

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) Case No.: 24-mj-1395
)
 v.) **Filed Under Seal**
)
 CERTAIN DOMAINS)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEIZURE WARRANT

I, [REDACTED] being duly sworn, hereby declare as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. I make this affidavit in support of a warrant for the seizure of 32 internet domains (the “SUBJECT DOMAINS”) that have been used by the Russian government and Russian government-sponsored actors to engage in foreign malign influence campaigns colloquially referred to as “Doppelganger,” in violation of U.S. money laundering and criminal trademark laws. As set forth below, since at least 2022, under the direction and control of the Russian Presidential Administration, and in particular Sergei Vladilenovich Kiriyenko (“KIRIYENKO”), the Russian companies Social Design Agency (“SDA”), Structura National Technology (“STRUCTURA”), ANO Dialog, have used, among others, the SUBJECT DOMAINS, which include “cybersquatted” domains¹ impersonating legitimate news entities and unique media brands created by Doppelganger, to covertly spread Russian government propaganda. As reflected in SDA’s notes from strategy meetings with KIRIYENKO and other Presidential Administration officials, SDA project proposals, and other SDA records obtained during the course of the investigation, some of which are attached as exhibits hereto, these actors designed the content of

¹ Based on my training and experience, I know that cybersquatting is a method of registering a domain intended to mimic another person or company’s domain. Cybersquatting is used to trick Internet users into believing they are visiting the legitimate person or company’s website.

such propaganda to, *inter alia*, reduce international support for Ukraine, bolster pro-Russian policies and interests, and influence voters in the U.S. and foreign elections without identifying, and in fact purposefully obfuscating, the Russian government or its agents as the source of the content. Among the methods Doppelganger used to drive viewership to the cybersquatted and unique media domains were the deployment of “influencers” worldwide, paid social media advertisements (in some cases created using artificial intelligence tools), and the creation of fake social media profiles posing as U.S. (or other non-Russian) citizens to post comments on social media platforms with links to the cybersquatted domains, all of which attempted to trick viewers into believing they were being directed to a legitimate news media outlet’s website.

2. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). I became a Special Agent in January 2017 when I was assigned to the Philadelphia Division’s Counterintelligence Squad. As part of the Counterintelligence Squad, my duties include, among other things, the investigation of foreign malign influence, espionage, and foreign intelligence activities against the United States. I have successfully completed the Counterintelligence Operations Course offered by the FBI Counterintelligence Training Center, where I was exposed to a variety of counterintelligence techniques, cases, and exercises. I have participated in the execution of numerous search warrants involving electronic evidence, among other investigative techniques.

3. As a federal agent, I am authorized to investigate violations of the laws of the United States and to execute warrants issued under authority of the United States. I have attended multiple training courses related to managing counterintelligence and espionage investigations. I have also been involved in various types of electronic and physical surveillance, the execution of search warrants, and interviews of crime victims, witnesses, and subjects. Where I assert that an

event took place on a particular date or at a particular time, I am asserting that it took place on or about the date or at or near the time asserted. Similarly, where I assert that an event took place a certain number of times, I am asserting that the event took place approximately the number of times asserted. Likewise, when I assert that a transaction involved a certain amount of money, I am asserting that the transaction involved approximately that amount of money.

4. The facts in this affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and experience, records seized pursuant to search warrants or obtained through legal process, and information learned from other agents and witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested warrant and does not set forth all of my knowledge about this matter.

5. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that the SUBJECT DOMAINS,² *see* Attachments A-1 through A-9, are property involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (international promotional money laundering) and 1956(h) (conspiracy to commit same) and/or property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part to facilitate violations of § 2320(a)(1) (trafficking in counterfeit goods or services) (collectively, the “SUBJECT OFFENSES”). In particular, the investigation has revealed that the SUBJECT DOMAINS have been purchased from U.S. registries or registrars by individuals abroad who are working under the direction and control of the Russian government, and in particular KIRIYENKO, including Ilya Gambashidze (“GAMBASHIDZE”), SDA, Nikolai Tupikin (“TUPIKIN”), and STRUCTURA, which have been sanctioned by the U.S. government and designated as SDNs, along with ANO Dialog, TABAK, and others, to advance their interests and the interests of the Russian government, thereby causing U.S. persons to unwittingly provide

² References to the individual SUBJECT DOMAINS in this affidavit will be denoted by **bolded** text.

goods and services to and for the benefit of one or more of the aforementioned SDNs, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). As noted above, the foreign malign influence effort described herein and carried out by SDA, STRUCTURA, and ANO Dialog is colloquially referred to as “Doppelganger.”

6. Because the SUBJECT DOMAINS represent property involved in a scheme to violate U.S. money laundering laws, they are subject to seizure, and therefore subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A) and 982(a)(1).

7. In addition, as a secondary basis for seizure and forfeiture, a subset of the SUBJECT DOMAINS represent property used, or intended to be used, to commit or facilitate the commission of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services (e.g., trademark infringement), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320, and therefore are subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1)(B) and (b)(1).

8. The procedure by which the government will seize the SUBJECT DOMAINS is described in Attachments A-1 through A-9 hereto and below.

TECHNICAL INFORMATION

9. Based on my training and experience and information learned from others, I am aware of the following:

10. Internet Protocol Address: An Internet Protocol (“IP”) address is a unique numeric address used by computers on the Internet. An IP Address is a series of four numbers, each in the range 0-255, separated by periods (e.g., 121.56.97.178). Every computer attached to the Internet must be assigned an IP address so that Internet traffic sent from and directed to that computer may be directed properly from its source to its destination. An IP address acts much like a home or business street address—it enables computers connected to the Internet to properly route traffic to

each other. The assignment of IP addresses to computers connected to the Internet is controlled by Internet Service Providers (“ISP”).

11. Domain Name: A domain name is a string of text that maps to an IP address and serves as an easy-to-remember way for humans to identify devices on the Internet (e.g., “justice.gov”). Domain names are composed of one or more parts, or “labels,” delimited by periods. When read right-to-left, the labels go from most general to most specific. The right-most label is the “top-level domain” (“TLD”) (e.g., “.com” or “.gov”). To the left of the TLD is the “second-level domain” (“SLD”), which is often thought of as the “name” of the domain. The SLD may be preceded by a “third-level domain,” or “subdomain,” which often provides additional information about various functions of a server or delimits areas under the same domain. For example, in “www.justice.gov,” the TLD is “.gov,” the SLD is “justice,” and the subdomain is “www,” which indicates that the domain points to a web server.

12. Domain Name System: The Domain Name System (“DNS”) is the way that Internet domain names are located and translated into IP addresses. DNS functions as a phonebook for the Internet, allowing users to find websites and other resources by their names while translating them into the IP addresses that their computers need to locate them.

13. Domain Name Servers: Domain Name Servers (“DNS servers”) are devices or programs that convert, or resolve, domain names into IP addresses when queried by web browsers or other DNS “clients.”

14. Registrar: A registrar is a company that has been accredited by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) or a national country code top-level domain (such as .uk or .ca) to register and sell domain names. Registrars act as intermediaries

between registries and registrants. Registrars typically maintain customer and billing information about the registrants who used their domain name registration services.

15. Registry: A domain name registry is an organization that manages top-level domains, including by setting usage rules and working with registrars to sell domain names to the public. For example, the registry for the “.com” and “.net” top-level domains is VeriSign, Inc., which is headquartered at 12061 Bluemont Way, Reston, Virginia.

16. Registrant: A registrant is the person or entity that holds the right to use a specific domain name sold by a registrar. Most registrars provide online interfaces that can be used by registrants to administer their domain names, including to designate or change the IP address to which their domain name resolves. For example, a registrant will typically “point” their domain name to the IP address of the server where the registrant’s website is hosted.

17. Virtual Private Network: “VPN” means a virtual private network. A VPN extends a private network across public networks like the Internet. It enables a host computer to send and receive data across shared or public networks as if they were an integral part of a private network with all the functionality, security, and management policies of the private network. This is done by establishing a virtual point-to-point connection through the use of dedicated connections, encryption, or a combination of the two. The VPN connection across the Internet is technically a wide area network (“WAN”) link between the sites. From a user perspective, the extended network resources are accessed in the same way as resources available from a private network-hence the name “virtual private network.” The communication between two VPN endpoints is encrypted and usually cannot be intercepted by law enforcement.

18. Virtual Private Server: “VPS” means a virtual private server. A VPS acts as an isolated, virtual environment on a physical server operated by a provider. VPS hosting providers

use virtualization technology to split a single physical machine into multiple private server environments that share resources. Hosting companies maintain server computers connected to the Internet. A server is a computer that provides services to other computers. Customers may use those servers for various functions, depending on the services offered by the hosting company. Some hosting companies offer simple cloud storage, which allows users to store files, much like an external hard drive, and share or edit those files with other persons. Other hosting companies allow users to operate and host websites on the Internet. Other hosting companies enable users to operate a virtual private server, which allows the customer to run virtualized operating systems from their computer over the Internet. Each VPS runs on a physical server but has its own self-contained disk space, bandwidth, processor allocation, memory, and operating system. Multiple VPS's can run on one physical server. A hosting company can offer any combination of the above. In the case of a VPS, each subscriber to a hosting company's services has full administrative control over the subscriber's VPS, which enables the subscriber to choose to install software from a menu the hosting company offers or store and run the subscriber's own software.

19. Who.is: A "Who.is" search provides publicly available information as to which entity is responsible for a particular IP address or domain name. A Who.is record for a particular IP address or domain name will list a range of IP addresses that the particular IP address falls within and the entity responsible for that IP address range and domain name. For example, a Who.is record for the domain name XYZ.COM might list an IP address range of 12.345.67.0-12.345.67.99 and list Company ABC as the responsible entity. In this example, Company ABC would be responsible for the domain name XYZ.COM and IP addresses 12.345.67.0-12.345.67.99.

INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND IEEPA

20. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(2)(A) (international promotional money laundering) prohibits, in relevant part, the transportation, transmission, or transfer of funds or monetary instruments from or through a place outside of the United States to a place within the United States, with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D), specified unlawful activity includes violations of IEEPA, which is codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 *et seq.* In addition, any person who “conspires to commit any offense defined in [Section 1956]” shall also be subject to criminal prosecution. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

IEEPA

21. IEEPA authorizes the President of the United States to impose economic sanctions in response to an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. Pursuant to that authority, the President may declare a national emergency through an Executive Order to deal with that threat.

22. IEEPA makes it a crime to willfully violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of any order, license, regulation, or prohibition issued pursuant to IEEPA. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a), (c).

23. In 2014, pursuant to his authorities under IEEPA, the President issued Executive Order 13660, which declared a national emergency with respect to the situation in Ukraine. To address this national emergency, the President blocked all property and interest in property that were then or thereafter came within the United States or the possession or control of any United States person, of individuals determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to meet one or more enumerated criteria. These criteria include, but are not limited to, individuals determined to be responsible for or complicit in, or who engage in, actions or policies that threaten the peace,

security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine; or who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to individuals or entities engaging in such activities. Executive Order 13660 prohibits, among other things, transferring, paying, exporting, withdrawing, or otherwise dealing in any interest in property in the United States owned by a person whose property and interests in property are blocked (a “blocked person”), as well as the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by a United States person, to, or for the benefit of a blocked person, and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by a United States person from any such blocked person.

24. The President on multiple occasions has expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660, including through: (1) Executive Order 13661, issued on March 16, 2014, which addresses the actions and policies of the Russian Federation with respect to Ukraine, including the deployment of Russian Federation military forces in the Crimea region of Ukraine; and (2) Executive Order 13662, issued on March 20, 2014, which addresses the actions and policies of the Government of the Russian Federation, including its purported annexation of Crimea and its use of force in Ukraine. Executive Orders 13660, 13661, and 13662 are collectively referred to as the “Ukraine-Related Executive Orders.” On February 21, 2022, the President again expanded the scope of the national emergency, finding that the Russian Federation’s purported recognition of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic regions of Ukraine contradicts Russia’s commitments under the Minsk agreements and threatens the peace, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

25. The Ukraine-Related Executive Orders authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers

granted to the President under IEEPA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of those orders. The Ukraine-Related Executive Orders further authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to redelegate any of these functions to other offices and agencies of the United States Government.

26. To implement the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") issued certain Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations. These regulations incorporate by reference the prohibited transactions set forth in the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders. *See* 31 C.F.R. § 589.201. The regulations also provide that the names of persons designated directly by the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders, or by OFAC pursuant to the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders, whose property and interests are therefore blocked, are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into the SDNs and Blocked Persons List (the "SDN List"), which is published on OFAC's website. *Id. at* note 2.

27. Among other things, E.O. 13661 prohibits United States persons from transferring, paying, exporting, withdrawing, or otherwise dealing in the property or interests in property of a designated person identified on the SDN List. E.O. 13661 § 1. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of, a designated person identified on the SDN List. E.O. 13661 § 4. Any transaction that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or causes a violation of E.O. 13661 is further prohibited. *Id.* § 5. "United States person" is defined as a United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the law of the United State or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States. 31 C.F.R. § 6(c).

28. On March 2, 2021, OFAC announced sanctions designating seven Russian government officials, including First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei KIRIYENKO, pursuant to E.O. 13661 for serving as officials of the Russian government.

In so doing, OFAC noted that KIRIYENKO “is reported to be President Putin’s ‘domestic policy curator.’”

29. On April 15, 2021, pursuant to his authorities under IEEPA, the President issued E.O.14024, which declared a national emergency with respect to:

[H]armful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation—in particular, efforts to undermine the conduct of free and fair democratic elections and democratic institutions in the United States and its allies and partners; to engage in and facilitate malicious cyber-enabled activities against the United States and its allies and partners; to foster and use transnational corruption to influence foreign governments; to pursue extraterritorial activities targeting dissidents or journalists; to undermine security in countries and regions important to United States national security; and to violate well-established principles of international law, including respect for the territorial integrity of states—constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.

Similar to the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders, E.O. 14024 blocked the property and interests in property of persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of State to meet one or more enumerated criteria and prohibited, among other things, the provision of funds, goods, or services by, to or for the benefit of such a designated person. To implement E.O. 14024, OFAC issued the “Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations,” 31 C.F.R. Part 587. Persons designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 are identified on the SDN List. *Id.* at note 1.

30. On February 22, 2022, OFAC announced additional sanctions against KIRIYENKO pursuant to E.O. 14024. With respect to KIRIYENKO, OFAC again described KIRIYENKO as “the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office” and reportedly “Putin’s domestic policy curator.” OFAC noted KIRIYENKO had previously “served as the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and as the General Director of Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation” and had been previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13661 in March 2021. Pursuant to E.O. 14024, OFAC redesignated KIRIYENKO for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the Russian government.

31. On March 20, 2024, OFAC designated GAMBASHIDZE and TUPIKIN, as well as SDA and STRUCTURA, pursuant to Executive Order 14024 for “being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of SDA and Structura” and “for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly” for the Russian government. In announcing the sanctions, the Treasury Department stated, “We are committed to exposing Russia’s extensive campaigns of government-directed deception, which are intended to mislead voters and undermine trust in democratic institutions in the United States and around the world.” OFAC explained that GAMBASHIDZE, TUPIKIN, SDA, and STRUCTURA:

[W]ere involved in a persistent foreign malign influence campaign at the direction of the Russian Presidential Administration. SDA and Structura have been identified as key actors of the campaign, responsible for providing GoR with a variety of services, including the creation of websites designed to impersonate government organizations and legitimate media outlets in Europe.

Leading into Fall 2022, Tupikin and Gambashidze implemented a campaign that impersonated news websites, staged videos, and fake social media accounts. Specifically, Tupikin and Gambashidze, via SDA and Structura, have implemented, on behalf of GoR, a sprawling network of over 60 websites that impersonated legitimate news organizations, and which used misleading social media accounts to amplify the content of the spoofed websites. The fake websites appeared to have been built to carefully mimic the appearance of legitimate news websites. The fake websites included embedded images and working links to legitimate sites and even used the impersonated site’s cookie acceptance page.

32. SDA and STRUCTURA, both of which were founded by GAMBASHIDZE, are Russian companies headquartered at adjacent buildings in Moscow. SDA is a public relations company, specializing in election campaigns, with deep ties to the Russian government. SDA’s website notes the work it has done for the Russian Duma, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as multiple other Russian government entities. According to its website, STRUCTURA is a technology company with experience using bots, offering website design, and coordinating

information systems among other services. STRUCTURA's website also highlights the work it has done for the Russian government and lists the same Russian government clients as SDA.

33. According to OFAC records, at no time has KIRIYENKO, GAMBASHIDZE,³ SDA, TUPIKIN, or STRUCTURA, or any of the individuals or entities described below, including individuals known to have worked at their direction, obtained a license or other written authorization to purchase, renew, transfer, use, or export the SUBJECT DOMAINS.

TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS

34. Title 18, United States Code Section 2320(a)(1) (trafficking in counterfeit goods or services), prohibits intentionally “traffic[king] in goods or services and knowingly us[ing] a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services.” “Counterfeit mark” is defined to mean “a spurious mark—(i) that is used in connection with trafficking in any goods, services, of any type or nature; (ii) that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark was so registered; (iii) that is applied to or used in connection with the goods or services for which the mark is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office . . .; and (iv) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(1)(A). “Traffic” means “to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or to make, import, export, obtain control of, or possess, with intent to so transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(5). “Financial gain” is in turn defined broadly to include “the

³ On March 20, 2024, Special Agents of the FBI interviewed a member of GAMBASHIDZE's family who is a U.S. citizen and alerted the family member to the sanctions. In a follow up interview on April 3, 2024, the family member confirmed they had spoken with GAMBASHIDZE regarding the sanctions after their interview with the FBI. The family member confirmed GAMBASHIDZE was aware of the sanctions and that GAMBASHIDZE claimed “what they say about me is not completely true.”

receipt, or expected receipt, of anything of value.” 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(2). Anyone who commits an offense under this provision is subject to criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b)(1).

35. According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), a trademark can be any word, phrase, symbol, design, or a combination of these things that identifies goods or services. The word “trademark” can refer to both trademarks and service marks. A trademark is used for goods, while a service mark is used for services. Trademark owners can register their trademarks with the USPTO, which maintains a database of registered and pending trademarks that is available to the public to search. That database includes the date the trademark owner applied for trademark registration, the date the trademark registered, and examples of the trademark.

PROBABLE CAUSE

A. Overview of the Russian-Government-Directed Doppelganger Operation

36. As set forth below, since at least 2022, under the direction and control of the Russian Presidential Administration, and in particular KIRIYENKO, Russian companies, including SDA led by GAMBASHIDZE, STRUCTURA led by TUPIKIN, and ANO Dialog led by TABAK, have used the SUBJECT DOMAINS to engage in foreign malign influence campaigns (which, as noted above, are colloquially referred to as “Doppelganger”) designed to reduce international support for Ukraine, bolster pro-Russian policies, and influence voters in U.S. and foreign elections by posing as citizens of those countries, impersonating legitimate news outlets, and peddling Russian government propaganda under the guise of independent media brands.

37. In general, Doppelganger, which is under the direction and control of the Russian government, and specifically KIRIYENKO, consists of two related foreign malign influence efforts.

38. The first component of the Doppelganger campaign carried out by STRUCTURA and SDA, acting under KIRIYENKO's direction and control, involves the creation of fake websites that mimic legitimate media outlets. Doppelganger places content on those spoofed websites that promote specific narratives identified by the Russian government to further the Russian government's objectives, such as influencing the U.S. electorate by targeting specific audiences within the United States and elsewhere. To evade detection, Doppelganger created sophisticated cybersquatted domains (which include the SUBJECT DOMAINS) that appear to be the websites of legitimate news outlets such as Fox News, The Washington Post, and Forward, among others. In general, the cybersquatted domains appear virtually identical to their legitimate media counterparts, including through the use of the same layout and design, as well as the same trademarks, logos, and slogans, and through attributing the false articles found on the cybersquatted domain to real journalists for the legitimate outlet, with the journalists' names, photographs, and bylines featured on the domain. In addition, links to other content on the SUBJECT DOMAINS re-route the reader to the legitimate news outlet. However, the content published on the cybersquatted domains is not the legitimate journalistic work of the impersonated media outlet and impersonated journalists; rather, the cybersquatted domains publish fake news articles that promote Russian interests without identifying, and in fact purposefully obfuscating, the Russian government or its agents as the source of the content.

39. For example, from within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, FBI agents located and reviewed⁴ six articles published on Doppelganger's cybersquatted domain

⁴ The FBI used the WayBack Machine to locate articles published on the cybersquatted domains. The Wayback Machine is a digital archive of the World Wide Web founded by the Internet Archive, an American nonprofit organization, that allows the user to go "back in time" to see how websites looked in the past. *See EVO Brands, LLC v. Al Khalifa Group LLC*, 657 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1322-23 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (collecting cases and noting that "[c]ourts have taken judicial notice of internet archives in the past,

washingtonpost[.]pm. **Washingtonpost[.]pm** is a nearly identical duplication of the legitimate Washington Post website. All links on **washingtonpost[.]pm** such as the website navigation menu, the Washington Post icon, and the byline, re-route the reader to the legitimate washingtonpost.com website. **Washingtonpost[.]pm** also features trademarks registered to The Washington Post. The articles published on the **washingtonpost[.]pm** are published under the name of a legitimate Washington Post journalist and feature his/her photograph. Based on my training, experience, and this investigation, I believe this duplication is likely to mislead or confuse U.S. persons and other readers into believing that the Russian propaganda presented in the article is from a legitimate U.S.-based news organization. A search for the articles located on **washingtonpost[.]pm** or substantially similar content on washingtonpost.com yielded negative results, as did a review of the legitimate Washington Post journalist's published articles on washingtonpost.com.

40. The articles located on **washingtonpost[.]pm** present a pro-Russia and anti-Ukrainian viewpoint, and many of the articles focused on U.S. policy or politics. None of the articles include attribution to SDA, STRUCTURA or the Russian government. For example, one article is titled "White House Miscalculated: Conflict with Ukraine Strengthens Russia" and purports to be authored by a Washington Post reporter. The article states, in part:

It is time for our leaders to recognize that continued support for Ukraine is a mistake. It was a waste of lives and money, and to claim otherwise only means further destruction. For the sake of everyone involved in the conflict, the Biden administration should just make a peace agreement and move on.

See Exhibit 1 for illustrative examples of the cybersquatted domains.

41. To distribute their propaganda without attribution to the Russian government, Doppelganger created social media profiles posing as U.S. (or other non-Russian) citizens. These

including Archive.org's 'Wayback Machine,' finding that Archive.org possesses sufficient indicia of accuracy that it can be used to readily determine the various historical versions of a website").

profiles then posted comments on social media platforms with links to the cybersquatted domains to trick viewers into believing they were visiting a legitimate news outlet.

42. The cybersquatted domains used by Doppelganger generally are not indexed by search engines. A visit to the standalone domain, such as [www.washingtonpost\[.\]pm](http://www.washingtonpost[.]pm), reveals a blank page or an error page. Rather, as its primary method of distribution, Doppelganger created fraudulent social media personas impersonating U.S. citizens to post article-specific extended hyperlinks to the cybersquatted domains on those social media platforms.⁵ To further disseminate their propaganda beyond social media posts, Doppelganger also purchased and placed advertisements on social media platforms to drive traffic to their articles. Based on my training and experience, I believe Doppelganger distributes its propaganda in this manner in order to obscure from Americans and other targeted readers the fact that they are not visiting a legitimate news outlet.

43. The second component of the Doppelganger campaign, carried out by ANO Dialog and TABAK, acting under KIRIYENKO's direction and control, focused on creating original brands (which include the SUBJECT DOMAINS) to disseminate Russian propaganda. These brands purport to be independent journalists or independent news media organizations but actually published content under the direction and control of the Russian government. As discussed below, the same articles would appear on both the cybersquatted domains and the ANO Dialog media brands, which indicates to me that ANO Dialog and SDA/STRUCTURA acted in close coordination under the direction and control of the Russian government and KIRIYENKO.

⁵ For example, while a visit to www.foxnews.cx would reveal a blank or error page, a visit to www.foxnews.cx/world/US-Decided-to-Trade-Ukraine-for-Security.html would reveal the active cybersquatted website with an article and the re-routing links to the legitimate Fox News.

44. As detailed below, individuals associated with Doppelganger—who are believed to be based in Russia or elsewhere outside the United States—have transferred funds from outside the United States to lease most of the SUBJECT DOMAINS from United States-based domain registrars or registries at the direction and control of, and for the benefit of, sanctioned persons, including KIRIYENKO, GAMBASHIDZE, SDA, TUPIKIN, and STRUCTURA. These criminal actors did not obtain an OFAC license before leasing the SUBJECT DOMAINS. Because they have transferred funds from or through a place outside the United States to a place within the United States, with the intent to promote a specified unlawful activity (here, an IEEPA violation), there is probable cause to believe they have violated U.S. money laundering laws. In addition, the conspirators took steps to make each of the SUBJECT DOMAINS available on the Internet, including in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. As set forth below, the conspirators specifically targeted the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s citizens, including those located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in order to influence the electorate in this, and other districts.

45. In addition, and as detailed further below, there is probable cause to believe that a subset of the SUBJECT DOMAINS is being used or is intended to be used to commit or facilitate trafficking in counterfeit goods or services. These SUBJECT DOMAINS feature registered marks—The Washington Post logo, for example—that are identical to, or substantially indistinguishable from, marks registered on the Principal Register maintained by the USPTO and that are in use by the mark holder. The SUBJECT DOMAINS use these marks in connection with goods or services that are the same as those for which they are registered on the Principal Register and the SUBJECT DOMAINS’ use of the marks is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive the public. As set forth below, the infringing SUBJECT DOMAINS were accessed from the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania and thus the infringing goods passed through Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

B. Public Reporting on Doppelganger

46. In July 2023, the European Union (“EU”) sanctioned seven Russian individuals and five Russian entities for their role in Doppelganger. Among the entities and individuals sanctioned by the EU were SDA, STRUCTURA, GAMBASHIDZE, and ANO Dialog. In so doing, the EU explained:

Russian actors have conducted a digital information manipulation campaign named ‘RRN’ (Recent Reliable News) aiming at manipulating information and disseminating propaganda in support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. That campaign, in which government bodies or bodies affiliated to the Russian State have participated, relies on fake web pages usurping the identity of national media outlets and government websites as well as fake accounts on social media.⁶

STRUCTURA and SDA were identified as “the key actor[s] of the campaign, responsible for the creation of fake websites impersonating government organizations and legitimate media in Europe (primarily Germany, France, Italy, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) and for boosting the pro-Russian ‘RRN’ campaign on social media.”⁷

47. On July 19, 2023, the Viginum Agency (“VIGINUM”), a French government agency tasked with vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference, which operates under the authority of the Secretariat-General for National Defense and Security, highlighted Doppelganger’s creation and operation of cybersquatted domains:

Since February 2023, VIGINUM has noticed an increasing number of impersonations of major French and foreign media outlets, in order to publish pro-Russian articles linked to the war in Ukraine. . .

The appearance of typosquatted websites is in every way similar to that of the media outlets they are impersonating, the only difference being the visited URL. The domain names of

⁶ *Regulations*, Official Journal of the European Union, L 190, Vol. 66 (28 July 2023) available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2023:190I:FULL>.

⁷*Id.*

typosquatted media outlets use the same source code as that of legitimate media outlets: most of the links on the legitimate website are downloaded on the typosquatted website, which lends it credibility in the eyes of unsuspecting users.

48. VIGINUM also highlighted Doppelganger's use of Facebook pages and advertisements to disseminate disinformation. According to VIGINUM, "Since February 2023, more than 160 Facebook pages have been identified by VIGINUM, posting more than 600 sponsored content containing links to articles and websites linked to the campaign." As described below, the investigation has revealed that Doppelganger purchased numerous social media advertisements targeting U.S. politicians and relied on artificial intelligence to generate the content.

C. The Russian Presidential Administration, through KIRIYENKO, Exercises Direction and Control Over Doppelganger

49. GAMBASHIDZE took extensive notes documenting meetings between KIRIYENKO, SDA, STRUCTURA, TUPIKIN, ANO Dialog, members of the Russian government like Sofia Zakharova ("Zakharova"), and others involved in Doppelganger. GAMBASHIDZE's notes include contact lists, staff lists, task or to-do lists, and potential ideas for malign foreign influence campaigns. Between April 2022 and April 2023, GAMBASHIDZE took notes related to at least 20 Russian Presidential Administration meetings.

50. For example, one note was titled "*Meeting with SVK at the AP*"⁸ and dated April 16, 2022. I assess that AP is an abbreviation for Administratsiya Prezidenta, which translates from Russian to English as the Presidential Administration. Based on the context and content of the meeting notes, other records obtained during this investigation, and the supervisory role that SVK

⁸ Virtually all records discussed herein were in the Russian language. Throughout this affidavit, italicized quoted language indicates a verbatim translation, whereas plaintext quoted language indicates a summary translation. Exhibits 2B through 13B to this affidavit have been translated verbatim. All translations were completed by FBI linguists.

appears to play in the Doppelganger campaign, I assess that SVK is a reference to Sergei Vladilenovich KIRIYENKO. As noted above, KIRIYENKO has been sanctioned and described by OFAC as “the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office” and reportedly “Putin’s domestic policy curator.” KIRIYENKO is frequently referred to in Russian and Western media as “Putin’s right-hand man.” In addition, the notes refer to Russian President Vladimir Putin and reveal that SVK, who is also referred to as Sergey in the notes, is overseeing and directing the malign foreign influence efforts described herein.

51. That note from April 16, 2022 details a meeting led by SVK at which “*SVK was taking detailed notes*” to discuss bolstering support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The meeting participants discussed topics for propaganda, and SVK provided his opinion, with GAMBASHIDZE recording SVK’s response to the ideas as “*well received*”, “*need to work*”, or “*the right thing to do.*” SVK told the group they must use two mechanisms “*to be effective: 1. Creating of a nuclear psychosis. The USA have been prepping Europe for a big war with the Russian Federation. War for peace. 2. Exaggeration.*” While GAMBASHIDZE’s note contains passing references to other meeting participants, the most substantive details recorded were when SVK provided his opinion or instructions. This note also makes reference to “Tabak.” I assess that the “Tabak” referenced in GAMBASHIDZE’s notes is Vladimir TABAK, the head of ANO Dialog.

52. On July 13, 2022, GAMBASHIDZE wrote a note titled “*Minutes of the Meeting at the AP on July 13, 2022.*” The note listed meeting participants as “*Stas, Sofia, Ilya, and Sergey.*” I assess that the Sofia referenced is likely Sofia Zakharova, a Russian Presidential Administration spokesperson. Zakharova is a Kremlin official who has also focused on information technology and communications infrastructure. Zakharova has regularly taken part in conferences and events

dedicated to artificial intelligence.⁹ Based on my training, experience, and information gathered through this investigation, I assess that the Ilya referenced is Ilya GAMBASHIDZE and that the Sergey referenced is KIRIYENKO. GAMBASHIDZE's note identifies KIRIYENKO, as "SVK", telling the meeting participants, "*it's an impossible task,*" which I assess to be a reference to the difficulties in effectuating the Doppelganger campaign. GAMBASHIDZE notes that the participants had "*initially talked him into five countries. Now he says no.*" Based on the context of the note and this investigation, I assess that "him" and "he" refers to KIRIYENKO. GAMBASHIDZE records that the group agreed "*the Germans are more dependent than the French*" and decided to focus its efforts on the Germans. In particular, the group agreed that "*first and foremost, we need to discredit the USA, Great Britain and NATO, and secondly, we need to convey the truth about the war in Ukraine*" and the need to convince Germans to oppose the "*inefficient politics of sanctions.*"

53. According to the note, the participants used the remainder of the meeting to discuss anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian narratives to distribute, with a focus on Germany. GAMBASHIDZE noted "*They were assigned Russian Reliable News – changed it into Recent, it's going to work.(was sent by Tabak).*"

54. GAMBASHIDZE referenced SVK in six other notes in addition to the two described above. According to a note titled "*Meeting Minutes AP_25.07.22 – 11.00*" SVK and others again discussed targeting Germany. SVK suggested "*in order to normalize relations, it is necessary to show who caused them to deteriorate,*" and directed the meeting participants to influence German-Russian relations. The notes indicate that Sofia, whom I assess to be Zakharova,

⁹ See <https://www.voanews.com/a/investigation-who-is-ilya-gambashidze-the-man-the-us-government-accuses-of-running-a-kremlin-disinformation-campaign-/7604052.html>

instructed the creation of “websites to tell the Germans the truth!” Another participant suggested using “real facts to complement fake facts.” One suggestion included trying to “make a fake on an American soldier that raped a German woman. That would be great!” Another note, titled “AP Meeting Minutes, Monday, January 16” referenced another party as being “fully in charge of filling the content on the Ukraine Tribunal portal.” That note also indicated a topic “for business-elites” as “Bypassing sanctions: they don’t need to be lifted, they need to be bypassed.”

55. Although five of the notes did not list SVK as a participant, the meeting notes indicate that the meetings discussed presentations, reports, and metrics related to Doppelganger for SVK’s review and awareness as well as his reactions to, and approval of, various products. For example, in a note titled “Minutes of the Meeting at the AP, August 1, 2022”, GAMBASHIDZE mentioned that articles would be submitted to SVK’s office and that “so far three were well received.” Other notes mentioned creating reports or presentations for SVK, to include media monitoring. Another note, “Minutes_-_ECC_AP_05.04.23”, included a discussion of resources, wherein a participant reported “SVK is not against including our influencers abroad.”¹⁰ That note referenced a French businessman whom the participants believed could do an “interview” for “RRN.” A note titled “Meeting Minutes -_AP_01.18.23” refers to SVK as “listening to no more than ten newsworthy events” and notes that “we need to create our OWN concept based on Ukraine monitoring and Tabak’s concept.” GAMBASHIDZE noted, “They are expecting fake news from us every day.”

56. At least 13 of the meeting notes listed “SAZ” as a meeting participant, which I assess to be a reference to Zakharova due to her initials and the use of Sofia in the body of some notes.

¹⁰ Another meeting note indicated that “we need influencers! A lot of them and everywhere. We are ready to wine and dine them.”

Based on my training, experience, this investigation, and the context and content of the notes, I assess that Zakharova reported to KIRIYENKO and conveyed information regarding these meetings to and from KIRIYENKO for his approval and further direction.

57. One note of a January 13, 2023, meeting attended by GAMBASHIDZE, Zakharova and others mentioned they had “*reported to the President about the project.*” I assess that “the President” refers to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The note stated that the participants should not constrain themselves to specific countries; rather, “*false stories spread could be initiated everywhere, in different countries, even launched through media.*” The note referenced specific campaigns, including the use of influencers, a “*media cluster*” with “*40-50 websites per country,*” which I assess refers to creating unique media brands led by ANO Dialog, and making “*political animated movies.*” After mentioning “*our fakes will be restored*”, “*the IAG team*” was specifically assigned to work on “*analytical products and videos.*” I assess that IAG is a reference to GAMBASHIDZE.

58. In addition to foreign influence campaigns, Doppelganger also appears to have conducted influence campaigns domestically within Russia, underscoring its close ties to the Russian government. For example, one note indicates that the “*project could be used for P’s election campaign*” which I assess to be a reference to Russian President Putin. Likewise, a different meeting note from a meeting SAZ attended indicated the group discussed “*Putin team-- example of work for the upcoming campaign*” and explained that “*Our battlefield is here. That’s why men are not in Donbas.*”

59. Another note, titled “*Meeting Minutes_-_AP_Factory_01.27.23*” includes the instruction that “*When providing a narrative it’s important to remember that this is ‘from a German*

to a German’, ‘from a Frenchman to a Frenchman’!” I assess this to be a reference to the Doppelganger’s strategy of posing as citizens of other countries in order to influence their publics.

D. Internal SDA Documents, Correspondence, and Notes Take Credit for the Doppelganger Campaign and Discuss SDA’s Overarching Foreign Malign Influence Strategy

60. An SDA internal document titled “*Countermeasures by foreign agencies and organizations*” which recounted that the “‘*collective West*’ countries are seriously concerned by the effectiveness of the project” and that, along with “*major online platforms, factcheckers and investigators*” they have “*been involved in the effort of countering our narratives since September 2022.*” The document went on to list and summarize 15 publications from various news sources and organizations, such as Meta, Premier Ministre, The Washington Post, Wired, and Le Monde, which discussed Doppelganger. I believe this document reflects SDA’s acknowledgment of its role in Doppelganger. *See Exhibit 2.*¹¹

61. In a similar vein, another SDA document highlighted social media companies’ attempts to combat SDA, STRUCTURA, and ANO Dialog’s propaganda by identifying the cybersquatted domains, as well as RRN, as suspicious and blocking them. The document set out a plan to combat the social media companies’ disruption efforts by posting comments through social media accounts to complements their use of bots and further publicize their narratives. The plan was to post “*60,000 comments per month for France and Germany combined.*” *See Exhibit 3.*

62. SDA also possessed at least 27 invoices for the equivalent of thousands of U.S. dollars’ worth of translation services. These invoices requested payments for the translation of

¹¹ Attached as Exhibits to this affidavit are the original Russian-language SDA documents lawfully obtained during this investigation (*see Exhibits 2B through 13B*) as well as English-language translations (*see Exhibits 2A through 13A*). All of the SDA documents were obtained prior to June 1, 2024. Consistent with Department of Justice policy, redactions have been applied to certain identifiers contained within the documents. The terms substituted in place of those identifiers in the English language translations relate to the status of those persons or entities at the time the documents were obtained.

files, identified by the file name. The file names on the invoices appear to correspond to the headlines of articles published on the cybersquatted domains, including certain SUBJECT DOMAINS. For example, one SDA invoice dated December 18, 2023, contained six file names, which matched articles found either on **washingtonpost[.jpm]** or **fox-news[.jin]**. One of the partial headlines listed on the SDA invoice was “*Middle East Coalition of US Allies Crumbles.*” I have located and reviewed a corresponding article published on **washingtonpost[.jpm]** that is titled “Middle East Coalition of US Allies crumbles like a House of Cards.” Accordingly, I believe these invoices reflect SDA’s payment for Doppelganger-related services. *See Exhibit 1 at 6.*

63. Multiple SDA documents detail SDA’s strategy for implementing its foreign malign influence campaigns. Among these documents is what appears to be an initial concept plan for the Doppelganger campaign, which specifically referenced GAMBASHIDZE, and noted “*if we can, we need a separate department for fakes - a factory!*”¹² The document indicated the campaign would target England, Germany, and Italy and would have “*Two news sites: English-language and German-speaking.*”¹³

64. A hallmark of the Doppelganger campaign was to impersonate U.S. and other non-Russian citizens through the creation of fake social media profiles. Then, that social media profile, posing as an American or other non-Russian citizen, would post comments or other content promoting a pro-Russian narrative and include a hyperlink to the cybersquatted domain impersonating a legitimate news outlet like The Washington Post or Fox News. Using this manner of distribution, KIRIYENKO, GAMBASHIDZE, TUPIKIN, SDA, and STRUCTURA are able to mislead, for example, American citizens into believing they are seeing the viewpoints of a fellow

¹² This translation was completed using machine translation software.

¹³ This translation was completed using machine translation software. As discussed below, I assess that these two “news” websites are likely references to RRN and Journalisten Freikorps.

American citizen, rather than the Russian government's view. SDA documents provide detailed instructions on how these fake American social media profiles should distribute Doppelganger content through social media platforms. For example, SDA documents provide instructions and exemplar social media posts designed to influence the U.S. election. One such document first sets out what appears to be an article, written in English, likely to be published on one of the cybersquatted domains with the headline "*U.S. Loses Its Position as a World Leader by Making Too Many Mistakes*" under the heading of "International Politics." The document envisions the creation of social media profiles posing as American citizens "*living in a small town,*" which would post comments linking to the article in order to influence the views of actual American voters. That document also provided suggested English-language comments for use in distributing the article on social media. *See, e.g.,* Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5.

65. Another 26-page SDA manual set forth a plan for a campaign targeting the Ukrainian public. The manual showed SDA dividing its influence campaigns into four sections: "*monitoring, analytics, content production, and content delivery.*" *See* Exhibit 6. This manual described SDA's efforts to create "*articles (long reads)*" which were "*original texts ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 characters with spaces, devoted to topics relevant to the Ukrainian audience, which fit into the main subject areas of the project. Each text is professionally edited and accompanied by 10 comments and 3 teasers for disseminating the text on social networks.*" I assess that SDA's reference to these articles, or "*long reads*", refer to the original content produced by Doppelganger and intended to be posted on domains SDA controls, including the SUBJECT DOMAINS, and which may also be distributed through ANO Dialog's unique media brands. Further, I assess that the reference to "*10 comments and 3 teasers*" refers to SDA's practice of spreading Doppelganger

content by posting links to the cybersquatted domains through proposed social media comments, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

66. SDA documents further reveal that SDA extensively monitors and collects information about a large number of media organizations and social media influencers. One document revealed a list of more than 2,800 people on various social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook and Telegram, spanning 81 countries, that SDA identified as influencers, including television and radio hosts, politicians, bloggers, journalists, businessmen, professors, think-tank analysts, veterans, professors, and comedians. When referring to politicians, the list often mentioned which U.S. state and/or political party they represent and the position they hold in Congress. The U.S.-based influencers accounted for approximately 21% of the accounts being monitored by SDA. On another list of over 1,900 “*anti-influencers*”¹⁴ from 52 countries, the U.S.-based accounts comprised 26% of the total accounts being monitored by SDA. I assess that “*anti-influencer*” indicates that the account posts content that SDA views as contrary to Russian objectives. Based on my review of other records obtained during this investigation, I know that SDA adds information captured through its monitoring efforts to dashboards. These dashboards analyze trends in public opinion and thereby measure the effectiveness of the malign foreign influence campaign based on its impact on public opinion. SDA’s content varies from project to project; however, it can include videos, memes, cartoons, social media posts, and/or articles. SDA’s content delivery also varies each campaign, but often relies heavily on social media posts driving targeted audiences to domains SDA controls, like the SUBJECT DOMAINS.

¹⁴ This translation was completed using machine translation software.

67. One SDA document outlined a project titled “*International Conflict Incitement*” which targeted Germany and France. As described by SDA, the

objective of the ‘International Conflict Incitement’ project is to escalate internal tensions in the countries allied with the United States in order to promote the interests of the Russian Federation on the international arena. To influence real-life conflicts and artificially create conflict situations, it is proposed to use a wide range of information tools to influence public opinion.

SDA intended for its project to result in the “[e]scalation of the conflict situation through the use of available tools (traffic redirection, work with comments, work with influencers, analytical articles, augmented reality, media mirror outlets, fakes, etc.) in order to destabilize the societal situation.” I believe “*media mirror outlets*” is the term SDA used to refer to Doppelganger’s use of cybersquatted domains to impersonate legitimate news outlets. The project intended to artificially generate conflicts through, among other things, “*spreading additional false narratives*”; “*fake videos, documents, and telephone conversation recordings*”; “*comments on social media*”; and “*fake and real quotes from influencers*”. The project identified the “*media mirrors outlets*”; “*foreign and Russian influencers*” and “*bots and work with comments*,” as “*delivery channels*” for the project. See Exhibit 7.

68. In another document, SDA summarized its campaign against Germany, identifying three major themes: (1) “*HOHLI – pigs*”;¹⁵ (2) “*The difference between Ukraine and Germany*”; and (3) “*The U.S. is behind everything.*”¹⁶ It also included 43 ideas for propaganda, which were all associated with one or more of the three themes listed above. The document placed each idea into a table, complete with the target audience and media type. For example, one idea for “*The U.S. is behind everything,*” theme was a “*screenshot of the publication with a photo of the US*

¹⁵ After consulting with Ukrainian and Russian speaking FBI employees, I have learned that this term is a derogatory word for Ukrainians.

¹⁶ This translation was completed using machine translation software.

Embassy in Germany. Headline: Scholz became employee of the month at the US Embassy.” This screenshot and headline were meant to impress upon viewers that the U.S. directs German policy.

SDA’s Foreign Malign Influence Plans for the 2024 U.S. Election

1. The Good Old U.S.A. Project


69. SDA records show that, starting in the fall of 2023, SDA began developing a campaign targeting the 2024 U.S. federal elections which it called “The Good Old U.S.A. Project.”¹⁷ See Exhibit 8. According to the planning document, the project’s goal was to influence U.S. public opinion to align with the viewpoint “*that the US should target their effort towards addressing its domestic issues instead of wasting money in Ukraine and other ‘problem’ regions.*” The document laid out objectives and specific demographics for targeting U.S. audiences (including specific messaging to voters in six swing states) through social media groups, social media advertising, and influencers. The document specifically refers to the content to be distributed by SDA as “*bogus stories disguised as newsworthy events.*” These “*bogus*” stories would be complimented by “*Mass distribution of text comments and memes in Facebook and X (Twitter) discussion threads.*” This “*commentary campaign*” would spread “*false reworked project narratives supported by facts*” and engage in “*targeted social engineering based on information trends and users’ emotional attitude towards them.*”

70. The Good Old U.S.A Project specifically highlighted the use of “[*t*]argeted advertising” on social media that would enable SDA to track Americans reactions “*to the distributed material in real time, and directing the psychological response group to contribute to*

¹⁷ In the original Russian-language document, the words “The Good Old U.S.A.” were written in English. This document followed a design template frequently used by SDA, featuring a red and black color scheme; a common Cyrillic font; bolded, numerical section headers; and logo in the bottom left of each page. Based on my review of documents obtained during this investigation, I know this template is frequently used by SDA employees.

comments thereof. With the help of a network of bots, the psychological response moderates top discussions and adjust further launches depending on which group was affected the most.”

71. The use of targeted advertising by Doppelganger is corroborated by records obtained from Meta pursuant to a warrant, which identified Meta pages and advertisements linked to the Doppelganger campaign. Notably, those records revealed Doppelganger’s apparent use of artificial intelligence tools to generate content, including images and videos, for use in negative advertisements about U.S. politicians. Several of these Meta accounts were registered with account names that approximate legitimate news media organizations, such as CNN California, Sacramento Inside, California News, and California BBC (screenshots from the Meta pages created by Doppelganger are contained below). The CNN California Facebook Page’s profile picture displayed a blue version of the legitimate CNN logo with California written underneath in the same shade of blue. The Page was listed on Facebook as a News and Media website and had a banner in blue with the CNN logo also in blue that read **BREAKING HOT NEWS /// HOT NEWS /// and LIVEHD /// TODAY**. Meta records also revealed that Doppelganger used credit cards issued by U.S. financial institutions to purchase Facebook advertisements.



2. The “Guerrilla Media Campaign in the United States”

72. SDA documents include a proposal for another campaign focused on influencing the United States, titled “*The Guerrilla Media Campaign in the United States.*” See Exhibit 9.¹⁸ The Guerilla Media Campaign focused on exploiting the perceived polarization of U.S. society by focusing on eight “*Campaign Topics.*” As reflected in the proposal, SDA anticipated using social media profiles on Facebook, X (formerly known as Twitter), YouTube, and Truth Social but noted that with “*Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, we need to create multiple ‘perishable’ accounts, primarily for the work with comments.*” The Guerilla Media Campaign would disseminate its propaganda through posts, “*comments on social networks and local group chats*”, memes, and “*video content, including news stories in the Fox News style.*” SDA’s plan stated “*In order for this work to be effective, you need to use a minimum of fake news and a maximum of realistic information. At the same time, you should continuously repeat that this is what is really happening, but the official media will never tell you about it or show it to you.*” I believe the reference to the “*work in the comments*” is a reference to Doppelganger’s creation of inauthentic social media profiles to post comments on social media that included links to the cybersquatted domains, including the SUBJECT DOMAINS. Further, it appears that SDA required a large number of “*perishable*” accounts to disseminate this content because of enforcement efforts by U.S. social media companies to identify and deactivate accounts associated with Doppelganger. Finally, as noted above, GAMBASHIDZE’s notes from meetings with the Presidential Administration reveal a suggestion to use “*real facts to complement fake facts.*”

¹⁸ This document follows the same template frequently used by SDA, like in The Good Old U.S.A. Project.

3. “U.S. Social Media Influencers Network” Project

73. SDA records revealed another influence campaign aimed at avoiding detection and mitigation by U.S. social media companies by creating and developing “*a network of 200 accounts in Twitter, four in each of the 50 states: two active and two ‘dormant’ ones. Active accounts in each state will be maintained on behalf of a fictitious individual, who actively supports*” a political party and “*represents ‘a community of local activists.’*” SDA actively sought to “*eliminate the possibility of detection of the ‘Russian footprint’ in the proposed project, a multi-level protection of the infrastructure will be built. It will contain VPN services, physical servers located in the United States, etc.*” The project’s goal was to steadily increase the number of subscribers, eventually reaching one million in one year. *See* Exhibit 10.

4. Targeting the U.S. by Influencing Other Countries.

74. SDA records also revealed its planning of campaigns targeting foreign countries, including Mexico and Israel, with the intent that those efforts would influence associated ethnic or religious groups residing in the United States. The goal of these campaigns was twofold: (1) to influence each countries’ populace; and (2) to influence the U.S. 2024 Presidential Election. A Presidential Administration meeting note from January 13, 2023, revealed that one of the objectives of the campaign, which had been assigned to GAMBASHIDZE, was to “*draft a media plan for work through expat community media outlets (Armenia--France; Turkey--Germany, Israel--USA)*” and to “*compile a list of scenarios for stirring inter-ethnic, religious, racial, and political conflicts in ‘focus countries.’*”

75. For example, one SDA document with the sub-heading “*PROJECT OF EFFECTIVE PROXY PARTICIPATION IN THE NOVEMBER 2024 CAMPAIGN*” presented a theme of “*México no perdona*” which translates in English to “*Mexico does not forgive.*” *See*

Exhibit 11. The campaign intended to encourage “*anti-American sentiment*” as well as to exacerbate confrontation between the United States and Mexico. Although the campaign would target Mexico, the campaign’s goal also intended to influence the U.S. Presidential Election. The proposal concluded with: “*Today, the time has come to show to the United States that it is under a threat. And we can do it.*”

76. As another example, an SDA document described a project titled *The Comprehensive Information Outreach Project in Israel (and also Jewish Community Outreach in the US)*”. See Exhibit 12. Similar to the document relating to Mexico, one of the stated goals of this campaign was to influence the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. Notably, the proposal suggested creating “*a full-fledged three language*” information project that would “*target Jewish communities across the globe, first and foremost in Israel and the US.*” I believe that this reference to a full-fledged online information project is likely a reference to the unique Doppelganger media brands discussed below.

77. Consistent with other Doppelganger campaigns explicitly targeting the United States, this Israel-related campaign would involve the creation of a media brand, targeted advertising to spread content, the publication of articles in legitimate media, and an operation involving the widespread posting of social media comments impersonating Israelis. A separate SDA document provided an example of how to pose as an Israeli and disseminate fake articles and comments presenting an unattributed Russian narrative through comments on social media. See Exhibit 13.

THE CYBERSQUATTED SUBJECT DOMAINS

78. The FBI’s investigation revealed that Doppelganger leased numerous cybersquatted domains from U.S. companies Namecheap, NameSilo, and GoDaddy using four online personas,

which I refer to as Kethorn, Kamcopec, Kaspartill, and Anguillet. Each of these personas used email accounts that incorporated the persona's name in the email address. I believe that the identity information provided to lease the domains is false given inconsistencies in names, mailing addresses, and naming conventions of the associated email addresses. These four online personas had significant overlap in the legitimate news sources their cybersquatted domains impersonated. All four personas leased domains impersonating Der Spiegel,¹⁹ three personas leased domains impersonating Bild²⁰ and T-Online,²¹ and two personas leased domains impersonating Reuters,²² Delfi,²³ and Süddeutsche Zeitung.²⁴

79. The personas used a similar pattern of cryptocurrency²⁵ payments and Proton Mail email addresses.²⁶ In general, Doppelganger actors took steps to obfuscate the origin of the

¹⁹ Der Spiegel is a German news magazine and website based in Hamburg using the domain spiegel.de.

²⁰ Bild is a German newspaper and website based in Berlin using the domain bild.de.

²¹ T-Online is a German news website based in Berlin using the domain t-online.de.

²² Reuters is a joint British/Canadian news agency that is one of the largest news companies in the world. It uses the domain reuters.com.

²³ Delfi is a news website in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania using the following domains delfi.ee, delfi.lv, delfi.lt, pl.delfi.lt, and en.delfi.lt.

²⁴ The Süddeutsche Zeitung, published in Munich, Bavaria, is one of the largest daily newspapers in Germany and uses the domain sueddeutsche.de.

²⁵ Based on my training and experience and consultation with FBI subject matter experts, I know that many criminal actors used virtual currencies or cryptocurrency, like Bitcoin, in order to obfuscate their activity. In general, transactions involving cryptocurrencies are posted to a public ledger, like the Bitcoin Blockchain (which can be reviewed through any number of open-source blockchain explorer websites or proprietary software programs that provide user-friendly interfaces to view data from the Bitcoin Blockchain). Although transactions are visible on the public ledger, each transaction is only listed by a complex series of numbers that do not identify the individuals involved in the transaction. This feature makes virtual currencies pseudo-anonymous; however, it is sometimes possible to determine the identity of an individual involved in a transaction through several different tools that are available to law enforcement. Bitcoin are sent to and received from Bitcoin "addresses." A Bitcoin address is somewhat analogous to a bank account number and is represented as a 26-to-35-character-long case-sensitive string of letters and numbers.

²⁶ Proton Mail is an end-to-end encrypted email service based in Switzerland.

cryptocurrency by using services like ChangeNOW and cryptocurrency mixing algorithms to obfuscate the originating cryptocurrency wallet used in their transactions.

80. Based on the commercially available cryptocurrency analysis tools²⁷ and analysis by an FBI cryptocurrency subject matter expert, these personas' cryptocurrency transactions with NameSilo and Namecheap show that the transactions originated with a cluster of cryptocurrency wallets. In this case, the FBI determined that the aforementioned cluster of wallets was funded by an account at a virtual currency exchange ("VCE-1").²⁸

81. Records received from VCE-1 pursuant to legal process revealed that the funding account belonged to an individual referred to herein as "Konstantin".²⁹ Those records showed that Konstantin provided Russian identification documents to VCE-1 and only accessed his account at

²⁷ While the identity of the address owner is generally anonymous, law enforcement may be able to ascertain information about the identity of the owner of a particular address by analyzing the Blockchain. The analysis can also reveal additional addresses controlled by the same individual or entity. For example, a user or business may create many addresses to receive payments from different customers. When the user wants to transact the cryptocurrency that it has received, it may group those addresses together to send a single transaction. Law enforcement uses sophisticated, commercial services offered by several different Blockchain-analysis companies to investigate transactions. These companies analyze the Blockchain and attempt to identify the individuals or groups involved in the transactions. Specifically, these companies create large databases that group transactions into "clusters" through analysis of data underlying transactions. Through numerous unrelated investigations, law enforcement has found the information provided by these companies to be reliable. The third-party Blockchain-analysis software utilized in this case is software used by banks and law enforcement organizations worldwide. This third-party Blockchain analysis software has supported many investigations and been the basis for numerous search and seizure warrants, and as such, has been found to be reliable. Computer scientists have independently shown that they can use "clustering" methods to take advantage of clues in how cryptocurrency is typically aggregated or split up to identify addresses and their respective account owners. *See generally United States v. Sterlingov*, 2024 WL 860983 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2024) (analyzing reliability of commercial Blockchain-analysis software).

²⁸ A virtual-currency exchange is a virtual-currency trading platform. Virtual currency exchanges typically allow trading between the U.S. dollar, other foreign currencies, Bitcoin, and other digital currencies. Many virtual-currency exchanges also act like virtual banks and store their customers' Bitcoin. Virtual currency exchanges doing business in whole or in substantial part in the United States are regulated under the Bank Secrecy Act, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5311 *et seq.*, and must comply with federal regulations designed to combat money laundering, including the collection of identifying information about their customers.

²⁹ Konstantin's full name is known to law enforcement but omitted here due to the ongoing nature of law enforcement investigations.

VCE-1 through IP addresses that resolve to Russia. On March 7, 2024, Konstantin was interviewed by U.S. law enforcement regarding his VCE-1 accounts and suspected criminal activity. Konstantin stated he was a “point to point” exchanger on VCE-1. In describing his business, Konstantin stated the funds that went through his accounts came from point to point requests and he had no direct communication with the people he moved the funds for, nor did he know the origin of the funds. Based on these facts and the analysis described above, I believe there is probable cause to believe the funds used to lease the SUBJECT DOMAINS by the four personas as described below, originated from outside the United States.

82. An analysis of the registrar account login records for the personas revealed that the vast majority of the login timestamps roughly correspond to Moscow business hours. The IP addresses used to access the registrars all resolved to either VPS services, or IP addresses that the cybersecurity company Spur³⁰ previously associated with criminal cyber actors who compromise IP addresses and sell access to them, to allow buyers to gain further anonymity online. Even the VPS services used by the personas were accessed through other VPS services and paid for using cryptocurrency.

83. For example, the Kamcopec persona used a particular IP address from a VPS service to lease one of the domains discussed herein. Records received pursuant to legal process revealed that a VPS service leased that IP to an account, which used another operational email address³¹ and a second VPS service to access the first VPS. That second VPS account accessed a GitHub repository which contained a script for layering VPSs. Based on the use of that repository,

³⁰ Spur is a U.S. cybersecurity industry leader specializing in detecting anonymous infrastructure cyber criminals use to obfuscate their locations and identities.

³¹ Based on my training and experience, I know cybercriminals often create “operational” email addresses using fake identifying information to conduct illegal activity as a way to obfuscate their identity.

I believe the Kamcopec persona was using at least three layers of VPS services to obfuscate their true identity and location. Based on my training and experience, this layering on top of layering of VPSs and operational email addresses, like Russian nesting dolls, are indicative of a high level of technical sophistication evidencing an intentional, willful desire to conceal identities and whereabouts that is commonly associated with state-sanctioned action. As noted above, internal SDA documents revealed that SDA actively sought to reduce the chance of “*detecting the ‘Russian footprint’ in the proposed project,*” by using “*a multi-level security infrastructure*” including VPN services and physical servers located in the U.S.

84. Based on the aforementioned similarities, I assess that these personas were all used in coordination and furtherance of the Doppelganger campaign either by individuals working for the sanctioned entities SDA and STRUCTURA, as well as ANO Dialog, and/or their co-conspirators, at the direction of KIRIYENKO, a sanctioned person, and the Russian government. Furthermore, as described herein, there is probable cause to believe that the funds used to lease the SUBJECT DOMAINS originated outside the United States.

A. The Kamcopec Persona

85. Information received from GoDaddy, a U.S. company, pursuant to legal process indicated that the Kamcopec persona leased the following 30 cybersquatted domains used in the Doppelganger campaign: washingtonpost[.]ltd, **lemonde[.]ltd**,³² **leparisien[.]ltd**,³³ spiegel[.]pro, bild[.]llc, bild[.]ws, welt[.]ltd,³⁴ welt[.]ws, welt[.]media, spiegel[.]work, nd-aktuell[.]net,³⁵ nd-

³² Le Monde is a French daily afternoon newspaper that uses the domain lemonde.fr.

³³ Le Parisien is a French daily newspaper that uses leparisien.fr.

³⁴ Die Welt (“The World”) is a German national daily newspaper that uses the domain welt.de.

³⁵ Neues Deutschland is a German daily newspaper that uses the domain nd-aktuell.de.

aktuell[.]pro, nd-aktuell[.]co, **bild[.]work**, obozrevatel[.]ltd,³⁶ **rbk[.]media**,³⁷ milliyet[.]com.co,³⁸ albayan[.]me,³⁹ gulfnews[.]ltd,⁴⁰ **pravda-ua[.]com**,⁴¹ **faz[.]ltd**,⁴² faz[.]agency, faz[.]life, **spiegel[.]agency**, sueddeutsche[.]ltd, sueddeutsche[.]me, sueddeutsche[.]cc, **sueddeutsche[.]co**, tagesspiegel[.]ltd,⁴³ and **tagesspiegel[.]co**. The Kamcopec persona also leased three non-cybersquatted domains: fraiesvolk[.]com, fraiepozition[.]store, and fraiepozition[.]site.⁴⁴

86. The Kamcopec GoDaddy account was registered using the name Iakov Shultz, a GMX email account, and a Polish address and phone number. Records received pursuant to legal process show these domains were generally leased for one year, and the majority are inactive. The inactive domains were either taken down by the registries or registrars, or not renewed. Of the aforementioned domains, nine SUBJECT DOMAINS identified in the preceding paragraph remain active; however, one of those domains appears to have been taken over by one of the cybersquatting victim companies, Süddeutsche Zeitung. The Kamcopec GoDaddy account used at least five VPS services, all of which are non-U.S. companies, one of which Spur linked to

³⁶ Obozrevatel is a Ukrainian news outlet that uses the domains OBOZ.ua and Obozrevatel.com.

³⁷ RBK is a Russian media group that runs a newspaper, TV station, and the website, rbc.ru.

³⁸ Milliyet is a Turkish newspaper based in Istanbul that uses the domain milliyet.com.tr.

³⁹ Al-Bayan is an Arabic language newspaper in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) which is owned by Government of Dubai that uses the domain albayan.ae.

⁴⁰ Gulf News is a daily English language newspaper published from Dubai, UAE, currently distributed throughout the UAE and also in other Persian Gulf Countries that uses GulfNew.com.

⁴¹ Ukrainska Pravda is a Ukrainian online newspaper using the domain pravda.com.ua.

⁴² Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is a German newspaper that uses the domain. faz.net.

⁴³ Der Tagesspiegel is a German daily newspaper, though it has a regional correspondent office in Washington, D.C. and uses the domain tagesspiegel.de.

⁴⁴ Based on my training and experience and information gathered through this investigation, I believe that the fraiesvolk domain was intended to mimic a German daily newspaper published in the 1950s that was highly critical of the Allied Powers.

cybercriminal activity, and an Argentinian internet service provider to lease the eleven SUBJECT DOMAINS.

87. Each of the SUBJECT DOMAINS leased from GoDaddy by the Kamcopec persona were paid for using credit cards issued by U.S. financial institutions. Each of the SUBJECT DOMAINS was leased from GoDaddy between the hours of 4:22 A.M. and 6:08 P.M., Moscow time. Specifically, the Kamcopec persona paid for the following SUBJECT DOMAINS using a credit card issued by a U.S. financial institution: **sueddeutsche[.]co**, **tagesspiegel[.]co**, **faz[.]life**, **bild[.]work**, and **rbk[.]media**. The Kamcopec persona paid for the following SUBJECT DOMAINS using a credit card issued by a different U.S. financial institution: **faz[.]ltd**, **lemonde[.]ltd**, **leparisien[.]ltd**, **spiegel[.]agency**, and **Pravda-ua[.]com**.

88. Records received pursuant to legal process revealed that the credit cards used to lease the aforementioned SUBJECT DOMAINS from GoDaddy were issued by U.S. banks to a U.S. company that has significant ties to, and employees based in, Russia. Consistent with other identified Doppelganger actors, the Kamcopec persona generally used IP addresses that resolved to VPS companies for their transactions. Based on my training and experience I know criminal cyber actors frequently use VPS companies to obfuscate their location, however analyzing their time stamps can reveal relevant information as to the cyber actor's potential location. For example, here, the VPS IP logins revealed that the actor behind the Kamcopec persona is most likely located in Russia. I assess that the Kamcopec persona either transferred money from Russia to the U.S.-based company, which acquired credit cards from U.S. institutions in order to obfuscate the source of the funds or paid off the credit cards used to lease the domains with funds from Russia.

89. Of the nine remaining domains initially leased from GoDaddy, five domains have been transferred by the Kamcopec persona to other registrars.⁴⁵ Specifically, on March 14, 2024, **spiegel[.]agency** was transferred to NewFold Digital, which is a U.S. registrar, but the registry remained Identity Digital Limited. On May 1, 2024, **pravda-ua[.]com** was transferred to Long Drive Domains, also a U.S. registrar, however the registry remained Verisign Global Registry Services.

90. For the remaining three domains, while the registrar was transferred to a foreign registrar, the registry for all three remained U.S. companies. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that when the domains were transferred, thus renewing the lease on the domain, a portion of those funds are used by the overseas registrar to pay the U.S.-based registries. On February 21, 2024, **bild[.]work** was transferred to GMO Internet, which is a Japanese registrar doing business as Onamae.com, but the registry remained GoDaddy Registry Services, LLC. On December 28, 2022, **lemonde[.]ltd** was transferred to Nameshield SAS, a French registrar, but the registry remained Identity Digital Limited. On February 2, 2022, **leparisien[.]ltd** was also transferred to Nameshield SAS, but the registry remained Identity Digital Limited.

91. Records received pursuant to legal process revealed that the Kamcopec persona also leased the cybersquatted domains **foxnews[.]cx**, **bild[.]bz**, and **lefigaro[.]me**⁴⁶ from Namecheap. However, in registering with Namecheap, the person using the Kamcopec GMX email account used a different name, address, and phone number than what was provided to GoDaddy. Additionally, the Namecheap account was accessed by a secondary Proton Mail account and used cryptocurrency to lease its domains, none of which are still active. I believe that the

⁴⁵ Domain transfer is a process of changing domain name registrars which is a common and simple process. When a domain is transferred it automatically renews the domain.

⁴⁶ Le Figaro is a French daily morning newspaper founded in 1826 using the domain lefigaro.fr.

Kamcopec persona's provision of different names, addresses, and phone numbers to GoDaddy and Namecheap is indicative of an effort to obfuscate the true identity and location of the person(s) behind the Kamcopec persona, whom I assess to be located in Russia.

B. The Kethorn Persona

92. Information received pursuant to legal process from NameSilo and Namecheap identified accounts created using a Proton Mail email address used by the Kethorn persona. Between June 26, 2022, and October 2, 2022, the Kethorn persona leased six domains from NameSilo and 24 from Namecheap. The domains include cybersquatted domains affiliated with the Doppelganger campaign that impersonated legitimate news sources and organizations including Reuters, Der Spiegel, T-Online, Bild, Delfi, la Repubblica,⁴⁷ and ManaBalss.⁴⁸

93. Specifically, the Kethorn persona leased the following domains: 70-putin-freunde[.]de, freikorps[.]press,⁴⁹ friekorps[.]press, jfreicorp[.]press, jfrieicorp[.]press, sieben-

⁴⁷ La Repubblica is an Italian newspaper and website using the following domains [repubblica.it](https://www.repubblica.it), [quotidiano.repubblica.it](https://www.quotidiano.repubblica.it), and [video.repubblica.it](https://www.video.repubblica.it).

⁴⁸ ManaBalss.lv is a civic organization based in Latvia that launched in June 2011 to provide a possibility for the citizens of Latvia to promote their initiatives and gain support for these initiatives for further submission to the national parliament of Latvia.

⁴⁹ Another one of the purportedly independent media brands that has been identified as having been established by the Doppelganger campaign is Journalisten Freikorps. This brand appears to be a reference to the German Freikorps which was a paramilitary unit that existed in Germany for decades. During World War II, many former Freikorps members rose to power in the Nazi party. I know that the Russian government has made claims about the presence of purported Nazis or Neo-Nazis in Ukraine as a justification for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I accessed both [freikorps\[.\]press](https://www.freikorps[.]press) and [jfreicorp\[.\]press](https://www.jfreicorp[.]press) using the Wayback Machine and ascertained that both webpages ostensibly posted news stories in German consistent with other Doppelganger content using the same Freikorps logo and banner. Through the investigation, the FBI identified an associated email address that incorporated "J.Freikorps" that was created on August 24, 2022, two days after a Telegram channel associated with Journalisten Freikorps started posted on Telegram inviting journalists to share their pieces. Records received pursuant to legal process revealed the subscriber's name for the "J.Freikorps" email address was Journalisten Freikorps and that an SDA employee's email address was connected to that account by cookies. Based on my training and experience, I know that when two or more accounts are linked by cookies, this means that the accounts were accessed using the same device(s) and are likely accessed by the same user(s). Thus, there is probable cause to believe that SDA is directing and controlling the Journalisten Freikorps campaign.

fragen-putin[.]de, tonline[.]life, tonline[.]today, t-onlinr[.]life, t-onlinr[.]live, t-onlinr[.]today, delfi[.]today, spiegel[.]fun, spiegel[.]quest, spiegel[.]today, spiegel[.]today, winter-is-comming[.]de, landwirtinnen[.]de, help-to-migrant[.]de, reuters[.]cfd, reuters[.]cyou, bild[.]vip, bild[.]asia, delfi[.]today, delfi[.]top, Repubblica[.]icu, repubblica[.]world, socialharmony[.]de, manabalss[.]li, and musubalss[.]org.

94. Of the aforementioned domains, only delfi[.]top appears to still be active and under SDA control. The Kethorn persona provided Namecheap with a German address and German phone number to lease domains and used German IP addresses resolving to a German VPS service to lease all the aforementioned domains. On July 12, 2022, the Kethorn persona sent cryptocurrency to Namecheap to lease delfi[.]top. While the delfi[.]top domain was initially leased from Namecheap, on February 15, 2024, the Kethorn persona transferred delfi.top to Tucows, a Canadian registrar. As noted above, this transaction, along with the initial lease of all the aforementioned domains leased by this persona, originated from a cluster of wallets that were funded by Konstantin P.

C. The Kaspartill Persona

95. Information received pursuant to legal process from NameSilo and Namecheap identified accounts created using a Proton Mail email address, hereafter referred to as the Kaspartill persona, which leased three domains from NameSilo and 14 from Namecheap. Specifically, the Kaspartill persona leased the following domains: spiegel[.]ink, sueddeutsche[.]online, t-online[.]life, bild[.]pics, dailymail[.]cam,⁵⁰ dailymail[.]cfd, delfi[.]life, repubblica[.]life,

⁵⁰ The Daily Mail is a British daily tabloid newspaper published in London that also uses the domain dailymail.co.uk.

spiegeli[.]life, spiegeli[.]live, spiegeli[.]today, reuters[.]sbs, dailymail[.]top, bllld[.]live, itcb[.]life, dekommt[.]live, and ukcommunity[.]vip.

96. Of the aforementioned domains, only dailymail[.]top appears to still be active and under SDA control; however, on or about October 18, 2023 the Kaspartill persona transferred registrars for the domain from Namecheap to Alibaba Cloud Computing. The Kaspartill persona provided Namecheap with a German address, German phone number, and used a German IP address resolving to a German VPS service to lease all the aforementioned domains. On June 9, 2022, the Kaspartill persona sent cryptocurrency to Namecheap to lease dailymail[.]top. The transaction took place at approximately 7:30 AM Moscow time and was effectuated using BTCPay. As noted above, this transaction, along with the initial lease of all the aforementioned domains by this persona, originated from a cluster of wallets that were funded by Konstantin.

D. The Angillet Persona

97. Information received pursuant to legal process from Namecheap identified an account registered using a Proton Mail account, hereafter referred to as the Angillet persona, as having leased the following nine domains, all of which are no longer active: Spiegelr[.]live, spiegeln[.]today, t-onlin[.]life, t-onlin[.]live, t-onlin[.]today, sueddeutsche[.]life, sueddeutsche[.]site, sueddeutsche[.]today, and spiegeln[.]life. Angillet also used cryptocurrency to lease its domains and provided a German address, German phone number, and German IP addresses resolving to a German VPS service to lease the aforementioned domains.

THE U.S. TRADEMARK INFRINGING SUBJECT DOMAINS

98. Four of the SUBJECT DOMAINS infringe on the trademarks of U.S. media outlets. Specifically, **washingtonpost[.]jpm**, **washingtonpost[.]ltd**, **fox-news[.]jin**, **fox-news[.]top**, and **forward[.]pw**, are domains operated by Doppelganger that are likely to confuse, mislead, or

deceive viewers into believing they are visiting the legitimate Washington Post, Forward, and Fox News websites.⁵¹ See Exhibit 1. These SUBJECT DOMAINS not only feature infringing content but also are themselves infringing through their use of registered trademarks as part of the domain name.

99. The Washington Post is an American daily national newspaper published in Washington, D.C. According to its website, The Washington Post’s mission statement includes seven principles, including “to tell the truth as nearly as the truth may be ascertained.” The legitimate domain for The Washington Post is washingtonpost.com. The following marks have been registered on the Principal Register maintained by the USPTO by WP Company LLC on behalf of The Washington Post:

The wordmark:⁵²

The Washington Post

The stylized wordmark:⁵³



The wordmark:⁵⁴

Democracy Dies in Darkness

100. I have reviewed content published on **washingtonpost[.]pm** and **washingtonpost[.]ltd**. Those domains feature articles purportedly written by a Washington Post reporter and feature their pictures and bylines. A review of the legitimate Washington Post website reveals no such articles written by that journalist. The **washingtonpost[.]pm** and **washingtonpost[.]ltd** domains use the registered marks of The Washington Post.

⁵¹ The registry for **fox-news[.]in** is National Internet Exchange of India and the registrar is Tucows, Inc. The registry for **fox-news[.]top** is .TOP Registry and the registrar is Tucows, Inc. The registry for **forward[.]pw** is Micronesia Investment and Development Corporation and the registrar is Sarek Oy. The registry for **washingtonpost[.]pm** is Association Francaise Pour Le Nommage Internet en Cooperation and the registrar is Sarek Oy.

⁵² Registration number 1665832.

⁵³ Registration number 1665831.

⁵⁴ Registration number 6590892.

101. Fox News is an American national media outlet based in New York City. According to its website, “FOX News Media offers its audiences in-depth news reporting, along with opinion and analysis encompassing the principles of free people, free markets and diversity of thought, as an alternative to the left-of-center offerings of the news marketplace.” The legitimate domain for Fox News is foxnews.com. The following marks have been registered on the Principal Register maintained by the USPTO by Fox Media LLC on behalf of Fox News:

The wordmark:⁵⁵ Fox News

The Stylized wordmark:⁵⁶



The Stylized wordmark:⁵⁷



The Stylized wordmark:⁵⁸



102. I have reviewed content published on **fox-news[.]in** and **fox-news[.]top**. Those domains feature articles purportedly written by a Fox News reporter and feature their pictures and bylines. A review of the legitimate Fox News website reveals no such articles written by that journalist. Both **fox-news[.]in** and **fox-news[.]top** use the registered marks of Fox News.

⁵⁵ Registration number 2708769.

⁵⁶ Registration number 6548048.

⁵⁷ Registration number 88980501.

⁵⁸ Registration number 518099.

103. Forward is an American news media organization. According to its website, Forward delivers “incisive coverage of the issues, ideas and institutions that matter to American Jews.” The legitimate domain for Forward is forward.com. The following mark has been registered on the Principal Register maintained by the USPTO by The Forward Fund, Inc., on behalf of Forward:



The Stylized wordmark.⁵⁹

104. I have reviewed content published on **forward[.]pw** and have been unable to find the same or similar articles on forward.com. The **forward[.]pw** domain uses the registered mark of The Forward Fund, Inc.

105. Records received from Cloudflare Inc. pursuant to legal process, revealed that two Proton Mail email accounts purchased Cloudflare services for **washingtonpost[.]pm**, **fox-news[.]in**, and **fox-new[.]top**. The Cloudflare accounts associated with these two Proton Mail email accounts were each accessed from the same Netherlands IP address which resolves to a British VPS server leased by Doppelganger with an address ending in 11.27 (the “11.27 Server”). On January 2, 2024, a search warrant was authorized for the 11.27 Server. The 11.27 Server had been identified as having been created by the same user who created two other VPS servers from the same provider that were used by the Kamcopec persona to register **foxnews[.]cx** from Namecheap, **Spiegel[.]ltd**, **fax[.]ltd**, and **welt[.]ltd** from GoDaddy, and to access a Cloudflare account associated with **Sueddeutsche[.]ltd**.

⁵⁹ Registration number 5243694.

106. The true IP address⁶⁰ for **forward[.]pw** resolves to a Hostinger VPS IP address. Records received from Hostinger pursuant to legal process, reveal that the Hostinger VPS was leased by adampalmer1973[.]proton.me on May 18, 2023 using cryptocurrency. The account accessed the Hostinger VPS using all three of the Doppelganger Servers leased from the British provider, including the 11.27 Server.⁶¹ Based on my training and experience, I know that when a person leases a VPS server, like the 11.27 Server, only that person or individuals they grant access to, can use that VPS server. Accordingly, I assess that any account or domain accessed from the 11.27 VPS server is a member of the Doppelganger conspiracy.

107. As described further above, the SUBJECT DOMAINS were used by Doppelganger as part of a foreign malign influence campaign carried out at the behest of the Russian government. SDA and STRUCTURA are Russian companies that list various Russian government entities as clients and that perform work for the Russian government.

The Unique Media Brand SUBJECT DOMAINS

108. As noted above, in addition to impersonating legitimate news outlets, Doppelganger, led by ANO Dialog and TABAK, under the direction and control of KIRIYENKO, a sanctioned person, also created original media brands (which are included among the SUBJECT DOMAINS). These brands purport to be independent journalists or news media organizations but are actually under the direction and control of the Russian government. The investigation has

⁶⁰ A true IP address for a domain is the server where the actual information that comprises the website or webpage resides. Accordingly, a True IP address for a domain is leased or purchased by the individual in control of the domain.

⁶¹ As noted above, records received pursuant to legal process revealed that Doppelganger leased three servers from the Provider who provided the 11.27 Server in three-month intervals before switching to a new server from the same Provider.

revealed that as ANO Dialog created the domains for its purportedly unique media brands, it also registered email addresses that correspond to those domains.

A. RRN, War on Fakes, and the RoyGeneral Persona

109. As discussed above, GAMBASHIDZE’s notes from Presidential Administration meetings with KIRIYENKO document the use of Reliable Recent News (“RRN”) by TABAK and ANO Dialog to further the malign influence campaign, noting “*They were assigned Russian Reliable News – changed it into Recent, it’s going to work.(was sent by Tabak).*” RRN was hosted at rrn[.]world and published in numerous languages. As the Meta coordinated inauthentic behavior reports⁶² note, RRN “maintain[ed] accounts on Twitter and Telegram, which were amplified by the operation’s Facebook Pages. The Facebook Pages of the Russian diplomatic missions in Malaysia, Sweden, Hungary, Slovakia and Bangladesh shared links to the site.” According to Meta, Doppelganger articles would often appear on RRN after they were posted on the cybersquatted domains: “For example, the same article about Bucha was published on the same day in English on the spoofed Guardian site, in Italian on the spoofed ANSA site, and in German on the spoofed Spiegel site. It also appeared in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Chinese on rrn[.]world.”⁶³

110. Information received from NameSilo, a U.S. company, pursuant to legal process revealed that the domain rrn[.]world was registered on June 6, 2022, by an identified individual,

⁶² Starting on September 27, 2022, Meta released a series of reports regarding Doppelganger. These reports are available to the public on Meta’s website.

⁶³ During the Russian occupation of Bucha, Ukraine, numerous reports of Russian war crimes were alleged. After the Russian military retreated from the town, independent journalists confirmed significant atrocities largely against the civilian population. *See* <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>. “The Russian Defense Ministry denied allegations that its forces killed civilians in Bucha, stating in a Telegram post on April 3, [2022] that ‘not a single local resident has suffered from any violent action’ while Bucha was ‘under the control of the Russian armed forces,’ and claiming instead that the evidence of crimes was a ‘hoax, a staged production and provocation’ by authorities in Kyiv.” On July 7,

using a Moscow address, with email address `reliablerecentnews[.]gmail.com`. The individual applied for and received visas from the State Department to enter the United States from Russia in 2008, 2012, 2015, and 2019. Information received from Google pursuant to legal process revealed that `reliablerecentnews[.]gmail.com` was created on July 14, 2023, with the name Reliable Recent News, a recovery email of `rrussianews[.]gmail.com` and recovery telephone number that matched the number provided by the individual on her State Department applications.

111. I determined that `rrn[.]world` continued to post Doppelganger content until approximately July 10, 2024, when it appears ANO Dialog lost control of the domain. At some point shortly thereafter, unknown actors took over the domain and renamed it Rotten Reliable News and used the domain to publish information regarding Doppelganger's methods and activities, much of which I know to be accurate.

112. Records received pursuant to legal process from Namecheap, revealed that on July 26, 2023, a week after the VIGINUM report was published identifying `rrn[.]world` as part of Doppelganger, `RoyGeneral[.]proton.me` was used to register an account with Namecheap and lease **`rrn[.]media`** and **`vip-news[.]org`**. In registering that Namecheap account, the RoyGeneral persona provided a Beaverton, Oregon address and what appeared to be an incomplete U.S. phone number. Law Enforcement and open-source records checks indicate the name and home address provided are not correlated. Additionally, as further discussed below, the RoyGeneral persona also created an account with NameSilo to lease three more Doppelganger domains and provided a New York City address and Canadian phone number.

2022, RRN published an article titled "Video: False Staging in Bucha Revealed!" which falsely alleged the atrocities were staged by Ukraine.

113. On July 26, 2023, the RoyGeneral persona accessed Namecheap with an Estonian VPS IP address ending in 77.25 (the “77.25 Server”) and deposited \$55.00 with BitPay.⁶⁴ That same day, the RoyGeneral persona used \$42.90 of the \$55 deposited to lease **rrn[.]media**. Like the 11.27 Server, given the frequent use of the 77.25 Server by Doppelganger actors, I assess that the 77.25 Server was leased by Doppelganger and only accessible to persons involved in Doppelganger.

114. As discussed further below, the RoyGeneral, Goodbye, Levinaigrenet, Holylandherald, and Artichocio personas used the 77.25 Server to access their Namecheap accounts between February 27, 2023 and July 12, 2024. On at least four occasions, more than one Doppelganger persona accessed their Namecheap accounts at approximately the same times using this same IP address. This was not the only shared IP address. Between May 11, 2024 and July 1, 2024, the RoyGeneral, Levinaigrenet, Holylandherald, and Artichocio personas each accessed their Namecheap accounts on at least two occasions from the same Dutch IP address resolving to the same Russian VPS ending in 76.173 (the “76.173 Server”). Based on my training and experience, I know that unlike VPNs, which tend to be used once and discarded, when cyber-criminals lease a VPS they will frequently make use of that particular server for a period of time until the lease ends. For example, records received pursuant to legal process revealed that Doppelganger leased servers from the Provider who provided the 11.27 Server in three-month intervals before switching to a new server from the same Provider.

⁶⁴ As noted below, the persona responsible for leasing **levinaigre[.]net**, **warfareinsider[.]us**, and **meisterurian[.]io** also accessed Namecheap from the 77.25 Server. Likewise, the individual responsible for leasing **holylandherald[.]com**, **grenzezank[.]com**, and **lexomnium[.]com** also accessed Namecheap from the 77.25 Server.

115. On July 1, 2024, the RoyGeneral persona accessed Namecheap via three IP addresses, including a British IP address resolving to a Russian VPS that Spur has linked to a cybercriminal network, a Moscow IP address that Spur has linked to a cybercriminal network, and from the 76.173 Server. That same day, the RoyGeneral persona deposited \$300.00 with BitPay and used \$42.90 to renew the lease for **rrn[.]media** and \$7.66 to lease **vip-news[.]org**. I reviewed materials posted on **rrn[.]media** and discovered that it uses the same logo and branding as the original **rrn[.]world** and continues to post content consistent with the malign influence campaign previously posted on **rrn[.]world**.

116. In addition, records received from OpenAI, a U.S.-based artificial intelligence research organization, revealed the purchase of multiple artificial intelligence program accounts, like ChatGPT, to generate and edit articles and comments specifically for **rrn[.]media** and other Doppelganger-linked domains. There were five email accounts used to register for OpenAI services linked to Doppelganger. Records received pursuant to legal process revealed one of those email accounts was connected by cookies to **reliablerecentnews[.]gmail.com**. Based on my training and experience, I know that when two or more accounts are linked by cookies, this means that the accounts were accessed using the same device(s) and are likely accessed by the same user(s). One of the other email accounts used to register for OpenAI was connected by cookies to 37 other email accounts. Almost all of these connected email accounts used naming conventions that corresponded to domains used by Doppelganger as part of their unique media branding operation, including some of the SUBJECT DOMAINS, as discussed further below.

117. One of the SUBJECT DOMAINS, **waronfakes[.]com**, was discussed in length in the VIGINUM report:

The first articles published on RRN website were identical copies of articles previously published on the fake Russian fact-checking website War on Fakes,

launched a few hours after Russia invaded Ukraine. Quickly identified for its role in legitimizing the Russian ‘special military operation’ and discrediting the Ukrainian State, War on Fakes has also been amplified by at least 65 official Facebook pages and official Twitter accounts of the Russian diplomatic network. Moreover, War on Fakes the administrator’s login page has been set up to redirect traffic to russiannews.com, thereby establishing a technical link between the two websites. The domain name **waronfakes[.]com** was registered on 1 March 2022 and was updated a year later by Timofey VASILIEV a Russian citizen known for having worked for ANO Dialog. Dialog is an organization created in 2019 under the supervision of the Russian Presidential Administration and the Department of Information Technologies of Moscow city. In charge of a portion of the public relations and communication strategy of Moscow, ANO Dialog has been accused of conducting online propaganda activities on behalf of the Russian State.⁶⁵

118. As noted in the VIGINUM report, the administrator’s login page for **waronfakes[.]com** redirected traffic to russiannews.com. The corresponding email address for russiannews.com, russiannews[.]gmail.com was the recovery email for the above-described Russian citizen’s reliablerecentnews[.]gmail.com account, which in turn was used to register the rrn[.]world domain. In addition, SDA records revealed that GAMBASHIDZE had the resume of an individual assessed to be working for Doppelganger, who described their experience from October 2022 to present as a writer for the Telegram channel war on fakes, with duties including writing posts for the channel war on fakes and war on fakes analytics, and working on translations and open-source research. **Waronfakes[.]com** is leased from an overseas registrar which leases the domain from the U.S. registry, VeriSign Global Registry Services (“VeriSign”). Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that when ANO Dialog renews the lease on the domain, a portion of those funds are used by the overseas registrar to pay VeriSign in the United States for the benefit of sanctioned persons.

⁶⁵ Available at https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/20230719_NP_VIGINUM_RAPPORT-CAMPAGNE-RRN_EN1.pdf

B. Other Doppelganger Media Brands

119. Based on records received pursuant to legal process, open-source research, the content of articles published on the domains, and information obtained throughout this investigation, I assess that each of the SUBJECT DOMAINS listed below is part of Doppelganger.

1. *The Demon Accounts*

120. As noted above in paragraph 116, five email accounts were identified as using OpenAI services in furtherance of Doppelganger. Records received from Google pursuant to legal process revealed that one of those accounts (the “Demon Account”) was subscribed in the name of “White Seo.” When it was registered, the Demon Account selected Russian as its language, listed a Russian recovery email ending in .ru with the same naming convention, namely “Demon” followed by a string of numbers, and provided a Russian phone number. The Demon Account was linked by cookies to 37 other email accounts with naming conventions that correspond to domains connected to Doppelganger’s unique media branding operation, including some of the SUBJECT DOMAINS, such as:

Email Account Linked by Cookies to the Demon Account	Corresponding SUBJECT DOMAIN
holylandheraldcom[@]gmail.com	holylandherald[.]com
mypride.press[@]gmail.com	mypride[.]press
liesofwallstreet.com[@]gmail.com	liesofwallstreet[.]io
50statesoflie.com[@]gmail.com	50statesoflie[.]media
ukrlm.info[@]gmail.com	ukrlm[.]info
meisteruiancom[@]gmail.com	meisterurian[.]io
AcrosstheLine.press[@]gmail.com	acrosstheLine[.]press
Electionwatch.live[@]gmail.com	electionwatch[.]io

Honeymoney.infonow[@]gmail.com	honeymoney.press
Uchina.press.now[@]gmail.com	uschina[.]online
Spicyconspiracy.info[@]gmail.com	spicyconspiracy[.]io
Levinaigre.net[@]gmail.com	levinaigre[.]net

2. *The Goodbye Persona Leased the **Acrosstheline[.]press**, **ukrlm[.]info**, and **mypride[.]press** Domains Linked to the Demon Account*

121. Two Proton Mail email accounts, Aurevourmail[@]proton.me and Buenasnochesmail[@]proton.me, (collectively, the “Goodbye persona”), leased domains from Namecheap for use in the Doppelganger campaign, including **acrosstheline[.]press**,⁶⁶ **ukrlm[.]info**,⁶⁷ and **mypride[.]press**.⁶⁸ Given that these Proton Mail addresses included derivations of a phrase roughly translated into two languages: Au Revoir and Buenas Noches, I assess that the Namecheap accounts were created using operational email addresses by ANO Dialog employees or agents acting on their behalf and will refer to them collectively as the Goodbye persona.

122. Records received from Namecheap pursuant to legal process revealed that the Goodbye persona leased **acrosstheline[.]press**, **ukrlm[.]info**, and **mypride[.]press** using the 77.25 Server and paid for them using a U.S.-based payment provider, called BitPay, which allows

⁶⁶ Across the Line presents itself as a website focused on migration and forced displacement issues, often presenting only an adverse perspective as it relates to the U.S. Its website footer notes, “Join us in tackling the problems of refugees across the globe and at the US border. Let’s cross the line to support those who didn’t ask to leave their homes and face uncertainty.”

⁶⁷ UKRLM is an English language website that describes itself as “Bringing you the latest updates, analysis, and insights from war-torn Ukraine. Stay informed on the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict with us.”

⁶⁸ My Pride Press is an English language website that focuses on the LGBTQ community, with topics including trans youth, athletes, health, woke wars, LGBT.

users to make payments via Bitcoin. Records received pursuant to legal process from Namecheap and BitPay revealed the following:

- a. On February 27, 2023, the Goodbye persona, using the 77.25 Server, sent 0.002612 BTC, equivalent to \$60.46, from a Bitcoin address ending in -MiP6T to Namecheap. The same day, Namecheap credited the Goodbye persona account with \$60.00 and the account used \$53.12 to lease **acrossthe[.]press**, **ukrlm[.]info**, and **mypride[.]press** which included a \$38.64 monthly subscription for EasyWP, a Namecheap product for managing websites.
- b. On March 21, 2023, the Goodbye persona, using the 77.25 Server, sent 0.001486 BTC, equivalent to \$40.84, from a Bitcoin address ending in -JPrHF to Namecheap. The same day, Namecheap credited the Goodbye persona account with \$40.00, which prevented the previously mentioned subscription from overdrawing the account.
- c. On April 20, 2023, the Goodbye persona, using the 77.25 Server, sent 0.003881 BTC, equivalent to \$110.62, from a Bitcoin address ending in -mhtcF to Namecheap. The same day, Namecheap credited the Goodbye persona account with \$110.00, which prevented the previously mentioned subscription from overdrawing the account.
- d. On July 23, 2023, the Goodbye persona, using a German IP address that Spur has linked to a cybercriminal network, sent 0.006791 BTC, equivalent to \$202.51, from a Bitcoin address ending in -Z2my to Namecheap. The same day, Namecheap credited the Goodbye persona account with \$200.00, which prevented the previously mentioned subscription from overdrawing the account.

- e. On December 15, 2023, the Goodbye persona, using a German IP address that Spur has linked to a cybercriminal network, sent 0.002147 BTC, equivalent to \$89.99, from a Bitcoin address ending in – qpW to Namecheap. The same day, Namecheap credited the Goodbye persona account with \$70.00, which prevented the previously mentioned subscription from overdrawing the account.
- f. On July 23, 2023, the Goodbye persona, using a German IP address that Spur has linked to a cybercriminal network, sent 0.004861 BTC, equivalent to \$206.86, from a Bitcoin address ending in -Z2my to Namecheap. The same day, Namecheap credited the Goodbye persona account with \$205.00 and the account used \$89.48 to renew their lease of **acrosstheline[.]press**, **ukrlm[.]info**, and **mypride[.]press**.

123. Based on these BitPay transactions, the IP addresses, and my training and experience, there is probable cause to believe the funds used to lease these three SUBJECT DOMAINS originated from outside the United States.

3. *The Levinaignet Persona Leased the **Levinaigre[.]net**, and **Meisterurian[.]io** Domains Linked to the Demon Account and **Warfareinsider[.]us**.*

124. Records received from Namecheap pursuant to legal process revealed that a user with the email address levinaignet[@]proton.me leased **levinaigre[.]net**,⁶⁹ **meisterurian[.]io**,⁷⁰ and **warfareinsider[.]us**.⁷¹ The Levinaignet persona provided Namecheap with a name of Jay Rom and a Broken Bow, Nebraska mailing address. All payments were made using funds transferred from BitPay. Law enforcement records checks reveal no association between a Jay

⁶⁹ Levinaigre is a French language website that focuses on French scandals.

⁷⁰ Meisterurian is a German language website that purports to publish German news stories.

⁷¹ Warfareinsider is an English language website that describes itself as reporting on “Latest military news. Stay sharp to look at it from the different perspective.”

Rom and the physical mailing address in Nebraska provided to Namecheap. In addition, despite indicating a U.S. mailing address, on June 16, 2023, the Levinaignet persona accessed Namecheap via the 77.25 Server and, using BitPay, deposited \$72.00. On June 19, 2023, the Levinaignet persona used the 77.25 Server to access Namecheap and used \$25.04 to lease **levinaigre[.]net** and purchase a monthly subscription of EasyWP. Then, on July 5, 2023, the Levinaignet persona accessed Namecheap via a French IP address that Spur linked to a cybercriminal network and, using BitPay, deposited \$120.00. The same day the Levinaignet persona used \$70.22 to lease **warfareinsider[.]us** and **meisterurian[.]io** and purchase monthly subscriptions of EasyWP for both. On June 4, 2024, the Levinaignet persona accessed Namecheap via the 76.173 Server. and, using BitPay, deposited \$200.00. The same day the account used \$10.48 to renew the lease for **warfareinsider[.]us** and **meisterurian[.]io**.

125. As discussed below, on both June 16 and 19, 2023, another Doppelganger linked Namecheap account also used the 77.25 Server to access their Namecheap account. Accordingly, although the Levinaignet persona provided Namecheap with a U.S. address, I assess that the individual accessing and paying for the account is actually located overseas.

4. *The Holylandherald Persona Leased the **Holylandherald[.]com** Domain Linked to the Demon Account and **Grenzezank[.]com**, and **Lexomnium[.]com***

126. Records received from Namecheap pursuant to legal process revealed that a user with the email address holylandheraldcom[@]proton.me leased **holylandherald[.]com**,⁷² **grenzezank[.]com**,⁷³ and **lexomnium[.]com**.⁷⁴ The Holylandherald persona provided Namecheap

⁷² Holyland Herald poses as an Israeli based English language news website focused on Israel-US relations, the war in Gaza, and other Middle East issues, however it also posted articles related to Ukraine, such as an article titled “Ukraine Interferes in Russian Presidential Elections.”

⁷³ Grenzezank is a German language website that focuses on international news, including U.S. politics.

⁷⁴ Lex omnium, which translates to The Law of All in Latin, is a French language website that appears to focus on French news with a legal perspective.

with a first name of holyland, a last name of herald, and a mailing address in Kansas City, Missouri that indicated the country of residence to be Germany. All payments for the domains were made using funds transferred from BitPay.

127. Specifically, on June 16, 2023, the Holylandherald persona accessed Namecheap via the 77.25 Server and, using BitPay, deposited \$65.00. On June 19, 2023, the Holylandherald persona accessed their Namecheap account using the 77.25 Server and used \$22.64 to lease **holylandherald[.]com** and purchase a monthly subscription of EasyWP. As referenced above, records received from Namecheap revealed that the account used to lease **Levinaigre[.]net**, **meisterurian[.]io**, and **warfareinsider[.]us** accessed Namecheap from the same server at approximately the same time. On April 16, 2024, the Holylandherald persona accessed Namecheap via a U.S. IP address that Spur has linked to a cybercriminal network and, using BitPay, deposited \$104.00. On May 20, 2024, Namecheap charged the account \$16.06 to renew the lease for **holylandherald[.]com**.

128. On July 5, 2023, the Holylandherald account accessed Namecheap via a German IP address that Spur has linked to a cybercriminal network and, using BitPay, deposited \$120.00. The same day the account used \$45.28 to lease **grenzezank[.]com** and **lexomnium[.]com** and purchase monthly subscriptions of EasyWP for both. On May 31, 2024, the account accessed Namecheap via the 76.173 Server. and, using BitPay, deposited \$100.00. The same day the account used \$32.12 to renew the lease for **grenzezank[.]com** and **lexomnium[.]com**.

5. *The RoyGeneral Persona Leased the 50statesoflie[.]media, uschina[.]online, and HoneyMoney[.]press Linked to the Demon Account*

129. As referenced above, the Doppelganger campaign created email addresses with a naming convention that correspond to **50statesoflie[.]media**,⁷⁵ **honeymoney[.]press**,⁷⁶ and **uschina[.]online**.⁷⁷ The registrar for all three of those domains was NameSilo and the domains were leased, from QHoster, a Uruguayan domain reseller,⁷⁸ using RoyGeneral[@]proton.me. Records received pursuant to legal process from NameSilo, revealed that the RoyGeneral persona created a QHoster account, using a New York, New York address and a Canadian phone number and leased the **50statesoflie[.]media**, **uschina[.]online**, and **honeymoney[.]press**. Law enforcement and open-source records checks indicate the name and home address provided are not correlated. As referenced above in paragraph 112, the RoyGeneral persona also leased **rrn[.]media** and **vip-news[.]org** but provided an Oregon address and an incomplete U.S. telephone number. At least one article published on **honeymoney[.]press** focused on the current U.S. Presidential administration's stance on Ukraine. Although the RoyGeneral persona provided NameSilo with a U.S. address, based on the RoyGeneral's use of VPSs with Namecheap, links to other Doppelganger actors, and leasing of **rrn[.]media** and **waronfakes[.]com**, I assess that the individual accessing and paying for the RoyGeneral account is actually located overseas.

130. Mandiant, an American cybersecurity firm and a subsidiary of Google, tracks the "Doppelganger Information Operations Campaign" and publishes a monthly report with updates

⁷⁵ 50 States of Lie describes itself as "Exposing the scandals that shape American politics and culture. We bring you the latest on corruption, cover-ups, and controversies in the land of the free."

⁷⁶ Honey Money Press is an English language website that focuses on U.S. consumer trends.

⁷⁷ US China Online on issues related to China's national interest, including U.S.-China relations, Taiwan, and U.S. trade and foreign policies.

⁷⁸ A reseller is a third-party company that offers domain name registration services through a registrar, in this case NameSilo, a U.S. company.

to the state of the campaign in a document Mandiant calls a “Narrative Tracker.” In their April 2024 report, Mandiant noted in addition to the continued use of cybersquatted websites, the Doppelganger campaign had begun using the following domains to target American audiences: Election Watch (electionwatch[.]live), Spicy Conspiracy (spicyconspiracy[.]info), 50 States of Lie (50statesoflie[.]com), and Dragonfly Times (uschina[.]press). Of note, records received from Hostinger pursuant to legal process, showed that the Goodbye persona leased Electionwatch[.]live, 50statesoflie[.]com, and uschina[.]press on February 23, 2023, using cryptocurrency transferred using CoinGate, a Lithuanian cryptocurrency payment processor.

131. As noted above, the Demon Account created email addresses that correspond directly to spicyconspiracy[.]io⁷⁹ and electionwatch[.]io.⁸⁰ At present, electionwatch[.]live, spicyconspiracy[.]info, 50statesoflie[.]com, and uschina[.]press are no longer active. However, I have reviewed the active domains **50statesoflie[.]media**, **uschina[.]online**, **spicyconspiracy[.]io**, and **electionwatch[.]io** and have confirmed that they use the same branding and formatting as electionwatch[.]live, spicyconspiracy[.]info, 50statesoflie[.]com, and uschina[.]press, which leads me to conclude that the same person(s) are behind these domains.

6. *The Artichocio persona leased **truthgate[.]us**, **shadowwatch[.]us**,⁸¹ and **artichoc[.]io**,⁸²*

132. Records received from Namecheap revealed that an individual using the email address artichocio[.]proton.me leased **truthgate[.]us**, **shadowwatch[.]us**, and **artichoc[.]io**, and

⁷⁹ Spicy Conspiracy describes itself as “Uncovering the truth behind the veil. Your source for in depth coverage of conspiracies, secret agendas, and hidden realities.”

⁸⁰ Election Watch focuses on U.S. elections, including the 2024 U.S. presidential election, political candidates, purported corruption, and polling results.

⁸¹ Truth Gate and Shadow Watch are English language websites that focused on disseminating corruption and conspiracy disinformation targeting the U.S.

⁸² Artichoc io is a French language website with a tagline that translates to “Art that Shocks.” It purports to

provided the name Jason Kant with a French mailing address and a U.S. phone number. The domains were purchased using Bitcoin transferred through BitPay.

133. June 29, 2023, the Artichocio persona used the 77.25 Server to access Namecheap and deposit \$120.00 using BitPay. As discussed above, given the frequent use of the 77.25 Server by Doppelganger actors, I assess that the 77.25 Server was leased by Doppelganger and only accessible to persons involved in Doppelganger. The same day, the Artichocio persona used \$52.86 to lease **artichoc[.]io** and purchase a monthly subscription of EasyWP. On April 16, 2024, the artichocio account accessed Namecheap via a German IP address that Spur has linked to a cybercriminal network and, using BitPay, deposited \$92.00. On May 30, 2024, Namecheap charged the artichocio account \$48.98 to renew the lease for **artichoc[.]io**.

134. On July 5, 2023, the artichocio account accessed Namecheap via a U.S. IP address resolving to a British VPS service and, using BitPay, deposited \$120.00. The same day, the artichocio account used \$34.72 to lease **truthgate[.]us** and **shadowwatch[.]us** and purchase monthly subscriptions of EasyWP for both. On June 18, 2024, the artichocio account accessed Namecheap from the 76.173 Server and, using BitPay, deposited \$220.00. The same day, the account used \$20.96 to renew the lease for **truthgate[.]us** and **shadowwatch[.]us**.

7. The Ukraine Domains

135. As noted above, one of GAMBASHIDZE's notes from a meeting with the Presidential Administration referenced a participant as "*fully in charge of filling the content on the Ukraine Tribunal portal.*" Two Doppelganger-linked domains, **tribunalukraine[.]info**,⁸³ and

focus on pop culture, art, and entertainment.

⁸³ Tribunal Ukraine is a German language website a focus on revealing the alleged truth about what is happening in Ukraine.

ukraine-inc[.]info,⁸⁴ were leased from Newfold Digital, a U.S. registrar. Records received from Newfold Digital revealed that ukraine-inc[.]info was registered on November 3, 2023. Those records also revealed that the email address trelelcalra1975[.]yahoo.com, was used to lease ukraine-inc[.]info. The trelelcalra1975[.]yahoo.com was only logged into five times, four times from German VPSs and once from a Russian IP address. The trelelcalra1975[.]yahoo.com user registered their Newfold Digital account in the name of Dennis Eggers with a German mailing address and German phone number. Subscriber records received from Yahoo Inc. revealed that the trelelcalra1975[.]yahoo.com account was registered using a Cyrillic first name and the last name Reddy and a Brazilian phone number, which does not match the information provided to Newfold Digital.

136. Records received from Newfold Digital revealed that **tribunalukraine[.]info** was registered on June 10, 2022. Those records revealed that the email address glennwallace9672[.]outlook.com was used to lease **tribunalukraine[.]info**. The glennwallace9672[.]outlook.com user registered their Newfold Digital account in the name of Glen Wallace with a Vienna mailing address and an Austrian phone number. Records received from Microsoft revealed that glennwallace9672[.]outlook.com was registered by Glenn Wallace from Austria. Notably, that Outlook account was only logged into twice, September 28, 2022, and October 5, 2022. According to records received from Newfold Digital, the Newfold Digital account for **tribunalukraine[.]info** was accessed from the 11.27 Server.

⁸⁴ Ukraine Inc is an English language website that features animated anti-Ukrainian videos. The videos contain anti-Semitic tropes that depict Ukrainian President Zelensky as an alcoholic and imply that the deaths of Ukrainians benefit him financially.

THE SUBJECT DOMAINS

137. As described above, the SUBJECT DOMAINS were used by individuals abroad who are working under the direction and control of the Russian government, and in particular KIRIYENKO, GAMBASHIDZE, SDA, TUPIKIN, and STRUCTURA, all of whom have been sanctioned by the U.S. Government, along with ANO Dialog, TABAK, and others, to advance their interests and the interests of the Russian government and to facilitate the violation of, or in violation of, the SUBJECT OFFENSES.

138. As set forth above and in Attachments A-1 through A-9, a search of publicly available Who.is domain name registration records revealed the dates that the SUBJECT DOMAINS were registered, with which registrar, the headquarters of that registrar, the registrant of each of the SUBJECT DOMAINS, and the top-level domain for each of the SUBJECT DOMAINS.

STATUTORY BASIS FOR SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE

139. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(A) provides, in relevant part, that any property involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (international promotional money laundering) and 1956(h) (conspiracy to commit the same) is subject to civil forfeiture.

140. Title 18, United States Code, Section 2323(a)(1)(B), provides, in relevant part, that any property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part to commit or facilitate the commission of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services (e.g., trademark infringement), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320, is subject to civil forfeiture to the United States government.

141. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(b)(2) authorizes seizure of property subject to civil forfeiture based upon a warrant supported by probable cause and “obtained in the same manner as provided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Forfeiture.”

142. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(b)(3) permits the issuance of a seizure warrant by a judicial officer in any district in which a forfeiture action against the property may be filed and such warrant may be executed in any district in which the property is found, and provides that the warrant may be executed in any district in which the property is found or transmitted to the central authority of a foreign state for service in accordance with any treaty or other international agreement.

143. Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that when imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (international promotional money laundering) and 1956(h) (conspiracy to commit the same), a court shall order that person’s property that was involved in the offense be forfeited to the United States.

144. Title 18, United States Code, Section 2323(b)(1), provides, in relevant part, that the court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services (e.g., trademark infringement), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320, an offense under section 506 of title 17, or section 2318, 2319, 2319A, 2319B, or 2320, or chapter 90, of this title, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed, that the person forfeit to the United States Government any property subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a) for that offense.

145. Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b)(1) incorporates by reference the procedures for seizure and forfeiture in 21 U.S.C. § 853. Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(f) provides in relevant part that a seizure warrant for property subject to forfeiture may be

sought “in the same manner in which a search warrant may be issued. A court shall issue a criminal seizure warrant if it determines that the property to be seized would, in the event of a conviction, be subject to forfeiture and that a restraining order would be inadequate to assure the availability of the property for forfeiture.”

146. Neither a restraining order nor an injunction is sufficient to guarantee the availability of the SUBJECT DOMAINS for forfeiture. By seizing the SUBJECT DOMAINS and redirecting them to another website(s), the Government will prevent third parties from acquiring the name and using it to commit additional crimes. Furthermore, seizure of the SUBJECT DOMAINS will prevent third parties from continuing to access the SUBJECT DOMAINS in their present form.

147. Title 18, United States Code, Section 2323(a)(1)(B), provides, in relevant part, that any property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate the commission of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services (e.g., trademark infringement), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320, is subject to civil forfeiture. Title 18, United States Code, Section 2323(b)(1), provides, in relevant part, that the court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services (e.g., trademark infringement), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed, that the person forfeit to the United States Government any property subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a).

148. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(h) provides that venue for civil forfeitures brought under this section lies in the district either where the defendant owning the property is located or in the judicial district where the criminal prosecution is brought.

149. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(b)(3) provides that a seizure warrant may be issued in any district in which a forfeiture action against the property may be filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b).

150. Title 28, United States Code, Section 1355(b)(1)(A), provides that a forfeiture action or proceeding may be brought in a district court for the district in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred.

151. Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(l) provides that the district courts of the United States having jurisdiction to enter orders, including seizure warrants, without regard to the location of property which may be subject to criminal forfeiture under § 853.

152. As set forth above, there is probable cause to believe that the SUBJECT DOMAINS are subject to civil and criminal forfeiture because they are property involved in in the commission of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (international promotional money laundering) and 1956(h) (conspiracy to commit same). Specifically, the SUBJECT DOMAINS are property involved in transactions or attempted transactions that violate 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (international promotional money laundering) and 1956(h) (conspiracy to commit same), done with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, specifically violations of IEEPA. Further, as set forth above, there is probable cause to believe that a subset of the SUBJECT DOMAINS are subject to civil and criminal forfeiture because they are property that facilitated the commission of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services (e.g., trademark infringement), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320.

153. Venue for civil and criminal forfeiture is proper in this district pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(3) and (h), 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(1)(A), and 21 U.S.C. § 853(l), as set forth above, as the government has venue to charge the above described international promotional money laundering,

conspiracy to commit the money laundering, and trafficking in counterfeit goods or services offenses in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In addition, as part of the money laundering conspiracy to promote violations of IEEPA, the conspirators took steps to make the SUBJECT DOMAINS available on the internet, including in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the defendants used a subset of the SUBJECT DOMAINS to commit or facilitate the commission of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services, including in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

SEIZURE PROCEDURE

154. As detailed in Attachments A-1 through A-9, upon execution of the seizure warrant, the registry or registrar for the top-level domain or for each SUBJECT DOMAIN (collectively, the “PROVIDERS”), shall be directed to restrain and lock the SUBJECT DOMAINS pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in the SUBJECT DOMAINS to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAINS cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation or DOJ.

155. In addition, upon seizure of the SUBJECT DOMAINS by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the PROVIDERS will be directed to associate the SUBJECT DOMAINS to a new authoritative name server(s) to be designated by a law enforcement agent. The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAINS will resolve indicating that the site has been seized pursuant to a warrant issued by this court.

REQUEST FOR SEALING

156. I further request that the Court order that all papers in support of this application, including the affidavit and search warrant, be sealed until further order of the Court. These documents discuss an ongoing criminal investigation that is neither public nor known to all of the

targets of the investigation. Accordingly, there is good cause to seal these documents because their premature disclosure may seriously jeopardize that investigation.

CONCLUSION

157. For the foregoing reasons, I submit that there is probable cause to believe that the SUBJECT DOMAINS are used in and/or intended to be used in facilitating and/or committing the SUBJECT OFFENSES. Accordingly, the SUBJECT DOMAIN NAMES are subject to seizure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f), and subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A) and 982(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1)(B), (b)(1), and I respectfully request that the Court issue a seizure warrant for SUBJECT DOMAIN NAMES.

158. Because the warrant will be served on the PROVIDERS that control the SUBJECT DOMAINS, and the PROVIDERS, thereafter, at a time convenient to them, will transfer control of the SUBJECT DOMAINS to the government, there exists reasonable cause to permit the execution of the requested warrant at any time in the day or night.

Respectfully submitted,

[REDACTED]
Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Affidavit submitted by email and attested to me as true and accurate by telephone consistent with Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1 and 41(d)(3) this 30th day of August, 2024 at 9:34pm.

[REDACTED] Digitally signed
by [REDACTED]
Date: 2024.08.30
22:19:07 -04'00'

[REDACTED]
United States Magistrate Judge

ATTACHMENT A-1

With respect to **tribunalukraine.info**, **rrn.media**, **ukrlm.info**, **faz.ltd**, **spiegel.agency**, **lemonde.ltd**, **leparisien.ltd**, **rbk.media**, **50statesofflie.media**, **meisterurian.io**, **artichoc.io** (“SUBJECT DOMAINS”), Identity Digital, located at 10500 NE 8th Street, Ste. 750 Bellevue, WA 98004, who is the domain registry for the SUBJECT DOMAINS, shall take the following actions to effectuate the seizure of SUBJECT DOMAINS:

- 1) Take all reasonable measures to redirect the domain names to substitute servers at the direction of the FBI, by associating the SUBJECT DOMAINS to the following authoritative name-server(s):
 - (a) Ns1.[fbi.seized.gov](https://ns1.fbi.seized.gov);
 - (b) Ns2.[fbi.seized.gov](https://ns2.fbi.seized.gov); and/or
 - (c) Any new authoritative name server or IP address to be designated by a law enforcement agent in writing, including e-mail, to Identity Digital Limited.
- 2) Prevent any further modification to, or transfer of, SUBJECT DOMAINS pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in SUBJECT DOMAINS to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAINS cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with FBI.
- 3) Take all reasonable measures to propagate the necessary changes through the Domain Name System as quickly as practicable.
- 4) Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the Terms of this Order and take no unreasonable action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAINS will resolve. That notice will consist of law enforcement emblems and the following text (or substantially similar text):

“This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with a seizure warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a law enforcement action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

ATTACHMENT A-2

With respect to **vip-news.org**, **acrossthepress**, **mypride.press**, **truthgate.us**, **warfareinsider.us**, **shadowwatch.us** (“SUBJECT DOMAINS”), NameCheap, located at 4600 East Washington Street Suite 300 Phoenix, AZ 85034, who is the domain registrar for the SUBJECT DOMAINS, shall take the following actions to effectuate the seizure of SUBJECT DOMAINS:

- 1) Take all reasonable measures to redirect the domain names to substitute servers at the direction of the FBI, by associating the SUBJECT DOMAINS to the following authoritative name-server(s):
 - (a) Ns1.[fbi.seized.gov](https://ns1.fbi.seized.gov);
 - (b) Ns2.[fbi.seized.gov](https://ns2.fbi.seized.gov); and/or
 - (c) Any new authoritative name server or IP address to be designated by a law enforcement agent in writing, including e-mail, to Namecheap.
- 2) Prevent any further modification to, or transfer of, SUBJECT DOMAINS pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in SUBJECT DOMAINS to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAINS cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with FBI.
- 3) Take all reasonable measures to propagate the necessary changes through the Domain Name System as quickly as practicable.
- 4) Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the Terms of this Order and take no unreasonable action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAINS will resolve. That notice will consist of law enforcement emblems and the following text (or substantially similar text):

“This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with a seizure warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a law enforcement action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

ATTACHMENT A-3

With respect to **pravda-ua.com**, **waronfakes.com**, **holylandherald.com**, **levinaigre.net**, **grenzezank.com**, **lexomnium.com** (“SUBJECT DOMAINS”), VeriSign Global Registry Services, located at 12061 Bluemont Way, Reston, VA 20190, who is the domain registry for the SUBJECT DOMAINS, shall take the following actions to effectuate the seizure of SUBJECT DOMAINS:

- 1) Take all reasonable measures to redirect the domain names to substitute servers at the direction of the FBI, by associating the SUBJECT DOMAINS to the following authoritative name-server(s):
 - (a) Ns1.fbi.seized.gov;
 - (b) Ns2.fbi.seized.gov; and/or
 - (c) Any new authoritative name server or IP address to be designated by a law enforcement agent in writing, including e-mail, to VeriSign Global Registry Services.
- 2) Prevent any further modification to, or transfer of, SUBJECT DOMAINS pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in SUBJECT DOMAINS to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAINS cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with FBI.
- 3) Take all reasonable measures to propagate the necessary changes through the Domain Name System as quickly as practicable.
- 4) Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the Terms of this Order and take no unreasonable action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAINS will resolve. That notice will consist of law enforcement emblems and the following text (or substantially similar text):

“This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with a seizure warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a law enforcement action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

ATTACHMENT A-4

With respect to **uschina.online**, **honeymoney.press** (“SUBJECT DOMAINS”), NameSilo, located at 1300 E Missouri Ave Ste A-110 Phoenix, AZ 85014-2362 who is the domain registrar for the SUBJECT DOMAINS, shall take the following actions to effectuate the seizure of SUBJECT DOMAINS:

- 1) Take all reasonable measures to redirect the domain names to substitute servers at the direction of the FBI, by associating the SUBJECT DOMAINS to the following authoritative name-server(s):
 - (a) Ns1.fbi.seized.gov;
 - (b) Ns2.fbi.seized.gov; and/or
 - (c) Any new authoritative name server or IP address to be designated by a law enforcement agent in writing, including e-mail, to NameSilo.
- 2) Prevent any further modification to, or transfer of, SUBJECT DOMAINS pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in SUBJECT DOMAINS to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAINS cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with FBI.
- 3) Take all reasonable measures to propagate the necessary changes through the Domain Name System as quickly as practicable.
- 4) Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the Terms of this Order and take no unreasonable action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAINS will resolve. That notice will consist of law enforcement emblems and the following text (or substantially similar text):

“This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with a seizure warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a law enforcement action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

ATTACHMENT A-5

With respect to **sueddeutsche.co**, **tagesspiegel.co** (“SUBJECT DOMAINS”), GoDaddy.com LLC., located at 100 S. Mill Ave Suite 1600 Tempe, AZ 85281 USA, who is the domain registrar for the SUBJECT DOMAINS, shall take the following actions to effectuate the seizure of SUBJECT DOMAINS:

- 1) Take all reasonable measures to redirect the domain names to substitute servers at the direction of the FBI, by associating the SUBJECT DOMAINS to the following authoritative name-server(s):
 - (a) Ns1.fbi.seized.gov;
 - (b) Ns2.fbi.seized.gov; and/or
 - (c) Any new authoritative name server or IP address to be designated by a law enforcement agent in writing, including e-mail, to GoDaddy.com LLC.
- 2) Prevent any further modification to, or transfer of, SUBJECT DOMAINS pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in SUBJECT DOMAINS to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAINS cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with FBI.
- 3) Take all reasonable measures to propagate the necessary changes through the Domain Name System as quickly as practicable.
- 4) Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the Terms of this Order and take no unreasonable action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAINS will resolve. That notice will consist of law enforcement emblems and the following text (or substantially similar text):

“This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with a seizure warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a law enforcement action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

ATTACHMENT A-6

With respect to **bild.work** (“SUBJECT DOMAIN”), GoDaddy Registry Services, LLC, located at 100 S. Mill Ave Suite 1600 Tempe, AZ 85281 USA, who is the domain registry for the SUBJECT DOMAIN, shall take the following actions to effectuate the seizure of SUBJECT DOMAIN:

- 1) Take all reasonable measures to redirect the domain names to substitute servers at the direction of the FBI, by associating the SUBJECT DOMAIN to the following authoritative name-server(s):
 - (a) Ns1.fbi.seized.gov;
 - (b) Ns2.fbi.seized.gov; and/or
 - (c) Any new authoritative name server or IP address to be designated by a law enforcement agent in writing, including e-mail, to GoDaddy Registry Services, LLC.
- 2) Prevent any further modification to, or transfer of, SUBJECT DOMAIN pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in SUBJECT DOMAIN to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAIN cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with FBI.
- 3) Take all reasonable measures to propagate the necessary changes through the Domain Name System as quickly as practicable.
- 4) Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the Terms of this Order and take no unreasonable action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAIN will resolve. That notice will consist of law enforcement emblems and the following text (or substantially similar text):

“This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with a seizure warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a law enforcement action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

ATTACHMENT A-7

With respect to **fox-news.top**, **fox-news.in** (“SUBJECT DOMAINS”), Tucows Inc., 10400 NE 4th Street, 5th Floor, Suite 121, Bellevue, Washington 98004 who is the domain registrar for the SUBJECT DOMAINS, shall take the following actions to effectuate the seizure of SUBJECT DOMAINS:

- 1) Take all reasonable measures to redirect the domain names to substitute servers at the direction of the FBI, by associating the SUBJECT DOMAINS to the following authoritative name-server(s):
 - (a) Ns1.fbiseized.gov;
 - (b) Ns2.fbiseized.gov; and/or
 - (c) Any new authoritative name server or IP address to be designated by a law enforcement agent in writing, including e-mail, to Tucows Inc.
- 2) Prevent any further modification to, or transfer of, SUBJECT DOMAINS pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in SUBJECT DOMAINS to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAINS cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with FBI.
- 3) Take all reasonable measures to propagate the necessary changes through the Domain Name System as quickly as practicable.
- 4) Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the Terms of this Order and take no unreasonable action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAINS will resolve. That notice will consist of law enforcement emblems and the following text (or substantially similar text):

“This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with a seizure warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a law enforcement action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

ATTACHMENT A-8

With respect to **forward.pw** (“SUBJECT DOMAIN”), Micronesia Investment and Development Corporation, located at P.O. Box 1256 Koror 96940, Palau who is the domain registry for the SUBJECT DOMAIN, shall take the following actions to effectuate the seizure of SUBJECT DOMAIN:

- 1) Take all reasonable measures to redirect the domain names to substitute servers at the direction of the FBI, by associating the SUBJECT DOMAIN to the following authoritative name-server(s):
 - (a) Ns1.fbi.seized.gov;
 - (b) Ns2.fbi.seized.gov; and/or
 - (c) Any new authoritative name server or IP address to be designated by a law enforcement agent in writing, including e-mail, to Micronesia Investment and Development Corporation.
- 2) Prevent any further modification to, or transfer of, SUBJECT DOMAIN pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in SUBJECT DOMAIN to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAIN cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with FBI.
- 3) Take all reasonable measures to propagate the necessary changes through the Domain Name System as quickly as practicable.
- 4) Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the Terms of this Order and take no unreasonable action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAIN will resolve. That notice will consist of law enforcement emblems and the following text (or substantially similar text):

“This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with a seizure warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a law enforcement action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

ATTACHMENT A-9

With respect to **washingtonpost.pm** (“SUBJECT DOMAIN”), Sarek Oy, located at Urho Kekkosen katu 4E 00100, HELSINKI, Uusimaa Finland, who is the domain registry for the SUBJECT DOMAIN, shall take the following actions to effectuate the seizure of SUBJECT DOMAIN:

- 1) Take all reasonable measures to redirect the domain names to substitute servers at the direction of the FBI, by associating the SUBJECT DOMAIN to the following authoritative name-server(s):
 - (a) Ns1.fbi.seized.gov;
 - (b) Ns2.fbi.seized.gov; and/or
 - (c) Any new authoritative name server or IP address to be designated by a law enforcement agent in writing, including e-mail, to Sarek Oy.
- 2) Prevent any further modification to, or transfer of, SUBJECT DOMAIN pending transfer of all right, title, and interest in SUBJECT DOMAIN to the United States upon completion of forfeiture proceedings, to ensure that changes to the SUBJECT DOMAIN cannot be made absent court order or, if forfeited to the United States, without prior consultation with FBI.
- 3) Take all reasonable measures to propagate the necessary changes through the Domain Name System as quickly as practicable.
- 4) Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the Terms of this Order and take no unreasonable action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

The Government will display a notice on the website to which the SUBJECT DOMAIN will resolve. That notice will consist of law enforcement emblems and the following text (or substantially similar text):

“This domain has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with a seizure warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b), 982(b)(1), 2323(a)(2), 2323(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a law enforcement action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

EXHIBIT 1

Washingtonpost[.]ltd

ECONOMY

The U.S. Sacrifices Control over Artificial Intelligence for Ideology

A new White House executive order bans direct investment in high-tech Chinese companies. But who's going to be worse off for it?

By [Redacted]

August 7, 2023 at 8:54 a.m. EDT



[Redacted] for The Washington Post

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The U.S. and China, whose relations are already far from ideal, are entering a new round of fighting. The White House picked a pretty good time to strike another blow against an advancing rival. This came at a time when the world's second-largest economy was in a very vulnerable position: it was very difficult for China to get out of the prolonged covid lockdowns, and it may never reach the cherished goal of 5% of GDP by the end of 2023.

It would seem to be the right move – to reduce the opportunities of a direct competitor on the global chessboard, where political sketches of planetary scale are played out. But will the move lead to further problems for the U.S.?

China is already predictably furious. Chinese experts are calling the updated U.S. technology export controls targeting all semiconductor factories in China the most 'deadly' ban since the U.S. began imposing related sanctions on Chinese high-tech companies in 2019.

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5 Germany pledged a military revamp when Ukraine war began. Now it's worse off.

READ THIS ARTICLE: EXCLUSIVE!

Revelations of the head of Ukraine

Our editorial Board has received an exclusive video of the interrogation of Volodymyr Zelensky, in which he speaks about the arrangements with the US concerning biolabs.

By [Redacted]

February 16, 2023 at 8:54 a.m. EST



Forced to speak, give orders and sign documents.

[Redacted] of The Washington Post

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Note! The authenticity of the video material has not been confirmed. Our editors have deciphered the dialogue and bring to your attention a sensational recording of the revelations of the head of Ukraine.

Surname, Name, Patronymic?

Zelensky Vladimir Alexandrovich.

Date of birth?

January 25, 1978.

Nationality?

Ukraine.

Position?

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3 Russian mercenary chief says he is also behind global information war



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5 Germany pledged a military revamp when Ukraine war began. Now it's worse off.



Washingtonpost[.]pm

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Middle East Coalition of U.S. Allies Crumbles like a House of Cards

The main players in the Middle East are moving into Russia's orbit of influence. The crisis of American diplomacy is shattering the familiar world

By [Redacted]

December 6, 2023 at 8:54 a.m. EST



[Redacted] for The Washington Post

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5 Germany pledged a military



INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Migration Crisis Will Bury [REDACTED] Future with Ukraine

In three years, the president has failed to address the problems important to U.S. citizens, and has only added many new ones

By [REDACTED]

January 26, 2024 at 8:54 a.m. EST



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5 Germany pledged a military

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

No More Money: Kremlin Will Solve Ukraine's Problems

The story of Ukraine's unrestricted funding is coming to an end. In the end you can punish Russia by simply giving it Ukraine in its current form.

By [Redacted]

December 6, 2023 at 8:54 a.m. EST



[Redacted] for The Washington Post

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Reuters reports that the U.S. Senate backed a defense policy bill that calls for a record \$886 billion in annual military spending with strong support from both

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4 Lukashenko blames Ukraine for war, warns Belarus will join fight if attacked

5 Germany pledged a military

Fox-news[.]top



UKRAINE - Published August 7, 2023 4:26pm EDT

U.S. Is Turning into a Giant Pyramid Scheme

Our nation's national debt has already surpassed \$33 trillion, and we will have to spend \$1.4 trillion a year to pay the interest on it. This brings us closer to the worst disaster in U.S. history

By [redacted] Fox News



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On September 18, our country's national debt set another 'record' - it exceeded \$33 trillion, which is more than \$97,000 for each of us, including the elderly and infants! At the same time, before the 'debt ceiling' was raised, it was \$32 trillion, i.e. it increased by \$1 trillion in just three months. Over the past five years, our country's total debt has increased

Fox-news[.]in



UKRAINE - Published December 4, 2023 4:26pm EDT

Sad Outcome and Tragic Finale: Zelensky Loses in War and Diplomacy

Zelensky's unfortunate visit was planned as such in advance. [REDACTED] are shifting the blame for the loss to the Ukrainian president.

By [REDACTED] | Fox News



[REDACTED] one of the loudest critics of Ukraine in Congress, said the agreement to help Ukraine in exchange for border security is offensive not only to members of the [REDACTED] but to all Americans.

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DOMESTIC POLITICS, ECONOMY, HEALTH CARE · Published May 27, 2024 4:26pm EDT

Young Americans Face a Poverty-Stricken Old Age

In a new study by eHealth, 83% of millennials said they would be willing to pay more out of their paychecks to fund Medicare, the health insurance program for people over 65, for the future.

By [Redacted] Fox News



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Young Americans are concerned that the Medicare health insurance program for people over 65 will not exist when they retire. 80% of Generation X – people born between 1965



DOMESTIC POLICY - Published June 12, 2024 4:26pm EDT

Your Neighbors Will Decide Who Your Spouse Will Be: the [REDACTED] Lead the Charge

[REDACTED] decided to score extra points among migrants, as their candidates are rapidly losing appeal among U.S. citizens.

By

[REDACTED] Fox News



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UKRAINE Published July 04, 2023 4:20pm EDT

U.S. Decided to Trade Ukraine for Security

One sensible decision by the White House is to deny Ukraine membership in NATO. It is of no particular value to the U.S., and the risks from Russia are too great.

By [redacted] Fox News



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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky showed himself in a new image at the NATO summit in Vilnius. Now this actor looks more like a dictator from Latin America. But this country doesn't even have the bananas to pay back the US for the weapons we are supplying Kiev. And the Ukrainian government is running the country in such a way that there are doubts that anything, but weeds will grow in their fields.

The more an American learns about Ukraine, the more he wants to forget about it. Monstrous corruption, Nazi torch marches, and a stunningly ineffective military are not at all what the U.S. is willing to defend.

It seems now that someone in the White House decision makers have been given a competent analysis of this country. Otherwise, how else to explain that at the NATO summit the invitation ticket was gain waved in front of Volodymyr Zelensky's nose but handed over to the King of Sweden.

Forward[.]pw

FOREIGN POLICY

Wikipedia Is in Favor of Hamas

Wikipedia continues to serve as a platform for Israeli-Palestinian information warfare. The platform's editors are definitely biased in reporting on the armed conflict.



Engage

CATCH UP ON YIDDISH EVENTS

Empty rectangular box for event registration

Photo by [redacted] for the Forward

By [redacted]
August 10, 2024

The battle over changes to the title of the Wikipedia article 'Accusations of genocide during the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2023' has not ended in Israel's favor. The headline now reads 'Genocide in Gaza'. Wikipedia has once again proved its incompetence as an 'encyclopedia site', because an encyclopedia represents unbiasedness and objectivity, but in the matter of this article, objectivity did not happen: the authors ignored many sources and spread a pro-Palestinian vision of the conflict.

POLITICS

Hezbollah's Tentacles Stretch from Germany: Hitler Would Be Happy

Israel is on the brink of a new fierce war. Hezbollah shoots civilians in broad daylight. Germany and other Western countries publicly express their support for the Jewish people, but it does not come to real action.



for the Forward

By

July 31, 2024

Engage

CATCH UP ON YIDDISH EVENTS

Only the most principled right-wing deputies insist that Germany should increase pressure on Hezbollah and support Tel Aviv. Whose rules does Europe use to play?

Little Amir went to play football with his friends in his hometown of Majdal Shams in northern Israel. This summer day seemed especially joyful to the boy. Today they will definitely defeat their fierce opponents from the neighboring

Support the *Forward* team's reporting from campuses across the country. Make a monthly gift today.

SUPPORT THE FORWARD



INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

U.S. Surrendered Israel to Hezbollah

Washington explicitly withdrew support for Israel in its conflict with Hezbollah while negotiating with terrorists behind Jerusalem's back.



Photo by [redacted] for the Forward

By [redacted]
July 1, 2024

Engage

CATCH UP ON YIDDISH EVENTS



YIDDISH COMMUNITY CALENDAR

Upcoming events in the Yiddish world



EXHIBIT 2A

Abbreviations:

Primary language

Russian

Secondary language

English

Countermeasures by foreign agencies and organizations

The “collective West” countries are seriously concerned by the effectiveness of the project. Government and private agencies of all four countries—Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community and Federal Foreign Office, France’s General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the US Department of State, and Israel’s Security Agency, as well as major online platforms, factcheckers, and investigators such as *META*, *Microsoft*, *DesInfoLab*, and others—have been involved in the effort of countering our narratives since September 2022. Articles about the project and its “destructive impact on public opinion” have been regularly published by major European and US media outlets.



France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs

Statement by Ms. Catherine Colonna—Foreign digital interference—France’s detection of an information manipulation campaign

June 13, 2023

“The implication of Russian cultural centers and embassies that have actively participated in spreading content produced by this campaign, including via their institutional accounts on social media, is further proof of the hybrid strategy that Russia is implementing to undermine the conditions for peaceful democratic debate, and therefore damage our democratic institutions.”



Blogs.Microsoft.com

Russian influence and cyber operations adapt for long haul and exploit war fatigue

December 7, 2023

“Since July 2023, Russia-aligned influence actors have tricked celebrities into providing video messages that were then used in pro-Russian propaganda. These videos were then manipulated to falsely paint Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as a drug addict.”



The Washington Post

Kremlin runs disinformation campaign to undermine Zelensky, documents show

February 16, 2024

“The Kremlin instruction resulted in thousands of social media posts and hundreds of fabricated articles, created by troll farms and circulated in Ukraine and across Europe, that tried to exploit what were then rumored tensions between two Ukrainian leaders.”



Meta

“Adversarial Threat Report”

August 2023

“Launched soon after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, *Doppelganger* created a huge number of fake websites that spoofed the appearance of mainstream European news outlets, and then posted links to those sites using fake accounts on many social media platforms, including *Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, X (formerly Twitter),* and even *LiveJournal,* among others.”



Le Parisien

Disinformation, Putin's other war: “The goal is to exacerbate tensions in France”

February 17, 2024

“Fake news about Macron’s assassination in Kiev, fake anti-Zelensky graffiti, Stars of David in Paris....Russia, where the opposition leader Alexei Navalny has just died, has activated its operation to destabilize the French society.”



Clearsky Internet Security

February 22, 2024

Doppelganger NG. Cyberwarfare campaign.

“Russian IW (Information Warfare) aims to shape international perceptions, political discourse, and policy directions around the world by exploiting social networks, news websites, and anonymity. Several Kremlin-aligned objectives are being pursued by Russia’s IW efforts, including influencing US election campaigns, weakening European Union cohesion, and reducing Western backing for Ukraine.

ClearSky Cyber Security and *SentinelLabs* have discovered a new wave of Russian information warfare campaign named *Doppelganger NG*. *Meta* exposed the infrastructure of *Doppelganger* campaign in 2022, and *RecordedFuture* research enhanced the findings in 2023. *Doppelganger* (meaning “double,” an exact but usually invisible replica) is a global information warfare campaign publishing false information on hundreds of fake websites and social media channels.

Our research revealed that *Doppelganger NG* is again fully operational in 2024, utilizing new infrastructure.”

The logo for SPIEGEL Politics consists of the word "SPIEGEL" in a bold, white, sans-serif font, followed by the word "Politics" in a smaller, white, sans-serif font. Both words are set against a solid orange rectangular background.

Spiegel

Social media trends expose Russian deceitful campaign

January 26, 2024

“False tweet is part of pro-Russian disinformation campaign exposed by Baerbock’s Ministry. Confidential analysis is available in excerpts from *MIRROR*. Between December 20 and January 20, experts used special software to evaluate Elon Mask’s short-message service *X* on behalf of the Federal Foreign Office’s Division 607 for Strategic Communication—with disastrous results.

In the four weeks preceding the beginning of the year, they identified over 50,000 fake user accounts, which coordinated efforts to shape sentiments among the German-speaking audience through over a million tweets in German. On some days, experts of the Federal Foreign Office

registered 200,000 such tweets. This is around two tweets per second—a digital drumbeat intended to manipulate the public.”



Byline Times

Under the radar: unmasking the coordinated reach of Russian Doppelganger bots

February 29, 2024

“One of Russia’s most widespread tactics is the “Doppelganger bot network,” in which state actors utilize Doppelganger bots on X/Twitter to disseminate misleading narratives, sow discord, and influence public opinions globally. Researchers have revealed the scale, methods, and adaptability of this disinformation campaign, emphasizing its impact on Western democracies.”



General Secretariat for Defence and National Security

Actors associated with Russia use new and old tactics in a bid to influence online discussion of the NATO Summit

August 21, 2023

“Russia-aligned actors made a comprehensive attempt to influence online discussions surrounding the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July 2023, using deceptive methods to promote ideas almost certainly intended to tarnish NATO and the host country of Lithuania. These included the distribution of documents believed to be stolen from the Lithuanian government, as well as the spread of false statements on NATO spending and participation in French internal affairs.”



Meta

Adversarial Threat Report

August 2023

“We assess that we are witnessing the largest and most aggressive covert influence operation from Russia since 2017.”




Wired

Russia is boosting calls for ‘Civil war’ over Texas border crisis

February 7, 2024

“While previous *Doppelganger* campaigns shared links to fake websites designed to look like legitimate ones but with fake articles, this campaign linked to websites run, built, and maintained by the *Doppelganger* operatives to push narratives to suit their needs. One article, for example, appeared on a fake site called *Warfare Insider*, and stated that Texas ‘has become a battleground symbolizing the clash between state and federal authorities.’”



Recorded Future

Obfuscation and AI content in the Russian influence network *Doppelganger* signals evolving tactics

December 5, 2023

“In subsequent campaigns targeting US and German audiences, *Doppelganger* created six original but inauthentic news outlets producing malign content. The US-focused campaign aimed to exploit societal and political divisions ahead of the 2024 US election, fueling anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment, criticizing US military competence, and amplifying political divisions around US support for Ukraine. The German-focused campaign highlighted Germany’s economic and social issues, intending to weaken confidence in German leadership and reinforce nationalist sentiment.

Doppelganger's adaptability exemplifies the enduring nature of Russian information warfare, with a strategic focus on gradually shifting public opinion and behavior. The use of generative AI for content creation signifies an evolution in tactics, reflecting the broader trend of leveraging AI in information warfare campaigns. As the popularity of generative AI grows, malign

influence actors like *Doppelganger* are very likely to increasingly employ AI for scalable influence content.”

Berliner Morgenpost

Berliner Morgenpost

Why are pro-Russian fake websites so tenacious

August 29, 2023

“Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community stated that the Russian disinformation is still significant and that it treats foreign influence and manipulations very seriously.

Authorities showed concern about fake websites from the moment the campaign was exposed, informing *DPA* a year ago, at the end of August 2022. Reports demonstrate “the scale of pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation in Germany.” According to the press-secretary, they aimed to undermine trust in politics, society, and government institutions. “

Le Monde

Le Monde

Doppelganger: Russian disinformation campaign denounced by France

June 13, 2023

“This very well-imitated page is, in fact, the tip of a vast Russian influence operation, which has been going on for over a year. The agents who created and circulated this fake French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs page are also responsible for countless imitations of media articles, perfectly imitating the layouts of *Le Monde* and other newspapers, such as *Le Parisien* and 20 Minutes, as well as most of the major German media. Similar fakes have also been seen in Ukraine, Italy, and the United Kingdom.”

●● Medium

Medium

Russia-based Facebook operation targeted Europe with anti-Ukrainian messages

September 27, 2022

“The Russian network targeted Germany and Latvia with narratives about impending hardships resulting from sanctions targeting Russian energy supplies. In France and Italy, the network targeted Facebook with posts that called for an end to weapons shipments to Ukraine. The timing and narratives of the posts coincided with policy decisions made by the targeted countries pages regarding the war in Ukraine.

The network displays the hallmarks of influence operations previously documented by the *DFRLab*, in which Russia or its proxies weaponize platforms to amplify pro-Kremlin interests while denigrating Ukraine and the West. It is accomplished with a wide range of techniques previously observed by the *DFRLab*, including paid promotion of content, the use of automation, coordinated narratives, and other indicators.”

EXHIBIT 2B

Меры противодействия иностранных государственных структур и организаций

Страны коллективного Запада крайне обеспокоены эффективностью проекта. С сентября 2022 года в работу по противодействию распространению наших нарративов включились государственные и частные структуры всех четырёх стран: МВД и МИД Германии, Генеральный секретариат национальной обороны и безопасности Франции, Госдеп США и служба безопасности Израиля, а также крупнейшие онлайн-платформы, фактчекеры и расследователи: META, Microsoft, DesInfoLab и другие. Статьи о проекте и его "разрушительном воздействии на общественное мнение" регулярно выходят в крупнейших СМИ Европы и США.



**MINISTÈRE
DE L'EUROPE
ET DES AFFAIRES
ÉTRANGÈRES**

МИД Франции

Заявление г-жи Катрин Колонна – Иностранное цифровое вмешательство – обнаружение Францией кампании по манипулированию информацией

13 июня 2023 г.

«Причастность российских культурных центров и посольств, которые активно участвовали в распространении контента, созданного в ходе этой кампании, в том числе через свои институциональные аккаунты в социальных сетях, является еще одним доказательством гибридной стратегии, которую реализует Россия, чтобы подорвать условия для мирных демократических дебатов и, следовательно, нанести ущерб нашим демократическим институтам».



Blogs.Microsoft.com

Российское влияние и кибероперации адаптируются к длительным срокам и используют усталость от войны

7 декабря 2023 г.

«С июля 2023 года влиятельные лица, связанные с Россией, обманом заставляли знаменитостей отправлять видеообращения, которые затем использовались в пророссийской пропаганде. Затем этими видеороликами манипулировали, чтобы ложно изобразить президента Украины Владимира Зеленского наркоманом».



The Washington Post

Кремль проводит кампанию дезинформации, чтобы подорвать позиции Зеленского, показывают документы

16 февраля 2024 г.

«Результатом инструкции Кремля стали тысячи постов в социальных сетях и сотни сфабрикованных статей, созданных "фермами троллей" и распространенных в Украине и по всей Европе, которые пытались использовать тогдашние слухи о напряженности в отношениях между двумя украинскими лидерами».



Clearsky International Security

22 февраля 2024 г.

Доппельгангер НГ. Кампания кибервойны

«Российская ИВ (информационная война) стремится формировать международное восприятие, политический дискурс и направления политики во всем мире, используя социальные сети, новостные веб-сайты и анонимность. Российские усилия по ИВ преследуют несколько целей, связанных с Кремлем, включая влияние на избирательные кампании в США, ослабление сплоченности Европейского Союза и сокращение поддержки Украины со стороны Запада».

«ClearSky Кибербезопасность и SentinelLabs обнаружили новую волну российской информационной войны под названием Doppelganger NG. Мета раскрыла инфраструктуру кампании «Doppelganger» в 2022 году и исследование RecordedFuture дополнило его в 2023 году. «Доппельгангер» (что означает двойник, точная, но обычно невидимая копия) — это глобальная кампания информационной войны, публикующая ложную информацию на сотнях фейковых веб-сайтов и в социальных сетях.

Наше исследование показало, что «Doppelganger NG» продолжит работать в 2024 году, используя новую инфраструктуру».

SPIEGEL Политика

Spiegel

Настроения в соцсетях разоблачают российскую лживую кампанию

26 января 2024 г.

«Фальшивый твит является частью пророссийской кампании дезинформации, разоблаченной министерством Бербок. Конфиденциальный анализ доступен в отрывках из журнала MIRROR. Эксперты использовали специальное программное обеспечение для оценки сервиса коротких сообщений Илона Маска X от имени Подразделения 607 по стратегическим коммуникациям Министерства иностранных дел с 20 декабря по 20 января – с ужасающими результатами.

За четыре недели, предшествовавшие началу года, они выявили более 50 000 поддельных учетных записей пользователей, которые, по-видимому, скоординированно создавали настроения среди немецкоязычной аудитории, в общей сумме более миллиона твитов на немецком языке. В некоторые дни эксперты Министерства иностранных дел регистрировали 200 000 таких коротких сообщений. Это составляет примерно два сообщения в секунду – цифровой барабанный бой для манипулирования общественностью».



Byline Times

Под прицелом: разоблачение скоординированного охвата российских ботов-двойников

29 февраля 2024 г.

«Одной из наиболее распространенных тактик в России является «Сеть ботов-двойников», в которой государственные субъекты используют ботов-двойников в X / Twitter для распространения вводящих в заблуждение сообщений, чтобы посеять раздор и оказать влияние на общественное мнение по всему миру. Исследователи раскрыли масштаб, методы и адаптивность этой кампании дезинформации, подчеркнув ее влияние на западные демократии».



Генеральный секретариат национальной обороны и безопасности

Связанные с Россией субъекты используют новые и старые тактики в операциях влияния, направленных на онлайн-обсуждение саммита НАТО

21 августа 2023 г.

«Связанные с Россией субъекты предприняли многоплановую попытку повлиять на онлайн-дискуссии вокруг саммита НАТО в Вильнюсе в июле 2023 года, используя обманные методы для продвижения идей, почти наверняка направленных на очернение НАТО и принимающей страны Литвы. В их число входило распространение документов, предположительно украденных у литовского правительства, а также распространение ложных заявлений о расходах НАТО и участии во внутренних делах Франции».



Meta

Отчет об угрозах со стороны противника

Август 2023 г.

«Мы считаем, что с 2017 года мы наблюдаем самый крупный и самый агрессивный из всех видов скрытого воздействия со стороны России».



Wired

Россия усиливает призывы к 'Гражданской войне' из-за кризиса на границе с Техасом

7 февраля 2024 г.

«В то время как предыдущие кампании Doxxelganger распространяли ссылки на поддельные веб-сайты, созданные под видом законных, но с поддельными статьями, эта кампания ссылалась на веб-сайты, запущенные, созданные и поддерживаемые оперативниками Doxxelganger, чтобы продвигать нарративы в соответствии со своими потребностями. Например, на поддельном сайте под названием Warfare Insider появилась статья, в которой говорилось, что Техас "превратился в поле битвы, символизирующее столкновение между штатом и федеральными властями"».



Recorded Future

Запутывание и контент искусственного интеллекта в Российской сети влияния “Двойник” сигнализирует об изменении тактики

5 декабря 2023 г.

«В последующих кампаниях, нацеленных на американскую и немецкую аудиторию, Doppelgänger создал шесть оригинальных, но недостоверных новостных агентств, выпускающих вредоносный контент. Кампания, ориентированная на США, была направлена на использование социальных и политических разногласий в преддверии выборов в США в 2024 году, разжигая настроения против ЛГБТК+, критикуя военную компетентность США и усиливая политические разногласия вокруг поддержки США Украины. Кампания, ориентированная на Германию, высветила экономические и социальные проблемы Германии, намереваясь ослабить доверие к немецкому руководству и усилить националистические настроения.

Способность «Двойника» приспосабливаться иллюстрирует устойчивый характер российской информационной войны со стратегическим акцентом на постепенное изменение общественного мнения и поведения. Использование генеративного ИИ для создания контента означает эволюцию тактики, отражающую более широкую тенденцию использования ИИ в кампаниях информационной войны. По мере роста популярности генеративного искусственного интеллекта субъекты злонамеренного влияния, такие как Doppelgänger, с большой вероятностью будут все чаще использовать искусственный интеллект для масштабируемого контента влияния».

Berliner Morgenpost

Berliner Morgenpost

Почему пророссийские фейковые веб-сайты упорствуют

29 августа 2023 г.

«Федеральное министерство внутренних дел заявило, что не наблюдается снижения уровня российской дезинформации и что оно очень серьезно относится к угрозе иностранного влияния и манипуляций.

Власти проявляли обеспокоенность по поводу поддельных сайтов с момента разоблачения кампании, сообщив DPA год назад, в конце августа 2022 года. Отчеты наглядно демонстрируют „масштабы пророссийской пропаганды и дезинформации в Германии“. По словам пресс-секретаря, они преследовали цель подорвать доверие к политике, обществу и государственным институтам.

Le Monde

Le Monde

"Двойник": российская кампания дезинформации, осужденная Францией

13 июня 2023 г.

«Эта очень хорошо имитируемая страница, по сути, является вершиной масштабной операции российского влияния, которая продолжается уже более года. Агенты, создавшие и распространившие эту поддельную страницу французского МИДа, также несут ответственность за бесчисленные имитации статей СМИ, идеально имитирующие оформление Le Monde и других газет, таких как Le Parisien и 20 минут, а также большинства крупных немецких СМИ. Аналогичные фейки также были замечены в Украине, Италии и Соединенном Королевстве».



Medium

Российская операция Facebook нацелена на Европу с антиукраинскими сообщениями

27 сентября 2022 г.

«Российская сеть нацелилась на Германию и Латвию с рассказами о надвигающихся трудностях в результате санкций, направленных против поставок российских энергоносителей. Во Франции и Италии сеть нацелилась на Facebook с публикациями, призывающими прекратить поставки оружия в Украину. Время и содержание сообщений совпали с политическими решениями, принятыми страницами целевых стран в отношении войны в Украине.

Сеть имеет признаки операций по оказанию влияния, задокументированных DFRLab, в ходе которых Россия или ее доверенные лица используют платформы в качестве оружия для усиления прокремлевских интересов, одновременно очерняя Украину и Запад. Это достигается с помощью широкого спектра методов, ранее наблюдавшихся DFRLab, включая платное продвижение контента, использование автоматизации, скоординированное повествование и другие показатели».

EXHIBIT 3A

Abbreviations:

[PH]

Phonetic

Work with Comments

Accompanying Reference

To amplify the impact of the Project's key information vectors on the audience in the target countries, we believe it advisable to launch a system for disseminating comments on social media platforms.

To operate the comments system, we are planning to prepare a media map to reach the relevant target audiences: popular communities with a focus on politics and economics and personal accounts of influencers. The operatives will comment on posts on behalf of the bots according to the media map. The comments (texts/images/links) will promote the Project's main narratives and evoke in the audience rational (such as, "really, why do WE need to help Ukraine?") and emotional (such as, "Americans are such scumbags!") reactions.

The following will be used as content:

- Links to high-impact, viral, or explosive social media statements by well-known influencers and bloggers who have thousands of followers (based on social media monitoring);
- Links to online media articles (based on online media monitoring);
- Memes and cartoons created by the Project's team; and
- Brief posts containing interpretations/takes, according to the established TL [PH].

Important: using the proposed tool for sharing links to our own resources (*RRN*, media swarm, mirrors) is ineffective: social network algorithms view mass posting of links to sites with a low citation index as spam, which leads to blocking and deletion of comments and compromises the resources.

In addition to the regular work with comments, we could implement special projects, i.e. attack opponents or support associates with comment campaigns.

The work with comments will help enhance the awareness of the Project's narratives among a significant part of the active social media users interested in politics and economics.

The Project's Key Performance Indicators:

- 1,000 comments per day per country;
- 30,000 comments per month per country;
- 60,000 comments per month for France and Germany combined.



EXHIBIT 3B

Работа в комментариях

Сопроводительная справка

Для усиления воздействия основных информационных векторов Проекта на аудиторию целевых стран считаем целесообразным запустить систему распространения комментариев в социальных сетях.

Для работы комментарийной системы планируется составление медиакарты для попадания в соответствующие целевые аудитории – популярные сообщества политической и экономической направленности, личные аккаунты ЛОМов. Операторы будут оставлять от имени ботов комментарии под постами согласно медиакарте. Комментарии (текст/картинка/ссылка) будут продвигать основные нарративы проекта и вызывать у аудитории рациональные (действительно, а зачем НАМ нужно помогать Украине?) и эмоциональные (какие же всё таки американцы подлецы!) реакции.

В качестве контента будут использоваться:

- ссылки на резонансные высказывания в соцсетях известных ЛОМ и блогеров-тысячников (на основе мониторинга соц.сетей),
- ссылки на публикации в онлайн-СМИ (на основе мониторинга СМИ),
- мемы и карикатуры, создаваемые командой проекта,
- короткие тексты с интерпретацией, соответствующие определенным ТЛ.

Важно: использование предлагаемого инструмента для распространения ссылок на собственные ресурсы (RRN, рой СМИ, зеркала) является неэффективным, так как массовый постинг ссылок на сайты с низким индексом цитирования воспринимается алгоритмами социальных сетей как спам и ведёт к блокировке и удалению комментариев, компрометации самих ресурсов.

Помимо регулярной работы в комментариях возможна реализация спецпроектов – комментарийная атака оппонентов или поддержка сторонников.

Система комментарийной работы будет способствовать проникновению нарративов проекта в поле внимания большей части активной аудитории социальных сетей, интересующейся политикой и экономикой.

КПЭ проекта:

- 1 000 комментариев день на одну страну,
- 30 000 комментариев в месяц на одну страну,
- 60 000 комментариев на Францию и Германию совокупно в месяц.



EXHIBIT 4A

Country: United States

Content Type: long read + comments

K — I **Candidate B** diplomacy has led the United States not only to the covert participation in the proxy war in Ukraine, but also to an open clash in the Middle East. **Candidate B** destroyed the world he presented to the voters. It's time for him to go.

U.S. Loses Its Position as a World Leader by Making Too Many Mistakes

International politics

The world no longer believed in U.S. leadership, and the image of the American dream has dimmed considerably. A logical outcome of ‘diplomacy of power’.

Late last year, Britain's Financial Times wrote that Western support for Israel's offensive on Gaza had weakened attempts to build an anti-Russian consensus among significant developing countries to condemn Russia's military operation in Ukraine.

“We definitely lost the battle for the Global South. All the work we did with Global South [on Ukraine] went to waste. Forget the rules, forget the world order. They won't even listen to us now,” the publication quoted an unnamed G7 diplomat as saying.

Western officials have underestimated the degree of distrust some states have toward the United States and Europe as well as the desire of the major players – Brazil and South Africa – to pursue independent policies and represent their interests in the international arena. Recently, the international community's willingness to publicly criticize Russia has significantly decreased. Many developing countries have opposed Ukraine's demands for reparations from Russia and the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the Russian leadership.

Now the U.S. is trying to figure out why Southern countries are unwilling to support the Western bloc in its quest to punish Russia. It is a matter of fact. According to polls, 66% of the 6.3 billion people living outside the West have a favorable view of Russia. In South Asia, the number is even higher – 75%, and in French-speaking Africa – 68%. Public opinion of Russia remains positive in China, India, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Vietnam. But why does this happen?

*After the **U.S. Political Party B** support for BLM, the phrases “American leadership is what holds the world together”, “American alliances are what keep us – America – safe”, and “American values are what make us a partner other countries want to work with” can only be uttered by a stand-up comedian – and even then as a bitter joke. But they are being said by the president of our country, and it already looks like bullying.*

With the idiotic foreign and failed U.S. domestic policies, the leaders of the Global South have a legitimate distrust of our country. Today, America and the European Union no longer dominate the world economy, and the Global South has other options. Moreover, China has become a world leader. In many respects, even the fate of the dollar as a world currency now depends on Beijing's position.

The problem for America is also that our foreign policy in dealing with Third World countries is based on a semi-colonial approach. In the modern world, it is not necessary to declare a militarily and economically weak country as a colony, as Europeans did until the middle of the last century. It's just not profitable – you have to keep your troops there to ensure loyalty, build hospitals, schools and some kind of manufacturing to export resources. It's cheaper to buy the president, and he will sell the country's resources to us himself at a steep discount. And how the people of his country live is of no concern to him. So is our most democratic country that acquires these resources. But now that approach is no longer working either.

“That government is democratic that benefits the United States.” This cynical stance by the White House is hated and despised not only in third world countries, but around the world. Washington is losing its influence in the Middle East, and the U.S. authorities themselves are to blame for what is happening. The U.S. has been certainly the dominant strategic power in the Middle East for the past three decades and remains so to this day, but the position may change in the future as Washington's allies strengthen relations with Russia, China and Iran.

Six Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Egypt, recently asked to join the China-led BRICS group, which also includes Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa. This is despite the ever-expanding regime of Western sanctions imposed on Russia. Saying 'No' to Washington in the Middle East region has become a popular position today. Plenty of people in the Middle East see the U.S. as a 'hypocritical imperialist power'.

Things are bad in our 'backyard' as well. Latin America has historically had poor relations with the United States. In the last century, Washington has established dominance over South American countries, interfered in their politics, supported dictatorial regimes and plundered wealth through transnational companies. All this makes the neighbors hostile to U.S.-Western policies in the world, especially after the rise to power of leftist leaders hostile to U.S. imperialism.

Latin American and African countries see in the Eurasian states' struggle against U.S.-Western hegemony an opportunity to expand the limits of their independence from the West, led by the United States. Moreover, Eurasian countries did not abandon African and Latin American countries during the severe crisis. The United States and Europe provided no significant assistance during the coronavirus pandemic, while China and Russia provided it at no cost.

Another reason for the West's deteriorating relations with the Global South is its attempts to impose liberal values that are at odds with the conservative foundations of Latin America and Africa. We impose our vision of free speech and human rights, even to the point of establishing the rights of sexual minorities, which is frowned upon in most southern countries. Apparently, they don't have as many oppressed gays as we expected.

Washington declares some coups democratic – as for example in Ukraine in 2014. And others are anti-democratic, such as in Niger. What's the difference? There's actually no difference. In the Ukrainian case our politicians decided to do the dirty on Russia, and in the case of Niger it's U.S. ally France, which needs uranium from this country, that suffers. Is it cynical? Yes, it is and that's why the whole world, except our European allies, is laughing at our understanding of the 'democracy'.

African and Latin American leaders clearly don't want anyone to back them into a corner. They are interested in multipolarity – mutually beneficial relations with Washington, but also with Beijing and Moscow. Considering that the U.S. has enough own economic problems, the loss of both Latin America and Africa could be a near-term signal that disaster awaits us. Because whoever wins the battle for influence in the Global South will be the leader in the new world order in the 21st century. And the ball is clearly not on our side.

The world has changed. Whereas 50 years ago the words of U.S. leaders should have been taken seriously, we are now wise to be ignored by allies and enemies alike. Whatever the White House promises, to punish or reward, its words can simply be dismissed as empty noise. American reputation has gone into hyperinflation: even a thousand assurances from the president of the United States are now worth less than a single throwaway remark from the president of a decent country. Broken promises are like living on credit: today you yell "Wolves, wolves!" and tomorrow you pay for your lies of today.

The gist:

How to easily and quickly destroy something that has been carefully crafted over years – ask the leaders of the U.S., they are really good at it.

Recommendations:

Post a comment of no more than 200 characters on behalf of an American living in a small town. The current US policy to support any regimes dear to the State Department does not sit well with him. He believes that the United States has gone too far and is losing its position as the world leader. He is certain that first and foremost, Washington must restore its influence in Latin America and Africa rather than support Ukraine. He does not see Russia as an enemy. He believes that all this speaks of internal social disintegration in America, and is confident that the United States should focus primarily on its domestic problems.

Comments:

- 1. Our country should solve its own problems and let other countries solve their own problems. Read the article, it's exactly about what went wrong.*
- 2. My wife and I work in the NYC movie industry, our profession involves communicating and discussing all the current news. We are personally observing that attitudes towards the U.S. are not changing for the better. Read why this is the case.*
- 3. The causes of the crisis are deeper than **Candidate B** stupidity... Read what the problem is.*
- 4. The article spells out the truth... No objection from my side. We just don't think about a lot of things (((*

5. *My partner and I don't think it's that bad. But it is also impossible to remain silent, pretending that the world has remained the same. No, it has changed. And about the gays in Niger the author is wrong, we are sure they are suffering there...*

EXHIBIT 4B

Страна: США

Тип контента: лонгрид + комментарии

К — 1 ██████████ дипломатия привела США не только к скрытому участию в прокси-войне на Украине но и открытому боестолкновению на Ближнем Востоке. ██████████ уничтожил мир, который представлял собой перед избирателями. Ему пора уйти.

U.S. Loses Its Position as a World Leader by Making Too Many Mistakes

International politics

The world no longer believed in U.S. leadership, and the image of the American dream has dimmed considerably. A logical outcome of 'diplomacy of power'.

Late last year, Britain's Financial Times wrote that Western support for Israel's offensive on Gaza had weakened attempts to build an anti-Russian consensus among significant developing countries to condemn Russia's military operation in Ukraine.

"We definitely lost the battle for the Global South. All the work we did with Global South [on Ukraine] went to waste. Forget the rules, forget the world order. They won't even listen to us now," the publication quoted an unnamed G7 diplomat as saying.

Western officials have underestimated the degree of distrust some states have toward the United States and Europe as well as the desire of the major players – Brazil and South Africa – to pursue independent policies and represent their interests in the international arena. Recently, the international community's willingness to publicly criticize Russia has significantly decreased. Many developing countries have opposed Ukraine's demands for reparations from Russia and the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the Russian leadership.

Now the U.S. is trying to figure out why Southern countries are unwilling to support the Western bloc in its quest to punish Russia. It is a matter of fact. According to polls, 66% of the 6.3 billion people living outside the West have a favorable view of Russia. In South Asia, the number is even higher – 75%, and in French-speaking Africa – 68%. Public opinion of Russia remains positive in China, India, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Vietnam. But why does this happen?

After the ██████████ support for BLM, the phrases "American leadership is what

holds the world together”, “American alliances are what keep us – America – safe”, and “American values are what make us a partner other countries want to work with” can only be uttered by a stand-up comedian – and even then as a bitter joke. But they are being said by the president of our country, and it already looks like bullying.

With the idiotic foreign and failed U.S. domestic policies, the leaders of the Global South have a legitimate distrust of our country. Today, America and the European Union no longer dominate the world economy, and the Global South has other options. Moreover, China has become a world leader. In many respects, even the fate of the dollar as a world currency now depends on Beijing's position.

The problem for America is also that our foreign policy in dealing with Third World countries is based on a semi-colonial approach. In the modern world, it is not necessary to declare a militarily and economically weak country as a colony, as Europeans did until the middle of the last century. It's just not profitable – you have to keep your troops there to ensure loyalty, build hospitals, schools and some kind of manufacturing to export resources. It's cheaper to buy the president, and he will sell the country's resources to us himself at a steep discount. And how the people of his country live is of no concern to him. So is our most democratic country that acquires these resources. But now that approach is no longer working either.

“That government is democratic that benefits the United States.” This cynical stance by the White House is hated and despised not only in third world countries, but around the world. Washington is losing its influence in the Middle East, and the U.S. authorities themselves are to blame for what is happening. The U.S. has been certainly the dominant strategic power in the Middle East for the past three decades and remains so to this day, but the position may change in the future as Washington's allies strengthen relations with Russia, China and Iran.

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Latin American and African countries see in the Eurasian states' struggle against U.S.-Western hegemony an opportunity to expand the limits of their independence from the West, led by the United States. Moreover, Eurasian countries did not abandon African and Latin American countries during the severe crisis. The United States and Europe provided no significant assistance during the coronavirus pandemic, while China and Russia provided it at no cost.

Another reason for the West's deteriorating relations with the Global South is its attempts to impose liberal values that are at odds with the conservative foundations of Latin America and Africa. We impose our vision of free speech and human rights, even to the point of establishing the rights of sexual minorities, which is frowned upon in most southern countries. Apparently, they don't have as many oppressed gays as we expected.

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African and Latin American leaders clearly don't want anyone to back them into a corner. They are interested in multipolarity – mutually beneficial relations with Washington, but also with Beijing and Moscow. Considering that the U.S. has enough own economic problems, the loss of both Latin America and Africa could be a near-term signal that disaster awaits us. Because whoever wins the battle for influence in the Global South will be the leader in the new world order in the 21st century. And the ball is clearly not on our side.

The world has changed. Whereas 50 years ago the words of U.S. leaders should have been taken seriously, we are now wise to be ignored by allies and enemies alike. Whatever the White House promises, to punish or reward, its words can simply be dismissed as empty noise. American reputation has gone into hyperinflation: even a thousand assurances from the president of the United States are now worth less than a single throwaway remark from the president of a decent country. Broken promises are like living on credit: today you yell "Wolves, wolves!" and tomorrow you pay for your lies of today.

Подводка:

How to easily and quickly destroy something that has been carefully crafted over years – ask the leaders of the U.S., they are really good at it.

Рекомендации для освещения:

Напишите комментарий не более 200 знаков от лица американца, проживающего в небольшом городке. Сегодняшняя политика США в плане поддержки любых режимов, вызывающих симпатию Госдепа, его не устраивает. Он считает, что США заигрались и утрачивают лидерские позиции в мире. Он уверен, что в первую очередь надо восстановить влияние Вашингтона в Латинской Америке и Африке, а отнюдь поддерживать Украину. В России он не видит врага. Он полагает, что всё это говорит о внутреннем социальном распаде в Америке, и уверен, что США следует сосредоточиться в первую очередь на внутренних проблемах.

Комментарии:

1. Our country should solve its own problems and let other countries solve their own problems. Read the article, it's exactly about what went wrong.
2. My wife and I work in the NYC movie industry, our profession involves communicating and discussing all the current news. We are personally observing that attitudes towards the U.S. are not changing for the better. Read why this is the case.
3. The causes of the crisis are deeper than [REDACTED] stupidity... Read what the problem is.
4. The article spells out the truth... No objection from my side. We just don't think about a lot of things (((
5. My partner and I don't think it's that bad. But it is also impossible to remain silent, pretending that the world has remained the same. No, it has changed. And about the gays in Niger the author is wrong, we are sure they are suffering there...

EXHIBIT 5A

K:1

Date: 01/04/2024

Country: U.S.A.

Type of Content: Comments

Recommendations for Coverage:

Write a comment of no more than 200 characters, including spaces, on behalf of an American from a small town. He believes that U.S. policy should be aimed at ensuring national security and not the U.S. Political Party B Party's ideology. He sees that the economy is deteriorating, inflation is increasing and Candidate B is unable to cope with it. He is convinced that Candidate B and the U.S. Political Party B are ineffective. He thinks that their policies are destroying America.

Comments:

1. The U.S. is a house of cards that is about to collapse. The longer I live, the more convinced I am of this. Read the article – it has facts only... 2. American corporations aren't investing anywhere. All they do is accumulate debt and plunder the money. Industrial capacity has been steadily declining. Climate and warming will finish it all off. I agree with the author – the outlook is sad... 3. Candidate B needs to tax the wealthiest – whether individuals or corporations. It will reverse 40 years of neoliberalism. The government spends a lot of public funds, but for nothing. We need to focus on the core issues, the author is right. 4. I'll vote for anyone to build a decent railroad network in America. But it's clearly not U.S. Political Party B, read... 5. Investing in your country's economy is wise, it promises further benefits. But that's not the U.S. Political Party B' style... Read the article so the future doesn't hit you over the head.

EXHIBIT 5B

К: 1

Дата: 04.01.2024

Страна: США

Тип контента: комментарии

Рекомендации по освещению:

Напишите комментарий не более 200 знаков с пробелами от лица американца из небольшого городка. Он считает, что политика США должна быть нацелена на обеспечение национальной безопасности, а не идеологии [REDACTED]. Он видит, что экономика ухудшается, инфляция усиливается, и [REDACTED] не справляется с этим. Он убежден в неэффективности [REDACTED] и [REDACTED]. Он считает, что их политика разрушает Америку.

Комментарии:

1. The U.S. is a house of cards that is about to collapse. The longer I live, the more convinced I am of this. Read the article – it has facts only...

2. American corporations aren't investing anywhere. All they do is accumulate debt and plunder the money. Industrial capacity has been steadily declining. Climate and warming will finish it all off. I agree with the author – the outlook is sad...

3. [REDACTED] needs to tax the wealthiest – whether individuals or corporations. It will reverse 40 years of neoliberalism. The government spends a lot of public funds, but for nothing. We need to focus on the core issues, the author is right.

4. I'll vote for anyone to build a decent railroad network in America. But it's clearly not [REDACTED], read...

5. Investing in your country's economy is wise, it promises further benefits. But that's not the [REDACTED] style... Read the article so the future doesn't hit you over the head.

EXHIBIT 6A

Center S. Comprehensive support for informational and political influence

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Description

The project of comprehensive support for informational and political influence on public opinion of the population of Ukraine in 2024 includes work in four main areas:

- monitoring;
- analytics;
- content production;
- content delivery;

Purpose:

- To shape public opinion in Ukraine, favorable for achieving the goals and objectives of the Special Military Operation, as well as future bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine.

Objectives:

- wide-ranging and continuous monitoring of the information space of Ukraine;
- analytical support for project teams working with Ukrainian audience;
- timely recognition and suppression of anti-Russian narratives, created in the Ukrainian information space, preempting of the adversary's informational and political operations;
- development and implementation of integrated informational and political operations;
- ensuring the continuous production of up-to-date multi-format content;
- delivery of content to the citizens of Ukraine using various communication channels;
- control of quantitative and qualitative indicators of content delivery, collection and analysis of audience reaction.

General main subject areas:

K1 - undermining military and political leadership

K2 -discord among the elites;

K3 - loss of morale in the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

K4 - sowing discord in the population;

1. Monitoring products

U-pulse Telegram channel

Monitoring:

A closed Telegram channel with a stream of news along the lines the main subject areas of the project, working daily in real time. The channel accumulates a news agenda of three information spaces: Ukrainian, international (mainly Western) and Russian. News sources are the media, social media networks, influencers' statements. The channel allows user to track the current agenda from a single operational source.

Format:

A private Telegram channel with short messages. Each message contains:

- brief news summary;
- a link to the original source;
- navigational hash tags:

Frequency:

Daily (up to 40 posts per day)

Example:

U -PULSE
#MU
#D Sowing discord N

Tsenzor.Net: The meeting between Polish government representatives and Polish freight companies that blocked the border with Ukraine ended without agreements

https://t.me/censor_net/39987
https://censor.net/ua/news/3454678/u_polschi_peremovyny_uryad_u_yi_pereviznykiv_yaki_blokuyut_kordon_z_ukrayinoyu_zakinchylasy_a_bez_domovlenostey

Telegram

Tsenzor.Net | Ukrainian and world news, war and analytics. The meeting between Polish government representatives and Polish freight companies that blocked the border with Ukraine ended without agreements



U -PULSE
DiscreditationVPR

Korrespondent.net: The official of the Customs Service in Kyiv was caught taking a bride of \$2,000 –proceeds were hidden in a coffee cup.

https://t.me/okoo_ukraine/46066
<https://ua.korrespondent.net/city/kyiv/4638846-u-kyievi-mytnyk-otrymay-khabar-u-stakani-dlia-kavy>

Telegram

Всевидающее ОКО 🇺🇦 Украина | Новости

All-seeing EYE. Ukraine.NEWS. The official of the Customs Service in Kyiv was caught with unusual coffee. It is reported that he assisted in sending illegal proceeds abroad.



Monitoring of influencers

Monitoring

Monitoring of pages of Ukrainian influencers in social media networks is aimed at identifying messages that can be interpreted in a favorable light for the Russian Federation along the lines the main subject areas of the project, Identified messages can be replicated in the Ukrainian information space. In addition, new narratives can be developed on their basis, and content can be produced.

The product consists of two parts: daily monitoring tables and a weekly analytical report.

Format:

1. Analytic table containing 6 columns:

- subject area (K);
- author and post;
- message text;
- statistics (reach, views and reactions);
- date and time of publication;
- recommendations for using publication in the work of the project.

2. A weekly report containing statistics on influencers' reports for the week, broken down by project's main subject areas and coverage / response analysis.

Frequency:

- table - daily (28-31 units per month);
- statistical report - weekly (4 units per month).

Example:

No.	Thematic direction	Author and post	Text	Statistics	Date and publication time	Recommendations
1	Discrediting Ukraine	<p>U.S. Person 4 – the presenter on the show of the conservative Daily Wire channel. Viewers: 437,542</p> <p>https://twitter.com/U.S. Person 4/status/1720767372246556884</p>	<p>Let's ponder, until it is all over. What did you like the best in the propaganda machine of Western Ukraine?</p> <p>I will forever miss the Phantom of Kyiv but also that the media informed us that Putin has cancer and he has a few weeks left to live, it was also awesome. Plus Foreign Official B is wearing his fake military uniform everywhere, begging to visit Oscar and Grammy, will forever be etched in my heart.</p>	<p>Reach 643700</p> <p>Likes 4000</p> <p>Reposts 9retweets0 619</p> <p>Comments 559</p>	<p>11.04.2023</p> <p>14:38</p>	<p>1. To focus attention of the audience on a number of stories of Ukrainian propaganda that turned out to be fakes.</p> <p>2. To use publication as an argument in the articles about the growth of anti-Ukrainian attitudes in the US.</p>
2	Europe, US, NATO, war mongers	<p>U.S. Person 5 kickboxer, businessman Viewers: 2,576,316</p> <p>https://twitter.com/U.S. Person 5/status/1720816453558976301</p>	<p>Billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of senseless Ukrainian lives.</p> <p>Although, the children of war mongers are just fine, so everything is okay. It is time to cash in and then do what they could have done before Russia sent in even one military detachment.</p> <p>Hurrah1 ...Disgusting</p>	<p>Reach 422000</p> <p>Likes 3000</p> <p>Reposts 9retweets0 444</p> <p>Comments 266</p>	<p>11.04.2023</p> <p>17:53</p>	<p>1. To use the post in conjunction with similar influencers posts as arguments that the main beneficiary of the war is the United States</p> <p>2. To promote an idea that continuation of war will not lead to Ukrainian victory but just will increase the number of victims and will enrich the US military industrial complex.</p>

2. Monitoring-analytical products

Overview of information field - Globe of Ukraine dashboard

Monitoring & Analytics

The dashboard under the working title of "Globe of Ukraine" is a document in the form of a graphically designed "dashboard", which in a format convenient for visual perception, presents a picture of the information space of Ukraine over the past week. The dashboard contains quantitative and qualitative indicators, covering the results of media monitoring (including foreign and regional), telegram channels, and social media networks. The following data can be gleaned from it:

- the main narratives and stories of the Ukrainian government media, the degree and pattern of their distribution;
- the most comprehensive and resonant stories discussed in social networks (patterns);
- convergence of stories in the media and social media networks, the "life cycle" of individual newsbreaks;
- The infiltration of Western newsbreaks into the Ukrainian information space;
- The infiltration of Russian newsbreaks into the Ukrainian information space;
- dissemination of the project's narratives and messages in the Ukrainian information space;
- other data

Format:

1. The document is in the form of a graphically designed "dashboard", which in a format convenient for visual perception, presents a picture of the information space of Ukraine over the past week. The most convenient print format - A3
2. Analytical report with the interpretation of dashboard data.

Frequency: weekly

Identification of trends in social media networks in Ukraine based on the analysis of user comments

Monitoring & Analytics

The monitoring and analysis of trends in social media networks in Ukraine is divided into three main stages:


- Identification of the most discussed stories based on monitoring the largest Telegram channels with open discussions, Ukrainian trends in X (Twitter), comments on articles in the Ukrainian media.
- Analysis of the array of comments under publications, identification of the main trends in discussions, combinations of positive/negative/neutral reactions.
- Interpretation of monitoring results, analysis of the reflection of the mood in Ukrainian society in comments on social media networks, and drawing up recommendations for the use of the data obtained in the process.

Format:

1. A briefing, containing monitoring outcome reports: the most discussed topics, the main topics of commentary trends, the most memorable comments.
2. An analytical note with an interpretation of the data, containing an analysis of each topic, identifying key narratives and determining their potential for producing content (comments, posts, articles, etc.), and general conclusions.

Frequency: weekly (based on an analysis of approximately 40,000 messages per week).

Example:

<p>3. US and EU are unofficially discussing the possibility of talks with RF with Ukraine and possibility of territorial concessions. Foreign Official 7 is proposing to transition immediately to peace talks with Russia, and Foreign Official 6 that no one will be able to force Ukraine to engage in peace talks.</p> <p>Highly demoralizing trend. The users are discussing the situation with despondence. Many are not ready to admit defeat. Still, the number of those in favor of negotiations is growing daily since people are tired of war.</p> <p>Interesting fact: the trend was created by pro-government bloggers and commentators in order to discredit Foreign Official 7 but in the end the situation became uncontrollable and everything turned out to be a clear negative reaction to the government.</p> <p>Main topics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace talks with RF will mean Ukrainian defeat; • Foreign Official 7 should not become president of Ukraine or Ukraine will lose territory • The west is tired, they need ceasefire; • The war is at the dead end that is why there is no other choice. • Here are most typical; comments regarding this event: • "When did any war ever made any sense..." <p>"Ukraine should have started confidential negotiations with RF regarding withdrawal</p>	<p>1) A controversial ex-member of Parliament, a linguist Non U.S. Person 1 stated that she cannot call the fighters of the Azov special detachment battalion, heroically defending Mariupol in 2022, Ukrainians. Non U.S. stated, "I cannot call them Ukrainians if they do not speak Ukrainian".</p> <p>Topics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • She should be sent to fight at the frontline so that she does not do this type of statements • Why do the authorities take no action against Non U.S. Person 1 • She exists to deflect people's attention from real problems <p>Opinion in the social networks now</p> <p>"In Ukraine (among Ukrainians) Russian is spoken either by the offsprings of the "liberators" or their victims (Ukrainian populace subjected to Russification). In both cases measures should be undertaken, Russian language in Ukrainian is not acceptable"</p> 
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Monitoring of world media

Monitoring and analytics

Monitoring of reporting in world media (the Western –above all) is aimed at identifying reports that can be interpreted in a favorable light for the Russian Federation along the lines the main subject areas of the project, The identified reports can be replicated in the Ukrainian information space. In addition, new narratives can be developed on their basis, and content can be produced.

Format:

1. Analytic table containing 6 columns:

- country;
- subject area (K)
- brief news summary;
- link to the original source;
- news quote;
- recommendations for using publication in the work of the project.

Frequency and volume:

It is possible to have it done in daily (28-31 units per month) or weekly (4 units per month) format.

Example:

Nr	Country	Direction	Publication	Source	Quote	Coverage recommendations
1	US	K3- Loss of morale in the Ukrainian Armed Forces	Ukrainian morgues have ran out of the space for the dead	WSJ https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/the-harrowing-work-of-burying-ukrainian-war-dead-29d0b0e0?mod=world_lead_pos5	WSJ writes : "Ukrainian morgues are overflowing with the dead. Due to lack of gurneys, the body bags are sorted out on the floor".	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To promote an idea that civil and military authorities of Ukraine were not ready for such high losses at the frontline. The real level of losses are not disclosed. 2. To emphasize that the government is doing everything to reduce the payments to the fallen soldiers to the maximum. 3. To note that current leadership of Ukraine makes not only the military victory but even ceasefire negotiations impossible.
2	US	K3- Loss of morale in the Ukrainian Armed Forces	Ukraine is actively recruiting women into the Armed Forces	NYT https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/world/europe/ukraine-war-army-women.html	NYT reports "In the circumstances of prolonged warfare, Ukraine is forcefully recruiting women into the Armed Forces. According to the data of Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, around 43,000 women are serving in the Ukrainian army, which is 40 percent more than in 2021"	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To promote an idea that mobilizing women and older people to serve in the Armed Services of Ukraine is an act of desperation. The youth is trying to avoid draft by giving bribes and fleeing to EU countries while the losses are mounting. 2. To emphasize that soon there will be no one to fight, the attitude toward veterans and disabled is terrible, the soldiers kill their commanding officers that treat them like cannon fodder. - 3. To note that current leadership of Ukraine makes not only the
3	Poland	K4- Sowing discord in population	Russia has accumulated almost 900 long-range rockets	PAP https://www.pap.pl/ru/ssiannawsw/ukrainskaya-voennaya-razvedka-rossiya-nakopila-pochti-900-raket https://www.pap.pl/ru/ssiannawsw/ukrainskaya-voennaya-razvedka-rossiya-nakopila-nochti-900-raket	Press secretary of the Main Directorate of military intelligence of Ukraine, ██████████ ██████████ stated that according to the data from the War Study Institute, Russian forces have 870 operational tactical; high-precision rockets in reserve. Press secretary also informed that in October Russian forces have launched 115 high-precision rockets capable to flying long distances", according to RAR.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To emphasize that as far back as December of the last year, head of SBU ██████████ ██████████ stated that Russia's arsenal of ammunition for high precision weapons is depleted but now SBU is stating the opposite. In other words, the authorities are deceiving Ukrainians, stating that the Russian resources are dwindling – the war will be long, and the winter will be terrible. 2. To promote an idea that the allies have abandoned Ukraine, delaying delivery of ammunition and weapons. Moreover, now the US has sent all of its assistance to Israel, EU may follow them and refuse assistance. Ukraine does not have its own resources to have a prolonged war with Russia. ██████████ ██████████ push for peace talks.

Commentary activity: identification of behavioral models and calculation of the sensitivity index

Monitoring & Analytics

The work is built on the basis of monitoring negative commentary trends in social networks. Based on this analysis, **behavioral models** are identified.

The behavioral model is a non-standard reaction of users, which allows identification of narratives that have the greatest support in Ukrainian society for a measurable period of time and directly affect the shaping of public opinion.

Behavioral models form the basis of commentary work, increasing its flexibility and mobility. Also, this work makes it possible to identify the level of sensitivity to the narrative in other target groups and calculate the **sensitivity index**.

The sensitivity index is an index that demonstrates the attitude of Ukrainian users to support main behavioral trends. It is calculated as a percentage of the number of comments from Ukrainian users who reacted positively to the trend.

Product format:

Analytical report in the dashboard format, containing the calculation of the sensitivity index of the main topics of the week in the context of the main subject areas of the project. Accompanied by a description of the calculation methodology.

Frequency and volume: weekly (4 units per month)

Product example:



Analysis of Western *think tanks*

Monitoring & Analytics

A report based on the analysis of materials from Western *think tanks* (analytical centers) on Ukrainian conflict. The analysis is accompanied by recommendations for adjusting influence effort and creating content based on articles for distribution in the Ukrainian infospace.

Format:

A multi-page document that contains:

- an overview of the findings of Western think tanks focusing on the current conflict;
- identification of stakeholders in the implementation of the recommendations proposed by these think tanks;
- assessment of the probability of implementation of certain scenarios ("sets of recommendations");
- assessment of the possible consequences of the implementation of certain scenarios;
- their own recommendations on scenarios proposed by Western think tanks, including recommendations for content creation.

Frequency and volume: Once biweekly (2 units per month)

Development of comprehensive strategic influence efforts

Monitoring and analytics

Development of comprehensive strategic influence efforts, designed to be long-term, includes the development of operational goals and objectives, the definition of methods and stages for achieving goals, analytical, forecast and political technology parts, content procurement for all agents of information and psychological influence, including official media, influencers, government and municipal institutions.

IMPORTANT! The development and implementation of an influence effort operation requires the participation of not only all teams involved in Center S, but also a robust interdepartmental interaction. The team of authors of this document, in addition to direct participation in the development of the document, is ready to coordinate the interaction of all participants in the process, monitor the effectiveness of the operation and adjust plans.

Particular attention should be paid to ensuring the secrecy of work performed.

Format:

A multi-page document, templates of narrative lines, content, instructions.

Frequency and volume: Once in 3 months (varies depending on the changing military and political situation).

3. Analytical Products

Center S main dashboard

Analytics

The project's main dashboard is a document in the form of a graphically designed "dashboard", which in a format convenient for visual perception, presents data on the results of the work of all project teams of Center S over the past week. Drafting of a document requires the collection, systematization and graphical processing of a large array of diverse data. The following information may be gleaned from the dashboard:

- the volume of content production for the week and distribution data;
- dynamics of changes in the main indicators of sociological research;;
- brief indicators of commentary work;
- analysis of the degree of dissemination of key topics of the project (including at the regional level)
- indicators of production and distribution of content within the framework of the main subject areas of the project;
- examples of the most popular posts of the project over the past week.

Product format:

1. The document is in the form of a graphically designed "dashboard", which presents the results of the work over the past week in a form that is convenient for visual perception. The most convenient print format - A3

2. Analytical report with the interpretation of dashboard data.

Frequency and volume: weekly (4 units per month)

Example:

The dashboard is divided into several sections:

- Key topics (analysis) Nationwide:** Lists five topics with their message counts and views. The most successful topic is "The last counteroffensive" with 3.7 thousand messages and 766,000 views.
- Regional:** Lists four topics with their message counts and views. The most successful topic is "Where do the coffins from Avdiivka go" with 0.7 thousand messages and 472 thousand views.
- K1 Discrediting MPL:** Content metrics: Total 893 (+12.04%), Total encounters 53 258 207 (+23.11%), Average ER% 4.91% (-0.25%), Average CTR % 5.08% (+0.38%), Comments Overall across all platforms 4 741 (-4.03%).
- K2 Discord among elites:** Content metrics: Total 504 (+26.91%), Total encounters 48 061 318 (+45.84%), Average ER% 4.02% (-0.06%), Average CTR % 1.73% (-0.24%), Comments Overall across all platforms 3 020 (-14.2%).
- K3 Loss of morale in the Ukrainian Army:** Content metrics: Total 596 (-23.98%), Total encounters 57 519 508 (+11.3%), Average ER% 3.95% (-0.55%), Average CTR % 4.92% (+0.32%), Comments Overall across all platforms 3 370 (+2.9%).
- K4 Disarray in the population:** Content metrics: Total 577 (-19.96%), Total encounters 30 200 471 (-56.56%), Average ER% 4.09% (-0.59%), Average CTR % 5.59% (+0.51%), Comments Overall across all platforms 3 270 (-3.54%).

Each category includes a "TOP material" section with a representative image and a brief description of the content.

Sociological dashboard

Analytics


An analytical document that presents data on the dynamics in the results of sociological research inside Ukraine over the past week in a form convenient for visual perception. Drafting of a document requires the collection, systematization and graphical processing of a large array of diverse data.

Format:

The document is in the form of a graphically designed "dashboard", which, in a format convenient for visual perception, presents the dynamics of changes in sociological data on key indicators of the project. The most convenient print format - A3

Frequency and volume: Once biweekly (2 units per month)

Example:



4. Content

Articles (long reads)

Content

Articles are original texts ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 characters with spaces, devoted to topics relevant to the Ukrainian audience, which fit into the main subject areas of the project. Each text is professionally edited and accompanied by 10 comments and 3 teasers for disseminating the text on social networks. The author of the text also selects the image for the text.

Format (set of files):

- text in Russian;
- text in Ukrainian;
- 10 comments in Russian;
- image

Frequency and volume: daily around 70 unit per month).

Product example:



The war did not hit Russia

International relations

Fighting and economic sanctions have hit mostly the Western countries, while the Russians are only growing their potential.

The thousands of sanctions imposed by allies against Kremlin, did not bring a tangible result. This view is becoming more prevalent not only in the number of publications in the Western press but also in the statements of politicians. Moreover, the sanctions have seriously hit our allies themselves, and it is especially obvious now when they openly state that they will just be unable to support Ukraine at the appropriate scale. They simply do not have the capacity to do so, neither financial, nor military.

At the same time, Russia, on the contrary, only continues to grow its capabilities. Representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate, [Foreign Official 11](#) in article published by REK-Ukraine, informed that in October Russia was able to produce nearly 115 high precision missiles with air-range of over 350 kilometers. It means that at this time in the war in Ukraine the enemy has in total 870 high precision missiles, and their production continues.

According to [Foreign Official](#) among the new high precision missiles – around 20 are Kalibr [SS-N-27 Sizzler] and around 40 XX-101 missiles. In addition, Russia produces around 30 new ballistic Iskander-M missiles monthly, as well as Iskander_K cruise missiles.

Country:	Ukraine	Type of comment:
Date:	11.10.2023	Teaser comments:
		Direction: K-3
		Demoralization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Comments:

1. Will we survive the winter, or what? The winter frost is coming and funding for municipal services is completely gone, everything was stolen.
2. The war has to be stopped, at any price, and start working on survival. And this is also not at all simple.
3. European Union and NATO now are at the brink of collapse. How do we rely on them here?
- 4.. The most important is the United States. We believed that they will not abandon us. Really? Now they have a different headache- Israel.
5. And regarding "forced" – it also depends. Some of them just do not want to help and some of them are fed-up.
6. In America the elections are taking place soon. And in general they don't give a damn about anything else. So, we will not get a damn thing from them anymore.
7. The Russians are writing there about some new missiles that are one of the kind but it could be that it does not exist.
8. And what, should we just quietly and calmly crawl to the cemetery? For some reason, I do not see any other option.
9. All of this has to stop. And truly, the issue now is to survive, not to win. What kind of victory can you have?
10. And meanwhile [Foreign Official](#) is still herding people to slaughter. For what? If everything is clear as it is.

Posts (short reads)

Content:

Short posts for social media networks with a volume of about 1,000 characters with spaces, dedicated to topics relevant to the Ukrainian audience, which fit into the main subject areas of the project. The texts are formatted for distribution on social media networks Facebook and X (Twitter). Each text is professionally edited and accompanied by a video, prepared in advance, with subtitles.

Format (set of files):

- text in Russian;
- text in Ukrainian;
- video with subtitles

Frequency and volume: daily around 200 unit per month).

Example:

Link to the picture


Russian

Seriously – how does she dare to say that about people who are fighting for our country, even if they don't speak our language? Perhaps we should also shoot the volunteers from Poland and Colombia since they are not that fluent in our language?

Or, perhaps, she should go to the frontline and demonstrate her heroism? It is much easier to bark at people who are fighting far from frontline!

And in general – what is this mistreatment up to demands "to dispose"?! Is it possible in our country to destroy people only because they are speaking "the wrong language"? Perhaps we should build concentration camps for the "wrong people" right away? Like the Germans did 80 years ago?

Ukrainian

Seriously – how does she dare to say that about people who are fighting for our country, even if they don't speak our language? Perhaps we should also shoot the volunteers from Poland and Colombia since they are not that fluent in our language?

Or, perhaps, she should go to the frontline and demonstrate her heroism? It is much easier to bark at people who are fighting far from frontline!

And in general – what is this mistreatment up to demands "to dispose"?! Is it possible in our country to destroy people only because they are speaking "the wrong language"? Perhaps we should build concentration camps for the "wrong people" right away? Like the Germans did 80 years ago?

The meme factory

Content

Memes are humorous images, videos, audio recordings with high viral (viral) potential, ridiculing topics relevant to Ukrainians within the framework of the main subject areas of the project. The Meme Factory produces a stream of images for further distribution on the social networks - Facebook and X (Twitter).

Format: Images

Frequency and volume: daily (about 200 units per month).

Examples:



The video memes factory

Content

Memes are humorous images, videos, audio recordings with high viral (viral) potential, ridiculing topics relevant to Ukrainians within the framework of the main subject areas of the project. The Meme Factory produces a stream of vertical videos for further distribution on Facebook, Instagram and X (Twitter) social media networks.

Format: video recordings up to 30 seconds.

Frequency and volume: daily around 50 unit per month).

Screenshot from video memes:

**NETFLIX MADE A FILM
ABOUT Foreign Official 6 SPEECH
AT THE UNITED NATIONS**



Cartoons


Content

Cartoons are original illustrations with high viral (viral) potential, ridiculing topics relevant to Ukrainians, Ukrainian officials and leaders within the framework of the main subject areas of the project. Cartoons act as both accompanying images to articles and posts, and as independent units of content.

Format: images

Frequency and volume: daily around 200 unit per month).

Examples:



Video clips

Content

Videos of different formats (non-fiction) - imitation of news stories of the Ukrainian media, video collages of the losses of the Ukrainian army, accompanied by voice-over or subtitles, imitation of propaganda videos of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, etc.

Format: video clips

Frequency and volume: weekly (up to 8 pieces per month).

Screenshot from the video:



But Ukraine is not showing success on
the battlefield

Але Україна не демонструє успіхи на полі бою

Augmented reality



Content

Augmented reality (fakes) is multi-format content aimed at misinforming the audience and provoking emotional reactions. In most cases, it is a multifaceted product: it may include the delivery of images (screenshots of "documents", correspondence on social media networks, derogatory photos), texts, comments, videos, audio recordings and other content.

Format: depending on the nature of augmented reality. The most common formats are screenshots of documents and correspondence in instant messengers, dubbed videos with accompanying texts.

Frequency and volume: weekly (up to 4 pieces per month).

Examples:



5. Content Delivery Products

Commenting machine

Content delivery

Preparation and **mass distribution of text comments and memes** in discussions of the Ukrainian segment of social media networks Facebook and X (Twitter).



Working with comments involves not only infusion of the revised narratives of the project, supported by facts, but also working **with targeted psychological attacks based on information trends** and the emotional attitude of users to them. This requires work on the analysis of user behavior patterns (see page 8)

Format:

- 1) a constantly updated set of pages on social networks for writing comments;
- 2) the texts of the comments;
- 3) comments left under posts on social media networks Facebook and X (Twitter)

Frequency and volume: daily (around 100,000 comments per month)

Examples:



"Sleeper" regional groups in social media networks

Content Delivery

The most popular social media networks in Ukraine are Facebook and X (Twitter) and Telegram. The administrators of these social media networks (except Telegram) have a pro-Ukrainian position and subject communities promoting pro-Russian narratives to strict moderation rules. The promotion of the pro-Russian agenda in the Ukrainian segment of social media networks is also complicated by the aggravated rejection by the majority of the audience of any messages and statements in favor of the "aggressor country" during the conflict.

In this regard, the proposal is to create and **develop a network of communities positioning themselves as Ukrainian regional news groups** for a long term (at least 4 months).

In such a "dormant" state, communities gain an audience with the help of targeted advertising, seeding and organic reach. At the right moment, having "gained weight", **communities become a point of entry and a channel of information dissemination, favorable to the Russian side and they become channels for influencing the local audience in Ukraine.**

The most famous recent example of a community working on the basis of this technology is the **anti-Russian Morning Dagestan Telegram channel**, which provoked riots at the Makhachkala airport on October 29, 2023. The network of "sleeper" communities will also be in demand after the end of the Special Military Operation.

Product format:

- 1) communities in social media networks - Facebook, X (Twitter), Telegram channels.
- 2) daily news and entertainment publications;
- 3) targeted advertising of communities and advertising seeding in other groups.

Frequency and volume: daily work on filling and advertising communities. One community in each of the three social networks in all 20 regions of Ukraine - a total of 60 communities.

The target minimum indicator of the "live" audience of at least one community in each region in 4 months is 4,000 subscribers, the total audience is 100,000 subscribers with subsequent growth of 10-20% per month.

Project implementation period: starting from 4 months.

Vzglyad na Ukrainu [Look at Ukraine] Portal

Content delivery

The proposal is to create and promote an aggregator website of news and opinions of influencers about the Ukrainian socio-political situation. Most of the materials will contain pessimistic forecasts, criticism of the military-political leadership of Ukraine and a description of corruption, crime and deteriorating living standards.

90% of the portal's materials will be reprints of Ukrainian influencers and the media, broadcasting the narratives we need. Also, 1-2 original materials (long reads) will be drafted daily for the site. For each influencer, whose materials will be posted on the site, a separate subsection and its personal design are to be created, thus creating the impression for the audience that the publication was written by him/her specifically for the project.

Due to the constant mention of the names of influencers and links to their websites, blogs, TG channels, search engine indexing mechanisms will begin to issue links to the site on the subject of the spectrum of "problems of Ukraine" on the first pages in three months.

Product format:

- 1) website;
- 2) original materials- long reads;
- 3) targeted advertising and advertising seeding in social media networks.

Frequency and volume: placement on the portal of about 50 materials daily, of which 1-2 are original texts.

Project's Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in 6 months:

- more than 8,000 posted materials;
- daily audience of more than 30,000 readers;
- more than 25,000,000 views.

Project KPIs in 1 year:

- more than 20,000 posted materials;
- daily audience of more than 100,000 readers;
- more than 100,000,000 views.

Project implementation period: starting from 6 months.

Targeted advertising

Content delivery

Targeted advertising on the Facebook social network is aimed at delivery of messages, tailored to the target audience of the material.

The target audience of each material is selected individually and depends on which of the population groups this material can cause the greatest psychological damage. The target audience can be ranked by geography, demographics, hobbies and interests, etc.

Targeted advertising on the Facebook social media network allows to track user reactions to the disseminated material in real time, send a psychological response group to comments on the distributed materials, which, with the help of a network of bots, moderates top discussions, and adjusts further launches based on which audience group suffered the greatest damage.

Also, based on the analysis of advertising launches, it is possible to draft reaction maps by analyzing user comments, their ranking and topics that caused them the greatest emotional response. This makes it possible to draft flexible maps of reactions, the basis for which are general main subject areas and an ever-changing agenda within the framework of their semantic content.

Product format:

- 1) posts, images, infographics,
- 2) advertising releases of the Facebook social media network.

Frequency and volume: daily. 1,000,000 releases per month (ERR - 10%).

The Telegram channels network

Content delivery

To increase influence on the domestic political agenda of Ukraine, the creation of the network of Telegram channels is proposed, in conjunction with Twitter and Facebook/Instagram presence with the most localized content and ideology that are not affiliated with Russian performers and Russian-language content. The use of Telegram channels specifically as the engine of the project is due to the fact that over the past year, the Ukrainian Telegram audience has grown by 600%. At the same time, it should be remembered that the enemy segment of local popular channels did not start with political topics, but with entertainment, 5 years ago the share of political channels in Ukraine was negligible. And the similar leap forward can be replicated, but in our favor.

The proposal is to create a network of 20 thematic target channels and 10 auxiliary channels necessary to promote and maintain the pace of recruitment of the project's audience. This approach will allow to quickly develop the number of subscribers to noticeable volume due to cross-reposts and the creation of a versatile core of the audience. Also, this approach will allow to quickly adapt the project to the constantly changing agenda by adding new channels with relevant topics and quickly recruiting their audience by supporting the entire network.

In the preparation of loading the content of channels, especially initially (one or two months), it is necessary to completely get away from propaganda, both nationalist Ukrainian and pro-Russian, to forego clichés and to influence the opinion utilizing the sequence in which information is presented. To quickly engage in trends on Twitter, it will be necessary to quickly create posts with popular topics through hashtags, an individual narrative style and interaction with influencers.

Product format:

- 1) 20 thematic target and 10 auxiliary channels in Telegram;
- 2) duplicate communities on social media networks - X (Twitter) and Facebook;
- 3) from 2 to 4 publications in each channel daily;
- 4) targeted advertising and seeding.

Frequency and volume: daily up to 4 publications in each channel.

Project's KPI: The forecast of the total growth of the project's audience is 20,000 subscribers per month.

Comments - delivery to regions

Content delivery

Based on the analysis of commentary trends in the regional communities of Ukraine, the proposal is to organize the targeted distribution of the creative content of the Delivery to the Regions project in the comments to posts in regional communities and in blogs of regional influencers.

- For each region, a media map is created, consisting of 50 communities that reliably have an audience tied to a specific area: particular city public forums, personal pages of the regional leadership, forums of interest, such as sports, cars, hobbies, etc.
- For each creative content, a lead-in commentary is developed, which has characteristics specific to this particular region. This approach will increase the credibility of the creative content and increase the level of audience engagement.
- Creative content, along with a lead-in comment, are distributed in comments to posts in the community using a network of bot accounts.

Product format:

- 1) comments in the regional communities of Ukraine;
- 2) images, memes, and other creative content

Frequency and volume: 50,000 comments in 20 regions of Ukraine per month.

Project KPIs: coverage of 10,000,000 encounters per month, ERR — 4%.

EXHIBIT 6B

Центр С. Комплексное обеспечение информационно-политического воздействия

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Описание

Проект комплексного обеспечения информационно-политического воздействия на общественное мнение населения Украины в 2024 году включает в себя работу по четырем основным направлениям:

- мониторинг;
- аналитика;
- производство контента;
- доставка контента.

Цель:

- формирование на Украине общественного мнения, благоприятного для достижения целей и задач СВО, а также дальнейшего межгосударственного взаимодействия России и Украины.

Задачи:

- разносторонний и непрерывный мониторинг информационного поля Украины;
- аналитическое обеспечение работы проектных команд, работающих с украинской аудиторией;
- своевременное распознавание и купирование антироссийских нарративов, формируемых в украинском контуре, упреждение информационно-политических операций противника;
- разработка и реализация комплексных информационно-политических операций;
- обеспечение непрерывного производства актуального разноформатного контента;
- доставка контента до граждан Украины с использованием различных каналов коммуникации;
- контроль количественных и качественных показателей доставки контента, сбор и анализ реакции аудитории.

Генеральные тематические линии:

K1 – дискредитация военно-политического руководства;

K2 – раскол элит;

K3 – деморализация ВСУ;

K4 – дезорганизация населения.

1. Мониторинговые продукты

Telegram-канал “У – пульс”

Мониторинг

Закрытый канал в Telegram с потоком новостей по тематическим линиям проекта, работающий ежедневно в режиме реального времени. Канал аккумулирует новостную повестку из трех информационных контуров: украинского, международного (преимущественно – западного) и российского. Источниками новостей являются СМИ, социальные сети, высказывания ЛОМ. Канал позволяет отслеживать актуальную повестку из единого оперативного источника.

Формат:



Закрытый канал в Telegram с короткими сообщениями. Каждое сообщение содержит:

- краткое изложение сути новости;
- ссылку на первоисточник;
- хэштеги навигации.

Периодичность:

Ежедневно (до 40 сообщений в день)

Пример:



Мониторинг ЛОМ

Мониторинг

Мониторинг страниц в социальных сетях лидеров общественного мнения Украины нацелен на выявление сообщений, которые можно трактовать в выгодном для РФ свете в соответствии с тематическими линиями проекта. Выявленные сообщения можно тиражировать в информационном поле Украины, а также формировать на их основе новые нарративы, производить контент.

Продукт состоит из двух частей: ежедневные мониторинговые таблицы и еженедельная аналитическая справка.

Формат:

1. Аналитическая таблица, содержащая 6 столбцов:

- тематическая линия (К);
- автор и пост;
- текст сообщения;
- статистика (показатели охватов, просмотров и реакций);
- дата и время публикации;
- рекомендации по использованию публикации в работе проекта.

2. Еженедельная справка, содержащая статистику по сообщениям ЛОМ за неделю с разбивкой на тематические линии проекта и анализом охватов/реакций.

Периодичность:

- таблица — ежедневно (28-31 ед. в месяц);
- статистическая справка — еженедельно (4 ед. в месяц).

Пример:

№	Тематическая линия	Автор и пост	Текст	Статистика	Дата и время публикации	Рекомендации
1	Дискредитация Украины	██████████ – ведущая шоу на консервативном канале Daily Wire Аудитория: 4377542 https://twitter.com/██████████/status/1720767372248556884	Давайте перазмыслим, пока все не закончилось. Что Вам больше всего понравилось в пропагандистской машине Западной Украины? Я буду вечно скучать по "Триоруку Клена", но и то, что пресса сообщала нам, что у Путина рак и ему осталось жить всего несколько недель, тоже было сильно. Плюс ██████████, который повсюду носил фальшивую военную форму, умоляя посетить "Оскар" и "Грэмми", навсегда займет место в моем сердце. ██████████	•Охват: 643700 •Лайки: 4000 •Репосты (ретвиты): 819 •Комментарии: 559	04.11.2023 14:38	1. Акцентировать внимание аудитории на серии сообщений украинской пропаганды, оказавших ФейкДММ. 2. Использовать публикацию как аргумент в статьях о росте анти-украинских настроений в США.
2	Европа, США и НАТО победят войны	██████████ ютубер, бизнесмен. Аудитория: 2578316 https://twitter.com/██████████/hashtag/1720816453559716301	Миллиарды долларов и сотни тысяч бессмысленных украинские жизни. Впрочем, дети поджигателей войны в порядке, так что все в порядке. Пора обновить фильм, а затем сделать то, что они могли бы сделать еще до того, как Россия ввела хоть один военный контингент! Ура! —Отвратительно	•Охват: 422000 •Лайки: 3000 •Репосты (ретвиты): 444 •Комментарии: 266	04.11.2023 17:53	1. Использовать пост в комплексе с аналогичными постами ЛОМ в качестве аргументов в пользу того, что главные бенефициары войны — это США. 2. Продвигать тезис, что затягивание войны не приведет к победе Украины, а только увеличит количество жертв и обогатит военную промышленность США.

2. Мониторингово-аналитические продукты

Обзор информационного поля – дашборд “Глобус Украины”

Мониторинг

и

аналитика

Дашборд под рабочим названием “Глобус Украины” представляет собой документ в виде графически оформленной “приборной панели”, которая в удобной для визуального восприятия форме представляет картину информационного поля Украины за прошедшую неделю. Дашборд содержит количественные и качественные показатели, охватывая результаты мониторинга СМИ (в том числе иностранных и региональных), телеграм-каналов, социальных сетей. Из него можно узнать следующие данные:

- основные нарративы и сюжеты государственных СМИ Украины, степень и динамика их распространения;
- самые охватные и резонансные сюжеты, обсуждаемые в социальных сетях (в динамике);
- взаимопроникновение сюжетов в СМИ и социальных сетях, “цикл жизни” отдельных инфоповодов;
- проникновение западных инфоповодов в украинский информационный контур;
- проникновение российских инфоповодов в украинский информационный контур;
- распространение нарративов и сообщений проекта в украинском информационном поле;
- другие данные.

Формат:

1. Документ в виде графически оформленной “приборной панели”, которая в удобной для визуального восприятия форме представляет картину информационного поля Украины за прошедшую неделю. Наиболее удобный формат распечатки – А3.

2. Аналитический доклад с интерпретацией данных дашборда.

Периодичность: еженедельно.

Выявление трендов в социальных сетях Украины на основе анализа комментариев пользователей

Мониторинг

и

аналитика

Работа по мониторингу и анализу трендов в социальных сетях Украины разбита на три основных этапа:

- Выявление наиболее обсуждаемых сюжетов на основе мониторинга крупнейших Telegram-каналов с открытыми обсуждениями, украинских трендов в X (Twitter), комментариев по статьям в украинских СМИ.
- Анализ массива комментариев под публикациями, выявление основных трендов обсуждений, сочетания позитивных/негативных/нейтральных реакций.
- Интерпретация результатов мониторинга, анализ отражения настроений украинского общества в комментариях в социальных сетях, составление рекомендаций по использованию полученных данных в работе.

Формат:

1. Справка, содержащая выкладки мониторинга: наиболее обсуждаемые темы, основные тезисы комментарийных трендов, наиболее яркие комментарии.
2. Аналитическая записка с интерпретацией данных, содержащая разбор каждой темы, выявление ключевых нарративов и определение их потенциала для изготовления контента (комментариев, постов, статей и т.д.), общие выводы.

Периодичность: еженедельно (на основе анализа примерно 40 000 сообщений в неделю).

Пример:

США и ЕС не публично обсуждают с Украиной возможность переговоров с РФ и вероятность территориальных уступок. [redacted] предлагает срочно переходить к мирным переговорам с Россией, а [redacted] заявил, что Украину никто не сможет склонить к мирным переговорам.

Крайне деморализующий тренд. Пользователи обсуждают ситуацию с отчаянием. Многие не готовы смириться с поражением. Хотя с каждым днем растет число сторонников переговоров, так как люди устали от войны.

Самое интересное: тренд был сформирован пророссийскими блогерами и комментаторами с целью дискредитации [redacted]. Но в итоге ситуация вышла из-под контроля, и все обернулось резким негативом в адрес властей.

Основные тезисы:

- Мирные переговоры с РФ будут означать поражение Украины;
- [redacted] не должен стать президентом, иначе Украина потеряет территории;
- Запад устал, им нужно прекращение огня;
- Война заваль в тупик, поэтому лучше никак.

Вот наиболее типичные комментарии по поводу этого события:

- «Когда какая-то война имела какой-то разумный смысл...».
- «Нужно было Украине начать деликатные переговоры с РФ в деле отстранения


1) Скандальная экс-депутат, языковед [redacted] заявила, что не может назвать бойцов отдельного отряда специального назначения «Азов», героически участвовавшего в обороне Мариуполя в 2022 году, украинцами. «Я не могу назвать их украинцами, если они не говорят на украинском» – высказалась [redacted]

Тезисно:

- Нужно её отправить на фронт, чтобы больше таких заявлений не делала.
- Почему никто из властей не предпринимает никаких действий [redacted]
- Она нужна для того, чтобы отвлекать народ от насущных проблем.

Мнение соц. сетей сейчас:

- «В Украине (среди украинцев) на русском языке разговаривают или потомки «освободителей» или их жертвы (украинское население, которое подверглось русификации).
- В обоих случаях должны быть приняты меры, русский язык из уст украинцев неприемлем»



<https://t.me/VaOnline/63322?comment=3064192>

Мониторинг мировых СМИ

Мониторинг

и

аналитика

Мониторинг сообщений в мировых (в первую очередь – западных) СМИ направлен на выявление сообщений, которые можно трактовать в выгодном для РФ свете в соответствии с тематическими линиями проекта. Выявленные сообщения можно тиражировать в информационном поле Украины, а также формировать на их основе новые нарративы, производить контент.

Формат:

1. Аналитическая таблица, содержащая 6 столбцов:

- страна;
- направление (К);
- краткая суть новости;
- ссылка на источник;
- цитата из новости;
- рекомендации по использованию публикации в работе проекта.

Периодичность

и

объем:

Возможно исполнение в ежедневном (28-31 ед. в месяц) или еженедельном (4 ед. в месяц) формате.

Пример:

№	Страна	Направление	Публикации	Источники	Цитата	Рекомендации по освещению
1	США	КЗ – деморализация ВСУ	В украинских моргах закончились места для погибших.	WSJ https://www.wsj.com/europe/the-narrowing-work-of-burying-ukraines-war-dead-2024-08-29?mod=world_lead_pos5	"Украинские морги переполнены погибшими из-за нехватки каталог мешки с останками сортируют на полах". — пишет WSJ.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Продвигать тезис, что гражданские и военные власти Украины не были готовы к столь высоким потерям на фронте. Реальный уровень потерь скрывают. 2. Акцентировать внимание на том, что правительство идет на все, чтобы максимально сократить выплаты погибшим. 3. Отметить, что при нынешнем руководстве Украины не возможна не только военная победа, но и даже переговоры о перемирии и приостановке военных действий.
2	США	КЗ – деморализация ВСУ	Украина активно привлекает женщин в ряды вооруженных сил.	NYT https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/06/world/europe/ukraine-war-army-women.html	"В условиях затнувшихся боев Украина активно привлекает женщин в ряды вооруженных сил. По данным министерства обороны Украины, в украинской армии сейчас служат около 43 000 женщин, что примерно на 40 процентов больше, чем в 2021 году". — пишет NYT.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Продвигать тезис, что привлечение женщин и пожилых людей к службе в ВСУ – шаг отчаяния. Молодежь стремится избежать мобилизации, давая взятки и сбегая в страны ЕС, а потери только растут. 2. Акцентировать внимание на том, что вскоре воевать будет некому: отношение к ветеранам и инвалидам отвратительное, бойцы убивают своих командиров, которые относятся к ним, как к тушечному мясу.
3	Польша	К4 – дезорганизация населения	Россия накопила почти 900 ракет большой дальности.	RAP https://www.pap.pl/ru/ussian/news/ukrainskaya-voennaya-rakvyedka-rossiya-naikopila-pochti-900-raket https://www.pap.pl/ru/ussian/news/ukrainskaya-voennaya-rakvyedka-rossiya-naikopila-pochti-900-raket	"Пресс-секретарь Главного управления военной разведки Украины [REDACTED] заявил, что, по данным Института изучения войны, российские войска имеют в резерве 870 оперативно-тактических и стратегических высокоточных ракет. Пресс-секретарь также сообщил, что в октябре российские войска произвели 115 высокоточных ракет большой дальности". — пишет RAP.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Акцентировать внимание на том, что еще в декабре прошлого года руководители ГУР [REDACTED] говорили о том, что у России истощен арсенал боеприпасов для высокоточного оружия, но сейчас ГУР утверждает обратное. То есть власти обманывают украинцев, говоря о том, что силы России на исходе – война будет долгой, а зима – ужасной. 2. Продвигать тезис, что союзники кинули Украину, затягивая поставки снарядов и вооружения. Более того, сейчас США все средства направили на помощь Израилю, испед за ними от помощи может отказаться и Европа. Собственных ресурсов для того, чтобы долго воевать с Россией у Украины нет. [REDACTED] надо добиваться проведения мирных переговоров.

Комментарийная работа: выявление поведенческих моделей и расчет индекса чувствительности

Мониторинг

и

аналитика

Работа, выстроенная на основе мониторинга негативных комментарийных трендов в социальных сетях. На основе данного анализа выделяются **поведенческие модели**.

Поведенческая модель – это нестандартная реакция пользователей, которая позволяет выявить нарративы, которые имеют в украинском обществе наибольшую поддержку за измеряемый период времени и напрямую влияют на формирование общественного мнения.

Поведенческие модели ложатся в основу комментарийной работы, увеличивая ее гибкость и мобильность. Также подобная работа позволяет выявить уровень чувствительности к нарративу у прочих целевых групп и рассчитать **индекс чувствительности**.

Индекс чувствительности – это индекс, который демонстрирует отношение украинских пользователей к поддержке основных поведенческих трендов. Рассчитывается, как процент от числа комментариев украинских пользователей, которые отреагировали на тренд положительно.

Формат

продукта:

Аналитическая справка в формате дашборда, содержащая в себе расчет индекса чувствительности основных тем недели в разрезе тематических линий проекта. Сопровождается описанием методологии расчета.

Периодичность и объем: еженедельно (4 ед. в месяц).

Пример продукта:



Анализ западных Think tank

Мониторинг

и

аналитика

Доклад, составленный по итогам анализа материалов западных Think tank (аналитических центров) вокруг украинского конфликта. Анализ сопровождается рекомендациями по корректировке информационно-психологической работы и созданию контента на основе статей для распространения в украинском контуре.

Формат:

Многостраничный документ, который содержит:

- обзор выводов западных исследовательских центров, уделяющих внимание текущему конфликту;
- выявление сторон, заинтересованных в реализации предлагаемых этими центрами рекомендаций;
- оценку вероятностей воплощения тех или иных сценариев (“ансамблей рекомендаций”);
- оценку возможных последствий воплощения тех или иных сценариев;
- собственные рекомендации в отношении предлагаемых западными аналитическими центрами сценариев, в т.ч. рекомендации по созданию контента.

Периодичность и объем: 1 раз в 2 недели (2 ед. в месяц).

Разработка комплексных стратегических информационно-психологических операций

Мониторинг и аналитика

Разработка комплексной стратегической информационно-психологической операции, рассчитанной на длительный период времени. Включает в себя разработку целей и задач операции, определение методов и этапов достижения целей, аналитическую, прогностическую и политтехнологические части, заготовки контента для всех агентов информационно-психологического воздействия, включая официальные СМИ, ЛОМов, государственные и муниципальные учреждения.

ВАЖНО! Разработка и реализация информационно-психологической операции требует участия не только всех команд, задействованных в Центре С, но и активного межведомственного взаимодействия. Команда авторов данного документа, помимо непосредственного участия в разработке документа, готова осуществлять координацию взаимодействия всех участников процесса, мониторинг эффективности реализации операции и корректировку планов.

Особое внимание необходимо уделить обеспечению секретности работы.

Формат:

Многостраничный документ, заготовки нарративных линий, контента, инструкции.

Периодичность и объем: 1 раз в 3 месяца (варьируется в зависимости от изменяющейся военно-политической обстановки).

3. Аналитические продукты

Генеральный дашборд Центра С

Аналитика

Генеральный дашборд проекта представляет собой документ в виде графически оформленной "приборной панели", которая в удобной для визуального восприятия форме представляет данные об итогах работы всех проектных команд Центра С за прошедшую неделю. Подготовка документа требует сбора, систематизации и графической обработки большого массива разноплановых данных. Из дашборда можно узнать следующую информацию:

- объемы производства контента на неделю и данные по распространению;
- динамика изменения основных показателей социологических исследований;
- краткие показатели комментарийной работы;
- анализ степени распространения ключевых тем проекта (в т.ч. на региональном уровне)
- показатели производства и распространения контента в рамках основных тематических линий проекта;
- примеры наиболее популярных сообщений проекта за прошедшую неделю.

Формат

1. Документ в виде графически оформленной "приборной панели", которая в удобной для визуального восприятия форме представляет итоги работы за прошедшую неделю. Наиболее удобный формат распечатки – А3.

2. Аналитическая справка с интерпретацией данных дашборда.

Периодичность и объем: еженедельно (4 ед. в месяц).

Пример:

Ключевые темы (анализ)

Общегосударственные

1. Наиболее успешной с точки зрения распространения стала тема "Последние контртеррористические" 3,7 тыс. сообщений и 745 тыс. показов. Наиболее успешный нарратив "Контртеррор в тулеме Пристана" 1,2 тыс. сообщений и 289 тыс. показов.
2. Тема "Что выдают в провале контртеррористов" 1,7 тыс. сообщений и 480 тыс. показов. Наиболее успешный нарратив "Мобилизованным на фронт" 0,7 тыс. сообщений и 274 тыс. показов.
3. Тема "Мобилизационный ресурс исчерпан" 0,5 тыс. сообщений и 317 тыс. показов. Наиболее успешный нарратив "Мобилизованным на фронт" 0,3 тыс. сообщений и 159 тыс. показов.
4. Тема "Варшавяне в Украине заводятся" 0,4 тыс. сообщений и 201 тыс. показов. Наиболее успешный нарратив "Ужасно на войне" и "ВПК не смотрит на поставки" 0,2 тыс. сообщений и 98 тыс. показов.
5. Тема "Запад променял Украину на Израиль" 0,1 тыс. сообщений и 98 тыс. показов. Наиболее успешный нарратив "НАТО посылает военные контингенты на помощь Израилю" 0,08 тыс. сообщений и 28 тыс. показов.


Региональные

1. Тема "Куда прадут громы из Ардана" 0,7 тыс. сообщений и 472 тыс. показов.
2. Тема "Частички и волонтеры зарабатывают во время войны" 0,4 тыс. сообщений и 127 тыс. показов.
3. Тема "Зима близко" 0,1 тыс. сообщений и 58 тыс. показов.
4. Тема "Брошенные герои" 0,3 тыс. сообщений и 55 тыс. показов.

K1 Дискредитация ВПК

Контент	
Прогнозируемый	993
Исполнено	504
Распространение	
Наданный контент	63 258 287
Средняя ER, %	4,91%
Средняя CTR, %	3,08%
Комментарии	
Суммарно на всех платформах	4 741

TOT-материал




Пост в TikTok: Попа после либиди
 Контент: 1 105 000
 ER: 3,65%

K2 Раскочевание

Контент	
Прогнозируемый	504
Исполнено	504
Распространение	
Наданный контент	48 061 318
Средняя ER, %	4,02%
Средняя CTR, %	4,72%
Комментарии	
Суммарно на всех платформах	3 020

TOT-материал




Пост в TG: [redacted] призвал и
 Контент: 799 200
 ER: 167

K3 Демонстрация ВСУ

Контент	
Прогнозируемый	596
Исполнено	596
Распространение	
Наданный контент	57 516
Средняя ER, %	3,95%
Средняя CTR, %	4,92%
Комментарии	
Суммарно на всех платформах	9 370

TOT-материал




Пост в ФК: Разгук с мобилизации
 Контент: 445 405
 ER: 11,20% CTR: 11,28%

K4 Декорганализация

Контент	
Прогнозируемый	577
Исполнено	577
Распространение	
Наданный контент	30 390 471
Средняя ER, %	4,09%
Средняя CTR, %	5,59%
Комментарии	
Суммарно на всех платформах	3 270

TOT-материал



Специобработка: Несколько месяцев
 Контент: 6 068 167
 ER: 32 566

Дашборд по социологии

Аналитика


Аналитический документ, который в удобной для визуального восприятия форме представляет данные о динамике в результатах социологических исследований на территории Украины за прошедшую неделю. Подготовка документа требует сбора, систематизации и графической обработки большого массива разноплановых данных.

Формат:

Документ в виде графически оформленной “приборной панели”, которая в удобной для визуального восприятия форме представляет динамику изменений данных социологии по ключевым показателям проекта. Наиболее удобный формат распечатки **A3.**

Периодичность и объем: 1 раз в 2 недели (2 ед. в месяц).

Пример:



4. Контент

Статьи (лонгриды)

Контент


Статьи – авторские тексты объемом от 2000 до 5000 знаков с пробелами, посвященные актуальным для украинской аудитории темам, укладывающимся в тематические линии проекта. Каждый текст проходит профессиональную редактуру и сопровождается 10 комментариями и 3 тизерами для распространения текста в социальных сетях. Автор текста также подбирает изображение к тексту.

Формат (набор файлов):

- текст на русском языке;
- текст на украинском языке;
- 10 комментариев на русском языке;
- изображение.

Периодичность и объем: ежедневно (около 70 шт. в месяц).

Пример продукта:



Війна вдарила не по Росії

Міжнародні відносини

Бойськи дії та економічні санкції вдарили в першу чергу по західних країнах, росіяни ж тільки нарощують свій потенціал.

Тисячі санкцій, введених союзниками проти Кремля, нааяного результату не принесли. Це думка все частіше прозирає між рядів не тільки публікацій в західній пресі, а й висловлювань політиків. Крім того, санкції відчутно вдарили і по самим нашим союзникам, що особливо помітно зараз, коли вони відверто заявляють, що просто не зможуть підтримувати Україну в необхідних обсягах. У них банально не вистачає для цього можливостей: ні фінансових, ні військових.

Тим часом Росія, навапи, тільки нарощує свій потенціал. Представник ГУР [REDACTED] в статті, опублікованій РБК-Україна, повідомив, що тільки в жовтні Росія змогла виробити близько 115 високоточних ракет з дальністю польоту понад 350 км. Це означає, що в даний час для війни на Україні у ворога є в цілому 870 високоточних ракет. Їх виробництво триває.

За словами [REDACTED] серед нових високоточних ракет – близько 20 "калібрів" і близько 40 ракет Х-101. Крім того, Росія щомісяця виробляє близько 30 нових балістичних ракет "Іскандер-М" і 12 крилатих ракет "Іскандер-К".

Страна:	Україна	Тип контенту:
Дата:	10.11.2023	Коментарії + тизери
		Напрямок: К-3
		Декоративність: ВСУ

Коментарі:

1. Зиму-то переживемо, чи як? Морози на носі, а в ЖКГ і квін не валявся, все розкрадено.
2. Треба припинити війну, за всяку ціну. І зайнятися виживанням. Що теж дуже непросто.
3. Євросоюз і НАТО зараз взагалі на межі розвалу. Як вже тут на них сподіватися?
4. Найголовніше – це США. Вірили, що вони нас не кинуть. Еге ж. У них зараз інший головний біль – Ізраїль.
5. Ну щодо "змушени" – це теж як сказати. Деякі просто не хочуть допомагати, а деяким набридло.
6. В Америці вибори на носі. І їм загалом на все інше наплювати. Так що ніхрена ми від них більше не отримаємо.
7. Там ще росіяни про якісь нові ракети пишуть, аналогів котрим немає. Так може бути й правда немає.
8. Ну що, тихо та спокійно повзаємо на цвинтарі? Яюсь не проглядається іншого варіанту.
9. Треба все це припинити. І правда, питання зараз – вижити, а не перемогти. Яка вже тут перемога?
10. А тим часом [REDACTED] все ще жене народ на забій. Навіщо? Яюсь і так все цілком зрозуміло.

Посты (шортриды)

Контент

Короткие посты для социальных сетей объемом около 1000 знаков с пробелами, посвященные актуальным для украинской аудитории темам, укладывающимся в тематические линии проекта. Тексты адаптированы для распространения в социальных сетях Facebook и X (Twitter). Каждый текст проходит профессиональную редактуру и сопровождается предварительно подготовленным видео с субтитрами.

Формат (набор файлов):

- текст на русском языке;
- текст на украинском языке;
- видео с субтитрами.

Периодичность и объем: ежедневно (около 200 шт. в месяц).

Пример:

Ссылка на иллюстрацию:



Рус.

А в самом деле – как она посмела так отзываться о людях, которые воюют за нашу страну, даже если и говорят не на нашем языке? Может, тогда и добровольцев из Польши или Колумбии тоже расстрелять – они ж не сильны в нашей мове?

Или, может, ей самой отправиться на фронт и продемонстрировать свой героизм? А то из глубокого тыла хорошо тявкать на тех, кто воюет!

Да и вообще – что за притеснения вплоть до требований «утилизировать»? Неужели в нашей стране можно уничтожать людей только за то, что они говорят на «неправильном» языке? Может, и концлагеря для неправильных сразу построить? Как немцы 80 лет назад?

Укр.

А справді - як вона посміла так відгукуватися про людей, які воюють за нашу країну, навіть якщо й не говорять нашою мовою? Може, тоді й добровольців із Польщі чи Колумбії теж розстріляти – вони ж не сильні у нашій мові?

Чи, може, їй самій вирушити на фронт і продемонструвати свій героїзм? А то з глибокого тилу добре гавкати на тих, хто воює!

Та й взагалі – що за утиски до вимог «утилізувати»? Неуже в нашій країні можна знищувати людей лише за те, що вони говорять «неправильною» мовою? Може, й концтабори для неправильних одразу збудувати? Як німці 80 років тому?

Фабрика мемов

Контент

Мемы – юмористические изображения, видео, аудиозаписи с высоким виральным (вирусным) потенциалом, высмеивающие актуальные для украинцев темы в рамках тематических линий проекта. Фабрика мемов производит поток изображений для дальнейшего распространения в социальных сетях Facebook и X (Twitter).

Формат: изображения

Периодичность и объем: ежедневно (около 200 шт. в месяц).

Примеры:



Фабрика видеомемов

Контент

Мемы – юмористические изображения, видео, аудиозаписи с высоким виральным (вирусным) потенциалом, высмеивающие актуальные для украинцев темы в рамках тематических линий проекта. Фабрика мемов производит поток вертикальных видео для дальнейшего распространения в социальных сетях Facebook, Instagram и X (Twitter).

Формат: видеозаписи до 30 сек.

Периодичность и объем: ежедневно (около 50 шт. в месяц).

Скриншот из видеомема:



Карикатуры

Контент

Карикатуры – авторские иллюстрации с высоким виральным (вирусным) потенциалом, высмеивающие актуальные для украинцев темы, украинских должностных лиц и лидеров в рамках тематических линий проекта. Карикатуры выступают и как сопроводительные изображения к статьям и поста, и как самостоятельные единицы контента.

Формат: изображения.

Периодичность и объем: ежедневно (около 200 шт. в месяц).

Примеры:



Видеоролики


Контент

Видеоролики разных форматов (неигровые) – имитация новостных сюжетов украинских СМИ, видео-коллажи потерь украинской армии, сопровождаемые закадровым голосом или субтитрами, имитация агитационных роликов ВСУ и т.д.

Формат: видеоролики.

Периодичность и объем: еженедельно (до 8 шт. в месяц).

Скриншот из **видео:**



Дополненная реальность



Контент

Дополненная реальность (фейки) – разноформатный контент, направленный на дезинформацию аудитории и провоцирование эмоциональных реакций. В большинстве случаев представляет собой комплексный продукт: он может включать в себя доставку изображений (скриншоты “документов”, переписок в социальных сетях, компрометирующие фотографии), текстов, комментариев, видеозаписей, аудиозаписей и другого контента.

Формат: в зависимости от характера дополненной реальности. Самые распространенные форматы – скриншоты документов и переписок в мессенджерах, переозвученные видеоролики с сопроводительными текстами.

Периодичность и объем: еженедельно (до 4 шт. в месяц).

Примеры:



5. Продукты доставки контента

Комментарийная машина

Доставка контента

Подготовка и **массовое распространение текстовых комментариев и мемов** в обсуждениях украинского сегмента социальных сетей Facebook и X (Twitter).



Работа с комментариями предполагает не только вброс переработанных нарративов проекта, подкрепленных фактами, но и **работу с точечными психологическими атаками на основе информационных трендов** и эмоционального отношения пользователей к ним. Для этого необходима работа по анализу поведенческих моделей пользователей (см. стр. 8).

Формат:

- 1) постоянно обновляемый набор страниц в социальных сетях для написания комментариев;
- 2) тексты комментариев;
- 3) комментарии, оставляемые под постами в социальных сетях Facebook и X (Twitter).

Периодичность и объем: ежедневно, около 100 000 комментариев в месяц.

Примеры:



“Спящие” региональные группы в социальных сетях

Доставка

контента

Наиболее популярные социальные сети на Украине – Facebook и X (Twitter) и Telegram. Администрации данных соцсетей (кроме Telegram) занимают проукраинскую позицию и подвергают жесткой модерации сообщества, продвигающие пророссийские нарративы. Продвижение пророссийской повестки в украинском сегменте соцсетей осложняется также обостренным за время конфликта неприятием большинством аудитории любых сообщений и высказываний в пользу “страны-агрессора”.

В связи с этим предлагается создать и в течение длительного времени (не менее 4 месяцев) **развивать сеть сообществ, позиционирующих себя как украинские региональные новостные группы.**

В таком “спящем” состоянии сообщества набирают аудиторию с помощью таргетированной рекламы, посевов и органических охватов. В нужный момент, “набрав вес”, **сообщества становятся точкой вброса и каналом распространения выгодных российской стороне информационных поводов и каналами воздействия на локальную аудиторию на Украине.**

Самым известным недавним примером сообщества, работающего на основе данной технологии, является **антироссийский канал в Telegram “Утро Дагестан”**, спровоцировавший беспорядки в аэропорту Махачкалы 29 октября 2023 года. Сеть “спящих” сообществ будет также **востребована после окончания СВО.**

Формат

продукта:

- 1) сообщества в социальных сетях Facebook, X (Twitter), каналы в телеграм.
- 2) ежедневные новостные и развлекательные публикации;
- 3) таргетированная реклама сообществ и рекламные посева в других группах.

Периодичность и объем: ежедневная работа по наполнению и рекламе сообществ. По одному сообществу в каждой из трёх социальных сетей во всех 20 регионах Украины – всего 60 сообществ.

Целевой минимальный показатель “живой” аудитории как минимум одного сообщества в каждом регионе через 4 месяца – 4000 подписчиков, общая аудитория – 100 000 подписчиков с последующим ростом на 10-20% в месяц.

Срок реализации проекта: от 4 месяцев.

Портал “Взгляд на Украину”

Доставка

контента

Предлагается создать и продвигать сайт-агрегатор новостей и мнений ЛОМ об украинской общественно-политической ситуации. Большая часть материалов будет содержать пессимистичные прогнозы, критику военно-политического руководства Украины и описание коррупции, преступлений и ухудшения уровня жизни.

90% материалов портала будут составлять перепечатки украинских ЛОМ и СМИ, транслирующие нужные нам нарративы. Также для сайта ежедневно будет подготавливаться 1-2 авторских материала (лонгрида). Под каждого ЛОМ, чьи материалы будут размещаться на сайте, делается отдельный подраздел и его личное оформление, это создаст у аудитории впечатление, что публикация написана им специально для проекта.

За счёт постоянного упоминания имён ЛОМ и ссылок на их сайты, блоги, ТГ-каналы, механизмы индексации поисковых систем уже через три месяца начнут выдавать ссылки на сайт по тематике спектра "проблемы Украины" на первых страницах.

Формат

- | | | |
|----|---|---------------------|
| 1) | | продукта: |
| 2) | авторские | интернет-сайт; |
| 3) | таргетированная реклама и рекламные посеы | материалы-лонгриды; |
| | | в социальных сетях. |

Периодичность и объем: размещение на портале около 50 материалов ежедневно, из которых 1-2 являются авторскими текстами.

КПЭ проекта через 6 месяцев:

- более 8 000 размещенных материалов;
- ежедневная аудитория более 30 000 читателей;
- более 25 000 000 просмотров.

КПЭ проекта через 1 год:

- более 20 000 размещенных материалов;
- ежедневная аудитория более 100 000 читателей;
- более 100 000 000 просмотров.

Срок реализации проекта: от 6 месяцев.

Таргетированная реклама

Доставка

контента

Таргетированная реклама в социальной сети Facebook направлена на точечную доставку сообщений к целевой аудитории материала.

Целевая аудитория каждого материала подбирается индивидуально и зависит от того, какой из групп населения данный материал может нанести наибольший психологический урон. Целевая аудитория может ранжироваться по географии, демографическим признакам, хобби и интересам и т.д.

Таргетированная реклама в социальной сети Facebook позволяет отслеживать реакции пользователей на распространяемый материал в режиме реального времени, направлять в комментарии к распространяемым материалам группу психологического реагирования, которая, с помощью сети ботов, модерирует топовые дискуссии, корректировать дальнейшие запуски исходя из того, какой группе аудитории был нанесен наибольший урон.

Также на основе анализа запусков рекламы возможно составлять карты реакций посредством анализа комментариев пользователей, их ранжированию и тем, которые вызвали у них наибольший эмоциональный отклик. Это дает возможность составлять гибкие карты реакций, базой для которых являются генеральные тематические линии и постоянно меняющаяся повестка в рамках их смыслового наполнения.

Формат

1) посты, изображения, инфографика,
2) показы в рекламе социальной сети Facebook.

продукта:

Периодичность и объем: ежедневно. 1 000 000 показов в месяц (ERR - 10%).

Сеть Telegram-каналов

Доставка

контента

Для повышения влияния на внутреннюю политическую повестку Украины предлагается создать сеть Telegram-каналов в совокупности с Twitter и Facebook/Instagram представительствами с максимально локализованным контентом и идеологией, не аффилированными с российскими исполнителями и русскоязычным контентом. Использование именно Telegram-каналов как локомотива проекта обусловлено тем, что за последний год украинская аудитория Telegram выросла на 600%. При этом следует помнить, что вражеский сегмент местных популярных каналов начинал не с политических тем, а с развлекательных, 5 лет назад доля политических каналов на Украине была ничтожна. И это рывок возможно повторить, только в нашу сторону.

Предлагается создать сеть из 20 тематических целевых каналов и 10 вспомогательных каналов, необходимых для раскрутки и поддержания темпов набора аудитории проекта. Такой подход позволит достаточно быстро развить число подписчиков до заметных значений за счет перекрестных репостов и формирования разностороннего ядра аудитории. Также этот подход позволит оперативно адаптировать проект под постоянно изменяющуюся повестку за счет добавления новых каналов с актуальной тематикой и быстрого набора их аудитории за счет поддержки всей сети.

В подготовке наполнения контента каналов, особенно на первых порах (один-два месяца), необходимо полностью уйти от пропаганды, как национал-украинской, так и пророссийской, отказаться от штампов, а влиять на мнение порядком подачи информации. Для оперативного занятия трендов в твиттере, будет необходимо оперативно создавать посты под популярные темы за счет хештегов, индивидуального стиля повествования и взаимодействия с ЛОМами.

Формат

продукта:

- 1) 20 тематических целевых и 10 вспомогательных каналов в Telegram;
- 2) дублирующие сообщества в социальных сетях X (Twitter) и Facebook;
- 3) от 2 до 4 публикаций в каждом канале ежедневно;
- 4) таргетированная реклама и посеы.

Периодичность и объем: ежедневно до 4 публикаций в каждом канале.

КПЭ проекта: Прогноз совокупного прироста аудитории проекта – 20 000 подписчиков ежемесячно.

Комментарии – доставка в регионы

Доставка

контента

На основе анализа комментарийных трендов в региональных сообществах Украины предлагается организовать целевое распространение креативов проекта “Доставка в регионы” в комментариях к постам в региональных сообществах и в блогах у региональных ЛОМ.

- Для каждой области собирается медиакарта, состоящая из 50 сообществ, достоверно имеющих аудиторию, привязанную к конкретной области: городские паблики, личные страницы руководства региона, форумы по интересам: спорт, авто, хобби и т.п.
- Для каждого креатива прорабатывается комментарий-подводка, имеющий специфику, характерную именно для этого региона. Такой подход увеличит доверие к креативу и повысит уровень вовлеченности аудитории.
- Креативы вместе с комментарием-подводкой распространяются в комментариях к записям в сообществе с использованием сети бот-аккаунтов.

Формат продукта:

- 1) комментарии в региональных сообществах Украины;
- 2) изображения, мемы и другие креативы.

Периодичность и объем: 50 000 комментариев в 20 регионах Украины в месяц.

КПЭ проекта: охват 10 000 000 касаний в месяц, ERR — 4%.

EXHIBIT 7A

International Conflict Incitement

Project

Brief Description

The fighting in Ukraine and the "war of sanctions" led to a crisis in the economies of many Western countries, the main blow fell on residents of the European countries, such as Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain.

Decreasing standards of living, new waves of refugees, rising energy prices and other destabilizing factors have exacerbated dozens of "protracted" internal conflicts in the West, and created new problems.

Among them are intensification of inter-ethnic and religious tensions, the intensification of socio-economic protest, internal political struggle, deepening of contradictions between allies in economic and military-political alliances (for example, the confrontation of the ██████████ government led by Foreign Official 4 and the European bureaucracy, the confrontation between the NATO members, Poland and Germany, on reparations, etc.).

The objective of the "International Conflict Incitement" project is to escalate internal tensions in the countries allied with the United States in order to promote the interests of the Russian Federation on the international arena.

To influence real-life conflicts and artificially create conflict situations, it is proposed to use a wide range of information tools to influence public opinion.

Geography of the Project

–Germany;

–France.

Algorithm for Working with Real Conflicts

1. Monitor media and social media daily to identify conflict situations.
2. Identify hotbeds of conflict and track how the conflict situation unfolds in a structured way.
3. Operational analysis of the conflict situation:
 - identify a conflict-generating factor, parties to the conflict, influencers, positions and requirements of the parties;
 - identify the type of conflict (social, economic, political, ethnic, religious, mixed type, etc.);
 - identify the scale of the conflict and the stage of escalation (local level, regional level, national level, international level);
4. Forecasting how the conflict situation will develop in the future. Assessment of the potential for using the conflict to implement Russia's foreign policy objectives. Strategy selection for further work.
5. If necessary, an artificial shift in the rhetoric of the conflict is made in order to further introduce/embed narratives that are beneficial to Russia (if the cause and rhetoric of the conflict initially does not fit into any of the necessary narrative lines.)
6. Escalation of the conflict situation through the use of available tools (traffic redirection, work with comments, work with influencers, analytical articles, augmented reality, media mirror outlets, fakes, etc.) in order to destabilize the societal situation.
7. Promotion of narrative lines beneficial to Russia, information support for the side of the conflict whose position is more consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation.

Algorithm for artificial generation of conflicts

1. Monitoring and analysis of the media, social networks, the results of sociological research to identify "pain points" and hotbeds of increased social and political tension.
2. Development of a conflict situation "scenario", narrative lines, a strategy of misinformation and further "instigation" of the conflict using available means and neutralization of counter-propaganda.
3. Preparation of content (videos, posts, comments, articles-revelations of "augmenting reality", analytical materials, etc.).
4. Introduction of conflict themed content through predetermined channels (targeted or mass).
5. Further stirring up the conflict and spreading additional false narratives.
6. Undermining counter-propaganda.
7. Analysis of the conflict development results for further use:
 - the degree of information dissemination, the viral effect;
 - dissemination channels effectiveness;
 - number of views/engagement;
 - audience's reaction on social media;
 - reaction of influencers, authorities, and the media;
 - counter-propaganda methods and their effectiveness;
 - lifetime of an artificially generated conflict from the moment it is posted to the time it's completely out of the agenda.

Tools

1. Creative means:

- 1) fake videos, documents, and telephone conversations recordings;
- 2) comments on social media;
- 3) news and pseudo-news;
- 4) analytical materials;
- 5) memes, caricatures, gifs;
- 6) “augmented reality” materials;
- 7) fake and real quotes from influencers;
- 8) songs, cartoons, and animation;
- 9) creating chats/groups to accumulate the number of participants in the conflict, etc.

2. Delivery channels:

- 1) media mirrors outlets;
- 2) foreign and Russian influencers;
- 3) bots and work with comments;
- 4) groups on social media, Telegram channels;
- 5) YouTube and other video hosting sites, etc.

Examples of narrative lines

Thematic Direction 01: Our country must pursue its own national interests and make decisions regardless of the influence of the United States / NATO / European Union / Anglo-Saxons.

Thematic Direction 2: The root of the conflict lies in the influence of the United States / NATO / European Union / Anglo-Saxons. It is these forces that benefit from destabilization in our society to strengthen their control.

Thematic Direction 3: The government of our country should focus on solving internal problems and not to direct resources to support the war in Ukraine.

Thematic Direction 4: In Russia, this conflict would be impossible, because there is a healthy society in which the interests of the family and traditional values are protected (a narrative line for conflicts is based on promoting the LGBTQ+ agenda.)

Thematic Direction 5: We are eaten out of our house and home and our last resources are taken away from us. The Ukrainians (refugees) feast on food, our people are almost starving. The diaspora dispute over resources comes at the expense of the country's indigenous people.

Scenario examples

	Germany	France
Inter-ethnic conflicts	Ukrainian refugees are constantly expressing dissatisfaction with the hosting arrangements in the country and demanding more. Humiliating texts (real and fake) written on behalf of Ukrainian refugees are being circulated on the internet. The Germans enter into heated discussions with the Ukrainians in the comments, actively recalling each other's past.	Multilateral conflict between Ukrainian refugees and Armenian diaspora in France. The conflict is provoked by fake "interviews" and "leaks" of audio messages from private chats of Ukrainian refugees in France, who rudely accuse the Armenians of supporting Russia. Armenian-language outlets react, the confrontation is supported by "stirring up" the discussion by bots in the comments.
Religious conflicts	A group of refugees from Ukraine, neo-Nazis wearing balaclavas holding knives and machine guns, recorded a message to the Germans. It accuses them of their weakness and says that it will help clear the Aryan land of the Muslims and other garbage. The video is distributed on the German-language segment of Twitter and Facebook.	The French government has come under attack from a number of Muslim religious activists. They speak on behalf of immigrants from Algeria and other African countries. Accusations: Foreign Official 5 rudely refused to apologize to Algeria for colonial policy. Instead of atonement for the sins of the past and showing support for diasporas, the French are sending funds to support the war in Ukraine and accept refugees. In response, "the Ukrainians"-bots massively insult Muslims.
Internal political conflicts	After the staging of the "coup d'état", the German government essentially switched to a quiet repression of the AfD. Using all tools, we support the party by creating the image of martyrs suffering for democracy and Germany's national interests.	Almost 70% of French residents who were surveyed oppose raising the retirement age initiated by Foreign Official 5 . We identify all criticizing publications related to the reform and provide them with additional traffic. Also, a number of analytical posts on mirror media outlets link raising the retirement age with the crisis caused by anti-Russian sanctions.
International conflicts	Poland continues to demand reparations from Germany for World War II. Using all the tools, we promote the theory that the Poles are acting on the direct orders of the United States in order to once again humiliate Germany and tie her hands on the international arena.	An article comes out in the Armenian-language press accusing France of helping Ukraine instead of helping Armenia that suffers. The article gets into the French-speaking segment, we provoke and stir up the public discussion in every possible way.

Economic/ socio-economic conflicts	There are clashes between eco-activists, who blocked access to the village of Lutzerath amid protests against coal mining, and the police. We promote the narrative in the media mirror outlets' comments and articles sections that a return to coal mining is the result of refusing to buy Russian gas.	In the north of France, doctors go on a strike. They demand higher salaries and hiring more staff. We create a closed channel for doctors who are fighting for their rights and carefully promote the narrative that the crisis in medical field is caused by anti-Russian sanctions. Similar groups can be created for different regions of the country.
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EXHIBIT 7B

Международная конфликтология

Проект

Краткое описание

Боевые действия на Украине и “война санкций” привели к кризису в экономике многих странах Запада, основной удар пришелся на жителей европейских стран – Германии, Франции, Италии, Великобритании.

Падение уровня жизни, новые волны беженцев, рост цен на энергоносители и другие дестабилизирующие факторы обострили десятки “застарелых” внутренних конфликтов Запада, а также создали новые проблемы.

Среди них: усиление межэтнической и религиозной напряженности, усиление социально-экономического протеста, внутривластной борьбы, углубление противоречий между союзниками по экономическим и военно-политическим блокам ([REDACTED] и евробюрократией, противостояние членов НАТО Польши и Германии по вопросам репараций и др.).

Задача проекта “Международная конфликтология” – эскалация внутренней напряженности на территории стран-союзников США в целях продвижения интересов Российской Федерации на международной арене.

Для воздействия на реально существующие конфликты и искусственного формирования конфликтных ситуаций предлагается использовать широкий спектр информационных инструментов воздействия на общественное мнение.

География проекта

– Германия;

–Франция.



Алгоритм работы с реальными конфликтами

1. Ежедневный мониторинг СМИ и социальных сетей, направленный на выявление конфликтных ситуаций.
2. Выявление очагов конфликтов с дальнейшим систематизированным отслеживанием динамики развития конфликтной ситуации.
3. Оперативный анализ конфликтной ситуации:
 - выявления конфликтогенного фактора, сторон конфликта, лидеров мнений, позиций и требований сторон;
 - определение вида конфликта (социальный, экономический, политический, этнический, религиозный, смешанный и т.д.);
 - определение масштаба конфликта и стадии эскалации (локальный уровень, региональный уровень, общенациональный уровень, международный уровень);
4. Прогнозирование дальнейшего хода развития конфликтной ситуации. Определение потенциала использования конфликта для реализации внешнеполитических задач России. Избрание стратегии дальнейшей работы.
5. В случае необходимости производится искусственное смещение риторики конфликта с целью дальнейшего внедрения нарративов, выгодных России (если причина и риторика конфликта изначально не укладывается ни в одну из необходимых нарративных линий).
6. Эскалация конфликтной ситуации через применение доступного инструментария (перенаправление трафика, работа с комментариями, работа с ЛОМами, аналитические статьи, дополненная реальность, СМИ-зеркала, фейки и т.д.) в целях дестабилизации общественной обстановки.
7. Продвижение выгодных для России нарративных линий, информационная поддержка той стороны конфликта, чья позиция более соответствует интересам РФ.



Алгоритм искусственной генерации конфликтов

1. Мониторинг и анализ СМИ, социальных сетей, результатов социологических исследований на предмет определения “болевых точек” и очагов повышенной социальной и политической напряженности.
2. Разработка “сценария” конфликтной ситуации, нарративных линий, стратегии “вброса” и дальнейшего “разжигания” конфликта доступными средствами, нейтрализации контрпропаганды.
3. Подготовка контента (видеороликов, постов, комментариев, статей-разоблачений «дополняющих реальность», аналитических материалов и т.д.).
4. Внедрение конфликтогенного материала через заранее определенные каналы (точечное или массированное).
5. Дальнейшее “подогревание” конфликта и вбросов дополнительных материалов.
6. Противодействие контрпропаганде.
7. анализ результатов развития конфликта для дальнейшего использования:
 - степень распространения информации, вирусный эффект;
 - эффективность каналов распространения;
 - количество просмотров/вовлеченность;
 - реакция аудитории социальных сетей;
 - реакция ЛОМов, официальных властей, СМИ;
 - методы контрпропаганды и их эффективность;
 - время “жизни” искусственно сгенерированного конфликта от момента “вброса” и до окончательного ухода из повестки.



Инструменты

1. Креативы:

- 1) фейковые видео, документы, записи телефонных разговоров;
- 2) комментарии в соцсетях;
- 3) новости и псевдоновостные материалы;
- 4) аналитические материалы;
- 5) мемы, карикатуры, gif;
- 6) материалы “дополненной реальности”;
- 7) фейковые и реальные цитаты ЛОМов;
- 8) песни, мультфильмы, анимация;
- 9) создание чатов/групп для аккумуляции участников конфликта и т.д.

2. Каналы доставки:

- 1) СМИ-зеркала;
- 2) иностранные и Российские ЛОМы;
- 3) боты и работа с комментариями;
- 4) группы в социальных сетях, телеграм-каналы;
- 5) YouTube и другие видеохостинги и т.д.

Примеры нарративных линий

ТЛ-1. Наша страна должна преследовать собственные национальные интересы и принимать решения независимо от влияния США/НАТО/Евросоюза/Англосаксов.

ТЛ-2. Корень конфликта кроется во влиянии США/НАТО/Евросоюза/Англосаксов – именно этим силам выгодна дестабилизация в нашем обществе для усиления контроля.

ТЛ-3. Правительство нашей страны должно сосредоточиться на решении внутренних проблем, а не направлять ресурсы на поддержку войны на Украине.

ТЛ-4. В России данный конфликт был бы невозможен, потому что там здоровое общество, в котором защищены интересы семьи и традиционные ценности (нарративная линия для конфликтов на почве продвижения повестки ЛГБТК+).



ТЛ-5. Нас объедают, забирают последние ресурсы. Украинцы (беженцы) жируют, наши люди уже почти голодают. Спор диаспор за ресурсы идет за счет коренных жителей страны.

Примеры сценариев

	Германия	Франция
Межэтнические конфликты	Украинские беженцы постоянно высказывают недовольство условиями размещения в стране и требуют большего. В интернете распространяются унижительные тексты (реальные и фейковые), написанные от лица Украинских беженцев. Немцы вступают в комментариях в баталии с украинцами, активно припоминая другу другу прошлое.	Многосторонний конфликт между украинскими беженцами и армянской диаспорой во Франции. Конфликт провоцируют фейковые "интервью" и "сливы" аудиосообщений из закрытых чатов Украинских беженцев во Франции, которые в грубой обвиняют Армян в поддержке России. Армяноязычные ресурсы реагируют, противостояние поддерживается "подогреванием" дискуссии ботами в комментариях
Религиозные конфликты	Группы беженцев с украины–неонацистов в балаклавах, с ножами и автоматами записала обращение к немцам, обвиняет их в слабости и говорит, что поможет очистить арийскую землю от мусульман и прочего мусора. Видео расходится по немецкоязычному сегменту Твиттера и Фейсбука.	Французское правительство подвергается нападкам от ряда мусульманских религиозных активистов. Они говорят от имени переселенцев из Алжира и других стран Африки. Обвинения – ██████████ грубо отказался извиняться перед Алжиром за колониальную политику. Вместо испулений грехов прошлого и поддержки диаспор, Французы направляют средства на поддержку войны на Украине и прием беженцев. В ответ боты-"украинцы" массово оскорбляют мусульман.
Внутриполитические конфликты	После инсценировки "государственного переворота" правительство Германии по сути перешло к тихим репрессиям против AfD. С помощью всех инструментов мы поддерживаем партию, формируя образ мучеников, страдающих за демократию и национальные интересы Германии.	Почти 70% опрошенных жителей Франции выступает против повышения пенсионного возраста, инициированного ██████████. Мы выявляем все критические публикации, связанные с реформой и обеспечиваем им дополнительный трафик. Помимо этого, ряд аналитических материалов на СМИ-зеркалах связывает повышение пенсионного возраста с кризисом, вызванным антироссийскими санкциями.
Международные конфликты	Польша продолжает требовать от Германии репарации за Вторую мировую войну. Используя все инструменты, мы продвигаем теорию о том, что Поляки действую по прямому указанию США, чтобы еще раз унижить Германию и сковать ей руки на международной арене.	В армяноязычной прессе появляется статья, обвиняющая Францию в том, что вместе помощи страдающей Армении она помогает Украине. Статья попадает во франкоязычный сегмент, мы провоцируем и всячески подогреваем общественную дискуссию.



Экономические/ социально- экономические конфликты	Между эоактивистами, которые заблокировали доступ к деревне Лютцерат на фоне протестов против добычи угля, и полицией идут столкновения. Мы продвигаем в комментариях и статьях в СМИ-зеркалах нарратив о том, что возврат к добыче угля - результат отказа от Российского газа.	На севере Франции происходит забастовка Медиков, они требуют повысить зарплаты и увеличить штат. Мы создаем закрытый канал для медиков, которые борются за свои права и аккуратно продвигаем там нарратив о том, что кризис в медицине вызван антироссийскими санкциями. Подобные группы возможно создать в для разных регионов страны.
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EXHIBIT 8A

The *Good Old USA* (“Good Old USA”) Project

1. Introduction

The current international environment is known for, first and foremost, severe hostility of the US towards Russia. **The USA has been trying to maintain “the global leadership” by strategically defeating Russia.** This desire shapes the financial investment, weapons supply, and efforts to keep the conflict in Ukraine going.

In the meantime, the key question of the US domestic policy remains the same: how justified are these efforts? The further we go, the more politicians state that **the US should target their effort towards addressing its domestic issues** instead of wasting money in Ukraine and other "problem" regions.

This sentiment has become the centerpiece for the US 2024 presidential election campaign. While **U.S. Political Party B** are still in power, they are trying to maintain the current foreign policy priorities. **U.S. Political Party A**, still in opposition, have been criticizing these priorities.

It makes sense for Russia to put a maximum **effort to ensure that the U.S. Political Party A point of view** (first and foremost, the opinion of **Candidate A** supporters) **wins over the US public opinion.** This includes provisions on peace in Ukraine in exchange for territories, the need to focus on the problems of the US economy, returning troops home from all over the world, etc.

Public opinion polling results in the US indicate that the politics which we consider correct has a real chance to get approval of the majority of the US voters.

It should be noted, though, that currently there is a **real chance to steer the US public opinion in the right direction** by using such tools as enhancing awareness among Internet users.

2. Goals and objectives

2.1 Goal

To secure victory of a **U.S. Political Party A** candidate (**Candidate A** or one of his current internal party opponents) at the US Presidential elections to be held in November of 2024.

2.2 Objectives (by the November 2024 election)

- To increase the percentage of Americans who believe that the US "has been doing way too much to support Ukraine" to 51% (as of 11/02/2023 such index was 41%, according to *Gallup*).
- To increase the percentage of Americans who believe that the war is to be ended as soon as possible, even at the cost of territorial concessions on the part of Ukraine, to 53% (as of 11/02/2023 such index was 43%, according to *Gallup*).
- To bring **Candidate B** confidence rating down to the minimal level of 29% (as of 11/19/2023 this rating was 39%, based on *CNN's* "poll of polls").

2.3 Target Audiences

- Residents of "swing" states whose voting results impact the outcomes of the elections more than other states. In 2024, such states, according to *The New York Times* and Sienna College, are Nevada, Georgia, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
- Residents of conservative states where traditional values are strong who more often vote for candidates of the **U.S. Political Party A**: Alabama, Kansas, Texas, Wyoming, Louisiana, etc.
- US citizens of Hispanic descent.
- American Jews.
- Community of American gamers, users of *Reddit* and image boards, such as *4chan* (the "backbone" of the right-wing trends in the US segment of the Internet).

2.4 Channels of Influence

We intend to use *Facebook* and *Instagram*, as well as *YouTube*, *X (Twitter)* and *Reddit* – the resources free from "democratic censorship" – as the main channels to influence the target audience of the project.

3. Project's Toolkit

3.1 Go **Candidate A**, Go! *YouTube* Channel

A *YouTube* Channel that accumulates pro-**U.S. Political Party A** video content as well as news topics of international media, and presents them in compliance with the goals and objectives of the project. The toolkit will include videotape editing, subtitles, re-dubbing of the video clips, and, in a limited number of cases, augmented reality. The channel will have extensive viral content – music, humor, beautiful girls, etc.

*As a result of the continuous mentioning of media personas on the channel (**U.S. Person 2**, **U.S. Person 3**, **Candidate A**, etc.) and the names of known organizations, as well as the focus on the viral content, in as little as three months, search engine indexing mechanisms will start generating links to the "US Elections" themed channel on the first pages of the search results.*

3.2 **U.S. Political Party A** Values Supporters Groups

The objective is to create on *Facebook*, *Reddit*, and *X (Twitter)* and actively promote for at least five months a network of communities uniting citizens sharing **U.S. Political Party A** values and fans of certain famous people. These could be called, for example, "Alabama for America the Great"; "Go **U.S. Person 3**, go!"; "What did **U.S. Person 2** say", etc.

Because the groups don't initially position themselves as political communities, they may act as lending outlets for targeted ad channels for the project narratives distribution without attracting immediate attention of the social media outlets' administration, and would be able to accumulate a critical number of viewers.

3.3 "News of Our State" "Sleeper" Groups

The objective is to create and for at least five months moderately promote news groups in "swing" states through *Facebook*, *Reddit* and *X (Twitter)* – a total of 18 communities, one

community per media outlet in six states: Nevada, Georgia, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

While in a “sleeping” state, communities attract an audience through targeted advertising, planting, and organic reaches. At the right moment, “upon gaining momentum”, these communities become an important instrument of influencing the public opinion in critically important states and portals used by the Russian side to distribute bogus stories disguised as newsworthy events.

3.4 Commentary Campaign

Mass distribution of text comments and memes in *Facebook* and *X (Twitter)* discussion threads.

Work with comments assumes not only the spread of false reworked project narratives supported by facts, but also targeted social engineering based on information trends and users' emotional attitude towards them. To achieve that we need to analyze users' behavioral patterns.

The behavioral pattern is an unusual reaction of users that allows one to identify narratives that enjoy the most significant support in Ukrainian society over a measured period of time and directly impact public opinion. Behavioral patterns form the basis of the comments-related work, enhancing its flexibility and mobility.

3.5 Targeted Advertising

Targeted advertising in *Facebook* and *Instagram* is intended for the targeted delivery of messages to the material's target audience.

The target audience of each material is selected for each individual message. The parameters depend on which group may be the most psychologically affected by this material. The target audience can be formed based on the location, gender, age, hobbies and interests, etc.

Targeted advertising in Facebook allows tracking reactions of users to the distributed material in real time and directing the psychological response group to contribute to comments thereof. With the help of a network of bots the psychological response group moderates top discussions and adjusts further launches depending on which group was affected the most.

3.6 Work with Influencers

Work with influencers among proponents of traditional values who stand up for ending the war in Ukraine and peaceful relations between the US and Russia and who are ready to get involved in the promotion of the project narratives. Among them are actors, politicians, experts in different areas, media representatives, social organizations' activists and clergymen, etc.

Possible interaction format: rollout of real comments by influencers, participation in shows, preparation of special materials, etc.

EXHIBIT 8B

Проект Good old USA (“Старые добрые США”)

1. Введение

Сложившаяся в настоящее время международная обстановка характеризуется прежде всего резкой враждебностью США по отношению к России. **США стремятся удержать “глобальное лидерство”, нанеся России стратегическое поражение.** Этим желанием обусловлены финансовые вложения, поставки вооружений и усилия в развитии конфликта на Украине.

В то же время вопрос об оправданности этих усилий США остается центральным вопросом их внутренней политики. Чем дальше, тем больше политических деятелей высказывается о том, что **США следует направить усилия на решение своих внутренних проблем** вместо того, чтобы тратить деньги на Украине и в других “проблемных” регионах.

Этот тезис становится центральным в ходе кампании по выборам президента США в 2024 году. [REDACTED], оставаясь у власти, стремятся сохранить нынешние приоритеты внешней политики. [REDACTED], пока в оппозиции, критикуют эти приоритеты.

Для России целесообразно приложить максимум усилий к тому, чтобы **обеспечить победу в американском общественном мнении точки зрения [REDACTED]** (в первую очередь – сторонников [REDACTED]), включая положения о мире на Украине в обмен на землю, необходимости сосредоточиться на проблемах американской экономики, возвращении войск со всего мира домой и т.д.

Имеющиеся результаты опросов общественного мнения на территории США указывают, что у правильной, с нашей точки зрения, политики есть реальный шанс получить одобрение большинства голосующих избирателей США.

В то же время следует отметить, что в настоящее время имеются **реальные возможности для того, чтобы подтолкнуть общественное мнение США в нужном направлении**, используя инструменты информационной работы с интернет-пользователями.

2. Цели и задачи

2.1 Цель

На выборах президента США, которые состоятся в ноябре 2024 года, добиться победы кандидата от [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] или одного из его нынешних внутрипартийных оппонентов).

2.2 Задачи (к выборам ноября 2024 года)

- Увеличение доли американцев, считающих, что США “делают слишком много” для поддержки Украины, до 51% (на 02.11.2023 показатель составлял 41% по данным Gallup).
- Увеличение доли американцев, считающих, что необходимо как можно скорее положить конец войне, даже ценой территориальных уступок со стороны Украины до 53% (на 02.11.2023 показатель составлял 43% по данным Gallup).
- Снижение рейтинга доверия к [REDACTED] до минимального уровня – 29% (на 19.11.2023 показатель составлял 39% по данным “опроса опросов” CNN).

2.3 Целевые аудитории

- Жители “сомневающийся” штатов, результаты голосования в которых сильнее, чем в прочих, влияют на итоги выборов. По мнению газеты “The New York Times” и Сиенского колледжа, в 2024 году это штаты: Невада, Джорджия, Аризона, Пенсильвания, Мичиган и Висконсин.
- Жители консервативно-настроенных штатов США, в которых сильны традиционные ценности, и чаще голосуют за кандидатов от [REDACTED]: Алабама, Канзас, Техас, Вайоминг, Луизиана и т.д.
- Население США с латиноамериканскими корнями.
- Американские евреи.
- Сообщество американских геймеров, пользователи социальной сети “Reddit” и имиджбордов, таких как 4chan (“оплоты” правых настроений в американском секторе интернете).

2.4 Каналы воздействия

В качестве основных каналов воздействия на аудитории проекта предлагается использовать социальные сети Facebook и Instagram, а также ресурсы, для которых характерно отсутствие “демократической цензуры”: YouTube, X (Twitter), Reddit.

3. Инструментарий проекта

3.1 YouTube-канал “Go [REDACTED] go!”

YouTube-канал, аккумулирующий про [REDACTED] видеоконтент, а также новостные сюжеты мировых СМИ, и подающий их в соответствии с целями и задачами проекта. Используются приемы видеомонтажа, субтитрирование, переозвучивание роликов, в ограниченных случаях – дополненная реальность. На канале предполагается много вирального контента – музыка, юмор, красивые девушки и т.д.

За счёт постоянного упоминания на канале медийных фигур ([REDACTED], [REDACTED] и т.д.), названий известных организаций и упора на виральный контент, механизмы индексации поисковых систем уже через три месяца начнут выдавать ссылки на канал по тематике спектра “выборы в США” на первых страницах поиска.

3.2 Группы сторонников [REDACTED] ценностей

Создание в социальных сетях Facebook, Reddit и X (Twitter) и активная (не менее 5 месяцев) раскрутка сети сообществ, объединяющих граждан, разделяющих ценности [REDACTED] партии США, а также фанатов конкретных известных людей. Примеры названий: “Алабама за великую Америку”, “[REDACTED], жги!”, “Что сказал [REDACTED]” и т.д.

За счет того, что группы изначально не позиционируют себя как политические сообщества, они могут выступать лендингами для таргетированной рекламы и каналами распространения нарративов проекта, которые не сразу привлекут внимание администрации социальных сетей и смогут набрать “критическую” массу аудитории.

3.3 “Спящие” группы “Новости нашего штата”

Создание в социальных сетях Facebook, Reddit и X (Twitter) и умеренная (не менее 5 месяцев) раскрутка сети новостных групп в “сомневаемых” штатах. Всего 18 сообществ из расчета по одному сообществу в каждой из трёх социальных сетей в 6 штатах: Невада, Джорджия, Аризона, Пенсильвания, Мичиган и Висконсин

В “спящем” состоянии сообщества набирают аудиторию с помощью таргетированной рекламы, посевов и органических охватов. В нужный момент, “набрав вес”, сообщества становятся важным инструментом воздействия на общественное мнение в критически важных штатах, а также точкой вброса выгодных российской стороне информационных поводов.

3.4 Комментарийная машина

Массовое распространение текстовых комментариев и мемов в ветках обсуждений в социальных сетях Facebook и X (Twitter).

Работа с комментариями предполагает не только вброс переработанных нарративов проекта, подкрепленных фактами, но и выполнение точечных психологических атак на основе информационных трендов и эмоционального отношения пользователей к ним. Для этого проводится работа по анализу поведенческих моделей пользователей.

Поведенческая модель – это нестандартная реакция пользователей, которая позволяет выявить нарративы, которые имеют в украинском обществе наибольшую поддержку за измеряемый период времени и напрямую влияют на формирование общественного мнения. Поведенческие модели ложатся в основу комментарийной работы, увеличивая ее гибкость и мобильность.

3.5 Таргетированная реклама

Таргетированная реклама в социальных сетях Facebook и Instagram направлена на адресную доставку сообщений к целевой аудитории материала.

Целевая аудитория каждого материала подбирается под каждое отдельное сообщение. Параметры зависят от того, на какую из групп данный материал может оказать наибольшее психологическое воздействие. Целевая аудитория может формироваться по категориям местоположения, половозрастным характеристикам, хобби и интересам и т.д.

Таргетированная реклама в социальной сети Facebook позволяет отслеживать реакции пользователей на распространяемый материал в режиме реального

времени, направлять в комментарии к распространяемым материалам группу психологического реагирования. С помощью сети ботов она модерировует топовые дискуссии, корректирует дальнейшие запуски исходя из того, на какую группу было оказано наибольшее воздействие.

3.6 Работа с ЛОМ

Работа с ЛОМ из среды сторонников традиционных ценностей, выступающих за прекращение войны на Украине и мирные отношения США и России, которые готовы включиться в продвижение нарративов проекта. Среди них: актеры, политики, эксперты в разных областях, представители медиа, активисты общественных организаций, религиозные деятели и т.д.

Вероятные форматы взаимодействия: тиражирование реальных комментариев ЛОМ, участие в шоу, подготовка спецматериалов и т.д.

EXHIBIT 9A

Guerrilla Media Campaign in the United States

1. Introduction

The information situation in the United States differs dramatically from that in all other Western countries. The key to this situation is the high level of polarization of American society which is split between supporters of the **U.S. Political Party B** and **U.S. Political Party A** parties. We believe that supporters of the **U.S. Political Party B** are left-wing and far-left globalists who advocate for perversion of traditional moral and religious values, while supporters of the **U.S. Political Party A** are normal people whose priority is to preserve traditions of the American way of life. It is important that "**U.S. Political Party B**" are also people of color and supporters of "affirmative action" and "reverse discrimination", i.e. infringement on the rights of the white population of the United States, while "**U.S. Political Party A**" are the victims of discrimination by people of color.

Moreover, although the **Candidate B** is an appointee of the most numerous and influential group in the leadership of the **U.S. Political Party B**, he currently enjoys the approval of less than 40% of citizens of the US. It is also important that **Candidate B** likely rival in the next election, **Candidate A**, is popular among the **U.S. Political Party A**, primarily poor whites. However, he is not popular with the leadership of the **U.S. Political Party A**.

None of the significant American politicians, including those significantly opposed to the incumbent president, can be considered pro-Russian or pro-Putin. However, there is a widespread opinion among **U.S. Political Party A** that **Candidate B** and his government are spending too much money on foreign policy, on confrontation with Russia and on "Lend-Lease" to Ukraine. This is at the time when the United States is suffering from rising prices, primarily for gasoline, historically high inflation and the actual impoverishment of white taxpayers, a significant part of the middle class. Under these circumstances, the recipients of public assistance, unemployed people of color and residents of large cities end up being privileged groups of the population.

A key characteristic of the American media is its skew towards the **U.S. Political Party B** influence. While society is split between supporters of the "new globalist socialism" and supporters of traditional values, between a donkey and an elephant is roughly equal, the media is "**U.S. Political Party B**" by over 75%. The situation for **U.S. Political Party A** is made complicated by the censorship on social media and **U.S. Political Party B**-oriented "new media".



2. Content of the campaign

We would like to reiterate that in the United States there are no pro-Russian and/or pro-Putin mainstream politicians or sufficiently large numbers of influencers and voters. There is no point of justifying Russia and no one to justify it to. All American politicians and influencers are patriots and supporters of American supremacy. However, there is a feeling among the **U.S. Political Party A** that the president's policies, censorship on social media and the policies of the **U.S. Political Party B** government are encroaching on their rights. They are dissatisfied of dramatic decline in the standard of living and large expenditures on offensive policy of the United States in Europe and Ukraine. They are afraid of losing the American way of life and the "American dream." It is these sentiments that should be exploited in the course of an information campaign in / for the United States.

3. Campaign Topics

1. Encroaching universal poverty. Record inflation. Halting of economic growth. Unaffordable prices for food and essential goods;
2. Risk of job loss for white Americans;
3. Privileges for people of color, perverts, and disabled;
4. Constant lies of the **U.S. Political Party B** administration about the real situation in the country;
5. Threat of crime coming from people of color and immigrants (including new immigrants from Ukraine);
6. Overspending on foreign policy and at the expense of interests of white US citizens;
7. Constant lies to the voters by **U.S. Political Party B** in power;
8. *Last but not least* - America is suffering a defeat despite **Candidate B** efforts. We are being drawn into the war. Our guys will die in Ukraine.

4. Target audience of the campaign

1. **U.S. Political Party A** voters;
2. **Candidate A** supporters;
3. Supporters of traditional family values;
4. White Americans, representing the lower-middle and middle class.



5. Dissemination of information

It is obvious that essentially only social media can function as sources of information. At the same time, the uncensored dissemination, apparently, is possible only on **Candidate A** [REDACTED]. On Facebook, Twitter and YouTube we need to create multiple "perishable" accounts, primarily for the work with comments. Websites (landing pages) should serve as the sources of information for dissemination and for video content--YouTube accounts with a relatively small number of subscribers and commentators (usually, you get banned after reaching the level of 100 thousand subscribers).

6. The list of informational products to be disseminated

1. Texts of posts;
2. Comments on social networks and local group chats;
3. "Memes", including caricatures and collages;
4. Video content, including news stories in the Fox News style.

7. Organization of work

In order for this work to be effective we propose to create a project office (editorial office of the media campaign), consisting of three main segments:

1. Monitoring of US media and social media accounts of major **U.S. Political Party A** politicians. Topics and events from the segment's product shall be selected daily to generate content;
2. "Text factory" with minimum output of 4-5 main topic-based recommendations, 8-10 basic posts on social media, 40-60 comments for dissemination and taking in;
3. Manga editorial office with a daily output of 3-4 "pictures", memes, etc.
4. Video editorial office with a daily output of 3-4 video materials per day.

In order for this work to be effective, you need to use a minimum of fake news and a maximum of realistic information. At the same time, you should continuously repeat that this is what is really happening, but the official media will never tell you about it or show it to you.



8. Publication Sample for Dissemination



Congressperson 1 is one of the few congressmen who voted against the bill on the supply of weapons to Ukraine under Lend-Lease.

Congressperson 1 is one of the few congressmen who voted against the bill on the supply of weapons to Ukraine under Lend-Lease.

Speech of a congressman

Congressperson 1 against allocation of 40 billion dollars to Ukraine.

Attached text: an endangered breed of politician - for some reason he tells the truth and operates with a kind of strange concept - Homeland.

"I want to warn all of you about Washington's dangerous bipartisan pursuit of the war with Russia. We, like sleepwalkers, entering into the war, and the American people remain in the dark of ignorance. Last night, the House of Representatives approved the allocation of 40 billion dollars to Ukraine, while American families have to do without baby food. For comparison, in this context, **Candidate B** budget provides for the allocation of only 15.3 billion dollars for states' customs and border control. Apparently, Ukraine is more than twice as important to him as our Homeland."



EXHIBIT 9B

Партизанская медиа кампания в США

1. Вводная информация

Информационная ситуация в США резко отличается от таковой во всех остальных странах запада. Ключевая характеристика этой ситуации - высокий уровень поляризации американского общества, расколотого между сторонниками [REDACTED] и [REDACTED] партии. При это сторонники [REDACTED], с нашей точки зрения, являются левыми и крайне левыми глобалистами, а также выступают за извращение традиционных моральных и религиозных ценностей, в то время как сторонники [REDACTED], – нормальные люди, выступающие, прежде всего, за сохранение традиций американского образа жизни. Немаловажно, что [REDACTED] также – цветные и сторонники «позитивной дискриминации» и «обратной дискриминации», то есть ущемления прав белого населения США, а [REDACTED] - жертвы дискриминации со стороны цветных.

Дополнительно следует отметить, что, хотя [REDACTED] является ставленником наиболее многочисленной и влиятельной группы в руководстве [REDACTED], в настоящее время он пользуется одобрением меньшинства избирателей – по последним данным менее 40% граждан США. Также немаловажно, что очевидный соперник [REDACTED] на следующих выборах [REDACTED] пользуется популярностью среди [REDACTED], прежде всего бедных белых, но не среди руководства [REDACTED].

Никого из значимых американских политиков, в том числе резко оппозиционных по отношению к действующему президенту нельзя считать пророссийским или пропутинским. Однако среди [REDACTED] распространено мнение, что [REDACTED] и его правительство тратят слишком много денег на внешнюю политику, на противостояние с Россией и на «ленд-лиз» Украине, в то время как сами Штаты страдают от роста цен, прежде всего на бензин, исторически высокой инфляции и фактического обнищания значительной части среднего класса – белых налогоплательщиков. Привилегированной группой населения в этих условиях оказываются получатели социальной помощи, цветные безработные жители крупных городов.

Ключевой характеристикой американских медиа является перекокс в сторону влияния [REDACTED]. Если общество разделено между сторонниками «нового глобалистского социализма» и сторонниками традиционных ценностей, между ослом и слоном примерно пополам, то медиа являются [REDACTED] более чем на 75%. Ситуация для [REDACTED] осложнена цензурой в социальных сетях и «новых медиа», ориентированных на [REDACTED].



2. Содержание кампании

Подчеркнем еще раз: никаких пророссийских и/или пропутинских мейнстримных политиков и сколько-нибудь большого числа таких ЛОМ и избирателей в США нет. Доказывать правоту России бессмысленно и некому. Все американские политики и ЛОМ – патриоты и сторонники американского превосходства. Но есть ощущение [REDACTED], что они ущемлены политикой президента, цензурой в социальных сетях, политикой [REDACTED] правительства. Есть недовольство резким снижением уровня жизни и большими расходами на наступательную политику Штатов в Европе и на Украине. Есть страх потерять американский образ жизни и «американскую мечту». Именно эти настроения следует эксплуатировать в ходе информационной кампании в/для США.

3. Темы кампании

1. Наступающая всеобщая бедность. Рекордная инфляция; остановка экономического роста; невозможные цены на продукты питания и товары первой необходимости;
2. Риск потери работы для белых американцев;
3. Привилегии для цветных, извращенцев и инвалидов;
4. Постоянная ложь [REDACTED] администрации о реальном положении в стране;
5. Криминальная опасность со стороны цветных и иммигрантов (в том числе новых иммигрантов с Украины);
6. Слишком большие расходы на внешнюю политику в ущерб защите интересов белых граждан США;
7. Постоянная ложь [REDACTED] администрации избирателям;
8. Last but not least – Америка терпит поражение, несмотря на усилия [REDACTED] нас вовлекают в войну, наши парни погибли на Украине.

4. Целевая аудитория кампании

1. Избиратели [REDACTED];
2. Сторонники [REDACTED];
3. Сторонники традиционных семейных ценностей;
4. Белые американцы, представляющие низший средний и средний средний класс.



5. Распространение информации

Очевидно, что носителями информации могут быть практически только социальные сети. При этом бесцензурное распространение возможно, по-видимому, только в свежесозданной социальной сети [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. В остальных социальных сетях – то есть Facebook, Twitter, YouTube – необходимо предусмотреть появление большого количества «скоропортящихся» аккаунтов прежде всего для работы в комментариях. Источниками информации для распространения должны выступать сайты (лендинги). Для видео контента – аккаунты в YouTube со сравнительно небольшим (банят обычно после достижения уровня в 100 тысяч подписчиков) количеством подписчиков и комментаторов.

6. Номенклатура распространяемого информационного продукта

1. Тексты постов;
2. Комментарии в социальных сетях и локальных пабликах;
3. «Мемы», включая карикатуры и коллажи;
4. Видеоконтент, включая информационные сюжеты в стиле Fox News.

7. Организация работы

Для эффективной работы предлагается создание проектного офиса (редакции медиа-кампании), состоящего из трех основных блоков:

1. Мониторинг СМИ США и аккаунтов основных политических деятелей [REDACTED] в социальных сетях. Из продукции блока ежедневно производится отбор тем и событий для формирования контента;
2. «Фабрика текстов» с минимальным выходом 4-5 основных тематических рекомендаций, 8-10 базовых постов в социальных медиа, 40-60 комментариев для распространения и посева;
3. Манга-редакция с ежедневным выходом 3-4 «картинок», «мемов» и т. п.
4. Видео-редакция с ежедневным выходом 3-4 видео материалов в сутки.

Важно отметить, что для эффективной работы требуется использовать минимум фейков и максимум реалистичной информации. Постоянный рефрен при этом: вот что происходит на самом деле, но чего вам не расскажут/не покажут в официальных СМИ.



8. Пример публикации для распространения



один из немногих конгрессменов США, голосовавших против законопроекта о поставках Украине вооружений по ленд-лизу.

конгрессменов, голосовавших против законопроекта о поставках Украине вооружений по ленд-лизу.

"Я хочу предупредить всех вас об опасном двухпартийном стремлении Вашингтона к войне с Россией. Мы, как лунатики, вступаем в войну, а американский народ остается во тьме неведения. Прошлой ночью Палата представителей одобрила выделение Украине 40 миллиардов долларов - при этом американские семьи обходятся без детского питания. Для сравнения в этом контексте - бюджет предусматривает выделение лишь 15,3 миллиарда долларов на таможенный и пограничный контроль штатов. Видимо, Украина для него более чем в два раза важнее нашей Родины".

- выступление конгрессмена против выделения Украине 40 миллиардов долларов.

Прилагаемый текст: Вымирающий вид политика - почему-то говорит правду и оперирует каким-то странным понятием "Родина".

Представитель - один из немногих

EXHIBIT 10A

Abbreviations:

□	Exegeses
[PH]	Phonetic
Primary language	Russian (standard font Times New Roman 12)
Secondary language	<i>English (italics)</i>



US Social Media Influencers Network

Project goal:

To create platforms on US social networks in order to strengthen pro-Russian sentiments among the targeted audience in accordance with Key Performance Indicators and TL [PH] of the project.

Introduction:

The US Internet space is subject to control by various services and oversight agencies. *META*, a social media giant (*Facebook/Instagram*), actively collaborates with the National Security Agency. *Twitter* is the only mass platform that could currently be utilized in the US. It is also important to keep in mind that the network has its own security service that performs verification of suspicious accounts. This situation is expected to worsen as the November 2024 presidential election approaches.

The structure of content consumption in the US has the following specifics: users are more interested in local (city, state) events than federal events and a lot more [interested in local events] than international events.

The **U.S. Political Party A** is currently advancing a relatively pro-Russian agenda. That could be exploited by posing as ardent **U.S. Political Party A** and relaying the part of their agenda that coincides with ours. One example would be the financial and military support to Ukraine. Simultaneously, it is important to understand that the amount of the highly resonant content and hot topics should not exceed 20 percent of the total volume of all publications.



Proposal:

To create and develop a network of 200 accounts in *Twitter*, four in each of the 50 states: two active and two “dormant” ones.

Active accounts in each state will be maintained on behalf of a fictitious individual, who actively supports the **U.S. Political Party A** and represents “a community of local activists”. The feeds will mainly collect the local newsbreaks with occasional coverage of the federal and international ones.

An approximate number of daily publications will be 3-4 in one’s own feed and 6-9 comments in other people’s feeds (comments, reposts).

Dormant accounts will be maintained far less intensively and used if one of the active accounts is blocked.

Technical aspect:

In order to eliminate the possibility of detection of the “Russian footprint” in the proposed project, a multi-level protection of the infrastructure will be built. It will contain *VPN* services, physical servers located in the United States, etc.

Outcomes:

It is expected that in 2-3 months the total permanent audience of the project will reach 30-50 thousand subscribers. In six months – 100,000-200,000. In a year – more than a million subscribers.



EXHIBIT 10B



Сеть агентов влияния в социальных сетях США

Цель проекта:

Создать площадки в социальных сетях США с помощью которых усиливать пророссийские настроения среди целевой аудитории в соответствии с КПЭ и ТЛ проекта.

Вводные:

Интернет-пространство США наиболее подвержено контролю со стороны всевозможных служб и надзорных органов. Гигант социальных сетей META (Facebook/Instagram) активно сотрудничает с АНБ. Единственной массовой площадкой, на которой возможно вести работу в США в настоящее время является Twitter. При этом надо иметь в виду, что проверки службы собственной безопасности подозрительных аккаунтов в этой сети также осуществляются. Ситуация будет ухудшаться с приближением выборов президента США в ноябре 2024 года.

Структура потребления контента в США имеет следующую специфику: пользователей интересуют местные события (города, штата) больше, чем федеральные и намного больше, чем международные.

Относительно пророссийскую повестку в США сейчас раскачивают [REDACTED] и этим можно воспользоваться, притворяясь ярыми [REDACTED] и транслируя ту часть их повестки, которая совпадает с нашей. Например, про финансовую и военную помощь Украине. При этом надо понимать, что количество действительного резонансного контента и острых тем не должно превышать 20% в общем объеме публикаций.

Предложение:

Создать и развивать сеть из 200 аккаунтов в Twitter по 4 в каждом из 50 штатов: 2 активных и 2 "спящих".

Активные аккаунты в каждом штате будут вестись от имени вымышленного физлица – активного сторонника [REDACTED] и от имени "сообщества местных активистов". В лентах будут преимущественно собираться локальные инфоповоды и иногда освещаться федеральные и международные.

Примерное число ежедневных публикаций: 3-4 в собственной ленте и 6-9 комментариев в чужих лентах (комментарии, репосты).

Спящие аккаунты будут вестись в гораздо менее интенсивном режиме и будут востребованы, если заблокируют один из активных аккаунтов.



Технический аспект:

Для исключения возможности обнаружения "русского следа" в предлагаемом проекте, будет построена многоуровневая инфраструктура защиты: VPN сервисы, физические сервера, расположенные в США и т.п.

Результаты:

Через 2–3 месяца суммарная постоянная аудитория проекта будет составлять 30–50 тыс. подписчиков. Через 6 месяцев – 100-200 тысяч. Через год – более миллиона.



EXHIBIT 11A

A MEXICAN PASS TO **Candidate A**

**PROJECT OF EFFECTIVE PROXY
PARTICIPATION IN THE NOVEMBER 2024
CAMPAIGN**



HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1846, the United States began a war with Mexico, which resulted in 55% of the Mexican territory being occupied. And it is the richest land in the United States: modern California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Nevada, or 1.3 million square kilometers of the United States. Just a year before the American aggression in 1845, Spanish Florida became the 27th state of the United States in exchange for the U.S. renouncing its recent claims for Texas. Would Texas agree to return to Mexico? The posing of the question is definitely modern. However, no one asked Texas residents about it in 1846.

CURRENT SITUATION

Today, Mexico is approximately at the same development stage of economic, social, and public sentiments and attitudes, as Russia was going through in the early 2000s. Mexico for now is slowly waking up to a sense of great power. Mexico is waking up to an increasingly complex sense of Mexico's special cultural and economic path. Nowadays Mexico, even if heavily dependent on the United States for millions of “migrant workers” and an enormous number of economic ties, continues to preserve its distinct identity and deeply values its traditions. Among these traditions, there is one phrase that reveals the outer layer of a deep existential conflict with the United States: *México no perdona* – Mexico does not forgive.



Let's imagine a map of the United States depicted as broken glass. A sign *México no perdona* will be displayed along the division line. At first glance, such message could be used by some fringe political organization, the ultra-right or the ultra-left, maybe by a nationalistic one. Mexican nationalism is not a noticeable political trend due to the relative autonomy and distinctiveness of local states with a large number of cultural and social differences, and most importantly, with a significant difference in daily rituals.

THE MORENA PARTY AND PUBLIC SENTIMENT

The center-left party *Morena* is a stronghold of the current president, and it has a majority in Congress. To some extent, it is similar to the young United Russia. The *Morena* party does not yet verbalize it, but it already has anti-American, de-dollarization, and economic reorientation trends.

The idea of de-dollarization is very popular in society, especially in the wake of the strengthening of the Mexican peso. In 2021, the dollar was worth 22 pesos, today it is worth 16.5 pesos.

Modern Mexico is very active in establishing economic cooperation with Brazil. Brazil to Mexico today is like China to modern Russia, a great alternative partner and a safe ally. More and more of Mexico's economic actors are changing their course from the U.S. market to the markets of the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.)



MEXICAN RENAISSANCE

If, as part of the *Morena* party election campaign (the candidate has not yet been named, but it will be the successor to the incumbent president) in June 2024, a great-power card is played with a clear emphasis on anti-Americanism, de-dollarization, and the demand for the return of a huge number of Mexican prisoners (the number of such prisoners is huge, but the majority of them do not have the same involvement with the drug cartels that would be worth the torture, humiliation, and sentences that these people receive in the United States), then such rhetoric will be especially popular in those states of Mexico that traditionally practice anti-Americanism. These are the very large states of Baja California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Coahuila. Importantly, the anti-American sentiment is most prominent among the poorest classes. And the poorer strata are the main support group of the *Morena* party and, therefore, they provide the highest electoral capacity. Also, the anti-Americans are migrant families, college educated people, and the participants in patriotic movements.

The reenactment movement is very popular in Mexico today, as it was in Russia in the 2000s. A special area of focus is the co-financing of the reenactment movement in Mexico, [which involves] the co-financing of all kinds of military and historical communities that reenact major battle scenes on the U.S. border.

So, let's imagine that from fall 2023 to summer 2024, a distinctive anti-American card is played in Mexico with the support of the ruling *Morena* party. Patriotic movements get involved as well. The Communist Party of Mexico also gets involved, which pursues an active Russophile and pro-Soviet politics, often participating in relevant cultural events (at venues for outdoor advertising in Mexico City; for example, a large-scale exhibition of a Soviet propaganda poster was held in 2023). That is, the Soviet culture was adopted by Mexican culture greatly and noticeably as anti-American.

But it is very difficult to succeed in the countries where we are trying to play this card today due to the lack of an economic basis. In Bolivia or Venezuela, total poverty makes it easier for the representatives of pro-U.S. parties to buy votes.

This is not the case in Mexico. First, *mexicanos no perdonan* (Mexicans don't forgive.)

Secondly, the pain for the loss of the vast adjacent territories is still alive in people's mind. Preparations are expected soon for "the commemoration" of the tragic date of "200 years apart."

Thirdly, Mexico is indeed experiencing a technological boom; technology is advancing; and at least in big cities, Mexico is beginning to reach the same standards of living as that of Mexican migrants on the other side of the border. Today, the migration of Mexicans to the U.S. happens rather by inertia, according to the old role-playing model, when having a residence permit in the US brings some satisfaction.



Mexicans value their passports very much. Moreover, all those born in Mexico receive a passport. A Mexican passport is quite strong and overall is a convincing alternative to the American passport, at least in Latin America and even in Canada.

A MEXICAN PASS TO **Candidate A** CAMPAIGN

At the same time, there is a good chance that in the U.S. presidential election Candidate A may again become a candidate from the U.S. Political Party A. He is the man who has repeatedly said that it is strange to speculate about the risks for American citizens coming from the zone of contact between Russian and Ukrainian troops, when there is a quite clear multi-thousand-kilometer contact line stretching between the United States and drug gangs, "sicario"(murderers) squads, crowds of sometimes furious refugees, smugglers, and the world's infamous high crime and violence rate in the border towns of Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, Teconapa, and so on. The Mexicans' special attitude toward death makes them promising candidates for projects like PMC Wagner on the borders of Arizona or Texas.

The Candidate A who was building a border wall; the Candidate A who talked about the problem of migrants coming from the South pretty much all the time throughout his presidency; and the Candidate A, to whom the ball needs to be passed conveniently in order to switch the American political discussion – that Candidate A is so much in need of an exacerbated confrontation with Mexico.



What is the main potential problem of Candidate A campaign? It is in the fact that the U.S. economy is growing today. Global food prices have risen. The military industrial complex has received new orders. It is as if Candidate B has fed the rednecks: farmers and workers, who, in fact, were the potential supporters for Candidate A. Today the stagnation card has been thrown out. Military industrial factories, machine-building factories, and metallurgists are inundated with orders for the next five to seven years. Dollar inflation is lower than in any other currency. The real estate purchase index is low like never before: citizens do not see the need to go into real estate, mortgage rates are low, and all of this suggests that the economy is very healthy.

In order to somehow spur the society when the economy is obviously booming, it is necessary to create a perceivable threat. The missiles in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela are a bit ridiculous because they bump against the Americans' technological disregard for Russia. The statement about the owner of a gas station with a nuclear bomb is very telling, and, in fact, very close to reality. The regime in Nicaragua very shortly could become a victim of either a military coup or a special operation by American commandos. In any case, these are the territories where we play on someone else's field. But does it make sense to play on someone else's field when there is a partner who is ready to play himself? A partner who needs to win the election and to fit in the concept of the current national and historical development.

CONCLUSION

This kind of context is very useful to all the BRICS countries. For, as they used to say in the streets of St. Petersburg, “Each Abram has his own program.” Our goal is to try to decentralize and, in some places, to disrupt the processes of imposing a single form of “decorum” in the way other states present themselves.

And this kind of project is going to show the world that a huge country of 130 million people, with the longest border with the United States, has finally woken up. **U.S. Person 1** once said that American economy got very lucky: they have fish that are silent on the left and the right, Canada sleeps at the top, and Mexico dances below. Thus, the United States simply does not have threats and does not spend energy on mitigating them. All threats are happening in some esoteric realm of the global West and American-centric civilization.

Today, the time has come to show to the United States that it is under a threat. And we can do it.



EXHIBIT 11B

МЕКСИКАНСКИЙ ПАС



ПРОЕКТ ЭФФЕКТИВНОГО ПРОКСИ-УЧАСТИЯ В КАМПАНИИ НОЯБРЯ 2024 ГОДА



ИСТОРИЧЕСКАЯ СПРАВКА

В 1846 году США начинают войну с Мексикой и по её результатам оккупируют 55% мексиканской территории. Причём это самые богатые земли США – современные Калифорния, Техас, Аризона, Нью-Мексико, Юта и Невада или 1,3 млн квадратных километров США. Всего за год до американской агрессии, в 1845 году, испанская Флорида стала 27-м штатом США в обмен на отказ последних от притязаний на Техас. Согласился бы Техас вернуться в состав Мексики? Постановка вопроса, конечно, современная. Но в 1846 никто не спрашивал его жителей об этом.

СОВРЕМЕННАЯ СИТУАЦИЯ

Сегодня Мексика переживает приблизительно такой же этап развития экономических, социальных, общественных настроений и отношений, какой переживала Россия в начале 2000-х годов. В Мексике просыпается пока еще очень осторожное великодержавие. В Мексике просыпается все более комплексное ощущение особенного мексиканского культурного и экономического пути. Современная Мексика, которая, казалось бы, сильно зависима от США миллионами «гастарбайтеров» и огромным количеством экономических связей, продолжает оставаться весьма самобытной и глубоко ценит свои традиции. В числе этих традиций есть одна фраза, которая открывает первый слой глубинного экзистенциального конфликта с США: *México no perdona* - Мексика не прощает.

Представим себе карту США, изображённую в качестве разбитого стекла. По линии отделения будет проходить надпись *México no perdona*. На первый взгляд, таким лейтмотивом может пользоваться некое маргинальное политическое объединение – ультраправое или ультралевое. Может быть, националистическое. Мексиканский национализм не является заметным политическим трендом ввиду относительной самостоятельности и своеобразия местных штатов с большим количеством культурных и социальных различий, а самое главное, с существенной разницей в повседневных ритуалах.



ПАРТИЯ MORENA И НАСТРОЕНИЯ В ОБЩЕСТВЕ

Левосторонняя партия Морена - оплот действующего президента, имеющая большинство в конгрессе, в какой-то степени похожа на молодую «Единую Россию». Партия Морена еще не вербализирует, но уже содержит в себе тренды на антиамериканизм, дедолларизацию и экономическую переориентацию.

Идея дедолларизации очень популярна в обществе, в особенности на фоне укрепления мексиканского песо. В 2021 году доллар стоил 22 песо, сегодня 16,5 песо.

Современная Мексика очень активно налаживает экономическое сотрудничество с Бразилией. Бразилия для Мексики сегодня, как Китай для современной России. Большой альтернативный партнер и безопасный союзник. Все больше экономических акторов Мексики перестраиваются с рынка США на рынки стран Меркосур (Аргентина, Бразилия, Уругвай).



МЕКСИКАНСКОЕ ВОЗРОЖДЕНИЕ

Если в рамках предвыборной кампании кандидата от партии Morena (кандидат пока не назван, но это будет преемник действующего президента) в июне 2024 года будет разыграна великодержавная карта с откровенным акцентом на антиамериканизм, деолларизацию и требование вернуть на родину огромное количество мексиканских заключенных – количество таких заключенных огромно, но большинство из них не имеют того отношения к наркомафии, которое бы стоило тех пыток, унижений и сроков, которые эти люди получают в США – то особенно популярной такая риторика будет в тех штатах Мексики, которые традиционно исповедуют антиамериканизм. Это очень крупные штаты Нижняя Калифорния, Чиуауа, Сонора, Коауила. Что важно, антиамериканские настроения наиболее ярко проявлены среди наиболее бедных слоев. А более бедные страты как раз и являются группой поддержки партии Morena и, соответственно, обеспечивают наиболее высокую электоральную емкость. Также антиамериканцы – это семьи мигрантов, интеллигенция, участники патриотических движений.

В Мексике сегодня, как и в России 2000-х, очень развито реконструкторское движение. Отдельным направлением софинансирование реконструкторского движения в Мексике: всякого рода военно-исторических сообществ, которые разыгрывают на границе с США крупные батальные сцены.

Итак, представим себе, что в период с осени 2023 по лето 2024 года в Мексике силами правящей партии Morena разыгрывается яркая антиамериканская карта. Подключаются патриотические движения. Подключается коммунистическая партия Мексики, которая проводит активную русофильскую и просоветскую политику, часто участвуя в соответствующих культурных мероприятиях (на площадках под размещение наружной рекламы в Мехико, например, в 2023 году проходила масштабная выставка советского агитационного плаката). То есть, советское вошло в культуру Мексики очень сильно и заметно именно как антиамериканское.

Но в тех странах, в которых мы сегодня пытаемся разыграть эту карту, очень сложно добиться успеха по причине отсутствия экономического базиса. В Боливии или Венесуэле тотальная бедность порождает возможность легкой скупки голосов представителями проамериканских партий.

В Мексике это не так. Во-первых, *mexicanos no perdona* (мексиканцы не прощают).

Во-вторых, рана потери огромных сопредельных территорий жива в народном сознании, и в скором времени ожидается подготовка к «празднованию» трагической даты в «200 лет порознь».

В-третьих, в Мексике действительно идет технологический бум, идет развитие технологий, и, по крайней мере в крупных городах, Мексика начинает сравниваться по условиям жизни и доходам с уровнем жизни мексиканских мигрантов по ту сторону границы. Сегодня миграция мексиканцев в США, скорее, происходит по инерции, по старой ролевой модели, когда вид на жительство в США приносит некое удовлетворение.

Мексиканцы очень ценят свой паспорт. Более того, паспорт получают все рожденные в Мексике. Паспорт весьма сильный и, в целом, создает убедительную альтернативу паспорту американскому. По крайней мере, в странах Латинской Америки и даже Канаде.



МЕКСИКАНСКИЙ ПАС КАМПАНИИ

В это же самое время в Америке на выборах президента кандидатом от [REDACTED] с высокой долей вероятности может вновь стать [REDACTED]. Человек, который неоднократно говорил, что странно рассуждать о рисках для американских граждан из зоны соприкосновения российских и украинских войск, когда есть вполне понятная многотысячекилометровая линия соприкосновения США с наркобандами, отрядами «сикарио» (убийц), толпами разъяренных подчас беженцев, контрабандистов

и прославленными на весь мир высоким уровнем криминала и насилия приграничными городами Тихуана, Сьюдад-Хуарес, Теконапа и так далее. Особое отношение мексиканцев к смерти делает их перспективными сотрудниками для проектов типа ЧВК Вагнер, но на границах с Аризоной или Техасом.

██████████, который строил пограничную стену, ██████████, который говорил о проблеме мигрантов с юга практически на протяжении всего президентского срока, ██████████, которому необходимо дать на ногу удобный пас для того, чтобы переключить американскую политическую дискуссию, сегодня остро нуждается в обострении противостояния с Мексикой.

В чем основная потенциальная проблема кампании ██████████? В том, что экономика США сегодня растет. Выросли мировые цены на продовольствие. Предприятия ВПК получили новые заказы. Получается, что ██████████ как бы накормил реднеков: фермеров, рабочих, которые, собственно, и были зоной развития для ██████████. Сегодня карта стагнации выбита. Заводы ВПК и машиностроения, металлурги завалены заказами на грядущие 5-7 лет. Инфляция в зоне доллара ниже, чем в любой другой валютной зоне. Индекс покупки недвижимости низок как никогда – граждане не видят смысла уходить в недвижимость, ставки по ипотеке низки и все это говорит о том, что экономика очень здоровая.

Чтобы как-то подстегнуть общество при такой находящейся на очевидном подъеме экономике, надо создать ощутимую угрозу. Ракеты на Кубе, Никарагуа или Венесуэле немного смешны, потому что натыкаются на технологическое пренебрежение американцев к России. Формулировка про владельца бензоколонки с ядерной бомбой очень характерна и, по сути, соответствует действительности. Режим в Никарагуа в очень короткой перспективе может стать жертвой либо военного переворота, либо спецоперации американских командос. В любом случае, это территории, где мы играем на чужом поле. А есть ли смысл играть на чужом поле, когда есть партнер, который готов сыграть сам. Партнер, которому надо выигрывать выборы, надо вкладываться в концепцию текущего национально-исторического развития.

ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ

Такого рода контекст очень полезен для всех стран БРИКС. Ибо, как говорили в питерских дворах: «Каждому Абраму своя программа». Попытка децентрализации, а где-то и хаотизации процессов насаждения единой формы «приличий» в позиционировании государств – это наша задача.

И как раз такого рода проект покажет всему миру, что огромная 130-миллионная страна с самой протяженной границей с США, наконец проснулась. ██████████ однажды сказал, что американской экономике очень повезло: слева и справа молчат рыбы, наверху спит Канада, а внизу танцует Мексика. Таким образом, США просто не имеют угроз и не тратят силы на их компенсацию. Все угрозы происходят в некоем эзотерическом пространстве всемирного Запада и американоцентричной цивилизации.

Сегодня пришло время показать США, что эта угроза у них есть. И мы можем это сделать.

EXHIBIT 12A



The Comprehensive Information Outreach Project in Israel (and also Jewish Community Outreach in the US)

Project

The Project includes

- Online media
- Work with Israeli influencers
- Creating forums in Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Yandex-zen
- YouTube Channels
- Telegram Channels
- Comments in social media
- Targeted advertising in social media

The Project Goals:

At present, the situation in the state of Israel seems very favorable for launching a major project aimed at influencing public opinion. The goal of such influence is to rip Israel out of the general Western anti-Russian agenda and to create a sustainable **public opinion which would deem neo-Nazism and dictatorship in Ukraine, rendering aid to neo-Nazis, and**, therefore, the escalation of the conflict by the West and helping anti-Russian political emigration **unacceptable**.

Under current circumstances, these goals could be achieved in a relatively short term, relying on forces that in fact exist within the country as well as in the Jewish diaspora in the United States.

Based on this, the key indicator of the effectiveness of the project will be **an increase in the number of Israeli citizens supporting Russia in the fight against Nazism**.

The following thematic directions will be reflected within the framework of the Project:



- Nazism in modern Ukraine and sowing of fear from its across Europe and the world. Truth about the conflict in Ukraine;
- Parallels between Russia and Israel in how they handle the threat to its territorial integrity and national security;
- Stirring up interest to the US presidential campaign: stakes, rumors, forecasts;
- Facts unmasking Russian opposition members overseas (scandalous statements against Israel, religion, Jewish traditions, and bribing authorities)

In addition to the main goal, the Project will be directed at achieving the secondary goal, that is, to ensure background support and consensus related to legitimizing the election of RF President in 2024 in Israeli public opinion.

Analysis of Political Situation in Israel. Public Opinion Factor

The public opinion of Israelis and American Jews has been strictly polarized. The election in the fall of 2022 brought to power a coalition of right-wing and religious parties lead by **Foreign Official 1** which in turn caused a reaction from the left-wing "democratic" forces in the vein of "Maidan" or "colored revolutions". Tens of thousands of people rally "against **FO 1** and his reforms" in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Speakers at these demonstrations promise to reprisals against and murders of **Foreign Official 1** supporters. "Democrats" threaten Israel with an open civil war. This threat is so serious that has been acknowledged as such by the **Foreign Official 2**.

It's important to note that the "left-wingers" who seek to overthrow the **Foreign Official 1** government and to bring the "Maidan" to the country, in general share views of the **U.S. Political Party B** of the United States and are the target audience of the **U.S. Political Party B**. That means that one of the important points in their political agenda is expanding aid to Ukraine against Russia up to military supplies (Israel has been currently supplying only "humanitarian" aid to Ukraine). The left-wingers demand, in addition to other things, that Israel expend refugee admission from Ukraine (including the ones without a confirmed Jewish origin), and provides the Ukrainian refugees with living accommodations and employment, as well as expands financial aid to Ukrainians. The left-wingers also support the so-called "Great Aliyah", i.e. mass emigration of liberally minded Jews from Russia. Among such "Russian" Jews are celebrities like **Russian Celebrities 1, 2 and 3** and others. The leftists support their repatriation and anti-Russian political activities, despite bribery scandals associated with issuing Israeli documents to some of them.

Unlike the left-wingers, the right-wingers support the current government of Israel, stand up for reduction of aid to Ukraine, want the government to focus on internal problems and impose more stringent policy on refugees. The right-wingers have been trying to amend "the



repatriation law" so that grandchildren of Jews could no longer be eligible to immigrate, i.e. limiting and even terminating the "Great Aliyah" and consequently cessation of accepting liberal fugitives from Russia. The right-wingers don't want these people to influence Israel internal policy.

The right-wingers also want better relations with Russia (despite of existing controversies). **Foreign Official 1**, the current head of Israeli government, is considered a "friend of Putin".

A special attitude towards Russia and the President of Russia in general is characteristic of the right and moderate in Israel. Thus, for example, the former Prime-Minister of Israel **Foreign Official 3**, last interview includes a description of his negotiations with the Russian President in spring of 2022 and literally overflows with compliments addressed to the outstanding, perceptive, and wise Russian leader.

It's obvious that we need to support the legitimate Israeli government against the left-wingers supported by the **U.S. Political Party B**.

It is also obvious that the Jewish population of the US is divided with regards to the issues of Ukraine and Israel, just as the population of Israel itself.

Influencing the public opinion of Israel will impact the public opinion of Jewish voters in the US prior to the 2024 Presidential Elections.

Project Specifics. Objectives

1. Organization of comprehensive monitoring:

- Obtaining real-time information on posts and official publications of Israel associated with the list of the Project's topics.
- Compiling, continuous update of media card in social media (influencers, key bloggers)--search of statements and threads within the framework of the Project topics;
- Reporting about key newsworthy events (events, statements by influencers, statements by leaders) within the framework of the Project through prompt notification channel--the Pulse system.
- Gathering data about sociological research published in open source on the Project topics.

2. Analytical work:

- Developing recommendations on covering newsworthy events;



- Situational analysis of high-profile statements, speeches and events;
 - Studying sociological research data published in open source and preparing analytic conclusions;
 - Drafting presentations to be delivered at numerous Project events; developing lists of topics for seminars and round tables within the framework of the Project.
3. Creating and maintaining online media outlets' network (possible to organize under the unified brand "Normal Israel"¹):
 - News aggregator portal;;
 - Telegram channels;
 - Accounts in Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Zen, YouTube channel.
 4. Work on distribution of the content across the network--targeted advertising.
 5. Media posting (publishing materials on Telegram channels and Israeli media).
 6. Work in the comments, that is, support of topics on the list and attacking opponents.
 7. Content producing company (including with the augmented reality technologies):
 - Short reads and posts in social media;
 - Comments;
 - Long reads;
 - Videos, including animated;

¹ We propose to create a full-fledged three language right-wing information online project in Hebrew, Russian and English. The online project will target Jewish communities across the globe, first and foremost in Israel and the US.

The official ideology of the project should be moderately religious Zionism of Soviet Jews (approximately matches the ideology platforms of Likud and Religions Zionism parties which are part of the government coalition.

An important part of the Project ideology is **counter-measures against forgetting Holocaust**, or, rather, reminding, who specifically was eliminating Jews in Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Russia, to wit, --these were Bandera followers, Ukrainian nationalists whose legacy has been promoted by the modern Ukrainian government.

The legend of the Project—it is done selflessly by caring activists, Israelis, part of them preferring to work anonymously.



- Memes, pictures;
- Cartoons, photoshops.

Team and Scopes of Work

Project Team:

- Management--managing the project.
- Media monitoring group--daily monitoring.
- Social media monitoring--finding headline-making statements by influencers
- Analytic group--preparing analytic and social research materials
- Creative group—T3 for production, special projects, own newsworthy events (fake news)
- Production group--pictures, texts, videos.
- Group of special correspondents in Israel and media manager.
- Translation services.
- Distribution group--posting materials and comments in social media.
- Reporting group--collection of statistics and user reactions, generating reports.

Scope of work:

- Monitoring media outlets and social media--once a day.
- Analytical memos based on social studies--once a week
- Situational analysis--upon request.
- Pulse-Israel channel--prompt notification of events and statements--continuously.
- Texts of publications (to the portal / to "mirrors" of the publications)--four a day.
- Texts of posts (to the accounts in social media)--20 per day.
- Comments--300 a day.
- Graphic creative content (memes, caricatures)--three a day.
- Videos clips--three per week.



- Administering channels, accounts and portal--every day, on a continuous basis.



EXHIBIT 12B



Проект комплексной информационной работы в государстве Израиль (а также с еврейской общиной США)

Проект

Проект включает

- Онлайн-СМИ
- Работу с израильскими ЛОМаи
- Создание площадок в социальных сетях: Твиттер, Фейсбук, Инстаграмм, Яндекс.Дзен
- Ютуб-канал
- Телеграм-каналы
- Комментарии в социальных сетях
- Таргетированную рекламу в социальных сетях

Цели проекта

В настоящее время ситуация в государстве Израиль кажется очень выгодной для начала серьезного проекта воздействия на общественное мнение. Цель такого воздействия – вырвать Израиль из общезападной антироссийской повестки, создать устойчивое **общественное мнение, для которого будет неприемлемым неонацизм и диктатура на Украине, оказание помощи неонацистам, следовательно, эскалация конфликта со стороны запада, а также помощь антироссийской политической эмиграции.**

В сложившейся ситуации достичь этих целей можно в относительно короткие сроки, опираясь на реально существующие силы внутри страны и в еврейской диаспоре в США.

Ключевым показателем эффективности проекта исходя из этого будем считать **увеличение числа граждан Израиля, поддерживающих Россию в борьбе с нацизмом.**



В рамках Проекта будут отражаться следующие тематические линии:

- Нацизм в современной Украине и посев страха от его расползания по Европе и миру. Правда о конфликте на Украине;
- Параллели между Россией и Израилем в подходах к угрозе территориальной целостности и безопасности страны;
- Подогревание интереса к президентской кампании в США: ставки, слухи, прогнозы;
- Факты, разоблачающие российских оппозиционеров за рубежом (скандальные высказывания против Израиля, религии, традиционных еврейских устоев, подкуп властей).

Помимо основной Проект будет направлен на достижение второстепенной цели – обеспечение фоновой поддержки и консенсус о легитимации выборов Президента РФ в 2024 году в общественном мнении Израиля.

Анализ политической ситуации в Израиле. Фактор общественного мнения

Общественное мнение Израиля и еврейское население США в настоящее время жестко поляризовано. Приход к власти на выборах осенью 2022 года коалиции правых и религиозных партий во главе с [REDACTED] вызвал реакцию левых «демократических» сил по типу «майдана» или «цветной революции». На митингах «против [REDACTED] и его реформ» в Тель-Авиве и Иерусалиме собираются десятки тысяч людей. Речи ораторов на этих митингах включают обещания расправы и убийств по отношению к сторонникам Нетаньяху. [REDACTED] угрожают Израилю открытой гражданской войной. Эта угроза столь серьезна, что признана таковой президентом Израиля [REDACTED].

Важно отметить, что «левые», которые стремятся к свержению правительства Нетаньяху и к «майдану» в целом разделяют позиции и являются клиентелой [REDACTED] США. Это означает, что одним из важных пунктов их политической программы является расширение помощи Украине против России – вплоть до военных поставок (в настоящее время Израиль осуществляет лишь «гуманитарные» поставки на Украину). Левые требуют, помимо всего прочего, расширения приема беженцев с Украины (в том числе не имеющих подтвержденного еврейского происхождения) предоставления им жилья и рабочих мест, расширения финансовой помощи для украинцев. Левые также поддерживают «большую алию» – то есть массовую эмиграцию евреев либеральных взглядов из России. В числе этих «русских» евреев – такие известные деятели, как [REDACTED], [REDACTED],



██████████ и др. Левые поддерживают их репатриацию и антироссийскую политическую деятельность несмотря даже на коррупционные скандалы, связанные с выдачей израильских документов части из них.

В противоположность левым, правые, поддерживая действующее правительство Израиля, стоят за ограничение помощи Украине, сосредоточение правительства на внутренних проблемах, более жесткую политику по отношению к беженцам. Правые стремятся изменить «закон о возвращении» таким образом, чтобы им больше не могли пользоваться «внуки евреев» – то есть к ограничению и даже прекращению «большой алии» и, следовательно, прекращению приема либералов-беглецов из России. Правые не хотят, чтобы эти люди приобретали все в израильской внутренней политике.

Правые также хотели бы потепления в отношениях с Россией (несмотря на имеющиеся противоречия) Действующего руководителя правительства ██████████ в Израиле считают «другом Путина».

Особое отношение к России и президенту России вообще свойственно правым и умеренным в Израиле. Так, например, последнее интервью бывшего премьер-министра Израиля ██████████ содержит описание его переговоров с российским президентом (весной 2022 года) и буквально переполнено комплиментами в адрес выдающегося, проницательного, мудрого лидера России.

Очевидно, что необходимо поддержать законное правое правительство Израиля против левых, которых поддерживает ██████████ США.

Очевидно также, что еврейское население США расколото по отношению к израильским и украинским темам так же, как население самого Израиля.

Воздействие на общественное мнение в Израиле будет сказываться и на общественном мнении еврейских избирателей в Штатах накануне выборов президента 2024 года.

Конкретизация проекта. Задачи

1. Организация комплексного мониторинга:

- Получение оперативной информации о публикациях в официальных изданиях Израиля в ключе ТЛ Проекта;
- Составление, постоянная актуализация медиакарты в социальных сетях (ЛОМ, ключевые блогеры) – поиск высказываний, тредов в рамках тем Проекта;



- Сообщение о ключевых информационных поводах (событий, высказываний ЛОМ, заявлений лидеров) в рамках Проекта через канал оперативного оповещения – система “Пульс”;
- Сбор данных социологических исследований по темам Проекта, опубликованных в открытых источниках.

2. Аналитическая работа:

- Разработка рекомендаций по освещению информационных поводов;
- Ситуативный анализ резонансных заявлений, выступлений, событий;
- Изучение данных опубликованных в открытых источниках социологических исследований, подготовка аналитических выводов;
- Разработка докладов спикеров на различных мероприятиях в рамках Проекта; разработка тем семинаров / круглых столов в рамках Проекта.

3. Создание и ведение сети онлайн-СМИ (возможна организация под единым брендом “Нормальный Израиль”¹):

- Портал-агрегатор новостей;
- ТГ-каналы;
- аккаунты в твиттер, фейсбук, инстаграм, дзен, Ютуб-канал.

4. Работа по технологическому “разгону” контента в сети – таргетированная реклама.

5. Медиаразмещение (публикации материалов в ТГ-каналах и СМИ Израиля).

¹ Предлагается создание полноценного трехязычного (русский, иврит, английский), ориентированного на еврейские сообщества по всему миру, прежде всего в Израиле и США «правого» информационного онлайн-проекта.

Формальной идеологией Проекта должен быть умеренно религиозный сионизм светских евреев (Приблизительно соответствует идеологическим основаниям партий «Ликуд» и «Религиозный сионизм», входящих в правительственную коалицию).

Важная часть идеологии Проекта – **борьба с забвением памяти о холокосте**, точнее, о том, кто именно занимался уничтожением евреев на Украине, в Белоруссии, в Польше и в России – это были бандеровцы, украинские националисты, которым наследует современное украинское государство.

Легенда Проекта – его бескорыстно делают неравнодушные активисты, израильтяне, часть из которых предпочитает работать анонимно.



6. Работа в комментариях – поддержка тем в рамках ТЛ, атаки на оппонентов.
7. Фабрика по производству контента (в т.ч. с технологией “дополненной реальности”):
 - шортриды и посты в соцсетях;
 - комментарии;
 - лонгриды;
 - видеоролики, в том числе анимированные;
 - мемы, пикчи;
 - карикатуры, фотожабы.

Команда и объемы работ

Проектная команда:

- Менеджмент – управление проектом.
- Группа мониторинга СМИ – ежедневный мониторинг.
- Группа мониторинга соцсетей – выявление резонансных высказываний ЛОМов.
- Группа аналитики – подготовка аналитических материалов, социсследований.
- Группа креатива – ТЗ на производство, спецпроекты, собственные инфоповоды (фейки).
- Группа производства – картинки, тексты, видео.
- Группа соборов на территории Израиля и медиаменеджер.
- Бюро переводов.
- Группа распространения – размещение постов и комментариев в соц.сетях.
- Группа отчетности – сбор статистики и пользовательских реакций, формирование отчетов.

Объемы работ:

- Мониторинг СМИ и соцсетей – 1 в день.
- Аналитические справки по социсследованиям – 1 в неделю.



- Аналитические ситуативные материалы – по запросу.
- Канал "Пульс – Израиль" – оперативное оповещение о событиях и заявлениях – постоянно.
- Тексты публикаций (на портал / на "зеркала" изданий) – 4 в день.
- Тексты постов (на аккаунты в соцсетях) – 20 в день.
- Комментарии – 300 в день.
- Графический креативный контент (мемы, карикатуры) – 3 в день.
- Видеоролики – 3 в неделю.
- Администрирование каналов, аккаунтов, портала – ежедневно, постоянно.



EXHIBIT 13A

Disaster 24: The US will soon have its hands full with issues other than Israel

Defense Ministry, United States, war in Gaza

The elections in the United States will lead to an unprecedented internal confrontation. The most pessimistic experts are talking about the possibility of the country's breakup and even a large-scale civil war. How will this resonate in the outside world and, most importantly, in the Middle East?

The US elections will undoubtedly become the highlight of 2024. They will overshadow any possible turns in any war due to one simple reason – there is no chance that any election outcome will be accepted not only by the country's population, but also by the elite.

The decision of the Colorado Supreme Court to remove **Candidate A** from the state ballot in 2024 opened the road to the de-legitimization of the election results. The court ruled that the **U.S. Political Party A's** candidate **Candidate A** is not a suitable candidate for the US presidency because of the 14th amendment's "ban of insurrectionists". The amendment states that officials who have taken the oath to uphold the constitution are prohibited from holding office in the future if they "participated in a rebellion".

"No person <...> shall hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer or the United States <...> to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof."

The amendment was adopted in 1868, after the American Civil War, and was aimed at infringing upon the voting rights of Confederate statesmen in the South, which was part of the occupational policy of the victorious North during the so-called "Reconstruction". In other words, the appeal to it is already a sign of the serious divisions in society, comparable to the antagonism of the Civil War. It is worth mentioning that classifying the march on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, as an "insurrection" and classifying **Candidate A's** role as "participation in the insurrection" both look like a fairly controversial statement, if not outright lawlessness. It is not a surprise that members of the Supreme Court received a flood of threats since such ruling.

The State Supreme Court's decision will be delayed until January 4, 2024, until **Candidate A** appeals at the Federal Supreme Court. It is clear that the majority of **U.S. Political Party A** within the Federal Supreme Court will overturn this decision, yet it will not exhaust the narrative.

Colorado is a unique state. Traditionally a **U.S. Political Party A** state, it has voted for the **U.S. Political Party B** in the last three elections. Most likely now it is the **U.S. Political Party B** who will receive nine electoral votes in the state. It may not sound like much, yet still... **Candidate A** does not really need Colorado by itself. The main struggle is supposed to unfold in six so-called "swing states" (*swing state*) in which neither **U.S. Political Party B** nor **U.S. Political Party A**

have consistent support: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. That is where the main struggle will unfold.

The results of the latest polls in these states show that **Candidate A** is definitely ahead of **Candidate B** in five states: Nevada – 52:41, Arizona – 49:44, Georgia – 49:43, Michigan – 48:43, and Pennsylvania – 48:44. Only in Wisconsin **Candidate B** maintains a slight advantage – 47:45. However, judging by the overall dynamics, this won't last long.

However, Colorado has set a legal precedent that will spread to other states as well. Sixteen more states have decided to follow Colorado's example and demanded for ex-president **Candidate A** to be banned from the primaries.

According to a significant number of experts, in the event of **Candidate A's** victory (his victory becomes more and more apparent if he cannot be removed from the elections), the leadership of the democratic states may refuse to recognize the result by declaring the decision of the Supreme Court unconstitutional. In the event of **Candidate A's** removal, the **U.S. Political Party A** will refuse to recognize the election results. According to many experts, the emergence of separate confederations of **U.S. Political Party A** and **U.S. Political Party B** states seems very likely.

Movie director **U.S. Person 6** is making a film about a future civil war in the United States; the film will be released by the time of the elections. It is not outside the realm of probability that the events described in the film will begin immediately after the premiere.

How does this prospect threaten the rest of the world? Even if it does not lead to a civil war, a purely political internal division will be enough for the US international politics to fall into a stupor.

Today's world is a collection of many frozen conflicts. Almost all of them are frozen, but many of them have been really ignited by US efforts. Americans have not allowed any of those conflicts to turn into final victory by either side, which would guarantee peace in a given region for at least 15-20 years. Our war with HAMAS is one of those conflicts that was switched on when the plan to change the power in Israel "peacefully" through "a color revolution" failed...

In some ways, this activity resembles the activities of a terrorist, who is rigging with explosives a house of civilians: "Should something happen to me, we all fly into the air together." A world rigged with explosives served as an additional guarantee of the American hegemony. But when the terrorist suddenly falls in an epileptic fit, the explosives start to explode at random...

The world is facing a period of bloody chaos until the regional powers restore at least some order. Unless, of course, those powers themselves fly at each other's throats...

For Israel, wrapping the US in a cocoon of internal problems would mean international isolation, greater than the one Russia is experiencing now. Europe has clearly demonstrated its readiness to join the camp of Israel's enemies. It is only the American leash that maintains a fragile balance.

It is important to understand that Europe will not be able to realistically help Arabs, as Europe will be completely taken by what is happening by its eastern borders. There, without the American support, Ukraine will be rapidly dismantled, and Russian troops will reach the European border.

Israel will find itself in a situation when the external isolation will be compensated by the absence of any external deterrent. We will fight the war as we see fit, without the American shouts and unnecessary losses caused by the forced containment of the power of attacks on the Arabs. In some ways, such situation would probably be preferable to what is happening today.

Conclusion:

Last year 2023 showed that the United States is deceiving Israel. If there is no support in 2024 either, the consequences will be horrendous for us.

Comments:

1. Getting the US variable out of the Middle East equation would not be the worst prospect. Given the toughening of the **Candidate B** administration's position, assistance from the US will dwindle, while the US interference will continue to grow.
2. A civil war might be too bold of an assumption, yet a deep division is inevitable. The division will be followed if not by a complete rejection of the involvement in the foreign political activity, then by its significant weakening.
3. The solution of the Gaza problem will cost several years (or several decades) of international isolation.
4. A civil war in a country with nuclear power would lead to an overly unpredictable course of events. Let's hope that the internal division will freeze at the "cold war" stage.
5. A war in the US is inevitable anyway, although it may not happen right after this election. **U.S. Political Party B** are leading the United States in the path of Southern Rhodesia, which turned into Zimbabwe. It means that the black population, despite all the concessions from the whites, sooner or later will simply try to slaughter them.

Please write a comment of 200 characters on behalf of an average Israeli puzzled by the painted prospect, yet who does not find it to be too terrible and who even finds some advantages in it.

EXHIBIT 13B

Катастрофа 24: США вскоре станет не до Израиля

МО, США, война в Газе

Выборы в США приведут к беспрецедентному внутреннему противостоянию, самые пессимистичные эксперты говорят о возможности раскола страны и даже масштабной гражданской войны. Как это отзовется во внешнем мире, и, в первую очередь, на Ближнем Востоке?

Главным событием 2024 года станут, несомненно, выборы в США. Они заслонят любые возможные повороты в любой войне по одной простой причине – нет никаких шансов на то, что любой результат выборов примут не только население страны, но и элиты.

Дорогу к делигитимации результатов выборов открыло решение Верховного суда штата Колорадо об исключении ██████████ из избирательного бюллетеня штата в 2024 году. Суд постановил, что кандидат от ██████████ партии ██████████ не является подходящим кандидатом в президенты США из-за «запрета повстанцев», предусмотренного 14-й поправкой. Эта поправка гласит, что должностным лицам, давшим клятву поддерживать Конституцию, запрещается занимать должности в будущем, если они «участвовали в мятеже»:

«Ни одно лицо не может занимать <...> какую-либо должность, гражданскую или военную, учрежденную Соединенными Штатами или каким-либо штатом, если оно в качестве члена конгресса или должностного лица Соединенных Штатов <...> ранее приняв присягу о том, что будет поддерживать Конституцию США, впоследствии участвовало в мятеже или восстании против США либо оказывало помощь или поддержку их врагам».

Поправка была принята в 1868 году, после Гражданской войны в США, и была направлена на ущемление избирательных прав государственных деятелей Конфедерации южных штатов, что было частью оккупационной политики победителей-северян в период т.н. «Реконструкции». Т.е. само обращение к ней уже является признаком серьезнейшего раскола в обществе, сравнимого с антагонизмом времен Гражданской войны. Не говоря уже о том, что и квалификация марша на Капитолий 6 января 2021 года, как «мятеж», и квалификация роли ██████████ в этих событиях, как «участие в мятеже» выглядят как достаточно спорное утверждение, если не прямой юридический произвол. Неудивительно, что члены Верховного суда после такого решения столкнулись с потоком угроз.

Решение Верховный суд штата будет отложено до 4 января 2024 года, пока [REDACTED] не подаст апелляцию в Верховный суд США. Очевидно, что [REDACTED] большинство в Верховном суде США отменит это решение. Но это отнюдь не исчерпает сюжет.

Колорадо – специфический штат. Традиционно отдающий голоса за [REDACTED], он последние трое выборов голосовал за [REDACTED] и сейчас, в общем-то, тоже, скорее всего, именно демократы получают 9 голосов выборщиков штата. Немного, но все-таки. Сам по себе Колорадо [REDACTED] не очень нужен. Основная борьба должна развернуться в шести т. н. «колеблющихся штатах» (swing state), где традиционно ни [REDACTED] ни [REDACTED] не имеют устойчивой поддержки: Аризона, Джорджия, Мичиган, Невада, Пенсильвания и Висконсин. Вот там и развернется основная борьба.

Результаты последних опросов в этих штатах показывают, что в пяти из них [REDACTED] уверенно опережает [REDACTED] Невада – 52:41, Аризона – 49:44, Джорджия – 49:43, Мичиган – 48:43, Пенсильвания – 48:44. Только в Висконсине [REDACTED] сохраняет небольшое преимущество – 47 против 45. Но, судя по общей динамике, это ненадолго.

Но Колорадо создал юридический прецедент, который распространиться и на другие штаты. Еще шестнадцать штатов решили последовать примеру Колорадо и потребовали не допустить экс-президента США [REDACTED] до праймериз.

По мнению значительного числа экспертов, в случае победы [REDACTED] (а она становится все более очевидной, если его не сумеют отстранить от выборов), руководство демократических штатов может отказаться признавать их результат, объявив решение Верховного суда неконституционным. В случае же отстранения [REDACTED], результаты выборов откажутся признавать [REDACTED]. По мнению многих экспертов, возникновение отдельных конфедераций [REDACTED] и [REDACTED] штатов представляется весьма вероятным.

Режиссер [REDACTED] снимает к выборам фильм о будущей гражданской войне в США. Не исключено, что описываемые в нем события начнутся сразу после премьеры фильма.

Чем такая перспектива грозит всему остальному миру? Даже если дело не дойдет до гражданской войны, достаточно будет чисто политического внутреннего раскола, чтобы международная политика США впала в ступор.

Сегодняшний же мир представляет собой совокупность множества замороженных конфликтов. Почти все они заморожены, а многие из них до

того разожжены стараниями США. Ни одному из них американцы не позволили дойти до окончательной победы одной из сторон, что гарантировало бы мир в конкретном регионе по крайней мере на протяжении 15-20 лет. Наша война с ХАМАС – один из таких конфликтов, который был включен, когда потерпел крушение план сменить власть в Израиле «мирным путем», через «цветную революцию»...

В чем-то эта деятельность напоминает деятельность террориста, минирующего дом с мирными жителями: «Если со мной что-то случится – на воздух взлетим все вместе». Заминированный мир служил дополнительной гарантией американской гегемонии. Но когда террорист вдруг начинает биться в эпилептическом припадке – мины начинают взрываться в случайном порядке...

Мир ждет период кровавого хаоса, пока региональные державы наведут хоть какой-то порядок – если, конечно, сами эти державы не вцепятся друг другу в глотку...

Для Израиля закаливание США в коконе внутренних проблем означает международную изоляцию, большую, чем та, в которой сейчас находится Россия. Европа наглядно демонстрирует готовность перейти в лагерь врагов Израиля, только американский поводок поддерживает хрупкое равновесие.

Другое дело, что помочь арабам делом Европа будет не в состоянии – она будет полностью поглощена происходящим на своих восточных границах, где без американской поддержки произойдет стремительный демонтаж Украины, и русские войска выйдут на границу ЕС.

Израиль окажется в ситуации, когда внешняя изоляция будет компенсироваться отсутствием какого-либо внешнего сдерживающего фактора. Мы будем вести войну так, как считаем нужным, без американских окриков и лишних потерь, вызванных вынужденным сдерживанием мощи ударов по арабам. Возможно, в каком-то смысле такая ситуация окажется более предпочтительной, чем то, что происходит сегодня.

Подводка:

Прошедший 2023 год показал: США обманывают Израиль. Если и в 2024 году поддержки не будет, последствия для нас будут ужасные.

Комментарии:

1. Выключить из ближневосточного уравнения переменную СЩА – не самая худшая перспектива. Учитывая ужесточение позиции администрации ██████████ – американская помощь будет сходиться на нет, а помехи с ее стороны будут только возрастать.
2. Гражданская война – слишком смелое допущение, но глубокий раскол неизбежен. А из него следует если не полный отказ от внешнеполитической активности, то, существенное ее ослабление.
3. Решение проблемы Газы стоит нескольких (или нескольких десятков) лет международной изоляции.
4. Гражданская война в стране с ядерным оружием – слишком непредсказуемый ход событий. Будем надеяться, внутренний раскол замрзнет на стадии «холодной войны».
5. Война в США неизбежна в любом случае, пусть даже не после этих выборов. ██████████ ведут США по пути Южной Родезии, превратившейся в Зимбабве – а это означает, что черное население, несмотря на любые уступки белых, рано или поздно попытается их просто вырезать.

Напишите комментарий в 200 знаков от имени рядового израильтянина, озадаченного нарисованной перспективой, но не находящего ее слишком ужасной и даже находящего в ней свои плюсы.