tim.

Next up we have Holly Kesler. On deck we have Sheryn Dowd.

MS. KESLER: Good afternoon. Thank you so much for allowing all of us to speak. I drove from Savannah, Georgia, so I do appreciate that.

While we're talking about the Moncla-Rossi case today, I want to remind everyone it wasn't just complaints submitted to the SOS and SEB.

There were complaints submitted to CISA -- CISA, the FBI, the attorney general, the inspector general, all surrounding this.

What I'm going to talk about today is that

there is a pattern of manipulation. And the reason I know this is because I've helped Jeff Fulgham with his case that he filed in Ware County. He conducted an investigation in Ware County after the SEB decided not to investigate it.

Now, I know a lot of y'all are new, so don't take that personally. I'm just stating the facts. So we went through -- I was an additional set of eyes on duplicate ballots. Y'all heard a lot about that today. It is happening, and it's happening in multiple counties. Phillip Davis actually has a report that's on a lot of the counties. They're still going through data.

I know you just brought up -- or whoever it was just brought up: why are we still doing this? Why are we still doing this? Well, it's because it's taken this long to get this kind of information. And it's really taken this long to get the experts and the data people and people who are knowledgeable in accounting to come together and figure this stuff out and figure out what's going on.

So while I didn't print y'all the 3,000-plus duplicates from Fulton County, I do have the Ware

County duplicate images. I don't know if y'all want to see what they look like when they're on paper and their submitted to court, but that's what they look like. But I'm going to give these to you, and then that way y'all can see this —this is a real issue. It is really happening.

Janelle, I do appreciate you stepping up and asking the questions and being a support, you know, to Dr. Jan. She's really done a lot. We do appreciate this because this is a matter, y'all, that does have to be resolved.

We're going into one of the most critical times in elections of our lives. And it's really up to y'all. The -- the complaints have been filed, you know, six ways to Sunday, and -- and yet here we are. Absolutely nothing.

So it's up to y'all to -- to help us figure this out. I mean, we're here helping y'all.

We're giving y'all all the data. We've got the experts. We've got everything you need. As a matter of fact, you've got your Fulton County monitors right here. You just heard from half of them. That's a fabulous team.

So -- so I just want to thank y'all, let y'all know that we do support you, but we are

also asking you to step up and do the right thing 1 2 as well. Thank you so much. Thank you, Holly, for your 3 MR.COAN: 4 comments. 5 Next up is Sheryn Dowd, and on deck is Dorothy Kirks -- Kirkley. Nobody here? Sheryl 6 7 Dowd? 8 (Unidentified speakers in the audience 9 speaking inaudibly.) 10 MR.COAN: Sheryl Dowd? Oh, please come up. 11 It's your turn. 12 MS. DOWD: (speaking inaudibly in the 13 gallery with microphone turned off) 14 MR.COAN: Yes. MS. DOWD: (speaking inaudibly in the 15 16 gallery with microphone turned off) 17 MR.COAN: We can either -- I mean, if Dorothy's ready, we'll have her go ahead and go 18 19 forward. She's from ABA. Thank you. Appreciate 20 it. MS. KIRKLEY: Good afternoon. 21 I'm Dorothy 22 Kirkley, a Georgia native. Mostly voted for 55 23 years plus in Fulton and DeKalb County. And now 24 I moved to Jackson County, Georgia. I've worked 25 with numerous election officials, been to many

polling places from the bottom to the top. I think it's a good system.

And people care. We are greeted at these polling places. It's by people who want you to vote. And that's what we need, I think, to continue to support in these rules.

My first job out of law school was in the Georgia Attorney General's Office representing the Secretary of State's Office and other state agencies. Back then and now, the overarching rule of law, one of the rules that makes democracy in this country survive --

(Unidentified speakers speaking inaudibly in the gallery with microphone turned off)

MS. KIRKLEY: -- probab -- what?

(Unidentified speakers speaking inaudibly in

the gallery with microphone turned off)

MS. KIRKLEY: I'm sorry, I can't hear ...

MR. FERVIER: Let's be respectful of our speakers, please.

MS. KIRKLEY: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought they had a question.

So the rule of law that applies in election contests and therefore is the overarching top of the system we're working with right now in your

proposed rules is that an election contest can be won by a losing candidate only if there are enough votes that are invalid or fraudulent or mistaken or erroneous and that they would change the result of the election. That rule has stood us in good stead in my 45 years plus of practicing law because it gives finality to the system.

And finality is what we need in the system and respect for that. When you have due process of law, which the courts provide, when people can subpoena witnesses, cross-examine them, get documents that are reliable, the right chain of custody, when you have specific laws that apply to election contests, they end in good final decisions.

Now, we're not happy with all of the decisions. As a trial lawyer, I have lost plenty of cases, not been happy, asked on motions for reconsideration, gone on to appeal two or three times because I kept fighting, like many of you are. But at some point, the fighting must stop and we must move forward.

I don't know much about the Fulton County situation except that I know the finding was

there were not enough votes that needed to be thrown out to change that election.

And number two, number two, a monitor has been put in place for 2024. That's what we ought to be looking forward to, is full and fair and free election in 2024. Thank you very much.

MR.COAN: Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you.

MR.COAN: Okay. We're --

(Unidentified speaker speaking inaudibly in the gallery with microphone turned off)

MR.COAN: Amen. Let's be respectful of each other. We're going to go to our last speaker and we're going to take a break for lunch. So last up until we get back from break is Tate Fall.

MS. FALL: All right. Hello. Am I on?
Okay. Mr. Chair, members of the board, director
Coan, and fabulous SEB staff members, thank you
for having us today and giving us an opportunity
to speak.

My name is Tate Fall. I'm the director of elections for Cobb County. I'm also a member of the GAVREO legislative committee, which is what I'm speaking on behalf of today in regard to the SEB proposed rule by the state election board

regarding advance voting ballots.

GAVREO asked for the following changes to this specific rule. First, we were concerned that paragraph 18 needs to be clarified to ensure that it properly aligns with state law and does not create additional burdens to counties. Many counties have already put local processes in place to address this issue that work well for them.

For example, some counties use labels on the envelopes themselves to track this information while others use forms or logs. We would appreciate clear language that allows voters to use other common carriers or to deliver ballots to our offices without further documentation and to avoid a one-size-fits-all form.

We are also concerned that the creation of a new type of provisional ballot may conflict with state law, but we would be happy to work with the state election board to ensure that the rule that is eventually adopted is accomplished in its stated goal.

Second, paragraph 19 is confusing, and we ask that parts of it be clarified. It seems to require video surveillance on any drop box in an

advanced voting site after the site closes and that the video includes the drop box if there is one available at that site.

The legislature specifically did not include a video surveillance requirement for drop boxes because they have to be under the constant supervision of sworn officials while they are open. Those same officials have to empty the box every night, and the same sworn officials have to ensure that it is still empty the following morning.

Additionally, a 24-month retention period is much too high when you stop and consider that it would be recording a box that we are already required to ensure is empty every single morning. We will know whether or not the video is needed when the box is opened the next morning. So we fail to see the need for a 24-month retention period.

The legislature addressed this issue by not requiring video surveillance of an empty box but we ask that if the board decides to move forward with this, that the retention period be shortened to two weeks unless something is found in that box that required an investigation in which case

the 24-month retention period would be more 1 2 appropriate. 3 Thank you. MR.COAN: Thank you for your comments. 4 MR. FERVIER: Given that this board has been 5 at this for a little over four hours now, we're 6 7 going to -- the chair would entertain a motion 8 for a recess for lunch for approximately 30 9 minutes. 10 DR. JOHNSTON: So moved --11 MR. JEFFARES: So moved. DR. JOHNSTON: -- that we recess for 12 13 approximately thirty minutes. 14 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second to recess for approximately 30 minutes. Any 15 discussion? Hearing no discussion, all those in 16 17 favor signify by saying aye. 18 THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye. 19 MR. FERVIER: Hearing no opposition, so 20 This board will recess for 30 minutes, approximately 30 minutes for lunch. Thank you. 2.1 (Lunch recess from 12:45 until 1:15 p.m.) 22 23 MR. FERVIER: The state election board is 24 back in session. We'll continue the public

25

comment section.

1	MD COAN, The series was Mrs. Ober the series
1	MR. COAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
2	Okay. Next on the list is Rebecca Anglin.
3	On deck is Tamara Favorito.
4	(Unidentified speaker speaking inaudibly in
5	the gallery with microphone turned off)
6	MR. COAN: You're not? Okay, thank you.
7	Okay.
8	Garland, are you still speaking? No? Okay,
9	very good.
10	Okay. So Rebecca Anglin is first. Linda
11	Menk it is Menk Menk is second. Linda
12	Menk.
13	MR. FERVIER: Is Rebecca here? No?
14	MR. COAN: All right. So Michelle Litton.
15	Gotcha, okay. Michelle Litton? L-i-t-t-o-n.
16	Uh-oh, I think I left people out. Karen Stolley?
17	Karen Stolley? Looks like Sarah Thompson?
18	MS. THOMPSON: I'm here.
19	MR. COAN: Okay, you want to speak?
20	MS. THOMPSON: (inaudible)
21	MR. COAN: Okay, great. We have Sarah
22	Thompson speaking to start us off.
23	MS. THOMPSON: So this star represents what
24	Georgia has been in the past and what it could be
25	in the future, a mighty state in the union with a

commitment to the republic. For now, however, it is lackluster and toppled over by a corrupt state government that you are a part of.

2.1

The Georgia Constitution isn't upheld by private corporations like the Georgia Republican Party, Inc. and its dirty and secret board of directors who consider the Georgia election code optional. Because there is no requirement for you all to rule on corporate matters, am I correct? You have no role in corporate matters.

The rules of the Georgia Republic Party,
Incorporated were adopted under chapter 3 of
Title 14. That is corporate law. Georgia code
21-2-153(e)(9) requires that rules and
regulations governing political parties be
adopted under chapter 2 of Title 21.

The Georgia Republican Party, Incorporated, as a private corporation, cannot have jurisdiction statewide. Corporations don't have jurisdiction over political party affairs and convention. Local jurisdictions of corporations also do not have proper lawful jurisdiction under election code. These are very significant constitutional matters.

I have come to you today all the way from

Statesboro, which is Bulloch County, to explain these to you. I am a former military officer, and we are a career military family.

This is disgusting. Our constitution is in crisis. Public officials pay qualifying fees to a private corporation. Public officials submit affidavits to a private corporation. However, that private corporation is not disclosed on the paperwork. We have a major problem, and our public officials are in -- huge problem, huge -- huge crisis.

Thank you for your time today.

MR. COAN: Thank you, Miss Sarah. I appreciate it.

Lisa Rutherford?

MS. RUTHERFORD: At the May meeting that I addressed this board when a complaint originated was on the agenda for blanket dismissal and my outward disapproval for not being allowed to address this complaint before you, Mr. Chair, I appreciated you recognizing me from the floor and allowing my redress of the case which ultimately resulted in a board vote for a letter of instruction instead of dismissal. Although generally I feel letters of instruction are

pointless, I appreciated the action.

As a follow-up, I e-mailed your office a week later to ask for a copy of the letter as the complaint originator from our records and received a response back it had not been issued yet but would be forwarded to me once processed.

Great.

Five weeks passed and no letter. So I followed up. No response. In my third attempt, I finally received a response, but it was: We do not have any records responsive to your request. Why not?

I responded for clarification. Does this mean the letter has not been issued? Or are you unable to provide me a copy? Again no response to date. Was I lied to? Do your votes matter here?

Mr. Chair, are you familiar with the phrase "perception is reality"?, meaning there is a perceived reality of something that is absent, any additional facts provided are proven to change the mind or outcome of the perception.

Board members, based on this, I am here today to state publicly that my perception is this board is not operating in good faith to the

citizens in Georgia in your official roles. You have here today some of the best election integrity across Georgia.

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At times we've watched the gamesmanship and public theater play out here and at our county levels through obvious delays of key evidence and cases that go against the narrative; preplanned agenda items; and motions brought forward by a board member with obvious coordination to another member to either agree or disagree based on what I perceive a predetermined outcome; motions brought forward for political points, knowing there will be no second and will die or will be a split vote with no action taken; members suspiciously absent from key meetings and votes; notes passed between each other; key cases or information of serious concern that I am personally aware of that have sat in your investigative circular file for over year with no action.

Instead you bring forward cases of citizens who took a picture out of concern for their ballot, made a Facebook post, smaller infractions, and you wag your fingers at them in disgust, touting election law. Meanwhile you

have serious cases of election fraud you've intentionally ignored.

I hope this board realizes your public actions and votes will be your legacies and long remembered by the good citizens of Georgia. Take due care.

MR.COAN: Thank you. Is Candace Taylor in the room? Candace Taylor? Okay. Helen? Is Helen in the room? Phil Looney?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He left.

MR. COAN: He left? Okay. We're rolling through these quickly. Kristin Davis? Is Kristin in? Jennifer Moore? Vivian?

MS. THOMAS: Thomas?

MR. COAN: Yes. I'm horrible with handwriting right now, but, yes. If you don't mind, state your name when you get up there. I thank you.

MS. THOMAS: Good day, Mr. Chair and Board.
My name is Vivian Thomas, and I greet you from
Henry County, Georgia.

I have the pleasure of serving as a district commissioner for five years. So I understand the role that you're taking today. Thank you for your time. And I will respect you as leaders of

this county and the leaders of this board.

In this day and time, digital systems are here in our educational system, banking system, even the food processing from farm to table. It is here. Our lives are inundated with AI and more to come. We can't travel or get medical attention without some type of computer attached to us or talking to us, instructing us.

I propose to this board that there are some challenges. You know them, you've heard some of them, but what I wanted to say to you, let's put together some things to fix them. Your goal hopefully is to make policies and procedures where the voting process in Georgia is made easier and that everyone has access to vote and exercise their right as a voter.

What I would like to propose to you is authorized software updates. It's software, update it. Make sure that in those software updates that it automatically kicks out any type of concerns of duplicate voting. That can happen. You can have a machine's audit. When concern about whether machines are operating properly, make sure those machines are audited on a regular basis and get some type of information

back to your board that it has been done.

The policy should be, regardless, run a second set of votes on everything electronically. That is so much cheaper than having somebody sit there and try and count them manually. Frankly speaking, I trust that machine to do the work more so than sticky fingers, bifocals, sleepy people, tired and angry and one-sided individuals.

I trust that machine. It doesn't have emotions. It doesn't care about what color I am, what size I am. It doesn't care about who I am or where I live. I trust that machine to say:

Hey, you can run another copy of me through another machine to make sure I did do my job well. There are options you have. The paper trail is there. Paper comes out, we put it back in the machine. It's there and you can look at it.

So I want to go further. I heard you,
Mr. Chairman, but I want you to know, please look
at what your options are and make this work for
everyone and thank you for your time.

MR.COAN: Thank you, Ms. Thomas.

Next on the list is Maribeth Kennedy. Is

Maribeth here? No? Okay. Allyson Rose Becker? Going once, going twice. Okay. Iliana Dobrew? Is it Dobrew? Wow. Well, this is last but not least Richard Shroeder. We're done.

MR. FERVIER: Did you say up here that ...

MR. COAN: We'll want to check it. Bob -- Bob -- is Bob Edwards here? He was with the ABA guys. He's not here either. So he was already gone. That's why I skipped him.

Rebecca -- Rebecca Anglin, are you here?

MS. ANGLIN: Yes.

MR. COAN: Would you like to come speak?

MS. ANGLIN: Yes.

MR. COAN: Thank you.

MS. ANGLIN: Good afternoon, and thank you to the board for the opportunity to speak publicly today. My name is Rebecca Anglin, and I'm the election director of Greene County. I'm also a member of GAVREO.

It is not only my stance but the stance of our organization that we do not support rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5) of hand-counting paper ballots at polling precincts on election night. GAVREO opposes this rule but believes that counties have the authority to follow the procedures described

in the proposed rule at their discretion.

These procedures were attempted during the pilot of our current voting system in 2019, and they delayed results without adding any additional security to the process.

We agree with the Secretary of State's

Office that the best practice is to very publicly remove all of the ballots from the ballot box and immediately place them in a sealed container to be transported to the election office. This ensures that any necessary investigation can be conducted in a controlled setting to minimize any mistakes.

We suggest that poll watchers be allowed to verify the box is empty and to allow them to record the seal number from the sealed container to ensure the chain of custody is not broken. We also acknowledge that counties may conduct a hand-count of ballots if a situation necessitates it on election night but strongly disagree that this should be a required step for every single polling place during every election.

Myself, along with the committee, certainly appreciate your time today. Thank you.

MR.COAN: Thank you so much. We appreciate

it, Rebecca.

And that concludes our speakers. So I'm going to turn it back over to the chairman for -- we're going to start from the beginning of rule changes.

MR. FERVIER: We have some other business too.

MR. COAN: Okay. I apologize.

MR. FERVIER: We're going to do it now. We have gone off agenda slightly. We will attempt to get back on the agenda now. And the first item on the agenda is the approval of board meeting minutes for the May 7th and May 8th meeting, 2024. A copy is in your book.

If the board would please take a minute to review those minutes from the May 7th meeting. Then the chair would entertain a motion on that meeting, on the -- on the minutes.

MS. GHAZAL: (inaudible)

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to accept the minutes by member Ghazal. Do we have a second? Any discussion? Hearing no discussion, all those in favor of accepting the minutes for the May 7, 2004[sic] meeting signify by saying aye.

THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: Any opposition? Hearing no 1 2 opposition, so moved. The next item is acceptance of the minutes 3 for the May 8, 2024, meeting. A copy is in your 4 5 If the board would review those for a The chair will entertain a motion. 6 minute. 7 MS. KING: Motion to accept. 8 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to accept the 9 minutes as presented. Do we have a second? 10 DR. JOHNSTON: Second. 11 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second 12 to present the minutes as accepted. 13 discussion? Hearing no discussion, all those in 14 favor of accepting the minutes for the Tuesday, 15 May 8, 2024, meeting signify by saying aye. 16 THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye. 17 MR. FERVIER: Any opposition? Hearing no 18 opposition, so moved. 19 The next item on the agenda is petitions, 20 hearing petitions. We've had a request to move a 2.1 petition to the front. 22 Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rule presented by Salleigh Grubbs 23 24 Ms. Grubbs, are you prepared MR. FERVIER:

to present your petition for rule change?

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before you start, I'd like to say -- no, please 1 2 go on up -- your petition is -- corresponds a bit to the one that I intend to make later on in the 3 meeting. Have you seen mine? 4 MS. GRUBBS: To be honest, sir, I've only 5 seen certain portions of it. I haven't 6 comprehend -- I've seen it, but I haven't 7 8 comprehended everything if I can just say it that 9 way. 10 MR. FERVIER: Yeah. It would seem to create 11 some difficulty because we can't approve yours 12 and mine both. 13 MS. GRUBBS: We're just going to have to 14 duke it out. MR. FERVIER: Right. You have the floor for 15 16 17 MS. GRUBBS: I go first? They might like mine before they even hear yours. 18 MR. FERVIER: Well, that's a problem. 19 MS. GRUBBS: I'm sorry. Do you want to go 20 21 first? 2.2 MR. FERVIER: No. 23 MS. GRUBBS: You're so sweet, it's hard to 24 just come against that, that look. But I really 25 want to present mine because we worked hard on

it.

MR. FERVIER: Okay. Well, why don't you go ahead and present it, and if the board would like to delay consideration on it until they hear mine, we can always do that.

MS. GRUBBS: Yeah. I totally get your -- I understand what you're saying.

MR. FERVIER: Okay.

MS. GRUBBS: Unless of course there's a board member that wants to make a motion to approve mine in the meantime.

MR. FERVIER: The board will entertain any motions that are made. Well, I take that back. We'll entertain most motions that are made.

MS. GRUBBS: I did do a parliamentary class or two. I'm just kidding.

First of all, I would like to say welcome to Mrs. King. We are so thrilled to have you in -- in the party here. We appreciate you.

And I personally would just like to say that I appreciate each and every board member. You as a body have a tremendous responsibility here in the state of Georgia, and I know that you take it very seriously. And, you know, sometimes there are things that happen in your own life that --

that really bring home the fact that it's a thankless job. You're doing it for free. You're doing it as a volunteer to the state of Georgia and to the citizens of Georgia. And I think sometimes people forget that and that it is something that, you know, you have this great responsibility and you can't make everybody happy.

But we do appreciate your service and your willingness to hear us. I think you've gone over and aboard -- gone over and above to make sure that people are heard, today especially, and so thank you for that. Sometimes people are just frustrated when they don't feel heard. So thank you for hearing people.

So Fulton County admitted in a consent decree that they double-scanned votes in November of 2020. They therefore watered down everyone else's votes. This is voter suppression and could have been avoided if a rule such as this had been in place.

In January of 2021, Fulton County forgot to upload the results for two Milton precincts.

Those votes didn't count until two weeks later when they recertified. Those votes were

suppressed. With a rule such as the rule we propose today, this would have never happened.

In May of 2022, Fulton County again failed to upload 1300-plus results and had to recertify. We were told that no results changed. We're often told that. We were told that in Cobb County as well, but this should not lighten the seriousness of the situation. Entire precincts of people's votes were not counted. People who took their time and energy to cast their ballot found out that it didn't count.

Every vote for every voter should count right away. We can no longer allow voter suppression to continue. We must take every step to ensure that the count is right the first time, not only for accuracy but for trust at a time when most Americans distrust the election process.

I'm for you, the board, to take the step of bringing back trust. I would like to say that in our petition for rule change, pursuant to Georgia 183-1-1-.01, that, you know, in my career of -- in -- an HR person and had to drug test people, and in the drug testing process, you have a chain of custody. You have where the person goes in

and they, you know, take the sample and, you know, you have to do a chain of custody every step of the way or you can be sued because that has been tampered with. And our votes should never be treated with less regard than that. So chain of custody, you've heard it a hundred times today and that continues to be the issue.

2.1

The intent of this position is to -petition is to have the state election board
adopt a rule to affirm existing Georgia law.
There is nothing new that alters changes or
amends Georgia law in this proposed petition
to -- rule petition.

As discussed in the May meeting, this rule is necessary to allow county superintendents and boards of registration and election to exercise their authority to oversee the conduct of elections. Members of the state election board expressed concerns about excluding entire precincts from the certification and fears that voters would be disenfranchised. This proposed rule would not allow for that because Georgia law describes the steps that must be taken when discrepancies are found and how the returns from precincts with discrepancies will be counted

justly.

While there are ongoing discussions and debates about access to other documents and election records, this rule does not address those issues. This simply seeks to optionalize an existing statutory requirement to allow counties to uniformly conduct the minimum level of review as described in the law.

Further explanation of the need for this rule is provided below in section (c), (d), and (f) of the petition. There is a crisis in confidence in our elections, and the oversight of elections in each county is critical to restoring trust.

I respectfully request that this revised proposed rule promulgation be considered today as required by 183-1-1-.01(4).

I would like to acknowledge that the ACLU and Vote Democracy are here opposing my rule. And it always kind of creeps me out when I hear my name from people I don't know when it's about rule changes or some kind of presentation here because I'm pretty easy to find. And I would think that if people wanted to actually move the ball down the field and to actually do something

to improve our elections, pick up the phone and call. Let's have a conversation. Let's not just take the opposing view because this is our state and this is our -- the United States of America. We need to work together.

So for the full text of the rule, addendum (a) as you -- the board has been given, rule 183-1-12.12.1, precertification, reconciliation of number of ballots to the number of votes.

So the whole intent for anyone here who's a layman who's never done this -- I have a feeling that there are a lot of very seasoned election people here, but the whole intent is let's be sure that the number of voters that are on the voter rolls, that the voter roll is accurate, number one.

But this is not about cleaning up the voter rolls which, by the way, are not done and desperately needs to be done.

And, number two, we don't have to -- need to have to pay for that either. In Cobb County there's talk about that. But we need to make sure that the voters that show up to vote, the cards that are cast because we're stuck with these machines as they are right now, but we need

to make sure that when a voter comes in and they receive a card that those numbers match. And then that the card, once that cast goes into the BMD and once you print your ballot, that that reconciles. It's all just a reconciliation process.

Let's make sure that when we go to the bank and we cash a check, we're actually getting the same dollars back as the numbers we wrote on the check. It's a very simple process. It does not have to be complicated. And again it complies with Georgia law and it just gives the -- the outline for how to do it.

Preparing for county certification after each election but no later than 3 p.m. on the Friday following the date on which the election was held, the board shall meet to conduct a review of precinct returns.

Two, after all absentee ballots received by the close of the polls, including those cast by advanced voting and all ballots cast in person on election day and all provisional ballots that have been validated have been tabulated, the total number of ballots cast by each vote method shall be reported for each precinct.

Three, a list of voters who voted in the election shall be compiled, including by category, the number of voters who voted election day, in-person advance voting, absentee, and provisionally. The list shall be examined for duplicates. The list shall then be sorted by precinct. The total number of unique voter IDs from each precinct shall be counted. The total number of unique vote who voted by each vote method shall be reported for each precinct.

2.1

For each precinct, the board member shall compare the total number of ballots cast to the total number of unique voter ID numbers. At any precinct in which the number of ballots exceeds the number of unique voters, the board shall determine the method of voting in which the discrepancy exists.

The board shall investigate the discrepancy and no votes shall be counted from that precinct until the results of an investigation are presented to the board as required in Georgia Code 21-2-493, subparagraph (b).

That's very important because you hear a lot of 2020 going on today. First of all, that should never have been delayed until 2024. And

so if we would have taken these measures at the time of the election on the precinct level, you would be at the beach. You would not be here.

2.1

Number 5, if any error is discovered that cannot be properly corrected, the board shall determine a method to compute the votes to --votes justly as required by Georgia Code 21-2-493, subparagraph 5.

If fraud is discovered, the board shall determine a method to compute the votes justly and report the facts to the district attorney for action as required by O.C.G.A. 21-2-493, subparagraph 5. A board member shall be permitted to examine all election-related documentation created during the conduct of elections prior of certification results.

That is a huge problem because, again, our election board members raise their right hand and they agree to uphold the Constitution, as do you. And when they are not allowed to receive the documentation after an election prior to certification, they are being asked to certify something they cannot certify because they do not have all the information to do that. This would take care of that problem.

Two, certification meeting. One, after all precinct discrepancies have been investigated and resolved, as required by Georgia code 21-2-493, the correct or corrected return shall be recorded until all of the returns from each precinct which are entitled to be counted or recorded. Then they shall be added together, announced, and verified as accurate.

Two, the consolidated return shall then be certified by the superintendent no later than 5 p.m. on the Monday following the date on which such election was held and such return shall be immediately transmitted to the Secretary of State.

As to (c) and (d), the statement of the reason that such rules shall be promulgated on pertinent facts, superintendents, county boards of registration and elections serve an important role in the oversight of elections in Georgia.

The powers and duties of the superintendent described in Georgia Code 21-2-70 include the critical duty to inspect systematically and thoroughly -- it's already in Georgia code, it's already there. They are required to inspect systematically and thoroughly the conduct of

elections to the end that primaries and elections may be honestly, efficiently, and uniformly conducted. The oversight of elections includes the duty to receive from poll officers the returns of all primaries and elections to canvass and compute the same and to certify the results thereof to such authorities as may be prescribed by law.

Georgia is one of the only states that does not have proper canvassing procedures, by the way. Recently various persons have suggested that the board of registration and elections has no discretion to inspect the conduct of elections and no permission to review the returns from the poll officers.

In fact, some outside entities have asserted that the certification of election results in a county is nothing more than a ministerial task and that the members of the board have no discretion but to rubber stamp results sight unseen.

I would really like for the ACLU and all these democracy groups that are probably in the room right now to admit that it's not just a ministerial duty that -- and if you say that,

then you don't believe in integrity of elections at all.

2.1

Although the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the state election board should promulgate the proposed rule to ensure that members of the county boards can perform at a minimum -- at a minimum -- their statutory duty unencumbered by outside influences and misunderstanding of the law.

When common sense requirement in the election code is a mandatory comparison of the number of ballots cast to the number of voters who voted -- and O.C.G.A. 21-2-493(b) requires this reconciliation be done prior to computing and prior to certification. This is a duty of the superintendent that is explicitly required in the law.

It should be noted that issues such as double-scanning of ballots, which the state election board has recognized is a problem, would be detected if the reconciliation required in 21-2-493(b) were properly completed. Errors should be identified and corrected before certification.

The parties who may be affected by this

rule. The state election board should adopt the proposed rules to ensure that every superintendent and board follows the same procedures as required in 21-2-493 in order that the citizens of Georgia will have confidence that counties uniformly, properly, and lawfully fulfill their duties, reconcile the number ballots to the number of voters so that certification of election results accurately reflects the will of the voters in every county.

2.1

2.4

I have citations that authorize the board to require the action required by the petition.

After the close of the polls on election day, the superintendent and board must ensure that canvassing of the absentee ballots continues until all lawful ballots have been tabulated and ensure all advance voting and election day provisional ballots are tabulated and results are released to the public.

Georgia code 21-2-493(a): The superintendent shall after the close of the polls on the day of a primary or election at his or her office or some other convenient public place at the county seat or in the municipality which the notice shall have been given as provided in

21-2-492, publicly commence the computation and canvassing of the returns and continue until all the absentee ballots received by the close of the polls, including those cast by advance voting, and all ballots cast on the day of the primary or election have been counted and tabulated, the results of such tabulation released to the public and then continue with provisional ballots as provided in code sections 21-2-418, 21-2-419, and those absentee ballots as provided in subparagraph (a) (1) (g) of code section 21-2-386 from day to day until completed.

That's the thing. It's already in the code. We're just asking you to agree with the procedure on how to do it. As a common sense check and balance of election returns, the General Assembly described the mandatory step to ensure one person one vote. For the people in the back, one person one vote.

Before the board computes or certifies any votes, they must complete -- compare the number of unique voters who participated to the number of ballots cast from each precinct. Certainly prior to the time for certification, the county has a list of all people who voted absentee by

advanced voting in person on election day and provisionally.

No persons is permitted to vote if they do not first identify themselves and confirm that they are a qualified elector. That list, the qualified electors list, must be available for the board to review for the record of unique voters who participated in the election, separated by precinct, so they can compare the number of voters to the number of ballots. It's already in the law.

If the total number of votes for candidates exceeds the total number of people who voted in a precinct, that discrepancy must be examined by the board. In fact, the law says that no votes from that precinct could be recorded until the discrepancy is first investigated. There is no way for the board to perform this mandatory responsibility which they were required to do by law if the member of the board is not permitted to view the list of people who voted to compare that to the precinct results which is a big-time problem in Bibb County specifically.

Georgia Code 21-2-493(b): The superintendent before computing the votes cast in

any precinct shall compare the registration figure with the certificates returned by the poll officers showing the number of persons who voted in each precinct or the number of ballots cast.

2.1

If upon consideration by the superintendent, the returns and certificates before him or her from any precinct it shall appear that the total votes any candidate or candidates for the same office or nomination or in any question exceeds the number of electors in such precincts — precinct or exceeds the total number of persons who voted in such precinct or the total number of ballots cast, such an excess shall be deemed a discrepancy and palpable error and shall be investigated by the superintendent and no vote shall be recorded from such precinct until an investigation shall be had.

If these procedures were followed and implemented, you would not be here. You would be at the beach.

Such excess shall authorize the summoning of the poll officers to appear immediately with any primary or election papers in their possession. The superintendent shall then examine all the registration and primary election documents, whatever, relating to such precinct in the presence of representatives from each party, body, and interested candidate.

Such examination may, if the superintendent deems it necessary, include a recount or recanvass of the votes of that precinct and a report of the facts of the case to the district attorney were such actions appear to be warranted.

When you get on the big scale, you get the complication. If these things were implemented and done on the precinct level, it would be easy to find. You would be looking for a needle in a small pile of spaghetti as opposed to a needle in a big, huge haystack.

Georgia Code 21-2-493: If any error or fraud is discovered, the superintendent shall compute and certify the votes justly regardless of any fraudulent or erroneous returns presented to him or her and shall report the facts to the appropriate district attorney for action.

Georgia code 293-493(k).

As the returns from each precinct are read, computed, and found to be correct or corrected as aforesaid, they shall be recorded on the blanks

prepared from the purpose -- until all returns from the various precincts which are entitled to be counted shall have been duly recorded, then they shall be added together, announced, and attested to by the assistants who made and computed the entries respectively and shall be signed by the superintendent.

2.1

The consolidated return shall then be certified by the superintendent in the manner required by this chapter. Such return --

So I can keep reading the code section. If anybody doesn't have a green book, you need to get one. I can tell you where to get them. They should be on sale in the gift shop if there was one.

Again, a member of the board who swears an oath to make a true and perfect return of elections must certainly be permitted to review the documents and perform the required voter-to-ballot comparison prior to voting on certification. Denying board members access to returns and documents upon which the results and certification rely would be inconsistent with Georgia law.

So I would like to say, Chairman, that I

decided I -- I have the utmost respect for you. In glancing at your little couple of notes, it is not ensuring one person one vote be mandatory. That's why the Democrats in the room probably love it. And let me just say the -- the rule proposal should be nonpartisan.

And you have to wonder when you have groups like the ACLU and Vote Democracy opposing this rule, you have to ask yourself why. Why do people want less transparency? And why do people advocate for actually breaking the law?

And it says -- I think in your rule it -- it refers to the privacy of the board of elections in the office. No. Elections should be open and transparent. The law that says -- the law says that prior to certification, the superintendent must compare the people who voted to the ballots cast.

If you're looking at a ballot recap form that says "x" amount of ballots were cast and "x" amount of people voted, that will not allow them to create a count of voters from each precinct because advanced voting recap includes people from multiple precincts. It lumps them together. We're trying to get granular on that to be sure

that it's done in accordance with law.

Numbered lists of voters is a product of the e-poll book. There is no paper numbered list of voters that exists in Georgia anymore.

For each precinct they need to know how many unique voters voted by mail, by advanced voting, and in person on election day and provisionally. Your rule does not do that.

You said review the number of registered voters with both the number of persons who were issued a ballot. Lots of people are issued a ballot but don't return it. Your rule does not accomplish the minimum process required in the code section, in short. It takes the language of existing law and gives the -- our proposed rule takes the language that's already in law -- you heard me reference the Official Code of Georgia over and over. It's because it takes the language of existing law and actually gives the counties a procedure by which to do that in a proper canvass. And you can check with other states if you want to and see that.

And David is going to add a couple comments here.

MR. HANCOCK: My name is David Hancock. And

as a poll worker, as assistant poll manager, and as a board of elections member, I would like to make a few comments.

And, Mr. Chairman, yes, I have read your rule. The concern I have is it doesn't seem to address the key issue which is is it a ministerial duty or is it not a ministerial duty?

So I made a few notes that I would like to say. This idea that we're talking about,

Ms. Grubbs has mentioned, the state has to certify an election at one point. At that point it's generally too late to catch anything. There are a number of certification steps that are required by Georgia law, starting at the precinct, then going to the county, then going to the state.

So a few of them, to ensure that we have confidence in our elections and procedures, I'd like to reference just a few more laws, as if you haven't heard enough already. It says poll officers shall duly certify the number of votes for each person. And that's 21-2-437.

However, the law also makes it clear that they should not certify if they believe that the election was conducted improperly. If you read

21-2-440, it says that if any poll officer shall refuse to sign or certify the general returns, he or she shall write his or her reasons therefor upon the general return sheets.

2.1

So they're saying that if you vote not to certify, that you need to give a reason for it, which is something that I am all in favor of doing because it -- if it's a situation that needs to be corrected, we need to know about it.

O.C.G.A. 21-2-494 requires that the superintendent in computing the votes cast at any election shall compute and certify only those write-in votes for candidates who have given proper notice of intent to be a write-in candidate. So that's a small detail, but that's a case where certification is not allowed without some inspection of the qualifications of the candidates.

State law identifies specific instances where the board should not vote to certify. If a challenged voter casts an absentee ballot, the board must hold a hearing -- and here's the law -- prior to the certification of the consolidated returns of the election and shall not certify such consolidated returns on such

hearing is -- until such hearing is complete and the registrars have rendered their decision on the challenge. And that's 21-2-230.

As you would imagine, penalties for improper certification are serious. Any poll officer who certifies as correct a false return of ballots shall be guilty of a felony.

And as a new -- as a board member, like -like member King there, I take this position very
seriously. I've only been involved in
certification several times, and after the
certification vote -- aside from our oath that we
take when we're sworn in, after the certification
vote, we sign a document. And I'd like to
read -- this is from the Secretary of State's
Office, the little part of that document.

It says: Upon certification, we, the undersigned board of elections, registrars, superintendent, supervisor of elections, and designees do jointly and severally certify that the attached election results summary is a true and correct account of the votes cast in this county for the candidates in the general election runoff. That's the one we just did. In testimony whereof, we have hereunto set our hand

and official seal.

So that makes it pretty clear that I'm on the hook if -- if -- as a superintendent of elections, if this -- if something has happened and I -- I'm aware of it or I can't prove that the election was conducted fairly. So I take that little signature block right there very seriously.

And they use words like hereunto, so you know it's -- you know it's important.

I think -- if you have any -- if you have any questions for us, we'd love to ...

Yes, ma'am.

MS. GHAZAL: (off microphone) I'll go. My first question (mic on) throughout the rule -- the board -- the rule refers to the board, the statute refers to the superintendent. And those are not necessarily interchangeable. So the -- we -- we can't go beyond what the statute says. It has to be the superintendent.

I am glad that you do acknowledge that the superintendent shall certify. "Shall" in the law is a mandatory act. Even your rule recognizes that certification is a mandatory act. It's important for folks to remember it's not the end.

You're certifying the number of votes. That's what the certification is. There are policies — there are procedures for investigating after the fact. It is this board that has the authority to investigate malfeasance or fraud or other problems or failure to follow procedures. That is the authority of the state election board.

And so that is not necessarily the authority of the superintendent. It is not part of the certification process. And an election contest cannot happen until the election has been certified. It is at that point where courts take jurisdiction.

So it is an important duty. To say it's a ministerial duty doesn't mean it's a rubber stamp. It is absolutely a crucial step and it's important to make sure that the numbers are proper.

And I know everybody loves to hate on Fulton County, but I can just name off the top of my head -- Cobb County, Fayette County, Floyd County -- where also counties have failed to properly upload all of the vote totals. And a proper canvass will avoid that, and that is what we want.

We -- we don't want to see recertification. 1 2 We want things to be right in the first instance. 3 But this takes it way beyond what the statute actually allows. I know you're citing to the 4 5 statute but a lot of this is not in there. is no place in the statute that authorizes the 6 7 superintendent to look for double voters. 8 will happen. The investigation will happen. 9 They will be identified. They will be pursued. 10 This -- this board, the state election board 11 has heard numerous cases where there were double 12 voters because that is our jurisdiction. 13

not part of the certification process. It's not in the statute. Can you tell me where in the statute you are to search for -- for duplicate --

MS. GRUBBS: So --

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MS. GHAZAL: -- ID numbers?

So would you agree that there MS. GRUBBS: are legal votes and there are illegal votes?

MS. GHAZAL: I would agree that the certification process is about the number of votes cast.

MS. GRUBBS: So it doesn't matter whether they're legal votes or they're illegal votes?

MS. GHAZAL: It will matter in an election

contest. But we've seen -- we've seen elections overturn on numerous occasions because there were votes that were not authorized. They were certified because they had to be certified. It went to court, the court overturned the election, and we ran a new election. It's happened multiple times in Banks and Habersham County because different bodies have different responsibilities.

MS. GRUBBS: So could you please give me your interpretation, then, of Georgia 21-2-493, subparagraph 5, where it says: If any error or fraud is discovered, the superintendent shall compute and certify the votes justly regardless of any fraud -- or fraudulent or erroneous returns presented to him or -- and shall report the facts to the appropriate district attorney? But you just told me that this body is the one responsible for investigating and finding out those issues.

And what would you suggest is an appropriate time frame for you all to do that? Because we just had -- we've just had, you know, the Moncla-Rossi. I feel like, you know, that's like saying bread and milk now because, you know, with

all due respect to Joe and Kevin, it's ridiculous the amount of time this has taken and that doesn't even account for all the un -- uninvestigated claims that are still sitting in a file drawer at the Secretary of State's Office.

So the problem here -- and I hear what you're saying. You don't want us to go too deep. We see a hump of dirt in the carpet, but we just want to stomp it down; we don't want to reveal it and see what's really under there because if we do, we're going to see too much.

I mean. I'm not trying to be overly burdensome. This rule is not overly burdensome. It's already included in the law. It's just saying that, you know, we would not be here today if the -- if the law had been followed. And since it wasn't -- since it wasn't followed, we're saying, okay, let's give the counties some guidance because, you know, it's like -- and I said this last -- in May for the other rule proposal, it's like going to daddy and saying, Can I have 20 bucks, and it's like, I don't know, go ask your mom. And you go ask your mom and then you're -- you know, you're playing that game all day. It's the same thing here because the

Secretary of State is derelict in its duties.

Now you have the power and authority to do something about it, and it's like but let's not get too detailed on the rules, guys, because we -- we are caught in the same thing with the local boards of election, and if they made sure their precincts -- I mean, it happened in Cobb County again, you know, where files were not uploaded.

If we had a proper canvass and we had proper rules on canvassing, the Secretary of State would be irrelevant. You would be at the beach. We would be fat, dumb, and happy because we would have safe elections. So I don't understand why we don't want more security in our procedures.

MR. HANCOCK: One comment if I may to -- to directly address one of the issues. You said O.C.G.A. 21-2-437 says poll officers shall duly certify the number of votes cast for each person. But then there's a law, 21-2-440 which says that if any poll officer shall refuse to sign or certify the general returns, he or she shall write his reason.

So there's a case where it says they shall certify, and the later says if they don't

certify, they vote not to certify, they have to give a reason.

We had an election just recently where one candidate lost by 17 votes. I was going through the -- the election -- we collect reams of documentation on every election. I was going through some of the material and discovered that two precincts that were in her district where she won in -- this particular candidate won in early voting. All the early voting she won. She lost on election day and by enough, the margin of 17 votes.

I also discovered that those two precincts, there was not a note that there were two people that carried the ballots in which is chain of custody issue. And so I -- I don't know. I was told that there were two people, but the documentation showed me there wasn't. So rather than vote against certification, I voted to abstain hoping to see the information later on, and I still haven't seen it. That was an important -- 17 votes is a big deal to lose by and to have missing documentation on the chain of custody in that area is, I think, serious.

MS. GHAZAL: And that's where the candidate

would've had an opportunity to file an election contest on that basis because that's -- that is -- without -- without certification, a candidate cannot contest an election. And then you've got absolute uncertainty. And that's the point.

There is a process, and this is an important step in the process. But if you don't certify an election, nobody has any standing to contest.

Excuse me.

So if you -- it is not the be-all end-all. It is not the end, but it is -- it is an important step.

And if -- to answer Ms. Grubbs' previous question, the whole point is to make sure that there not more votes than ballots and not more ballots than voters checked in. That is the investigation that the certification process gets to. That is the investigation that you were -- that the canvass and procedures identify. And that is what the certification is about.

MR. HANCOCK: So then why don't we just at the end of Tuesday, at the end of voting, why don't we just go ahead and certify? If -- if we aren't going to check anything, it -- it seems

like -- I don't understand the reason for having this step that we're required to vote to certify -- or -- or is it just a certification vote? That doesn't that -- doesn't say you have to vote yes, but we have the certification vote. I don't see why we have to have it if we aren't going to -- if we aren't going to uphold the -- the document that we're going to sign.

MS. GHAZAL: But that --

MR. HANCOCK: I -- I --

MS. GHAZAL: But that is -- that is the process that has been laid out. That is the process in the statute. But also remember the legislature cut the time period in which to do this by an entire week. They could not have intended for each superintendent to conduct a thorough investigation and analysis of every single voter when they give you a week less time.

We can only apply rules and regulations to what the legislature has given us in the form of the statutes.

MS. GRUBBS: But respectfully, Ms. Ghazal, it -- it doesn't really matter what the legislature's intent was. We have the law in our hands right now and that's -- it's the hand we're

dealt. And unfortunately, you know, I hate it when people go through the Bible and they pick out a verse and then they -- they throw it out at you and they say, you know, this -- this is -- you know, what it means without taking the entire context. And I do believe that the legislature had a good intention of wanting us to have fair elections in Georgia.

But when you say that if there's any issues or whatever, that what y'all are here to do and deal with it, you know, ten years down the road instead of the night of the election or the week of the election, that -- I -- I can't -- I believe you're a person of character and integrity, but I can't take you seriously when you --

I believe your vote reflected that you did not want investigate the Moncla-Rossi complaint. So when we get here and you don't want to fully investigate issues, and you -- you have taken thus far just the advice of the Attorney General's Office and not said, "You know what, we need to dig into this," it is very difficult to take you at your word that you guys are the investigative body to really get to the bottom of

it when we're not seeing evidence of that.

2.2

And these are things that -- you know, my election director is here today, and I'm saying to her, "It's your job to run the elections, absolutely, and it's your job to make sure everyone down the chain on that -- you know, that manages the polls does this," but you're kneecapping those people from actually doing what they are legally required to do because you're not giving them the proper procedures.

And when I was getting into all of this in Cobb County, I asked -- I did an ORR request for the policies and procedures of the Cobb County Board of Elections, and the responsive request was "There aren't any." I kid you not.

So if -- we're looking to you as the wise counsel to say, "Look guys, here's the procedure, but your procedure needs to be thorough enough to expose any issues." And I don't believe that a lot of times these things happen are fraudulent. I believe it's a lack of proper procedures that these people might slip a USB card in their pocket and forget to put it with the tabulator tapes. I don't believe that there are thousands of nefarious people that go to change a memory

1	card in a tabulator and they prop it open and
2	"whoops, we accidentally tabulated."
3	I mean, I don't think that's necessarily an
4	evil person, but that is a weak spot in our
5	election system that you have the power to fix
6	with my rule. And I like my rule.
7	And with all due respect, Chairman, I like
8	my rule better than your rule.
9	MR. FERVIER: Regardless of what has
10	happened today, I will not take offense at that
11	statement.
12	MS. ALEXANDER: So I yes, ma'am.
13	MR. FERVIER: Wait
14	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Janelle.
15	MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston has already
16	•••
17	DR. JOHNSTON: So, Ms. Grubbs, we do have
18	electronic poll books; correct?
19	MS. GRUBBS: Unfortunately we do.
20	DR. JOHNSTON: And we have electronic voter
21	lists; correct?
22	MS. GRUBBS: Unfortunately we do.
23	DR. JOHNSTON: And we have an electronic
24	voting system; correct?
25	MS. GRUBBS: Unfortunately we do.

DR. JOHNSTON: So we could use the power of computing and utilize that to the advantage of producing these numbers for each precinct in a very timely and efficient way; correct?

MS. GRUBBS: Absolutely. Because that's what they tell us when we buy all this really expensive electronic stuff.

DR. JOHNSTON: Right. And according to the Georgia code 21-2- -- definitions on page 18, 21-2-2, definition of superintendent is either the judge of the probate court or the county board of elections -- the county board of elections and registration or the county -- city, county board of elections; correct?

MS. GRUBBS: Correct.

DR. JOHNSTON: Okay. So when we -- when we speak of superintendent, I know sometimes it seems to blur a little bit whether that means it's the supervisor or the board of elections, but I take this -- since the board of elections certifies the election, I would -- I would read this as that when we speak of superintendent in this disregard, we're speaking of the board of elections.

MS. GRUBBS: And the collective body of

people; correct.

DR. JOHNSTON: Right. Okay. So I find this rule consistent with Georgia election law. I would say that there's more to canvassing than just what is in this rule according to the Election Assistance Commission. I think inspection of documents is warranted and expected as well as checking the tabulation of the votes of every vote and ballot.

And -- and according to Georgia law, these should all be segregated by precinct to account for every type of vote cast and every ballot. I don't think we'll ever exceed the number of electors in each precinct because our voter rolls are not accurate and there will always be way too many voters on the list in each precinct as it stands right now in Georgia. It will be very difficult to exceed the number of voters.

MS. GRUBBS: And apparently it's going to get a lot more expensive too because they want to charge us to do voter challenges now. I don't know if you've heard that or not, but just like an FYI.

DR. JOHNSTON: Well, I would say that
Georgia exceeds expectations when it comes to

voter lists.

2 MS. GRUBBS: Yes.

DR. JOHNSTON: So anyway I -- I think this is a good rule, and I think -- I would move that we accept this -- this petition for rulemaking --

MR. FERVIER: The discussion is not complete
yet --

MR. HANCOCK: Can I make one more brief
comment --

DR. JOHNSTON: -- when the time comes.

MR. HANCOCK: -- to -- one more brief comment to address an issue that was specifically brought up. I -- we have five members on our board of elections, and Gwinnett County is -- is one of the largest counties in the state with 650,000 voters.

Our election supervisor's actually here today and him -- yeah, Zach Manifold back there, him and his staff were absolutely stellar in getting the board all the information that we needed, and we had no trouble.

We are absolutely not going to check every voter and run every voter down and go knock on their door and make sure that they voted. That's not at all what we're doing.

There's an old saying that you've heard:
You don't get what you expect, you get what you inspect. And so we have so many procedures that had to be followed, if somebody knows that at least a group of people is coming in after the election and just at least looking to make sure on the surface -- and if anything looks askew, dive down into it. But that's really what the purpose of this is.

It's not the purpose to catch anything. The purpose is to make sure that the election is conducted accurately, fairly, and that state law is followed.

MS. KING: Dr. Johnston --

MR. FERVIER: Member King.

MS. KING: So, it's funny. The term I was taught by my dad was, you know, if you can't investigate it, don't invest in it. So I -- my question for you, Mr. Hancock, is what -- what -- that week that they have to go through this whole process, this certification process, what exactly are you supposed to do if you find something that's wrong? Do you just put it to the side and go on and certify? Like what -- what's the expectation currently?

MR. HANCOCK: It depends on the -- I think it would depend on the severity of the situation, right? If we find that -- if we find fraud, we certainly would report it. The certification vote comes up and then each person -- I think if the information was put up out there and everyone was aware that, yes, there was suspected fraud that happened in this election, I don't think there would be a problem with voting to certify to get on with the challenges and the investigation of a fraud.

MS. KING: Okay.

MR. HANCOCK: I'm not saying -- I'm not saying we have to be satisfied on everything, but we just need a procedure that allows us to go through and inspect it.

I had to pay \$41.25 to look at the records after the last election before I voted to certify because I wanted to actually look at some documents. I had to do an open records request. So that's -- that's inconvenient to me, but I don't mind doing it if it means I get a chance to make sure the election is certified.

MS. GRUBBS: You shouldn't have to.

MS. KING: So basically what you're saying

is currently if you find something that's wrong,
even if it's unanimous that everyone thinks it's
wrong, you're still going to all certify. And
then we hope that it goes -- like, we just hope
the process works out where after the fact, after
the person's elected, after things are already
done, then we go back and fix it? Is that what's
the current practice?

MR. HANCOCK: This is -- this is a legal
question that I don't know the -- I don't know
the answer to.

MS. KING: Is that your current process?

MR. HANCOCK: Because this document --

MR. FERVIER: That's not what's happening.

MR. HANCOCK: Because that -- this
document --

MR. FERVIER: Because we have people that are refusing to certify because they -- they think there is something that occurred. So they refuse to certify.

MS. KING: That's not what's happening. But what's the current process? Is that the current process?

MR. FERVIER: The current process is that you're supposed to certify, and if there is an

2 investigated. MS. KING: So what I was saying, right? 3 you certify and then you investigate; correct? 4 MR. HANCOCK: 5 Right. MR. FERVIER: Continue the investigation 6 7 (indiscernible). That -- that is -- that's the 8 process. 9 MS. KING: I'm just -- I'm just want to 10 make --MR. FERVIER: The purpose -- the purpose --11 MS. KING: -- sure I'm clear and I 12 13 understand what that means. 14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (speaking inaudibly 15 in the gallery) MR. FERVIER: The purpose of this is for the 16 board to hear the rules, the board to discuss the 17 rules and ask questions of the petitioners. And 18 19 the longer that we have interruptions, the longer 20 it's going to take. So I would just ask you to 21 please be respectful of the people asking the 22 questions so that we can learn what we need to 23 learn. MR. HANCOCK: Well, in response to member 24

King's question, the document from the Secretary

irregularity, you report that and it's

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of State that we sign that I have -- I read it to you earlier where it says that I am certifying that it is a true and correct count of votes cast. And then, you know, hereunto set our hand and official seal. This is like swearing an oath that it is a true and correct count of votes cast. And I know there's going to be errors in 650,000 voters with a hundred and, you know, fifty-six precincts. There's going to be little things that happen. But as long as I'm confident that this number is pretty close to a true and accurate count, then I'm willing to do it. But if -- if there are outstanding issues, I would -- I have voted not to certify.

MS. GRUBBS: Yeah.

DR. JOHNSTON: One of the goals of this for my colleague is to identify areas where there may be some discrepancies that would -- would warrant process improvement.

MS. GRUBBS: Yeah, but I --

DR. JOHNSTON: So it's to identify the difficulties with counting large numbers of ballots and to correct that in the future as long as it's not too large a discrepancy or something that suggests that perhaps fraud had occurred.

MS. KING: Personally, I'm just trying to find out which process makes more sense, right? So we have the process of finding it, when we go through the process of, you know, going through all the votes. You — if you find something that's wrong, even if it's unanimous, you all kind of put it aside. You understand this is going to be an issue. We all certify, and then investigation happens later.

And what you're proposing is that you have a little bit more power as it relates to going through the voters in your precinct, in your county to make sure that it's not just -- you're not just certifying that you have the total number, but there also -- that total number is actual legal votes; correct?

MR. HANCOCK: That's the document that I'm signing. And that's the same documents that are signed at each precinct, by each precinct worker. They do the same thing. They do a little mini certification, then the county does a certification, then the state does a certification.

MS. KING: Right. And the purpose of those mini certifications is to make sure when we get

to the big certification we don't have major issues. And then we don't have to go back and tear down the whole fence. We just go back and repair that one, right?

MR. HANCOCK: The state when they go to certify, they aren't going to check every precinct in Georgia.

MS. KING: Correct.

MR. HANCOCK: But the precinct can. The person who runs the precinct can absolutely check and make sure that there are no ballots stuck in the machine or whatever the case happens to be.

MS. KING: How much additional time would this -- how would this increase the process that's already in place? So if you have a week, how much more time?

MR. HANCOCK: It just takes time for the board. The staff has been very good about just getting the information. They have -- we have somebody that sits with us, answers any questions. But we just go through the documents.

And I spent maybe -- presidential preference primary was a case where there was -- there was no issue. There's never going to be an issue.

Nobody's going to challenge that election. The

general primary and -- and the runoff for the primary we just had, maybe I personally put in, you know, four or five hours. Maybe.

MS. KING: Additionally?

MR. HANCOCK: Over the case -- yeah. I took Wednesday off because Tuesday's a rough night. We're there all night Tuesday. Took Wednesday off and Thursday came in and looked at a few. Maybe I looked at a few on Friday. And then I did some more on Monday because we had to certify at five.

So I came in Monday morning. We had a meeting at nine for provisional ballots and went through those. And then spent some time looking at some other little questions.

Gwinnett County -- and this is something that would be a great thing to standardize -- has a wonderful procedure where they -- as each poll closed at election night, and they -- the poll workers bring in all their material -- it's a -- it's a lot of material -- there is a very detailed checklist. And there's two officials. We have, like, 15 stations, I believe. Don't -- if I'm wrong. I'm sorry. And each precinct comes up and they say, How many poll workers had

the ballots? Oh, two, check. Do you know the provisional ballot bag's sealed? Yes, check. Do you have, you know, the memory card? Check.

And so I can look at this summary sheet for each precinct in less than an hour and immediately identify areas where there might be problems.

MS. KING: Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Ms. Grubbs?

MS. GRUBBS: Yes, sir.

MR. FERVIER: Not surprisingly, I like my proposal better than yours. I -- I feel like the issue that I have with yours is that -- I am sympathetic to what you're trying to do, I really am. I'm sympathetic to having documents to look at before you certify and not having access to any documents in some locations. I'm very sympathetic to that.

I just believe that there needs to be a list, a defined list of documents that the board of registrations and elections gets to see. And so it's not a never-ending search of I need this document, I need this document, I need that document.

You know, I feel like there needs to be a

defined list and my proposal gives a defined list of what the board is allowed to see before certifying. And that way they can see the documents that are produced on election that are readily available. They have time to consider that for being certified -- before -- before certifying the election. And your proposal doesn't include a list of documents.

MS. GRUBBS: Well, I'll be happy to include it because I still like my rule better.

MR. FERVIER: We're going to arm wrestle
over --

MS. GRUBBS: Yes.

MR. FERVIER: -- whose is better.

MS. GRUBBS: Because there -- there are some critical things that your rule does not include. And this is why, you know, if -- if the heart of the board really is to see that we have fair elections in Georgia, I want to see people work together. I don't want to see any board member called and harassed because we want them to do something a certain way.

I want -- I want Georgia to be the shining example of what election integrity looks like.

And we are not that. We are anything but that

right now.

And so I would -- I would be happy to change it, but we have a very important election that is going to determine the course of this country coming up in November, and we ain't got no time to waste. And we have got to get this right.

And, you know, I did not write this rule.

I'm presenting this rule. And I hope I'm doing it justice. But, you know, to the point of when the lobbyists -- actually not just the -- the activists who care about this country, but when the lobbyists who were paid money to come up here and oppose my rule said there was no organization that did this, this rule was -- was done by Bridget Thorne and this is subsequent to the May meeting.

So she took to heart what was said in the May meeting and incorporated those things and better defined those things. So here we are in the July meeting, and I just feel like it's super important for us to do this.

MR. FERVIER: I -- I -- like I said, I am sympathetic to that. My -- I sent the rule to GAVREO, my rule to GAVREO, for -- to take a look at. And GAVREO altered it as well as other

individuals --

MS. GRUBBS: Clearly, they did.

MR. FERVIER: Well, okay.

MS. GRUBBS: Not a big fan.

MR. FERVIER: Well, they -- they may have a different opinion. We'll allow them to speak on it. But they are election supervisors also.

MS. GRUBBS: Are they superintendents?

MR. FERVIER: Mr. Kirk, we'll let you speak in a minute. Yes.

So I -- anyway as I was stating earlier,
my -- my issue with your rule is the fact that
it's not definitive enough on the documents that
the board gets to see. I think there needs to be
a list of -- of documents that -- that they get
to see before certifying.

MS. GRUBBS: So a lot of that has to do -like with what David said as far as Gwinnett
County, you know, it has been difficult in Cobb
County. And I love our elections director, but
do you know that -- everybody mentions 2020, so
I'll just have to throw this in there, that
during the recount in 2020, I asked our
then-elections director -- after the first day of
the recount, I said: Could I please have the

tallies for the votes? And she said: I don't have those. And I said -- and Ms. Ghazal was there too, and I said: Well, I just stood here on this hard concrete floor all day and didn't eat and stomped around here watching you count all these ballots. Why can't you give me a total? She said: Oh, well, we just don't have that. It goes into Arlo and then the next day the Secretary of State gives us the count.

So when you talk about documents and stuff, I'm all about doing those kind of documents, but there is a certain amount of authority on the local level that -- that I do think needs to stay on the local level.

We need to make sure that the board of elections in our counties are certainly able to do -- certainly able to do their job. But they also need to develop good -- good practices and procedures.

And, you know, something stuck out -- stuck out on me in that code section that I read earlier as far as the local superintendent, which sometimes, as Dr. Johnston pointed out -- you know, I got schooled on that. The superintendent, depending on what the structure

is of the board of elections, whether it be a probate judge -- and I think the reason that that language is used, Ms. Ghazal, is because we have a hundred and fifty-nine counties in Georgia that are all independent. And they all have different structures on their elections.

So a superintendent can be one person or a superintendent can be a board. So it says when -- when they find something, they shall report it to their district attorney. And I want to know out of a hundred and fifty-nine counties, how many board of elections superintendents have ever reported something to their district attorney in the last five years?

And I venture to say that number is probably zero. If not zero, close to zero. And so we need that power to be on the local level for people to do that so you can be at the beach.

MR. FERVIER: But you're asking us to put guidelines in and at the same give freedom to the local boards. And what I'm saying is that if we -- we need consistent rules across the street, and by setting a defined list of documents that's easy for anyone to follow --

MS. GRUBBS: But to your point, I quoted you

exactly what was already in Georgia law, and everything that is in this rule is consistent with Georgia law. Your proposed list of documents is not in Georgia law. That's another reason why I think my rule is better.

MS. KING: Mr. Chairman?

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. KING: Is it -- is -- let me see how I
want to ask this. Is it possible to merge
your -- your rule and her -- and Salleigh's rule?
Is there any aspect of your rule that --

MR. FERVIER: So having only been in this job for six months and still trying to figure out why I'm doing it -- let me -- let me list what I think the board has the ability to do today when we're hearing a rule, okay? We can either accept it and initiate rulemaking procedures, we can deny the rule, we can revise the rule as we sit here, we can table the rule for further consideration to a later time, or we can assign the rule to a board member to work on with petitioner to make revisions.

And so, yes, could we -- could we merge the two? Yes. Likely not here today.

MS. KING: Got it, okay. So how about this?

Can I make a motion to hear your rule now versus -- so we can hear them back to back versus waiting to the end?

MS. GHAZAL: I would second that.

MS. KING: Let's hear them side by side.

MR. FERVIER: If we -- if discussion is over, then we can do that. So ...

MR. HANCOCK: Mr. Chair, I would make one more comment. Your -- your rule does list a number of documents, but I believe it's 21-2-72 that says that any registered voter in the county can go in and look at any document that's not under seal after an election.

So I don't want to say this in a bad way, but you -- you aren't going to stop me from going in and looking at some of these documents.

MR. FERVIER: It -- it doesn't prevent you from looking at anything. All we're saying -- all my rule says is that you -- the board has the right to look at these documents before certifying.

MR. HANCOCK: Which they do now.

MR. FERVIER: But -- but my understanding from last meeting was that some of the superintendents weren't providing documentation

to the board. And so the board was having to 1 2 certify without having the ability to look at any 3 documents at all. MR. HANCOCK: Well, this -- this rule says 4 5 that the documents will be made available, right? 6 MS. GHAZAL: But it -- but it -- but it has 7 no list of documents. It says --8 MR. HANCOCK: No. (indiscernible) --9 (Cross-talking) 10 MR. FERVIER: -- any -- any documents you 11 12

want to look at. And my fear is that it just can go on and on and on: I want to see this, I want to see that, I want to see this, I want to see that.

MS. GRUBBS: Well --

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MR. FERVIER: And it's like there's no end to it. And so you never get to the end of it. So I'm just trying to put some -- I'm trying to put some guardrails around and some timeliness around it.

MS. GRUBBS: There's only a finite list of available information anyway. There's -- it's not a complicated -- well, I started to say it's not a complicated process, but duh.

There's a finite list of available data and

documentation involved in the elections anyway.

I mean this is not -- this is not rocket science.

Number of eligible voters on the voter list -you know, it -- it's -- to say that we've got to
have a list of documents is making it -- I mean,
I would like to see a list of documents. That
way everybody would understand and know.

So I see your point, but that's not what the code says.

MS. KING: I mean, quite -- to be quite frank, Mr. Chairman, I -- I have issues with increasing documents when the board is still waiting on documents. There's things that we haven't gotten from the SOS office. There's things that the board -- I mean, from my understanding, that we're still waiting on as it relates to documents. There's missing documents. I think the problem is too many documents.

I think what we need to do is have a process that ensures that we can catch things in the -- in the interim versus dragging it out. I -- I have a problem with people spending three and four years of their time working on something that we all should be doing quickly. That is an issue for me personally.

So I -- I'm not a fan of all the additional documents. I just want to make sure that we are attacking this issue or attacking possible issues at the early stage. That's what I hear in this rule.

MR. FERVIER: The difference between them is that her rule does not define what documents people can answer for. So they could ask for any document they want to or any number of documents they want to.

Mine -- mine gives a definitive list of documents that they would be able to ...

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, this proposal for this petition very nicely separates the -- the precertification reconciliation by precinct, and it does specifically list a list of voters, a comparison of number of ballots to voters, and actually this rule is slightly different.

It's -- it's 183-1-12-12.1 rather than just 12 which is -- is your petition.

So I  $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$  I would move that we vote to accept this.

MR. FERVIER: The difference is paragraph -well, it would be paragraph 6; it's listed as
paragraph 5 in this -- her addendum here. It

says: Board members shall be permitted to examine all election-related documentation created during the conduct of elections prior to certification of results, which means they could ask for any document that was produced during the conduct of the elections.

MS. GRUBBS: Because that's actually already the law, all the documents are required by law to be produced anyway because it's all evidence in an election.

MS. GHAZAL: Well, let -- if I could
-- if I could.

MS. GRUBBS: Uh-huh. Go right ahead.

MS. GHAZAL: Is it -- so documents created in the course of an election include certification letters for poll watchers. So under your rule, a board member could refuse to certify until they see all of those. Do you think that that is necessary for certification?

MS. GRUBBS: I am not a hypothetical person. People very rarely even pay attention to the -- and here's -- my answer to that is I support what is in Georgia law, and I support transparency. And I believe that if there was a board member who thought that there were poll watchers who

were illegal poll watchers, and they wanted to see certification, if that's his documents, I absolutely think they should be able to see them before certification.

MS. GHAZAL: So my point is there are lots of things that can go wrong that have nothing to do with vote totals. Certification is about vote totals. It's not about the entire election and whether there was any mis -- misdeeds or malfeasance related to anything. It's about the vote totals.

MS. KING: How are totals correct if there is -- if we're not making sure that the persons voting can legally vote, then how is the total correct?

MS. GHAZAL: I'm talking about poll watchers. I'm talking about there -- there's so much more documentation that is surrounding an election that has nothing to do with the vote totals. Absolutely. But the -- the voters are -- are checked in and all of that. That's -- that's part of it. If there is one illegal vote or one illegal voter, that cannot be done -- that cannot necessarily be discovered in the certification process, that will be investigated.

Everything will be investigated. Every document is available through open records before it's sealed. Every document is not necessary for the certification process though.

- MS. GRUBBS: Do you think that it is incumbent upon board members to have to pay open records fees to get documents related to an election?
- MS. GHAZAL: If we pass the rule that the chair has -- has sponsored, they have a -- that -- that's the point of that rule is so that board members -- that the -- that the superintendent has the authority to review all of those documents prior to certification. That is the point of that rule so that that does not happen. But the issue --
- MS. GRUBBS: So the point of the chairman's rule is to avoid board members from having to pay open records request fees?
- MS. GHAZAL: The point of the rule is to -to define the documents that are necessary to
  review or that -- that are appropriate to review
  for certification.
  - DR. JOHNSTON: HOW --
  - MS. GRUBBS: The issue is --

DR. JOHNSTON: I'm sorry. Excuse me, I'm
sorry.

MR. FERVIER: (indiscernible) --

DR. JOHNSTON: Yeah.

MR. FERVIER: Are you finished?

MS. GHAZAL: (indicating)

MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston.

DR. JOHNSTON: Excuse me. Every election document should be available to every member of a board. There is no election document that should be prevented from review and consideration by the election board.

MS. KING: I can -- and I can back that up by looking at this code that says that primary and election records are to be open to the public. And this includes -- which I'm not going to read all of them, but it includes reports, it includes all other documents in official custody, tally papers, return accounts, contracts. This is all stuff that's open to the public.

So I don't think we should determine what documents you have to request if you have an issue. It says here it's open to the public. I think we're making it more complicated when we start doing that. And then we're also limiting

the rights of voters when we start doing that.

So I -- I would like to either hear the speak -- chairman's bill so -- I mean rule so that we can compare the two, or I think we should move forward with the motion that's on the floor.

MR. FERVIER: I would like to hear from GAVREO if they have a representative here.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (indiscernible)

MR. FERVIER: The board can hear from whoever they need knowledge from.

MR. KIRK: (indiscernible)

MR. FERVIER: Please.

MR. KIRK: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Any questions or do you want me to just address some of this?

MR. FERVIER: Would you -- would you define the -- GAVREO's opinion on this rule.

MR. KIRK: Well, we were opposed to it, as I mentioned earlier. Some of the concerns that are being raised -- excuse me -- are addressed at other points in the process. For example, voter eligibility is established when somebody applies to register to vote.

We verify their identity and eventually add their name to the official list of voters, then

verify their identity when they come in to vote, verify if they've already voted, cast another ballot.

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If they have been issued a ballot, we have to address that before they're issued a second ballot or third ballot before they ever cast that ballot.

So to go through for duplicates at that point in the process is duplicating our efforts. The process to -- to certify an election -- let me back up.

Some of the most important work we do happens after election day. The show is not over on election night. We're going through all of the documents, all of the records. We're investigating kind of incidents that may have happened.

We're comparing numbers as you mentioned:
How many voters are eligible compared to how many actually were issued a ballot compared to how many ballots were cast? Not just cast but were recorded at the polling place, at the county, the state level. We're looking at all these numbers to be sure everything is matching up. Why doesn't it match? Why doesn't it balance?

So address the idea of investigations, yes, we conduct investigations before the board goes to certify. But if we can't resolve the investigation prior to certification, that doesn't halt certification. We'll report what we found to the DA, to the state election board, to the Secretary of State's Office, and then allow them to continue on. But we can't -- well, the courts have to -- we can't act until we certify.

So, for example, if I was comparing these numbers and discovered there's a thousand ballots less reported for a poll than those published on the Secretary of State's website, I would look to see where the problem happened. Did we forget to upload a memory card? Was there some other problem? And if this can be corrected before we certify, of course we're going to do that.

There's the idea of risk-limiting audits where we're checking to be sure the tabulation was correct before the state certifies their results. And if that investigation shows -- the audit shows there's a problem, then we would vote to recertify the results and send those results to the state.

So at the end of this whole process, what

the -- what we're talking about is computation and consolidation, or in the old days we had machines with dials and levers. We had to -- we had to call those numbers out, add them together publicly, and then that's when the board made the comparison and that's when they would vote to certify.

Now we've come a little bit farther than that. There's reports we look at, things like that. But at its core what the board's looking at at this point in the process is were more ballots cast than should've been? Did we have more ballots we're looking at than voters who were checked in who were eligible to vote in this election? And if the answer is yes, yeah, we investigate.

But let's say I had a hundred additional ballots I couldn't account for. I was told by my board to certify and immediately vote to -- to forward this along to the DA. We'd vote -- we'd cooperate completely and possibly the ones asking for a new election from the judge. The judge couldn't ask until we certify. Does that make sense?

MS. KING: So what if we're not trying to

trigger the courts? We just wanted to make sure that what we see is accurate. Like, I mean, it's not that --

MR. KIRK: In --

MS. KING: I mean, it just -- let's say he
just sees something --

MR. KIRK: Yeah.

MS. KING: -- and he's like: Look, let's just hold off on certifying until we make sure that this is accurate. Are you okay with that?

MR. KIRK: Oh, yes. But I would -- I would encourage folks to start that investigation well before the deadline to certify because that's a hard deadline. We have to meet it. If they come in an hour before the meeting and say, We want to see all the stuff, that's not possible. You'll be involved in the process ahead of time.

MS. KING: (indiscernible) have to -- I
mean, you would have to start it quickly.

MR. KIRK: Exactly. And, for example, in my case, my board delegates a lot of those duties to me where I'm -- I'm going through all the paperwork. I'm -- I'm conducting interviews. I am working with the poll workers to figure out what happened so that by the time it comes time

for certification, I'm reporting to them publicly when we're right or we're wrong, we can improve on and kind of employment issues and hear the final results.

They examine them. They look at that comparison and -- and you're right, it's not a precinct-by-precinct comparison on the reports we use, but the numbers are much smaller than total voters who could've voted. And then they vote to certify.

So those -- those things are happening, possibly not by the board in many cases because these are volunteers, same as y'all, that have jobs, have lives that they're taking care of. We're full-time employees who were delegating duties too. But I do work for my board to be sure they have the information they need before they certify.

So getting to the rule we worked on with the chair, those are the documents that I look at for the most part to ensure everything is balanced.

And I do have a similar procedure to what you described in Gwinnett where we're checking supplies, a form I go through and fill out for every precinct or actually polling place, be sure

stuff balances, make notes, make sure that everything is as it should be.

And, yes, every once in a while there's one less than there should be or one more than there should be. We do our best to explain that, but if we can't, it does not delay certification. We just report it as we should.

MS. KING: Okay. I just trying to wrap my
brain around it.

MR. KIRK: Okay.

(Cross-talking)

MS. KING: (indiscernible) --

MR. KIRK: Oh, it's a lot. It really is.

MS. KING: (indiscernible) and not
addressing it.

MS. GRUBBS: Mr. Chairman, may I?

MR. FERVIER: Yes, Ms. Grubbs.

MS. GRUBBS: First of all, GAVREO, we're still not talking about legal votes. So we haven't even dug into the fact that there are legal votes. So that kind of -- you know, kind of sticks in my craw.

But on top of that, you know, there are people, good people, who have been candidates and there are people who have been candidates and

held elected office on your board and in -- a lot in this room, and it is very, very unfair to candidates that they hang in the balance when there's a question on an election.

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And it is unfair to election board members to make them -- I mean, look at the definition of We -- and we talked about that certification. last time too. It's a big topic. So certifying an election and then you throw it in the lap of the -- the candidate to say that if you -you know, if there's an issue in your election -and maybe it's outside of the margin a little bit allowed by law, but they just really think there was an issue in several precincts -- and, you know, races are determined by a small number of votes. Okay, well, if you're within the range and you ask for a recount, blah, blah, blah. But if you're outside the range but you just know or you were told something. In Cobb County we've had the whole redistricting and Home Rule issue. There have been lots of issues that a candidate would have a reason to contest an election, but now you've put that candidate -- not only have they had to run a race, but now they're going to have to hire legal counsel. And good election

attorneys are hard to find, let me tell you.

So you've now put the onus on a candidate to challenge something that is the responsibility of the board of elections and registration just to give them parameters to do their job because right now the only information they're getting is through their little chat thing from the Secretary of State.

They're not getting good advice, you know, from people who care like you all. They're getting direction from people that, you know -- from people that maybe don't see the same things from the same world view that we do.

So they're getting all that hammered all the time and you're not coming back with say: Hey, you know what? These are the things that you need to be looking at instead of taking -- I mean, the Legislature thought enough to remove the Secretary of State from this board and yet you have election offices that are still having to take direction on what's required for certification and they're the ones still saying certify anyway, certify anyway. And we don't care whether they're legal voters or not, certify it anyway. And we don't care if you get the

reports that you need to be sure that the numbers make sense. So this is -- I just like my rule.

MR. FERVIER: Your rule -- your rule doesn't change that. Your rule still requires certification by 5:00, 5 p.m. on Monday following the date which elections are held. Requires certification.

MR. KIRK: Since you raised the topic of legal and illegal votes. I mentioned before that there are different parts of the process where things are addressed. We address whether or not someone is entitled to vote at the time they register: if they're a citizen, if they exist.

We address if they're eligible to vote when they apply for a ballot whether that's done through the mail or in person. We -- we check their identity in person with their photo ID and match that to our records.

So, yes, things fall through the cracks. Yes, mistakes are made occasionally. But at this point in the process the assumption is we're trusting our employees' work that checked voters in, that verify their identity. Check the -- trusting employees who verify their -- verified the information on their applications originally,

that they are eligible to vote and the ballot they were given, you know, and cast is a legal vote. It's just how the process works.

If there's issues with the eligibility, that's addressed in the place of the code, not during certification procedures because there's no good way for a board to say: Well, okay, this one person here we don't think they were entitled to vote, we're going to take their ballot out. They have a secret ballot. There's no way to know which ballot was that person's. So there's -- there's no functional way for them to pick and choose which votes are going to count out of a precinct.

MR. FERVIER: Ms. Grubbs, I think that there's some substantial similarities between our rules.

MS. GRUBBS: I'm sorry?

MR. FERVIER: I think that there's some substantial similarities between our rules and some differences. I am willing to work with you to merge them unless you feel like mine is totally out of balance at which point then this board will have to decide which one they want to move forward with.

MS. GRUBBS: Well, there are some
deficiencies. I'm willing to work --

MR. FERVIER: I feel like yours could be improved.

MS. GRUBBS: You know, I'm always willing to work with anybody who's willing to work with me. That said, I would -- I would like to give the board the opportunity -- I mean, it's not within my purview, but I think it's -- the issue of requiring documentation if the -- if the legis -- not to quote what you said before but to quote what you said before but to quote a list in there, they would've put a list in there.

And I feel like that legally it's a slippery slope because everything should be available and everything in an election is evidence. And if something were to happen and -- you know, this would be a great world if everybody on the board of elections or every superintendent would make sure that everything was open and transparent. But when you have some boards of election in the state that make their own board members pay for documents, that's just not right.

And so I -- I get what you're saying. It's just that this -- this makes sense. I mean,

would you debate with your bank over giving you a reconciliation on your deposit? Or would you --would you just -- now, Chairman Fervier, we know that you won a thousand dollars, but I need for you to give us, you know, whatever. Or vice versa. I don't even know what I'm saying at this point. I'm just -- I mean, I do, but, y'all, I'm tired. I've got a heavy burden going on. So I'm just saying that I like my rule and I think it should be up to the board to make that decision.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair?

MR. FERVIER: Any more questions from the board?

DR. JOHNSTON: One more question. My concern is this rule supports the statute that says all documents are -- all election documents are available to all board members so that they can be assured that they are signing that the election outcome and tabulations are correct and certify the election.

I see your rule is more restrictive in listing certain documents. It's actually more restrictive than the statute provides and would be limited -- it would end up limiting the authority and ability of boards of elections

to -- to review the documents. Not to say that they're going to review all of the documents, but they should have the right to review all of the election documents that have taken -- have been provided or produced in the election.

So I would favor this -- Ms. Grubbs' petition.

MR. FERVIER: And I would disagree with you a little bit on that. My -- my rule is simply to give guidelines. So they get to see at least the documents listed in my rule. It doesn't change what's written in the statute.

DR. JOHNSTON: Well, I fear a guideline will become a restriction. And that -- that's the problem with putting it in writing as it is on -- actually restricts and diminishes the authority of the board of elections.

MS. KING: Yeah. I mean, I have to say I agree. I think adding additional -- or creating a list of documents you have to request and you have to ask for or -- you don't -- you don't know what I'm thinking. What if I need something else? Like what if it's -- what if what I need is not in that list in order for me to corroborate whatever I'm -- I'm seeing?

So I think that will create a tricky situation. I think it's put our -- our boards as well in a tricky situation where they have to tell people no. So I just think it's going to make it more complicated. And the last thing we need right now is to be more complicated because it's already too complicated in my opinion.

So if that's -- if that's what the merge would be is adding that list, then I -- I think we should move forward with -- with Ms. Grubbs.

MR. FERVIER: Any more discussion from the board? As I've said before, this board has five

MR. FERVIER: Any more discussion from the board? As I've said before, this board has five options to either initiate rulemaking procedures, to deny the request, to revise the request, to table for further consideration, or to assign to a board member to work on with the petitioner. Is there a motion?

DR. JOHNSTON: I make a motion to approve the request for Ms. Grubbs' petition for rulemaking.

MR. FERVIER: Is there a --

MS. KING: Second.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second to approve the petition to initiate rulemaking procedures. Any discussion?

Hearing no discussion, all those in favor 1 signify by saying aye. Please give a voice vote. 2 DR. JOHNSTON: Aye. 3 MS. KING: Aye. 4 5 MR. JEFFARES: Aye. 6 MR. FERVIER: Any opposition? 7 MS. GHAZAL: Nay. MR. FERVIER: Motion carries three to one. 8 9 MS. GRUBBS: Mr. Chairman, may I say one 10 thing? I want to thank you. I know things might 11 seem contentious, but I appreciate you, I 12 appreciate your service. 13 And I appreciate your service and your service. 14 And I appreciate your E.D. and his service. 15 16 And Mrs. King and Mrs. Ghazal, I appreciate 17 your service because it is service to the state 18 and I thank you. 19 MR. FERVIER: Thank you. 20 The next item on the -- next item on the 21 agenda is a petition for amendment of state 2.2 election board rule presented by Sharlene 23 Alexander. 24 MS. ALEXANDER: Thank you. I'm --

MR. COAN: Sharlene, pull that mic down to

25

you. There you go.

MS. ALEXANDER: Yeah. I am a tad short. Okay.

MR. COAN: No.

## Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rule presented by Sharlene Alexander

MS. ALEXANDER: Honorable members of the state election board, my name is Sharlene Alexander.

I come to you with this petition, and it is submitted as an individual. You will learn later part of the reasoning behind my rules petition, but this is as a 33-year resident of Fayette County. I'm quite active. I've been a poll worker. I've been an assistant manager. I have been a poll watcher. And also as background, where I come from, I have been a CPA since 1970. I've been a senior auditor of municipals and audits and banks. I've even been an expert trial witness on embezzlements. That's the way my mind works, that you always have to have checks and balances.

And so the reason for this -- I'm going to try to shorten it if that's okay and let you ask questions -- is that prior to 2022 in -- at least

in Fayette County and I think most of the other counties, we used to hand-count the totals of the ballots at the precinct. You know people would pull them out of the scanners and we would have three of us go over and we would each individually count all those ballots that came out of the scanner, and then we would wrap them up, you know, and put them in. We would check them with the electronic totals, but it was just a check that we had hand counts of the precincts. We all thought that was just part of the deal and we did it. We didn't really pay much attention to how much time it took. It didn't seem like it was taking a lot of time.

And then in October of 2022, first I was told that there was a SB-202 law change that all of a sudden we get this memo from Blake Evans at -- the elections director that poll workers have been told that they are to hand-count ballots at each polling location on election night, that is not something your poll workers should do.

So the word came down we were to no longer count -- hand-count the ballots at the precincts based on this memo. No rationale. Just we

weren't supposed to do it.

So my rule proposal is basically going back to what we used to do, which was you use -- in accounting, if you understand it, you're always looking for -- when you go in you're looking for, yes, do the numbers make sense? We add them up. Do they all crosscheck?

But we also are looking for holes or areas of opportunity for errors or for collusion. And you will learn -- the first thing you learn is that if you have two, that is collusion. So you always go with a minimum of three. I can't remember what the odds were back -- it's been a long time, but you have at least three because the odds of collusion go way down if you have three.

So that's the reason I picked three, all right? And it's really not that difficult, but my whole purpose is I rewrote -- all I did was add to the section of 21-20 -- wait, I'm sorry. 183-1-12-.12(a)(5). All I'm doing is I'm adding that when they pull the ballots out of the scanner, it goes to a separate section with three poll workers.

They would take those ballots -- they're

going to be in a big pile -- and they each just start pulling those ballots out of the pile. And what we did is we just quickly -- as quickly as we could, we counted them into stacks of fifty. I can't tell you why fifty, but we did fifty.

And we would cross -- you know, lay them later crosswise in stacks of 50, and then we would push them to the next person. And it just kept going. Each of us counted out the stack.

So at the end result was all three of us had hand-counted and verified and we had to come up with the same number of ballots, hand-counted. Didn't take that long.

So my rule is basically saying that we go back to that. If you want to know, the first thing I always get is oh, that's going to take too much time. Well, this was really rough and it probably isn't really very scientific, but we — because we couldn't remember it taking more than 30 minutes, but we didn't remember how many ballots we were counting — just this weekend, I had four people plus myself, we went and we got brand-new reams of paper, copy paper — granted that's different than ballots — and I said, okay, you each take your ream of 500 pieces of

paper and I want you to count them in stacks of fifty, and I want you to time it. We all came up and we were right in the margin of six minutes to do 500 pieces of paper. And -- and, you know, they're not all bean counters like me.

So the whole idea is even if you had several thousand -- I mean, if I extended that, that the ballots would be heavier so it would take you longer, let's take it up to ten minutes. You -- you could do 3,000 -- right? -- if -- if you could do them in ten minutes at 500 a pop. Ten.

So I don't believe that it's going to take that much time. I did this on election day.

Quite frankly it should be done every time you open up the scanner. It's just a good crosscheck.

And one of the reasons, as I summarize this, from an audit perspective, I believe -- well, I gave three cases that if you had doing hand-counts, I gave, like, three -- three recent incidents in our -- in our county. One was the November 3, 2020, election. This board cited our director and two members of the board who happened to certify those results -- they certified -- the board recommended that they be

sent for criminal investigation. And the reason was there was a memory card that was missed.

2,760 ballots. I don't want that to happen to me, I can tell you.

So that was one thing. You actually cited them as one of -- for investigation. That should not happen. You shouldn't have a situation where you've got memory cards missing, and you haven't even figured out, you know, that they're missing.

We also had in early voting precinct, the last day of early voting this year, the ballots were removed from the AIP scanner and the poll manager, she still -- even though she's not supposed to, she still counts the ballots.

Because we've seen it too many times. She happened to crawl in that -- in that scanner and there was one stuck to the top of the scanner. I think we've all seen that, whether it's static electricity -- I don't know. But that was another incident that would've been caught at the precinct if we -- if we counted.

And finally in Fayette County general primary in May 21, 2024, one precinct had a discrepancy of ballots that happened to be discovered during the risk-limiting audit. And

just happened to be the precinct that they -that they pulled. So they sent the -- two
technicians to the warehouse where the scanners
are kept, and what they found was the write-in
ballot bin had not been opened. Had we counted
those ballots at the precinct, we would've found
that.

And so I -- to me it's a simple thing. I mean, I like things to check. I also believe that we've had so many comments and conspiracy theories, and call it whatever you want to, right now everything that we use is all within the electronic system. It's poll pads, it's BMDs, it's the scanners. There's absolutely no crosscheck outside of that electronic system to help us gain more confidence in our elections. And that's what I believe this would do.

Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Petition --

MS. GHAZAL: (off microphone) I've got a -(indiscernible) question (microphone on) and you
may or may not be able to answer this. When
the -- when the ballots drop into the -- the bin
because they need to be hand adjudicated on the
basis of a write-in ballot, are the -- are the

rest -- remaining votes are already scanned and 1 2 tabulated when that happens and it's simply the -- the -- is that correct? 3 MS. ALEXANDER: Are you talking about 4 5 when -- when are the write-in ballots scanned? MS. GHAZAL: No. 6 7 MS. ALEXANDER: No? 8 MS. GHAZAL: When there is a ballot that 9 goes into the -- the separate bin because it has 10 a write-in --11 MS. ALEXANDER: Yeah. 12 MS. GHAZAL: -- vote on that, the remaining 13 votes that are regular, are those already 14 tabulated so they would be included in the vote 15 totals already? 16 And I -- I see Mr. Kirk. So -- so, in fact, 17 while the ballot itself might not have been counted if you hand-counted, the votes were 18 19 already included in the vote totals. 20 MS. ALEXANDER: On the scanner. MS. GHAZAL: On the scanner. So --21 MS. ALEXANDER: 22 Yes. MS. GHAZAL: Because -- here's my issue. 23 24 We've heard some -- we've heard testimony that 25 when this was piloted, it was problematic because while you as a CPA probably ran an incredibly tight ship every time you did it and there weren't errors, there are other -- there are other counties where there -- they -- after 14 hours at work, they could never reconcile the hard numbers correctly.

And so where the SB202 came in -- and this is where I'm going to fill in some blanks where I think that were not included in this order -- that was where initially there was a hard deadline of 10 p.m. put into place by the legislature where all votes cast, not the -- all election day votes totaled and absentee votes, and that all had to be reported by 10 p.m. that night. And having to count the ballots in the precinct was causing counties to miss that deadline.

The first time that we had a hearing after that was put in place, more than half of the counties across the state of Georgia missed the deadline. I suspect that is what led to this order being sent out -- or this advisement being sent out from the Secretary of State's Office, because the -- the procedure was causing -- which is not necessarily required, but the procedure

was causing the counties to miss the statutory deadline. So that's just to give some context.

Now, there is also a requirement that a poll staffer stands by each tabulator and they can watch as it ticks up. And so they watch every single ballot that goes in, hopefully not -- they are not supposed to see what's on the ballot, but they see that the ballot is being tabulated. So that total number of -- of votes goes in there. That is going to be reconciled with the number of BMD ballots and the number of voters checked in at the end of the day.

I have seen one case in which the number of votes that was scanned in was higher than the number of voters that check in. And then it -- the -- the ballot box was opened up with permission, the -- the ballots were counted by hand and a problem was found.

Would you be consi -- would you be willing to consider a modification where the counties are required to do the hand-count where there's a discrepancy that's identified?

MS. ALEXANDER: No. No. I'll say this. If you do this at the -- I've had some people say, well, we can do it back at the elections office.

You know, after everybody's tried to meet the deadline, the memory cards have come in, and da, da, da, da, da.

The problem is with everything that we've had go on since 2020, the whole object of all of this is to check that system, that counter that's going through because if we have a hand-count and that's the number that we're looking at in -- in the precinct, that can't be changed. Once you've got three of them to do it and it's a hand-count and they're all sealed and they go back, any time somebody wants to manipulate -- let's say they do -- with double ballots, double scans, et cetera, that -- you can't come back to those same -- that same count that we did in the precinct.

My whole idea of doing it in the precinct is because everything is right there. All the people that have worked the election, all the equipment that's there, and the hand-count is there. If you're missing something, you're going to start turning every table over to try to find what's missing.

So I would say you're not going to know a discrepancy until later, and that's too late. I

2 check that system. I mean -- sorry. MS. GHAZAL: If a -- if a -- if a 3 reconciliation is not done at poll close, then 4 there are procedures that are not being properly 5 6 followed, I will say. That (indiscernible) --7 (Cross-talking) 8 MS. ALEXANDER: If you don't hand-count it, 9 you aren't reconciling. 10 MS. GHAZAL: You're reconciling the number 11 of -- of poll pad check ins, the number of BMD 12 ballots, and the number on -- on the scanner. 13 And my -- and again I will reiterate the reason 14 that this was not put into place is because when it was tested in 2019, it failed. 15 16 Your -- your experience may not have been 17 that way, but other counties tried it and failed. And I don't want to be setting up our counties 18 for failure. 19 20 MS. ALEXANDER: I would be happy, free of 21 charge, to go around and help train all hundred 22 fifty-nine counties. 23 MS. KING: Quick question. 24 MS. ALEXANDER: Sure. 25 MS. KING: Currently what is the process of

want to find that stuff right now, and I want to

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checking to make sure that the machine count is accurate?

MS. ALEXANDER: You have recap sheets right now. As far as crosscheck, you have a recap sheet, you have recap sheets for the poll pads, you know, for the voter check-ins. You have all of your BMDs. And so you have a BMD recap sheet where they take all the totals and the -- and then you have the scanner. You also have the tape, you know, that we print, the three tapes. I have been told -- I've not seen it, I have been told that there can be differences between what's on the scanner and what is on that totals tape. I've never seen it, but let me --

MS. KING: Particularly if you have two pages.

MS. ALEXANDER: I'm sorry?

MS. KING: Particularly if you have, like, two pages and, you know, it can be scanning.

MS. ALEXANDER: Okay. Maybe. I don't know. This was the tape, the -- you know, the three -- the three tapes that you print out at the end of election night. And --

But my whole point is, yes, they do the recap sheets. And in most cases those all three

will tie in. You would expect that. I mean that's what the system is designed.

MS. KING: So the recap is -- so basically, like, the scanner shoots out their number and then the recap shoots out another -- the same number again?

MS. ALEXANDER: Yeah.

MS. KING: And that's the --

MS. ALEXANDER: They're -- they're taking the number off of the scanner and putting it on the recap sheet. And then they're doing the same thing if they have ten or twelve BMDs. They go around and take each one. And they add up the totals of the BMDs, and then your poll pads automatically are in sync and so they sync and you have a count -- I mean, they can check it off through the day as to how many voters have checked in.

So theoretically all three of those recap sheets are supposed to balance and be the same. Sometimes they're off, you know, maybe four or five ballots in -- I don't know what they do with that or even why that happens.

But my whole point is as an auditor, as a bean counter, you have got to have something that

checks that electronic system. It would stop a lot of the stuff that everybody's theorizing is going on, you know: the software glitches, being controlled outside from the Internet, and all that stuff. I mean, I don't -- have a hand-count, you know?

MS. KING: So -- so if this was in your county, if you -- if you received a printout and your recap, everything was -- let's say all your -- all your printouts and one was off, do you immediately go to hand-counting? Or what do you do if the number's off?

- MS. ALEXANDER: You -- well, typically what would happen even on -- on the hand-counts because when we did it -- if let's say we were off one or even two, we would --
- MS. KING: No, no. Before -- I don't want you to go that way. Before we get to the hand-count part, right?
  - MS. ALEXANDER: Okay, I'm sorry.
- MS. KING: (indiscernible) an option. So, like, basically if -- if I am -- and please bear with me if I don't have all the terminology. But if the machine spits out a number and says this is the total number of people who voted today,

and then the recap come out and said this is the number, and let's say that's off by one or two, the recap -- let's just say it's off, the technology -- is there a method to go in from the precinct level or the county level to verify, like the -- is there -- do you immediately go to a hand-count and say, hey, let's just match it? Or is there -- what do you do?

MS. ALEXANDER: To my knowledge, what has happened in the past, if they were off when they just, you know, first finished the recap -- and let's say you were off a couple, right? -- the first thing they would do is go back, of course, and -- and re-add, right? You're going to double-check your totals and stuff like that. But they also usually will go around and -- and they actually look under tables and that sort of thing because there's such a thing as an unaccompanied ballot, you know, where somebody left it, you know, in a machine or it fell down, something. It just wasn't scanned.

So that's usually what they would do. We would just look and see: Are there's some ballots in place that we missed?

MS. KING: Okay.

MS. ALEXANDER: Just within the system.

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MS. KING: And what you're proposing would be that we eliminate the possibility of having to go look for them. You're proposing that we run it through the machine as well, but then we also do a hand-count to make sure that the numbers are accurate.

MS. ALEXANDER: Yeah. I mean, I'm not really trying to stop if there's two, looking at that. My -- my big thing is in all things, if you were a bank teller, if you were a waitress, how many times did you have to take all your total receipts for the night and -- and verify it with what was wrung up on the machine? It's just a natural part of being accountable. And so to me I want something outside of that electronic system. I think that would stop a lot of the stuff that we're hearing about what's going on in the systems. Do I like the system? Well, maybe it's faster -- won't say I'm crazy -- but I want to check on that thing.

I will tell you, I'm also -- I don't think I said I'm a new member of the board of elections in Fayette County. So I have now been through two or three of elections, and now I see a lot of

other stuff. This would help me feel a whole lot better, okay?

Thank you.

DR. JOHNSTON: That's got it, thank you. I have -- I have never met Ms. Alexander. And when this petition arrived, I thought it was like a Christmas present. It's exactly what I wanted. It provides uniformity and not just uniformity in accounting, but uniformity across the state. Because my understanding is some counties do hand-count, some counties do not. Some precincts do -- polling places do hand-counts, others do not.

And we -- we could make a big step toward achieving uniformity for the state with a simple check-and-balance process. This complies with the standard chain-of-custody practices for documents and necessary chain-of-custody documents. It provides the -- the accounting of the paper audit trail. It is consistent with HAVA requirements to have a system such as this.

So I think this is a no-brainer, and I thank you for providing this petition.

MS. ALEXANDER: Yeah. Can we make clear that we're only hand-counting totals. We're not

1	separating and doing the individual offices.
2	It's just a double-check on totals.
3	DR. JOHNSTON: I under I do understand,
4	and I assume that this is any ballots that are
5	removed from any ballot box through any part of
6	the election.
7	MS. ALEXANDER: Yes, should be. Yes.
8	DR. JOHNSTON: So early in person and and
9	election night; correct?
10	MS. ALEXANDER: Any time ballots are taken
11	out of the scanner
12	DR. JOHNSTON: Right.
13	MS. ALEXANDER: they need to be counted.
14	DR. JOHNSTON: Thank you.
15	MS. ALEXANDER: Yes, thank you.
16	MR. FERVIER: Any further questions from the
17	board? Is there a motion?
18	DR. JOHNSTON: I move that we accept
19	Ms. Alexander's petition and forward it for
20	rulemaking procedures.
21	MR. FERVIER: There is a motion to initiate
22	rulemaking procedures on this petition. Is there
23	a second?
24	MS. KING: Second.
25	MR .TEFFARES: Second

1	MS. KING: Oh, well, Rick Rick got it.
2	MR. FERVIER: Having a motion and a second,
3	any discussion? Hearing no discussion, all those
4	in favor signify by saying aye.
5	THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.
6	MR. FERVIER: Any opposition?
7	MS. GHAZAL: Nay.
8	MR. FERVIER: Vote carries three to one.
9	MS. ALEXANDER: Thank you.
10	MR. FERVIER: We have a the chair will
11	entertain a motion for a recess.
12	DR. JOHNSTON: (inaudible)
13	MR. FERVIER: We have a motion for a recess.
14	Is there a second?
15	MS. KING: (inaudible)
16	MR. FERVIER: All those in favor?
17	THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.
18	MR. FERVIER: So moved. We will recess for
19	ten minutes.
20	(Recess from 3:20 until 3:30 p.m.)
21	MR. FERVIER: The next item on the agenda is
22	hear the petition for amendment of state election
23	board rule presented by David Cross.
24	We have copies.
25	Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rule presented by David Cross

MR. CROSS: All right. For the benefit of the folks in the room that you don't have this document in front of you, I'll read it off here. The petitioner -- this petition is for an amendment to the -- to election rule that incorporates a change to the way ballots are mailed to electors in a way that provides for maintenance of chain of custody for ballots.

I filed this -- this petition in good faith. The intent of the rule is to maintain chain of custody of ballots in Georgia elections on behalf of all Georgia voters.

Item 2, the full text of the rule required to be amended and desired to be promulgated is with regard to rule 183-1-14-.11, mailing and issuance of ballots -- ballots. And my recommendation to the board is to strike the words "during early voting" as I think it's redundant. As additional applicants for absentee ballots are determined to be eligible, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall -- instead of using the words "mail or issue" -- mail by United States Postal Service restricted and tracked mail official absentee ballots for provisional absent -- or provisional absentee

ballots, if appropriate, to such additional applicants immediately upon determining their eligibility.

Instead of -- as it stands right now, when ballots are mailed, it's the only time we ever lose chain of custody. When ballots are produced at the printer, they are produced under lock and key. When they're sent to the counties, they're kept under lock and key. Then we put a first-class stamp on them and hope that they actually get to the intended recipient. It is the only time that ballots ever lose chain of custody.

When you or I go in to -- to vote in a -you know, in a precinct, you have to show your
ID. Once your ID is verified, you're then given
either a ballot or a ballot card. You go over,
make your selections, and a BM -- or a ballot
marking device will print out -- will print out
your ballot for you. You go put it into the
scanner, all under the watchful eye of election
workers. So they see that that ballot never
leaves the room. In fact, if you try to leave
the room with your ballot, without putting it
into the scanner, it's like all holy hell breaks

loose and they're going to call the police to come and get you, right? But when we mail ballots, we have no assurance that the ballot actually gets to the intended recipient.

Now, the reason for the rule and the reason why the -- why it should be amended, again, is because ballots are mailed in first-class -- you know, first-class mail, metered mail, or by a contractor, which is even worse, with the only specification that ballots are not forwardable.

So to maintain chain of custody on Georgia ballots, counties should be using -- in my original rule, I put down United States Postal Service restricted delivery service. And I would like to strike that in favor of using UPS or FedEx, all right?

Our own Senator Jon Ossoff recently came out a couple months ago and said: United States

Postal Service is terrible; I don't think they're going to be able to deliver things on time.

And my concern there is that when election time rolls around, we're going to have people saying, Well, Jon Ossoff said that -- you know, that there's no way that the mail's going to get there on time, so we should be able to take in

ballots from the postal service for, like, the next week or so.

2.2

And, again, as you know, in 2020 it took these fantastically fast machines, I think, twenty days -- or not twenty, it took them twelve days to count -- to count the ballots.

So, again, the key thing here is that when a ballot is delivered and it's sent by UPS or FedEx, they have the ability to -- to check to see if those -- you know, if that -- if the -- if the delivery is being made to the person it's going to.

As it stands right now, the -- the cost of mailing with the United States Postal Service is \$13.65. But, of course, like I said, you get what you pay for. UPS on an unnegotiated full retail rate is \$18.30. So it's a little bit more expensive. And I do have a cost for every county if -- if the board would like to see that.

For the entire state of Georgia to have run the election for all the mail-in ballots to be handled properly, it would've cost the entire state \$4,000,500 -- I'm sorry \$4,000,500 -- this is not coming out right. Four million, five hundred, six hundred eleven dollars. So 4.5

million is what it would've cost to run it with UPS.

2.1

All right. So the United States Election
Assistance Commission states in their publication
best practices for chain of custody regarding
ballots, that there are points in the life cycle
of the mail -- of the mailed ballot that are
important for documentation and chain of custody,
including when ballots are received from the
printer, when voters request a mailed ballot or
an application, when a mailed ballot is
transmitted to -- to a voter, when a mailed
ballot is collected from a voter, when a mailed
ballot has a defect, when a mailed ballot is
counted, and when a mailed ballot is stored in
the custody of an election official.

So one of the key things that's on here is that when a mailed ballot is transmitted to a voter -- so EAC wants the states to be -- they want Georgia to be keeping track of when a mail is -- or when a ballot is transmitted to a voter. So does transmitted just mean when it went out the door?

To me, transmitted means that it was sent and it was received and have confirmation that my

message was sent and received to the -- to the intended party.

The EAC goes on to recommend that signatures help create an auditable record whenever the equipment, supplies, and ballots change hands or location. By signing the chain-of-custody forms, the signers are certifying that they took custody of the voting equipment, supplies, and ballots and delivered them to a particular location.

That — the only time that that's not required is when a ballot is mailed to someone.

So delivery using tracking can satisfy the EAC's best practice recommendation because it provides a time-stamp record for each step on the way to delivery. It captures the time of mailing, it captures the time of delivery, and delivery requires proof of identification with a time-stamped signature to verify delivery.

One of the next questions that you're asked when you're putting in a rule, it says: Tell any and all pertinent facts as the -- as the petitioner's interest in the matter. And I said I'd personally been contacted by multiple U.S. postal workers who have stated, one, they were instructed by their postmaster to deliver ballots

after an election has ended. Two, they have been -- they have observed unsecure, undelivered ballots in their post office. Three, they have picked up large numbers of ballots from assisted-living homes.

I'm keenly interested in election integrity if you don't know. And I do not understand why we have such tight security on mailed ballots when they're manufactured, when they're stored securely prior to use, when they're stored after use, but not during use. So there's no tracking that's done on delivery.

Item number 5 says any and all facts known to the petitioner that might influence the decision of the board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking. The fact that the letter that I sent had to be sent certified or registered mail per the -- per the SEB rules demonstrates that the state election board values proof of delivery. If this document is required to be sent with proof of delivery, why is the same not required for our ballots? Ballots are infinitely more valuable and consequential than a letter regarding a potential rule change.

Now, one thing that's critical, I think,

to -- for folks to understand is the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services uses signature confirmation restricted delivery. They were having such difficulty making sure that people's citizenship documentation was getting to them properly and on time that on April 27, 2018, they put out a press release and they announced that day that that agency will be in phasing in use of the U.S. Postal Service signature confirmation restricted delivery service to mail citizenship documents beginning April 30, 2018.

2.1

So signature confirmation restricted delivery, they said, increases the security, integrity, and efficiency of document delivery. The signature confirmation restricted delivery process provides better tracking and accuracy of delivery information improving service to applicants.

So I believe that maintaining chain of custody is critical for election security and for the confidence in our elections. The current Georgia rules and regs require that counties mail ballots and that cost of mailing is the responsibility of the county. It's just what the law says. Opponents of this rule as you heard

earlier today said that it's an -- it's going to be like an unfunded mandate. It's going to cost a bunch of money. It's going to restrict people.

Now, I don't know about y'all, but I think most everybody has put in a delivery with Amazon and you've gotten your -- you've gotten your box delivered at your house, either by UPS or by Amazon. They can get that thing to you. And if you're not there, they'll hang something on your door that says they'll come back at another time. So this -- this is an easy and proven service.

Proponents would argue that voting -- early voting is an unfunded mandate also -- I would say that -- where counties employ election workers at poll places that take in just a handful of voters on some early voting days. Both folks are correct, and yet the counties have found a way to integrate the cost of mailing ballots without assistance or significant impact to their budget.

Number six, citations and legal authorities that require that -- the action requested. So O.C.G.A. 34-9-81, contents of written notice and manner of delivery, specifies that with -- with Georgia workers' compensation claims, written notice shall be given personally to the employer

or his agent, representative, or foreman or to the immediate supervisor of the injured employee and may be sent by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery addressed to the employer at his last known residence.

So if the state is required to deliver unemployment notices or benefits by certified mail, it stands to reason that ballots, being sensitive legal documents also, should be delivered in the same manner.

So that is the crux of, you know, the rule change I'd like to see. I'm looking simply for maintaining chain of custody. That's the whole point. That's it.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Cross. I -- my issue with your rule change is it doesn't allow the flexibility for the county to use other services that might track equally or better than the United States Post Office. I know that when my wife orders frequently through the mail, through either UPS or FedEx or whatever, she knows every step of the way. And --

MR. CROSS: I'm totally happy to use UPS or FedEx. In fact, I would prefer it.

MR. FERVIER: Yeah. I'm just saying --

but -- but your rule change doesn't allow for 1 2 that to -- the county to have the flexibility to 3 use whatever service might be cheaper or better than the United States Post Office. So ... 4 MR. CROSS: Okay. Well, I'm -- I'm not 5 6 the -- I'm not the expert on writing the rules. 7 You guys, you know, and the -- and the lawyers behind you are supposed be able to help out with 8 I'm amenable to making that change. 9 10 MR. FERVIER: We have a question from the 11 mics. 12 MR. KIRK: Just -- yes. 13 MR. COAN: Do you want to ask a question? MR. KIRK: Oh, no. No. 14 MR. FERVIER: Well, you -- you hit the 15 16 button. 17 MR. KIRK: Sorry. MR. CROSS: Oh, friendly amendment? 18 19 I'm open to a friendly amendment. How about 20 that? MS. GHAZAL: The BallotTrax service that 21 22 USPS provides -- the BallotTrax service that the 23 United -- U.S. Postal Service provides actually 24 provides a step-by-step tracking of exactly where

the ballot is, both when it goes in -- but -- but

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the additional benefit that BallotTrax has is it also tracks the ballot once it is returned into the mail stream by the voter and goes back to the county. It actually provides more certification than what simply a -- a signature requirement.

My biggest problem with this is the example of my daughter. My daughter is a college student who lives in Washington DC. She lives in an apartment. And in her apartment they have mailboxes. There is — there will never be an occasion where she would be able to receive her ballot at her mailbox. She would have to go to her nearest post office. I have no idea where that is. She has no idea where that is. She's never been, I'm sure. And that is the case for thousands of voters who vote by absentee ballot.

I agree chain of custody is important, and that's why I think that the Secretary of State should use the BallotTrax service that is available and they pay for and use it in a robust manner so that every voter can actually track their ballot through the system.

In terms of certification that it is the voter, the legislature put into place a higher standard of verification through SB202 by

requiring both signature and the ID number as well as the voter's date of birth. So this is all PII that nobody else has access to. So there's confirmation that that voter has voted that ballot.

But under this rule not only I -- not only does it, I believe, exceed our regulatory authority because of the extreme cost that it puts onto the regulated body, because under the Georgia APA, we have to be able to justify any additional costs that we are -- that -- that we are causing by our -- our regulations and a cost that is 18 times what the current cost is, when the same service can be provided by BallotTrax which is in fact a better service to the voter themselves.

I don't think that -- I don't think that this would even pass muster under -- under the Georgia APA. I don't think we have the authority to pass something that is this extreme.

MR. FERVIER: Does the Attorney General's Office have an opinion on that?

MS. YOUNG: (speaking without a microphone):

I wanted to correct a little bit of a statement
earlier about the idea of substituting it.

Statutory (indiscernible). Under the APA, if there's going to be any substitution to the proposed rule, you're going to have to resubmit that.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Can't hear.

MR. CROSS: Has she got a microphone?

MS. GHAZAL: Here, she can use mine.

MR. CROSS: Hey, even better.

MS. YOUNG: So any -- any substantive change to a proposed rule is going to require resubmission of that rule and re-promulgation of that rule with the 30-day-notice period with the changes in it.

I would caution that the terms "mail" and "statutory -- "statutory delivery," those are terms of art found outside of our elections code in chapter 1 and nine ten ten. So if we're going to write rules that refer to mail, mail typically means first-class mail. Registered mail, certified mail are also defined terms. And statutory overnight delivery would be the term that you would use for the delivery of FedEx or UPS. So when we're writing rules like that, please try to use that legal terminology.

Second of all, the statute --

MR. CROSS: I'm just a -- I'm just a
citizen. I'm -- I had no idea how to write the
rules --

MS. YOUNG: Sure. And I'm -- I'm trying to offer guidance if there's any further drafts of rules that come around. There are statutes that specifically require to absentee ballot delivery by mail. This board is not authorized to change that. If that is a change that is desirable to the people, they need take that up with the legislature and not this board.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. Thank you very much.

MS. KING: Okay. (off microphone) So for me

MR. FERVIER: Member King. Hold on.

MS. KING: Oh, sorry. For me, I have three -- three things that are a little concerning for me. One is not utilizing USPS which means that we will start utilizing an outside vendor, which also means that we'll have to throw out a RFP because we can't direct award to US -- UPS and just tell FedEx to go sit down. So -- can't do that. But so that -- so then it's who's going to review that, who's going to

determine that this company gets this award. So that's another -- and I'm always cautious around that.

And then the 18 times more cost is -- that's hefty to put on the county.

And then lastly, I personally -- I -- I'm one of those I don't like to police -- I don't want to police voters. Now, I do understand that we have to put in parameters, we've got to put in boundaries, we've got to make sure there are rules in place.

However, once the ballot is sent out, I don't want to, like, ensure the person has it in their hand. Like, that's up to that person, right? You -- you give them the right address, you make sure it's going to an address that's -- that's correct. You get the ballot, you vote, you cast your -- you know, you turn it in.

I think that's just the duty of voters. I don't want to police it too much. So that's my -- my concern.

MR. CROSS: I -- I appreciate that. I'm not really so much concerned about legitimate voters that are -- that are asking for ballots. One of my concerns is -- is about theft of ballots when

they're mailed out.

So when a ballot is mailed out, it's sent in an odd-size envelope. It's roughly this size (indicating). It's easy to pick out. It has this cool little symbol on it that says, "official election mail," making it easy to pick out.

And again my concern has to do with the fact that it seems like it would be fairly simple to be able to pilfer ballots out of mailboxes, out of -- you know, out of mail centers. I think -- I think it's fairly -- fairly simple.

With regard to BallotTrax being able to track things, my understanding is that it only tracks when it's going back. It's not when it's going to the voter. I mean, I've asked counties to send me anything that will show that -- that they are -- that they're tracking ballots being -- you know, going out. And I've got no such records exist.

MS. GHAZAL: (off microphone) I will ask -I'm going to -- I'm going to tag Mr. Kirk in
this, but I will say that, again, just to be
aware that your concern (indiscernible) satisfy
private information (indiscernible) (microphone

on) available is included as part of the verification process for every ballot that gets returned.

So it's a signature plus the -- plus the ID number or copy of an ID or last four digits of the social security number. The vast majority of them are the Georgia ID and -- and date of birth. This is not publicly available information. This is how it's verified.

MR. CROSS: I can buy that information for everybody in Georgia this afternoon.

MS. GHAZAL: And then -- but there is no evidence that that has ever happened. There's no evidence. I can think of one case in the last three years where there was -- somebody voted somebody else's ballot. It was caught because the signature was not matched. The voter also said -- it was never counted. The voter reported that she didn't receive her ballot. The reason it was -- it was taken is because she didn't update her -- her mailing address. There has -- I have not seen one instance of voter identity fraud.

MR. CROSS: Okay. Well, in the -- in the interest -- in the interest --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (inaudible)

MS. GHAZAL: So it --

MR. CROSS: We're losing -- what's going on?
What --

MS. GHAZAL: Creating -- creating virtual insurmountable barriers for vo -- certain classes of voters, particularly voters who live in apartment buildings over a -- a fear of a problem that has never been manifest as far as I can tell is not an appropriate use of our regulatory authority.

But I do -- but I do want to answer your question on the BallotTrax -- and I don't have that -- because I do think that's an important process, and I will ask Mr. Kirk.

MR. KIRK: So currently -- BallotTrax is a company that tracks ballots the jurisdictions can contract with. Currently my -- my understanding is the state uses that service to alert voters to the information we put in the GARViS when the ballot's sent, when the ballot's received. There's expanded functionality that would track it in the mail kind of like tracking a package through Amazon. But we do not currently use that. But that does exist.

MR. CROSS: Okay. So if the state's not 2 currently using it, can we --3 MS. GHAZAL: I would do --4 5 MR. CROSS: -- enact a rule to say, hey, let's -- let's use this service? 6 7 MS. GHAZAL: -- everything in my power to 8 try to -- to encourage the Secretary of State to 9 expand their use. 10 I do not -- we -- we don't have the 11 authority to order them to do that, but I certainly think we can strongly encourage, and I 12 13 would also encourage all of y'all to strongly 14 encourage the Secretary of State's Office to expand the use about BallotTrax. 15 16 MR. FERVIER: (Off microphone) Is there any 17 other questions for the board? Is there a motion on this petition? 18 19 MS. GHAZAL: I move that we reject the 20 petition. MR. CROSS: Can I make a change to it before 21 22 you -- before you vote on it? Very simple. 23 Instead of -- you know, instead of using, you 24 know, U.S. Postal Service, you know, restricted

delivery, you know, insert BallotTrax in there.

MS. GHAZAL: So --

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Some -- you know, something that's going to allow -- something that if I as a citizen want to be able to make sure that ballots were sent and actually received, you know, by people to -anybody can see that. It's all in the interest of transparency, and it's in the interest of -of chain of custody. MR. FERVIER: (off microphone) The A.G.'s office: Am I correct that you said any changes to these rules would require resubmission? MS. YOUNG: (speaking inaudibly without a microphone) MR. FERVIER: So we don't have the ability to change it at the meeting?

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MS. YOUNG: No, it would not be appropriate to alter the rule, and it has to do with transparency. The public has a right to know what's being voted on today. So changes to that have to go through that process and be put on the

agenda for a future meeting.

MR. FERVIER: (off microphone) We
(indiscernible) violated that at this meeting,
right?

We have a motion in place to deny -- (microphone on) deny initiating rulemaking

procedures.

Mr. Cross, you are obviously invited to resubmit if you would like to.

Is there a second?

MS. KING: I'll second.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (indiscernible)

MR. FERVIER: Pardon me?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We have a quorum.

MR. FERVIER: Yes, we have a quorum.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What about Dr. Jan?
Jan (indiscernible).

MR. FERVIER: This board has a quorum and this board's able to take action based on the quorum present.

So we have a motion and a second to reject the petition as presented. Any discussion?

MS. KING: (off microphone) Yeah, I just want to say, I -- my -- I think (microphone on) a major issue that there's just some challenges with the way it's presented.

So I would say to go back to the drawing board and fix some of those issues, like the -the 18 times more is a lot. And like I said, the vendor thing is -- USPS may be your better option, but I don't know. But I just say revamp

it and then bring it back.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second to reject the rule as presented. Any further discussion? Hearing no further discussion, all those in favor of rejecting the motion as presented signify by saying aye.

THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: Any denials? Hearing no denials, the motion carries to deny it three to zero.

The next item on the agenda is petition for amendment of state election board rule presented by Orion Danjuma. I'm sorry if I messed that up.

MR. SIMMONS: (speaking inaudibly without a
microphone)

MR. FERVIER: Orion, I'm sorry.

## Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rule presented by Orion Danjuma

MR. SIMMONS: Is this -- okay, there we are.

Chairman Fervier and esteemed members of the board, and a special welcome to our newest member, Mrs. King, my name is Peter Simmons. I'm the Georgia state policy strategist for Protect Democracy. We're a nonpartisan, nonprofit dedicated to defending the rule of law,

protecting democratic norms, and promoting free and fair elections.

2.1

I've come here today before the board to ask the court to initiate rulemaking proceedings on our proposed rule regulating voter challenges. Since the 2020 election, outside organizations from all across the country have prepared volunteers to challenge voters' registrations and their right to vote in the state. And despite the fact that these -- despite the fact that these challenges depend on unreliable information and place an extraordinary burden on election officials, they have continued to be filed.

During the 2020 runoff -- excuse me, expert testimony offered during recent litigation expressed the sense that the record linkage process that challengers are trying to attempt to complete is extremely difficult and has appeared that the architects of these lists have not met their duty to implement adequate quality control measures because these data sets have contained huge numbers of missing values.

Additionally, the district court judge who was presiding over the case, despite ruling in favor of the challengers on the issue of voter

intimidation under the Voting Rights Act, 11(b), remarked that the challengers' lists verged on recklessness and utterly lacked reliability.

2.1

Further it's become clear from the record that challengers were warned by an expert working at the secretaries of state -- the Secretary of State's Office at the time, that their lists as presented without individualized evidence would be insufficient to substantiate these challenges.

Despite this, hundreds of thousands of these challenges have been filed. However, they have been largely rejected and appear to target voters mostly who are already inactive and therefore on the way to being removed under proper list maintenance activities.

This doubling of efforts is inefficient and risks improperly shifting complex -- complex list maintenance activities through activists from election administrators who are not prepared either with the expertise or the necessary information to execute these duties adequately. This risks diverting precious time and resources away from list maintenance activities, ironically.

County boards have been forced to interpret

both of these statutes, 21-2-22 -- 21-2-229 -- that's a tongue twister -- and 230 without adequate guidance. This has led to varied interpretations all across the state which has caused confusion for both voters and election administrators as they have had to expend significant time and resources attempting to comply with the law.

2.1

The county boards must be empowered to take common sense steps to ensure that they are spending time on appropriate challenges filed appropriately under Georgia law. And voters must be empowered to understand and navigate the process without being allowed to take advantage of it. Both of these objectives are equally important and are critical for our election administration infrastructure to function as intended.

In order to accomplish these objectives, we have developed regulations that, first, specify who is eligible to submit a challenge. Second, they standardize the depth and quality of information that electors are required to submit with their challenges. They ensure that the burden of substantiating challenges on their face

are properly allocated. And they promote uniformity across counties as it concerns the burden of proof for substantiating these challenges as well as implementing specific deadlines related to certain types of challenges and the difficulties they may face -- they may present.

So to start, both 21-229 and 230 -- and I'm so sorry, I can't get my distance right -- state that any elector in a county or municipality may challenge another voter's -- another voter's right to vote who remain registered in the relevant jurisdiction. This clearly restricts participation in the challenge process to those with the right to vote in the -- in the jurisdiction where that voter is challenged.

Despite that, we have seen challenges that raise questions about who the actual challenger is.

So these regulations will emphasize that the individuals who are not eligible voters may not challenge other voters in the state.

Second, it clarifies that even eligible voters may only challenge other voters in the appropriate jurisdiction. And finally it creates guardrails that will allow county officials to

adequately determine whether a challenge is properly filed by an elect -- eligible elector and to only expend, not waste, resources on appropriate challenges.

2.1

Next, both of those statutes also require that challenges be in writing and specify distinctly the grounds of a challenge.

Challengers must make well-supported and specific allegations and provide enough information for election officials to understand the reason for the challenge on its face.

However, in many instances challengers have offered precious little information to substantiate these challenges and forces -- which forces election administrators to -- excuse me, to bear the burden of substantiating themselves in violation of Georgia law.

Even officials who have championed recent legislation regarding voter challenges have made it clear that they believe that they -- we -- that they think we have an excessive -- excessive number of challenges -- excuse me -- while some state level leaders of challenge efforts themselves have remarked that others who participated in these efforts may have created

lists that may be considered systematic in violation of the individualized nature of the proceedings contemplated under these statutes.

2.1

The 11th circuit has specified that list maintenance activities can be considered systematic if they did not rely upon individualized information or investigation to determine which names from the voter registry to remove and instead used a mass computerized data-matching process to compare the voter rolls with other state and federal databases.

To remedy this, these -- these regulations require challengers to demonstrate that their challenge is part of an individualized inquiry and has utilized processes that are sufficiently rigorous. It also specifies that they must produce sufficient evidence to substantiate these challenges on their face accord -- as required by the statute, and they clarify what can be considered an inappropriate systematic inquiry.

Next, section 229 explicitly states that the burden shall be on the elector making the challenge to prove that the person being challenged is not qualified to remain on the list of electors. Despite this, many county boards

have assumed sole responsibility of substantiating these claims in violation of Georgia law. This requires election boards to devote significant time and energy to adjudicate these challenges where they need their capacity to be devoted to administering the election and executing their duties effectively.

2.1

2.4

These regulations specify that voter challenges under the statute must meet the clear and convincing evidentiary standard. 229 specifies that the challenging elector bears the burden, but the statute fails to define the standard that challengers must meet to meet their burden of proof.

We rectify this. Additionally we clarified that challengers can satisfy their burden by producing witnesses with personal knowledge or reliable documentary evidence that substantiates their claim.

And finally, section 21-2-230 requires county boards to determine whether probable cause exists to sustain a challenge as the first step of their inquiry under that statute. Many of the challenges filed, as I said before, contain very little information and that leads us to believe

that these are being sustained improperly and -because they're appropriately survive -surviving that part of the inquiry.

Our regulations define probable cause under this specific instance and in this context and clarify that unproven information and -- and unreasoned accusations cannot form the basis for probable cause.

We hope that the board will promulgate these regulations and provide election officials with clear guidelines and electors -- and electors the guidelines they need to adequately engage in this process.

Thank you. I'll take any questions now.

MR. FERVIER: Any questions? Member Ghazal.

MS. GHAZAL: I am going to take my (indiscernible) as a -- as a board member and do something that I would be horrified if I were in his position --

## UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.

MS. GHAZAL: -- and I'm going to ask

Mr. Manifold to -- as -- as the election director

of Gwinnett County, as a county that has seen

some of the greatest burdens, if he could speak.

But I'm -- I'm sorry to put you in this position

and I've never actually spoken with you.

MR. FERVIER: Speak into your -- speak into your microphone, member Ghazal. Use your microphone.

MR. SIMMONS: I yield the well --

MS. GHAZAL: Yes.

MR. SIMMONS: -- temporarily.

MR. FERVIER: You -- you can speak from back
there.

MR. COAN: Do you want to hit your button?

MR. FERVIER: Hit your button.

MR. MANIFOLD: All right. Does that work?
Can you hear me? All right.

No, thanks actually because that's why I cam down here for today, was -- was this rule in particular. I think -- I know GAVREO was supportive of the rule. I do think that we -- you know, we've been waiting for a rule from this board for well over a year. I think Judge Duffey did a lot of work.

I know there's a lot of behind the scenes work to try to come up with a rule. I met with a lot of people for a long time to try to get to a rule on this to kind of just give counties guidance because I know -- I think even other

directors in this room -- we talked about it at lunch today, that it's kind of all over the board. I think we're all trying to do our best work, but there's a lot to take in from conflicting state law and then NVRA laying over -- over top of all that and what we need for a signature from the voter. There's a lot here that needs -- that we could use.

Like I said, GAVREO is supportive of this rule. I will point out that -- just one thing as I was reading through this, I do think seven and eight on the -- page 3 could probably be removed because the law changed on July 1st. I think that probably the 230 -- section 21-230 changed. It goes into when a 230 challenge can be filed. Those are now -- it's now 45 days. So that kind of gets outside of -- we start sending out UOCAVA ballots at 45 days. So I do think seven and eight could probably go away in this rule on page 3.

But I do think this provides a basic under
-- kind of rule to kind of set the guidelines for
counties. Talking to my predecessor that had
done this job for 27 years before me, who's
happily retired, she said that -- you know, some

legislative history. I think when this was put in, 229 was very much about "I live at this property, this person doesn't live here anymore." That is what 21-229 -- 21-2-229 challenge is very much about: I have personal knowledge of this property and this voter is not here.

And for 20 years that's kind of -- they would have one or two every year that -- that these challenges would come through. You know, usually it was sustained and it usually was somebody with direct knowledge of that parcel and who was living there.

And then I think in 2020, they just -either 2018 or 2020 a lot of NCOA lists just kind
of started getting dumped onto counties and
saying, hey, look these voters aren't here
anymore. And I think that just gets away from
the original intent of 229, which is a
personal -- an individualized knowledge of is
that voter still there?

I think we see a lot of -- I like to call them just data dumps. It's like here's five or six databases that -- put together that say that this voter's maybe not there anymore. And that's just not -- that's not a certainty. That's not a

hundred percent that voter's not there. It -it's just become this kind of -- like I said,
like a -- it's not individualized anymore. It's
not personal knowledge of -- of that property and
that voter. And each one of these is a voter.

And so Gwinnett, we've spent a lot of time -- some boards have -- have tossed a lot of these out. In Gwinnett we view it as, hey, this is a challenge to an individual voter. The challenger and the individual voter both have a right for us to look at this, and we take this very seriously.

So, you know, in 2022, in August 2022, I think we had something like 35,000 challenges that I walked into our office one day and there's eight boxes of -- Xerox boxes, boxes of information sitting there. And so we spent a lot of time just going through it and what was it? And we didn't want to just toss it out without knowing what it was. But that takes time.

I think we spent -- I think I said in there -- mentioned the time, something like six to ten employees --

MR. SIMMONS: Over several weeks.

MR. MANIFOLD: -- and those -- yeah, I think

something like five or six weeks working full time on that just to get through all that data. And then at the end of the day, we figured out that of that 35,000, I think about 11,000 was actually a 229 challenge. A lot of it was related to absentee voting in 2020 which just isn't a 229 challenge.

And then of that, I think it was only, like, 5600 or something of those 11,000 were still even registered at that address because the data was, I think, nine -- nine months old from when they had pulled it from the Secretary of State.

And so I think counties are spending -trying to do their due diligence, and they're
spending a lot of time. And then at the end of
the day, it -- it's -- there's not a whole lot -it's not individualized. And so I will say I do
think we need rules sooner rather than later.

I had -- I got an e-mail yesterday morning with a pending voter challenge. It was a list of 34,000 voters. So that's 34,000 more challenges that -- that our board's going to have to try to figure out and deal with. And this -- the one that got submitted yesterday didn't -- it just said that these people were in a new state.

There was no date, no information to kind of back it up, even where the data came from. But it still is a challenge that was submitted.

So I think -- like I said, I think Judge

Duffey came to us, I think, at the GAVREO

conference in 2022 and apologized to Gwinnett

specifically that there been no guidance provided

to counties. And we were put through the

situation that we spent six weeks having to go

through this data and -- and really dug in.

So I think -- I don't know what is going to happen with this rule, but whatever happens we really do need a rule on this so that counties can have some guidance. And I really would like to see us start to move back towards a 229 challenge is very much individualized, and you need to have knowledge about the voter at that -- at that property.

I do think that was the legislative intent decades ago, and I think getting back to that would -- would be a good thing.

MS. GHAZAL: If -- if I may --

MR. FERVIER: I --

MS. GHAZAL: -- ask one other question. I'm
sorry.

MR. FERVIER: Then I'll make a comment.

MS. GHAZAL: I think it might be very helpful for the folks here also to understand the -- the systematic list maintenance activities that you all do so that -- so that everyone understands what is constantly going on anyway without the challenge process. And I know that there are extra this year that are not -- have not previously been conducted in -- in an election year.

MR. MANIFOLD: Correct. I think there's something like five different versions of list maintenance that we go -- that we go through each year. Anything from NCOA, the ERIC -- the ERIC list to, you know, if you haven't voted in several general elections, you haven't had any contact, no contact list. So there are, I think, about five different mail -- large mailings that we're conducting every year to try to clean these up.

At the end of the day, I think the greatest frustration even from the public is that it all comes down to the fact that the NVRA only gives us two ways to remove a voter. They either -- the voter's got to come back to us with a

signature, saying, Hey we're moving, I'm no longer registered. Or they've got a -- if they don't return that, we've got to go through that confirmation process and they have to go two federal election cycles.

And I get it. It's frustrating. I -sometimes I get frustrated with how long it takes
for us to get through the confirmation process.
But at the end of the day, it's Congress that set
it and we have to go back to them. And when I
met with them -- when I go to DC, I talk to
Congress, our -- our congressional delegation,
all them. We could use some fixes and updates at
NVRA.

So I get it. I get the frustrations, but at the end of the day, it feels like the 229 process currently is trying to be used to speed up the confirmation process. And I just don't think that's the proper use of a 229 challenge.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. I --

MS. REARDAN: (speaking inaudibly without a
microphone)

MR. FERVIER: In just -- yeah, just one moment. If you'd press your button, then at some point I will ... okay.

I appreciate you presenting this. I feel like there's a lot to unpack with this rule change. And I personally -- I don't feel like I have the ability to make a really educated decision on it today. I would like to better know the intent of the legislature with what they put into law this year and how that would be impacted by this rule change myself. I mean, I'd like some more time to -- to look at this. I don't feel like I've had enough time to really study it and ask the right questions of the legislature itself.

That's just my personal thing. I don't want to make an educated vote today on something that I don't fully understand the impact of.

So number 14.

MS. REARDAN: Thank you. Thank you, chair. My name is Pamela Reardan, and I'm in Cobb County, and I'm very familiar with vote challenges and this new legislation and the rule changes as of July the first.

This rule that you are proposing is preposterous at the least. So I'm just saying that -- it's very simple. It's very simple. If the counties want to really clean up the voter

rolls, they can make the citizens that are helping regis -- they can make them deputy registrars and they can work with the county and they can help clean up the rolls.

They are not taking data from anywhere and everywhere. They are taking data from other states, secretary of states, and they're comparing the NCOA -- they start with that -- and then they -- then they take another data point if the person has moved to another county or another state. And they're registered in another state. They voted in another state. They should be automatically removed from our voter rolls.

It is a no-brainer. And it is in the legislation. It is in the NVRA that you conveniently bring up, but it says that is on the onus of the state to clean up the rolls and do voter maintenance on the roll -- rolls.

And then the Secretary of State, Blake

Evans, has said -- I have the e-mails -- that

every single county has to do their own voter

roll maintenance. That is the procedure, and

that is NVRA stamped, if you want to call it,

okay? It's -- they stamped it. That's what they

do.

Congress, this week, is actually voting on the Save Act which will change the NVRA at some future time. But the Save -- that's not this week, sorry, that's coming.

The Save Act is the noncitizens voting, and that is a real problem that we're facing right now because we can't verify that they're -- the citizens -- that the people who are voting are all citizens because we're not at the DDS asking them for their papers when they change their driver's license or get a driver's license.

And it's -- it's on the honor system right now, folks. The honor system. And I don't really think that 15 million people coming across our border, invading us, is an honor system.

Okay?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mr. Chair --

MR. FERVIER: We -- I'm sorry, we're --

MS. REARDAN: And we have multiple problems. I know I got off track.

MR. FERVIER: We're going far afield of what we're trying to discuss today.

MS. REARDAN: But we're going off facts -that's right. But there is a way to fix this.

We -- there is in the law right now, July 1st,

okay. NCAO data, the data that the Secretary of State just released to the counties -- our county said, well, we're not going to look at it.

MR. FERVIER: Well --

MS. REARDAN: No. We -- we are going to look at it because that's the law. And that's why you guys have to have a rule. This is not the rule though.

Thank you very much.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. Thank you. Member King.

MS. KING: Yeah. So I have some -- some serious concerns about this, and that's because it says: Electorates making such challenges must meet this burden by -- and this is where I have a major issue -- it says, identifying and producing witnesses who can demonstrate personal knowledge of the circumstances proving the challenged voters ineligibility.

I love Colombo, love Nancy Drew. But I don't want my neighbors to be -- to start rounding up other neighbors to tell -- to come and testify against me or something. That becomes way, way, way too much. And there's a couple of -- there's a couple of things in here

that alludes to just kind of making -- making the neighbor become the investigator. And we're not paying the neighbor. You know, we're -- we're paying these officials that are at these county offices. And it's unfortunate that, you know, there are so many.

And here's where I stand. I agree with you. I had a personal friend who has voted God knows how -- how many times and her -- she was challenged because she didn't have the northwest on her address. And that's ridiculous. Like that's when it starts to become ridiculous.

And I do think this can get completely out of hand. I feel like while we're trying to reduce neighbor investigations, that you're creating more of that because it's just too strenuous. I -- I don't want our neighbors having to do that. So ...

MR. SIMMONS: Yes, ma'am. So actually the statute, 229, anticipates that the board of registrars or board of elections would subpoena witnesses and that -- documents, papers, and other materials to prove the case in their proceedings.

So the statute actually itself contemplates

a quasi-judicial set of proceedings similar to administrative proceedings like this one or the FEC or the ethics board.

The intent of that part of the rule is to reemphasize that the elector who bears the burden according to the statute is doing their due diligence to take the burden off of the election officials, like those in Gwinnett County, that had all day every day for six weeks when the statute requires the elector, like a complainant, to issue enough evidence to prove their case.

So in this situation, the board of elections is more of a judge or quasi-judicial body, not an investigator. And the --

MS. KING: Board of elections; correct.

MR. SIMMONS: Correct.

MS. KING: For the -- what -- I don't want your -- our neighbor to become the judge, right? Like, that's the point I'm making. I don't want the neighbor to be out there subpoending neighbors to come and testify on behalf of their other neighbors.

MR. SIMMONS: Well, member King, that appears to be the intent of the legislature. So because this is based on an individualized

inquiry, and it contemplates subpoenas for 1 2 witnesses similar to the language in my regulations, the neighbor investigations are 3 built in. This would actually standardize the 4 5 procedures for those type of investigations and create a more orderly --6 7 MS. KING: Well, this is --8 MR. SIMMONS: -- unified process. MS. KING: -- asking them to do that to 9 10 challenge. 11 MR. SIMMONS: Say again. 12 MS. KING: This is asking them to do that in 13 order to challenge. You're asking them to 14 produce witnesses that have personal knowledge in 15 just a challenge. MR. SIMMONS: Yes, ma'am. That's what --16 17 that's what the statute contemplates. 18 produce witnesses for the statute. In fact, I 19 can read the language of 229 if you'd like. 20 MS. KING: Okay. I have some other issues. So that would be 229. 21 MR. SIMMONS: MR. FERVIER: 22 Would -- twenty-six? 23 MR. SIMMONS: 229(c). MS. KING: Yeah. Yeah. I had some -- a 24

couple of other issues, but ...

25

without a microphone after which the microphone was turned on) I just want to reiterate

Ms. Reardon's (inaudible). One of the most important mandates that the counties in the state have is to maintain a precise and active voter roll. If they don't have the resources or the staff to do it, I would personally volunteer to get it done. You can check my résumé. You can check my (indiscernible). I would gladly help, and once it's done, I will go away and (indiscernible), but let's get the voter roll (inaudible).

MR. FERVIER: Thank you.

Member Ghazal.

MS. GHAZAL: I -- I think it's really important to differentiate between list maintenance and voter challenges. And that's the problem. These are two different things. List maintenance is -- is the process by which the counties maintain clean voter rolls. And the 11th circuit, which is binding on Georgia, says that any list -- any voter challenges that are based on a systemized -- systematized search on a database, that is list maintenance activity, and

therefore you have to follow the procedures written out in 52 USC 20507 which is the National Voter Registration Act.

And they are very, very strict and very stringent, and this is where the frustrations that Mr. Manifold was talking about come up.

Because in order to be removed from -- through list maintenance, you have to put a voter through two federal election cycles if you don't have their signature on a piece of paper.

Now, their signature can come through their voter registration from another state. If we have a copy of their voter registration record from another state, then we can remove them. And the way we get that data is through ERIC. ERIC is the only procedure that allows us access to that. Because the -- the publicly available databases that are used for this do not have personal identifiable information.

This is why in our last meeting, I made the point. We received a list of name of 60 people who allegedly had voted twice. As it turned out, two-thirds of that list were not the correct matches. People had ident -- somebody in the public identified two -- two different names that

were the same but their personally identifiable information turned out they were different people. It's shocking how many different people there are, how many different Sarah Tindalls or Joe Smiths who were born in 1968 are.

So the -- the risk of false positives through these mass databases is much greater than the risk of missing somebody who happens to be registered in two -- two states. That is why the National Voter Registration Act has these safeguards built in. And that's why personalized -- personal knowledge is required and -- and individualized data for a voter challenge.

These are two different procedures and they are -- with two different pathways to follow. List maintenance is one, voter challenges are another. And I -- and -- and the public very frequently mixes those two up.

MR. FERVIER: Number 28.

MR. BARTELSKI: Hello? Is it live?

MR. FERVIER: Yeah.

MR. BARTELSKI: Okay. I spoke earlier in the public comments, and I just want to reiterate again that if everything was needed to be so

individualized, and with due respect to the director from -- from Gwinnett, in those days when -- when these laws were set up, we had paper ballot book -- paper poll books and we had paper ballots. Things have changed. We're in the 21st century. We have computers. We have a lot of -- everything gets done with computers. Everything through Amazon, through FedEx, the doctors, the health, everything's done through computers. So we have to live with the fact that we have computers.

I resent that a lot of the time you were saying that the data that's being used is not known. The data that is used in a lot of these tools is exactly the same data that's used by ERIC. So if our data's not good, then ERIC's not good.

Now, actually ERIC is not good because the director, again there from Gwinnett -- and I know other counties as well -- they complain that -- he's just complained that he got a list of 34,000 challenges, right? I know that most of these challenges are correct. Even if you say, okay, we make mistakes. 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, right? You're still at 30,000

registrations that should not be there.

And, I mean, if -- if you look at the law, 228 -- 21-2-228 puts the onus firmly on the board of elections. They are the ones responsible for correct voter rolls. NVRA does the same thing. And just now we were told, well, the NVRA has list maintenance and they've got to be on the rolls in an active status, you've got to wait two -- two federal cycles. That's also not true.

NVRA actually says if a person has in writing said that they are in a new location, then they can be taken off the rolls immediately without waiting. What is that in writing?

Doesn't say that the county or the state where they moved from needs to see that piece of paper, just says it has to be in writing. Applying for a driver's license, applying for a voter registration in your new state is -- answers the NVRA.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. Thank you.

We have several people that want to speak.

Let's try and keep our comments to about two

minutes, if you don't mind, in the back corner.

MS. PRETTYMAN: Thank you. Amanda Prettyman, Bibb County.

I just wanted to share that my family moved from Bibb County to North Carolina in 2014. We bought their house in 2015. Their registration cards stayed there and ours came there too. So it looked like four voting adults lived in that house when we never lived with them.

And then we since moved, I believe, in 2018 or so to our current home, and their voter registration cards followed us. In 2020 prior to the election, we thought we'd do our small part to clean up the voter rolls, and I contacted my county. They said, no, you can't do it. Your family has to. So I contacted my brother-in-law, said, hey, would you mind doing this? So he reached out to the county as he believes in having clean voter rolls, and — and they told him what to do. I followed up with him. He said he did what they told him to do. He remained on the voter rolls. I only was able to get him removed with a change of registrars, and it was, I believe, just this past year.

So the -- you know, what you're saying, individual challenges, there are counties who aren't even following the law with that. And this is optional. You're not required to be on a

voter -- it's an optional list, right? And so he
wanted to be off our list, and they would not
remove him.

And then recently Bibb tossed several -- I don't remember the number, but challenges to voters who had moved to North Carolina and the voter registrations were provided. Each one was printed, but they did not look at that at all that I know within my family. You know, they weren't in that list, but they are proof that they were actual people who lived in North Carolina.

So I could have requested an absentee, they could've requested it, and Bibb would've counted that absentee because it -- it would've looked like they belonged in Bibb County when they didn't. Obviously we didn't do that because we're honest and he is too. But that was a potential scenario, and it's why the voter rolls need to be clean and accurate.

MR. FERVIER: This could go on for a while.

I understand there's a lot of people that want to talk and we've heard a lot of comments already.

The board --

Would the board like to hear more

1	information or is the board ready to make a
2	motion?
3	MS. GHAZAL: I would move to accept the
4	the petition and initiate rulemaking.
5	MR. FERVIER: Would you consider an
6	alternative motion to table this issue for
7	further consideration?
8	MS. GHAZAL: I withdraw my motion.
9	MR. FERVIER: The chair will exercise its
10	right to make a motion and will make a motion to
11	table this petition for further review.
12	MR. JEFFARES: (speaking without a
13	microphone) I second that.
14	MR. FERVIER: There's a motion and a second
15	to delay or to table this petition for further
16	review. Any discussion? Hearing no discussion,
17	all those in favor signify by saying aye.
18	THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.
19	MR. COAN: (speaking inaudibly without a
20	microphone) Is the motion (inaudible)?
21	MR. FERVIER: Aye. Any dissent? Hearing no
22	dissent, motion carries, four to zero. This will
23	be tabled for further review.
24	MR. SIMMONS: Thank you very much for your
25	consideration and your deliberateness.

1	MR. FERVIER: I'm sorry about those who
2	didn't get to speak. I felt like that was the
3	appropriate action to take at this time so the
4	board can further consider this.
5	If you have comments, we'd appreciate that
6	you send them to us, through the board's website
7	or e-mail so that we can consider those.
8	I'm at a quandary now in that we are quickly
9	approaching 5:00. We have
10	MS. GHAZAL: Is Ms. Lee here?
11	MR. FERVIER: seven huh?
1,2	MS. GHAZAL: Is Ms. Lee here? I think we
13	can just
14	MR. FERVIER: I'm sorry?
15	MS. GHAZAL: Is Ms. Lee here at the
16	(indiscernible). Because I believe Ms
17	MR. FERVIER: Ms. Lee?
18	MS. GHAZAL: Yes.
19	MR. FERVIER: Is Ms. Lee here?
20	MS. GHAZAL: I think this is one we can
21	dispose of very quickly.
22	Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rule presented by Gail Lee
23	MR. FERVIER: Okay, Ms. Lee. We'll hear one
24	more today, and then we will tomorrow we will
25	hear the rest of the petitions, starting at

9:00 in this -- this room here.

The next item on the agenda is to hear a petition for amendment of state election board rule presented by Gail Lee.

Ms. Lee, you have the podium.

MS. LEE: Okay. My name is Gail Lee. I'm a concerned citizen, living in DeKalb County.

Thank you for hearing and considering my proposed rule amendment.

The most basic metric of any election is that the number of ballots cast should equal the number of voters who cast a ballot with minor adjustments for individual situations.

In DeKalb County certification meeting for the May 21st primary, the number of voters who cast a ballot was reported to be 94,317, but the reported number of ballots cast was a hundred eighty-five thousand five hundred thirty-six.

The executive director explained the 91,000-ballot discrepancy was due to some ballots having more than one page since the machines only count pages. I found that disturbing. How can we know ballots are not being inserted? How many had multiple pages? While poll watching, I did not observe multiple pages being put through the

scanners. Perhaps I just missed it.

I did however observe that absentee ballots had multiple pages. There were approximately 3200 absentee ballots in DeKalb's primary. If they each had four pages, that would only be 13,000 pages. Where could all those other ballots -- cast ballots be coming from?

Then I found SEB rule 183-1-12-.12(e), reconciliation report. The rule requires counties within 30 days following certification of election results to transmit to the Secretary of State a report that reconciles by precinct the number of ballots cast to the number of voters who received credit for voting. If the numbers do not match, the superintendent is to conduct an investigation and explain and report any discrepancies.

Surely, I thought, that would clear up any discrepancies for me and anyone else who has seen similar election results in their counties.

Thus, I propose this rule amendment to have the counties post the required reconciliation report on their websites when they submit the form to the Secretary of State. Transparency is important for the public to have confidence in

our election results, and this rule imposes a very minor effort for compliance.

However, last week I received a copy of the reconciliation report for DeKalb County through an open records request. Sadly, it did not clear up the discrepancy because it showed ballots cast by precinct of 94,315 reconciled back to 94,319 voters credited, a difference of just four.

There was no mention of the 185,000 cast ballots that were in the official and certified election results. So my proposed rule, while informative for the public, will not enhance accountability if counties don't have to explain the numbers they've already officially reported.

Now I'm just a citizen wanting to ensure accuracy in our elections, and there's plenty I don't know. But it seems to me that the certified number of ballots cast should be reconci -- reconciled to the number of voters who have cast a ballot. That's all.

MS. GHAZAL: (speaking inaudibly without a microphone after which the microphone was turned on) whether this -- this information is published by each county or by the Secretary of State?

MS. LEE: I think it should be published by

the counties.

2 MS. GHAZAL: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: (speaking inaudibly without a microphone) Are there any other questions from the board? The board will entertain a motion on the petitioner.

MS. KING: (speaking inaudibly without a microphone) I make a motion that we accept this petition -- oh, wait (inaudible) and promulgate rulemaking. Initiate rulemaking.

MR. FERVIER: A motion has been made by member King that we -- that this board initiate rulemaking procedures on this petition. Is there a second?

MR. JEFFARES: Second.

MR. FERVIER: There is a motion and a second to initiate rulemaking procedures on this petition. Any discussion? Hearing no discussion, all those in favor of initiating rulemaking procedures on the petition signify by saying aye.

THE BOARD MEMBERS: Ave.

MS. GHAZAL: To make sure this is on the transcript, Dr. Johnston is participating by phone here.

1	MR. FERVIER: Did you ask Dr. Johnston?
2	MR.COAN: I'll ask her one more time.
3	Jan, how would you like to vote on that?
4	Just give it a give us an aye. Give us a loud
5	aye.
6	DR. JOHNSTON: (via phone) Aye.
7	MR.COAN: Okay. So let it be.
8	MR. FERVIER: Any nays?
9	MR. COAN: Thank you.
10	MR. FERVIER: Hearing no nays, the motion
11	carries, four to zero.
12	MS. LEE: Thank thank you.
13	MR. FERVIER: I don't believe that we need
14	to go into another rule petition at this time.
15	The board will entertain a motion to recess until
16	tomorrow morning at 9:00.
17	MS. GHAZAL: So moved.
18	MR. JEFFARES: Second.
19	MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second
20	to recess. All in favor signify by saying aye.
21	THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.
22	MR. FERVIER: The motion carries four to
23	zero. Thank you.
24	(Recessed at 4:53 p.m.)

## CERTIFICATE

## STATE OF GEORGIA

I hereby certify that the foregoing meeting was taken down and was reduced to typewriting under my direction; that the foregoing transcript is a true and correct record given to the best of my ability.

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This, the 12th day of August, 2024.

\*\*Mary K McMahan\*\*

20 Mary K McMahan, CCR Certified Court Reporter 21 Certificate Number 2757

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4	THE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE STATE OF GEORGIA
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8	IN THE MATTER OF:
9	STATE ELECTION BOARD MEETING
10	Atlanta, Georgia
11	Monday, August 19, 2024
12	via Microsoft Teams
13	9:00 a.m.
14	
15	APPEARANCE OF THE PANEL
16	
17	John Fervier, Acting Chair
18	Sara Tindall Ghazal
19	Janice Johnston
20	Janelle King
21	Rick Jeffares
22	
23	
24	Mary K McMahan, CCR, 2757
25	STEVEN RAY GREEN COURT REPORTING LLC Atlanta, Georgia 30324 (404)733-6070

1	Transcript Legend
2	[sic] - Exactly as said.
3	(ph) - Exact spelling unknown.
4	Break in speech continuity.
5	Indicates halting speech, unfinished sentence or
6	omission of word(s) when reading.
7	
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## PROCEEDINGS

MR. FERVIER: So we'll call to order the Monday, August 19, 2024, meeting of the state election board, Georgia State Election Board. I appreciate everybody that is attending today virtually. It looks like we have about 256 individuals online so far, and I hope everybody can hear and see appropriately. We're all in different locations today and we will do our best to make this work as easily as we can.

I do want to address something first of all.

I've had a lot of comments that have been sent to me about having this meeting virtually from a lot of members. This board has -- this will be the third meeting this year that this board has had virtually. And prior to this year, the board went almost two years having virtual meetings.

So having a virtual meeting is not something that's unknown to this board. And due to some recent circumstances, we felt that it was necessary to have this meeting virtually. It does not mean that meetings in the future will be virtual. They will be taken on a case-by-case basis, depending on what the circumstances are at the time. But it was necessary to do it this

1	time. It's not something that, like I said, is
2	unusual for this board or other boards in the
3	state. And this is, like I said, the third time
4	this year that this has been done.
5	With that in mind, we will start with the
6	invocation and the Pledge of Allegiance.
7	Dr. Johnston, would you help us with the
8	invocation?
9	DR. JOHNSTON: I would be glad to.
10	(Invocation)
11	MR. FERVIER: Thank you, member Johnston.
12	Member Ghazal, would you lead us in the
13	Pledge of Allegiance, please.
14	(Pledge of Allegiance)
15	MR. FERVIER: Thank you, member Ghazal.
16	The next item on the agenda is the approval
17	of
18	DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair.
19	MR. FERVIER: board meeting minutes.
20	Yes.
21	DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, this is member
22	Johnston. I'd like to make a amend the
23	agenda, hopefully, if I may.
24	MR. FERVIER: What request what amendment
25	would you like to make?

DR. JOHNSTON: I'd like to add to old
business the item of U.S. citizen-only signs.

MR. FERVIER: Without any dissent from other members of the board, we'll add that to the agenda as item number (c) under old business.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chairman, may I request
one more amendment to the agenda?

MR. FERVIER: And what is that Dr. Johnston?

DR. JOHNSTON: To have a set meeting date and place for the next meeting before we adjourn today.

MR. FERVIER: Without dissent, that'll be added to the old business.

DR. JOHNSTON: Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: The next item on the agenda is approval of board meeting minutes from the meetings on August 6th and 7th, 2024. I've been informed that those meetings are not available yet for presentation to the board. So we're going to refer those or delay those until the next meeting for approval.

## Public Comment

The next item on the agenda is the public comment section. We've had 48 people that have signed up for public comment. The same as our

last meeting, we will hear the first 30 people for public comment and -- at the beginning of the meeting. We ask that you keep your comments to two minutes, please. When you get close to two minutes, you will hear me lightly tap on the gavel, and then at two minutes we will cut off the discussion and move to our next -- next person.

The -- Alexandra Hardin, our paralegal, has the list of individuals that will be speaking, and so she will call them. And we will hear from the first 30. At the end of the meeting, we will hear from all remaining people that wish to issue public comment before this board.

That being said, the -- I'm going to allow Ms. Hardin to start calling out the first speaker that we hear this morning.

MS. HARDIN: First speaker on the list is Kathleen Hamill. I know Ms. Hamill's in the room. I want to make sure that she has camera and microphone working.

MR. FERVIER: It's not working.

Is Kathleen Hamill available? I don't hear Ms. Hamill.

Ms. Hamill, are you in attendance today?

MS. HAMILL: Yes. Thank you so much.

Apologies for that delay there. Thanks.

me?

I am Kathleen Hamill, a voter in Fulton

County. I am here on behalf of the Georgia

Democracy Task Force. We seek to support the

rule of law in the context of elections. We're a

group comprised largely of lawyers and concerned

citizens. Thank you for considering the written

remarks that we have submitted to you.

Related to these two proposed rules in particular on tabulating results, we'd like to express opposition to these rules. If enacted, we are concerned that they would unnecessarily complicate --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (indiscernible)
MR. FERVIER: Yeah, but it's garbled.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Shoot. Now I lost -MS. HAMILL: Can you hear me? Can you hear

THE BOARD MEMBERS: (nodding)

MS. HAMILL: Okay, thanks. We're concerned about these rules unnecessarily complicating the election administration process. And we have concerns that they run contrary to Georgia law as well. They potentially will burden election --

election workers because, as you know, they relate to tabulating results and certification.

In particular the rule proposed,
hand-counting of ballots at all polling locations
at -- before closing, really raises concerns
because that adds another level of work and of
potential issues related to security, related to
chain of custody. And we feel that this is
unnecessary and -- and does not serve the stated
purpose of -- of bolstering voter confidence and
the integrity of our elections. As for the
second proposed --

(Background voices)

MS. HAMILL: -- rule, this raises issues related to overreach of individual board members' authority. And the law actually does not grant individual members the -- the power to require or summon poll officers to examine each and every document that they might choose.

(Background voices)

MS. HAMILL: And just in closing, I wanted to make reference to -- sorry there's some background noise. So I'm having a little bit of -- hearing some --

(Background voices)

MR. FERVIER: Somebody -- can you hear,
Dr. Johnston?

MS. KING: It looks like we muted everyone. Probably should just mute everyone except for the speaker.

MS. HAMILL: Sorry, I was muted and I just unmuted myself. I hope you can hear me.

MR. FERVIER: We can hear you, yes.

MS. HAMILL: Okay, thanks. I don't want to repeat myself but I guess the main point here is that there's -- we, as the ABA Georgia Democracy Task Force, are concerned about two rules in particular related to tabulating results that potentially could complicate and -- and undermine election integrity. And again specifically on the rule related to certification, it does not include any substantive qualifications or time limits on document requests made by individual board members which already is an inappropriate overstep of the role of individual board members under the Georgia election code.

I want to make sure I'm not taking up all the airtime here. I know there are a lot of people who want to speak. But I would just say thanks to the board members for your service.

Thank you for considering our written comment which I think lays this out very clearly and appreciate again all of your work. Thanks.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you very much.

The next individual to speak before us is Jennifer Moore.

Alexandra, if you'd turn on Jennifer Moore's.

MS. MOORE: Good morning.

(Cross-talking)

MS. MOORE: Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. MOORE: Thank you. Thank you. Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. My name is Jennifer Moore. I'm a licensed practicing attorney here in Georgia, and I'm a former adjunct professor of legal research, writing, and appellate advocacy at Emory School of Law.

I'm here today with the Georgia Democracy
Task Force also. As a lawyer, I've spent many
years analyzing statutory language and applying
rules of statutory construction and also learning
from state and federal courts who do the same.

The proposed amendment to rule

183-1-12-.12(a)(5) seeks to inject a hand-counting requirement at the precinct level. I urge this board to reject this proposed amendment as it is inconsistent with this board's statutory duties as described by O.C.G.A. 21-2-31 and other Georgia election laws.

2.1

Part 2 of O.C.G.A. 21-2-31 specifies that any rules and regulations this board adopts must be consistent with the law and conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections. This proposed amendment is inconsistent with existing Georgia law which specifies in great detail the methods for counting paper ballots at tabulating centers and not at precincts.

The glaring absence of any such ballot-counting instructions or procedures at the precinct level indicates that the General Assembly did not intend that counting of paper ballots could be required to take place there.

The proposed amendment also conflicts with the part of the General Assembly's SEB 202 which requires that vote tallies be submitted by 10 p.m. on election day. Requiring the hand-counting paper ballots multiple times at

precincts will lead to delays that make compliance with this deadline improbable.

Finally it's important to note that the poll managers' oath in O.C.G.A. 21-2-94 pertains to allowing properly registered citizens to vote and not vexatiously delaying or refusing to permit such persons to vote, not hand-counting paper ballots.

This amendment could prevent poll managers from fulfilling their oath because lengthy counting requirements could lead to missing deadlines and thus the disenfranchisement of every voter at a particular polling place.

MR. FERVIER: Thank -- thank you.

MS. MOORE: In conclusion --

MR. FERVIER: Appreciate --

MS. MOORE: Okay, thanks.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you.

Our next -- our next speaker will be Marisa Pyle.

Ms. Pyle, are you available? Marisa Pyle?

MS. PYLE: Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes. Ms. Pyle, please begin.

MS. PYLE: Awesome, thank you. My name is Marisa Pyle. I'm the senior democracy defense

manager at All Voting is Local Action. I'm here today to join both previous commenters as well as the hundreds of Georgians who submit written -- written comments and opposed to the Grubbs proposed revisions to 183-1-12-.12 which would dangerously undermine the statutory requirements for election boards to certify and transmit election results to the state.

For meeting after meeting this board has heard from legal experts, election administration advocates, and elected officials that this proposal in conjunction with the Heekin proposal that has already been passed by this board would make it more difficult to certify results after an election, create legal jeopardy for counties, and it risks undermining public trust in election results.

Much has already been said about the risk that this rule poses to certification of elections itself and as well as those who brought this rule as reported over the weekend by ProPublica. It has the potential for individual precincts to be targeted for exclusion from certified results for single discrepancies that may be real or perceived or imagined and as small

as a single error among thousands of votes.

The exclusion from an entire precinct from certified results risks disenfranchising thousands of voters from the process, putting their constitutional right to vote in serious legal jeopardy. This is not even to mention the direct conflict that this rule poses with Georgia code which states clearly that even if there is an error, that shall not stop the canvass and certification process.

Additionally, the provision that provides for examination of all election-related documentation created during the conduct of elections creates a risk that makes documents wholly unrelated to results themselves used for excuses for noncertification. These documents could range from training manuals to hiring documents to poll watcher credentials, meeting minutes, polling place agreements and much more, all potential bases for claims of, quote/unquote, discrepancies by anyone who is seeking to undermine faith and legitimacy of our election results.

Georgia law and election experts are clear this rule must be rejected to protect the best

interests of voters, election workers, and our democracy. And I urge you to vote accordingly. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Pyle. I appreciate that.

Our next speaker is Betsy Shackleford.

MS. SHACKLEFORD: Okay. Can you hear me? Hello? Hello?

MS. KING: We can hear you.

MS. SHACKLEFORD: Oh, okay. Nobody responded. Okay. Once again, being called a pit bull for Donald Trump exposes a deep partisanship that has no place on the state election board. Those three uber-partisans should resign from the board immediately. But of course they will not. The three proposed rules for tabulating results are part of Trump's MAGA playbook for throwing the election into disarray.

These rules do not assist in transparency.

They are administrative burdens to poll

workers -- workers already under the gun to

deliver quite a lot of paperwork, results, media,

and equipment on a tight time crunch.

Clearly the people proposing these burdensome rules have not been poll workers. As

a poll worker, I know that, for example, tying up three workers for paper counts is foolish and would expose ballots insecurely. The requirement to count ballots in stacks of fifty is silly. As a poll worker who has counted ballots by hand, it is much easier to get an accurate count with smaller stacks. These are just ill-informed attempts to gum up the works. That is what all three of these proposals are about: planned interference.

2.2

The purported reason is to, quote, prevent fraud. There is no widespread fraud. Stop legislating and rulemaking from paranoia fanned by rampant misinformation, in other words, lies. Thank you.

MS. KING: You're muted, John.

MR. FERVIER: Our next speaker is Cindy Battles.

Ms. Battles, are you there? Cindy Battles?

MS. BATTLES: Yes, sir, I'm here. Thank you so much for allowing me speak today. I apologize, I'm not sure why my camera's not working, but it is, as always, a pleasure to be in front of this board. I do want to thank each one of you for your service and decry any sorts

of violence or accusations that have been thrown around because I know that this is a tough job. However, I will say that I am concerned about some of the actions of this board particularly in the last couple of months.

I am going to ask this board as it continues to consider rules and petitions that it considers that it is funding a number of unfunded mandates making it more difficult for election administrators to run our elections in the ways that you say that you want them run which is in a fair, transparent, and obviously well-run manner so that we can have faith in our elections.

Further, actions like passing vague and poorly written rules about certification that do not make clear that counties must certify the elections is going to throw our elections into disarray. If we are going to pass those kind of rules, we need to make sure that that kind of language is included.

I did appreciate the chair's attempt to outline what election records could be called into question so as to help appease some of the confusion. But one of the things that this board is supposed to be doing is educating voters on

how our elections are run in Georgia. And instead it feels like you are doing the work of spreading misinformation and disinformation. And obviously some of that feels very partisan which is why I think we have a lot of what is happening in this virtual room and across the state today.

I would just like to ask the board to take those things into consideration as it votes today and let the voters of Georgia decide who should be our next elected officials instead of passing rules that make it more difficult for the people to be heard. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Battles. I appreciate you staying within your two minutes.

Our next speaker today is Linda Brooks Cooper. Ms. Cooper.

MS. COOPER: Yes. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes, I can. Please proceed.

MS. COOPER: All right, thank you.

Georgia's GOP-controlled state election board is poised to adopt a rule on today that would give county election board members an additional avenue to delay certification of election results, potentially allowing them to throw the state vote count into chaos this fall.

This rule is very concerning because it requires county boards to investigate discrepancies between the number of ballots cast and the number of people who voted in a precinct, no matter how minor. It bars counties from certifying the election tallies until officials can review an investigation of every precinct with inconsistencies and only in extreme rare cases affect the outcome of elections.

This requirement to explain every one of them and the litigation that goes around it could take far longer than the time allowed to certify the vote.

My name is Linda Brooks Cooper. I am not a lawyer. I am a registered voter in the state of Georgia, and I have voted in all general and primary elections for the last 30 years. I am a concerned citizen over your new rules added by the state election board.

First, let me remind you what others have said. There were over 60 cases on behalf of the GOP candidate for president in 2020 that did not come to fruition. I am concerned that the three poll workers to count ballots on elections night to make sure they match the number about by

recording -- by the voting machine. This will 1 2 delay our election results. And in Fulton County alone, there were 527,000 votes that were cast. 3 Counting in packs of 50 will suggest that one 4 5 poll worker will have to put in a staggering number of hours which is unnecessary to the 6 7 taxpayers. 8 And then again --9 MR. FERVIER: (indiscernible) --10 MS. COOPER: -- I want --11 MR. FERVIER: Ms. Cooper --12

MS. COOPER: -- to point out that this rule that refers to reasonable inquiry, there is no definition by the board of what a reasonable inquiry looks like. There is no guidelines and no suggestions.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Cooper.

MS. COOPER: (indiscernible) election deniers. Thank you.

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MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Cooper.

Appreciate your comments.

The next presenter is Rachel Lastinger.

Ms. Lastinger, are you online?

MS. LASTINGER: Yes, good morning. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes. Please start.

MS. LASTINGER: Good. Thank you. So the ACLU of Georgia's voter access project works to ensure voting is easy and accessible for all Georgians. And today I urge you to reject the petition to amend rule 183-1-12-.12, addressing the process of certifying election results and the petition to amend rule 183-1-12-.12, addressing hand-counting ballots in polling places.

The proposed amendment addressing the certification process is unreasonable and has the potential for great harm to our democratic process. This rule significantly threatens counties' ability to certify election results by introducing an unnecessary and vague reconciliation process before all votes are counted.

The current certification process in Georgia has been successful in ensuring that correct and accurate results are reported. Additional requirements are completely unnecessary. The proposed rule does not specify the election-related documents that must be provided to county board members allowing for a

significant burden on election staff to prepare documentation on demand.

The petition as it stands is void under Georgia law because it allows actions by board members outside of the scope of their authority under the code. Its purported purpose is to ensure that counties, superintendents, and boards of election follow the required procedures and can uniformly, properly, and lawfully fulfill their duties. It calls for actions that is beyond the limits of that board's legal authority delineated by the Legislature. The proper way to change a scope of board power is through the Legislature not the state election board.

The petition to amend the rule addressing hand-counting ballots in polling places requires a large input of financial resources and staff time. Neither (background noise, indiscernible) is fair. This petition is unnecessary and unreasonable and would only delay the process of announcing county election results by (background voices, indiscernible) additional steps to the chain of custody process in handling final ballots.

I also urge you to dismiss any petitions

that would enter into rulemaking today and moving 1 2 forward. Many of these petitions are outside the state election board's authority and would have 3 significant burden on counties. 4 5 Moreover less than 90 days out is far too 6 late to initiate a new ruling into the rulemaking 7 phase. And if a rule is passed this late, it 8 could lead to significant confusion for voters and burden local election administrators. 9 10 MR. FERVIER: Thank you. 11 MS. LASTINGER: International best standards 12 calls for significant change to be within one 13 year of an election. Thank you so much. 14 MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Lastinger.

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appreciate your comments.

Our next -- next speaker is Lynn Durham.

Ms. Durham, are you online? Lynn Durham?

Ms. Durham? One more chance. Ms. Lynn Durham.

Lynn, are you online?

MS. HARDIN: I see her. She's here.

MR. FERVIER: Is her mic off?

MS. HARDIN: Uh-uh. Her mic is (indiscernible).

MR. FERVIER: Ms. Durham, we can't hear you. We'll -- we'll come back to you. See if we

can -- if you can work out things on your end.

Our next speaker is Donald Sherman.

Mr. Sherman, are you online?

MR. SHERMAN: I am. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Is this Mr. Sherman?

MR. SHERMAN: Yes.

2.1

MR. FERVIER: Please proceed.

MR. SHERMAN: Mr. Chairman and members of the board, my name is Donald Sherman and I'm a government ethics lawyer whose mother and family have lived and voted in Georgia for more than a decade.

My organization, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington submitted a comment with the ACLU of Georgia and public rights project urging this board not to adopt the proposed rule permitting individual county election board members to examine all election-related documentation created during the conduct of elections prior to certification of results because it's contrary to this board's rulemaking authority under Georgia law.

Georgia already has a robust process for addressing election fraud. This rule could invite unnecessary chaos into that process. The

portion of this rule at issue, subsection 6, is contrary to Georgia law in two key ways.

2.1

First, the election code does not vest any power in individual members of county election boards but instead in any each county's, quote, election superintendent which is the majority of the board's voting members, not any one member.

Second, no Georgia statute grants even election superintendents an unconditional right of access to, quote, all election-related documentation created during the conduct of elections prior to certification of results.

Rather the election code provides that the voting majority of the county board must first identify a numerical excess in vote totals from the precinct before the board has any authority to summon the poll officers with any primary election papers in their possession.

The proposed rule improperly omits this statutory condition. This section if adopted could disrupt any county canvassing and certification empowering — by empowering individual board members to demand any election-related documents, even ones from different counties or that have no bearing on

2 abuse could sow doubt in Georgia's election and certification process, compromising the votes of 3 millions of Georgian's including my family. 4 5 We respectfully urge the board not to adopt 6 this proposal. Thank you. 7 MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Sherman. We 8 appreciate your comments. 9 Our next speaker is Kristen Nabers. 10 Ms. Nabers, are you online? Kristen Nabers? 11 Ms. Nabers, we can't hear you. Is your 12 microphone on? We'll come back to Kristen Nabers. Our next 13 14 speaker is Kristin Davis. Kristin Davis. 15 MS. DAVIS: Can you hear me? 16 MR. FERVIER: Yes, we can hear you. Is this Kristin Davis? 17 MS. DAVIS: Yes, Kristin Davis. 18 19 MR. FERVIER: Please -- please proceed. 20 Thank you. 21 MS. DAVIS: Hi. My name is Kristin Davis 22 and I'm a licensed and practicing Georgia 23 attorney. I'm also here with the ABA's Democracy 24 Task Force, and I wish to follow up on the task 25 force concern and opposition to the new

certification, all based on mere whim. Such

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hand-counting requirements of ballots in Georgia elections.

Regarding the uniformity of election practices and proceedings, implementing manual counting requirements would unduly burden the more populous precincts in counties. In fact, it would likely be impossible for all Georgia counties and precincts to uniformly comply with such requirements within the certification time frame prescribed by the General Assembly.

Additionally, there are already many other checks and balances in place that are more controlled, reliable, auditable, and accurate than any hand-count could ever be. This includes poll pads tracking the number of voters, ballot-marking devices tracking the number of votes, scanners tracking how many ballots have been scanned, and paperwork that requires poll workers to track each of those items and document the reason for any discrepancy. Not only are these checks and balances more accurate than hand-counts, they also allow for the protection and purity of the original ballots.

If the board has concerns about the lack of hand-counting at the precinct level, it can

following its statutory duty described in O.C.G.A. 21-2-31(6) which is to make recommendations to the Georgia General Assembly to address this issue. The General Assembly could then consider whether to impose such a requirement and how it can coordinate with its other election laws.

While everyone here presumably would agree that election integrity is paramount, the proposed "hand-counting of ballots" rule before you today will not further this goal. The facts in evidence are that this change is outside what the Legislature has mandated, (indiscernible) disrupting the chain of custody and inject unnecessary burdens and requirements into the process. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Davis. We appreciate your comments.

I want to go back to Lynn Durham. I see that Lynn is online.

Lynn, can you hear us? Lynn? Lynn Durham, can you -- can you speak, Lynn? We can't hear you.

All right, we're going to have to move forward then. The next speaker is Wanda Mosley.

Wanda Mosley, are you online?

MS. MOSLEY: Yes. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes, ma'am. Please proceed.

MS. MOSLEY: My name is Wanda Mosley. I am deputy policy director of Black Voters Matter.

I'm here today to speak out against these proposed changes.

You know, in preparing for this meeting, I wanted to go back and do some research to see if there had been any actual credible instances of voter fraud that resulted in the changes of any elections in our state. And I could find none.

And so that leads me to one conclusion, that these proposed changes, which have been noted are an overreach of this board's actual abilities, are all predicated on what those of us who love democracy call the big lie.

We know that this is another attempt to muddy, to cause confusion, sow chaos on elections in Georgia. We know that Georgia is a very important state for the upcoming presidential election. And your desire to make things more complicated for voters in our state is beyond frustrating and is beyond maddening.

But we all know why. We all see why. We

all understand why. You know it really is frustrating that with democracy on the ballot, you would think that this body would be concerned. You would think that this body would want our state to continue to offer free and fair elections, opportunities for folks to vote. But instead your actions suggest otherwise. But if it means you get a shout out from your supreme leader, well, then I guess that's what we are all here for, right?

I guess that's more important than the actual democracy in this country. It's more important than making sure that elections are counted using a system that, by the way, has worked for decades. Because again we have no credible instances where elections needed to be overturned.

Now, we do have indictments in Fulton County but those aren't because of voters. Those are, again, outside actors fueled by outrage, a tantrum by the former president who wishes to be a dictator. And so anyone who aids and abets that is obviously not someone who cares about democracy because you are wanting to just push your partisan agenda and you want to support the

1	partisan outrage by your former leader.
2	MR. FERVIER: Ms. Mosley
3	MS. MOSLEY: So I close today saying that
4	I'm frustrated by your actions. This is not in
5	your purview, and you should not be interfering
6	in the way elections are tabulated. Have a good
7	day.
8	MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Mosley. Thank
9	you.
10	DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair.
11	MR. FERVIER: The next yes.
12	The next speaker is Janice Swaney.
13	Ms. Swaney, are you online? Janice Swaney?
14	Ms. Swaney, are you online?
15	All right. We'll go to the next speaker.
16	The next speaker is (background sounds) Anita
17	Tucker.
18	Ms. Tucker, are you online? Anita Tucker?
19	MS. TUCKER: Can you hear me?
20	MR. FERVIER: Yes. Is this Ms. Tucker?
21	MS. TUCKER: This is Ms. Tucker.
22	MR. FERVIER: Ms. Tucker, please proceed.
23	MS. TUCKER: Thank you. My name's Anita
24	Tucker. I'm the assistant secretary for the
25	Forsyth County Board of Registration and

Elections.

2.1

The new proposed rule change to 183-1-12-.12, tabulating results, that requires each precinct to hand-count paper ballots after close of election night is useless (indiscernible) busywork.

Understand that poll workers arrive at the precincts at 5:30 a.m. on election day. The odds of a hundred and fifty-nine counties getting the hand-count right first try after 7 p.m. is zero. It is unreasonable to expect this of poll workers. The paper ballots are backup to the scanned ballots. The scanned vote count is what is considered the official vote count. Counting the paper is inconsequential on election night.

And members of GAVREO are the elections experts in Georgia. They can provide this state election board with the best solutions to the perceived questions that these new rules are attempting to answer. Consistently -- consist -- consistently since the 2020 election, new elections legislation and rules have been pushed down to county elections officials every single year. Funding has been restricted, recruiting poll workers and staff has become more difficult.

Burnout is a serious problem.

Of the 61,000 plus voters challenged in Forsyth since the 2021 Senate runoff, only 1,152 have been canceled at the county level. That is 0.2 percent. Not a good return on a time and resource invested in this effort.

The current version of the Georgia election code is 606 pages long. That is the guideline the county elections officials must navigate to ensure fair and legal elections. Perhaps time better spent on updating this antiquated rulebook full of contradictions and vague requirements. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Tucker. We appreciate your comments.

The next speaker is Joseph Kirk. Mr. Kirk, are you available? Joseph Kirk?

MR. KIRK: I am -- I am here.

MR. FERVIER: Okay. Mr. Kirk, please proceed.

MR. KIRK: Thank you. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the election supervisor from Bartow County. I've been in this position since 2007. And I am the -- and I am also a member of the Georgia Association of Voter Registration and

Election Officials.

I am here today to speak in opposition of rule 183-1-12-.12 regarding certification. One, the deadline in that rule of 3 p.m. does not match the deadlines in law. But other GAVREO members will speaker on that.

What I'm more concerned about is the impression that the rule gives that the board has more authority that it does. The rule restates the code but leaves out some important language.

It says the board shall (indiscernible)
justly but leaves out regardless of any
fraudulent or erroneous results presented -brought to him or her. Regardless is defined as
without paying attention to.

So the board is required by law to (indiscernible) votes justly without paying attention to any fraudulent or erroneous results, but then to report their findings of any kind of fraud or erroneous results to the district attorney for the DA to do their job. We -- that omission seems to be very telling and gives -- seems to grant the board more authority than they legally have.

The other things to talk about is the rule

creates more questions than answers. You know, one example is that the majority of the procedures in the code were written for older sorts of voting systems -- mechanical voting machines or hand-marked hand-counted paper ballots -- and matching our -- our -- these -- our current procedures to those code sections creates a lot of confusion.

Most of all our tabulation, aggregation, comparison happens through the voting system now and then we go back and double-check it through other means that the poll workers report to us. And there's a lot of work that goes into that. We're happy to share that work with y'all and explain how things work with the current system, but this rule has to take that into account.

The last one I want to mention is that I regret I'm going to speak in opposition to this. We desperately need rules on certification and precertification procedures. This one just isn't it and does not answer the question we need to answer.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you --

MR. KIRK: But thank y'all very much.

MR. FERVIER: -- Mr. Kirk. Thank you,

Mr. Kirk.

All right. Ms. Durham, I can see you online, but I can't hear you.

MS. DURHAM: Can you hear me now? Can you
not --

MR. FERVIER: I can hear you now,

Ms. Durham. I can (indiscernible) -
(Cross-talking)

MS. DURHAM: I'm sorry about that. When the (indiscernible) got turned off, it turned off my mic too and I had to switch to phone.

MR. FERVIER: Please --

MS. DURHAM: I'll be very quick here. I'm

Lynn Durham. I'm a registered Gwinnett County

voter and I vote regularly. I represent the

majority of Georgians. Rather than Republican or

Democrat, we're in the middle. Sometimes we vote

one way, sometimes we vote another. We base our

votes on policies as well as characteristics such

as vision, courage, strength, integrity,

leadership, and empathy.

In 2020, a candidate tried to steal the presidential election in Georgia, but our honorable Republican Secretary of State upheld the sanctity of our vote. Because of this, our

Republican State Legislature installed three election deniers to the board even though recounts by Republicans in state after state found that the Republican had lost the presidential election.

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Out of nearly 400 voting irregularity complaints that this board examined, five were found valid and noncitizens were not found to be voting. The audience may also be interested to know that the Heritage Foundation, a bastion of ultra right-wing politics, maintains an election fraud conviction database. That database shows that since 1991 an average of only 33 cases of fraud per year have been convicted, in no way sufficient to change the course of a presidential election.

Today the board seeks to institute a rule that relies on the word "reasonable," an inherently subjective word without defining what that means in this context. To someone in Atlanta, an hour in traffic might seem reasonable while someone from Plains might think that's crazy. To bulldog fans, an eight and oh conference season is reasonable. For Yellow Jackets, it might seem a dream.

It's clear to see that refusal to define the term "reasonable" is a recipe for chaos that this board surely would want to avoid. Here's another example. I guarantee that if I gave each of these board members 5,000 paper ballots to count and compare results, the reported results would not match. They wouldn't be off by much, not enough to throw an election, and yet we're being asked to accept that absolutely no difference between comparisons is reasonable. I reject that.

Patrick Henry said the Constitution is not an instrument for the government to restrain the people. It is an instrument for the people to restrain the government. And yet Georgia's leaders have continually sought to restrain the voting franchise of its citizens and our state government continues to defund safe and fair elections.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you.

MS. DURHAM: The eye of Georgians are on this board. The eye of the world is on this board. And more importantly history has its eyes on you. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Durham, we

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appreciate -- appreciate your comments.

I'm going to go back to Kristen Nabers.

Kristen, are you online? Are you available

Okay, Janice Swaney? Janice Swaney? No? All right. Rebecca Anglin? Rebecca Anglin?

MS. ANGLIN: Hi. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes, I can. Is that you,

It is.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, please --

MS. ANGLIN: Good morning. Thank you, Chairman.

Good morning. My name is Rebecca Anglin and I'm the election director for Greene County. I have worked in elections for 24 years and have served as a poll worker and elections technician, state election employee, and director for two counties as well as a board chair. And I am a member of GAVREO.

I'm speaking in opposition today of rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5), hand-counting ballots. One of the top priorities on election day is security and chain of custody of the ballots. My concern

with this proposed rule is that the chain of custody could be compromised with ballots being handled by so many individuals on election night. At our precincts all items, including equipment, must be removed and cleaned out on election night. Many counties are (indiscernible) and picking up equipment and such the next day. What happens when ballots from hand-counted counting are mistakenly left behind and the cleaning crew comes through the next day and discards them? I would have no idea of this.

Currently ballot boxes are locked and sealed and returned to our office. If by chance ballots are mistakenly left in the scanner or the write-in bin, we have the -- we have them in our custody and our staff are able to retrieve them in our office which is a controlled environment.

I humbly ask that a compromise be made in this matter or that I myself work with the writer of this rule or a member of the state election board to reach a reasonable resolve.

I thank you so much for your time today.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Rebecca. We appreciate you.

The next person to speak will be Deidre

Holden.

Deidre Holden, are you online?

MS. HOLDEN: Yes. Good morning. Can everyone hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes. Please proceed.

MS. HOLDEN: Thank you. I'm Deidre Holden.

I'm the elections director for Paulding County.

We are currently serving 135,790 voters. I've worked in elections for 20-plus years and I'm also the past president of the Georgia

Association of Voter Registration and Election

Officials. I love elections and I was called to be a public servant and I take this very seriously.

If you pass rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5), you will be setting 159 counties up for failure on election night. You will be responsible for the delaying of the results in the most crucial election that has been conducted in the state this year. The Paulding County Board of Elections agreed that we will hire an additional 132 poll workers to come in after the polls close to count the ballots.

You're looking at poll workers who have been there for over 15 hours that are fatigued and not

thinking correctly. So we wanted to do this to get the best results and do it the best way. However, the additional cost to our county will be \$7,000. Could be more depending on the number of ballots that we have. Some counties, due to their already strained budgets, will not be able to afford this.

I'm here to ask you to please consider that the count be completed prior to state certification. Ballots will be counted in our office, a controlled location with monitors.

In closing I would also like to suggest that this board create an election support committee to assist the state election board in future endeavors so that the state election board and election officials will have a team that can ensure the voters of Georgia that they are conducted fairly, securely, transparently, and with the most — the utmost integrity for the voters of our state.

We will be here to answer any questions if you need us and I appreciate your time. Thank you so much.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Holden. We appreciate your comments.

The next speaker is Travis Doss. Is Travis Doss online?

MR. DOSS: Hello, chairman. Can you hear
me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes, I can. Please proceed, Mr. Doss.

MR. DOSS: Yes, hi. Well, thank you, chairman and the SEB members for allowing us an opportunity to speak. I, too, am an elections director. I am currently the elections director from Richmond County. I have been in elections for the past 29 years, and I am currently serving as president of the Georgia Association of Voter Registration and Election Officials.

(indiscernible) are those comments from my other members who are over 500 members strong. We are in opposition of 183-1-12-.2[sic](a)(5) regarding the hand-count. It is not that we are against hand-counting ballots. We are against the potential of the chain of custody being broken when those ballots are removed from the ballot box and spread out over tables after being in a secure ballot box and locked. We would rather seal those ballots up and then be able to -- if -- if counting is necessary, do it in a

controlled environment rather than at the polling place where mistakes can be made.

The reason that we use electronics nowadays is because we use technology. We do not count money by hand. We use hand -- we use money counters. We do not add up in our heads or an abacus. We use calculators. So there is a reason that we trust the scanners to give us the accurate numbers.

Also speaking out against 183-1-12-.12, the certification. The 3:00 required meeting by board members is in direct contrast to state rules and state laws. Both of those allow voters to allow their absentee ballots and the provisional ballots to be cured and/or counted by 5 p.m. A meeting prior to 3 p.m. will result in vote totals being inaccurate and then lead to the possibility of undermining the public trust during that election process.

Then the final rule being proposed today 183-12[sic]-12(e), posting the reconciliation report, that rule is poorly written. Not all election offices have a website where they can post those rules. I would recommend -- or I would suggest that all rules be suspended 90 days

prior to any election just like federal law has us reserve the voter registration rolls.

Thank y'all very much for your time and for listening.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Doss. We appreciate it.

Our next speaker today is Tonnie Adams.
Tonnie Adams?

MR. ADAMS: I'm here. Yes, sir.

MR. FERVIER: All right. You're up and please proceed.

MR. ADAMS: My name is Tonnie Adams. I'm a member of the Georgia Association of Voter Registrars and Election Officials and the election supervisor in Heard County.

I wish to express my opposition to the amendment to SEB rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5) concerning the hand-counting of ballots at the precinct. While we appreciate the intent of the rule -- the rule change and accounting for ballots at the precinct, the proposed change will potentially delay the reporting results on election night.

The General Assembly has passed laws that make it clear that they prioritize timely results

to be reported on election night. Any prolonged delay in reporting results creates doubt and sows mistrust with the results reported from precincts. Requiring the ballots to be hand-counted three times will delay results in precincts that have large turnout on election day. There are counties throughout the state that will have more than 2,000 ballots to be counted, and some may have as many as 5,000 to 6,000 ballots on election night.

These precincts will see a prolonged delay of two to three hours or more before they can finish their returns and report results. If the priority of the state election board is to have timely results on election night, then we ask that you vote no when this issue comes before you. Listen to your election officials. We are the experts and will be the individuals responsible for enacting this rule.

And finally, the amendment to SEB rule 183-1-12-.12, concerning certification, we ask how can we begin the certification meeting before the deadline for a cure of absentee ballot, UOCAVA ballot submission, and provisional ballot approval? The numbered list you refer to in the

amendment will change during the two hours after
the board convenes. Until 5 p.m., the board
cannot make a final determination of the exact
number of ballots that were cast that will be
counted. Some absentee ballots cast will be
rejected because they were not cured, and some
provisional ballots that were cast will be
rejected because the board of registrars has
decided they will not be accepted.

We ask that you work with your election
officials to craft a rule that clarifies state

We ask that you work with your election officials to craft a rule that clarifies state code rather than introduces a meeting deadline that has no basis in law. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you very much, Tonnie. We appreciate your comments.

The next speaker today is Konrad Hayashi.
Konrad Hayashi? Hayashi?

DR. HAYASHI: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

MR. FERVIER: I'm sorry if I butchered your
last name. I'm trying my best.

DR. HAYASHI: I sometimes joke that it's
Smith but it's spelled funny.

MR. FERVIER: Well, we'll call you Konrad Smith.

DR. HAYASHI: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: Please proceed.

DR. HAYASHI: Okay, certainly. I am

Dr. Konrad Hayashi, navy captain retired. I've

been a DeKalb County registered voters since 2008

after over 30 years active duty and just before

starting at the CDC.

Like so many others, I urge you reject the petitions revising rule 183-12-02[sic] that would enable overreaching discretion in investigation and hand-counting of ballots. The proposed alterations are highly objectionable because, first, it contradicts existing Georgia state law requiring that county officials, quote, shall certify results, unquote, with precedent set for over a century.

Second, alteration would grant undue license to members to investigate all documents and perceived discrepancies following the subjective extremist partisan perspective indefinitely. This would sabotage certification and would disenfranchise voters.

By the way, even the Heritage Foundation previously found Georgia to have among the highest election integrity measures in the country.

Third, Georgia code powers and duties, 15(b), states that the board of election oath includes, quote: And that I will at all times truly, impartially, and faithfully perform my duties, unquote. Adopting the alterations would have board members betraying their oath.

Fourth, no confirming factual evidence was found despite millions spent to find proof of widespread voter fraud in Georgia and other states. To paraphrase the writer, Dorothy Parker: There is no there there.

The state election board would show profound cluelessness at best, election subversion at worse were it to adopt these unwarranted changes. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Hayashi. And thank you for all your service to our country. We appreciate that.

(Cross-talking)

DR. HAYASHI: (indiscernible)

MR. FERVIER: Thank you.

The next speaker is Pamela Reardon.

Pamela Reardon, are you online?

MS. REARDON: Hello, chair.

MR. FERVIER: Hello, Pamela. Please begin.

MS. REARDON: Okay. So I'm Pamela Reardon and I'm a voter and a citizen in Cobb County.

I, for the life of me, sit here and cannot understand all these previous speakers objecting to common sense rules that should be followed by every county. I myself was a poll watcher in Smyrna in '22. And the people at the end closed out the polls and the workers had plenty left over to pull out the ballots from the scanner boxes, put them in groups of 50 or however they were doing it, and make sure that that number is the same as the scanner number.

Now there's been so much misinformation, it drives me crazy. Marc Elias is a liar. I'm just going to say it. And all these democracy-something groups are lying, lying, lying. These rules do not do what they're saying. So that's what I wanted to say about that.

But I would like to know from

Mr. Raffensperger how many non-citizens were
removed from the Georgia voter roll that he
publicly made such a big deal about that he was
going to look at. Can somebody on this board get
that information? That would be great. And I

also wanted to know if the prison systems in Georgia are registering felons to vote because I just saw a recent article in Alabama. Wes Allen is the secretary of state there, stated that the Federal Bureau of Prisons were conducting registrations in his prisons and they are going through their rolls. So this has to be looked at, folks.

And, again, why don't we just go back and delete everyone off the rolls and have people turn up with their proof of citizenship, right? And their IDs of where they -- addresses where they live on election days and vote.

And to answer the question about what your duties are, I think Senate Bill 189 gave you the authority to make clear the rules that -- or the lies that they made, right?

MR. FERVIER: Ms. --

MS. REARDON: Because there's a little mud there. So you're just clearing it up. So thank you so much.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Reardon. We appreciate your comments. Thank you very much.

The next speaker is Michael Chermansky(ph).

And I apologize if I butchered that last name.

Michael Chermansky, are you online? Michael?

We'll move on. The next speaker is Pam Woodley. Pam Woodley.

Pam Woodley, are you online?

We'll try and come back to Pam and Michael.

Next speaker is Beth Hendrickson. Beth

Hendrickson?

MS. HENDRICKSON: Yes, Mr. Chair. I'm here.

MR. FERVIER: Good. Thank you, Beth.

Please proceed.

MS. HENDRICKSON: My name is Elizabeth
Hendrickson and I am a registered voter and
citizen of Cobb County. Election officials are
polite, professional, helpful, and patient
despite the long hours, high pressure
environment, and intense scrutiny. They have
performed their jobs with meticulous diligence
day after day.

The proposed board rule adding hand-counts at polling locations would unnecessarily burden election workers, introduce a new risk of human error, undermine current security protocols by having more hands on ballots, and introduce another point of potential confusion into the

process.

2.1

This rule would also take effect far too close to the upcoming election to ensure a smooth rollout as all these elections directors have mentioned, adding further stress and even greater likelihood of human error. Requiring the county boards to meet by the Friday following election day to review precinct returns, investigate potential discrepancies, and review all election related materials is unrealistic and conflicts directly with Georgia law requiring certification.

The statutory requirement to certify is not discretionary and should not be made so. Certification means that all procedures have been followed and the vote being reported is what came from the required documents. It's not asking anyone to sign something stating that they have personally checked and double-checked every number involved. Should there be evidence, not merely suspicion of an irregularity, there are already procedures in place to address them after the legally mandated certification.

Rules created by the Secretary of State's Office and this board are only intended to

clarify and operationalize state law, not change or contradict it. These two proposed rules go beyond or contradict the intent of state law and will add uncertainty and potential contentiousness into the process which will be detrimental to confidence in our electoral process.

Thank you for this opportunity to speak and for your role in keeping Georgia's election secure and accessible.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Hendrickson, for your comments.

The next speaker is Allison Pen -Prendergast. Allison Prendergast?

- MS. PRENDERGAST: Yes, sir. Can you hear
  me?
- MR. FERVIER: I can. Just one moment, please. I want to -- hit your reset. Please proceed.
- MS. PRENDERGAST: I'm Allison Prendergast, a registered voter in Gwinnett County. Ronald Reagan said: True peace rests on the pillars of individual freedom, human rights, self-determination, and the respect for the rule of law.

Based on that, I'd say we don't have true peace in Georgia because some members of this state election board do not respect the rule of law. Georgia law clearly states your duties shall be to establish uniform practices for election officials as well as legality in all elections and to establish rules that are consistent with law and are conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of elections.

2.1

This board has wasted time and taxpayer money to reopen issues that have already been settled. That's a misuse of power. Election lawyers, the board chairman, and even the state's top election official have all stated several rules recently adopted contradict state law.

Today the board is discussing adopting rules requiring county election boards to hand-count ballots and to meet the Friday after election day to review returns and allow for examining election-related documents, risking the chain-of-custody protocol. Again this conflicts with state law since it allows for ongoing review of documents well past certification deadlines.

Where else can people ignore state law and not face fines or liability? If ordinary

citizens did this in their own lives, they could 1 2 go to jail. The difference is, unlike an individual, when y'all ignore state law, it 3 doesn't just impact you. It throws the entire 4 5 state election process into chaos and chaos is the opposite of the rule of law and the orderly 6 7 conduct of elections. 8 But I have to say that's exactly why some of 9 y'all were chosen for this board. Thank you. 10 MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr.[sic] 11 Pendergra-- Allison Prendergast --12 (Cross-talking) MS. WOODLEY: Chairman? 13 14 MR. FERVIER: We appreciate your comments. MS. WOODLEY: 15 Pam Woodley is unmuted now. MR. FERVIER: 16 All right. 17 MS. WOODLEY: Thank you. 18 MR. FERVIER: Pam, please proceed. MS. WOODLEY: 19 Thank you, if that's okay. 20 I --MR. FERVIER: 21 Yes. MS. WOODLEY: -- I wasn't unmuted before. 22 23 Okay. Yeah, I'm also going to talk about the 24 manual counting of ballots requirement. If you

all were poll workers, you would know that this

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is a ridiculous, unnecessary, and harmful idea. You would know that we verify all machine counts are at zero at the beginning of the day and that the scanner is empty. We take pictures to prove all this and send them to the county. We reconcile the counts on the poll pads, voting machines, and the scanner every hour and send that to the county.

The worker manning the scanner watches that the count increases by one every time a voter feeds a ballot in. We complete dozens of forms documenting that everything reconciles at the end of the day.

But now at the end of a 16-hour day, you want to add a requirement that three of us hand-count thousands of pieces of paper that a machine has already counted. This is completely ridiculous.

I also heard you to reject the proposed rule regarding certification. I'm not an attorney or representing any organization. So I'm just going to say clearly this is driven by your belief in the con of voter fraud. People have been trying to prove this voter fraud con for four years and no one has succeeded and you will not succeed

either because this is America and in our great country you actually have to have evidence to prevail. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you very much, Pamela.

I appreciate you working with us on these technical issues.

The next person to speak is Michael Beach.
Michael, are you online?

DR. BEACH: I'm online. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: I can. Please proceed.

DR. BEACH: Okay, thank you. My name is Dr. Michael Beach and I have served as a poll worker and assistant poll manager in DeKalb County for almost three years now, since my retirement. The proposed rule to hand-count ballots at polling locations, as you've heard, is duplicative and unnecessary, could introduce more errors, and certainly will delay when ballots are delivered to the main office.

As we know confidence in elections is undermined when results are delayed. As a poll worker, we already check hourly for discrepancies between check-ins at the poll pads, voting at the touchscreens, ballot counts at the scanner.

In my precinct actually, we have tried

hand-counting of ballots and found that issues with count consistency are always due to human counting error. The scanner count has always been correct.

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The proposed rule for the county board's role in certification conflicts with Georgia laws, as you've heard, that require superintendent certification on the Monday after the election. Giving a hundred and fifty-nine boards discretion to hold up certification with ambiguous wording, allowing members to, quote, examine all election-related documentation could be used to delay election certification with potentially never-ending review of documents.

As we know, the U.S. has been embroiled in election chaos for four years now, questioning whether our election systems are secured.

Multitudes of lawsuits and accusations have proliferated, but at the end of the day those efforts have failed due to a total lack of hard supporting evidence.

As seen over the past four years also, adding more rules will never satisfy those who are convinced elections are not secure. It only emboldens them to submit more and more layers of

unneeded and potentially harmful changes. Even our elected Republican Secretary of State just published that these last-minute changes in election procedures undermines voter confidence and burdens election workers.

The election is coming up soon. Our election officials and poll workers need to be laser-focused. I ask that you deny these changes and allow the election to go forward unburdened, unstressed by these unnecessary last-minute changes. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Dr. Beach. We appreciate your comments.

The next person to speak is Kathleen

Kneeland. Kathleen Kneeland, are you online?

Kathleen Kneeland?

- MS. KNEELAND: Hello. Yes, I'm online.
- MR. FERVIER: Great, great.
- MS. KNEELAND: Yes. Thank you very much.

  I'm a registered voter in Forsyth County. And actually I had a whole lot of points to make, but I'm -- they've already been made several times.

  So I'll try to keep this brief.

And, first, addressing the whole delay of certification issue, this is been refuted legally

time and time again, not just recently in the four years following 2020, but literally for decades it has been rejected by the courts. And I just want to repeat a slogan that I've heard many times and that is: A definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.

And I don't see why Georgia would want to complicate certification once again to have it rejected once again.

Secondly, I think the hand-counting of ballots takes us back to the bad old days of potential ballot stuffing. This was a chronic problem in the days of paper ballots. And how we are now assuming that paper ballots are somehow more accurate than computers and electronics really escapes me.

But having said those two things, the main issue I'd like to raise now is one of cost. And that is how much are all these last-minute changes going to cost Georgia taxpayers? And I'd like to see a detailed cost analysis and answer to this question.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Kneeland.

MS. KNEELAND: Not to -- oh, sorry, thank

you for listening.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. We appreciate your comments, Ms. Kneeland. Thank you very much.

The next speaker is -- I apologize ahead of time on this one -- Matt Rowenczak. Matt Rowenczak, are you online?

MR. ROWENCZAK: I am. Good morning, board.

MR. FERVIER: Did I butcher your last name too much?

MR. ROWENCZAK: No. You did a pretty good job, chair. Appreciate that.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. Please proceed.

MR. ROWENCZAK: Good morning, board. So I wanted to express my support for the first three rules for final adoption as well as the two rules submitted by Ms. Lucia Frazier.

And one thing before I get into some of those rules is I think it's very apparent that there's been some shenanigans in this meeting because there's a couple of organizations that seems to have gotten potentially advanced notice for this meeting. When you do a virtual meeting like this -- right? -- it's all -- word gets spread on equal times -- right? -- when people have to physically show up in person to get

public comment -- right? -- there is a time and a
place. You don't have equal process when you do
this online.

I wanted to speak to the second rule from Ms. Sharlene Alexander. And that is it's pretty absurd that we have folks that are concerned about counting ballots to make sure that they match, right? So there are firms -- right? -- when you become an accountant -- right? -- and you're -- and, you know, people often joke and call you a bean counter -- right? -- because they go physically verify the inventory that matches the books. This rule is not controversial. It's basically a reconciliation. It's a process that has been done for years. Just recently the secretary of state guided our counties to not do it.

And for folks that think there haven't been any issues, let me remind them -- because some said they did a lot of research, well, apparently they didn't do much research because in DeKalb County when Michelle Long Spears in the Democrat primary in 2022, all of a sudden she went from roughly 3,000 votes to 6,500 after they counted. And a hand-count of the ballots would've caught

it.

So we have a lot of partisan activists that have given public comment, and people of common sense know that this is a good rule that's been in practice previously for many, many years.

Thank you for the time.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Rowenczak. We appreciate your comments.

The next person to speak is Jodi Lewis Lipsitz. Jodi Lewis Lipsitz? Are you online, Jodi? Jodi Lewis Lipsitz, are you online?

We will go forward to -- the next person will be Matt Weiss.

Matt Weiss, are you online?

MR. WEISS: Oh, can hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes. Is this Matt?

MR. WEISS: Yes. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MR. WEISS: Yes, it is.

MR. FERVIER: Please proceed, Matt.

MR. WEISS: I thank you, members of the state election board. I speak this morning on behalf of the Democratic Party of Georgia as its deputy general counsel in opposition to the comment regarding notice to rulemaking to amend

subject 183-1-12-.12, relating to tabulating results.

The proposed rule is problematic as it departs from its purported statutory authority, O.C.G.A. 21-2-493. The proposal rule would require boards of election to compare the total number of ballots cast to the total number of unique voter ID numbers and to determine the basis for any discrepancy.

Whereas, the proposed rule requires that all such discrepancies be investigated and resolved before certification, the statute requires that if error or fraud is discovered, quote, the superintendent shall compute and certify the results justly, regardless of any fraudulent or erroneous returns presented to him or her.

That's O.C.G.A. 21-2-493(i), with fraud dealt with by the district attorney or in subsequent litigation.

So what's driving this rule? A report published by ProPublica yesterday revealed that the rule is being pushed by the Election Integrity Network, a right-wing organization involved in challenging the legitimacy of elections led by Cleta Mitchell and the Election

Research Institute; a right-wing group led by
Heather Honey, the leader of the election monitor
team for Fulton County proposed at the last
meeting, and according to the New York Times, an
activist known for spreading conspiracy theories
about elections.

As detailed in the DPG's written comments on this rule, the rule ultimately further undermines the established legal principle in Georgia that the certification of elections is a ministerial duty of election superintendents which is clear from the plain reading of Georgia's election code and in precedent from the state -- the Supreme Court of Georgia dating back over a hundred years.

Thank you very much.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Weiss. We appreciate your comments, sir.

We're going to go back one more time and try some individuals that were unable to connect earlier: Kristen Nabers.

Kristen Nabers, are you online? We see you online.

Is Kristen Nabers' microphone off? It's enabled?

Ms. Nabers, are you online? Is your -- is 1 2 your mic off? Kristen Nabers? All right. Janice Swaney? Janice Swaney, 3 are you online? 4 All right. Michael Chermansky? Michael 5 Chermansky, are you online? 6 7 All right. Jodi Lewis Lipsitz? Jodi Lewis 8 Lipsitz, are you online? 9 Okay. That will conclude, then, our public 10 comment portion of the meeting this morning. 11 We'll go into procedure matters which are discuss 12 proposed rule amendments and -- and petition for board rules. 13 14 The chair would entertain a comfort recess of about five to seven minutes. Do we have a 15 motion? 16 MS. GHAZAL: So moved. 17 18 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion from member 19 Ghazal for a short recess. Is there a second? MS. KING: Second. 20 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second 21 from member King. Any discussion? Hearing no 22 23 discussion, all those in favor signify by saying 24 aye. Dr. Johnston?

DR. JOHNSTON: (indicating)

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1	MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal?
2	MS. GHAZAL: Aye.
3	MR. FERVIER: Member King?
4	MS. KING: Aye.
5	MR. FERVIER: The ayes have it.
6	We will now recess for approximately five
7	minutes and reconvene at 10:30 a.m. Thank you.
8	(Recess)
9	MR. FERVIER: We will reconvene the meeting
10	now after that short break which I appreciate
11	greatly.
12	We one of our callers from this morning
13	just informed us or one of our speakers this
14	morning just informed us that she is available,
15	was having some technical issues. So we'll begin
16	by hearing from Jodi Lewis Lipsitz for
17	approximately two minutes.
18	Ms. Lipsitz, are you online?
19	MS. LIPSITZ: I am.
20	MR. FERVIER: Good. Please please
21	proceed for your two minutes. And thank you.
22	MS. LIPSITZ: Good morning. My name is Jodi
23	Lewis Lipsitz. My legal name is Josephine for
24	whatever that's worth. Thank you to all the
25	board members and thank you for letting me say my

piece.

My earliest political memory is the

Kennedy-Nixon debate. I voted for the first time
in the McGovern-Nixon election. Never missed

voting in a presidential election since that

time. It's only been in the last few years that

I felt concerned that my vote might not be

counted. I vote by absentee ballot because these
days it is not easy for me to stand for any
appreciable length of time at the polls. Frankly
it's alarming that my vote could be determined to
be fraudulent at the whim of someone else.

I'm speaking up now because as Americans we deserve to have free and fair elections. We must not let anyone or any party take away this right which was won for me by the sacrifices of people like my father who served in World War II. He would be horrified at the situation in our country at present.

Elections in this country have worked relatively well and smoothly until the 2020 election. We don't need additional minders treating us as though we are toddlers. The system is not broken, and it does not need to be fixed. We must not interfere with this process.

We need to learn to discuss our differences with civility. We must put our country before party affiliation and be allowed to vote our own consciousness without fear that someone who does not agree with us will negate our vote.

Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. We appreciate -- appreciate your comments.

## Discussion and Voting on Proposed Rule Amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12

MR. FERVIER: The next portion of our meeting -- of our meeting today is procedural matters which the first item is a discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB rule 183-1-12-.12. This was a rule that was presented by Salleigh Grubbs, I believe, and Bridget Thorne.

The -- we've been presented with a list of speakers for this rule. We don't -- as we've done in -- in the meetings that we've had in person, we're going to try and limit the proponents of this rule to 20 minutes unless the board has questions for any of the speakers which the board is -- certainly can do that, can ask questions if they want to of these speakers.

So Ms. Grubbs has listed six speakers that she would like to speak on behalf of this rule. But we still would like to limit them to 20 minutes. And then if there is any rebuttal that the board would like to hear, then the board can ask for a rebuttal from anybody else.

I believe that Ms. Thorne will be presenting this.

Is that correct, Ms. Thorne? Are you online?

MS. THORNE: Yes. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes. Are you going to be the first of the speakers?

MS. THORNE: Yes, I am.

MR. FERVIER: Okay. Let me -- let me get set up here. Would you proceed, Ms. Thorne, please.

MS. THORNE: Yes. I am a Fulton County commissioner but I am submitting this form as a private Georgia citizen. I'm a former precinct manager of almost nine years, a Dominion poll technician, a poll watcher, poll trainer, and election integrity advocate.

I was out of last -- out of town last month, so I apologize that I couldn't present this rule.

But I'm thankful that Salleigh and David did such a far better job than I ever could. But I'm here now as the originator of this rule.

This rule is a common sense rule. Most people would assume that there is a reconciliation that the number of voters who voted would equal the number of ballots cast before certification. After all, it is stated in law that -- and this rule simply offers guidance on following the existing law.

Fact: Fulton County had to recertify the January 2021 elections, the November 2021 election, and the May 2022 election. And then they recounted the November 2023 election twice.

The current election director thinks that recertification is just part of the process.

That process means that you are disregarding law.

You certified not knowing that the account -- the count is true and correct the first time.

Fact: Last June Fulton County elections was forced to sign a consent decree that they double-scanned 3500-plus absentee ballots in the November 2020 election. Votes were watered down. They were suppressed. There was no longer one person equal one vote.

So what are you doing, state board? What place guards are you putting -- safeguards are you putting in place so that this would never happen again? Know your advocates here because -- they're advocating that: let's just keep it the same, it's all good. Who cares that people's votes were watered down?

I have an engineering background. I started working elections because I was amazed how broken and dysfunctional the election processes were. I thought I could make a difference. But I learned that most election directors do not have process management skills, auditing backgrounds, or experience outside of elections in the real world. They are — they are hired straight out of college or out of government.

In a nonelection world, common sense processes like this would be put in place.

GAVREO comments that the rule cannot change law, well, that will be addressed here by my expert attorneys that I have brought in. And the fact that they say that you -- it's ridiculous that they say you can't remove a ballot after it's been cast. Of course we know that. But we've come up with methods to prevent people's ballots

not being counted and that are being counted too often.

Even in 2020 the Secretary of State had to admit that 1500-plus people double-voted. 1500 people were turned in and prosecuted. Those 1500, I think, were put -- because a rule was put in place last minute that counties could go ahead and start tabulating absentee ballots early, people saw that their absentee ballots hadn't been counted. So they went ahead and went in and voted in person in a panic.

What are you guys doing to correct this? What are you --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's false.
MS. THORNE: -- (indiscernible).

I have here, since I'm not an attorney and
I'm taking notes from what you did, Mr. Fervier,
by having a CREW attorney come in, I have three
legal experts to present the rule. I have Hans
von Spakovsky, senior legal scholar at the
Heritage Foundation and a former member of the
Fulton County Board of Registration and
Elections; Ken Cuccinelli, former attorney
general of Virginia and president of the Election
Transparency Initiative; and Harry MacDougald, an

attorney, managing partner at Caldwell Carlson 1 2 Elliott and DeLoach and is a former member of the Fulton County Board of Registration and 3 Elections. 4 MR. FERVIER: Ms. Thorne? Are you finished, 5 6 Ms. Thorne? 7 MS. THORNE: Yes. 8 MR. FERVIER: Okay. We're going to leave 9 your mic on in case the board has any questions. 10 I have some questions about this rule after the 11 other speakers. 12 So we'll hear from Hans von Spakovsky first. MS. THORNE: Yes. 13 14 MR. FERVIER: Is he -- Mr. Spakovsky, are you online? Is his mic off? 15 16 MR. VON SPAKOVSKY: Can you hear me now, 17 Mr. Chairman? MR. FERVIER: Yes. 18 Yes, we can. Please 19 proceed. 20 MR. VON SPAKOVSKY: Good. Look, this rule 21 simply takes the statutory provision in -- in 22 Georgia law and sets out the common sense process 23 for putting it in force. 24 Now, I will tell you, Mr. Chairman and

members of the board, that while I work at the

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Heritage Foundation, I'm here independently on my own, presenting my own personal opinions. And while I've got a lot of experience in the administration of elections, most relevant, as Ms. Thorne said, is that I spent five years administering elections with the rest of my county board in Fulton County.

Reconciliation is probably the most important function of a board. You want to be sure that the number of votes you are counting matches the number of voters who came in, went through the registration verification process and voted.

Now, I've heard a lot of attacks on you, attacks on others, all kinds of politics brought into that. What I would say to you is you need to ignore all these partisan allegations you've heard. This is a matter of good government, not politics.

And those who say this will disenfranchise voters, that's just not true. What will disenfranchise voters is if a precinct counts 900 votes but when you check, it turns out a thousand voters came in. And for anyone who believes that kind of thing can't happen, I suggest you Google

what happened in Houston two years ago when it turned out that Houston lost until after the election 10,000 votes: 6,000 which were Democratic votes, 4,000 which were Republican.

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Again, this is not going to delay certification. If you look at the rule and if you look at the process set up, the common sense process, it says that if the error or discrepancy can't be resolved, then the board determines a just way of counting the votes and they go forward. That's clear in the statute. It's clear in the process.

Now, I've heard folks constantly say, Oh, this will delay results. It's true the public wants to get the results as soon as possible, but getting quick results does not overrule making sure you have an error-free election.

Again, that is the most basic thing that is the responsibility of election officials. And I can't think of anything worse for public confidence than for election officials to certify an election despite errors and omissions and discrepancies that they have not actually looked at and investigated.

I've heard it said that members of county

boards don't have the authority to do that, they don't have the authority to look at documentation and other things in the election. Excuse me, but under the law and certainly when I was on the board, members of the county boards of elections have 100 percent responsibility for elections in their county from the time people register to when they're voting to when the tabulation is occurring. What, they're supposed to carry out that duty without having access to everything that's going on? That makes no sense.

It is not any different from the responsibility that members of the board have to investigate and determine whether provisional ballots should be counted. That is an absolute obligation that board members have, as we all know, after elections. And how is that done? They have to do a complete investigation of an individual voter who said that they registered to vote, get all of the documentation involved to find out whether that actually did occur or whether an error was made by election officials.

I would tell you that unless an election official, a board member, has full confidence in the administration of the election, that it was

done without errors, they should not certify the elections.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Got to stay and count
all those paper ballots (indiscernible).

MR. FERVIER: Let's -- excuse me.

Alexandra, if you could make sure that everybody's comments are -- everybody's mic is turned off.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: After staying there
at 5:30 or more, do you want stay there --

MR. FERVIER: Mr. von Spavo -- I'm sorry.

I -- I undid mine. Would the speaker please turn your mic on, back on. We've muted everybody at this point.

MR. VON SPAKOVSKY: Yes, sir. It's back on.
MR. FERVIER: Good. Please proceed.
(Cross-talking)

MR. VON SPAKOVSKY: I don't want to take a lot of time more, I would say that the absolute obligation of every election officials is to make sure that you have a fair, honest, and accurate election. And what we want at the end of election day is that everyone is confident, including the losers, that the election was fairly, honestly, and accurately conducted.

You -- that is not going to happen unless election officials have the authority, the power, and the ability to reconcile and investigate any discrepancies and errors that occur. And that is the ultimate goal of all election officials.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. We appreciate your comments. Thank you very much.

Our next speaker would be Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli.

Mr. Attorney General, are you online?

MR. CUCCINELLI: I am. Not getting the camera opportunity. So you -- you get my radio persona, I guess. I appreciate the chance to speak to you all. I wish it were visual, but that's okay. I want to thank you first for the opportunity to speak and for the work you all do being on this board week in, week out, month in, month out, year in, year out.

And the -- you know, I've heard a lot of constructive comments on both sides of this debate. I've also heard some of the things that make it harder to do your job. And I just appreciate you all bearing up through all that and using your mind, using your brain, using your

time, exercising your discretion which leads me to my first comment.

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I -- I keep hearing this notion that your job or the job of boards of election is ministerial, the "shall certify" language. And I also see the code section relevant to this rule being, in my view, misquoted, particularly the -the tail end under (i). I heard at least one person sort of short the code section. Says if any or fraud is discovered, superintendent -which is board, where there isn't a superintendent -- shall compute and certify the votes, and they stop there. But the next word is "justly," which rather clearly implies that that board is intended and expected to use its judgment to determine on very short time frames what is the most proper outcome of the vote count in their area of responsibility. This is not a ministerial function. It's a very thoughtful, weighty function, and we appreciate you all engaging in your part of it here before ballots begin to be cast.

One of the reasons for the loss of confidence in 2020 was that the rules were changing while votes were being cast and after

that, often by courts, sometimes by unelected officials, secretaries of state -- yours is elected, not every state's is -- and that severely undermines confidence in an election.

So I appreciate you addressing a reconciliation subject before ballots begin to be cast so everybody knows the rules and how it will take place.

I think the honest analysis of the two sides of the debate with respect to this reconciliation rule are speed versus accuracy. And I would hope that this board will come down on the side of accuracy. And I would simply note that you are not actually sacrificing much in the way of speed except in rare instances where problems do, in fact, arise.

I've also heard allegations about concerns about fraud and so forth. In my experience -- and as attorney general I dealt with an entire state, not yours of course, although I was a Georgia lawyer first -- that it is awfully difficult to deal with problems after they occur rather than preventing them on the front side. Elections, the old saying, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," is probably

closer to an ounce of prevention is worth a ton of cure because of how difficult it is to deal with problems after the fact in the incredibly condensed time period we have.

Presidential elections are actually the worst because your state is just one of 50 plus the District of Columbia rather than being able to deal with it inside one state, dealing with only one state. For example, after the Abrams-Kemp race in 2018, it was just you all determining that outcome.

The reconciliation rule proposed here would flag serious problems at the earliest point in the process prior to certification. And if more ballots show up than voters, good grief, I would think anybody would want to flag and solve that problem as soon as possible. And that's what this rule does.

The opportunity to do that farther down the process gets more and more and more difficult.

And I don't -- I don't really want to dwell on 2020 at all because the other side was complaining in 2016 and we can -- it's whoever loses complains. So we want the best rules for everybody.

One of your speakers, I think it may have been Hans, said: We want the losers happy. want -- we want them to be able to be confident. This reconciliation rule provides an element of transparency and confidence that is very common to the business world, reconciliation and accounting for example, and a very clear red flag in the very rare instances when it arises. And I will tell you from my old prosecutor days the best way to avoid problems is to make it clear to folks that you will catch the problems and fix them. And where there is maliciousness, that being the minority of instances in my view, you will hold people accountable. And this rule allows that to happen more reliably than current practice.

My last comment would be the only election law case most Americans might know is Bush v Gore from 24 years ago, when Florida was truly incompetent, and the seven to two Supreme Court rule that legal standards needed to be the same across the state. And the charge of your body of obtaining consistent application of Georgia law is fulfilled by supporting the reconciliation rule so that standards and practices are the same

across the state. 1 2 I appreciate the chance to speak to you all on this rule. 3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. But I'm --4 5 that's what I was wondering --6 MR. CUCCINELLI: I appreciate it being 7 brought forward, and I will stay on and continue 8 to listen. 9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- should I look at 10 people who were maybe in July? It would a more 11 accurate count? MR. FERVIER: Thank you. Mr. Attorney 12 13 General, I apologize for that. We keep having 14 people join and you have to --MR. CUCCINELLI: That's no problem --15 MR. FERVIER: -- mute their mics --16 17 MR. CUCCINELLI: -- I understand. 18 MR. FERVIER: -- as they join. And so we 19 appreciate your comments. Thank you. 20 want to remain online in case the board has any 21 questions when -- when we're finished. MR. CUCCINELLI: Yes, Mr. Chairman, 22 23 certainly. MR. FERVIER: The next speaker is Harry 24

MacDougald. Mr. MacDougald.

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MR. MACDOUGALD: Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MR. MACDOUGALD: Are you able to hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes, we are. Thank you.

MR. MACDOUGALD: So good morning,

Mr. Chairman and members of the board. My goal here is to give you a guidepost for evaluating the argument about whether this rule is lawful in requiring precinct level reconciliation of voters, ballots, and ballots cast. And you can figure that out for yourselves by reading two statutes which are 21-2-70 and 21-2-423. And I'm going to call a couple of provisions of those to your attention.

Subsection (8) of 21-2-70 imposes on local election boards the duty that they shall inspect systematically and thoroughly the conduct of primaries and elections in the several precincts. So it's clearly within their statutory authority.

Then I'd like you to consider the oath of office that local election board members take under 21-2-70, subsection 15(b): that I will to the best ability prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying on elections and that I will make a true and perfect return of such primaries

and elections.

So the duty to certify a correct result is very clearly stated.

Now, as for the precinct level reconciliation, that is provided by the Georgia Election Code 21-2-493, subsection (b) requires precinct level reconciliation. And this rule applies that code section to the conduct of elections. I was on the Fulton County election board for eight years and precinct level reconciliation was required of every precinct in our county.

Why would this be something that needs to be reiterated in this rule? It is because in Fulton County we know that we had 3,930 duplicate ballots and we know that we had over 17,000 votes for which there were no ballot images. Those are significant irregularities that would've been caught by precinct level reconciliation.

And when it comes to the certification requirement, board members, when they certify, they are attesting that the results are correct. Georgia has a criminal statute that makes it a crime to submit a false document to the state or county government. That's 16-10-20. Board

members face legal jeopardy for certifying results if they are not accurate.

And so this rule will make the practice in the state uniform. Other speakers who are election directors described their procedures for reconciliation at the precinct level and they're to be commended for that. But the plain fact is that did not happen in Fulton County and we have had tremendous problems because of that and this will help solve that problem.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. MacDougald. I appreciate that. Once again if you would stay online in case the board has any questions for you.

- MR. MACDOUGALD: Yes, sir.
- MR. FERVIER: Ms. Grubbs, are you online?
- MS. GRUBBS: Yes, sir, I'm here.
- MR. FERVIER: Now, we've gone a little past your 20 minutes, but I think all of this is important. So if you would -- you and Mr. Hancock would be brief in your comments, then we can get to board questions.
- MS. GRUBBS: Yes, sir, I will be brief.

  You've heard from three esteemed legal scholars
  who know what they're talking about. What I will

add to the conversation is what a proper canvass is.

It's defined in the law dictionary as the act of examining and counting the returns of votes cast at a public election to determine authenticity. So proper canvassing is also cited by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. They wrote -- actually I have (indiscernible) on it. Chapter 13 for canvassing and certifying an election: Canvassing and certifying should be used together to ensure that there is accuracy. And I have heard from people -- and, you know, out of 27 public commenters, two were allowed in that were pro, the rest were against the rules. And some of those were from smaller counties.

I will say that in Georgia we are a diverse state and we have more populous counties. But even with that, our precincts are not overwhelmed with voters. And this is something that can be achieved on the precinct level without issue. And there was something key that one of the commenters said, is that the vote's contained in the QR code anyway and, like, there's an expectation that the paper ballots are not going to reconcile with the tabulated results because

that's where the vote actually is.

Well, we have to have assurance as Georgians that what we see printed on our ballot is exactly how the ballots are cast. And the only way to do that is by hand reconciliation on the precinct level.

So, Mr. Chairman, I -- I do appreciate you and the other members, but I would say that there has been an unequal presentation of comments today. And I would like to also express that the talking points from some of those organizations have been pushed down to the local levels, to our local boards of elections. We had a local board of election meeting in Cobb County the other day and some of the exact same verbiage is used.

And I would just ask that you not let that color or influence your decisions today because as you can see, everything that's been presented in this rule is in accordance with Georgia law, and it is also to support and defend those people who are certifying elections to give them confidence and the ability to raise their right hand and certify the election without breaking law in Georgia and without violating the Georgia Constitution.

So thank you very much.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Grubbs. I -- I have to make one comment that the -- that the -- it appears to be happening on both sides, the comments made, because I've receive hundreds of the very same e-mail over and over and over again. So I think that it -- both sides would be guilty of talking points. So ...

MS. GRUBBS: I hear you. I don't disagree.

MR. FERVIER: Yep.

MS. GRUBBS: (indiscernible) in entertaining those comments.

MR. FERVIER: It's been interesting.

And, Mr. Hancock, are you online? David Hancock?

MR. HANCOCK: Yes, sir.

MR. FERVIER: Like I said, we -- would you just take a couple minutes to make your points, please?

MR. HANCOCK: Yes, I would. And I would like to -- speaking -- I am a county board election member, but I'm not speaking on behalf of the board. I'm speaking on my own. And I just want to address some of the -- mention the talking points that were mentioned. Some of the

more misleading or perhaps indicated a
misunderstand -- stand -- understanding of the
law.

Previous speaker just recently pointed out that one of our duties as board members, 21-2-70, is to inspect, and systematically and thoroughly, these election results. But also importantly is the oath that we sign -- or the document that we sign from the Secretary of State's Office.

Mentioned this in the original presentation. But I take this very seriously.

It says once we certify -- it says: We, the undersigned board of electors, registrars, superintendents do jointly and severally certify that the attached election results summary is a true and correct count of the votes cast in this county for the candidates in the election in testimony whereof, we have un -- hereunto set our hand and ink the official seal.

And then another point that was made is that election board members who do not follow election law can be charged with not just a misdemeanor but a felony in some cases. And one other thing that I heard, and this is my last comment, they -- somebody mentioned that the board -- and

this is a true statement -- I am not the superintendent of elections. I am essentially one-third because we have a five-member board. It takes a majority to be the superintendent.

However, 21-2-72 says that the primary election records of each superintendent, registrar, municipal governing authority, and committee of a political party or body, including registration statements, nomination petitions, affidavits, certifications, tally papers, returns counts, contacts reports, and other documents in official custody, except the contents of voting machines shall be open to public inspection and may be inspected and copied by any elector.

So even if I am not representing the superintendent of elections, any elector is allowed to go and inspect these documents that we're asking to see.

So I will yield the rest of my time which doesn't look like there's any left.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. Thank you. We appreciate your comments.

We've heard from six members presenting this petition today. I think I'd like to open it up now to comments from the board. One thing I'd

like to do, I understand that member Jeffares has joined us by phone, but he has called in and is -- our director Coan and member King, I would -- I would prefer that member Jeffares call Alexandra Hardin, who's in the room with me. Since I have to verify the votes on my end, I'd rather be able to hear it myself. So if you'd ask him to please call our paralegal Alexandra Hardin, then I can actually hear his vote instead of having it relayed to me when votes are taken on these.

MR. CUCCINELLI: Mr. Chairman, this is Ken Cuccinelli. Can I offer --

MR. COAN: He said he --

MR. CUCCINELLI: -- (indiscernible) for
clarification?

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MR. CUCCINELLI: Just I know you all have different business to do. I just want to clear up that the reconciliation rule and the hand-count effort are -- are separate undertakings, that the reconciliation at the precinct level is, you know, in -- we're talking about a few different things because you have lots of business before you, but on the one

reconciliation rule, it does not include the 1 hand-count piece. That is held -- that is been 2 3 addressed separately. MR. FERVIER: Yes. Yes, that's correct. 4 5 have -- we have --6 MR. CUCCINELLI: Thank you. 7 MR. FERVIER: That won't be heard. 8 It's two different rules. 9 So, member Mr. Jeffares, are you online? 10 MR. JEFFARES: I'm online. I'm on the phone 11 with Alex. 12 MR. FERVIER: Great. I just wanted to make 13 sure that I could hear any comments and questions 14 that you had.

MR. JEFFARES: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: All right. Does the board have any questions for this team of presenters? We'll go in order of seniority.

Member Ghazal.

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MS. GHAZAL: Thank you. And I want to thank everybody who has presented this rule. It is important, and I don't think that anybody who has been involved in elections in Georgia would question the fact that a proper reconciliation and canvass effort is absolutely critical to the

outcome and to a proper certification and election process.

But what we're dealing with here is -- is very specific text of a very specific rule. And there are some very problematic portions of this. And I'm going to just address some of my questions openly for whomever would like to respond. My first question is the very first portion --

MR. FERVIER: Let me -- let me see.

So, Ms. Thorne, since you're presenting the rule, would you address the questions, or if you want to refer it to somebody else on your team, we'll let you do that. But if you would just kind of organize the answers for us.

MS. THORNE: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: Okay.

MS. GHAZAL: As a -- as an initial question,
who actually wrote this?

MS. THORNE: It was a collaborative team of people. I actually called for an audit in October of the absentee ballot processing system after we moved into our new facility in Fulton County. I wanted to make sure we had standard operating procedures in place to prevent

double-scanning which I'm encouraged. They're now double-scanning in batches of 50 and reconciling it with the number of people that they had voted.

I expressed this concern to numerous people, that how can we prevent things like this happening? How can we prevent this from happening again in the chaotic world when you have a pandemic and you have a hundred forty-seven thousand ballots coming through and you have ballots coming through on open carts? There was no chain of custody. I was a first-hand eyewitness to early voting tabulators with no chain of custody, zero, people dumping ballots on the floor.

I'm in conversations with lots of people in election integrity. I mentioned it -- Heather Honey was at our warehouse poll watching, I mentioned it to her, mentioned it to Dr. Jan, mentioned it to my board members, both Republican board members on the board. I talked at length with the other commissioners. I talk at length when I go to conferences with people all over the state.

So this is something that's kind of been put together on a collaborative issue -- a collaborative effort by numerous people, and numerous groups have had their hands in it. So I couldn't pinpoint it. I don't take credit for all of it, but I will take credit for trying to get something done to correct problems and come up with solutions. That's what engineers do. We come up with solutions for problems. And it's a problem I see. And this was just an effort to -- I'm -- I'm not -- I don't -- I don't write law language. I could write, okay, I see this, I understand this, but then I have lawyers and attorneys like Ken, Hans, and Harry to speak on it today.

MS. GHAZAL: Well, it seems to me a lot of this is driven by concerns over what happened in Fulton County, and this has to apply to a hundred and fifty-nine counties. One of my -- well, I'll list out several of my concerns and then hope to get some answers.

First is the fact that it requires a meeting to review precinct returns before precinct returns are even finished, and that seems to me to be extremely problematic because our UOCAVA,

which is our overseas and military ballot receipt deadline, isn't even until close of business on that Friday. And counties still have to process them to determine whether or not they meet the requirements and can be accepted. But you're requiring a meeting at 3 p.m., two hours before that deadline. So the returns aren't even finished at that point. So I'm really concerned that this is creating a heavy burden on counties and it's just going to complicate things.

The process -- the canvassing process begins on the night of the election. Actually even before then because the canvassing process begins when the early voting scanners are tabulated during -- during the day. It begins when the absentee ballots may be tabulated during the day.

That happens all the way through. But requiring a county to meet at 3 p.m., before the deadlines for provisional ballots, absentee ballots that need to be cured, and -- and our overseas and military ballots are even due necessarily, it's extremely problematic.

I'm also wondering how it is that "board" which is not defined anywhere in our rules -- because our rulemaking def -- definitions under

rulemaking can be found under 183-1-12-.02(1)(g). And that -- that defines election superintendent.

Do any of you have any idea how many counties are still using probate judges as an election superintendent?

MR. FERVIER: I believe it's approximately
twenty-five.

MS. GHAZAL: Right. This law -- this rule does -- in the way it is drafted will not apply to them. So if we're looking at creating standards, this doesn't create a standard because it defines "boards." We have at least one county that has a separate board of registrars and a separate board of elections. Again this rule, because it is not defined, it's not defined code, it is not defined under O.C.G.A. 21-2-2, the -- the body that has the responsibility for certifying elections is the superintendent, it's not the board.

The board -- the use of the term "board" here has no legal definition for it. So I don't see -- I don't understand how we can apply this the way it is written because this is the rule that was presented to us and this is an issue that I brought up the first time we saw it, but

nobody wanted to change it.

So I'm having a really hard time as an attorney understanding how you apply a rule when you are using terminology that does not have a legal definition.

- MS. THORNE: I will let Harry MacDougald answer that question. There have been law changes, recent law changes to make "board" acceptable.
- MS. GHAZAL: In twenty -- is that -- that -- I believe you're talking about the provision that requires counties to move to boards as opposed to using judges, but that doesn't apply until 2025.
  - MS. THORNE: All right, Harry.
- MR. MACDOUGALD: So if I would -- I think board member Ghazal is making the point that the rule might be -- it would be uniform if it referred to superintendents of elections rather than boards. That would be a -- I think a worthwhile change to make so that it's -- that it's uniform statewide.

The statute that I was referring to, 493 and 70, they speak of the superintendent. The superintendent of elections is either a board or a probate judge. So for the sake of uniformity,

they should be synced up. The statute and the rule should be synced up.

MS. GHAZAL: Thank you.

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MR. FERVIER: Any further questions, member
Ghazal?

I -- I have to respectfully MS. GHAZAL: disagree with Mr. von Spakovsky in terms of --I -- I apologize. I don't recall if it was Mr. Cuccinelli or Mr. von Spakovsky that suggested that the provision of O.C.G.A. 21-2-493(i) that says the board -- let me -- let me get it exactly right. If error or fraud is discovered, the superintendent shall compute and certify the votes justly regardless of any fraudulent or erroneous returns presented to him or her. That has been translated into -- into the rules as "the board shall determine a method to compute the votes justly" and leaves off the "regardless of any fraudulent or honest erroneous returns presented to him or her."

I do not read into that a grant of -- a statutory grant of authority for the board to exercise discretion here. And just as a thought experiment, one of the things -- Ms. Thorne -- Commissioner Thorne pointed this out, that there

were certainly occasions -- we've seen occasions in which a voter inadvertently would cast two ballots because they would cast an absentee ballot, they would see that it had not been processed, so they'd vote in person.

So that might end up -- might result in a precinct that had one more vote cast than unique voters. What would the board do in that instance? There's one more vote. In the past what has happened and the correct procedure is that that is reported out thusly, that the -- the actual vote totals are certified because there is no way to remove one vote or one ballot from that batch. If there is a -- if there's an election that that one vote would determine the outcome, it is up to a judge to determine the proper procedures at that point.

It is not the role of the county board to try to change vote totals. It is the role of the county board to certify vote totals and allow a judicial process to be triggered because an election contest cannot occur until those votes are certified.

And so that -- that is -- I -- I simply do not agree that the word "justly" is a grant of

authority to the county to exercise discretion in this case.

MS. THORNE: I'm happy to speak on that, but would anybody else like to speak on that?

MR. MACDOUGALD: I would like to speak on that, Harry MacDougald, for just a second. So board member Ghazal, the statutory structure for the role of election superintendents to tabulate, compute, canvass, and certify the returns implies discretion at virtually every level. And so it would be, I think, an error of legal analysis to focus on just one parenthetical phrase in subsection (i) to conclude that there's no discretion.

After all, the boards are expected to vote on whether they certify. And the fact that they're expected to vote necessarily implies that they're exercising discretion. So there's antecedent duty to come up with the correct number and then certify it. And if they find a discrepancy, they're to report it out. The hypothetical that you pose, the st -- we have to follow the statute on that.

And the statute says they shall certify the returns justly to the best of their ability. And

if they're not able to do that because of a discrepancy, then they're to report that to the district attorney and, you know, post their returns and then it goes from there.

The post-certification remedies are an inadequate substitute for the antecedent duty to get the numbers correct in the first place.

MS. GHAZAL: And I don't think we disagree. I don't think we disagree at all. I think that conducting a proper canvass and making sure that every vote is accounted for is absolutely critical. My concern is that some of the language that's being used is suggesting that superintendents have discretion to determine which votes are counted. And that is not the case, that -- the statute does not support that.

And I want to make sure it's very clear to all 859 people who are listening right now that that is not the case. The statute does not allow a county superintendent to determine which votes count. It is their duty, their legal duty, their lawful duty to count votes and to account for all of them. And nothing about this changes the 5 p.m. deadline on the Monday or I think in this November it's actually going be Tuesday because

Monday is a holiday. But nothing about this changes the absolute mandatory duty to certify at the county level seven days -- six days after the election. And nobody should have any mistake in that.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair.

MR. FERVIER: Yes. Are you done, member
Ghazal?

MS. GHAZAL: I am.

MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston, you're recognized.

DR. JOHNSTON: Thank you so much. First, thank you to everyone who said their comments. It's evident that -- that many, many people are interested in this rule petition and we appreciate all that.

I would differ with my colleague,

Ms. Ghazal, about counting every vote. And to

qualify that, that it is the duty -- it's the

authority and the duty of the board or the

superintendent to review and systematically count

every legal vote such that if the board or the

superintendent found that there were votes that

were made illegally, they -- they should not be

counted.

And so that -- that's part of the review, part of the canvass, part of the reconciliation such that if a tabulator that was given -- produced with 5,000 votes that were -- could not be verified or authenticated, than they would be called into question and it should be -- it should be justly determined at that time and corrected if necessary.

So -- and I would emphasize 21-2-70 in the code, that the superintendent or the board is to -- they're advised, they're given the authority and the duty to inspect systematically and thoroughly the conduct of the primaries and the elections in the precincts.

And I -- my understanding of this petition regarding the 3 p.m. Friday meeting is it really doesn't have anything to do with certification. It's just -- it's just by that point a review should be available and provided to the board members so that they can fulfill their duties. And the certification is still four days later at the county level. So I have no problem with the 3 p.m. Friday mention in this rule petition.

I'd also like to thank the lawyers that have so graciously given their time to give their

opinions of this. And I would like to enter into the record a letter from the Honorable J. Kenneth Blackwell that was to the board. And I'll read it very quickly.

2.1

(reading): My name is Kenneth Blackwell, and I'm chair of the Center for Election
Integrity at the American First Policy Institute,
AFPI, and a former secretary of state of Ohio. I spent much of my career working to ensure that
Americans are guaranteed safe, secure, and transparent elections that are accountable to the people and not corrupted by outside forces.
Raising American confidence in our elections is a critical piece of this mission. As a body responsible for implementing election integrity measures in Georgia, you have the task of ensuring that Georgia's elections are safe, secure, transparent, and accountable.

(reading): The proposed rule 183-1-12-.12 would establish standard procedures for counties to comply with the existing requirement that mandates reconciliation of any discrepancies between numbers of voters, numbers of ballots, and numbers of votes before certifying election results.

(reading): This already required -- this is already required under Georgia law 493(b) as mentioned by Mr. MacDougald. The proposed rule simply standardizes the implementation. The AFPI report previously identified thousands of discrepancies in Georgia alone that were never reconciled prior to election certification.

(reading): Moving forward we want to ensure that should a scenario like this arise again, the law is followed uniformly and correctly across all Georgia counties. The number of voters, number of ballots, and number of votes should all be the same. This is just common sense. Any opposition to this proposed rule is suspicious in nature as it opposes the simple principle of one voter casting one vote at one time, counted once.

(reading): Georgians need to know that their vote counts and their vote matters. They need to trust their elections. I encourage you to support the proposed rule, 183-1-12-.12 at your meeting.

Sincerely, the Honorable J. Kenneth Blackwell.

Mr. Chair, I have one more letter to -- to enter into the record. This is from Senator

David Perdue.

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(reading): Dear members of the Georgia
State Election Board, I am a long-standing
resident of Georgia and am writing to support the
proposed SEB rule 183-1-12-.12 which outlines the
standard procedure to reconcile the number of
voters with the number ballots before the final
count and certification are completed. This rule
is just common sense and similar to banking
disciplines used to reconcile financial accounts.
This proposed rule does not introduce a new
concept. It simply restates the existing
procedures the Georgia State Legislature has
already placed in the election code, O.C.G.A.
21-2-493(b).

(reading): The proposed rule also ensures that reconciliation actions taken across all 159 counties are being conducted uniformly as required by state and federal law. These proposed rules re -- this proposed rule requires counties to match the number of actual unique voters to the number of actual ballots counted. This assures one person, one vote, and will strengthen the integrity of the election process.

(reading): I believe that a disciplined and

fully implemented reconciliation process is 1 2 absolutely required to ensure accurate election results and that this reconciliation should be 3 completed before any vote count certification is 4 5 completed. I strongly urge the Georgia State Election Board to adopt this proposed rule. It 6 7 is absolutely necessary to assure the accuracy 8 and fairness of our election process. 9 Thank you for your consideration. Kindest 10 regards, Senator David Perdue. 11 MR. FERVIER: Any further questions, member 12 Johnston?

DR. JOHNSTON: Not at this time.

MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares, are you
online?

MR. JEFFARES: (indiscernible)

MR. FERVIER: Do you have any questions?

MR. JEFFARES: (inaudible)

MR. FERVIER: I'm sorry?

MR. JEFFARES: No.

MR. FERVIER: No? Okay.

Member King.

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MS. KING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I -- I don't have any questions, but I do want to make sure that I know something. As I'm listening to

everyone, I do feel like every concern is valid. We do take it very seriously. I've listened to both perspectives on this. That being said, a lot of the attacks that I'm hearing is centered around the idea that this particular rule or some of these rules that are being presented are being presented based off of us chasing some ghost that didn't exist or some conspiracy theory, some hypothetical. And I just want to make sure I note that several times it's been notated that there were issues that took place in the election cycle, particularly 2020, but then also elections that came following 2020.

That being said, this -- these issues have been noted by the Secretary of State's Office who are now saying that there were issues although that was not the case in 2020. We have a letter directly from the Governor to a citizen expressing that he also saw some major concerns that took place.

We -- we're -- we have evidence that there were issues in the 2020 election cycle. However, many of the opposition letters, e-mails, comments that have come are based in the conspiracy or hypotheticals that there could be issues going

forward, that there could be people delaying things, there could be these type of things. And so what I'm a little confused on is that you're asking us not to support these rules or some of these rules as they are because you assume that they're based in us chasing conspiracy theories while the opposition perspective is based in a theory that there could be something wrong going forward.

That being said, I think it's important that we address what we know occurred. And that's what we're doing by supporting this -- this particular rule.

MR. FERVIER: Any -- no questions member
King?

MS. KING: No questions. I've heard
everything.

MR. FERVIER: Okay. I will make a few comments and then we'll move forward with that. I do have several issues with this rule as it's written, although I'm sympathetic for what they're trying to do. As I've stated many times, I believe that the board of elections in each county deserves the right to review documentation that will help them certify and help them feel

comfortable with the results of the election.

In this particular rule, I see a couple issues, many of them member Ghazal has already stated. I see -- I believe it conflicts 21-2-419(c)(1) and 21-2-386(g) which allows three days after the election occurs in order for all of the votes to come in. And so I think -- I think it conflicts with that in that it's calling for a meeting at 3:00 on Friday.

I also have issues with the fact that not every county in Georgia has a board of elections. Some of them have a judge that serves in there. I believe paragraph 4, the last (indiscernible) of that where you use the word "counted." The statute says, "recorded" not "counted." And I think it's a little bit confusing that paragraph in itself when it says no vote shall be counted if discrepancies are presented. But the votes must be counted in order to identify discrepancies. So I think it's a little confusing there.

I think paragraph 5, it is the duty of the superintendent by statute not the board. And then I -- you know, I have a question for Ms. Thorne.

So we -- statute 21-2-493(k) in this rule requires that the board certify by 5 p.m. on the Monday following the election; correct?

MS. THORNE: Yes.

MR. FERVIER: And if that's the case, then if we have an election board member that refuses to certify for any reason at all, are they in violation of 21-2-493(k) and in violation of this rule? And are they subject to be investigated by this board at that point for refusing to certify?

MS. THORNE: I assume. But it says the superintendent, not one person must certify. So the superintendent would be a majority of that board. It can't be one person.

MS. KING: Mr. Chair, I --

MR. FERVIER: So the board would be -- the board would be in violation then of statute and this rule and so the board, then, would be subject to investigation by this board for refusing to certify.

DR. JOHNSTON: I would -- I would beg to differ, that it says the superintendent which means the majority of the board is the vote of the board. It's not just --

MS. THORNE: One individual board member

does not have authority to -- to overrule the other board members. You certify as a body. And I think board members would have the right to disagree if they wanted to disagree. But hopefully by having this process in place, everybody will be confident and go ahead and certify.

MS. KING: And we have precedent,

Mr. Chairman. In 2020 there were two election
board members who did not certify. And the

majority of the board did and that's what moved
forward. So we have precedent that that's how it
operates.

MR. FERVIER: Well, that's what's happened in the past, but no case has been brought before this board yet on those individuals for not certifying. And so my question is can a case be brought forward if an individual refused to certify?

MS. THORNE: Well, in a court of law, they have testified that -- Mr. Wingate has testimony that he did not certify because they did not do signature verification in Fulton County. They decided not to follow the law and just approved every ballot without signature verification. And

also all three counts came at different -- he didn't see that he felt comfortable certifying that election since the counts differed.

DR. JOHNSTON: And Miss --

MR. MACDOUGALD: Chairman Fervier, if I could offer a point on that in answer to your question if that's permissible.

MR. FERVIER: Sure.

MR. MACDOUGALD: So the question is a good one and it's been posed by, I think, what amount to threats from the Secretary of State's Office against local election boards that were reluctant to certify. I believe the way that the statute contemplates this dilemma being resolved is the provision in 493 that they certified the results justly without regard to any fraud or error. In other words, they certify a result they know is correct. They exclude results that they cannot truly and honestly certify are correct.

I think that's what the statute contemplates, but let's consider a further hypothetical where the board is presented with a countywide result and being told to certify and they know to a moral certainty that the figures are not correct. And they vote by a majority not

to certify. What happens then? They -- assume we're in court and the Secretary of State's Office is asking to either prosecute or have an order of mandamus to certify a result and the board members are over there saying, well, we're not going to certify it because it's not true.

If I were representing the board members, I would say to the judge: Your Honor, the Secretary of State's asking you to order my client to commit a felony in certifying falsely the results of this election. I don't believe there's any judge in America that would enter such an order.

Now that's a hypothetical. It's never happened. But we do that as a thought experiment. The board members have the right to vote on certification. That necessarily gives them the right to vote against it. And if the figures are not correct --

(Background voices)

MR. MACDOUGALD: -- (indiscernible) are not
correct.

MR. FERVIER: Hold on just for a second.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And isn't Bridget
Thorne a fake engineer? She never got an

engineering job. She --1 2 MS. KING: You are so disrespectful. 3 We're -- we -- no. And, Mr. Chairman, you're muted. 4 We can't 5 hear you, but --MR. FERVIER: We had to mute --6 7 MS. KING: -- we can't allow this. 8 MR. FERVIER: We had to mute everybody. 9 When we have people join, they're automatically 10 unmuted. So we had to go through and mute 11 everybody and start over again. So ... 12 MR. MACDOUGALD: Okay. So I'll just finish up. But the fact that --13 14 (Cross-talking) MR. MACDOUGALD: -- they can vote implies 15 16 they can vote against it. And that needs to be 17 reconciled with the statutory scheme. MR. FERVIER: Okay. Thank -- thank you. 18 19 think that -- and my last issue with this rule is 20 the same one that I've always had is that -- I 21 think it's paragraph 6 that leads for an -- just an unlimited search for documents. 22 We've discussed that at previous meetings. 23 24 I -- I felt like it needed to be a limited amount

of documents that a board would -- would be

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necessary for the board to view. This rule continues to lead for an unlimited search of documents that could, I think, create a -- you know, any board member saying, oh, I didn't receive x, I didn't receive y, I didn't receive whatever, so I'm not going to -- I'm not going to certify this election.

I think that's just a -- open-ended. I've always believed that there needed to be guardrails around that process. I've stated that many times. And this rule does not provide any guardrails for that process. So ...

MS. THORNE: Mr. Chairman, if I could be respectful and disagree with you. Georgia Code 21-2-493(b) says the superintendent shall then examine all registration and primary or election documents, whatever, relating to such precinct in the presence of representatives of each party body and interest — interested candidate.

So they do have -- they do have access by law -- by law. It is tied to law to examine all election related documentation.

MR. FERVIER: I -- I understand that, but I also know that we're -- we're interchanging superintendent and board here and that we've seen

boards recently -- or board members recently that refuse to certify because they didn't see x, y, or z documents. And so that -- I think that this just even opens the door more to that in my opinion. But I am only one opinion on this board. So ...

MS. GRUBBS: Mr. Chairman, this is Salleigh.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. GRUBBS: One thing is we -- we also -- if we're going to talk about interchanging words, you can't interchange a board for a board member. If a board member does not feel comfortable certifying because they've been refused documents that they're entitled to see by law, you can't condemn them for not being willing to cast a vote to certify as a board member because they have been selectively excluded from the process. And we have seen that happen.

MR. FERVIER: Well, I haven't -- I haven't done that. I was -- I asked my question about the investigation because it was -- it's a legitimate question that I think will occur in the future. And I wanted to obtain y'all's opinion on that. So ...

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

DR. JOHNSTON: Just in response to the question about delay in seeking all sorts of documents, which in my opinion the whole board should be able to see any election-related document at any time before they reach the point of certification, I noticed that Mr. Sus from Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington who visited us at the last meeting wrote a lengthy letter of opinion about this petition for rule, and he mentioned a particular board member, Miss Adams, from Fulton County and the issue of her not certifying an election.

So I queried Miss Adams specifically and asked her about the incident that Mr. Sus was referring to. And I asked if he was present at the certification meeting in May that he was referring to about Miss Adams. And the answer was he was not present, but he certainly spoke about it in his letter of opinion.

And I asked if his description of the meeting was accurate and Miss Adams said it was not accurate and that she had asked for certain documents that related to the election and they were not provided. So what is a board member to

do if they're trying to look at election documents and the staff cannot or will not provide those documents for review that have to do with the reconciliation and the canvass?

I asked -- I asked Miss Adams who provided information to Mr. Sus and she did not know, but it -- it was an open meeting for anybody to watch, although there was -- there was no audio provided. So I'm not sure where Mr. Sus received his information from. And I asked if -- did she find any irregularities that led to her reluctance to certify for that primary election? And she said, yes, actually.

She did find irregularities and inconsistencies in the vote count and those were not answered or heard to her satisfaction. A discrepancy of 15 votes in one precinct -- and that's a significant amount as far as a counting error -- two votes in another precinct and one vote in another precinct. And to this day or at the point of asking these questions, she has not had those inconsistencies or irregularities answered.

So I think, one, is that there is room for improvement in the reconciliation process. But

also I think as compared to that the boards have full access to all documents as soon as possible, not -- not two hours before they're supposed to sign their -- put their signature on a certification that they have not adequately had the opportunity to review and investigate.

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But I just want to make that point. And likewise the Election Assistance Commission clearly describes the reconciliation and canvassing process, and it involves a comprehensive process throughout the election, especially right after the election, including things like chain-of-custody review, ballot and voter reconciliation, documentation review, and voter verification.

So these are all very important things that -- that we want our boards to review and expect them to review before they certify an election. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you. I -- I have no comment on Mr. Sus. I don't know where his information came from.

You know, lastly, my -- my last concern over this is that this board is once again exceeding our authority in that this rule kind of redefines

the certification process that's in O.C. -- you know, the 21-2-493. We -- I believe that these type of definitions need to be left up to the Legislature, not this board, and that, you know, this is a -- an issue that should go before the representatives. We're -- we're not elected officials and we shouldn't try and create law. And I see this as one of those that's outside our -- outside of our authority, but that's my opinion as a single member of this board. So ...

Are there any other questions from board members?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We are merely disenfranchising the whole county because we miscounted the number of voters. Thank you.

MS. KING: Who's speaking?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your mother.

MR. FERVIER: (indiscernible) let's cut him
off.

MS. KING: Okay. Mr. Chairman, yeah, I -- I also -- I would just like to add that, you know, the -- there are boards that are -- that have the freedom to look at all election materials and election documents in the state. There are other boards that have been doing this, you have had

this freedom, have exercised this freedom. So creating a uniform process is -- in my opinion is not exceeding any -- breaking any law or creating any law or new law. As a board member -- as a board member here for the SEB or any other board that we sit on, we should have the right to see whatever we need to see --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, if -- if you
could keep us updated on this, I would really
like to know --

(Cross-talking)

MS. KING: (indiscernible) --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- (indiscernible) --

MR. FERVIER: We continue to have the same problems. Thank you.

MS. KING: No, I understand. I appreciate -- I appreciate you working through that, Mr. Chairman.

But, you know, as I was stating, I just think it's important to note that, you know, any time -- and we have a lot of attorneys that are on this call, that -- we have an attorney that's a member of the board, we have several attorneys around us, and I just feel like we have to make sure we're being completely transparent with the

fact that whenever we put a legal document in front of an individual and ask them to sign it without giving them the proper information or allowing them to do proper due diligence in order to ensure that what they are signing is accurate, whenever you put that in front of them and just tell them to sign without having that opportunity, that in my opinion is neglect and is neglectful as well as it causes us — it puts us — that individual in a particular situation where the onus will fall on them if something was to go wrong.

If we found something later, it falls on them. And I think every individual has a right to have everything they need in order to ensure that the legal documentation they are signing is accurate and that to me is the bottom line of all of this, is that we're debating the hypotheticals and the should-have could-haves and what could go down.

And we've debated that to exhaustion. I think at that point we need to look at the fact there were issues, there are boards that do not feel confident that they can get access to the particular information needed to make a solid

decision and that is the bottom line of what we're addressing.

So I don't just don't want to confuse those who are on this call, those who are watching to think that there's some other issue going on. At the end of the day this is about making sure that before these individuals sign a legal document, they have everything they need.

MR. FERVIER: I understand that. I mean, there is -- there -- there's an ongoing argument about whether this is a ministerial duty or whether it's a -- you know, otherwise. And so that will --

DR. JOHNSTON: Well, Mr. Chair ...

MR. FERVIER: That will ultimately be decided, I guess, outside of this board on whether it's ministerial or not. But I've -- we've all made our points.

Dr. Johnston, did you have something else?

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes. I'd like to say one further thing. I think some of our county board members over the past year or so have been sent intimidating letters actually threatening legal action if they delay certification or decide not to certify. And I find that quite offensive and

actually almost constituting election interference.

And I'm very con -- I am very concerned about those sort of threats, threats of legal action against any of our county board members and against this state election board also. The rhetoric has -- has really ramped up, and I think it does nothing to help the actual work in process that we are obligated to perform.

And I would -- I would certainly ask people to temper their language and avoid inciteful wor -- inciteful words like "threat" and "you're going to be sorry." And we've all received these unwanted and threatening e-mails. And I think we need to caution people to disagree civilly and respectfully, and we will treat everyone the same. Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mr. Chairman,
Ms. Johnston's trying to discourage lawsuits, but
government officials are --

MS. KING: Who's speak -- okay.

MR. FERVIER: Yeah. People are joining and as they join, we can't automatically mute them.

It's just a -- a problem with the system. So we have to go through and mute everybody and kind of

reset. So we're -- we're just going to have to deal with this.

Your -- your words are well taken,

Dr. Johnston. I think that this nonsense needs
to stop too. We -- we disagree on things, but we
can do it in a friendly manner without having to,
you know, take ourselves down to the negativity
and all that certainly.

I agree -- I agree with many of you on many things. I disagree with many of you on many things. So ...

And I want to remind everybody we're all -we are all volunteers on this board. We're not
getting paid for this harassment and negativity.
We're doing it for some reason. But -- but we're
all volunteers and we're just trying to serve the
citizens of Georgia. So ...

Any more comments from the board? The chair will entertain a motion.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, I move we approve the petition for the rule for 183-1-12-.12.

MS. KING: I second.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to approve SEB rule 183-1-12-.12. We have a second by member King. Any discussion? Hearing no further

discussion, we will now have a vote. I will call 1 2 out each individual member by seniority. Member Ghazal, how do you vote? 3 MS. GHAZAL: Nay. 4 5 MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston, how do you 6 vote? 7 DR. JOHNSTON: Aye. 8 MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares, how do you 9 vote? 10 MR. JEFFARES: Aye. 11 MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares votes aye. 12 Member King, how do you vote? 13 MS. KING: Aye. 14 MR. FERVIER: The chair will exercise its right to vote. Will vote nay. The motion 15 carries three to two. 16 17 MS. THORNE: We thank you. 18 MR. FERVIER: Thank you. 19 If you will give me one minute, our 20 paralegal thinks she has a solution for these 21 interruptions. Let me just take a minute here. 22 (Pause) 23 MR. FERVIER: All right. So our paralegal 24 has gone through and given access to the members

of the board only and everyone else will be muted

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1	unless they're unless they're brought up to
2	speak. And hopefully this will work for anybody
3	else joining, that they they'll also be muted
4	to start. So we'll try that process and see how
5	it works.
6	Turn their microphone
7	MS. HARDIN: The board members.
8	MR. FERVIER: Turn them on?
9	MS. HARDIN: Yes. They're
10	MR. FERVIER: Would each of you board
11	members please turn your microphones on?
12	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (indiscernible)
13	DR. JOHNSTON: Good, good.
14	MR. FERVIER: Dr. Johnston.
15	Member Ghazal?
16	MS. GHAZAL: Yes.
17	MR. FERVIER: Okay. Let's see if this
18	works.
19	All right, the next item on the agenda is
20	discussion and voting on proposed rule to SEB
21	rule 183-1-1212, subsection (a), subsection
22	(5).
23	Discussion and Voting on Proposed Rule to SEB Rule
24	183-1-1212, Subsection (a), Subsection (5).

MS. KING: Mr. Chairman.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. KING: If I -- I would like to start this off because I do have an amendment that I would like to propose.

MR. FERVIER: Okay.

MS. KING: Okay. So for those who are watching to sort of give a little bit of a backstory as to why I want to amend my position a little bit on this particular rule. So initially I supported this petition in its original form. However, after attending a county board meeting, reviewing concerns expressed in several e-mails, my perspective has evolved a bit on this particular petition.

But first for those of you that are saying that there wasn't any wrongdoing or voter fraud in 2020 elections, I suggest that you go back to the August 7th meeting where the 2020 SOS attorney, Ryan Germany, admitted that there were mistakes and errors made and that that's why he is asking to be part of the monitoring team to monitor those same mistakes that were made in 2020 to be made here in 2024.

So I just want to make sure I'm very clear in the fact that there is a need for these

particular rules and the particular rule that is presented in front of us. However, the concerns that stood out to me were about understanding the purpose of the rule while also questioning how -- it's practical use and how it would be put into action.

Specifically there were worries about exhaustion of people counting the votes after working 12- to 14-hour shifts. There was also inquiry as it relates to whether or not they would have to increase staffing in order to accommodate this particular rule which would lead to increased cost. And I think those are valid concerns and emphasize the importance of consulting with those who would be affected by this policy as I have.

So therefore I would like to propose the following amendment be added to rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5). The amendment will read as such -- well, the amendment that I presented to the team is as such. The board members did have a chance to look at it. There is a legal -- more legal form of this particular rule that will be presented in for rule -- during the 30-day process which we will -- I will discuss in a

second that that may come into play.

However, the amendment will go as such (reading): The decision on when to commence the count -- the ballot counting, ballots in each ballot box process rests with the poll manager and assistant poll manager. This determination can be to commence at the close of polls on election day or during the week allocated for county certification considering factors such as increased costs, labors, and fatigue.

take place after election day, the counting shall occur in the county election office on the next business day following the election day and must conclude prior to any scheduled or announced postelection audit, all within the designated county certification period. The ballot counting of all separately counted ballot boxes shall be reconciled with the number of voter lists, number of voters certificates, BMD totals, scanner totals, and closing results tapes from that polling place postelection day. The process of opening, counting, and resealing the ballots must be conducted in the presence of three sworn-in poll officers from the corresponding polling

place.

2.2

(reading): Additionally the corresponding polling manager and assistant poll manager must be present or assistant poll manager must be present. These procedures must be conducted publicly to ensure transparency. If the counting of ballots takes place at any time or place other than the polling location, the supervisor of elections must communicate the date and time and place of such actions with all candidates on the ballot and the county chair, both major political parties.

The rule that will be entered into -- that will be -- that I would like to be published for the next 30 days and possibly approved will read as such -- and this is just again me adding -- just making sure we have the legal aspect around this rule in place. So I want to read this to everyone as well.

It says that (reading): The decision on when to commence the process set forth in paragraph (a)(5) above rests with the poll manager or assistant poll manager. This determination can be to commence at the close of polls on election day or commencing the following

day and completing during the week allocated for county certification considering factors such as staffing needs, fatigue, and efficiency and accuracy-related concerns. If the ballot counting is to take place after election day, the relevant ballots, tabulation tapes, enumerated voter lists, and polling information shall be sealed in a tamperproof container and the number of the seal noted.

(reading): The counting shall occur in the county election office on the next business day following election day and must conclude prior to any scheduled or announced postelection audits.

The process must be completed within the designated county certification period.

(reading): The process of opening, counting, and resealing ballots must be conducted in the presence of three sworn-in poll officers from the relevant polling place. Additionally the poll manager or assistant poll manager must be present. These procedures must be conducted publicly to ensure transparency.

(reading): If the counting of the ballots takes place at any time or place other than the polling location, the supervisor of elections

must immediately communicate the date, time, place of such action with all candidates on the ballot and the county chair of both major political parties no later than 10 p.m. on election day. The poll manager shall post such information on the outside windows of the polling location together with all the other information required to be -- to be so posted.

2.2

So this is an amendment that I am going to propose that we -- or make a motion at some point after we have discussion that we enter in that should address some of the major concerns that we heard as it relates to fatigue, as it relates to having to hire additional people, additional costs.

It is my understanding that there are other counties that have done this and who do do a complete hand-count of all ballots even if they are asked to only look at one particular race. So it is being done. So I just think that adding in this amendment would be important and is an important step to find some form of uniformity and acknowledgment that we do hear some of the other concerns.

That being said, I -- I will ask that this

amendment be added to the rule and posted to -no later than tomorrow by close of business so
that we can go ahead and start the 30-day process
of allowing the public to review this amendment
that's added to this rule for us to vote on it at
a later time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

- MR. FERVIER: Thank you, member King. Have you discussed this amendment with Sharlene Alexander who originally proposed this petition?
- MS. KING: I have not. I sent this
  e-mail -- and I just thought about it yesterday
  as I was really going through all of the
  information I'd received. I considered
  everything that came in front of me. So I would
  assume that she would have an opportunity to
  either -- rebuttal, correct, add corrections,
  whatever necessary during that 30-day period.
- MR. FERVIER: So I think in order to be procedurally correct, this board would need to -- one of two things would need to happen.

  Ms. Alexander would need to withdraw her petition and then we could add the amendment to it and post it tomorrow for the 30 days of review by the public. Or Ms. Alexander could proceed with her

petition as is in which case this board would have to vote on her petition.

If her petition is voted in favor by this board, then it would go forward as is. The rule would go forward as is. If this board voted in the negative, to not accept it, then you could take her petition and your amendment to it and post it tomorrow for a 30-day review.

Would you turn on Ms. Alexander, please. Is she on?

Ms. Alexander, are you online now?

Ms. Alexander, are you online? Ms. Alexander,

your camera and microphone has been enabled. You

might want to look up at the top of your screen

to make sure that your mic is on.

Ms. Alexander, can you hear me? Are you online?

Member King, I would recommend that we defer this for a few minutes and take up the next petition until we can get her online and let her respond to this.

MS. KING: Absolutely. Not a problem.

MR. FERVIER: Okay. Without dissent by the board, we'll -- we'll hear the next petition and see if we can get Ms. Alexander online. Does

anybody have contact information for her? We can call her.

MS. HARDIN: (indiscernible)

MR. FERVIER: You do? Will you see if you can reach her and help her get online?

The next petition -- or the next rule --

MS. ALEXANDER: Wait. I think I'm on now.

MR. FERVIER: Oh, she's on.

MS. ALEXANDER: Sorry.

MR. FERVIER: It's okay.

MS. ALEXANDER: Okay. First of all, I really wish I would've heard your amendment. It's rather lengthy. I'm going to go ahead and discuss my amendment as I submitted it and I will also try to answer some of your questions as we go forward.

Honorable members the state election board,
I am Sharlene Alexander. I want to make it clear
that I have presented this proposal as an
individual taxpaying citizen of Fayette County
and not on behalf of any organization or
individual.

Further, I think it's important that you know my background which I have lived in Fayette County for 33 years. I've been active. I've

voted in every election. I have been a poll worker. I've counted these ballots after a 14-hour day. I've been an assistant manager. I've been a poll watcher. Also, additionally, so you know where I come from on checks and balances, I was licensed as a CPA in 1970. I have been a senior auditor of restaurants, of cities, counties, and banks. I've also been an expert trial witness on embezzlement. So I have it up to my ears in terms of reconciling or having second checks on important things, whether it's money or ballots.

The purpose of my petition, as I stated, is that it enhances election integrity by providing a checkpoint outside of the electronic system, which today that's all we have because everything is within the system. It should provide more accurate results and reduce the opportunity for collusion to sabotage election results or reduce error complaints, leading to stolen election theories.

I also -- well, I'll address your amendment later, but basically in our petition, the reason I came up with this is because up until October of 2022, in Fayette County -- we have 36

precincts -- we actually hand-counted the ballots as soon as the polls closed. You have -- you know, we had six to eight people who worked the polls. The poll manager, the assistant managers, they have their duties that they have to do. And you had extras. Pick up signs, et cetera.

It was no problem for three of us once they pulled all those ballots out and handed it to three of us poll officials who'd been there, worked all day, and we each counted the ballots that were there. And we verified that our number agreed with the other electronic system numbers.

Then -- we just always did it. We didn't question it. It was expected of us to do it. I understand that a number of other counties often did that. So this is precedent that we've done it. It didn't tax the people that were doing the counting. We didn't have a lot of errors.

Quite frankly it's obvious that as an auditor, I come at this from a different place than a lot of people do. I also understand that in all things -- let's take, for example, banks, as I used before -- you always have the count -- the count -- excuse me. The tellers always had to cash -- count their cash drawer. That's just

a double check on what the system said they were supposed to be turning in.

To me, this just common sense to have something outside of that electronic system. And we know that we've had how many complaints, whether they been proven or not, as far as election integrity goes? There have been claims that the poll pads can change numbers or that the scanners can duplicate scan. A lot of changes supposedly can happen, not proven I don't think. Well, I take that back. It has. But a lot of things can be changed after the polls close.

And in my opinion we need to help people understand that we've done a good job, we have free and fair results, that we have something outside of the election system that checks it. I mean it's just a check-and-balance procedure.

And one of the things that I also stated was -- and GAVREO comes out and they say that, you know, this would just muddy up the works, et cetera, et cetera.

I'm only referring to election day. That's number one. So even if you have 537,000, whatever registered voters in a county, we're looking at the turnout on election day for this

rule. Also if you look at some of our larger counties, they have 430-some-odd precincts. So you want to take that 20 percent take it down by precinct. And I've looked at some of these in the big counties and there was only one out of 400-and-some-odd that had even more than a thousand people who voted on election day. I do not see how that this is going to change anything that what we've done before. Most of us didn't understand why it stopped in the first place.

So in our county, for example, we've had numerous instances -- and I say it has to happen at the precinct where everything is. You've got the scanners, you've got the BMDs, you've got the provisionals, you've got everything right there in the precinct. If you start loading these things up and taking it to, let's say, the next day, first of all, you know, if you -- I think what you said was that they have the option to do the count, presuming it's a hand-counted total -- that's what we're talking about, not races but total ballots in that precinct, that three of them would go from each precinct to one place and pull those ballots out again and count them?

That's going to be a lot of people in one

place. It also means that you will not stop -just like we had the -- you know, we have rules
about how many accompany the ballots, et cetera.
How are you going to assure that if you pack
those ballots up, take them someplace else,
they're reopened and three people start messing
with them in a different place, you can't resolve
anything that happened at the polling place which
is what we want to do. We want to satisfy right
then if we've missed anything.

2.2

We have multiple instances in a number of counties, but I'll take mine, where copy paper has been run through that scanner and it accepted it which is not according to law. You have a case where this board actually filed a complaint against our director in 2020 and two members of the board then that -- because there was a memory card that was missed.

We've had situations that, yes, should people look at that -- at that scanner and make sure they got everything? The fact is they don't. This is a double check and a lot of people will still do it anyway just because that's how they've been trained. If they've been a bank teller before, a waitress, anybody else

that has messed with money, they know you've got to double-check something. So they can crawl in the scanner but we've had write-in bins missed, we've had ballots missed. That all needs to happen at the precinct.

And with -- again, yes, you're right, minimum of handling, but we're right in the same place, where we can ask questions and we can find out what the problem is and resolve it right then. We don't have questions about who touched those things once they were put in a ballot and hauled to the elections office and then pulled out again and messed all round.

Those are my concerns and why I believe it has to happen. Maybe you have to have an audit background to understand the need for it and why it needs to happen right there. Otherwise you'd have people -- bank tellers, what if they did it the next day? What good would that do if their tallies didn't come out right? You want to find out right then where the issue is and find it.

So that -- that's my point.

MR. FERVIER: Ms. Alexander, do you -- do you have anybody else that wants to speak on behalf of this rule?

MS. ALEXANDER: I did not know that I could. So the answer is no. Nobody told me how to do this. So ...

MR. FERVIER: You've done a great job by yourself. You've done a great job by yourself.

MS. ALEXANDER: I can -- I can tell you that I have spoken with precinct managers, poll managers in our county and assured that we had done this for years. Nobody understood when we stopped. A lot of people had a problem why we weren't continuing to do it at the precinct. I don't think we had any complaints about people being very tired of having errors and humans working a 12- or 14-hour day and then hand-counting the ballots while the other people picked up the signs or whatever.

I've even talked with people who run polls in other counties. And they assured me that they've always done it, some of them still do even though they're not supposed to. So I just think that a lot of these people that -- they're blowing smoke and they're trying -- they're saying that we're trying to stop the system.

We're not going to hold up results.

As I understand it, in one of your bigger

counties, they have runners that take the memory 1 2 cards to the -- to the center within 30 minutes 3 of that poll closing. So I don't see how that's going to hold up the results. I mean, we're 4 5 going to make sure that everything is the same while we're at the precinct when we have it. 6 7 So could we ask if there's anybody else that 8 would like to raise their hand since I didn't know to bring anybody in? 9 10 MR. FERVIER: Well, the problem we have with 11 that is we have 777 people online and we're just 12 not sure about comments being made by some people 13 that are coming on and offline. And so we're 14 trying to --MS. ALEXANDER: I have someone that would 15 16 speak, that I would allow to speak, and that's 17 Suzanne Brown. 18 MR. FERVIER: Is she online with you or is 19 she with you? 20 MS. ALEXANDER: She's not with me. She is 21 on line. MR. FERVIER: 22 Suzanne Brown? MS. ALEXANDER: Yes. 23 24 MR. FERVIER: Okay.

Can you ask her to spell that?

MS. HARDIN:

25

1	I don't see a Suzanne.
2	MR. FERVIER: Is there a Brown? Suzanne
3	Brown?
4	MS. ALEXANDER: Suzanne Brown.
5	DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, I have also asked
6	a CPA, Mr. Erik Christensen, to speak.
7	MR. FERVIER: Can you find Mr. Christensen?
8	Ms. Alexander, we don't have a Suzanne Brown
9	online. She might be under using somebody
10	else's computer possibly.
11	MS. ALEXANDER: I don't know.
12	MR. FERVIER: We'd need to find that out
13	because she she may have logged in under
14	somebody else's
15	MS. ALEXANDER: Is there a Brown
16	county S.B., Fayette County? The initials,
17	S.B., as in boy, Fayette County?
18	MR. FERVIER: Is there an S.B. from Fayette
19	County?
20	We we don't see that. While you're
21	searching that, Mr. Christensen, can you find him
22	and turn his mic on?
23	MS. HARDIN: Uh-huh.
24	MR. FERVIER: Mr. Christensen, your mic is
25	on. Would you like to say a few words?

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah, thank you,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Johnston for asking
me to speak on this issue right here. So it's
good to have Sharlene who's another fellow CPA
and Ken, I guess. And there's no conspiracy
here. This is all accounting and auditing 101.

John, you're familiar with this stuff too since you were internal audit at Waffle House. So nothing here but just trying to get to an accurate count of the votes.

So the first thing that we've got to do in order to get an accurate count of the votes is we have to account for all the ballots. And fortunately, I've run across some data here I'll show you. This is an absentee ballot recap from either 1985 or 1992. We did this. I don't know why we got rid of it. It's unbelievable that we're not doing it.

We've also got numbered list of voters. We didn't do the recap of the number of listed voters back then to the ballots because we didn't have ballots back then. We were on a DRE. But I guarantee you if we did have paper ballots like we do today, we would do a reconciliation.

So I'm in support of Sharlene's petition

unamended.

And I hear yours, Janelle. You've got some things that cross over some of the things that I'm going to propose, and I would propose you put that in maybe separately because I think right now we just need to do this. This is just basic stuff.

I -- I talked to my daughter, who used to work with my mother-in-law, her grandmother, at the polls, and she said they did this. They batched in 50s and they passed them down the line and everybody counted them to make sure they were in 50s. And they had their 50 batches.

So how we got rid of that, I have no idea, but it's a great accounting and audit control.

And reconciling those paper ballots back to the number -- the numbered list of voters and to the machine count is the first thing that we have to do. Before we count, we've got to account for the ballots. Do we have all the ballots? Now if we've got the ballots, we can count them.

I know the system's counting them for us, that's fine. That's fine. The system can count them for us, but if we have to get back, then, to the paper ballot, which is the only legal

documentation from the ballot, then -- then we know we've got them all.

So that's all I've got to say. It's just no conspiracy, just normal accounting and auditing, take time to do the right thing. Everybody, whether you're on the left or the right, should all say, hey, we support this. I mean, it's something that everybody should support. And it's not onerous on the poll workers, according to my daughter who was 14 the last time she did this. Thank you.

MR. FERVIER: Well, we have to -- we have to mention people in the center too.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: The people in the center, exactly. But everybody -- I mean, I wish we could all just kind of agree on this because I hate it seems like it's a partisan thing here. And that's what I don't like about it because, you know, the press and everybody's going to say Georgia's, you know, divided down partisan lines. Let's just all agree on this. It's just -- it's normal stuff. Everybody wants one person, one vote. Can't we just all get along, you know?

MS. KING: Mr. Chairman.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you for your -- thank

you for your comments.

Member King.

MS. KING: So to be clear, because I do know that my -- my amendment is a bit lengthy. So I understand there's -- there's -- it's hard to read that.

So I -- to be clear, I am in support of this particular rule. My amendment was to address the idea that there could be some fatigue. Now, here's the thing. I understand that that's not everyone, but I had enough -- enough people come to me about this particular issue.

So my question would be for -- for Sharlene or Mr. Christensen. What -- what would -- what is the issue with allowing this counting process to take place the following day if that would -- if that would allow these county offices to still, you know, do the counting process but also address potential fatigue? What is the concern on that one? I'm interested in hearing.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well --

MS. ALEXANDER: I will just say that --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Go ahead, Sharlene.

MS. ALEXANDER: Thank you. Going up to 2022 -- and we've had a lot of elections where we

constantly did that. And a number of us were seasoned, let's say well seasoned -- that's come up about age, you know -- that are poll workers and working a 10-, a 12-, a 14-hour day because we didn't know any different. None of us questioned it. It was something that we had to do just like, you know, putting the tape out on the front door or going and pick up -- picking up the hundred and fifty-foot signs outside.

All of that was just part of the process.

And I don't recall anybody that I have talked to saying that we got tired, we made errors. We didn't make errors. I mean, if we had a problem the first time with three of us counting -- as I've said before, two is ripe for collusion, you go to three. You can add more if you want to, but three is the minimum if you take the odds for collusion downward, trying to remove any question about whether we have one vote and whether everything is correct within that electronic system.

I have not heard -- other than people surmising that we might have, you know, fatigue and might make errors, et cetera, I did not hear that from anybody that I know has counted

those -- those at the poll. As I've said before, any time you allow ballots to be moved from where they came right out of the scanner, you always have the opportunity for something, some manipulation, something happening between the precinct and getting to the election office. So that's why I keep saying it's no big deal to count them.

Listen. If you have -- I think I gave the thing. You know, I wasn't counting ballots but I had people count a ream of paper, 500, and it took us within six minutes for us each to count 500. Granted ballots are longer maybe or they're thicker, but even if I went to ten, one person should be able to -- ten minutes, one person should count 1500 in a half an hour.

And I haven't seen a precinct yet that had over -- let's see, one that had over a thousand ballots on election day in one precinct. It can be done. We've done it before. I don't see -- people that are bringing this up obviously are not accountants. And I'm not saying we're better than anybody else, but it sounds like speed and messing around this stuff is more important than resolving an issue that might be there that

night. Accuracy.

MS. KING: So I want to -- I would like to read an e-mail that I received. And this is from a county election team that did a mock version of this. And I want you to -- if you hear something that is inaccurate or that that is outside of what the rule would do, you know, please notate that and share it with me.

But the e-mail goes as such. First, the policy is unclear in the exact execution. Does each person count the entire stack before passing it along or can they pass along the stack of 50? They took -- and it says they took our two biggest scanner totals from a single day of A -- an AIP in November 2022 -- scanner A, 3,000 ballots, scanner B, 2,000 ballots -- and follow the first procedure. Each person counts the entire stack before passing it along. For scanner A, that took 2.5 hours. They followed the second procedure. They passed along each stack of 50 for scanner B and that took over an hour.

Each worker was a seasoned AIP site manager and expressed grave concern over the ability to do this accurately after working a

12-,13-,14-hour day. They are working on a statement to compile this.

Now, this came from one particular county election member, but I do have someone that I would like to speak as it relates to this as well, and that is Miss Deidre from the Paulding County director -- she's the director of the Paulding County Election Board. So I would like at some point to have her speak as well to this particular concern, as she and I spoke about this in depth.

MR. FERVIER: Let me --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Ms. King, can I (indiscernible) just to answer specifically your question because you had a question what --

MS. KING: Yeah. The day -- the next day.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. So, you know, there's a chain-of-custody issue then because, you know, what do we do with the ballots that night? Are we able to lock them up, keep them secure at the precinct? I don't know if we can and maybe that's not an issue. I think it's fine. We've got seven days this year.

Someone pointed out that we've got a national holiday on Monday, so that pushes our

confirmation certification date till Tuesday. So it provides plenty of time. I like the precinct. And Harry MacDougald talked about the sanctity of the precinct. The precinct is where we want to control everything because we've got what's called segregation of duties. We've segregated, you know, in Fulton County into 244 different precincts and all of the other counties have segregation.

So you don't have this central place where shenanigans could go on. And, you know, if you -- and if you look, people have been saying there's no shenanigans. Just read the 69-page what I would call damning, you know, thing that was done by Joe Rossi from 2020. It's State Election Board 2023-025. Look at that.

I mean, no matter -- again, no matter what side of the aisle you're on, look at that and read it and see what you think. So, you know -- because I believe there's truth in there. And the first thing that we've got to do is we've got to admit that we've got a problem.

Let's get to step 1 of the 12-step program and say we got a problem. And it's very easy to fix all this stuff, really, by going back to the

procedures that we had previously. I don't know how we got off of them, but if we got back to those procedures, we'd be just fine. And I've got more things that kind of -- you know, that we can go -- we're going to go into later, I guess, a rule request that I'm requesting that'll pretty much --

You know, people have questions about

Dominion. So everybody thinks Dominion is some

kind of corrupt Venezuelan, you know,

election-fixing system. But we can fix that too.

And it's not hard to do it. And it doesn't cost

anything.

MS. ALEXANDER: Can I also add before you go to Deidre that the example that you used was AIP which is early voting. That is not a part of this rule, but also if they're saying they pulled 3,000 ballots and 2,000 ballots, I would ask that they review the rule that requires that if their scanner during early voting reaches 1500, they are to pull those ballots. So if they allowed 3,000, that's their bad, okay?

Also when we're all talking about -- well, let's go -- let's go to Deidre.

(Cross-talking)

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I -- Sharlene -- can I add one thing to Sharlene's because I was asked to speak on this. So let me just add one more thing. So, yes, I like on the early voting or whatever the batches hit 1500, because they're not separated by precinct at early voting, that at that point in time when those ballots are pulled, that they're separated by precinct.

We've got to get back to their sanctity of the precinct where we can get those ballots back to the precinct. If we have to do an audit or a recount, we've got everything in one place.

MS. ALEXANDER: Erik, that's -- that's early
voting. That comes up next.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay.

MS. ALEXANDER: I will also go back and say that at least in my county -- and I understand we're talking about fatigue -- our pay scales are by day. So if you want to hire more people, that's up to you, but I don't -- I've not seen any examples on election day where fatigue has stopped us from doing an accurate count.

And not only that, when we count those ballots, the hand-count of the ballots, we are driving a stake in the ground at that precinct

1	that those numbers cannot change after. Right
2	then. We've driven that stake and that's what
3	everything has to agree with is the whole
4	MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Alexander.
5	Ms. Brown you asked Ms. Brown to speak
6	and she's on.
7	Ms. Brown, can you hear us? Suzanne Brown?
8	Ms. Brown?
9	MS. HARDIN: Her camera and microphone are
10	enabled.
11	MR. FERVIER: Ms. Brown?
12	They're on?
13	MS. HARDIN: Her camera and microphone are
14	on. It was enabled.
15	MR. FERVIER: Ms. Brown, you might need to
16	turn on your mic. If you'll look at the upper
17	right-hand corner of the Teams invite.
18	Well, we'll try and come back to Ms. Brown.
19	Who was the other one you wanted to speak?
20	MS. KING: Ms. Deidre Holden.
21	MR. FERVIER: Ms. Deidre Holden?
22	MS. HARDIN: Okay, I see her.
23	MS. HOLDEN: Can y'all hear me now?
24	MR. FERVIER: Yes. Is this Ms. Holden?
25	MS. HOLDEN: It is. It's Deidre from

Paulding County.

MR. FERVIER: All right.

MS. HOLDEN: Just a few things that I've taken from what she's been talking about. I really struggle with the fact that any of us would be accused of ballot stuffing. I know the requirements that I have here in Paulding that no election material is left with just one person. We have a requirement here in Paulding that everything is carried with two people, and they can't be related.

So for somebody to say that the results are going to change from the polling location to the office, that -- that terribly upsets me. First of all, the ballots are sealed in that scanner. You break that seal, there's going to be a problem.

However, you know, you want to talk about leaving ballots in a precinct unattended. Yeah, that's a problem. Those ballots need to be coming back to that election office on election night and they need to be secured, which they should be in the election office in a locked room.

The chain of custody, you know, that's

another thing. There again when those ballots leave that polling location, there's a chain of custody. And when it gets to our office, there's a chain of custody that we receive those ballots.

The only thing you're going to get when you count in a polling location is the same number that matches that tape that's on that scanner.

And that's what you're looking for. So that's a process of the certification. So bringing them back into this office is kind of like the absentee process. When we're opening absentee ballots prior to an election, we have monitors here that take an oath that watch us. We have poll watchers. We welcome that.

But the counting on that night, maybe it's not fatigue, but it does leave a whole door open for a lot of mistakes because those people want to go home. I don't know what world some people live in, I'm a medium-size county. I have 21 precincts. There -- in November there's going to be probably five to eight thousand ballots in one scanner that we have at a polling location. That's going to take a while to count. If you're having those ballots go through that many hands on election night, nobody's going to get the same

number. The results will be delayed.

Now, we're going to continue our process.

We are one of the counties that has runners.

Those memory cards will be brought here and they'll be uploaded. But counting those ballots, you're going to have a lot of people sitting there waiting and waiting and waiting. And you know what? If that -- if that election is conducted properly, you're going to get the same number of ballots as you are on that tape.

That's what people are beating to death. We have conducted 100 percent audits here in Paulding as we always have, and we have never been off by one vote.

Everything that we touch, every ballot, we count every ballot. And we also match what the results are. That -- that don't lie. You have the human element and you have the equipment element and it does not lie. If you have dishonest people in elections, you're going to get dishonest answers. The chain of custody is important. You need two people with all the results with the tapes, everything at all times. And if counties are not doing that, then shame on them.

We have -- we are accountable for those votes. Those votes are important. It doesn't matter where you count them at. As long as there's not a chain of custody, then you do have a problem. Whether we count them in the precinct that's going to take hours upon hours in a November election or we bring them back here, we have the managers, three counters, monitors, and poll watchers here, that's no problem. But I'm more concerned about people thinking there's ballot stuffing going on when it can't possibly happen unless you have a lot of dishonest poll workers that's working for you.

So, you know, I think that -- that there's a lot of conspiracies that go on here. I think that a hundred and fifty-eight counties are paying for the sins of Fulton County. No offense against Fulton, but that's who's in the news and we all have to -- we have to build our lives around what Fulton County's done. That is not right.

Out of the hundred and fifty-nine counties, you have 99 -- 98, 99 percent of those counties doing elections the way they're supposed to be doing.

So, you know, I -- I think I -- I speak for a lot of people that are on this call that are in the election business. Something's seriously wrong if the county is not accounting for every vote, they're not balancing. But whether you count them in the precinct or in the office, you should be getting the same number. Those tapes should be matching the number of ballots that's in there, wherever you count it at.

MS. ALEXANDER: And that's why you should not be afraid to count them at the precinct and get it done. If they're going to match, which in most cases they do -- but also I can tell you that while you're doing great in Paulding, I think what you said was the ballots come back to your elections office and at some point, that night or the next day, you all hand-count those ballots. If I heard that correctly, I can tell you our county doesn't do it.

If they're not counting them at the precinct, they are stuffing -- nobody's counting those ballots, they're stuffing them in those sealed containers. They go back to the county office and they are put away unless there's a question that comes up on a recount. And even

then, they're only pulling samples.

So not every county is doing like you're doing, Deidre, which is great, but I still maintain if they're going to come out the same, what is anybody afraid of?

And, plus, I will also say that we know, yes, two people are supposed to accompany those ballots to the office. That's for chain of custody. I can tell you that we have followed in different counties -- followed that poll manager with those ballots and two did not go with them.

So, you know, your county's great, but we don't have anything that's consistent throughout the state.

And, Janelle, I would be happy -- I'd be happy to work with anybody that wants to sit there and say how can we do this so that it doesn't take us all night? It doesn't have to take all night.

MS. KING: I think it's important to note that my amendment gives you the option. So if you would like to count on election day and you feel that that's the best course of action for your county, then you can. And you can count it as is. The precincts can do exactly what your

rule is stating.

option in case there is a poll manager or an assistant poll manager that sees that they are running into an issue of fatigue or an issue — because fatigue doesn't necessarily mean it's a hundred — it's only a hundred ballots so you shouldn't be tired. I mean, we can't determine where people's fatigue levels are. And I can't say in confidence that I've spoken to enough people to determine that this is — that fatigue should not play a role.

So I think it's important to ensure that we have some form of way of addressing that because that it is something that can happen. I -- I may -- I know I can go 14-, 16-hour days, I do it all the time, but that doesn't mean that everyone can.

So, again, this is just providing an option for those poll managers to have some form of control over being able to manage their people rather than putting them in a position where they have to create this plan, plan B so to speak, on the back end considering the rule being set in stone as is. So I'm just giving them an option.

MS. ALEXANDER: If you give them an option, you don't have consistent methods throughout precincts, within a county, or within county — or throughout counties if you give them an option. And if you have GAVREO opposing my rule — which they may come out in favor of yours, but if they come out in favor — against mine, I can tell you that the elections offices are not going to give that option to poll managers.

MS. KING: Well -- well, the option is not to not fulfill the -- what the rule is asking you to do, it's just rather you do it on the same night or the following day. And it's also prior to any audits taking place or any -- any type of postelection audits or anything that's assoc -- or any scheduled audits being -- taking place as well.

MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal has a few comments to make.

Member Ghazal.

MS. GHAZAL: Thank you. I appreciate it. First I've got a couple of threshold issues. And one of them is the assertion that anybody who's opposed to this rule must be opposed to it on a

partisan basis. And I -- that's a very dangerous sentiment. The vast majority of the opposition to this rule has come from election supervisors. And I could not tell you what partisan proclivity an elections supervisor has.

2.1

Universally, every elections supervisor I've had the honor to work with across the state sees their role as a neutral nonpartisan election professional. And to assert that their opposition to this rule is partisan is frankly dangerous and offensive to me and I think to every elections supervisor who has a valid reason to oppose this.

I think a lot of the emphasis has been on large counties with a large number of precincts. We're completely neglecting the fact that since — in the last ten years counties have been consolidating. Many of our smaller counties have consolidated to a small handful of precincts. And even director Holden mentioned that she has precincts that have 5,000 cast ballots on election day. So I appreciate the fact that she's here to explain that.

I also really appreciate the fact that member King is working very hard to try to find a

solution that works for all of our counties.

This -- and I want to make sure that we're very cognizant of the fact that today is

August 19th. Today is the first day that counties are already accepting absentee ballot applications. The election is already underway.

So it is -- it is way too late in our cycle to be making any changes right now.

We received a letter during our last meeting. It was dated August 6th, so literally in the middle of our last meeting, from John Merrill and Trey Grayson. John Merrill was the secretary of state for Alabama from 2015 to 2023. Trey Grayson was the secretary of state for Kentucky from 2004 to 2011 and the president of the National Association of Secretaries of State.

Not partisan actors -- at least not -certainly not Democratic actors, these are GOP
election officials who mentioned in the letter
that in 2022 Alabama passed a constitutional
amendment prohibiting changes to election
processes within six months of an election
precisely because making changes close to an
election is one of the reasons that we had so
many issues in 2020 with the public not trusting

it, because they changed the rules of the game.

2.1

It happened in 2020 because we were facing a global pandemic and states were trying to -trying their best to address the exigencies at
the time. There are no exigencies right now in
2024. The conditions that exist today existed a
year ago, two years ago, three years ago.
Changing the rules when voting basically is
starting right now is something that is
devastating to election administration and to
public confidence.

I would be more than happy to work with anybody to look at a rule applicable starting 2025 where we hand-count ballots in a controlled environment where the counties themselves or the superintendents would have the choice to determine whether to do it at the polling place or at the election office because, frankly, I haven't done a survey of all of our precincts to know whether or not there's even the physical space to undertake this sort of hand-count after an election. I don't think anybody here can say that they have surveyed all of our election day precincts to see if they would be conducive for this sort of activity.

So I think that the fact that it is our election supervisors and many board members who are opposing this needs to be taken extremely seriously. The fact that we are right up against the deadlines for -- we're already conducting the election for all intents and purposes.

It is too late to be making changes like this. These were good ideas. They should've been proposed six months ago. We could've taken it seriously. We could've had a deliberative process. We could've brought in election supervisors, board members, and come up with a solution that worked for everyone. Posing last-minute changes like this is a recipe for chaos.

MR. FERVIER: I've lost ... oh, you have to
-- can you hear me still?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Uh-huh.

MR. FERVIER: I have lost my connection and I cannot see anybody at this point.

MS. KING: We can hear you.

MR. FERVIER: One moment, please.

MS. KING: We can hear you and see you.

MR. FERVIER: Yeah. I -- technology is not my friend. Any other comments by the board?

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

MR. FERVIER: Dr. Johnston.

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes, thank you. Just to reset the whole topic of paper ballots is the Help America Vote Act which is dated 2002. And part — as part of the development or the writing of the Help America Vote Act, when they were talking about voting machines and paper — paper ballots, one of — they were trying to promote the use of machines or voting systems.

But they -- they said that there had to be an audit capability. And the audit capability had to be a paper audit trail, a manual audit capability. And to quote exactly the Help America Vote Act, it says: The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity for such system. Paper record produced under subparagraph (a) shall be available as an official record for any recount conducted with respect to any election in which the system is used.

There is the crux of the matter. Our paper ballot is what is used for a recount. It's also used for -- for our audits. If you do not have a provable paper trail, it's not auditable. So if

we're not counting the ballots, we -- we don't
have sufficient security to conduct a recount.
It automatically makes any recount unacceptable.

So you have to have the counted ballots that -- at some point in time. And the best place is at the precinct. And I would like to read from a paper from -- that's posted at the Carter Center, and it's from the Commission for Democracy through Laws. It's Code of Good Practice of Electoral Matters.

And it talks -- and when it speaks about counting, it says the votes should preferably be counted at the polling stations themselves rather than special centers. Polling station staff are perfectly capable of performing this task, reducing the risk of substitution. Counting should be conducted in a transparent manner. That is dated from 2002 and Help America Vote Act was 2002.

I spoke with Mr. Harry Haury who is a computer expert and cybersecurity expert. He has credentials that are really quite impressive. He has extensive experience in dealing with operational security matters. And he actually was the consultant for writing the Help America

Vote Act 20 years ago. He's a workflow expert. He -- he helped develop the voluntary voting standards, and he continues to -- he has consulted with NSA, CIA, NORTHCOM, DHS, DTRA, treasury, DOD, FEMA, DOJ, and Sandia. Many others.

I spoke with him and he immediately focused on counting the paper ballots. He says you have to have these operational security controls. There must be accountability features. He went on to say that if you don't have this counting and the chain of custody that goes with it, then if and when there is a time for an audit or a recount, you've broken the chain of custody. If you have not counted the ballots, you can never establish the proper chain of custody to deal with these ballots, these paper ballots.

Now, mind you, we -- mostly we rely on our scanning machines and the memory cards. And that's great and it's efficient, but counting the paper ballot is the control. It is simply assuring the reconciliation of the electronic record to the actual ballots and the actual -- the ballots are out votes by definition. It's in our code. The vote is the ballot. The ballot is

the vote.

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So when we -- when we come to the question of what is really the vote or the count, we always speak of going back to the paper ballot. And that's our ultimate original document and so we need to respect it.

So I did look into the question about how many ballots were required to be counted at our most recent largest election, which was four years ago, and I looked at several counties.

Columbia County had -- on election day, they had 277 per scanner. Let's see if I added that right. I'm sorry, in Columbia County they had 47 precincts and the number of ballots voted on election day ranged from a hundred and twenty-five to seven hundred sixty-nine total ballots. But most of the precincts were in the 300- to 400-ballot range. I would think that would be easy and quick to count and not problematic, although fatigue maybe is a factor because election workers do work long days.

I looked at another county and it was -- the range -- for 19 precincts, they had a range of 284 to 1,421 ballots cast on election day. And most were in the 500- to 700-ballot range, which

is a very -- it's easy to count.

I looked at Cobb County on election day in November of 2020 and the average was 480 ballots per precinct. And also I looked at Cherokee County. And they have 42 precincts and the range of ballots cast on election day were 287 to 1,403. 287 would be easy to count at the close of polls. 1,403, if the workers were very tired, then maybe the poll manager would elect to count those the next day when you're rested and fresh.

But if the ballots are moved from the precinct, very careful chain of custody, seals -- seals and security ties must be placed and the chain of custody followed very carefully.

So -- so one is it's just a matter of reconciling the number of paper -- we're not talking about votes. I don't want people to be confused that we're counting the votes, like, for a candidate. This is simply -- this is ballot accountability. It's just counting pieces of paper to make sure that they agree with the number of people who checked in to vote at that polling place to the numbers on the scanners. So it's just -- it's the control feature for the ballot scanner. And I -- I would expect -- I

would expect the ballot scanner to be faster and most accurate but any small errors should be easy to correct.

MS. KING: I would like to add that -again, I just want to be careful that we are not
over course correcting here, right? To Dr. Jan's
perspective -- or her point, I do think that
there will be several counties that will follow
this rule as written and they will do it on
election day just simply because they want to
just get things over with and get it done.
However, I do think it's important to have some
level of discretion around whether or not those
who will be counting are in optimum position to
do -- to count.

Because one of the things I thought about was, you know, who knows, let's say someone forgot to eat lunch and, you know, there's -- and it just so happens that now they have to do this additional step that they weren't anticipating or they were anticipating it but it just so happens they don't feel well and now we're in a position where we're forcing counties to have to produce these results not without considering those particular, again, human mistakes or human errors

that could occur.

So, again, I don't want to over course correct. I'm -- I'm not by any means saying that these ballots are not going to be counted. In the amendment it says that if the ballot count needs to take place after election day, which will be that one business day after the close of the polls, the relevant ballots, tabulation tapes, enumerated voter lists, polling information shall be sealed in a tamperproof container and the number of seal noted. The counting shall then take place at the county elections office.

So there they will be protected. They will be sealed going to the county election office and then they will pick up counting from then on.

Too many times, even if it's ten pieces of paper, if you're tired or you want to get through something quickly or the phone is ringing or the child is calling -- it could be a number of reasons that can cause you to miscount and then they then will have to start over which will again elongate the day.

And I just think this is a simple amendment that I would be in support of. Leaving it as is

with the number of county managers and county officials who have expressed that this is a concern, I personally cannot support it
100 percent as is. I would love to consider my
-- again this is not a motion but a consideration at this point.

I do think that Ms. Alexander should consider withdrawing, allowing -- I -- I would -- I would review -- I will send this amendment to her, allow her to add the amendment that just gives this optional opportunity for those who may find themselves in a peculiar situation and then be posted tomorrow as -- as by petition, go through the 30-day process, and then we move forward.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, member King. I want to make three quick points. Number one, the overwhelming number of officials that I have heard from on this rule oppose it for different reasons. Mostly because of the cost and time requirement and having to deal with very tired workers at the end of the day. And I've received a lot of -- lot of comments on it.

Number two is I -- once again I think that this board could be forcing a requirement cost

upon a county that the Legislature ought to be doing and not us. And I think this is a legislative issue and ought to go through the Legislature, not through this board.

And then, thirdly, I think that this is just happening too close to the election. And it -- when you're putting major rules in effect or major procedures in effect, the counties ought to have more time to respond to it than what they have. I mean, they're -- the voting's going to start fairly quickly.

And so I -- those are -- those are my three comments on that. If anybody else has any comments, then -- other than that, this board needs to -- the chair will entertainment a motion on this rule as it's written, proposed SEB rule 183-1-12-.12, subsection (a), subsection (5).

MS. KING: Point of order. If Ms. Alexander wished to withdraw and then review the amendment for the consideration of us -- me bringing it back or me posting it -- forgive me if I'm saying this all wrong, but if that was to take place, would we still have to vote on it or --

MR. FERVIER: No. No.

MS. KING: -- does she have that option?

MR. FERVIER: No. She can withdraw and this board would not vote on it. We'd move forward with the -- you can introduce your amendment. The board would then vote on initiating rulemaking procedures on your amendment and the rule. And if we voted in the affirmative to initiate rulemaking procedures, then it would be posted tomorrow. MS. KING: Okay. MR. FERVIER: Ms. Alexander, are you still online? MS. ALEXANDER: I sure am. MR. FERVIER: Do you wish to proceed with

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your rule as written or do you wish to withdraw it and allow member King to present her proposal with the amendment? Ms. Alexander?

MS. ALEXANDER: It bothers me that this goes against every accounting principle that I've ever had. I don't believe that it should be given an option. I believe it's going to go back.

If I understand correctly, Janelle, I believe what you're saying is that the ballots would be counted --

MS. KING: Yes.

MS. ALEXANDER: -- correct?

MS. KING: Yes, correct.

MS. ALEXANDER: Okay. So they would be counted the next day. Yes?

MS. KING: Only if the poll manager sees that their workers are fatigued and they need that extra day. But otherwise the poll managers can and those that are working can decide to count on the same day, as written.

MS. ALEXANDER: Okay. But you're saying that three poll officials from each precinct -- yes? --

MS. KING: Yes.

MS. ALEXANDER: -- would go to some center,

I would presume the elections office. So if you
have 36 precincts, you have three times 36 -- you
have over a hundred people showing up at an
elections office to count the numbers in their
precinct. I believe that that's just a tad
unwieldly. But --

MS. KING: Well, what it says is the process of opening, counting, and resealing the ballots must be conducted in the presence of three sworn-in poll officers from a relevant polling place. Additionally, the poll manager or assistant poll manager would be present.

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So it doesn't have to be three people from every polling precinct. There just needs to be three sworn-in poll officers that can represent -- you know, just as long as there's three sworn-in poll officers. Doesn't have to be three from every precinct.

MR. FERVIER: Member King, I -- and not to interrupt, but I -- I -- it's likely that many of the precincts would go ahead and count that night.

MS. KING: Correct.

MR. FERVIER: And so you wouldn't have a hundred-plus people show up. You would have maybe one or two or three or five that decided that their workers were too tired and would have -- would show up the next day.

So it's not -- it's not all or nothing,

Ms. Alexander. It's a -- it could be one

precinct, it could be none, it could be five

precincts that decided to extend it to the next

day.

MS. KING: Correct.

DR. JOHNSTON: Chairman. Chairman Fervier.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

DR. JOHNSTON: I thought I heard that the --

it would be the poll officers that correspond to that precinct is what I heard for as counting the ballots.

MS. KING: The poll manager and the poll assistant. The poll manager or the assistant poll manager from the -- from that precinct.

DR. JOHNSTON: From that precinct, okay.

MS. KING: Yeah, that must be present. But, again, that goes back to the option -- right? -- that is if they choose to go about it this route, then that would be the case. However, they have the option of counting on the election day.

And, again, this will only go into effect -it says considering factors such as staffing
needs, fatigue, efficiency, and accuracy-related
concerns.

And the entire rule will stay the same. We would just add this paragraph in as section 6.

And it'd just go straight in. There were no adjustments made to the overall rule.

MS. ALEXANDER: So in requiring -- and I understand you could have three poll officials that could do any precinct at a tabulation center; correct? You're saying any people that have worked a poll -- poll official can be there

the next day and they could count any precinct, ves?

MS. KING: Three sworn-in poll officers from the relevant polling place and additionally one -- either the poll manager or the assistant poll manager must be present. And, again, this is -- this is if that particular county decided that they want to start counting the next day rather than on election day.

And it doesn't have to be every precinct, you know. There may be precincts, to Dr. Jan's point, that only have a hundred and fifty-four ballots and they decide to go ahead and count it, turn it in. But then there may be some that have 1500 or 1400 and then they say, hey, we -- we're going to do it tomorrow.

So the chances of a likelihood of every single precinct deciding to do it this way, I don't think that's as likely. But again, you know, that's -- that's an assumption that I'm making.

MS. ALEXANDER: So are they going to pay those people that come in to count the next day another day rate?

MS. KING: That's what -- that county will

have to decide that. So that's how I'm -- why I know that this may not be the case for -- for a majority of the counties or -- you know, they -- they have this option. However, after speaking with one of our county officials, they were already looking into hiring and paying people for the additional day -- I'm sorry, hiring people to come in -- hiring -- I think it was over 230 or so individuals to come in on election day at the end of the night to do this counting.

So the cost associated with it is up to the counties and that's where my concern is. By forcing them to have to do it on election day, we could find ourselves in a position where we're also forcing counties to incur additional costs that they weren't preparing to have to acquire prior to this rule being in place. So it affects more than just the day of, it affects their budget and some other decisions that they have to make.

So that will be solely left up to the counties to decide. But, again, this just gives them an option, some flexibility to achieve what this rule is attempting to achieve while also keeping in mind that we are dealing with humans.

And we want to make sure that we have them in 2 their optimum position. 3 MS. ALEXANDER: May I work with you on the 4 wording? 5 MS. KING: Yeah, absolutely. So what we can do is I --6 7 Mr. Chairman, tell me if I'm incorrect on 8 this. Could -- could -- if she was to withdraw 9 and I -- would we have to vote on the rule with 10 my amendment today, or could we --11 MR. FERVIER: Yes. 12 MS. KING: Could I -- okay. So if I was to 13 say let's just table this and then I work with 14 Sharlene to make sure the amendment works within 15 her rule, we would -- I would have to bring it 16 back at the next meeting; is that correct? MR. FERVIER: You could work with her and 17 bring it back again to this meeting. 18 19 MS. KING: Okay. So I could -- if I e-mail 20 this over to you, Sharlene, and you review it, we 21 could revisit this by the end of the meeting. 22 that okay? 23 MS. ALEXANDER: Sure. 24 MS. KING: Okay. I will send that to her. 25 MS. ALEXANDER: Tabling it at this point?

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Τ	Not voting on it. we're tabling it so you'd send
2	it to me?
3	MR. FERVIER: We are we are tabling her
4	amendment. The first question is whether or not
5	you are willing to withdraw your petition at this
6	time.
7	MS. ALEXANDER: So I have to do that before
8	I see the wording?
9	MS. KING: You would that's a good
10	question.
11	MR. FERVIER: That's I hear the chair
12	is
13	MS. KING: We should just table it till the
14	end of the day.
15	MR. FERVIER: The chair is feeling very
16	hungry right now. Why don't we table both of
17	these for the time being?
18	MS. KING: Until lunch. And I'll e-mail
19	this to you, Sharlene, to look at during lunch.
20	MR. FERVIER: The chair would entertain a
21	motion to table Ms. Alexander's rule until later
22	in the meeting.
23	MS. KING: I make a motion that we table.
24	MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to table
25	Ms. Alexander's rule for the time being to be

1	heard later in the meeting. Do we have a second?
2	DR. JOHNSTON: Second.
3	MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second
4	from Dr. Johnston. Any discussion? Hearing no
5	discussion, all those in favor of tabling
6	Ms. Alexander's rule SEB rule 183-1-1212,
7	subsection (a), subsection (5) until later in
8	the meeting signify by saying aye.
9	Member Ghazal.
10	MS. GHAZAL: Aye.
11	MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston.
12	DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.
13	MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares.
14	MR. JEFFARES: Aye.
15	MR. FERVIER: Aye. Member King.
16	MS. KING: Aye.
17	MR. FERVIER: The motion carries four to
18	zero. That is tabled.
19	Thank you, Ms. Alexander.
20	The chair would entertain a motion now for a
21	short lunch break.
22	MS. KING: I make a motion we take a short
23	lunch break.
24	DR. JOHNSTON: I second.
25	MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second

by member Johnston. All those in favor of taking a -- let's say a 45-minute recess, we'll recess till 2:00 -- signify by saying aye.

THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: Any opposition? Hearing no opposition, so moved. This meeting is now recessed until 2:00 at which time we'll come back and continue with the agenda. Thank you.

(Recess)

MR. FERVIER: We will call this meeting back to order.

Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB rule 183-1-12-.12(e).

MR. FERVIER: The next item on the agenda is discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB rule 183-1-12-.12, subsection (e). And I believe that Gail Lee proposed this rule.

Ms. Lee, are you online? Gail Lee?

MS. LEE: Yes, I'm here. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Great. Yes, ma'am. And so you're -- this is your rule. Would you like to speak about it?

MS. LEE: I would very briefly. I recognize, acknowledge, and appreciate the public comment made on my rule. And the concern that

was addressed in that public comment is valid. The concern involved the portion that said each county shall publish the report on their county election results website. And I plead guilty --

MS. LEE: Pardon me? I plead guilty to living in a bubble in a large county that has technology resources. So I -- if possible, I'd like to amend my rule.

MR. FERVIER: We -- the board is allowed to make minor amendments to it, a word or two, without having to go through the entire process again.

MS. LEE: Okay.

(Background noise)

MR. FERVIER: Any major amendments would require withdrawing this rule and then resubmitting and going through the whole rulemaking procedure again. So I'd need to know what that amendment is.

MS. LEE: I'll be glad to tell you. The whole -- the whole rule is (reading): Upon submission to complete -- submission of the complete reconciliation report to the Secretary of State, each county shall publish the report on their county election results -- that was what

was already submitted -- or in the absence of a website make it available to the public upon request.

So the addition would be "or in the absence of a website make it available to the public upon request." What do you think?

MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal, do you have an opinion on that?

MS. GHAZAL: I do. I believe that is a substantive enough change to require reposting. However, I also believe that you will not -- I would not anticipate anybody to vote against this and therefore that the counties would have sufficient notice to be able to adhere to the rule without any issues.

But I think for -- for the sake of it to be fully lawful, it would need to be reposted and then voted again in 30 days. And I will -- for myself, I will vote in favor of -- of this rule again as I did previously.

So I -- but I do think that it does require because it is -- it is not a scrivener's error, it is a substantive change and a substantive difference in what is -- what is required of the counties.

MR. FERVIER: Yeah. That's -- that's my fear is that it's more than a word or two change as we had discussed with the Attorney General at our last meeting. And I think that there's still time for this to go in effect because we will have another meeting on September 20th. And so if it was posted tomorrow, then that would meet the 30-day requirement for a final vote on September 20th.

DR. JOHNSTON: Sara, are you aware of any county that does not have a website?

MS. GHAZAL: Yes. I have not gone through all -- all hundred and fifty-nine, but, for instance -- I always check on Taliaferro because they're the smallest county. The -- they do not have a separate website for their -- their election office. It is a county website. And I have to -- I have to assume that others are in a -- are similarly situated.

MS. LEE: Do they post election results on that county website?

MS. GHAZAL: I -- I can't answer that. I'm sorry. I don't know.

DR. JOHNSTON: Yeah. So the -- the wording says county election results website. So it

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sounds like that would cover a county host -- website host.

MS. LEE: Uh-huh.

MR. FERVIER: Well, you could -- what about if you put on there county or county election results website?

MS. LEE: That'd be fine with me.

MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal, do you think that's a -- too much of a change?

MS. LEE: On -- it currently says: On their county election results website. It does currently say that. I mean, it's --

MS. GHAZAL: I think if they add county or county election results because there is not a separate website. So there are many counties that do not have a separate website for their elections.

MS. LEE: Oh, that's true.

MS. GHAZAL: So I think adding county or county election results website, I -- I would be comfortable making that minor an error -- minor a change. And I think that also makes it more accessible than simply providing it as a response to an open records request.

MS. LEE: Okay. Thank you.

1	MR. FERVIER: Member King, do you have any
2	comments about this?
3	MS. KING: Uh-oh. Okay. No, I'm okay with
4	this one. I I think adding in that additional
5	change is fine and I plan on continuing to
6	support it.
7	MR. FERVIER: Okay. Member Jeffares, do you
8	have any comments about this proposed change?
9	MR. JEFFARES: The only thing I would say,
10	there's somewhere around 30 counties that don't
11	have any kind of website. So
12	MR. FERVIER: Well, that's a problem.
13	MR. JEFFARES: And I might be wrong, but
14	I it's going to be a higher number than you
15	think.
16	MS. KING: Yeah. I think adding in this
17	change will be
18	MR. FERVIER: Well, member Jeffares said
19	that in his opinion there's probably around 30
20	counties or more that don't have any sort of
21	website.
22	MR. JEFFARES: I could be wrong. That was
23	from about four or five years ago. There was a
24	bunch of them that don't have them. Back then.
25	MS TEF. No

MR. FERVIER: He said from his knowledge as of four years ago, there was at least 30 counties or more that did not have any form of website.

MS. LEE: WOW.

MS. GHAZAL: Can I move that we table this for the next hour and direct director Coan to reach out to -- reach out to the Association -- the county commission association --

Director Coan, you know the organization I'm thinking of; correct? The --

DR. JOHNSTON: ACCG?

MR. COAN: Yes. It's the Association of County Commissioners, ACCG.

MS. GHAZAL: Yes. Can you see if you can find out in the next hour whether or not there is at least a website for each county, each of our hundred and fifty-nine counties? Because if there is at least a website, then this rule will cover that. If they --

MR. COAN: Okay. And we're speaking strictly on the county as a whole, not talking about elections boards separately.

MS. GHAZAL: Yes. Exactly. Exactly.

MR. COAN: Very good. I'll work on that right now.

MR. FERVIER: Well -- well, my -- my -- well, my other questions is whether this board has the authority to force a county to publish this on their website. I mean, I would almost revert back to what the original thing was that -- that we revise this rule to say that they have to make it available upon request and then we resubmitted -- we vote on it for rulemaking procedures and then revote on it on September 20th.

MS. GHAZAL: And I think by doing that,
Mr. Chairman, the counties can make the
determination if they want to post it on their
website even if there is not an election website
if that's the method in which they -- and I would
encourage counties to do that, but that we're not
instructing them to do that. So I think ...

MR. FERVIER: Yeah. I just don't think we have the authority to force a county to post it, the county election boards but not -- not the county themselves. So ...

MS. LEE: Okay. Let me be clear what you're saying, that I would withdraw this and then resubmit and put in the wording or in the absence of a website make it available to the public upon

request or --

MR. FERVIER: Yes. Yes.

MS. LEE: Okay. Okay.

MS. GHAZAL: A county may voluntarily choose to post it on their county website, but I think the chairman is correct in his assessment, that we don't have the authority to direct a county to publish something like that.

MS. LEE: Oh, okay. So then the wording,
"in the absence of a website," shouldn't be in
there either because --

(Background sound)

MS. LEE: -- then there's the qualification that would force them if they have a website to -- to post it. Okay. All right. Well, so we need to make it optional.

DR. JOHNSTON: I would ask if the county or the election office posts their results -- any results, election results -- that this would also fall -- would be appropriate to post this rather than giving them the option of they post election results but don't -- do not -- do not post the reconciliation report.

If they have a website where they're posting election results, then it would be appropriate to

have this posted also. I think if I'm understanding --

(Cross-talking)

MS. LEE: Okay, how about this?

MR. FERVIER: It would but I just don't think we have power to mandate that for counties. We do for election boards, but not for the counties themselves.

MS. LEE: Okay. Each county election board shall post the report in the same manner and media as their other election results are posted for public viewing?

MR. FERVIER: No, I -- I don't -- no. I think Dr. Johnston was talking about if a county -- not the county election board, but a county posted election results that we should ask them to also point -- do this. And my position was we don't have the power to make a county do anything, only the election board.

So your rule would be as written, but we would add the language shall publish a report on their county election results website or provide a copy if requested.

MS. LEE: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: And I think it's just adding

those simple words, "will provide a copy if requested."

MS. LEE: (indiscernible) a copy if requested. Okay. All right.

MR. FERVIER: Does the board have any opinion on that -- that language? Does the board have any opinion on that language that changed that rule?

MR. JEFFARES: That's fine with me.

DR. JOHNSTON: Chairman Fervier, I -- I'd recommend rather than "as requested" that it would be posted in the election office if it's not posted on the website. Rather than somebody having to ask for the report, it should be posted in the office for public review.

MR. FERVIER: So instead of "as requested," it would be posted in the elections office. I'm fine with that too.

Member Jeffares.

MR. JEFFARES: Yeah. That's fine with me because that's kind of what my rule change does which we're going to vote on next month. Since you don't have a website, you've got to post it.

MR. FERVIER: All right. So the change would be -- this would be the rule: Upon

submission of the completed reconciliation report 1 2 to the Secretary of State, each county shall 3 publish their report on their county election web -- results website or post in the elections 4 5 office. 6 MS. LEE: Or post it in the elections 7 office, okay. 8 MR. FERVIER: Yes. Any further comments --9 MS. LEE: (indiscernible) -- so do I need to 10 withdraw and redo it? 11 MR. FERVIER: No. No. This board would 12 need to initiate rulemaking procedures on that 13 rule. So we would need to go ahead and vote on 14 that to initiated rulemaking procedures and then 15 we would post it by the end of the day tomorrow 16 so that it could be voted on on September 20th. 17 MS. LEE: Cool. All right. Thank you. 18 MR. FERVIER: Well, we haven't voted yet. 19 MS. LEE: Yes. I'm thanking you in advance. 20 DR. JOHNSTON: Was that a --21 MR. FERVIER: Well, let me see. Miss Lee, 22 would you like to withdraw your petition -- or 23 your rule? 24 MS. LEE: So then I need to do that first, 25 right?

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. LEE: Okay. Yes, I would like to withdraw my petition for the rule.

MR. FERVIER: Yes, okay.

So Ms. Lee has withdrawn her petition or -for the rule. The chair will entertain a motion
to initiate rulemaking procedures on the revised
rule which would state: Upon submission of the
completed reconciliation report to the Secretary
of State, each county shall publish the report on
their county election results website or post in
the elections office.

MS. KING: So moved.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion from member King to accept that as presented. Do we have a second?

MR. JEFFARES: Second.

DR. JOHNSTON: Second.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second from member Jeffares. Any discussion? Hearing no discussion, all those in favor of initiating rulemaking procedures on SEB rule 183-12-.12[sic], subsection (e) stated as: Upon submission of the completed reconciliation report to the Secretary of State, each county shall

publish their report on their county election 1 2 results website or post in the elections office. We have a motion and a second. All those in 3 favor signify by saying aye. 4 Member Ghazal. 5 MS. GHAZAL: Aye. 6 7 MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston. 8 DR. JOHNSTON: Aye. 9 MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares. 10 MR. JEFFARES: Aye. 11 MR. FERVIER: Member King. 12 MS. KING: Aye. MR. FERVIER: The motion carries four to 13 14 zero. 15 Thank you very much, Ms. Lee. 16 MR. FERVIER: Alex, you want to make sure 17 that gets posted, okay? 18 The next item on the agenda is petition for 19 amendment of state election board rules presented 20 by Debbie Dooley. Ms. Dooley, are you online with us today? 21 22 MS. DOOLEY: I am. Can you hear me? MR. FERVIER: I can hear you. 23 MS. DOOLEY: Good. 24

MR. FERVIER: Do you plan on having anyone

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speak with you?

MS. DOOLEY: Sir?

DR. JOHNSTON: Do plan on having anybody
speak with you on your behalf?

MS. DOOLEY: No.

MR. FERVIER: Okay, great. Please go forward please.

Petitioner for Amendment of State Election Board Rules
Presented by Debbie Dooley.

MS. DOOLEY: Debbie Dooley. I've been a lifelong Republican since I was a senior in high school in 1976. I'm one of the 22 national cofounders of the Tea Party Movement in 2009 and lifelong Republican, big Trump supporter. And I want to say from the outset with my rule, this is not about the 2020 election. This is about securing the 2024 election. And I think that is important. And I think there are some things that are not about left or right. They're about right or wrong. And this is one of those issues that have drawn bipartisan support.

I would like to briefly -- I appreciate -- I never understood the hard work you guys had to do until I actually sat in on this -- this meeting so far. You guys deserve a badge of honor and

courage. Thank you for what you're doing.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you.

MS. DOOLEY: Anyway I want to read you -this kind of sums up the grassroots, how the
conservative grassroots feel about having to vote
on the Dominion screens. This is from -- and
each of you board members should have received an
e-mail from the author of this. And it's from a
county in middle Georgia.

(reading): Good afternoon -- he sent this yesterday -- state election board members.

Tomorrow will be a landmark day in Georgia.

Tomorrow, August 19th will be the day we find out whether the shooter on the roof has been neutralized. You see, that's the analogy I make to the situation with Dominion Voting Systems.

Dominion is the shooter on the roof. CISA told us in 2021, three years ago, that there was a shooter on the roof. The Georgia Secretary of State decided to do nothing about it prior to the most important election this country has faced in 2024.

So here we are with the 2024 presidential election about to enter center stage. Everybody knows the shooter is there. And those that have

been pointing out the vulnerabilities of the election because of the shooter are frustrated that nothing has been done. So now we are down to the wire.

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The citizens of the state of Georgia on both sides of the aisle want free and fair elections and are looking to the state election board to neutralize the vulnerabilities of the election that the shooter brings. It has been proven that the system can be hacked. It has been proven that vote counts have changed. It has been proven that because of the QR code the Dominion system does not meet the requirements of Georgia laws.

The voters of -- and he lists his county -- in the 12th District, the state of Georgia are not content with rolling the dice and hoping for the best. We know the vulnerabilities of the system will be tested. We know that with the Georgia SOS announcement that nothing will be done prior to the election. Hackers with ill intent have began eagerly researching ways to breach the system.

We are calling on you to neutralize the shooter. We are calling on you to mandate

hand-counted ballots for the upcoming election. You also have the authority and duty to restore trust in Georgia's election system.

And let me say one thing. I know a lot has come up about whether or not you guys have the ability to declare that backup voting systems will be used in November. You do. Judge Totenberg -- Judge Totenberg issued a ruling that said -- this is May 2019 and introduced the provisions of 20-2-281 providing for backup balloting when the voting system is impaired. The court said -- Judge Totenberg said: O.C. -- I mean, it goes on: 21-281[sic] is not limited to election superintendents. And the board members are responsible for enforcing Georgia's election code under this -- under state law. That's Judge Totenberg.

And there was a ruling from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in *Grizzle v Kemp*. This is when Governor Kemp was secretary of state. On March 8, 2011, they found in their ruling on page 3, under Georgia law, the state election board is vested with the power to issue orders directing compliance with chapter 2 of Georgia's election code or prohibiting the actual or

threatened commission of any conduct constituting a violation chapter 2. That was done in multiple places in that order, in that *Grizzle v Kemp* order.

You do have the authority to use the emergency ballots. This is a -- 2024 November is a dumpster fire waiting to happen. And here is the thing. As I sit here and listen through all these proceedings today -- and I gained a new respect for you guys, trust me -- that listening to all of this, I mean, you voted to -- you voted for rules previously or amendments to rules that some people are saying is -- you don't have the authority to do and you can't do it and they filed a legal challenge. The one about the common sense reconciliation that you voted on, the first thing you voted on, that's common sense. But you have some folks that are striking out against it.

The people of Georgia deserve to have a secure election. I have a 15-year background in information technology at a high level. And I can tell you these machines are hackable.

Halderman is much more technically astute than I am and in his Halderman report, he admitted this

is a dumpster fire waiting to happen. I am asking you to take action and hear -- and to order or pass a rule where the counties will use the backup balloting process, paper ballots, in November.

This has not been -- the backup ballot process has been in effect for years because you never know when you'll get to a polling place and something happened and you have to go to backup ballots if it happens to your computer system. If hackers can delay with all the security Elon Musk has in Twitter, if hackers can delay the Trump town hall for 45 minutes with a DDoS attack, what do you think they can try to do to our Dominion touchscreens, BMD, on election day when Republicans are the ones that usually vote on that? What do you think they will try to do?

And this is something that you guys do have the authority to do. And Secretary of State Brad Raffenperger has been derelict in his duty to secure the elections. He has known about the CISA vulnerability since 2021 and he has done nothing to change that, nothing to change that.

And I am just asking that you consider and that you pass my rule changes that I submitted.

And I will take questions now. Are there 1 2 any questions? MR. FERVIER: Just one moment. 3 Just one moment, please. 4 5 MS. DOOLEY: Okay. 6 MR. FERVIER: We have to -- we have to get 7 our stuff together here. 8 MS. DOOLEY: I'm sorry. I could've waited. 9 MR. FERVIER: No, no, no, no, no, no, no. 10 MS. DOOLEY: I could've awaited. I mean, 11 you know. 12 MR. FERVIER: No, you're fine. You're fine. 13 Are there any questions from the board for 14 Ms. Dooley? 15 MS. KING: Quick question. The backup 16 voting process that's in place now to use the 17 emergency ballots if there are some issues, are 18 you saying that's not in place? 19 MS. DOOLEY: Well, what we're -- what I'm 20 requesting with my rule change is that we ditch 21 the Dominion BMDs except for the -- the folks 22 that are impaired and need to use a touchscreen 23 and that we go to the backup ballot process that poll workers already -- have already been trained 24 25 on instead of using the Dominion BMDs.

And they can go through and -- like, with the hand-marked paper ballots, you can put them in the scanner or the tabulator, go in and scan them in, and, you know, and count the votes. But it is a lot more secure than using these Dominion BMDs.

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I'll tell you another issue with the Dominion BMDs. Something that I've noticed when I go vote in person that I have noticed with them is that, you know, you line these touchscreens in a room where voting takes place and there's no privacy. Somebody -- I've walked by different locations where I have voted and I can see -- you know, they're out there visible. So you could see where the voter is actually -- you can see what they're marking. There's no privacy and that's a violation of both state and federal law. There is a federal law and it says that this is Federal Law 52 USC 2108[sic], section (A), paragraph (i) that says: Voter must be able to verify in a private and independent manner the votes selected by voters on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted. That's federal law. That is a federal statute. You can't read a QR code. And it's very easy to put in malware and

change the QR code.

And I think Dr. Johnston had mentioned in the last board meeting that there were four different counties whose systems have been hacked. And this is what I'm asking. If there is some doubt of whether or not you can legally do this, once it's put in the rulemaking procedure, then you have time to research it, you can get legislative counsel to take a look at it and do that. Just start the process going. And if something happens and they say, no, you can't do that, then I'll -- then I will withdraw my rule if it's investigated.

MS. KING: I -- I have looked into what we can and can't do. And I think the challenge is when you want to just ditch the Dominion machine altogether except for --

MS. DOOLEY: No.

MS. KING: -- those who are -- except for the elderly or those who are -- that need it as far as disabilities of some sort. That's where it becomes really tricky because now we are altering how the election is being conducted and that is what's outside of the purview of the SEB board. That's the part that makes it really

difficult.

MS. DOOLEY: Well, it's not because you have procedures in place. Now, there are clear CISA -- CISA vulnerabilities that the Secretary of State has been derelict in his duty to patch. He has not patched that. It's been three years. And this is the most important election of -- of my lifetime. And, I mean, so you're put out -- would you send your -- your husband or your kids to go on a trip in an automobile that you know has major issues and could break down on the road? You wouldn't do that. You would repair it before. You do have the authority to go to these backup procedures.

When you go to a precinct on election day and if you get there and the power's off or the machines are down, then you can -- the poll workers can use the backup balloting procedures which is the hand-marked paper ballots. They'll be able to use that. And, yes, I am saying you can use the Dominion scanner or tabulator, whatever the poll workers -- one poll worker will call it one thing, one will call it another. You can use that because in cases of discrepancy with all the good rule changes that you guys have

already passed, in cases of discrepancy you can count hand-marked paper ballots instead of machine-marked paper ballots. And that is something that I truly believe you guys have the authority to -- to do to make this decision.

But at least you could get the process going. And then if you find out you don't, then, you know, at least you can get it going and we can get a definitive answer. But I've already read you the opinions from two different federal courts. And Judge Totenberg was the district court, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also found that -- that you could do things like that. The Secretary of State's dereliction of duty for not patching the CISA vulnerabilities, so why is he left -- why was he focused on the GARViS poll pads when he should've been focused on patching the CISA vulnerabilities? And it's a train wreck waiting to happen.

MS. KING: My -- this is my last point and then I'm going to -- I -- I would love to hear from the rest of the board on what they think about this. I think it goes back to -- the example you gave is that if a -- if a poll official -- polling official goes in, they see

the machine is just not turning on, right?

That's a totally different situation than to

determine from a statewide level as a board that

every county has to follow this particular

procedure.

That's what makes it a little bit tricky. However, I am interested in hearing from the additional members of the board in case I'm not seeing this correctly.

MR. FERVIER: Ms. Dooley, I -- I appreciate what you're trying to do. My -- I think my issues with this is that the Legislature in Georgia has put their trust and confidence in these Dominion machines and allowed them to come about and we all vote that way now. And I don't think that it's the place of this board to go against what the Legislature has put in place for us to -- as a voting system.

What your rule would do would change completely the way we vote in Georgia and in effect put hand-marked paper ballots back in, you know, as our primary way of voting. And I think that that is just in direct contradiction of what the Legislature's decided to do in Georgia.

And if, you know -- and my other issue with

this is, you know, the naming of Dominion in here and some of these other comments that are made in the rule itself. I don't think it's this board's place to take a position on that and to name any company, like Dominion, in these rules and, you know, vulnerabilities that Dominion may or may not have. For me, it is inappropriate to be in a rule itself.

I -- I -- so I appreciate what you're doing.

I just feel like that -- that the Legislature is the proper place to make this change if it needs to be made in the state of Georgia. So ...

MS. DOOLEY: But we have this election -and it is your -- it is the board's
responsibility to make sure our election systems
are secure. And --

MR. FERVIER: I don't disagree.

MS. DOOLEY: -- they're not. They're not
secure.

MR. FERVIER: I appreciate that, but it really is the Legislature's responsibility to make sure that we have the proper laws in place. And so I would, you know, go back to the Legislature and say: These machines are working, they're not working. That's the appropriate

venue for me, I think, that something like this needs to occur.

MS. DOOLEY: Well, they have that code section that the Eleventh Circuit talked about and that code section hasn't changed. And it gives you guys the authority to go to backup measures and to oversee the election system. And --

MR. FERVIER: Well, we --

MS. DOOLEY: -- it gives you the authority to do that if you want to use rulemaking. And keep in mind, I'm not asking for this to be done permanently. All I'm doing, is there a security risk there? All I'm asking is to go to backup ballots -- backup ballots until the Secretary of State actually patches the vulnerabilities mentioned in the CISA report. I'm not asking for it to be done permanently.

Now, if I was asking for it to be done permanently, you're absolutely correct. That would be up to the Legislature and that would be up to people to decide, okay, is my legislator pro Dominion or anti-Dominion? and vote accordingly in 2026.

So but I'm not asking for any permanent

change. I'm just asking that you move to secure our voting system before the most important election in the lifetime. I'm not asking for a permanent change. If the Secretary of State -- he's been derelict in his duty to patch the CISA vulnerability. He's been very derelict in his duty. All he does is defend Dominion. And I mean it's at risk. It's at risk that he's doing that and I -- I think you guys -- I think you have the authority to pass this temporary rule change.

Now, if he wants to come in and all of a sudden start patching Dominion, which he's not, but this is just until he does his responsibility and patches the extreme vulnerability with the Dominion machines. This is not permanent.

MR. FERVIER: Yeah. I guess my other issue is I -- you know, having read almost all of the rules in this green book and a lot of the statutes, I -- I don't see any other place where we're talking about Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and Dominion machines. I mean, it's listed over and over again in your rule, and I -- I don't feel it's appropriate for us to have those kinds of

comments in rulemaking determinations on public companies and whether or not they're -- you know, an emergency situation exists because of use of a certain company. I feel like that puts us at some risk for slander and things like that.

That's just my personal feeling of that. So ...

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MS. DOOLEY: Well, if you would like, I could change the rule to remove Dominion and just put in voting machines, but, I mean, you know, it's like calling a cat a dog when you don't name what the issue is. And Dominion has been the voting machine that's had vulnerabilities. That's what -- we have seen it. We don't have to quess what's going to happen. We have seen that there have been -- according to Dr. Johnston, there have been four county election systems already that have been hacked. So we know that's a vulnerability. And the board has it within their authority, according to the -- you don't like Judge Totenberg, the Eleventh Circuit definitely ruled, said you guys have authority to -- to govern.

MR. FERVIER: I have no opinion on Judge
Totenberg. Well, I've -- I mean, I've made my
comments. And isn't this substantially similar

to a rule that we heard in a previous meeting?

MS. DOOLEY: Yes. It's Marilyn Marks. When I wanted to -- I worked with Marilyn on different issues for a couple of years, volunteered my time about the security system, and I'm a firm believer don't remake the wheel.

And I consider Marilyn to be a very good subject matter expert in this situation and in these Dominion machines and what federal laws say. And I wanted to make sure that -- and she already had a rule that I saw that I thought was good and so why remake the wheel? Why not do that?

And I would remind folks that when Georgia was getting ready to deploy Dominion, Stacey Abrams and other Democrats spoke out against using Dominion voting machines. A lot of them did. After 2020 and we started going after Dominion, all of the sudden they just love — many Democrats just love Dominion. But not all Democrats do. And as I said, there are some issues that is not about left and right. They're about right and wrong. And it's wrong to expect voters — to demand that voters vote on a system that's not secure. And that's wrong. And people

think their votes don't count.

MR. FERVIER: Any other comments from the board or questions from the board?

Member Johnston's -- okay.

DR. JOHNSTON: Chairman Fervier.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

pR. JOHNSTON: In reading through the petition, there's a mention about a precinct specific ballot printing plan which would probably take some planning and time, that would probably take a great deal of time actually. And there's also mention about a ballot-on-demand printer. I don't think polling places have ballot-on-demand printers. Do they?

MS. DOOLEY: I believe some do. And here is the thing. The -- they already have some of the ballots printed up that they have to have in case the computer system goes down and you have to have backup balloting. So they're -- they're already familiar with that process of backup balloting -- of backup balloting in case of issues.

And my -- my nightmare would be that on election day a DDoS attack go -- and all the computer systems go -- you know, a lot of the --

the election equipment go down, people can't vote. And they -- you know, you've got to have enough ballots at each polling place.

And provisional ballots, aren't there already provisional ballots at the polling place in case the system goes down or in case somebody is not registered? There's already ballots there that are printed with specific races.

MS. GHAZAL: If I may jump in here.

MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal.

MS. GHAZAL: Dr. Johnston, no, we do not have precinct-based ballot-on-demand printers nor do we have early voting location ballot-on-demand printers. It is absolutely true that every polling place needs to have 10 percent of the number of registered voters available in emergency and provisional ballots as a backup as part of the emergency system.

And that also means that every early voting location needs to have at least a small number of backup ballots. But the problem is we don't -- ballot-on-demand printers are extremely expensive.

Now, for the record, this would've been the system -- this was the system that I favored very

strongly in 2019 when -- when the state adopted the BMD system. But we do not have the capability of printing ballots on demand for all of our precincts, all of our election day precincts, and particularly during early voting because finding the actual -- either printing out on demand or finding the correct ballot style during early voting is a significant -- significant burden because, you know, in our larger counties, we have up to, like, a thousand different ballot styles. Each precinct can have several different ballot styles for the -- for that precinct, so identifying and having enough ballots to be able to do this.

It actually -- ironically that is what Fulton County is still getting criticism for because they printed more ballots than they had voters in 2020 because of the need to have access to ballots if you're working on a completely paper ballot system. So I wanted to clarify some of those questions.

MS. DOOLEY: Well, here's a solution to that. You order enough ballots to match the registered voters in your precinct. Order them ahead of time and have them there. And it costs

a lot less than using the Dominion BMDs, the 2 touchscreens. You could have a -- there's ample time to order them and have them in stock there. 3 Where there's a will, there's a way. 4 5 MS. GHAZAL: Mr. Chairman, I will call the 6 question. 7 MR. FERVIER: Are there any other comments 8 or questions? 9 Member Jeffares? Member --10 MR. JEFFARES: Not -- not right now. 11 MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares has no 12 questions. Any other questions or comments from the board? Is there a motion? The chair will 13 14 entertain a motion from the board. 15 MS. GHAZAL: I would move that we decline Ms. Dooley's petition. 16 17 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion from member 18 Ghazal to decline this petition. Is there a 19 second? DR. JOHNSTON: Second. 20 MR. FERVIER: We have a second from member 21 22 Johnston. Any discussion? Hearing no 23 discussion, all those in favor of declining this 24 petition signify by saying aye. I'll call out 25 the members.

1

1	Member Ghazal.
2	MS. GHAZAL: Aye.
3	MR. FERVIER: To decline? Yes.
4	MS. GHAZAL: Decline.
5	MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston.
6	DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.
7	MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares.
8	MR. JEFFARES: Aye.
9	MR. FERVIER: Aye.
10	Member King.
11	MS. KING: Aye.
12	MR. FERVIER: The chair the motion was
13	made to decline this petition and it was voted
14	four to zero to decline this petition.
15	Thank you, Ms. Dooley.
16	Member King, are you ready to bring back
17	your
18	(Background noise)
19	MS. KING: Yes. We have come to a solution.
20	Discussion and Voting on Proposed Rule Amendment to
21	SEB Rule 183-1-1212(a)(5)(continued)
22	MR. FERVIER: So we will go back on the
23	agenda and revisit SEB rule 183-1-1212,
24	subsection (a), subsection (5).
25	Member King, you have the floor.

1	MS. KING: Yes. So Miss Sharlene and I have
2	spoken and we believe we've reached a compromise
3	on the amendment. We made a simple adjustment.
4	I just want to make sure I read that, and then
5	I'm sure Ms Ms. Alexander is going to
6	withdraw her petition and we can then vote on the
7	petition with my amendment. So the
8	MR. FERVIER: Okay.
9	MS. KING: proposed
10	MR. FERVIER: Let me let me ask
11	Ms. Alexander.
12	Ms. Alexander, are you online with us?
13	MS. ALEXANDER: I am.
14	MR. FERVIER: Are you willing to withdraw
15	your petition?
16	MS. ALEXANDER: I am.
17	MR. FERVIER: Okay. Ms. Alexander has
18	withdrawn her petition.
19	Member King
20	MS. KING: Yes. So
21	MR. FERVIER: would you like to present a
22	new petition?
23	MS. KING: Yes. So the new petition will be
24	her rule as is, but we will be adding section 6
25	which would be my amendment. And it would read

as such (reading): The decision about when to start the process described in paragraph (a)(5) is up to the poll manager and assistant poll manager. This decision can be made at the end of election day or if a scanner possesses more than 750 ballots on election day, the poll manager can choose to start the next day and finish during the week designated for county certification.

(reading): This decision should take into account factors such as staffing requirements, fatigue, and concerns about efficiency and accuracy. If the ballot counting is to take place after election day, the relevant ballots, tabulation tapes, enumerated voter lists, and polling information shall be sealed in a tamperproof container and the number of seal noted. The counting shall occur in the county election office on the next business day following election day and must conclude prior to any scheduled or announced postelection audits. The process must be completed within the designated county certification period.

(reading): Counting will take place as mentioned in section (a)(5). The process of opening, counting, and resealing ballots must be

conducted in the presence of the relevant poll manager or assistant poll manager. These procedures must be conducted publicly to ensure transparency.

(reading): If the counting of ballots takes place -- takes place at any time or place other than the polling location, the supervisor of elections must immediately communicate the date, time, and place of such action with all candidates on the ballot and the county chair of both major political parties no later than 10 p.m. on election day.

(reading): The poll manager shall such -shall post such information on the outside
windows of the polling location, together with
all other information required to be so posted.

I believe this amendment will help address some of the challenges we have as it relates to our larger counties that would have, you know, ballots that are more than 200 or more. So this is the amendment that we are adding to her rule to be voted on.

MR. FERVIER: If you would please send that language to Alexandra so that -- she was writing furiously but I don't think she got it all down.

1 So ...

MS. ALEXANDER: Okay. Sending it to you right now.

MR. FERVIER: Be a great help.

MS. KING: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: So we have an amended -- we have a petition for -- to initiate rulemaking procedures on SEB rule 183-1-12-.12, subsection (a), subsection (5). It is an amended petition presented by board member King. Are there any questions from the board?

MS. GHAZAL: Yes. Member King, have you spoken with any election superintendents or supervisors with regard to this change and whether or not they have the capacity to do this, to make these changes on the fly on election night and if they have the actual physical capabilities of doing this in their election offices?

MS. KING: Yes, I have. I have spoken with several county officials and that's how we came up with this tweak. It was actually recommended by a county official.

MR. FERVIER: Any other questions from the board?

1	MR. JEFFARES: Hold on, I had my mute on.
2	Do what?
3	MR. FERVIER: Any other questions from the
4	board?
5	MR. JEFFARES: No.
6	MR. FERVIER: No questions from member
7	Jeffares.
8	Member Johnston.
9	DR. JOHNSTON: No questions.
10	MR. FERVIER: The board will entertain a
11	motion on this amended petition to initiate
12	rulemaking procedures.
13	DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, I move
14	MR. JEFFARES: So moved.
15	DR. JOHNSTON: I move that
16	MR. JEFFARES: So moved.
17	DR. JOHNSTON: we initiate
18	MR. FERVIER: Let let hold on. Excuse
19	me. We had more than one speaking at one time.
20	Member Johnston.
21	DR. JOHNSTON: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I move
22	that we initiate rulemaking for the rule just
23	referred to and as read and amended by Ms. King
24	
25	MS. KING: Second.

DR. JOHNSTON: -- to be posted tomorrow, no later than close of business tomorrow, and be reconsidered at the September 20th meeting.

MR. FERVIER: Member King, since this is your rule, I'd ask that you recuse yourself from voting on this one.

MS. KING: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. FERVIER: So we have a motion to initiate rulemaking procedures on SEB rule 183-1-12-.12, subsection (a), subsection (5). Do we have a second?

Member Jeffares, could you hear that?

MR. JEFFARES: I thought I made the motion but if I didn't, I'll second it.

MR. FERVIER: Okay. We had two people making a motion. I selected Dr. Johnston since she's been on the board longer than you.

MR. JEFFARES: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second from member Jeffares. Any discussion? Hearing no discussion, all those in favor of initiating rulemaking procedures on SEB rule 183-1-12-.12, subsection (a), subsection (5) signify by saying aye.

Member Johnston.

1	DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.
2	MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal.
3	MS. GHAZAL: Nay.
4	MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares.
5	MR. JEFFARES: Yea.
6	MR. FERVIER: The ayes carry it two to one.
7	DR. JOHNSTON: I'm sorry, what was the
8	result?
9	MR. FERVIER: The ayes carry it two to one.
10	DR. JOHNSTON: Okay.
11	MR. FERVIER: Next item on the agenda is
12	petition for amendment of state election board
13	rules presented by Lucia Frazier.
14	Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rules
15	Presented by Lucia Frazier
16	MS. FRAZIER: Hello. Can you hear me?
17	MR. FERVIER: Yes, Ms. Frazier. I want to
18	make sure that I have the correct one. I believe
19	you're talking about rule 183-1-1219,
20	subsection (6), subsection (a).
21	MS. FRAZIER: Yes. And I can talk to both
22	rules at the same time. I have a few slides on
23	each one. And I can go through
24	MR. FERVIER: We we need to we need to
25	vote on them individually. So let's talk about

each one individually.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay. All right, so let me share my screen. Are you able to see my screen?

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay. So for the certified list of electors, that's what the first rule is about, the problem that I see is that we have lots of ineligible registrations that were in the 2020 and 2022 elections and they still exist in the current voter roll. And these are things like duplicates, commercial addresses, deceased, nonexistent addresses, double registrations in two states, and registrations that were challenged and accepted and then removed and then put back on.

So the solution to this, and something that would help greatly, is to require the posting of the eligible electors list for the state and counties before advanced voting begins so that we can fulfill our citizen oversight duties. And the reason I say all that is because, as you know, the Sunshine Laws and several judicial decisions explain proper governance as the Constitution intended which is that we are supposed to take ownership and provide oversight,

and especially now because I told you there's a lot of issues on the rolls right now that are not being corrected and they are there for years.

And some of the laws that the Sunshine Laws that I allude to in the paper is that, you know, these -- all the election data has to be timely and accessible. Even if it's a third party helping, there should be no charge for anything 15 minutes or less, especially if it's routine data.

And there should be public disclosure of all records concerning elector lists as said by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. And finally the Georgia Supreme Court had -- has said there should be no charge for routine public data.

So to give you more of a picture of the current state right now, the elector list is uploaded in the poll pads before early voting and a copy is given to each poll manager. Some changes are made through early voting and reflected on the poll pads immediately. However, this ideally or by law is -- there shouldn't be any changes five days before election day because one of the laws says it has to be frozen five days before election day.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: People are saying
you're distorted.

MS. FRAZIER: Oh, okay.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So let's try this
(indiscernible).

MS. FRAZIER: Am I -- am I being -- can you
guys hear me okay?

MR. FERVIER: I can hear you. It is just a little bit distorted, but I can understand you.

MS. FRAZIER: All right. Let me see if I can plug this in and speak through this. All right. All right, how does that sound?

MR. FERVIER: A little bit better.

MS. FRAZIER: Little bit better, okay. I'll keep going. Stop me if you think it's distorted again.

Okay. So (indiscernible) what's happening right now. And so this list is analyzed before election day and then it's uploaded to the poll pads and a supplemental paper list is created for anything that didn't make it to the poll pads and given to the poll managers for election day. So that's what we currently have right now.

And I just have some call-outs of the code just showing you that it is being done already.

It's something we already do. And I'm just asking this rule to ask the counties and Secretary of State to post that in a timely manner, so before early voting and before election day. And if there's any changes before early — between the first day of early voting and election day, we need to have an account of those changes. So that's what I'm saying down there at the bottom.

And then I have some verbiages that are in blue just because it wasn't totally clear before to me that they were making changes during early voting. Ideally they shouldn't be once early voting starts. All registrations are due 29 days before an election. So ideally everything would be in there.

I have heard there are errors sometimes and they do make those changes on the fly when people come in and vote during early voting. So if that's going to happen, then either we need to have the changes documented and posted or they should not make changes and make notes and then that way you'll have a comparison -- a (indiscernible) comparison of what's going in and what's coming out.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They're saying it's distorted. Ask them if they're -- if they can hear you.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay. Is it still sounding distorted?

(Multiple speakers)

MR. FERVIER: I can understand you. It sounds like -- almost like you're talking too close to the microphone, you know? There's distortion sometimes.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay, hold on. Okay. Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (indiscernible) do it
on the other laptop. It might be better.

(indiscernible).

MS. FRAZIER: Okay, give me one second here. Okay, I will keep going and I'll just maybe go a little slower. And then if --

MR. FERVIER: That sounds fine, yes.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay. And then if we -- well, we'll have an opportunity to switch to a different laptop real quick if we need to. Okay.

So the next slide. So I just want to show some examples of why this is so important. These are seven different buckets of different types of ineligible registrations that are currently on

the voter rolls. And this is as of August 13th of this month. So we just went in and looked at all this.

There are in the top left corner several people that are deceased and still registered in Fayette County. And this was identified, I think, several months ago initially. On the right side, with the pictures, you see some commercial addresses, registrations that use commercial addresses or they use addresses that don't exist, like a highway. There's I-20 there, on Lee Street or the side of the commercial road here on Nesbit Ferry, and then there's also a house that is on there that has 20 registrants but the house is clearly abandoned. And that picture was taken two days ago.

So just -- and all of these have actually been brought to the county's attention a long time ago. Some of them, a couple years ago. And they had agreed that they should come off, but somehow they ended up back on.

So there is a process problem. And, okay -- and then also with -- there's 29,000 people that are registered in Florida and Georgia right now that have filled out an NCOA and registered to

vote in Florida. So that's another issue.

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And then lastly on this slide, there's registrations with impossible birth years. So just the 1900, there's about 800; 1800 there's 21; and then there's 48 from 1901 to 1910. So my bottom line is that the data that's being entered is not being verified.

And one more example here. This is what duplicate registrations look like. Each pair of lines is one person and so every column that has the quotes in it are all -- you know, they match. But where you see yellow is where, say, there's a last name that's spelled differently or there's an apartment number that's either there or not there. And so they're listed twice. These are just several different examples. Sometimes there's a middle initial and sometimes there's a middle name. And sometimes there's a hyphen or an apostrophe or a period and sometimes there And sometimes their city is different. And sometimes in the pink there, it's all the same but just listed three times. And there are thousands more like this on here.

And even though Mr. Sterling has said that we have the cleanest voter lists and that they do

use Real ID, photo ID, somehow it's not -- it's not being caught because these are in here right now. And if this isn't being caught, there's even -- there's worse cases that could be potentially happening.

So for that reason and those reasons, I really feel that we need citizen oversight. And to have citizen oversight, we need to have the election data available for oversight. And we already have the -- the law already allows us to have that, to have access to all election data. We pretty much have forgotten that the citizens own this process and the citizens do have oversight. And if -- if the process isn't working, I think it's okay that people should be accepting of citizen help, which many counties do, by the way. Many counties do accept a lot of help.

So it actually is working very well and it would be great to have this more consistent. From the SEB it would be great to have a rule that says the counties and the SOS to post the current voter roll before election so we all are able to audit ourselves and see that we're on there and see that the right things are on there

before election starts.

So that's what I have on that first rule. And I'll take questions.

MR. FERVIER: Are there questions from the board for Ms. Frazier?

DR. JOHNSTON: I have a question.

MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston.

DR. JOHNSTON: Ms. Frazier, since this is
public information, if you went to a county,
would you -- would they provide the voter roll -the certified list of electors to you to review?

MS. FRAZIER: That is what they should be doing. And in our experience, they have not. The answer has been: We're too busy. So there's never -- I don't know anyone who's been able to get a voter role right close -- you know, the certified electors list right before election. So ... and that should be available. I mean, that's -- that's a certified list that it is a document created for the process, therefore it is something we should have access to.

MR. FERVIER: We do have a -- we do have Blake Evans with the Secretary of State's Office online with us and would like to respond to this.

Mr. Evans, are you online?

MR. EVANS: Yes, sir. Can you hear me okay?

MR. FERVIER: Yes. Yes, we can hear you.

MR. EVANS: Okay, great, great. Just want to provide a little bit of feedback and as it pertains to this particular rule. And I thought that GAVREO -- I was reading through their comments this morning, and I thought theirs were accurate as well. And that is to the -- the registration deadline is 29 days before the election. The counties are continuing to process applications that they received for days following that as long as the person who's submitting the registration application met that registration deadline.

And so right now what this rule is asking for is essentially the voter list at that moment in time. And I will say that we will process voter list purchases all during that time up and to and through election day. And so anybody that wants this list or anybody that wants a voter list as of that moment in time can simply go to our website, purchase the list, and it will be provided to them within a matter of days.

And so really if somebody wants a voter list during this time frame, they'll simply just need

to purchase it and it'll be provided to them and it'll have that information as far as the application date that somebody can look at, any citizen can look at once they get their order and see who was registered by the -- by the deadline, by the registration deadline. And that'll be the -- that'll be the list.

One thing that I'll point out -- excuse

me -- from GAVREO's comments is that I believe

they were in opposition to this rule because the

list of voters who are eligible to participate in
an election isn't static and changes from day to
day as we perform our duties as required by law.

And that's referring to continuing to process the
applications as long as they met that
registration deadline. Now, if they come in
after the registration deadline, they don't get
put on. But I'll just reiterate that we have a
process in place to provide voter lists and
anybody who wants to purchase one can do so and
it will be provided to them.

MS. FRAZIER: So if I can respond to that.
The --

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. FRAZIER: The voter list that you're

making available is an ever-changing list. What we are asking for is the certified list, the frozen list. And I do -- the frozen list, according to law, has to be frozen five days before election. So there's at least one point where the list will not change. And that is the frozen list for election day. And we would like that list posted. And that's what this is asking for.

And if someone were to request it through the Secretary of State and maybe they have -- I believe they have and it never -- it's never materialized ever. So to make this transparent and to make it accessible like the Sunshine Laws are requiring, it should be posted just like, you know, the other states that do this. So it's not a difficult thing to do. But there is a point in time where it is frozen and certified.

Now, before early voting, there can be -there currently -- currently you do not claim
that there is a certified electors list before
early voting. I'm saying there can be because
you can easily say -- you put a date stamp on it
and you say this is the certified electors list
going into early voting. And I understand some

changes theoretically can be made in the first few days of early voting because I know there's some errors that are made, but it's very few from my experience -- and I have worked the polls and I have worked with poll managers and talked to many, there are very few changes that have to be made during that time.

So that's my response, is that it is -- it is really, really important that -- the emphasis I'm trying to make is that we do need a starting point, a frozen point and all registrations are due 29 days before. Early voting starts 21 days. Those nine days the staff is doing their work and getting that blocked in.

MR. EVANS: Yeah. And the only thing I'll add is that that voter list that I was speaking of earlier has got a column that is application date. And so any application that was received by the registration deadline or before, that's -- that's the list. And so that's -- those are the people eligible for the election. Not any more or not any less.

MS. FRAZIER: Well, it needs to be called certified. That's what we're saying. It's -- it's -- it's creating a clean starting point

before an election. 1 MR. FERVIER: Ms. Frazier --2 MR. EVANS: Mr. Chair, I -- Mr. Chair, I 3 don't really have any other comments. 4 5 MR. FERVIER: Okay. Any -- any questions for Mr. Evans from the board? 6 7 DR. JOHNSTON: Ouestion. 8 MR. FERVIER: Yeah, member Johnston. 9 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes. Blake, if I had -- if I 10 didn't have any money and I -- and I took the bus 11 down to the county office, would they provide a 12 list for me to just review for free? 13 MR. EVANS: No, I don't believe so. believe the -- I believe -- and I can confirm 14 15 this and get back to you on it, but I believe 16 that there is a price for a county electors list. 17 I know to go through our website and purchase a 18 county electors list, there -- there is a price. 19 I believe it's \$50. I'll confirm that. 20 had some pricing changes. But I can confirm that price for you and get back to you on it. 21 22 DR. JOHNSTON: Okay. I just thought in the 23 code it said that an elector or a citizen could

go to the office and review such public material

or a document like that.

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MR. EVANS: I can check and confirm for you.

DR. JOHNSTON: Okay. So is this elector

list available at the county level five days

before voting begins?

MR. EVANS: So they can at any point in time -- they could generate a report that has this data on it, but what they are using, as was presented -- what they're using is the information that's out of the electronic poll book.

So essentially what happens is if somebody has met the registration deadline, their data gets put into the electronic poll book that's used for advanced voting. And then let's say if a couple of days into advanced voting a registrar realizes that there was an application or has an application that met the registration deadline that wasn't put in yet, they can enter that voter into the registration system and after that voter gets verified and it gets added to the rolls, then that record would appear in the electronic poll book as well.

And so the -- the electronic -- or the -- the registrar has access to this information through both the poll book and also through the

voter registration system. They can, like I said, generate a report at any time.

DR. JOHNSTON: And is there -- additionally
is there a supplemental list?

MR. EVANS: So that's -- that's a good question. There -- there's -- there's less supplemental lists than there used to be because it used to be that -- because the way that it works now is that if a voter gets added in the voter registration system, that information gets -- within a matter of minutes after that voter's verified gets put into the electronic poll book.

And so to the extent that there's a supplemental list, it would only be for a backup on election day. Because even on election day, there's essentially an exchange of data in near realtime. And so once a voter checks into an electronic poll book on election day, within about ten to fifteen minutes, that check-in is appearing in the voter registration system. And so the supplemental list would only be as a backup to the paper elector list that is also a backup on election day.

MS. FRAZIER: The supplemental list is

actually voters that didn't make it into the poll book on election day. So when people come in and check in and they're not in the poll book, we check them off the supplemental list and then we handwrite their name on the numbered list of voters. And that's how they're captured, not electronically.

MR. EVANS: So that -- that used to be the case, but now because of electronic poll books and once the voter -- even if -- even if the voter is verified -- let's say the registrar entered the -- the voter two weeks before or a week before. Once the verification process completes on the voter, that information gets synced on the poll pad and the voter appears there.

So that's -- when I said there's less of a need for a supplemental list than previous -- previously, that would be why.

MS. FRAZIER: But there's still a supplemental paper list where people are not in the poll book. It just happened in May. So I know that that -- that is just another avenue for, you know, ones that make the registration date but did not get processed in time to get

into the poll book.

DR. JOHNSTON: So, Blake, would it be
feasible -- would it be feasible to -- to -- for
the county or -- or to post their list on their
website?

MR. EVANS: And so I would say that the method that's prescribed right now -- that's essentially purchasing a voter list. And so right now the opportunity to purchase a voter list is through our website to be able to get that data.

MR. FERVIER: (indiscernible) --

MS. FRAZIER: The counties receive an elector list from the -- I mean, the counties create the elector list to give to the Secretary of State, and then the Secretary of State uploads it into the poll pads. Therefore the county gets an electronic copy from you guys. And when they're doing municipals, they upload it themselves into the poll pads. That -- That exists. That means that you can just post it, you know, just like you're giving it to the county for municipals five days before election. And you can post it.

MR. EVANS: So I think what you're referring

to is we do make -- we do make available to counties essentially in CSV or Excel format a backup list that is their electors list that they could -- they could use as a backup if they want to put it on a laptop. We also will take that same list and have it printed and shipped to them. That way they have a paper backup. So I believe that that's what you're referring to.

But for members of the public, what is prescribed in the code, in O.C.G.A. 21-2-225, is that there is a method to purchase a voter list and that is, again, available through our website and can be done anytime.

MR. FERVIER: I think that -- I want to make that point because it -- it does affect all these rules that you've put in place, Ms. Frazier -- or are asking for, Ms. Frazier. I mean, it is 21-2-225, subsection (c) down there. Let me just read it real guick.

(reading): It's a duty -- it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to furnish copies of such data as may be collected and maintained on electors whose names appear on the list of electors maintained by the Secretary of State pursuant to this article within the limitations

provided in this article on electronic media or computer-run list or both. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the Secretary of State shall establish a cost to be charged for such data.

And it goes on to say some other stuff. So the Secretary of State, by statute in this book, has the right to charge for that data and your petitions are asking for it to be freely available which is contrary to statute. And so the statute would have to be changed in order for your petitions to go forward, I believe, because it is — it's in the statute.

MS. FRAZIER: You guys, if you believe this data that -- you know, the first question is do you believe this data should be available to the public? The second question is do you believe this data should be available to the public free? And therefore your vote will show, you know, one way or the other and the rule can go into rulemaking and then it would -- it would reflect what the Sunshine Laws say.

The statute -- if the Secretary of State has to -- they can post something, you know, they can put a cost on something, but that is in violation

of the Sunshine Laws. It's already routine data and it's something they already do and it's not going to add any cost. And therefore if they are charging so much for these items, then, you know, they're making a profit because there's — they're already doing it whether somebody asks for it or not.

MR. FERVIER: Well, I understand that, but this board cannot freely violate the law. And this is what the law says.

MS. FRAZIER: You're not violating the law by asking counties and SOS to post it freely because at that point it's on the Secretary of State to -- you know, if they insist on putting a price, then, you know, then we will go from there. But from this board, the recommendation needs to be following what the Sunshine Laws are saying, to make the data available to the public.

MR. FERVIER: Well, but your -- your -- your proposition here says that the Secretary of State will also post a freely accessible link. So we'd be directing the Secretary of State to post a freely accessible link and that is in violation of 21-2-225 -- or it contradicts 21-2-225, subsection (c).

So you're asking us to tell the Secretary of

State to do something that's -- you know,

contradicts the code, what the code allows.

MS. FRAZIER: Well, they can charge zero.

It says it doesn't have to be -- it can charge

one dollar, I guess, but the point is we can make

MR. FERVIER: Right --

MS. FRAZIER: So it's not contradicting.

that -- and the law doesn't say what to charge,

it just says they have the ability to charge.

MR. FERVIER: You are because you're saying free. And we can't -- we can't tell the Secretary of State's Office to provide this list free. We can't do that because code doesn't allow that. The code -- yeah, they could charge zero, they could charge a dollar, they could charge a penny. They can charge whatever they want to charge. That's up to the Secretary of State. That's not up to this board.

DR. JOHNSTON: So, Mr. Chair.

MR. FERVIER: Yes, ma'am.

DR. JOHNSTON: That same section, 21-2-225, paragraph (b) states that all the data collected and maintained on electors whose names appear on the list of electors maintained by the Secretary

of State pursuant to this article shall be available for public inspection. So how would -- how would I go -- where and how would I go for public inspection of this data?

MR. FERVIER: Well, that would be up to the Secretary of State. I mean, that -- that's not --

DR. JOHNSTON: Yeah. Okay, I'm looking at the Secretary of State. Blake.

MR. EVANS: So to go back and answer,

Dr. Johnston, one of your earlier questions, I

confirmed with a couple of election directors

that if somebody comes in and were to request a

county-level list, they -- they typically refer

them to -- to our office.

And I also say, before I get back to your question, that there's a lot of data that's made available through our website during an election completely for free including who -- who goes to vote, the absentee voter file, and also the voter participation file that's there, available.

And the last thing I'll say before I get back to the question is, you know, one of the things we do when we look at our fee is consider how much it costs to maintain the voter list.

And costs have gone up and it's -- it's very expensive to maintain the voter lists. And I do think the fee that we charge is reasonable. If you look at the state of Alabama, they charge \$38,000 for their list. And then other states, like South Carolina and Tennessee, charge \$2,500. And I know that there are states out there that do charge zero, but we're pretty middle of the road or even on the lower end based on -- based on our fee. So ...

And then, Dr. Johnston, can you remind me the code section that you just asked about?

DR. JOHNSTON: It's 21-2-225, paragraph (b). Says the only exception are bank statements.

MR. EVANS: Yes. So the way that I read that -- now, I'll defer to -- I'll defer to our attorney, but is that there's some information that -- that is available to the public and some information has to be protected because it's personally identifiable information, like driver's license number, Social Security number, and -- and that sort of thing. But I don't read that as saying that all -- like an entire voter list has to be made available for free, which I think is consistent with part (c) when it says

that we can -- we can charge a fee for it.

So I -- I don't -- again, I would defer to our attorney on that, but I don't -- I don't read that as saying that everything for all 8 million voters has to be available for free at one time.

MR. FERVIER: Yeah. I believe that there's also a section in the Open Records Act, 50-18-71(c), that allows state agencies to charge for information.

MS. FRAZIER: It does say that there -- may impose a reasonable charge. But it also says that, you know, if it's something that's fifteen minutes or less, there should be no charge. And in this case, this is something that's already being created. It's not something -- it's not a one-off. It's just generating a link that people can access.

MR. FERVIER: Well, but the information -the information in that link took quite a bit of
time to generate.

MS. FRAZIER: That would happen irregardless of requesting. That's part of the process. And if you -- I mean, I understand it's a lot of work to maintain a voter roll, but I've just shown you it's not even being done. And I'm paying for

something that's not being done. I'm doing it for free, me and many other citizens.

So some courtesy could be given to the public to share the electors list, timestamp date before early voting and before election day.

That's a very simple ask and you're not contradicting anyone.

MS. KING: I have a question for the chairman.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. KING: I guess this question would be for Mr. Evans.

What exactly is the strategy if there is a voter who cannot afford these fees? Do we just disenfranchise them from being able to have access to this information?

MR. EVANS: So if somebody were to not be able to afford the fee -- now, I do want to -- I do want to also go back and say that what we charge for a statewide voter list is \$485. But if somebody were to say they wanted like an individual voter record or were to ask a county, hey, can I have a -- the information that's publicly available for an individual voter, that's an open records request and that's

typically little to no cost at all. In fact, we have a report out of the voter registration system that they can click and then it's -- it's there in PDF form and they can send it. It's only got that publicly -- or the -- the publicly releasable information in it.

And so, you know, I mean, as -- as of right now, there are the costs that are on our website for -- if somebody wants a precinct list or a county list. And it starts small and then it works its way up to \$485 for the full statewide list.

MS. KING: Okay. My under --

MS. FRAZIER: And when will the -- sorry.

MS. KING: So from my understanding, I understand that this is something that is up to the SOS office as it relates to setting the pricing, but I also understand that this definitely disenfranchises voters. It basically says unless you can afford this information, you can have it which I do believe puts us in a peculiar situation because this is information that should be available to voters, all voters.

MR. FERVIER: Any other comments or questions from the board?

MS. GHAZAL: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

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MR. FERVIER: Yes, member Ghazal.

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24 25 MS. GHAZAL: I just kind of wanted to

reiterate what you said, that in my reading of O.C.G.A. 21-2-225, this is outside of our authority. This is the -- the Secretary of State has sole authority over management of the voter rolls.

MS. FRAZIER: The counties have first authority of management on the voter rolls by And they give that to the Secretary of State which compiles for everybody. That's a courtesy and just -- it's just because it's more efficient that way. But I -- the counties actually have the first authority.

So technically the counties could post their own voter rolls and elector lists before an election if they choose to for any price or no price. And then the Secretary of State is just making it a -- he's making it easy on everybody by taking it and compiling it and giving it back to them to put in the poll pads because it's now electronic.

> DR. JOHNSTON: I have a question.

Mr. Evans, does anybody or does any entity

get the voter rolls for free?

MR. EVANS: No. No. We have, like, our -for example, our poll book vendor, obviously,
that -- that gets the data to be able to put into
the poll books, but aside from something like
that, then no.

MS. KING: So as a member of the board, if I want to request this information, I would have to pay for it as well?

MR. EVANS: I believe that has typically been the practice in the past, but I don't know if that were -- I believe that's typically been the practice in the past.

MS. KING: Okay, thank you.

MS. GHAZAL: I think it may be different if we, as the board, were to vote to try to access some sort of information or we -- we were to -- because as individual board members, we -- we don't have any additional rights from any other member of the public. As a board, we can act as a board, but that's different.

MR. FERVIER: Well, you will recall also this board is now independent of the Secretary of State's Office and it's treated like any other state agency. So ...

1	DR. JOHNSTON: So one more question. In the
2	statute it says that any election official
3	well, actually it might be in HAVA. It says any
4	election official shall have access to the voter
5	registration information and data. Are we
6	compliant with that?
7	MR. EVANS: Are you asking if county
8	election officials have access to the data?
9	DR. JOHNSTON: Well, HAVA HAVA states any
10	election official, which I guess this board is an
11	election official, shall have access to the voter
12	registration (indiscernible)
13	MR. EVANS: So that's something
14	DR. JOHNSTON: state.
15	MR. EVANS: That's something I'll I'll
16	need to talk with our attorneys about.
17	MR. FERVIER: Do we have any other questions
18	from the board? If not, the board would
19	entertain a motion on this petition.
20	MS. FRAZIER: I do have one person that I
21	have to help with some of these questions that
22	would like to speak.
23	MR. FERVIER: Okay.
24	MS. FRAZIER: Is Mark Davis on the line and
25	ready?

MR. FERVIER: Is it Mark Davis did you say?

MS. FRAZIER: Yes.

electors.

MR. FERVIER: Yeah, Mr. Davis's mic has

been -- should be open at this point. So ...

Mr. Davis, can you hear us?

MR. DAVIS: I'm here. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MR. DAVIS: Hi. Appreciate the opportunity to speak on this. I wasn't really planning to and wasn't really prepared but I'll give it my best shot. I have testified a number of times as an expert witness in disputed elections cases. And whenever I do that, I always try to start with a certified copy of the qualified list of

My understanding is that there is a legal distinction between a regular garden-variety voter list and the qualified list of electors. As an example, if someone's 17 and a half, they can register to vote and they can go on the voter list. If someone registers two weeks after the deadline to register for an election, they can go on the voter list. But my understanding is neither one of those people can go on the qualified list of electors. And I think what the

effort here is to try to pin down who is and is not qualified.

And, you know, I want to make a point about why this is so important. In 2020 I put in an open records request for a qualified list -- a certified copy of the qualified list of electors for the 2020 election. I ended up getting handed just a hot mess.

I can show you guys what I got if you want to see it, but at the time the normal voter file had 62 fields, I believe. What I got was maybe a couple of dozen, about half of them were blank, and a lot of them I didn't even recognize. It was missing key data elements, like the voters' county and their voting districts and so on and so forth.

I think what we're trying to do here is we're try to close the loop on transparency and accountability. We want to know, okay, who was eligible and who was not eligible to vote in the election? And then we want to know, okay, who did and did not vote in the election? And then we want to know, okay, how did they vote? Did they vote early and absentee or by mail or did they show up on election day?

So what we're trying to do here is close the loop so that we know exactly what's going on with who's voting, whether or not they're eligible, you know. And then if these cases end up going to court, that's something — those are documents that are critical because when — when you're litigating this kind of thing, you have to be able to show that you started with who was qualified. If at all possible, you want to be able to show that you started with a certified copy of the qualified list of electors.

If you can't get your hands on it, then a current voter roll, I guess, is the next best thing. But I think as a matter of practice, it's a really good idea for this list to be cast in stone. And if that winds up being the statutory five days before the election, I guess it is. But my point is it can't be a constant moving target all the time, if that makes any sense.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you for your comments.

I think that the real issue for me with this -this rule and the next rule and the third rule is
whether or not the Secretary of State has to
provide these lists freely. And my position
remains that according to code, the answer is no.

The code allows for them to charge a fee reasonable. And this board doesn't have the authority to change that. Doesn't have the authority to change that code. So --

MR. DAVIS: Well, I think cost is one issue, but I think the other one that would be wise for the board to address is whether or not we can even access them at all.

MS. FRAZIER: That's correct. That is a big part of this. The accessibility is first and foremost. The freely available is -- also should be according to the Sunshine Laws. But, you know, you're throwing that into the SOS's court. But I believe you have the authority to make this rule and we can go into rulemaking and we can determine -- we can determine the language that -- that would be needed to reflect what the Sunshine Laws are saying.

I do have one more person that was on standby that could help -- may be able to give you one more piece of data that might help.

Garland, are you on?

MR. FERVIER: Who is this person?

MS. FRAZIER: Garland Favorito.

MR. FERVIER: Mr. Favorito's scheduled to

speak later today.

Mr. Favorito, two minutes, please.

We don't ... what?

Mr. Favorito, two minutes, please.

Mr. Favorito, can you hear us? Mr. Favorito?

It appears we have some technical difficulties with him.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay. Well, we can -- I guess I just want to reiterate that what we're asking for is already being created and that it is just part of the process. And there's a stake in the ground before each election and we just want to see that copy it's already -- that's already there.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you.

The chair will entertain a motion from the board on this rule petition for rulemaking procedures on rule 183-1-12-.19, subsection (6)(a). Is there a motion from the board?

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

DR. JOHNSTON: I make a motion that we approve this petition for rulemaking for the county to post an accessible link to the certified list of electors.

MR. FERVIER: That'd be the counties and the
Secretary of State?

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

MR. FERVIER: Right, Dr. Johnston?

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

MR. FERVIER: Dr. Johnston has made a motion to initiate rulemaking procedures on this rule that would require the counties and the Secretary of State to post a freely accessible link. Is there a second?

MS. KING: Because I feel like this will disenfranchise voters if we don't have some type of option for those who can't afford to pay, I will second.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second. Any discussion?

MS. GHAZAL: I would like to just note that there is a long-standing Attorney General opinion that the state election board does not have the authority to direct the Secretary of State to do anything through the rulemaking process.

So not only is the subject matter something under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of State, we cannot direct the Secretary of State to do anything. So wanted to make sure I put

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that out on the record.

MR. FERVIER: Yeah. I would also like to make it a part of the record that this rule would be in direct contradiction with statute 21-2-225, section (c) and also with the Open Records Act, 50-18-71, subsection (c), subsection (1) and (2) and that this board is -- well, I'll make that

Any further comments? Hearing no further discussion, all those in favor of initiating rulemaking procedures on 183-1-12-.19, subsection (6) (a) signify by saying aye.

Dr. Johnston.

DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal.

MS. GHAZAL: Nay.

MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares. Member

Member Jeffares votes aye.

MS. KING: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: The chair will exercise his vote -- his option to vote and votes nay. carries.

MS. FRAZIER: Thank you guys very much.

MR. FERVIER: You're still up, Ms. Frazier.

MS. FRAZIER: All right. Has -- has my speaking been better this last few minutes? I can do a quick changeover to different laptop.

MR. FERVIER: Oh, it's fine.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: The next item on the agenda is a petition to initiate rulemaking procedures on rule number 183-1-12-.19, subsection (12).

Ms. Frazier.

## Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rules, presented by Lucia Frazier

MS. FRAZIER: Okay. So for this rule, this is the numbered list of voters. The problem that I see right now is not only do we have ineligible registrations on the rolls, but there are many instances where votes are cast for many ineligible registrations. And this could happen again in the future elections.

So the -- currently the voter history file is inadequate because the counties have 60 days to upload voter credit. And, just for example, between November and December of 2020, there were 23,000 of them canceled. So there's no way to audit back to -- back to, say, the elector list

if there's that many changes being made to show who actually voted.

So the solution is to require the posting of the numbered list of voters within five days after the election. And, again, I'm using the same -- the same code here, the Sunshine Laws and decisions that I explained before, that this data should be available and accessible to the public because it is part of the process and it is already routine.

So the current state is that in each voting location, the numbered list of voters is electronically recorded in the poll pad and it's also handwritten, like I mentioned before, because there are some voters that do not make it on the poll pads. So once the polls close, this list is extracted from the poll pads and the handwritten list. So both lists are submitted to the superintendent and to the SOS.

So, for example, right now during early voting I know that Fulton does post the numbered voter list for the absentee voters daily, which is great, but not after election day. Cobb County does post the numbered list of voters after every election day. So some counties are

doing, you know, a good job, but I don't think -- I'm not sure if any counties are doing the full job.

So the full job would be that every county would post the accessible link of the numbered list of voters within five days after the election. And the reason why I say, "each county," I say, "and SOS," the same thing as before, because the counties do report this data right back to the SOS which compiles it into one statewide file.

So having individual and statewide would be something that's already routine and just asking to post a freely accessible link. And just to show you some examples, there are two different examples here.

So on the left side, I showed you this address earlier that's on the voter rolls and there was a vote cast from that address or it -- that was given credit at that address in 2022.

And on the right side I have an example of matching a person that has filed an NCOA, moved to Florida, and matched their information. So they have information on both the Georgia and Florida voter roll and have voting history in

both states and they do overlap. Well, they should not have.

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So the bottom line here is that when this is happening, it does cause a dilution of the votes. There are legitimate votes that are canceled by illegitimate votes. And there are many more examples of this that if ever needed, we could share.

So that's it for that rule.

MR. FERVIER: Are there any questions from the board for Ms. Frazier?

MS. GHAZAL: Ms. Frazier, I have a specific question about requiring check-in times to be part of the information that is posted. I find this -- well, first, I question whether that's technologically possible. Second, I actually find it's -- it's kind of troubling because in rural counties, we have three weeks of early voting. Identifying check-in times is tantamount to identifying somebody's vote when you -- when you compare that to cast vote records. It will be very easy to identify exactly who cast a vote at a certain time and I think that poses an enormous constitutional risk.

MS. FRAZIER: Cobb County does that now and

has always done that for, I believe, a very long 1 time. And the absentee voter file doesn't 2 have -- I guess it doesn't have check-in times. 3 We are asking for that. So, yes. 4 5 MS. GHAZAL: In larger counties where you have a lot of turnover in voting, it does not 6 7 pose a risk of revealing somebody's actual vote. 8 When you have rural counties and two people go to 9 an early voting location in one day, you have 10 just revealed exactly who voted what.

MS. FRAZIER: I don't understand that. I think in the interest of being able to audit an election and have good citizen oversight, I think this data is still readily available to the public.

MS. GHAZAL: I wouldn't --

MS. FRAZIER: And --

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MS. GHAZAL: -- vote --

MS. FRAZIER: -- I would say --

MS. GHAZAL: -- for that.

MS. FRAZIER: -- if it's a strong -- and I don't -- I mean, you're not saying that Cobb is breaking the law. So ...

DR. JOHNSTON: I'm saying that requiring a hundred and fifty-nine counties to do this would

violate voters' constitutional rights.

MS. FRAZIER: I would say the priority is that the data needs to be available to the public in a consistent way across counties and it's already available to the public as far as the Sunshine Laws are concerned. In these processes it was at some point available to the public before we were doing this electronically. So I think when people sign up to register to vote, they have an expectation that they are part of a system that is part of the public process.

- MS. GHAZAL: The Georgia Constitution guarantees the right to a private -- to a secret ballot. It's -- it's really that simple.
- MS. KING: Member Ghazal, could you show me exactly where in the petition your concerns are. I want to make sure I'm following.
- MS. GHAZAL: Of course. The full text of the rule specifically says that during advanced voting a file showing voter name, voter ID, precinct voted, and check-in time for each day of advance voting will be generated and posted. It's specifically during advance voting that we see very low turnout in some elections, particularly -- and not general elections, but in

rural areas even in general elections, the 1 2 advance voting site sometime have such low 3 turnout that you can -- you will know exactly who voted what ballot by comparing the check-in time 4 5 with the cast vote records. MR. FERVIER: The last time I voted I was 6 7 the only person in the place. 8 MS. FRAZIER: Well, the machines do timestamp everyone that votes. So ... 9 10 MS. GHAZAL: But comparing that to the 11 check-in time, so that's ... 12 MS. FRAZIER: Again, I -- Cobb is doing it 13 right now. So ... 14 MS. KING: That does give me a bit of a pause. I want to make sure we're not creating a 15 16 problem when it comes to that aspect of this rule 17 as well. I am concerned about people being able to directly connect the -- you know, using this 18 19 data to directly connect it to voters. But I'm interested to hear what the rest of the board 20 21 thinks. DR. JOHNSTON: Since we are -- chairman. 22 23 MR. FERVIER: Yes, ma'am. 24 DR. JOHNSTON: Where are you? Oh, there you

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are.

1	MR. FERVIER: I'm here.
2	DR. JOHNSTON: Are you taking a nap?
3	MR. FERVIER: This chair keeps leaning back
4	on me.
5	DR. JOHNSTON: Since we do have ballot
6	images and the date timestamp on those images, I
7	have a I have bit of a pause there, too, about
8	that about the check-in time.
9	Would would Ms. Frazier be willing to
0	strike the check-in time from her petition?
L1	MS. FRAZIER: If it's only from the
_2	absentee, then perhaps. But the election the
.3	election day numbered voter list should have the
L 4	check-in time.
L 5	MS. GHAZAL: It does not obviate the risk
L 6	when you have a low turnout election. It's
L 7	MS. FRAZIER: Oh.
L 8	MS. GHAZAL: you know, it's the same risk
L 9	on election day and the
20	MS. FRAZIER: So the cast vote record is
21	actually randomized. So that that should
22	help.
23	DR. JOHNSTON: So you can't link the cast
2 4	vote record to to the check-in time of of
25	the numbered voter list?

1	MS. FRAZIER: Correct. It's randomized in
2	the tabulator.
3	MS. GHAZAL: But is it is it random
4	I've seen the cast vote records and they're
5	sequential. They're timestamped.
6	MS. FRAZIER: Let me see if I can find more
7	information on that then.
8	MS. GHAZAL: And the reason I know that is
9	because of the one of the former cases that we
10	saw concerning the reading errors on that on
11	ballots.
12	DR. JOHNSTON: It's my understanding that we
13	actually get the get the voter list from
14	absentee or early voting as right now; correct?
15	So we so we don't get the numbered voter list
16	from election day until, I don't know, a week or
17	ever?
18	MS. FRAZIER: Ever. From Fulton it's never.
19	I don't know about all the counties. The request
20	that I'm making is that all counties should post
21	the numbered list of voters.
22	DR. JOHNSTON: Like Cobb like Cobb County
23	does?
24	MS. FRAZIER: Correct. Cobb County does for
25	election day. But I don't and Fulton County

only does for early voting. So I think all counties should do both for early voting and election day.

And I do -- I think Mark Davis is still on the line. And I think he can help answer this question about the cast vote record.

DR. JOHNSTON: By any chance is Tate Fall on the line from Cobb County? The ballot records are not timestamped.

MS. FRAZIER: Mark Davis, are you still on?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, I'm here.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay.

MR. DAVIS: I would like the board to know why this is critical. I'm sure you're all aware of the double-voting incident that we had happen in 2020. That was discovered when I was working in a tiny little case for a probate judge down in Long County. And Harrison -- Hamilton Evans famously told folks in town that he voted twice just to see if he could. That was the first time I'd ever become aware of double-voting.

And so I went looking for it and the way I found it was by comparing the numbered list of voters with the early and absentee voting data where I found 14 matches. And that led to an

investigation by the Secretary of State where they found over a thousand more in over a hundred counties.

But my concern there is we had passed a rule on May 18, 2020, or this previous board had that allowed the opening and scanning of absentee ballots early. And my concern is that I'm not sure whether or not that analysis properly took that into account.

But the point I'm trying to make here is that it is that numbered list of voters that's a critical piece of the puzzle because if we know who voted absentee, we know who voted early, and we know who voted on election day, then we can look for that overlap and we can identify issues like double-voting.

And I remain very concerned about that. I was just going through that data from 2020 last night, and we had over a couple hundred thousand folks who asked for an absentee ballot, who apparently received it, and apparently returned it because the absentee voter data shows the return date. But then those were marked canceled and most of those folks then voted in person on election day.

Well, we don't have any real accountability for or any way to evaluate this issue. We don't have any way to do that without that numbered list of voters. At this point we're kind of trusting the Secretary of State's Office kind of like people used to trust Catholic priests to read them the good book and tell them what it means. And personally I'm just not satisfied with that as an answer.

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I wanted to do a statewide evaluation of that issue, and I sent my concerns to Jordan

Fuchs and she invited me to do it as an outside contractor, but only if I would sign an NDA which basically would've put a muzzle on me for life.

I would not have been able to talk about the issue at all. So I'm not comfortable with not having access to that data.

It's my understanding that the cast vote records are in the order that they're scanned, not the order that somebody walked in the precinct. So I don't find that argument that it violates their sanctity of the secrecy of the ballot -- I don't find that argument particularly compelling.

I think that, you know, as Justice Brandeis

once said: Sunlight is the best of disinfectants. And we need some sunlight in this process.

MS. FRAZIER: Thank you, Mark. I just -- I wanted to add in that for the CVR, cast vote record, I've got -- I think it's -- someone else wanted to -- to chime in on that, but I will say that I -- that (indiscernible) -- (indiscernible) cast vote records are timestamped as well. Just learned. And I don't know if --

Yeah. So is Kevin Moncla on the line?

And he's the one who actually can speak to that.

MS. GHAZAL: The point is not that it's timestamped, the point is that it is sequential. And when you have a very low turnout day or election, then you can very easily match a voter to the vote when you're looking at the time that they checked in.

And if you haven't spent time in rural Georgia and worked with those offices, you probably don't understand what I'm talking about. But I'm sure Mr. Davis has seen -- because I know he's worked on elections in rural Georgia where we have entire weeks where you have a handful of

voters going -- going through there.

And so I'm not saying that the data itself should not be made available. I'm saying that that specific aspect of the data is really problematic.

- MS. FRAZIER: It's sounds -- sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt. I was just going to say it sounds like that it's randomized and not timestamped. So I feel like somebody must -- must've already solved this problem.
- MS. GHAZAL: (indiscernible) literally just said that it was sequential. So -- and that's the point, is when it's sequential, if it is not randomized, then (indiscernible) --

(Cross-talking)

MS. FRAZIER: So --

- MR. DAVIS: But as (indiscernible) -- by the
  order that they're scanned, not the --
  - MS. GHAZAL: Right.
- MR. DAVIS: -- order that they enter the
  polls.
- MS. GHAZAL: Right. But when you only -when you're one person at a poll at a time, then
  that is going to be the same. In a county like
  Cobb it's not an issue because you have people

coming in and out all the time. I think we're -we're talking past each other at this point if
you're not getting my concern.

I will also say that the fact that we have moved -- we've upgraded our poll pads, we have upgraded our system and they are being constantly updated as to -- throughout the day as to who cast ballots during early voting.

And I think on -- on election day it not a live list but during early voting -- and I'm assuming that included absentee ballots -- those lists are live updated so that the risks that we saw in past years are significantly lower now.

I understand what you're saying, Mr. Davis, about the risk of double-voting. It would be extremely difficult to do that unless it was a massive, massive human error. And that's not something you can necessarily plan around for massive human errors. But the system itself is far more secure now than it was in previous years.

DR. JOHNSTON: So -- so the -- also for those that are listening and watching, the issue is not confined to small counties or under -- or low population counties. There are actually four

or five precincts in Fulton County that have one or two eligible voters. And there's absolutely no way you can protect their ballot secrecy no matter what you do. It doesn't matter about the numbered voter list because they only have a numbered list of one or two. So, you know, I -- but that -- that's -- I guess that's some sort of district issue or precinct issue.

I definitely would be in favor of following the example of Cobb County and having a numbered voter list. This is the -- it's the first piece -- or actually the second -- second piece in the election of who came in to vote. Not how they voted but who came in to vote and that's following who's eligible to vote in the first place.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay. And if --

DR. JOHNSTON: If Cobb County can do it, then we can certainly provide this for the rest of the counties.

MS. FRAZIER: And if the board would just allow me one more person that could maybe help some -- help us feel better about some of this, I think --

Kevin Moncla, are you on right now?

MR. FERVIER: My question is does the board
need to hear anything else before making a
decision on this?
Member King.
MS. KING: No. I think I'm I think I'm
good. I don't know about everyone else.
MR. FERVIER: Dr. Johnston. Member
Johnston.
DR. JOHNSTON: No other questions.
MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal.
MS. GHAZAL: I have no other questions.
MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares.
MR. JEFFARES: I'm good.
MR. FERVIER: I think that the board is able
to go ahead and make a vote on this.
MS. FRAZIER: Okay.
MR. FERVIER: The chair will entertain a
motion.
DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, I move that we
approve this petition for rulemaking.
MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston has made a
motion to initiate rulemaking procedures on
183-1-1219, subsection (12). Is there a
second?
MS. KING: Mr. Chair, before we vote on

this, just -- if I'm out of order, correct me.

If I'm not prepared to -- but I still -- I'm

still evaluating whether or not this is going to

show -- people's information is going to be made

public or -- I'm still not clear on the process.

So I can either abstain or if member Johnston's

open to tabling so that I can become a little

more clear on this because I'm not in a position

to support.

- MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston, are you open to tabling this motion for further consideration?
- DR. JOHNSTON: Perhaps I might ask what information we might be -- where we might be able to obtain the information that we need.
- MS. KING: Well, my concern is around whether or not the timestamping and posting that, if there is -- if anyone could find any type of link towards that.

I know, member Johnston, you talked about certain precincts even in Fulton County where there are a handful of people that utilize those precincts as well as I see information that in some cases there's 30 minutes or so in between individuals coming and going from different precincts.

2.1

So I just want to make sure that I review this adequately. As a new member, I'm not 100 percent certain on what is or what isn't as it relates to the information that's being posted. So that's where I'm a bit concerned. So a lot of this is just me, you know, just not being in a strong position to say that I completely support this.

MS. FRAZIER: Can I add anybody -- you know, the speaker that I called earlier to help with this right now? Or ...

MR. FERVIER: The board would -- the board would have to decide whether they need to hear anybody else or -- right now or not.

MS. FRAZIER: Okay.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, I amend -- amend my motion to recommend that we table this to the September 20th meeting.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to table this petition for rulemaking procedures to defer to the September 20th meeting. Is there a second?

MS. KING: Second.

MR. JEFFARES: Second.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second from member Jeffares. Any discussion? Hearing

1	no discussion, all those in favor signify by
2	saying aye.
3	Member Ghazal.
4	MS. GHAZAL: Aye.
5	MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares.
6	MR. JEFFARES: Aye.
7	MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares votes aye.
8	Member Johnston.
9	DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.
10	MR. FERVIER: Member King.
11	MS. KING: Aye.
12	MR. FERVIER: Motion carries four to zero to
13	table this for further discussion and to be heard
14	again on the September 20th meeting.
15	MS. FRAZIER: Okay. Thank you.
16	MR. FERVIER: We've been going for about
17	almost two and a half hours since lunch break.
18	The chair would entertain a motion for a
19	five-minute recess.
20	MS. KING: So moved.
21	MR. FERVIER: We have a motion. Do we have
22	a second?
23	DR. JOHNSTON: Second.
24	MR. JEFFARES: Second.
25	MR. FERVIER: All those in favor signify by

saying aye.

THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: The motion carries four to zero. We will recess for less than five minutes. Thank you.

(Recess)

MR. FERVIER: We'll proceed. I just want to let everyone know that we still have -- one, two -- three more petitions to hear and they're taking thirty minutes to an hour each.

We have several things on old business to hear, and then we have another -- over 20 speakers left to hear at the end of the day. So this is going to be a very long day.

So the next item on the agenda is to --

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair.

MR. FERVIER: Yes.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair, if I may.

(indiscernible) we suspend the rule and make a determination of the date and time and place of the next meeting so Ms. Hardin can -- can send information to the IT department to get the previous meeting petitions posted. And --

MR. FERVIER: I believe you just -- I believe this board has already agreed on

_	September 20th as the next meeting date.
2	DR. JOHNSTON: Right. We need a location,
3	though, Mr. Chair.
4	MR. FERVIER: Well, as of now, it will be in
5	the Capitol in room 341 unless events between now
6	and then dictate otherwise. So
7	DR. JOHNSTON: Okay. Mr. Chair, the Capitol
8	would would be wonderful. Also I have I
9	understand that Fulton County, their their
10	meeting room is also available and reserved. So
11	both places are available. Do you have a
12	preference?
13	MR. FERVIER: No, the Capitol would be my
14	preference.
15	DR. JOHNSTON: Very good. Could we could
16	we as a board decide that for sure. So those
17	notices can be posted.
18	MR. FERVIER: Well, the notices we have
19	two days to post those. So we have until the
20	21st to post those to get the 30-day time limit
21	in.
22	DR. JOHNSTON: Right.
23	MR. FERVIER: And so I think I think the
2 4	board's already selected the 20th, and, like I
25	said, we'll have it at the the Capitol, room
	I <b>I</b>

341 and overflow rooms if necessary and usual 1 2 start time of 9:30. DR. JOHNSTON: Okay. 3 MR. FERVIER: Yeah. I think we usually 4 start at 9:30 for people coming from way up 5 north. So -- and from out of town. So ... 6 7 DR. JOHNSTON: All right. And any --8 MR. FERVIER: All right? And Ms. -- pardon 9 me? 10 DR. JOHNSTON: Yeah. I guess no opposition 11 to that. 12 MR. FERVIER: No. 13 **DR. JOHNSTON:** Okay. 14 MR. FERVIER: The next item on the agenda is petition for amendment of state election board 15 16 rules, presented by Marilyn Marks. 17 Ms. Marks, are you available? Marilyn 18 Marks? Ms. Marks, we can't see or hear you. 19 MS. DUFORT: This is Jean Dufort, 20 co-petitioner. I don't know how to control the 21 I don't see a control on my end. 22 was able to unmute. And Marilyn is here. 23 MR. FERVIER: Okay. Well, we're not as 24 worried about the camera unless you have exhibits 25

you want us to see.

1	MS. GHAZAL: If you're in the same room with
2	Ms. Dufort, Ms. Marks, I can hear you. I can
3	hear a vague, vague so I don't know, somehow
4	somebody is hearing you, but I'm not hearing it
5	directly from you, if you understand what I mean.
6	MS. DUFORT: We aren't in the same city
7	even. I'm in Madison and she's in Charlotte.
8	MR. FERVIER: Yeah, we can't I can't
9	really hear Ms. Marks. I don't know if she needs
10	to turn up her volume or or something, but,
11	yeah, your mic her microphone's on, her volume
12	is just too low to be heard.
13	MS. DUFORT: Let me text her.
14	MS. MARKS: Let me speak (inaudible) again.
15	MS. HARDIN: I hear her. There she is.
16	MR. FERVIER: We can see you. Can you
17	speak, Ms. Marks?
18	MS. MARKS: Yes. I have (inaudible).
19	MR. FERVIER: Can you turn the volume up?
20	MS. MARKS: I don't think there is anything
21	I can do on (inaudible). Is there a number I can
22	call?
23	MR. FERVIER: Is there I don't I don't
24	think there

Is there a number she can call in?

1	MS. HARDIN: She has my phone number but I'm
2	on the phone with Rick right now.
3	MS. KING: Marilyn, do you have earphones
4	that you can plug into your computer?
5	MS. MARKS: That (inaudible) going to try.
6	Okay, what about now? Can you hear me now?
7	MR. FERVIER: Perfect, perfect.
8	MS. KING: You know, it just takes it
9	just takes the millennial.
10	MS. MARKS: Okay. Okay, so you can
11	everybody can hear me now, right?
12	MR. FERVIER: Yes. Yes. Please proceed.
13	Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rules,
14	presented by Marilyn Marks
14 15	<pre>presented by Marilyn Marks</pre>
15	MS. MARKS: Okay. Well, all right, great.
15 16	MS. MARKS: Okay. Well, all right, great.  Great.
15 16 17	MS. MARKS: Okay. Well, all right, great.  Great.  Ms. King, thank you for that help.
15 16 17 18	MS. MARKS: Okay. Well, all right, great.  Great.  Ms. King, thank you for that help.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman and board and thank
15 16 17 18	MS. MARKS: Okay. Well, all right, great.  Great.  Ms. King, thank you for that help.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman and board and thank you for your patience with that little technical
15 16 17 18 19 20	MS. MARKS: Okay. Well, all right, great.  Great.  Ms. King, thank you for that help.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman and board and thank you for your patience with that little technical glitch.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MS. MARKS: Okay. Well, all right, great.  Great.  Ms. King, thank you for that help.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman and board and thank you for your patience with that little technical glitch.  My name's Marilyn Marks. I'm the executive
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MS. MARKS: Okay. Well, all right, great.  Great.  Ms. King, thank you for that help.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman and board and thank you for your patience with that little technical glitch.  My name's Marilyn Marks. I'm the executive director for Coalition for Good Governance.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MS. MARKS: Okay. Well, all right, great.  Great.  Ms. King, thank you for that help.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman and board and thank you for your patience with that little technical glitch.  My name's Marilyn Marks. I'm the executive director for Coalition for Good Governance.  We're the petitioner today for a temporary rule

impaired and should not be used. 1 2 November election is no doubt one of those times that the primary system should not be used. 3 4 Morgan County Democratic Party is also a 5 co-petitioner here for this request and Jeanne Dufort will also have a few comments and be 6 7 willing to answer questions as well when I get 8 through with my comments. 9 MR. FERVIER: Can I ask you a question real 10 quick? 11 MS. MARKS: Certainly. 12 MR. FERVIER: Is this -- is this the same 13 petition that Ms. Dooley had earlier? 14 MS. MARKS: It is not. It's similar to it. 15 She had added a few improvements, quite frankly, 16 but it is -- it is very -- it is similar to it in 17 many ways. 18 MR. FERVIER: Well, if -- if hers --19 MS. MARKS: But it is not exactly the same. 20 MR. FERVIER: If hers is improved --MS. MARKS: Yes. 21 22 MR. FERVIER: -- would we need to -- would

MS. MARKS: Well, I would --

we need to listen to yours then and then vote on

23

24

25

yours?

MR. FERVIER: If we already voted on hers?

MS. MARKS: I would hope that for the record that you would, and I would hope that I could -- could clear up some misunderstandings that I heard in the -- in the back and forth with her.

I also have a couple of alternatives that might work for -- for amendments.

MR. FERVIER: Okay.

MS. MARKS: So all right, thank you. I -- I appreciate that. For people who are listening online and if they want to reference any of the documents that we'll talk about today, they can go to our website, coalitionforgoodgovernance.org, and on the homepage tab, they will see these documents.

The -- I will try to get through this quickly, Mr. Chair, and -- but particularly hit some of those comments that I heard you all make.

Consider this hypothetical for a moment that's not hard to imagine, particularly since the system's been compromised. Let's say the night before election day, the state learns that there's malware in the system that's flipping votes in some place and that there's malware that will shut down the touchscreens the next day at

10 a.m. Who has the authority to do anything under the way this board is thinking about authority? Certainly on election night you can't go running back to the General Assembly and say: Oh, tell us what to do with these types of malware attacks. And the Secretary of State doesn't have the authority to order the use of backup balloting. That's why it's so important for this board to have backup balloting plans in place as laid out in the statute.

Today, given the position of this board so far, everyone would just be looking at each other, saying: Oh, it's not my job to deal with this malware we've got in the system. But it is the board's job. You've been made very aware of the risk to the election in November and somehow the board seems to be saying you don't want to deal with the role that the General Assembly gave you, authorized you to do, and the duties that they gave you.

And so we would ask you to reconsider that as you think more about this today. It cannot be that the board is saying that we use BMDs no matter what, even if they are -- if the system's compromised, even if the system is confirmed to

have vote-stealing malware in it. When we hear you say, Oh, but the General Assembly said it's our primary method of voting, we agree. It is the primary method of voting and until an authority like a court or the -- or the General Assembly says otherwise, it should stay the primary method of voting.

But the General Assembly in its wisdom decades ago said if the primary method of voting is impaired, then there has to be a backup. It only makes sense. So now as we are looking at this very compelling high-risk situation in November, where the Department of Homeland Security cybersecurity agency said to this board and the Secretary of State two years ago that the state needed to immediately undertake mitigations for those vulnerabilities, the board needs to recognize that has not been done. Therefore it is the board's duty to mitigate the system for the work that has not been done because the system needs to be safeguarded.

As you all know, you've done the reading, you know that the system's been compromised and types of malware are out there that can be easily implanted. And once there's a failure, it cannot

be reversed. Not the way this system is set up. So right now, because this board is saying it's not our job, the state has no plan at all, no contingency plan to deal with these very real and extreme risks of failures.

So we would ask you to seriously consider the risks that the state is facing and your responsibility in dealing with them. The General Assembly did order a contingency plan and every time we talk to you all about this, we keep hearing you say: Well, the General Assembly just ordered the BMDs. No, they didn't just order the BMDs. They said if the BMDs are impaired, then you need to be using the backup system. But it is on -- it is on the duties of the state election board to say: Okay, it's time to deploy that backup system and that time is for the November election.

Obviously you can't look to the General Assembly to convene every time you've got a cyberattack or malware or a software system design problem. They've already done their job. Meeting after meeting we hear you all say: Well, this needs -- there needs to be some more legislation. We can't imagine what more we would

want the General Assembly to order. They have given you all the generalities that the agency should have and then promulgating rules under the statutes that they gave. It wouldn't be appropriate for the General Assembly to be giving the detailed cybersecurity responses to the problems that have been encountered. And instead they — they directed the board to give orders and to create rules that would put the use of the backup balloting system in place.

Mr. Chairman, you had asked Ms. Dooley about the Dominion system. You had stated that the General Assembly chose the Dominion system. I need to clarify that. No, they -- they chose a very generic set of principles for a voting system which was completely appropriate on their part. They did not choose any vendor. They didn't choose any particular type of software. Instead they ordered the Secretary of State to choose a voting system with generic attributes such as ballot secrecy that you all have just spent some time talking about.

Unfortunately the Secretary of State did not meet many of those mandates when he chose the Dominion touchscreens. He disobeyed the General

Assembly. The system wasn't secure as has been proven, and even after that was proven, the system, now we know, is compromised as well.

So when we are looking at the situation we are in today, we've got to recognize that the system did -- it never met the requirements that the General Assembly set out. And then it was compromised afterwards. We learned of more vulnerabilities afterwards. So now it is up to this board to -- to deal with that in a temporary way.

There was discussion of feasibility and ballot on demand. Let's recall that for the vast majority of counties, probably just guessing, maybe a hundred and twenty-five counties or so don't have the problem of having multiple early voting centers with lots of different ballot styles. They have one early voting center. It's in the clerks office. They already have all the ballot styles. They're on hand there. They manage them everyday. So for the vast majority of counties, the distribution of different types of ballot styles in early voting is not a problem.

It really is a handful of large counties

that have the logistics problem. But let's remember that logistics problem's been solved all over the nation, many other states with early voting vote centers. And either managing, as they do in Wake County which is larger than Fulton here in North Carolina, they manage to have all their ballot styles on hand, preprinted. They have a very organized arrangement. Then other counties and other states use ballot-on-demand printers. They do not need to be expensive printers. There are very economical solutions for that to either print everything on demand or to print a certain percentage of your high-volume needs on demand.

If this needs more explanation and work to be able to demonstrate to you all that it is a feasible, easily solved problem and there's plenty of time to solve it, then I would urge you to go ahead, accept this rule to put it into rulemaking, and then take the next 30 days in the public comment period to deal with letting us demonstrate to you how feasible this really is. Georgia can't be such an outlier that when other states can do it, that Georgia can't do it.

Further, if there are still questions -- and

I cannot imagine why there would be -- about your authority, given the clear rulings of the Eleventh Circuit and Judge Totenberg and the plain reading of the statutes, if there are still questions about your authority in that 30-day period for public comment, as you know, a copy of the rule goes to the General Assembly standing committees. And they have the opportunity to tell you: Wait a minute, you're coloring outside the lines.

2.2

So we would ask you to -- to consider doing just that, going through the comment period so that you can resolve any questions in your mind about that.

A few minutes ago Ms. Ghazal was bringing up the serious issue, which she called an enormous constitutional risk, of ballot secrecy. And yet there are many problems with ballot secrecy. We all know it. Anybody who's been into a polling place knows it. In -- in dealing with the security issue, if you will go to hand-marked paper ballots as your emergency backup, your backup balloting system, it resolves a lot of problems that today the board is not enforcing. You're not enforcing the laws on ballot secrecy

or on logic and accuracy testing or any number of other laws that can be resolved by the use of backup balloting which is authorized.

So the -- the solutions are simple but the problem and the risk is grave. And we would ask that you consider this board's responsibility to -- to act to protect the November election.

I guess I would also say if the board is still unwilling to act according to its responsibility to go ahead and, you know, to -- to say, yes, we need to use backup balloting, I would ask you to consider two other alternatives -- or three alternatives.

One, as I said, put it into rulemaking to get your 30 days' comments with no obligation to pass the rule after the 30 days.

If you won't do that, would you consider looking at the provision that was in Ms. Dooley's petition -- it is not in ours, it should've been in ours -- that says, all right, the counties have our blessing, the authorization to -- to understand the cybersecurity risks that are threatening the election and go ahead on their own and make the decisions that they need to go to emergency ballots, to -- to backup balloting.

They surely have the authority and they have been too intimidated by these board's actions in the past to do it. That's something that we could easily do. I can make amendments in ours to -- to make sure that that at least is available to counties going forward.

One other alternatives that I would hope you would consider if you will not consider the rule is to consider ordering the counties to secure the systems by going to backup -- to secure the systems, to protect the secrecy of the vote, to comply with the logic and accuracy testing by going to -- to generate an order which is the -- also in the authority of this board to do that.

So I'm offering a number of alternatives in a more or less desperate attempt to protect the election for November.

I'll be happy to answer any questions or you can hear from Ms. Dufort.

MR. FERVIER: Ms. Dufort, do you have comments to make?

MS. DUFORT: I do. Thank you. I'm speaking on behalf of the Morgan County Democratic Committee. When I was young, around ten, I watched my deeply devout Catholic parents head to

the big city in a successful effort to convince the bishop to remove our parish priest who was not serving us well. A few years later we were marching and organizing to remove our corrupt Democratic mayor and replace him with a newly formed Citizen Party candidate who was our family physician. And our town shortly after became an All-American city.

So I do come by this honestly. My lifelong commitment to speaking truth to power and my conviction that when you choose to lead, whether it's as an elected official on a statewide board or a local party official, you assume a responsibility beyond personal interests.

From your code of conduct, the code of conduct of the state election board, I'm quoting now: Fair, legal, and orderly elections are the board's watchwords for our service to the people of Georgia. We are committed to the highest standards of integrity in our service for our state and its citizens in all matters related to the election process. These are the values to which we commit.

For 17 days as 2024 started, I sat in a room at the federal courthouse while  $Curling\ v$ 

Raffensperger was heard. The single session I missed was for my first appointment with my Emory oncologist. I wish you'd been there. I wish you had chosen to read the transcripts or the reports of the experts that both sides put forth because the truth about the risks to the 2024 election could not have been made clearer.

2.1

The vulnerabilities documented by Dr.

Halderman in 2021, three years ago, the basis for the 2022 advisory that mitigation should be done forthwith, were serious and they're scalable, including using access to machines by a voter with a Bic pen or a ballot access card. In less time than it takes to vote, the seal's broken and no remaining evidence that a poll worker would discover.

You'd be clear about the risks created when the software that powers Georgia elections was copied and widely distributed to unauthorized people. And you would be clear that not a single expert put forth by your lawyers or by the plaintiffs would testify under oath that universal use of touchscreens was a safe way to conduct elections in Georgia.

So my question is if you can't use the

touchscreens safely, how can you conduct a fair, legal, and orderly election?

In your letter denying our security rules proposal last month, Chair Fervier cited concerns about the ongoing litigation related to this matter and ruling in favor of the petition would interfere with the ongoing litigation. Really? Does your oath go away, does the risk go away because your lawyers want to win in court?

Member King, you asked Debbie Dooley earlier today is the backup system in use now? And the answer is actually yes and no. Yes, on election day 2020, my own county, every single polling place swapped seamlessly to backup ballots as polls opened because the ballot access cards wouldn't work. And no, because the only county in the state who tried to move proactively to backup balloting because they could not comply with all of the laws was met with swift and sure punishment by this board.

To this day, counties across the state refuse to protect ballot secrecy for fear of being "athened." That is a phrase in common use among local election directors across the state. You set a precedent and the counties will listen

to you or not.

The irony is that the Legislature has done its job. I've heard you say over and over: It's not for us, it's for the Legislature to decide. But the facts suggest other side. State law governing touchscreens says they must be used as long as they're safe to use and comply with all relevant state laws. Otherwise it's very clear, use the backup balloting system.

And the only example the legislators gave was one that would be discovered during the ballot-building or logic-and-accuracy testing stage. What if there were more candidates than fit on the screen? It was a very, very broad brush that the legislators paint. That is the law.

But it's this body, the state election board, that added the word "emergency" -- it is not in the statutes -- and then added descriptions of things that would only be encountered in a polling place, like power failures and long lines. And then the Secretary of State reinforced that limitation with its procedures and training video. So if you haven't gone back and done a compare-and-contrast, it is

not surprising that you're thinking about only emergencies that would happen on election day. But that is not what the Legislature said.

The idea of unforeseen emergency is an invention of this body as is the idea, frankly, that some laws are more important than others when it comes to election administration. But that limitation is not in your oath. It's not what your oath says.

So here's what I ask you today on behalf of the Morgan County Democratic Committee and a coalition of voters and leaders from across the political spectrum in Georgia. Do you believe the experts, do you believe them when they say using the touchscreens without mitigating the risks is a bad idea? Do you believe it's your duty to enforce rules for fair, legal, and orderly elections? And can you say precisely what you would want the Legislature to change in the backup balloting statute that is unclear to you now? Because you do after all have a duty to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding elections. And we've been talking about this for more than a year.

So you can vote no again and continue to

pass the buck or you can say yes, post the rule 1 2 today, use the 30 days to consult legislators, attorneys, find out more about the logistics and 3 perhaps to read the Halderman report and the CISA 4 5 and experts' letters and maybe even some of your own experts' testimony and make a final decision 6 7 next month. 8 I ask you and Morgan County Democrats ask 9 you please vote yes. 10 MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Dufort. 11 Are there any questions from the board? 12 MS. KING: I have a question. 13 MR. FERVIER: Yes, member King. 14 MS. KING: Ms. Marks, you mentioned that the 15 General Assembly has a backup plan in case of an 16 impairment. MS. MARKS: Yes. 17 18 MS. KING: Did they outline what would 19 constitute an impairment? 20 MS. MARKS: No. No. They used the words, 21 "impossible -- by the way, I'm being -- you can 22 hear me still, right? 23 MS. KING: Yeah. 24 MR. FERVIER: Yes.

MS. KING: You're it.

25

MS. MARKS: Thank you. Thank you. The -no, they use the words, "impossible" or
"impracticable." And so we are certainly in a
situation where the -- it is impracticable, it's
also impossible to use -- it's impossible to
legally comply with the law, to meet all the
legal requirements. It's also impracticable to
be using a system that's compromised.

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And while they gave an example, it was just an example. But they went on to say -- no, let me -- I'll give you that example. And it said basically if the system couldn't handle all of the contestants that might be on a -- like a general primary or something -- you know, if you've 30 contestants and the system wouldn't handle that many people on a particular contest, they said, okay, then you go to paper ballots where you can print enough -- enough names on the ballot. You know, that's not a sudden, unanticipated emergency. You know how many candidates that you're going to have months before the election day. They did give that example, but then they went on to say: Or for any other reason.

So they looked to you all, the state

election board, to be a little more precise on that and to have rules for when does it kick in and when doesn't it kick in? And right now you all have addressed sometimes that that statutory backup plan kicks in.

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For example, if the power is out. That's one of the times that you all have said, yeah, it kicks in if the power's out. You've said it can kick in if the lines are over 30 minutes long. It's certainly not impossible to use the machines. It becomes a matter of feasibility and it's better to go ahead and kick in the backup system. But the example that Jeanne gave of -- that the machines were not operating properly in her polling place in 2020, you know, that is not specifically covered in the statute, but that is where your rules do kick in.

MS. KING: Okay. And so it --

MS. MARKS: So the statute is there.

MS. KING: Okay. And we've since had several elections since the 2020 election. And are you saying in the most recent election, the machines constituted impairment in the most --

MS. MARKS: Yes.

MS. KING: -- let's -- in the primary --

1	MS. MARKS: Yes.
2	MS. KING: the machines
3	MS. MARKS: Yes. Yes.
4	MS. KING: Can you explain to me
5	MS. MARKS: Now, we uh-huh. Okay, two
6	two or three things here. One, what what was
7	learned in 2022 was that the system had
8	according to CISA and according to Dr. Halderman,
9	had numerous exploitable vulnerabilities that
10	were not known before that. It is not known
11	whether any
12	MS. KING: And these
13	MS. MARKS: were exploited or not.
14	MS. KING: Are these potential
15	vulnerabilities that I would like to know if
16	you've had
17	MS. MARKS: No, they are they are
18	absolute vulnerabilities that were confirmed by
19	CISA and which is part of the Department of
20	Homeland Securities.
21	MS. KING: Okay. So they found these
22	MS. MARKS: Homeland Security.
23	MS. KING: vulnerabilities but it did not
24	affect the 2022 election.
25	MS. MARKS: Nobody can know that. They

nobody has done any testing on that. And there's 2 no way to know -- to know that --3 MS. KING: Okay. MS. MARKS: -- because some of these --4 5 because the problem with the system is, you know, 6 the malware can erase itself, can be written to 7 erase itself, and it is not an auditable system. 8 So the answer to your question is no one knows. 9 And that's why the vulnerabilities need to be 10 mitigated before people vote again. MS. KING: Okay, thank you. No more. 11 12 more for me, Mr. Chairman. 13 MR. FERVIER: Any other questions from the board? Member Ghazal? Dr. Johnston? 14 15 DR. JOHNSTON: No questions. 16 MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares, any 17 questions? MR. JEFFARES: No questions. 18 19 MR. FERVIER: The board will -- or the chair 20 will entertain a motion. MS. KING: I'm still not clear on how we as 21 22 a board can instruct the entire state to change 23 the voting meth -- voting process at this point. 24 So I make a motion that we reject this petition. 25 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion from member

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1	King to reject this petition to 183-1-1211. Is
2	there a second?
3	MR. JEFFARES: Second.
4	MS. GHAZAL: Second.
5	MR. FERVIER: We have a second from member
6	Jeffares. Any discussion? Hearing no
7	discussion, all those in favor of rejecting this
8	petition signify by saying aye.
9	Member Ghazal.
10	MS. GHAZAL: Aye.
11	MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston.
12	DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.
13	MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares.
14	MR. JEFFARES: Aye.
15	MR. FERVIER: Member King.
16	MS. KING: Aye.
17	MR. FERVIER: Motion carries four to zero.
18	Thank you, Ms. Marks.
19	MS. MARKS: Thank you.
20	MR. FERVIER: The next item on the agenda to
21	be heard is a petition for amendment of state
22	election board rules presented by Erik
23	Christensen.
24	Mr. Christensen, are you available.
25	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, I'm available.

MR. FERVIER: You have the floor,
Mr. Christensen.

## Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rules Presented by Erik Christensen

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. I'm going to go through this quickly because I've got a lot to cover.

So the current process in the county for Georgia ballots -- and I'm very focused on ballots here, just on whether they're emergency, absentee, provisional, or ballot-marking device ballots -- lack (indiscernible) accounting controls including chain of custody, reconciliation procedures, and physical security over the ballots being processed and tabulated. We've already talked about a lot of the problems that we have. I'm not going to go through all of them.

I'm going to dive right in with rule request number 1. All ballots must be numerically controlled. I know this is going to freak out Marilyn Marks and maybe Ms. Ghazal. And I do apologize to Ms. Ghazal for earlier when we talked about all being on the same page. I was not particularly pointing you out or anything

like that. I'm just saying it has to do with, you know, accounting and auditing, numbering. I think these things are pretty straightforward. I think they're very nonpartisan.

So let me just read my rules then. So this is 183-1-11-.03, ballot memory required for precinct, absentee, provisional, emergency ballots. I'm not familiar with any system, whether it be QuickBooks or SAP, the cheapest or the most expensive accounting system, that does not use a numbering system. This is what keeps you from having duplicate scanning.

And I'll back up one second and just go over what are we trying to prevent? The stuff, the swap, the toss, and the electronic manipulation, these are the four risk areas that we've got.

The stuff's been going on for 250, 300 years. There's nothing new here. So everybody knows this. If you read the book, *Ballot Battles*, you can read about them all there in *Ballot Battles*. We don't have to go over it.

Okay. Absentee ballots shall be individually numbered with their precinct code and shall include a tear-off strip with the corresponding number on both the ballot and the

tear-off strip. Absentee ballots shall be white in color. I think this is already Georgia law right now.

Unfortunately in 2020, if you can see this right here, when they printed the 770,000 absentee emergency ballots here, they didn't have a tear-off strip on them which I believe is required. Anyway we're probably too late for that one, so -- because I would -- do you think -- have ballots been printed yet? Does anyone know? Anybody know the answer to that? Okay, I'll move on.

Emergency ballots shall be individually numbered with their precinct code and shall include a tear-off strip. Also I believe that's required. But the corresponding number on both the ballot and the tear-off strip emergency ballot shall be light yellow in color, okay?

Emergency ballots are ones that we actually will scan but we need to differentiate between those and the regular absentee ballots.

Provisional ballots are ones we don't scan.

These are ballots that may be scanned at a later date, should be individually numbered with their precinct code, and shall include a tear-off strip

with corresponding number with a ballot tear-off strip. Emergency ballot shall be light red in color.

And then precinct level ballots generated by the ballot-marking device shall be individually numbered with their precinct code and two copies be printed: one to be scanned by the Dominion scanner and one to be placed in a locked and sealed audit bin to be picked up and stored in a locked evidence room of local law enforcement.

Now, here's where we get past -- you know, I would say that, you know, Marilyn's proposal -- and everybody else is talking about paper ballots. Those are fine proposals and we could use paper ballots because we have the Dominion system and we can scan those ballots at the precinct, I would imagine, if the machines were configured properly. So that would be an okay system, but I don't think we need to go there.

I think we can just print two copies of the ballot, put one in the audit box. Okay, we've got a totally different chain of custody. We've got local law enforcement picking it up. What's in the ballot -- the audit box should be exactly the same that what's in the ballot box.

These things will never get opened. They're going to be taped and sealed. And unless we get into some very contentious thing, we should never have to open these up. But we've got them. The fact that they're there prevents any shenanigans, okay? Just because they're there.

Okay, numbering shall be done to ensure ballot secrecy and no record shall be kept that would compromise the secrecy of the ballot.

That's rule request number 1.

And this will weld -- if there's a back door on Dominion, people talking about, well, it can be hacked, it can be electronically manipulated, this welds the back door shut. Electronically manipulate it, hack it, do whatever you want and you don't want to know we've got the truth in two different places.

And, you know, when you do a reconciliation of your bank account, you use your -- you use your -- the bank statement, use your books. You compare those two. That's what we're going to do here. We're going to compare these two. They'd better be the same, and if they're not, we'll reconcile it.

Okay, rule request number 2, rule

183-1-14-15, absentee ballots received back required to match their absentee ballot application. I would think that this would be something that everyone would be doing. I understand Hall County does this. And in looking back at the 1985 and 1992 procedures we had, this is done in the county that I'm looking at. They matched every one of them. And, you know, this is your number one control. Did I actually apply for an absentee ballot? And when I sent my absentee ballot back, did we match that up? Okay.

So the verification envelope -- and this is the verification envelope, this is not the ballot -- for all absentee ballots received back shall be Bates-stamped and the name, Bates-stamp number, and precinct number of the elector shall be recorded in the county absentee ballot logbook.

So over time, the county sends ones out, or if we're using an outside third party, which I believe we are now -- I think we used Runbeck in 2020 and now we're using somebody local here.

He's going to be able to log these because he probably already does. And I think we already

passed the rule that said we had to track them by absentee ballot mailed out. So we're already doing this.

Absentee ballot verification envelope shall be logged again, matched and paper-clipped to their corresponding absentee ballot application and filed by precinct with the name and Bates-stamped number of the elector recorded in the precinct absentee ballot logbook. But here we separate them now and we put them -- we file them by precinct until we're ready to count them.

And I guess that data when we start counting those is, you know -- maybe it's twenty -- I think it was 21 days. Was that the emergency rule? Was 21 days? I think it really should be, you know, whatever the Friday before, whenever we start doing UOCAVA. We should have the absentee ballot procedures the same as the UOCAVA procedures because the UOCAVA are absentee ballots.

All absentee ballot verification envelope information shall be compared to the SOS information system, which I think is called GARViS, for all information including elector name, registration number, address, and

signature. Absentee ballot verification envelopes received back with no corresponding application shall not be processed, okay? Shall be separated, separately logged, and shall be priority mailed daily to the state election board for investigation. I don't know how we can get an absentee ballot verification envelope back if we never had an application. So those need to be looked into.

Okay, rule request number 3, 183-1-14-16, matching of absentee ballot requests and absentee ballot verification envelope received back required. This just says we have to -- we have to match them, and the person that did the matching needs to put their name on it and say: I did this matching, I saw that it was correct, the signature appears to match, and they are a registered voter in my county and they're registered in the precinct that we've got them. But they have to sign and date that they actually did the work.

I don't think there's any indication of who did the work. So what we want is we want accountability where somebody signs off and said:

Yes, I'm the person that did the work and I

verified that this was correct.

Once we have accountability, we're going to have better accuracy because people are going to know when they sign their name that they better have done the work.

Okay, rule request number 4, 183-1-14-17, documentation of mailing of absentee ballot packages in response to county or SOS system absentee ballot request required. All absentee ballot requests processed and mailed by outside contracts for counties shall be logged and include the name of the elector, the precinct of the elector, and the name, date, and signature of the contractor or of the county election employee -- employee fulfilling the absentee ballot request. I think we got that, but we need a log. We've got to have a log and we've got to know, you know, who fulfilled the request: name, date when they did it.

And it's got to be in a log because we've got to be able to get back to this thing right -this -- this absentee ballot recap. We need to be able to reconcile what we've mailed, what we've received back, what was actually voted.

Next, 183-1-14-18, reconciliation of

absentee ballot verification envelopes held, absentee ballot sealing envelopes, scanner counters to the county intake log and precinct intake log. So it used to be that -- my understanding is absentee ballots were processed at the precinct, which is -- this is -- this would be the best case. This is what we should be, you know, moving towards, back to where we used to be. The absentee ballots actually get sent to the precinct for processing where there's control and you're not in some gigantic, you know, State Farm arena where there's thousands of people running around, there's no chain of custody.

The precinct is a pretty controlled environment and that's a good place to be processing ballots. I don't know why we don't process all the ballots there. But if we're going to process them centrally, the absentee ballot verification envelope shall not be separated from their enclosed ballot sealing envelopes until initial processing begins except as provided by O.C.G.A. 21-2-386.

Again, I really think it should be, you know, the Friday the same as UOCAVA, but if it's

21 days in advance, I -- I guess that's -- that's what was agreed to. I don't think that's the law. I think the law is whatever the Legislature said the law was. That was some type of letter agreement or something we did in response to an emergency situation back in 2020.

Upon completion of scanning of all the absentee ballots received prior to the initial scanning cutoff date, a reconciliation shall be performed by precinct reconciling absentee ballot verification envelopes, Bates-stamped, received and processed to the total Bates-stamped absentee ballot sealing envelopes to the individual scanner counter to the precinct logs in a total the county logged the absentee ballots.

I think it would make sense to have a cut-off date because UOCAVA votes can come in after election day -- and I believe other absentee ballots can come in after election day. If they're postmarked by election day, I guess they can come in. Am I right on that? I think I am. Sara's saying no.

MS. GHAZAL: No, every -- every non-UOCAVA absentee ballot has to be received by 7 p.m. on elect day otherwise it is rejected.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Oh, wow. I thought that was under the America's Right to Vote Act or something like that.

MS. GHAZAL: The single biggest category of rejected ballots are ballots that are received late.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. Okay. Okay, so that's good then. If we have a hard cut-off, then we don't have to worry about this.

Upon completion -- upon completion of absentee ballot scanning, each precinct's absentee ballots shall be placed in a security-sealed ballot box and locked. You know, once we've done this, there's no reason for them to be floating around. They should be sealed and they should be locked and nobody should touch them until it gets to audit or recount time.

And so different types of security boxes are readily available out there. I've got one here made by Pelican that is watertight, airtight, has a lock place, a seal place, it's got wheels. It would be a good way to do it is to make sure these things are completely locked up.

And, you know, I'm proposing that the seals and locks for each precinct come from the state

election board, that you guys seal them and nobody looks at them after election day. They should never, ever be in that State Farm arena-type situation ever again. If we ever have to do an audit or recount, it should be in a controlled environment, and I get to that here later.

Rule 183-1-14-19, absentee ballots received after initial processing cutoff date to be accounted for separately. You're saying that's not an issue. I'll withdraw that one if there is not a -- a cutoff date. If we can get everything in one locked and sealed ballot box, great. If we can't, then we should have some type of cutoff where we have reconciling items, like, you know, deposits in transit, essentially ballots in transit.

And those don't -- I mean, you know, if we're within the -- they should be treated really like provisional ballots at that point. There's no sense -- if it's a big win either way, then there's no sense in busting those open and voting them if there's not enough to swing the difference.

And rule 183-1-14-20, locks and seals

required for all absentee ballots and precinct level ballots, okay. All absentee ballots and all precinct ballot-marking device ballots processed and scanned shall be locked and sealed by precinct with locks and seals provided by the state election board. One sealed ballot box shall not be opened by anyone except for the express written consent of the state election board for recount, audit, scanning, or public access and examination.

I know we're spending money on scanning, but that scanning is not real scanning. And to me it's of very limited value because we're just retabulating the chips that are coming from Dominion. So I don't know what we're getting for that \$1.5 million. Unless you're scanning the real ballots, I think you're wasting your money.

Unlocked and unsealed ballot boxes opened for any reason must be separated and processed individually by precincts with video surveillance and recording at all times. In no event shall multiple precincts be unlocked and unsealed at any time unless in separate locations or locations separated by 20 feet with caution tape separating each individual processing area.

So if we get into a recount like we did in 2020 -- and I think this is where a lot of the people started questioning the whole process, when, you know, you've got boxes coming out from underneath tables, and, you know, what appeared to be an unorganized recount and I think it was -- you know, that's why people don't have confidence in our election system when you watch what's going on there.

If you do it by precinct, it's fine. You know, each -- each -- we've got what, 244 precincts in -- in Fulton County. You know, we've got a couple thousand votes in each precinct. Very manageable. You know, we've got 2500 precincts in the state. Those are all going to be done at the county level. All that's a very manageable process as long as we don't, you know, try to bust all the ballots out and put them in stacks and count them in some kind of centralized place.

You know, our -- the voting for me has always been precinct level. I mean, everything is reported by precinct, report by precinct, report by precinct. That's how we post it on the precinct door, and that's how it should be kept.

Outside vendors engaged in scanning ballots for public access shall be ISO9006 certified document management specialist and shall be required to video record such scanning and processing.

I think we passed a law that the ballots are now, you know, a matter of public record. So we're going to have to scan them at some point. And so let's scan them with somebody that knows what they're doing in a controlled environment, you know, by precinct. We'll go get a precinct scanner, bring it back. Additionally ballot boxes shall be weighed in and weighed out prior to and after scanning, shall be returned in the same manner as they were received.

Okay, last, rule number 7. And this is already kind of out there. And I think this is where we've got one of the real issues. And, you know, Michael Heekin and his reasonable request said, you know, if we're certifying -- you know, what are we certifying? If we're not checking the numbers, if we're not checking the tabulation, are we just blindly signing some form that somebody puts in front of us? I mean, I think whoever is on the county election board should be entitled to look at the precinct level

data and the numbers to make sure that they all add up, that they're in a spreadsheet -- and the Secretary of State has a spreadsheet that does some of this stuff because I downloaded it all, but they should be able to look and make sure that those numbers are correct. I just don't think it's right to put somebody in a position to say, hey, I certified this election but I haven't looked at any of the tabulation or any of the numbers.

So after tabulation is completed, all absentee ballot vote totals -- and I'm not talking about just absentee, I'm talking about all ballot vote totals and precinct level vote totals -- published shall be reconciled, verified, and signed off by both the county supervisor of elections and the Secretary of State prior to certification by the governor.

You know, I think everybody's in a difficult position, whether it's the Secretary of State or whether it's the Governor because of the wording in the Georgia law that says "shall certify."

And I don't think you should certify anything that you don't feel comfortable with or you at least haven't checked the numbers.

You know, the process might not be -- is never going to be completely correct and there's no way it's going to be a hundred percent of, you know, everybody following every procedure accurately. But at the end of the day, we've got numbers and those numbers need to roll up by precinct, by county, and to the totals that the Governor's going to sign. And he should feel comfortable that somebody signed off on those numbers and they've actually looked at them to make sure they are the correct numbers.

I know that's a lot right there and each one of these kind of needs a separate look at because I think some of these -- like I said, we could be too late on the -- on the numbering of the absentee ballots since the day we're supposed to be accepting applications, but I think we need to get here. Whether it's in this cycle or it's the next cycle, we should have numerical control over ballots.

And my understanding is that the Dominion system allows for this and some states use it. I got that information secondhand from Garland Favorito. I'm shocked that we don't use it. That's all I've got.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Christensen.

Do you have anybody else that wants to speak on these proposed rules?

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I do not.

MR. FERVIER: Okay. Are there questions from the board for Mr. Christensen?

MS. GHAZAL: I have a couple of threshold questions which the first one is,

Mr. Christensen, have you spoken or worked with any election supervisor on any of these rules?

MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, uh-uh. No. These are accounting and auditing rules. These aren't election rules. These would be things that you would use for any, you know -- like I said, it's accounting and auditing 101. This is not complicated stuff. It's really the most simplest of any type of accounting you can do, which is addition. That's all it is. It's adding up votes. Once you've accounted for the ballots, then you can add the votes, but you've got to have control over the ballots before you -- before you count the votes.

MS. GHAZAL: But do you recognize that a lot of these would be a really dramatic shift in the way that counties manage and process ballots

right now? 1 2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Not number 1. I don't think number 1 would be. 3 MS. GHAZAL: Well, number 1 --4 MR. CHRISTENSEN: It's just that's the 5 6 configuration setting within the software. Like, 7 for me to do that in QuickBooks right now, it 8 would take me five minutes. For me to do it in SAP would take me five minutes. 9 10 MR. FERVIER: The problem with number 1, 11 Mr. Christensen, is you're -- you're asking for 12 different colored ballots. And --MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. I think that 13 14 might -- I think that might be a little bit, you know -- the first one, okay, I think -- and those 15 16 do come in white anyway. I believe they come 17 white. The Runbeck ones had color in them, but these -- the second and third one right there, I 18 19 think, we're a long ways out to getting these 20 printed. 21 MR. FERVIER: Well, the problem is that 22 we -- they can't use colored paper. 23 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Oh, you can't? 24 MR. FERVIER: 25 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Why not?

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MR. FERVIER: No, we -- we went through this about -- another proposal for colored paper came in in -- I believe it was the May meeting.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: And we -- we followed up on that, and so the optical scanners won't read those colored ballots. This was something that was already decided at a previous hearing.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. I apologize for that. I'd be happy to drop that and make --

MR. FERVIER: That's okay.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- an amendment to -- to wipe out the color. But, I mean, I think they should still be separate. They should say absentee on one form, provisional and emergency on another. They should all be separate.

MS. GHAZAL: Again, yeah, we did review this. O.C.G.A. 21-2-383 states that the form for either ballot shall be determined and prescribed by the Secretary of State. So this is -- this is yet again an area that the Legislature has -- has delegated authority -- has vested authority solely in the Secretary of State for the form of our ballots. And my understanding --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. Well, that's fine.

But this is -- this is numbering. This is a numbering proposal right here. It's not a -- it's not -- you know, the color -- forget about the color, but it's numbering, that we have numbers on the ballots --

MS. GHAZAL: That is -- that's -- (Cross-talking)

MR. CHRISTENSEN: You know, just like -just like this right here, and this is a
negotiable instrument, this is a one dollar bill,
nobody's tracking this to me, but every single
one of them has a number on it. And so, you
know, the Treasury decides they want to use that
and there's a lot of those out there.

MS. GHAZAL: Well, and they also use those serial numbers to trace ballot -- trace bills when -- for law-enforcement purposes.

But that simply -- it's not within the authority of the state election board to determine what the ballot looks like. That is the -- the Secretary of State's Office that determines that.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: But this is not that issue. This is a numbering issue. This is not a --

(Cross-talking)

MS. GHAZAL: (indiscernible) --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- what the ballot looks like. The format of the ballot -- the format of the ballot has to be in compliance with the law and that's not what I'm -- I'm talking about. I'm talking about numbering on the ballot to say there's a -- an actual unique serial number on every ballot. You know, I'm required in the moving industry to have prenumbered bill of ladings. I'm regulated by the state. They say you've got to use prenumbered bill of ladings.

MS. KING: I'm pretty sure -- didn't we pass -- don't we have a rule that's in rulemaking right now that Mr. Cross put forward that will separate the ballot -- the absentees from the provisional and emergency?

MR. FERVIER: I thought that we might've either deferred it -- is it in rulemaking or did we defer that to determine whether or not we were allowed to even alter the ballot because there was questions about whether we could alter the ballot image? Because I remember the question was brought up about the Secretary of State having sole -- sole authority to do that.

1	MS. KING: Okay.
2	DR. JOHNSTON: It's in rulemaking.
3	MR. FERVIER: Is it in rulemaking? You do
4	know? Okay. Alex tells me we did initiate
5	rulemaking on it. I know we discussed it at one
6	of our previous meetings.
7	MS. KING: Yeah. Yeah.
8	MS. GHAZAL: And I still I still hold
9	that that exceeds our rulemaking authority.
10	MR. FERVIER: Yep, okay.
11	DR. JOHNSTON: All right. And I I still
12	hold that we're currently violating Georgia code
13	because Georgia code says that "absentee ballot"
14	is the only thing that goes on an absentee ballot
15	for a label.
16	MS. KING: Correct. But I think the point
17	is that we have that in rulemaking as we speak.
18	DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.
19	MR. CHRISTENSEN: You have you have
20	numbering in rulemaking right now? Numbering of
21	the ballots?
22	MS. KING: I'm referring
23	MR. FERVIER: No. This is simply labeling
24	on the ballots.
25	MS. KING: Yeah. I'm just referring to

the --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay, yeah. The format of the ballots I don't care about. It's just the numbering. It's the serial number.

MS. KING: But it's inside your petition.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: It is. Yes, yes.

MS. KING: Okay.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. And -- and the -you know, and the tear-off strip to make sure -this is something that the Secretary of State is
supposed to do, but when he allowed 770,000 of
these to be printed right here, there was no
tear-off strip. The tear-off strip is required
for every ballot except the ballot-marking device
ballots. I don't think a tear-off strip is
required for those.

And that's why in lieu -- you know, the tear-off strip is -- is somewhat like a serial number but not really because the way you account for those at the precinct level is you tear off the strip and that goes in one envelope and then the provisional or emergency ballot goes in another envelope. And so you have a reconcilia -- it allows you to do a reconciliation. That's the purpose of the tear-off strip.

On an absentee that's a mail-in absentee, you're supposed to tear off the strip yourself and keep it. I understand a lot of them get sent back in, but that's a different reconciliation process there. The reconciliation process there is the log. It's logging in and making sure that the totals that were applied for and returned back agree to -- especially the ones that agree back are reconciled back to the precinct level, going back to the procedure that we used to have in 1992.

MS. GHAZAL: So moving on, number 4 would require two ballots to be printed for every single vote cast.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. Let me --

MS. GHAZAL: That is not something that I can in any way, shape, or form support.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. Those aren't ballots. They're -- they're a -- they're not a ballot because a ballot would have every -- you know, a ballot would look like an absentee ballot and have everything. It's just -- it's a BMD -- it's the audit copy.

So HAVA was designed because people did not like the black box, I quess. So, you know, we

were using Diebold back then, DRE. So we went to the ballot-marking device so it would have a paper audit copy of what the voters' intent was, which we've never done anything with except put them in boxes and file them away. But my understanding is that is the only legal vote. That is the legal vote according to Georgia code.

So that gets picked up by the county, and it gets filed, I guess, by precinct and then audited if it's a risk-limiting audit or recounted if there's a recount required. But the purpose of the audit boxes, if you're in, like, a hotel and there's -- you get a copy of a receipt and it says audit copy, the purpose of the audit copy is to have a different chain of custody, different segregation of duties. And hopefully they never get called on to even have anything done with them.

You program the machine to print out two.

You can print one or two. You print out -- God
gave us two hands, so you can put one in each
hand. You flip them over, looks like My Vote.

One goes into the scanner. The argument's going
to be, well, if you put it into the scanner, what
if you put them both into the Dominion scanner?

If you're using numbering, they're going to be rejected and come back out.

The purpose of the number is to prevent the duplicate scan, which we've had lots of issues with duplicate scans.

MS. GHAZAL: (indiscernible) --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: So let's get rid of the issue.

MS. GHAZAL: -- happened in the -- in the precinct. Duplicate scans happen in -- during -- have happened during recounts. Are you -- do you have any -- has any state ever had two ballots? Because these are ballots -- 95 percent of our votes in 2022 and I expect 95 percent of our votes in 2024 are going to be conducted on the BMD scanner -- BMD ballots and the scanners. Do we even know if the -- if the machines have the capability of doing this, much less whether it's a good idea?

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't know. I think
it's a regular printer setting --

MS. GHAZAL: It -- I --

(Cross-talking)

MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- that you can -- you can set any printer to print one or two.

MS. GHAZAL: The -- do the BMDs do that?
And if they do, that's a huge problem --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think they -- I think they --

(Cross-talking)

MS. GHAZAL: -- if these are --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think they would do --

MS. GHAZAL: -- ballots.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think any -- any -- you know, I don't think we're using -- if you look at the technology -- you know, it's the software that we bought. The -- you know, whatever we're using -- Microsoft Touch or whatever, you know -- you know, pad, ThinkPad or whatever we're using there at the touchscreen. And the printers are just -- there's nothing special about that equipment. It's like HP printer, you know, give me any compatible Microsoft or android, you know, laptop. And I think, you know, as long as it's touchscreen enabled, you can use it.

I don't think there's anything special about that hardware. It's the software that's special.

MS. GHAZAL: But, Mr. Christensen, I appreciate the time and effort that you've put into trying to put together rules that you think

2 that this isn't ready for prime time. We don't even know if our systems can do this. 3 I think it would be a terrible idea to print 4 5 out two ballots for every vote. We have no 6 authority to direct law enforcement to be 7 taking -- taking custody of this. These are 8 legislative issues. MR. CHRISTENSEN: There's -- there's --9 10 MS. GHAZAL: (indiscernible) --11 MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- somebody there. 12 mean, I think --13 (Cross-talking) 14 MS. GHAZAL: -- (indiscernible) --MR. CHRISTENSEN: I believe at every 15 16 precinct --MR. FERVIER: Okay. Oh, let's --17 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. 18 19 MR. FERVIER: Let's speak one at a time, 20 please, and not speak over each other. All 21 right. MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I disagree. 22 I think 23 if you want to solve the problem, let's solve the 24 problem. We've talked about it now for four 25 years. If we want to solve it, let's solve it.

might improve our system. But it's very clear

1

These are all very solvable and doable -- you know, fixable problems with the existing people, process, and technology that we have in place today. We don't have to blow things up and start over. We can use the exact same people, process, and technology that we've got.

MS. GHAZAL: These are legislative issues. These are not -- these are not issues that are conducive to rulemaking. This is an entirely different process. And, frankly, trying to make changes like this of this scope in August -- rules that -- and -- when -- go into rulemaking today will not come in -- into force until early voting is starting.

Do you understand the sort of dramatic changes that you're suggesting? I just -- I don't know what we're doing here.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: You know, I disagree first of all. I say that these are the types of things that would be within rulemaking. And as long as they're not in contradiction to, you know, federal or state election law, these are the exact types of things we should be doing.

These are reconciliations that allow us to account for the ballots. Once we've accounted

for the ballots, we can count the votes.

The other thing about what I'm proposing here is it allows the system to be auditable. The system is completely unauditable right now. There is no way that you could provide any certification of, you know -- maybe in some of the smaller counties. There's no way you can provide any certification of these things. I mean, it's just -- there's not enough controls in place the way the current process is set up.

There was. We had them. And somehow they went away. And now, you know, after 250 years, it's like we're starting over. It's like all the good stuff we had back in 1992 somehow disappeared. It's odd because we had a ballot recap. We had a numbered list of voters, every precinct. And — and oddly they've been, you know, removed somehow. I — I don't even understand it because the procedures were solid. I looked at them and I said, these are great procedures. If we would do this with every ballot, we'd have control over the ballots.

And, again, I'm going -- what I'm talking about here is control over the paper ballots, whether it's a ballot-marking device ballot or

whether it's a, you know, absentee, emergency, or provisional ballot. That's all I'm talking about. How do we control them? How do we make sure that we've got a good count, that we know where they all are? We're supposed to reconcile the printing records, but we're not doing that. You know, if we had good reconciliation procedures, none of this would've -- we wouldn't have the issues that we've got.

So this is -- this is how you fix the system right here. And guess what? It's a little bit difficult and it's tedious, but it isn't technical and it's not hard and it's not like we don't have the resources to be able to get it done.

And I'm happy to go through each one individually, like I said. You know, if the -- if the scanner is incompatible with colored paper, then don't make it colored paper, but do make them separate. If -- if the requi -- if the law requirement is that we've got to have separate absentee ballots, then let's make them separate from the provisional and the emergency. All these things might --

MS. KING: (indiscernible) --

1	(Cross-talking)
2	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. Go ahead, Janelle.
3	I'm sorry.
4	MS. KING: So that aspect of your request is
5	already in rulemaking. That's what we were
6	explaining earlier.
7	MR. CHRISTENSEN: So the numbering is in
8	MS. KING: That was presented.
9	MR. CHRISTENSEN: rulemaking already.
10	The numbering piece?
11	MS. KING: Okay. I I think the problem
12	we're having is that I feel like we're kind of
13	talking in circles. So you just mentioned the
14	separation of the absentee ballots from the
15	emergency and the provisional. That
16	particular that separation of those doc of
17	that ballot
18	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay.
19	MS. KING: that's already in rulemaking.
20	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Great.
21	MS. KING: Now, I'm not referring to your
22	numbering aspect, but I just want you to know
23	that that part is already in the rulemaking
24	process.
25	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. Okay. The

separation is great. That's great. So it really just comes down to numbering then. The numbering is what allows us to do the reconciliation. We can't have a good reconciliation without numbers on the documents.

MR. FERVIER: Mr. Christensen, I think that these rules all need some more work and you should partner with some election supervisors and with a member of the board to try and perfect them. I think that they have some significant requirements that are not stated in the statute. That may or may not be an issue.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay.

MR. FERVIER: And also that this is extremely close to an upcoming election to make these kind of changes.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, then if we've got to -- if we've got to push them, then let's push them, you know. If we have to push them, let's push them, but let's not stop working. And we've got some momentum here and I think that, you know, moving forward is a good thing to do. If you guys say, hey, we want to defer or, you know, push the implementation date, I would think that would be within your authority.

MR. FERVIER: But I think -- I think they need some work.

Yes, Mr. Jeffares. Mr. Jeffares.

MR. JEFFARES: I make a motion to deny these rules but tell the petitioner I would love to work with him on these in the future.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well ...

MR. FERVIER: Did you hear that,

Mr. Christensen?

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah, but -- you know, let's -- I mean, I would like to go on each one individually because each one of these is a separate rule request. And so I'd like an up or down vote on each one of them. And I know that some of them need amendment. And if you want to push this -- I know you've got 30 more people that have got to speak and you've got more stuff, but I would like a vote on each one.

MR. FERVIER: Well, the problem is that you issued these as one petition.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, I didn't. I have one letter on the top, but each one of them is a separate exhibit. It says, Exhibit A, rule request 1, rule request 2, rule request 3. I mean, if you want me to put them on, you know,

seven different letters to you, I could do that,
but I think that's --

MR. FERVIER: Well, I think that we --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- form over substance.

MR. FERVIER: I know we -- we have a board
member that has stated he's willing to work with
you and actually is --

MR. JEFFARES: (indiscernible) it's just -just go ahead and -- it's too late. These are
complicated. I'm willing to work with you
because I think you've got some great ideas.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I mean they're not all complicated. Like, not all of them are complicated and some of them we could -- we could cut right here. You know, absentee ballot verification envelopes received after the cut-off date shall be processed and accounted for separately in accordance to rule. You know, we could -- that's rule request number 6. If you want to say no on that, that's fine. I get it. If you say there is no cut-off date, let's -- let's kill that one then.

MR. FERVIER: Well, I mean, you --

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I thought there was a cut-off date.

1	MR. FERVIER: I understand. We but we			
2	have we have a motion that needs to be			
3	considered. We have a motion made			
4	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay.			
5	MR. FERVIER: by member Jeffares to deny			
6	these rules and Mr. Jeffares would work with			
7	Mr. Christensen going forward to try and perfect			
8	these rules.			
9	So we have a motion. Do we have a second?			
10	MS. GHAZAL: Second.			
11	MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second			
12	by member Ghazal to deny these rules as presented			
13	and to any discussion? Hearing no discussion,			
14	all those in favor of denying these rules as			
15	presented signify by saying aye.			
16	Member Ghazal.			
17	MS. GHAZAL: Aye.			
18	MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston. Member			
19	Johnston?			
20	DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.			
21	MR. FERVIER: Aye. Member Jeffares.			
22	MR. JEFFARES: Aye.			
23	MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares votes aye.			
24	Member King.			
25	MS. KING: Aye.			

1	MR. FERVIER: The motion carries four to				
2	zero. The rules are denied.				
3	But, Mr. Christensen, member Jeffares has				
4	offered to work with you and try and perfect				
5	these so that you can bring them back before this				
6	board at a later date.				
7	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. So when do they				
8	need to be turned in by to make the				
9	September 20th meeting? Because, I mean, some of				
10	them I'm going to cut and some of them will I				
11	still want a I want an up or down vote.				
12	MR. FERVIER: The to be considered they				
13	need to be turned in 20 days prior to the				
14	meeting.				
15	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. So September 1st.				
16	MR. FERVIER: Yes.				
17	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Or the 31st.				
18	MR. FERVIER: Yes.				
19	Member Jeffares, did you have a question?				
20	MR. JEFFARES: Yeah. Tell Alex to give him				
21	my number and tell him to call me.				
22	MR. FERVIER: Yeah. We'll we'll give him				
23	your contact information.				
24	MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. Okay. Thank you.				
25	MR. FERVIER: Thank you.				

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay, thanks.

MR. FERVIER: The next item on the agenda is -- well, we're on business -- petition for amendment of state election board rules presented by Lucia Frazier. This was a petition that was heard at the last meeting and it was deferred to this meeting.

Ms. Frazier, are you still online?

MS. FRAZIER: Yes. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Ms. Frazier? Yes, yes. You have the floor, Ms. Frazier.

## Petition for Amendment of State Election Board Rules Presented by Lucia Frazier

MS. FRAZIER: Okay. So this was -- this petition -- I don't really have slides for this, but I'll just speak to it. So this was to request that the voter roll that is currently accessible to the public but it's not free -- and it's accessible by request to the Secretary of State at the -- for county and statewide voter rolls for the prices that I showed listed in the petition.

So at this point, the -- we've talked about this with the other petitions as well as far as the Secretary of State being able to charge for

that. My recommendation is that -- well, there's two parts to this discussion that we can talk about.

One part is the counties do own their own voter roll data and so they would have the ability to post on their website their updated voter rolls with the timestamp. And that could be something that we could recommend. We can also still recommend that it's done at the state level as well. Like I said, I think that the Secretary of State, if they're going to choose their price, that they could choose zero. We could, you know, enforce the Sunshine Law with our rule or at least word the rule to comply with the Sunshine Law.

So that's -- that's where I'm at with these.

I think there's -- there's probably going to want
to be some discussion on that.

MR. FERVIER: This one is particular to the Secretary of State and directing the Secretary of State to provide these registration files for free. And I -- you know, I have to make the same comments I made the before that this board has no authority to direct the Secretary of State to do anything.

And also the -- you know, as I stated in statute 21-2-225(c), the Secretary of State by statute has a right to charge for these -- for these records. That's -- I mean, it's the same discussion we had earlier concerning that. And this particular rule request is -- is simply to -- an attempt to force them to give these for free.

Does any other board members have any questions on this?

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair.

MR. FERVIER: Yes, Dr. Johnston.

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes. Just to repeat. Also 21-2-225, paragraph (b) says they're available for public inspection. So I don't know how one would pursue that at the county level or at the state level. But it does say that they're -- they should be available for public inspection. And how that is accomplished, I think, Mr. Evans said he would get back with us on that.

Also I wonder -- I asked if -- if any of these rolls were provided for free. And I think quite -- actually, they're provided for free to ERIC. As a matter of fact, we probably pay ERIC to take our voter rolls and -- and work with

them. I don't think we charge ERIC \$480 or whatever it is.

And one idea is why -- why wouldn't one be able to -- to make an open records request of the voter rolls and it takes less than 15 minutes to download such. So and that -- if it's less than 15 minutes of somebody's time, it's supposed to be free. Would that be a novel way of requesting the voter rolls? Just -- just an idea.

And just, again, once more to the Help
America Vote Act of 2002, section 303 reads: Any
election official in the state including any
local election official may obtain immediate
electronic access to the information contained in
the computerized list.

I would like to know how our board could obtain immediate access to the voter rolls. So I -- I -- unfortunately -- or reluctantly I agree that the voter rolls are under the control of the Secretary of State. And it is probably an issue that will need to be worked out with the Secretary of State and their decision about whether to charge for voter rolls.

I'm still concerned about people that cannot afford \$480 to get a voter roll. It's sort of

a -- that whole thing, "pay to play," and I just -- I find it unfortunate that people without a lot of money could actually obtain the voter rolls to do their research or participate in the elections in that way. But that's all.

MR. FERVIER: Are there any other questions from the board on this proposal?

MS. GHAZAL: Well, for what it's worth, I just wanted to provide a little bit of color on the ERIC -- and I'm -- I'm open to being corrected on this, but my understanding is that all of the data is actually hashed in a way that it is not -- there's no individual that can actually read it in -- within the system, and it is -- it is matched solely by an algorithm, computer algorithm.

So while the information is sent, it is not sent in a form that anybody can actually use. I know that's -- that's a little outside the scope of this petition and I apologize, but I just want to make sure that folks understand the way that that system works.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you.

Are there any other comments or questions from the board?

DR. JOHNSTON: I think it would be nice for the people of Georgia to know more about how ERIC works and how the security and safety of their private information is handled and protected.

MS. GHAZAL: I agree.

- MR. FERVIER: Are there any other questions or comments from the board? The chair will entertain a motion on this petition.
- MS. GHAZAL: I move that we reject the petition on the basis that it is beyond our -- our legal capacity.
- MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to reject this petition based on the fact that it's beyond our legal capacity. Is there a second?
- MS. FRAZIER: Could we table this so that -because I've heard the discussion that we were
  going to talk more about it.
  - MR. FERVIER: The --
- MS. FRAZIER: I should've spoken up sooner, but I'm just trying to understand the process.
- MR. FERVIER: Yeah. The board has to act on the motion that's been made. We have a motion to reject this petition based upon it's not under the authority of this board. Is there a second?
  - MS. KING: Mr. Chairman, I'm concerned about

just directly shooting this down because I'm still -- I still have questions as to what is the plan should there be a member of our -- of our great state who cannot afford to purchase this document? What is the method of ensuring that individuals can -- can see this public document? I -- I think I'm still confused on that. Weren't we supposed to have an answer, particularly from attorneys, on whether or not -- on how to go about that for this meeting? Like, wasn't that why we tabled it to this meeting?

I thought for sure the attorney that was with us said that they -- she -- she would get me the information confirming why this will be outside of our purview and what would be the plan during those (indiscernible).

MR. FERVIER: I -- I haven't received that.

And we'd have to make a request of the -- a

written request of the Attorney General's Office

for that information.

MS. KING: Okay, yeah. We spoke about it at the board meeting, but I -- I'm all for tabling this one more time if I -- and I can put in a written -- I'll shoot an e-mail just -- I just want to make sure I know what the process is

because if we turn this down because, you know, changing the cost is something that has to be done through the Secretary of State's Office, that still leaves the major question which is what happens to those individuals who can't afford to pay for a document that's supposed to be publicly available?

MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal made the motion.

Member Ghazal, are you -- would you consider withdrawing your motion and presenting another motion to table this?

MS. GHAZAL: Yes. I withdraw my motion to reject and I will move to table it once -- once again.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to table this petition. Do we have a second?

DR. JOHNSTON: Second.

MR. FERVIER: Who made the second?

DR. JOHNSTON: (indicating)

MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston made the second. Any discussion? Hearing no discussion, all those in favor of tabling this petition signify by saying aye.

Member Johnston.

DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal. 1 2 MS. GHAZAL: Aye. MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares. 3 MR. JEFFARES: Aye. 4 5 MR. FERVIER: Member King. 6 MS. KING: Aye. 7 MR. FERVIER: This motion is tabled for 8 further consideration. 9 MS. FRAZIER: Thank you. 10 MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Frazier. 11 Discussion of Fulton County Monitor Proposal MR. FERVIER: The next item on the agenda is 12 13 discussion of the Fulton County monitoring 14 proposal. I want to inform the board that I have 15 been in contact with the new chairman of the 16 board, Sherri Allen, and Mrs. Allen and I have 17 plans to meet next week. It was the first 18 available date that we could both work out and 19 everybody could attend. 20 So we have plans to meet and discuss a 21 proposal made, I believe, originally by member 22 Jeffares where -- an alternate proposal where 23 board members would be able to select members for

Are there any questions from the board on

a monitoring team.

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that? Or any comments or any further discussion needed?

DR. JOHNSTON: Look forward to hearing -hearing about the outcome of the meeting.

MR. FERVIER: Okay. Thank you. Okay.

The next item on the agenda is a -- "U.S. citizen only" signs.

Dr. Johnston, you wanted that on the agenda.

DR. JOHNSTON: I do. Thank you very much.

As you recall, last -- last meeting we passed -- passed a motion to provide "U.S. citizens only" to be placed in polling places and election offices to provide a visual for those who might not be U.S. citizens to provide a message that voting in elections in Georgia is for U.S. citizens.

Since that time there have been some new -news reports of thousands of noncitizens found on
voter rolls in Virginia, 6900; in Alabama by the
Secretary of State, 3000. And the election
officials in those states have moved quickly to
remove noncitizens from their voter rolls.

Additionally the Supreme Court is considering a case for emergency stay for --

including 24 states that includes Georgia that will confirm that states can make rules governing their own elections, including requiring voters to show proof of citizenship. But because there are repeated news articles or concerns, at least in the media, about the potential or the risk of noncitizens trying to vote or getting registered to vote in the state, I would -- I would like to make -- I would make a motion that rather than the signage being optional, that we would require this sign to -- to be placed in all polling places or all places that are receiving -processing voters to vote and in election offices. And the sign should be of at least the same size as the signage for no -- no cell phones or no weapons to be placed in a prominent place at the entrance to the polling place and at each voter check-in table.

MR. FERVIER: The -- I think that the proper procedure here would be that you would need to make a motion for reconsideration of a previously passed motion because the previously passed motion was to send a letter along with it, advising that it was optional --

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

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MR. FERVIER: -- and -- and it was approved by this board. And therefore, you would have to -- I believe you were on the prevailing side of that and therefore you would be able to make a motion for reconsideration.

DR. JOHNSTON: Thank you for reminding me.

I will make -- that motion will be a motion for reconsideration of such with a letter and a provision of PDF or formats that the counties can use to make these signs.

MR. FERVIER: Let's -- let's -- I believe that you need to make a motion to reconsider a previously accepted motion. And we will vote on the motion for reconsideration, and then you can make a new motion with sending a letter requiring it. So ...

DR. JOHNSTON: All right. I'll make -Mr. Chair, I'd like to make a motion to
reconsider the previously approved motion
concerning signage in polling places.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to reconsider the previously approved motion authorizing signage -- the "U.S. citizen only signage" in polling places along with a letter that would stipulate that it was -- they could put it up and

it would be on a voluntary basis. Is there a 1 2 second? MR. JEFFARES: Second. 3 MS. KING: Second. 4 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion and a second 5 from member Jeffares. Any discussion? Hearing 6 7 no discussion, all those in favor of this motion 8 to reconsider signify by saying aye. 9 Member Ghazal. 10 MS. GHAZAL: Nay. 11 MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston. 12 DR. JOHNSTON: Aye. MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares. 13 14 MR. JEFFARES: Aye. 15 MR. FERVIER: Member King. MS. KING: Aye. 16 17 MR. FERVIER: Motion carries three to zero. 18 Give me one moment. Let me plug in this phone --19 it has a low battery -- so we can continue to 20 hear member Johnston. There we go. We had to plug you in, member 21 22 Jeffares. 23 MR. JEFFARES: I'm about gone too. I'm down 24 to 30 percent.

MR. FERVIER: Are you talking about your

phone or yourself?

MR. JEFFARES: My phone and myself. It's after midnight here or getting close to it.

MR. FERVIER: All right. Now, we voted and the motion carried three to one.

Member Johnston, you have another motion.

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes. Mr. Chair, I make a motion to -- to provide the signage for U.S. citizens only to be placed in -- as required signage to be placed in all polling places where voting is occurring and election offices to be of the size -- at least the same size as signage for no cell phones or no weapons and also to be placed at each voter check-in table.

A letter will be sent from the state election board with the electronic transmission of the image for the counties to use. And that this motion will -- or that this recommendation will be mandatory.

MR. FERVIER: We have a motion on the table. Is there a second?

MS. KING: Second.

MR. JEFFARES: Second.

MR. FERVIER: We have a second from member Jeffares. Any discussion?

MS. GHAZAL: I have one question. Are there any other signs that are mandatory both in the precinct and also at every check-in place?

DR. JOHNSTON: There are many signs that are
mandatory according to voting laws. And --

MS. GHAZAL: Right. That's not my question. At each -- at each check-in location is there -- are there signs that are provided both in -- within the precinct and at each check-in location, which is what your -- your motion is?

DR. JOHNSTON: Not that I know of.

MS. GHAZAL: So this is the only sign -this is the only prohibi -- the only prohibition
that is getting that sort of blanket coverage?

MS. KING: Okay.

MS. GHAZAL: Just want to clarify and make sure we all -- we're all operating from the same basis of understanding.

MS. KING: I mean, that could possibly be the case, but, I mean, this is also a unique situation. I, too, have received several notifications, messages, alerts. I've read about several different cases where this could possibly pose a major problem, particularly it's already showing up in some other states. And so I think

it's -- it warrants this form of attention and it 1 2 also allows those who are here, who may be here 3 illegally or those who are here legally but are still under -- learning our election process, it 4 5 creates a precedent for -- for us going forward and a layer of -- a barrier for those who don't 6 7 understand what we allow and what we don't allow. 8 MR. FERVIER: Any further comments from the 9 board? We have a motion and a second. All those 10 in favor signify by saying aye. 11 Member Ghazal. 12 MS. GHAZAL: Nay.

MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston.

DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.

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MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares.

MR. JEFFARES: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: Member King.

MS. KING: Aye.

MR. FERVIER: The motion carries three to one. That dispenses with our old business.

We will go back to public comment now. We have about 600 less people online so we will see how many people have stuck around long enough to make public comment.

DR. JOHNSTON: Mr. Chair.

1	MR. FERVIER: Yes.
2	DR. JOHNSTON: I'm sorry. One one last
3	piece of business maybe just to be clear that the
4	petitions that were heard today will be posted so
5	that they may be heard on the September 20th
6	meeting; is that correct?
7	MS. HARDIN: All of them? Or just
8	MR. FERVIER: No, just the ones for
9	DR. JOHNSTON: The ones the ones that
10	were
11	MR. FERVIER: The ones for rulemaking
12	procedures.
13	DR. JOHNSTON: that were approved and
14	MR. FERVIER: For rulemaking procedures.
15	DR. JOHNSTON: and for rulemaking.
16	MR. FERVIER: You have till the 21st. So
17	you have two days.
18	DR. JOHNSTON: Okay. But no no later
19	than that. Posting no later than that.
20	MR. FERVIER: Yeah. I'm sorry. Alex?
21	MS. HARDIN: If y'all can review and approve
22	before the end of the 21st.
23	MR. FERVIER: Oh. It may be a long night.
24	Alex is going to do her Alex is going to do
25	her best to do it. So

MR. JEFFARES: Hey, Mr. Chairman. I've got 1 2 one last question too. MR. FERVIER: Yes. 3 MR. JEFFARES: At the end of the day, we --4 5 we talked about some of these that might be not our job, might not be what we're supposed to do. 6 7 Is Legislative Counsel, Attorney General, 8 Secretary of State -- has any of these attorneys 9 ruled on this stuff? I mean, they should know. 10 And if they've got an objection to it, shouldn't 11 they let us know they've got an objection to it? 12 MR. FERVIER: Well, you would hope so. 13 send it to them, and I don't think we --14 (Cross-talking) MR. JEFFARES: (indiscernible) to be that 15 16 they've got all this time, you know, but it -- we 17 shouldn't have a debate on whether this stuff is 18 our duty or not. They should let us know whether 19 it's our duty or not. Don't you think? 20 MR. FERVIER: Well, we send it to them. 21 so --22 MR. JEFFARES: I mean, if they don't 23 respond, then I guess they've got no complaint 24 against it.

MS. KING: I mean, they're responding --

there's media. I saw the press --2 (Cross-talking) MR. FERVIER: (indiscernible) -- The 3 press -- I'm sorry. I'm sorry. 4 Member Jeffares, would you continue please? 5 MR. JEFFARES: I hate to hear anybody say 6 7 we're out of order, we're out of order, and 8 nobody from the Attorney General, Secretary of 9 State, or Legislative Counsel has said anything. 10 What are they doing? 11 MR. FERVIER: Well, we --MR. JEFFARES: If they have an objection, 12 13 they should let us know they've got an objection 14 to the rules. And that's starting to get frustrating to me. And I don't even know any 15 16 other way to say it. 17 If they think we're out of order, they 18 should tells we're out of order. And the fact 19 they're not telling us we're out of order, then I 20 guess they're saying that we -- we're doing what 21 we're supposed to do. MR. FERVIER: Pertaining to the rules? 22 23 MR. JEFFARES: Yes. MR. FERVIER: Yes, pertaining to the rules, 24

yes. We -- I can't answer for them. All -- all

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I know is that we send them the -- as required. So ...

MR. JEFFARES: And if they don't reply, then they must think we're doing the right thing.

That's all I want to say.

MR. FERVIER: Your -- your -- your opinion is on the record, member Jeffares.

Member King.

MS. KING: Yes. I would like to add to that on the record. I've noticed that our Secretary of State has been speaking to the public that he has grave concerns about the actions of this state election board, yet he has yet to have communicated with any board member, of my knowledge. He may have spoken to you or member -- member Ghazal.

But I know myself, Dr. Jan, I don't think we've received anything from the Secretary of State saying that he has grave concerns or at least alluding to why he has grave concern. So I do think that this is a major issue, is that we are -- we're hearing through the media about concerns from the Secretary of State's Office but no one is communicating with us.

And I think it should be on the record that

we have yet to have been contacted by the Secretary of State's Office, particularly the Secretary himself, who has -- has concerns about our actions.

MR. JEFFARES: And the Attorney General.

MR. FERVIER: We received two letters today from the Attorney General that I have forwarded to the board, member Jeffares.

MS. KING: Today?

MR. JEFFARES: (indiscernible) am sorry
about that.

MR. FERVIER: Okay. Yes, I forwarded them earlier today.

MS. KING: So he had -- so they -- again, we're not getting anything in time to review it before the board meeting begins. You know, I do think that's a valid concern is that we cannot keep utilizing the excuse that we can't do something because it's outside of our purview when we request the -- the attorneys to provide us with some type of understanding and we get nothing.

MR. FERVIER: The letters received today were not related to items on the agenda today.

MS. KING: Okay. Well, that just proves my

point. I'm not sure what they're writing us about rather than what's on the agenda.

MR. FERVIER: The board has been copied on those letters. I sent them sometime midday today. I received this morning, sent them sometime midday today. So ...

MR. JEFFARES: I'll have to go back and look. Thanks -- thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## Public Comment

MR. FERVIER: Okay. Are we ready to proceed with public comment?

Oh, boy. Kevin Olazonoi(ph)? Kevin
Olazonoi. He's what? Oh, we don't show him on.
The next individual, Matthew Bolin(ph). Matthew
Bolin's no longer online. Next individual,
speaker is Brittany(ph) Burns. Brittany Burns is
no longer online. The next individual is Garland
Favorito.

Mr. Favorito, it appears that you're still with us. Can you hear us? Mr. Favorito, your mic is on, but we can't hear you. Mr. Favorito, we still can't hear you. Mr. Favorito, we'll come back to you. You need to check and see if your mic is on or if you're having a computer issue there.

The next speaker is Tamara Favorito.

Ms. Favorito is still online.

Ms. Favorito, we're unable to hear you.

MS. FAVORITO: Okay. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes, we can hear you now, Ms. Favorito.

MS. FAVORITO: Thank you. And Garland was having technical problems. He can come down here to my computer after if you're fine with that.

But I just want to say I -- I heard the heat that the board took during public comments earlier today. And I want to tell you how much I appreciate all of you. I see how hard you are all working. And I just want to remind everybody once again that this is not supposed to be a nonpartisan board except for our chairman.

And I think the board has proved by the way they have worked together on some of these issues today that they do put their political parties aside to do what's right. And if we're going to be concerned about conflicts, we can look at a prior board member who was a lobbyist for the counties that this board sometimes had to investigate. Those are the conflicts we need to be concerned about.

But for all of you, thank you so much. I 1 2 appreciate that you are taking a lot of heat for 3 this and I'm -- I'm sorry for it. I appreciate your efforts. Thank you. 4 5 MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Ms. Favorito. 6 Garland with you now? MS. FAVORITO: Garland? He says could you 7 8 go to the next speaker and then come back. MR. FERVIER: We can. 9 10 The next speaker is Katie Benson. 11 Ms. Benson is no longer online. The next speaker 12 is Leticia Ellerson. Ms. Ellerson is no longer 13 online. Next speaker is Sonya Sood, S-o-o-d. 14 Ms. Sood is no longer online. Next speaker is Greg Davis. Mr. Davis? 15 16 MR. DAVIS: Yes. Can you hear me? 17 MR. FERVIER: Yes, we can. 18 MR. DAVIS: Okay, great. Let me just get my 19 sound properly -- am I loud enough? 20 MR. FERVIER: Yes, you're perfect. You have 21 two minutes, please. 2.2 MR. DAVIS: Okay, thank you. I thought 23 school board meetings were long. They only 24 lasted five hours.

As a voting precinct worker in Clarke County

for a few election cycles, I believe counting of ballots at the precinct level is a bad idea. As many have already said, there are chain-of-custody issues, a greater chance of error, and a greater possibility of a ballot being misplaced in a school, church, or community center that are used as precincts.

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Though I was initially hopeful that Ms. King's amendment to provide that this ballot count be done by the next day at the local board of elections, her final language that this must be done by each precinct manager and assistant manager is not helpful. Is it really realistic to ask these individuals to show up the next day at the board of elections to conduct a count? What if one but not the other can show up? Additionally, how is the time for this individual precinct ballot count to be established by 10 p.m. on the night of the election? Why can we not depend on the permanent and temporary staff that are stationed at the local board of elections during the election period? involve precinct workers?

In Clarke County we arrive in our precinct at 6 a.m. to complete set up. Every hour,

beginning at seven, we then record the numbers obtained from the poll pads, ballot-marking devices, and scanner on the hour. At 7:00 it takes myself and five coworkers almost two hours to record the final counts on the poll pads, ballot-marking devices, and scanner, shutting -- shut down -- shut down the equipment using a couple of dozen digit-coded zip tides -- ties, store all the equipment in their cases, gather and count all materials used during the day which includes tables, batteries, signs, styluses, et cetera.

As to the scanner, two poll workers power down the scanner, unlock the scanner, pull out the ballots, and both get on their hands and knees to ensure that all the ballots are out of the machine and put those ballots in a case that is locked.

The last thing we --

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: -- on the precinct level is to do -- to do at 8:30 p.m. is to have hundreds of ballots spread out on a school lunch room table to be stacked and counted.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: We are trying to focus on 1 2 closing down and eating dinner. Thank you for 3 your --MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Davis. 4 5 MR. DAVIS: -- attention. 6 MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Davis. 7 you. 8 Mr. Favorito, are you online now? 9 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, I am. Can you hear me 10 okay? 11 MR. FERVIER: Yes, I can. You have two 12 minutes, sir. Please start. 13 14

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MR. FAVORITO: Oh, I -- I hate to take -- I hate to take two more minutes, but on Friday Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger conducted a WSB-TV interview that y'all were just talking about, where he attacked this board by implying it's passing rules that are illegal.

Thank

As a former SEB chair, he knows full well that every state election board rule is vetted by Legislative Counsel before a final vote, as member Jeffares just said. Counsel ensures the board passes rules within their legal authority and some of the law that I want to quote to you shows that his claims are, in fact, false.

In regards to certification, O.C.G.A.

21-2-78 states that the certifying board members duties are, quote: To inspect systematically and fairly the conduct of primaries and elections to the end that primaries and elections may be honestly, efficiently, and uniformly conducted.

Mr. Hancock, a board member, has previously explained that the attestation board member must sign requires them to, quote, certify that the attached election result summary is a true and correct count of the votes cast in this county. Their oath, stated in O.C.G.A. 21-2-20(15)(b) requires them to swear, quote: That I will to the best of my ability prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse and, quote: I will make a true and perfect return of such primaries and elections.

Attorney MacDougald explained that if a board member falsely swears to inaccurate results, the member can be charged with a felony under O.C.G.A. 16-10-20. And Commissioner Thorne explained that O.C.G.A. 21-2-493 states, quote: That the superintendent shall then examine all of the registration and primary or election documents.

These statutes show an unbiased individual

that the board is legally correct in the actions it took today and in its last meeting.

I thank the board for rejecting the bogus legal arguments and refusing to rubberstamp corrupt secretly counted elections.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. Favorito.

Appreciate your comments.

The next speaker is Aleta(ph) Silverman.

Ms. Silverman is no longer online. The next speaker is Amy Leventhal. Ms. Leventhal is no longer online. Next speaker is Michelle Spellman. Ms. Spellman is no longer online.

Next speaker is Larry LeSueur.

Mr. LeSueur, are you still online with us?
Mr. LeSueur?

MR. LESUEUR: I am here. Can you hear me?

MR. FERVIER: Yes, sir. You have two minutes. Please proceed.

MR. LESUEUR: Thank you.

I'm a voter from Cherokee County. Please note that at least two of the outside speakers in favor of altering Georgia's current election procedures are what might be described as professional partisans from the right-wing group Heritage Foundation which is also responsible for

the extremist Project 2025.

Indeed, both Hans Von Spakovsky and Ken Cuccinelli are listed among the authors of the subjectively anti-American manifesto.

A point to consider: In 2018, in Fish vs
Kobach, Judge Julie Robinson ruled that
Spakovsky's claims of voter fraud were not backed
up with provable researched cases. The judge
said, quote: Spakovsky's clear agenda and
misleading statements render his opinions
unpersuasive, unquote.

Another point: Spakovsky shared his views of voter fraud in the movie, 2000 Mules. That movie was so thoroughly debunked and widely ridiculed that it's distributor issued an apology and pulled the movie from circulation. For an administration known to value loyalty over honesty, that these two appointees of previously Republican administrations may be angling for positions in a new one should be considered.

A recent USA Today headline reads: Trump says Georgia election board members are, quote, pit bulls for his victory, unquote. But is that their job? He thinks it is and maybe he's right.

The SEB was formed by the Republican

Legislature after losing two Senate seats in the presidential election. The result of fielding extremely weak candidates with the top of the tickets spewing a litany of (indiscernible) claims of voter fraud. It's under the specter of these false claims, along with member of -- with compromising interests and political PACs, job offer prospects of their own, cheerleading at political campaign rallies, and the partisan nature of its creation in an apparent attempt to find in 2024 that 11,780 votes that Trump was looking for in 2020, that the decisions of this board and Trump's trio of pit bulls must be viewed.

Please do what's right, not just what's right for your party.

MR. FERVIER: Thank you, Mr. LeSueur.

The next speaker is George Balbona.

Mr. Balbona, are you still online?

Mr. Balbona, we can't hear you. Your mic has been turned on. Mr. Balbona, are you still online?

We'll move on. The next speaker is Ahmad Surika(ph). Mr. Surika is no longer online.

Next speaker is Cynthia Ingram(ph). Cynthia

Ingram is no longer online. The next speaker is 1 2 Vivek Shenoi (ph). Vivek Shenoi is no longer The next speaker is Elaine Morris. 3 online. Elaine Morris is no longer online. 4 5 That is the last of our speakers list. The 6 agenda for today has been completed. 7 motion -- I mean, the chair will entertain a 8 motion to adjourn. 9 MS. KING: So moved. 10 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to adjourn. 11 Do we have a second? 12 DR. JOHNSTON: Second. 13 MR. FERVIER: We have a motion to adjourn 14 and a second. All those in favor signify by 15 saying aye. 16 Member King. 17 MS. KING: Ave. 18 MR. FERVIER: Member Johnston. 19 DR. JOHNSTON: Aye. 20 MR. FERVIER: Member Ghazal. MS. GHAZAL: 21 Aye. 22 MR. FERVIER: Member Jeffares is no longer 23 The motion carries three to zero. online. 24 meeting is now adjourned. Thank you.

(Adjourned at 6:28 p.m.)

## CERTIFICATE

STATE	$\sim$ $\Box$	GEORGIA
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I hereby certify that the foregoing meeting was taken down, and was reduced to typewriting under my direction; that the foregoing transcript is a true and correct record given to the best of my ability.

The above certification is expressly withdrawn upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing transcript, unless said disassembly or photocopying is done under the auspices of Steven Ray Green Court Reporting, LLC and the electronic signature is attached thereto.

I further certify that I am not a relative, employee, attorney, or counsel of any of the parties; nor am I financially interested in the action.

This, the 26th day of September 2024.

\*\*Mary K McMahan\*\*

Mary K McMahan, CCR Certified Court Reporter Certificate Number 2757

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#### STATE ELECTION BOARD

#### NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

#### Revisions to Subject 183-1-12-.12 Tabulating Results

#### TO ALL INTERESTED PERSON AND PARTIES:

Notice is hereby given that pursuant to the authority set forth below, the Georgia State Election Board, (hereinafter "SEB") proposes the attached amendments to Subject 183-1-12-.12 (Tabulating Results).

This notice, together with an exact copy of the proposed new rules and a synopsis of the proposed rules, is being distributed to all persons who have requested, in writing, that they be placed on a distribution list. A copy of this notice, an exact copy of the proposed rule amendments, and a synopsis of the proposed rule amendments may be reviewed during normal business hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, except official state holidays, at the Office of the Secretary of State, Elections Division, 2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive, S.E., 8th Floor West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334. These documents will also be available for review on the State Election Board's web page at: https://sos.ga.gov/page/proposedstate-election-board-rule-amendments . Copies may also be requested by contacting the State Election Board at: ahardin@sos.ga.gov.

To provide the public an opportunity to comment upon and provide input into the proposed rule amendments, a public hearing will be held on Friday, September 20, 2024 at 9:00 A.M. The meeting will take place at the Georgia State Capitol, Room 341.

Information regarding how to join and provide public comment at the meeting will be available on the State Election Board's webpage at: https://sos.ga.gov/page/state-election-board-meetingsevents.

Public comments given at the meeting will be limited to two minutes per person. Additional comments may be given using the following means and must be received by noon on September 19 to be considered by the State Election Board:

- Electronically by emailing SEBPublicComments@sos.ga.gov
- By mailing comments to:

State Election Board

C/O Alexandra Hardin

2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive, S.E.

8th Floor West Tower Suite 802

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

This notice is given in compliance with O.C.G.A. §50-13-4.

This 21st day of August 2024.

Posted: August 21, 2024

Chair, State Election Board

# SYNOPSIS OF THE PROPOSED RULE OF THE STATE ELECTION BOARD RULE 183-1-12-.12 *Tabulating Results*

Purpose: The purpose of the rule is to ensure the secure, transparent, and accurate counting of ballots by requiring a systematic process where ballots are independently hand-counted by three sworn poll officers. The rule mandates detailed documentation, sealing, and certification of ballot counts, with provisions for resolving inconsistencies and communicating any counting that occurs outside the polling location to relevant parties.

Main Features: The main features of the amendments to this rule are that requires the poll manager and two sworn poll officers to unseal ballot boxes, remove and record the ballots, and have three poll officers independently count them. Once all three counts match, they sign a control document. If discrepancies arise between the hand count and recorded totals, the poll manager must resolve and document the inconsistency. The counted ballots are sealed in labeled containers, signed to ensure integrity.

# DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EXISTING RULE AND THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF THE STATE ELECTION BOARD, RULE 183-1-12-.12 Tabulating Results

NOTE: <u>Underlined</u> text is proposed to be added.

#### Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5)

5. The poll manager and two witnesses who have been sworn as poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 shall unseal and open each scanner ballot box, remove the paper ballots from each ballot box, record the date and time that the ballot box was emptied and present to three sworn precinct poll officers to independently count the total number of ballots removed from the scanner, sorting into stacks of 50 ballots, continuing until all of the ballots have been counted separately by each of the three poll officers. When all three poll officers arrive at the same total ballot count independently, they shall each sign a control document containing the polling place, ballot scanner serial number, election name, printed name with signature and date and time of the ballot hand count. If the numbers recorded on the precinct poll pads, ballot marking devices [BMDs] and scanner recap forms do not reconcile with the hand count ballot totals, the poll manager shall immediately determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken. A separate container shall be used for the hand counted paper ballots from each ballot box and the container shall be labelled with the polling place, ballot scanner serial number, the number assigned to the ballot scanner for that election, the scanner counts of the ballots from the tabulation tape, and the hand count ballot total as certified by the three poll officials. The container shall be sealed and signed by the poll manager and two of the three hand count poll officers such that it cannot be opened without breaking the seal. The poll manager and two witnesses shall sign a label affixed to the container indicating that it contains all the hand counted ballots from the indicated scanner box and no additional ballots.

- a. The decision about when to start the process described in this rule is up to the Poll Manager or Assistant Poll Manager. This decision can be made at the end of Election Day, or if a scanner possesses more than 750 ballots on Election Day, the Poll Manager can choose to start the next day and finish during the week designated for county certification. This decision should take into account factors such as staffing requirements, fatigue, and concerns about efficiency and accuracy.
- b. If the ballot counting is to take place after Election Day, the relevant ballots, tabulation tapes, enumerated voter lists, and polling information shall be sealed in a tamper-proof container and the number of the seal noted. The counting shall occur in the County election office on the next business day following Election Day and must conclude prior to any scheduled or announced post-election audits. The process must be completed within the designated county certification period.
- c. Counting will take place as mentioned in this rule. The process of opening, counting, and resealing ballots must be conducted in the presence of the relevant poll manager or assistant poll manager. These procedures must be conducted publicly to ensure transparency.
- d. If the counting of ballots takes place at any time or place other than the polling location, the supervisor of elections must immediately communicate the date, time, and place of such action with all candidates on the ballot and the county chair of both major political parties no later than 10:00 pm on Election Day. The poll manager shall post such information on the outside windows of the polling location together with all other information required to be so posted.

Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-483(a), 21-2-436, 21-2-420(a)

#### COPY OF THE PROPOSED NEW RULE

#### Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5)

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Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-483(a), 21-2-436, 21-2-420(a)

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# GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND ELECTION OFFICIALS

September 17, 2024



Dear Members of the State Election Board,

The Georgia Association of Voter Registration and Election Officials (GAVREO) offers the following feedback on the eleven rules that have been posted for rulemaking to be voted on at your September 20<sup>th</sup> meeting.

We hope you understand that our role is to administer elections in a nonpartisan manner. To that end, any feedback that we provide during the rulemaking process is not only nonpartisan but is rooted in decades of practical election administration experience. We do not oppose rules because we are lazy or because a political operative or organization wants us to. We oppose rules because they are poorly written, inefficient, would not accomplish their stated goals, or go directly against state law. The proposed rules under consideration are not simply "common sense" rules that no reasonable person could disagree with.

The 2024 General Election is less than 50 days away and by-mail voting starts today for some counties and no later than this Saturday for all counties. Ballots have been designed, procured, and are presently being issued to military and overseas voters. Election officials are training thousands of poll workers daily across the state and are already working to educate the public on what to expect throughout the voting process and beyond. We respectfully ask that these proposed rules, and any other petitions for rulemaking, be tabled until 2025.

#### 1. 183-1-12-.01 (Absentee Ballot Distinction)

GAVREO opposes this rule because it goes against state law, will waste taxpayer money, and cannot be implemented prior to the upcoming election.

As we have previously stated, distinguishing between different types of hand marked paper ballots will do nothing to increase the chain of custody of those ballots. However, we would be remiss if we did not inform the board that the opportunity to adopt this rule prior to the 2024 General Election has already passed.

It takes a significant amount of time to design, proof, and order hand-marked paper ballots before the first ballot is ever issued to a voter. That process is routinely completed between 60-70 days prior to any major statewide election so registrars can meet deadlines enumerated in both state and federal law. For the upcoming election we are required to

mail absentee-by-mail ballots to military and oversees voters beginning as early as Tuesday, September 17<sup>th</sup> and no later than Saturday, September 21. Ballots will be mailed to all other requestors on Monday, October 7<sup>th</sup>. Considering that rules are not in place until a minimum of 20 days after the Board votes to adopt them, the earliest day that this rule could be in place is October 10<sup>th</sup> – weeks after ballots have been delivered to counties and three days after we will send ballots to most absentee-by-mail voters.

The stated purpose of this proposed rule is to improve the security and chain of custody of hand-marked paper ballots by ensuring that absentee-by-mail ballots are visually distinct from emergency and provisional ballots. However, knowing the reason that any ballot was cast does almost nothing to address the chain of custody of that ballot but will potentially violate the secrecy of ballots cast in small batches (such as provisional ballots). Rather, we track the chain of custody of hand-marked paper ballots using printed text both on the ballot and the attached stub that is specific to each ballot.

#### 2. <u>183-1-12-.12</u> (Reconciliation)

GAVREO is neutral on this rule, but believes that this rule is unnecessary.

Poll workers are already required to record the number of ballots cast from the screen of each in-person scanner on the appropriate paperwork. That number is already printed on the results tape for redundancy (and it's worth noting that the number of ballots cast on the results tape is a printed version of what is already on the screen). This rule is redundant and simply could provide the poll managers with an opportunity to make a clerical error on official paperwork.

#### 3. 183-1-12-.12 and 183-1-14-.02 (Hand Counting)

While GAVREO appreciates the Board's efforts to amend the proposed rule to address our concerns, we continue to oppose the rules for the reasons we have previously stated including: the rule's potential to delay results; set fatigued employees up for failure; and undermine the very confidence the rule's author claims to seek. Please see our previous comments for more detail about our concerns with this rule.

#### 4. <u>183-1-12-.12</u> (Reconciliation Reports)

GAVREO does not object to this rule as it will provide more transparency to the election process, but we have identified what we believe is an inconsistency with the rule. If the goal of the rule is to require counties to post the reconciliation report referenced by the rule to their respective county websites, and to allow counties without a county website to post it at their office instead, it appears that the rule provides a county with the choice to report on the website or at the office at its discretion.

While GAVREO does not object to this particular rule, we do object to passing rules within 90 days of the election.

#### 5. <u>183-1-12-.13 (Storage of Returns)</u>

GAVREO does not object to this rule <u>on the condition that the State Election Board provides</u> any additional memory cards that our members may need for future elections.

We acknowledge the importance of retaining election data contained on certain memory cards for a sufficient period of time. However, procuring a new set of memory cards for every election will be expensive even if we procure them through the most economical source possible rather than the current recommended supplier.

Also, we want to be clear that we are not saying that the data described in the rule should not be retained. We simply think that there are more efficient ways to accomplish that goal. For example, each in-person scanner contains two identical memory cards for redundancy. Only retaining one memory card would cut costs in half.

#### 6. <u>183-1-12-.19 (Voter Lists)</u>

GAVREO opposes this rule as it seems to assume that there is a static list of eligible electors that cannot be changed during the voting process. That is simply not the case. Registrars are often required to update the list during active elections for a variety of reasons.

For example, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-224 describes the deadline for anyone to <u>apply</u> to register to vote in an election. That does not imply that they must be registered by that date – only that the application has to be submitted by that date. Furthermore, we are required to accept any application that is received through the mail as long as the application is postmarked on or before the deadline. In fact, that same code section requires election officials to accept any mailed application that does not have a postmark but was received by the Secretary of State's Office no later than 25 days prior to the election.

Another example is O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(d) that requires registrars to provide applicants 30 days to provide any missing information, and to only finish processing those applications when that information is received (which can occur on Election Day). One last example is that O.C.G.A. § 21-2-407 expressly authorizes registrars to correct the list of electors during every primary and election as we discover errors or omissions.

It is worth noting that Electors Lists are not used during Advance Voting and are only used at Election Day Polling Places. Advance voting is a form of absentee voting, and O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(b)(1) requires that each application is verified against the information on file at the registrar's office rather than against the electors list.

The Board should also know that the Supplemental List is a document that is often filled out by hand by the poll workers at the direction of a registrar while voting is taking place. It cannot be posted online for public review weeks before Election Day, and the Secretary of State has no way to gather that information statewide as the rule describes.

#### 7. <u>183-1-12-.21 (Daily Reporting)</u>

GAVREO is neutral on this rule as it seems to attempt to make the voting process more transparent by including the number of ballots cast in related daily reporting requirements. However, we are concerned that it contains different reporting requirements for Primary and General Elections. Paragraph (1)(a) requires that registrars include the number of ballots cast in their daily reports for primary election, paragraph (1)(b) does not require those numbers to be reported for General Elections, and special elections are never mentioned. We would prefer if there was one standard report for all three types of elections.

#### 8. 183-1-13-.05 (Poll Watchers at Tabulation Center)

GAVREO is neutral on this rule.

#### 9. <u>183-1-14-.02</u> (Reconciliation)

GAVREO regretfully opposes this rule because it creates a situation where a county may miss a reporting deadline that is required by law.

Our members routinely reconcile the number of absentee ballots cast to the number of voters who were issued ballots throughout the absentee voting period. However, mistakes happen and as a result discrepancies occur that must be investigated prior to certification.

However, under this rule we only have an hour to investigate any discrepancy to the satisfaction of the Election Superintendent before any absentee results can be reported. But, for the majority of our counties the superintendent is the full board and cannot be expected to meet during one of the busiest times on Election Day. Per the rule as written, this rule would effectively contradict the law adopted by the legislature passed this year that expressly requires us to report absentee results within an hour of the polls closing.

While we wholeheartedly agree that the numbers described in this rule should be reconciled and any discrepancies explained prior to certification, the timeline described in the rule is unreasonable.

#### 10. <u>183-1-14-.11</u> (Chain of Custody)

GAVREO opposes this rule because it fails to increase chain of custody, enhance security, or improve transparency. Furthermore, it cites a law that does not exist.

The main feature of the proposed rule states that it requires absentee-by-mail ballots to be tracked to ensure chain of custody. However, the rule never actually requires us to track absentee-by-mail ballots. The changes in the rule are:

- a. That the registrars use a common carrier that offers tracking to send ballots, and
- b. That the registrars maintain any USPS tracking records generated by this process in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 50-17-70.

The rule never requires registrars to track absentee-by-mail ballots. It requires registrars to retain records that are not generated by the USPS. Furthermore, O.C.G.A. § 50-17-70 does not exist.

Also, even if the rule was not fundamentally flawed, it is too late to pass the rule for the upcoming election. (See the response to 183-1-12-.01 for the applicable timeframes.)

Sincerely,

**GAVREO Executive Board** 

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September 19, 2024

State Election Board 2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive, S.E. 8th Floor West Tower Suite 802 Atlanta, Georgia 30334

#### Via Email only to SEBPublicComments@sos.ga.gov

Re: Comment Regarding Notices of Proposed Rulemaking to Amend Rules 181-1-12-.01, 183-1-12-.12(a)(5), 183-1-12-.19(6)(a), 183-1-13-.05, 183-1-14-.02

Chairman Fervier and State Election Board Members,

The Democratic Party of Georgia submits this comment in opposition to the following proposed revisions to the State Election Board Rules ("Proposed Rules"):

- 1. **Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)(5)** (Hand Counting), requiring new hand-counting procedures for primary and general elections.
- 2. **Rule 183-1-14-.02** (Advance Voting Hand Counting), requiring new hand-counting procedures during the advance voting period.
- 3. **Rule 181-1-12-.01** (Absentee Ballot Distinction), requiring provisional ballots to be marked "separately and distinctly" from absentee ballots.
- 4. **Rule 183-1-13-.05** (Poll Watchers in Tabulating Center), expanding the number of poll watcher observation areas.
- 5. **Rule 183-1-12-.19(6)(a)** (Voter Lists), requiring the state and counties to provide free and accessible lists of eligible voters before early voting begins.

The Proposed Rules will not benefit voters, nor will they facilitate the administration of orderly, secure elections – in November or beyond. The Proposed Rules are solutions in search of a problem and the only people who stand to benefit from them are a group of partisan actors desperate to vindicate unmoored, debunked conspiracy theories about a "stolen election" who are now seeking to have Georgia's November 5, 2024 election take place in a chaotic environment under the guise of multiple new rules for which county election officials have not received sufficient guidance or training.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See e.g., Russ Bynum, Conservative Group Tells Judge it has no Evidence to Back its Claims of Georgia Ballot Stuffing, AP News (Feb. 14, 2024, 4:06 PM), https://apnews.com/article/georgia-elections-true-vote-ballot-stuffing-199113b47bc2df79c63fdf0

This Board has the limited authority to "promulgate [only] such rules and regulations . . . as will be conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections." The Proposed Rules rip straight through this statutory directive in stark violation of Georgia law. At a time when rules for the upcoming election should be fixed and clear, this Board is knowingly courting confusion and chaos. It's not surprising, then, that this Board is currently the subject of multiple ethics complaints, lawsuits, and international media attention arising from its

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<u>07cd23115</u>; Owen Averill, Annabel Hazrati, and Elaine Kamarck, *Widespread Election Fraud Claims by Republicans Don't Match the Evidence*, Brookings (Nov. 23, 2024), <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/widespread-election-fraud-claims-by-republicans-dont-match-the-evidence">https://www.brookings.edu/articles/widespread-election-fraud-claims-by-republicans-dont-match-the-evidence</a>; Press Release, Ga. Sec'y of State Office, State Election Board Clears Fulton County "Ballot Suitcase" Investigation; Report Finds No Evidence of Conspiracy, No Fraud (June 20, 2023),

https://sos.ga.gov/news/state-election-board-clears-fulton-county-ballot-suitcase-investigation-report-finds-no.

https://americanoversight.org/litigation/complaint-american-oversight-v-georgia-state-election-board-open-meetings-act-violation (last visited Sep 14, 2024).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See O.C.G.A. § 45-10-3(1) (stating that "each member of all boards . . . created by general statute shall . . . [u]phold the Constitution, laws, and regulations of the United States, the State of Georgia and all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion"); *id.* § 45-10-3(2) (stating that "each member of all boards . . . created by general statute shall . . . [n]ever discriminate by the dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone, whether or not for remuneration); *id.* § 45-10-3(8) (stating that "each member of all boards . . . created by general statute shall . . . [n]ever engage in other conduct which is unbecoming to a member or which constitutes a breach of public trust").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Press Release, Ga. Ass'n Voter Registration & Election Offs., GAVREO Calls on State Elections Board to Pause Future Rule Changes Ahead of Presidential Election (Aug. 21, 2024), <a href="https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Press-Release.pdf">https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Press-Release.pdf</a> ("Given the proximity of the election, introducing new rules at this stage would create unnecessary confusion among both the public and the dedicated poll workers and election officials who are critical to ensuring a smooth and efficient voting process."); Caleb Groves, County election boards urge the State Election Board to pause rule making, Atlanta Journal Constitution (Sep. 17, 2024), <a href="https://www.ajc.com/politics/county-election-boards-ask-the-georgia-state-election-board-to-pause-rulemaking/70VUVXYNUVD3TB6SUGAJRY5PVI/">https://www.ajc.com/politics/county-election-boards-ask-the-georgia-state-election-board-to-pause-rulemaking/70VUVXYNUVD3TB6SUGAJRY5PVI/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> SEB Ethics Complaint by C. Woolard, <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/25048992-seb-ethics-complaint-c-woolard">https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/25048992-seb-ethics-complaint-c-woolard</a> (last accessed Sep. 14, 2024); Nabilah Islam, X (Aug. 19, 2024, 7:11 PM), <a href="https://x.com/NabilahIslam/status/1825671961235570950">https://x.com/NabilahIslam/status/1825671961235570950</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Jeff Amy & Kate Brumback, Democrats Sue to block Georgia rules that they warn will block finalization of election results, AP News (2024),

https://apnews.com/article/georgia-democrats-state-election-board-rules-republicans-740179526 97aa0db904fc043d94ada5c (last visited Sep 14, 2024).; American Oversight v. Georgia State Election Board - Open Meetings Act violation, American Oversight (2024),

politicized role in a critical swing state on the eve of a Presidential election.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, Secretary of State Brad Raffensberger has said "[1]egal precedent is pretty clear. You shouldn't change rules in the middle of an election."

The Board has an opportunity now to dispel appearances of impropriety. For these reasons and those that follow, the Board should reject the Proposed Rules.

# I. Objections to Rules 183-1-12-.12(a)(5) (Hand Counting) and 183-1-14-.02 (Advance Voting Hand Counting)

As explained previously, the proposed hand counting rules are poor solutions in search of a problem.<sup>9</sup> These rules are ripe for human error, vulnerable to abuse, and would add considerably to the workload demanded of election workers.<sup>10</sup> And they are demonstrably ineffective. For example, last year in Spalding County, ballot counters made an adding error when comparing the machine tally to the hand tally.<sup>11</sup> Each total was off significantly until the adding error was fixed.<sup>12</sup> On multiple occasions, observers noticed hand counters miscounting, election workers calling out the wrong numbers, and multiple people complaining of fatigue.<sup>13</sup> At the August 19 Board meeting, Member King proposed language addressing this final concern with respect to Election Day voting<sup>14</sup> – but the added language creates more problems than it resolves.

When the Election Day hand-counting rule was considered at this Board's August 19 meeting, Member King proposed language giving the Poll Manager or Assistant Poll Manager

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See e.g., Nick Corasaniti, *How a Far-Right Takeover of Georgia's Election Board Could Swing the Election*, New York Times (Aug. 19, 2024), https://www.nvtimes.com/2024/08/19/us/politics/trump-2024-georgia-elections.html.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Amy Gardner & Josh Dawsey, *Decision on Georgia Election Board Threatens Kemp's Détente with Trump*, Wash. Post (Aug. 30, 2024, 7:42 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/08/29/trump-kemp-georgia-election-board.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Exhibit A, Comment Regarding Notice of Rulemaking to Amend Subject 183-1-12-.12(a)5 ("Tabulating Results") (Aug. 18, 2024) (objecting to the hand-counting procedures for primary and general elections).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See id.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> <u>https://allvotingislocal.org/blog/georgia-elections-highlight-absurdity-counting-ballots-by-hand</u> <sup>12</sup> *Id.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Curiously, the proposed hand-counting rule for advance voting does not allow Poll Managers any discretion to delay counting – even though some early voting locations can see as many as hundreds or thousands of votes on a given day. For example, in the 2022 midterm elections, 231,063 people voted on the last day of early voting. *See* Georgia voters set all-time midterm early turnout record | Georgia secretary of State,

https://sos.ga.gov/news/georgia-voters-set-all-time-midterm-early-turnout-record (last visited Sep 14, 2024). Fulton County alone received 283,084 in-person ballots during the 17 days of early voting in the 2022 midterm elections. *See* Data Hub - November 8, 2022 general election | Georgia secretary of State, <a href="https://sos.ga.gov/data-hub-november-8-2022-general-election">https://sos.ga.gov/data-hub-november-8-2022-general-election</a> (last visited Sep 14, 2024).

the discretion to begin the hand-counting process the day after Election Day, "tak[ing] into account factors such as staffing requirements, fatigue, and concerns about efficiency and accuracy." What happens, though, if election workers express fatigue or an inability to hand count votes on Election Day but the Poll Manager decides to initiate the process anyways? The Proposed Rule prescribes no method of resolution. Further, many election workers cannot secure time off from their full-time jobs to potentially participate in a multi-day process of unknowable length. As previously flagged, Fulton, Gwinnett, Cobb, and DeKalb Counties would likely require 847, 642, 576, and 575 additional poll workers, respectively, to carry out this hand-counting process on Election Day. How many more volunteers would these counties need if the process extends across multiple days?

Additionally, the implications of these rules have not fully been considered. What happens if the hand counts are not completed on time? Are those votes thrown out? Would the delay provide County Boards of Election with a pretext to vote against certification on the mistaken belief that they are entitled to do so as part of their "reasonable inquiry" under the Board's recently adopted rules? Furthermore, this rule is likely to impact more populous counties, which in Georgia are historically more Democratic. This may create an inaccurate perception on Election Night that Democratic candidates received fewer votes than would be reflected in a final count. History has shown that bad actors will use this development as a pretext to allege the existence of improprieties.<sup>16</sup>

Adding these unnecessary steps to complete before closing polls will only burden tabulation and certification efforts and sow distrust in the electorate. What's more, early voting in the November 5, 2024 General Election begins in four weeks. County administrators have no time to implement and train workers on these new procedures. To promulgate this Proposed Rule would be a dereliction of duty and a recipe for disaster. Accordingly, this Board should reject both proposed hand count rules.

#### II. Objections to Rule 181-1-12-.01 (Absentee Ballot Distinction)

The Board should reject the proposed Absentee Ballot Voting Distinction rule for three reasons. *First*, as the Chair and Member Ghazal have warned, the Proposed Rule is a direct violation of Georgia law. Georgia law invests the Secretary of State with the authority "to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See Exh. A at 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See, e.g., Jane C. Timm & Adam Edelman, *The 2020 election took days to call.* Could it happen again this year?, NBC News (Feb. 27, 2024),

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/election-wait-mail-ballots-swing-states-rcna14 0221 (noting that during 2020 election "Trump allies portrayed slow counting of mail ballots as a sign of fraud").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See id. ("Poll workers already stand at scanners to ensure that counters accurately reflect deposited ballots. In addition, current procedures require frequent comparison during the day among poll pads, ballot monitoring devices, and scanner numbers."); see also Press Release, Ga. Ass'n Voter Registration & Election Offs., supra note 5 ("In a time when maintaining public confidence in elections is more important than ever, making changes so close to Election Day only serves to heighten concerns and fears among voters.").

determine the forms of nomination petitions, <u>ballots</u>, and other forms."<sup>18</sup> This Board does not have authority to direct the Secretary of State regarding the contents or form of provisional or absentee ballots.

Second, the Proposed Rule would go into effect after the first ballots have been printed. The Board will vote on this proposal Friday, September 20. If adopted, the regulation will not go into effect for another twenty days, at the earliest. Absentee ballots are set to be mailed to uniformed military and overseas voters on September 21, the day after this Board votes on the Proposed Rule. The passage of such a rule this close to when absentee ballots will be mailed thus risks the possibility of ballots being invalidated and votes not being counted simply due to election administrators not having sufficient time or resources to procure new ballots and otherwise adjust to new regulations.

Third, this rule is unnecessary because there are painstaking laws and procedures in place to prevent the intermixing of absentee ballots and emergency/provisional ballots.<sup>19</sup> Absentee ballots and provisional ballots are tracked and counted through entirely separate processes. Absentee ballots must be mailed or personally delivered to a voter's county board of registrars or else personally delivered to an approved drop box location.<sup>20</sup> Absentee ballots must then be processed and verified before they can be counted, a process that includes "writ[ing] the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot receipt on its envelope."<sup>21</sup> Finally, if the voter has signed the voter's oath, the person assisting has signed the required oath, if applicable, and the identifying information entered on the absentee ballot envelope matches the same information contained in the voter's registration record, the registrar or clerk will sign or initial their name below the voter's oath, certifying the ballot.<sup>22</sup> The voter's name is then added to a numbered list of absentee voters for a given precinct.<sup>23</sup>

Georgia law also outlines a thorough framework for casting<sup>24</sup> and counting<sup>25</sup> provisional ballots. Moreover, counties have established, printed procedures for distinctly cataloging provisional ballots. Take Richmond County for example.<sup>26</sup> In Richmond County, poll workers are instructed to immediately place voted provisional ballots into sealed, orange Provisional Ballot Bags.<sup>27</sup> The "Voter's Certificate, ballot stub and any other forms completed during the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50(a)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See generally O.C.G.A. § 21-2-380 et seq.; Exh. B, Richmond County, *The Poll Worker Manual* (March 26, 2024).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-382, 21-2-385.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> *Id.* § 21-2-382(a)(1)(B).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> *Id.* § 21-2-386(a)(1)(B).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See id. § 21-2-418 ("Such person voting a provisional ballot shall complete an official voter registration form and a provisional ballot voting certificate which shall include information about the place, manner, and approximate date on which the person registered to vote."); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 183-1-12-.18 ("Provisional Ballots").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419; ; Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 183-1-12-.18 ("Provisional Ballots").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Richmond County's 2024 Poll Worker Manual is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> See Poll Worker Manual, supra note 18, at 36.

process" are then "place[d] in [an] orange Provisional Folder." Further, "[w]hile the voter is voting, [poll workers must] write the voter's name, time, precinct number, and provisional code on the Numbered List of Provisional/Challenged Voters." Poll workers also track the number of Provisional Ballots issued during the election, noting any discrepancies. 30

In sum, the Proposed Rule is poorly thought out and legally dubious. The Proposed Rule's author did not – and could not – even cite or allege specific instances where absentee and provisional ballots were mixed up in the past. This type of baseless overreach and last-minute rulemaking is the exact reason why this Board is currently the subject of multiple ethics complaints and lawsuits.<sup>31</sup> The Board should thus reject this needless proposal.

#### III. Objections to Rule 183-1-13-.05 (Poll Watchers in Tabulating Center)

We also object to the proposed revisions to Rule 183-1-13-.05, which would expand the number of poll watcher observation areas, for the obvious reason that this proposal grossly and unlawfully threatens the security and privacy of Georgia's elections. Georgia law is clear about the areas in which poll watchers may observe tabulation processes:

[I]n the locations <u>designated by the superintendent within the tabulating</u> <u>center</u>. Such designated locations shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and <u>such other areas as the superintendent may</u> <u>deem necessary</u> to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center.<sup>32</sup>

The Proposed Rule would remove from the superintendent's discretion the decision to allow poll watchers to observe "provisional ballot adjudication of ballots, closing of advanced voting equipment, verification and processing of mail in ballots, memory card transferring, regional or satellite check in centers and any election reconciliation processes." Some of these processes do not even involve vote tabulation, and some are intentionally private to reduce the risk of private, personal identifiable information being disclosed. For example, absentee ballots are processed and verified in private because that process involves signature verification and other information such as a voter's date of birth and their driver's license number, state identification card, or the last four digits of their social security number. Poll watchers may observe the scanning of absentee ballots *only after* those ballots have been separated from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> *Id.* at 35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See supra notes 6 & 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408(c) (emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386(a)(1)(B). *See also id.* § 21-2-386(a)(1)(A) ("The board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk *shall keep safely, unopened, and stored in a manner that will prevent tampering and unauthorized access* all official absentee ballots received from absentee electors." (emphasis added)).

personally identifiable information.<sup>34</sup> (Even then, this process is governed by a separate rule – Rule 183-1-14-.14, *Early Absentee Ballot Processing*.)

Beyond its legal infirmities, this Proposed Rule should also be rejected because there is insufficient time before the November general election for political parties, bodies, and candidates to adequately recruit and prepare poll watchers for these new roles and locations. This increases the possibility of a partisan imbalance among poll watchers at various polling locations around the state. There is also the risk of inconsistent election administration between larger and smaller counties, where the number of election staff and volunteers is comparatively limited. All of this raises concerns about potential distractions and, in a worst case scenario, interference with the county employees' efforts to tabulate votes reminiscent of the "Brooks Brothers Riot" at the Miami-Dade County Elections Office during the recount following the 2000 Presidential Election.<sup>35</sup>

#### IV. Objections to Rule 183-1-12-.19(6)(a) (Voter Lists)

Lastly, we urge this Board to reject Proposed Rule 183-1-12-.19(6)(a) because it exceeds the Board's statutory authority and attends to baseless claims of voter fraud.

The State Election Board has no authority to direct the Secretary of State and individual county election boards to "post a freely accessible link to the certified time-stamped list of Electors." Controlling federal law provides that "each State, acting through the chief State election official, shall implement . . . a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the State level." Georgia's corresponding law explicitly reserves determinations about list maintenance and accessibility to the Secretary of State:

[A]ll data collected and maintained on electors whose names appear on the list of electors <u>maintained by the Secretary of State</u>. . . . It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to furnish copies of such data as may be collected and maintained on electors whose names appear on the list of electors maintained by the Secretary of State pursuant to this article, within the limitations provided in this article, on electronic media or computer run list or both. <u>Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the Secretary of State shall establish the cost to be charged for such data.<sup>37</sup></u>

In voting to initiate rulemaking on this Proposed Rule, the Board once again ignored the plain black-letter law that binds it. But make no mistake: this Board cannot lawfully enforce the dictates of this proposal. Voter Lists are available for purchase online through the Secretary of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> See id. § 21-2-386(a)(2)(A).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> See Michale E. Miller, 'It's insanity!': How the 'Brooks Brothers Riot' killed the 2000 recount in Miami, Washington Post (Nov. 15, 2018),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2018/11/15/its-insanity-how-brooks-brothers-riot-killed-recount-miami.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(a)-(b) (emphasis added).

State's website.<sup>38</sup> The Board may implore the Secretary of State to adjust his policies, but adopting the Proposed Rule would knowingly run afoul of state and federal laws – and for no good reason.

As stated above, there have been no credible findings of widespread voter fraud in Georgia.<sup>39</sup> Adopting the Proposed Rule will encourage vigilantism that merely erodes the public's trust. The Secretary of State and county boards of elections are best positioned to maintain voter rolls. Indeed, there are many valid reasons why a voter's information might appear incomplete or inaccurate on public lists. For example, a voter who has obtained a restraining order, or who's a resident of a family violence shelter, may have their address kept confidential.<sup>40</sup> Private citizens, however, will not be able to divine this information from public Voter Lists. Making Voter Lists with necessarily incomplete information freely accessible is a recipe for disaster when certain actors interpret any omission from such lists as proof of fraud or foul play.

Lastly, this Rule would not go into effect until Friday, October 11, at the earliest. That's four days before the start of early voting and twenty days after the first mailing of absentee ballots to military and overseas voters. Again, this Board cannot fall into the temptation of taking unnecessary action and must refrain from rewriting rules in the run-up to a major election. To implement this rule (and defend against the formal and informal challenges<sup>41</sup> that inevitably follow) will require counties to divert limited resources that should be focused on the upcoming election. This Board has an obligation to avoid such an outcome.

#### Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge the Georgia State Elections Board to reject these Proposed Rules. We also request that the Board include this comment in the rulemaking record. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(a)(2). If the Board votes to adopt the proposed rule, we request that it "issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its adoption and incorporate therein its reason for overruling the consideration urged against its adoption." *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> See Order Voter Registration Lists and Files, <a href="https://sos.ga.gov/page/order-voter-registration-lists-and-files">https://sos.ga.gov/page/order-voter-registration-lists-and-files</a> (last visited Sept. 19, 2024).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> See supra note 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> See VoteSafe, https://sos.ga.gov/page/votesafe (last visited Sept. 19, 2024).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> It's worth noting that federal and state laws severely restrict voter roll maintenance within 90 days of a federal election. The National Voting Rights Act prohibits all activities constituting "systematic" list maintenance within 90 days of a federal election. *See* 52 U.S.C. §20507(c)(2)(A). Georgia law offers an additional protection by postponing all challenges pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-230 brought within 45 days of an election. *See* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-230(b)(1). Adopting the Proposed Rule now will potentially lead to frustrating conflict between newly deputized private citizens and voter protection laws.

Sincerely,

#### /s/ Tolulope Kevin Olasanoye

Tolulope Kevin Olasanoye Executive Director Democratic Party of Georgia

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# EX. A



August 17, 2024

State Election Board 2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive, S.E. 8th Floor West Tower Suite 802 Atlanta, Georgia 30334

Via Email only to SEBPublicComments@sos.ga.gov

Re: Comment Regarding Notice of Rulemaking to Amend Subject 183-1-12-.12(a)5 ("Tabulating Results")

Chairman Fervier and State Election Board Members,

The Democratic Party of Georgia respectfully submits the following comment opposing the proposed revision to State Election Board Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)5 (Tabulating Results) ("the Proposed Rule"), requiring new hand-counting procedures for primary and general elections. These procedures would require election workers to cross-check hand-counted ballot totals with "the numbers recorded on the precinct poll pads, ballot marking devices [BMDs] and scanner recap forms." Workers would then be directed to correct perceived inconsistencies between these varying records before placing voted ballots in sealable containers.<sup>2</sup>

At best, the Proposed Rule represents an unnecessary effort to address accounting errors that manifestly do not affect the outcome of Georgia's elections.<sup>3</sup> At worst, it's an inconspicuous effort to sow distrust within the electorate and sully election outcomes. For these reasons and those that follow, the Board should reject the Proposed Rule.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Exhibit A, State Election Board Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Revisions to Subject 183-1-12-.12. *Tabulating Results*, July 18, 2024.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Press Release, Ga. Sec'y of State Office, Georgia's 2022 Statewide Risk Limiting Audit Confirms Results (Nov. 18, 2022), <a href="https://sos.ga.gov/news/georgias-2022-statewide-risk-limiting-audit-confirms-results">https://sos.ga.gov/news/georgias-2022-statewide-risk-limiting-audit-confirms-results</a> (explaining that the Secretary of State's risk limiting audit confirmed the accuracy of voting machine counts in the 2022 election).

#### I. The risk of human error outweighs any perceived benefit of hand-counting ballots.

Put simply, hand-counting ballots on the proposed scale within the time mandated by law<sup>4</sup> will invite utter chaos and confusion.<sup>5</sup> This Board is charged with "promulgat[ing] such rules and regulations . . . as will be conducive to the fair, legal, <u>and orderly conduct of primaries and elections</u>." The Proposed Rule fundamentally ignores this statutory directive.

Hand-counting thousands of ballots, even in units of 50, is a long, monotonous task that demands keen attention. It's not hard to imagine, then, how such hand-counts might frustrate tabulation and certification efforts at the end of long election days. Sticky fingers or a moment's carelessness could easily derail the process. The Proposed Rule also overlooks the very real risk of ballots being misplaced or damaged while election workers handle loose papers for an extended period of time. A gust of wind or clumsy gesture, for example, could result in mixed stacks or missing ballots. And that's to say nothing of the risks presented by bad actors with desires to delegitimize the process. As Secretary of State Raffensperger stated in response to the Proposed Rule, "having poll workers handle ballots at polling locations after they have been voted introduces a new and significant risk to chain of custody procedures. Georgia law already has secure chain of custody protocols for handling ballots, and efforts to change these laws by unelected bureaucrats on the eve of the election introduces the opportunity for error, lost or stolen ballots, and fraud."

So let's be clear: the Proposed Rule neither identifies nor rectifies a procedural defect. Rather, it attends to unfounded myths about election fraud – and proposes a system that is significantly more vulnerable to abuse and error than the one in place. In short, this is a (poor)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Under Georgia law, "[a]s soon as possible but <u>not later than 11:59 P.M. following the close of the polls on the day of a primary, election, or runoff</u>, the election superintendent shall report to the Secretary of State and post in a prominent public place the following information: (1) [t]he number of ballots cast at the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, including provisional ballots cast; (2) [t]he number of ballots cast at advance voting locations during the advance voting period for the primary, election, or runoff; and (3) [t]he total number of absentee ballots returned to the board of registrars by the deadline to receive such absentee ballots on the day of the primary, election, or runoff." O.C.G.A. § 21-2-421 (emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Press Release, Brad Raffensperger, Raffensperger Defends Georgia's Election Integrity Act from Last Minute Changes Delaying Election Results (Aug. 15, 2024), https://sos.ga.gov/news/raffensperger-defends-georgias-election-integrity-act-last-minute-change s-delaying-election ("The General Assembly knew that quick reporting of results and certification is paramount to voter confidence and passed S.B. 202, but misguided attempts by the State Election Board will ... undermine chain of custody safeguards. Georgia voters reject this 11th hour chaos, and so should the unelected members of the State Election Board." (emphasis added)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Frequently Asked Questions, FAYETTE COUNTY POLL WORKER FAQ, https://fayettecountyga.gov/elections/poll-worker-faq (last visited Aug 15, 2024) (stating that "[a]ll poll workers should anticipate a minimum 14 hour day, which may include a lot of standing and or sitting in one position.").

solution in search of a problem. As discussed further below, already existing guardrails adequately secure cast ballots and ensure the accuracy of results.

# II. The suggested language will undermine existing security protocols and potentially compromise voter privacy.

Although the Proposed Rule states that these amendments are necessary to "enhance election integrity by providing a checkpoint outside of the electronic system [and] more accurate results," the practical import would be the opposite. The Proposed Rule would complicate procedures that already achieve these aims while potentially compromising voters' constitutional expectations of privacy.<sup>8</sup>

The Rule in its current form requires a poll manager and two sworn witnesses to place completed ballots in a sealable container when they remove those ballots from a ballot box, and to log/inventory that container for secured storage until the time of tabulation. "The poll manager and the same two witnesses who emptied the ballot box shall [then] complete and sign a form indicating that the ballot box was properly emptied and the ballots were properly stored and secured." Trained poll watchers may be present to observe this process. 11

As this Board knows, Georgia law already requires county election superintendents to conduct "precertification risk-limiting audits" with "a risk limit of not greater than 10 percent." Time and time again, these audits have confirmed that existing security and tabulation procedures produce honest, accurate results. The Petition from which the Proposed Rule

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See Press Release, Brad Raffensperger, *supra* note 5 ("Throughout this year, the Secretary of State's office has been traveling across the state working with county election officials to conduct audits and site inspections that ensure the state's voting equipment is secure and in working order.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-12-.12(a)(5)–(6).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> *Id.* 183-1-12-.12(a)(6).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408(b); *see also id.* § 21-2-408(d) ("Poll watchers shall be entitled to observe any activity conducted at the location at which they are serving as poll watchers. Except as otherwise provided for in this chapter, poll watchers shall be entitled to sit or stand as close as is practicable to the observed activity so as to be able to see and hear the poll worker or election official being observed.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> O.C.G.A. § 21-2-498(b).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-15-.04(1)1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See, e.g., Press Release, Ga. Sec'y of State Office, Risk Limiting Audit Confirms Runoff Results (July 1, 2024), <a href="https://sos.ga.gov/news/risk-limiting-audit-confirms-runoff-results">https://sos.ga.gov/news/risk-limiting-audit-confirms-runoff-results</a>; Press Release, Camden Cnty., Risk Limiting Audit Confirms Election Day Results (May 30, 2024), <a href="https://www.co.camden.ga.us/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=1872">https://www.co.camden.ga.us/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=1872</a>; see also The Carter Center, 2022 Georgia Risk-Limiting Audit, at 3, <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/u\_s\_elections/2022-risk-limiting-a\_udit-final.pdf">https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/u\_s\_elections/2022-risk-limiting-a\_udit-final.pdf</a> ("On Nov. 17 and 18 [2022], The Carter Center sent 40 nonpartisan observers to 33

originates (the "Alexander Petition") ignores this mandatory audit, and fails to explain why an additional, burdensome hand count is necessary in light of it. Further, the Alexander Petition identifies only three (3) incidents that purportedly justify the Proposed Rule.<sup>15</sup> Notably, however, the Alexander Petition does not (and indeed, cannot) allege that these incidents affected the outcome of an election.

Curiously, the Proposed Rule claims to "reduc[e] the opportunity for collusion to sabotage election results." But the Proposed Rule leaves open a number of potential avenues for such collusion that need to be addressed before this rule could be adopted. What's to stop three poll workers, say, from colluding ahead of time to alter their hand counts by five, seventeen, and fifty-two votes, respectively? Will poll workers know in advance the other persons who will hand-count ballots assigned to them? How will these poll workers be shielded from outside influence? These are just some of the questions that must be answered before any such rule can reasonably be said to "reduc[e] the opportunity for collusion."

What's more, the Proposed Rule potentially violates Georgians' constitutional right to cast votes privately through a secret ballot. Specifically, the Georgia Constitution provides that "[e]lections by the people shall be by secret ballot." Ga. Const. art. II, § 1, para. 1. Under the Proposed Rule, three different people will handle each cast ballot. Put differently: three different people might see for whom or what an individual voted – either by accident or on purpose. And to make matters worse, unless every precinct has sufficient poll watchers at the time of night hand counts will be happening, much of this activity will be unmonitored. The right to vote by secret ballot is essential to the health of our elections. Fear that a fellow community member might see who one voted for threatens the integrity of our elections. Given the security and audit processes already in place, there is simply no need to add this invasive, constitutionally dubious hand-count procedure.

# III. The proposed rule would significantly burden county election superintendents and poll workers.

Beyond the striking privacy and security issues discussed, the Proposed Rule would impose significant burdens on county election superintendents with less than 90 days before the general election on November 5. Georgia law requires superintendents to provide training for all

counties 1 to watch the audit process. . . . In all counties observed, the audit proceeded smoothly and calmly on the counting days, with few significant problems.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See Exhibit B, Sharlene Alexander Petition for Amendment to Election Rules (June 6, 2024) ("Alexander Petition").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Exhibit A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Chief among our concerns is the scenario in which a nefarious actor in the dead of night, long after polls have closed, takes advantage of the fact that poll observers are too few or too tired to notice him or her looking at the actual contents of those ballots, thereby invading electors' legitimate expectations of privacy.

poll workers ahead of an election cycle.<sup>18</sup> Superintendents will be required to quickly amend their training materials should the proposed changes be implemented. Further, to accommodate the sudden need for more poll workers, superintendents in larger counties will have to quickly scale recruitment plans for the upcoming general election. As other commenters have explained with regard to similar proposals, "to do so, counties will need to divert already limited resources away from other responsibilities on an accelerated timeline, including poll worker recruitment efforts that are already underway."<sup>19</sup>

At a public Board of Elections meeting on August 14, the Election Director stated that Paulding County will need to hire 132 additional poll workers for the sole purpose of hand-counting ballots as contemplated by the Proposed Rule. Extrapolating this data to Georgia's four largest counties based on the number of registered voters in each county as indicated in the Secretary of State's Georgia Active Voter Report,<sup>20</sup> Fulton, Gwinnett, Cobb, and DeKalb Counties would require 847, 642, 576, and 575 additional poll workers, respectively.

Adding steps to complete before closing polls would also add a completely unnecessary burden on poll workers. Poll workers already stand at scanners to ensure that counters accurately reflect deposited ballots. In addition, current procedures require frequent comparison during the day among poll pads, ballot monitoring devices, and scanner numbers. A standard Election Day often requires election officials to work 14 hours or more, starting very early in the morning, continuing through a hectic and stressful day, and ending sometimes very late at night after a last rush of voters at closing time.<sup>21</sup> Having poll workers hand count ballots after a 14-hour work day on top of all of their other necessary tasks administering the election is unduly burdensome, superfluous in light of existing protocols, and all too prone to error. This Board should consider the risks of losing experienced poll workers due to these added burdens.

# IV. Ambiguities in the Proposed Rule will sow distrust in Georgia's elections and increase threats of violence.

The bottom line is that the Proposed Rule will sow distrust in the democratic process. As an initial matter, the Proposed Rule contains many procedural ambiguities ripe for inconsistent, (and perhaps insidious) resolution. Most notably, the Proposed Rule does not articulate a clear, uniform process in the event poll workers cannot reconcile recorded numbers with hand count

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ga. Code Ann. §§ 21-2-70(8), 21-2-99(a)–(b).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See Exhibit C, Brennan Center for Justice, Comment Petition to Amend SEB Rule 183-1-14-.02 (Aug. 5, 2024), at 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> GEORGIA ACTIVE VOTERS REPORT | GEORGIA SECRETARY OF STATE, <a href="https://sos.ga.gov/georgia-active-voters-report">https://sos.ga.gov/georgia-active-voters-report</a> (last visited Aug 17, 2024) (noting the Active Voter Population of Fulton, Gwinnett, Cobb, and DeKalb Counties as 751,192, 569,336, 510,490, and 509,896, respectively).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Voting Rights Lab, *Ballot Hand Counts Lead to Inaccuracy* (Feb. 27, 2024), <a href="https://votingrightslab.org/2024/02/27/ballot-hand-counts-lead-to-inaccuracy">https://votingrightslab.org/2024/02/27/ballot-hand-counts-lead-to-inaccuracy</a>.

totals. This Board should be able to divine workable limiting principles before voting on any rule – particularly one directed at tabulations and certifications.

What's more, the Proposed Rule would put State Election Board Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)5 at odds with State Election Board Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)2. Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)2 reads:

The poll manager shall cause the number of printed ballots from each ballot marking device to be recorded on the recap form. The poll manager shall further cause the number of spoiled ballots and ballots placed in the emergency bin of the scanner that were unable to be scanned to be recorded on the recap form. The poll manager shall cause the total number of voter check ins from the electronic poll book and/or paper voter list to be recorded on the recap form. If the numbers recorded on the recap form do not reconcile with each other, the poll manager shall immediately determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken.

Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)2 does not contemplate a mandatory hand count. Recognizing this inconsistency, the Alexander Petition states that "Rule 183-1-12-.12(a)2 would [have to] read 'if the numbers recorded on the recap forms do no reconcile with each other and the the total of hand counted paper ballot, the poll manager shall immediately determine the reason for inconsistency . . . "22" Yet this language is not included in the Proposed Rule. Meaning a polling location could be in compliance with subsection (a)2 but not subsection (a)5. If a poll manager is able to reconcile inconsistencies pursuant to subsection (a)2 without hand-counting ballots, why are the risks and burdens inherent in the proposed amendments necessary?

The Board must weigh these risks seriously, because as we have said previously,<sup>23</sup> rulemaking has a real impact on the physical safety of elections officials. The Proposed Rule would make poll workers targets for undue pressure campaigns and threats of violence.<sup>24</sup> Instead of dignifying the harmful attitudes and conspiracies animating the Proposed Rule, the Board should focus on providing clear and detailed guidance for existing rules and procedures that have ensured the success, security, and integrity of Georgia's elections.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See Exhibit B, Alexander Petition at 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> See Exhibit D, Democratic Party of Georgia, Comment Regarding Notice of Rulemaking to Amend Subject 183-1-12-.12 (defining "Election Certification") (Aug. 5, 2024).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See, e.g., Josh Meyer, Exclusive: Homeland security ramping up "with intensity" to respond to election threats, USA Today (2024),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/05/08/dhs-alejandro-mayorkas-responds-2024-election-threats/73345797007/ (last visited Aug 17, 2024)(citing to prior examples of threats against election officials and their children and warnings of a "mass shooting of poll workers.").

#### Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge the Georgia State Elections Board to reject the proposed amendment to 183-1-12-.12(a)(5).

We also request that the Board include this comment in the rulemaking record. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(a)(2). If the Board votes to adopt the proposed rule, we request that it "issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its adoption and incorporate therein its reason for overruling the consideration urged against its adoption." *Id*.

Sincerely,

#### /s/ Tolulope Kevin Olasanoye

Tolulope Kevin Olasanoye Executive Director Democratic Party of Georgia

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# EX. B

### The Poll Worker Manual

May 2024



1

### **Board of Elections Office**

**Richmond County Board of Elections** 535 Telfair Street Suite 500 Augusta, GA 30901 Phone: 706-821-2340

Fax: 706-821-2814 www.augustaga.gov/vote

richmondelections@augustaga.gov

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- Esther Jackson, Deputy Registrar ejackson@augustaga.gov
- Windell Hamilton, Deputy Registrar whamilton@augustaga.gov
- Ebony Stevens, Deputy Registrar estevens@augustaga.gov

#### **Board Members**

- Timothy McFalls, Chairperson Nonpartisan
- Marcia Brown, Vice Chair Democratic Appointee
- Sherry T. Barnes, Secretary Republican Appointee
- Isaac McAdams, Republican Appointee
- Betty Reece, Democratic Appointee

#### About the Board of Elections

- The Board of Elections sets all policies and procedures for conducting elections in Augusta-Richmond County.
- The Board of Elections office staff works for the Board of Elections.
- Board Members often visit polling places on Election Day. They will introduce themselves and will have credentials. Please show them every courtesy.

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# May 21, 2022 General Primary/Nonpartisan/Special Election What's on the Ballot

#### **Federal Offices**

U.S. Representatives (Congressional District 12)

#### **State Offices**

State Senator (Districts: 22, 23)

State Representatives (126.127.129,130,132)

#### Questions

Republican (8 state, 3 county)

Democratic (8 state)

#### County Offices

District Attorney

Clerk of Superior Court

Sheriff

Solicitor–General

Tax Commissioner

#### **County Offices**

Coroner

Probate Judge

Presiding, Civil and Magistrate Court Judge

#### **Nonpartisan Offices**

Supreme Court Justices

Judges, Court of Appeals

Superior Court Judge (to succeed Flythe)

Superior Court Judge (to succeed McIntyre) Superior Court Judge (to succeed Hunter)

Marshal

Commission (Districts: 1,3,5,7,9)

Special Election Question (Mayor voting power)

Republican





Democratic





Nonpartisan





### Reminders

#### **Advance Voting:**

 All four of our Advance Voting locations will be open from 8:30am-6:00pm for all 17 days. The Municipal Building will be open on Sunday, May 12, 2024 from 8:30am-6:00pm. If you are assigned to work at a location different from where you are assigned to vote, please plan on voting at one of our advance voting locations or by absentee ballot.

#### **Absentee Ballots:**

· Applications will be accepted up until May 10, 2024.

#### Drop Boxes

 We will have one drop box located inside the Municipal Building in the Linda Beazley room that will be accessible during early voting days and hours instead of 24/7.

#### Election Day:

- Wait times for check-in at the Poll Pads shall be recorded three times throughout the day (in the morning, at midday, and prior to the close of the polls) on the hourly log and Poll Pad Recap sheet.
- Prohibits anyone except poll workers from handing out water to voters in line and prohibits passing out food
  and water to voters within 150 feet of the building that serves as a poll, inside a polling place or within 25
  feet of any voter standing in line.
- Votes cast by a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct will not be counted unless it is cast after 5:00 P.M.
  and before the regular time for the closing of the polls and unless the person executes a sworn statement,
  witnessed by the poll official, stating that he or she is unable to vote at his or her correct polling place prior
  to the closing of the polls and giving the reason.
- Once the close out procedures are completed, the Poll Manager must report to the Board of Elections the
  total number of ballots cast and the total number of Provisional Ballots cast <u>PRIOR</u> to leaving the polling
  place. This information is then forwarded to the state.

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## **Polling Place Changes**

#### **Advance Voting**

• Henry Brigham Advance Voters will vote at:

Charles Evans Community Center 1898 Highland Avenue Augusta, GA 30904

#### **Election Day**

Henry Brigham Election Day Voters will vote at:

Belle -Terrace Presbyterian Church 2473 Golden Camp Road Augusta, GA 30906

 Hephzibah – Carroll Community Center Election Day Voters will vote at:

Oasis Church at Hephzibah 2228 GA Hwy – 88 Hephzibah, GA 30815

## Poll Official Requirements

- · 16 Years of age or older.
- · Resident of U.S. and Richmond County.
- · Must be able to read, write and speak the English language.
- If you've been convicted of a felony at least 10 years has to elapse between the completion of the sentence and becoming a poll worker.
- No public official or a candidate for public office may serve as a poll worker.
- Cannot be an immediate relative of candidate appearing on ballot where you are assigned to work.

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### Code of Conduct

- Maintain a professional appearance at all times.
  - · Wear clean, comfortable clothes.
  - Bring drinks, snacks, a bag lunch, medications, cell phone and charger.
  - · You may want to bring a light jacket or sweater.
  - <u>Do not</u> wear political, campaign, or items with controversial slogans and avoid strong colognes and perfumes that may affect sensitive people.









### Code of Conduct

- Do not suggest or openly discuss in <u>ANY WAY</u> a particular party, candidate or question. The voter will select the party they wish to vote in on the Poll Pads so you should never have to ask that question.
- Never interpret what a question on the ballot means. If asked, the only thing you can do is give them a sample ballot to look over.
- Do not eat while at your workstation.
- Do not use a cell phone, IPod, video games or other electronic devices while at your workstation.
- · Keep the noise level and personal conversations with voters and co-workers to a minimum.
- Monitor work area for campaign literature including newspaper, radio advertisements, pamphlets, etc.
- If you are unable to work at your assigned poll, you must immediately notify the Board of Elections Office.

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### **Election Morning**

#### Duties Prior to 7:00am

- All duties must be performed in full view of the public.
   Potential voters may watch but are not allowed to enter the enclosed space or interfere when preparations for opening the polls are in progress.
- At no time are the doors to the polling place to be locked to exclude any member of the public from viewing the preelection preparation, conduct of the election, or the closeout procedures.
- There are to be <u>three</u> people in the polling place at all times.

### **Election Morning**

#### Duties Prior to 7:00am

•MANAGERS – Have a plan <u>before</u> Election Morning. Assign your poll workers to complete certain tasks using your poll worker list.

 Never attempt to open any piece of equipment without the instructions. This is why mistakes are made. Make sure every poll worker follows the step-by-step instructions.

•Follow your Election Day Checklist that is in the front of your Manager's Expanding File.



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### **Election Morning**

#### Duties Prior to 7:00am

- 5:30am Poll officials report to Polling Place.
- OATHS -Before entering upon duties at any primary or election, all poll officers shall take and subscribe in duplicate to the oaths required.
  - · Assistant Manager swears in Manager.
  - Manager then swears in the two assistant managers and the clerks.
  - Oaths are signed and placed back inside the Manager's Expanding File.

Note – Managers make sure that any Poll Officials arriving at 6:00am or late take and sign the Oath of Workers before completing any duties.

NAME BADGES – Affix your name badge. The badge must be worn at all times.

Poll Officials who are assigned to open the equipment will immediately begin setup of the Scanner, BMDs, and Poll Pads after completing the Oath of Workers and affixing the name badge. The rest of the polling place setup will begin once the equipment is ready. Some locations may be able to do this simultaneously if they have enough workers.

- PAYROLL Sign the payroll sheet.
- TEAMS It is essential that all Poll Officials work together on Election Day. Teamwork reduces the possibility of errors, promotes voter satisfaction, and helps provide accurate returns Election Night.

# Setting Up....

Do we have our supplies?

 SUPPLY CHECK OFF SHEETS – <u>PLEASE</u> locate and use the Supply Check Off Sheets and Packing Lists provided to make sure you have all your supplies and are setting up properly. Notify your Poll Manager immediately if any items are missing.







13


# **Election Morning**

**Posters** 


 Half of the required posters will now be on a Blue Shield. The remaining will be found in the Manager's Rolling Tote. Please use the guide attached to the set in the Manager's Blue Rolling Tote to hang the remaining posters.




Blue Shield w/Posters Attached.



**Election Day Poster Guide** 





# **Election Morning**

Supplies



Rolling Tote





Blue Ballot

**Transport Bag** 





Manager's **Expanding File** 

Blue Memory Card Bag





**Ballot Bag** 



Red Emergency **Ballot Bag** 



**Green Emergency Backup Supply Bag** 

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# **Election Morning**

Poll Official Manual

- Located in Manager's Blue Rolling Tote.
- Be sure to look through the Poll Official Manual in the black binder. It provides information that you will find very helpful on Election Day.





- There is a map outlining your precinct boundaries and a map showing the 150 ft. no campaign line around your polling place in the back of the black binder.
- We suggest that once an hour a poll official go outside with the 150 ft. perimeter map to make sure that all campaigners are abiding by the law.


# Setting Up....

# Equipment Set up and Opening

For Opening and Closing of ICP-Scanners, ICX-BMD Touchscreens and Printers, and Poll Pads:

- One Poll Official reads the instructions
- · One Poll Official follows the instructions as read to them
- · One Poll Official records the necessary information on the forms
- Procedures and documents to open and close each piece of equipment can be found in folders located in the Manager's Expanding File.





 The Manager's Expanding File must be kept in a secure location, and no one should handle or remove items without the Poll Manager's knowledge. Stay organized! Put items removed back in the correct place.

Note – Contact the Elections Office immediately if you are having problems with opening any piece of equipment.

19

19


# Techniques to Improve with Opening/Closing Procedures

- Start with a clear plan: Each Poll Manager has a checklist that will guide you through the opening and closing process. Use it and make sure you follow the order that it is in.
- Slowing down your thoughts to comprehend what you are reading is essential for effective reading comprehension.
- Practice Mindfulness: Before you start reading, take a few deep breaths and center yourself. Focus your attention solely on the text and let go of racing thoughts.
- Eliminate Distractions: Keep the noise level to a minimum.
- Follow the Instructions: A lot of time goes in to making sure you have everything you need to be successful. You must use the opening and closing instructions provided. You should <u>NEVER</u> attempt to open any piece of equipment without the instructions. If you are missing any of the instructions or feel you need additional assistance, call our office and we will talk you through the situation.

# **Election Morning**

#### ICP- Scanner Opening Procedures

- Begin Opening procedures on the ICP Scanner immediately following Oath of Workers. Your goal is to have all equipment up and ready by or before 6:00am.
- PLEASE READ AND FOLLOW ALL INSTRUCTIONS.
   Skipping steps results in errors. Managers should be a part of the team that prepares the ICP-Scanner.
- A team of <u>two</u> prepares the ICP Scanner using the ICP-Scanner Open/Close Procedures and the Scanner/Ballot Box Recap Form (both documents located in Manager's Expanding File/ICP-Scanner Folder/Tab 2).
- It is very important that you make sure the ICP-Scanner is set for the correct date/time, so it shows correctly on the printed tape.
- The Poll Manager and two Poll Officials need to verify the Zero Tape has <u>printed properly</u> and has all ZERO's <u>before</u> moving to the next step.
- When removing the tape be sure to gently pull it forward and tear it off to prevent the print bar from dislodging. This will help you avoid issues in printing the Results Tapes during closing procedures.



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# **Election Morning**

#### ICP-Scanner Recap

This form is used to verify the Scanner/Ballot Box was checked, resealed before the polls opened, and the results were zero at opening. It is found in the Manger's Expanding File/ICP - Scanner Folder/Tab Two (2).

- Verify top portion is correct.
- Verify Scanner Serial Number listed on Scanner/Ballot Box Recap matches Serial Number located on ICP-Scanner.
- Verify seal numbers listed in the L&A Seals Section.

Note - Not all the seals on the ICP - Scanner will be listed on the Scanner/Ballot Box Recap Sheet. Use the Seal Locations diagram in the ICP - Scanner Folder to help identify the seals listed.

- Remember that you must remove the seal, unlock and check that the Ballot Box and Emergency Bin are empty.
- In the Opening Section Circle YES that both the Ballot Box and Emergency Bin have been checked, resealed, and record the new seal numbers and th time the ICP-Scanner was opened.
- Record Zero (0) in Opening Count Column.
- Put all the documents back in the ICP Scanner Folder and return it to the Manager's Expanding File/Tab 2.

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# **Election Morning**

**ICP-Scanner Seal Locations** 

Use the diagram in the ICP - Scanner Folder to help identify the seals listed on the Scanner/Ballot Box Recap.



There are NO Write-In Options on the ballot (except for the City of Blythe) and the white door located inside the Ballot Box will have NOT a red seal on it.

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# **Election Morning**


ICX – BMD & Printer Opening Procedures

- · Complete before 6:00am.
- A team of <u>two</u> (if available) prepares the ICX-BMD units and printers.
- Units will already be set up for you by our technicians and delivery crews.
- PLEASE READ AND FOLLOW ALL INSTRUCTIONS. Skipping steps results in errors.
- Use the ICX-BMD Opening/Closing Instructions, Election Day Touchscreen Recap Form, Ballot Recap Form and Orange Poll Worker Card (located in the Manager's Expanding File/ICX-BMD Folder/Tab 3) to open the polls on units.
- DO NOT UNPLUG & REARRANGE YOUR EQUIPMENT. Contact our office if you have a problem.



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Election Morning

Ballot Recap

This form is used to account for all the ballots issued, printed, cast, and spoiled.

Confirm the top of the form is completed correctly.

Section A of the form is intentionally left blank so that you can record the ICX-BMD (Touchscreen) Serial Numbers in the order that they are set up in your polling place.

Record the Touchscreen Serial Numbers in the Order that they are set up in your polling place.

Record Opening Count. All counts should be ZERO.

Put the Ballot Recap Sheet back in the ICX – BMD Folder and return it to the Manager's Expanding File/Tab 3.

# **Election Morning**

ICX - BMD & Printer Opening Procedures

Managers - Please check to ensure the following has been completed  $\underline{\text{before the polls}}$  open:

The polls have been "Opened" on each ICX-BMD - if you see a red bar going across the top, you know the unit is NOT READY. The bar across the top will be gray once the ICX-BMD is ready.

Polls are Closed. Unit Not Ready when red across the top.



Polls are Open. Unit Ready when gray across the top



Total Ballots Cast should be at Zero (0).

- All the Power/Printer Doors (bottom right) have been resealed <u>properly</u> and other three seals are still intact.
- Total Ballots Cast on all ICX-BMD Units show Zero (0). Date and Time are correct on each unit.
- Touchscreen Recap and Ballot Recap have been completed properly and placed back in the ICX-BMD Folder with the Orange Poll Worker Card and you return folder to the Manager's Expanding File/Tab 3.

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
# **Election Morning**


**Universal Power Supply** 


- The Universal Power Supply (UPS) supplied with the Ballot Marking Devices ("BMD") can accommodate 2 Hewlett Packard printers and 2 ICX-BMD units.
- The 2 AC power receptacles on the upper portion of the back of the unit are labeled "Printer" and are to be used only for the HP Printers. These receptacles will provide battery-supplied power to the printers in the event of a power outage.
- The 2 receptacles at the bottom of the back of the unit are labeled "ICX" and these are to be used only for the Touchscreen component of the BMD. These do not supply battery backup power, as the ICX-BMD Touchscreen has an internal battery to do so in the event of a power outage.
- All the Universal Power Supply units should already be on when you arrive Election Morning at your Polling Place. If they are not, you will find instructions on how to power them on in your Manager's Expanding File/ICX-BMD Folder/Tab 3.











# **Election Morning**

Spoiled & Unaccompanied Ballot Recap

- Confirm Spoiled & Unaccompanied Ballot Recap sheets are available at each Poll Pad Station before Polls open.
- Only <u>PRINTED</u> ballots from the Touchscreens that are spoiled or found unaccompanied should be documented on this form.
- The Spoiled or Unaccompanied Ballot should be attached and kept with the recap sheet it is recorded on.
- At the close of voting, place all completed Spoiled/Unaccompanied Ballot Recap Sheets with the Ballot(s) attached in the Envelope Labeled Spoiled/Unaccompanied Ballot found in the Manager's Expanding File/ Poll Pad Folder/ Tab Four (4).
- For every line completed there should be a <u>Printed Ballot</u> attached. If no ballot is printed, then do not put it on this form or make sure you record "No Ballot Printed" on the form.

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# Setting Up....

Forms - Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballot Recap Sheet

A Spoiled Ballot is a <u>Printed</u> ballot that is returned to the poll official by the voter while in the enclosed space.

The following are reasons for a spoiled ballot:

- · Voter Requested to change selections
  - · Due to wrong party selected
  - · Error in selecting a candidate or answer to a referendum
- Printer Error
- Scanner Error
- Touchscreen Error
  - · Voter believes they selected a different candidate or answer to a referendum

Once the Printed Ballot is returned to the Poll Pad Station, the Poll Official will:

- Marked the printed ballot as SPOILED across the front of the ballot
- Enter the precinct, combo, reason, and initial on the Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballot Recap Sheet
- · Attach the printed ballot to the Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballot Recap Sheet
- There should be a printed ballot for each spoiled ballot listed on the Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballot Recap Sheet

Note: Once a ballot is scanned into the Polling Place Scanner, the ballot is cast.

An Unaccompanied Ballot is a printed ballot that has been left on the printer at the Touchscreen station or found in the polling place.

If an unaccompanied ballot is found and the voter has left the enclosed space:

- The ballot should be returned to the Poll Pad Station
- Marked as SPOILED across the front of the ballot
- Entered on the Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballot Recap Sheet

Note: All Unaccompanied ballots must be spoiled. No Poll Official is allowed to scan an unaccompanied ballot.

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# **Election Morning**

#### **Voter Assistance Station**

Set up the Voter Assistance Station.


- Provisional Voting is done at the Voter Assistance Station and each polling place is required to have one.
- Provisional Ballots are in the sealed large blue canvas bag that is in the blue Manager's Rolling Tote.
- Managers use the Election Morning Checklist (located in Manager's Expanding File/Tab 1) to verify the Provisional Ballot Bag seal.
- Remove seal and verify that you have the correct ballots.
- Keep the Provisional Ballots in the large blue canvas bag and in a secure location at the Voter Assistance Station. Do not leave them out on the table. I suggest keeping them in the Red Voter Assistance Box on floor behind the Poll Official at the Voter Assistance Station.
- The Provisional Ballots do not need to be resealed until Election Night after completion of the Provisional Recap Sheet.



Poll Manager's Blue Rolling Tote







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# Polling Place Forms Opening the Polls

**Voted Ballot Removal Form During Voting** 

- This form is to be completed ONLY if the ballot box becomes full and/or must be emptied to continue to scan ballots while the polls are open.
- Most polling locations may <u>never</u> have to use this form. Just leave the document in the Manager's Expanding File.
- The removal process must be conducted in view of the public.
- Each time ballots are removed; the form must be signed by the Poll manager and two witnesses.
   The time must be listed as well.

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# Polling Place Forms

Opening the Polls

**Voting Equipment Exception Report** 

- This form is used to document any voting equipment malfunctions during voting.
- If an error is due to equipment malfunction, the poll officer shall document the incident on this form.
   The poll manager shall inform the election superintendent immediately if one or more electronic ballot markers are associated with a significant number of incidents.
- See SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12

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#### **Polling Place Forms** Failure to get all information on required documents could result in Poll Managers along with the Poll Officials who accepted the Non-Felon Affidavit (AFF-20) forms to appear before the Board of Election Members to explain why necessary information was not collected. This form is located in the Manager's Non-Felon Affidavit Expanding File/Tab 5 and is to be used when (Affirmation of Eligibility to Vote) an elector has been identified by county registrars as potentially serving a felony sentence as reflected in the voter registration system, but the elector's record has not been cancelled yet pursuant to the notice provision of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-231(c). These voters will be marked "Potential Felon" in the Poll Pads. If the elector knows that he or she is not erion who votes or attempts to vote at any primary or election, knowing ses not possess all the qualifications of an elector at such primary or elec currently serving a felony sentence and is by law, or who comes or emangers to come at any primary in violations of Code Section 31-2-223 or who knowsnighy gives false informations to poil officers in an attempt to come in any primary or election shall be guilley of a falsony and, upon constrains thereof, shall be eligible to vote, the elector may sign this form and be issued a regular ballot. amount \$100,000,00 or both." Elector Prints First and Last Name. Elector signs and dates form. Poll Official completes the bottom portion. Follow the procedures on the Poll Pad Quick Reference Guide to issue a Voter Access Card so the voter can vote on the ICX-BMD.

# Setting Up.... Security Paper for Ballots

# NEW LOCATION FOR EXTRA BALLOT PAPER!



Ballot Transport Bag

Extra security paper for printing the ballots will no longer be in the blue Ballot Transport Bag. It will now be in a box with a neon pink label with "Extra Paper" and will be placed on the Manager Table or Voter Assistance Table by our delivery crews.

#### **Election Morning -**

- · Each printer will already be filled with paper.
- · Keep the extra ballot paper in a secure area.
- You will need to check the paper trays occasionally throughout the day.
- · Ballot paper should ONLY be used to refill printers, as needed.
- · Refill printers with paper as needed, do not overfill.

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# **Election Morning**

Station Setup

MANAGERS ASSIGN THESE DUTIES BEFORE ELECTION MORNING USING YOUR POLL WORKER LIST!

#### **Greeter Station**

Ensure the following supplies are present:



- List of Acceptable Forms of Identification
- Sample Ballots

#### Poll Pad Station

**Ensure the following supplies** 

- are present:
   Poll Pad
- Poll Pad Notebook
- Stylus
- Voter Cards
   Sample Ballots
- Sample Ballots
- Baskets with Reusable Stylus

#### **Voter Assistance**

#### Station

#### Ensure the following

- supplies are present:
- Voter Assistance Station Guide
   Provisional/Challenged Ballot
  Supplies
- Voter Registration Forms/Address
- Change Forms
  Certificate of Voting Pad
- Sample Ballots

#### Roamer

 Poll Official who will be in the area of the ICX-BMD's to offer instructions and assistance to any voter who needs it.

#### Scanner Station

Ensure the following supplies are present:

- Magnifiers for reviewing printed ballot.
- Posters reminding voters to not leave with ballot and to review their ballot

Poll Official will remind each voter to review ballot before placing it in the scanner.

#### **Exit Door Station**

Ensure the following supplies are present:



- I'm a Georgia Voter Sticker
- Box to collect voter card

# Election Morning

# **Emergency Preparedness**

- Before your polls open, please locate the following:

  Fire Extinguishers

  Fire Alarms

  Building Exits

  Building Exits

  Name and Address of your polling location (you need to know this if have to call 911).

  Labels containing your site address and phone number are on each station guide and

In the event of a situation that requires emergency evacuation of the precinct, priority is the safety of the poll officials and voters, however, protection of ballots and voting documentation is of vital importance. The poll managers should be familiar with these procedures and adapt them as necessary to meet the needs of each situation. Emergency Procedures can be found in the Poll Worker Manual. Once emergency action has been taken, the manager must notify the Elections Office of the situation immediately.

# Setting Up to Be Accessible

Inside of the Polling Place

Mark the path of travel to the voting room, if necessary.





the path of travel is free from barriers or obstructions.



# Setting Up to be Accessible

Outside of the Polling Place

- Remember to setup your metal vote here signs. Each polling location will receive at least two. Poll Managers will have a diagram in the Manager's Expanding File to show where the signs should be placed.
- Post accessible parking signs, if provided
- Mark the path for voters, if necessary.

Setup wireless doorbells (if required).









- Poll Officials should not park close to the door and should always reserve the best parking spaces for voters.
- Poll Officials should refrain from parking in the accessible parking spaces. These should be reserved for voters. (If you have a disability and need to park close to the building, please have another worker move your vehicle before the polling place opens).

# **Election Morning**

Opening the Poll

 Once setup is complete the Poll Manager calls the Board of Elections office to let them know that the polling place is ready to open.



Managers – Please remember to keep your cell phones on and nearby so we can reach you.

 At 7:00 A.M., the Poll Manager is to publicly declare, "The Poll is Open."

Mangers – you no longer are required to notify the Board of Elections Office that you have your equipment up and running by 6:00am. However, if you are having problems at your polling place and feel you need assistance, CALL OUR OFFICE IMMEDIATELY AND WE WILL SEND SOMEONE TO ASSIST YOU SO YOU CAN OPEN PROMPTLY AT 7:00 A.M.

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# The Enclosed Space

What is It?

- The Enclosed Space is the secure area of the polls.
- It is the area in which the Poll Pads, Ballot Marking Devices, Voter Assistance Station, and the Ballot Scanner are located.
- Stanchions will be provided to secure the enclosed space.



Who May Enter the Enclosed Space?

Poll officials, voters, persons legally assisting voters, authorized poll watchers, persons
authorized by the Secretary of State or State Elections Board (including investigators and
monitors), Board of Elections members and staff, Peace Officers when necessary to preserve
order, technicians appointed by the Board of Elections, Children under the age of 18
accompanied by parent or any child 12 years and younger provided that they do not create a
disturbance and do not in any manner handle the voting units.

Who May Not Enter the Enclosed Space?

Media, interested citizens, people representing special interest groups.

# Campaigning at the Polls

Campaigners must be 150 feet from the outer edge of the building in which voting is taking place.
 There is a map in the back of the manager's *Poll Worker Manual* that shows where the 150-foot line is around your polling place.





- Any person entering the poll for any reason must first remove or cover any campaign literature on their person (Hat, buttons, T-shirt, signs).
- · Examples of what is permitted
  - A t-shirt or cap with the name of a former candidate or elected official.
  - · A t-shirt or cap with a picture even if that picture is affiliated with a party or candidate.
  - A t-shirt or cap with a slogan even if the slogan is affiliated with a party or candidate.
- Examples of what is NOT permitted
  - A t-shirt or cap with the name of a current candidate on the ballot.
  - A t-shirt or cap promoting the passage of a referendum that is on the ballot.
  - A t-shirt or cap with the name of a political party who has candidates on the ballot.
- Candidates may not visit any poll. They may only go to their own poll to vote. After voting, they must leave and may not return.
- Exit Polling is permitted so long as it is done at least 25 feet from the building in which a polling place is located. This includes media.
- All persons, except poll workers, are prohibited from handing out water to voters in line and prohibited from
  passing out food and water to voters within 150 feet of the building that serves as a poll, inside a polling place
  or within 25 feet of any voter standing in line.

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# Poll Watchers





- Official Poll Watchers will have been given a letter by the Board of Elections, candidate, or party
  chairperson and a badge bearing the words "Official Poll Watcher", the name of the poll watcher, the
  primary or election in which the poll watcher shall serve, and polling place in which the poll watcher shall
  serve. The poll watcher shall wear such badge at all times while serving as a poll watcher.
- Are permitted within the enclosed space for the purpose of <u>observing</u> the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes. Accredited poll watchers must be able to observe the polling place setup and closed down process; however, they may not interfere with either.
- Shall in no way interfere with the conduct of the election, and the poll manager may make reasonable
  regulations to avoid such interference. If a poll watcher persists in interfering with the conduct of the
  election or in violating any of the provisions of Code Section 21-2-408 after being duly warned by the poll
  manager or superintendent, he or she may be removed by such official.
- Are prohibited from talking to voters, checking electors' lists, using photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, using cellular telephones, or participating in any form of campaigning while they are behind the enclosed space.
- Any infraction or irregularities observed by poll watchers shall be reported directly to the Election Superintendent, not to the poll manager.
- New After the tabulation (closing of the scanner) of results on election day has been completed, accredited poll watchers shall be permitted to photograph the tape of tabulated results and the provisional ballot recap sheet, which will both be taped to the polling place door.

# **Voter Interaction**

#### Successful communication with all voters is central to a smooth and successful Election Day.

- Greet voters as they enter the Polling Place and direct them to the appropriate station to begin the voting process.
- Make good eye contact, smile, and nod while speaking.
- · Offer the voters in line a Sample Ballot to review, if needed.
- · Ask the voters to have their ID ready for the Poll Pad Station.
- Remind the voters to silence their cell phones and that cell phones are not allowed to be used in the polling place.
- Limit personal conversations with voters and other poll officials.
- Keep the noise level down so it does not distract voters.
- Remember that body language matters just as much as the words you use.
- Respect others personal space. Never attempt to put "I'm a Georgia Voter" stickers on the voter.

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# **Voter Interaction**

- Voters with Speech Limitations

  Be patient. Walt for the voter to finish speaking. Do not interrupt or attempt to finish a sentence.
  To clarify a voter's statement, restate what you understood as a yes/no question.
  Tools: pen and paper for voter to write questions.

- Voters with Hearing Limitations
  If a voter uses an interpreter, address the voter directly.
  If a voter reads lips, face him or her and speak clearly in a normal tone of voice.
  Do not speak loudly unless the voter requests.
  Tools: pen and paper for voter to write questions.

#### **Voters with Mobility Limitations**

- Never touch or move a walker, cane, or other equipment without the voter's permission.

  Sit down to speak with a voter who is seated or in a wheelchair (it's much easier on the voter's neck!) If a voter brings an assistant, address the voter directly.

#### **Voters with Sight Limitations**

- Identify yourself and announce your arrival and departure
- Ask if any assistance is needed.
- If a voter asks to be guided, offer an arm or shoulder for the voter to hold, then walk slightly ahead of the voter.
- Keep the magnifier and signature guide out and ready to use at the Voter Certificate Station

#### Service animals

- Are allowed in all public and private buildings.
- Never attempt to pet, feed, or distract a service animal.
- These animals are trained not to bite.
- Handle any complaints with a positive attitude and explain voter has the right to be accompanied.



# Voter Interaction

# Practice Vigilance

The OHNO approach - Observe, Initiate a Hello, Navigate the Risk, and Obtain Help



#### Observe

your surroundings for suspicious behaviors and/or activities

#### Initiate a "Hello"

to determine why an individual is at a voting location or facility

#### Navigate the Risk

to determine if the behavior observed is threatening or suspicious

#### **Obtain Help**

from authorities or management

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#### Voter Interaction

#### Practice Vigilance w/ OHNO

The OHNO approach - Observe, Initiate a Hello, Navigate the Risk, and Obtain Help

#### OBSERVE

#### SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIORS:

- Abandoning/placing an object and leaving the area
- · Taking pictures/videos of personnel, facilities, security features, restricted zone, or the facility itself in an unusual or covert manner
- · Attempting to enter a restricted area/impersonating authorized personnel
- Loitering at a location without a reasonable explanation. For example, loitering inside the campaign free zone
- Avoiding security personnel or systems or Expressing threats of violence

#### Initiate a Hello

#### DO OR SAY THE FOLLOWING:

- Smile, make eye contact, and introduce yourself" Hello. If you need anything, I'll be right over here."
  If you are looking for something or someone in particular, I can assist if needed."
  Hello, if you need assistance I will be around if needed."

  "I will be here in case you need help."

#### **Navigate the Risk**

#### ASK YOURSELF:

- · Do they appear to have legitimate business in the election facility or ballot processing center?
- Is their clothing consistent with the weather or for the gathering of the day?
- · Are they avoiding security?
- · Are they asking questions about business functions or employee information?

#### **Obtain Help**

#### PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO FIRST RESPONDERS OR SECURITY PERSONNEL:

- · What is happening?
- Who is doing it?
- Where is it taking place?
- When did you observe it?
- Why are they here?

#### Voter Interaction

GEORGIA LAW ENFORCEMENT QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE



- Reference guide highlights potential violations found within the Georgia
  Election Code that may be reported to local law enforcement. The role of local
  police and sheriff's offices is typically going to relate to public safety,
  interference with elections, elections facilities or elections officials. Keep in
  mind, minor violations (such as displaying electioneering materials at or near a
  polling location) are often handled directly by Elections Officials without
  involvement of law enforcement.
- Document is in the Managers Expanding File/Tab 1 and should be returned there if ever removed.

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# Sample Ballots

- Each polling place will have 11x17 posters of the sample ballot that you post on the wall.
- Voters coming into the polling place <u>are allowed</u> to bring their own copy of a sample ballot and take it to the booth with them but should not pass it around to others if it has been marked on.
- Sample Ballots are available for all registered voters online at <u>www.mvp.sos.ga.gov</u> or through the free mobile app "GA SOS".
- Remember Do not suggest or openly discuss in <u>ANY</u> <u>WAY</u> a particular party, candidate or question.


# Voting

Acceptable IDs

#### Proper identification shall consist of any one of the following:

- A Georgia driver's license which was properly issued by the appropriate state agency;
  - · An Expired Georgia Driver's License is a valid ID for voting.
  - · Name and Address can be different
- A valid Georgia voter identification card or other valid identification card issued by a branch, department, agency, or entity of the State of Georgia, any other state, or the United States authorized by law to issue personal identification, provided that such identification card contains a photograph of the voter;
- A valid United States passport;
- A valid employee identification card containing a photograph of the voter and issued by any branch, department, agency, or entity of the United States government, this state or any county, municipality, board, authority, or other entity of this state;
- A valid United States military identification card, provided that such identification card contains a photograph of the voter; or
- A valid tribal identification card containing a photograph of the voter.

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# Assistance in Voting

Georgia law requires all polling places to be fully accessible and equipped with poll workers that are trained to take care of the needs of all voters. Voters who are 75 years of age or older or have a disability and show up at the polling place between 9:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., will not be required to wait in line if voter requests to move to the front of the line.

Who Can Assist Voters with Disabilities

- No elector shall receive any assistance in voting at any primary or election unless he or she is unable to read the English language, or he or she has a disability which renders him or her unable to see or mark the ballot or operate the voting equipment or to enter the voting compartment or booth without assistance. A person assisting an elector shall identify himself or herself to a poll worker who shall record such information on the disabled elector's voter certificate showing that such person provided assistance in voting to such elector.
- Any elector who is entitled to receive assistance in voting under this Code section shall be
  permitted by the managers to select <u>any person</u> of the elector's choice except such elector's
  employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of such elector's union. Do not require the
  person assisting a voter to indicate a relationship nor limit the number of voters an individual
  may assist.
- Election Day and Advance Voting An illiterate or disabled elector who is entitled to receive
  assistance pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-385 or 21-2-409, or a person assisting such an elector,
  may use an <u>assistive technology device</u> to help the elector review their paper ballot prior to
  casting. Any image of the ballot obtained through using an assistive technology device shall be
  immediately deleted. Use of an assistive technology device by an illiterate or disabled elector or
  by a person assisting an illiterate or disabled elector shall not be deemed a violation of O.C.G.A. §
  21-2-413(e).

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# Assistance in Voting

#### **Voter Who Does Not Know How to Use the Voting Equipment**

- A poll official may accompany the voter into the booth to offer them instructions but must leave the booth when the voter ballot appears.
- If during the course of voting the voter needs additional instruction, a poll officer may offer such instruction, but the poll officer must not attempt to see how the voter has voted.

#### Sight Impaired Voter - (Can't read the "normal" print)

The voter may magnify their ballot by tapping the "LARGE TEXT" button that is on the voting instructions page of the voting unit. This will make the print larger. It also will sometimes cause candidate's names in the same race to be split across two pages, or to appear different than with the "normal" setting, so be aware. Additionally, a magnifier and signature guide are available for voters and should be kept at the voter certificate station.

#### Blind or Illiterate Voter

One unit in each poll is equipped with a headset and Audio Tactical Interface (ATI) in order to allow a blind voter to vote unassisted using an audio ballot. A voter hears candidates' names and questions through the headphones, and then the voter responds to prompts by touching the keypad similar to an automated phone service. A voter access card will have to be specially encoded at the Poll Pad to activate this feature.

#### **Color Blind Voter**

 The voter may change the contrast on the voting unit by tapping the HIGH CONTRAST button on the instruction page of the voting unit. This will turn the screen print from color to black and white, which will enable a colorblind voter to see the print better.

#### **Seated Voting**

 One of the Voting Units will accommodate a voter who needs to vote while sitting in a chair or wheelchair.

#### Deaf Voter

You do not necessarily need to make special arrangements on the voting equipment for a deaf voter.
 You should have paper and pencil on hand in the event you have trouble communicating with a deaf voter.

# Poll Pad Station Using the Barcode Scanner

Remember to look at the Identification provided by the voter. Don't just automatically take it and set it in the ID Tray to scan.

- To search using the Barcode Scanner, simply place the voter's Georgia Drivers License or Georgia ID Card with the picture side facing down in the ID Tray.
- If the voter's drivers license number matches a record in the Poll Pad, that record will be displayed.
- Poll Official must verify that the record displayed is that of the present voter.
- Have to voter verify the information and sign the Poll Pad using the Disposable Stylus.
- Remember, you must have the ID Tray in the correct position so that the camera can see the barcode.





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# The Poll Pad Station

Special Situations



#### Voter appears at the polling place with an Absentee Ballot:

- Voters are not allowed to turn in voted Absentee Ballots to a polling location on Election Day to
  be <u>counted</u>. For a Voted Absentee Ballot to be counted, it must be turned in to the Board of
  Elections Office by 7:00 P.M. on Election Day. Ex: Someone trying to turn in a voted Absentee
  Ballot at the polls for a disabled parent. That ballot would have to be brought to our office before
  7:00pm in order to be counted.
- Voters may submit their own Absentee Ballot (voted or unvoted) to be <u>cancelled</u> so that they may
  vote on the ICX-BMD.
- NEW A Poll Official must contact the Board of Elections Office and <u>upon approval from our office</u>, the voter may turn in their absentee ballot and vote at the polls:
  - Follow the instructions on the Poll Pad Quick Reference Guide.
  - · Verify the ballot is theirs by comparing the name on the envelope with their photo identification.
  - Verify the ballot is in the envelope.
  - Write "Cancelled" across the front of the yellow absentee ballot envelope and put the cancelled absentee ballot in the manila envelope marked Cancelled Absentee Ballots/Cancelled Absentee Ballot Affidavits (located in the blue Manager's Rolling Tote). The manager will bring these back to the Elections Warehouse on Election Night.
  - Look the voter up on the Poll Pad. Follow the instructions on the Poll Pad Quick Reference Guide so that you can encode them a voter card.

Remember: Never turn a voter away. Always notify the Chief Poll Manager or Assistant Manager to assist in handling any special situation, if needed.

# Poll Pad Station


#### Special Situations

What if the voter is marked as receiving an Absentee Ballot but does not have the Absentee Ballot with them?

- The Poll Official must contact the Board of Elections Office. <u>Upon approval from our office</u>, the voter may complete an Affidavit of Cancelled Ballot (located in red Voter Assistance Box) stating that they would like to cancel their Absentee Ballot and vote in person at the polls.
- The Poll Official must ensure that the form is completed properly and place the Voter Registration #, Precinct # and their initials at the bottom of the form.
- Once completed these forms should be placed in the envelope labeled Cancelled Absentee Ballots/Cancelled Absentee Ballot Affidavits (located in blue Manager's Rolling Tote). The manager is to turn them in to the Elections Warehouse Election Night.

Note: DO NOT FOLD THESE FORMS.

- Remember to check voter's ID using your Acceptable Forms of Identification handout as guide.
- Follow the instructions on the Poll Pad Poll Quick Reference Guide to issue a Voter Access Card so the voter can vote on the ICX-BMD.



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# The Poll Pad Station

### Special Situations

What if a voter does not have one of the acceptable forms of Identification?

- · Look the voter up on the Poll Pad to verify the voter's eligibility.
- If the voter is listed on the Poll Pad as a First-Time Voter, additional forms of identification can be provided (HAVA IDs). These forms of ID must list the name and address of the voter
  - Utility Bill
  - Bank Statement
  - Government Check
  - Paycheck
  - Government document
  - Previous listed photo IDs
- If voter is found on the Poll Pad and has no form of acceptable Identification have to voter go to
  the Voter Assistance Station to vote a Provisional Ballot. If you are a split precinct you will need
  to write the precinct number down so that the person at the Voter Assistance Station will know
  which ballot to give them.

Remember: Never turn a voter away. Always notify the Chief Poll Manager or Assistant Manager to assist in handling any special situation, if needed.

# The Poll Pad Station

## Special Situations

What if you can't locate the voter on the elector's list?

- Make sure you have typed their name correctly.
- · Use the Advanced Search option on the Poll Pad.
- Ask the voter if they could be listed under a different name.
- Check the Supplemental List of Voters
- If still unable to locate them, send them to the Voter Assistance Station or notify the Poll Manager. The Voter Assistance Station Official or the Manager will attempt tocall the Board of Elections office for guidance.
- A Provisional Ballot should be issued if you are unable to reach the Board of Elections Office.

Remember: <u>Never turn a voter away</u>. Always notify the Chief Poll Manager or Assistant Manager to assist in handling any special situation, if needed.

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# **Electors List**

# Three Lists at Polling Place

There are three separate lists of voters at each polling location

- Poll Pad Poll Pad digitally stores registered voter information for each county in Georgia. Poll
  Pads allow you to search for voters and check their eligibility for the election. If eligible and
  they have not voted during Advanced in Person or by Absentee by Mail, they are issued a voter
  card to vote. The voter inserts the card into the Touchscreen, makes their selections and prints
  their ballot and then after reviewing their ballot, inserts it into the Polling Place Scanner to
  cast their vote. The voter is automatically added to the Numbered List of Voters.
- Supplemental List The supplemental list contains the voters that met the Voter Registration
  deadline but did not meet the deadline for the Poll Pad upload. Anyone that is not on the Poll
  Pad but is on the supplemental list is allowed to vote on the Touchscreen unit. These voters do
  not need to vote a paper provisional ballot. A voter card is manually created for these voters
  and their name must be manually added to a Paper Numbered List of Voters and they must
  complete a paper voter certificate.
- Paper Back Up list The paper back up list is a list of all the electors in your precinct. If your
  polling place loses power or your Poll Pads stop working for some reason, you do not have to
  stop processing voters. This is what the paper list is for.

# **Supplemental List of Voters**

A Supplemental Voter is a person who is eligible to vote but their information was not included when the Poll Pads were loaded. These voters will be listed on the yellow Supplemental List of Voters located in the front of the white Poll Pad Notebook or be written in by a Poll Official with approval from our office.

- All Poll Pad Officials should check to see if there are any names on this list before voting begins.
- Follow the instructions at the top of the Supplemental List of Voters to document the voter's information.
- Remember that these voters are not listed in the Poll Pads so you will have to have the Poll Manager or Assistant Manager escort them to an ICX-BMD and use the Manual Activation on the ICX-BMD Procedures and Ballot Activation Code for their precinct (located in white Poll Pad Notebook) along with the Orange Poll Worker Card (located in the manager's Expanding File/Tab 3/ICX-BMD Folder to activate the voter's ballot.
- Once the Ballot is activated, remove the Orange Poll Worker Card and allow the voter to vote in private.
- Voter prints their ballot and scans their voted ballot into the ICP-Scanner. No green Voter Card will be turned in at the Scanner or the Exit Door Station.
- Do not worry! All the information you need is provided, and you do not have to remember all the steps. You just read and follow the instructions.









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# **Backup Election Supplies**

If any voting system component malfunctions during Election Day, the Poll Manager shall immediately notify the Board of Elections office and shall not allow any voter to use the component until and unless the malfunction is corrected. The Poll Manager shall utilize appropriate Backup Procedures so that voting is not interrupted due to any equipment malfunctions.

#### Backup Procedures are provided for the following:

- Poll Pad If the Poll Pad will not encode voter cards a paper elector's list and paper voter
  certificates are provided in the green canvas Backup Election Supply Bag. Follow the voting
  procedures outlined in the red Backup Supply Folder located in the green canvas Backup Election
  Supply Bag.
- ICX-BMD If the ICX-BMD will not mark ballots, paper ballots are provided and located in the red canvas Emergency Ballot Bag. Follow the voting procedures outlined in the red Backup Supply Folder located in the green canvas Backup Election Supply Bag.
- Ballot Scanner If the Ballot Scanner will not scan ballots, the voter shall place their voted ballot in
  the Emergency Bin located on the top of the Ballot Box. The Poll Manager will remove the seal,
  unlock the bin, open the slot on the Emergency Bin, and reseal it before any voters are allowed to
  place ballots in the Emergency Bin. Follow the voting procedures outlined in the red Backup Supply
  Folder located in the green canvas Backup Election Supply Bag.








# **Voter Assistance Station**

#### **Provisional Voting**

- The Poll Official responsible for issuing Provisional Ballots must <u>ALWAYS</u>
  refer to the procedures in the Voter Assistance Station Guide for instructions
  on how to issue the individual types of Provisional Ballots.
- When you don't follow instructions, mistakes are made that could cost someone their vote and result in the Poll Manager along with the Poll Officials who accepted the forms to appear before the Board of Elections to explain why the information was not collected.






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# **Voter Assistance Station**

**Provisional Voting** 

#### **Provisional Ballot Voting Guide**

- Each polling place shall have an information sheet available for voters who have questions about the provisional ballot process. This is in your red Voter Assistance Guide folder.
- The guide describes relevant laws regarding provisional ballots for voters who do not show up on the electors list for that polling place.



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# **Voter Assistance Station**

#### **Provisional Voting**

There are seven types of Provisional Ballot Voters:

- PI Pink Folder Voters who do not have one of the six forms of photo identification required by law
- V Pink Folder First time registrants whose voter application has not been fully verified and do not have one of the six forms of photo identification required by law
- PR Blue Folder -Person not on the Elector's List
- OP Blue Folder Person whose name does not appear on electors list for your precinct. If a person
  is not on your Electors List but is showing registered in another precinct, inform the voter of their
  assigned precinct and then let the voter decide if they can go to their assigned precinct, or vote a
  provisional ballot. Any votes cast by a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct will not be counted
  unless it is cast after 5:00 P.M. and before the regular time for the closing of the poils on the day of
  the primary, election, or runoff.
- IR Purple Folder IDR voter who does not have ID but can show certain identification types other than photo
- EH Green Folder Voters who vote during Court Order extended hours (only happens when a federal candidate is on the ballot)
- OTHER Voter who is marked in Poll Pad as Absentee Received, Advance In-Person, or Absentee Issued and they have no ballot to surrender, or you are unable to contact us to have absentee ballot cancelled and they claim they have not returned a voted ballot or voted in advance.

Refer to the procedures in the Voter Assistance Station Guide for instructions on how to issue the individual types of Provisional Ballots.

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# **Voter Assistance Station**

**Provisional Voting** 


EVERY PROVISIONAL VOTER MUST COMPLETE A PAPER VOTER CERTIFICATE.

PLEASE FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS IN THE RED VOTER ASSISTANCE FOLDER. CALL THE

BOARD OF ELECTIONS OFFICE IF YOU NEED ASSISTANCE.

- On the front side the voter completes:
  - · County Name
  - Date of the Election
  - Current Name
  - Current Address
  - · Date of Birth
  - Signature





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# **Voter Assistance Station**

## **Provisional Voting**

- Print the voter's name, precinct number, and date on the outer salmon-colored provisional envelope. Mark the type of election, and provisional code.
- Select the correct Provisional Ballot.
- Remove the stub from the top of the Ballot.
- Record the ballot number on the voter certificate and initial as issued

Provisional Ballots should be kept in a secure location at all times.

- Hand voter the ballot and both Official Provisional Ballot Envelopes. Instruct the voter to:
  - Color the oval next to the candidate or answer of their choice.
  - After voting fold the ballot and seal it in the white inner provisional envelope and to seal the white envelope inside the salmon outer envelope.
- While voter is voting, write the voter's name, time, precinct number,, and provisional code on the Numbered List of Provisional/Challenged Voters.





<u>ALWAYS</u> Refer to the procedures in the Voter Assistance Station Guide for instructions on how to issue the individual types of Provisional Ballots.

# **Voter Assistance Station**

## **Provisional Voting**

- Voter will place the voted ballot, sealed in both sets of envelopes, into the orange Provisional Ballot Bag (make sure bag has been sealed).
- Give the voter the appropriate Important Notice to Voter. There is one for each type of Provisional Voter.
- Paperclip the Voter 's Certificate, ballot stub and any other forms completed during the process together and place them in the orange Provisional Folder.



<u>ALWAYS</u> Refer to the procedures in the Voter Assistance Station Guide for instructions on how to issue the individual types of Provisional Ballots.


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# **Provisional Ballots**

# "Out of Precinct" OP

ATTN: Failure to get all information on required documents could cost Voters their Vote and result in Poll Managers along with the Poll Officials who accepted the forms to appear before the Board of Election Members to explain why the information was not collected.

- This form is in the front pocket of the red Voter Assistance Station Guide Folder. All "Out of Precinct" OP voters must complete this form and Poll Officials must complete the bottom portion.
- This form is to be used when an elector has presented themselves at a polling place in the county/municipality in which he or she is registered to vote, but not at the precinct at which he or she is registered to vote.
- Any votes cast by a Provisional Ballot in the wrong precinct will not be counted unless it is cast after 5:00 P.M. and before the regular time for the closing of the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff and is accompanied by the Provisional Ballot Affidavit (Out of Precinct) form.



<u>ALWAYS</u> Refer to the procedures in the Voter Assistance Station Guide for instructions on how to issue the individual types of Provisional Ballots.

## **Voter Assistance Station**

#### **Challenged Ballots**

ALL VOTERS VOTING A CHALLENGED BALLOT WILL VOTE A PAPER BALLOT.

#### There are three kinds of challenged ballot voters:

- Voters marked on the Poll Pad as a "Potential Non-Citizen. If unable to provide one of the valid proofs of citizenship, these voters must vote a challenged ballot because at the time they registered to vote their US Citizenship could not be verified.
- Those who's right to vote has been challenged by the registrar.
- Those who's right to vote has been challenged by another voter.

Challenged ballots are essentially handled in the same manner as provisional ballots. The elector has three days to provide documentation to settle the challenge.

<u>ALWAYS</u> Refer to the procedures in the Voter Assistance Station Guide for instructions on how to issue the individual types of Challenged Ballots.

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
# Challenged Ballots

#### "Potential Non-Citizen Status"

- Those who vote a Challenged Ballot because at the time they registered to vote, their US Citizenship could not be verified.
- If the voter can provide the acceptable documentation, the poll official should tap on the Documentation Provided box on the Poll Pad screen and process the voter to vote on the Touchscreens.
- If the voter does not have a proof of citizenship document with them, a
  provisional ballot should be issued. On the Provisional Numbered List
  of Voters and the salmon outer envelope, "CHAL" should be recorded.
- The Poll Official shall provide the individual with written contact information (located in clear folder/Voter Assistance Box) so the individual may provide a copy of acceptable documentation to the registrar by personal delivery (by you or someone acting on your behalf), or by sending the copy by mail, fax, or electronic mail (if mail, fax, or electronic mail is used, you should contact the registrar's office after sending it to make sure it was received) by or before the Friday following the date of the election at 6:00PM.

<u>ALWAYS</u> Refer to the procedures in the Voter Assistance Station Guide for instructions on how to issue the individual types of Challenged Ballots.





# **Challenged Ballots**

#### **Procedures**

- Locate the Challenged Ballot Procedures in the Voter Assistance Station Guide. Make sure you read and follow the instructions step by step. It is the Poll Official's responsibility to ensure all forms are completed accurately.
- Verify that the front portion of the Voter Certificate is completed accurately, and the type of identification provided is initialed by a Poll Official (If voter does not have identification, you will place your initials beside the PI code in the provisional section on the back of the Voter Certificate).
- Initial beside the challenged code in the salmoncolored section on the back of the Voter Certificate or write "Chal" at bottom of certificate.
- Print voters' name, precinct number, and the date on the salmon-colored Provisional Ballot Envelope. Mark the type of election and write Challenged Ballot on the front of the Provisional Envelope and list the type of Challenged Ballot.







<u>ALWAYS</u> Refer to the procedures in the Voter Assistance Station Guide for instructions on how to issue the individual types of Provisional Ballots.

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# **Challenged Ballots**

#### **Procedures**

- Instruct the voter to:
  - Color the oval next to the candidate of their choice.
  - After voting fold the ballot and seal it in the white inner provisional envelope and to seal the white envelope inside the salmon outer envelope.
- While voter is voting, write the voter's name, time, precinct number, and challenged code on the Provisional/Challenged Numbered List of Voters.
- Voter will place the voted ballot, sealed in both sets of envelopes, into the orange Provisional Ballot Bag (make sure bag has been sealed).
- Give the voter the Important Notice to Voter, paperclip the Voter 's Certificate, ballot stub and any other forms completed during the process together and place them in the orange Provisional Folder.





ALWAYS Refer to the procedures in the Voter Assistance
Station Guide for instructions on how to issue the
individual types of Challenged Ballots.

# **Voter Assistance Station**

Address Changes and Hourly Inspection

#### **Change of Name or Address**

- If voter is on the electors list, but needs to change their name or address, have voter complete a voter registration form/address change form.
- Place all completed name/address changes in the Completed Paperwork Envelope located inside the red Voter Assistance Box.
- \*Please use a black pen on these forms!

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# Hourly Inspection of Units

- At least once an hour, Poll Officers shall inspect the booth for any unauthorized materials.
- Verify that the Poll Pads are in sync and are receiving power.
- Verify that the ICX BMD units are receiving power.
- · Verify that the printer has security paper.
- · Verify that the Ballot Scanner is receiving power.
- Make sure no campaign materials were left in the voting booths.
- Record the Number of Voters.
- Record the wait times for voter Check-in on Poll Pad three times during the day. Text the keyword "Time" to 45995 to receive a link to report the wait times at your location to the state.
- At Closing the wait times will need to be recorded on the Poll Pad Recap.

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#### **Ballot Scanning Station**

- · Every voter is reminded to review their ballot.
- · The voter will cast their ballot by inserting it into the scanner.
- The screen will confirm that their ballot was cast.

#### **Exit Door Station**

- Voter returns voter card.
- Voter Exits the Enclosed Space.
- Voter receives their "I'm a Georgia Voter I SECURED MY VOTE" sticker.
- Be sure to thank them for voting.

#### Ballot Scanning Station Special Situations

What if the voter does not have the Voter Access Card when they appear at the Exit Door Station?

 Instruct the voter to return to the ICX-BMD Voting Unit upon which he or she voted and retrieve the card.

What if the voter does not have their printed ballot when they appear at the Ballot Scanner Station?

- Instruct the voter to return to the ICX BMD Voting Unit upon which he or she voted to ensure they
  retrieved their ballot off the printer.
- Notify the Chief Poll Manager or Assistant Manager if additional assistance is needed.

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# Closing the Polls

At 7:00 PM

- PUBLICLY declare the polls closed promptly at 7:00 P.M.
- If voters are still in line at 7:00 P.M., mark the line and allow them to vote.
- <u>ALL</u> poll workers are required to stay at the polling place to help with the close out procedures, unless told otherwise by the Poll Manager. Please do not ask to leave early.
- One Poll Official <u>must</u> accompany the Manager to the Warehouse to deliver the required supplies on Election Night.

Managers: Please make prior arrangements with one of your Assistant Managers or Clerks to accompany you. This is a State Law, and it is mandatory.

# Closing the Polls

•MANAGERS – Follow your Election Day Checklist that is in the front of your Manager's Expanding File.

•Do not attempt to close any piece of equipment without the instructions. This is why mistakes are made. Make sure every poll worker follows the step-by-step instructions.



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# Closing the Polls


Collecting Information

- Begin ICX-BMD, Poll Pad, and Ballot Scanner close out by referring to Opening/Closing Instructions Sheet. You must wait until after the polls have officially closed to begin closeout procedures on the ICX-BMD Equipment, Poll Pads, or Ballot Scanners.
- Please be sure to follow the instructions carefully and ensure that all paperwork is completed properly.
- It is best to have one person read the instructions and one person follows the instructions as they are read to them.
- DO NOT REMOVE POSTERS FROM THE PRIVACY SHIELDS ON THE ICX-BMD UNITS. LEAVE PRIVACY SHIELDS ON UNITS.


# Closing the Polls

ICP - Scanner

- Begin Closing Procedures on the ICP Scanner immediately after last voter votes.
- PLEASE READ AND FOLLOW ALL INSTRUCTIONS. Skipping steps results in errors.
- The Poll Manager and two Poll Officials must close the ICP – Scanner using the ICP-Scanner Open/Close Procedures and the Scanner/Ballot Box Recap Form (both documents located in Manager's Expanding File/ICP-Scanner Folder/Tab 2).



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# Closing the Polls ICP Ballot Scanner

- Break the seal on the Poll Worker compartment on the ICP-Scanners
- Eject the Poll Worker Memory Card and place it, the morning Zero Tape (attached to the Scanner/Ballot Box Recap, and 2 of the result tapes in the small manila envelope labeled ICP-Scanner Memory Card and Tapes (located in the blue Manger Rolling Tote/ Blue Canvas Memory Card Bag). Put the envelope back in the Blue Memory Card Bag.
- One copy of the Result Tape goes on the yellow copy of the Unofficial Results Posting (located in the Manager Expanding File/Tab 6) & must be posted on the polling place outer door with the goldenrod copy of the Provisional Recap.
- You <u>DO NOT</u> have to reseal the Poll Worker Compartment once the Poll Worker Memory Card is removed.



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# Closing the Polls

### ICP Ballot Scanner

- Unlock and cut the seal on the Ballot Box Door (Picture 1).
- Remove all scanned ballots from bottom portion of the Ballot Box, stack them together neatly and place a rubber band or clamp around them. Note – Reach up inside the Ballot Box to ensure all ballots have been removed and check underneath the ICP-Scanner to make sure none were dropped during removal.
- You will have Write-Ins for this Election. Open the Write-In Chamber Door and remove all ballots, stack them together neatly and place a rubber band or clamp around them. Note – Reach up inside the Write-In Chamber and make sure all ballots have been removed.
- Place them in the Blue Ballot Transport Bag (Picture 2). NEW – You will no longer have the large Regular Scanned Ballot manila envelopes to put the scanned ballots in. You will have one labeled Unscanned Emergency Ballots in the event the ICP-Scanner stopped working.
- Please follow the checklist provided in the Ballot Transport Bag so that other items do not get placed inside this bag.





Picture 1



Picture 2

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ICX – BMD & Printer Closing Procedures

- Use the ICX-BMD Closing Instructions, Touchscreen Recap Form, Ballot Recap Form and Orange Poll Worker Card (located in the Manager's Expanding File/ICX-BMD Folder/Tab 3) to close the polls on units.
- PLEASE MAKE SURE ALL WORKERS READ AND FOLLOW ALL INSTRUCTIONS. Skipping steps results in errors.




Touchscreen Recap

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# Closing the Polls

## Touchscreen Recap

- Verify the seals are intact and place a checkmark in the Compartment Seals Verified/Intact column.
- Record the closing count on the appropriate line. Please match the serial number on the Touchscreen Recap to the serial number on the ICX-BMD and make sure you are recording the correct counts on the correct lines.
- Any discrepancies should be noted at the bottom of the form.
- The form must be signed and dated by the Poll Manager and two Poll Officials.



# **Closing Procedures**

### **Transport Cases**

- DO NOT REMOVE POSTERS FROM THE BLUE SHIELD OR THE BLACK PRIVACY SHIELDS ON THE ICX-BMD UNITS. LEAVE BLACK PRIVACY SHIELDS ON UNITS.
- Place the Blue Shield with the Posters on table with other supplies that our delivery crews pick up.
- Place the Black Transport Bags located on the delivery cart in front of the ICX-BMD unit by matching the Touchscreen Serial Number with the Serial Number on the front label of the Transport Bag.
- Place the Black Printer Transport Bag in front of the Printers by matching the Label on the front left of the Printer with the label located on the bottom of the Printer Transport Bag. This helps speed the process for our delivery crews.





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# Closing the Polls

# Poll Pad Closing Procedures

- Follow the Poll Pad Closing Procedures (located in Manager's Expanding File/Poll Pad Folder/Tab
   to close the polls on the Poll Pads.
- From the Hourly Inspection of Units, record the Wait Times to Check-in to Vote.
- Section A: Record Closing Time
- · Section B: Record number of Check-Ins.
- Section C: Record Total Number of voters marked as Voted on Supplemental List (only include Supplemental Voters who Voted).
- Section D: Record Total number shown on Supplemental Numbered List.
- Complete sections E & F and explain any differences, if needed.
- Return the Poll Pads and attachments to the correct Poll Pad cases and seal.
- Record Closing Seal Numbers.



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Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballot Recap Sheet

- Confirm spoiled and unaccompanied ballots are documented on the form.
- Record Total of Spoiled Ballots.
- Record Total Unaccompanied Ballots.
- The Poll Manager and two Poll Officials must sign the bottom of each Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballot Recap.
- \* Keep Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballots attached to the Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballot Recap Sheets and place them in the envelope labeled Spoiled and Unaccompanied Recap Sheets and Forms located in the Manager's Expanding file/Poll Pad Folder/Tab 4. Do not fold the forms.

Remember: For each Spoiled or Unaccompanied Ballot listed on this document you must have the printed ballot attached to it or have No Ballot Printed recorded on the form.

 The envelope containing Spoiled and Unaccompanied Recap Sheets will go in the blue Manager Rolling Tote and be returned to the Elections Warehouse Election Night.



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# **Closing Procedures**


**Ballot Recap Sheet** 


This form is used to account for all the ballots issued, printed, cast, and spoiled.

#### **Complete Section A:**

- Record the Ballots Printed at Closing Count from each Touchscreen Unit. Please be sure to record the total numbers on the correct
- Total the number of Ballots Printed from above rows.
- (a) Record Ballots Printed on BMD.
- (b) Record Emergency Ballots Issued (if none issued put Zero (0)).
- (c) Record Total Ballots Printed (a+b).
- (d) Record Total <u>Printed</u> Ballots Spoiled from Spoiled and Unaccompanied Ballot Log.
- (e) Record Total Issued and Cast (c-d).

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# Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- These forms are located in the Voter Assistance Box/Clear Provisional Folder.
- You MUST complete one for <u>each</u>
   Precinct at your Polling Place even if
   you had no Provisional/Challenged
   Voters

Ex: If your Polling Place has 3 precincts then you should have a total of 3 Provisional Numbered List with the heading completed and marked 0 Voters, if polling place has 2 precincts you should have a total of 2 Provisional Numbered List., if polling place has 1 precinct a total of 1 Provisional Numbered List.

Writing all precincts on one form is not acceptable by the State.

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# Closing the Polls

**Provisional Forms** 

### **Voted Provisional Ballots and Paperwork**

Place the following in the orange Provisional Bag:

- Voted Provisional Ballots.
- Orange Provisional Ballot folder with completed forms.
- Provisional Numbered List of Voters (one for each of your precincts, even if you had no voters).
- Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet (make sure there are <u>three signatures</u> at the bottom).
- Remember the place the goldenrod copy on the polling place door.

#### **Unused Provisional Ballots**

- Place the unused Provisional Ballots into the Blue Provisional Transport Bag and reseal it.
- · Seals are located inside the bag.





# Closing the Polls Reporting Totals

- Once close out procedures are complete and prior to leaving the polling place to return the Election Results to the Board of Elections Warehouse, Poll Managers must complete an online Election Total Report (Jennifer will text link to Poll Managers Election Day) that requires:
  - The Polling Location
  - The total number of voters from the ICP Scanner Results Tape
  - A picture of one of the printed Result Tapes from the ICP- Scanner
  - The total number of Provisional Ballots
  - A picture of the completed Provisional Recap Sheet







If unable to complete the Election Total Report Online, then you MUST call the number listed on the Phone Number Sheet (located in Manager's Expanding File/Tab 1) to report totals prior to leaving polling place.

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# Closing the Polls

**Packing Lists** 

Refer to the Packing Lists for proper return of all Election Materials.

These are the same lists that you used to inventory your supplies

Election Morning.





Manager's Check List

 Refer to Election Night Supply Return Sheet for proper return of all Election Materials.



 Managers you will be sent back to get anything that is listed on this form, and you do not have when you check in at the Board of Elections Warehouse Election Night.

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# Things to Remember

- PLEASE READ AND FOLLOW ALL INSTRUCTIONS. Skipping steps results in errors and could cost someone their vote. Those not following instructions are subject to being called in for questioning by the Board of Elections.
- Don't Panic. Everything you need is provided for you. You do not have to remember all the instructions. You just need to READ and FOLLOW the instructions. If you are missing any of the instructions or feel you need additional assistance, call our office and we will talk you through the situation.
- Most of the forms you are required to complete have been updated and each section that you are required to fill out is highlighted. Be sure to put something in each highlighted box.
- If you can't locate a voter in the Poll Pad, contact our office. If you can't reach our office, then you must offer the voter the option of voting a provisional ballot.
   <u>Never turn a voter away. Always notify the Chief Poll Manager or Assistant Manager to assist in handling any special situation, if needed.</u>
- Use the packing lists provided in the Black Supply Box and Voter Assistance Box to inventory your supplies and setup in the morning. Use the same lists to repack your supplies and close in the evening.
- Managers use the Election Night Return sheet to ensure that you bring all the required materials to the warehouse.

# Things to Remember

- . There are to be three people in the polling place at all times.
- Poll Managers must contact the Elections Office and report how many Voted Ballots and how many Provisional Ballots you have prior to leaving the polling place.
- Be sure that all recap sheets and documents are completed properly and have <u>three signatures</u> at the bottom.
- Be sure that the Poll Worker Memory Card from the Ballot Scanner is returned on Election Night.
- If you are still at your polling place after 8:30 P.M., please call the warehouse to let us know your status.
- If you have a key to your polling place, please be sure to return the room to how it was when you arrived. Remove personal items, turn out the lights, lock all the doors, set the alarm (if required).
- Be respectful to the people working at your polling location. If you have a problem with the building, you need to call us.
- Stay organized.

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# Preparing Yourself for Election Day

#### Vote Before Election Day

- On Election Day you will be busy assisting voters and it may be difficult to go to your polling location to vote.
- Request an absentee ballot by mail or vote early at one of the advance voting sites.

#### **Review your Training Materials**

Review this handout.

#### Manager will Contact you

- Your manager will call you before the election to confirm your attendance and provide information about what your assigned polling location does for lunch.
- If you are the Poll Manager, please remember to contact all workers and to let Jennifer know that you have confirmed that
  all are planning on working by Thursday, May 16, 2024.
- Make sure you check you voice mail for messages and ensure it is working properly.
- Managers Texting workers may work better than leaving a voice mail. Share your contact information with them so that
  they recognize your number and can contact you if needed.
- Poll Officials Please respond to all voice messages and texts so that the Manager is aware that you are planning to work.

#### **Get Ready the Day Before**

- Get enough rest so that you stay alert throughout Election Day.
- Pack any items you will be taking with you, including medications.
- Remember your cell phone.
- Charge your cell phone and have it turned on. Take your cell phone charger with you.
- Make sure to set your alarms. You must arrive at your assigned polling location by 5:30 AM (unless told otherwise by Poll Manager) on Election Day.

#### **Poll Official Pay**

- Poll Workers will be paid by direct deposit, and it should be done on Friday, May 31st.
- You are only paid for training if you work the election.
- New Check Policy: You will be charged the current stop payment fee for each stop-payment order initiated due to negligence. This does not apply for any check lost in the mail and never received.

# **Voting Schedule**

Date	Time	Location				
Monday, April 29, 2024 – Saturday, May 4, 2024	8:30am- 6:00pm	Linda Beazley Rm Municipal Bldg. 535 Telfair Street	Charles Evans CC 1866 Highland Ave.	Robert Howard CC 4355 Windsor Spring Rd.	Warren Rd. Rec 300 Warren Rd.	
Monday, May 6, 2024 – Saturday, May 11, 2024	8:30am- 6:00pm	Linda Beazley Rm Municipal Bldg. 535 Telfair Street	Charles Evans CC 1866 Highland Ave.	Robert Howard CC 4355 Windsor Spring Rd.	Warren Rd. Rec 300 Warren Rd.	
Sunday, May 12, 2024 (Downtown Site Only)	8:30am- 6:00pm	Municipal Buildi	Linda Beazley Room Municipal Building 535 Telfair Street			
Monday, May 13, 2024 – Friday, May 17, 2024	8:30am – 6:00pm	Linda Beezley Rm Municipal Bldg. S35 Yelfair Street	Charles Evans CC 1866 Highland Ave.	Robert Howard CC 4355 Windsor Spring Rd.	Warren Rd. Rec 300 Warren Rd.	
Tuesday, May 21, 2024 Election Day	7:00am – 7:00pm	All Election Day Sites				

# 2024 Election Calendar

ELECTION	ELECTION DATE	
Presidential Preference Primary	March 12, 2024	
General Primary & Nonpartisan Election		
	May 21, 2024	
General Primary & Nonpartisan Runoff	June 18, 2024	
General Election	Nov 5, 2024	
Federal & State General Election Runoff	Dec 3, 2024	

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# Please take a look at The Board of Elections Website:

### www.augustaga.gov/vote

- View sample ballots
- Find your polling place
- See what districts you live in
- Download and print absentee applications
- Register to vote or update your information

Remember all this information is now available for mobile devices on the Apple and Android platforms. Just search for "GA SOS" in the app store.





You can also **Like** us on Facebook, **Follow** us on Instagram and Twitter. **Share** your photos.



Richmond County Board of Elections and @ARCBOE

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### SUMMARY STATE ELECTION BOARD MEETING

Friday, September 20, 2024 9:00 A.M. Georgia State Capitol, Room 341 Atlanta, Georgia

As required by O.C.G.A.  $\S$  50-14-1(e)(2)(A), the following is a summary of the subjects acted on and the Board members present at the meeting.

### **Call to Order and Introductory Remarks**

Mr. John Fervier, as Chairman, called the State Election Board (the "Board") meeting to order at 9:09 A.M. A quorum was present for each Board action taken. The following Board members attended the meeting: Mr. John Fervier, Mrs. Sara Tindall Ghazal, Dr. Janice Johnston, Mr. Rick Jeffares, and Mrs. Janelle King.

Dr. Johnston requested to amend the agenda to add the discussion of a petition for rule amendment previously submitted by Salleigh Grubbs, Chairman Fervier denied the request, Dr. Johnston moved to appeal the decision of the Chair, Mrs. King seconded, Mr. Jeffares voted aye, Mrs. Tindall Ghazal voted nay, Chairman Fervier voted nay, motion passed 3-2.

Dr. Johnston requested that under new business, the item of "discussion of voter challenges complaints", be addressed after the Board returns from lunch. After discussion, Dr. Johnston withdrew her request.

### **Approval of Board Meeting Minutes**

The Board voted to approve the minutes of the Board meeting held on August 6 & 7, 2024, with the amendment of adding the rule citations to the rule proposals and petitions heard.

The Board voted to approve the minutes of the Board meeting held on August 19, 2024, with the amendment of adding the rule citations to the rule proposals and petitions heard.

### **Public Comment**

The following individuals provided public comment: Mason Hill, Natalie Crawford, Brook Schreiner, Barbara Gooby, Larry LeSueur, Elizabeth Hendrickson, Tate Fall, Valerie Kennedy, Marisa Pyle, Ellen Apte, Jacqueline Isaacson, Marci McCarthy, Jane Branscomb, Sam Collier, Akiva Freidlin, Mary Belle Hodges, Michael Beach, Travis Doss, Tonnie Adams, Kevin Muldowney, Kathleen Hamil, Matt Rowenczak, Milton Kidd, Joseph Kirk, Julie Adams, Ethan Compton, Sandy Schoepke, Richard Schroeder, Kristin Nabers, Saira Draper, Salleigh Grubbs, Earl Ferguson, Tracy Moore, George Balbona, Joey McKimon, Michael Kincaid.

#### **Procedure Matters**

A. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12 (Tabulating Results). Subject of Rule: Hand Counting. Presentation from Sharlene Alexander and Janelle King.

After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to adopt the proposed rule.

B. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-14-.02 (Advance Voting). Subject of Rule: Absentee Ballot Hand Counting. Presentation from Sharlene Alexander.

After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to table the rule for discussion after the November General Election.

- C. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-12-.01 (Conduct of Elections). Subject of Rule: Absentee Ballot Distinction. Presentation from David Cross. After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to table the rule for discussion after the November General Election.
- D. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-14-.11 (Mailing and Issuance of Ballots). Subject of Rule: Chain of Custody. Presentation from David Cross. After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to table the rule for discussion after the November General Election.
- E. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12 (Tabulating Results). Subject of Rule: Reconciliation Reports. Presentation from Gail Lee and Janelle King.

After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to adopt the proposed rule.

F. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-12-.19 (Preparation of the Electors List and Use of Electronic Poll Book). Subject of Rule: Voter Lists. Presentation from Lucia Frazier.

After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to reject the proposed rule.

G. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-12-.21 (County Participation and Totals Reporting). Subject of Rule: Daily Reporting. Presentation from Rick Jeffares.

After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to adopt the proposed rule.

H. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-13-.05 (Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center). Subject of Rule: Poll Watchers in Tabulating Center. Presentation from Julie Adams.

After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to adopt the proposed rule.

I. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-12-.13 (Storage of Returns). Subject of Rule: Storage of Returns. Presentation from Garland Favorito. After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to table the rule for discussion after the 2025 Legislative Session.

- J. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-14-.02 (Advance Voting). Subject of Rule: Reconciliation. Presentation from Garland Favorito.

  After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to adopt the proposed rule.
- K. Discussion and voting on proposed rule amendment to SEB Rule 183-1-12-.12 (Tabulating Results). Subject of Rule: Reconciliation. Presentation from Garland Favorito.

  After presentation and discussion of the proposal, the Board voted to adopt the proposed rule.

The Board voted continue the Old Business and New Business items on the agenda to Monday.

The Board heard the remaining individuals who signed up for public comment.

### **Recess**

The Board voted to enter recess at 4:50 P.M., and continue business at 9:30 A.M. on the following Monday.



# SUMMARY STATE ELECTION BOARD MEETING

Monday, September 23, 2024 9:30 A.M. Georgia State Capitol, Room 341 Atlanta, Georgia

As required by O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(e)(2)(A), the following is a summary of the subjects acted on and the Board members present at the meeting.

#### **Call to Order and Introductory Remarks**

Mr. John Fervier, as Chairman, called the State Election Board (the "Board") meeting to order at 9:37 A.M. A quorum was present for each Board action taken. The following Board members attended the meeting: Mr. John Fervier, Mrs. Sara Tindall Ghazal, Dr. Janice Johnston, Mr. Rick Jeffares, and Mrs. Janelle King.

#### **New Business**

### A. Petition for amendment of SEB Rule 183-1-12-.13

### **Presented by Salleigh Grubbs**

After presentation and discussion of the petition, the Board voted to initiate rulemaking procedures.

#### **Old Business**

### A. Petition for promulgation of new State Election Board Rule

### **Presented by Lucia Frazier**

After presentation and discussion of the petition, Mrs. Frazier withdrew her petition.

#### B. Petition for amendment of SEB Rule 183-1-12-.19

### **Presented by Lucia Frazier**

After presentation and discussion of the petition, the Board voted to reject the petition.

#### C. Petition for amendment of SEB Rule 183-1-15-.03

### **Presented by Marilyn Marks**

After presentation and discussion of the petition, the Board voted to reject the petition.

#### **New Business, Continued**

### **B.** Discussion of voter challenges complaints

After presentation from Ms. Marci McCarthy and discussion amongst the Board, the Board voted to request that Executive Director Mike Coan investigate the voter challenge complaints received. The Board also voted to invite county election board members to attend the October 8 SEB meeting to provide information and answer questions regarding their voter challenge policies.

### C. Report on the Monitor Team for Fulton County 2024 General Election

Chairman Fervier provided an update on the status of the monitorship. Chairman Fervier and Dr. Johnston agreed to meet with Ryan Germany and the Fulton BOE Chair to discuss the monitorship further.

The Chair announced without dissent that the remaining business items would be continued to the October 8 meeting.

# **Adjournment**

The Board voted to adjourn the meeting at 4:47 P.M.