



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000

September 7, 2024

The Honorable Tom Cole
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Cole:

I am providing a detailed list of the impacts of a six-month continuing resolution (CR) for the Department of Defense. The Department appreciates the opportunity to share its view on a six-month CR and the litany of difficulties it would impose – not only on accomplishing our mission and maintaining national security, but also on the quality of life of our Service members and their families.

If passed, a six-month CR would represent the second year in a row, and the seventh time in the past 15 years, where the Department is delayed in moving forward with critical priorities until mid-way through the budget year. These actions subject Service members and their families to unnecessary stress, empower our adversaries, misalign billions of dollars, damage our readiness, and impede our ability to react to emergent events.

As you have heard me say, our budget is aligned to our strategy. A six-month CR would set us significantly behind in meeting our pacing challenge highlighted in our National Defense Strategy – the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC is the only global competitor with both the intent and capability to change the international order. The PRC does not operate under CRs. Our ability to execute our strategy is contingent upon our ability to innovate and modernize to meet this challenge, which cannot happen under a CR. Asking the Department to compete with the PRC, let alone manage conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, while under a lengthy CR, ties our hands behind our back while expecting us to be agile and to accelerate progress. We have already lost valuable time, having operated under 48 CRs for a total of almost five years since 2011. We cannot buy back this time, but we can stop digging the hole.

Moreover, under the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (FRA), the consequences of such a CR in fiscal year (FY) 2025 could be even more dire for the U.S. and its allies and partners. Failure to pass any one of the 12 full appropriations acts by January 1, 2025, will start a process to reduce discretionary spending limits (caps) for the security category by one percent below the enacted FY 2023 level. This will be enforced through sequestration, potentially resulting in a total reduction of \$42 billion from the Department’s FY 2025 request. A six-month CR takes us far too close to the April 30, 2025 deadline for a permanent sequestration order, as required by the FRA and related legislation.

A long-term CR in FY 2025 would impede thousands of DoD programs and projects. Military recruiting would be damaged, just as we are post-COVID, returning to meeting our

goals. We would be forced to forego vital investments in our defense industrial base, including the submarine and ship building bases. We would lose time and money the Nation cannot risk on modernization of our nuclear triad, rapid fielding of Uncrewed Aerial Systems through the Replicator initiative, execution of hundreds of military construction projects, and deterrence initiatives in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Additionally, because there would be no funds for legally required military and civilian pay raises during a CR, the Department would be forced to offset the cost of these well-deserved pay raises, and in fact all inflation impacts across the Department, by cutting into other programs and accounts at potentially damaging levels.

Enclosed with this letter is information that highlights the impacts on each of the Military Departments and certain Defense-Wide activities should Congress fail to act. As you will see, the repercussions of Congress failing to pass regular appropriations legislation for the first half of FY 2025 would be devastating to our readiness and ability to execute the National Defense Strategy.

The single most important thing that Congress can do to ensure U.S. national security is to pass timely legislation for all 12 appropriations bills for FY 2025. I am fully aware of the political pressures that will challenge the Congress from fulfilling its duty before our national elections conclude. No matter who wins this election, there will be a Presidential transition. I urge you and your colleagues to take up action immediately after the election to limit damage to our national security during this vulnerable period around transitions and uphold the bipartisan tradition of funding our nation's defense prior to the inauguration of a new President.

The Department stands ready to assist Congress in any way possible to ensure it has the information and resources to pass this essential legislation. As I have said several times in the past, it's not only the right thing to do, but also the best thing to do for our Nation's defense.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the other Chairs and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dan J. Rostenkowski". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent "R" and "K".

Enclosure:
As stated

6-MONTH CONTINUING RESOLUTION (CR) IMPACTS FOR FY 2025

Summary

- **Impact of a Six-Month Long CR in FY 2025:**

- Continuing Resolutions (CRs) of any length are disruptive, inefficient, expensive and create uncertainty, thereby severely limiting progress in executing the Department's national defense priorities.
- This uncertainty only grows the longer a CR extends and is further amplified in the current environment where the possibility of an across-the-board sequestration reduction under the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (FRA) looms if all 12 full-year appropriations bill are not enacted by April 30th.
- Operating under a CR for an extended period erodes the U.S. military advantage relative to the People's Republic of China (PRC), impedes our ability to innovate and modernize, degrades readiness, hurts our people, and limits our ability to take action against future energy challenges (e.g., fuel and utilities). It signals to our adversaries that the U.S. is not committed to its stated priorities.
- There have been 48 CRs over 14 of the last 15 fiscal years lasting a total of 1,794 days, which equates to executing almost 5 out of the previous 15 years under a CR.
- We must break this pattern of extensive inaction as we cannot compete with the PRC with our hands tied behind our back every fiscal year.
- The Department cannot execute our strategic priorities, such as investing in cutting-edge technologies and capabilities, with last year's budget.
- Starting FY 2025 under a CR means executing at the FY 2024 annualized level, which is \$6.0B less than the FY 2025 request and structured to fund last fiscal year's mix of projects – resulting in a much greater reduction when considering funds that are misaligned and potentially unusable against planned FY 2025 expenditures. Under the annualized CR level –
 - The Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance appropriations would be underfunded by \$16.4B, while the Procurement, RDT&E, and Military Construction appropriations would be \$10.3B above the requested levels, and therefore unnecessary to meet our requirements in these areas.
 - A CR's prohibition on new starts and production rate increases, such as to advance our Replicator initiatives, further limit the use of funds available under a CR.
 - FY 2025 Procurement and RDT&E appropriations include 168 new start efforts valued at \$4.3B and 101 procurement rate increases totaling \$39.8B.
 - For Military Construction and Family Housing appropriations, the new start prohibition would delay 135 new construction projects totaling \$9.8B.
- Although not all of these efforts are impacted on day one of the fiscal year, the following are examples of specific activities of each Service that would be impacted under a six-month CR.
 - **Army:** Delays development of Next Generation Squad Weapon and Lethal Semi-Autonomous Aerial Unmanned Systems – Engineering Development; delays procurement of 54 Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance Unmanned Systems and the planned production increase of 1,392 GMLRS. Additionally, a six-month CR

would increase the GMLRS production lead time from the planned 24 months to 30 months.

- **Navy:** Delays Space and Electronic Warfare Engineering programs and planned Nuclear Command, Control and Communications engineering activities supporting STRATCOM. Delays a critical Refueling and Complex Overhaul to CVN-74, reducing aircraft carrier availability in the future.
 - **Air Force:** Delays B-21 progress towards Initial Operation Capability inhibiting fundamental cornerstone capability for Strategic and Nuclear Deterrence. Limits production quantity increases, product support procurement, and modernization funding to provide key technologies required to enhance survivability and lethality.
- The following tables illustrate the impact on the Department’s total annualized discretionary budget authority under a CR, assuming no adjustments.

Title	FY 2024 Enacted ^{1&2}	CR Adj ³	FY 2025 Annualized CR ⁴	FY 2025 PB	Δ FY 2025 Full-Year CR to FY 2025 PB
Military Personnel	175.9	0.5	176.4	181.9	(5.5)
Operation and Maintenance	327.0	0.0	327.0	337.9	(10.9)
Procurement	171.6	-	171.6	167.5	4.1
RDT&E	148.3	-	148.3	143.2	5.1
Revolving & Mgmt Funds	1.8	-	1.8	1.7	0.1
Defense Total	824.6	0.5	825.1	832.2	(7.1)
Military Construction	16.7	-	16.7	15.6	1.1
Family Housing	2.0	-	2.0	2.0	-
Military Construction Total	18.7	-	18.7	17.6	1.1
Total DoD Base Budget	843.3	0.5	843.8	849.8	(6.0)
Supplemental Funding ⁴	67.3	--	--	--	-

Military Department	FY 2024 Enacted ^{1&2}	CR Adj ³	FY 2025 Annualized CR ⁴	FY 2025 PB	Δ FY 2025 Full-Year CR to FY 2025 PB
Army	185.8	0.2	186.0	185.8	0.2
Navy ⁵	255.0	0.2	255.2	257.6	(2.4)
Air Force ⁵	257.2	0.2	257.4	262.7	(5.3)
Defense-Wide	145.2	0.0	145.2	143.7	1.5
TOTAL DoD Base Budget	843.2	0.5	843.8	849.8	(6.0)

¹ FY 2024 includes Division A of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-42), Division A of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47), and the non-recurring rescissions.

² The total rescissions for FY 2024 were \$2.6B of which \$0.973B is non-recurring.

³ Adjusted for Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Funds (MERHCF) for FY 2025 based on permanent-indefinite authority.

⁴ Funding provided in P.L.118-50 would not carry over under a year-long CR.

⁵ The Department of the Navy includes Navy and Marine Corps; the Department of the Air Force includes Air Force, Space Force and classified activities.

Long-Term CR Challenges

Lower DoD Topline:

- Under a CR, DoD operates at a reduced annualized topline of ~\$6.0B (-1 percent) below the President’s Budget request (\$843.8B vs. \$849.8B) – harming military readiness and stifling innovation and modernization efforts.
 - The actual reduction would be greater when considering CR funds that are misaligned and potentially unusable against planned FY 2025 expenditures.
 - The committees have expressed concern that the DoD budget needs to keep up with inflation. A six-month or longer CR would do just the opposite – it would cut out the funds requested to keep pace on pay and programs.

Misalignment of DoD Funding:

- During a CR, the Department must operate at the previous year’s funding levels by account, and some of the accounts are much lower than the FY 2025 President’s Budget request.
 - Several appropriation titles for the Department would experience shortfalls – Military Personnel reduced by \$5.5B, Operation and Maintenance (O&M) reduced by \$10.9B.
- These shortfalls would disrupt readiness gains and capability enhancements achieved to date and slow the pace of innovation and modernization in the midst of a challenging and dynamic threat landscape.
- Conversely, the Procurement, RDT&E, and Military Construction accounts would include about \$10.3B of funding above the FY 2025 request. However, due to the “new start” prohibitions under a CR, the Department would essentially be unable to use those excess funds.

Major Mission Impacts:

- **Taking Care of People:** (2.8 million military and civilian personnel)
 - A six-month CR would likely force reductions in our military personnel or halt new accessions and permanent change of station (PCS) moves. These unplanned disruptions would place further pressure on our current force and would fly in the face of our shared responsibility to take care of our people.
 - The moral and legal imperative to fund military and civilian pay and benefit increases adds risk to readiness and operations, which would be offset to fund these requirements.
 - A six-month CR would not include funds for the following must-pay compensation bills:
 - Funding necessary for 4.5 percent pay raise for military (\$5.2B) and the 2.0 percent pay raise for DoD civilians (\$2.9B)
 - Funding for statutory increases in Basic Housing and Subsistence Allowance Increases (\$1.2B)
 - Increasing the Basic Needs Allowance threshold from 150 percent to 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines (\$245M)
 - Funding necessary to support healthcare inflation and stabilization of the Military Health System (\$1.8B)

- A long-term CR would jeopardize the Department’s investments in taking care of our people and jeopardizes our ability to:
 - Execute critical construction needed to replace aging unaccompanied housing facilities as requested by Congress and GAO, as well as provide needed childcare/youth center facilities for our families without specific authorization.
 - Continue hiring up to 3,000 prevention workforce personnel associated with implementing the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Independent Review Commission (IRC) recommendations.
 - Continue implementation of the Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee recommendations to promote the wellness, health, and morale of the Total Force.
 - Payments to eligible current and former civilian employees and their dependents who have incurred qualifying injuries to the brain under the Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological Attacks (HAVANA) Act.
- **Impacts to PRC Pacing Challenges:**
 - Curtails Operational Imperative Execution. A CR would delay four Air Force Operational Imperative (OI) initiatives, that would close key capability gaps, accelerate development, and assure U.S. advantage against pacing challenges with Space Order of Battle, Kill Chain Automation, Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) development, and Moving Target Engagement;
 - Delays rapid fielding of Uncrewed Aerial Systems through the Replicator initiative.
 - Prohibits multiyear procurement, such that the Department cannot proceed with the award of multiyear procurement contracts for the CH-53K (Heavy Lift – 321 engines) and for Virginia Class submarines;
 - Pause investments in new space architectures for warfighters, including resilient space data transport, missile warning and tracking, other tactical sensing, and position, navigation, and timing (PNT), critical to the Joint Force in contested environments;
 - Hamper efforts to develop a family of survivable, long-range, and persistent sensors, and kill chain automation tools across multiple modalities and in all domains. These advancements increase the lethality of F-35, long-range strike platforms, and other current and future Joint air assets; and
 - Undermine the Joint Force’s ability to successfully conduct operations at a rate needed to win against the PRC without *optimized resilient forward basing* that can remain functional and effective under heavy attack.
- **Nuclear Triad:**
 - A six-month CR would delay the nearly \$8B in funding needed to modernize the nuclear triad;
 - Stall the second production lot buy of 20 Family of Beyond the Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) plus spares restricting worldwide nuclear survivable data and communications on the B-52; and

- Put at risk the modernization of the sea-base leg of the triad by preventing fully funding the second Columbia Class Submarine leading to future cost increases and potential schedule delays. This restriction would delay the Advanced Procurement (AP) award for future Columbia Class Submarines.
- *A reduction in Columbia (CLB) Class Advance Procurement (AP) compared to the FY 2025 request would cause construction delays to SSBNs 827 – 830 with associated delivery delays. There is no schedule margin remaining between the first operational availability of the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and the retirement of the Ohio SSBNs.*
 - Columbia class requires a total of \$6.2B of AP funding in FY 2025, which exceeds the FY 2024 enacted amount of \$3.4B by \$2.8B or 82 percent. The increase in advanced procurement funding includes a \$1.55B increase in investments in the submarine industrial base to help increase production of Columbia and Virginia Class submarines.
- A six-month CR would disrupt the momentum for priority divestment and modernization efforts, by putting on hold a considerable number of new starts in programs with direct impact to our nuclear triad. A six-month CR would impact the life-of-type buy needed to procure critical components for the new Mk21A reentry vehicle; it would also delay several key recapitalization efforts in the Minuteman III program (such as battery replacement, procurement of depot reentry support equipment, and missile transport equipment). Essential updates to the Little Mountain Test Facility would not be able to commence, which could further impact the LGM-35A Sentinel program.
- At a time when the PRC has built 100 new missile silos, the United States' ground-based leg must move forward in areas such as LGM-35A Sentinel and the MH-139 program. The air leg of the triad will suffer when the six-month CR causes a delay in the additional procurement of the B-21 Raider, which is a critical element of the NDS to meet future nuclear threats and deter aggression.
- A six-month CR would delay the W93/Mk7 warhead program, which is a Navy-led effort to develop a new warhead and aeroshell for a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). The program is critical to United Kingdom's parallel but independent A21/Mk7 through the Mutual Defense Agreement and Polaris Sales Agreement. A six-month CR would disrupt the Navy's program from entering the next phases of development and would drive a re-plan of the procurement and hardware needed to support FY 2025 and FY 2026 test efforts. Delays to these test activities will introduce significant risk into the program and create significant cost and schedule delays.
- **Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN):**
 - Prohibitions against new starts and increases in rates of operations in prior year Shipbuilding Programs (Cost to Complete) could result in work stoppages, future cost increases, and delays in turning the ships over to the fleet.
 - The FY 2025 increase in Virginia and Columbia class submarines AP would cause future start of construction delays and future cost increases for these ships. Further, a CR would:

- Delay the award of the Carrier (CVN) Refueling and Complex Overhauls and would worsen already challenged delivery schedules for ships under construction requiring Cost to Complete funding for the first time in FY 2025; and
- Delay the award to fully fund two DDG-51s for FY 2025 and \$1.68B to fully fund the FY 2023 and FY 2024 ships.

- **Inflation amounts contained in the FY 2025 PB:**

- The Department estimated the inflation rate impact using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Price Index and other assumptions from the FY 2025 budget.
- Table 3 is the breakout by title of the inflation impacts assumed in PB 2025. Under a CR, the Department would not have the additional funds available to address inflation impacts for contracts in FY 2025. This is in addition to the loss of the funding needed to cover the budgeted pay raises for our people.

Table 3. FY 2025 Inflation by Title (\$B)	
Title	FY 2025
Operation and Maintenance	5.0
Procurement	3.5
RDT&E	2.8
Military Construction	0.4
Family Housing	-
Revolving Funds	-
TOTAL	11.7

- **Lack of New Start and Production Rate Increase Authority:** Under any CR, the DoD lacks the authority to undertake new start efforts or production rate increases over FY 2024 executed levels for investment programs, which are critical to innovation and modernization goals. For the Procurement and RDT&E titles, a CR would inhibit 168 new start efforts and 101 procurement rate increases, including:
 - *Army’s Multi-Domain Artillery Cannon System (MDACS)*
 - *Navy’s Aim-9X Sidewinder and Rolling Airframe Missile*
 - *Air Force’s B-52 Radar Modernization Program (RMP)*
 - *Nuclear Enterprise. LGM-35A Sentinel modifications*
 - *Space Procurement. Integrated Operations Network*
- **Military Construction:** Under a CR, the Department can ONLY carry out previously fully or incrementally funded major construction projects, minor construction projects, and planning and design. A six-month or longer CR without relief from the new start prohibition would delay 122 new FY 2025 major construction projects totaling \$9.1B and 13 family housing projects totaling \$0.7B spanning a wide swath of initiatives, including:
 - Eleven (11) Unaccompanied Housing projects for \$1,093M at various locations.
 - Six (6) Child Development Centers/Youth Center for \$293M at various locations,
 - Five (5) B-21 bed down projects for \$208M at Ellsworth AFB, SD and Dyess AFB, TX.

- Seven (7) Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) projects for \$927M at various locations.
- Aircraft Maintenance Hangar for \$231M at Wheeler Army Airfield, HI.
- Aircraft Maintenance Hangar for \$213.5M at MCAS Cherry Point, NC.
- Ten (10) family housing new construction/replacement/construction improvement projects for \$499M in Europe and the Pacific.
- Three (3) military housing privatization initiative restructures supporting housing inventory sustainment and reinvestment needs of \$194M at Fort Eisenhower, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, and Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland Air Force Base.
- **Impact to Military Readiness:** A CR of six months or longer would jeopardize readiness gains of our forces and their equipment at a time when security threats are extraordinarily high. Examples of actions that may have to be taken to stay within the CR funding levels include the following:
 - Stop offering/paying new enlistment and reenlistment bonuses resulting in lost accessions/reenlistments and higher recruiting and training costs in the future.
 - Significantly delay/cancel military permanent change of station (PCS) moves creating gaps in military units, disrupting military families, and reducing morale.
 - Delay essential Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve training leading to a decrease in overall readiness.
 - Potential descoping or delay of 58 specific ship depot maintenance availabilities scheduled in FY 2025.
 - Reduce funding for readiness needs such as weapon system sustainment, flying hours program, home station training, ground combat readiness, and other warfighting training activities.
 - Halt Space System Development.
 - Defer Facility, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) projects.
 - May impede the replacement of munitions and other critical defense articles provided to Ukraine and other partners and allies if reliant on base budget contracting actions with no additional supplemental funds.
- **Impact to Modernization Efforts:** Derails the momentum for priority divestment and modernization efforts under a six month or greater CR, such as:
 - Impacts the production increases for high end weapon systems or delays critical long lead purchases, putting planned delivery at risk and adversely impacting the Department's ability to deter and defeat near-peer adversaries. For example, a CR would:
 - Delay T-7A first Lot production (7 aircraft) by a year and prevents production increase for MH-139.
 - Halt \$540M modernization effort for Evolved Strategic SATCOM inhibiting worldwide and Arctic secure operations; jam-resistant, and survivable SATCOM for Presidential and National Command Authorities and C2 over strategic ground, air, and sea forces.

- Delay delivery of \$360M PTS-Global and Resilient program advancements for reduced latency, increased capacity, and robust anti-jam capability.
- Stop work on launch and range test system software & IT modernization needed to address current and predicted threats and challenges to future operations' range and spaceport, which could lead to scrubbing critical launch missions impairing national capabilities and potential loss of Space lift Range launch resources.

Impact of the Fiscal Responsibility Act on Discretionary Spending Limits: On June 3, 2023, the President signed the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) of 2023 (Public Law 118-5).

- Section 102 of the FRA provides incentives for Congress to enact all 12 of the federal government's full-year appropriations acts for FY 2025 by the end of calendar year 2024.
- If there is a continuing resolution of any length less than 12 months in effect for any of the 12 full-year appropriations acts on or after January 1, 2025, the discretionary spending limit (cap) for the security category would be reduced by one percent below the enacted FY 2023 level, enforced through sequestration.¹
- This potential additional reduction in the spending caps, sometimes called the "fallback" provision of the FRA, would not be enforced until April 30th, providing Congress a four-month "grace period" in 2025 to complete the appropriations process.
- If any of the 12 full-year appropriations acts fall under a CR on April 30, 2025, and the defense category exceeds the revised Section 102 cap, a sequester is ordered.
- The reductions in the spending caps would presumably be reversed if all 12 of the full-year discretionary appropriations acts are enacted before the end of fiscal year 2025. However, having to operate under lower CR levels for a significant portion of the fiscal year would still be damaging to DOD operations.
- While the President has already exempted military personnel funding from a potential FY2025 sequester, those reductions are shifted to other portions of our defense budget, deepening the impacts to readiness and acquisition programs.

¹ 2 USC 901: Enforcing discretionary spending limits:

(e) Revised discretionary spending limits for fiscal year 2025

(1) In general

Subject to paragraph (3), if on or after January 1, 2025, there is in effect an Act making continuing appropriations for part of fiscal year 2025 for any discretionary budget account, the discretionary spending limits specified in subsection (c)(10) for fiscal year 2025 shall be adjusted in the final sequestration report, in accordance with paragraph (2), as follows:

(A) for the revised security category, the amount calculated for such category in section ³(d)(1)(A); and

(B) for the revised non-security ² category, the amount calculated for each category in section ³(d)(1)(B)

Table 4. FY 2025 Annualized CR Amounts vs. FY 2025 PB Request by Title (\$B)									
Title	FY 2024 Enacted ^{1&2}	CR Adj ³	FY 2025 Annualized CR	FY 2025 PB	Δ FY 2025 Full-Year CR to FY 2025 PB	Add'l 1% Sequester ⁴	FY 2025 Sequester Results ⁵	Sequester of FY 2025 Request ⁴	FY 2025 Sequester Results ⁵
Military Personnel	175.9	0.5	176.4	181.9	(5.5)	-	176.4	-	181.9
Operation and Maintenance	327.0	-	327.0	337.9	(10.9)	(17.6)	309.4	(21.2)	316.7
Procurement	171.6	-	171.6	167.5	4.1	(9.2)	162.4	(10.5)	157.0
RDT&E	148.3	-	148.3	143.2	5.1	(8.0)	140.3	(9.0)	134.2
Revolving & Mgmt Funds	1.8	-	1.8	1.7	0.1	(0.1)	1.7	(0.1)	1.6
Defense Total	824.6	0.5	825.1	832.2	(7.1)	(35.0)	790.1	(40.8)	791.4
Military Construction	16.7	-	16.7	15.6	1.1	(0.9)	15.8	(1.0)	14.6
Family Housing	2.0	-	2.0	2.0	-	(0.1)	1.9	(0.1)	1.9
Military Construction Total	18.7	-	18.7	17.6	1.1	(1.0)	17.7	(1.1)	16.5
Total DoD Base Budget	843.3	0.5	843.8	849.8	(6.0)	(36.0)	807.8	(42.0)	807.8
Supplemental Funding ⁵	67.3	--	--	--	-	-	-	-	-

¹ FY 2024 includes Division A of P.L. 118-42, Division A of P.L. 118-47, Division A of P.L. 118-47, and non-recurring rescissions.

² The total rescissions for FY 2024 were \$2.6B of which \$0.973 is non-recurring.

³ Adjusted for Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Funds (MERHCF) for FY 2025 based on permanent-indefinite authority.

⁴ Assumes that Military Personnel (MP) accounts will be exempt from sequestration.

⁵ Sec 102 of P.L. 118-5 (Fiscal Responsibility Act) imposes a sequester, effective April 30, 2025, if any agency's discretionary account is under a CR on or after January 1, 2025.

Table 5. FY 2025 Annualized CR Amounts vs. FY 2025 PB Request by MilDep (\$B)									
Military Department	FY 2024 Enacted ^{1&2}	CR Adj ³	FY 2025 Annualized CR	FY 2025 PB	Δ FY 2025 Full-Year CR to FY 2025 PB	Add'l 1% Sequester ⁴	FY 2025 Sequester Results ⁵	Sequester of FY 2025 Request ⁴	FY 2025 Sequester Results ⁵
Army	185.8	0.2	186.0	185.8	0.2	(6.3)	179.7	(7.2)	178.6
Navy ⁶	255.1	0.2	255.2	257.6	(2.4)	(10.6)	244.6	(12.3)	245.3
Air Force ⁶	257.2	0.2	257.4	262.7	(5.3)	(11.3)	246.1	(13.4)	249.3
Defense-Wide	145.2	0.0	145.2	143.7	1.5	(7.8)	137.4	(9.0)	134.8
TOTAL DoD Base Budget	843.3	0.5	843.8	849.8	(6.0)	(36.0)	807.8	(42.0)	807.8

¹ FY 2024 includes Division A of P.L. 118-42, Division A of P.L. 118-47, Division A of P.L. 118-47, and non-recurring rescissions.

² The total rescissions for FY 2024 were \$2.6B of which \$0.973B is non-recurring.

³ Adjusted for Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Funds (MERHCF) for FY 2025 based on permanent-indefinite authority.

⁴ Assumes that Military Personnel (MP) accounts will be exempt from sequestration.

⁵ Sec 102 of P.L. 118-5 (Fiscal Responsibility Act) imposes a sequester, effective April 30, 2025, if any agency's discretionary account is under a CR on or after January 1, 2025.

⁶ The Department of the Navy includes Navy and Marine Corps; the Department of the Air Force includes Air Force, Space Force, and classified activities.