

Thursday, April 18, 2024 at 12:53:10 Eastern Daylight Time

Subject: RE: Public Information Request (TX-SOS-24-0322) - SOS PIR 24-0351
Date: Thursday, April 18, 2024 at 12:09:57 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: GeneralCounsel
To: AO Records
CC: GeneralCounsel
Attachments: 4.18.24 Documents.zip, 4-18-24 15 Day Letter to Requestor - American Oversight PIR 24-0351.pdf, 4-18-24 15 Day Letter to OAG - American Oversight PIR 24-0351.pdf

EXTERNAL SENDER

Good morning,

Please see the attached letters, and zipped folder containing documents, in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

The responsive documents contain email addresses of the general public. An email address of a member of the public is confidential under section 552.137 of the Texas Government Code. The attorney general authorized all governmental bodies to withhold an email address of a member of the public without first requesting an attorney general opinion in Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009). Thus, this information has been redacted.

As stated in the attached letter, we require more time to continue reviewing our records and produce additional responsive information. We will provide you additional responsive documents on a rolling basis—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—with our next production by 5:00 p.m. on May 9, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2024 11:42 AM
To: 'AO Records' <records@americanoversight.org>
Cc: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: RE: Public Information Request (TX-SOS-24-0322) - SOS PIR 24-0351

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter, with enclosure, in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code. We will also provide you with responsive documents and a copy of our brief to the OAG on April 18, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: GeneralCounsel
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2024 8:38 AM
To: 'AO Records' <records@americanoversight.org>
Subject: RE: Public Information Request (TX-SOS-24-0322)

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (“Office”). This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was received by the Office via email on March 27, 2024 (the “Request”).

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. Our Office will be closed on Friday, March 29th in observance of Good Friday. You will receive a response from our Office on or before the 10th business day, April 11, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: AO Records <records@americanoversight.org>
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2024 8:47 AM
To: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: Public Information Request (TX-SOS-24-0322)

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Dear Public Information Officer:

Please find attached a request for records under the Texas Public Information Act.

Sincerely,

Marwah Adhoob | She/Her
Paralegal | American Oversight
records@americanoversight.org
www.americanoversight.org | @weareoversight

PIR: TX-SOS-24-0322

From: [REDACTED]
To: [Christina Adkins](#)
Subject: Advisory 2022-10 Ballot Security
Date: Tuesday, December 12, 2023 1:34:49 AM

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Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Can you please revisit a question we've had regarding providing surveillance of all areas where early voted ballots are processed or stored prior to the close of early voting and prior to the close of election day? As you know, some number of early voting ballot boxes are processed and stored before early vote and election day closes.

Can you please review [Advisory 2022-10](#) and sections noted below related to surveillance of all areas containing early voted in person ballots and cvrs for those ballots?

The Advisory details that surveillance includes:

- "The livestream video recording must begin with the first meeting of the CCS, EVBB, or SVC (whichever is earlier), and must continue until the local canvass of election results."
- "all areas containing voted ballots or electronic media containing cast vote records, including any areas where those ballots are qualified, processed, counted, or stored"
- "At minimum, this will include the CCS ...as well as any other locations where voted ballots and media are stored during the required timeframe."
- "If the voted ballots will be moving from one location to another location during the required timeframe, the recording should also record those voted ballots while they are in transit through hallways or other areas in the office."

For Nov 7 elections, Williamson County's early voting ballot board [started on Oct. 20](#), therefore it seems that according to the Advisory, all areas processing or storing voted ballots or cvr's must be under surveillance starting on Oct. 20th, well before early voting closes. This interpretation would really improve ballot security for early voting.

Can you please help us with this?

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or
distribute this email.**

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2024 3:54 PM
To: GeneralCounsel; Christina Adkins
Subject: ES&S Form 101s - SoS Open Records Request

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well.

Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide ES&S's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2018 - 2023.

- EVS 6.3.0.0
- EVS 6.2.0.0
- EVS 6.0.3.0
- EVS 6.1.1.0
- EVS 6.1.0.0
- EVS 6.4.0.0
- EVS 6.0.2.0
- EVS 6.0.0.0

Thank you for your help.

Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.

From: GeneralCounsel
Sent: Thursday, March 7, 2024 7:56 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: GeneralCounsel
Subject: FW: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233
Attachments: Verity Voting 2.4 Form 101_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 2.5 Form 101_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 2.7 Form 101_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 1.0 Form 101_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 2.0 Form 101_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 2.3 Form 101_Responses.pdf

Good morning,

We sent the information to you on February 29th.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Sent: Thursday, February 29, 2024 11:27 AM
To: [REDACTED] >
Cc: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: RE: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

Good morning,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"). Please see the attached documents responsive to your request for information under the PIA.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: GeneralCounsel
Sent: Friday, February 16, 2024 10:45 AM
To: [REDACTED] >
Subject: RE: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (“Office”). This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on February 14, 2024, and is considered received on February 15, 2024 (the “Request”).

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. Our Office will be closed on Monday, February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on or before the 10th business day, March 1, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: [REDACTED] >
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 6:48 PM
To: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

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Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide Hart InterCivic's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2015 - 2024.

- Verity Voting 2.7
- Verity Voting 2.5
- Verity Voting 2.4
- Verity Voting 2.3
- Verity Voting 2.0
- Verity Voting 1.0

Thank you for your help. Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

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Verity Voting 2.4 Certification Application

Form 101 Responses

Explain How the Voting System:

1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only (Specific to Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer Duo)
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not
 - Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
 - Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

Safety. Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing.

Accuracy. Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, “All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass.”

Efficiency. Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network.

Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

9. Permits write-in voting;

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo, that voter will select the “Write-In” option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to “Include in Straight Party”. If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and

Verity Touch Writer and Verity Touch Writer Duo, the Ballot Marking Devices, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is accessible through the Count application interface and can be physically printed or exported as a PDF file.

14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects "Provisional" for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code with Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the poll worker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and

Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

Printing of Audit Logs

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.

Virtex Enterprises, the contract manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001:2008 standards certified.



Verity Voting 2.5 Certification Application

Form 101 Responses

Explain How the Voting System:

1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only (Specific to Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer Duo)
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not
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In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

Safety. Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing.

Accuracy. Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, "All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass."

Efficiency. Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network.

Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

9. Permits write-in voting;

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo, that voter will select the “Write-In” option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to “Include in Straight Party”. If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and

Verity Touch Writer and Verity Touch Writer Duo, the Ballot Marking Devices, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is accessible through the Count application interface and can be physically printed or exported as a PDF file.

14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects "Provisional" for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code with Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the poll worker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and

Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

Printing of Audit Logs

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.

Virtex Enterprises, the contract manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001:2008 standards certified.



Verity Voting 2.7 Certification Application

Form 101 Responses

Explain How the Voting System:

1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only (Specific to Touch Writer Duo)
- Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not
 - Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
 - Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

Safety. Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing.

Accuracy. Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, “All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass.”

Efficiency. Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network.

Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

9. Permits write-in voting;

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo, that voter will select the "Write-In" option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to "Include in Straight Party". If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and

Verity Touch Writer and Verity Touch Writer Duo, the Ballot Marking Devices, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is accessible through the Count application interface and can be physically printed or exported as a PDF file.

14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects "Provisional" for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code with Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the poll worker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and

Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

Printing of Audit Logs

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.

Virtex Enterprises, the contract manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001:2008 standards certified.



Verity Voting 1.0 Certification Application

Form 101 Responses

Explain How the Voting System:

1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Build (the election definition software application that is also used to print ballots) includes a user-customizable option that allows election administrators to decide whether to include anonymous unique identifiers on ballots, or not
- If users want to completely leave off unique identifiers of any kind on printed ballots, they can – in this way, no ballot has a unique or sequential number of any kind, human-readable or not
- If users want to use unique identifiers in order to disallow scanning of duplicate ballots, the unique identifiers are randomized, in a non-sequential way
- If users want to use unique identifiers in order to disallow scanning of unique ballots, users can turn off human-readability of any numbers
- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (BMD, Touch Writer):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only
- Verity Touch Writer includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch Writer employs distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not

- Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
- Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

Safety. Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Global Solutions, Verity Voting passed this testing. In addition, a variety of environmental and safety hardware test reports from accredited third-party examiners are included in our EAC Technical Data Package (TDP), which has been included with this application.

Accuracy. Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Global Solutions as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, “All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass.”

Efficiency. Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch Writer and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to

minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network. Verity components that can use LAN networks include Build, Central, and Count.

Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Build application.

6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch Writer and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch Writer to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

9. Permits write-in voting;

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch Writer, that voter will select the "Write-In" option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to "Include in Straight Party". If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight

Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for Touch Writer and Scan are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and

Verity Touch Writer, the Ballot Marking Device, provides a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is printed on a line printer.

14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and

Verity Touch Writer allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and

Not applicable.

16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and

Not applicable.

17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)

Not applicable.

18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 29, 32, 48, and 52).

19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.

TS3 Technology, the manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001 certified.



Verity Voting 2.0 Certification Application

Form 101 Responses

Explain How the Voting System:

1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Build (the election definition software application that is also used to print ballots) includes a user-customizable option that allows election administrators to decide whether to include anonymous unique identifiers on ballots, or not
- If users want to completely leave off unique identifiers of any kind on printed ballots, they can – in this way, no ballot has a unique or sequential number of any kind, human-readable or not
- If users want to use unique identifiers in order to disallow scanning of duplicate ballots, the unique identifiers are randomized, in a non-sequential way
- If users want to use unique identifiers in order to disallow scanning of unique ballots, users can turn off human-readability of any numbers
- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not

- Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
- Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

Safety. Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing. In addition, a variety of environmental and safety hardware test reports from accredited third-party examiners are included in our EAC Technical Data Package (TDP), which has been included with this application.

Accuracy. Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, “All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass.”

Efficiency. Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they

can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network. Verity components that can use LAN networks include Data, Build, Central, and Count.

Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;
Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch Writer to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

9. Permits write-in voting;

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer, that voter will select the "Write-In" option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to "Include in Straight Party". If this

option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and

Verity Touch Writer, the Ballot Marking Device, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is printed on a line printer.

14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects “Provisional” for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code with Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the pollworker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and

Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

Printing of Audit Logs

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and
Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.
TS3 Technology, the manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001 certified.



Verity Voting 2.3 Certification Application

Form 101 Responses

Explain How the Voting System:

1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only (Specific to Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer Duo)
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not
 - Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
 - Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report

them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

Safety. Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing.

Accuracy. Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, “All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass.”

Efficiency. Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support

others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network.

Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch

Writer/Touch Writer Duo to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

9. Permits write-in voting;

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo, that voter will select the “Write-In” option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to “Include in Straight Party”. If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and

reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and

Verity Touch Writer and Verity Touch Writer Duo, the Ballot Marking Devices, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is accessible through the Count application interface and can be physically printed or exported as a PDF file.

14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects "Provisional" for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code with Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the poll worker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and

Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

Printing of Audit Logs

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.

Virtex Enterprises, the contract manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001:2008 standards certified.

From: [Marcia Watson](#)
To: [Christina Adkins](#)
Subject: Fwd: Election Integrity – Williamson County, TX
Date: Thursday, February 15, 2024 1:52:14 PM

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FYI

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Marcia Watson [REDACTED] >
Sent: Monday, February 12, 2024 10:38:23 AM
To: senatorbobhall@gmail.com <senatorbobhall@gmail.com>
Subject: Election Integrity – Williamson County, TX

Senator Hall

Please review Election Integrity Project Aware Overview and Parts 1-4. The WilCo DA Shawn Dick asked us to provide this info to his office for investigation and he sent it to the TxOAG Investigator who has been working with me.

https://www.counties.citizensdefendingfreedom.com/tx-williamson/resource_category/election-integrity/

Our WilCo CDF Election Integrity Team also put together this video and presented it to our CEC to help educate them on why the importance of pre-printed, sequentially numbered ballots starting with 1.

<https://rumble.com/v4ayd89-the-security-feature-of-ballot-numbering.html>

Marcia Watson
512-573-9506

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 6:48 PM
To: GeneralCounsel
Subject: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

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Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide Hart InterCivic's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2015 - 2024.

- Verity Voting 2.7
- Verity Voting 2.5
- Verity Voting 2.4
- Verity Voting 2.3
- Verity Voting 2.0
- Verity Voting 1.0

Thank you for your help. Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

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From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55 PM
To: Christina Adkins
Subject: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

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Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for your help.
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, February 5, 2024 12:46 PM
To: GeneralCounsel; Christina Adkins
Subject: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

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Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552. Please provide the following information regarding certification of electronic pollbooks in Texas.

- A. For each vendor and pollbook system noted below, please provide the
- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
 - List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
 - A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex Precinct Central 4.2.2 and 4.5.2.4
Votec VoteSafe 1.0.34, 1.3.77 and 1.3.85
Knowink Poll Pad 2.4.9, 2.5.2 and 3.0.0
ES&S ExpressPoll 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.0.

B. For each electronic pollbook vendor noted below, that may have been certified after 2022, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex
Votec
Knowink
ES&S

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, January 17, 2024 7:45 PM
To: GeneralCounsel
Cc: Christina Adkins
Subject: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219
Attachments: Pressley Response_SoS Clar_SOS PIR No. 23-1219.pdf

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Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. This attached letter responds to your December 28, 2023 request for clarification for SOS PIR No. 23-01219. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact my office at (313) 720-5471 or at the e-mail address listed above.

Thank you in advance for your help.
Copying Mrs. Adkins.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.

On Thursday, December 28, 2023 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM

To: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>; Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

Subject: Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

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Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

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On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel
<GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

To: Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

Subject: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for your help.
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

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January 17, 2024

Dr. Laura Pressley

Secretary of State
Executive Division
Capitol Building, 1E.8
Austin, TX 78711-2697

Re: Request for records, considered received: December 11, 2023 (SOS PIR No. 23-1219)

Sent via Electronic Mail to: GeneralCounsel@SOS.Texas.Gov

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. This letter responds to your December 28, 2023 request for clarification for SOS PIR No. 23-01219.

To note, we originally requested the following documents:

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Our response to your request for clarification of items #1 and #2 are as follows:

1. With respect to any e-mails or other written communications to which the Request extends, are you seeking (1) communications that the Secretary of State and staff sent to or received from *external* sources (*i.e.*, individuals and entities outside the Secretary of State's office) regarding the meeting(s) referenced in the Request; (2) *internal* communications exchanged solely among Secretary of State employees before or after the specified meeting(s); or (3) both?

Our response: We are seeking all types of communications –

(A) communications that the Secretary of State and staff sent to or received from *external* sources (*i.e.*, individuals and entities outside the Secretary of State's office) regarding the meeting(s) referenced in the Request;

(B) *internal* communications exchanged solely among Secretary of State employees before or after the specified meeting(s); and

(C) any other types of communications exchanged that are not comprehended above.

2. As to any standalone documents, is the Request limited to materials that Secretary of State staff received from *external* sources in connection with the meeting(s) referenced in the Request, or does your inquiry also encompass *internal* Secretary of State documents prepared in advance of or after the meeting(s)?

Our response: We are seeking all types of communications –

(A) materials that Secretary of State staff received from *external* sources in connection with the meeting(s) referenced in the Request;

(B) *internal* Secretary of State documents prepared in advance of or after the meeting(s); and

(C) any other types of communications exchanged that are not comprehended above.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact my office at (313) 720-5471 or at the e-mail address listed above.

Thank you in advance for your help.

Regards,



Dr. Laura Pressley, Ph.D.

Cc: Christina Adkins (CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)

From: [REDACTED]
To: [Christina Adkins](#)
Subject: Re: Advisory 2022-10 Ballot Security
Date: Wednesday, January 3, 2024 4:10:26 PM

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Hello Christina,

Hope you are doing well.
Can you please review the email below and provide guidance moving forward?

Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

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On Tuesday, December 12, 2023 1:34 AM, [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Can you please revisit a question we've had regarding providing surveillance of all areas where early voted ballots are processed or stored prior to the close of early voting and prior to the close of election day? As you know, some number of early voting ballot boxes are processed and stored before early vote and election day closes.

Can you please review [Advisory 2022-10](#) and sections noted below related to surveillance of all areas containing early voted in person ballots and cvrs for those ballots?

The Advisory details that surveillance includes:

- "The livestream video recording must begin with the first meeting of the CCS, EVBB, or SVC (whichever is earlier), and must continue until the local canvass of election results."
- "all areas containing voted ballots or electronic media containing cast vote records, including any areas where those ballots are qualified, processed, counted, or stored"
- "At minimum, this will include the CCS ...as well as any other locations where voted ballots and media are stored during the required timeframe."

"If the voted ballots will be moving from one location to another location during the required timeframe, the recording should also record those voted ballots while they are in transit through hallways or other areas in the office."

For Nov 7 elections, Williamson County's early voting ballot board [started on Oct. 20](#), therefore it seems that according to the Advisory, all areas processing or storing voted ballots or cvr's must be under surveillance starting on Oct. 20th, well before early voting closes. This interpretation would really improve ballot security for early voting.

Can you please help us with this?

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
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313-720-5471

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From: [Christina Adkins](#)
To: [REDACTED]
Bcc: [Elections Internet](#); [Christina Adkins](#)
Subject: RE: Advisory 2022-10 Ballot Security
Date: Thursday, February 15, 2024 2:44:38 PM
Attachments: [image.png](#)

Laura,

What you stated below is still consistent with our interpretation of the law. Let me know if you have any other questions.

Thanks,

Christina Worrell Adkins

Director of Elections

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

512-463-9859 (direct) | 1.800.252.VOTE (8683)

elections@sos.texas.gov | www.sos.texas.gov

For Voter Related Information, please visit:



The information contained in this email is intended to provide advice and assistance in election matters per §31.004 of the Texas Election Code. It is not intended to serve as a legal opinion for any matter. Please review the law yourself, and consult with an attorney when your legal rights are involved.

From: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] >

Sent: Wednesday, January 3, 2024 4:10 PM

To: Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

Subject: Re: Advisory 2022-10 Ballot Security

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313-720-5471

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[REDACTED] wrote:

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during the required timeframe, the recording should also record those voted ballots while they are in transit through hallways or other areas in the office."

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VOTE TEXAS.GOV

POWERED BY THE **TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE**



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, March 5, 2024 11:34 AM
To: Bridgette.Escobedo@wilco.org; Christina Adkins
Cc: Movin-OnTX; Shawn.Dick@wilco.org; Marcia Watson
Subject: Re: Obstruction of a poll Watcher in a polling location

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

Dear Bridgette and Christina,

We are in dire need of a communication that watchers are entitled to view election records at the *locations they are serving* according to Tex. Elec. Code 33.056(c). Currently, we have SoS attorneys that have confirmed watchers are entitled to view election records at the locations they are serving regardless of what party appointed them.

Tex. Elec. Code 33.061 provides criminal penalties of a Class A misdemeanor for knowingly obstructing watchers. We believe what has been reported below at The Oaks and Randalls in Georgetown are obstructions and we do not want to file complaints with law enforcement. Please recall the statute under Chapter 32, Election Judges and Clerks and under the Subchapter for Eligibility, Tex. Elec. Code 32.0552 states:

Sec. 32.0552. INELIGIBILITY OF PERSON CONVICTED OF ELECTION OFFENSE.

A person is ineligible to serve as an election judge or clerk in an election if the person has been finally convicted of an offense in connection with conduct directly attributable to an election.

It is my interpretation that someone, a clerk or judge, finally convicted of obstruction will be ineligible to serve in the future - which includes early voting clerk, the elections administrator if they are informing their subordinates to obstruct. We pray you correct these offenses.

Regards,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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On Tuesday, March 5, 2024 10:57 AM, Movin-OnTX <Movin-OnTX@proton.me> wrote:

Good morning,

My name is Terry Soll, I am a poll watcher in Williamson County. Two locations, the Oaks and Williams Dr Randalls have refused access to the democrat machines. Stating that the poll watcher needed another set of paperwork with a Democrat appointment. Sec 33.056 states a watcher is entitled to observe any activity at the location..... a watcher is allowed to inspect the returns and other records prepared by the election officers..... A watcher may not be prohibited from making notes while on duty.....

A gentleman called me at 8:47 Am this morning, March 5th supposedly from the Secretary of State hotline. The noise in the background was so bad I should having talking to the person behind him. It was impossible to hear him. I asked that he send me an email to answer my question on this obstruction.

I had talked to Lena Proft on Friday, March 1 on whether or not poll watchers could document information from Democrat and Republican machines. She said Yes.

The EPB (Electronic Poll Books) in the polling locations are all connected. The voter Checked in numbers from each EPB in the room add up to the Cumulative count of how many ballots should be in the DS200 tabulators.

There is no way to reconcile the numbers at the end of the day unless both Democrat and Republican numbers are viewed.

Wellspring Methodist at 9:53

Democrat EPBs

EPB 199 8 voters checked in 42 voters cumulative count

EPB 200 3 voters checked in 42 voters cumulative count

DS200 9 Public Count with voters at Express voting machines

Republican EPBs

EPB 197 16 voters checked in 42 voters cumulative count

EPB 198 16 voters checked in 41 voters cumulative count

DS 200 31 Public Count with voters at Express voting machines

As you see the normal way to reconcile using the cumulative count will be a problem for this election. The cumulative count includes both Republican and Democrat voters.

The poll watcher must be able to verify that numbers are consistent in the polling location, or we must assume there are problems because the numbers do not add up. Obstructing the poll watcher from gathering data will only expand the problems at the end of the day.

Bridgette Escobedo, EA, has already told one judge not to let the poll watcher view the machines. This is not a good ruling.

Terry Soll

Williamson County Poll Watcher Coordinator

Movin-OnTX@proton.me

210-323-5346

There are no Mistakes Only Opportunities to be Creative

Sent with Proton Mail secure email.

From: Jenny Blount [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2023 3:06 PM
To: GeneralCounsel
Subject: Re: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

Good Afternoon,

This is a lot of money for just one county. I want to reconsider requesting this programming for the entire state and would like a quote for that as a comparison. Thank you.

Respectfully,

JENNY BLOUNT
Election Integrity Lead
Tarrant, Texas
512-658-7909 [REDACTED]



From: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Sent: Monday, November 20, 2023 10:31 AM
To: Jenny Blount [REDACTED] >
Cc: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: RE: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter, with enclosure, in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: Jenny Blount [REDACTED] >
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 3:32 PM
To: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: Re: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

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Good Afternoon,

Thank you for your response. I will narrow my request as follows:

Please provide a list of people registered to vote in Tarrant County, Texas (as of the date you process this information) who for which the system does not reflect Texas driver's license information. I would like to see the following fields in the results:

Full Name

DOB (or month/year if the day is private)

Complete Address

VUID #

Date the information was processed for this PIR

XLXS or CSV format please

Please provide an estimate of the cost. I am surprised this data is not maintained as a "living list".

Since January 2011, Texas has sent a very large number of voter registration applications, where no photo ID was provided, to

HAVV so they can be verified by SSN. That number is (as of today) 21,443,466. This is more than double of any other state. As a native Texan, I am concerned about this high volume of applications that are bypassing the photo ID requirement.

I am grateful for your work in keeping Texas elections safe, secure and transparent. Here is the HAVV site to which I referred.

<https://www.ssa.gov/open/havv/havv-jan2011-todate.html>

Thank you,

JENNY BLOUNT

Election Integrity Lead

Tarrant, Texas

512-658-7909 / [REDACTED]



From: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 9:30 AM

To: Jenny Blount [REDACTED]

Cc: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

Subject: RE: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office"). This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office on October 23, 2023 and forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response.

We are processing your inquiry in accordance with the PIA. To that end, we may be able to retrieve information from the State's voter registration database identifying voters who are registered to vote (as of the date of the search) for which the system does not reflect driver's license information. (The system will not indicate whether a voter listed a driver's license number on his or her original voter registration application, as referenced in your request.) However, this would require customized programming in the voter registration database and would be available only at a significant cost that covers the programming and manipulation of data. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.231. Additionally, the statewide voter registration system is a living database, constantly updated with information reported by county officials on a daily basis; it is not a historical record. As such, any information that is extracted for a request is current as of the date that our search is performed. We are unable to provide information from the statewide voter registration list "as of" any specified year.

Given these limitations, we ask that you clarify whether—and to what extent—you are still seeking to obtain from this Office any of the information identified in your October 23 email. If you would like for us to provide you a statement of estimated costs for retrieving the requested information (or any portion thereof), please let us know. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.2615

CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.222

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: Jenny Blount <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2023 2:47 PM
To: Elections Internet <Elections@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: PIR Attached

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Thank you

JENNY BLOUNT
Election Integrity Lead
Tarrant, Texas
512-658-7909 / [REDACTED]



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External Message - Please be cautious when opening links or attachments in this email

From: GeneralCounsel
Sent: Monday, November 20, 2023 10:32 AM
To: 'Jenny Blount'
Cc: GeneralCounsel
Subject: RE: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034
Attachments: 11-20-23 Statement of Estimated Costs - Blount 23-1034.pdf; Attachment A for Request Regarding Cost Estimate.pdf

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter, with enclosure, in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: Jenny Blount <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 3:32 PM
To: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: Re: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

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Good Afternoon,

Thank you for your response. I will narrow my request as follows:

Please provide a list of people registered to vote in Tarrant County, Texas (as of the date you process this information) who for which the system does not reflect Texas driver's license information. I would like to see the following fields in the results:

Full Name

DOB (or month/year if the day is private)

Complete Address

VUID #

Date the information was processed for this PIR

XLXS or CSV format please

Please provide an estimate of the cost. I am surprised this data is not maintained as a "living list".

Since January 2011, Texas has sent a very large number of voter registration applications, where no photo ID was provided, to

HAVV so they can be verified by SSN. That number is (as of today) 21,443,466. This is more than double of any other state. As a native Texan, I am concerned about this high volume of applications that are bypassing the photo ID requirement.

I am grateful for your work in keeping Texas elections safe, secure and transparent. Here is the HAVV site to which I referred.

<https://www.ssa.gov/open/havv/havv-jan2011-todate.html>

Thank you,

JENNY BLOUNT
Election Integrity Lead
Tarrant, Texas
512-658-7909 / [REDACTED]



From: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 9:30 AM
To: Jenny Blount [REDACTED] >
Cc: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: RE: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the “Office”). This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was sent to the Office on October 23, 2023 and forwarded to the Office’s General Counsel for response.

We are processing your inquiry in accordance with the PIA. To that end, we may be able to retrieve information from the State’s voter registration database identifying voters who are registered to vote (as of the date of the search) for which the system does not reflect driver’s license information. (The system will not indicate whether a voter listed a driver’s license number on his or her original voter registration application, as referenced in your request.) However, this would require customized programming in the voter registration database and would be available only at a significant cost that covers the programming and manipulation of data. *See* Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.231. Additionally, the statewide voter registration system is a living database, constantly updated with information reported by county officials on a daily basis; it is not a historical record. As such, any information that is extracted for a request is current as of the date that our search is performed. We are unable to provide information from the statewide voter registration list “as of” any specified year.

Given these limitations, we ask that you clarify whether—and to what extent—you are still seeking to obtain from this Office any of the information identified in your October 23 email. If you would like for us to provide you a statement of estimated costs for retrieving the requested information (or any portion thereof), please let us know. *See* Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.2615

CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.222

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: Jenny Blount [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2023 2:47 PM
To: Elections Internet <Elections@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: PIR Attached

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Thank you

JENNY BLOUNT
Election Integrity Lead
Tarrant, Texas
512-658-7909 / [REDACTED]



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The State of Texas

Executive Division
Capitol Building, 1E.8
P.O. Box 12887
Austin, Texas 78711-2887



Phone: 512-463-5770
Fax: 512-475-2761
Dial 7-1-1 For Relay Services
www.sos.texas.gov

Jane Nelson
Secretary of State

November 20, 2023

Jenny Blount

Sent via Electronic Mail to: [REDACTED]

Re: Clarified request for records, received: November 6, 2023 (SOS PIR No. 23-1034)

Dear Ms. Blount:

This letter responds to your clarified request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the “Office”) via email on November 6, 2023 (the “November 6 Request”). Your original request was received by the Office via email on October 23, 2023 (the “October 23 Request”).

In the October 23 Request, you indicated that you were seeking certain identifying information regarding registered voters for which the State’s voter registration database does not reflect driver’s license information. On November 6, 2023, we asked you to clarify or narrow the scope of your inquiry. Later that same day, you clarified that you are requesting “a list of people registered to vote in Tarrant County, Texas (as of the date you process this information) who for which the system does not reflect Texas driver’s license information.”

NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.231 OF THE TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE

Pursuant to Section 552.231 of the Texas Government Code, we have determined that (1) responding to the November 6 Request will require programming or manipulation of data; and (2) the information responsive to the November 6 Request can be made available only at a cost that covers the programming and manipulation of data. In addition, we have determined that the Office lacks the in-house programming capabilities to provide you the responsive information you have requested. To provide such information in the requested form, Civix—the entity with whom the Secretary of State has an existing contract to host and maintain Texas’s statewide voter registration database—would have to write customized programming to retrieve and process the information responsive to the November 6 Request.¹ Civix anticipates that it would take approximately 7 hours to complete this work, and Civix has indicated that it would charge the Office a contracted rate of \$234.00 per hour for project management, \$185.00 per hour for development work, and \$174.00 per hour for quality assurance to fulfill the November 6 Request.

¹ The full date of birth (or month/year of birth) of a voter is considered confidential under the Public Information Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101. As such, this statement of estimated costs takes into account that the information retrieved by the Office’s voter registration system vendor would include only a voter’s year of birth.

Statement of Estimated Time and Costs:

Pursuant to Sections 552.231 and 552.2615 of the Texas Government Code, the responsive information can only be made available to you in the requested form at a cost that covers the programming and manipulation of the data, resulting in the imposition of a charge that exceeds \$40. And, consistent with Section 552.263 of the Texas Government Code, because the cost is estimated to exceed \$100, we will require a cash deposit of the entire estimated cost for responding to your request prior to providing any responsive information. As noted in the list of charges below, the estimated cost of responding to your request is **\$1,322.00**.

Itemized List of Charges:

Description	Qty x Price	Total
Labor charge per hour for programming and processing of data – Project Management	1 x \$234.00	\$ 234.00
Labor charge per hour for programming and processing of data – Development	4 x \$185.00	\$ 740.00
Labor charge per hour for programming and processing of data – Quality Assurance	2 x \$174.00	<u>\$ 348.00</u>
	Total	<u>\$1,322.00</u>

Additionally, as further detailed in Attachment A to this letter, pursuant to Section 552.2615 of the Texas Government Code, you must take certain steps in order to avoid the withdrawal of the November 6 Request. Specifically, Section 552.2615 requires:

- (1) the requestor to provide the governmental body with a mailing or electronic mail address to receive the itemized statement (it is the requestor's choice which type of address to provide);
- (2) the Office of the Secretary of State to inform the requestor that the request is considered automatically withdrawn if the requestor does not respond in writing to the itemized statement within 10 business days after the date the statement is sent to the requestor. This response is limited by law to a response that the requestor will accept the estimated charges, will modify the request in response to the itemized statement, or has sent to the Cost Rules Administrator at the Office of the Attorney General a complaint alleging that the requestor has been overcharged for the requested public information; and
- (3) the requestor to respond to the statement by delivering the written response to the governmental body either by mail, in person, or by electronic mail.

Separately, Section 552.263(f) of the Texas Government Code provides that a requestor “who fails to make a deposit or post a bond required . . . before the 10th business day after the date the deposit or bond is required is considered to have withdrawn the request for the copy of the public information that precipitated the requirement of the deposit or bond.”

Finally, as provided in Attachment A, if this Office determines at a later date, but before making the copy of the public information available, that the estimated charges will exceed the charges

detailed in the written itemized statement by 20 percent or more, this Office will send a written updated itemized statement that details all the estimated charges that will be imposed, including any allowable charges for labor or personnel costs.

We have provided this statement to you via electronic mail because that is the method in which you have chosen to communicate with us. If you would like to receive the statement by mail, please let us know. If you agree to accept the estimated charges, please do so in writing. To pay the charges by credit card, please respond with a phone number and we will contact you to obtain your payment information. The Office does not accept payment information via email. Alternatively, you may deliver a copy of this letter with a check or money order for the amount to the following address:

Mailing Address:
Office of the Secretary of State
Executive Division
P.O. Box 12697
Austin, TX 78711-2697
Attn: Adam Bitter, General Counsel

Delivery Address:
Office of the Secretary of State
Executive Division
1100 Congress Avenue
Room 1E.8
Austin, TX 78701
Attn: Adam Bitter, General Counsel

Email: generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov

The check or money order should be made payable to “Secretary of State.” We will provide you any responsive information—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—as soon as reasonably possible upon receipt of your payment.

If you have any questions or would like to discuss or further modify your request, please do not hesitate to contact our office at (512) 463-5770 or at the email address below.

Sincerely,



Adam Bitter
General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State
generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov
AB/jw

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT A

Rights and Responsibilities of a Requestor When Presented with an Itemized Estimated Statement of Costs

Pursuant to Section 552.2615 of the Texas Government Code, you must:

- Provide this office with a mailing or electronic mail address for the purpose of receiving the itemized statement and any updated itemized statement. It is your choice as to which type of address to provide this office.
- Respond in writing to the itemized statement or any updated itemized statement within ten (10) days after the date the statement is sent by this office and inform this office that:
 1. You will accept the estimated charges;
 2. You are modifying the request in response to the itemized statement; or
 3. You have sent a complaint to the Attorney General alleging that you have been overcharged for being provided with a copy of the public information requested.

If this office determines at a later date, but before making the copy of the public information available, that the estimated charges will exceed the charges detailed in the written itemized statement by 20 percent or more, this office will send a written updated itemized statement that details all the estimated charges that will be imposed, including any allowable charges for labor or personnel costs.

NOTICE: Your request will be considered automatically withdrawn if you fail to respond within ten (10) business days after the date the statement of itemized estimated costs is: (1) delivered to you in person; (2) deposited by this office in the United States mail; or (3) transmitted by electronic mail if you have agreed to receive the statement by electronic mail.

You may respond to the itemized statement of estimated costs sent to you by delivering your written response by mail, in person, or by electronic mail. The addresses are as follows:

Mailing Address:

Office of the Secretary of State
Executive Division
PO Box 12887
Austin, TX 78711-2887
Attn: Adam Bitter, General Counsel

Delivery Address:

Office of the Secretary of State
Executive Division
1100 Congress Avenue
Room 1E.8
Austin, TX 78701
Attn: Adam Bitter, General Counsel

Email: generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov

From: GeneralCounsel
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2023 9:04 AM
To: 'Jenny Blount'
Cc: GeneralCounsel
Subject: RE: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034
Attachments: 12-12-23 Modified Statement of Estimated Costs - Blount 23-1034.pdf; Attachment A for Request Regarding Cost Estimate.pdf

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter, with enclosure, in response to your modified request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: Jenny Blount [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2023 3:06 PM
To: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: Re: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

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Good Afternoon,

This is a lot of money for just one county. I want to reconsider requesting this programming for the entire state and would like a quote for that as a comparison. Thank you.

Respectfully,

JENNY BLOUNT
Election Integrity Lead
Tarrant, Texas
512-658-7909 [REDACTED]



From: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Sent: Monday, November 20, 2023 10:31 AM
To: Jenny Blount [REDACTED]

Cc: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

Subject: RE: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

Good morning,

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Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: Jenny Blount [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 3:32 PM
To: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: Re: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

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Good Afternoon,

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Please provide a list of people registered to vote in Tarrant County, Texas (as of the date you process this information) who for which the system does not reflect Texas driver's license information. I would like to see the following fields in the results:

Full Name

DOB (or month/year if the day is private)

Complete Address

VUID #

Date the information was processed for this PIR

XLXS or CSV format please

Please provide an estimate of the cost. I am surprised this data is not maintained as a "living list".

Since January 2011, Texas has sent a very large number of voter registration applications, where no photo ID was provided, to

HAVV so they can be verified by SSN. That number is (as of today) 21,443,466. This is more than double of any other state. As a native Texan, I am concerned about this high volume of applications that are bypassing the photo ID requirement.

I am grateful for your work in keeping Texas elections safe, secure and transparent. Here is the HAVV site to which I referred.

<https://www.ssa.gov/open/havv/havv-jan2011-todate.html>

Thank you,

JENNY BLOUNT
Election Integrity Lead
Tarrant, Texas
512-658-7909 / [REDACTED]



From: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 9:30 AM
To: Jenny Blount [REDACTED] >
Cc: GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: RE: PIR Attached - SOS PIR 23-1034

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the “Office”). This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was sent to the Office on October 23, 2023 and forwarded to the Office’s General Counsel for response.

We are processing your inquiry in accordance with the PIA. To that end, we may be able to retrieve information from the State’s voter registration database identifying voters who are registered to vote (as of the date of the search) for which the system does not reflect driver’s license information. (The system will not indicate whether a voter listed a driver’s license number on his or her original voter registration application, as referenced in your request.) However, this would require customized programming in the voter registration database and would be available only at a significant cost that covers the programming and manipulation of data. *See* Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.231. Additionally, the statewide voter registration system is a living database, constantly updated with information reported by county officials on a daily basis; it is not a historical record. As such, any information that is extracted for a request is current as of the date that our search is performed. We are unable to provide information from the statewide voter registration list “as of” any specified year.

Given these limitations, we ask that you clarify whether—and to what extent—you are still seeking to obtain from this Office any of the information identified in your October 23 email. If you would like for us to provide you a statement of estimated costs for retrieving the requested information (or any portion thereof), please let us know. *See* Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.2615

CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.222

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

From: Jenny Blount [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2023 2:47 PM
To: Elections Internet <Elections@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: PIR Attached

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Thank you

JENNY BLOUNT
Election Integrity Lead
Tarrant, Texas
512-658-7909 / [REDACTED]



External Message - Please be cautious when opening links or attachments in this email

External Message - Please be cautious when opening links or attachments in this email

The State of Texas

Executive Division
Capitol Building, 1E.8
P.O. Box 12887
Austin, Texas 78711-2887



Phone: 512-463-5770
Fax: 512-475-2761
Dial 7-1-1 For Relay Services
www.sos.texas.gov

Jane Nelson
Secretary of State

December 12, 2023

Jenny Blount

Sent via Electronic Mail to: [REDACTED]

Re: Modified request for records, received: November 28, 2023 (SOS PIR No. 23-1034)

Dear Ms. Blount:

This letter responds to your modified request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the “Office”) via email on November 28, 2023 (the “November 28 Request”). Your original request was received by the Office via email on October 23, 2023 (the “October 23 Request”), and a clarified request was received by the Office via email on November 6, 2023 (the “November 6 Request”).

In the October 23 Request, you indicated that you were seeking certain identifying information regarding registered voters for which the State’s voter registration database does not reflect driver’s license information. On November 6, 2023, we asked you to clarify or narrow the scope of your inquiry. Later that same day, you clarified that you are requesting “a list of people registered to vote in Tarrant County, Texas (as of the date you process this information) who for which the system does not reflect Texas driver’s license information.” On November 20, 2023, we provided you with a statement of estimated costs to respond to the November 6 Request pursuant to Sections 552.231 and 552.2615 of the Texas Government Code. In your November 28 response, you modified your inquiry to seek the same type of information for the entire State of Texas.

NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.231 OF THE TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE

Pursuant to Section 552.231 of the Texas Government Code, we have determined that (1) responding to the November 28 Request will require programming or manipulation of data; and (2) the information responsive to the November 28 Request can be made available only at a cost that covers the programming and manipulation of data. In addition, we have determined that the Office lacks the in-house programming capabilities to provide you the responsive information you have requested. To provide such information in the requested form, Civix—the entity with whom the Secretary of State has an existing contract to host and maintain Texas’s statewide voter registration database—would have to write customized programming to retrieve and process the information responsive to the November 28 Request.¹ Civix anticipates that it would take approximately 8 hours to complete this work, and Civix has indicated that it would charge

¹ The full date of birth (or month/year of birth) of a voter is considered confidential under the Public Information Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101. As such, this statement of estimated costs takes into account that the information retrieved by the Office’s voter registration system vendor would include only a voter’s year of birth.

the Office a contracted rate of \$234.00 per hour for project management, \$185.00 per hour for development work, and \$174.00 per hour for quality assurance to fulfill the November 28 Request.

Statement of Estimated Time and Costs:

Pursuant to Sections 552.231 and 552.2615 of the Texas Government Code, the responsive information can only be made available to you in the requested form at a cost that covers the programming and manipulation of the data, resulting in the imposition of a charge that exceeds \$40. And, consistent with Section 552.263 of the Texas Government Code, because the cost is estimated to exceed \$100, we will require a cash deposit of the entire estimated cost for responding to your request prior to providing any responsive information. As noted in the list of charges below, the estimated cost of responding to your request is **\$1,507.00**.

Itemized List of Charges:

Description	Qty x Price	Total
Labor charge per hour for programming and processing of data – Project Management	1 x \$234.00	\$ 234.00
Labor charge per hour for programming and processing of data – Development	5 x \$185.00	\$ 925.00
Labor charge per hour for programming and processing of data – Quality Assurance	2 x \$174.00	<u>\$ 348.00</u>
	Total	<u>\$1,507.00</u>

Additionally, as further detailed in Attachment A to this letter, pursuant to Section 552.2615 of the Texas Government Code, you must take certain steps in order to avoid the withdrawal of the November 28 Request. Specifically, Section 552.2615 requires:

- (1) the requestor to provide the governmental body with a mailing or electronic mail address to receive the itemized statement (it is the requestor’s choice which type of address to provide);
- (2) the Office of the Secretary of State to inform the requestor that the request is considered automatically withdrawn if the requestor does not respond in writing to the itemized statement within 10 business days after the date the statement is sent to the requestor. This response is limited by law to a response that the requestor will accept the estimated charges, will modify the request in response to the itemized statement, or has sent to the Cost Rules Administrator at the Office of the Attorney General a complaint alleging that the requestor has been overcharged for the requested public information; and
- (3) the requestor to respond to the statement by delivering the written response to the governmental body either by mail, in person, or by electronic mail.

Separately, Section 552.263(f) of the Texas Government Code provides that a requestor “who fails to make a deposit or post a bond required . . . before the 10th business day after the date the

deposit or bond is required is considered to have withdrawn the request for the copy of the public information that precipitated the requirement of the deposit or bond.”

Finally, as provided in Attachment A, if this Office determines at a later date, but before making the copy of the public information available, that the estimated charges will exceed the charges detailed in the written itemized statement by 20 percent or more, this Office will send a written updated itemized statement that details all the estimated charges that will be imposed, including any allowable charges for labor or personnel costs.

We have provided this statement to you via electronic mail because that is the method in which you have chosen to communicate with us. If you would like to receive the statement by mail, please let us know. If you agree to accept the estimated charges, please do so in writing. To pay the charges by credit card, please respond with a phone number and we will contact you to obtain your payment information. The Office does not accept payment information via email. Alternatively, you may deliver a copy of this letter with a check or money order for the amount to the following address:

Mailing Address:
Office of the Secretary of State
Executive Division
P.O. Box 12697
Austin, TX 78711-2697
Attn: Adam Bitter, General Counsel

Delivery Address:
Office of the Secretary of State
Executive Division
1100 Congress Avenue
Room 1E.8
Austin, TX 78701
Attn: Adam Bitter, General Counsel

Email: generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov

The check or money order should be made payable to “Secretary of State.” We will provide you any responsive information—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—as soon as reasonably possible upon receipt of your payment.

If you have any questions or would like to discuss or further modify your request, please do not hesitate to contact our office at (512) 463-5770 or at the email address below.

Sincerely,



Adam Bitter
General Counsel
Office of the Texas Secretary of State
generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov
AB/jw

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT A

Rights and Responsibilities of a Requestor When Presented with an Itemized Estimated Statement of Costs

Pursuant to Section 552.2615 of the Texas Government Code, you must:

- Provide this office with a mailing or electronic mail address for the purpose of receiving the itemized statement and any updated itemized statement. It is your choice as to which type of address to provide this office.
- Respond in writing to the itemized statement or any updated itemized statement within ten (10) days after the date the statement is sent by this office and inform this office that:
 1. You will accept the estimated charges;
 2. You are modifying the request in response to the itemized statement; or
 3. You have sent a complaint to the Attorney General alleging that you have been overcharged for being provided with a copy of the public information requested.

If this office determines at a later date, but before making the copy of the public information available, that the estimated charges will exceed the charges detailed in the written itemized statement by 20 percent or more, this office will send a written updated itemized statement that details all the estimated charges that will be imposed, including any allowable charges for labor or personnel costs.

NOTICE: Your request will be considered automatically withdrawn if you fail to respond within ten (10) business days after the date the statement of itemized estimated costs is: (1) delivered to you in person; (2) deposited by this office in the United States mail; or (3) transmitted by electronic mail if you have agreed to receive the statement by electronic mail.

You may respond to the itemized statement of estimated costs sent to you by delivering your written response by mail, in person, or by electronic mail. The addresses are as follows:

Mailing Address:

Office of the Secretary of State
Executive Division
PO Box 12887
Austin, TX 78711-2887
Attn: Adam Bitter, General Counsel

Delivery Address:

Office of the Secretary of State
Executive Division
1100 Congress Avenue
Room 1E.8
Austin, TX 78701
Attn: Adam Bitter, General Counsel

Email: generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov

From: [Christina Adkins](#)
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Surveillance of Early Voting Ballots - TEC 127.066 + 127.1232
Date: Thursday, February 15, 2024 3:54:57 PM
Attachments: [image002.png](#)

Laura,

I wish that the law was written more broadly so that all voted ballots were required to be under surveillance. However, the way the law was written, it only applies to ballots delivered to the CCS or the EVBB. The section of the code you cited below only applies to delivery of election day ballots. For early voting in person ballots, the applicable delivery rule is Sec. 85.071 which provides that these ballots have to be delivered back to the main early voting location which places them in the custody of the early voting clerk.

As a best practice, I would strongly urge any of our counties that are equipped with video surveillance to store **all voted ballots** under surveillance. I am planning on addressing this in the next version of the Electronic Voting Systems Advisory that is scheduled for release this summer.

Let me know if you have any more questions.

Thanks,

Christina

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 3:26 PM
To: Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: Surveillance of Early Voting Ballots - TEC 127.066 + 127.1232

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

Christina,

Thank you for the response. Therefore, is it your opinion that **by-mail ballots** received *are required* to be under surveillance, yet **in-person** early voting ballots delivered prior to, or at the close of early voting *are not required* to be under surveillance?

Seems that by applying both Tex. Elec. Code 127.066(a) and 127.1232(b), all early voting ballots (**by-mail and in-person**) are to be under surveillance.

Sec. 127.066. SEALING DEPOSIT SLOT; DELIVERY OF SEALED BALLOT BOX

TO COUNTING STATION.

(a) Immediately on completion of voting at a polling place using sealed **ballot** boxes or, if the presiding judge inactivates a sealed **ballot** box before completion of voting, immediately on inactivation, an election officer shall seal the deposit slot in each box so that nothing can be deposited through the slot without breaking the seal.

(b) The presiding judge, an election clerk, and not more than two watchers, if one or more watchers are present, shall sign the seal. The watchers must be of opposing interests if such watchers are present.

(c) After the box is sealed, it shall be delivered to the central counting station by two election officers. The officers shall deliver the box to the presiding judge of the central counting station or to the judge's designee.

Sec. 127.1232. SECURITY OF VOTED BALLOTS.

(a) The general custodian of election records shall post a licensed peace officer to ensure the security of **ballot** boxes containing voted ballots throughout the period of tabulation at the central counting station.

(b) The general custodian of election records in a county with a population of 100,000 or more shall implement a video surveillance system that retains a record of all areas containing voted ballots:

(1) from the time the voted ballots are delivered to the central counting station until the canvass of precinct election returns; and

(2) from the time the voted ballots are delivered to the signature verification committee or early voting **ballot** board until the canvass of precinct election returns

Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.

On Thursday, February 15, 2024 2:44 PM, Christina Adkins
<CAdkins@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Laura,

What you stated below is still consistent with our interpretation of the law.
Let me know if you have any other questions.

Thanks,

Christina Worrell Adkins

Director of Elections

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701
512-463-9859 (direct) | 1.800.252.VOTE (8683)

elections@sos.texas.gov | www.sos.texas.gov

For Voter Related Information, please visit:

The information contained in this email is intended to provide advice and assistance in election matters per §31.004 of the Texas Election Code. It is not intended to serve as a legal opinion for any matter. Please review the law yourself, and consult with an attorney when your legal rights are involved.

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, January 3, 2024 4:10 PM

To: Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

Subject: Re: Advisory 2022-10 Ballot Security

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Hello Christina,

Hope you are doing well.

Can you please review the email below and provide guidance moving forward?

Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

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CONFIDENTIAL.**

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email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Tuesday, December 12, 2023 1:34 AM,

[REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Can you please revisit a question we've had regarding providing surveillance of all areas where early voted ballots are processed or stored prior to the close of early voting and prior to the close of election day? As you know, some number of early voting ballot boxes are processed and stored before early vote and election day closes.

Can you please review [Advisory 2022-10](#) and sections noted below related to surveillance of all areas containing early voted in person ballots and cvrs for those ballots?

The Advisory details that surveillance includes:

"The livestream video recording must begin with the first meeting of the CCS, EVBB, or SVC (whichever is earlier), and must continue until the local canvass of election results."

"all areas containing voted ballots or electronic media containing cast vote records, including any areas where those ballots are qualified, processed, counted, or stored"

"At minimum, this will include the CCS ...as well as any other locations where voted ballots and media are stored during the required timeframe."

"If the voted ballots will be moving from one location to another location during the required timeframe, the recording should also record those voted ballots while they are in transit through hallways or other areas in the office."

For Nov 7 elections, Williamson County's early voting ballot board [started on Oct. 20](#), therefore it seems that according to the Advisory, all areas processing or storing voted ballots or cvr's must be under surveillance starting on Oct. 20th, well before early voting closes. This interpretation would really improve ballot security for early voting.

Can you please help us with this?

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

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LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

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delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

From: [REDACTED]
To: [Christina Adkins](mailto:Christina.Adkins@sos.texas.gov)
Subject: Re: Surveillance of Early Voting Ballots - TEC 127.066 + 127.1232
Date: Thursday, February 15, 2024 5:10:11 PM

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Christina,

Tex.Elec.Code 81.002 authorizes statutes to apply to early voting.

The facts are early voting ballot boxes are delivered to the central counting stations and accepted by their deputy, not delivered to main polling location. In Williamson County and Dallas, and others, ballots are not delivered to the main polling location because those locations are rarely the elections office:
<https://www.wilcotx.gov/DocumentCenter/View/9156/FINAL-Early-Voting-Locations-and-Schedule---March-2024?bidId=>
https://www.dallascountyvotest.org/wp-content/uploads/EV-and-ED-Locations_MarchPrimary.pdf

Regardless, harmonizing all four statutes is possible - Tex. Elec. Code 81.002, Sec. 127.066, Sec. 127.1232, and 85.071(c) can be interpreted to require surveillance even at the main polling location where ballots *are transferred and stored*.

The Sec. of State's office is required to consistently interpret the law for counties to ensure uniformity as the laws are written, not just urging them to do the right thing. These three statutes integrated together protect all ballots cast early to be under surveillance and you have the authority to interpret them consistently. Tex. Elec. Code 81.002, Sec. 127.066, Sec. 127.1232.

Please reconsider the Secretary's interpretation.

Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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On Thursday, February 15, 2024 3:54 PM, Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Laura,

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As a best practice, I would strongly urge any of our counties that are equipped with video surveillance to store **all voted ballots** under surveillance. I am planning on addressing this in the next version of the Electronic Voting Systems Advisory that is scheduled for release this summer.

Let me know if you have any more questions.

Thanks,

Christina

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 3:26 PM
To: Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>
Subject: Surveillance of Early Voting Ballots - TEC 127.066 + 127.1232

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Christina,

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Seems that by applying both Tex. Elec. Code 127.066(a) and 127.1232(b), all early voting

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Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

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On Thursday, February 15, 2024 2:44 PM, Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Laura,

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Thanks,

Christina Worrell Adkins

Director of Elections

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

512-463-9859 (direct) | 1.800.252.VOTE (8683)

elections@sos.texas.gov | www.sos.texas.gov

For Voter Related Information, please visit:



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From: [REDACTED]

>

Sent: Wednesday, January 3, 2024 4:10 PM

To: Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

Subject: Re: Advisory 2022-10 Ballot Security

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

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Hello Christina,

Hope you are doing well.
Can you please review the email below and provide guidance moving forward?

Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

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CONFIDENTIAL.**

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On Tuesday, December 12, 2023 1:34 AM,

[REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Can you please revisit a question we've had regarding providing surveillance of all areas where early voted ballots are processed or stored prior to the close of early voting and prior to the close of election day? As you know, some number of early voting ballot boxes are processed and stored before early vote and election day closes.

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"all areas containing voted ballots or electronic media containing cast vote records, including any areas where those ballots are qualified, processed, counted, or stored"

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For Nov 7 elections, Williamson County's early voting ballot board [started on Oct. 20](#), therefore it seems that according to the Advisory, all areas processing or storing voted ballots or cvr's must be under surveillance starting on Oct. 20th, well before early voting closes. This interpretation would really

improve ballot security for early voting.

Can you please help us with this?

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

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LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me,
delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 29, 2024 1:47 PM
To: Steve Armbruster; County Judge; Valerie Covey; Commissioner Pct 3; Commissioner Precinct 4; Terry Cook; Cynthia Long; Nancy Rister; Larry Gaddes; PartyChair@wilcodemocrats.org; [REDACTED]; 'Bryan.Hughes@senate.texas.gov'; Adam Bitter; 'Paul.Bettencourt@senate.texas.gov'; Brandon Jenkins; Bridgette Escobedo; Brent Webster; Shawn Dick
Cc: Marcia Watson
Subject: Re: Urgent - Williamson '24 Primary - Voters Getting Wrong Party Ballot

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Dear Mr. Armbruster,

Thank you for interviewing one of the voters that got the wrong party ballot in Williamson County. There are many others documented on the Spoiled ballot forms at the polls. We have new information on this issue. We had an eye witness report of the pollbook **choosing the party ballot for the voter.**

Marcia Strickler went to the Leander Library on Feb.27th to early vote and the pollbook she signed into **selected a "Republican" ballot for her on the pollbook screen - before she could choose her party.** This issue was immediately reported to the clerk and the clerk claimed they did not choose the party for her and a long discussion ensued. Mrs. Strickler decided to not vote at that site.

Why did the **pollbook screen choose "Republican"** before Mrs.Strickler Watson chose it? This could be an error in the software or a error by clerks, etc. To determine the root-cause, more investigation must be done.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.

On Wednesday, February 28, 2024 11:01 AM, Steve Armbruster [REDACTED] wrote:

Dr. Pressley,

Thank you for bringing this to my attention and giving me the name of a voter who was involved in this event.

Following your advice, I did reach out to Mr. Ray Wazny about his experience. I was unable to take his call when he called me back but he and his wife were nice enough to leave me a voicemail. I have attached their voicemail for everyone here to hear.

You insinuate in your email below that there is something nefarious going on with the equipment that enables this to keep occurring as you accuse. In the one case that you have submitted to me for evidence it was clearly a case of operator error on the part of the voter. Don't take my word for it, listen to their voicemail.

After doing the due diligence necessary on this it is clear that a voter made a mistake and requested the wrong ballot. The voter identified the mistake and the poll workers identified the issue and corrected it on the spot and enabled the voter to get the correct ballot.

I consider this matter now closed.

Steve Armbruster

Chairman, Williamson County Republican Party

512-956-6761

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 1:03 PM

To: County Judge <ctyjudge@wilco.org>; Valerie Covey <vcovey@wilco.org>;
Commissioner Pct 3 <comm3@wilco.org>; Commissioner Precinct 4 <Comm-PCT4@wilco.org>; Terry Cook <terry.cook@wilco.org>; Cynthia Long

<clong@wilco.org>; Nancy Rister <nriste@wilco.org>; Larry Gaddes
<lgaddes@wilco.org>; PartyChair@wilcodemocrats.org; Steve Armbruster
[REDACTED];
'Bryan.Hughes@senate.texas.gov' <Bryan.Hughes@senate.texas.gov>;
ABitter@sos.texas.gov; 'Paul.Bettencourt@senate.texas.gov'
<Paul.Bettencourt@senate.texas.gov>; Brandon Jenkins <brandon.jenkins@wilco.org>;
Bridgette Escobedo <bridgette.escobedo@wilco.org>; Brent Webster
<Brent.Webster@oag.texas.gov>; Shawn Dick <shawn.dick@wilco.org>
Subject: Urgent - Williamson '24 Primary - Voters Getting Wrong Party Ballot

EXTERNAL email: Exercise caution when opening.

Dear Williamson County Judge, County Commissioners Court, County Election Commission Members, Ms. Escobedo, Mr. Jenkins, Mrs. Adkins, Mr. Bitter, Republican Chair Renaldi, State Senator Hughes, State Senator Bettencourt, Williamson County District Attorney Dick, and First Assistant Attorney General,

In this '24 Primary, we have many, many reports of Williamson County voters **AGAIN** receiving wrong ballots - many voters are receiving the wrong **party** ballot. These occurrences are being documented by watchers at the polls and these instances are also documented on the Spoiled Ballot Forms at the polls.

Not all voters are astute enough to catch this and spoil their ballot. We strongly believe these occurrences are being under-reported. This is absolutely unacceptable. **Why does Williamson County election equipment programming, year after year, cause voters to not receive their correct ballot?**

Ask Kathleen Wazny, President of the Republican Club of Sun City how this feels, it happened to her husband. How can any of the results be trusted - for either party?

In shock,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

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From: Christina Adkins
Sent: Tuesday, February 6, 2024 4:22 PM
To: 'Beth Biesel'
Cc: Elizabeth Baron; Clint Curtis; Jody Curtis
Subject: RE: Wednesday, Oct. 25th Follow-up

My apologies – I did not hit send on this email. Please let me know if you have any additional questions/concerns.

Beth,

Forgive me for the delay --- I'm still in post-Election catch up. Here are our responses.

- Cameras are allowed after the polls close, 7:00pm or later, in the counting area - or before 7:00pm if the counting is done 100ft away from the polling place.
 - This is consistent with our existing guidance.
- If using the calculator method, we should use the label "Batch Total Sheet" rather than "Batch Tally Sheet" since we are not using tally marks.
 - As a reminder, this method of hand counting would require certification or a legislative change. But we agree with the change in terminology.
- If using the calculator method, we need a way of memorializing the tally count with a paper trail showing how we arrived at our totals for each candidate or proposition.
 - This method would require certification or a legislative change. I agree that they should incorporate some kind of tally method to provide better documentation for the results of their counting process that do not solely depend on a continuous camera feed.
- Elizabeth Baron will follow up with you on what can be done with the number grid/bingo tally sheets. We want to know if they comply with the need to have a paper record showing how the total for a candidate or proposition was determined.
 - We're happy to review this when it comes in. No issues with a modified tally sheet, but we'll want to make sure it complies with the requirements.
- Parallel counting is not allowed. Parallel counting would be an unauthorized count. The reason is to avoid disputes as to which count would be official.
 - This is correct.
- Ballot on Demand printers do not need to be certified.
 - Correct.
- The hand count calculators do not need to be certified because they are not a voting system. They do not cast ballots and they do not tabulate ballots.
 - If we are talking about the device they presented to us, then that would require a legislative change to the definition of "voting system" under 122.001 to create an exception for this type of system. The current definition of "voting system" encompasses this type of device and under current law it would require certification as a voting system.
- Write-in candidates would be counted and adjudicated, if necessary, by the Presiding Judge when the hand count is done at the precinct location.

- **Correct.**
- Ballot Boxes 1-4 may have some flexibility. In Dallas County, we use a zippered canvas bag with a seal for our ballot box 4. Chuck or Heidi were going to clarify the absolute requirements for boxes, especially if the counting begins after the polls closed. Could we eliminate one of the boxes if we begin after 7:00pm?
 - **If they are not using rotating ballot boxes, then I don't think they need to have both Ballot Box #1 and #2, and could use a single ballot box for the deposit of voters' ballots that is delivered to the counting officers at the end of the night.**
- Ballots must be approved by the SOS before going to the printer.
 - **Printers have to provide notice to our office under 51.013 if they will be printing ballots for the GESCO or a primary. They don't need approval for individual ballot formats.**
- Chuck will investigate whether or not the process of counting one pair of candidates at a time across all ballots in a batch vs counting one ballot at a time is materially different from the process described in Chapter 65? Would it need a legislative change or would the law requirements be met because we are still counting by race, albeit, by pairs. (The calculator method of hand counting is done by counting the votes for a pair of candidates at a time, within a given race, going through all the ballots in a batch for each pair. After all the candidates within the race are counted, then the counters would go to the next race/next pair. The advantage of this method is that the throughput rate is much faster than Chapter 65 (fewer people, less time) and the two means of reconciling a) for each count run and b) at the end of each race yield a higher degree of accuracy and confidence.
 - **We are looking at this issue in more detail. Our concerns lie with Section 65.005(a) of the Texas Election Code. We've had a couple of different questions on this issue and are discussing. I'll have an answer for you on this one shortly.**
- The question of sorting the ballots by precinct/ballot style during Early Voting was discussed, but I am unclear on what the law requires. For Early Voting, could we sort the ballots at the countywide vote location as they are voted into ballot boxes labeled by precinct number/ballot style? Historical data will give us a high degree of accuracy of predetermining the majority of precincts that are represented at a particular vote location. The outliers could go in a miscellaneous box to be sorted at the end of the night or some other time.
 - **I don't think there is anything that would authorize sorting at the early voting locations. You have to have specific authorization to access the ballot box for specifically authorized purposes, and there is nothing in the Election Code that allows for this kind of sorting at a polling location. I think the EVBB can (and should) certainly sort the early voting ballots before they are hand-counted.**
- We know that counting of Early Voting ballots may not occur until polls open on Election Day, but may EVBB convene before that time to sort ballots into precincts?
 - **87.062 is organized implies that the ballot boxes are being opened at the time that counting will be conducted. But I am open to a different approach here.**

Christina Worrell Adkins

Director of Elections

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

512-463-9859 (direct) | 1.800.252.VOTE (8683)

elections@sos.texas.gov | www.sos.texas.gov

For Voter Related Information, please visit:



The information contained in this email is intended to provide advice and assistance in election matters per §31.004 of the Texas Election Code. It is not intended to serve as a legal opinion for any matter. Please review the law yourself, and consult with an attorney when your legal rights are involved.

From: Beth Biesel <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2023 9:29 AM
To: Christina Adkins <CADkins@sos.texas.gov>
Cc: Elizabeth Baron <[REDACTED]>; Clint Curtis <[REDACTED]>; Jody Curtis <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Wednesday, Oct. 25th Follow-up

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Dear Christina,

Thank you so much for meeting with Elizabeth, Clint, Jody, and me Wednesday, October 25, 2023, and for bringing your very talented staff to the meeting to help us sort through the many sections of the Texas Election Code. We appreciate your taking a serious look at our two alternatives to the Chapter 65 Hand Count Method. Your guidance and suggestions are extremely valuable.

To make sure that we are on the right track, I would like to summarize the things that we learned from the meeting. I look forward to your feedback. In no particular order:

- Cameras are allowed after the polls close, 7:00pm or later, in the counting area - or before 7:00pm if the counting is done 100ft away from the polling place.
- If using the calculator method, we should use the label "Batch Total Sheet" rather than "Batch Tally Sheet" since we are not using tally marks.
- If using the calculator method, we need a way of memorializing the tally count with a paper trail showing how we arrived at our totals for each candidate or proposition.
- Elizabeth Baron will follow up with you on what can be done with the number grid/bingo tally sheets. We want to know if they comply with the need to have a paper record showing how the total for a candidate or proposition was determined.

- Parallel counting is not allowed. Parallel counting would be an unauthorized count. The reason is to avoid disputes as to which count would be official.
- Ballot on Demand printers do not need to be certified.
- The hand count calculators do not need to be certified because they are not a voting system. They do not cast ballots and they do not tabulate ballots.
- Write-in candidates would be counted and adjudicated, if necessary, by the Presiding Judge when the hand count is done at the precinct location.
- Ballot Boxes 1-4 may have some flexibility. In Dallas County, we use a zippered canvas bag with a seal for our ballot box 4. Chuck or Heidi were going to clarify the absolute requirements for boxes, especially if the counting begins after the polls closed. Could we eliminate one of the boxes if we begin after 7:00pm?
- Ballots must be approved by the SOS before going to the printer.
- Chuck will investigate whether or not the process of counting one pair of candidates at a time across all ballots in a batch vs counting one ballot at a time is materially different from the process described in Chapter 65? Would it need a legislative change or would the law requirements be met because we are still counting by race, albeit, by pairs. (The calculator method of hand counting is done by counting the votes for a pair of candidates at a time, within a given race, going through all the ballots in a batch for each pair. After all the candidates within the race are counted, then the counters would go to the next race/next pair. The advantage of this method is that the throughput rate is much faster than Chapter 65 (fewer people, less time) and the two means of reconciling a) for each count run and b) at the end of each race yield a higher degree of accuracy and confidence.
- The question of sorting the ballots by precinct/ballot style during Early Voting was discussed, but I am unclear on what the law requires. For Early Voting, could we sort the ballots at the countywide vote location as they are voted into ballot boxes labeled by precinct number/ballot style? Historical data will give us a high degree of accuracy of predetermining the majority of precincts that are represented at a particular vote location. The outliers could go in a miscellaneous box to be sorted at the end of the night or some other time.
- We know that counting of Early Voting ballots may not occur until polls open on Election Day, but may EVBB convene before that time to sort ballots into precincts?

We are so deeply grateful for your incredible dedication to protecting our Texas elections! You have a great team! We look forward to working closely with you as we find new ways to increase trust in our elections through transparency, verifiability, and accuracy. This is not a slogan; it is the gold standard!

Sincerely,
 Beth Biesel
 and
 Elizabeth Baron
 Jody and Clint Curtis

From: [REDACTED]
To: [Christina Adkins](mailto:Christina.Adkins)
Subject: Surveillance of Early Voting Ballots - TEC 127.066 + 127.1232
Date: Thursday, February 15, 2024 3:26:12 PM

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Christina,

Thank you for the response. Therefore, is it your opinion that **by-mail ballots** received *are required* to be under surveillance, yet **in-person** early voting ballots delivered prior to, or at the close of early voting *are not required* to be under surveillance?

Seems that by applying both Tex. Elec. Code 127.066(a) and 127.1232(b), all early voting ballots (**by-mail and in-person**) are to be under surveillance.

Sec. 127.066. SEALING DEPOSIT SLOT; DELIVERY OF SEALED BALLOT BOX TO COUNTING STATION.

(a) Immediately on completion of voting at a polling place using sealed **ballot** boxes or, if the presiding judge inactivates a sealed **ballot** box before completion of voting, immediately on inactivation, an election officer shall seal the deposit slot in each box so that nothing can be deposited through the slot without breaking the seal.

(b) The presiding judge, an election clerk, and not more than two watchers, if one or more watchers are present, shall sign the seal. The watchers must be of opposing interests if such watchers are present.

(c) After the box is sealed, it shall be delivered to the central counting station by two election officers. The officers shall deliver the box to the presiding judge of the central counting station or to the judge's designee.

Sec. 127.1232. SECURITY OF VOTED BALLOTS.

(a) The general custodian of election records shall post a licensed peace officer to ensure the security of **ballot** boxes containing voted ballots throughout the period of tabulation at the central counting station.

(b) The general custodian of election records in a county with a population of 100,000 or more shall implement a video surveillance system that retains a record of all areas containing voted ballots:

(1) from the time the voted ballots are delivered to the central counting station until the canvass of precinct election returns; and

(2) from the time the voted ballots are delivered to the signature verification committee or early voting **ballot** board until the canvass of precinct election returns

Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

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On Thursday, February 15, 2024 2:44 PM, Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Laura,

What you stated below is still consistent with our interpretation of the law. Let me know if you have any other questions.

Thanks,

Christina Worrell Adkins

Director of Elections

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701
512-463-9859 (direct) | 1.800.252.VOTE (8683)

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From: [REDACTED] >

Sent: Wednesday, January 3, 2024 4:10 PM

To: Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

Subject: Re: Advisory 2022-10 Ballot Security

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Hello Christina,

Hope you are doing well.

Can you please review the email below and provide guidance moving forward?

Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

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On Tuesday, December 12, 2023 1:34 AM,

[REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Can you please revisit a question we've had regarding providing surveillance of all areas where early voted ballots are processed or stored prior to the close of early voting and prior to the close of election day? As you know, some number of early voting ballot boxes are processed and stored before early vote and election day closes.

Can you please review [Advisory 2022-10](#) and sections noted below related to surveillance of all areas containing early voted in person ballots and cvrs for those ballots?

The Advisory details that surveillance includes:

"The livestream video recording must begin with the first meeting of the CCS, EVBB, or SVC (whichever is earlier), and must continue until the local canvass of election results."

"all areas containing voted ballots or electronic media containing cast vote records, including any areas where those ballots are qualified, processed, counted, or stored"

"At minimum, this will include the CCS ...as well as any other locations where voted ballots and media are stored during the required timeframe."

"If the voted ballots will be moving from one location to another location during the required timeframe, the recording should also record those voted ballots while they are in transit through hallways or other areas in the office."

For Nov 7 elections, Williamson County's early voting ballot board [started on Oct. 20](#), therefore it seems that according to the Advisory, all areas processing or storing voted ballots or cvr's must be under surveillance starting on Oct. 20th, well before early voting closes. This interpretation would really improve ballot security for early voting.

Can you please help us with this?

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

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From: [REDACTED]
To: [Chuck Pinney](#); [Christina Adkins](#)
Subject: Tex. Admin. Code Rule 81.52(h)2 - Unplug scanners when suspending EV
Date: Tuesday, February 20, 2024 10:20:57 PM

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Christina and Chuck,

The Tex. Admin. Code Rule 81.52(h)2 states ballot scanners should be unplugged when suspending polls for early voting using ballot scanners. Your thoughts on this requirement is appreciated. Counties around the state are leaving hotspots on, and not unplugging the scanners.

Tex. Admin. Code Rule 81.52(h)

If a precinct ballot counter is to be used during early voting by personal appearance, it must have a real-time audit log. In addition, the counter must be secured to prevent tampering by the following procedure.

(2) At the close of each day's voting, the precinct counter's doors must be locked and sealed with a numbered paper seal. The precinct counter must be unplugged and secured for the evening.

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.

Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

313-720-5471

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From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 1:03 PM
To: County Judge; VCovey@wilco.org; Commissioner Pct 3; Commissioner Precinct 4; Terry Cook; Cynthia Long; Nancy Rister; Larry Gaddes; PartyChair@wilcodemocrats.org; Steve Armbruster; [REDACTED]; 'Bryan.Hughes@senate.texas.gov'; Adam Bitter; 'Paul.Bettencourt@senate.texas.gov'; Brandon.Jenkins@wilco.org; Bridgette.Escobedo@wilco.org; Brent Webster; Shawn Dick
Subject: Urgent - Williamson '24 Primary - Voters Getting Wrong Party Ballot

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Dear Williamson County Judge, County Commissioners Court, County Election Commission Members, Ms. Escobedo, Mr. Jenkins, Mrs. Adkins, Mr. Bitter, Republican Chair Renaldi, State Senator Hughes, State Senator Bettencourt, Williamson County District Attorney Dick, and First Assistant Attorney General,

In this '24 Primary, we have many, many reports of Williamson County voters **AGAIN** receiving wrong ballots - many voters are receiving the wrong **party** ballot. These occurrences are being documented by watchers at the polls and these instances are also documented on the Spoiled Ballot Forms at the polls.

Not all voters are astute enough to catch this and spoil their ballot. We strongly believe these occurrences are being under-reported. This is absolutely unacceptable. **Why does Williamson County election equipment programming, year after year, cause voters to not receive their correct ballot?**

Ask Kathleen Wazny, President of the Republican Club of Sun City how this feels, it happened to her husband. How can any of the results be trusted - for either party?

In shock,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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From: [REDACTED]
To: "Bryan.Hughes@senate.texas.gov"; "Paul.Bettencourt@senate.texas.gov"; Drew Tedford; Sonya Aston; Tan.Parker@senate.texas.gov
Cc: Christina Adkins; Brent Webster; Adam Bitter; Lesley French
Subject: Urgent - Waiver By Sos - Sec. 129.023(c-1) - ES&S Central Accumulators Not Tested Across Texas
Date: Thursday, February 15, 2024 4:33:48 PM
Attachments: [Bell_Certification_of_ESS_Central_Accumulators_Mar_2024.pdf](#)

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Senators Hughes, Bettencourt and Parker,

For the March 2024 Primary, the Sec. of State has issued a new waiver of law - TEC Sec. 129.023(c-1). The result is the ES&S EMS central accumulator computers that aggregate votes are not hash tested to insure no software changes have occurred since its certification by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC).

Details of this failure is noted by Texas examiners and have been known since 2019:
<https://whowhatwhy.org/elections/election-assistance-commission-investigated-ess-voting-systems/> .

To skirt this failure now in 2024, the Sec. of State claims the EMS computer is not considered voting system equipment. See red text in email included below. We believe it is voting system equipment - according to Texas Election Code section [121.003\(4\)](#), "Voting system equipment" means any kind of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic apparatus for use in a voting system."

Section [129.023\(\(c-1\)\)](#) requires testing of "a representative sample of *voting system equipment*" and does not limit testing to "*voting machines*" (section [121.003\(3\)](#) "Voting machine" means an apparatus on which voters cast their votes, that records each vote, and that furnishes a total of the number of votes cast for the candidates and for and against the measures).

How can the Sec. of State claim the EMS central accumulator that tabulates all ballots, is not voting system equipment and is thus *not comprehended* in section [129.023\(\(c-1\)\)](#) and is not require to be tested? See red text below. The Sec. of State's interpretation that the ES&S central accumulator is excluded from hash testing is illogical and is just another waiver of law from their office.

Further, Sec. of State's statement, "In a strict reading of section [129.023\(\(c-1\)\)](#), this software validation requirement really only applies to the devices used for voting in a polling place" is not entirely accurate because the central scanners, DS450 and DS850 (not used at the polls), ARE hash tested. See attached.

How can you address with the SoS and AG that votes should only be tabulated on tested voting system equipment around the state? Copying them. One solution is to potentially have counties only use the DS200's, 450's and 850's to scan and tabulate Primary ballots and report results - those have been hash tested according to law.

Regards,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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From: Christina Adkins <CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov>
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 2:25 PM
To: Mike Slaton [REDACTED]; 'Jennifer Hajdu' [REDACTED]; Heider Garcia <Heider.Garcia@dallascounty.org> <Heider.Garcia@dallascounty.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]; Wes Bowen [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Voting machine testing/voter roll issues

Mike,

The most recent versions of the ES&S system do allow for hash validations on the EMS computer. Since the law was enacted, we have consistently tested and verified this.

However, there are some past versions of the ES&S system where we can perform hash validations on everything but the EMS system. This is because the EAC did not generate a "golden hash" for the EMS computer during their certification process for these older versions of the system. When I responded to your email, I did not confirm which version of the ES&S system that Dallas County was using. It is my understanding that Dallas is currently using EVS 6110. This is one of the versions that does not have a golden hash upon which to verify for the EMS computer.

In a strict reading of section 129.023((c-1) , this software validation requirement really only applies to the devices used for voting in a polling place. However, our office has chosen to direct counties to perform hash validations on all equipment used for voting and tabulating ballots. Because the law is specific to these voting devices, the older ES&S software versions that are not able to perform hash validations on the EMS computer are still compliant with Texas law. We are working with our counties and ES&S to get our counties still using these older software versions upgraded so that counties can perform these hash validations on all components of the voting system.

Again, I apologies for not confirming which version Dallas used before I answered your question.

Let me know if you have any additional questions.

Thanks,

Christina

**CERTIFICATION OF PUBLIC LOGIC AND ACCURACY TEST, HASH VALIDATION
 AND FIRST TEST OF AUTOMATIC TABULATING EQUIPMENT**

We, the Presiding Judge of the Central Counting Station and the General Custodian of Election Records, do hereby certify that the hash validation comparison, Public Logic and Accuracy Test and the First Test of the Automatic Tabulating Equipment to be used to count the ballots for the

Primary Election to be held on Mar / 05 / 2024 was conducted
 (name of election) (date of election)


using a predetermined number of valid votes for each candidate and for and against each proposition on the ballot for the election. Each contest position, as well as each precinct and ballot style was able to be voted and was accurately counted. Each type of device that will tabulate ballots including precinct scanners and/or central scanners, whichever is applicable, was included in the testing. The test group also contained ballots with overvotes, ballots with undervotes, if applicable to the system being tested, multi-candidate races, provisional votes and write-in votes, if applicable. We further certify that a representative sample of voting system equipment was tested with a hash validation process to ensure that the source code of the equipment has not been altered. The trusted hashes for each unique device in the voting system are pertinent to the most current version of the voting system and were obtained from the Secretary of State's office prior to the Public Logic and Accuracy Test.


Vendor: ES+S

Software Version: 6.1.1.0

Type of Device Tested	Serial Number of Device
<u>Express Vote - Hash Ballots</u>	<u>EV0218350023</u>
<u>Express Vote - Ballots</u>	<u>EV0218350023</u>
<u>DS 200 - Hash</u>	<u>DS0318360273</u>
<u>DS 200 Ballots ED</u>	<u>DS0319351314</u>
<u>DS 200 Ballots EV</u>	<u>DS0318360273</u>
<u>DS 850 #2 - Hash</u>	<u>DS817110326</u>
<u>DS 850 #2 - Ballots</u>	<u>DS0318360599</u>

The test was successful and was concluded at 4pm on 02/09/2024
 (time) (date)

ERRA COOK
 Printed Name Presiding Judge
 of Central Counting Station

 Signature of Presiding Judge
 of Central Counting Station

DESI ROBERTS
 Printed Name General Custodian
 of Election Records

 Signature of General Custodian
 of Election Records

Instructions to Presiding Judge and General Custodian:

The hash validation process must take place at the Public Test for Logic and Accuracy. The hash validation test may be practiced in advance of the Public Logic and Accuracy Test for proofing purposes, but only the public performance of the hash validation test may be certified. If either or both of the initial tests were not successful, prepare a written record of the changes to the program, adjustments to the equipment and other actions taken to achieve a successful test and attach to this certification.

Note: If your county does not use a Central Counting Station, only the General Custodian of Election records is required to sign this form.



**CERTIFICATION OF PUBLIC LOGIC AND ACCURACY TEST, HASH VALIDATION
 AND FIRST TEST OF AUTOMATIC TABULATING EQUIPMENT**

We, the Presiding Judge of the Central Counting Station and the General Custodian of Election Records, do hereby certify that the hash validation comparison, Public Logic and Accuracy Test and the First Test of the Automatic Tabulating Equipment to be used to count the ballots for the

Primary Election to be held on Mar / 05 / 2024 was conducted
 (name of election) (date of election)


using a predetermined number of valid votes for each candidate and for and against each proposition on the ballot for the election. Each contest position, as well as each precinct and ballot style was able to be voted and was accurately counted. Each type of device that will tabulate ballots including precinct scanners and/or central scanners, whichever is applicable, was included in the testing. The test group also contained ballots with overvotes, ballots with undervotes, if applicable to the system being tested, multi-candidate races, provisional votes and write-in votes, if applicable. We further certify that a representative sample of voting system equipment was tested with a hash validation process to ensure that the source code of the equipment has not been altered. The trusted hashes for each unique device in the voting system are pertinent to the most current version of the voting system and were obtained from the Secretary of State's office prior to the Public Logic and Accuracy Test.


Vendor: ES+S

Software Version: 6.1.1.0

Type of Device Tested	Serial Number of Device
<u>Express Vote - Hash Ballots</u>	<u>EV0218350023</u>
<u>Express Vote - Ballots</u>	<u>EV0218350023</u>
<u>DS 200 - Hash</u>	<u>DS0318360273</u>
<u>DS 200 Ballots ED</u>	<u>DS0319351314</u>
<u>DS 200 Ballots EV</u>	<u>DS0318360273</u>
<u>DS 850 #2 - HASH</u>	<u>DS817110326</u>
<u>DS 850 #2 - Ballots</u>	<u>DS0318360599</u>

The test was successful and was concluded at 4pm on 02/09/2024
 (time) (date)

ERRA COOK
 Printed Name Presiding Judge
 of Central Counting Station

 Signature of Presiding Judge
 of Central Counting Station

DESI ROBERTS
 Printed Name General Custodian
 of Election Records

 Signature of General Custodian
 of Election Records

Instructions to Presiding Judge and General Custodian:

The hash validation process must take place at the Public Test for Logic and Accuracy. The hash validation test may be practiced in advance of the Public Logic and Accuracy Test for proofing purposes, but only the public performance of the hash validation test may be certified. If either or both of the initial tests were not successful, prepare a written record of the changes to the program, adjustments to the equipment and other actions taken to achieve a successful test and attach to this certification.

Note: If your county does not use a Central Counting Station, only the General Custodian of Election records is required to sign this form.



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2024 4:03 PM
To: Christina Adkins; GeneralCounsel
Subject: Voting Sys and Pollbook System List - SoS Open Records

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Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide an up to date list of voting systems and electronic pollbooks that each county in Texas have been authorized by the SoS to use for the March 2024 Primary. Please include information such as

- all voting system components and version, and
- pollbook systems and version.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

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If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2024 4:47 PM
To: GeneralCounsel; Christina Adkins
Subject: Voting System Contract Approval Requests - SoS Open Records

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Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide the following documents related to voting system and voting equipment contract approvals pursuant to Tex. Elec.Code Sections 123.0311, 123.035 for the following years and counties:

- Harris (2019 - 2024)
- Bexar (2019 - 2024)
- Dallas (2019 - 2024)
- Tarrant (2019 - 2024)
- Travis (2019 - 2024)
- Fort Bend (2019 - 2024)
- Montgomery (2019 - 2024)
- Hays (2019 - 2024)
- Williamson (2019 - 2024)
- Bell (2019 - 2024)

For the counties and time frames noted above, please include information:

- Each of the county's requests for an SoS letter and SoS order for the secretary to determine if the version of the voting system and equipment being acquired under the contract between the county and ES&S or Hart InterCivic complies with the applicable requirements.
- Each of the county's voting system contracts (between the county and ES&S or Hart InterCivic) submitted to the SoS for review and determination if it complies with requirements.
- Each of the SoS letters stating that the voting system and voting system equipment being acquired by the County under the submitted contract satisfy the applicable requirements for approval.
- Each of the SoS written orders issued under Section 122.038 and 122.070 approving the voting system and voting system equipment for use in elections and, if applicable, of the written order issued under Section 122.095 granting conditional approval of the system or equipment.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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From: [REDACTED]
To: Bridgette.Escobedo@wilco.org; Brandon.Jenkins@wilco.org; [Commissioner Pct 3](#); [Commissioner PCT 1](#); [Commissioner Precinct 4](#); [Cynthia Long](#); [County Judge](#); [Larry Gaddes](#); [Steve Armbruster](#); PartyChair@wilcodemocrats.org; [Nancy Rister](#)
Cc: [Movin-OnTX](#); [Christina Adkins](#); [Chuck Pinney](#); [Brent Webster](#); [Lesley French](#); ["Bryan.Hughes@senate.texas.gov"](mailto:Bryan.Hughes@senate.texas.gov); ["Paul.Bettencourt@senate.texas.gov"](mailto:Paul.Bettencourt@senate.texas.gov); [Sonya Aston](#)
Subject: Williamson County - Early Voting Irregularities, Illegals and Watcher Obstructions
Date: Tuesday, February 20, 2024 5:56:24 PM

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov.

Hello Bridgette, Brandon, Williamson County Commissioners, and Election Commission members,

There have been reports of watcher obstructions in Williamson County today at the polls, the first day of early voting.

Will you please review the information and help address these?

Issue 1 - Election technicians are removing election records, the DS300 configuration tapes, from polling locations - The configuration tapes printed when the DS300's are powered up at the polls are being removed from the premises by county technicians. This causes watchers to not be able to inspect the configuration tape.

- At Georgetown Randalls, Mrs. Soll, a watcher, was present at 7:47am before polls opened and was prevented from viewing the printed configuration tape because technicians removed it from the site at 8am. According to TEC [33.056\(c\)](#), watchers are entitled to inspect "other election records prepared by election officers at the location the watcher is serving." By removing the configuration tape from the site, the technicians have distanced the watcher from the election record in a manner that makes the watcher's observation not reasonably effective.
- At Georgetown The Oaks, I was a watcher and the printed configuration tape was removed from the polling site by technicians around 9am.

Request #1 - Please instruct technicians to not remove election records prepared by election officers from the polling premises.

Issue 2 - Election judges have difficulties printing Zero Tapes (Georgetown Randalls and The Oaks) - Election workers experience difficulties printing Zero Tapes because written instructions did not match the DS300 screen names and options.

- At Georgetown Randalls, the judge and two experienced technicians, did not print the Zero Tape when opening that poll, in contravention of TEC [61.002\(a\)](#).
- At Georgetown The Oaks, the Zero Tape printing instructions were confusing and eventually the tape was printed.

Request #2 - Please correct the tape printing instructions to match the equipment screens and options on the DS300 and DS200.

Issue 3 - Election judge at Georgetown Randalls would not permit watcher to inspect poll affidavit

- Because the Zero Tape was not printed at the Georgetown Randalls, the Elections Office advised the judge to fill out an affidavit describing why the Zero Tape was not printed. The judge refused to allow watcher, Mrs. Soll, to inspect that affidavit document in contravention of TEC [33.056\(c\)](#). The affidavit is an election record prepared by election officers at the location the watcher is serving and watchers are entitled to inspect it.

Request #3 - Please instruct election judges to permit watchers to inspect election records prepared by election officers at the location the watcher is serving, including affidavits and other documents.

See the TEC section related to obstructing watchers from inspecting documents at the polls:

Sec. 33.061. UNLAWFULLY OBSTRUCTING WATCHER.

(a) A person commits an offense if the person serves in an official capacity at a location at which the presence of watchers is authorized and knowingly prevents a watcher from observing an activity or procedure the person knows the watcher is entitled to observe, including by taking any action to obstruct the view of a watcher or distance the watcher from the activity or procedure to be observed in a manner that would make observation not reasonably effective.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

We are interested in your thoughts - it is our hope these issues will be addressed moving forward.

Blessings,
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC
313-720-5471

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