


2024

# DEFENSE OF JAPAN



MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

# On the Publication of "Defense of Japan 2024"

**KIHARA Minoru**

Minister of Defense

木原 稔



The international community has entered a new era of crisis. It is now facing its greatest trial since the end of World War II. The existing order is being seriously challenged. Japan finds itself in the most severe and complex security environment of the post-war era.

China has been rapidly building up military capabilities while intensifying its activities in the East China Sea, where the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands are, as well as in the Pacific. North Korea has been advancing its nuclear and missile development and pushing ahead with the launch of ballistic missiles and others. Russia has been conducting intensive military activities in the Far East encompassing the Northern Territories, while continuing its aggression against Ukraine. Russia has also been observed engaging in joint activities with China involving aircraft and vessels.

Amidst the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are committed to protecting the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese people and defending Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace to the end. In fulfillment of these missions, the MOD/SDF will drive the implementation of policies expressed in the National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program.

These policies consist of three major objectives. The first one is to steadily actualize a fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities of Japan. Building future core defense capabilities such as stand-off and IAMD (Integrated Air and Missile Defense) must be prioritized. Therefore, Japan is going to acquire various types of stand-off missiles earlier than originally planned, including Tomahawk missiles and the ground-launched version of upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles. Japan will expedite the start of the construction of Aegis System Equipped Vessels to defend herself from increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles and other threats. Enhancing sustainability and resiliency is another important task. Japan will thus proceed to improve the operational availability of equipment, secure sufficient ammunition and guided missiles, and promote focused investments to improve the resiliency of defense facilities.

The second major objective is to cooperate with our ally, like-minded countries, and other partners. No country can now protect her own security alone. As challenges to the existing international order continue, it is critical for Japan to deepen cooperation and collaboration with our ally, like-minded countries, and other partners with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests.

The Alliance with the United States is the cornerstone of our national security policy. Japan will steadily implement concrete measures to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

At the same time, it is important for Japan to enhance cooperation with like-minded countries and other partners to ensure peace and stability of the region. Japan will implement measures which contribute to realizing the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific". To this end, Japan will proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, such as bilateral/multilateral exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation, taking into account characteristics and other factors of the region and each country. Such cooperation is represented by the joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft. This joint development aims to enhance the performance of fighters, which constitutes the core defense capability of Japan. It will serve to the world a basis of security, stability, and prosperity over the coming decades.

There has also been progress in multilateral cooperation centering on Japan and the United States. Last December, Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea began the operation of the real-time sharing of missile warning data on North Korea. Around that time, the Australian Defence Force participated for the first time in two Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercises: "Keen Edge" and "Yama Sakura." Japan will promote such cooperation.

The third major objective is to reinforce our human resource base, which is an urgent one. As Japan is in a midst of serious labor shortages, there is an increasingly fierce competition to secure human resources. SDF personnel constitutes the core element of defense capabilities of Japan. To procure excellent human resources in the competitive recruiting environment, we will take all necessary measures to reinforce our human resource base without ruling out any options. These consist of the enhancement of SDF recruitment capabilities, the effective use of human resources, the improvement of living and working environments, and the reformation of remuneration systems.

Harassment has no place in the MOD/SDF, as an organization where people matter. Recognizing that harassment damages the mutual trust among SDF personnel and shakes the very foundation of the entire organization, we will continue to create a working environment of zero tolerance for harassment of any kind by implementing effective harassment prevention measures.

"Defense of Japan 2024" describes the security environment surrounding Japan and the efforts of the MOD/SDF as have been outlined above. In particular, we took care to comprehensively explain our progress towards the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities of Japan; or in other words, how Japan's defense and deterrence capabilities have been taking stable steps towards reinforcement. The year 2024 marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the SDF, and "Defense of Japan 2024" is the 50th commemorative issue of Japan Defense White Paper. The opening pages touch upon the 70-year history of the SDF as a special feature article.

Efforts of the MOD/SDF, including the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, would not be made possible without the understanding and support by the Japanese people and countries around the world. I hope this white paper will help as many readers as possible to facilitate a better comprehension of the security environment surrounding Japan and the efforts made by the MOD/SDF.

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**VOICE** “VOICE” contains thoughts and impressions from an individual standpoint by JDF personnel on the field and outside concerned parties.

**Perspective** “Perspective” is the analysis by a researcher of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) from a more academic point of view based on an individual standpoint. This is the researcher’s own version of analysis, relying on publicly available materials, and does not represent the official view of the Japanese government or the Ministry of Defense.

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## The Concept of the Drawing on the Front Cover ~ Swordsmith ~

Since its establishment, the MOD/SDF has been working very hard to forge its “sword” to avoid having to draw it. By forging the “sword,” i.e., deterrence, the MOD/SDF has been deterring a military invasion of Japan. Commemorating the 70th anniversary of the SDF’s establishment, the drawing represents steady progress in bolstering deterrence capabilities and the determination of the MOD/ SDF to make continuous efforts, under the National Security Strategy of Japan and other security documents.

- The Defense of Japan white paper was first published in 1970, and has been published annually since 1976. The purpose of publishing this paper is to make the current status, issues and initiatives of Japan’s defense common knowledge for as many people as possible, as simply as possible.
- This edition of Defense of Japan covers the defense and security environment of Japan and the initiatives of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) during the one-year period from April 2023 to March 2024. However, certain important events that took place in April 2024 and beyond are also described.
- Maps in this paper may contain omissions depending on the design and layout and may not necessarily show the entire Japanese territory.
- To facilitate access to the latest information even after this White Paper is published, QR codes have been included to link readers to the relevant pages on the MOD website (created based on URLs as of June 2024). Previous editions of Defense of Japan, including this edition, can be viewed on the MOD website, so please feel free to make use of it.
- The photo on the back cover shows uniformed SDF personnel saluting KIMURA Tokutaro, the first Director General of the Defense Agency, in the ceremony marking the agency’s establishment.

■ 2024 DEFENSE of Japan  
[https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w\\_paper/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/index.html)



### Legend

The terms below will be abbreviated as follows in this White Paper, and other terms may also be abbreviated appropriately. (Official names may be used in some cases for explanatory purposes.)

- |                                       |                                  |   |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Ministry of Defense → MOD          | 5. Air Self-Defense Force → ASDF | 9. Air Staff Office → ASO                     |
| 2. Self-Defense-Forces → SDF          | 6. Joint Staff Office → JSO      | 10. National Security Strategy of Japan → NSS |
| 3. Ground Self- Defense Force → GSDF  | 7. Ground Staff Office → GSO     | 11. National Defense Strategy → NDS           |
| 4. Maritime Self-Defense Force → MSDF | 8. Maritime Staff Office → MSO   | 12. Defense Buildup Program → DBP             |
|                                       |                                  | 13. United Nations → UN                       |

# DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2024

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE





# 70 Years of the SDF as described in the Defense White Papers

The Ministry of Defense (MOD), formerly the Defense Agency (DA), and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) was established on July 1, 1954, and marks its 70th anniversary in 2024.

“Defense of Japan 2024” is the 50th issue of Japan’s Defense White Paper since the first edition was published in 1970.

This feature shows a 70-year history of the MOD/SDF—which has worked in step with the public—as described in the past 50 defense white papers.

Note: The coverage of events that happened before the first defense white paper was published is based on descriptions in successive white papers up to the 2024 Defense White Paper, with a special focus on features and other articles in the 1994 Defense White Paper (the 40th anniversary of the SDF) and the 2004 Defense White Paper (the 50th anniversary of the SDF).

## The Period from the SDF’s Establishment to the Subsequent Gradual Buildup of Defense Capabilities

1949

### NATO established

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and German Democratic Republic (East Germany) established  
People’s Republic of China established  
1950

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed  
Korean War broke out



12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty (April 1949) [NATO website]

1953

USSR carried out its first hydrogen bomb test

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea

1954

### Paris Agreement signed

West Germany recovered sovereignty, being allowed to rearm and join NATO



[NATO website]

Political and military rivalries between the East and West blocs over political, economic, and ideological differences during the Cold War

July 1, 1954

Defense Agency established  
Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces established  
Joint Staff Council established



The Battle of Inchon in the Korean War. [AFP/Jiji Press Photo]



Through the GHQ, the U.S. asked the Government of Japan (GOJ) to dispatch a minesweeper unit of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to Korea in order to fill the gap in the minesweeping capabilities in its landing operations. The photo shows “Yuchidori”, the flagship of the JCG unit.

1952

### National Safety Agency established

The purpose was to complement the general police force. It did not reach an established defense force at this point.

1954

### Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDA) signed based on U.S. Mutual Security Act (MSA)

MSA, which involved the integration of economic assistance and a strengthened military alliance, called on Japan to make defense efforts on its own.



Ceremony marking the establishment of the DA (SDF personnel saluting Director General KIMURA Tokutarō)

1945

## The End of World War II



After the war, the allied forces occupied and disarmed Japan. [Jiji Press Photo]

### 1950 National Police Reserve established

Background: There was growing concern about public order in Japan after the bulk of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) was deployed to the Korean peninsula after the Korean War started.

1952

### Maritime Guard established

As an organization within the JCG

1951

### Treaty of Peace with Japan and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed

- Japan provides facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces.
- Treaty of Peace with Japan meant the recovery of Japan’s sovereignty(1952), but it left Japan dependent on U.S. Forces for its security.

SDF flag (left) and SDF naval ensign (right) instituted upon the DA’s establishment  
Director General KIMURA Tokutarō (center)



In Charleston, the U.S., JS Asakaze and JS Hatakaze were transferred to the MSDF at the first transfer ceremony under the Agreement for the loan of U.S. naval vessels to Japan (October 1954)



The duty to defend Hokkaido was transferred from U.S. Forces’ XVI Corps to the GSDF Northern Army (September 1954)

## Legend

- : International affairs
- : Reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities
- : Japan-U.S. relations
- : International contribution / international exchange / cooperation with other countries, etc
- : Other

1955

### Warsaw Pact Organization established 1962

#### Cuban Missile Crisis

- USSR launched construction of a nuclear missile base in Cuba, escalating tensions between U.S. and USSR.
- Post-crisis efforts to avert a critical confrontation or a catastrophe between the two countries led to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 1 (SALT I) in 1972.



President Kennedy ordered a naval blockade in response to the Soviet Union building a nuclear missile base in Cuba. [Avalon/Jiji Press Photo]

1964

### Gulf of Tonkin incident

In response, U.S. Forces bombed torpedo boat bases in North Vietnam.  
**China conducted its first nuclear test**

From cir. 1970  
**Détente**

- East-West relations remained stable.
- The United States restrained its defense efforts.
  - The USSR consistently built up its military capabilities and expanded into Southeast Asia, Africa, etc. to increase its political influence there.

**Ease of tensions between the United States and the USSR (Détente)**



1976  
2nd Defense White Paper published (Published annually from then on)

1970

1st Defense White Paper published

# 1957 Basic Policy on National Defense

- Supporting UN activities and promoting international collaboration to realize world peace
- Stabilizing the livelihood of the people, fostering patriotism, and thereby, establishing the necessary basis of national security
- Building up rational defense capabilities by steps within the limit necessary for self-defense in accordance with national strength and situation
- Dealing with external aggression, based on the security arrangement with the U.S., until the United Nations will be able to fulfill its functions in stopping such aggression effectively in the future

1954

SDF Reserve Personnel System introduced

## Gradual buildup of defense capabilities

### Buildup of defense capabilities

#### First Defense Buildup Program (1st DBP) (1957)

- 1st DBP called for the buildup of minimum necessary self-defense capabilities commensurate with the national strength

#### 2nd DBP (1961), 3rd DBP (1966), 4th DBP (1972)

- Under these DBPs, The aim of building up defense capabilities was to effectively respond to aggression in local or lower-level wars involving conventional weapons.

### Joint operations

#### The Joint Staff Council's authority put under review (1961)

- Grant authority to execute DA chief's orders to joint force

#### Joint Staff College established (1961)

## Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

#### Japan-U.S. Security Treaty re-signed (1960)

- Clarifying the U.S. obligation to defend Japan
- Deleting the provision so called "internal riots clause" that allowed U.S. Forces to put down internal riots in Japan
- Setting a framework of prior consultation between Tokyo and Washington regarding actions to be taken by U.S. Forces



The first joint maritime transport exercise by the Ground, Maritime and Air SDF in Shizuoka Prefecture (1962)

1956

### Relocation of the Defense Agency



Completed new DA building in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo (From Etchujima to Kasumigaseki)

1960

### Relocation of the Defense Agency



New DA HQ in Roppongi (Hinoki-cho), Tokyo (From Kasumigaseki to Hinoki-cho)

1962


### Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) established



DFAA plate mounted (November 1962)

1964

### SDF supported Tokyo Olympics



The ASDF Blue Impulse drawing the five rings over Tokyo at the 18th Olympic Games in Tokyo

## Return of Okinawa

### Aichi-Rogers talks (1971)

- The Agreement on the Return of Okinawa was signed

### Return of Okinawa (1972)

- Following Okinawa's reversion to Japan, the GOJ provided USFJ facilities and areas under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.



An MSDF vessel unloading 54 billion yen in cash at Naaha Port, Okinawa Prefecture, for conversion from USD to JPY following Okinawa's reversion

## Arms Exports

Three Principles on Arms Exports were declared at the Diet (1967)  
Arms exports to the following countries or regions shall not be permitted:

- (1) communist bloc countries,
- (2) countries subject to "arms" exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council's resolutions, and
- (3) countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.

The Government's Unified View on Arms Export announced (1976)  
Arms exports to areas not subject to the Three Principles shall also be restrained.

1971

### All Nippon Airways plane collided with SDF aircraft



Crashed ANA plane, and SDF personnel in search and rescue operations near Shizukuishi, Iwate Prefecture



Maiden flight of Hinomaru-marked jets (T-33) over Kyushu (January 1955)



The National Defense Academy holding its first graduation ceremony (March 1957)




Demonstrators opposing the new security treaty in front of the Diet (January 1960)



Between the late-1950s and the late 1960s, the SDF helped farmers with rice planting and others, mainly in rural Hokkaido and Tohoku in the busy farming season as requested by local governments.

# The Period of the Basic Defense Force Concept and the Period of International Contribution

## Main Military Forces in Japan's Surroundings (Approximate Strength) (FY1976)



(Note) 1 Compiled from the 1977 Defense White Paper.  
 2 The number of U.S. troops stationed in these countries indicates the combined total for ground, naval, and air forces.  
 3 Figures in parentheses indicate the military force of Marine Corps.  
 4 Figures for Japan indicate the actual strength.  
 5 - - - - - indicates the actual strength of Japan as of 1976.

Religious and ethnic tensions became apparent

1989  
End of the Cold War declared  
1990  
East and West Germany unified



The Berlin Wall, a symbol of the Cold War, was torn down in 1989. [EPA/Jiji Press Photo]

1990  
Iraq invaded Kuwait



The Gulf War started when the multilateral forces resorted to the use of force in order to eliminate the Iraqi aggression and secure peace and security in the Gulf region. [AFP/Jiji Press Photo]

1991  
Warsaw Pact dissolved

1991  
Civil war broke out in Yugoslavia

The end of the Cold War

1976  
MiG-25 landed at Hakodate Airport without permission



The Soviet military aircraft made an unauthorized landing at Hakodate Airport. This incident highlighted such issues as how radar sites should cope with aircraft intruding at low altitude and a gap in the early warning and surveillance functions. This in turn led to the introduction of airborne early warning aircraft and improvements to communication structures.

1979  
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

1983  
Soviet military aircraft shot down KAL airliner  
1987  
U.S. and USSR signed Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

Setting out the GOJ's views as specifically as possible on what Japan's defenses should look like to form national consensus on this issue

1976  
Formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines (1976 NDPG)


• "Basic Defense Force Concept"  
 • Japan is to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capabilities as an independent nation to prevent itself from creating a power vacuum that would destabilize the area surrounding Japan, instead of directly countering military threats to Japan.

### Japan-U.S. Alliance

Subcommittee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation established (1976)  
 Cabinet approved Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978)  
 • Calling for studies on joint defense planning for the defense of Japan as well as bilateral training and exercises  
 • Defining the roles of Japan and the United States in case of contingencies in Japan



Destroyer JS "Hiei" navigating alongside a U.S. aircraft carrier during the SDF's first participation in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) hosted by the U.S. Navy (1980)



Out of consideration that mutual technological exchanges with the United States in the defense sector are extremely important to ensure effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1976  
"GNP 1% ceiling" adopted for defense spending  
The Immediate-Term Defense Buildup Program" (Cabinet decision on November 5, 1976) called for limiting total annual defense-related expenditures to less than 1% of gross national product for the time being.

1983  
Transfer of military technologies to U.S. approved  
The Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that such provision was not subject to the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

1987  
The GNP 1% ceiling rescinded  
The GOJ said that although it would not apply the GNP 1% ceiling<sup>1</sup>, it would continue to respect the spirit of seeking a moderate defense buildup<sup>2</sup>.

(Notes)  
 1 "Plans for Dealing with the Immediate-Term Defense Buildup Program," which was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on November 5, 1976, in the FY1987 Budget (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 30, 1986)  
 2 The Program for the Future Buildup of Defense Capability (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on January 24, 1987)

**Legend**

- : International affairs
- : Reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities
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**Spread of nuclear and missile threats**

1993

North Korea declared the withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)  
North Korea conducted a ballistic missile test launch toward the central Sea of Japan



An array of North Korean missiles in the military parade celebrating the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People's Army. [Korea News Service/Jiji Press Photo]

While the likelihood of a global armed conflict has become distant, security concerns diversified.

**1995  
Formulation of the National Defense Program Guideline (1995 NDPG)**

- Basically following the Basic Defense Force Concept
- "Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters" and "contributing to building a more stable security environment" added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of "defense of the nation"

**Contributing to building a more stable security environment**

**Enforcement of the International Peace Cooperation Act and amendment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law (1992)**

- Developed a domestic structure focusing on human resources for more active contribution to the international community



The SDF's first international peace cooperation activity in Cambodia. The SDF conducted road and bridge repairs, ceasefire monitoring, and other activities.



Dispatch of SDF to international peace cooperation assignments including :

- Cambodia (1992–1993)
- Mozambique (1993–1995)
- Rwanda (1994)
- The Golan Heights (1996–2013)
- etc.

**Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (the SDF Law) (1994)**

- The transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas was added as a duty of the SDF

**Amendment of the SDF Law (1999)**

- The use of SDF vessels and shipboard helicopters, in addition to SDF aircraft, is now allowed to transport Japanese nationals and others overseas



Training for transporting Japanese nationals and others overseas (leading people to the onboard boat)

**Japan-U.S. Alliance**

The unfortunate incident in 1995 led to the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) (1996 The SACO Final Report).



The SACO Final Report agreed to return some 21% in area of the facilities and areas of the USFJ located in Okinawa Prefecture at the time. The photo shows Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, the total return of which was stipulated in the report. [Ginowan City Website]

**Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (1996)  
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation revised (1997)**

- Studying and making revisions in three areas: (i) cooperation under normal circumstances, (ii) actions in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (iii) cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan

**The Act Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan came into force (1999)**

- Providing for measures that Japan will take in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan (rear area support, rear area search and rescue operations, etc.) as well as for implementation procedures among other requirements.



The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed the importance of Japan-U.S. security arrangements as a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. relations, and made clear what the Japan-U.S. Alliance should look like in the 21st century. [Jiji Press Photo]

1996

**North Korean mini-submarine ran aground on the east coast of ROK, and its crew intruded into ROK territory**



A North Korean submarine designed to carry special operations forces ran aground in the ROK's territorial waters. Its crew and armed agents on board intruded into the ROK's territory. [Jiji Press Photo]

1999

**Kosovo conflict breaks out**



2000

1999

**2000  
Relocation of the Defense Agency**



Ichigaya area at the time of relocation (Hinokicho => Ichigaya)

**Strengthening Japan's architecture for national defense**

**Joint operations**

The Defense Intelligence Headquarters established (1997)  
The authority of the Joint Staff Council (JSC) strengthened (1999)

- The JSC now assists the DA chief in disaster relief operations and international disaster relief activities in addition to defense and public security operations.

The Central Command Post started operations following the relocation of the DA (2000)



Joint arrangements in action for disaster relief operations following the eruption of Mt. Miyake. The photo shows a RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft flying near Miyakejima Island.

**Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)**

The G0J and the U.S. signed the Exchange of Notes and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Japan and the U.S. on Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on BMD (1999)

The government decided to introduce the BMD system (2003)

**Amendment of the SDF Law (2005)**

- Paving the way for responding with the BMD system when no defense operation orders are given



SDF Ready Reserve Personnel in training

**The SDF Ready Reserve Personnel System introduced (1998)**

**Dealing with various contingencies such as large-scale disasters**


**The Great Hanshin and Awaji Earthquake and the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack (1995)**



**The Basic Act on Disaster Management and the SDF Law amended, the Defense Agency Disaster Prevention Plan amended (1995)**

- Additional authority to uniformed SDF personnel in a disaster relief operation (e.g., the authority to ensure the passage of emergency vehicles when no police officers are around)
- Clarified criteria for discretionary dispatches and closer cooperation with local governments

Main Military Forces in Japan's Surroundings (Approximate Strength) (FY2004)



(Note) 1 Compiled from the 2005 Defense White Paper.  
 2 Figures for the ground forces of U.S. Forces Japan/Korea indicate the combined total for Army troops and U.S. Marines.  
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# The Period of New Threats, Diverse Contingencies, and a Growing Role of Defense Capabilities

China expands and increases activities in surrounding waters

## 2001 The 9/11 terrorist attacks



[dpa/Jiji Press Photo]

## 2003 Iraq War broke out



[AFP=Jiji]

## Developments in North Korea

A missile launched by North Korea (presumed to be Taepodong 1) passed over Japan (1998)



[AFP=Jiji]

Discovery of a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula (1999)



Nuclear test (2006)

• From the onward, one such test each in 2009, 2013, and 2017, as well as two in 2016.

- New threats, such as international terrorism and ballistic missile attacks
- The direct connection between world peace and Japan's peace
- Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on deterrence to responding to the situation

## 2004 Formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines (2004 NDPG)

- Calling for multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities while dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies
- Succeeding the effective parts of the Basic Defense Force Concept

## Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies

### Legislative measures

#### Act on Special Measures against Terrorism (2001)

#### Amendment of the SDF Law (2001)

- Amendments for the response to suspicious vessels (regarding the use of weapons during Maritime Security Operations)
- Amendment that allows for Guarding Operations and define the authority to conduct them
- Amendment for the response to armed agents (allowing both for information gathering before an order for a Public Security Operation is issued and for the use of weapons during such an operation)

#### Three Emergency-Related Laws (Armed Attack Situation Response Law, etc.) enacted. (2003)

- Armed Attack Situation Response Law specifies (i) basic principles, (ii) the responsibilities of national and local governments, and (iii) cooperation of the people in armed attack situation, etc. (Armed Attack Situations and Expected Armed Attack Situations).

#### Seven bills related to Armed Attack Situation Response Law passed and three treaties ratified (2004)

- The Civil Protection Law, etc.



A MSDF vessel in escort operation



SDF personnel participating in civil protection training in Fukui Prefecture, the first such training under the Civil Protection Law

## Response to suspicious vessels

### First order for maritime security operations (1999)

- MSDF destroyers gave orders to halt and fired warning shots.
- P-3C aircraft dropped bombs as a warning.

### Joint exercise with JCG to deal with suspicious vessels (from 1999)

- "The manual for jointly dealing with suspicious vessels" was formulated.




A MSDF destroyer conducting a joint exercise with a JCG patrol vessel in light of the lessons learned from the cases of suspicious vessels

## 2002 Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel System introduced

**Legend**

- International affairs
- Reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities
- Japan-U.S. relations
- International contribution / international exchange / cooperation with other countries, etc
- Other



### Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan

- Submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japan's territorial waters, breaching international law (2004)
- China Maritime Surveillance vessels intruded into Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, and hovered and drifted there (2008)
- Chinese fishing trawler collided with a JCG patrol vessel in Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands (2010)
- Chinese government ship ordered a Philippine research vessel to withdraw in the South China Sea (2011)
- China moved to build new constructions such as station poles in the South China Sea (2011)
- Chinese government ship cut an investigation cable towed by a Vietnamese resource exploration vessel (2012)


- Change in global power balance
- Complex military situation surrounding Japan
- Diversification of the military role in global society

## 2010 Formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines (2010 NDPG)

- Developing a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the Basic Defense Force Concept)
- Facilitating effective deterrence and responses to various contingencies and making it possible to proactively conduct activities in order to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner



### 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake



A joint task force conducting various activities for supporting affected people, including searching for missing persons

- #### 2011 Comprehensive exemptions to Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. (Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary).
- Cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation
  - Cases regarding international joint development and production of defense equipment that contribute to Japan's security



### 2009 Order for ballistic missile destruction measures issued for first time

ASDF PAC-3 deployed in the Tohoku region after an order for ballistic missile destruction measures was issued for the first time (2009)

### From 2009 Counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

Piracy incidents were frequent and surging in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. To protect Japan-related vessels from piracy, an order for Maritime Security Operations was issued first. This was followed by an order for counter-piracy operations after the Counter-Piracy Measures Act was enacted.

The MOD/SDF began to operate a new operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti for the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) in 2011.

### Effective deterrence and responses

#### Strengthening the defense architecture in the southwestern region Ensuring security of sea and airspace surrounding Japan

- Increasing the number of submarines, introducing P-1 patrol aircraft, and upgrading fixed 3D radars

#### Improving capabilities for rapid deployment and response

- Establishing the 15th Brigade and introducing next-generation cargo aircraft

#### Improving intelligence-gathering and patrol/surveillance postures

- Increasing the number of transportable radars in Naha, and deploying a coast observation unit in the southwestern region

Ceremony to mark the delivery of submarine "Unryu" and granting of the MSDF flag

Ceremony to mark the granting of the unit's flag in an event celebrating the newly established 15th Brigade

The maiden flight of a prototype of next-generation cargo aircraft (XC-2) from ASDF Gifu Air Base

### Further stabilizing the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improving the global security environment

#### Continue proactive contribution to international peace cooperation activities

#### Starting initiatives to provide capacity building (from 2012)

- Creating a desirable security environment for Japan by helping the partner countries' forces, etc., to adequately fulfill their roles in maintaining international peace and regional stability

GSDSF personnel explaining vehicle maintenance procedures in Timor-Leste

### Joint operations

#### Joint Staff established (2006)

- Changed the posture from each SDF based operations to joint based operations

Clarified The status and roles of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters as "the central intelligence service for the Defense Agency" (2006)

### Response to ballistic missile attacks

Surface-to-air missile PAC-3 introduced (first deployed in March 2007)

Destroyer JS "Kongo" was equipped with ballistic missile response capabilities (December 2007)

With a shift to the joint operations system, the first Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, assumed his post (March 2006)

### Established a structure that allows the SDF to independently and proactively engage in international peace cooperation activities


#### Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq (2003-2009)

Japan dispatched the SDF units to Iraq following the collapse of the Hussein administration to provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support, such as providing medical services and supplying water.

#### International peace cooperation activities became a primary SDF mission (2007)

Female SDF personnel participated in PKO for the first time, in Timor-Leste (2002)

**Main Military Forces in Japan's Surroundings (Approximate Strength) (FY2013)**



(Note) 1 Compiled from the 2014 Defense White Paper.  
 2 Figures for the ground forces of U.S. Forces Japan/Korea indicate the combined total for Army  
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
**The Period of Developing Legislation for Peace and Security and Strengthening Defense Architecture in New Domains and in the Southwestern Region**

**U.S. policy of rebalance (redistribution of resources)**

**2012**  
 The U.S. announces a policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region in its Defense Strategic Guidance

- After the GOJ transferred the ownership of three of Senkaku Islands in 2012, activities by Chinese vessels were markedly intensified in waters surrounding the islands.
- China increased the numbers of surface vessels (most notably the commissioning of the aircraft carrier "Liaoning"), submarines, and 4th generation fighters (2012)
- A Chinese warship directed a fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea (2013)



**China rapidly expands and intensifies activities in the maritime and aerial domains**



**Developments in Russia**

- "Annexation of Crimea" (2014)
- Conducted what is known as "hybrid warfare," which is constituted so as not to be recognized as the use of force by the state
- Strengthened missile capabilities with the deployment of new equipment in the Far East, including Japan's Northern Territories

**Russian armed forces intensify activities around Japan**



**Growing interest in global commons such as outer space and cyberspace**

**Growing tensions in the Korean Peninsula**

**2010**  
 ROK naval patrol ship "Cheonan" sunk in the Yellow Sea  
 North Korea shelled the ROK's Yeonpyeong island  
 2012  
 North Korea launched what it calls a satellite

**2010 The U.S.'s National Security Strategy (NSS) referred to global commons.**



- An increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan
- The U.S.'s strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region
- Lessons learned from the SDF's experience in the Great East Japan Earthquake

**2013**

**Formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines (2013 NDPG)**

- Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force
- Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operations, which enables the SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security environment and carry out various activities—such as achieving maritime and air superiority—seamlessly and flexibly

**2014**  
 Cabinet decision on "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology"



**2015**

**Legislation for Peace and Security enacted**

- Amendment of the SDF Law (including the Rescue of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas and Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces)
- Enacted the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (to replace the Act concerning "Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan")
- Enacted the International Peace Cooperation Act (to cover, inter alia, Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security and so-called "kakettsuke-keigo" (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) operations)
- Amendment of the Armed Attack Situation Response Law (to cover Survival-Threatening Situations)
- Enacted the International Peace Support Act (to allow for cooperation and support activities in Joint International Peace Response Situation)



**Securing a posture for effective deterrence and response to various situations**

**Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan**



The MOD/SDF continues to engage in strict measures against intrusions into territorial airspace to ensure the security of the air and sea areas around Japan, even after China set the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.

**Response to an attack on remote islands (Strengthening of the defense architecture in the southwestern region)**




- Deploying units to the southwestern region (Yonagunijima Island in 2016, Amami Oshima Island and Miyakojima Island in 2019, and Ishigakijima Island in 2023), including a Type-12 SSM unit
- Defense capabilities were bolstered to ensure air superiority as evidenced by the establishment of the Southwestern Air Defense Force (2017)

**Response to ballistic missile attacks**



**Responses in space and cyberspace**



**2013**  
 National Security Council established; National Security Strategy of Japan formulated

**Legend**

- : International affairs
- : Reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities
- : Japan-U.S. relations
- : International contribution / international exchange / cooperation with other countries, etc
- : Other

**Rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum**



The threatening text of the malware "WannaCry," which wreaked havoc globally [EPA/Jiji Press Photo]



Ground-deployed electronic warfare (EW) system "Leer-3" [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]



2018

**2018 Formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines (2018 NDPG)**


- The security environment surrounding Japan became increasingly severe and uncertain at a remarkably fast pace
- Rapid expansion in SDF's use of new domains, which are space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum
- Notable trends toward further increases in military capabilities and activities

- Building a Multi-Domain Defense Force
- Truly effective defense capability that enables cross-domain operations organically fusing capabilities in all domains by strengthening not only those in traditional domains-land, sea and air-but also those in new domains, which are space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum



2019

- China established the "East China Sea ADIZ," which covers the Senkaku Islands. (2013) It incorrectly indicates them as Chinese territories.
- China pushed rapid and large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (from 2014 onward)



[Sources: CSIS/AMTI/Maxar]

- The Philippines-China South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal determined the illegality of China's activities, such as land reclamation (2016)
- China placed its maritime security units under the command of the People's Armed Police (PAP) and ultimately the Central Military Commission (2018)



2017



2016

**2016 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake**



**2016**

**Japan advocates a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" vision at TICAD**

**(Three pillars)**

- Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade
- Pursuit of economic prosperity (e.g. improving connectivity)
- Commitment to peace and stability

**2015**

**Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation**

- Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism available from peacetime
- Strengthening of operational coordination
- Formulation and update of joint plans



Announcement of the new Guidelines at the Japan-U.S. "2+2"

**Strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations**

**Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains**



- ASDF Space Operations Squadron established (2020)
- ASDF Space Operations Group established with expanded units (2022)



JSDF Cyber Defense Command established by expanding the functions of the Cyber Defense Unit and by abolishing the SDF Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command (2022)



- GSDF Electronic Warfare Operations Unit established (2022)
- GSDF Network Electronic Warfare System acquired (from 2017)
- ASDF stand-off electronic warfare aircraft developed (from 2020)

**Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains**

**Maritime and air domains**




F-35A fighter



Soryu-class submarine

- Acquiring F-35A/B fighters, P-1 patrol aircraft, KC-46A aerial refueling/transport aircraft
- Acquiring a new type of frigates (FFM)
- Increasing the number of submarines
- Refurbishing Izumo-class destroyers and testing the takeoff and landing of F-35B fighters (2021).

**Comprehensive air and missile defense capabilities**



PAC-3



Maya-class Aegis destroyer

- Deploying PAC-3ME surface-to-air guided missiles
- Increasing the number of Aegis destroyers (to 8 by 2020)


**Strengthening sustainability and resiliency**

- Procuring ammunition (anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes) necessary for ensuring air and maritime superiority

**Stand-off defense capabilities**




Upgraded Type-12 SSM (image)



JSM-equipped F-35A (image)

- Conducting R&D of upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles, hyper velocity gliding projectiles for the defense of remote islands, hypersonic missiles, etc. (from 2018)
- Procuring stand-off missiles (JSM) (from 2018).


**Mobile deployment capabilities**



Ospreys



C-2




Type-16 mobile combat vehicles

- Acquiring V-22 Ospreys, Type-16 mobile combat vehicles, and C-2 transport aircraft
- Establishing rapid deployment regiments



**Main Military Forces in Japan's Surroundings (Approximate Strength) (FY2022)**



(Note) 1 Compiled from the 2023 Defense White Paper.  
 2 Figures for the ground forces of U.S. Forces Japan/Korea indicate the combined total for Army troops and U.S. Marines.  
 3 Figures in parentheses indicate the military force of Marine Corps.  
 4 Figures for Japan indicate the actual strength.  
 5 - - - - - indicates the actual strength of Japan as of 1976.

**Emerging new ways of warfare**

Attacks in space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, as well as attacks by UAVs, etc.



Threats to the stable use of space

**November 2021**

Taiwan released the National Defense Report, which concerns about "cognitive warfare"

The report describes "cognitive warfare" as being designed to create disorder in society by manipulating and disturbing the public's mentality through the "Three Warfare" and disinformation via social media.




2021

**From 2020 Response to COVID-19**



Preparation for administering vaccines at a large-scale vaccination center. The MOD/SDF administered some 2.49 million doses from May 2021 to March 2023.


**From February 2022 Russia's aggression against Ukraine Massive missile attacks**



Ukrainian housing complex destroyed by Russian missile attack (January 2023) [Facebook account of the Government of Ukraine]

**Hybrid warfare including information warfare**

The caption of a video taken and posted by President Zelenskyy in front of the Presidential Office to counter disinformation that he had left Ukraine (February 2022) [Facebook account of President Zelenskyy]



2022

**August 2021 Transportation of Japanese nationals and others from Afghanistan**



The SDF organized a joint task force to transport 15 Japanese nationals and others from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan by C-130 transport aircraft following the Taliban's takeover of the capital city, Kabul. The photo shows the activities of the SDF transport assistance unit at Kabul Airport.

**The Period of the Most Severe and Complex Security Environment since the End of WWII and Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities**

**China-Russia joint actions**

- Joint flights by Chinese and Russian bombers (from 2019)
- A total of 7 flights since 2019 (as of the end of March 2024)
- Joint navigation by Chinese and Russian navy vessels (from 2021)
- Bilateral exercises



Russian Navy shipboard helicopter and Chinese Navy vessel participating in joint China-Russia navigation as part of the Russia Eastern Military District strategic command and staff exercise "Vostok 2022" (September 2022) [Official Rutube channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]

**China-Russia strategic coordination**

**Intensified activities by China around Taiwan**

**China's activities around Taiwan**

- China conducted large-scale military activities around Taiwan.
- Five ballistic missiles landed in the waters around Japan, including Japan's EEZ (2022)
- Significant increase in the number of Chinese aircraft entering Taiwan's airspace





Image of China's ballistic missile launch in August 2022

Chinese military aircraft confirmed around Taiwan [Website of Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense]

**December 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) National Defense Strategy (NDS) Defense Buildup Program (DBP)**

- Fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities as well as reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country by integrating the strength of the nation
- Focusing on the capabilities of opponents and new ways of warfare
- Presenting Japan's defense objectives, approaches, and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives, in lieu of the NDPG
- Fundamentally reinforcing the current Multi-Domain Defense Force through further accelerated efforts



2023

**April 2023 Transportation of Japanese nationals and others from Sudan**




Inside the C-2 transport aircraft carrying 45 Japanese nationals and others from the Republic of the Sudan following the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces

**Japan-U.S. Alliance**

**Cooperation in space**

Japan-U.S. "2+2" confirmed that an attack in space could lead to invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. (January 2023)

**Policy coordination at different levels**



Japan-U.S. joint press conference (April 2024) [Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]

**Cooperation in R&D, etc.**

- Joint research in glide phase interceptor (GPI) to counter hypersonic guided weapons and in AI technology for autonomous UAV



GPI (image)

**Legend**

- International affairs
- Reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities
- Japan-U.S. relations
- International contribution / international exchange / cooperation with other countries, etc.
- Other

**November 2023**  
**North Korea launched a military reconnaissance satellite**  
 Image of launching the "military reconnaissance satellite" released by North Korea [Korea News Service]



**April 2023**  
**North Korea launched a solid-fuel-propelled, ICBM-class ballistic missile "Hwasong-18" for the first time**




Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile "Hwasong-18" [Korean News Service/ Jiji]


**From October 2023**  
**Clashes between Israel and the Palestinian militants.**



An Israeli tank rolling in the north of the Gaza Strip (December 2023) [AFP/Jiji]

**December 2023, March 2024**  
**Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology partially amended**  
 Cabinet decision made in March 2024 on direct transfer of finished products regarding Global Combat Air Programme from Japan to countries other than partner countries

**January 2024**  
**Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Noto Peninsula Earthquake**



2024

**October and November of 2023**  
**Transportation of Japanese nationals and others from Israel**



SDF aircraft carrying Japanese nationals and others from Israel landed at Haneda Airport

**Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country**

- R&D (recognizing it as a matching business)
- Public infrastructure Development (Specific-Use Airport and Seaport)
- Cybersecurity
- International cooperation for enhancing deterrence capabilities of Japan and like-minded countries (Official Security Assistance [OSA])




The ceremony of E/N signing for the provision of coastal surveillance radars to the Philippines [Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]

**Strengthening Japan's architecture for national defense**

**Capabilities to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby deterring invasion of Japan itself**

- Stand-off defense capabilities**
- Moving forward the deployment of upgraded Type-12 SSM (ground-launched) (from FY2026 to FY2025)
  - Moving forward the acquisition of Tomahawks (from FY2026 to FY2025).
  - Development of hyper velocity gliding projectiles for the defense of remote islands





Upgraded Type-12 SSM that have stood various trials on the ground [Courtesy of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.]

- Integrated air and missile defense capabilities**
- Japan-U.S. cooperative development of Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) to counter hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), etc.
  - Signing of a design contract for Aegis System Equipped Vessels
  - Procurement of various interceptors (SM-3 block IIA, SM-6, PAC-3MSE, etc.)
  - Strengthening of the sensor network by improving the capabilities of FPS-5, JADGE, etc.



**Additional capabilities to ensure asymmetric advantage across domains should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur**

**Unmanned defense capabilities**

- 
- Middle-range reconnaissance UAV (image)
- 
- Research on multi-purpose combat-support USVs (image)
- Acquisition of middle-range reconnaissance UAV equipped with a synthetic aperture radar
  - Trial operations of USVs (unmanned surface vehicles)
  - Research on multi-purpose combat-support USVs
  - Joint development with the U.S.

**Cross-domain operation capabilities**


- Acquiring SDA satellites (FY2026)
- Implementing the cyber-related Risk Management Framework (RMF) and developing human resources at the GSDF System and Signal/Cyber School, etc.
- Acquiring counter air electronic warfare system and developing electronic warfare aircraft



Counter air electronic warfare system (image)


**Command and control/intelligence-related functions**

- Establishing JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) (FY2024)



• Upgrading the Central Command System, and responding to information warfare with the special regard to the cognitive dimension

**Capabilities to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush the opponent's will to invade**

- Mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection**
- 
- maneuver support vessel (image)
- Establishing an SDF Maritime Transport Units (tentative name)
  - Acquiring maneuver support vessels and transport helicopters
  - Utilizing private maritime transport service

**Sustainability and resiliency**

- Securing various ammunition, and sustaining and maintaining equipment
- Developing as necessary master plans that involve structural reinforcement, relocation, and consolidation of facilities to improve the resiliency of those facilities and the living and working environments of SDF personnel
- Improving facility resiliency (e.g., developing facilities associated with the establishment of units, making major command headquarters underground, improving natural disaster resilience, and securing ammunition storage facilities)



An improved aircraft shelter for F-15 fighters at the Chitose Air Base

**Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others**



The Japanese, UK, and Italian defence ministers signing the convention on the establishment of GIG0 for the joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft (December 2023)



At the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting at Camp David, the three leaders affirmed progress towards the operationalization of sharing missile warning data on North Korea in real-time. (August 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]

The Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement, the first of its kind for Japan, came into force. (August 2023) The photo shows the signing ceremony (January 2022) [Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]



The 2nd Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD) (March 2024)

# 2

## Voice of SDF Personnel

# My Way to

### ◆ Diverse missions



**Working in a Company That Is Key to the Defense of the Southwestern Region**

Commanding the company in a combat exercise (the author is in the right)

I am the commander of an infantry company of the Yaeyama Area Security Force at Camp Ishigaki, which was established in March 2023 in Okinawa Prefecture.

Ishigaki Island is the center of the Yaeyama Islands located some 400 kilometers from Naha. Along with Miyako Island and Yonaguni Island, Ishigaki Island is the hub of the defense of remote islands, making us feel the increasingly severe security environment on the front line. For this reason, a surface-to-air guided missile unit and a surface-to-ship guided missile unit are also stationed at Camp Ishigaki. The Yaeyama Area Security Force works with these units from the peacetime to be ready for any situation.

I will continue working hard every day with my colleagues, who gathered from all over the country. When the camp opened to achieve our national defense mission with our catchword, "Work hard in Yaeyama for the peace of the nation!"



A guard of honor for the Minister of Defense at the camp's opening (the author is in the left)

Major **OSHIRO** Takanori

- 1 Infantry company, GSDF Yaeyama Area Security Force (Camp Ishigaki)
- 2 Infantry

The MSDF conducts 24-hour monitoring and surveillance activities in the waters around Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, and my first duty after boarding the MSDF destroyer JS Makinami was to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities. I remember having been very tense all the time for response to Chinese vessels.

As an engineer officer, I monitor and manage the status of a ship's engines and electrical power. As it was necessary to record information required for surveillance during the mission, I was assigned to command collecting records.

Through the mission, I directly learned about the increasingly severe security environment we face, which made me brace myself, and I strongly felt a sense of fulfillment and experiencing personal growth through my contributions to national defense. I will continue to pursue this challenging work and develop myself.



The author (front) on duty in the cockpit

Ensign **NISHIDA** Saki

- 1 JS Makinami (Ominato)
- 2 Engineer

**My duties in monitoring and surveillance activities around Japan, including the Senkaku Islands**

The author (right) recording information



The author (right) recording information

**Preparedness for countermeasures against airspace violations**

The author is preparing for F-2A taking off



The author is preparing for F-2A taking off

As an F-2 fighter pilot, I am engaged in countermeasures against aircraft intruding into Japan's territorial airspace.

These measures involve scrambling fighters and other aircraft to deal with foreign aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan that may intrude into Japan's territorial airspace without permission. In recent years, the number of scrambles has consistently remained high, nearly 1,000 times annually, as we also deal with unmanned aircraft.

Upon receiving a scramble order, we promptly launch our jets, strive to ascertain the status of aircraft that may be intruding into Japan's territorial airspace, and vigilantly monitor their activities.

Our airfields serve as the frontline, embodying Japan's intention and capability. With this understanding, I remain steadfastly committed to my duties, upholding a stringent attitude and a profound sense of responsibility and urgency.



The author and the F-2 fighter jet she is piloting

First Lieutenant **MIZUKOSHI** Misaki

- 1 8th Air Wing Flight Group, 8th Fighter Squadron (Tsuki Air Base)
- 2 Pilot

# “Defend Japan”

GPDF	MSDF	ASDF	Administrative officer and others	Rank	Name
				1 Assignment	
				2 Branch of service/ appointed area	

(Note) The rank and assignment are as of March 31, 2024.


## Deployment to two disaster relief operations: the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and the Great East Japan Earthquake



At the time of departure for the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster Relief Operation

My first disaster relief operation was the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake where I was engaged in saving lives as the leader (sergeant), and for the first time, I felt that I was helping people as a SDF personnel. During the Great East Japan Earthquake, I was engaged in rescue operations and searching for missing persons as an operational training officer for the 3rd Division of the Infantry Regiment. I was able to work in an organized manner, thanks to the lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and carry out a tough mission that only the SDF could perform. Having participated in two disaster relief operations, I realized that the times we are active are when people are in distress. Currently, the SDF is highly regarded, but without becoming

complacent, I will continue training to be ready for any mission at any time.



Major IKUBO Masanori

- 1 4th Sergeant Training Unit, Middle Army Combined Brigade (Camp Otsu)
- 2 Infantry

Regarding ballistic missile defenses, the MSDF performs its missions on its own and also with the GPDF and the ASDF as a joint task force. If there is a possibility of a ballistic missile falling into Japanese territory, Aegis will promptly launch missiles to intercept it.



The SPY radar of Destroyer JS “Atago” and the author

Petty Officer 1st Class  
**ICHINOMIYA Toshiaki**

- 1 JS Atago (Maizuru)
- 2 Fire Controlman

The job of the fire control man is to operate and maintain the SPY radar, which is the main sensor of Aegis. Since the condition of equipment is directly linked to the success of operations, I strive to work with all my strength all of the time.

I believe, our mission is the elimination of imminent threats at an early stage with absolute accuracy, though our operations are unnoticeable to the public as we work at sea.

## My duties regarding ballistic missile defenses



The author (back row, left) during maintenance work



## Transportation of Japanese Nationals and others from Israel

Seeing off after arriving in Japan (the author is standing in the middle)

My regular job is to make contracts for the acquisition and repair services of equipment that is necessary for national defense. In November 2023, I was engaged in a mission to transport Japanese nationals and others from Israel to Japan. From the moment I had read and watched press reports in October about the deteriorating situation, I had been wanting to rush to the site as soon as possible. I was therefore confident and motivated when the mission was announced. I headed to the country, hoping to give a sense of safety, especially to women and children as a female SDF personnel.

At the evacuation site, we provided boarding assistance from the airport terminal to the transport aircraft. When we arrived in Japan and saw off the people we had assisted, I felt relieved and proud that I

had played an important role as an SDF personnel. I will pass on this experience to my juniors and continue to support the SDF missions by further growing myself.



The author responding to the situation on board the flight.

Airman 1st Class  
**INOUE Mizuki**

- 1 The 4th Air Depot Procurement Division (Iruma Air Base)
- 2 Procurement

# My Way to "Defend Japan"

## Aiming to become an SDF officer



Achieving my original aspiration


Command as a Tank Commander (the author is in the upper left)

The Great East Japan Earthquake was a major incident to learn about the existence of the SDF. At that time, I was in 5th grade at elementary school, and when I saw SDF personnel rescuing residents in disaster-stricken areas and helping them with outdoor cooking and bathing at evacuation sites, I thought they were cool, and I wanted to be someone who was needed like they were. That is why I joined the National Defense Academy.

Currently, I make training plans for maneuvers, shooting, winter combat skills, etc. to fulfill my duties in national defense as a tank platoon leader, and I work hard with other members to strengthen my unit. Being fascinated with tanks, I spend fulfilling days as I train hard with my fellow members, who all entrust their lives to each other.

My future aspiration is to become a commander who is needed by my troops.

It is important to carry on the aspirations you had at the beginning until the end.



Winter Combat Skill Training (Ski)

Second Lieutenant

**NAKAGAWA Natsuki**

- 1 11th Tank Unit (Camp Kita-eniwa)
- 2 Armor

I joined the MSDF because I wanted to serve people and the nation through my work, and my grandfather, whom I admire, had been a member of the MSDF. Currently, I belong to the 1st Maintenance and Supply Squadron at Kanoya Air Base. My main job includes loading and unloading electronic equipment on P-1 patrol aircraft, handling equipment malfunctions, and guiding aircraft using hand signals.

Electronic equipment is essential for the activities of patrol aircraft, and the success of missions greatly depends on the condition of the equipment. So I pay close attention to the wiring, etc. when performing maintenance, and I always check the maintenance records.

Therefore, when I see aircraft return home without any problems, I feel that we maintenance personnel have also accomplished the mission, which gives me a sense of achievement and makes me feel proud of my work.



The author guiding the aircraft

Seaman

**TAKEICHI Kodai**

- 1 1st Maintenance and Supply Squadron, Fleet Air Wing 1 (Kanoya Air Base)
- 2 Avionics Maintenance (Air Crew)



Aiming to achieve the mission

The author working on the installation of the electronic device to be replaced

## 10 years since I joined the SDF: Where I am now




10 years of gratitude

The author in instrument maintenance service

I joined the SDF because I was impressed by the work of SDF personnel in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. I have served at many sites as a ground radio maintenance technician and have gained valuable experience. In this sense, I am extremely grateful to my superiors and colleagues. Currently, I am in charge of managing the unit's information system and maintaining the radio equipment of the anti-aircraft unit. Although I had not imagined this when I joined the SDF, I now have a family and work with the understanding and support of my wife, for which I am extremely grateful. Also, we are blessed with a child. Seeing my child make me motivated for child rearing as well as working harder. Our

life is thus fulfilling. I will carry on my work as an SDF personnel for society and my family in my own way.



The author working for information

Staff Sergeant

**SHINZATO Toshiyuki**

- 1 Patriot Operation Center, Southwestern Air Defense Missile Group (Naha Air Base)
- 2 Ground Radio Maintenance

## Protecting Japan in various places

(Note) The rank and assignment are as of March 31, 2024.

### Promoting the space policy



The author (right) participating in a tabletop exercise to strengthen the functional security of the entire space system

I have been primarily engaged in the research and development of aircraft and related fields as a developmental engineering officer. Recently, I had the opportunity to be seconded to the Cabinet Office and now work at the National Space Policy Secretariat. The secretariat, which is responsible for comprehensively and systematically promoting and coordinating space policy, approaches work from various perspectives, including diplomacy, intelligence, security, economics, and technology. Nowadays, space services, such as communications, observation, and positioning, have become entrenched in our daily lives, making space more familiar to us while still leaving issues to be solved, including space congestion, caused by the rapidly increasing number of artificial satellites, and space debris. Through my work at the secretariat, I will strive to do my daily job to help ensure the stable and sustainable use of outer space.

Colonel  
**HAYAKAWA Yukihiro**

- 1 Cabinet Office, National Space Policy Secretariat (Kasumigaseki)
- 2 Developmental Engineering

### Working on the PFI vessel Natchan World after retirement



Situation inside the ship (when I was dispatched to the Noto Peninsula earthquake site in 2024)

I am a former member of the MSDF and served as a school instructor and a destroyer captain.

I retired in January 2022 and currently work as a chief officer on the PFI vessel Natchan World. In October 2022, I was registered as a SDF Reserve Personnel, and I strive to do my regular tasks and training as a SDF Reserve Personnel.

The main job of the ship is to transport SDF units, and I work to assist the captain with all of the operations, including navigational watches, the coordination and supervision of all onboard operations, and the direction and supervision of the loading and unloading of tanks and other vehicles. The most memorable part of my work so far was the relief activities in response to the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake. After receiving instructions from the MOD, we made an emergency departure from Hakodate Port and rushed to Nanao Port in Ishikawa Prefecture. During my work there, I saw the enthusiasm of the people who had been dispatched to work in disaster-stricken areas, and the warm words of gratitude we received are deeply engraved on my heart.




The author operating the ship in Nanao Port (when I was dispatched to the Noto Peninsula earthquake site in 2024)

Reserve Captain  
**TAKASUGA Masanobu**

- 1 Toyo Marine Service Co., Ltd.

### To Enhance Local Disaster Prevention Capabilities



Briefing the prefectural governor during the 2nd Prefectural Disaster Response Headquarters Operation Drill in FY2023 (the author is second from the right)

After retiring from the GSDF, I became a prefectural disaster prevention supervisor, where I contribute to the improvement of local disaster prevention capabilities in my home prefecture of Kagawa by utilizing my experience of disaster relief operations at the GSDF's Engineer Unit and the headquarters. Currently, I am in charge of counter-disaster activities at the prefectural disaster management headquarters, as well as the education and training of prefectural staff, disaster management lectures, and liaison and coordination with the SDF.

Kagawa Prefecture in particular is required to prepare for and respond to disasters, such as a Nankai Trough megathrust earthquake as well as storm and flood disasters caused by typhoons. While the frequency of disasters in Kagawa Prefecture is low compared to other prefectures, it is extremely important to raise disaster awareness among residents to promote self-help and mutual support and for the prefecture and its

cities, towns, and disaster management organizations to cooperate in conducting practical training and drills and reflect the lessons learned. I want to contribute to saving the lives of people in the prefecture from disasters.



Giving a disaster prevention lecture at the 2nd Disaster Prevention Fair in Mannoike Forest Park (the author is top right)

Major General (before retirement)

**AOI Tsuneharu**

- 1 Crisis Management Division, Headquarters for Crisis Management, Kagawa Prefecture
- 2 Disaster Prevention Supervisor

# My Way to "Defend Japan"

## For the Success of the GCAP

In the United Kingdom, where the headquarters of the international government organisation of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) is to be located, I engage in a joint development of fighter aircraft between Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy as an engineer representing the Japanese government on the preparation team. In this international project with unprecedentedly high goals and scale, the process of integrating complex and advanced technologies requires a high level of expertise and experience, so I




A meeting with engineers (The author is on the far right.)

feel proud and fulfilled to be able to utilize the skills I have developed as a technical and engineering official in this project. I believe that the key to success of the project is to recognize each other's differences in technological edges, cultures and behaviors and help each other in positively integrating such differences, and I will lead the project with this belief in mind.



Counsellor  
**DOI Hirofumi**

- 1 Embassy of Japan in the United Kingdom (London)
- 2 Civilian official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Technical and Engineering Official, Ministry of Defense



## The Voice of a Defense Attaché to France

The population ratio between Japan and France is roughly 2:1, and the SDF and French armed forces are roughly the same size in terms of personnel. France has taken a different approach than Japan to maintain national defense in a declining population society. After the end of conscription in 2001, France adopted a volunteer system. In 2019, France imposed on those aged 15 and older the obligation to take a course that includes the field of defense under the principle of "Universal National Service." I am constantly learning about the wide range of national defense policies in France. In our missions, we encourage a stronger presence for European countries and others in the Indo-Pacific region through interaction with French military personnel, military officer groups, and NATO-related European military personnel. I am a member of the Kyudo (Japanese traditional archery) club in the city, through which I strive to enhance Japan's presence in the region through training and related events.



(A reception in March 2024 to celebrate the Japanese Emperor's birthday [The author is in the center.]

Lieutenant Commander  
**HAYASHI Aiko**

- 1 Embassy of Japan in France (Paris)
- 2 Second Secretary and Defense attaché

## Being a Defense Attaché in a War Zone

Every day, I hear reports of many civilian casualties caused by attacks from Russia. I work hoping for a swift resolution to this conflict in a manner that is desired by the Ukrainian people. I feel a sense of solidarity with the military officers of NATO countries, which are providing various types of weapons to Ukraine. Although Japan cannot provide



A meeting with the Defense Minister of Moldova, a country to which Embassy of Japan in Ukraine is accredited.



The author in front of a monastery with a table where memorial flowers are placed


Colonel  
**DEGUCHI Arata**

- 1 Embassy of Japan in Ukraine (Kyiv)
- 2 Intelligence

such direct military support, we have heard numerous expressions of gratitude for accepting wounded soldiers at the SDF Central Hospital and providing SDF vehicles. By continuing to collect and report on various information appropriately in the region, I hope that Japan will be able to continue to provide support and contribute to achieving peace.

## Further Strengthening Trust in Japan through PKO

I have been working in the Republic of South Sudan since January 2024 as an aviation operations staff at the UNMISS headquarters, where I am responsible for creating and issuing daily flight plans for the UNMISS aircraft, aircraft operations management based on flight plans, safety management, and emergency flights handling.



Checking aircraft operations status (the author is in the right)

Most of the multinational staff working for the UNMISS are friendly toward Japan, and I strongly feel the trust that has been built by the past Japanese staff, including the missioned units and headquarters personnels. I will continue to contribute to the peace and stability of South Sudan and strive to further strengthen the trust in Japan.




Interactions with other countries' military and local staffs (the author is in the left)

Captain  
**SUZUKI Wakana**

- 1 UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan) (Juba)
- 2 Aviation

## Gathering Information in the War Zone ~The Israel-Palestine situation~

The attack on Israel by Hamas and others that occurred on October 7, 2023, is said to be the greatest tragedy for the country since the founding of the State of Israel, with over 1,200 people killed on that day alone. The ensuing fighting resulted in numerous casualties for both Israel and Palestine, mainly in the Gaza Strip, and I have also experienced many sad moments. One of the missions of a defense attaché



The Iron Dome intercepts rockets fired by Hamas (photographed by the author)

is to follow the latest local developments and trends of the Israel Defense Forces known for utilizing the latest technologies, such as unmanned assets and AI, and accurately report it to Japanese government. In addition to direct support, such as ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals and others residing in the region and, if necessary, evacuating them, we aim to make a solid contribution to defending Japan in the Middle East by gathering such information.

Colonel  
**OKAMOTO Jun**

- 1 Embassy of Japan in Israel (Tel Aviv)
- 2 Legal

(Note) The rank and assignment are as of March 31, 2024.

# MOD/SDF in action around the world

6

## Work in the SDF Training Squadron

I have been serving for about five months as a staff member (a communications specialist) at headquarters with a training squadron that is touring overseas for the purposes of educating and training junior officers and enhancing friendships with other countries. In parallel with my duties as a communications specialist, I am in charge of drone photography at home and abroad as well as the receptions on board ships at ports of call. I use drones to record videos for external release. At the receptions, I help domestic and international guests understand the activities of the SDF. At the Training Squadron Headquarters, a small number of personnel handle many tasks, making it a unit where we can gain valuable experiences that we could not gain in other units.



The author holding a drone he operates



Meeting Miss Colombia during a reception held on board a ship (the author is on the right)


Petty Officer 2nd Class  
**KINOSHITA Takao**

- 1 Training Squadron Headquarters (Kure)
- 2 Communication

I would like to continue to strive in my duties so that many people can understand the activities of the SDF.


## Participating in Capacity Building for Laos

I participated in capacity building for Laos as a member of the military medicine Education Team. This project aimed to enhance the capabilities of the Lao People's Army in the fields of search and rescue and military medicine, and it provided guidance and advice to Lao People's Army instructors and personnel participating in the training. As a SDF personnel, I am proud to have fulfilled my mission in an environment with a different language, culture, customs, and religion and to have contributed to building trust and strengthening relations between our two countries.



Working in the field (the author is second from the left)

Amid the current unstable international situation, I strongly feel that fostering trust among people through projects like this will serve as a foothold for future collaboration in the international community.



The closing ceremony of the training (the author is on the right)


Sergeant  
**YAMASHITA Mao**

- 1 The 2nd Infantry Regiment (Camp Takada)
- 2 Medical

## Participating in F-35 Deployment Training to the United States and Australia

I was missioned to Tindal Air Base, Australia, as a maintenance technician for the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) for F-35A fighter jets.

There, I transmitted aircraft analysis data relating to the ASDF F-35A to Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture).



The author transmitting aircraft analysis data

This was the first time for the ASDF to transmit F-35 data from abroad, and I felt a sense of pride and fulfillment as an engineer to be able to contribute to overseas deployment training.


I am grateful for the valuable experiences I have had, such as deepening mutual friendships with members of the Royal Australian Air Force. I am committed to working hard to become a female SDF personnel who can play an active role both domestically and internationally.

Airman 1st Class  
**MAEDA Yui**


- 1 Armament Maintenance Squadron, Maintenance Supply Group, 3rd Air Wing (Misawa Air Base)
- 2 Computer Processing

## As a member of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE)

I am engaged in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and information-gathering activities in the Middle East as a P-3C patrol aircraft pilot of the 53rd DAPE in the Republic of Djibouti in eastern Africa. During flights, I check vessels one by one until I can confirm there are no abnormalities, which keeps me alerted and leaves me strong fatigue after landing. But at the same time, it gives me a sense of accomplishment and fulfillment that I cannot experience during the domestic duties. My work in cooperation with the militaries from other countries is rewarding and makes me realize that I am actually participating in international activities. This experience has given me good opportunities to expand my worldview.



Members of the team working together (the author is in the center)



During an operational flight (the author is on the right)

Lieutenant Junior Grade  
**SUGITA Yukika**

- 1 The 53rd Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) (Republic of Djibouti)
- 2 Fixed-wing aircraft pilot

## Studying in New Zealand

I am currently taking the Command and Staff Course at the New Zealand Defense College. The course is unique in that it is an integrated course, and nearly half of the class are international students. This, coupled with New Zealand's national character of accepting diversity, fosters on a daily basis lively discussions across military branches and national boundaries. In fact, this is the first time that an SDF member has joined the course, and I have received many words of welcome and encouragement. While I am studying until graduation, I would like to interact as much as possible with students from other countries and use this experience as inspiration for my future work. I find the SDF very attractive as it offers many avenues of learning through service.



In front of the traditional Maori meeting house at HMNB Devonport (the author is fifth from the left in the front row)

Major  
**NAKANE Kohei**

- 1 New Zealand Defense Collage, Command and Staff course
- 2 Air Defense Missile Maintenance

other countries and use this experience as inspiration for my future work. I find the SDF very attractive as it offers many avenues of learning through service.




## Overview

## Chapter 1

### International Community Facing Its Greatest Trial Since WWII

- States that do not share universal values or political and economic systems based on such values are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts represent a serious challenge to the existing international order. The international community is facing its greatest trial since World War II and entering a new era of crisis. The global balance of power is shifting dramatically and competition among states continues, especially between the United States and China, and is set to intensify even further in future.
- Rapid developments in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop innovative technologies that can become so-called game changers. The traditional military structure is undergoing fundamental changes, as are warfare tactics and strategies.
- Risks in cyberspace and other domains are becoming more serious and other security-related global issues such as information warfare and climate change are emerging.
- Gray zone situations involving territorial disputes are constantly occurring. The use of hybrid military and non-military warfare will become even more sophisticated.



Security Environment Surrounding Japan

### Increasingly Severe Security Situation in the Indo-Pacific Region

- These global security environment and challenges are particularly prominent in the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is located, and are likely to intensify still further in future.
- Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. It cannot be ruled out that a serious situation similar to Russia's aggression against Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region in future, particularly in East Asia.

## Russia's Aggression and Defense by Ukraine

## Chapter 2

- Russia's aggression against Ukraine undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is a serious violation of international law prohibiting the use of force and of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force have shaken the very foundation of the international order, including in Asia.
- This situation, in which a permanent member of the Security Council, which is supposed to take primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, openly engages in military actions challenging international law and the international order, claims innocent lives and repeatedly uses language and actions that can be interpreted as threats involving nuclear weapons, is unprecedented. If such aggression is tolerated, it could send out the wrong message and implication that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are also acceptable elsewhere. Accordingly, the international community, including Japan, should never tolerate Russia's action.
- In addition to Ukraine's strong resistance, the international community has united to implement strong sanctions and ongoing support for Ukraine, leaving Russia with no choice but to pay a heavy price. As an ally of the United States—a NATO member—and is located on the opposite side of Europe across the Eurasian continent, Japan must closely monitor future changes in the European situation, including their strategic impact, acknowledging that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is inseparable.



Damage in Kharkiv, Ukraine (January 2024) [AFP/Jiji Press]

## Defense Policies of Countries

### Chapter 3

#### The United States - Prioritizing its Response to China's Challenges with the Superiority of Alliances and Partnerships


- The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy released by the United States in October 2022 positioned China as a “pacing challenge,” Russia as an “acute threat,” and North Korea as a “persistent threat.”
- China is posing the most serious challenge and strategic competition to the United States, which is prioritizing efforts to address the relevant issues.
- The United States recognizes that it cannot address complex and interconnected challenges alone and that mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships must underpin its national defense strategy.
- In the Indo-Pacific region, the United States is committed to deepening its partnership with allies, including Japan, and promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) through multilateral frameworks such as QUAD and AUKUS.
- The United States is demonstrating its commitment to a FOIP through ongoing “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea and allowing U.S. Navy vessels to traverse the Taiwan Strait.



Quad Leaders' Summit (May 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister's Office to Japan]

#### China - Intensifying Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts

- China's external posture, military activities, and other activities are a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others.
- For more than 30 years, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without transparency, engaging in broad, and rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. China will probably have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and will continue growing its force to 2035. It has increased its production of surface combatants and submarines and built its second indigenous aircraft carrier, Fujian. It continues to develop and deploy modern fighter jets and wide-ranging UAVs.
- China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly in the area around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean, extending beyond the so-called the first island chain to the second island chain.
- China has intensified its military activities around Taiwan. China conducted military exercises in the sea and airspace in several times. It is believed that through the series of activities, China seeks to create a fait accompli where the PLA is operating, and improve its actual combat capabilities.
- China has intensified its activities in the South China Sea based on assertions, which are conflicting with existing orders of the seas, and promoting the establishment of military bases. Such actions to further promote unilateral change of the status quo by force and turning it into a fait accompli are serious concerns to Japan. Issues surrounding the South China Sea are directly connected to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and represent a legitimate concern, not only for Japan, which has major sea lanes in the South China Sea, but also for the entire international community.
- China is further strengthening cooperation with Russia, including in military activities. It has also conducted joint bomber flights and naval navigations with Russia in the vicinity of Japan. These repeated joint activities are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan and are a grave concern from the perspective of the national security of Japan.



Xi Jinping, currently in his third term as general secretary [EPA - Jiji Press]



The third PLA aircraft carrier “Fujian,” which is China's second indigenous one [China News Service/Jiji Press Photo]

# Part I

# Security Environment Surrounding Japan

## U.S.-China Strategic Competition Escalates; Tension Grows in Taiwan

- The political, economic, and military competition between the United States and China has become even more evident in recent years due to various concerns such as changes in the balance of power caused by China's growing national power and various pending issues.
- The overall military balance between China and Taiwan is rapidly tilting in China's favor.
- Regarding Taiwan, China firmly maintains the principle that Taiwan is part of China and that the Taiwan issue is its internal affair. China has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force. In response to the strengthening US-Taiwan relationship, China has further intensified its military activities around Taiwan.
- The ruling party candidate, Lai Ching-te, won the Taiwan presidential election held in January 2024.



President Lai Ching-te delivers a speech at his inauguration ceremony (May 2024) [Website of Taiwan's Office of the President]

## North Korea - Making Advances in Nuclear and Missile Development

- North Korea's military activities are posing an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's security than ever before. They seriously undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. They also represent a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to non-proliferation of weapons including WMDs.
- North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests in the past and possesses the technological capability to mount a nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles with their range covering the Japanese Archipelago and to strike Japan.
- In recent years, North Korea has continuously pursued missile development at an extremely rapid pace, launching ballistic missiles that fly with irregular trajectories as well as so-called "hypersonic missiles." North Korea is also pursuing operationalization of long-range cruise missiles designed to carry a tactical nuclear warhead.
- Since 2023, North Korea has conducted launches of the "Hwasong-18", a solid-fuel propelled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class as well as launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch. North Korea is focusing on qualitatively improving its nuclear and missile capabilities, such as diversifying its equipment systems and acquiring intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) means that complement its nuclear and missile operational capabilities.



An image released by North Korea on the launch of a "military reconnaissance satellite" [Korea News Service/ Jiji]

## Russia - The Strategic Alliance between Russia Embracing the "Strong State" Model and China

- The Russian military is continuing active military activities in the vicinity of Japan and its surrounding areas, showing its tendency to deploy the latest military equipment in the Far East. Russia's military activities in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, coupled with its strategic partnership with China, are posing a strong security concern.
- Russia has been developing and deploying various new weapons under its "strong state" model. Since the start of its aggression against Ukraine, it has also been moving to increase troop numbers and expand and reorganize its military units.
- Russia is continuing active military activities in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, under illegal occupation. As well as the ongoing construction of facilities for its troops in the region, Russia has deployed new military equipment such as coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles belonging to its Navy and fighter jets belonging to its aerospace forces. It also conducts large-scale exercises in the surrounding seas and airspace.



President Putin (center) participating in the Russian Navy Day commemoration ceremony (July 2023) [SPUTNIK/Jiji Press Photo]

## Other Regions

- Amid ongoing tensions between Israel and Palestinian armed groups, fighters from Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups invaded Israeli territory on October 7, 2023; killing and abducting Israeli soldiers and civilians. In response, the Israeli military launched a ground operation into the Gaza Strip.
- Since November 2023, there have been repeated attacks by the Houthis on commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. On November 19, a vessel operated by a Japanese company was seized by the Houthis.



An Israeli tank rolling in the north of the Gaza Strip (December 2023) [AFP - Jiji Press]

# Trends and Challenges Facing the International Community Concerning the Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domains and Information Warfare Chapter 4

## Trends in Science and Technology that Are Expanding to Information Warfare and Elsewhere

- The creation of science, technology, and innovation are what underpin Japan's economic and social development. Using these technological capabilities appropriately is essential, not only for security but also to address global-scale issues like climate change.
- To ensure technological superiority, each country is focusing its efforts on the research, development and military applications of AI, quantum technology, next-generation information and communication technology and other advanced, potentially game-changing technologies that could dramatically change the future character of warfare.
- Information warfare by spreading disinformation and other means is ongoing.

## Trends in the Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domains


- Space-based technologies and information and communication networks have become core infrastructures in people's everyday lives and for the military. Meanwhile, it has been pointed out that countries such as China and Russia are strengthening their capabilities to interfere with other countries' use of space and that their governments and militaries are involved in cyber-attacks.
- Countries are working to improve their capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains; aware that they represent methods of warfare that effectively deter enemies from demonstrating their war potential.



Pyongyang General Control Center of the National Aerospace Technology Administration [Korea News Service - Jiji]

## Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)

- The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the missiles delivering them, have been a grave threat since the end of the Cold War.
- In recent years, as competition and confrontation among states have intensified and as the current international security environment becomes complex and severe, there is concern that it is becoming difficult for the international community to rally together in taking on common challenges such as arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.



NATO cyber exercise [Website of NATO]

## Impact of Climate Change on the Security and Military

- Climate change represents an urgent threat to world peace and security. As well as significantly influencing the strategic environment, it affects military equipment, infrastructure and operations themselves.
- Rising sea levels and extreme weather events make the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region complicated, and various exercises are being conducted with the possibility of an increase in military operations related to climate change in mind.

# Part II

# Japan's Security and Defense Policy

## Basic Concepts of Japan's Security and Defense Chapter 1

- What we must prioritize first and foremost is developing proactive diplomacy to protect the lives and livelihood of Japanese nationals. On that basis, it is essential to coordinate with like-minded countries and promote multilateral cooperation through the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a cornerstone.
- At the same time, diplomacy needs to be backed by defense capabilities. As part of its strategic approach, Japan will actively pursue diplomacy under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) and promote the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities, including the possession of counterstrike capabilities.
- Adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan ensures civilian control and observes the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.



Prime Minister Kishida and Defense Minister Kihara at Air Review (November 2023)

## The Three Documents, including the National Security Strategy of Japan Chapter 2


### National Security Strategy (NSS)

- The NSS is Japan's supreme national security policy document. It provides strategic guidance for policies in wide-ranging areas, including not only diplomacy and defense, but also economic security, technology and intelligence.
- Japan will take the necessary measures to ensure that the budget level for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives reaches 2% of GDP in FY2022 (approximately 11 trillion yen) in FY2027.

### National Defense Strategy (NDS)

- The NDS comprehensively presents Japan's defense objectives and approaches and the means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives.
- The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) and the basis of Japan's national security, is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihoods as well as Japan's territorial land, airspace and waters. The international community, including Japan, is facing serious challenges and has entered into a new crisis. Japan needs to squarely face this grim reality and fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, focusing on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare.
- In fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities, Japan focuses on seven capabilities: (i) stand-off defense capabilities, (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain operation capabilities, (v) command and control / intelligence-related functions, (vi) mobile deployment capabilities / civil protection and (vii) sustainability and resiliency.
- The NDS calls for the possession of counterstrike capabilities that mainly capitalize on capabilities (i), which are key to deterring invasion of Japan.

### Defense Objectives



### Approaches to Achieve Defense Objectives

<b>1. Strengthening of Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense</b> • Fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities • Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country (Part III, Chapter 1)	<b>2. Strengthening Deterrence and Response Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance</b> Revealing the will and capabilities of Japan and the United States (Part III, Chapter 2)	<b>3. Reinforcing collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others</b> Reinforcing collaboration with as many countries as possible (Part III, Chapter 3)

The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) conducting landing training (February 2023)      MSDF destroyer "Ise" sailing with a U.S. aircraft carrier (January 2024)      Japan-Italy Formation Flight in Japan-Italy Bilateral Training (August 2023)

Three Defense Objectives and Three Approaches to Achieve them (image)

### Defense Buildup Program (DBP)

- The DBP indicates the level of defense capability Japan should possess to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities under the NDS. It also sets out total expenditure and the quantity of major equipment to be procured to achieve this end.
- By FY2027, five years after the formulation of the DBP, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities to a point Japan will be able to take primary responsibility for countering any invasion of its nation and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining the support of its ally and others. Further efforts will be made approximately ten years after formulating the DBP to better ensure that these defense objectives have been met and reinforce Japan's defense capabilities so that any invasion of Japan can be disrupted and defeated earlier and at places further afield.
- Total expenditure needed to achieve the level of defense buildup sought by the DBP for five years from FY2023 to FY2027 amounts to approximately 43 trillion yen.

## Defense Buildup and the Budget

### Chapter 3

- The international community is facing its greatest trial since the end of World War II and has entered a new era of crisis. With this basic understanding, the GOJ secured a budget that was necessary and sufficient for FY2024 defense buildup under the NDS and the DBP for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.
- On an annual expenditure basis, the GOJ allocated 7,724.9 billion yen to steadily execute the budget, for the significant increase in contract amount.
- On a contract basis, the GOJ allocated 9,362.5 billion yen to early start equipment procurement and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) facility development that extend across multiple years. Allocations for FY2023 and FY2024 comprise some 42% of the contracted 43.5 trillion yen needed to implement the DBP.
- The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF continues to support the seven fields of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities. Special emphasis was placed on procuring various types of stand-off missiles and Aegis System Equipped Vessels as well as on improving the resiliency of camps, bases and other existing facilities nationwide.
- The GOJ worked to secure financial resources to reinforce defense capabilities.
- Total expenses for the DBP and complementary initiatives for FY2024 amount to 8.9 trillion yen, which is about 1.6% of the GDP at the time the National Security Strategy of Japan was formulated (FY2022).

① Stand-off Defense Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening the defense capabilities to oppose invading forces from a safe distance where we will not be attacked</li> </ul> 
② Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening our capabilities to respond to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats such as missiles</li> </ul>  <p>Shipbuilding of an Aegis System-Equipped Vessel <sup>(Photo)</sup></p>
③ Unmanned Defense Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening our capabilities via information gathering and combat support with unmanned assets</li> </ul>  <p>Preparation of UAV for reconnaissance (for mid-range) <sup>(Photo)</sup></p>
④ Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, land, sea and air capabilities necessary for combat by fusing all capabilities</li> </ul>  <p>Development of Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft <sup>(Photo)</sup></p>
⑤ Command and Control and Intelligence-related Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening command and control and intelligence-related functions to accelerate and refine decision-making</li> </ul>  <p>Acquisition of Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2) <sup>(Photo)</sup></p>
⑥ Mobile Deployment Capabilities/Civil Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening maritime and air transport capabilities to quickly maneuver and deploy the necessary forces</li> <li>Implementing civil protection by utilizing the above capabilities</li> </ul>  <p>Acquisition of transport vessels <sup>(Photo)</sup></p>
⑦ Sustainability and Resiliency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preparation of necessary and sufficient ammunition, guided missiles and fuel from an early stage</li> <li>Secure funds to acquire parts for equipment, repair equipment and improve resiliency of facilities</li> </ul>  <p>Securing the ammunition storage facilities <sup>(Photo)</sup></p>

Fig. II-2-2-3 Seven Functions and Capabilities on which to Focus in Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities and Their Images  
The (Note) in the figure is an image.

## Organizations Responsible for Japan's Security and Defense

### Chapter 4

- The MOD/SDF develops and executes policies based on the fundamental stance discussed at the National Security Council, which is a part of the Cabinet.
- To rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted a joint operations system in which the Ground SDF (GSDF), the Maritime SDF (MSDF) and the Air SDF (ASDF) are operated integrally.
- JSDF Joint Operations Command will be established in Ichigaya during FY2024 as a permanent joint headquarters that can unify the command of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF. This will allow the command of joint operations by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to be integrated, as well as building capacity for cross-domain operations on a daily basis.




Fig. II-4-2-5 Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces and JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC)

## Framework for the SDF Activities

### Chapter 5

- Under the SDF Law and other laws and regulations, the SDF defends Japan and also maintains public order, responds to Important Influence Situation and engages in international peace cooperation activities.

## Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense Chapter 1

### Creating a Security Environment That Does Not Tolerate Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force

- Diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan's enhanced defense architecture are important for our efforts to prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force. Coupled with diplomatic efforts, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will promote cooperation with our ally and multilayered coordination with like-minded countries to create a desirable security environment.
- As a maritime nation, it is crucial for Japan to reinforce the maritime order and ensure the freedoms and safety of navigation and overflight.
- Japan is responding to the North Korea's "illicit ship-to-ship transfers" in violation of the UN Security Council resolution, and conducting the necessary measures to secure Japan-related vessels in the Middle East region to secure the stable use of Japan's vital sea lanes.



P-3C patrol aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) engaging in information-gathering activities in the Middle East

### Responses to Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts

- To influence opponent's actions, Japan will improve and enhance training and exercises such as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) and Strategic Communication (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with its ally, like-minded countries and others.
- The MOD/SDF is conducting continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and analysis from peacetime.
- To verify whether unmanned aerial vehicles can serve as replacements for some of its missions in future, the operation and verification of MQ-9B (SeaGuardian) aircraft of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is promoted. The initial plan for three RQ-4B (Global Hawk) aircraft of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has been completed.
- Followed by the establishment of the procedure to have the Minister of Defense control the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in an armed attack situation, the MOD/SDF constantly strengthens cooperation with the JCG. In FY2023, new joint training was conducted under the simulation of an armed attack situation.
- In FY2023, ASDF aircraft scrambled 669 times (479 times in response to Chinese aircraft and 174 times in response to Russian aircraft).



Personnel responding to a scramble

### Responses to Invasions of Japan, including Missile Attacks

- Japan will fundamentally reinforce its stand-off defense capabilities to respond from outside the threat zone, including anti-aircraft missiles, against naval vessels and landing forces that invade Japan, including its remote islands. Deployment on Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surfaced-launched variants) and acquisition of U.S.-made Tomahawks will be accelerated by one year, starting in FY2025, to promptly secure sufficient capabilities.
- To strengthen the integrated air and missile defense capabilities, the MOD/SDF will start of the construction of Aegis System Equipped Vessels and Japan and the United States will jointly develop a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) guided missile to counter Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs).
- The MOD/SDF will promote the introduction of unmanned assets that can minimize human loss and operate continuously for a long period of time compared to manned equipment (including the development of unmanned amphibious vehicles that can land on any shore of islands and perform tasks such as transporting supplies from the sea to the vicinity of troops).
- Japan will conduct cross-domain operations that organically integrate capabilities in the space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, as well as land, sea and air domains.
- Japan will improve mobile deployment capabilities to the southwest region, including the establishment of a new Self-Defense Forces Maritime Transport Group (tentative name) as a joint force.
- The MOD/SDF will work closely with relevant organizations to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks, accompanying attacks on nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructure effectively and will smoothly implement civil protection measures, including evacuation guidance for residents.



Upgraded Type 12 SSM that withstood various tests on the ground (Prototype) [Courtesy of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.]



LOA signing ceremony to advance Tomahawk acquisition (January 2024)

## Initiatives to Strengthen Information Capabilities, including Responses to Integrated Information Warfare

- As military activities around Japan intensify, while striving to gather information quickly and accurately through various means on a regular basis, the MOD/SDF is reinforcing functions such as analysis.
- In the international community, information warfare is being emphasized, namely the action of establishing a security environment favorable to one's own country by spreading disinformation and strategic information to influence public opinion and decision-making elsewhere, even when a conflict has not yet erupted.
- From the perspective of the defense of Japan, the MOD/SDF is building a system and set-up that can handle integrated information warfare reliably, focusing on the cognitive dimension, as well as fact-checking and analyzing disinformation and disseminating information promptly and appropriately.

## Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives to Ensure War Sustainability

- There is a need to strive to ensure and maintain sufficient warfare sustainability so that the SDF can continue persistent activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrence
- The MOD/SDF is promoting of various types of ammunition and expansion of the necessary ammunition storage facilities.
- The MOD/SDF will promptly promote a system in which the capabilities of existing equipment can be fully demonstrated by securing sustainment and maintenance budgets and resolving equipment non-operational situations due to parts shortages.
- The MOD/SDF is promoting the move underground and structural reinforcement of major command headquarters and creating a plan (the master plan) to consolidate and reconstruct the SDF facilities nationwide efficiently, promoting the facilities' resiliency.



An improved aircraft shelter for F-15 fighters (ASDF Chitose Air Base)

## Measures for Protection of the Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals

- Besides invasions of Japan, large-scale disasters and infectious disease crises are other serious threats. In the event of a large-scale disaster, such as the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake, the MOD/SDF cooperates closely with relevant organizations to carry out life-preserving activities, emergency, livelihood support and other essential services effectively.
- The SDF maintains a state of readiness and regularly conducts Joint Exercises to swiftly and accurately implement the rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas. The MOD/SDF transported Japanese nationals and others overseas twice in FY2023 (from Sudan and Israel).
- To secure the safety of Japanese nationals overseas, the counter-piracy unit was assigned an additional mission to maintain a temporary posture for possible rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas based at the SDF facility in Djibouti.




Personnel rescuing people in the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake (January 2024)



After landing at Haneda Airport for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others from Israel (October 2023)

## Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country

- To protect Japan, besides strong Self-Defense Forces, it is essential for the whole country to work together.
- To this end, in addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan builds an overall national defense architecture by integrating its national power, which includes diplomatic, intelligence, economic and technological capabilities and systematically combining all policy measures. As part of this effort, the government complements the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and, alongside, promotes initiatives in four areas under the framework of relevant ministries and agencies to strengthen the comprehensive defense system.





**Outline of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements**

- The alliance with the United States is a key pillar of Japan's national security policy. Fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities will also lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities, further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- Japan has maintained its peace, security and independence centered on the Security Arrangements with the world's dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and a capitalist economy as well as interests in maintaining global peace and security and has strong economic ties.
- Policy discussions on security between Japan and the U.S. are closely conducted at various levels of the MOD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including "2+2".

**Strengthening Japan and U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities**

- Japan's defense strategy and the U.S. defense strategy are in agreement that the highest priority is to integrate all approaches and means to prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force from occurring. Deeper discussions with the United States on both countries' respective roles, missions and capabilities further strengthen Japan-U.S. joint integrated deterrence capabilities.
- Japan will further deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-domain operations of the Alliance, including the space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. Regarding Japan's counterstrike capabilities, Japan and the United States will jointly establish a cooperative framework to demonstrate such capabilities more effectively. Japan will reinforce collaboration in areas such as air defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious operations, airborne operations, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT), protection of assets and facilities and logistics support.
- Japan will work to improve the response capability of the Alliance, including its readiness and interoperability, through more advanced and practical exercises and training.
- To ensure that the United States extended deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible and resilient, Japan will further actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence, including those at the ministerial level.

**Enhancement of Alliance Coordination Function**

- Japan and the United States established Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) to address a consistent joint response by the two countries seamlessly and effectively.
- Subsequently, Japan and the United States have collaborated closely, utilizing the ACM, to address, for example, the Kumamoto Earthquake and the Noto Peninsula Earthquake, North Korea's ballistic missile launches and China's activities in the sea and airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands.

**Strengthening of Joint Response Foundation**

- It is necessary to strengthen the foundation to support effective Japan-U.S. joint response at all stages. Japan will fundamentally reinforce information security and cybersecurity initiatives and further enhance defense equipment and technology cooperation with the United States.

**Initiatives for the Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan**

- While the presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) functions as a deterrence, it is necessary to make efforts that are appropriate for the actual situation of each area to mitigate the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of local residents.
- The realignment of the USFJ is a crucial initiative to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, while further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Therefore, the MOD will steadily advance the realignment and other initiatives and continuously make efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of the local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas.



Japan-U.S. Joint Press Conference (April 2024)  
[Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]



Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (May 2024)



Japan-U.S. bilateral training in southern Okinawa (January 2024)



Lower Plaza Green Square Opening Ceremony (March 2024)

## Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others Chapter 3

### Strategic Promotion of Multilateral and Multilayered Defense Cooperation

- To create a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force, it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration, not only with the ally but also with as many countries as possible. The MOD/SDF is promoting multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
- The MOD/SDF has been advancing high-level exchanges, bilateral/multilateral exercises, capacity building, and defense equipment and technology cooperation with various countries, both within and outside the Indo-Pacific region.
- The MOD/SDF is also expanding the establishment of institutional frameworks such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, with like-minded countries and others.
- Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea have been advancing defense cooperation, including sharing missile warning data on North Korea in real time.
- The MOD/SDF is accelerating the promotion of changing mindset among all SDF personnel and international cooperation on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) under the Headquarters for WPS Promotion in MOD. By holding seminars on WPS for Indo-Pacific countries, the MOD/SDF is contributing to raising awareness of WPS among the defense personnel in each country.



2nd Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (March 2024)



Destroyer JS "IKAZUCHI" Engaged in Direct Escort in the Gulf of Aden (November 2023)

### Ensuring of Maritime Security

- As a maritime nation, it is essential for Japan to reinforce the maritime order and ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and flights.
- The MOD/SDF is promoting multilateral cooperation concerning maritime security, such as the monitoring of maritime situations, including ongoing counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

### Initiatives for International Peace Cooperation Activities

- The MOD/SDF has been dispatching the personnel of Headquarters to the Multinational Force and Observer Mission (MFO) tasked with monitoring the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel and to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).
- The MOD/SDF is actively contributing to UN initiatives for international peace by dispatching SDF personnel to the UN Secretariat and PKO training centers and providing various types of support to the UN Triangular Partnership Programme (UNTPP).
- The SDF always maintains a posture to respond to urgent requests from affected countries for international disaster relief activities.



SDF personnel working at UNMISS

### Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that could serve as their means of delivery, as well as that of weapons, goods, and sensitive technologies that could be adapted for military use, pose an imminent challenge to international peace and stability.
- The MOD/SDF actively participates in the development of international systems and trainings related to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.



SDF personnel participating in PSI training (May 2023)

**Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability itself****Reinforcing Defense Production Base**

- Currently, the SDF can fully demonstrate its capabilities and accomplish its mission of defending Japan only by using equipment that incorporates advanced technology. Defense production and technology bases are indispensable foundations for securing superior equipment; they are a virtually integral part of defense capability itself, and their fundamental reinforcement is essential.
- Japan's defense industry is responsible for each stage (research, development, production, sustainment and maintenance, supply, decommissioning, etc.) of the equipment life cycle, and the defense equipment and defense industry are inseparable. The Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases has been established and enacted to implement necessary measures to maintain and enhance the capabilities of the defense industry to produce advanced defense equipment and ensure high operational rates.
- The MOD has announced the basic policy based on the Act. According to this policy, in addition to the measures stipulated in the Act, the MOD will promote initiatives to reinforce the bases, such as revitalizing the defense industry, building a robust supply chain, and strengthening defense industrial security.



Launching ceremony of the Mogami class destroyer JS "Yubetsu"  
(November 2023)

**Reinforcing Defense Technology Base**

- How we utilize the technology possessed by our country is extremely important to acquire the equipment necessary for new ways of warfare. The creation of science, technology and innovation based on Japan's advanced technological capabilities is a source that brings about economic and social development in our country and a major element of the comprehensive national strength related to our country's security. Furthermore, strengthening Japan's architecture for national defense is essential to actively utilize the high technical capabilities cultivated over many years by our country in the public and private sectors without being bound by conventional thinking in the security field.
- The MOD has formulated the Defense Technology Guideline 2023, which defines the MOD policy for reinforcing defense technology bases and serves as a roadmap for the Ministry to drive various initiatives in a unified and robust manner. The MOD will promote initiatives based on this guideline to strengthen the bases with the aim of protecting Japan through technology into the future.
- For the defense of Japan, it is vital that Japan continues to employ superior, state-of-the-art fighters that can ensure air superiority well into the future. Regarding the next-generation fighter aircraft, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy will jointly develop an advanced fighter that ensures future air superiority by bringing together technological advantages and sharing costs and risks. The three countries have signed the Convention to establish GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO), an international organization essential for an efficient delivery construct.
- Fundamentally strengthening capabilities to create defense innovations and groundbreaking equipment are required. The Defense Innovation Technology Institute (tentative name) will be established within the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), which institute will conduct breakthrough research to create innovative functions and equipment from a variety of rapidly evolving science and technology that will significantly change the future of warfare by adopting approaches and methods different from those used in the past with reference to the efforts of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and others.



Defense ministers of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy signs the Convention for establishing GIGO (December 2023).



Railgun (electromagnetic gun) under research at the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency

## Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation and Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology



The first air surveillance radar system turnover ceremony hosted by the Philippine Air Force (December 2023)

- The transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, create a desirable security environment for Japan, and provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force.
- In December 2023, the government partially revised the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, after the Working Team (WT) of the ruling parties held several of discussions on the system revisions in order to promote the smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high-security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. These steps have enabled the transfer of defense equipment in a wide range of fields, but at the same time, the review process for transfers has been made more rigorous.
- The Implementation Guidelines were partially revised in March 2024 to permit the direct transfer of finished products related to the next-generation fighter aircraft from Japan to countries other than partner countries. A cabinet decision was taken, stating that the cabinet would decide for each case when actual transfers are made in the future.
- Japan will improve the capabilities of the partner country's armed forces and maintain and strengthen medium- to long-term relationships with the partner country by strengthening initiatives for defense equipment and technology cooperation, including the transfer of defense equipment and international joint development. In FY2023, Japan announced the start of the cooperative development of GPI with the United States and signed the "Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Arrangement" with Australia. Concerning the Philippines, the first and the second air surveillance radar systems were delivered to the Philippine Air Force, the first finished equipment transfer from Japan to a foreign country.

## Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities

### Chapter 2

### Reinforcing Human Resource Base

- The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. To demonstrate the defense capabilities, the MOD/SDF will secure the necessary human resources and reinforce the human resource base to create an environment enabling all SDF personnel to demonstrate their abilities while maintaining high morale and pride.
- Based on the "Expert Panel on Reinforcing the Human Resource Base of the MOD/SDF," the MOD/SDF will implement various measures to secure diverse human resources, including those from outside the organization and promote the active participation of SDF personnel throughout their life cycle.
- The MOD/SDF will enhance recruitment activities and mid-career recruitment, expand the student loan system, utilize the SDF Reserve Personnel, raise the retirement ages of personnel, and reappoint retired uniformed SDF personnel.
- The MOD/SDF is implementing effective measures throughout careers, from entry as the SDF Personnel to retirement, to improve their treatment, and living and working environments, to take more responsibilities for their re-employment, and to increase opportunities for honors and privileges, etc.



The SDF Reserve Personnel in action during the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake Disaster Relief Operations

### Creating a Working Environment of Zero Tolerance for Harassment of Any Kind

- To create a working environment of zero tolerance for harassment of any kind, the MOD/SDF will promote a fundamental review of the handling process of harassment-related consultations, and harassment prevention measures.
- The "Harassment Prevention Task Force" was formed based on the result of the special defense inspection and the recommendations of the "MOD Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention and Measures" established under the direction of the Minister of Defense. The Task Force will review of the effective measures, including counseling system and education.
- To create a working environment of zero tolerance for harassment of any kind, the MOD/SDF will regularly disseminate messages from the top management, including the Minister of Defense, review harassment prevention education, raise awareness of SDF personnel by using education opportunities, update the standard of disciplinary action to make it more appropriate and clearer, expand the counseling system, and share its contact information.

**Further Promotion of Work-life Balance and Women's Participation**

- Ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires creating an environment in which staff are both mentally and physically healthy and are able to maintain high morale and pride, and fully demonstrate their abilities.
- The MOD/SDF is promoting working from home and paperless work environment, implementing stringent management of work hours, encouraging male personnel to take parental leave, and establishing a comfortable work environment for all personnel, etc., to encourage the participation of women personnel and improve work-life balance.
- The MOD/SDF is promoting measures to support emergency attendance at work by temporarily taking care of children of SDF personnel at SDF camps in case emergency support is required during disaster relief operations, etc.
- In addition to expanding the recruitment and promotion of women and lifting restrictions on the assignment of female uniformed SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF is promoting the improvement of educational infrastructure to support women's activities and the establishment of quarters in barracks and MSDF vessels for women with a view to increasing the number of female uniformed SDF personnel.



Emergency attendance support for SDF personnel engaged in disaster relief during the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake

**Transformation of Medical Functions**

- The SDF medical force needs to be transformed into an organization that focuses on not only maintaining the health and fitness of SDF personnel but also saving their lives from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency.
- The MOD/SDF will promote the strengthening of medical function to improve the combat trauma care capabilities with (i) Reinforcement of seamless medical care and transportation system from the frontlines to the final rear destination, (ii) Reinforcement of joint operation readiness for medical, and (iii) Fundamental management reform of the National Defense Medical College as the three pillars.
- The MOD/SDF will establish a system to autonomously secure and stockpile blood products based on the recommendations of the “Expert Panel on Blood Transfusion during Combat Trauma Care of the MOD/SDFs”.
- The MOD/SDF will reinforce the National Defense Medical College to serve as a clinical site for medical officers who provide combat trauma care by establishing the “Center for Trauma, Burn and Tactical Medicine” in FY2024.
- The SDF provides medical care overseas in disaster-stricken areas as part of international disaster relief activities and support capacity building in the medical field, among other international cooperation.



Joint Logistics and Medical Training during the FY2023 Joint Exercise “05JX” (November 2023)

**Reinforcement of Policy-making Function**

- For the SDF to respond to the increasingly severe, complex and fast-paced strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required.
- The “MOD Committee of Experts on Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities” will be convened as a body to obtain advice for policies from the experts, and will hold frank discussions on issues such as fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities.
- The MOD/SDF is closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies particularly the defense industry as their core. In addition, the MOD/SDF is reinforcing its intellectual base by reviewing and reinforcing research systems of the MOD/SDF, including the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS).



International Conference on Policy Simulation “Connections Japan 2023/24” held by the National Institute of Defense Studies (January 2024)

## Measures Relating to Training and Exercises

### Chapter 3

#### Various Measures Relating to Training and Exercises

- For the SDF to fulfill its challenging mission of defending Japan, each SDF personnel and each unit, the core of the defense forces, must maintain and improve their high level of proficiency from peacetime. High capabilities and proficiency are the foundation of Japan's deterrence and response capabilities.
- The SDF actively conducts various high-level training and exercises to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of Japan jointly with the United States.
- Based on the awareness that the stability of the security environment of Japan is indispensable to maintain the peace of our country, the SDF actively promotes bilateral/multilateral exercises with the ally and like-minded countries and others in the Indo-Pacific Region to facilitate the realization of FOIP.



FY2023 Joint Exercise "05JX" (November 2023)

#### Improvement of Various Training Environments and Safety Management

- To further improve the training environment, the MOD/SDF is promoting initiatives to enhance the training infrastructure in Japan and overseas, utilizing opportunities for bilateral and multilateral exercises with other countries.
- The MOD/SDF strives to implement thorough safety management on a daily basis.



ASDF conducted the first Japan-France Bilateral Training in Japan (July 2023)

## Initiatives on Coexistence with Regional Society and the Environment

### Chapter 4

#### Measures Concerning Harmony with Regional Society

- The various activities of the MOD/SDF are hard to implement without the understanding and cooperation of every person, local governments and other organizations. It is necessary to deepen mutual trust between regional society and people, and the SDF.
- For stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan, which is an extremely important element in securing the safety of Japan, it is essential to gain the understanding and cooperation of local governments in the surrounding areas.

#### Responding to Climate Change and Environmental Issues

- As a member of the Government, the MOD/SDF will address and contribute to resolving various climate change and environmental issues. In addition, the MOD/SDF will promote initiatives that focusing more on the coexistence of the SDF/USFJ facilities/areas with the surrounding areas.
- The Bill for Adjustment between Defense and Wind Power was passed and enacted during the ordinary Diet session in 2024, promoting policies to balance national security and renewable energies.
- The MOD/SDF takes appropriate measures for aqueous film-forming foam containing PFOS

#### Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives Management, Disclosure of Administrative Documents, etc.

- To gain the trust and cooperation of Japanese people and various other countries, the MOD/SDF proactively implements easy-to-understand public affairs efforts regarding MOD/SDF activities in various ways, and also manages administrative documents properly and responds appropriately to disclosure requests for administrative documents.



Defense seminar in Omitama City, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan (November 2023)



SDF music festival as part of the SDF Memorial Day commemorative events (November 2023)

Part

# I

## Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1

Overview

Chapter 2

Russia's Aggression and Defense by Ukraine

Chapter 3

Defense Policies of Countries

Chapter 4

Trends and Challenges Facing the  
International Community Concerning the  
Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains  
and Information Warfare

# Overview

## Chapter 1

### 1 Global Security Environment

Current trends in the security environment have several features. First, economic and culture interactions among states are further expanded and deepened following the development of information society and the expansion of international trade. On the other hand, there are also states that do not share universal values or political and economic systems based on these values, and they are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts represent significant challenges to the free and open international order underpinned by the rule of law. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has revealed this in a most blatant way. The international community is facing its greatest post-war trial yet and has entered a new era of crisis. In addition, the global power balance has significantly changed and interstate competition across the political, economic and military spheres is emerging. The interstate competition between China and the United States in particular is expected to further intensify in various fields.

Second, rapid advances in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that could dramatically alter the character of warfare and thus prove to become "game changers." The organization of military, methods and means of warfare are changing.

Third, there exists a range of global security challenges such as increasingly serious risks in cyber and other domains, information warfare, including the spread of disinformation, and climate change.

In cyber, maritime, space, and electromagnetic

#### KEY WORD

#### Grey Zone Situations

So-called "grey zone" situations simply represent a wide range of situations that are neither peacetime nor wartime.

In a gray-zone situation, for example, a country that confronts another over territory, sovereignty or maritime and other economic interests uses some forceful organization to demonstrate its presence in the relevant disputed region in a bid to alter the status quo or force other countries to accept its assertions or demands.

domains and other areas, the risks that impede free access and utilization of these areas are becoming increasingly serious. In particular, the threat of cyberattacks, in which the risk of exposure is relatively low and where attackers have an advantage, is growing rapidly. Cyberattacks have been used constantly to disable or destroy critical infrastructures, interfere in foreign elections, demand ransoms, and steal sensitive information, even in the form of state-sponsored cyberattacks.

In addition, **grey zone situations** over territories are constantly occurring. It is highly likely that **hybrid warfare**, combining military and non-military means to achieve military objectives, such as information warfare that utilizes the spread of disinformation prior to an armed attack, will be conducted in an even more sophisticated form in the time ahead.

Furthermore, addressing those issues not necessarily deemed as security targets in the past, such as supply chain vulnerabilities, increasing threats to critical infrastructures, and leadership struggles over advanced technologies, has also become a major security challenge. As a result, the scope of security has expanded to include the economic sector, making economic measures even more necessary to ensure security.

#### KEY WORD

#### Hybrid Warfare

The so-called "hybrid warfare" represents methods intentionally blurring the boundaries between the military and non-military realms, forcing affected actors to take complex measures that are not limited to military actions.

The means of hybrid warfare include operations using military units of unidentified nationality, cyberattacks to affect communications and other critical infrastructure, the spread of false information through the internet and the media, and other influential operations. The combination of these measures is considered to amount to hybrid warfare. In hybrid warfare, a country takes measures that are difficult to identify definitively as an "armed attack" based on its outward appearance. It is said that such an approach is taken with the intent to make it difficult for the target country to address the situation, such as delaying the military's initial response, while denying the attacker country's own involvement.



The global security environment and challenges articulated above are particularly prominent in the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is situated, and may get still severe in the future. The Indo-Pacific region is the core of global vitality, home to more than half of the world's population. The dynamism of the intersection of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans is a growth engine for the global economy. Japan, situated in this region, is well positioned to benefit from this. At the same time, the Indo-Pacific region faces a host of security challenges. For example, several nations and regions that possess large military forces, including nuclear weapons, do not share universal values, nor political and economic systems based on such universal values. Furthermore, there exists a complex intertwining of diplomatic and other relations based on historical backgrounds. In the case of Japan, the territorial issues of the Northern Territories and Takeshima, which are inherent territories

of Japan, remain unresolved. In addition, Japan faces threats and challenges of various types and intensities, such as unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East and South China Seas and other areas, piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and natural disasters.

Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order. The possibility cannot be precluded that a similar serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia. Across the globe, historical changes in power balances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, are occurring.



See


Fig. I-1-1 Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan; Fig. I-1-2 Military Strength of Major Countries/Regions (approximate numbers); Fig. I-1-3 Main Military Forces surrounding Japan (Approximate Strength)



**REFERENCE** : Security Environment Surrounding Japan

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_act/sec\\_env/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/index.html)

Fig. I-1-1 Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan




○Indo-Pacific region has many security challenges.

- There are several nations and regions in this region with large military forces, including nuclear weapons, do not share universal values, nor the political and economic systems based on such universal values.
- There exists a complex intertwining of diplomatic and other relations based on historical backgrounds.
- Diverse threats and challenges of various types and intensities exist in this region, such as unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East China Sea and South China Seas and other areas, piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and natural disasters.

(Note) Figures for modern destroyers and frigates for China show the total number of Renhai-class, Luhai-class, Luhai-class, Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class, and Luzhou-class destroyers and Jiangwei-class and Jiangkai-class frigates. Additionally, China has 49 Jiangdao-class corvettes (in 2024).

Fig. I-1-2

Military Strength of Major Countries/Regions (approximate numbers)




Ground forces (10,000 troops)			Maritime forces (10,000 tons (vessels))			Air forces (aircraft)		
1	India	124	1	United States	675 (970)	1	United States	3,320
2	North Korea	110	2	China	236 (690)	2	China	3,240
3	China	97	3	Russia	207 (1,180)	3	Russia	1,450
4	Ukraine	74	4	United Kingdom	75 (140)	4	India	840
5	United States	62	5	India	50 (330)	5	Republic of Korea	660
6	Pakistan	56	6	France	40 (290)	6	North Korea	550
7	Russia	54	7	Türkiye	29 (270)	7	Egypt	510
8	Iran	50	8	Republic of Korea	29 (230)	8	Pakistan	490
9	Vietnam	38	9	Italy	26 (160)	9	Taiwan	470
10	Republic of Korea	37	10	Iran	24 (560)	10	Saudi Arabia	460
-	Japan	13	-	Japan	53 (138)	-	Japan	370

(Notes) 1. Figures for ground forces are basically the numbers of Army personnel in "The Military Balance 2024."\* Figures for maritime forces show their tonnages compiled by the MOD based on "Jane's Fighting Ships 2023-2024." Figures for air forces are the total numbers of bombers, fighters, attack aircraft, surveillance aircraft, etc., compiled by the MOD based on "The Military Balance 2024."

2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2023; the number of combat aircraft (air forces) is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).

\* Figures are rounded off to the nearest 10,000 personnel. Figures for the United States include 450,000 Army personnel and 170,000 Marines personnel. Russia's strength includes 500,000 Ground Force personnel and 35,000 Airborne troops personnel. Regarding Ukraine, "The Military Balance 2024" states that the number of army and regional defense forces, mainly comprised of reserves, is 200,000 to 350,000, respectively. For convenience, maximum values are used. 350,000 ground troops, 350,000 regional defense forces, and 40,000 airborne troops are included. Figures for Iran include 150,000 ground force personnel of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in addition to 350,000 Army personnel.

Fig. I-1-3 Main Military Forces surrounding Japan (Approximate Strength)



- (Notes)
- 1 Source: Documents published by the DoD, "The Military Balance 2024" and "SIPRI Yearbook 2023," etc.
  - 2 Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2023; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft(excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).
  - 3 Figures for the ground forces of U.S. Forces Japan/Korea indicate the combined total for Army troops and U.S. Marines.
  - 4 Figures for combat aircraft include naval and marine aircraft.
  - 5 Figures in parentheses indicate the total number of major units such as divisions and brigades. That for North Korea includes only divisions.
  - 6 The figures for the U.S. 7th Fleet indicate forces forward-deployed to Japan and Guam.
  - 7 The figures for the combat aircraft of U.S. Forces Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet include only fighter aircraft.

Legend

	Ground forces (200,000 troops)		Vessels (200,000 tons)		Combat aircraft (500 aircraft)		Number of nuclear warheads (500)
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Commentary

## Increasing Nuclear and Missile Capabilities in the Vicinity of Japan

There are several countries and regions surrounding Japan that have large-scale military forces, including nuclear weapons.

China is seeking to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces from the perspective of ensuring deterrence and complementing conventional forces, and it is investing in and increasing the number of land, sea, and air nuclear delivery means as well as increasing the production of nuclear warheads. North Korea has been promoting nuclear development, including nuclear weapons, to build its nuclear deterrent and counter threats from the United States. Furthermore, North Korea has indicated that it will pursue the development of tactical nuclear weapons with a view to dealing with an armed conflict with the U.S. and South Korean armies that could occur on the Korean Peninsula. As for Russia, it is placing importance on securing its international standing and balancing its nuclear forces with those of the United States as well as placing importance on its nuclear forces to compensate for its inferiority in conventional forces. Russia is also proceeding with the deployment in the Far-East of naval vessels equipped with the sea-launched cruise missile system Kalibr, which is said to be capable of carrying conventional or non-strategic nuclear warheads.

In this way, as the nuclear forces around Japan continue to increase and missile forces that can serve as a means of delivering nuclear weapons have increased significantly in both quality and quantity, missile attacks on Japan are a real threat.


For example, activities around Japan include attempts to improve the secrecy and speed of missile launches by launching missiles from various platforms, such as Transport Erector-Launchers (TELs) and submarines, and attempts to improve precision-strike capabilities. In addition, the development and deployment of hypersonic weapons is also in progress around Japan, such as Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), which are said to glide and maneuver at hypersonic speeds (Mach 5 or more) through the atmosphere to reach targets, and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs), which use technologies such as a scramjet engine to enable hypersonic flight, and ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes in irregular trajectories.

In 2020, China began operating DF-17 semi-intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which are said to be capable of carrying HGVs, and it has been pointed out that China may replace some older short-range ballistic missiles with the DF-17. It has also been pointed out that in 2021 China conducted a test launch of an HGV that can fly long distances using an ICBM. As for North

Korea, in addition to repeatedly launching ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes on irregular trajectories and pursuing their practical application, it has identified the development of hypersonic glide warheads as one of its priority goals. It has also launched hypersonic missiles. With regard to Russia, its short-range ballistic missile Iskander, which was used in the invasion of Ukraine and is believed to be deployed in the Far East, is said to be capable of flying at low altitudes on irregular trajectories. Russia is also proceeding with the deployment of the HGV Avangard and the HCM Tsircon. Russia has announced that it will deploy the new ICBM Sarmat, which is said to be capable of carrying the Avangard, by the end of 2024.

These hypersonic weapons and low-altitude irregular-trajectory ballistic missiles fly at lower altitudes than normal ballistic missiles, thus delaying radar detection. Their maneuvering capabilities make it difficult to predict their trajectories and impact points, making their interception more difficult. Their development and deployment are believed to be progressing with the intent to counter or bypass existing missile defense networks.

Under such circumstances, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is working to ceaselessly strengthen the quality and quantity of Japan's missile defense capabilities. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to fully respond to this threat with the existing missile defense network alone, particularly if Japan continues to rely solely on the means of missile defense. Therefore, in the event of a missile attack by an adversary, Japan will use its missile defense network to intercept incoming missiles while preventing further armed attacks from the adversary through counterstrike capabilities as an absolute minimum self-defense measure that is unavoidably necessary in cases where it is recognized that no other means are available.



# Russia' Aggression and Defense by Ukraine

## Chapter 2

Part I

Chapter 2

Russia' Aggression and Defense by Ukraine

### 1 General Situation

Russia's aggression against Ukraine undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is a serious violation of international law, including the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of force. Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force have shaken the very foundation of the international order, including in Asia. In addition, brutal and inhumane acts committed by Russian soldiers have been revealed in many parts of Ukraine. The murder of numerous innocent civilians is a grave violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and a war crime, and utterly unforgivable.

After the end of World War II, denial of unilateral changes to the status quo by force became one of the foundations of international order. But, Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is supposed to take primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, is now openly taking military actions challenging international law and the international

order, claiming innocent lives and repeatedly making threatening mention about nuclear weapons, which can be called an unprecedented situation. If such Russia's aggression is tolerated, it could send a message with the wrong implication that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are acceptable in other regions as well, including Asia. Therefore, the international community, including Japan, should never forgive Russia's action.

The international community works together in solidarity against this Russia's aggression by imposing sanctions against Russia and continuing to provide Ukraine with defense equipment such as tanks, artillery, and ammunition in order to support Ukraine's efforts to defend itself and eject Russian military from Ukraine. The future developments surrounding Russia's aggression against Ukraine remain unpredictable. But Japan needs to monitor the related situation closely with grave concern.

### 2 Russia's Aggression against Ukraine and the Future Outlook

#### 1 The Failure of Russia's Blitzkrieg and Ukraine's Successful Defense

On February 24, 2022, Russia started full-scale aggression against Ukraine. Mr. Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, clearly expressed his intention to remain in Kyiv from the early stage of the aggression, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and other military and para-military units obstructed the advance of the main units of Armed Forces of Russian Federation (AFRF) at suburbs of the capital, which caused heavy losses for AFRF aiming at taking control of the city within short time period. It is pointed out that Russia's goal to

eliminate the Zelenskyy administration was finally failed after AFU fought off the AFRF in the Kyiv direction in the end of March through the early April.

The AFU successfully defended Kharkiv, the second largest city in Ukraine as well as a major transportation hub. Meanwhile, it is believed that the Russian forces made territorial gains in southern Ukraine more quickly than in other area. The AFRF occupied Kherson, the capital city of Kherson oblast on the western bank of the Dnieper River in early March 2022, and advanced further west in the direction of Mykolaiv, the capital city of Mykolaiv oblast. It is also believed that the AFRF made territorial gain in the southern Zaporizhzhia oblast




**REFERENCE** : Information related to Ukraine

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/ukraine2022.html>

Fig. I-2-1

Map of Ukraine



and the southern Donetsk oblast on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov.

See Fig. I-2-1 Map of Ukraine

## 2 Redeployment of Russian Forces and Start of Ukrainian Counteroffensive

### (1) Redeployment of troops and territorial expansion in Eastern and Southern Ukraine

Russian forces, which failed to take control of the capital Kyiv, on March 25, 2022, announced that previous military action had been at “the first phase of operation” and that the primary goal of its operation would shift to the “liberation” of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in eastern Ukraine, that is, pursuing expanded territorial gains in the regions.

It is said that after withdrawing its forces from the Kyiv area and regrouping, AFRF seized Sievierodonetsk, the temporary capital city of Luhansk oblast, and its surroundings from late June to early July 2022.

The AFRF concentrated its forces on seizing the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works (AISW) in Mariupol, Ukraine’s last stronghold in the southern Donetsk



Ukrainian Military's High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) being launched (Kherson oblast, southern Ukraine) [EPA-Jiji]

oblast on the coast of the Sea of Azov. In May 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that then Defense Minister Shoigu had reported to President Putin that the AFRF completed the operation in Mariupol with the surrender of Ukrainian units at the AISW.

As a result of the seizure of Mariupol, Russia secured the whole coast of the Sea of Azov and the land bridge connecting to the Crimean Peninsula.

### (2) Start of Ukrainian Counteroffensive

After repelling the Russian attack on large cities such as Kyiv and Kharkiv, the Ukrainian military, kept fierce

resistance to the AFRF along the entire front line as well as intensified its attacks on Russian positions from April 2022, which seemed to be prepared for the future counteroffensive.

The Ukrainian military reportedly sank a Slava-class guided missile cruiser “Moskva,” the flagship of Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, by a domestically produced surface-to-ship cruise missile “Neptune” in May 2022 in southern Ukraine where Russian forces achieved relatively considerable successes. In June 2022, General Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU (then), announced that the AFU had attacked AFRF units on Zmiinyi (Snake) Island in the Black Sea, occupied in the early stages of the war and forced them to withdraw from the island.

These Ukrainian attacks degraded the Russian air defense network that had been provided by the vessels of Russian Black Sea Fleet in southern Ukraine, which made it difficult for Russian Air Forces to conduct operations in the area, as a result of which made it easier for Ukraine to launch a counteroffensive in the region.

It can further be seen that the AFU used the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), supplied by the United States, in action from late June 2022. The AFU announced an attack on fuel and ammunition depots in a Russia’s base near Nova Kakhovka, Kherson oblast, in July 2022 and mentioned starting a counteroffensive in the south. The Ukrainian military effectively attacked Russian command posts and logistics bases using a long-range precision strike weapons system such as HIMARS in the region, and interdicted bridges and other crossing sites over the Dnieper River. Difficulties in logistics caused by these attacks decreased fighting capabilities and morale of Russian troops in the north of the river and improved conditions for the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

### 3 Ukrainian Counteroffensive on the Kharkiv and Kherson Fronts in 2023 and Russia’s Response

#### (1) Full-fledged Ukraine Counteroffensive

In early September 2022, the Ukrainian military conducted a successful counteroffensive in Kharkiv oblast in eastern Ukraine and regained most of the Russian-occupied area in the oblast. It is probable that the Ukraine military strived to conceal its plan and intent for the counteroffensive in the east, unlike the south where the counteroffensive was conspicuous. It is also pointed out that the Russian troops in the east

had become vulnerable after the redeployment of its troops to the south to prepare for the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive, which led to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive in the east.

On the other hand, in the south, as a result of efforts to cut off and undermine each AFRF unit using the Dnieper River, the AFU forced Russian troops to withdraw and successfully regained the northern part of the Dnieper of Kherson oblast including Kherson, the capital city of the oblast, in mid-November 2022.

Furthermore, there was some damage caused by an explosion and destruction of a girder of the bridge connecting Krasnodar of Russia and the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine in October 2022. Russia blames Ukraine for Crimea bridge blast.

#### (2) Russia’s Response

Russia responded in various ways to Ukraine’s full-fledged counteroffensive, such as with troop buildups and making its occupation of Ukrainian territory a fait accompli.

With respect to the buildup of forces, President Putin signed executive orders related to partial mobilization, explained the necessity of the actions and asked people for their support in September 2022. Regarding the mobilization, then Defense Minister Shoigu said that he was planning to mobilize some 300,000 reservists.


Regarding Russia’s fait accompli of the occupied areas in Ukraine, Russia illegally “annexed” four regions of the occupied areas in the oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson on September 30, based on the results of what they called a “referendum” conducted in the area from September 23 to 27 to ask the people whether their territory was to be “annexed” to Russia or not.



President Putin (center) and the “heads” and “chief executives” of the eastern and southern four regions of Ukraine, at the ceremony for incorporating the regions (oblasts) (September 2022) [Presidential Executive Office of Russia]



In addition, AFRF has built multi-layered defenses, including trenches, anti-tank ditches and concrete anti-tank obstacles known as “Dragon’s Teeth” and minefields, along the entire contact line in anticipation of counterattacks by the Ukrainian military. At the same time, the AFRF intensify bombardments with missiles and loitering munitions all over Ukraine. It is pointed out that this was aimed at depleting Ukraine’s air defense missile reserves, as well as weakening war sustainability and the fighting spirit of Ukrainian people by damaging power grids critical for civilian life in cold winter. While the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimates the number of noncombatant victims caused by Russian attack in Ukraine amount to be over 10,000 as of November 2023, the actual number is possibly much larger as accurate numbers cannot be determined due to the ongoing fighting, and the number is likely still increasing now.



An apartment complex in Dnipro, central Ukraine, destroyed by a Russian missile attack on January 14, 2023 (January 2023) [Ukrainian government Facebook].

In January 2023, the Russian military and the private military company (PMC) “Wagner” intensified their offensive in the eastern Donetsk oblast. In May 2023, they seemed to have taken control of Bakhmut, a key transportation hub in the oblast.

#### 4 Stagnation of Ukrainian counteroffensive on the Zaporizhzhia front in 2023 and Russian eastern offensive

##### (1) Provision of Western weapons to Ukraine and stagnation of Ukrainian counteroffensive

While thrown on the defensive in the face of the offensive on the Bakhmut front by the Russian military and other forces, the Ukrainian military received various equipment from Western countries, including main battle tanks such as the “Leopard 2A6” and “Challenger 2” and air-launched long-range cruise missiles such as the “Storm Shadow.” It seems to have been preparing for a counteroffensive by reorganizing its new units and training its soldiers in Europe.

The Ukrainian military is believed to have launched a counteroffensive in early June 2023 and sequentially recaptured multiple villages; centering on the front of southern Zaporizhzhia oblast. However, the Ukrainian military is also said to have suffered significant losses in personnel and equipment as its advance was blocked by numerous antipersonnel mines and tank mines laid by Russian forces and anti-tank missiles from attack helicopters.

The Ukrainian military’s counteroffensive is reportedly meant to break through the Russian military’s defensive line in the southern Zaporizhzhia oblast and advance southward to the Sea of Azov, thereby cutting off the Russian military’s land logistics route connecting mainland Russia and the Crimean Peninsula. However, it appears that the originally envisioned goals have not been achieved.

The following have been pointed out as the reasons behind the stagnation of the Ukrainian military’s counteroffensive: the shortage of firepower such as howitzers and trench mortars, short-range air defense systems to protect advancing ground forces from airborne threats, obstacle-clearing equipment to break through minefields and trained soldiers in the Ukrainian military.

In October 2023, the United States provided Ukraine with the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), a surface-to-surface ballistic missile system. Ukrainian forces successfully attacked Russian military airfields using ATACMS missiles. They also damaged ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet using domestically produced unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and cruise missiles. However, no major breakthrough was achieved in ground operations. In November 2023, President

Zelensky ordered the construction of defensive positions in preparation for a Russian military offensive, it is believed that the Ukrainian military was on the defensive.

Russia claims to have quadrupled its military manufacturing capacity by the end of 2023. As Russia ramps up the pace of repair and production of various types of equipment, it is anticipated that the expansion of support from Western countries will become increasingly crucial for Ukraine's future.

## (2) Intensifying Russian military offensives and missile attacks in eastern Ukraine

Russian forces, which had countered the Ukrainian military's counteroffensive with well-prepared defensive positions and ground and air forces, allegedly intensified their offensive in the Avdiivka and Bakhmut sectors of Donetsk oblast and the Kupyansk sector of Kharkiv Oblast from October 2023 onwards and seems to have seized control of Marinka in Donetsk oblast by the end of 2023. In February 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it had taken control of Avdiivka.



Damage in Kharkiv, Ukraine (January 2024) [AFP-Jiji]

In addition, since late December 2023, the Russian military has intensified its missile attacks across Ukraine, but while the missile attacks in the winter of 2022 targeted power grids, some observers have pointed out that the targets of the missile attacks in the winter of 2023 are military industries, with an eye on a protracted war. This trend continues into the spring of 2024, with a shortage of air defense equipment said to be exacerbating damage to Ukraine.

## 5 Russia's Attack on Nuclear Power Stations and Nuclear Facilities and the Situation Surrounding Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons

Russia repeatedly takes dangerous actions around nuclear facilities in ongoing aggression against Ukraine. Russia occupied the Chernobyl nuclear power plant near the Belarusian border in February 2022 and also occupied the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southeastern Ukraine in March 2022. In addition, Russia attacked the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology (the KIPT), which has experimental reactors and handles nuclear substances, multiple times on and after March.

In April 2022, when the Russian military conducted its first flight test of "Sarmat" the new large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in development, President Putin made a statement showing off his country's nuclear force. Furthermore, President Putin repeatedly mentioned nuclear weapons probably with the intention of intimidation. For example, he said Russia would use every possible means to bounce back threats to the territorial integrity of the nation in his statement to people to promulgate an executive order about partial mobilization in September 2022. He was clearly keeping nuclear weapons in mind in the statement. Other high officials make similar statements repeatedly as well.

Russia has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine may use chemical and biological weapons. However, the United States and the United Kingdom evaluate it as showing that Russia is preparing for the so-called "false flag campaign." In March, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden made a statement to the effect that there are certain signs that President Putin is considering using biological and chemical weapons in Ukraine. In May 2024, the U.S. Department of State pointed to a suspicion that Russia had used chemical weapons.

## 6 Future Outlook

While there is no predicting about what may happen in the future regarding aggression against Ukraine, there are many indications about the strategy, tactics and human and material war sustainability of both the AFRF and the AFU which may impact future developments.

Some difficulties in the chain of command of the AFRF were indicated from the very early stages. It has been pointed out that, at the start of aggression, the AFRF allocated the chain of command and assigned

troops of a Joint Strategic Command (Military District) to each operational front as it is in peacetime and thus did not have a centralized command chain covering the entire projected force consisting of mechanized infantry forces said to be as many as 200,000-strong and missile units belonging to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, as well as sea power and air power.<sup>1</sup> In early April 2022, a Joint Task Force Commander was reportedly appointed to command all actions of the AFRF. This is seen as a measure to improve cooperation among services and theaters. Also, in January 2023, Russia announced that General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the AFRF, was named as the Joint Task Force Commander, aiming to improve cooperation among services, the quality of logistics support and command efficiency of the unit. In May 2023, Prigozhin's private military company "Wagner" is said to have contributed to the capture of Bakhmut in the eastern Donetsk oblast by deploying numerous troops. However, subsequent discord between the military and "Wagner" led to Prigozhin instigating an "armed rebellion" in June 2023, allowing "Wagner" to advance into Russia. At one point, the "Wagner" offensive reportedly came within 200 km of Moscow, but the situation was brought under control through the mediation of the Belarusian president. In an effort to prevent the recurrence of such an armed uprising, Russia's Defense Ministry has been encouraging former "Wagner" soldiers to sign contracts with the military. It has also been pointed out that the Ministry is trying to centralize the chain of command by managing other private military companies under the



"Wagner" fighters holding Russian flags  
(May 2023) [AFP-Jiji]

control of the General Staff Office.

The AFU continues fighting until today undauntedly against the AFRF which has superior quality and larger numbers. Continuation of fighting is made possible by several factors such as a number of reservists with combat experience derived from the eastern front campaign since 2014, significant progress in training non-commissioned officers who assume leading roles in battle realized with the reorganization of the Defense Ministry and the AFU aiming to achieve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard and the introduction of rapid and highly accurate fire coordination systems based on commercial off-the-shelf technologies including the command and control support software "GIS Arta" and the situational awareness system "Delta."

For human war sustainability, it is pointed out that the number of casualties was 190,000 for the AFU as of August 2023, and 465,000 for the AFRF as of May 2024.<sup>2</sup> In June 2023, President Putin signed a law allowing prisoners and suspects, excluding felons, to sign military service contracts. In October the same year, the military personnel registration regulations were revised to include a new provision for "special military personnel registration," which has facilitated the enlistment of prisoners without requiring a physical examination. These measures appear to be aimed at securing military personnel by creating an environment for deploying prisoners more quickly in actual combat operations. Ukraine seems to be facing difficulties in securing personnel, as President Zelenskyy revealed that the military is requesting the mobilization of an additional 500,000 troops in December the same year. The AFU is supported in education and training for recruits by Western countries.

It is pointed out that Russia's war sustainability for material has been undermined by hindered equipment acquisition caused by economic sanctions against the country. Even in this situation, the Russian military maintains its power by various means such as the ammunition industry operating around the clock, diverting missiles not for ground attacks, the acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) made in Iran, taking over tanks from Belarus and the procurement of artillery shells and missiles from North Korea. Furthermore, it is pointed out that Russia is capable of

1 In addition to the AFRF, paramilitary forces including the following are participating in the aggression: the National Guard of the Russian Federation (former Internal Troops of Russia), the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, and a troop called "Kadyrovites" under the control of the Head of the Chechen Republic Kadyrov.  
2 According to the New York Times, August 18, 2023 (announced by the UK Ministry of Defence in May 4, 2024)

prolonged battle, even under sanctions, because it has sufficient production capacities for equipment including ammunition belonging to the technical scope of the former Soviet Union.

The Ukrainian military, on the other hand, can acquire only limited parts and ammunition from outside of Russia because most of its equipment was manufactured in the former Soviet Union. Although some equipment can be repaired or acquired domestically, it is difficult to carry out repair or acquisition, because the major ammunition industrial cities, such as Kharkiv and Dnipro, are within the attack range of the AFRF. Therefore, support from foreign countries is important in the acquisition of equipment and ammunition as well as in education and training to change over former Soviet Union equipment to Western equipment to maintain war sustainability.

While the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) is expected

to maintain its relentless efforts to reclaim its territory with a strong will to resist invaders, it has been pointed out that there is a possibility of a prolonged battle, given Russia's attempt to build up its strength.



Prosecutors examining the wreckage of a missile allegedly made by North Korea used in an attack on Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine (Kharkiv, Ukraine) (January 2024) [AFP-Jiji].

### 3 The Impact of Russia's Aggression against Ukraine on International Affairs and Various Countries' Responses to It

#### 1 General Situation

For the Russia's aggression against Ukraine, Russia has had to pay a high price not only because Ukraine itself strongly resists Russia's aggression but also because the international community imposes strong coordinated sanctions against Russia and continues to support Ukraine. In Europe, the security environment has reached a major turning point in the wake of the aggression against Ukraine, with countries not only increasing their defense spending but also Finland and Sweden, which had previously advocated policies of neutrality, joining NATO. Clearly, the aggression by Russia, which saw NATO's eastward expansion as a threat to itself, prompted European countries to shift their security policies in this manner. The aggression has made it hard for Russia to say that it has achieved its strategic goal of gaining security for itself through maintaining its "sphere of influence."

In this view, Japan needs to pay attention to the future developments of the situation in Europe, including its strategic effects and recognize that European-Atlantic

security and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible. This is because Japan is a close ally of the United States, a NATO member state and is located on the opposite side of Europe across the Eurasian Continent where Russia also sits. In addition, the change in the European situation in response to the Russia's aggression against Ukraine can also have an impact on global affairs including developments of the strategic competition between the United States and China and impact on Asia. In any case, it is necessary to monitor the related situations closely with great interest.


#### 2 NATO's response

Russia's aggression against Ukraine prompted a rapidly growing alarm amid European countries and Russia's aggressive actions are being viewed as the most severe and direct threat to European and northern Atlantic security.<sup>3</sup> With renewed awareness of the threat of Russia, NATO member states direct their efforts at enhancing defense cooperation under the collective defense system of NATO and pursue the development

3 NATO adopted a new strategic concept for the first time since 2010 at a summit meeting held in June 2022. In the previous strategic concept, the Europe-Atlantic region was considered peaceful and the possibility of an attack on the NATO territory was considered small; however, in the current strategic concept, the Europe-Atlantic region is not considered peaceful and the possibility of an attack on the member states' territories is deemed impossible to rule out. Furthermore, Russia, with which a "genuine strategic partnership" was pursued in the previous strategic concept, has been positioned as "the most serious and direct threat to the security of the member states and the peace and stability of the Europe-Atlantic region."

of defense capabilities in each country. For example, the unit scale in the eastern direction is expanded as needed and an agreement has been made to put 300,000 and more troops into high readiness conditions in place of NATO Response Forces.

The United States also intends to enhance the strength of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. In June 2022, the United States announced among other measures the establishment of U.S. Army V Corps permanent headquarters in Poland, increasing the number of U.S. destroyers based on Spanish ports, rotation deployment of U.S. troops in Romania and additional deployment of an F-35 squadron to the United Kingdom.

 Chapter 3, Section 9-2 (Enhancement of Multilateral Security Frameworks)

Several nations including NATO member states provide equipment, training support and the like to Ukraine depending on the progress of the war. At the beginning of the war, the donor countries provided portable anti-tank missiles and man-portable surface-to-air missiles that seemed to contribute to preventing front-line expansion by delaying the advancement of Russian military armored units and reducing the strength of airborne troops. After the AFU stopped Russia's full-scale aggression, the countries moved towards providing large equipment that helps suppress and secure wide areas in ground fighting, such as tanks, armored vehicles and howitzers, for the Ukrainian military's counteroffensive. In January 2023, each country announced for the first time the provision of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles not made by the former Soviet Union, beginning with the delivery of German tanks to Ukraine by Poland in February of the same year.

They also came to provide longer-range artillery to attack enemy bases, following the concentration of AFRF troops in the eastern Ukraine region.

Furthermore, the handing over of air defense systems from various countries rapidly progressed as a result of Russian armed forces commencing missile attacks targeting all over Ukraine including civil facilities from October 2022. In April 2023, it was reported that an air defense system called "Patriot," capable of coping with ballistic missiles, was also provided.

Some NATO member states stated that they would deliver fighter jets made by the former Soviet Union in March 2023 and the United Kingdom and the Netherlands stated in May that the two countries would establish an "international union" for fighter jets acquisition and

flight training. Furthermore, the United States stated in the G7 Hiroshima summit meeting that it would support the multilateral initiative for the flight training of fourth-generation fighter jets including F-16 fighters. As of early 2024, countries including the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Norway, have offered to provide F-16 fighters, with a total of nearly 113 fighters expected to be delivered to Ukraine.

Among all of this support from various countries, the contribution of the United States is prominent. The cumulative security support from the United States to Ukraine under the Biden administration is USD 51.3 billion, including USD 50.6 billion announced after the start of Russia's aggression against Ukraine (as of May 10, 2024). The United States clearly shows a strong supporting attitude towards Ukraine providing not only a variety of equipment in large quantities but also familiarization training for newly delivered equipment and boot camp training outside Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the United States in December 2022, and said support from the United States is "an investment in global security and democracy" in his speech to U.S. Congress appealing to the American people to continue support. President Zelenskyy, who had also visited the United States in December 2023, appealed for continued support to Ukraine in a speech at the U.S. Congress.

The United Kingdom also provided continuous support to Ukraine through equipment support and dispatching training instructors with the United States and other countries from when Russia "annexed" the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and since the regime change from the Johnson administration to the Sunak administration, it has continuously and actively supported Ukraine by providing a variety of equipment and conducting boot camp training. In particular, the United Kingdom took the plunge to announce that it would provide its main battle tanks in January 2023 ahead of any other country. It also provided air-launched long-range cruise missiles. In addition, similarly to the United States, the United Kingdom is actively disclosing information about the Russian military movement to counter Russia's disinformation and contain the action of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) through announcements by high officials and posting on social media.

France, together with Germany, has been acting as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine in the "Normandy

Format,”<sup>4</sup> to peacefully resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In addition, France has announced the delivery of equipment such as wheeled combat vehicles, missile air-defense systems and air-launched long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine.

Germany drastically changed its defense strategy after Russia's aggression against Ukraine, announcing to deliver infantry fighting vehicles and surface-to-air missile systems and started to deliver its main battle tanks directly to Ukraine as well as permit the transfer of German-made main battle tanks from third-party countries to Ukraine in January 2023. Since then, Germany has been continuously supplying artillery shells and air defense missiles.

Canada has been providing training support to the AFU since 2015. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Canada has been actively supporting Ukraine, providing military support of more than CAD 2.4 billion as of January 2024.

The European Union (EU) has also decided to provide military aid to Ukraine totaling 5.0 billion euros through the European Peace Facility, an EU fund.

In addition, technical support provided by private companies to Ukraine is also attracting attention. Satellite internet services using a small satellite constellation provided by U.S. companies in response to the request from the Ukrainian government are used not only as a means of communication for the Ukrainian people but also are utilized to operate the Ukrainian military's unmanned aircraft. Moreover, it is pointed out that some European and U.S. IT/security companies have been supporting Ukraine's cybersecurity since before aggression against Ukraine began, and have successfully reduced and localized damage from Russian cyber-attacks.

While players such as NATO member states and other countries moved towards supporting Ukraine, some countries are taking their own measures. Türkiye, which has deep relations with both Russia and Ukraine, shows consideration for Russia to some extent. Concretely, Türkiye declares support for Ukraine while basically not implementing economic sanctions against Russia. The country also mediates the restarting of exporting grains from Ukraine. Hungary, which deeply depends on Russia economically, has shown a more conciliatory attitude toward Russia than any other NATO member, as evidenced by its not providing weapons to Ukraine and

by its veto at the European Council in December 2023 of a vote on EU financial assistance to Ukraine amounting to 50 billion euros (the assistance finally reached agreement in February 2024 as a result of a negotiation between the EU and Hungary).

### 3 Other Regions Response

A United Nations general meeting resolution that demands an immediate stop to Russia's aggression was adopted by approval of 141 member states, which is over 70% of UN member states, on February 23, 2023, one year since the start of aggression against Ukraine. On the other hand, in addition to Russia, some countries and regions do not sympathize with this movement. For example, six countries and regions including Belarus and North Korea were against the resolution and thirty-two countries including India and China abstained from voting.

North Korea is showing its stance of standing by Russia, for example, as it voted against the UN General Assembly's resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and claims that the United States and other Western countries are to be blamed for the conflict in Ukraine. It was also revealed that missiles provided by North Korea to Russia since the end of December 2023 were used against Ukraine. Japan has strongly condemned the arms supply from North Korea to Russia, as it could lead to further deterioration of the situation in Ukraine and also violate the relevant Security Council resolutions that completely prohibit the transfer and procurement of arms and related materials between North Korea and Russia.

 See Chapter 3, Section 4-1-5 (Relations with Countries and Regions)

While Iran has been increasingly opposed to Western countries since its secession from the nuclear agreement with the United States in 2018, it is enhancing its relationship with Russia, particularly in the economic and military domains. Iran made an argument for a diplomatic solution regarding the aggression against Ukraine but showed sympathy for Russia's standpoint to the extent of insisting that if Russia had not acted then NATO would have provoked the war. Then President Raisi of Iran and then Secretary Patrushev of the Security Council of Russia talked together in November

4 A framework for dialogue based on the Minsk Protocol among the four countries of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany to resolve the situation in Ukraine, which has been deteriorating since 2014

2022. The Iranian side stated it would raise its level of strategic relationship with Russia in various fields and criticized sanctions against Russia by the United States and its allies.

The United States announced in July 2022 Iran's plan to provide UAVs to Russia and in September 2022, pointed out that Russia was using Iran-made UAVs for attacks as well as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). The Ukrainian military also announced that Russia conducted attacks in various points of Ukraine using Iranian UAVs. To this, Iran claims that the delivery of Iranian UAVs to Russia was carried out before the aggression against Ukraine and suggests that their purpose was not for use in war with Ukraine. William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), pointed out in February 2023 that Russia is considering the possibility of supporting Iran's missile plan and providing fighter jets in return for Iran's support. In November the same year, Kirby, Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the U.S. National Security Council, pointed out that Iran may be considering providing ballistic missiles to Russia. While he stated in February 2024 that he had "not been able to confirm" reports that Iran had provided ballistic missiles to Russia, the progress of cooperation between the two countries must be closely observed.

China avoids direct criticism of Russia in respect of the aggression, requesting "self-restraint and dialogue" to both Russia and Ukraine and takes a standpoint from which China will play constructive roles in its own ways towards a solution to the Ukraine issues. However, China insists that Russia's actions are caused by the "Cold War mentality" of the United States and other NATO countries and that it understands Russia's reasonable concerns about security issues and criticizes sanctions against Russia and equipment delivery to Ukraine from Western countries.

In September 2022, President Xi Jinping stated that China would strongly support Russia on issues about mutual core benefit at the China-Russia Summit Meeting that was held face-to-face for the first time after the start of the aggression. He also announced in regard to the aggression against Ukraine, that "China will continuously maintain an objective and fair standpoint, encourage the formation of collaborated influence in the international community and take a constructive role towards peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crises" in an online China-Russia Summit Meeting in December 2022. Furthermore, he stated that China will play constructive

roles in peace negotiations and reconstruction after the conflict in a document titled "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" published in February 2023. Xi also rated highly Russia's intention to reopen dialogue with Ukraine as quickly as possible and was opposed to unilateral sanctions without the resolution of the United Nations Security Council in the joint communique resulting from the meeting with President Putin held in Russia in March 2023. In October the same year, President Putin visited China for the first time since the aggression against Ukraine and held a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping, mutually confirming the deepening relationship of trust between the two countries. Russia, which is internationally isolated with its aggression against Ukraine will find its political and military cooperation with China more important than ever.

On the other hand, it is seen that Western countries are taking action to contain China which is deepening cooperation with Russia. In September 2022, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg pointed out that China continued to cooperate with Russia and opposed expanding NATO even after the aggression against Ukraine and the notion that NATO should regard China as a challenge to international security was adequately reasonable. The United States added Chinese entities including companies regarded as providing satellite images to Russian private military company Wagner to the list of entities subject to regulations for export from the United States. Furthermore, Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, warned Wang Yi, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, during their meeting in February 2023 that delivery of lethal weapons to Russia would have serious consequences for the U.S.-China relationship.

Japan, as a country neighboring both countries, must continue to monitor with concern the trend of cooperation between the two countries, which has deepened further since Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

 Chapter 3, Section 2-3 (Relations with Countries and Regions)

India emphasized the need for an immediate stop to hostile operations and violence, as well as the need for a solution through diplomatic means and dialogue regarding the aggression against Ukraine and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated "Now is not the age of war" to President Putin at the Indo-Russia Summit Meeting in September 2022, while India, which has traditionally deep relations with Russia, avoids explicit

criticism of Russia. As stated above, India maintains a strong military cooperative relationship with Russia and responses such as increasing the import of Russian crude oil with lower prices due to the economic sanctions have

been observed. Close attention should be paid to India's movement in future.

 Chapter 3, Section 5-5-5 (1) (Relations with Asian Countries)

Perspective

## Situation of Russia's Aggression against Ukraine



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Due to Russia's invasion, people across Ukraine have been forced into a state of war for more than two years since February 2022. Not only are the government and military, led by President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, conducting the defense, many people are also working to protect their society through the defense of their country, Ukraine. They are helping people in trouble, providing information useful for operations, restoring communications and transportation infrastructure, enhancing economic and operational capabilities through technological development and production, and supporting national defense policies while debating them. In a public opinion poll at the end of 2023, more than 70% of people said that they should not abandon their territory, and they have a strong will to continue the operations despite their predicament.

Russian President Vladimir Putin launched an attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, declaring a "special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine." Although Russia conducted intensive attacks on the capital, Kyiv, the attacks were not accompanied by military preparations necessary for a full-scale capture and occupation of the city. In Russia's view, Ukrainian politics had been always divided and fragile, so Putin probably thought that a combination of military force and insider maneuvering could easily make Ukrainian people abandon Zelenskiy's government, whose approval rating had been declining, and create a pro-Russian government. Putin may have decided the invasion in haste, believing that the United States would not be willing to become strongly involved in Eastern Europe at the time

and that this would be a good opportunity that would not come around in the future. However, the reality is that Ukraine is much more resilient, and the gap between the purpose of the Putin administration's aggression of Ukraine and the reality has become so large that it has been unable to even think about stopping it, and the number of casualties has only increased.

If Russia ends its use of force someday, realizing that Ukraine is resilient and that the damage to Russia is too great, it will have less incentive to resort to force again. Ukraine's current tough fight is meaningful in that it supports future peace. It is dangerous to give Russia room for its misconception that the use of force yields results, and the ability and resolve to dispel such misconceptions will become the foundation of peace.



Utility workers engaged in rebuilding after the shelling of Kharkiv  
[Ukrinform / Jiji Press Photo]

(Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher's academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position.



### Section 1 The United States

#### 1 Security and Defense Policies

In the National Security Strategy (NSS)<sup>1</sup> released in October 2022, the United States expressed its recognition that it faces two strategic challenges of “geopolitical competition between the major powers” with China and Russia, and “shared challenges” which are cross-border issues such as climate change. To deal with the strategic challenges, the United States shows its stance that it focuses on investment in national power as the source of its strength and calls on its allies to invest in capabilities required for enhancing deterrence while positioning its alliances and partnerships as the most important strategic asset. Also, it states that it has a vital interest in deterring aggression by China, Russia and other states and expresses its intention to promote Integrated Deterrence<sup>2</sup> that achieves maximum effect in deterring acts of aggression through combining capabilities with domestic agencies and allied countries, based on the understanding that the United States cannot afford to rely solely on its conventional forces and nuclear deterrence against competitors promoting new strategies.

In addition, the Department of Defense (DoD) released the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in October 2022 and expressed its intention to advance “Integrated Deterrence” and other strategic approaches while identifying top level priorities that the DoD must pursue to strengthen deterrence such as defending homeland and deterring strategic attacks. On top of that, the DoD showed its recognition that mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are the greatest global strategic advantage of the United States and are a center of gravity for the NDS, with the understanding that the United States cannot meet these complex and interconnected

challenges alone.

The NSS states that China presents America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge and is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it. Based on those recognition, the DoD shows its idea to out-compete China while constraining Russia which poses an acute threat to the international system. The NDS also states that China remains the most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades and is the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security. The NDS directs the DoD to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with China as the “pacing challenge” for the Department, which indicates Biden administration’s stance to prioritize addressing challenges posed by China.

The United States has been working to address human rights issues in its relations with China. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act went into effect in June 2022, banning the import of all products produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region unless the company could prove the products were not made with forced labor. Under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity<sup>3</sup> (IPEF), which was launched in May the same year under the leadership of the United States as part of efforts related to economic security, the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement came into force in February this year. At the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India (the Quad) Summit Meeting held in the same month, the leaders also announced a joint statement regarding the principle of critical technology supply chains, promoting cooperation to improve resilience against various risks

1 Both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) are required by law to be submitted to Congress within a certain period of time. Titles 50 and 10 of the United States Code respectively stipulate that the NSS shall be submitted to Congress no later than 150 days after the date on which a new President takes office and the NDS shall be submitted as soon as possible after a newly elected President has nominated a new Secretary of Defense, once the Senate has approved the nomination.

2 The approach in which a seamless combination of capabilities including integration among domains and integration with allies deter aggression by convincing an opponent the cost of hostile behavior would outweigh the benefit of it.

3 The framework aims to increase economic strength, sustainability, inclusion, economic growth, fairness and competitiveness and was initiated by 13 countries in the Indo-Pacific region: the United States, Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Currently, 14 countries, including Fiji, participate.

to the region.

In regard to Russia, the United States evaluates that Russia poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and it is a source of disruption and instability globally but it lacks the across the spectrum capabilities of China as Russian government has chosen to pursue an imperialist foreign policy with the goal of overturning key elements of the international order. Based on the above, the United States expressed its policy to prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over China while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia. Furthermore, the Biden administration evaluates Russia's aggression against Ukraine as a strategic failure that profoundly has diminished Russia's status vis-a-vis China and other Asian powers such as India and Japan. On the other hand, together with NATO allies, the United States evaluates that they are strengthening their defense and deterrence and welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO will further improve their security and capabilities.

In regard to relations with North Korea, the administration announced the completion of a review of its policy toward North Korea in April 2021 and has indicated that it intends to advance diplomacy with North Korea through a "calibrated, practical approach" with the goal of "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." The administration has also made clear its intention to advance its consideration in consultation with allies and partners, such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, at every step of the response to North Korea.

Regarding the Middle East, negotiations to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia had been underway with the mediation of the United States, which hopes to stabilize the region. In October 2023, however, Palestinian armed groups including Hamas conducted military operations against Israel. In response, Israel launched a large-scale military operation in the Gaza Strip, an autonomous Palestinian territory. Israel has announced its intention to continue operation in the Gaza Strip until it achieves its objectives, such as the destruction of Hamas and the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. Developments in the operation need to be closely watched in light of the impact it will have on future situation in the Middle East. In addition, with regard to relations with Iran, negotiations were underway to rebuild the nuclear agreement from which the previous Trump administration withdrew in May 2018, but these remain underway and there is no sign of the relationship

between the two countries improving.

The Biden administration has indicated that its foreign policy direction will be based on international cooperation and that its responses will be made in close collaboration with allies and partners. Concrete moves in this foreign policy direction are approaches by the Quad which is a coalition of democratic partners sharing a common vision, comprising Japan, the United States, Australia and India. To realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Summit Meeting held in Hiroshima in May 2023 announced concrete details of cooperation in areas such as climate change and emerging technologies. AUKUS, a security cooperation framework established in September 2021 by three countries—Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to deepen diplomatic, security and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, also held a summit meeting in March 2023. At this meeting, it was announced that Australia would acquire three Virginia-class nuclear submarines from the United States in the early 2030s and that the three countries would jointly develop new nuclear submarines.

[See](#) Section 6-1 (Australia)

On the domestic political front in the United States, a presidential election is scheduled for November 2024 and attention will be focused on how the results will affect future U.S. security and defense policies, especially those relating to the Indo-Pacific region.



Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Summit Meeting during the G7 Hiroshima Summit (May 2023)  
[Prime Minister's Office Website]

## 1 Perception about Security Environment

The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the most pressing strategic challenges to pursuing a free, open, prosperous and secure world are coming from

great powers that combine authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. The NSS also showed its recognition that the next ten years would be the decisive decade in setting the terms of the competition with China, managing the acute threat posed by Russia and in its efforts to deal with shared challenges, particularly climate change and pandemics. The NDS states that China seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and the People's Liberation Army's growing strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests. As a result, the United States regards China's coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor as the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security. On the other hand, the NDS indicates that the DoD would support robust deterrence of aggression by Russia that poses acute threats such as its aggression against Ukraine with its allies and partners. North Korea is mentioned as a persistent threat continuing to expand its nuclear and missile capability to threaten the U.S. homeland and East Asia and Iran is mentioned as further undermining Middle East stability by supporting terrorist groups and malicious cyber operations. Also, the NDS shows the perception that these competitors seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone activities.

## 2 NSS and NDS

The NSS presents three lines of effort to realize a free, open, prosperous and secure international order; namely, 1) investing in the U.S. national power, 2) building the strongest coalition of nations and 3) modernizing and strengthening the U.S. Military. The NSS also indicates six pillars as concrete approaches to realize these directions: namely, 1) breaking down the dividing line between foreign policy and domestic policy, 2) alliances and partnerships, 3) perception of geopolitical challenges, 4) involvement in other areas, 5) correspondence with new economic situations and 6) maintaining and increasing international cooperation. On top of that, the NSS shows the policies that the United States focuses on investment in domestic strength as a source of American power, positions alliances and partnerships as its most important strategic asset and deals with strategic challenges. Furthermore, the NSS presents a policy that the United States will cooperate with any countries including non-democracies that is willing to work constructively with

the U.S. to address “shared challenges” which are cross border issues including climate change.

The NDS presents four top-level defense priorities to support a stable and open international system and defense commitments; namely, 1) defending the U.S. homeland, 2) deterring strategic attacks, 3) deterring aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict, 4) building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem. The NDS also indicates an idea to advance the top-level defense priorities through 1) Integrated deterrence, 2) Campaigning and 3) Building enduring advantages. With regard to deterring aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflicts a policy to prioritize the China's challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe is presented. As such, attention will be focused on how the United States will deal with these challenges.

## 3 Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region

The NSS presents a stance to deepen partnerships with allies including Japan in the Indo-Pacific region and promote “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” through multilateral frameworks such as the Quad and AUKUS. With regard to the relationship with Japan, the United States reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under mutual security treaty, which covers the Senkaku Islands. In addition, the NSS shows an intention to expand its regional diplomatic, development and economic engagement, with a particular focus on Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. Regarding the relationship with India, which is the world's largest democratic country and a major defense partner, the NSS states that the United States and India will work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, to support their shared vision of “FOIP” and that the United States will promote prosperity and economic connectivity across the Indian Ocean region by addressing climate change and China's coercive behavior with regional partners in South Asia, including India.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was released in February 2022, clearly indicated that the United States will continue to place the highest priority on the Indo-Pacific region where faces increasing challenges from China. It also makes clear that the United States will cooperate with allies and partners in efforts to advance “FOIP” and strengthen regional security.

In July 2020, regarding China's maritime expansion, after the U.S. DoD expressed concern about China's

decision to conduct military exercises in the South China Sea, the United States deployed two Carrier Strike Groups in the South China Sea for the first time in about six years and conducted naval exercises. Since then, the United States has continued Carrier Strike Group operations in the same region to demonstrate continuously its commitment to promote “FOIP” to allies in the region. In January 2022, the State Department released a study examining China’s claims regarding its maritime rights in the South China Sea in light of international law. The study noted that China’s claims over most of the South China Sea are inconsistent with international law and gravely undermine the rule of law in the ocean. In May 2023, the U.S.-Philippines summit reaffirmed the applicability of the “Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America” in the event of an armed attack against the Philippines in the Pacific Ocean, including the South China Sea. The same month, the U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines were formulated and released for the first time to serve as a roadmap for modernizing alliance cooperation.

As part of its activities around strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. Navy which promotes Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO)<sup>4</sup> deployed the USS America, an amphibious assault ship with enhanced ability to carry F-35B fighters and other carrier-based aircrafts to Sasebo in December 2019 and deployed for the first time the MQ-4C Triton, an unmanned maritime reconnaissance vehicle, in Guam in January 2020. The U.S. Air Force which promotes Agile Combat Employment (ACE)<sup>5</sup> conducts ACE exercises in the Indo-Pacific region using fighter jets and unmanned aircraft. Furthermore, the U.S. Army which promotes the Multi-Domain Operations concept announced in September 2022 the deployment of a Multi-Domain Task Force<sup>6</sup> in Hawaii to undertake operations simultaneously in all domains including the aspect of human cognition. The U.S. Marine Corps which promotes Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)<sup>7</sup> deployed its first Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) with capabilities to conduct EABO activities in Hawaii in March 2022. The

12th Marine Regiment stationed in Okinawa is scheduled to transition to the 12th Marine Coastal Regiment by 2025 and as part of this effort, the unit was redesigned in November 2023. In addition, in March 2018, the U.S. military brought the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to Vietnam, as the first U.S. aircraft carrier port call in Vietnam in more than 40 years. Another port call in the country was made in March 2020, by the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. In 2023, various U.S. strategic assets were frequently deployed<sup>8</sup> around the Korean Peninsula, including a strategic nuclear submarine having made its first port call in Korea in about 40 years.

The United States has continued to conduct “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea and U.S. Navy vessels and aircraft have passed through the Taiwan Strait to show the U.S. commitment to “FOIP.”

The United States has made it clear that it intends to continue “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in future.

In September 2023, the United States further demonstrated its growing engagement in the region, which has seen China’s attempt to expand its influence, by hosting the U.S.-Pacific Island Countries Summit and announcing initiatives to strengthen partnerships

Based on the posture towards the Indo-Pacific described above, the United States appears to continue to be undertaking initiatives based on its vision of “FOIP.”

In contrast, while talks between the United States and North Korea have been conducted since their first summit meeting in history held in June 2018, no specific progress has been seen with regard to the dismantlement of North Korea’s missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and South Korea took steps including cancelling or downgrading scheduled Joint U.S.-ROK exercises in response to the meeting. Then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan expressed in regard to the U.S.-ROK exercises a willingness to maintain U.S. Forces in the ROK, stating that close coordination between the military activities of the United States and the ROK will continue to support diplomatic efforts and that the two countries were committed to ensuring the continued combined defense posture of U.S.-ROK combined forces and

4 An operational concept that concentrates overwhelming combat power by dispersing each asset and integrating them through a network.

5 An operational concept aiming to rapidly deploy Air Force powers from dispersal airfields they have been located.

6 The Multi-Domain Task Force is an army unit with the mission of forward execution of the “multi-domain operational concept,” an operational concept that aims to defeat the enemy’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy by conducting operations in all domains (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, the information environment including cognitive aspects, etc.).

7 An operational concept that executes front-line operations by rapidly dispersing and deploying within the enemy’s firepower zone and establishing temporary bases.

8 A South Korean government official has said that U.S. strategic assets were deployed around the Korean Peninsula 17 times in 2023, a significant increase from the five-time deployments in 2022.

maintaining firm military readiness. The United States and the ROK have been expanding the scope and scale of exercises since the Yoon Suk Yeol administration of ROK, which exhibits a firm stance against North Korea, was inaugurated in May 2022. The reaction of Kim Jong-un, the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, towards this situation is intensifying and he reportedly stated the aim of the United States was “to disrupt my regime anytime,” and, to restrain the United States on a long-term basis, “we can never abandon nuclear weapons.”

The U.S. Government has expressed in the NSS its intention to seek a sustained diplomatic relationship with North Korea to achieve concrete progress towards compete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while it states in the NDS that the DoD will deter attacks through forward posture of U.S. forces and nuclear deterrence against North Korea, which continues to expand its nuclear and missile capability and has been trying to drive wedges among the allies. At the present point, no concrete progress can be seen in the disarmament of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and missiles. However, attention will be paid to how the United States advances its policy toward North Korea going forward.

 Section 4-1-5 (1) (Relations with the United States)

#### 4 Innovation in the National Defense Field

In President Biden’s remarks at the DoD in February 2021, the President, emphasizing the importance of technologies in national defense strategies, stated that the United States would deal with dangers and opportunities generated through emerging technologies, enhance its capabilities in cyberspace and lead in a new era of competition from deep sea to outer space. In addition, the NDS states that the DoD will support the innovation ecosystem to develop defense equipment through cooperation among research institutes, private companies and government agencies as one of the approaches to building enduring advantages. It also aims to promote research and development for advanced capabilities including in directed energy and cyber as well as create opportunities in biotechnology and quantum science. Attention will be focused on activities in this field.

#### 5 Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy

In October 2022, the DoD released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the Missile Defense Review (MDR)

on the same day as NDS, which had previously been published individually, to ensure tight linkages between each strategy.

In the NPR the DoD expresses that China is the overall “pacing challenge” for U.S. defense planning and a growing factor in evaluating its nuclear deterrent and evaluates that China will become a major nuclear power following Russia by the 2030s and the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers. It also states that Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in its strategy, modernize and expand its nuclear forces and brandish its nuclear weapons in support of its revisionist security policy, while recognizing that the Russia’s modern nuclear arsenal presents an enduring existential threat to the United States and its Allies and partners, and the possibility of the limited use of nuclear weapons to avoid a defeat. The NPR mentions that North Korea is not a rival on the same scale as China and Russia, but it poses a persistent threat as it expands non-nuclear capabilities as well, including its chemical weapon stockpile, in addition to nuclear and ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the DoD evaluates that a crisis or conflict on the Korean Peninsula could involve a number of nuclear-armed actors, raising the risk of broader conflict.

The U.S. Government expressed its goal to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as well as its plan to pursue engagement with other nuclear powers continuously to mitigate nuclear risks based on its understanding of the situation in respect of nuclear weapons as mentioned above. The following were raised as the roles for U.S. nuclear weapons: (1) deterrence of strategic attacks; (2) assurance of allies and partners; and (3) for achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, while “hedging against an uncertain future,” which was raised as one of roles for nuclear weapons in the NPR published under the Trump administration in 2018, was eliminated this time. Also, according to the NPR, under the declaratory policy, the basic role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks by enemies and the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances. Although the U.S. Government conducted a thorough review of a broad range of options for nuclear declaratory policy including both “No First Use” and “Sole Purpose” policies, it concluded that those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light of the range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict strategic-level damage to the United States and its allies

and partners, but it indicated that the government retains the goal of moving toward a sole purpose declaration.

Based on the understanding that the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies require tailored strategies for potential adversaries, the NPR mentioned that the United States would maintain a flexible deterrence strategy and force posture against China, while it would bolster the nuclear Triad<sup>9</sup> against Russia through fielding a modern nuclear Triad and with flexible, tailorable nuclear forces to deter both large-scale attacks and limited strikes. It also indicated that the United States would work on the replacement program for the nuclear triad, which most systems are operating beyond their original design life, to avoid any gaps in its nuclear deterrent, ensuring that the United States can withstand any strategic attack, tailor its deterrence strategies as needed, and assure Allies in support of its extended deterrence commitments by maintaining a modern Triad. The NPR states that, although the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) loaded with low-yield nuclear warheads that are currently in action will be maintained as flexible and adjustable nuclear power, the sea-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile program mentioned in the previous NPR has been canceled. Also mentioned is a plan to transfer the roles of dual-capable aircraft (DCA) from F-15E fighters to F-35A fighters to support NATO nuclear missions.

Moreover, the U.S. Government withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on August 2, 2019 as the government alleged that Russia violated the treaty. In the same month, the United States conducted a flight test of a conventionally configured ground-launched missile with a range of more than 500 km. In this regard, the United States has been working on the development of intermediate-range, conventional, and ground-launched missiles whose test launches, production and possession had been restricted by the treaty.

President Putin stated in his annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly of Russia in February

2023 that the implementation of the New START Treaty (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), extended for five years in February 2021 based on the agreement between the United States and Russia, has been halted. Attention will be focused on future movement of nuclear arms control.

The MDR, whose contents strongly reflect the “integrated deterrence” concept mentioned in the NDS, expresses a concept that to protect the United States and deter attacks, missile defenses are positioned as a top priority area and that they offset benefits of an enemy attack and are useful to limit damage when deterrence has been breached. Also, the U.S. Government declares that it will recognize attacks on any U.S. territory overseas including Guam as attacks directed at the U.S. mainland and states that Guam is vital as an operation base to maintain “FOIP” and that defending Guam helps realize integrated deterrence.

## 6 FY2025 Budget

In March 2024, the United States government released the President’s request for FY2025 discretionary funding. The President’s discretionary request for the DoD is approximately US\$849.8 billion, an approximately 4% increase from the previous year. Regarding this budget, the DoD has explained that it supports the continued implementation of the NDS, which shows a policy of prioritizing the response to multi-domain challenges posed by China and the deterrence of strategic attacks.


Based on above, the DoD is requesting US\$9.9 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to strengthen deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific region and is also requesting US\$143.2 billion for R&D on innovation and modernization. The goals for military strength include securing 1,276,700 troops - a decrease of around 7,800 from the previous fiscal year - and in terms of equipment, the procurement of 68 F-35 fighters.



Fig. 1-3-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Department of Defense Budget)

9 The nuclear triad consists of “ICBM Minuteman III,” “a strategic nuclear submarine armed with Trident II D5,” and “B-52 and B-2 strategic bombers armed with nuclear cruise missiles and nuclear bombs.”

Fig. I-3-1-1 Changes in the U.S. Department of Defense Budget



(Notes) 1. Figures shown are the DoD expenses based on historical tables (outlays).  
2. The amount for FY2024 is an estimate.

## 2 Military Posture

### 1 General Situation

The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces; rather it is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of four commands with functional responsibilities and seven commands with regional responsibilities.

The U.S. ground forces have about 450,000 Army soldiers and about 170,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK and Japan, among other countries.

The U.S. maritime forces have about 970 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.75 million tons. The 7th Fleet is responsible for the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; the 2nd Fleet in U.S. East Coast, North Atlantic Ocean and Arctic Ocean; the 6th Fleet in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and Africa; and the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the northwest Indian Ocean.

The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,300 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK, among others.

In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States proceeded with its reduction based on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START Treaty) that came into force in February 2011. It announced that its deployed strategic warheads<sup>10</sup> stood at 1,419, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 662.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, in May 2018, the Cyber Command, which had been under the U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated to a unified combatant command.


In August 2019, the United States founded the Space Command to serve as a geographic unified combatant command and then established the Space Force as the sixth branch of the military within the Department of the Air Force that December.

 See Fig. I-3-1-2 (Structure of the Unified Combatant Command)

<sup>10</sup> Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and warheads equipped in deployed strategic bombers (a deployed strategic bomber is counted as one warhead) are covered.

<sup>11</sup> The figure as of May 1, 2023.

Fig. I-3-1-2 Structure of the Unified Combatant Command



## 2 Current Military Posture in the Indo-Pacific Region

The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region by deploying the Indo-Pacific Command, a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Space Force, in the region. The Indo-Pacific Command is a geographic combatant command which is responsible for the largest geographical area and its subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea.

The Indo-Pacific Command consists of the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, U.S. Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Space Forces Indo-Pacific, all of which are headquartered in Hawaii.

The Army Pacific's subordinate commands include

the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces Korea and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,400 personnel to commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.<sup>12</sup>

The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The 7th Fleet mainly consists of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. An aircraft carrier, amphibious ships and Aegis cruisers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 20,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which employs F-35B fighters and other aircraft, and other units in Japan. In addition, the force deploys maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others in the Western Pacific.


The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters, C-130 transport aircraft and others) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and others) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

**See** Fig. I-3-1-3 (U.S. Forces Deployment Status); Fig. I-3-1-4 (U.S. Engagements to the Indo-Pacific Region (image))

<sup>12</sup> The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of September 30, 2023) and could change according to unit deployment.




Fig. I-3-1-3 U.S. Forces Deployment Status



(Notes) 1 Source: Documents published by the DoD (as of December 31, 2023), etc. The majority of the Space Force personnel are based in the U.S. mainland.  
 2 The number of personnel deployed in the Indo-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

Fig. I-3-1-4 U.S. Engagements to the Indo-Pacific Region (image)



## Perspective

## Three-Pronged Responses Required of the United States



**KIRIDORI Ryo, Research Fellow, U.S.-Europe-Russia Division, National Institute for Defense Studies**

Since 2018, the United States has pursued a force construct that is capable of defeating one threat while deterring others. The Joe Biden administration has taken over this “defeat and deterrence” principle, prioritizing dealing with China in the Indo-Pacific region. What is important is that the 2022 National Defense Strategy (2022 NDS) acknowledged the United States’ acceptance of a certain degree of risks from military challenges posed by countries such as Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist groups but excluding China and Russia, and even if crises occur in other regions, national defense planning priorities, including resource allocation, must not be affected. Some have pointed out that committing to all issues with limited resources lacks effectiveness. Meanwhile, with the current force construct, if deterrence fails in relatively lower priority areas, the question remains: How much risk and crises can the United States, as a global power, actually tolerate?

In this sense, the United States’ responses to the situations in Ukraine and Gaza in recent years are instructive. This is because U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and Israel could provide an indirect boost to the military operations of regional partners while minimizing the need to reallocate planned defense resources. So far, the U.S. has not deployed a large force to any regional partner that would force a rethinking of its combat readiness, thus avoiding a drain on the U.S. military’s most important asset, namely its human resources. This alone demonstrates a certain effectiveness of the military assistance approach in responding to contingencies that may occur at the same time in multiple regions while placing the highest priority on strategic competition with China. It also should be noted that the military assistance model is highly consistent with the 2022 NDS, as evidenced by the emphasis in the 2022 NDS of supporting the threat response capabilities of allies and partner countries and providing necessary capabilities to the U.S. and its allies and partner countries in a timely manner

by enhancing productive capacity.

On the other hand, responding to multiple crises with military assistance also has side effects. In the context of strategic competition between the United States and China, there is a tendency to emphasize the uncertainty surrounding the situation in East Asia, especially Taiwan. However, US military assistance to Taiwan and also Ukraine, Israel, and other countries can become a difficult-to-balance tradeoff. For instance, it is believed that the delivery of approximately \$19.2 billion worth of weapons sold to Taiwan, which was recently approved by Congress, has been delayed. Many of these weapons are also in high demand in Ukraine. In addition, demand for 155mm artillery shells, which are widely used by many armed forces including Taiwan, is increasing due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in the Gaza Strip. This is further straining the already stretched-to-capacity U.S. weapons production lines. In response to the international shortage of U.S.-made weapons, the Department of Defense announced the National Defense Industry Strategy in January 2024, aiming to address the problem by expanding long-term weapons production capacity and improving efficiency. However, shortages of many items are expected to persist, at least in the short to medium term.

In this way, the United States continues to engage with Europe and the Middle East through military assistance while clarifying its strategic priorities. This in itself enhances the United States’ reputation for its resolve, but how will it continue to deploy the capabilities needed to address threats in other regions, including the Indo-Pacific, which is its top priority? This question is posing a major challenge to the posture of the U.S. military, which advocates the defeating of a single threat. It remains to be seen how the United States will deal with the dilemma of its strategic competition with China and its other risks.

(Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher’s academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position.

## Section 2 China

### 1 General Situation

China, the world's most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline as well as a long coastline. It also has various races, religions, and languages. China's pride in its unique history of having shaped a distinct culture and civilization, and semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century are driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism.


China faces various domestic problems including human rights issues. Among the problems emerging are the spread of bribery and corruption among the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and such issues as disparities between urban and rural areas, and between coastal and inland regions, as well as disparities within cities and environmental pollution. More recently, the pace of China's economic growth has slowed and the country is also expected to face issues associated with the rapid aging of the population, including problems related to pensions and other aspects of the social security system. The range of factors potentially destabilizing government administration has thus been expanding and becoming increasingly diverse. Additionally, there have been protests about human rights violations against ethnic minorities of the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. The international community has grown interested in human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In addition, in Hong Kong, in response to a series of large-scale protests occurring since 2019, the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" was established and entered into force in June 2020, resulting in the arrests of protesters. In March 2024, Regulations on the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was enacted and enforced to supplement the aforementioned law. Moreover, popular concern over the measures has spread. For example, under the electoral system in Hong Kong, which was changed to tout the idea of "patriots run Hong Kong," "pro-China" candidates took nearly all the seats in the legislative election in December 2021 and the district council election in December 2023.

Amid these circumstances, the Chinese Government has been tightening its control over society. While it

has been suggested that the development of the Internet and elsewhere of information and communications technology (ICT) has made it difficult to control activities of the masses, it has been noted that rapidly developing ICT technologies are exploited for social control. Since 2014, China has established laws and regulations to strengthen its domestic counterintelligence system based on "a holistic view of national security" that covers not only external threats but also culture and society.

The "anti-corruption" movement following the launch of the Xi Jinping leadership has made inroads under the policy of cracking down on both "tigers" and "flies," targeting both dominant figures and junior officials. It has been pointed out that a series of dismissals of senior military officials from important positions since July 2023 was also a result of "corruption", and the "anti-corruption" movement is expected to continue.

Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, has been making his power base in CCP stronger through these and other activities. "Two Safeguards" meaning "uphold General Secretary Xi's core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole and uphold the Central Committee's authority and its centralized, unified leadership" was incorporated into the Party constitution as an obligation at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (20th CCP Congress) held in October 2022. In addition, in the 1st Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP held immediately after the 20th CCP Congress, Xi Jinping secured his third term, and personnel changes that allow persons close to Xi to occupy the majority of



Xi Jinping, currently in his third term as general secretary [ [EPA/Jiji]

the CCP leaderships were announced. There were moves in which high-ranking officials who were reportedly appointed by General Secretary Xi were dismissed one after another, including then Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang in July 2023 and then Foreign Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu in October 2023. In general, however, an environment is being created in which Xi's intentions will be more directly reflected in China's policy decisions.

China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China and that the Taiwan issue is a domestic one. China maintains that the "One China" principle is the underlying premise and foundation for dialogue between China and Taiwan. China is also strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as

any move towards the independence of Taiwan, and has repeatedly stated that although it will strive with utmost effort to realize a peaceful reunification, it will not promise to renounce the use of force. "The Anti-Secession Law," enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out China's policy of not renouncing the use of force, providing that in the event that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the revised party constitution adopted at the 20th CCP Congress, the phrase "the CCP resolutely opposes and deters separatists seeking 'Taiwan Independence'" was added, and blocking the independence of Taiwan was placed as a party duty.

## 2 Military Affairs

### 1 General Situation

For more than 30 years, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval, and air forces. China has also intensified its attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the waters and airspace of the East China Sea and South China Sea, including its intrusions into Japan's territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, and is expanding and intensifying its military activities in the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean, which is affecting Japan's national security.

In strengthening its military capabilities, China has so far emphasized improving its ability to carry out practical joint operations by modernizing its military through military reforms and other measures.

China has also been placing emphasis on the "informatization" of its military, with the aim of improving the military's overall operational capability through the acquisition of information superiority and

hindering the enemy's ability to demonstrate its military power. For example, it has been rapidly expanding its capabilities in the cyber domain, enabling it to disrupt enemy communications networks, and in the field of electromagnetic spectrum, which offers the potential to render enemy radar ineffective. In the space domain, China is also focusing on securing supremacy in new areas, including continuing to strengthen its capabilities to limit its enemies' use of space. Bolstering these capabilities will reinforce China's "**Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities**" and lead to the establishment of operational capabilities further afield.

Additionally, China is promoting the so-called "**development strategy of civil-military fusion**" across the board and is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes. Such cutting-edge technologies include the use of AI (Artificial Intelligence) and other so-called game-changing technologies that will completely change the nature of future combat.

Along with this strengthening of its military power,

#### KEY WORD

#### Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities

The A2/AD capabilities represent a concept given by the United States. Anti-Access or A2 capabilities refer mainly to long-range capabilities to block adversaries from entering some operating zones. Area-Denial or AD capabilities refer to short-range capabilities to limit adversaries' freedom of action within operating zones.

#### KEY WORD

#### Civil-military fusion

Civil-military fusion is an initiative promoted by China as a national strategy designed to promote the military use of civilian resources and the civilian use of military technologies in peacetime as well as emergency, in addition to the traditional development of defense mobilization arrangements for emergency. In particular, initiatives in seas, outer space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence (AI), which are referred to as "emerging areas" for China are viewed as priority areas for civil-military fusion.

China has expanded beyond the so-called the first island chain and into the second island chain, including the East China Sea around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and even the Western Pacific, including around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, intensifying activities in the entire area surrounding Japan. China is increasing military pressure on Taiwan and also promoting the establishment of military bases in the South China Sea. Moreover, China is further strengthening its cooperation with Russia, including in military activities.

China's current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power including its defense capabilities and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries, and others.

## 2 Defense Policies

China has described the objectives of its defense policies and the missions of its military forces as: supporting the CCP's leadership, China's characteristic socialism system, and the modernization of its socialism; defending the nation's sovereignty, unification and security; backing the nation's sustainable "peaceful development" through protecting its maritime and overseas national interests; building strong national defense and massive military forces commensurate with the interests of the nation's security and the interests of development; and providing strong assurances for realizing the "Chinese dream" of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. China contends that these national defense policies are "defensive" in nature.<sup>1</sup>

To develop national defense and military forces, China has employed a policy of building the "system of modern military power with Chinese characteristics" by sustaining the military development under the party, the military buildup through reforms, military promotion based on science and technology, and law-based military governance, by pursuing practical capabilities that "can fight and win a war" by giving greater priority to the civil-military fusion, by promoting the fusion

and development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. Such military buildup in China apparently indicates that China has given top priority to dealing with a Taiwan contingency by improving its capabilities to deter or deny Taiwan's independence and foreign military support for the Taiwanese independence and has recently considered the improvement of operational capabilities in more distant waters to protect its expanding overseas interests.

Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare. It regards the concept of "Three Warfare" - "Media Warfare," "Psychological Warfare," and "Legal Warfare" - as part of the political work of the military. In addition, China has set forth a policy of coordinating military struggle closely with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors.

As for the future goals of the development of national defense and military forces, General Secretary Xi Jinping's report to the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017 and the defense white paper released in 2019 noted that China would try to (1) basically achieve mechanization and make great progress in informatization to dramatically improve strategic capabilities by 2020, (2) basically complete the modernization of national defense and military forces by 2035, and (3) generally transform Chinese forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century.

In the 5th Plenary Session held in October 2020, the goal year for 1st stage mentioned above, China's determination to achieve a struggle goal for the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the PLA in 2027 was announced. The new "three-step development strategy" was stipulated in the so-called "historic resolution" in 6th Plenary Session in 2021, which consists of the achievement of the 100th anniversary struggle goal of the PLA by 2027 as the first step, and achievement of the aforementioned goals by 2035 and the mid-21st century as the second and third steps respectively. Furthermore, the report of 20th CCP Congress in 2022 newly stated that elevating the PLA to world-class standards "more quickly" is a strategic task for building a modern socialist country in all respects, and it is possible that the CCP is considering moving forward its target of "establishing world-class forces," scheduled for the mid-21st century.

However, China has recognized a wide gap between the real military modernization level and the level

<sup>1</sup> According to the National Defense White Paper "China's National Defense in a New Era" (July 2019).

required for national security, and between Chinese and world-class military forces. Although China has not defined what it means by “world-class forces,” it has been pointed out that China may be trying to develop military forces that equal or in some cases surpass the U.S. military. Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that China aims to build “world-class forces” capable of “intelligentized warfare” by acquiring advanced technology and becoming an “innovation superpower.”<sup>2</sup> In light of this, it is suggested that China is planning to offset its military power gap with the U.S. military, and may recognize that the “intelligentization” of its forces is a necessary condition for this. It is thought that China will aim to build an army that can “fight and win a war” against the U.S. military in the “intelligentized warfare” of the future.<sup>3</sup>

Based on that recognition, it is expected that China will further accelerate the military modernization against the backdrop of national power development and General Secretary Xi’s enhancement of his power base in the CCP in his third term and expansion of his power as Chairman of the Central Military Commission.<sup>4</sup>

### 3 Transparency Concerning Defense Policies and Military Affairs

China has neither set out a clear and specific future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs. Although China had released a defense white paper roughly every two years since 1998, it has not released a white paper in recent years since “China’s National Defense in the New Era” released in July 2019 for the first time in four years. Even the white paper did not sufficiently clarify the specific situation of equipment possession, procurement goals and results, the organization and deployment of major units, the military’s major operations and training results, and the breakdown of national defense expenditures.

Incidents in which Chinese authorities provide factually inaccurate explanations or refuse to admit facts regarding Chinese military activities have been confirmed, inciting concerns over China’s military decision-making and

actions. For example, the submerged transit of a Chinese Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but China did not acknowledge this. In the same way, in the cases of submarines in the contiguous zone around Amami Oshima Island presumed to belong to China confirmed in June 2020 and September 2021, China did not acknowledge this fact. On the contrary, there were some Chinese media reports that criticized the Japanese side by claiming they were making exaggerations.

China’s influence in the international community has risen politically, economically, and militarily. It has become increasingly important for China to improve its transparency regarding defense policies and military affairs, provide fact-based explanations about its activities, and share and observe international rules as a responsible country in the international community to allay concerns about China. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency through such efforts as specific and accurate information disclosure.

### 4 National Defense Budget

China announced that its national defense budget for FY2024 was approximately RMB 1,665.54 billion (approximately JPY 33,310.8 billion when the value is mechanically converted at 20 JPY per RMB).<sup>5</sup> This is around 7.2% growth from the budget of the previous fiscal year according to China’s announcement. China’s announced defense budget has been increasing at a rapid pace, and the nominal size of China’s announced defense budget has increased approximately 32 times in the 30 years since fiscal 1994, and approximately 2.1 times in the decade since fiscal 2014. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development. It is believed that China has continued to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development. However, there have been many years in which the announced annual national defense budget increase rate exceeded the economic growth (an increase in gross domestic product [GDP]). Attention is to be paid to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth would affect


<sup>2</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2021)

<sup>3</sup> There is a view that “intelligentization” of the military provides an excellent opportunity for a latecomer’s military to leap ahead in development and thereby rapidly surpass other advanced-level militaries.

<sup>4</sup> The Central Military Commission is a leading and commanding organ to China’s armed forces. Formally, there are the CCP CMC and the People’s Republic of China CMC. However, each consists of the same members, indicating both commissions as an organ for the party to control the armed forces.

<sup>5</sup> The announced defense budget of China is rapidly increasing. The budget of FY2024 is about 4.3 times larger than defense-related expenditures of Japan. Japan’s defense-related expenditures increased to 1.6 times larger than that around 20 years ago (approximately 1.6 times larger than the expenditures around 30 years ago).

Fig. I-3-2-1 Changes in China's Announced Defense Budget



(Note) This basically shows the defense budget within "the central government's general public budget," which had been named as "the central fiscal expenditures" prior to FY2014. Year-on-year growth rate compares the budget of a given year against the initial budget of the previous year. Note that the FY2002 defense budget was calculated based on the increased amount from the defense budget in the previous FY because only the amount and rate of growth were released. For FY2016 and FY2018-2024, the amounts of "the central government expenditures," which are part of the central government's general public budget, are used because they were the only announced amounts. Figures for year-on-year growth rate include figures announced by China.

its national defense budget.

In addition, the amount of the announced defense budget is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include foreign equipment procurement costs or research and development (R&D) expenses. According to an analysis of the U.S. DoD, actual defense spending in FY2022 was significantly higher than the announced national defense budget.<sup>6</sup>

As for a breakdown of the national defense budget, past defense white papers specified personnel, training and sustainment, and equipment expenses for the announced national defense budgets for FY2007, FY2009 and FY2010-2017 (and expenses for active, reserve and militia forces for FY2007 and FY2009). However, no more details have been given.

See Fig. I-3-2-1 (Changes in China's Announced Defense Budget)

## 5 Military Posture

China's armed forces are composed of the PLA, the People's Armed Police Force (PAP), and the militia. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The PLA

is defined as a people's force created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Rocket Force, the Information Support Force, the Joint Logistics Support Force, etc.

The PAP is designed to engage mainly in patrol, emergency response, counterterrorism, maritime rights protection and law enforcement, emergency rescue, defense operations, etc. The militia is planned to engage in economic construction, etc., in peacetime and undertake logistic support missions in an emergency.

### (1) Military Reforms

In recent years, China is said to have been engaged in military reforms seen as the largest in its history.

China is also said to have largely completed central military reforms by the end of 2016. Specifically, they abolished the PLA's seven Military Regions and created five new Theaters with primary responsibility for command of operations, namely, the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater. In addition, they also formed the PLA Army (PLAA) Headquarters-ranked equally with the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Headquarters-, the Rocket Force (PLARF), the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and the Joint Logistics

<sup>6</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

Support Force. Moreover, the headquarters for the entire PLA were replaced by 15 functional sections under the CMC, including the Joint Staff Department, Political Work Department, Logistics Support Department, and Equipment Development Department.

On the other hand, there are also moves to reorganize the central-level organizations. In April 2024, the establishment of the new “Information Support Force” was announced. This is pointed out to be a reorganization of the Strategic Support Force which was established at the end of 2015. Military reforms seem to be under way since 2017, including those at the field level.

These series of reforms are believed to be aimed at building a more combat-ready military by improving its ability to carry out joint operations. In addition, it has been noted that the reorganization of the headquarters is a means of tackling corruption at the center of the military by decentralizing the leading organs. Persons close to and deeply trusted by Xi Jinping are actively appointed as members of the CMC; for example, Zhang Youxia remained in his position as Vice Chairman of the CMC in the 1st Plenary Session after the 20th CCP Congress held in October 2022. Given these points, it is thought that Chairman Xi is attempting to further enhance his leadership in the CMC and the military.

## (2) Nuclear and Missile Forces

China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missiles for their delivery since the mid-1950s, indicating its apparent attempt to ensure nuclear deterrence, supplement its conventional forces with nuclear capabilities and secure its influence on the international community.

It is regarded that China’s nuclear strategy is to deter any nuclear attack on its territory by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a limited number of targets such as cities in adversary countries, should China be subject to nuclear attacks. China has explained that it is committed to “no first use” of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, to “unconditional negative security assurance” that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally, and to keeping its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. In

recent years, however, doubts have been expressed about the explanation.<sup>7</sup>

China is aiming to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear capabilities. It is investing in and increasing the number of means to deliver nuclear weapons by land, sea, and air, as well as increasing the production of nuclear warheads. The number of operational nuclear warheads in its possession exceeds 500 as of May 2023, and it has been pointed out that it may exceed 1,000 by 2030 and continue to increase until 2035.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the United States has requested China’s participation in the framework of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which sets limits on strategic nuclear forces between the United States and Russia, but China has consistently refused to participate. It is believed that China plans to strengthen deterrence against the United States and will continue to place importance on nuclear and missile capabilities in the future.

China possesses ballistic missiles of various types and ranges, including ICBMs, SLBMs, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability and readiness. Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase their performance by such means as extending ranges, improving targeting accuracy, and employing maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

China’s main ICBMs, its strategic nuclear asset, had been the fixed-site liquid-propellant DF-5 missiles. However, China has in recent years deployed the DF-31, which is a mobile-type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a transporter erector launcher (TEL). In addition, China has reportedly deployed the **DF-41**, a new type of ICBM that first appeared in a military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of its founding in October 2019 and is said to have a range of approximately 11,200 km and can carry 10 warheads. China is also building ICBM silos and is reported to have constructed three new launch facilities in 2022, including more than 300 new silos.<sup>9</sup> In addition, it has been pointed out that China is pursuing the development of an ICBM equipped with a conventional warhead,

<sup>7</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>8</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>9</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)



in order to be able to threaten the U.S. mainland with conventional forces<sup>10</sup>.

With regard to submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), it is considered that Jin-class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) equipped with **JL-2** with an estimated range of approximately 7,200 km are operational. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that JL-3s, extended range SLBMs reportedly with a range of 12,000 km, have already been loaded into the Jing-class SSBNs, making them possible to reach the mainland United States from China's coastal waters.<sup>11</sup>

China's missile forces have been put outside the framework of the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and China holds numerous amounts of ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km that had been subjected to the INF treaty. It is also deemed that China is ahead of the United States in relation to ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.<sup>12</sup> As for the IRBMs/ MRBMs covering the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, China has the mobile solid-propellant DF-21 and DF-26, which can be transported and operated on TELs. These are viewed as capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. China possesses ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), called "carrier killer," which carries conventional warheads to attack overwater ships including aircraft carriers. The DF-26, which has a range including Guam and is called "Guam killer," is considered a "second-generation ASBM" developed on the basis of the DF-21D. Its deployment was announced in April 2018. China also possesses the CJ-20 (CJ-10) long-range land-attack cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6 bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise missile. It is deemed that these missiles complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Indo-Pacific region including Japan. In the military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of its founding in October 2019, CJ-100/DF-100, which is said to be a supersonic cruise missile, also made its first public appearance. The deployment of these ASBMs and cruise missiles is expected to strengthen China's "A2/AD" capabilities.

Concerning SRBMs, China has deployed a large

number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF-11 missiles facing Taiwan. It is believed that their ranges cover a part of Japan's Southwestern Islands including the Senkaku Islands.

Furthermore, China is believed to be rapidly developing multiple models of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) to acquire striking power capable of penetrating

### DF-41 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)

#### [Specifications, performance]

Maximum firing range: 11,200 km

#### [Description]

New intercontinental-range ballistic missile showcased for the first time at the military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of China's founding in October 2019. Viewed as capable of carrying 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and having attack capabilities with high accuracy.



DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile [Imaginechina/Jiji Press Photo]

### JL-2 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)

#### [Specifications, performance]

Maximum firing range: 7,200 km

#### [Description]

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) viewed as strategic nuclear forces of Chinese Navy. It is pointed out that China is developing and deploying JL-3 SLBMs (maximum range 12,000 km - 14,000 km) with extended ranges for further strengthening strategic nuclear forces.



JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) [Avalon/Jiji]

### DF-17 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)

#### [Specifications, performance]

Maximum firing range: 2,000 km

#### [Description]

Medium-range ballistic missiles viewed as having been developed based on DF-16 SRBMs and as being capable of carrying a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). Showcased for the first time at the military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of China's founding in October 2019.



DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying a hypersonic glide weapon [Avalon/Jiji]

<sup>10</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)


<sup>11</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>12</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2020)

missile defenses. In the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of China's founding in October 2019, the **DF-17** MRBM viewed as capable of carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle made its first public appearance. The U.S.


DoD has pointed out that China began DF-17s operations in 2020 and some older SRBMs may be replaced with DF-17.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, China conducted its first orbital launch of an ICBM carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle

Fig. I-3-2-2 Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing) (image)



(Note) The figure above is for illustrative purpose, showing the range of each missile from Beijing.

Fig. I-3-2-3 Changes in the Number of China's Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile Launchers



(Notes) 1 The numbers of launchers, missiles, and warheads of ballistic missiles possessed by China are not publicized.  
 2 This data classifies the number of launchers possessed by China into ICBM, IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM according to the general standard based on "The Military Balance" of each year.

<sup>13</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

in July 2021. The vehicle reportedly flew approximately 40,000 km in over 100 minutes, and did not strike its target, but came close.<sup>14</sup> In addition, it has been pointed out that multiple warheads can be attached to the aforementioned new ICBM, the DF-41, and that China is testing an intercontinental range HGV. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that it is highly likely that the launch vehicle is derived from the DF-41. It will not only be capable of significantly extending the effective range of HGVs compared to the DF-17, but will also be capable of carrying larger, heavier hypersonic glide vehicles. These weapons are said to be more difficult for missiles to intercept because they fly low at very high speeds and are highly maneuverable.

China seems to be building a missile defense system and is believed to be focusing on developing related technologies, such as the “HQ-19” ballistic missile defense system. It is believed that China has been conducting missile interceptor tests in the mid-course phase since 2010. It has been pointed out that this is an attempt to acquire capabilities to respond to IRBMs and other missiles.<sup>15</sup> Cooperation with Russia has also been noted, with joint missile defense computer exercises “Aerospace Safety” having been held in 2016 and 2017. In May 2019, two surface-to-air missile systems “S-400s” introduced from Russia were reportedly deployed near Beijing. In October of the same year, Russian President Putin stated that Russia was helping China build a “missile-attack early warning system.” Furthermore, the U.S. DoD has pointed out the possibility that China has at least three early warning satellites in orbit as of 2022.<sup>16</sup> Given that ballistic missile defense technology has the potential to be applied to missiles capable of destroying satellites, attention will focus on future Chinese missile defense trends.

 **See** Fig. I-3-2-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing) (image)); Fig. I-3-2-3 (Changes in the Number of China's Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile Launchers)

### (3) Ground Forces

China has the third largest ground forces in the world, following India and North Korea, with approximately 970,000 personnel. China has sought to improve the operational capabilities of ground forces pursuing the

downsizing, multifunctionality, and modularization of military units. Specifically, it is believed to be shifting from a regional defense type to a region-wide mobility type and is improving mobility by motorizing and mechanizing infantry units, as well as strengthening airborne units of the Air Force, amphibious units of the Army and Navy, special forces, and helicopter units.

It is said that the Navy Marine Corps is still in the process of reinforcement. It is reportedly acquiring equipment and conducting training necessary to become an expeditionary force. On the other hand, it repeatedly conducts training for amphibious operation including using civilian RORO vessels.<sup>17</sup> It is also pointed out that these activities suggest that Navy Marine Corps troops are to be flexibly utilized in multiple roles in a scenario surrounding Taiwan.<sup>18</sup>

The Chinese Army is reportedly has been conducting trainings that focus on combined combat operations and incorporating mock confrontation drills to improve its ability to conduct practical operations. China has conducted on a regular basis Stride, Firepower, and Sharp Sword maneuver-exercises that cut across multiple regions. They are aiming at verifying and improving the capabilities necessary to deploy army troops to remote areas, such as long-distance maneuvering capabilities of the Army, and logistical support capabilities that include mobilizing militias and public transportation. The U.S. DoD has pointed out that the Chinese Army conducted multiple large-scale 24-hour exercises at exercise areas across the country in 2022, including exercises to respond to U.S. and Taiwanese military activities.<sup>19</sup> These facts suggest China's attempt to improve its practical operational capabilities.

The above described PAP consists of internal security corps, which are organized and established based on administrative divisions such as provinces and autonomous regions, mobile corps, which do not have fixed areas in charge and perform missions across different areas, and the Coast Guard, described later, which is said to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and maritime interests as well as implements law enforcement. The PAP is said to own various equipment such as armored vehicles, rotary-wing aircraft, and heavy machine guns.

<sup>14</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>15</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>16</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>17</sup> Roll-on-Roll-off ships. Generally, ships to which vehicles loaded with cargo are driven aboard on their own wheels, that can be transported with cargo.

<sup>18</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2022)

<sup>19</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)

Furthermore, it is reported that the PAP focuses on maintaining internal security and joint operations with the PLA, and is developing capabilities for readiness, mobility, and counter-terrorism operations.<sup>20</sup>

 See Fig. I-3-2-4 (Deployment of the People's Liberation Army (image))

#### (4) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets: North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. China's naval forces, which own a larger scale of ships exceeding the U.S. Navy and are said to be the largest navy in the world.<sup>21</sup> The Chinese Navy is rapidly modernizing, increasing production of surface combatant vessels such as the Jankai II-class frigates, which are highly capable of fleet air defense and anti-ship attack, and the Renhai-class destroyers, which are the largest in the Chinese Navy, and domestically produced Yuan class-submarines, which has its strength on quietness, as well as reinforcing landing ships and aircraft carriers.

The Renhai-class destroyer is said to be equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) with 112 launch cells, almost twice the number of launch cells as the

new Luyang III-class destroyer. This VLS is said to be capable of launching long-range land-attack cruise missiles and YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles with a supersonic terminal attack capability, as well as ASBMs. It has also been pointed out that the destroyer is being considered as a launch vehicle to defend against ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase,<sup>22</sup> and that this suggests a plan for capability of carrying anti-ship HGVs. At least eight Renhai-class destroyers have been in service by April 2024, and they may become the key to the Chinese Navy's long-range missile capabilities in the future.

As for landing ships, large Yusheng-class landing ships have been launched one after another. The No.1 warship "Hainan" was commissioned in the Southern Theater in April 2021, the No. 2 warship "Guangxi" was commissioned in the Eastern Theater in December of the same year, the No. 3 warship "Anhu" was commissioned in 2022, and the No. 4 warship is said to have already been launched. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Type-076 landing ships may be built following on from the Yushen-class landing ships.

In addition, China is currently operating two aircraft carriers and is in the process of building a third. The

Fig. I-3-2-4 Deployment of the People's Liberation Army (image)



(Notes) 1 ● Theater headquarters    ■ Theater Army organization    ▲ Theater Navy headquarters

2 Theater boundaries have not been officially announced. The above map is prepared based on U.S. DoD reports, media reports, etc.

20 According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

21 According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

22 According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, was commissioned in September 2012, and the first domestically produced aircraft carrier (China’s second aircraft carrier), Shandong<sup>23</sup>, was commissioned in December 2019, operating in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Pacific Ocean, respectively. Moreover, the second domestically built aircraft carrier (China’s third aircraft carrier) **Fujian**, which was launched in June 2022, is believed to be larger than the Liaoning and Shandong and equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system capable of operating fixed-wing early warning aircraft. This has been pointed out to improve operational capabilities for the carrier-based aircraft. It has also been pointed out that China has plans to build nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

China is believed to have been developing and deploying unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) that are available for military purposes. Such equipment is considered an asymmetric force that is relatively inexpensive, yet capable of interfering with the enemy’s ability to gain superiority at sea and in the water.

Given these developments concerning the naval forces, China appears to be steadily building up capabilities for conducting operations in more distant waters in addition to near sea defense. It has also been pointed out that in the near future, the PLA Navy will have the capability

**Aircraft carrier “Fujian”**

**[Specifications, performance]**

Full-load displacement: Over 80,000 tons  
 Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h)  
 Number of aircraft: 60-70, including J-15 fighters, KJ-600 early warning aircraft, and others

**[Description]**

China’s second indigenous aircraft carrier believed to be equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system. The first sea trial was conducted in May 2024 (pointed out in general reporting etc.)





The third PLA aircraft carrier “Fujian,” which is China’s second indigenous one [China News Service/Jiji]

to make long-range precision strikes against land targets using land-attack cruise missiles from submarines and surface combatant ships, and its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of surface combatants and fixed and rotary wing aircraft are significantly improved, while it continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.<sup>24</sup> It is necessary to continue to monitor the related developments.

The People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), one of China’s armed forces other than the military, has the Coast Guard, which is said to be the world’s largest maritime law enforcement agency, under its umbrella.

**Fig. I-3-2-5** China’s Main Maritime Forces



<sup>23</sup> The “Shandong” is a ski-jump type aircraft carrier that is said to be an improved version of the “Liaoning,” and it has been pointed out that it can accommodate increased number of aircraft on board.  
<sup>24</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)


In recent years, the Coast Guard's vessels have become larger and more armed. At the end of December 2023, the China Coast Guard possessed 159 ships<sup>25</sup> with full load displacement of 1,000 tons or more, including two 10,000-ton-class patrol ships, among the world's largest ones. The operations of vessels equipped with a gun-like armament were observed as well. It is pointed out that the newer ships are significantly larger and more capable than older ships, and are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, guns ranging from 20mm to 76mm, and other equipment, so that they are able to withstand long-term operations and engage in distant-water activities.<sup>26</sup>

The enhanced cooperation between the PLA and the China Coast Guard has also been confirmed. In July 2018, the China Coast Guard that had been conducting maritime surveillance operations under the direction of the State Council's Ministry of Public Security was transferred to the PAP as the PAP Coast Guard and is currently operated under the PAP, which receives unified guidance and command from the Central Military Commission. After the transfer, former naval officers were reportedly given major Coast Guard posts, indicating enhanced cooperation between the military and Coast Guard. It has been noted that retired naval destroyers and frigates were delivered to the Coast Guard, suggesting that the

military has been supporting the Coast Guard in terms of equipment as well as personnel. It has been pointed out that the military forces and the Coast Guard have conducted joint exercises. The enhanced cooperation between the PLA and the PAP including the Coast Guard is believed to be intended to steadily strengthen their joint operational capabilities through the enhancement of cooperation.

Amid such a situation, in June 2020, "Law of the People's Republic of China in the People's Armed Police Force (PAP Law)" was revised, and "protection of maritime interests and law enforcement" were added to the duties of the PAP. The revised version also stipulates that the PAP shall be centrally and uniformly guided by the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the People's Republic of China. The Coast Guard Law of the People's Republic of China (Coast Guard Law), which stipulates the Coast Guard's responsibilities and authority including the use of weapons, was newly enacted in January 2021 and entered into force in February 2021. The Coast Guard Law includes problematic provisions in terms of their inconsistency with international law. The Coast Guard Law must not be allowed to infringe on the legitimate interests of the relevant countries including Japan. Furthermore, it is completely unacceptable that the law

Fig. I-3-2-6 The Coast Guard's Transfer to the PAP



(Notes) 1 Unification of PAP leadership and command system (January 1, 2018)

2 Transfer of the Coast Guard to the PAP (July 1, 2018)

3 The amendment to the People's Armed Police Law (June 21, 2020)

→ In emergency situations, the Central Military Commission, or else the military of the Theater Commands, can issue orders to the divisions of the People's Armed Police Force (PAP).

4 The scope of the China Coast Guard that is transferred to the PAP and placed under its command is unknown.

5 Units enclosed by a red dotted line belonged to the China Coast Guard before the realignment (2013).

25 According to "Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2024," Japan Coast Guard

26 According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

would increase tensions in maritime areas such as the East China Sea.


It is pointed out that, among the militia, whose status is China's armed force other than the military, the so-called maritime militia is playing the role of the front guard for supporting China's maritime interests. The maritime militia is said to operate in the South China Sea, etc. and consist of fishermen and residents of isolated islands.<sup>27</sup>

Given the China's emphasis on the necessity of "fully exerting the overall power of the military, police and militia" on the seas, attention should be paid to these asymmetrical forces, too.

**See** Fig. I-3-2-5 (China's Main Maritime Forces); Fig. I-3-2-6 (The Coast Guard's Transfer to the PAP); and Fig. I-3-2-7 (Buildup of China Coast Guard Vessels).

## (5) Air Forces

Fig. I-3-2-7 Buildup of China Coast Guard Vessels



(Notes) 1 Number of ships as of the end of FY2023

2 Number of vessels as of the end of December 2023; Estimation based on publicized information (may be altered in the future)

\*1 According to "Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2024," Japan Coast Guard

China's air forces consist mainly of the Navy's air units and the Air Force. As for fourth-generation fighters, China has introduced from Russia the Su-27 and Su-30 and the Su-35 latest fourth-generation fighter. China is also developing its own domestic modern fighters. China has started the mass production of the J-11B fighter, a suspected copy of the Su-27, and the J-16 fighter, a suspected copy of the Su-30, as well as the

domestic J-10 fighter. The J-15 carrier-based fighters, which are also carried on the aircraft carriers "Liaoning" and "Shandong," are said to have been copied from the Russian Su-33. China is deploying **J-20** fifth-generation fighters and developing J-31 (J-35) fighter. It has been pointed out that J-31 (J-35) fighter could be the base for developing the replacement for the J-15 carrier-based fighter.

As China is continuing the modernization of its bombers as well, the Air Force has increased the number of **H-6 bombers**, which are capable of carrying long-range land-attack cruise missiles with nuclear capability. In an attempt to improve bombers' long-range operation capabilities, the Air Force has reportedly begun to operate H-6N bombers that can take advantage of aerial refueling to fly longer. It is believed to be developing a new long-range stealth bomber called H-20. It is also pointed out that China is developing an air-launched ballistic missile with nuclear capability to be carried by such bombers. Moreover, it has also been pointed out that China is developing a stealth bomber.

China is also making continuous efforts to improve

### J-20 fighter

#### [Specifications, performance]

Maximum speed: 3,063 km/h

#### [Description]

A fifth-generation stealth fighter. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced in February 2018 that the J-20 has started to be delivered to operational units.



J-20 fighter [Imaginechina/Jiji Press Photo]

### H-6 bomber

#### [Specifications, performance]

Maximum speed: 1,015 km/h

Main armament (H-6K): Air-to-surface cruise missiles (maximum firing range over 1,500 km)

#### [Description]


Indigenous bomber. The H-6 can carry cruise missiles (CJ-20) that can be loaded with nuclear warheads.



H-6 bomber

<sup>27</sup> In addition, it is pointed out that while the maritime militia often rents fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, China has built a state-owned fishing fleet in the South China Sea for the maritime militia. It is also pointed out that the Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands. Since this maritime militia unit recruits military veterans as its members to create a unit on par with a career soldier unit, it is reported that salary is paid separately from its commercial fishing activities.

Fig. I-3-2-8 Major Chinese Air Force Capability



capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air power by introducing the H-6U and IL-78M aerial refueling tankers and the KJ-500 and KJ-2000 early warning and control aircraft. Since July 2016, China has promoted the deployment of the indigenously developed Y-20 large transport aircraft. The Y-20U, an aerial refueling tanker based on this transport aircraft, has also been deployed since June 2021.

China is rapidly developing a variety of domestic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes as well as those capable of carrying weapons such as missiles. Some of these are deployed and actively exported. In fact, it is suggested that the Chinese Air Force has created a UAV unit for attack missions and frequently used UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes in waters and airspace surrounding China. In 2023, the KVD-002 unmanned aircraft, which is expected to be used in support of army helicopters, was unveiled for the first time. Moreover, it has been noted that China is improving “Swarm” technology to operate a large number of small low-cost UAVs.

Given such modernization status of the air forces, it is believed that China is steadily improving not only its defense capabilities for its national airspace but also capabilities for conducting combat operations and supporting ground and maritime forces in more distant areas.

See Fig. I-3-2-8 (Major Chinese Air Force Capability)

### (6) Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic domain capabilities

Information gathering, and command and communication in the military sector have increasingly relied on satellites and computer networks. As such, China stated that “outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights (capture point) in strategic competition among all parties,” indicating that it has recognized the importance of taking on information mastery in wartime when it must protect its own information systems and networks while neutralizing those of its adversaries.

Regarding the space domain, it is believed that China is also planning to improve its ability to conduct military operations in space, given the fact that China’s administrative organizations and state-owned enterprises involved in space utilization are said to have close cooperative ties with the military.<sup>28</sup> Specifically, China has rapidly increased the number of satellites available for military purposes in recent years. For example, the “BeiDou” global satellite positioning system, which is called a Chinese-version GPS and pointed out as available for ballistic missiles and other guided weapons systems, started its global operation service in late 2018, and it is deemed that the launch of all satellites constituting the BeiDou system was completed in June 2020.

In the cyber domain, China appears to be strengthening

<sup>28</sup> According to “The Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (2019)



its cyber operations capabilities against networks, and the U.S. DoD has pointed out that China has the ability to carry out cyber attacks that cause localized and temporary disruption to critical infrastructure in the United States.<sup>29</sup> Such an ability is considered to strengthen China's "A2/AD" capabilities. It has been noted that current major military training of China always contains cyber operations covering both attacks on and defense of command systems. The militia as a part of China's armed forces reportedly includes "cyber militias" with excellent cyber domain capabilities.

With regard to electromagnetic spectrum domain, the presence of aircraft equipped with electronic warfare pods and having electronic warfare capabilities has been pointed out, including not only the Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft that frequently flies around Japan, but also J-15 carrier-based aircraft, J-16 fighters, and H-6 bombers.

### (7) China's "Intelligentization" of its Military Forces

The "intelligentized warfare" advocated by China is said to be integrated warfare deployed in the land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic spectrum, cyber, and cognitive dimensions using intelligentized weapons and equipment and corresponding operational methods based on IoT information systems. The "cognitive dimension" is believed to be recognized as important in the future aspects of warfare.

Also, in respect of "intelligentized warfare," it is pointed out that the PLA

- has recognized that new technologies will increase the speed and tempo of future warfare, and that operationalization of AI will be necessary to improve the speed and quality of information processing by reducing battlefield uncertainty and providing decision making advantage over potential adversaries.
- is exploring next-generation operational concepts for intelligentized warfare, such as attrition warfare using intelligentized swarms.
- considers unmanned systems to be important intelligentized technologies, and is pursuing greater autonomy for unmanned land, sea, and air assets to enable swarm attacks, optimized logistics support, as well as dispersed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.<sup>30</sup>

### (8) Efforts to Develop Joint Operational Capabilities

In recent years, initiatives have been under way to improve joint operational capabilities in areas from the front line to logistics. The CMC Joint Operations Command Center is believed to have been established under the initiatives for the CCP to carry out decision making at the highest strategic level. The five new theaters established in February 2016 are seen as representing permanent joint operation headquarters. Attention will be focused to movement towards integration in personnel affairs as well; for example, General He Weidong who has experienced as a commanding officer of a joint force as Commander of the Eastern Theater Command was assigned as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission in October 2022. In recent years, China has implemented joint service trainings giving priority to practicality and other drills to improve its joint operational capabilities. These drills are apparently designed to secure the effectiveness of the abovementioned organizational reforms and other initiatives to improve joint operational capabilities and are expected to continue to progress in the future.

## 6 Maritime and Airspace Activities

### (1) General Situation

Recently, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities for operations in more distant waters and airspace, including those to project power to waters including the so-called second island chain, beyond the first island chain. In such efforts, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the maritime and aerial domains using its naval and air powers. In waters and airspace surrounding Japan, particularly, Chinese naval vessels, and naval and air force aircraft suspected as conducting training and information gathering activities have been observed frequently, along with Chinese naval ships heading for the Pacific and Indian Ocean and numerous China Coast Guard vessels operating under the name of protecting maritime interests. Their activities include China Coast Guard vessels' intermittent intrusions into Japan's territorial waters, and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, such as the directing of fire-control radar at Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) ships and aircraft,<sup>31</sup> Chinese

<sup>29</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>30</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)


<sup>31</sup> In January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed a fire-control radar at a Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer navigating on the high seas of the East China Sea on January 30. Moreover, it is believed that another Chinese naval vessel directed a fire-control radar at a helicopter mounted on an MSDF destroyer on January 19. Projecting fire-control radar is normally conducted prior to firing at a target and thus it is a dangerous act that may cause unintended consequences.

military fighters' abnormally close approach to Japanese SDF and U.S. military aircraft, and the establishment<sup>32</sup> of the "East China Sea ADIZ" and other activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight. These activities have become a grave matter of concern and are extremely regrettable. Furthermore, flying objects that were confirmed within Japanese territorial airspace are strongly presumed to be unmanned reconnaissance balloons flown by China. In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, expanding and intensifying its activities in the air and sea space in the area, and creating a fait accompli of unilateral changes to the status quo by force. It is strongly hoped that China will act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law and play active roles in the region and the international community in a more cooperative manner.

## (2) Military Activities in Japan's Surrounding Waters and Airspace


The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensified their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. These activities include those allegedly based on China's unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities, creating a situation of great concern to Japan. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has continued to make frequent scrambles against Chinese aircraft, as indicated by an all-time high of 851 scrambles in FY2016. China has also continued naval vessels' passage through waters near Japan for navigation to distant waters such as the Indian Ocean, as well as activities viewed as training of maritime and air forces making forays to the Pacific and the Sea of Japan.

Fig. I-3-2-9 (PLA's Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image))



<sup>32</sup> On November 23, 2013, China established the "East China Sea ADIZ" including the Senkaku Islands misleadingly indicated as if they were China's territory. China requires aircraft flying in the zone to abide by rules set by its Ministry of National Defense and claims to take military "defensive emergency measures" against aircraft failing to do so, unduly infringing on the principle of freedom of overflight. Over the move to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, not only Japan but also the United States, the ROK, Australia, and the European Union (EU) expressed concerns.

Fig. I-3-2-10 Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft



The activities of the Chinese military have become more sophisticated in recent years, with signs of improvement in their ability to carry out practical joint operations. Chinese military activities in Japan's surrounding waters and airspace should be closely watched with great attention.

#### a. Activities in the East China Sea (including the Areas around the Senkaku Islands)

Chinese naval vessels have been conducting operations in the East China Sea continuously and actively.

Declaring its own position regarding Japan's Senkaku Islands, China claims that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely justifiable and lawful. Chinese naval vessels have been continuously operating in the areas near Japan's Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate became the first ever Chinese Navy combatant vessel to enter Japan's contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. In July 2022, a Jiangwei II-class frigate passed into the contiguous zone southwest of the Uotsurishima Island.

Submarine activities have also been confirmed. In January 2018, a submerged Shang-class submarine and a Jiangkai II-class frigate entered the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on the same day. This was the first time a Chinese submarine was identified and announced as conducting submerged transit through the contiguous waters around the Senkaku Islands. In June 2020 and September 2021, submerged transit of a submarine presumed to belong to China was confirmed in the contiguous zone surrounding Amami Oshima Island.

In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessels (AGIs) and survey vessels have also been found. In November 2015, a Dongdiao-class AGI sailed back and forth in waters outside the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Dongdiao-class AGI sailed in Japan's territorial waters

near Kuchinoerabujima Island and Yakushima Island, and then passed Japan's contiguous zone north of Kitadaitojima Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducted east-west passages outside the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, a Shupang-class survey ship sailed through Japan's territorial waters near Kuchinoerabujima Island, Kuchinoshima Island, and Yakushima Island in November 2021, in April,

July, September, November, and December 2022 as well as in February, June, and September 2023.

In recent years, Chinese military aircraft have also been active in the airspace closer to the Nansei Islands, including the Senkaku Islands and the main island of Okinawa. Such activities are thought to include warning and surveillance, combat air patrols (CAPs), and training, or may be intended to operate the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.

Moreover, activities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been intensifying in recent years; for example, UAVs such as TB-001 reconnaissance/attack-type UAVs, BZK-005 reconnaissance-type UAVs, and WZ-7 reconnaissance-type UAVs flew past alone in the air space between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island in July and August 2022, January 2023, and June 2024. In November 2022, one presumed Chinese UAV flew from the East China Sea, and after heading south, flew off in the direction of the continent.

#### b. Advancements into the Pacific Ocean

Chinese Navy combatant vessels continue to transit the waters near Japan to advance into the Pacific Ocean with high frequency. The advancement routes are multiplying. Chinese naval vessels have been confirmed as transiting the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and have been found passing through the Osumi Strait, the sea area between Yonagunijima Island and Iriomotejima Island, the sea area between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoatejima Island, the Tsugaru Strait, and the Soya Strait.

Aircraft carriers operating in the Pacific Ocean have also been confirmed. The aircraft carrier "Liaoning," along with several other vessels, passed the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island in December 2016. After that, Liaoning also went into the Pacific Ocean in April 2018, June 2019, April 2020, and in April and December 2021, and in May and

December 2022. The aircraft carrier “Shandong” was first confirmed operating in the Pacific in April 2023, and then again in September and October of the same year. During the deployment of these aircraft carriers into the Pacific Ocean, several cases have been observed where they have passed through the Bashi Channel from the South China Sea, or through the waters off the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the East China Sea. In addition, the landing and takeoff of shipborne fighter aircraft in the Pacific Ocean has also been frequently confirmed.

Through this expansion into the Pacific, China seems to be aiming to improve the operational capabilities of its maritime forces, including aircraft carriers, and its ability to carry out operations in distant waters.

Regarding air forces, a naval aircraft was first confirmed advancing into the Pacific Ocean in 2013, and an air force aircraft advancing into the Pacific Ocean was confirmed in 2015, and since 2017, expansion into the Pacific Ocean involving passage through the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island has become even more active. Furthermore, the types of military aircraft that pass through this airspace are becoming more diverse year by year. Bomber flights have also been confirmed, and the U.S. DoD has indicated that the Chinese military is believed to be conducting training exercises and other activities targeting the United States and its allies.<sup>33</sup>

Flight patterns of Chinese military aircraft have also been changing. Flights from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and from the direction of the Bashi Channel to the Pacific Ocean, both with the return trips on the same shuttle routes, have been repeatedly made. In 2016, H-6K bombers and other aircraft were confirmed as flying around Taiwan. In August 2017, H-6K bombers were confirmed as flying to waters off the Kii Peninsula after advancing to the Pacific Ocean via waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island for the first time.

Through frequent long-distance flights of bombers and other aircraft, including advancements to the Pacific, and their advanced flight paths and composition, China is thought to be demonstrating its presence around areas including those surrounding Japan, and planning further enhancements to more practical operational capabilities.

Additionally, activities considered planned to improve

sea and air joint operational capabilities in more distant areas, such as what seemed to be air-to-ship attack drills including advancements to the Pacific Ocean, have been seen in recent years. China is expected to further expand and intensify naval and air activities in the Pacific Ocean.

Fig. I-3-2-11

Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships' and Aircraft Carriers' Activities around the Southwestern Islands and the Soya and Tsugaru Straits





Fig. I-3-2-12

Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft's Passage between the Main Island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island



### C. Activities in the Sea of Japan

In the Sea of Japan, China's military activities of maritime and air forces have been intensifying, including joint activities with the Russian military.


As for naval forces, they have been sailing into the Sea of Japan occasionally, such as navigating toward distant waters for trainings. Intelligence-gathering ships have also been frequently confirmed passing through the Tsushima Strait. Since 2013, China and Russia have conducted joint exercises “Maritime Cooperation” regularly in the Sea of Japan. Since 2021, joint maritime patrols with Russian ships have been carried out three times. Each time vessels that participated in the joint exercises in the Sea of Japan joined in the patrols after the exercises.

<sup>33</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2018)


Regarding aircrafts, activities in the Sea of Japan have increased since it was confirmed in January 2016 that Chinese military aircraft passed through the Tsushima Strait for the first time. The types of military aircraft flying in this airspace are also becoming more diverse, and in March 2024, a WZ-7 reconnaissance-type unmanned aerial vehicle was confirmed flying for the first time. China has carried out seven joint flights of bombers with Russia since 2019; in every case, the bombers flew over the Sea of Japan, and a case in which PLA aircraft passed through Russian airspace and moved into the Sea of Japan directly was observed.

China is anticipated to continue to expand and intensify its activities in the Sea of Japan also in the future.

**Fig. 1-3-2-13** Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships' Passage through the Tsushima Strait



**Fig. 1-3-2-14** Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft's Passage through the Tsushima Strait



**See** Fig. 1-3-2-9 (PLA's Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image)); Fig. 1-3-2-10 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft); Fig. 1-3-2-11 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships' and Aircraft Carriers' Activities around the Southwestern Islands and the Soya and Tsugaru Straits); Fig. 1-3-2-12 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft's Passage between the Main Island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island); Fig. 1-3-2-13 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships' Passage through the Tsushima Strait); Fig. 1-3-2-14 (Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft's Passage through the Tsushima Strait)


### (3) Activities of Chinese Ships Including Coast Guard Vessels in the East China Sea (including Areas around the Senkaku Islands)

China Coast Guard vessels have been seen almost every day in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands, Japan's inherent territory, and repeatedly intruded into Japan's territorial waters. Since the activities of China Coast Guard vessels based on China's own assertion conducted in Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands are violating international law, Japan has been strongly protesting against these activities and requested them to leave many times. Despite Japan's strong protests, however, Chinese Coast Guard vessels continued to intrude into the Japanese territorial waters in FY2023. Almost every month in 2023, China Coast Guard vessels entered Japan's territorial waters. During these intrusions, Chinese Coast Guard vessels continuously navigated in Japan's territorial waters for more than 80 hours, the longest time ever, from the end of March to the beginning of April 2023. Incidents occurred in which China Coast Guard ships attempted to approach Japanese fishing boats when those Japanese boats were navigating in Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands.

In the past, a China Maritime Surveillance vessel intruded into Japan's territorial waters for the first time in December 2008. Since then, China Maritime Surveillance vessels and China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels have gradually intensified their activities in the Japanese territorial waters. Such activities have intensified greatly since September 2012, when the Japanese Government acquired three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsurishima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island).

China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use Coast Guard vessels to intrude into Japan's territorial waters. For example, the number of vessels involved in each territorial sea intrusion was about two to three until around 2016, whereas in recent years, the number of four-vessel intrusions has increased. Since December 2015, Chinese ships armed with gun-

Fig. I-3-2-15 Activities by China Coast Guard Vessels, etc., around the Senkaku Islands



like armament have repeatedly intruded into the Japanese territorial waters. In 2023, Chinese Coast Guard vessels were confirmed to be active in the contiguous waters around the Senkaku Islands, with the number of active days reaching 352 days and the total number of active vessels reaching 1,282, both the highest ever.

Cases indicating the improvement of China Coast Guard vessels' operational capabilities have been also confirmed. From February to July 2021, China Coast Guard vessels were seen in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands for a record 157 consecutive days.


In December 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration was identified as the first Chinese aircraft to intrude into Japan's airspace around the Senkaku Islands. In May 2017, it was confirmed that an object that appeared to be a small drone was flying above a China Coast Guard vessel intruding into the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This flight also constitutes an invasion of Japan's territorial airspace.

China has thus relentlessly continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter of concern. Japan cannot accept China's actions to escalate the situation.

In addition, in the East China Sea, China continues to engage in unilateral resource development activities even though the boundaries between Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf and those of China have not yet been demarcated. Since June 2013, it has been confirmed that construction work is progressing on a new offshore platform in addition to the four offshore platforms installed on the Chinese side of the Japan-China "Median Line" in the East China Sea prior to the

"2008 Agreement" on resource development in the East China Sea, and Japan has repeatedly protested against the ongoing unilateral development by China, and at the same time strongly requested that the work be halted.

In July 2023, a buoy was found within the Japan's EEZ on the east side of the geographical median line in the East China Sea. The buoy was believed to be installed by China. Japan has lodged a protest with China regarding this matter, and is also demanding its immediate removal.

 See Fig. I-3-2-15 (Activities by China Coast Guard Vessels, etc., around the Senkaku Islands); Reference 14 (Number of Days and Total Incursions into the Territorial Waters Around the Senkaku Islands by Ships Belonging to the China Coast Guard Bureau, etc.)

#### (4) Trends of Activities around Taiwan

China has intensified military activities around Taiwan. According to announcements from the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan, entry into airspace around Taiwan has been increasing since September 2020. The total number of aircraft that entered was over 970 in 2021, and that number increased significantly from 2021 to over 1,700 aircraft in 2022 and 2023. Furthermore, the Ministry announced that other aircraft such as attack helicopters, air refueling tankers, and UAVs have been reportedly observed entering the airspace since 2021, in addition to conventional fighters and bombers. Taiwan's Minister of National Defense stated at the Legislative Yuan in May 2023 that Chinese naval vessels are deployed in the waters surrounding Taiwan, and that since around the end of 2022 they have been regularly deployed also in eastern Taiwan.

Furthermore, since August 2022, China has frequently conducted military exercises in the sea and airspace

surrounding Taiwan.

On August 2, 2022, China announced the setting of six training areas surrounding Taiwan, and conducting “a series of integrated military operations” around Taiwan, in conjunction with the visit of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (then) to Taiwan. China launched nine ballistic missiles on August 4, 2022, five of which landed within the Japan’s EEZ, an another landed at the closest point to Japanese territory, which was about 80 km from Yonagunijima Island. This is a serious issue relating to Japan’s security and the safety of its people and was perceived as a threat to local residents. In addition, some of the missiles passed over Taiwan. After that, the PLA continued the large-scale military exercise covering subjects such as joint blockage, sea and ground attack, air superiority combat, and anti-submarine warfare in air space and sea space around Taiwan for about one week. It is probable that, in this military exercise, China may have rehearsed some parts of a Taiwan invasion operation, such as the blockade of Taiwan, ground/ship attacks, the acquisition of sea/air superiority in wartime, and gray-zone situations, including cyber attacks and “cognitive warfare.”

In addition, in response to then President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with Kevin McCarthy, then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives on April 5 (local time) during her visit to the United States as a stopover for her tour of Central America in April 2023, China conducted large-scale military exercises in the sea and airspace around Taiwan from April 8 to 10, involving numerous naval vessels and aircraft, including the aircraft carrier “Shandong.” China announced that simulated joint accurate attacks to important targets in Taiwan and the sea area around Taiwan and joint blockage by several services were executed in these exercises. It is viewed that China may have rehearsed some parts of a Taiwan invasion operation, following the exercise in August 2022.

In August 2023, in response to then Vice President Lai Ching-te’s stopover in the United States on the way to South America, China conducted military exercises and deployed numerous ships and aircraft on the 19th of the same month. China announced that this military exercise practiced the coordination of ships and aircraft, as well as the acquisition of air and sea superiority. Part of the invasion strategy against Taiwan was probably rehearsed here as well. It was pointed out, however, that



President Lai Ching-te delivers a speech at his inauguration ceremony (May 2024)  
[Website of Taiwan’s Office of the President]

the exercise was small in scale compared to those in August 2022 and April 2023.

In addition, in May 2024, in response to Lai’s inauguration as president on the 20<sup>th</sup>, China conducted a large-scale military exercise from the 23<sup>rd</sup> to the 24<sup>th</sup> in the sea and airspace around Taiwan, including remote islands such as Kinmen Islands. A large number of naval vessels and aircrafts was involved.

Furthermore, according to an announcement by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the Chinese military has repeatedly entered the airspace east of China-Taiwan “Median Line<sup>34</sup>” in the Taiwan Strait since Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

It is believed that through the series of activities around Taiwan, China seeks to create a fait accompli that the Chinese military is continuously operating there and improve its actual combat capabilities.

These intensified military activities indicates a situation, where a possibility could not be excluded that tension between China and Taiwan rises in the military sense. The stability of the situation surrounding Taiwan is important not only for Japan’s national security, but also for the stability of the international community, and Japan needs to pay close attention to it with an even greater sense of urgency.

### (5) Trends of Activities in the South China Sea

China has also been intensifying its activities based on assertions, which are conflicting with existing laws and orders of the seas, in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors,

<sup>34</sup> The line that supposed to have been set over the Taiwan Strait by the United States in the 1950s. Taiwan insists on the existence of the median line, and published the coordinates of it, while China claims “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, hence the so-called the ‘median line’ does not exist.” Chinese military aircraft hardly crossed over the line until now.

## Chinese Military Trends Concerning Taiwan

Since the Chinese military conducted an exercise including ballistic missile launches following then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2020, it has been pointed out that China has been intensifying its naval and aircraft activities around Taiwan. Here, we will look at the Chinese military's movements around Taiwan from August 2022 to the end of 2023, focusing on the activities of aircraft and naval vessels, based on announcements from Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND).


The first topic is aircraft activities. Since August 2022, the number of aircraft entering Taiwan's airspace announced by Taiwan's MND has been increasing. From January to July 2022, there were approximately 620 aircraft entering the airspace, and from August to December, there were approximately 1,110, bringing the total number of aircraft entering the airspace in 2022 to nearly double the number (approximately 970) of that in 2021. The same level of activity was maintained in 2023. Since August 2022, the Chinese military has been continuously conducting activities that cross the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait. Following the Chinese military exercise conducted in response to the visit to the United States by then vice president Lai Ching-te, Chinese military aircraft began to fly for longer distance alongside of the east side of the "median line" after crossing the "median line".

Based on the flight track chart released by Taiwan's MND, it appears that the operating airspace of Chinese military aircraft has traditionally been centered on Taiwan's southwest. However, from August 2022 onwards, in addition to the aforementioned flights crossing the aforementioned median line, activities moving from Taiwan's southwest airspace into the western Pacific Ocean seem to be increasing. Regarding activities in the Western Pacific, the Chinese military conducted aircraft training using the aircraft carrier Shandong in 2023. During a military exercise coinciding with then president Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the United States in April of the same year, it was announced that J-15 carrier-based aircraft entered Taiwan's eastern airspace for the first time. Regarding the Western Pacific deployment of the Shandong in September of the same year, Taiwan's defense minister pointed out that the Chinese military conducted war-gaming training with the aircraft carrier as an opposing force. These training are believed to have practiced a pincer attack on Taiwan from the east and west and preventing third-country intervention. In addition, it was announced that the Chinese military's reconnaissance drones and surveillance and attack drones have circled Taiwan multiple times since April 2023. It has been pointed out that the airspace in which Chinese military aircraft operate is gradually expanding from the conventionally established center of Taiwan's southwestern airspace to encompass Taiwan.

Regarding the types of aircraft involved, the activities of fighters, bombers, manned mission support aircraft such as intelligence-gathering aircraft, as well as the activities of unmanned aircraft since September 2022 have also been announced. As for military exercises around Taiwan, the ratio of unmanned aircraft and manned mission support aircraft increased in the April 2023 exercises compared to the August 2022 exercises, suggesting that the content of the exercises has deepened to a more practical level.

The next topic is the status of naval vessel activities. Previously, the number of Chinese military vessels that Taiwan's defense claimed to have confirmed in the waters surrounding Taiwan had remained at three to four per day since late September 2022. However, following military exercises in April 2023, the average daily number of Chinese military vessels confirmed by the end of the same year increased to approximately 5.8. Furthermore, Taiwan's defense minister has pointed out that since the end of 2022, Chinese military vessels have been regularly deployed in Taiwan's eastern waters. As a matter of fact, since March 2023, it has been announced that patrol helicopters, which appear to be carrier-based, have been operating intermittently on the eastern side of Taiwan in addition to the conventional western side operations. In this way, the Chinese military is believed to be increasing the number of naval ships deployed to the waters surrounding Taiwan and building up the posture of constant deployment to encircle Taiwan.

Given these developments, the Chinese military seems to seek a fait accompli that its aircraft and naval vessels are regularly operating in the sea and airspace surrounding Taiwan, and improve its actual combat capabilities through measures such as increasing operational proficiency and intelligence gathering in the sea and airspace surrounding Taiwan. Due to this escalation of coercive military activities by China, concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, but also in the entire international community.



A flight path image of a Chinese military aircraft released by the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense



including some member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Since 2014, on seven features of the Spratly Islands (Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reefs, Hughes Reef, and Johnson South Reef), China pressed ahead with large-scale and rapid land reclamation. The Philippines-China arbitration award issued in July 2016 denied the “historic rights” as the basis of the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, and determined the illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation. However, China has made it clear that it would not comply with this decision and is currently continuing military activities while promoting the development of military facilities, such as batteries, and various kinds of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, including runways, ports, hangars, and radar facilities, to militarize these features.

On Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs, called the Big Three of the Spratly Islands, China has developed batteries for anti-aircraft guns, missile shelters, underground storage facilities pointed out to be munitions storage, large ports capable of accommodating combatant ships and runways available for takeoff and landing of fighters and bombers.

Chinese military activities have been frequently pointed out at Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. In May 2020, it was reported that Y-8 patrol aircraft and Y-9 early warning aircraft may have been deployed on a rotational basis to Fiery Cross Reef. Additionally, in April 2018, it was reported that anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles were deployed on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs for military training and that radar jamming systems were deployed on Mischief Reef.

On the other four features, it is pointed out that the construction of facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars, has made progress and that what appears to be large anti-aircraft guns and a close-in weapon system (CIWS) may have already been deployed. Furthermore, in December 2022, it was reported that new construction activities were being carried out on the other four features in the Spratly Islands.

If these features of the Spratly Islands are used for full-scale military purposes, it could significantly change the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

China carried out the militarization of the Paracel Islands before that of the Spratly Islands. China has reportedly extended the runway to nearly 3,000 m on

Woody Island since 2013. Since 2015, fighter jets such as the J-11 and J-10 have been deployed, and since 2016, the presence of equipment that appears to be surface-to-air missiles has been confirmed. In August 2023, new construction activities were reported to be underway on Triton Island.

In recent years, Chinese vessels have allegedly been conducting what are likely to be survey activities in Scarborough Shoal, where a standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine government ships in April 2012. It is pointed out that new land reclamations on the shoal might be seen in the future. It is also pointed out that if China conducts land reclamations and installs radar facilities, runways, and other infrastructure on Scarborough Shoal, it could possibly increase its ability for situation awareness and power projection capabilities in the surrounding sea area and ultimately enhance its operational capabilities throughout all the areas of the South China Sea.

Also, it has been pointed out that if China were to consider bastion operations (fortification) to enhance the survivability of new types of long-range SLBMs capable of hitting the U.S. mainland, the South China Sea would be the suitable choice.<sup>35</sup> Attention must continue to be paid to the situation in the South China Sea going forward.


The activities in the sea and airspace in the area are expanding and intensifying as well. For example, in 2016 after the Philippines-China arbitral award, Chinese Air Force H-6K bombers conducted “combat patrol flights” in the airspace near Scarborough Shoal in July and August, and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that these patrols would be “regularized” in the future. In September, a joint Chinese-Russian naval exercise called “Maritime Cooperation 2016” was held in the South China Sea for the first time. It was reported in December that a H-6 bombers flew along the “nine-dash line.”

In 2020, when the establishment of new administrative regions called “Xisha (Paracel) District” and “Nansha (Spratly) District” under Sansha City, Hainan Province was unilaterally announced, in July, China conducted simultaneous military exercises in three sea areas (South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea) and is believed to have launched middle-range ballistic missiles in August.

These vigorous activities of the Chinese military have been remarkable even in recent years. Since May 2021, there have been frequent reports of training exercises

<sup>35</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)

Fig. I-3-2-16 Example of China's Advancement and Militarization Utilizing the Power Vacuum in the South China Sea (image)



involving carrier-based aircraft takeoff from and landing on the aircraft carrier Shandong. In December of the same year, it was also reported that the aforementioned Yushen-class landing ships conducted a series of exercises in the South China Sea, and that exercises were conducted at several locations on Hainan Island facing the South China Sea. It was pointed out that the latter exercises in particular were possibly exercises simulating an amphibious operation using Hainan Island against Taiwan.

In addition, there were incidents in which Chinese naval vessels or other ships approached or obstructed U.S. military vessels operating in the sea and airspace of this region, as well as incidents in which Chinese military aircraft approached U.S. military aircraft.<sup>36</sup> In October 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense released videos of 15 cases in which Chinese military aircraft took dangerous actions against U.S. military aircraft flying over the East China Sea and South China Sea.

In this way, it appears that China seeks to expand its presence and enhance war-sustaining and other joint operational capabilities including military and other means in the South China Sea.

Such activities conducted by China based on its own assertions, which are conflicting with existing laws and orders of the seas, further advance unilateral changes to the status quo by force and efforts to create a fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned about these activities, and the concern is shared with the international community, including the United States and other G7 Member States.

The issues surrounding the South China Sea are directly related to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and are a legitimate concern not only for Japan, which has major sea lanes in the South China Sea, but also for the entire international community. Countries concerned, including China, are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the

<sup>36</sup> In March 2009, December 2013 and September 2018, Chinese naval and other vessels approached and intercepted U.S. Navy vessels navigating in the South China Sea. In May 2016, February 2017 and May 2017, PLA fighters allegedly flew close to U.S. Forces aircraft.

basis of the principle of the rule of law.

 See Fig. 1-3-2-16 (Example of China's Advancement and Militarization Utilizing the Power Vacuum in the South China Sea (image))

## (6) Trends in the Indian Ocean and Other More Distant Waters

The Chinese Navy is considered to be shifting towards “protection missions on the far seas” and has been steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters, such as the Indian Ocean, in recent years. Progress has been seen in the Navy’s development of such equipment as large combatant ships and replenishment ships and in its operational initiatives, such as deployment to distant sea areas and securing bases for this purpose.

Since December 2008, Chinese naval vessels have been deployed off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to take part in international counter-piracy efforts. The dispatched vessels have conducted joint training exercises with the militaries of other countries in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere.<sup>37</sup> In 2023, they conducted joint exercises with the Russian and South African navies in the waters off Durban in eastern South Africa in February, and with the Pakistan navy in the northern Arabian Sea in November. In March 2024, they conducted joint exercises with the Russian and Iranian navies in the northern Indian Ocean. Retrospectively in May 2015, China and Russia had conducted a joint naval exercise called “Maritime Cooperation” in the Mediterranean Sea and elsewhere.

China has also deployed a space observation support ship in the southern Pacific and dispatched a military hospital ship to waters including the southern Pacific as well as those near Latin America under “Mission Harmony.”

In September 2015, five Chinese naval vessels reportedly sailed in the high seas of the Bering Sea and in U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands. In September 2022 and August 2023, Russia announced that Chinese vessels participating in joint navigation

with Russia sailed through the Bering Sea. China has deployed the vessels such as the polar research vessel Xue Long 2 to the Arctic Ocean in total 13 times since 1999;<sup>38</sup> moreover, in January 2018, China published a white paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy,” which mapped out a policy of active involvement in Arctic initiatives, including efforts to build a “Polar Silk Road” through the development of Arctic sea routes. It is pointed out that China could take advantage of scientific survey and commercial activities to increase its presence including military activities in the Arctic sea.<sup>39</sup>

Additionally, China has been remarkably trying to secure overseas outposts such as harbors. For example, in August 2017, China began to operate a “support base” for logistics support of the PLA in Djibouti facing the Gulf of Aden. The Chinese military is said to be considering and planning to establish military logistics facilities in multiple countries, including Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.<sup>40</sup> China has been promoting its **“Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI)** whose main purpose is advertised as establishing an economic zone in regions including the Eurasian continent, with the Chinese military possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counter-terrorism capabilities in coastal states through bilateral and multilateral exercises. While it is thought that the initiative includes a strategic intention to expand its influence in the region, it is possible that the initiative will further improve the PLA’s operational capabilities in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean and elsewhere. For example, China’s support for the construction of port infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other Indian Ocean countries as well as Pacific island countries including Vanuatu could lead China to secure outposts available for its military purposes.

<sup>37</sup> In addition to military exercises, port calls to countries along the Indian Ocean coast are also frequent.

<sup>38</sup> In 2012, Xue Long became the first polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, the cargo freighter Yong Sheng became the first Chinese commercial ship to cross the Arctic Ocean. Canadian scientists took part in Xue Long’s voyage to the Arctic Ocean in 2017, and they succeeded for the first time in trial navigation of the Arctic Northwest Passage (along the north coast of Canada). Furthermore, its second polar research vessel Xue Long 2 completed its first Arctic Sea cruising in September 2020, and China is promoting research and construction of a heavy icebreaker.

<sup>39</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2019)

<sup>40</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2023)

**KEY WORD****“Belt and Road” Initiative**

A concept for an economic sphere proposed by President Xi Jinping. The “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) were announced in September and October 2013, respectively. Since then, the two concepts are collectively referred to as the “Belt and Road” Initiative.

**(7) Objectives of Activities in Waters and Airspace**

The development and activities of Chinese naval and air forces, descriptions in defense white papers, China’s geographical conditions and globalizing economy, and other factors indicate that the recent water and airspace activities of the Navy, Air Force and other Chinese organizations have the following objectives:

The first is to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territorial land, waters and airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in the effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second is to develop capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. To ensure the prevention of foreign intervention in the Taiwan issue, China needs to enhance its operational capabilities at sea and airspace as Taiwan is surrounded by the sea in all directions.

The third is to weaken the control of other countries on islands and China’s one-sided claims on their sovereignty and marine interests, by means of various surveillance activities and the use of force in the waters and airspace surrounding these islands. Such activities of China are considered to also have the purpose of creating a fait accompli as part of the reasons for unilaterally changing the status quo and justifying China’s claims based on its own concept of “legal warfare.”

The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as fishing and navigating in the East and South China Seas. In order for these activities to continue safely and stably, the Chinese military is believed to be playing a role as a backstop, deterring the activities of maritime law enforcement organizations of other countries through its military presence.

The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In the background is the fact that its sea lanes, including its oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are essential for the Chinese economy. Given the recent strengthening

of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they have been expanding military capabilities to cover distant waters beyond China’s near seas.

Given these objectives of China’s water and airspace activities and recent trends, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, as well as in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

**7 International Military Activities**

In recent years, the PLA has been indicating its positive attitude on nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterpiracy, dispatching numerous units for such overseas missions.

China has vowed to consistently support and actively participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), increasing its presence in UN PKOs.

According to the UN, as of the end of November 2023, China had a total of 2,267 personnel including troops and police members - the largest number of peacekeepers among the permanent members of the UN Security Council - engaged in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The Chinese share has remained the second largest, after the U.S. share, since 2016.

Moreover, China has been actively participating in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities.

It is pointed out that factors behind such Chinese attitude include the growing need for protecting and promoting China’s national interests overseas following the expansion of national interests beyond its national borders, China’s attempt to verify military capabilities including units’ long-distance deployment, its intent to raise its status by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community, its hope to diffuse the military’s peaceful and humanitarian images, and its attempt to enhance relations with PKO regions including African countries.

**8 Education and Training**

In recent years, the PLA under the policy of building a military that “can fight and win a war” has promoted practical exercises such as joint exercises led by theater commands, force-on-force exercises, landing exercises,

inter-theater exercises, and large exercises including distant ones, as well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other countries, in order to strengthen its operational capabilities.

In the education spectrum as well, the PLA aims to train soldiers who have the ability to execute joint operations. It was reported in 2017 that the PLA National Defense University began training to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations.

China has been developing defense mobilization systems and others in order to effectively utilize private resources in case of emergencies, including wars. The military use of civilian resources includes civilian ships' transportation of military equipment. As such initiative generally augments China's forces available for military missions and is expected to proactively be promoted in the future, the initiative's implications for the Chinese military forces' operational capabilities should be watched closely.

## 9 National Defense Industry Sector

Under the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, a department of the State Council, China's main national defense industry had consisted of 10 corporations to develop and produce nuclear weapons, missiles and rockets, aircraft, vessels, information systems and other military equipment. It is pointed out that China was the fourth largest weapon supplier in the world as of 2022.<sup>41</sup>

While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed that China places emphasis on the enhancement of its military industrial sector, including the domestic production of equipment, to modernize its military. It has been pointed out that China is acquiring technologies ambitiously not only through domestic technology research and development and foreign direct investment, but also via illegal means in the form of secret information theft.<sup>42</sup>

China's civil-military fusion policy has been evident

in the technology area. China promotes two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy while civilian technologies are absorbed for national defense development. It also seems interested in absorbing foreign technologies available both for military and civilian purposes. It is pointed out that China's civil-military fusion policy gives priority to initiatives in seas, outer space, cyber, artificial intelligence (AI), and other emerging areas for China. The U.S. DoD has pointed out that civil-military fusion includes six mutually related efforts: (1) fusion of China's defense industrial base with its civilian technology and industrial base, (2) integration and use of scientific and technological innovation across military and civilian sectors, (3) human resources development and mixing of military and civilian expertise and knowledge, (4) incorporation of military requirements into civilian infrastructure and use of civilian structures for military purposes, (5) use of civilian services and logistics capabilities for military purposes, and (6) expansion and deepening of China's defense mobilization system in a manner that includes all relevant aspects of society and economy for use in competition and war.<sup>43,44</sup>

In addition, in recent years, China has reportedly promoted the standardization of civilian products for their military adoption from the production stage under the civil-military fusion policy. This initiative is expected to allow the military to utilize civilian resources more effectively.

As the growth rate of defense spending has slowed in recent years, the civil-military fusion policy is expected to become increasingly important for China, which must balance building up its defense and its economy. In addition, in order to realize the aforementioned "intelligentized warfare" advocated by China, it is key to acquire advanced civilian technologies, including so-called game-changing technologies, that would dramatically change future warfare. Therefore, because China's civil-military fusion policy is seen as an indispensable means to achieve this, this policy, including its relationship to "intelligentized warfare," must continue to be monitored with serious concern.

<sup>41</sup> According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database

<sup>42</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>43</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>44</sup> The existence of the "Hundred Talents Program" and the "Thousand Talents Plan" to invite to China highly specialized human resources from overseas, including people of Chinese descent, is pointed out. As part of this, for example, it is noted that there are researchers with research experience in Japan who are engaged in developing wind tunnel test facilities necessary to develop hypersonic weapons.

### 3 Relations with Countries and Regions

#### 1 General Situation

China, particularly regarding maritime issues over which its interests conflict with others', continues to demonstrate its attitude of realizing its unilateral assertions without compromise, while promoting assertive actions including those to unilaterally change the status quo by force and create a *fait accompli* for such changes, based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order. China has been promoting its BRI as a national strategy, but some BRI-participating countries have recently reconsidering BRI projects due mainly to their fiscal deterioration. Furthermore, it has been pointed that there have been moves towards creating China's own international order, including the establishment of China-led multilateral mechanisms in many fields such as security, growth, and development<sup>45</sup> to influence political decisions in other countries through efforts such as winning over foreign politicians.<sup>46</sup>

At the same time, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China's overall national power. Based on such recognition, China has advocated building a "community of shared future for mankind" and referred to promoting the building of "a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, equity and justice, and win-win cooperation." China proactively carries out military exchanges with other countries. In recent years, China has been engaged in active military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin America. Furthermore, movement to strengthen relationships with Pacific countries is observed. The objectives of China's promotion of military exchanges are thought to include alleviating other countries' concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with these countries, creating a favorable security environment for China, enhancing China's influence in the international community, exploring overseas arms markets, securing stable supplies of natural resources, and ensuring foreign bases.

#### 2 Relations with Russia

Ever since the so-called China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, China and Russia have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the deepening of their "relationship" since its establishment in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was concluded. In 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries came to a



President Xi Jinping and President Putin holding a China-Russia summit meeting in October 2023 [China News Service/Jiji]

settlement. The two countries have a common view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order, and have further deepened their relations. At the China-Russia summit meeting in early February 2022, the two countries assessed China-Russia relations as "superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era." Furthermore, for example, amid growing tensions in U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations, China and Russia have consistently deepened their cooperation. Each country is believed to be planning to create an international environment favorable to itself by taking a united stance on security issues, such as Taiwan and issues surrounding NATO's eastern expansion, which are in conflict with the United States and others.

<sup>45</sup> For example, President Xi put forward the "Global Security Initiative" consisting of advocacy of the United Nation's authority and status as well as opposition to security build-up sacrificing the security of other countries in April 2022.

<sup>46</sup> According to the statement by then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in December 2017

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China.<sup>47</sup> Although China-Russia arms transactions in value in recent years have been lower than in some past period, China has apparently continued to indicate its strong interests in importing advanced Russian defense equipment and in joint equipment development with Russia. For example, China has introduced what are believed to be the latest fourth generation Su-35 fighters and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia. China has been reported as the first country to import the Russian S-400. It is also suggested that Russia has concerns about competing with China in arms exports taking into consideration China's improvement of technological power.

Military exchanges between China and Russia take place in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior military officers and bilateral and multilateral exercises. For example, China and Russia have been conducting large-scale joint naval exercises called "Maritime Cooperation" since 2012, including the first in the South China Sea in 2016 and the first in the Baltic Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk in 2017.

In addition, moves indicating deepened China-Russia relations have been confirmed in recent years. In the two countries' "first joint strategic flight" of bombers in July 2019, their bombers joined in the Sea of Japan and flew to the East China Sea. In September the same year, China and Russia signed a series of documents on cooperation in the military and military technologies.<sup>48</sup> In October 2021, as a continuation of the joint naval exercise "Maritime Cooperation 2021," a total of ten Chinese and Russian warships conducted joint navigation around Japan under the title "First Maritime Joint Patrol." Furthermore, at the China-Russia Defense Ministers' online meeting held in November the same year, both sides agreed to expand cooperation in areas such as "strategic exercises" and "joint patrols." The joint statement issued after the China-Russia summit meeting in March 2023 specified that the two countries would regularly conduct "joint patrols" and "joint exercises" at sea and in the air.

Supporting these trends, China and Russia have continued to mutually participate in military exercises since 2018. In 2018, the Chinese military participated

in Vostok 2018, which is considered the largest post-Cold War exercise by the Russian military, followed by Tsentr 2019 in 2019, Kavkaz 2020 in 2020, and Vostok 2022 in 2022.<sup>49</sup> The Russian military also participated in "Western Joint-2021" conducted by the Chinese Army's Western Theater Command in 2021, and in "Northern Joint-2023" conducted by the Northern Theater Command in 2023. China likely regards these exchanges as an opportunity to learn about how to operate Russian-made weapons and the operational doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces, which have combat experiences.

Furthermore, bombers of Russia and China have flown long distance jointly around Japan a total of seven times since the joint flight in July 2019 mentioned above, namely, in December 2020, November 2021, May and November 2022, and June and December 2023. Among others, the joint flight in May 2022 was with stronger provocation than ever because it was intended for demonstration of force against Japan, which was holding a Japan-U.S.-Australia-India summit meeting at that time. During joint flights in November of the same year, it was said that a Chinese aircraft landed at an airfield in Russia for the first time, and a Russian aircraft landed at an airfield in China for the first time. In June 2023, joint flights were conducted over a two-day period for the first time, and flights involving a total of 20 fighter jets were also confirmed, showing the diversification of their activities.

Regarding activities by Chinese and Russian naval vessels, in addition to the aforementioned joint navigation in October 2021, joint navigations around Japan were carried out by Chinese and Russian naval vessels centering on participating warships of the aforementioned "Vostok 2022" in September 2022 and by Chinese and Russian naval vessels centering on participating warships of the aforementioned "Northern Union-2023" from July to August 2023. During the joint navigation conducted in 2023, it is said that more than 50 combat training exercises were conducted. Before and after the joint navigation, ships participating in it made port calls to each other's countries for the first time, which indicated a diversification of their activities. Moreover, in June 2022, naval vessels of both countries navigated separately one week apart around Japan in almost an orbital manner.

<sup>47</sup> According to SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

<sup>48</sup> A total of more than 2,000 Chinese military personnel from land, navy, and air force troops, as well as aircraft and naval vessels are said to have participated in the "Vostok 2022" exercise.

<sup>49</sup> According to the Russian military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* (the "Red Star") on September 6, 2019

## Chinese and Russian Militaries Strengthening Cooperation



HIDA Masafumi, Director, Security Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies

China and Russia, which experienced a severe confrontation during the Cold War, have gradually improved their relationship through confidence-building measures, such as mutual reductions in military forces deployed in border areas and border demarcation negotiations. In 2003, the first joint exercise between the Chinese and Russian militaries took place as part of a multilateral anti-terrorism exercise organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In 2012, the Chinese Navy and the Russian Navy jointly conducted a “maritime cooperation” exercise for the first time with the theme of joint defense at sea. Since then, they have conducted joint exercises almost every year and not only in the waters surrounding China, such as the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, but also in waters surrounding Russia, including the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea. Since 2018, the Chinese and Russian militaries have been mutually participating in strategic joint exercises conducted by the two countries, further enhancing the coordination between their militaries through military exercises.

Furthermore, the Chinese and Russian militaries have begun engaging in joint operations in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan and are strengthening operational cooperation. The “Joint Aerial Strategic Patrol,” which began in 2019 by Russian and Chinese bombers, has been conducted with diversification of participating aircraft types and expansion of flight airspace. Joint maritime patrols by Chinese and Russian warships, which began in 2021, are also conducted annually. In 2023, they sailed off the

coast of Alaska in the United States, conducted training in the Bering Sea, and then passing between Okinawa’s main island and Miyakojima island, they sailed to the East China Sea. It can be said that cooperation between the Chinese and Russian militaries is progressing towards a de facto alliance.

One of China’s aims in strengthening cooperation with the Russian military is to improve the operational capabilities of its military through joint exercises and actions with the Russian military, which has a wealth of practical experience. In addition, China, which is becoming increasingly hostile to the United States, is aiming to gain an advantage in strategic competition with it and its allies and partners by strengthening military cooperation with Russia, which also opposes the United States. On the other hand, it is believed that Russia is placing importance on China as a strategic partner in countering the United States, and it also expects a reduction in the presence of U.S. forces confronting Russia on the European front by it providing indirect support to China in its military opposition to the United States and encouraging the U.S. military to become more involved in the Indo-Pacific region.

Even after Russia invaded Ukraine, joint exercises and actions between the Chinese and Russian militaries have continued to be carried out, so it is expected that military cooperation between the two countries will continue to deepen in the future. To ensure Japan’s security and maintain stability in East Asia, we must remain vigilant about such developments.

(Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher’s academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position.

The repeated joint flights of bombers and joint navigations of ships between China and Russia are obviously intended as demonstration activities against Japan and are a grave concern for Japan’s security.

In this way, China and Russia is demonstrating actions to enhance cooperation further even while aggression against Ukraine is ongoing. There is a possibility for the two countries to enhance military cooperation further, and these developments, including the strengthening of military cooperation between China and Russia, not only have a direct impact on the security environment surrounding Japan, but may also have strategic effects on the United States and Europe, and should be watched with concern.

 See Chapter 2, Paragraph 3-3 (Other Regions Responses)

### 3 Relations with North Korea

China has kept close relations with North Korea under the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president to visit North Korea in 14 years, and held his fifth summit meeting with the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un. In October 2022, Chairman Kim sent a congratulatory telegram to President Xi Jinping on his election as President for his third term. In September 2023, Xi sent a congratulatory telegram to North Korea on the 75th anniversary of its founding.

China has reportedly adopted three principles on the Korean Peninsula - (1) the denuclearization of the



Korean Peninsula, (2) the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and (3) the resolution of problems through dialogue and consultations - indicating that China gives priority to the maintenance of stability and dialogue as well as the denuclearization. Under these principles, China, while agreeing to UN Security Council resolutions until 2017 to enhance sanctions on North Korea, cooperated with Russia in proposing a draft resolution including lifting some of the sanctions based on UNSC resolutions recently. In May 2022, China exercised its power of veto with Russia to a draft resolution for sanctions proposed by the United States in response to North Korea's launching of ICBM-class ballistic missiles.

Although China has vowed to have seriously observed its international obligations, it has been pointed out that Chinese ships have been involved in illicit ship-to-ship transfer prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions.

## 4 Relations with Other Countries

### (1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, reciprocal summit-level visits and other activities continue to be actively carried out. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and the ROK), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Furthermore, China has developed bilateral relations through infrastructure development support, etc., under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the military front, there seems to be moves that China has made efforts toward military confidence building, such as the first ASEAN-China Maritime Field Training Exercise, which took place in October 2018.

Moreover, the possibility of China using part of Cambodia's Ream Naval Base exclusively has been pointed out. Concerning this matter, the Cambodian side denied the existence of such a fact, saying that hosting foreign military bases is against its Constitution. In addition, in June 2021, Cambodia's Minister of National Defense acknowledged that China had contributed to the development of the Ream Naval Base. However, he stated that access to the base facilities was not limited to China alone. Against this backdrop, a Chinese naval vessel reportedly entered the Ream Naval Base in preparation for Cambodian Navy training in December 2023.

In July 2016, an arbitration award based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adjudicating the Philippines' case against China in the South China Sea was rendered, accepting most of the Philippine claims. Under these circumstances, in recent years there have been frequent reports of sabotage activities against Philippine ships by vessels belonging to the Chinese Coast Guard. In November 2022, the Philippines announced that China Coast Guard interrupted a Philippine navy boat that collected a floating object and tried to take it back with them, and the Chinese ship then took it by force. Since August 2023, there have been numerous reports of the Chinese Coast Guard and others allegedly interfering with Philippine ships and other vessels attempting to replenish the Philippine warship Sierra Madre stranded on the Second Thomas Shoal. Of these, collisions between Chinese Coast Guard vessels and Philippine vessels are said to have occurred in October and December 2023, and March 2024. In September 2023, the Philippine Coast Guard issued a statement criticizing the Chinese side after the Chinese Coast Guard installed a floating barrier on Scarborough Shoal, and later announced that the Philippine Coast Guard had removed it.

China and Vietnam have territorial disputes and oil drilling issues in the South China Sea. In August 2023, it was reported that a Vietnamese fishing boat was damaged in the Paracel Islands after being sprayed with water from a vessel believed to be a Chinese Coast Guard vessel. Meanwhile, in the demarcated maritime boundary waters of the Gulf of Tonkin, the militaries of both countries have been conducting regular joint naval patrols since 2006. In November 2023, the Vietnamese military participated for the first time in the multilateral exercise "Peace and Friendship-2023" hosted by the Chinese military in Southeast Asia.

China and ASEAN have continued talks to discuss the formulation of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). In July 2019, China announced at the Chinese and ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting that they had completed the first reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text. Subsequently, a second reading was initiated. At the August 2021 ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, it was noted that a provisional agreement on the Preamble had been reached. In the Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit in November of that year, there was mention of expectations for the early conclusion of an effective and substantive COC. At the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting in July 2023,

the “Guidelines for Accelerating the Early Conclusion of an Effective and Substantive COC” was adopted.

## (2) Relations with Central Asian Countries

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political stability and security situations, such as terrorism by Islamic extremists, in Central Asian states. Such concerns of China appear to be reflected in China’s tightened border control and its engagement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the stabilization of Afghanistan. Moreover, China is strongly interested in Central Asia, with a view to diversifying its supply sources and procurement methods for resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations.

## (3) Relations with South Asian Countries

China has a close relationship with Pakistan under their “all-weather strategic partnership,” and mutual visits by their summit leaders take place frequently. Their cooperation in the military sector, including bilateral exercises, exporting weapons, and transferring military technology, is also deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for China, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China accordingly, partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean.

Although economic ties between China and India are strengthening, the two countries have not demarcated their borders in areas such as Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh.

In May 2020, a clash between Chinese and Indian forces occurred near the China-India border in Ladakh, India, and tensions between the two countries escalated with the first deadly clash in 45 years on June 15 of the same year. Since then, China and India have regularly held commander-level meetings based on the management agreement for the Line of Actual Control, a temporary border between the two countries. Currently, the countries are still continuing efforts to gradually ease tensions.

In recent years, China has also been deepening its

relations with Sri Lanka. To Sri Lanka, which is located at a strategic point in the Indian Ocean and supports the BRI, China has provided massive economic and technical cooperation in infrastructure development, including for railroads, ports, and airports. On the other hand, in July 2017, an agreement was reached to lend interests for 99 years to Chinese enterprises at the Port of Hambantota, which is being constructed with Chinese loans. Some have noted that this constitutes what has been described as a “debt trap.” President Wickremesinghe took office in July 2022, and continues discussions with creditor countries including China to resolve the debt problem. Chinese tracking ship Yuan Wang 5 reportedly operated by the PLA Strategic Support Force entered the Port of Hambantota in August 2022.

## (4) Relations with European Countries

For China, the European Union (EU) countries are increasingly in its presence especially in the economic field.

European countries possess more advanced military technologies than China or Russia regarding information and communication technology, avionics/aeroengines, air independence propulsion (AIP) systems for submarines, and elsewhere. The EU countries have maintained their arms embargo on China since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, and China has requested them to lift the embargo.<sup>50</sup> If the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, sophisticated military technologies could be transferred to China and to third countries via China, dramatically changing the security environment in the Indo-Pacific and other regions.

China’s recent rise has attracted attention from NATO as well. The new strategic concept announced at a NATO summit meeting in June 2022 states that “China’s ambition and coercive policies challenge NATO’s interests, security, and values,” and expressed concern over rapid enhancement of nuclear forces, absence of transparency, and malicious hybrid and cyber activities. Based on this, it mentioned that NATO will be engaged with China for the alliance’s security interests, and to prevent China’s coercive actions to divide the NATO.

China’s relations with European countries, including EU discussions on the arms embargo on China and NATO’s policy on engagement with China, should be continuously watched.

<sup>50</sup> According to the policy paper on the EU released by China in December 2018

## (5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries, and Pacific Island countries

China has been enhancing its relations with Middle Eastern and African nations in the economic realm. In recent years, it has also strengthened military relations with them. Not only intensive interactions among state leaders and senior military officials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted. China also actively dispatches personnel to undertake UN PKO in Africa. Some suspect that underlying these movements could be China's aim to ensure a stable supply of natural resources and to secure overseas bases in the future.

China is Australia's biggest trade partner. However, the relations of the two countries have deteriorated, such as China's successive restriction on importing Australian beef and other goods, since April 2020 when Australia suggested the necessity for an independent investigation into the origin of COVID-19 in China. Subsequently, however, with the change of government in Australia, an improvement in the relations has been sought.

China has also been boosting its relations with Pacific island countries by providing them with proactive and continuous economic support and medical services deploying a military hospital ship. China is reportedly promoting resources development in Papua New Guinea and has repeatedly approached it about concluding an agreement on defense and police cooperation. Moreover, it was announced in April 2022 that China

and the Solomon Islands signed the "Framework of Security Cooperation." It was reported in March 2022 that the draft framework included items that allow China to deploy police and troops and allow Chinese naval vessels to call at ports and get supplies. China has also been moving to enhance military relations with Fiji and Tonga. While China has been enhancing relations with Pacific island nations, Australia and some other countries have expressed concerns about such Chinese moves.

### 5 International Transfer of Weapons

China has been expanding exports of weapons such as missiles, tanks, aircraft including drones, and ships. China's major arms export destinations include Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. China has also been reportedly exporting arms to Algeria, Nigeria, and other African countries, countries in Southeast Asia including Thailand and Cambodia, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern countries.<sup>51</sup>

Some claim that China has transferred weapons to foreign countries in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with friendly nations, enhance its influence in the international community, and secure natural resources. China has not participated in some of the frameworks for international arms export control, and some point out that missile-related and other technologies have been transferred from China to other countries.



**REFERENCE** : Security Environment Surrounding Japan (China)

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_act/sec\\_env/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/index.html)

<sup>51</sup> According to SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

## Section 3

## Relations between the United States and China, etc.

## 1

## Relations between the United States and China (General Situation)

With regard to the relationship between the United States, the world's largest economic power, and China, the second largest, competitions between the two countries across the political, economic, and military realms have become increasingly apparent in recent years. This is due to various concerns such as changes in the balance of power caused by China's growing national power, trade issues, issues concerning the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, the Hong Kong issue, and human rights issues in China regarding Uighur and Tibet. In particular, since the former Trump administration, the moves of the United States and China that had kept each other in check have come to the surface. Under the Biden administration as well, there has been strong interest in the irreversible developments in the strategic competition between the two countries.

In October 2022, the Biden administration published the National Security Strategy (NSS), identifying China as the United States' most consequential geopolitical challenge and positioning it as the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to achieve this. It stated that China has ambitions to become the world's leading power, invests in its rapidly modernizing military power, enhances its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, and attempts to erode U.S. alliances. The NSS also expressed the idea that the world is at an inflection point, and the next ten years will be the decisive decade in determining the competitive position of the United States against China. Based on this perception, the administration raises three points as the axis for its policy towards China, that is, (1) investment in competitiveness, innovation, resiliency, and democracy, (2) cooperation with allies and partners, and (3) responsible competition with China to defend the interests of the United States and build a vision for the future. The government stated it will pursue greater strategic stability through measures to responsively manage competition, lower risks of unintended military escalation, and ultimately engage with China through measures on arms control efforts. On the other hand, the administration expresses that it is willing to work with China where both interests align because China, being central to the global economy, has a strong influence on shared challenges. Climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and the global food crisis are indicated

as some of the challenges requiring cooperation. In this way, the Biden administration takes over from the former Trump administration the deterrence stance against China while considering dealing with cross-border challenges important, and thus it announces managed competition with China and cooperation in specific fields.

The administration, in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) published in October 2022, placed China's coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor, to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences, as the most comprehensive and serious challenge to the security of the United States. It further stated that China was a "pacing challenge" that needs to be dealt with, and that the Department of Defense should take actions rapidly to maintain and enhance deterrence against China, because China has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), with a focus on offsetting U.S. military advantages.

Taking a strict attitude towards China is becoming common nonpartisan policy. For example, a resolution to establish a nonpartisan "Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party" was passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in January 2023.

On the other hand, China opposes this, stating that this type of attitude is an old-fashioned representation of a Cold War mentality and zero-sum game, and is stirring up competition between superpowers. China shows a non-compromising attitude over its own "core interests and material concerns," and uses special caution regarding involvement with the United States especially in regard to Taiwan issues that China values as "the core of the core interests." When then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, China conducted large scale military exercises in various areas around Taiwan and showed an uncompromising attitude against the United States. For example, China announced countermeasures that it withholds various discussion between the two countries. Both countries agreed on the importance of working out a competition management policy, continued dialogue, and cooperation to deal with international challenges such as climate change and food security at the U.S.-China summit meeting held for the first time in person under the Biden administration

in November 2022. However, they made no concessions in areas of conflict such as the Taiwan issue, human rights issues, and on trade issues. United States Armed Forces shot down a Chinese reconnaissance balloon that was detected over the U.S. homeland in February 2023. The U.S. Government communicated to China that the flight was a clear violation of its sovereignty and of international law, and postponed Secretary of State Blinken's visit to China scheduled in the same month. China insisted that it was a privately owned weather observation airship that strayed into U.S. territory due to force majeure and expressed strong discontent with the shooting down of the balloon by the United States and protested against it.

Against this backdrop, exchanges between the U.S. and China, including between their military authorities, slowed down, but efforts have been made to resume exchanges since then. In November 2023, President Biden held a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time in about a year. They agreed to resume high-level dialogue between military authorities, which the Chinese side appears to have suspended in response to the shooting down of its spy balloon. Additionally, they agreed to resume consultations between their military authorities, which had been suspended by China as a countermeasure when then-House Speaker Pelosi visited Taiwan. In December of the same year, a video conference was held between the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Joint Staff of the PLA, and exchanges between the U.S. and China are gradually resuming.

Meanwhile, in the field of sensitive technologies and critical technologies, where U.S.-China competition is particularly conspicuous, the United States has become increasingly wary of China. China promotes the "intellectualization" of the PLA; for example, General Secretary Xi of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), stated in his report in the 20th CCP Congress in October 2022 that China "holds fast to merge and develop mechanization, informatization, and intellectualization." Based on these movements, the Biden administration puts effort into protecting and fostering sensitive technologies and key technologies recognizing that U.S. security will be threatened as a result of the strengthening of Chinese military power due to leakage of sensitive and key

technologies from the United States and its allies. Aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of the United States in the semiconductor field, the "Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act" was passed in August 2022 to support semiconductor manufacturing companies in the United States financially, while making it compulsory that the supported companies agree with the Secretary of Commerce not to enhance advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities in countries of particular concern including China for ten years. In addition, the administration announced the enhancement of Export Administration Regulations related to semiconductors in October 2022 to limit the ability of China to obtain and manufacture technologies and products used in advanced military systems to increase the accuracy and speed of military decision making. In 2023, the Biden administration continued to add companies that support the modernization of China's military to the Entity List,<sup>1</sup> which regulates exports from the U.S.<sup>2</sup> In August of the same year, the administration issued a presidential directive restricting investment in China in three areas of national security concern: semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum technology information, and artificial intelligence.

On the other hand, China criticizes these measures taken by the United States as malicious blockage of Chinese companies. Moreover, in response to the tightening of regulations by the United States and other foreign countries, China has been enforcing a series of countermeasures, such as laws and regulations, since 2020. In September 2020, China implemented its Unreliable Entity List in response to the U.S. Entity List. In December of the same year, China's Export Control Law entered into force to control the export of technology and the like related to China's national security and interests. As further pushing back against the United States measures, in January 2021, China passed new rules to protect its firms from "unjustified extra-territorial application of foreign legislation and other measures." In addition to this, in June 2022, China announced the entry into force of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and implemented sanctions against U.S. individuals and organizations, including the former U.S. Secretary

<sup>1</sup> "The Entity List is a list of companies designated by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) as having national security or foreign policy-related concerns under the Export Administration Regulations. Exports of goods, software, or technologies necessary for production or development to companies on the list require authorization from the BIS."

<sup>2</sup> For example, in February 2023, the U.S. government added Chinese aerospace-related companies and organizations to the Entity List because of their support for the Chinese military's aerospace programs, including balloons. In June 2023, the U.S. government added Chinese companies and organizations to the Entity List for their contribution to the modernization of the Chinese military.

of Commerce. China's Ministry of Commerce then criticized the U.S. Export Administration Regulations related to semiconductors as disruptive to the order of the international economy and trading and presented a case to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2022. In February 2023, China added two U.S. companies to its Entity List of untrustworthy trading partners for the first time, citing repeated sales of offensive weapons to Taiwan as having undermined China's security. In January 2024,

China announced that it would impose sanctions on five U.S. companies under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law.

Competition in the technology field between the United States and China is likely to intensify further in the future as both sides continue to reciprocate each other's efforts to set forth new regulations. For example, the United States made a move to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the effects of which can be seen to be spreading internationally.

## 2 Military Trends of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific Region

### 1 General Situation

The Biden administration, which places utmost importance on the Indo-Pacific region, announced in NSS that it was going to deepen its tightest partnerships with five allies, namely Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand based on the recognition that a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is achievable only with the collective capacity of alliances and partnerships. Furthermore, it was stated that the Quad (comprising Japan, Australia, India, and the United States) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are also important for dealing with regional challenges, because total power can be strengthened through cooperation between Indo-Pacific countries and European countries. The administration also stated that it places emphasis on Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands regions to enhance regional diplomacy, development, and economic involvement. Moreover, it discloses in the NDS the direction of the United States to reinforce and build out resilient security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region in order to sustain a free and open regional order and deter attempts to resolve disputes by force. With this view, it is stated that it is necessary to modernize the alliance with Japan and strengthen combined capabilities by aligning strategic planning and priorities in a more integrated manner.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 passed through Congress in December 2023 places importance on strategic competition with China and Russia. It includes initiatives aimed at strengthening the posture and capabilities of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, such as increasing the budget for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to enhance the posture of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region and the formulation

of a strategy for ground-based theater-range missile capabilities in the region.

The United States expressed its determination to optimize its force posture in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, in the joint statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. "2+2") held in January 2023. Furthermore, the United States repeatedly states that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is applied to the Senkaku Islands as well. The Biden administration also reconfirms in the NSS its unwavering commitment to defense of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and this policy is continuously reconfirmed in various occasions including Japan-U.S. summit meetings.

On the other hand, China resists this U.S. posture, saying these are acts of repressing the growth of China and protecting U.S. hegemony. It is seen that China is wary of the growth of initiatives such as the Quad into strong alliances, as well as with the growing involvement of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, the military power balance between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region is changing because China is rapidly strengthening its military power against a background of its economic growth and other factors. China is out of the framework of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty) and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START Treaty) and has been enhancing ground-launched missile power unilaterally. Although the United States has insisted that China should be included in arms control negotiations and expressed its intention to apply brakes to China's missile power build up, China consistently refuses,<sup>3</sup> asserting that the United States should take the initiative in conducting disarmament.

The changes in the military power balance between

<sup>3</sup> According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on December 11, 2019

the United States and China can affect peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the U.S.-China military trends in the region concerning the South China Sea and Taiwan will require further attention.

## 2 South China Sea

With regard to the issues over the South China Sea, the United States is concerned about such dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of navigation in sea lanes, restrictions on the activities of U.S. Forces, and the worsening security situation in the entire region. The United States has requested China comply with international norms and has repeatedly criticized China's unilateral and assertive actions. On the other hand, China expresses opposition saying the United States is the largest threat to peace and stability in the South China Sea, and confrontation between these two countries is deepening.

China has been advancing into the South China Sea taking advantage of the power vacuum there since the 1950s, and promoting the militarization of the Paracel Islands. It has also been conducting rapid reclamation of the Spratly Islands on a large scale since 2014. Even after the illegality of the Chinese activities such as land reclamation was determined at the Philippines-China arbitration in 2016, China has made it clear that it would not comply with the decision and has been promoting its plan to militarize the area.

 See Section 2-2-6 (5) (Trends of Activities in the South China Sea); Section 7 (Southeast Asia)

The United States has been criticizing China's action about issues concerning the South China Sea hitherto and conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations and other activities.

The Biden administration has continued to show its consistent and strict deterrence stance against China. For example, it stated that the United States will reject China's claims about maritime interests in the South China Sea and stand up together with Southeast Asian countries facing China's pressure. Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, stated again in July 2021, on the fifth anniversary of the ruling of the arbitral tribunal to *Philippines v. China*, that the United States demands China comply with the obligations of international law. In addition, in January 2022, the U.S. Department of State released a study examining China's maritime claims in the South China Sea in light of international

law. The study concluded that China's claims over most of the South China Sea are inconsistent with international law and gravely undermine the rule of law in the ocean. In February 2023, during a defense ministerial meeting between the United States and the Philippines, the two countries agreed to add four new cooperation bases within the Philippines, in addition to the existing five, under the "Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)" to facilitate the rotational deployment of U.S. forces. In this way, the administration is showing its stance to further enhance cooperation with countries surrounding the South China Sea.

Additionally, the United States has sought to enhance military efforts in the South China Sea. It has continuously conducted the Freedom of Navigation Operations, carried out joint exercises in July 2020 by deploying two Carrier Strike Groups for the first time since 2014, and even after President Biden took office, in February 2021, conducted similar exercises several times in order to confront China's excessive claims on maritime interests. The United States has also conducted joint training with partner countries including Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Responding to these American efforts, China has criticized the United States for hindering the peace and stability of the region. Additionally, there have been cases of Chinese naval vessels approaching and interfering with U.S. naval vessels sailing through the South China Sea and elsewhere, as well as cases of Chinese fighter jets allegedly approaching U.S. military aircraft. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has recorded more than 180 dangerous flights by Chinese military aircraft against U.S. aircraft in the East China Sea and South China Sea from 2021 to 2023 and has pointed out that the Chinese military has carried out approximately 100 dangerous actions against the militaries of U.S. allies and other nations.<sup>4</sup>

Going forward, while forming free and open order based on the rule of law is important in the South China Sea, the military tensions may rise. Japan, which promotes the vision of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) with the United States, will have to pay great attention to the situation.

## 3 Taiwan

China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China and that the Taiwan issue is its internal affair.

<sup>4</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," U.S. DoD (2023)

China maintains that the “One China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for dialogue between China and Taiwan. China is also strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan and has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force in respect of the Taiwan issue. “The Anti-Secession Law,” enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out China’s policy of not renouncing the use of force, providing that in the event that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. General Secretary Xi stated in the report to the 20th Party Congress held in October 2022, in respect of cross-strait issues, China’s position to “continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort” while he stated again “resolving the Taiwan issue and realizing China’s complete reunification is a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”

On the other hand, the United States stated in the NSS that it has an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, does not support Taiwan independence, and remains committed to the “One China” policy which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. Based on this, the United States also makes it clear that it intends to uphold its commitments under the TRA to support Taiwan’s self-defense, and to maintain the United States’ capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.

The Biden administration has positioned China as America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge as well as the only competitor with the intent and power to reshape the international order and has made clear its diplomatic stance to contain China through cooperation with allies and partner countries on issues concerning Taiwan and other matters. For example, since the start of Biden administration, the importance of “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” has been repeatedly mentioned at international meetings such as the Japan-U.S. summit meetings, the G7 Summit, and the U.S.-EU summit meetings. Furthermore, the Biden administration has been promoting efforts to enhance Taiwan’s international standing, including calling on UN member states to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in

the UN system.

The United States has decided to sell weapons to Taiwan based on the TRA. Since the inauguration of the Biden administration also, the United States has continued to sell weapons such as self-propelled howitzers, aircraft-launched missiles, and maintenance and repair packages for air defense missile systems. The Biden administration also continued to have U.S. warships and aircraft pass through the Taiwan Strait periodically. Moreover, then President Tsai Ing-wen acknowledged that the U.S. military was visiting Taiwan for training purposes in an interview with U.S. media in October 2021. In March 2023, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin testified at a congressional hearing that the U.S. National Guard was training Taiwan’s military.

Moreover, not only the U.S. government but also the U.S. Congress has indicated its intention to further enhance support for Taiwan. Congressional delegations of the United States including then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi, visited Taiwan repeatedly and met with then-President Tsai and others, and exchanged views on strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations and other matters during 2022. Moreover, the FY2023 National Defense and Authorization Act (NDAA) includes approvals for the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to enhance security cooperation with Taiwan, and military financing of up to US\$10 billion over five years from 2023 to 2027, among other items. The FY2024 NDAA includes provisions for providing comprehensive training and advice to Taiwan’s military and establishing an institutional capacity-building program.

In response to this proximity between the United States and Taiwan, China has further stepped up its military activities around Taiwan, including conducting military exercises around it when VIPs from the United States and Taiwan visited each other.

 **See** Section 2-2-6(4) (Trends of Activities around Taiwan); [Commentary] (Chinese Military Trends Concerning Taiwan)

While the Biden administration is clarifying its stance of supporting Taiwan in the military-related area, it is deemed unlikely that China, which position Taiwan issues as “the core of the core interests,” will show a compromising attitude towards the U.S. stance. It is viewed that the U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan may become more apparent. Stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important not only for Japan’s security but also for the stability of the international community. Therefore, it is necessary that we pay close attention to the situation with a sense of crisis more than ever before.



## 3

## Military Capabilities of Taiwan and Military Balance between China and Taiwan

## 1 Relations with China

Then Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who took office in 2016, has noted that she has never accepted the “1992 Consensus” that China claims as embodying the “One-China” principle.<sup>5</sup> In response, China has criticized the DPP for unilaterally destroying the political foundation “the peaceful development of cross-strait relations” and has emphasized that upholding the “1992 Consensus” is the foundation for peace and stability in cross-strait relations.

In a January 2019 speech at an event commemorating the 40th anniversary of China’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” regarding the application of the “one country two systems” model to Taiwan, General Secretary Xi stated that “the specific form of the ‘one country, two systems’ model in Taiwan will give full consideration to the situation in Taiwan.” In her immediate response to the speech, then President Tsai issued a statement firmly rejecting the “one country, two systems” model and called for negotiations between “government-authorized agencies.” Moreover, in October 2021, at the ceremony commemorating the 110th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution, President Xi sought to check the Tsai administration again, stating, “Those who... seek to split the country will come to no good end; they will be disdained by the people and condemned by history.” On the other hand, in her speech for the Double Tenth National Day Celebration that month, then President Tsai said, “We call for maintaining the status quo,” stating that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other,” and emphasized the stance that cross-strait conflicts should be resolved through dialogue between the two sides on equal footing.

In the Taiwan presidential election held in January 2024, Lai Ching-te, the ruling DPP candidate who declared that he would continue Tsai Ing-wen’s line, was elected and took office as president in May of the same year. Meanwhile, in the Legislative Yuan election held on the same day as the presidential election, both the DPP, which had held an outright majority before the election,

and the Nationalist Party (KMT) fell short of a majority, with the opposition KMT becoming the largest party with 52 seats out of a total of 113 seats, the ruling DPP becoming the second largest party with 51 seats, and a new party, the Taiwan People’s Party, holding the casting vote with 8 seats. In response to these election results, China warned Lai and his incoming administration, saying, “The basic fact that Taiwan is a part of China cannot be changed,” and “The election results showed that the DPP in no way represents mainstream public opinion.”

In regard to relations between the international community and Taiwan, since around the inauguration of then President Tsai for her first term, Taiwanese delegates were refused attendance at or had their invitations deferred from meetings held by international organizations, including ones in which they had participated up to that point.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Nauru severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in January 2024 and established diplomatic relations with China, reducing the number of countries with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations from 22 when the Tsai administration first took office in May 2016 to 12. The Taiwanese authorities have strongly protested against these moves, describing them as “China’s attempt to compress Taiwan’s international space.”

## 2 Taiwan’s Military Power and Defense Strategy

With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a total of approximately 104,000 personnel. In regard to the organization of the army, plans are underway to abolish the traditional Army Corps and the like and establish “theaters of operation” as permanent organizations of joint operation. The Taiwanese Minister of National Defense explained the reason for this as being advantageous for the execution of integrated operations during conflict or peacetime. In addition, it is assessed that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. In January 2022, the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency was established to integrate the reserve forces

<sup>5</sup> The “1992 Consensus” refers to what represents a common understanding reached between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities in 1992 on the “One-China” principle. The CCP and Taiwan’s Kuomintang Nationalist Party (Taiwan’s ruling party at the time), viewed as parties to the consensus, have reportedly differed over the interpretation of the consensus. In addition, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has clarified that it has not accepted the “1992 Consensus.”


<sup>6</sup> According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan on September 24, 2019

and public and private organizations involved in wartime mobilization to optimize the efficiency of the mobilization system in the event of an emergency. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses the indigenously built “Tuo Chiang” stealth corvette, among other vessels. Taiwan is currently promoting a national shipbuilding program to independently build its own military vessels, which includes plans to build eleven mass-produced Tuo Chiang-class corvettes by 2026 and ultimately about eight submarines, including the first submarine, which was launched in September 2023. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 fighters (F-16V upgraded from A/B), Mirage 2000 fighters, Ching-kuo fighters, and other assets. In November 2021, Taiwan’s first unit composed of F-16V fighters upgraded from F-16A/B fighters was established at Chiayi Air Base, and the deployment of fighters capable of carrying longer-range missiles is being strengthened, including the new F-16V fighters scheduled to be introduced from the United States.

Taiwan had conscription from 1951, but later transitioned to a volunteer system, with conscription ending by the end of 2018. Since then, while the four-month mandatory military training for males aged 18 to 36 had been maintained, the Tsai administration revived one-year obligatory military service for males of conscription age starting in January 2024. The Army formed seven new infantry brigades, primarily consisting of compulsorily conscripted soldiers, for a total of 12 brigades by 2023, and began accepting soldiers with one-year mandatory conscription from January 2024. The new conscription system has strengthened the training content beyond what was required under the previous military training obligations, and specifically, it requires enhanced training in operating new equipment and participation in practical training.

On the other hand, since China has consistently expressed its intention of not renouncing the use of force to Taiwan, the country may make a decision on military options such as air and maritime blockade, limited use of force, air and missile operations, and invasion of Taiwan.

**Fig. I-3-3-1** Placement of Taiwan Military



If that happens, it is deemed that China will deter or delay any potential interventions by the United States. It was reported in December 2021 that an unpublished report submitted from the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan to the Legislative Yuan described a postulated Chinese process for invading Taiwan as follows: China will assemble its military forces on the Chinese coast under the guise of exercises and use “cognitive warfare” to cause panic among the Taiwanese people. Then, naval vessels will be gathered in the Western Pacific to prevent foreign military intervention. Next, under the strategy of transformation from exercises to war, the Rocket and Air Forces will launch ballistic and cruise missiles to attack Taiwan’s key military facilities, while the Strategic Support Forces carry out cyber-attacks on Taiwan’s key military systems. Finally, after gaining sea and air superiority, landing operations by amphibious assault ships, transport helicopters, and more will be carried out, thus achieving total control of Taiwan before foreign forces intervene.

In response to such moves of China, Taiwan under then President Tsai Ing-wen has put forth defense strategy called as “Resolute Defense and Multi-domain Deterrence” preventing the invasion from China at the farthest points possible within its territory with a multi-layered defense posture, which combines major equipment such as fighters and vessels with asymmetric force. According to the 2019 Taiwan Defense Report, this strategy proposes a defense concept comprising “force protection” to contain the initial destruction caused by the enemy and ensure integrity of military power through mobility, concealment, dispersion, deception, camouflage, and other tactics, “decisive battle in littoral zone” to gain a partial superiority by air assets and shore-based firepower, and deploying integrated forces in order to intercept and destroy the enemy’s landing forces, and “destruction of enemy at landing beach” to destruct the enemy at breathing, landing beach and coastal areas by integrating forces, firepower and prepositioned barriers of three services during the enemy’s landing and maneuvering operations on shore, and give them no places to set foot on.<sup>7</sup> This is believed to be aimed at exhausting the operational capabilities of the Chinese military and preventing or reducing the landing of Chinese troops in the face of the overwhelming gap in military strength

between China and Taiwan, as well as delaying an invasion by the Chinese military and buying time until intervention by the U.S. military. It is believed that Taiwan plans to constrain any Chinese military invasion from a long distance by expanding the development and production of domestically produced asymmetric capabilities and long-range weapons, as well as introducing high-performance, long-range weapons from the United States, in order to successfully execute “Resolute Defense and Multi-domain Deterrence.” Taiwan is currently strengthening its domestic development of sea and air capabilities, long-range missiles, and the like. In November 2021, a special budget bill for the expansion of sea and air capabilities was passed, and it was decided to invest 240 billion Taiwan dollars (approximately 950 billion yen) over five years for the acquisition of self-developed equipment. In addition to these, Taiwan has decided to acquire from the United States the “M142” (HIMARS) high mobility artillery rocket system, the “RGM-84L-4” (Harpoon) surface-to-ship missile system, and the “AGM-84H” (SLAM-ER) long-range air-to-surface missile.

In September 2023, the 2023 National Defense Report was released for the fourth time under the Tsai administration, announcing national defense policy initiatives and other issues. The report also included a new section on China’s normalization of harassment and threats as a security issue, pointing out that since 2022, China’s military actions against Taiwan have become more frequent and diverse, including the crossing of the “median line” across the Taiwan Strait by Chinese military assets, the establishment of a no-sail/no-fly zone around Taiwan, and practical military exercises, and it expressed Taiwan’s strong vigilance against normalized activities of the PLA, claiming that China is stepping up its threats against Taiwan. In response to these Chinese threats, the report maintains the defense strategy of “Resolute Defense and Multi-domain Deterrence” while adding a new section on “Defense in Depth” in its explanation of the strategy, which specifically includes a preemptive strike against a gathering invasion force, expansion of the defense space in coordination with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, and enhancement of the combat capability of the duty and reserve forces as well as the ability to mobilize residents, demonstrating a posture of working to create a multi-layered defense line

<sup>7</sup> Note that the 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Report present tactical principles of “resist the enemy on the opposite shore, attack it at sea, destroy it in the littoral area, and annihilate it on the beachhead.” It will impose multiple interdiction and joint fire strikes to degrade the enemy’s capabilities, disrupt its offensive and prevent it from landing, so as to ultimately defeat its aggression.

and strengthen the resilience of society as a whole.


In addition to this, Taiwan annually conducts the “Han Kuang” large-scale military exercise that simulates an invasion by Chinese forces. It is believed that the Taiwan military’s defense strategy has been verified through this series of drills. In recent Han Kuang exercises, training exercises, such as anti-landing and interception drills, as well as training focused on gray zone strategies, such as cyber warfare and joint training between the Navy and the Coast Guard, have been conducted. It was reported that the content of the 2023 “Han Kuang 39” exercises was set based on the invasion of Ukraine, the increased activity of Chinese naval vessels on the eastern side of Taiwan, etc. Although some exercises were cancelled due to a typhoon, exercises for anti-landings, critical infrastructure protection, wartime disaster prevention through military-civilian cooperation, and the eastern deployment of surface-to-ship missiles were conducted.

### 3 Military Balance between China and Taiwan

While China has continued to increase its defense budget by a significant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget, at approximately 434.5 billion Taiwan dollars for FY2024, has remained almost unchanged for nearly 20 years. China’s announced military budget in the same year totals approximately 1,665.54 billion yuan, roughly 17 times the amount of Taiwan’s in terms of U.S. dollars based on exchange rates announced by the Taiwanese Central Bank. It is pointed out that China’s actual defense expenditure has been larger than the published defense budget, indicating that the China-Taiwan defense expenditure gap could be greater.

Fig. I-3-3-2

Changes in the Taiwan’s Defense Authority Budget



(Note) the website of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan.

According to the 2023 Report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” released by the U.S. Department of Defense in October 2023, the PLA’s capabilities to invade Taiwan have been assessed as follows:

- The PLA Army organized six combined arms brigades capable of carrying out amphibious operations, comprising four brigades in the Eastern Theater the operational range of which includes Taiwan, and two brigades in the Southern Theater.
- In order to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain and prevent intervention by third countries, the PLA Navy is deploying new attack submarines and surface combatants with an anti-aircraft capability. While it has not invested in landing ships and craft considered to be enough in number for large-scale assault on Taiwan, it may intend to make up for the shortage with civilian transport ships and other vessels.
- The PLA Air Force has acquired advanced aircraft to conduct air and ground-attack operations. It also has a high Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability to support military operations in the event of a Taiwan invasion. Furthermore, it is improving its ability to operate further from China through enhanced refueling capabilities.
- The PLA Rocket Force intends to degrade Taiwan’s defense and break the will to fight through missile attacks against high-value targets including Taiwan’s military facilities.

In addition to this, it is pointed out in the report that the Strategic Support Force would conduct cyber and psychological warfare in the event of a Taiwan invasion, and the Joint Logistic Support Force would be responsible for integrated logistical support missions.

The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows:

- (1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an overwhelming number of troops, its capability of landing and invading the main island of Taiwan is limited at present. In recent years, however, China has been steadily improving its landing invasion capabilities through building and commissioning large landing ships, and it is also improving transportation capabilities by mobilizing civil transport ships and the like. Confronting this, in recent years, Taiwan also has been taking actions to improve anti-landing capabilities such as by conducting enhanced training using asymmetric weapons including Javelin anti-tank

missiles, and expanded combat drills with reservists and would-be draftees from conscription.

- (2) In regard to China's naval and air forces, the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force are being rapidly reinforced both in terms of quality and quantity. This includes the launching of the second domestic-built aircraft carrier which reportedly could be equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system, and operational deployment of J-20 fifth-generation fighters. While Taiwan strives to enhance its naval and air forces by passing special budgets for them, the capability gap is expanding in an advantageous direction for China.
- (3) Regarding missile strike capabilities, China has many missiles including short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and multiple launch rockets and other assets with enough range to strike Taiwan. In response, Taiwan has strengthened its missile defense capabilities by introducing PAC-3 missiles from the United States and increasing the number of Taiwan's own Tien Kung III missile sites. However, limitations to this response have been pointed out when it comes to dealing with a saturation attack. In addition, Taiwan is enhancing stand-off attack capabilities, including

by developing and producing long-range cruising missiles such as the "Hsiung Sheng" surface-to-surface missile, which is said to have a range of 1,200 km, and it is considered to be aiming to introduce the AGM-158 long-range air-to-surface missile from the United States.

Comparison of military capabilities should be made based not only on the troop strength and the performance and quantity of equipment but also on various other factors such as the purpose and aspects of assumed military operations, operational arrangements, the skill level of personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is rapidly tilting to China's favor.

China has intensified its coercive military activities around Taiwan, and concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, which is indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community, are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, but also in the entire international community.

Recognizing that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are a challenge not only for the Indo-Pacific

Fig. I-3-3-3 Comparison of China and Taiwan Military Forces

		China	Taiwan
Total military forces		Approx. 2.04 million personnel	Approx. 0.17 million personnel
Ground forces	Ground troops	Approx. 0.97 million personnel	Approx. 94,000 personnel
	Tanks, etc.	Type-99/A, Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 5,950 vehicles	M-60A3, CM-11 and others  Approx. 750 vehicles
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 690 vessels Approx. 2,360,000 tons	Approx. 150 vessels Approx. 210,000 tons
	Aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates	Approx. 100 vessels	Approx. 30 vessels
	Submarines	Approx. 70 vessels	4 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 40,000 personnel	Approx. 10,000 personnel
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 3,200 aircraft	Approx. 470 aircraft
	Modern fighter aircraft	J-10 × 588 Su-27/J-11 × 327 Su-30 × 97 Su-35 × 24 J-15 × 60 J-16 × 292 J-20 × 200 (Fourth and fifth generation fighters (total): 1,588)	Mirage2000 × 54 F-16 (modified V) × 140 Ching-kuo × 127 (Fourth generation fighter aircraft (total): 321)
Reference	Population	Approx. 1.402 billion	Approx. 23.6 million
	Term of service	2 years	1 year


(Note) Data from "The Military Balance 2024," etc.

region but also a common challenge for the entire world, Japan, in cooperation with its ally, the United States, like-minded countries, and the international community, will pay close attention to the relevant situation with a

greater sense of crisis.

**See** Fig. I-3-3-1 (Placement of Taiwan Military); Fig. I-3-3-2; (Changes in the Taiwan's Defense Authority Budget); Fig. I-3-3-3; (Comparison of China and Taiwan Military Forces); and Fig. I-3-3-4 (Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan)

**Fig. I-3-3-4** Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan



(Note) Data from "The Military Balance" (of respective years).


## Section 4 Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula has been split for more than half a century, with people of the same ethnicity divided between south and north parts. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under such security environment is an extremely important challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region of East Asia.

 See Fig. I-3-4-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula)

**Fig. I-3-4-1** Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula



		North Korea	ROK	U.S. Forces stationed in Korea
Total military forces		Approx. 1.28 million personnel	Approx. 500,000 personnel	Approx. 30,000 personnel
Army	Ground troops	Approx. 1.1 million personnel	Approx. 370,000 personnel	Approx. 20,000 personnel
	Tanks	T-62, T-54, T-55, etc. Approx. 3,500	M-48, K-1, T-80, etc. Approx. 2,120	M-1A2SEPv2
Navy	Warships	Approx. 760 vessels 100,000 tons	Approx. 230 vessels 290,000 tons	Supporting corps only
	Destroyers		12	
	Frigates	6	13	
	Submarines	21	20	
	Marines		Approx. 29,000 personnel	
Air Force	Combat aircraft	Approx. 550	Approx. 660	Approx. 80
	Third, fourth and fifth generation fighters	MiG-23 × 56 MiG-29 × 18	F-4 × 29 F-16 × 160 F-15 × 59 F-35 × 39	F-16 × 60
Reference	Population	26.19 million	51.97 million	
	Term of service	Men: 10 years Women: 7 years	Army: 18 months Navy: 20 months Air Force: 21 months	

(Note) Data from "The Military Balance 2024," etc.

# 1 North Korea

## 1 General Situation

Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea (hereinafter referred to as “Chairman Kim”)<sup>1</sup> made it clear that he adhered to the so-called “Byungjin line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development as well as “Songun politics”<sup>2</sup> in May 2016. In fact, North Korea pushed ahead and conducted three nuclear tests and launched numerous ballistic missiles from 2016 to 2017 and stated that it had completed development of the state nuclear force. This situation intensified sanctions based on resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and other independent sanctions by several countries including Japan and the United States.

On the other hand, in early 2018, Chairman Kim declared that the “Byungjin line” had been successfully carried out and announced the “new strategic line” in which it would “fully concentrate efforts on the construction of a socialist economy.” Chairman Kim decided to discontinue “nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic rocket test-fire” and announced the nuclear test ground had been blown up, while momentum towards dialogue between the United States or the ROK and North Korea grew. He also expressed during the summit meeting with the U.S. in June 2018 the intention to work towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

However, the February 2019 U.S.-North Korea summit meeting ended without the two sides reaching an agreement. In December of the same year, Chairman Kim announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolled back its hostile policy towards North Korea. Furthermore, Chairman Kim showed his hostile stance towards the United States in January 2021 and stated to “further strengthen the nuclear war deterrent,” showing the intention to continue developing nuclear and missile capabilities.

After that, North Korea criticizes the U.S. attitude towards it and continuously states its intention to strengthen military power including nuclear weapons as a “self-defense” right. In recent years, North Korea

repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and other missiles with an unprecedented frequency. North Korea resumed launching intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM)-class ballistic missiles from February 2022. In September 2023, North Korea added a provision to its constitution stating that it would “developing nuclear weapons to a higher level.”

North Korea has continued to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and enhancement of their operational capabilities by conducting six nuclear tests and repeatedly launching ballistic missiles as a nuclear delivery system so far. North Korea, concerning its ballistic missiles with their range covering the Japanese Archipelago, is considered to possess the technological capability to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead and, thereby, to attack Japan. Still, it will continue to make greater efforts to maintain and enhance military capabilities and combat readiness, including its nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea retains large-scale special operations forces and has been strengthening its cyber force.

While the defense budget of North Korea was said to make up 15.9% of its annual budget according to North Korea’s announcement regarding the Supreme People’s Assembly in January 2024, this seems to be only a part of the actual defense budget. While facing serious economic difficulties without any improvement in its human rights situation to date, North Korea continues to heavily allocate its resources to military affairs. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly used provocative rhetoric and behavior against relevant countries, including Japan.

North Korea’s military activities described above are posing an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. North Korea’s military activities also pose a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to non-proliferation of weapons including WMDs.

Needless to say, North Korea’s development and

<sup>1</sup> As of May 2016, Kim Jong-un held the position of the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was renamed the State Affairs Commission, and Kim Jong-un assumed the position of Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. Reflecting this change, “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” is used for the title of Kim Jong-un throughout this white paper.

<sup>2</sup> In a written decision of the 7th Congress of the KWP, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016), it has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force.



possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. At the same time, sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of its ballistic missiles and the like, military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and proliferation of WMDs and missiles by North Korea. As for North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals, utmost efforts continue to be made to realize the return of all abductees to Japan as quickly as possible by close cooperation with related countries, including the United States.

## 2 Military Posture

### 1 General Situation

North Korea has continued to enhance its military forces consistently in the situation of south-north division,<sup>3</sup> however, reduction in military assistance from the former Soviet bloc due to the end of the Cold War, its sluggish economy and modernization of ROK Forces have resulted in much of its equipment being outdated, and there is significant qualitative disparity between North Korea's conventional forces and those of the ROK's military and U.S. Forces Korea. Nevertheless, while North Korea is concentrating on strengthening its nuclear and missile capabilities, it also seems to be focusing on maintaining a certain military foundation for its conventional forces by continuously conducting research, development, and training.

North Korea's military forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength reaching roughly 1.28 million personnel. It still maintains a large-scale military force, including artillery units deployed near the DMZ. North Korea also retains special operations forces and the like on a large scale for information gathering and sabotage. In addition, many military underground facilities seem to exist all over the land, which is a peculiarity of North Korea.

Furthermore, North Korea is believed to be intensively building up its WMD and ballistic missiles. In recent years, North Korea has repeatedly launched short-range

ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and other missiles capable of flying at low altitudes with irregular trajectories in a simultaneous process of promoting the development of ICBM-class ballistic missiles covering a range of the whole U.S. territory, rapidly improving related technologies and operational capabilities and diversifying their launch platforms to include rail-launched and submarine-launched types. At the same time, North Korea has been striving to expand more practical SRBM capabilities. Furthermore, since Chairman Kim mentioned the development of "ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including intermediate-range cruise missiles" in January 2021, North Korea announced that it had succeeded in conducting test launches of long-range cruise missiles and launched ballistic missiles in what it called training for "tactical nuclear weapons operation units."

The background for North Korea's series of development and launches appears to be that in addition to acquiring nuclear deterrent capabilities through the possession of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles for the maintenance and survival of the regime, North Korea aims to acquire the means to be able to respond in an armed conflict that could occur between itself and the United States as well as ROK forces in which conventional forces or tactical nuclear weapons are used.<sup>4</sup> North Korea repeatedly stated it would enhance its military power including nuclear weapons and missiles according to the "five-year plan for the development of the defense science and the weapon system" (hereinafter "five-year plan") said to have been presented at the 8th Congress of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) in January 2021,<sup>5</sup> and it is likely that it is focusing efforts on research and development (R&D) and enhancement of operation capabilities for various weapons under this five-year plan.

### (2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about 1.10 million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them seem to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army

<sup>3</sup> North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines, consisting of extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country, adopted at the 5th plenary meeting of the 4th KWP Central Committee in 1962.

<sup>4</sup> For example, at the 8th Congress of the KWP in January 2021, Chairman Kim stated that North Korea would "develop tactical nuclear weapons which can be used for various missions according to the purpose of operational duty and target of strike in a modern war" and "thoroughly contain, control and handle various military threats on the Korean peninsula which inevitably accompany the nuclear threat on our own initiative." He also stated in September 2022 that North Korea "will be enhancing tactical nuclear operation measures relentlessly, realize higher level of diversity of applying means, and strengthen nuclear combat posture from multiple directions."

<sup>5</sup> There was no direct reference to the name "five-year plan for defense scientific development and weapons system development" in North Korea's announcement at the same Congress of the KWP in January 2021. However, when there was an announcement of the launch of a long-range cruise missile on September 13 of the same year, the North Korean media mentioned it publicly for the first time by stating that this missile development project was significant for "achieving the key objectives of the five-year plan for the development of defense science and weapon system presented at the 8th Congress of the KWP."

is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled artillery guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including Seoul. It has also been pointed out that, in recent years, North Korea has been developing and operating various multiple rocket launchers with extended ranges.

The Navy retains about 790 ships and boats with a total displacement of approximately 100,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model Romeo-class submarines, about 30 midget submarines and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and other actions of the special operations forces. In September 2023, the Navy launched a new submarine that appears to be a modified Romeo-class submarine and dubbed it a “tactical nuclear attack submarine.”

The Air Force has approximately 550 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces.

Moreover, North Korea retains a large-scale special operations force<sup>6</sup> as so-called asymmetric capabilities. Also, it is likely in recent years that it has been strengthening its cyber forces as asymmetric forces as well in order to steal military secret intelligence and funds for developing nuclear weapons and missiles and develop capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of other countries.

### 3 WMD and Missiles

The launches of ballistic missiles and other missiles by North Korea have continued; moreover, from early

2022, in particular, it has forced through launches with an unprecedented frequency. North Korea resumed launches of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)-class and longer-range ballistic missiles which it had not launched since 2018. At the same time, North Korea likely intends to enhance further surprise attack capabilities, making identification of signs of launch, detection, and interception difficult by launching ballistic missiles that can fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories as well as by launching these missiles from a variety of platforms such as Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs)<sup>7</sup>, submarines, and trains.

Since 2023, North Korea has conducted launches of solid-fuel propelled ICBM-class and IRBM-class ballistic missiles as well as launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch. North Korea is focusing on qualitatively improving its nuclear and missile capabilities, such as diversifying its equipment systems, and acquiring intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) means that complement its nuclear and missile operational capabilities.

Furthermore, given its technological maturity obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed to possess the technological capabilities to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead, at least, on such ballistic missiles as Nodong and Scud ER (Extended Range), with their range covering the Japanese Archipelago and, thereby, to strike Japan. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly expressed its intention to further strengthen its nuclear capability.

#### (1) Nuclear Weapons

##### a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Considering that North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests so far, it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program.

North Korea possesses nuclear reactors,<sup>8</sup> including a 5MWe graphite-moderated reactor and an experimental light water reactor, as well as a reprocessing plant and uranium enrichment facilities in Yongbyon. The 5MWe

6 James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK notes about North Korea’s Special operations force, “The forces are estimated at approximately 200,000 strong.”

7 The signs of a launch from a fixed launcher are easy for the adversary to detect and are vulnerable to attack by the adversary. TEL was developed mainly by the former Soviet Union, among others, in order to make the detection of launch signs more difficult and increase survivability. According to the U.S. DIA’s “North Korea Military Power” of October 2021, North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs for Scud B and Scud C, 100 TELs for Nodongs, and 50 TELs for IRBMs (Musudans). As for a TEL-mounted missile launch, it is deemed difficult to detect individual specific signs in advance concerning the detailed location and timing of the launch. This is because it is operated by being mounted and transported on a TEL, and furthermore, military-related underground facilities are thought to exist all over North Korea.

8 Nuclear reactors are classified into graphite-moderated reactors, heavy water reactors, and light water reactors, depending on the moderator used. Graphite-moderated reactors and heavy water reactors use natural uranium as their fuel, while light water reactors use as their fuel low-enriched uranium with the uranium 235 concentration increased to 3–5%.

graphite-moderated reactor was thought to have been out of operation since 2018, but some have pointed out that it resumed operation in July 2021.<sup>9</sup> If it had actually resumed operation, it has been noted that it would be able to produce about 6 kg of plutonium per year (enough to produce one to 1.5 nuclear warheads). It has also been pointed out that the experimental light water reactor has been undergoing test operations since October 2023.<sup>10</sup>

With regard to plutonium, a fissile material<sup>11</sup> that can be used for nuclear weapons, North Korea has suggested several times that it has produced and extracted plutonium.<sup>12</sup> Because the restarting or startup of the reactors could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, those activities are causes of great concern.

As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. In November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in recent years; in this regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. Furthermore, it is also pointed out that there are some uranium enrichment facilities that have not been disclosed by North Korea. The series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.<sup>13</sup>

In general, facilities used for uranium enrichment are more secretive in appearance than reactors used for plutonium production, and it is difficult to ascertain their activities from the outside. On the other hand, plutonium has a smaller critical mass than uranium, and it is pointed out that it is easier to make nuclear weapons smaller and

lighter. In light of both these advantages, North Korea may continue to promote the development of both plutonium and uranium types of nuclear weapons.

North Korea conducted nuclear tests on October 9, 2006, May 25, 2009, February 12, 2013, January 6, 2016, September 9, 2016, and September 3, 2017. It is highly likely that North Korea has made strides in its nuclear weapons program, while miniaturizing nuclear weapons to be loaded on ballistic missiles, collecting the necessary data through these nuclear tests. For example, in September, 2017, it was announced that Chairman Kim had visited North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Institute and had seen a hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded into an ICBM, in addition to which, following North Korea's sixth nuclear test that was forced through on the same day, North Korea announced that it "successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for ICBM."<sup>14</sup>

In regard to miniaturization of nuclear weapons small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile, considering the fact that the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s as well as the North Korean technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached through its previous six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea, concerning its ballistic missiles with their range covering the Japanese Archipelago, has already miniaturized its nuclear warheads to mount. There have also been reports that North Korea possesses approximately 30 nuclear warheads—overall enough fissile material to produce 50 to 70 nuclear warheads.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, it is likely that North Korea has been preparing for other nuclear tests, as has been suggested that North Korea has been working on restoring its northern nuclear test site since March 2022, which it officially announced it had blown up in 2018.

<sup>9</sup> According to the IAEA's "Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" published in August 2021 and others. Indicated by a Member State in the interim report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee released in October 2022.

<sup>10</sup> "IAEA Director General Statement on Recent Developments in the DPRK's Nuclear Programme," released in December 2023

<sup>11</sup> Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%).

<sup>12</sup> North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium from a 5MWe graphite-moderated reactor, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods. The 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK estimates that North Korea possesses around 70 kg of plutonium.

<sup>13</sup> The 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK assesses that North Korea possesses a substantial amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It has been noted that a uranium enrichment facility different from the one in Yongbyon exists in Kangson.

<sup>14</sup> The yield of the sixth nuclear weapons test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a maximum yield of approximately 160 kt. Given the size of the estimated yield, the possibility cannot be discounted that the test was of a hydrogen bomb. North Korea also insisted that its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb test. However, given that the yield of that test is estimated at 6 to 7 kts, it is difficult to conceive that this was a hydrogen bomb test as generally defined.

<sup>15</sup> According to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook 2023.

## b. Background of the Nuclear Program and Future Outlook

North Korea's ultimate goal appears to be maintaining its existing regime. It has been developing nuclear weapons to accomplish this goal through constructing its own nuclear deterrence to counter U.S. threats, including threats with nuclear weapons. These perceptions are obvious as can be seen in Chairman Kim's speech<sup>16</sup> that North Korea can never abandon its nuclear weapons because the objective of the United States is to collapse "our government." It is likely that North Korea will continue to focus on advancing development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles capable of attacking the whole U.S. territory in order to acquire deterrence against the United States.

On the other hand, amid its confrontation with the Yoon Suk Yeol administration of the ROK, which pursues a strict policy toward North Korea, North Korea has described the ROK as its "principal enemy" and has repeatedly stated that it will not exclude the ROK from being a potential targets of its nuclear attack. North Korea has shown its stance to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons for deterrence against the United States as well as with a view to dealing with a possible armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

In September 2022, North Korea passed "the law on the state policy on the nuclear forces" that stipulates mission and command and control of its nuclear forces as well as conditions of using its nuclear weapons. The law notes the main mission of nuclear forces are "to deter a war." If deterrence fails, its nuclear forces "shall carry out an operational mission for repulsing hostile forces' aggression and attacks and achieving decisive victory of the war." Chairman Kim justified his nuclear development, saying that by promulgating this law, "our status as a nuclear power irreversible." Furthermore, it is stipulated in the law that nuclear weapons can be used when an attack deemed imminent, regardless if it is a nuclear or conventional, on "leadership" or "important strategic objects" and, in particular, that a "nuclear strike" will be conducted automatically and immediately in the case that "command and control system over the

state nuclear forces" are exposed to any danger. From these factors, it is possible that North Korea assumes a possible use of nuclear weapons in an actual combat.

In fact, North Korea has repeatedly launched missiles, allegedly, for practical training; for example, it launched missiles in "tactical nuclear operation units" training several times from late September to October 2022 and exploded test warheads simulating nuclear warheads above the targets in what was called "comprehensive tactical training for simulated nuclear counterstrike" among others in March 2023. North Korea also announced in March 2023 that Chairman Kim received explanation about tactical nuclear weapons from the department in charge and "instructed about weaponizing of nuclear weapons," giving direction to expand the production of weapon-grade nuclear materials and nuclear weapons.



Image publicly released by North Korea when it announced the Chairman Kim's on-site guidance for a nuclear weaponization project (March 2023) [AFP-Jiji]

Furthermore, it is possible that North Korea will conduct additional nuclear tests in the near future to arm ICBM-class ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and operationalize tactical nuclear weapons, pursuing further miniaturization of nuclear weapons.<sup>17</sup>

### (2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea's biological and chemical weapons development and


<sup>16</sup> Chairman Kim stated in his speech at the Supreme People's Assembly held in September 2022 that "while the United States aims to have us remove our nuclear weapon, its final goal is even forcing us to abandon our executive ability for the right to self-defense or to weaken it, and to disrupt my regime anytime" and "we can never abandon nuclear weapons, ... no matter what difficulty we may face." Furthermore, at the Supreme People's Assembly held in September 2023, Chairman Kim stated in his speech that Article 58 of Chapter 4 of the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea clearly states that "the country will advance the development of nuclear weapons to guarantee the country's right to survival and development, deter war, and safeguard peace and stability in the region and the world," and that "the Republic's nuclear forces construction policy has been made permanent as the basic law of the Republic so that no one can interfere with it no matter what."

<sup>17</sup> Chairman Kim mentioned "progressing R&D project to complete multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology" and "further development of downsizing and weight saving of nuclear weapons and tactical weaponization" at the 8th Congress of the KWP in January 2021.

arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to chemical weapons, North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for

the production of biological weapons.<sup>18</sup> Possession of sarin, VX, mustard and other chemical weapons and of anthrax, smallpox, pest, and other biological agents that could be used as biological weapons have been pointed out.

Fig. I-3-4-2 Ballistic Missiles and others Developed/Possessed by North Korea




(Notes) 2 Ranges of SRBM (A) / (B) / (C) and new type SLBMs are the largest ones achieved. SRBM (D) may have a range of 750 km.

3 At the time of launch on January 5, 2022, the ballistic missile referred to as a "Hypersonic Missile" flew about 500 km if it were launched with a normal ballistic trajectory. Another time of launch on January 11 of the same year, it was believed that the flight distance may have been less than 700 km if it were launched with a normal ballistic trajectory. It is also believed that the flight distance may have been longer than this, but analysis is currently being conducted.

4 Depends on weight of the warhead, etc.

18 The 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK pointed out that North Korea began the production of chemical weapons in 1980s and has stored around 2,500-5,000 tons of them. Furthermore, it is estimated that North Korea has capabilities to cultivate and produce various kind of biological weapons such as anthrax, smallpox, and the plague on its own. North Korea ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987 but has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Fig. I-3-4-3 Range of North Korea's Ballistic Missiles



(Notes) 1 Depends on weight of the warhead, etc.

2 For simplicity, the distance from Pyongyang is displayed in concentric circles as an image.

3 Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.

The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on warheads.

### (3) Missile Forces

The missiles deemed to be possessed and developed by North Korea are the following.

**See** Fig. I-3-4-2 (Ballistic Missiles and others Developed/Possessed by North Korea); Fig. I-3-4-3 (Range of North Korea's Ballistic Missiles); Fig. I-3-4-4 (Major Trends in North Korea's Ballistic Missile and Other Launches); Fig. I-3-4-5 (Cases of North Korean Ballistic Missiles Overflying Japan)

#### a. Types of Ballistic Missiles and others Possessed or Developed by North Korea<sup>19</sup>

##### (a) New SRBMs first launched since 2019

North Korea has launched various kinds of short-range ballistic missiles different from traditional liquid fuel propelled type ones such as Scud missiles since 2019. From published images, it can be ascertained that these SRBMs were launched from a wheeled-drive or continuous-tracked TEL or railway cars with the

characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propelled engines. Many of these SRBMs are being launched towards the east coast of North Korea. It is assumed that North Korea aims to advance operational capabilities, as some images that show impact on a specific target have been released.

(i) Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) A (referred to as "new type of tactical guided weapon" by North Korea)


SRBM A has a maximum flight range of approximately 800 km, the longest ones achieved. It has a similarity to the Russian short-range ballistic missile "Iskander" and is deemed able to fly at a lower altitude with an irregular trajectory than conventional ballistic missiles. Some have pointed out that SRBM A can be mounted with a nuclear warhead.<sup>20</sup>

North Korea also launched two SRBMs on both September 15, 2021 and January 14, 2022. Based on images released by North Korea, these missiles were launched from railway cars that appear to have been

<sup>19</sup> According to "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia" (accessed in March 2023) North Korea possesses 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles in total, 45% of which are presumed to be Scud-class, 45% Nodong-class, and the remaining 10% other intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles.

<sup>20</sup> According to the Congressional Research Service's "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs" (January 2023) and others.

Fig. I-3-4-4 Major Trends in North Korea's Ballistic Missile and Other Launches



[Enhancement of missile-related technologies]

1. Enhancement of launch secrecy and instantaneity
2. Enhancement of capabilities to breach Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
3. Development of long-range missiles

[Enhancement of missile operation capabilities]

North Korea conducted simultaneous launches of multiple missiles, launches at very short intervals, and launches from different locations to a specific target, etc.

Fig. I-3-4-5 Cases of North Korean Ballistic Missiles Overflying Japan

· Launches of ballistic missiles allegedly as launches of satellites after reporting supposed falling areas to international organizations (three times)

Date	Presumed type of missile	Number of launches	Location	Flight distance
April 5, 2009	Taepodong-2 or variant	1	Taepodong Area	3,000 km or more
December 12, 2012	Taepodong-2 variant	1	Tongch'ang-ri Area	Approx. 2,600 km (second stage landfall)
February 7, 2016	Taepodong-2 variant	1	Tongch'ang-ri Area	Approx. 2,500 km (second stage landfall)

· Launches of ballistic missiles without prior notice (four times)

Date	Presumed type of missile	Number of launches	Location	Flight distance
August 31, 1998	Taepodong-1	1	Taepodong Area	Approx. 1,600 km
August 29, 2017	IRBM-class "Hwasong-12"	1	Near Sunan	Approx. 2,700 km
September 15, 2017	IRBM-class "Hwasong-12"	1	Near Sunan	Approx. 3,700 km
October 4, 2022	Ballistic missiles over IRBMs in the range	1	Inland	Approx. 4,600 km

(Notes) 1 After the launch of Taepodong-1 on August 31, 1998, North Korea announced that it was the launch of a satellite.

2 Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.

converted from ordinary freight cars. They have external similarities with SRBM A, and it is possible that they were developed based on that missile. North Korea has announced that it was a firing exercise by the “railway-borne missile regiment” and has also expressed its intention to expand the units in the future.

(ii) SRBM B (referred to as a “new weapon” or “tactical guided weapon” by North Korea)

SRBM B has a maximum flight distance of about 400 km, the longest ones achieved and is believed to be capable of flying at lower altitudes with an irregular trajectory than conventional ballistic missiles. Regarding TELs, various types can be confirmed in images published by North Korea.

(iii) SRBM C (referred to as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher” by North Korea)

SRBM C has a maximum flight distance of approximately 400 km, the longest ones achieved. Some of the intervals between launches were estimated less than 1 minute, suggesting that North Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire capability required for saturation attacks and the like. Chairman Kim mentioned that they can be loaded with tactical nuclear warheads.<sup>21</sup> Regarding TELs, various types can be confirmed in images published by North Korea.

(iv) SRBM D (referred to as a “new-type tactical guided missile” by North Korea)

It has been suggested that the SRBM D was developed based on the SRBM A. It is capable of flying at lower altitudes with an irregular trajectory than conventional ballistic missiles, and their maximum range could reach about 750 km.

In addition, North Korea carried out two launches of what could have been SRBMs on July 31, 2019 and another two a couple of days later, on August 2. Furthermore, the analysis is ongoing regarding the details of two missiles launched on November 2, 2022, that flew approximately 150 km and 200 km, respectively.

 See Fig. I-3-4-6 (List of SRBMs A-D launch dates (including rail-launched types))

### (b) Scud

The Scud is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile and is operated on a TEL.

Scud B is an SRBM with a range of 300 km, and Scud

Fig. I-3-4-6

List of SRBMs A-D launch dates (including rail-launched types)

Launch dates	Type of missile
May 4, 2019	SRBM (A)
May 9, 2019	SRBM (A)
July 25, 2019	SRBM (A)
August 6, 2019	SRBM (A)
August 10, 2019	SRBM (B)
August 16, 2019	SRBM (B)
August 24, 2019	SRBM (C)
September 10, 2019	SRBM (C)
October 31, 2019	SRBM (C)
November 28, 2019	SRBM (C)
March 2, 2020	SRBM (C)
March 9, 2020	SRBM (C)
March 21, 2020	SRBM (B)
March 29, 2020	SRBM (C)
March 25, 2021	SRBM (D)
September 15, 2021	SRBM (rail-launched)
January 14, 2022	SRBM (rail-launched)
January 17, 2022	SRBM (B)
January 27, 2022	SRBM (A)
May 12, 2022	SRBM (C)
May 25, 2022	SRBM (possibly A or D)
June 5, 2022	SRBM (including A, B and C)
September 28, 2022	SRBM (D)
September 29, 2022	SRBM (C)
October 1, 2022	SRBM (A)
October 6, 2022	SRBM (C,A)
October 9, 2022	SRBM (C)
October 14, 2022	SRBM (A)
November 3, 2022 <sup>22</sup>	SRBM (C)
November 9, 2022	SRBM (possibly A or D)
November 17, 2022	SRBM (C)
December 31, 2022	SRBM (C)
January 1, 2023	SRBM (C)
February 20, 2023	SRBM (C)
March 19, 2023	SRBM (A)
March 27, 2023	SRBM (A)
August 30, 2023	SRBM (B)
September 13, 2023 <sup>23</sup>	SRBM (A)
March 18, 2024	SRBM (C)
April 22, 2024	SRBM (C)
May 30, 2024	SRBM (C)

C is an SRBM with an extended range of 500 km. It is believed that North Korea has manufactured and retained them and has exported them to the Middle East and other countries. On November 3, 2022, North Korea launched three Scud C missiles.

<sup>21</sup> Chairman Kim attended the event to “present” a super-large multiple rocket launcher to the 6th plenary meeting of 8th Central Committee of the KWP in December 2022 and stated this missile’s range covered the whole ROK territory, and “even can be loaded with a tactical nuclear weapon.” He also said that the missile entered a mass production phase in January 2023.

<sup>22</sup> It is presumed that of the six ballistic missiles launched on November 3, 2022, the two which flew approximately 350 km were both SRBM C.

<sup>23</sup> The two ballistic missiles launched on September 13, 2023, are estimated to have flown approximately 350 km before maneuvering and ascending again, flying a total distance of approximately 650 km.



The Scud-ER is a ballistic missile that has an extended range due to the extension of the Scud's body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of the Scud ER is estimated to reach approximately 1,000 km, and it appears that a part of Japan falls within this range. Regarding the two ballistic missiles that were launched on December 18, 2022, North Korea announced that their launch was for an important test for development of a "reconnaissance satellite" and released images. These missiles could have been ballistic missiles based on Scud-ER.

Furthermore, North Korea is also developing a ballistic missile that appears to be an improvement of the Scud missile. This ballistic missile was launched on May 29, 2017. A day later, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted the new development and test launch of a ballistic rocket incorporating a precision navigation guidance system.

In addition, while the images released by North Korea show that the ballistic missile was launched from a continuous-tracked TEL and had what appears to be small wings on its warhead, i.e., characteristics different from those of existing Scud missiles, the shape other than the warhead and length are similar to existing Scud missiles. Another similarity is that it can be confirmed that the missile has straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel-propelled engine. It has also been noted that this ballistic missile is equipped with a Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV).

### (c) Nodong

The Nodong is a liquid fuel propelled single-stage ballistic missile and is operated on a TEL. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, reaching almost all of Japan.

Although the details of Nodong's performance have not been confirmed, Nodong may not be able to carry out precise strikes on specific target installations, as it is likely based on Scud technology. However, it has been suggested that North Korea is working to increase the Nodong's accuracy. A launch aimed at enhancing accuracy by improving the shape of the warhead (whose range is deemed to reach approximately 1,500 km through the weight reduction of the warhead) was confirmed for the first time in the images published by North Korea a day after the launch of one Scud and two Nodong missiles on July 19, 2016.

### (d) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)

North Korea is believed to possess one Gorae-class submarine (displacement of approximately 1,500 tons) that is capable of carrying and launching a single submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and is being operated mainly as a test vessel. Additionally, in September 2023, a submarine called a "tactical nuclear attack submarine" appeared, which is believed to be a modified version of an existing Romeo-class submarine. Chairman Kim Jong-un has stated that he intends to convert all existing medium-sized submarines into submarines capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons. In January 2021, Chairman Kim mentioned the goal of possessing nuclear-powered submarines, so it is believed that North Korea will continue to focus on building them along with modifying the Romeo-class submarines.

North Korea has been developing SLBMs to be mounted on these submarines, and in May 2015, it announced the first successful test launch of an SLBM.<sup>24</sup> North Korea is believed to be seeking to diversify its ballistic missile strike capabilities and improve its survivability.

(i) SLBM "Pukguksong" (referred to as "Pukguksong" type by North Korea)

This is an SLBM launched from a Gorae-class submarine. Judging from the images and footage that it has made public so far, North Korea may have succeeded in operating the "cold launch system," in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air. Moreover, it appears, based on observations such as the shape of the flame coming out of the missile and the color of the smoke, that the solid fuel-propelled system has been adopted. If launched with a normal trajectory, this missile is expected to have a range of over 1,000 km.

(ii) SLBM "Pukguksong-3" (referred to as "Pukguksong-3" by North Korea)

This SLBM is different from the "Pukguksong" SLBM launched in October 2019, and if launched with a normal trajectory, it could have a range of about 2,000 km. The characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel-propelled engines are identifiable on images published by North Korea. The SLBM in question could potentially have been launched from an underwater launch test equipment.

In addition, North Korea unveiled possibly new, SLBMs marked as "Pukguksong-4" and "Pukguksong-5," the launches of which have not yet been confirmed, at

<sup>24</sup> In addition to what the Ministry of Defense has so far presumed to be North Korea's SLBM launches, North Korea announced on May 9, 2015, that it had successfully test-launched an SLBM, and on January 8, 2016, it released a video that appeared to be an SLBM ejection test different from the one it had released in May 2015.

its military parades in October 2020 and January 2021, respectively.<sup>25</sup>

### (iii) New Type of SLBM

This is a new type of SLBMs that have been launched since October 2021 and has a maximum flight distance of approximately 650 km, the longest ones achieved. Regarding the September 2022 launch, North Korea announced later that it had conducted a training exercise to launch a ballistic missile loaded with simulated tactical nuclear warhead at a “water reservoir underwater launch site” in the northwestern region and revealed the existence of a “water reservoir underwater launch site construction” plan.

Based on images released by North Korea, it is possible that the missile was developed based on the SRBM A, as it has external similarities with that missile.

### (e) Ballistic Missile Modified from the SLBM (referred to as “Pukguksong-2” by North Korea)

This is a solid-fuel propellant ballistic missile and is a modified version of the SLBM “Pukguksong” for ground launch. If it were launched with a nominal trajectory, the firing range is assessed to surpass 1,000 km. A day after the launch in February 2017, North Korea announced that it was developed as a ground-to-ground ballistic missile based on the results of the August 2016 SLBM launch. It also announced a day after the launch in May 2017 that it had again successfully conducted the test launch of the missile and that Chairman Kim had authorized its “operational deployment.”

Moreover, the launch by a “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air from a continuous-tracked TEL, and the characteristic

radial exhausts of solid fuel-propelled engines, can be confirmed from each of the images that North Korea released.

 See Fig. I-3-4-7 (List of Launch Dates and Platforms for SLBMs and “Pukguksong” Series Ground-launched Ballistic Missiles)

### (f) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)-Class

#### (i) “Hwasong-12” type (according to North Korea’s designation)

To date, North Korea has launched four liquid fuel-propelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles. One of these ballistic missiles was launched on each of May 14, 2017 and January 31, 2022, and based on their flight patterns, it is presumed that they were launched with a lofted trajectory. Had they been launched with a nominal trajectory, the maximum firing range is assessed to be close to approximately 5,000 km. In addition, the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed from the images released by North Korea a day after the launch.

On August 29 and September 15, 2017 respectively, a single “Hwasong-12” missile was launched, and each flew over Japan’s territory in the vicinity of the Oshima Peninsula and Cape Erimo (both in Hokkaido). In view of their flight paths, “Hwasong-12” missiles appear to have demonstrated a certain level of function as IRBMs.<sup>26</sup>

North Korea also launched a missile passing over Aomori Prefecture, Japan, on October 4, 2022. It is presumed that this missile was a ballistic missile with a range over that of an IRBM, based on the flight distance of around 4,600 km achieved at that time. North Korea announced later that a “new type of surface-to-surface long-range ballistic missile” was launched. From images

Fig. I-3-4-7 List of Launch Dates and Platforms for SLBMs and “Pukguksong” Series Ground-launched Ballistic Missiles

Date	Presumed type of missile	Launch platforms
April 23, 2016	“Pukguksong”	Gorae-class submarine
July 9, 2016	“Pukguksong”	Gorae-class submarine
August 24, 2016	“Pukguksong”	Gorae-class submarine
February 12, 2017	“Pukguksong-2”	TEL
May 21, 2017	“Pukguksong-2”	TEL
October 2, 2019	“Pukguksong-3”	* Estimated to have been launched from underwater launch test equipment
October 19, 2021	New type of SLBM	Gorae-class submarine
May 7, 2022	New type of SLBM	Gorae-class submarine
September 25, 2022	New type of SLBM	* Estimated to have been launched from underwater launch test equipment

<sup>25</sup> In addition, at the military parade on April 25, 2022, what may have been a new type of SLBM that has not previously been made public by North Korea was unveiled, but it was not named, and no details have been released.

<sup>26</sup> North Korea repeatedly launched the Musudan that is believed to be a ballistic missile in 2016. Although the missile launched in June of the same year flew a certain distance on a lofted trajectory, the fact that there were two successive launch failures in October would suggest that there may still be obstacles remaining towards the operationalization of the Musudan and that North Korea may be concentrating on the development and operationalization of the “Hwasong-12” as an IRBM instead. It is pointed out that the range of the Musudan is up to approximately 2,500-4,000 km. This missile is liquid fuel propelled, and transported and operated loaded on a TEL.

released at the time, although the date of photography was not mentioned, the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine and the TEL similar to ones for the “Hwasong-12” missile were visually confirmed. On the other hand, since the shape of the warhead and engine structure were different to that of the “Hwasong-12,” the possibility that the missile North Korea launched at that time was a new type of IRBM-class ballistic missile cannot be ruled out.

(ii) New solid fuel-propelled Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) class ballistic missiles

North Korea launched a solid fuel-propelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles each on January 14 and April 2, 2024. Images released by North Korea showed that the ballistic missile launched on January 14 had a conical warhead, while the ballistic missile launched on April 2 had a flattened warhead. Details of the launches, including whether these ballistic missiles were hypersonic weapons, are currently being analyzed.

**(g) Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-Class**

(i) ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” (according to North Korea’s designation)

North Korea launched “Hwasong-14,” on July 4 and 28, 2017. From the flight pattern, it is presumed that the two missiles were launched with a lofted trajectory. If they were to have been launched with a normal trajectory, it is estimated that they would have a maximum range of at least 5,500 km. The images suggest that the missiles were of two-stage configuration.

Furthermore, on the day following the July 28 launch, North Korea asserted that the “nuclear bomb detonation device” had functioned normally, and the safety of the warhead in an atmospheric reentry environment had been maintained.

(ii) “Hwasong-15” (according to North Korea’s designation)

On November 29, 2017, North Korea launched “Hwasong-15” with a lofted trajectory. In a “major report” on the day of the launch, North Korea made a “government statement,” declaring that it had successfully conducted a test launch of the “Hwasong-15,” a newly developed type of ICBM with the capability to strike all areas of the U.S. mainland and asserting that it had completed development of its state nuclear force.

Moreover, another “Hwasong-15” missile was launched with a lofted trajectory on February 18, 2023. Then on the following day, North Korea announced that “ICBM launch training” had been conducted and that “the reliability of the weapon system was reconfirmed and verified.”

“Hwasong-15” is loaded on a nine-axle TEL, and from released images, two-stage configuration and its straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed.<sup>27</sup>

Moreover, the range of “Hwasong-15” is estimated to be over 14,000 km based on the trajectory of maximum altitude around 5,700km and flight distance around 1,000km when it was launched in February 2023, depending on factors such as its warhead weight. In this case, the range would cover the whole U.S. territory including the East Coast.

(iii) “Hwasong-17” (according to North Korea’s designation)

North Korea launched one ballistic missile on both February 27 and March 5, 2022. Both are estimated to have been launched with a lofted trajectory, flying approximately 300 km, and reaching maximum altitudes of approximately 600 km and 550 km, respectively. North Korea announced the day after each launch that they were “reconnaissance satellite” development tests, but it is believed that the missiles launched were of the “Hwasong-17” type.

The ICBM-class missile launched on March 24 the same year, recorded a lofted trajectory of maximum altitude over around 6,000 km and flight distance over



The “Hwasong-17” ICBM-class ballistic missile that appeared at a military parade on February 8, 2023 [Korea News Service/Jiji]

<sup>27</sup> Based on the released images, the “Hwasong-14”-type ICBM-class ballistic missiles have the following in common with the “Hwasong-12”-type IRBM-class ballistic missile: (1) the configuration of engine system (one main engine and four auxiliary engines); (2) the shape of the lower part of the propulsion system (conical shape); and (3) the straight-line flame of liquid-propulsion systems can be confirmed. Based on the respective ranges that can be estimated for the missiles and other matters, it can be assumed that Hwasong-14 type was possibly developed on the basis of the Hwasong-12 type IRBM-class ballistic missile. It has been pointed out that the Hwasong-15 type has two Hwasong-14 type engines.

around 1,100 km, greatly exceeding the trajectory and distance of “Hwasong-15” launched in November 2017. North Korea announced on the following day that it conducted test launching of “Hwasong-17.”<sup>28</sup> While North Korea repeatedly launched missiles after that, the launches on May 4 and 25, and November 3 and 18, 2022, and March 16, 2023, are presumed to be of the ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-17.” The range of “Hwasong-17” is estimated to be over 15,000 km based on the past flight trajectories depending on factors such as its warhead weight. Furthermore, North Korean media later reported on the launch on November 18, 2022, stating that the “final test launch” of “Hwasong-17” was successfully conducted.

From released images, “Hwasong-17” is presumed to be two-stage, and the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed. The missile is mounted on an 11-axle TEL, believed to be the largest in North Korea’s possession, and its size is thought to exceed that of the existing “Hwasong-15”-type. It has been suggested that this raises the possibility that North Korea pursues a greater yield from increased warhead weight and multiple warheads, which are generally considered difficult to intercept.<sup>29</sup>

(iv) “Hwasong-18” type (according to North Korea’s designation)

On April 13, July 12, and December 18, 2023, North Korea launched a single ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-18.” The Hwasong-18 is a new three-stage solid-fuel propelled missile, and during its launch on



Image officially released by North Korea when it launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-18” [Korea News Service/Jiji]

April 13, it is estimated to have flown about 1,000 km while changing direction to the left (i.e., north). North Korea announced this launch as its “first test launch,” and images released by North Korea show the missile was launched by so-called a “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after being ejected into the air, and from a TEL assumed to be the same as the 9-axle TEL shown for the first time in the military parade in February 2023. Radial exhausts, a typical characteristic of solid fuel-propelled engines, can be confirmed from each of the images that North Korea released.

The Hwasong-18, was also launched as a “test launch” on July 12 of the same year, with a flight distance of approximately 1,000 km and a maximum altitude of over approximately 6,000 km, and depending on the weight of the warhead carried, the range of the Hwasong-18 could exceed 15,000 km. Regarding the launch on December 18 of the same year, North Korea announced that it was a launch training “with the purpose of inspecting the readiness of North Korea’s nuclear war deterrence and confirming its maneuverability, combat capability, and reliability.”

#### (h) Taepodong-2

Taepodong-2 is a long-range ballistic missile launched from a fixed launch pad. It is believed to use in its first stage, four engines, each of which was developed based on the technologies of Nodong, and the same type of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than



Image released by North Korea when it launched a “military reconnaissance satellite” [Korea News Service/Jiji]

<sup>28</sup> North Korea also launched a ballistic missile shortly prior on March 16, 2022, but it is presumed to have not flown properly, and other details, including the type of missile, are still being analyzed.

<sup>29</sup> Eleven Hwasong-17s and five launchers that may be TELs for as-yet unannounced new ICBM-class missiles (later, North Korea announced the launching an ICBM-class ballistic missile they called Hwasong-18 from a TEL that was viewed identical to this one) were shown in what was called the “ICBM column” at the military parade in February 2023. Since the number of missiles significantly increased from the four Hwasong-17s and four Hwasong-15s shown at the previous parade (in April 2022), it is pointed out that North Korea was showing off its mass-production setup of ICBM-class ballistic missiles and TELs for ICBM-class missiles.

approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over approximately 1 ton. Taepodong-2 missiles and its variants have been launched a total of five times by February 2016.

**(i) Chollima-1 (according to North Korea's designation)**

“Chollima-1” is what North Korea claims to be a “new satellite-carrying rocket” intended to launch a “military reconnaissance satellite.” “Chollima-1” is launched from a fixed launch pad and is three-stage configuration.

North Korea used “Chollima-1” to conduct a total of three launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch in May, August, and November 2023, with the first two launches believed to have failed. As for the November launch, analysis in cooperation with the United States and the ROK confirmed that the object launched at that time was orbiting Earth.<sup>30</sup>

**(j) Ballistic Missiles Referred to as “Hypersonic Missiles”**

On January 5 and 11, 2022, North Korea launched one ballistic missile each day, which it referred to as a “hypersonic missile”. Both missiles are believed to have flown at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. In particular, the missile launched on January 11 may have flown at a maximum speed of approximately Mach 10 with an irregular trajectory that included horizontal maneuvers.<sup>31</sup>

Based on images released by North Korea, it is confirmed that the missiles were launched from a wheeled TEL and that they had a conical warhead and were equipped with an engine appearing to be a liquid-fuel propulsion system. It has been pointed out that its conical warhead may have been based on Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV)-related technology. In any case, based on announcements to date, it is clear that North Korea continues to pursue the development and enhancement of hypersonic missiles and the like in an attempt to breach other countries’ missile defense networks. It is necessary to monitor its future technological progress, including its application of these technologies on longer-range missiles and moves for the development of a possible ballistic missile with a flat warhead (referred to as the “Hwasong-8” by North Korea), which was launched on September 28, 2021

with the designation of being a “hypersonic missile.”

In addition, the aforementioned new IRBM-class ballistic missile launched on January 14, 2024, is currently under analysis, including whether it was a hypersonic weapon.

**b Other Missile Forces under Development by North Korea**

**(a) Cruise missiles**

While North Korea has been supposed to develop and retain anti-ship cruise missiles with relatively short-range including ones modified from Chinese-made cruise missiles, in recent years it stated its intention to develop new cruise missiles which are supposed to load tactical nuclear weapons on them. For example, Chairman Kim mentioned the development of “ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including intermediate-range cruise missiles” in January 2021. In fact, North Korea announced that it successfully conducted a test launch of a newly developed long-range cruise missile in September 2021, then that a long-range cruise missile that is believed to be of another type was launched in January 2022. These cruise missiles were repeatedly launched after that and announced as launches of “strategic cruise missiles” said to be deployed in the “tactical nuclear weapons operation unit.” It is clear that these missiles have come to be known as “Strategic Cruise Missile Hwasal-1” and “Strategic Cruise Missile Hwasal-2” respectively. According to North Korea’s statement, these cruise missiles flew up to 2,000 km. It



Image released by North Korea when it launched a “submarine-launched strategic cruise missile” [Korea News Service/Jiji]

<sup>30</sup> The launched object separated into several parts, the first of which is presumed to have fallen into the Yellow Sea approximately 150 km west of the Korean Peninsula, the second into the East China Sea approximately 350 km west of the Korean Peninsula, and the third passed over the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima island and into the Pacific Ocean approximately 1,000 km west of Okinotorishima, outside Japan’s EEZ, all of which are presumed to have fallen outside the predicted drop zones.

<sup>31</sup> It is presumed that the ballistic missile launched on December 23 2022 was the same as the ballistic missiles launched on January 5 and January 11, 2022 that North Korea referred to as hypersonic missiles. In addition, a missile with an appearance similar to the Hwasong-8 was unveiled at an exhibition titled “Armed Equipment Exhibition 2023” in July 2023 and a military parade in the same month, but the missile also has different characteristics from the Hwasong-8, and details have not been revealed.

was also announced that “strategic cruise missiles” were launched from submarines in March 2023 and January 2024 and from a patrol ship in August of the same year.

In January 2024, North Korea also test-fired a cruise missile it called “Pulhwasal-3-31,” but details of the missile, including the differences with the conventional “Hwasal,” remain unknown.

While many of the details, including their actual performance, are still unknown, it is obvious that North Korea pursues implementation not only of ballistic missiles but also of long-range nuclear capable cruise missiles. If the series of the announcements about flying distances and the like are factual, there is a need for concern, as these missiles pose threats peace and stability in the region.

### **(b) “New Type of Tactical Guided Weapon”**

On April 17, 2022, North Korea announced that a “new type of tactical guided weapon” was launched. The missile announced at that time was seen at the military parade on April 25, and also later appeared in North Korean media. It can also be confirmed that the missile is transported on a three-axle wheeled TEL and radial exhausts, a typical characteristic of solid fuel propelled engines. This missile is believed to be one of the weapons that North Korea is developing as potentially tactical nuclear weapons, in aiming to deal with armed conflicts that may occur with U.S. Forces and ROK Forces involving conventional forces and/or tactical nuclear weapons. This belief is based on North Korea’s announcements stating that these missiles are significant in drastically improving long-range artillery firepower and strike capabilities on each front and enhancing “effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons operation.”

### **c Trends in Ballistic Missile Development**

North Korea has driven ballistic missile development and attempted to improve related technologies and operation capabilities quite rapidly and in continuous manner. These trends have the following characteristics.

#### **(a) Improvement of missile-related technologies**

##### **(i) Improvement of concealment and promptness**

North Korea appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing concealment and promptness to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch.

North Korea has repeatedly launched missiles from various platforms such as TELs, submarines and railway cars in recent years. Using these platforms, launchers can be concealed, and missiles could be launched from any position. It appears that North Korea aims to make identification of signs of a launch, detection, and

interception difficult, by improving concealment.

In addition, particularly since 2019, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles using solid fuel. It is therefore believed that North Korea is proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Generally, solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles are relatively easier to store and handle. Additionally, since they come preloaded with solid fuel, they can be quickly reloaded onto launchers and relaunched in a relatively short time. In this respect, they are considered militarily superior. Such characteristics are expected to contribute to improving the ability to conduct surprise attacks. While in the past solid fuel propelled ballistic missiles developed and retained by North Korea were mainly short-range missiles, Chairman Kim raised the development of solid fuel propelled ICBMs as a task in January 2021 and has actually launched solid fuel propelled ICBM-class ballistic missiles as well as new solid fuel-propelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles, so future developments need to be closely watched.

##### **(ii) Enhancement of penetration capabilities for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)**

North Korea is advancing the development of ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories in an attempt to breach other countries’ missile defense networks. The SRBM A, SRBM B, and SRBM D, as well as rail-launched ballistic missiles and a new type of SLBM with a similar outline to the SRBM A, with irregular trajectories, are believed to be capable of flying at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles.

Furthermore, North Korea raised the development of “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” as one of its priority targets. Actually, it has launched several types of missiles it called “hypersonic missiles” since September 2021. In this way, North Korea is persistently pursuing missile development to make interception difficult and to breach missile defense networks.

##### **(iii) Developing long-range missiles**

North Korea consistently pursues development of SRBMs flying with irregular trajectories as well as long-range missiles with ranges covering the United States. North Korea’s ICBM-class ballistic missiles Hwasong-17 and -18 are thought to have a range of over 15,000 km depending on the weight of its warhead, etc. In such a case, the whole U.S. territory including the East Coast is within its range.

For the operationalization of these ballistic missiles, it is said that technology to protect the re-entry vehicle from the extremely high temperature generated during

the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead is required. Although North Korea announced that the reliability of warheads in the re-entry environment had been proven after launching ICBM-class missiles “Hwasong-14” and “Hwasong-15” in 2017, careful analysis is still needed to determine whether this technology actually has been established.

On the other hand, should North Korea make further progress in the development of long-range ballistic missiles, it may unilaterally come to have a recognition that it has secured a strategic deterrence against the United States. If North Korea has such a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, it could lead to an increase and escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region, a situation that Japan needs to be deeply concerned about.

#### **(b) Enhancement of missile operation capabilities**

North Korea has launched ballistic missiles in various patterns such as multiple and simultaneous launches, consecutive launches at very short intervals and multiple launches from various locations at specific targets.

First, there have been some cases since 2014 in which it launched multiple missiles from unprecedented locations, cutting across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late at night using TELs. In recent years, North Korea has conducted launch drills and other training combining SRBMs with various types of artillery, showing that it has the capability to launch multiple missiles simultaneously at a given time and place.

Second, North Korea attempts consecutive launches at very short intervals. For example, the SRBM C which North Korea refers to as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher” is thought to be developed in order to enhance continuous fire capabilities. In fact, from 2019, there was a case, in which two SRBM C were launched at estimated intervals of less than one minute.

Third, there have been some cases since 2019, in which North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles and other weapons from various places and hit specific targets.

Through these launches, North Korea is believed to be pursuing the enhancement of practical missile operation capabilities with saturation attack and the like in mind.

#### **(4) Future Trends in Weapons Development**

Chairman Kim specifically mentioned the development of various weapons as future military objectives at the 8th Congress of the KWP in January 2021. The goals presented at this time are believed to be included in the “five-year plan.”

With regard to nuclear weapons and missiles, Chairman Kim also mentioned “tactical nuclear weapons” as further advancement of nuclear technology, miniaturization and weight reduction of nuclear weapons and development of tactical weapons. He also stated that North Korea would promote the production of “super-sized nuclear warheads,” improve its hit rate on targets within a 15,000 km range and upgrade its “preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike capabilities.” In addition, North Korea mentioned the promotion of research and development of multi-warhead technology, “hypersonic gliding flight warheads,” nuclear-powered submarines, “underwater-launched strategic nuclear weapons” and solid fuel-propelled ICBM, demonstrating its stance of relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack. In addition, besides the nuclear and missile capabilities, development of reconnaissance means, including military reconnaissance satellites and unmanned reconnaissance aerial vehicles, was also mentioned.

In fact, since this year, North Korea has launched missiles repeatedly as if to advance the process of the development plan presented at the Congress.

Furthermore, these objectives seem to have a certain degree of priority. North Korea stated that the hypersonic missile R&D project was “belonging to the five high priority challenges in the strategic weapons division of the five-year plan” when it launched a missile referred to as “hypersonic missile Hwasong-8” in September 2021. North Korea stated in December 2022 that the “captive firing test of high-thrust solid-fuel engine” was completed successfully and that Chairman Kim rated this highly, saying, “another significant problem has been solved to realize the five high priority challenges in the strategic weapons division of the five-year plan,” and stated that he expected to “show another new strategic weapon” in the shortest period of time.<sup>32</sup> At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in December 2023, Chairman Kim stated that the launching of satellites would mark “the realization

<sup>32</sup> Chairman Kim also stated in the 6th plenary meeting of 8th Central Committee of KWP at the end of the same month that North Korea will develop “another ICBM system” with the mission of “rapid nuclear counterattack.”

of the prerequisite task of modernizing the Republic's armed forces, as set out at the 8th Congress of the Party." From these statements, North Korea is believed to be promoting research and development while prioritizing the realization of "hypersonic gliding warheads," solid-fuel-propelled ICBMs, and the launch of "military reconnaissance satellites" in its "five-year plan."

On November 21, 2023, North Korea launched the "Malligyong-1," which it claims is a "reconnaissance satellite," using the aforementioned "Chollima-1," and it insisted that it had accurately entered its orbit. Regarding this "reconnaissance satellite," North Korea had been publicly disclosing its activities toward its launch since 2022. On February 27 and March 5 of the same year, North Korea launched ICBM-class ballistic missiles, claiming that they were tests for the development of a "reconnaissance satellite," and later made public footage of Chairman Kim's inspection of the "reconnaissance satellite," during which he stated that the purpose of military reconnaissance satellites is to obtain real-time military information on the ROK, Japan, and the Pacific Ocean, that a large number of "reconnaissance satellites" would be deployed within the "five-year plan" period, and that to that end, the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in the Tongch'ang-ri district would be renovated and expanded.

In May, August, and November 2023 and May 2024, North Korea went ahead with launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch from the vicinity of Tongch'ang-ri on the west coast of North Korea towards the south, after giving advance notices of the durations and drop zones. The launches in May and August 2023 and May 2024 are believed to have failed to deploy satellites, but as for the launch in November 2023, it was confirmed that the object launched at that time is orbiting Earth. The details of what functions this object is performing are still being analyzed.

At the December 2023 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Chairman Kim Jong-un mentioned the launches of three additional

"reconnaissance satellites" as a goal for 2024 and is expected to continue to conduct launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch in the future.

Furthermore, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Kim Yo-jong stated in December 2022 and February 2023, "try right now" and "the frequency for us to use the Pacific Ocean as our shooting range" was dependent on the action of U.S. Forces in refuting views questioning North Korea's acquisition of atmospheric re-entry technologies for ICBM-class ballistic missiles. It is pointed out that this was suggesting the possibility for North Korea to decide to verify whether its ICBM-class missiles can tolerate practical use through launching them towards the Pacific Ocean if North Korea escalates provocation in the future.

In addition, North Korea showed its stance to pursue the diversification of its nuclear delivery systems through the statement made in March and April 2023 and January 2024 that it had tested weapons called an "underwater nuclear attack boat," namely "Haeil", and a weapon described as an "underwater nuclear weapon system".

In this way, North Korea constantly focuses on the R&D of related technologies in line with the "five-year plan," while claiming that these are "defensive" actions and making the situation a fait accompli. It is possible that North Korea may continue to repeatedly launch various missiles and the like to accomplish the "five-year plan."

## 4 Domestic Affairs

### (1) Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime

In North Korea, the power base centered on Chairman Kim is being solidified. The constitution of North Korea stipulates that the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission is "the supreme leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who represents the state," and it is pointed out that North Korea is run under the leadership of the KWP. Chairman Kim took the office of



**REFERENCE** : Security Environment Surrounding Japan (North Korea)

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_act/sec\\_env/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/index.html)



**REFERENCE** : Information related to North Korean missiles, etc.

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/surround/defense/northKorea/index.html>





## North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Development Trends in 2023 and beyond

Recently, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and others with an unprecedented frequency. In 2022, North Korea launched 59 ballistic missiles, the highest number ever in a single year. Although the number of launches in 2023 was not as high as in 2022, North Korea launched new solid-fuel propelled ICBM-class ballistic missiles as well as a “military reconnaissance satellite” using “Chollima-1”, what North Korea claims to be a “new satellite-carrying rocket.” Thus, North Korea seems to be focusing on improving its nuclear and missile capabilities in a qualitative sense.

The Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea held in 2021 provides a glimpse into the blueprint for the currently observed direction of North Korea's nuclear and missile development. At the Congress in 2021, Chairman Kim mentioned specific goals, such as reducing the size and weight of nuclear weapons, the development of tactical nuclear weapons, “super-sized nuclear warheads”, “hypersonic-gliding flight warheads,” and solid-fuel propelled ICBMs, and the operation of “military reconnaissance satellites.” North Korea appears to be systematically strengthening its nuclear and missile development and operational capabilities to achieve these goals.

Looking at the situation of North Korea's actual launches, we can see that technological progress has been made to a certain extent in line with these development goals. In particular, regarding ICBM-class ballistic missiles, North Korea launched the liquid fuel-propelled “Hwasong-17” and the solid fuel-propelled “Hwasong-18” in March and December 2023, respectively, as launch training, indicating that their test launch stage had been completed.

Furthermore, there is a possibility that the goals mentioned at the 2021 Workers' Party Congress are not all of North Korea's development goals, and the boundaries of the development goals may expand depending on the development situation. In the past, there have been cases where weapons systems that were not explicitly mentioned at the 2021 Workers' Party Congress were later found to be included in the development goals, as evidenced by remarks made during inspections by Chairman Kim. It is believed that both the production of transporter erector launchers (TELs), which was mentioned by Chairman Kim during his military factory tour in August 2023, and the renewal of IRBM capabilities, which was mentioned by him during the IRBM solid fuel engine test in November 2023, are also development goals. From 2023 to 2024, Kim Jong-un inspected factories producing various types of TELs and it was reported that in January 2024 the production of TELs for strategic missiles was making progress. Since 2024, North Korea has also launched new solid-fuel propelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles.

North Korea has been developing and launching various types of missiles while at the same time further intensifying its provocative

stance toward the ROK. Continuing on from 2022, North Korea has conducted short-range ballistic missile launches with high frequency since 2023, including launches purported to be training for a “tactical nuclear operations unit.” In April and August 2023, it was reported that Chairman Kim checked a front-line offensive operation plan and discussed military action guidelines for front-line troops at meetings of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Workers' Party of Korea, with images of Chairman Kim pointing to what appears to be a map of the ROK. The December 2023 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea described its relations with the ROK as “relations between two states hostile to each other” and referred to North Korea's readiness in a contingency to mobilize all means, including nuclear weapons, to conquer the entire territory of the ROK.

Domestically, North Korea seems to be making progress in legislation on its nuclear weapons. In September 2022, North Korea adopted “the law on the state policy on the nuclear forces,” which sets forth the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. And in September 2023, it amended the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, stipulating that it would develop nuclear weapons to a higher level to deter war. Thereby, North Korea is believed to have indicated to the international community its direction toward possessing and developing nuclear weapons as its external stance.

As these examples show, throughout the year, North Korea has sought to improve its missile-related technologies and operational capabilities, which are believed to be aimed at 1) acquiring deterrence against the United States through the possession of nuclear and long-range missiles and 2) developing tactical nuclear weapons and various missiles as their delivery systems that enable North Korea to deal with an armed conflict against U.S. and ROK forces. In particular, regarding the development of tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery means, it has been suggested that North Korea is attempting to compel its adversaries to fear the possibility of it using nuclear weapons as a military response in the event of a war and aiming to take the lead in managing the escalation of the situation. If North Korea becomes more confident in its ability to manage situations at all stages of a conflict, its military provocations could escalate further.



Image released by North Korea in January 2024 regarding the inspection of the production status of transporter erector launchers (TELs) [Korea News Service/Jijj]

the general secretary of the party in January 2021.

## (2) Economic Conditions

In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, it faces enhanced independent sanctions by countries including Japan and the United States and sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions adopted in response to nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches.<sup>33</sup>

Furthermore, it is believed that COVID-19 infections and natural disasters largely affected North Korea's economy from 2020. However, North Korea declared

“victory over” and eradication of COVID-19 in August 2022. It is now considered that restrictions have been somewhat relaxed, as evidenced by North Korea inviting representatives from China and Russia to its military parade in July 2023.

In January 2021, Chairman Kim presented a new “five-year plan for national economic development” based on self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Regarding this plan, Chairman Kim had stated in 2023 that the task was to “establish a decisive guarantee for the completion of the five-year plan,” but in 2024, looking back over the three years from 2021, he said that “he has become confident that the five-year plan can be fully completed.” Thus, even under difficult circumstances, it is believed that North Korea continues to consider rebuilding the economy in accordance with “the plan” important.

**Fig. I-3-4-8** Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea

Main content

Items	Sanction content	Related resolution
Crude oil	Restriction of annual supply to 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons	No. 2397 (December 2017)
Petroleum refined products	Restriction of annual supply to 500,000 barrels	No. 2397 (December 2017)
Coal	Total ban on imports from North Korea	No. 2371 (August 2017)
Ship offloading (ship-to-ship transfer)	Banned	No. 2375 (September 2017)

Summary of recent UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions against North Korea

Date	Resolution	Catalyst event	Main content
July 15, 2006	No. 1695	Seven ballistic missile launches (2006/7/5)	Request transfer prohibition on related goods and funds for nuclear and missile plans
October 14, 2006	No. 1718	First nuclear test (2006/10/9)	Prohibition on export and import of weapons of mass destruction related goods and large weapons
June 12, 2009	No. 1874	Taepodong-2 launch (2009/4/5), second nuclear test (2009/5/25)	Adoption of financial regulations
January 22, 2013	No. 2087	Taepodong-2 launch (2012/12/12)	Addition of six organizations and four individuals to sanctions
March 7, 2013	No. 2094	Third nuclear test (2013/2/12)	Tougher financial regulations and obligation to conduct inspections of goods suspected of transporting embargoed goods within one's own territorial waters
March 2, 2013	No. 2270	Fourth nuclear test (2016/1/6), Taepodong-2 launch (2016/2/7)	Ban on air fuel exports and supply and ban on coal and iron ore exports by North Korea (excluding those for personal livelihood or unrelated to North Korea's nuclear and missile plans)
November 20, 2016	No. 2321	Fifth nuclear test (2016/9/9)	Establishment of an upper limit on coal exports by North Korea (roughly \$400 million/7.5 million tons a year)
June 2, 2017	No. 2356	Ballistic missile launches since 2016/9/9	Addition of four organizations and 14 individuals to sanctions
August 5, 2017	No. 2371	ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” launch (2017/7/4 and 7/28)	Total ban on coal imports, total ban on iron and iron ore imports, and establishment of an upper limit on the total number of work permits for North Korean workers for the first time
September 11, 2017	No. 2375	Sixth nuclear test (2017/9/3)	Addition of oil to supply restrictions for the first time, addition of textile products to the import ban, and ban on work permits for overseas workers
December 22, 2017	No. 2397	ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” launch (2017/11/29)	Further supply restrictions in the oil area, expansion of the scope of bans on trade (exports/imports) with North Korea bans, and return of North Korean workers to North Korea

(Note) Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.

**33** In recent years, North Korean fishing boats and Chinese fishing boats have been conducting illegal operations within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding Yamato tai, creating a situation that threatens the safety of Japanese fishing boats operating in the EEZ. In this sea area, the Fisheries Agency and the Japan Coast Guard are working together to conduct strict surveillance vigilance and control in the waters around Japan, including issuing warnings to foreign fishing vessels engaged in illegal fishing. See the Cabinet Office Annual Report, “The situation of the oceans and the implemented measures by the Government with regard to the oceans,” the White paper on Fisheries and the Japan Coast Guard Report for further details of the control activities.

Nevertheless, as North Korea is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system, it will face various challenges in making fundamental improvements to its current economic situation. Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that amid the difficult economic and food situation, the regime is wary of social unrest caused by the influx of information from abroad and is further strengthening its ideological control. This is notable from the perspective of the stability of the regime.

North Korea is presumed to be evading the UN Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions.<sup>34</sup> The final report of the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee ("Final Report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to resolution 2680 (2023)"), released in March 2024, pointed out that, between January 1 and September 15, 2023, approximately 1.02 million to 1.52 million barrels of refined petroleum products, exceeding the annual limit of half a million barrels, may have been illegally transported to North Korea with North Korean-flagged tankers.



See Fig. 1-3-4-8 (Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea)

## 5 Relations with Countries and Regions

### (1) Relations with the United States

In June 2018 at the historic U.S.-North Korea summit meeting, Chairman Kim presented his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement being reached between the two countries. After that, while North Korea stated that the United States is its "biggest enemy," it has shown a stance that the key to establishing a new U.S.-North Korea relationship is withdrawal of hostile policy towards North Korea by the United States.

In April 2021, the United States announced that it had completed a review of its policy towards North Korea and that it would explore diplomacy with North Korea under a "calibrated practical approach" with the

continued goal of "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Although the United States clearly stated, in the National Security Strategy (NSS) published in October 2022, that it will seek sustained diplomacy with North Korea to make tangible progress towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, progress such as formal restarting of dialogue has not been seen, and the relationship between the United States and North Korea remains deadlocked.

Although North Korea voluntarily declared to stop "the test launch of inter-continental ballistic rockets" in April 2018, no progress has been seen in the U.S.-North Korea relationship. Then, in January 2022, Chairman Kim ordered North Korean officials to "promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily suspended activities" based on the assessment that the "hostile policy and military threat by the United States have reached a danger line that cannot be overlooked anymore." In fact, North Korea restarted launching ICBM-class ballistic missiles from February 2022. Chairman Kim stated that North Korea will thoroughly prepare for long term confrontation against the United States.<sup>35</sup>

### (2) Relations with the ROK

The three inter-Korean summit meetings in 2018 led to major progress in inter-Korean relations, including an agreement on the "Panmunjom Declaration," which confirms, among other matters, that the two parties agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain and confirmed the common goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The summit meetings also led to an agreement on the "Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018," which refers to the ending of military hostilities, and the "Agreement on the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain," which prescribes concrete measures to ease inter-Korean military tensions. However, there has been no progress in inter-Korean relations since the breakdown of the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in 2019.

Furthermore, in April 2022, after President Yoon Suk Yeol, who demonstrates a strict stance against North Korea, assumed the presidency in the ROK, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Central

<sup>34</sup> In the period from the beginning of 2018 to the end of March 2024, MSDF patrol aircraft and ships have observed 24 cases in which a North Korean-flagged tanker was sailing alongside a foreign-flagged vessel were anchored side-by-side on the high seas. As a result of comprehensive judgment by the government, there are strong suspicions that the observed vessels were engaging in illicit ship-to-ship transfers.

<sup>35</sup> On July 17, 2023, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the KWP, said that if the United States further strengthens its extended deterrence posture, "the United States should recognize that the negotiating table will move even farther away."

Committee of the KWP, stated in her press statement that while the ROK was not a main enemy and that the north and the south were of the same nation who should not fight each other, if the ROK selected a military confrontation, “our nuclear combat forces will fulfill their duty.” Chairman Kim also stated in his speech in July 2022 that if the ROK conducted preemptive strikes, North Korea would retaliate immediately and the “Yoon administration and his armed forces will be annihilated.” North Korea’s attitude to the ROK began to turn harsh. Regarding its military activity involving a series of missile launches, North Korea announced it had conducted training of “tactical nuclear weapons operation units,” hypothetically targeting airfields in the ROK in October 2022. Moreover, until December of the same year, North Korea repeatedly conducted shelling towards the area in which military exercises are banned by the military agreement between the south and north Korea.

In November 2023, in response to North Korea’s launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch, the ROK suspended some clauses of the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” and resumed the reconnaissance and surveillance activities against North Korea along the Military Demarcation Line it had conducted in the past. In response, North Korea declared the complete abandonment of the agreement. In December of the same year, Chairman Kim described the relationship between North Korea and the ROK as “the relationship between two hostile nations” and mentioned the necessity of “keeping pace with the powerful military actions of the Korean People’s Army to subjugate the whole territory of the south” in contingency as an important task in the external sector. In addition, in January 2024, North Korea and the ROK conducted firing drills on both sides of the North Limit Line (NLL), including around Yeonpyeong Island (Yeonpyeongdo).

### (3) Relations with Other Countries

While North Korea has been repeating hardline statements against the United States and the ROK, it appears to be seeking to strengthen cooperation with China and Russia, with the North Korean Foreign Ministry stating that the relationships between China, North Korea and Russia “play a central role in protecting

peace and stability not only in the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding region but also in the world.”

#### (i) Relations with China

China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea. The “Sino–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance” signed in 1961 is still effective, and China is currently North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2021, trade volume between China and North Korea was very large, accounting for over 90% of North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between North Korea and the ROK),<sup>36</sup> suggesting North Korea’s dependence on China.

In regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has stated that the issues should be resolved through dialogue and consultations based on the concept of a “dual-track approach” (denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the transition from the armistice mechanism to a peaceful mechanism) and the principle of phased and synchronized actions. In recent years, China has demonstrated a stance of defending North Korea’s repeated provocations through exercising its power of veto with Russia over a draft UNSC sanction resolution proposed by the United States for North Korea’s launching of ICBM-class ballistic missiles, and it stated that the current worsened situation on the Korean Peninsula was caused by the United States.

The China–North Korea summit meeting was held five times from March 2018 to June 2019. In October 2022, Chairman Kim sent a congratulatory telegram to General Secretary Xi Jinping on his reelection. In September 2023, General Secretary Xi sent a congratulatory telegram to Chairman Kim on the 75th anniversary of the founding of North Korea in which he conveyed China’s desire to



Then Russian Defense Minister Shoigu's visit to North Korea [AFP-Jiji]

<sup>36</sup> According to an announcement by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)

work with the North Korean side to strengthen strategic communication and deepen practical cooperation.

#### (ii) Relations with Russia

When Chairman Kim visited Russia in September 2023, North Korea expressed its intention to place the highest priority on relations with Russia.

Concerning North Korea's nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. In October 2021, Russia submitted a draft UN Security Council resolution on North Korea jointly with China stating that North Korea had already taken many denuclearization measures and that there should be adjustment of some sanctions concerning the economy and livelihoods, and in May 2022, Russia exercised its

veto with China against the draft sanction resolution proposed by the United States, mentioned above.

North Korea continuously shows the stance to assist Russia, insisting since the start of Russia's aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 that the cause of the situation in Ukraine is the United States and Western countries. In October 2023, Japan, in cooperation with the United States and the ROK, conducted related intelligence gathering and analysis and obtained information sufficient to believe that North Korea had provided Russia with military equipment and ammunition. Furthermore, it was revealed that North Korea had provided Russia with ballistic missiles, which were used against Ukraine between the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024.

## 2 The ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea

### 1 General Situation

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration, established in May 2022, positions North Korea's nuclear and weapons of mass destruction as the most pressing security threat in the "National Security Strategy" it announced in June 2023 and stated that it would actively deter various provocations from North Korea, including nuclear and missile threats, and would strongly retaliate and repel North Korea if it went ahead with a provocation.

The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces Korea have been playing an important role in securing peace and stability of the region such as playing a vital role in deterring a large-scale armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Also, in the aforementioned National Security Strategy, the ROK acknowledges that the U.S.-ROK alliance, which marked its 70th anniversary in 2023, has been playing a central role in maintaining peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

The strategy also states that the geographic scope of the U.S.-ROK alliance will be expanded globally and that the ROK will work together with friendly nations, centered around the United States, to build an open, inclusive, and rule-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the solidarity of freedom with them.

### 2 Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10 million, is situated close to the DMZ.

In Defense White Papers under the previous administration, the words "main enemy" and the phrase "the North Korean regime and its military are an enemy of the ROK" had not been used, but in the version of the Yoon administration, the latter expression was used again.

The ROK has continued to undertake reforms of its national defense. The Yoon administration is promoting "Defense Innovation 4.0" based on cutting-edge science and technology such as artificial intelligence (AI) from the fourth industrial revolution. The administration also stated that it would construct stepwise combined combat systems of manned and unmanned platforms to resolve the shortage of soldiers and minimize casualties in war.

### 3 Military Posture of the ROK

The ROK's military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 17 army divisions with approximately 370,000 personnel and 2 marine divisions with approximately 29,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of approximately 230 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 290,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 660 combat aircraft.

The ROK Forces has been modernizing its military

forces- not only its Army but also its Navy and Air Force- in order to establish an omni-directional defense posture. The ROK Forces are focused on building the “Korean three-axis system” consisting of kill chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). In January 2023, President Yoon stated that the KMPR is the most important part of the “Korean three-axis system.”<sup>37</sup> Amid this, in December of the same year, the ROK military’s first reconnaissance satellite, which the ROK Ministry of National Defense positions as the foundation of the “Korean three-axis system,” was launched in the United States. The strategic command for the effective integrated operation of forces in the system is scheduled to be established in 2024.

In terms of ballistic missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed Hyunmoo-2 missiles with an estimated range of 300-800 km and other missiles. The ROK also promotes the development of “high power” type missiles; for example, it is said that a test launch of Hyunmoo-4 missile with a two-ton warhead and 800 km firing range was successfully conducted in 2020, and a missile under development that is said to be Hyunmoo-5


and equipped with a heavier warhead was announced in October 2022.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the ROK announced that it successfully conducted a test launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 2021.

With regard to cruise missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed the Hyunmoo-3 surface-to-surface cruise missile, which is believed to have a range of about 500-1,500 km, and the Haeseong series ship-to-ship/ship-to-surface cruise missiles, which are believed to have a maximum range of 1,000-1,500 km.

Furthermore, the ROK has been actively working on equipment export in recent years. In particular, in 2022, the annual export resulted more than doubled that of 2021 on a contract basis, reaching US\$17.3 billion, including a large-scale export contract with Poland that is striving to enhance its defense capabilities after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although the value for the 2023 contract was about \$14 billion, down from the previous year’s record high, the number of export partners reportedly increased from 4 to 12 countries.

Defense spending in FY2024 (regular budget) increased by about 4.2% from the previous fiscal year to nearly KRW 59.4244 trillion, marking the 25th

Fig. I-3-4-9 Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget



(Note) According to the website of the Ministry of National Defense of ROK (accessed in December 2023)

<sup>37</sup> Minister of National Defense Shin Won-sik stated in December 2023 that Korea Massive Punishment & Retaliation (KMPR) is a “strategy to eliminate the enemy leadership.” He went on to point out that the ROK does not possess nuclear weapons that would constitute the basis for mutually assured destruction on nuclear terms, and that the safety of its leadership is more valuable than that of its citizens for North Korea, concluding that the combination of traditional U.S. nuclear forces and the ROK’s high-power conventional forces could enhance the integrity of deterrence.

<sup>38</sup> At the large-scale “Armed Forces Day” event in September 2023, a “high-power Hyunmoo surface-to-surface missile” was unveiled, with a description of “three-axis system” on its transporter erector launchers (TEL).

consecutive year of increases since 2000. In addition, according to its “2024-2028 Defense Mid-term Plan,” the ROK will increase its defense budget by 7% on an annual average over five years until 2028.

 See Fig. I-3-4-9 (Changes in the ROK's Defense Budget)

#### 4 U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea

The United States and the ROK have taken various steps to deepen the U.S.-ROK Alliance in recent years. The two countries regularly confirm the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK Alliance at various levels.

As specific undertakings through the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), a consultative body headed by the defense ministers of both countries, the two countries approved the “Tailored Deterrence Strategy,” designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, at the 45th U.S.-ROK SCM in 2013.

At the 46th SCM in 2014, the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D Operational Concept was approved.

Recently, at the 53rd SCM in 2021, the United States and the ROK approved new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) for the first time in 11 years and agreed to update their operation plans based on the SPG. Moreover, at the 54th SCM, the first for the Yoon administration in 2022, both countries agreed to several measures to enhance extended deterrence such as strengthening deployment of U.S. strategic assets<sup>39</sup> around the Korean Peninsula<sup>40</sup> and regularly conducting tabletop exercises including a North Korea nuclear use scenario. At the 55th U.S.-ROK SCM in 2023, the “2023 Tailored Deterrence Strategy,” revised for the first time in 10 years, was approved, and it was confirmed that it reflects guidelines for how to utilize all categories of U.S. military capabilities, including U.S. nuclear capabilities, as well as ROK’s conventional capabilities.

At the summit level, the ROK stated in the Washington Declaration of the U.S.-ROK summit meeting<sup>41</sup> in April 2023 that the country recognized the importance to trust the U.S. commitment for extended deterrence and reaffirmed the ROK’s commitment to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), whose establishment was announced at the summit meeting, held its inaugural meeting on July 18, 2023, and on the same day, a U.S. strategic nuclear submarine made its first port call in the ROK in about 40 years.

While the United States and the ROK had aborted or reduced the scale of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises from 2018, considering the progress of dialogue with North Korea, both countries have been expanding the scope and scale of the exercises since the Yoon administration was established in May 2022. The regular command post exercises have been changed to the form that the Freedom Shield (FS) exercise is conducted in first half of a year and the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise is in the latter half. In the UFS exercise from August to September 2022, a field training was resumed in parallel with command post exercises for the first time in four years. In March to April 2023, in cooperation with the FS exercise, largescale joint field training “Warrior Shield” was conducted with U.S. bombers, aircraft carrier and amphibious assault ship deployed. In addition, the UFS exercise was held in August of the same year continuing on from the 2022 exercise, and field training was conducted on a larger scale than the 2022 UFS exercise.

Regarding the deployment of U.S. strategic assets around the Korean Peninsula, a U.S.-ROK maritime exercise involving the U.S. aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan and a U.S.-ROK air exercise involving U.S. B-1B bombers were conducted in 2022.<sup>42</sup> In 2023, U.S. strategic assets, including the aforementioned U.S. strategic nuclear submarine, were allegedly deployed 17 times, a significant increase from five in 2022.

At the same time, the two countries deal with such issues as the transition of operational control (OPCON)

<sup>39</sup> According to the ROK “Defense White Paper 2022,” U.S. strategic assets are the military capabilities provided by the United States that effectively deter external attack and provocations and ensure an overwhelming response. They include the U.S. nuclear triad (ICBMs, strategic bombers, and strategic submarine ballistic nuclear (SSBNs)), as well as some conventional forces (aircraft carrier strike groups, B-1B bombers, and cruise-missile nuclear submarines [SSGNs]).

<sup>40</sup> The ROK stated that it will increase the frequency and intensity of deployment of U.S. strategic assets to a level equivalent to permanent deployment.

<sup>41</sup> President Biden stated in the joint press conference after the U.S.-ROK summit meeting that the United States will not station nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.

<sup>42</sup> Other than this, U.S.-ROK air force training was conducted with B-52H bombers and F-22 fighter jets deployed around the Korean Peninsula in December 2022. The name of the U.S.-ROK air force training conducted from October to November 2023 was changed from “Vigilant Storm” to “Vigilant Defense,” but no announcement was made about deployment of U.S. strategic bombers to the Korean Peninsula during the training period.

to the ROK<sup>43</sup> and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea.

For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the United States and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces.

Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM in 2014 to re-postpone the transition of OPCON and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing the transition when conditions such as the ROK Forces' enhanced capabilities are met. At the 50th SCM in October 2018, it was decided that following the transition of OPCON, a ROK military officer will serve as the commander of the Future Combined Forces Command, replacing the current arrangement of a U.S. military officer serving as the commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces.

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) verification was conducted as the first step to evaluate ROK Forces' capability in combined command post exercise in August 2019, and the important role of the exercise to verify IOC was confirmed. Furthermore, Full Operational Capability (FOC) evaluation was conducted as the second step in the UFS exercise in 2022, and at the 54th SCM in November 2022, it was confirmed that the FOC evaluation was successfully conducted and that all assessment tasks met the criteria.<sup>44</sup>

ROK Forces stated that the United States and the ROK comprehensively consider the results of combined evaluation about ROK Forces' military capabilities of leading U.S.-ROK combined defense and ability to respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, which are necessary for the transition of OPCON, then steadily promote evaluation of the Future Combined Forces Command according to procedures for each of the steps. The 55th U.S.-ROK SCM in 2023 also discussed the future direction toward the transition of OPCON to the Future Combined Forces Command.

With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea, an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces' Yongsan Garrison

located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeongtaek area, south of Seoul and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river. Subsequently, however, the agreement has been partially revised, due to various factors, including: in relation to the postponement of the transition of OPCON, it After the China-ROK foreign ministers' meeting in August 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China insisted that the ROK government stated the policy of "One Restriction" in which the ROK limits the operation of the THAAD already deployed to U.S. Forces Korea, in addition to the "Three Nos" (no participation in the United States' missile defense system, no consideration for additional THAAD deployment, no development of Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation to military allies) that the ROK government is said to have announced externally in 2017. has been necessary for some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison; and it was decided that the counterfires forces of U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their location north of the Han River to counter the threat of North Korea's long-range rocket artillery.

In July 2017, the U.S. Eighth Army headquarters relocated to the Pyeongtaek area; in June 2018 the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea and UN Command, and in November 2022, the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command Headquarters also relocated to the same area.

Concerning defense burden sharing, whereby the ROK government bears a portion of the total stationing costs of the U.S. Forces Korea to ensure a stable stationing environment, in March 2021, the United States and the ROK reached an agreement on the 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA). This agreement is valid for six years from 2020 to 2025. Total amount for FY2020 remains unchanged at the FY2019 level and 13.9% increase for FY 2021, compared to FY2020, while for FY2022-FY2025 the rate of increase in the ROK defense spending from the previous year will be applied.

## 5 Relations with Countries and Regions

### (1) Relations with China

China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to strengthen their relations. China opposes the deployment

<sup>43</sup> The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency.

<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, Full Mission Capability (FMC) evaluation as the third step is scheduled.



of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)<sup>45</sup> to U.S. Forces Korea, saying that it undermines the strategic security interests of China. Although both countries agreed in October 2017 to continue communicating on the THAAD-related issues that China was concerned about through channels established between their respective military authorities, conflicting views still remain.<sup>46</sup> The Yoon administration has made it clear that the THAAD issue is a matter relating to the sovereignty and security of the ROK and that it will respond consistently and resolutely based on national interests and principles. Attention will be focused on future trends in China-ROK relations.

## (2) Relations with Russia

The ROK and Russia have agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and

military supplies. Both countries held Defense Strategy Dialogue in August 2018 and agreed to promote the dialogue to vice minister level and, in November 2021, also agreed to set up hotlines between Navies and between Air Forces.

The ROK has implemented sanctions against Russia and provided military supplies and other resources to Ukraine in a show of solidarity with the international community following Russia's aggression against Ukraine since February 2022. Although the ROK still maintains a cautious attitude to deliver lethal weapons to Ukraine, President Yoon suggests possible support outside the scope of humanitarian and economic ones when Ukraine civilians receive attacks in a largescale. An attention will be focused on what measures the ROK will take based on the situation in Ukraine and in terms of stably managing the relationship with Russia.

<sup>45</sup> A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes outside of the atmosphere or in the upper atmosphere. Additionally, after North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test in January 2016, it was temporarily deployed by the U.S. Forces Korea in 2017.

<sup>46</sup> After the China-ROK foreign ministers' meeting in August 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China insisted that the ROK government stated the policy of "One Restriction" in which the ROK limits the operation of the THAAD already deployed to U.S. Forces Korea, in addition to the "Three Nos" (no participation in the United States' missile defense system, no consideration for additional THAAD deployment, no development of Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation to military allies) that the ROK government is said to have announced externally in 2017.

## Section 5 Russia

### 1 General Situation

President Putin, who has been seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and influential power, commenced full aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Russia's aggression against Ukraine undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and it is also a serious violation of international law including the Charter of the United Nations, which forbid the use of force. The aggression shakes the foundations of the international order and is understood as the most serious and direct threat to defense in the European area.

Russia also makes clear its stance that it continues to work on the modernization of strategic nuclear weapons, and repeats speech and behavior that can be taken as nuclear weapons threats in the middle of the aggression

against Ukraine.

Russian forces around Japan in recent years have introduced new types of equipment and activities. Also movement to enhance strategic cooperation with China, such as the joint flights of Russian and Chinese bombers, joint navigation of warships and continued mutual participation in exercises is observed. Military trends of Russia in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, combined with this strategic cooperation with China, are strong concerns for security. Also taking into account movements in the aggression against Ukraine, close observation of the situation is required.

 See Chapter 2 (Russian Aggression and Defense by Ukraine)

### 2 Security and Defense Policies

#### 1 Strategic and Policy Documents

Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security Strategy” revised in July 2021.

The National Security Strategy states that Russia's policies through now to strengthen its defense capabilities, domestic unity, and political stability, and modernize its economy, and develop its industrial base, have strengthened Russia as a sovereign state capable of pursuing an independent domestic and foreign policy and effectively opposing external pressures. This indicates Russia's awareness of the existence of external threats and its belief that it is a “strong state” that will not succumb to them. It also states that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) military activities around Russia are a military threat and that the deployment of U.S. intermediate- and short-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region is a threat to strategic stability.

In the defense section, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia's military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and combat readiness of Russian military forces, including the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF).

The Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as a document substantiating the principles of the National

Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of NATO's military infrastructure closer to Russia's borders including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and deployment of strategic missile defense (MD) systems. In addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defining the following as new military risks: NATO's military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; the rise of global extremism (terrorism); the formation of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening Russia's interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia.

In addition, the doctrine raises characteristics of modern military warfare as being the massive use of precision weapons, hypersonic weapons, electronic warfare equipment, all types of autonomous vehicles, and the like, as well as the phenomena of automation and centralization of operations through a network of automatic management systems. In addition, without using the phrase “hybrid warfare,” the doctrine also points out the integrated use of military force and political, economic, informational and other non-military measures, as well as participation in hostilities by irregular armed groups and private military companies.

The Military Doctrine positions nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of

nuclear wars and military conflicts that use conventional weapons. Regarding the criteria for its use, it states Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation not only for the use of nuclear or other WMDs, but also in the event of invasion using conventional weapons, where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

In June 2020, for the first time, Russia released a policy document, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” which is equivalent to the so-called nuclear doctrine. Criteria for the use of nuclear weapons are the same as the criteria described in the military doctrine, but the document clarifies the conditions for Russia to newly proceed to the use of nuclear weapons. In the “Basic Principles,” it is explained that, in addition to the “individual states [...] that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary,” “military coalitions (blocs, alliances)” in which these countries participate are also subject to Russia’s “red lines” for nuclear deterrence.

## 2 Defense Budget

With regard to Russia’s defense budget, the amounts executed from FY2011 to FY2016 (implemented amount) showed year-on-year double-digit growth and reached 4.4% of GDP. After that, it has generally remained at a level of around 3% of GDP, but original

budget in FY2024 accounts for 6% of GDP. Furthermore, the budget to be implemented in FY2023 (provisional amount) increased 36.9% from the previous year, and the original budget for FY2024 increased 68.2% from the previous year due to the aggression against Ukraine.<sup>1</sup>

 See Fig. I-3-5-1 (Changes in Russia’s Defense Expenditure)


## 3 Military Reform

Russia has promoted full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. By January 2021, joint strategic commands were placed instead of four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts) as well as the Northern Fleet (in charge of units facing the Arctic) and the military forces have been jointly operated under each District Commander in this system. However, since the commencement of the aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Russia shows some movements to increase strength as well as to enlarge and reorganize units.

Defence Minister Shoigu proposed to increase total strength to 1.5 million troops, establish two military districts in Moscow and Leningrad, reorganize several existing brigades into divisions, newly deploy one corps to the Finland border region, and other measures to President Putin at the Ministry of Defence staff conference expanded meeting in December 2022. At a meeting in December 2023, it was reported that the number of the military personnel had reached 1.15 million during the year and that two combined arms armies, a mixed aviation corps, four divisions, 18 brigades, and 28 regiments had already been newly formed. On February 26, 2024, President Putin signed a presidential decree on the reestablishment of military districts, which stipulated the creation of the Moscow Military District and the Leningrad Military District.

As for the navy, in May 2023 the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy expressed his recognition that “a strong navy directly commanded by the General Headquarters of the Navy is necessary,” and it has been pointed out that during the same year, each fleet of the Navy was withdrawn from the subordination of the military districts and returned to direct subordination to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy from corresponding military districts. This is believed to be because the Russian Navy placed more importance on

Fig. I-3-5-1 Changes in Russia’s Defense Expenditure



(Note) Data announced by the Russian Ministry of Finance and Federal Treasury (the amount for FY2014-FY2021 is expenditures, for FY2023 is expenditures budget (provisional) as of September 1 of the year, and for FY2024 is original budget.)

<sup>1</sup> According to documents published by Russia’s Ministry of Finance and Federal Treasury


establishing a unified operation of naval vessels and aircrafts by the General Headquarters of the Navy than

on an unified operation system at the military district level when operating its fleets

### 3 Military Posture and Trends

Russia's military forces are comprised of forces such as the AFRF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The AFRF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace Forces; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces.

In developing its military capabilities, after having been conscious of the United States, which it has confronted in the past, and ensured a balance in its nuclear forces, Russia is expanding equipment similar to that of advanced nations, such as land-attack cruise missiles capable of being precision-guided and unmanned vehicles, for its conventional forces that it perceives as inferior to those of advanced nations. As for its asymmetric responses, it is believed that Russia places importance on improving its so-called "A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area-Denial)" capabilities through long-range surface-to-air and surface-to-ship missile systems and electronic warfare equipment.

 Fig. 1-3-5-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military (image))

#### 1 Nuclear and Missile Forces

Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces not only to secure its global position and to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States, but also to supplement its conventional forces, which have been severely depleted in the course of its continued aggression against Ukraine. Russia is thus making efforts to maintain readiness, and is renewing various platforms, early-warning systems,

##### ICBM "Sarmat"

###### Specifications and performance

Under development (deployment scheduled in 2024)

###### Description

Advanced large (silo-launched) ICBM It is believed to be available for various types of warheads as a response to advanced missile defense systems and to be guided with Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS. 46 missiles scheduled to be deployed.



ICBM "Sarmat" [Official Rutube channel of the Russian Ministry of Defense]

and other equipment.

Regarding strategic nuclear forces, Russia possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers comparable to the United States in scale.

In 2011, Russia started the deployment of ICBM Yars, which is considered a multi-warhead version of ICBM Topol-M. The large ICBM "Sarmat" was scheduled to be deployed in 2023 in order to replace ICBM "Voyevoda" made in Ukraine during the Soviet era, but it has been pointed out that its launch tests in February and November 2023 may have failed, and at the end of the same year, Defense Minister Shoigu announced that preparations were underway for its deployment in 2024. Seven Borey-class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN), which carry the new-type SLBM Bulava, were commissioned. Also, there are plans to deploy five of such vessels each to the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet in the future. Russia also continues to carry out. The modernization renovation of Tu-95 bombers

##### Surface-to-surface missile system "Iskander"

###### Specifications, performance

Maximum range: 500km

###### Description

Ballistic and cruise missile types exist. The ballistic missile type is said to fly at a lower altitude than normal ballistic missiles and to take an irregular trajectory during the terminal phase.



Surface-to-surface ballistic missile system "Iskander" [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]

##### Sea-launched cruise missile system "Kalibr"

###### Specifications, performance

Range: Submarine-launched type (to-ground) approximately 2,000 km; Surface-launched type (to-ground) approximately 1,500 km  
Speed: Mach 0.8


###### Description

Actually used in Syria and Ukraine. Can be loaded on various platforms, and the Russian Navy continues to acquire loaded ships.



Sea-launched cruise missile system "Kalibr" [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]

Fig. I-3-5-2 Location and Strength of Russian Military (image)



		Russia		
Total military forces		Approx. 1,100,000 personnel		
Ground forces	Ground troops	Approx. 500,000 personnel		
	Tanks	T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 1,750 (Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 5,750 including mothballed ones)		
Sea power	Warships	1,179 vessels, Approx. 2,070,000 tons		
	Aircraft carriers	1 vessel		
	Cruisers	3 vessels		
	Destroyers	11 vessels		
	Frigates	18 vessels		
	Submarines	50 vessels		
	Marines	Approx. 250,000 personnel		
Air power	Combat aircraft	1,377 aircrafts		
	Modern fighter aircraft	MiG-29 × 108 Su-33 × 17 Su-35 × 111 Su-57 × 12	Su-30 × 125 Su-25 × 170 (Fourth generation fighter aircraft: Total 797) (Fifth generation fighter aircraft: Total 12)	MiG-31 × 142 Su-34 × 124
	Bombers	Tu-160 × 16 Tu-95 × 58 Tu-22M × 58		
Reference	Population	Approx. 141.51 million		
	Term of service	1 year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)		

(Note) Sources are "The Military Balance 2024," etc. Ground force's strength is including 550,000 Ground Force personnel, 40,000 Airborne troops personnel, and the 30,000 personnel of "the separatist in Eastern Ukraine" forces that Russia announced to incorporate to AFRF.

## ALBM "Kinzhal" It is suggested that Russia has used Zircon in Ukraine

## Specifications, performance

Speed: Mach 10 or more  
Range: 500 km (Total range with combat action radius of loaded aircraft: 2,000 km)



ALBM "Kinzhal" [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]

## Description

Air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) loaded on a fighter that can be maneuvered during flight.

Some point out that ALBM is an air-launched version of a ground-to-ground short-range ballistic missile system "Iskander."

and the new production of Tu-160 strategic bombers and Russian Ministry of Defence announced that four new Tu-160 strategic bombers were delivered in 2023.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia is working to deploy various non-strategic missiles such as the surface-to-surface missile system "Iskander," which is believed to be capable of carrying either conventional or non-strategic nuclear warheads, the sea-launched cruise missile system "Kalibr," the air-launched cruise missile Kh-101, and the air-launched ballistic missile "Kinzhal." Russia places these missiles as "non-nuclear deterrence by precise guided weapons," and considers them important. In particular, Russia has been promoting the deployment of warships capable of carrying the "Kalibr" submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) system in the Far East. It is necessary to closely watch this trend because it could have a major impact on the security environment around Japan.

## 2 New Types of Weapons

Russia has opposed ongoing missile defense system build ups by the United States domestically and abroad in recent years.

Russia announces that it develops the following various advanced weapons in order to penetrate missile defense systems deployed in the United States and other countries, that can be countermeasures for Russian ballistic missiles which are the foundations of Russia's nuclear forces.

- Hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) "Avangard," which is claimed to be capable of flying at speeds greater than Mach 20 in the intercontinental atmosphere
- Sea-launched hypersonic cruise missile (HCM) "Zircon," which has a believed range of 1,500 km with the maximum speed of Mach 9

## HGV "Avangard"

## Description

Viewed as capable of flying through the atmosphere at a speed exceeding Mach 20 and of avoiding MD systems by changing altitudes and trajectories. It is believed that 12 missiles were deployed as of the end of 2023.



ALBM "Kinzhal" [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]

## HCM "Zircon"

## Specifications, performance

Speed: Mach 9  
Range: 1,500 km

## Description

Ship-borne type HCM sharing a launcher with cruise missile "Kalibr." Started to be deployed in January 2023. Ground-to-ship version is reportedly under development.



HCM "Zircon" [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]

## Surface-to-air missile system "S-500"

## Description

Ground-to-air missile system succeeding "S-400." It is believed that pre-production models are currently experimentally deployed in air defense units around Moscow.



Surface-to-air missile system "S-500" [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]

- Nuclear cruise missile "Burevestnik," which is capable of flying at lower altitudes with no substantial range limitation
- Nuclear-powered unmanned underwater drone weapon "Poseidon," which is claimed to be able to navigate at high-speed in the deep sea

Of these new weapons, HGV "Avangard" is deployed already, and HCM "Zircon" is believed to be deployed because Russia announced in January 2023 that the Gorshkov-class missile frigate RFS Admiral Gorshkov, equipped with HCM "Zircon," is going to be deployed to the high seas as a part of the Northern Fleet. It is suggested that Russia has used Zircon in Ukraine.

Regarding Russia's own missile defense equipment, it is reported that the delivery of advanced **surface-to-air missile system "S-500"** to each unit started in spring of 2022, and it was announced that test launches of an advanced ballistic missile intercept missile system were conducted in November 2022.

### 3 Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Russia has conducted research and development for equipment based on its State Armament Program (GPV). However, it is pointed out that several factors, such as the need to cover the loss of equipment from the aggression against Ukraine, and very low availability of machine tools and various parts due to economic sanctions, are hindering the continuation of the GPV.

Land Forces continue tests for advanced equipment such as T-14 tanks and Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled 155 mm howitzers.

The Aerospace Force announced that deployment of the pre-production model of the so-called "fifth-generation fighter" Su-57 was started, and that it is putting effort into integration of unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft for UAV development.

The Russian Navy plans to increase the rate of modernization of its equipment to 70% by 2027. Because the development of surface vessels for coastal waters is being completed, the Navy will now move on to building surface vessels for the open sea.

### 4 Space and Electromagnetic Domain

The AFRF has also been stepping up its activities in the realms of space and electromagnetic spectrum in recent years. Russia is believed to be promoting the development of anti-satellite weapons such as the "Nudol" anti-satellite missile system. In November 2021, Russia announced that it would conduct a satellite destruction test using an anti-satellite missile. Since 2013, Russia has put satellites into both low and geostationary orbits to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), which have repeatedly been observed engaging in frequent RPO with other countries' satellites on geostationary orbits.

In the electromagnetic spectrum domain, since 2009, the AFRF has established an Electronic Warfare (EW)

Unit, and many new EW systems have been procured and distributed or allocated to each service and force. In particular, it has been pointed out that in Ukraine, various electronic warfare equipment, including the Pole-21, are being deployed on the front lines and used against the Ukrainian military's GPS-guided artillery shells and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

 Chapter 4, Section 2-2-3 (Russia); Chapter 4, Section 4-2-3 (Russia)

### 5 Trends Related to the AFRF (General)

Since 2010, the AFRF has been conducting large-scale round-robin exercises in each military district, with the objective of verifying the combat readiness of the military districts, etc.<sup>2</sup> These exercises are helping to improve the long-distance mobilization capability of the AFRF. In 2022, the strategic command and staff exercise Vostok 2022 was conducted in the Eastern Military District with over 50,000 troops, and 14 countries including China and India participated. Zapad 2023 scheduled for 2023 in The Western Military District, was canceled.

Among exercises for nuclear and missile forces, in February 2022, just prior to the start of the aggression against Ukraine, a large-scale missile exercise was conducted across Russia as a "strategic deterrence forces exercise" using strategic nuclear forces such as ICBMs and SLBMs as well as missile forces capable of carrying conventional or tactical nuclear warheads (Iskander, Kalibr, Kinzhal, and Zircon). In addition, a similar missile exercise for strategic nuclear forces also was conducted as "strategic deterrence training" in October 2022 and in October 2023.

In the Arctic Region, Russia is developing coastal surveillance radar networks for enhanced vigilance and surveillance. At the same time, Russia is rebuilding airfields and deploying Tu-22M medium-range bombers and MiG-31 interceptor fighters, while also deploying surface-to-air missiles and surface-to-ship missiles to develop sufficient preparedness for dealing with airborne threats from the north and attacks from ships. Along with these developments, Russia has built a large-scale residential facility for personnel at the base in two places within the Arctic Region.

In addition to the development of such military facilities, the AFRF has also been conducting such

<sup>2</sup> The exercises were conducted primarily in the Eastern, Central, Southern, and Western Military Districts, and are called "Vostok (East)," "Tsentr (Central)," "Kavkaz (Caucasus)," and "Zapad (West)" respectively.

activities r4 as various exercises by naval vessels, strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN, and patrol flights by long-range bombers. For example, the comprehensive Arctic expedition “Umka-2022” was held in the Chukchi Sea in 2022. The tactical exercise “Finval-2023” was held in the Bering Sea, outside the Arctic Ocean, in addition to the Chukchi Sea, and the AFRF is believed to be strengthening its defense posture in the Arctic by expanding the area in which it conducts exercises. In addition, Tu-95 bombers flew over the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea in June 2023, and some believe that these activities were conducted to contain Finland, which had joined NATO in April of the same year, and Sweden, which had joined in March 2024.

Russia thus appears to be stepping up military activities, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required.

## 6 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan

Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. Land Forces, the Pacific Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military District Commander, who conducts unified operation of these services. Meanwhile, in December 2023, Russian media reported that command of each fleet, including the Pacific Fleet, was transferred from the Military District Commanders to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It will be necessary to continue to closely monitor the trends in the Russian military’s chain of command, organizational restructuring, and changes in its joint operational posture since the aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of how the Russian military will reflect the lessons it learned in Ukraine in its operational posture.

The current presence of the AFRF in the Far East region is significantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. In recent years, Russia has also been deploying the latest equipment in the Far East. It announced that the percentage of new equipment in the Eastern Military District was 56% as of December 2021.

Given that the AFRF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with conflicts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to keep our attention on the trends

of the AFRF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions.

### (1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, approximately 30 Tu-95 bombers are deployed in Ukrainka, and it is reported that the Russian Ministry of Defence has plans to deploy Tu-160 long-range bombers newly in the Far East, so it will be necessary to keep e4 on future deployment trends of these bombers. As for maritime nuclear forces, four Borey-class SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. Russia plans on deploying five Borey-class SSBNs to the Pacific Fleet in the future.

### (2) Ground Forces

The Eastern Military District now consists of 31 brigades and two divisions with approximately 80,000 personnel in total, including motorized rifles (mechanized infantry), tanks, artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, material and technology security (logistics), and air defense, as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, “Bal” and “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile system.



Surface-to-ship missile system “Bastion”  
[Official YouTube channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]

### (3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The fleet is comprised of approximately 253 ships with a total displacement in the region of approximately 710,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 15 submarines (approximately 10 of which are nuclear powered submarines). Warships





Surface-to-ship missile system "Bal"  
【Official YouTube channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence】

equipped with cruise missile Kalibr have also been deployed sequentially to the Pacific Fleet since 2021. As of the end of FY2023, such warships as one Udaloy-class frigate and four improved Kilo-class submarines in Vladivostok, as well as one **Steregushchiy III-class frigate** and one Yasen-class nuclear-powered attack submarine in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy are deployed.

#### (4) Air Forces

In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately 320 combat aircraft from its Aerospace Forces and Navy combined. Existing models are being modernized and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters and the Su-34 fighter-bombers, are being introduced to improve their capabilities.

#### (5) Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

In the vicinity of Japan, the AFRF has been actively continuing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform.

The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak.

With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, various exercises and long-distance voyages have been

#### Steregushchiy III-class frigates

##### Specifications, performance

Full-load displacement: 2,235 tons (for the type without "Kalibr"), 2,500 tons (for the type with "Kalibr")

Maximum speed: 26 knots

Main armament: SS-N-30A

anti-ground cruise missile (anti-ground "Kalibr," maximum range:

1,500 km), SS-N-27A anti-ship

cruise missile (anti-ship "Kalibr," maximum range: 660 km), SS-N-26

anti-ship cruise missile ("P-800 Onix," maximum range: 300 km), 9M96

surface-to-air missile (maximum range: 60 km)

On-board aircraft: One helicopter (Ka-27)

##### Description

Russian Navy's new-type frigate. One frigate armed with "Kalibr" cruise missiles and four without are assigned to the Pacific Fleet.



Steregushchiy III-class frigates [Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]



Su-35 fighters 【Official YouTube channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence】

carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels, along with patrols by nuclear-powered submarines.

In April 2023, the commander of the Pacific Fleet was replaced for the first time in 11 years, and the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that a surprise inspection of the Pacific Fleet was conducted with the participation of more than 25,000 personnel and more than 160 vessels. Defense Minister Shoigu explained that the objective of this inspection was to "prevent the aggression of an enemy into the southern Sea of Okhotsk," indicating that Russia intended to show off the capability of the Russian Navy to actively operate in the Sea of Okhotsk, which Russia considers crucial as an operating area of strategic nuclear submarine, even while it is engaged in the aggression against Ukraine. In addition, President Putin stated during a related exercise that military power of the Pacific Fleet "can be used in conflicts on all fronts." It is believed that his statement was aimed to emphasize that the naval forces in the Far East are maintaining the combat readiness even while


ground forces are dispatched from the Eastern Military District to Ukraine.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long range bombers. Also, there were flights of Tu-95 bombers refueled in mid-flight and supported by A-50 early warning and control aircraft and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160. In October 2023, two Tu-95 bombers, accompanied by two fighter jets, flew from the Sea of Japan and headed southeast toward Japanese airspace, and one aircraft, presumed to be a Russian helicopter, violated the airspace over territorial waters off the Nemuro Peninsula in Hokkaido. According to the Russian Defence Ministry, two Tu-95 bombers flew over the Sea of Japan in January 2024.

 See Fig. I-3-5-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft)

Fig. I-3-5-3

Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft



## 4 Russian Forces in Japan's Northern Territories

Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed Land Forces units on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan.

While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division, which belongs to a corps still stationed in South Sakhalin, is located on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, anti-air missiles, and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles are deployed.

Furthermore, in recent years, Russia has been upgrading the facilities of its troops located in the Northern Territories. It is also deploying new equipment such as coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles belonging to its Navy and fighter aircraft belonging to its Aerospace Forces, conducting large-scale exercises, and continuing its vigorous military activities under the illegal occupation of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan.

Some point out the background for such moves as being the rising military importance of all of the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN, as well as the trend of increasing Russian military activities not only in the Northern Territories but also in South Sakhalin and the Chishima Islands, whose jurisdiction has not been determined.

In recent years, the deployment of major new equipment in the Northern Territories has included the

announced deployment of coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands in 2016, and in August 2018, three Su-35 fighters were reportedly deployed at the new civilian airport on Etorofu Island, which was opened to military and civilian dual use in January of that year.

As for equipment of the Land Forces, in December 2020, media related to the Russian Ministry of Defence reported the deployment of "**S-300V4**" **surface-to-air missile** (maximum firing range of 400 km) in Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. It has been revealed that the S-300V4s on both islands have disappeared since the aggression against Ukraine. The missing S-300V4s are believed to have been diverted for use in Ukraine, and the impact of continued operations in Ukraine is also evident in Russia's air defense posture in the Far East. Furthermore, in January 2022, it was announced that in the previous year, the tanks of the units located in the Northern Territories had been replaced with T-80BV

### Surface-to-air missile system "S-300V4"

#### Specifications, performance

Maximum firing range: 400 km

Maximum altitude: 37 km

#### Description

Air defense missile said to have capabilities to deal with stealth aircraft.



Surface-to-air missile system "S-300V4"  
[Official YouTube Channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence]

tanks, which are suitable for operation in cold regions.

Military exercises have also continued in the Northern Territories. In June 2021, landing and anti-landing exercises were conducted on Etorofu Island, Kunashiri Island, and South Sakhalin, involving over 10,000 military personnel, 500 ground equipment and machines, 32 aircraft, and 12 vessels.

In addition, in the vicinity of Sakhalin and the Chishima Islands, which, like the Northern Territories, are adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, it is reported that the AFRF newly deployed the S-400 surface-to-air missile system to South Sakhalin in February 2021, the surface-

to-ship missile system Bastion to South Sakhalin at the end of 2021, to Matua (Matsuwa) Island of the Chishima Islands in December 2021, and to Paramushir Island of the Chishima Islands in December 2022. There are reports on the establishment of a new coastal (surface-to-ship) missile brigade placed in South Sakhalin, with jurisdiction over units located on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. It is necessary to monitor with strong concern the Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories, while taking into account developments in the aggression against Ukraine.

## 5 Relations with Countries and Regions

### 1 General Situation

On March 31, 2023, President Putin approved the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation for the first time since 2016. In this document, Russia condemns Western countries for adopting anti-Russian policies and emphasizes cooperation with countries such as China and India, while stating that it aims to build a multipolar international order.<sup>3</sup> Moves to strengthen collaboration with China in particular have been seen since the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, seemingly in inverse proportion to the deepening of Russia's conflict with Western countries, and is significant especially since the aggression against Ukraine in February 2022.

### 2 Relations with the United States

President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia considers as "a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia's strategic interests."

On the military front, feeling that the United States' installation of missile defense systems both at home and abroad - including in Europe and the Asia-Pacific - undermines global and regional security, Russia has criticized these moves for upsetting the strategic balance. Russia is also moving forward with the development of new strategic weapons that are said to be capable of reliably penetrating missile defense systems.

In regard to arms control between the United States and Russia, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended in August 2019 during the former Trump administration after having gone through a

series of processes originating from the withdrawal announcement of the United States side. In November 2020, the United States pulled out of the Open Skies Treaty, which was signed by the Western countries and Russia allowing its participants to mutually conduct unarmed observation and surveillance flights, and this was followed by Russia announcing its withdrawal in January 2021.

On the other hand, with regard to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which set the upper limit of strategic nuclear forces for Russia and the United States, although both countries agreed on its unconditional extension for five years in January 2021, just before the expiration of the treaty in February of the same year, President Putin unilaterally declared "holding the treaty in abeyance" in February 2023, which is not stipulated in the treaty.

 See Chapter 2, Paragraph 3-2 (NATO's response)

### 3 Relations with China

Russia has exported military equipment such as surface-to-air missiles, fighter jets, and submarines to China since the 1990s until recent years. Russia also continues to advance close military cooperation even during the aggression against Ukraine, and Russia and China conduct various joint military actions.

In June and December 2023, the "China-Russia joint air patrol," which has been conducted annually since 2019 by Russian Tu-95 bombers and Chinese H-6 bombers, was conducted in the airspace from the Sea of Japan through the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

In September 2022, warships of Russia and China conducted joint training as a part of Russia Eastern

## Russia's Military Trends in the Area Surrounding Japan

As Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine, the country is believed to have suffered significant losses in conventional forces, primarily ground forces, including units deployed in the Far East region. These losses will likely further deepen its reliance on nuclear forces in the future. In the area surrounding Japan, Russia is expected to further focus on the defense of the area surrounding the Sea of Okhotsk, which is its waters of operation for strategic nuclear-powered submarines.

Regarding its strategic nuclear-powered submarines, Russia has deployed four new types of Borey-class SSBNs since 2015. In the future Russia is expected to have a total of five Borey-class SSBNs, and it is modernizing and upgrading some of its existing nuclear-powered submarines.

In recent years, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) has newly deployed “Bastion” and “Bal” surface-to-ship missiles and S-400 surface-to-air missiles in the Kamchatka Peninsula, which is in the vicinity of the Sea of Okhotsk, Russia’s waters of operation for nuclear-powered submarines; in the Chishima Islands and South Sakhalin, which are disputed territories; and in Japan’s Northern Territories. These moves are thought to be part of Russia’s so-called “bastion” strategy, in which it seeks to prevent other countries’ militaries from approaching the area around the Sea of Okhotsk, the waters where it operates its strategic nuclear-powered submarines.

In addition, from the perspective of strengthening the “bastion” strategy, the AFRF is expected to develop and utilize naval and air forces based in Primorsky Krai and the Kamchatka Peninsula. Specifically, Russia is in the process of upgrading the Pacific Fleet with ships armed with “Kalibr” cruise missiles, which are precision-guided munitions capable of carrying tactical nuclear

and conventional warheads. In Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, it is newly deploying Steregushchiy III class frigates and Yasen M class submarines, and in Vladivostok, it is newly deploying Improved Kilo-class submarines, both of which are capable of carrying “Kalibr” cruise missiles. “Zircon” hypersonic cruise missiles, which were deployed in January 2023, will also be equipped on Gorshkov-class missile frigates that are currently under construction and may be deployed in the Far East region in the future.

These naval and air forces are expected to be utilized on a regular basis to act as a deterrent to the United States and its allies, including Japan. Increased naval and air force activity was seen even before the start of aggression against Ukraine. For example, in December 2017, Russia deployed Tu-95 bombers to Biak in eastern Indonesia, and in the summer of 2021, the Pacific Fleet reportedly conducted a large-scale exercise in the central Pacific west of the Hawaiian Islands. Furthermore, with China, Russia has been conducting joint flights of bombers from 2019 onward and joint navigation of warships from 2021 onward in the area surrounding Japan.

We must watch Russia’s military developments in the Indo-Pacific region, including the area surrounding Japan, as well as trends in Russia’s cooperation with China, with strong concern.




A Russian Navy Kilo-class submarine that moved westward through the Soya Strait from October 6 to 7, 2022. It is believed to be the “Magadan,” the third Improved Kilo-class submarine in the Pacific Fleet capable of carrying the “Kalibr” cruise missile.

Fig. I-3-5-4


China-Russia Joint Flights (FY2023)

China-Russia Joint Flights (FY2023)


June 6, 2023



June 7, 2023



December 14, 2023



Military District strategic command and staff exercise Vostok 2022. After the exercise, warships of both navies, consisting mainly of vessels that participated in the exercise, conducted the China-Russia Joint Naval Patrol for the second time since October 2021, in the sea area around Japan. In July 2023, Russia's naval vessels participated in the exercise "Northern/Interaction-2023," led by China's Northern Theater Command in the Sea of Japan, and then through August, the two countries' naval vessels conducted their third "China-Russia joint navigation" in the sea area around Japan. These repeated joint flights of Russian and Chinese bombers and joint navigations of naval vessels are intended to be demonstrative behavior against Japan, so they are a significant concern for the security of Japan.



The Russian Navy Steregushchiy-class frigate "Gromkiy" firing live ammunition in the Sea of Japan off the western coast of Hokkaido, Japan in September 2022 as part of the "Vostok 2022" exercise

 See Fig. 1-3-5-4 (China-Russia Joint Flights (FY2023)); Section 2-3-2 (Relations with Russia)

#### 4 Relations with Former Soviet Republics

Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with former Soviet republics as one of its most important foreign policy objectives. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the region. It deploys its troops in the Collective Security Treaty Organization<sup>3</sup> (CSTO) members Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), and Ukraine (Crimea). Through the conclusion of an alliance and strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November 2014, the conclusion of an alliance and

integration treaty with South Ossetia in 2015, and other efforts, Russia has been working to ensure its military influence.

However, today, after more than thirty years have passed since the collapse of USSR, none of the former Soviet Union countries except Belarus support Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Some consider that Russia's influence on the former Soviet area will decline still further in the wake of the aggression against Ukraine.

Russia strengthens military cooperation with Belarus along with the start of the aggression against Ukraine. Belarusian President Lukashenko asked President Putin to modernize his country's aircrafts to allow them to carry nuclear weapons in June 2022, and President Putin agreed. It was announced in February 2023 that Belarusian forces deployed surface-to-surface missile system Iskander received from Russia. In May 2023, it was announced that the defense ministers of the two countries had signed documents regarding procedures for storing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. In December 2023, Belarusian President Lukashenko stated that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons that Russia had delivered to the Belarusian territory was completed in October.

In the Caucasus region, Azerbaijan launched a military operation in September 2023 to force Armenian forces to



President Aliyev leads at the military parade in Nagorno-Karabakh region [EPA/Jiji]

<sup>3</sup> CSTO is a military alliance consisting of six member states, namely Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Article 4 of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty, which is the grounds for establishing the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), states that, in the event of an act of aggression against any of the participating States, "all other participating States at the request of this participating State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary assistance, including military, and provide support by the means at their disposal in accordance with the right to collective defense pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter."

withdraw from the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which had unilaterally declared independence on Azerbaijan's territory and had been exercising effective control over the region. After being attacked by Azerbaijani forces, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic surrendered in September and signed an agreement for the dissolution of the republic by January 2024. Following the dissolution, nearly 80,000 of the 120,000 Armenian residents of the republic are believed to have fled to Armenia.

As a result of this conflict, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which had been exercising effective control over 4 part of Azerbaijan's territory for more than 32 years since the end of the Soviet Union, disappeared.

The Russian armed forces, stationed as peacekeeping forces in the republic, were unable to prevent the military conflict, which caused Armenia, a CSTO member state and Russia's military ally, to lose trust in Russia, and some believe this has exposed the decline of Russian influence in the region.

## 5 Relations with Other Countries

### (1) Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East, and security. In Asia, in addition to its relations with China, Russia assigns an important role to its Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership with India. In December 2021, in conjunction with the annual summit meeting, the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue of the Foreign and Defence Ministers was held in New Delhi. As for military arrangements, another example of the ongoing wide-ranging military cooperation between Russia and India is the joint exercise "INDRA," which has been taking place since 2003 with the involvement of the armies and navies of both countries, with their air forces also taking part in the recent years. Furthermore, Russia is working to strengthen its relations with ASEAN, and conducted the Naval Cooperative Exercise with ASEAN countries firstly in the inshore waters of Indonesia in December 2021. In addition, vessels from the Russian Pacific Fleet visited eight countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia between November and December 2023. In particular, Russia co-hosted an anti-terrorism tabletop exercise with Myanmar within the framework of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM-Plus) in August and then

conducted the first joint naval exercise between the two countries, the Myanmar-Russia Maritime Security Exercise (MARUMEX), in November.

Russia is also seen to be strengthening its cooperation with North Korea. In September 2023, Chairman Kim Jong-un visited the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russian Far East and held the first summit meeting with President Putin in four years. He also visited Komsomolsk-on-Amur and was briefed on the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter jet, and then he visited Vladivostok, where he was briefed on the Udaloy-class destroyer "Marshal Shaposhnikov".

### (2) Relations with European Countries

Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of common interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia thereafter, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC's ambassador-level meetings. Moreover, with the aggression against Ukraine, the relationship between Russia and European countries is the tensest it has been since the Cold War era.

 See Chapter 2, Paragraph 3-2 (NATO's response)

### (3) Relations with Middle Eastern and African Countries

In the Foreign Policy Concept published in March 2023, comprehensive mutual cooperation with Iran, total support for Syria, and deepened partnerships with Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other countries are stated definitely. Above all, for Syria, the AFRF has continued to secure the Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base in Syria since September 2015 to conduct operations to support the Assad administration. In operations in Syria, Russia has conducted bombings using fighter bombers and long-range bombers, as well as attacks using cruise missiles from surface ships and submarines deployed in the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. It has been pointed out that Russia maintains a military presence in Syria and is building permanent "A2/AD" capabilities by deploying long-range surface-to-air missiles, as well as expanding cooperation with neighboring countries such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Taking this into account, Russian influence over the eastern Mediterranean region,

especially Syria, cannot be ignored.

Russia is increasing its influence over both the Syrian situation and peace in Libya, while at the same time coordinating its interests with Türkiye. In May 2020, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) announced that Russian MiG-29 fighters were delivered to Libya after military aircraft insignia had been removed in Syria and accused of Russia's involvement in creating the war situation in Libya using private military companies (PMCs) that the Russian government supports. It has been also noted that approximately 2,000 personnel from PMCs under the General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defence are operating in Libya.

In December 2020, the Russian government announced an agreement with the government of Sudan to set up a naval base on the Red Sea in Sudan, northeastern Africa. If a base of the Russia Navy were to be established in Sudan in the future, it is believed that deployment capabilities of the AFRF would be improved in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

In January 2022, the Malian military spokesman stated that Russian instructors had been dispatched to the country under a bilateral agreement to train Mali's military, and It is reported that 1,000 personnel from PMCs under the General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defence are operating in Mali.

In February 2023, warships of the Russian Navy Northern Fleet including an Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate conducted a joint naval exercise with navies of China and South Africa in the Indian Ocean east of South Africa, for the second time since 2019.

## 6 Arms Exports

Russia actively promotes the export of arms not only to maintain the defense industrial base and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. Export control is exclusively conducted by the Rosoboronexport State Corporation. Currently, Russia has the third largest share of arms exports in the world after the United States and France,<sup>4</sup> exporting fighters, vessels and surface-to-air missiles to regions including Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. In recent years, Russia has actively tried to sell not only to conventional importers of its products but also to U.S. allies and U.S. friendly countries such as Türkiye. However, the U.S. Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) passed in 2017, and sanctions against Russia from Russia's aggression against Ukraine are seen to be having a severe impact on Russia's defense industry.

 Chapter 4, Section 1-5 (Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases)



**REFERENCE** : Security Environment Surrounding Japan (Russia)

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_act/sec\\_env/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/index.html)

<sup>4</sup> According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia had the third largest share of arms exports in the world (11%) after the United States and France between 2019 and 2023.



## Section 6 Oceania

### 1 Australia

#### 1 General Situation

Australia is an island nation that forms a continent solely with its own territory and has the geopolitical characteristics of being located at a certain distance from major powers and at low risk of being directly involved in international conflicts. It is promoting an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region and is a special strategic partner with Japan; sharing fundamental values and strategic interests.

#### 2 Defense Policies

##### (1) Defense Strategies

Given the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and China in 1970s, Australia had improved its relations with China and it continued to assume that there was no immediate or direct threat to Australia. Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities conducted in 1986, assessed itself as "one of the most secure countries in the world" and indicated that it would receive at least 10-years' warning before any major attack on Australia. This outlook defined Australia's defense policy even after the Cold War.

In July 2020, the former Morrison Conservative Coalition Government released the 2020 Defence Strategic Update to reconsider its defense strategy in response to Australia's strategic environment that had deteriorated more rapidly than anticipated due to military modernization in the Indo-Pacific region and intensifying competition between major powers, including the United States and China. The former government stated that Australia's defense plan based on the aforementioned 10-year warning time was no longer appropriate.

Furthermore, the objectives for Australia are to deploy military power: (1) to shape Australia's strategic environment, (2) deter actions against the country's interest and (3) respond with credible military force when required. To achieve the objectives, the Australian Government plans to deploy military capabilities including a long-range strike capability and grey-zone response capability.

The Albanese Labor Party Government formed in May 2022 clearly stated that it would follow the basic direction of the previous government's defense policy and announced that it would conduct Defence Strategic Review (DSR) to implement this policy and optimize the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

In April 2023, following the completion of the DSR, conducted by the former Minister of Defence and the former Chief of the ADF, the Government released the National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, which includes the Review itself and the government's response to the challenges set out in DSR to reform the Defence's posture and structure. The DSR recommended to transform the ADF from a traditional "balanced force" capable of responding to range of contingencies and having low-level conflicts in mind to a "focused force" designed to address the nation's most significant military risks. It also recommended that the A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) capability be enhanced by adopting a "Strategy of Denial"<sup>1</sup> and improving long-range strike capability, undersea warfare capability and shorter-range capability.

The Albanese Government agreed with these recommendations by the DSR in principle and identified priority areas for immediate action, including the following:

- Acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS to improve Australia's deterrence capabilities
- Developing the ADF's ability to precisely strike targets at longer-range
- Improving the ADF's ability to operate from Australia's northern bases

To achieve the above, the Government developed the National Defence Strategy (NDS) and the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) in April 2024. The Government has announced that it will update these two documents biennially and also announced to boost defense spending to 2.4% of GDP by 2033.

##### (2) AUKUS initiatives

In September 2021, then Prime Minister Scott Morrison, along with the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom, announced the establishment of a

<sup>1</sup> According to the National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, a strategy of denial is a defensive approach designed to stop an adversary from succeeding in its goal to coerce states through force, or the threatened use of force, to achieve dominance

new trilateral security cooperation framework, AUKUS, aimed at deepening diplomatic, security and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Through this framework, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia announced to promote (1) deeper information- and technology-sharing, (2) foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial infrastructure and supply chains and (3) deeper cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities. Furthermore, as concrete initiatives, they clarified: (1) support for Australia to acquire at least eight nuclear-powered submarines<sup>2</sup> and (2) technical cooperation for advanced capabilities (cyber, artificial intelligence [AI]), quantum technology and undersea capabilities).

In April 2022, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced in relation to aforementioned (2) that they would deepen their cooperation regarding hypersonics and counter-hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare, defense innovation and information sharing.

In addition, Australia has announced its intention to advance cooperation with the United States on the introduction of Tomahawk cruise missiles and standoff missiles, as well as on the development of hypersonic missiles for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

In March 2023, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States held a summit meeting in the U.S. and announced that they will deliver conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines for Australia through three-phase approach, while meeting the commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. In the first



Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. leaders announcing Australia's policy to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, at U.S. Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego (March 2023) [DVIDS]

phase, the U.S. and the U.K. plan to establish rotational presence of their nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) as early as 2027 at the HMAS Stirling on western Australia and the Royal Australian Navy will also be on board to conduct practical training. The second phase is to acquire up to five U.S. Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s. In the third phase, AUKUS partners will deliver a trilaterally-developed submarine (SSN-AUKUS) for both Australia and the U.K. They will incorporate the cutting-edge submarine technologies of the U.S. to the U.K.'s next-generation design. The two countries intend to build the submarines in their domestic shipyard.

In December 2023, Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. held an AUKUS defense ministers' meeting and confirmed the progress of support for Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and advanced technology cooperation. During the meeting, it was announced that: Australian Navy crew would begin operations in Guam in 2024 to acquire nuclear-powered submarine maintenance skills in support of the Submarine Rotational Force – West (SRF-West) that will be established off the west coast of Australia. The three countries will conduct joint experiments and exercises with uncrewed maritime systems and share and process maritime data in real time to improve their the maritime domain awareness and all three countries will promote the technological development of quantum sensing to improve undersea positioning capabilities and to accelerate technological development of submarine-based undersea vehicle as part of efforts to further develop the SSN-AUKUS.

In April 2024, an AUKUS defense ministers' joint statement was issued, confirming cooperation in the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS's Pillar I, while announcing its consideration of that cooperating with Japan under Pillar II, the area of advanced capabilities.

### 3 Relations with Foreign Countries

#### (1) Relationship with the United States

Australia and the United States have an alliance based on the ANZUS (Security Treaty among Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America) Treaty,<sup>3</sup> a mutual defense treaty that underpins Australia's security

2 Australia had planned to procure 12 conventional submarines (attack-class submarines) from France, but this plan was suspended when it was decided to acquire nuclear-powered submarines within the framework of AUKUS.

3 A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand due to its adoption of a non-nuclear policy. The treaty is thus effective only between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand.

policy. In response to the spread of communism in East Asia and the descending British influence in the Asia-Pacific after World War II, Australia strengthened its alliance with the United States, mainly possessing U.S.-made high-performance land, sea and air equipment. Australia has dispatched its troops to U.S.-led wars and conflicts, such as the Vietnam War, the Gulf War and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the foreign affairs and defense ministerial consultations or AUSMIN (Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations), to discuss major diplomatic and security issues. In July 2023, AUSMIN was held in Australia and in their joint statement, both countries noted that the U.S.-Australia alliance has never been stronger and committed to expanding collaboration between the two countries, as well as with regional partners and institutions, to ensure an Indo-Pacific that is open, stable, peaceful, prosperous and respectful of sovereignty.

In November 2011, the United States and Australia announced the “Force Posture Initiative,” a framework for the rotational deployment of the U.S. forces to Australia as part of the U.S. rebalance policy during the Obama administration. Since 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps has been deployed on a rotational basis to northern Australia, including Darwin. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force has been deploying B-52 strategic bombers and F-22 fighter jets to Australia as needed to conduct joint exercises and training with the RAAF. In July 2023, the rotational deployment of the U.S. Army landing craft took place for the first time during the U.S.-Australia joint exercise “Talisman Sabre.” The United States and Australia have also indicated their intention to deploy the U.S. Navy patrol and reconnaissance aircraft on a rotational basis in Australia in the future.

Since 2005, the U.S. Forces and ADF have biennially conducted “Talisman Sabre” to improve interoperability and strengthen ties among participating countries. In 2023, it was the largest exercise ever, with 13 countries participating, with Indonesia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga participating for the first time. The exercise was conducted in the land, maritime and air domains, including amphibious operations and land combat training.

## (2) Relationship with China

China is Australia’s largest trading partner and two countries have conducted various exchanges in the

defense area such as dialogues between the defense authorities, bilateral exercises, and mutual visiting of vessels, in addition to exchanges and cooperation in the political areas.

Meanwhile, Australia has been clearly showing its wariness towards China by explicitly conveying its stance on China given the military use of South China Sea and its expansion to Pacific island countries.

The Australian government has been expressing strong concerns over China’s reclamation and construction activities in South China Sea and opposing any unilateral attempt to change or influence the status quo through militarization or coercive actions on disputed features. It has also expressed its intent to continue exercising its rights to freedom of navigation and overflight.

In April 2020, Australia had suggested the necessary for an independent investigation into the origin of novel coronavirus outbreak in China. China successively imposed trade blockages on Australian beef and other products, leading to a rapid deterioration of the Australia-China relations.

Subsequently with the change of government in Australia, the two countries resumed diplomatic and security dialogue and the first Australia-China defense ministers’ meeting in about three years was held in June 2022. In November 2023, Prime Minister Albanese visited China and met with President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Qiang. This visit of Australian Prime Minister to China was the first time in seven years.

On the other hand, according to the Australian government, in November 2023, there was an incident which had resulted in the injury of an Australian diver. When the diver on the Royal Australian Navy frigate; frigate conducting monitoring and surveillance activities against North Korea’s illicit “ship-to-ship transfers”, was removing a fishing net entangled in the ship’s screw within Japan’s EEZ, sonar waves were emitted by a Chinese navy guided-missile destroyer sailing nearby and had injured the Australian diver. The Australian government expressed serious concerns to the Chinese government, describing the Chinese navy’s activity as dangerous and unprofessional, but the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted the Chinese military had consistently conducted professional operations in accordance with international law and practice.

## (3) Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries

In its 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Australia

announced a policy of focusing on the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the adjacent areas from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland Southeast Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific.

Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense fields following the signing of the Lombok Treaty, a security cooperation framework, in November 2006 and the elevation of their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in August 2018. The bilateral relationship has been strengthened through initiatives such as the regular holding of Foreign and Defense Ministers Meetings (2+2) and the announcement in February 2024 that they are considering a treaty-level defense cooperation agreement.

With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out regular combined joint exercises in the South China Sea and other areas under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA; entered into force in 1971) framework, whereby the two countries, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand would consult together in the event of any form of armed attack or threat of such attack against Singapore or Malaysia, for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken. Australia considers that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner and that they share Australia's interest in a secure maritime trading environment. The defense cooperation between the two countries is also deepening, including the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Military Training and Training Area Development in Australia under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in October 2016. Regarding Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force Base Butterworth and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern

Indian Ocean.

Australia has been strengthening its defense relationship with the Philippines, primarily through support for building counter-terrorism capabilities and at the Australia-Philippines defense ministers' meeting in February 2023, it was concurred that this meeting would be held annually from the following year. Australia has been participating in the U.S.-Philippines joint exercise Balikatan since 2014 and in August 2023 it conducted its first Australian-Philippines amphibious exercise, Exercise Alon, which included scenario training for reclaiming enemy-captured island. Additionally, in November the same year, Australian and the Philippines forces conducted Maritime Cooperative Activity in the water and air around the Philippines for the first time.

Regarding Pacific Island countries, the Albanese Government criticized the former Morrison Government for failing to intervene in the signing of a framework agreement between Solomon Islands and China on security cooperation in April 2022 and announced a basic policy to strengthen engagement with Pacific Island countries. Based on this policy, the government announced the establishment of Australia Pacific Defence School to provide training programs for members of Pacific Island countries and security forces and the establishment of a framework to support the development of climate-resilient infrastructure for these countries for which climate change is a critical issue.

Australia plays a leading role in assisting these countries in fields such as security maintenance, natural disasters response and maritime patrol. In addition, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. Australia has provided 18 Guardian-class patrol boats to Pacific island nations.

 See Paragraph 2 (New Zealand) and Section 7 (Southeast Asia)

## Commentary

**Security Issues Faced by Pacific Island Countries**

Pacific Island Countries is a collective term for 14 island countries located in the South Pacific Ocean. They are important to Japan as they are a source of abundant marine resources due to their vast exclusive economic zones and serve as transport routes for energy resources.

On the other hand, due to their distance from other regions and their narrow and dispersed national territories, they face various constraints and vulnerabilities, and none of them, excluding three countries, have their own military. Under these circumstances, they position climate change as the single greatest security threat and take the loss of land due to rising sea levels and the expansion of natural disasters seriously.

These countries have traditionally had deep relationships with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. However, in recent

years geopolitical competition between the major powers has become apparent due to China's increasingly active international approach. For example, while China secured a security cooperation agreement with the Solomon Islands that reportedly includes provisions that allow the dispatch of Chinese police and military to them as well as Chinese port calls and replenishment of ships, the United States has signed a defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea, which is said to include U.S. military access to Papua New Guinea's ports and airports. Furthermore, as China seeks to expand its influence through large-scale infrastructure development and the dispatch of hospital ships, the United States is attempting to maintain and expand its existing military presence simultaneously. Thus, competition between the United States and China over involvement in the region is attracting attention.

**2 New Zealand**

New Zealand is located in the Indo-Pacific and is an important strategic cooperative partner that shares fundamental values with Japan.

In July 2022, the Department of Defence (DoD) announced that it would conduct a Defence Policy Review to formulate a long-term defense strategy in light of the growing impact of climate change and the intensification of strategic geopolitical competition, including Russia's aggression against Ukraine. It was decided that this "review" would be implemented through the development of four documents.

In August 2023, as the first phase of this "review," the DoD, recognizing that the country is facing the most challenging strategic environment than it had for decades, released the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement, which sets out defense policy goals and strategies and announced the Future Force Design Principles, which guide the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF) investment plans for the next 15 years.

In its Statement, the Department of Defence (DoD) noted that the heightened competition and tensions in the disputed Indo-Pacific region could have significant impact on New Zealand's interests and that the impact of climate change will exacerbate existing fragilities within Pacific Island countries and across the region which in turn can increase economic and governance

risks. On China, the DoD observed that the country is using all instruments of national power in ways that can pose challenges to existing international rules and norms. Also, it is assessed that China continues to invest heavily in growing and modernizing its military, and is increasingly able to project its military and paramilitary force beyond its immediate region, including across the wider Indo-Pacific region.

In light of this assessment, the DoD indicated that the Defence Forces would shift its focus to more actively shaping the country's security environment, rather than responding to incidents as they happen. Regarding climate change, the DoD affirmed its commitment to continuing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities for Pacific Island countries in cooperation with like-minded countries and others.

The DoD intends to release a defence white paper with the final defense policy, strategy, capabilities and budget, as well as a defence capability plan outlining a defense development plan to complete the Defence Policy Review.

As for diplomatic relations, New Zealand has maintained close relationships with the United States and Australia and sees Australia as its only formal defense ally.

## Section 7 Southeast Asia

### 1 General Situation

Southeast Asia is the center of the Indo-Pacific region, located at the intersection of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean and occupies a strategic position for traffic, linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. Therefore, it is an important region for Japan, which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people.

Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, and separatist and independence movements. Moreover, there has also been problems with Islamic extremist groups and piracy incidents

obstructing the safe passage of ships. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Each country is also pursuing cooperation respectively with such countries as the United States, China, Russia, and Australia to this end. Recently, given the backdrop of economic development, countries have been modernizing their military forces, mainly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capabilities.

### 2 Security and Defense Policies of Each Country

#### 1 Indonesia

Indonesia is a major country in Southeast Asia, with the world's largest Muslim population. At the same time, it is the largest archipelago country in the world as it has vast territorial waters and occupies a strategic position for maritime traffic.

As part of its military force reform, Indonesia aims to meet the minimum requirements for defense capabilities—what it calls “Minimum Essential Force (MEF).” In particular, Indonesia acknowledges that its maritime defense capabilities are still very much inadequate. Accordingly, Indonesia has announced a defense budget increase as well as a policy to bolster its deployment of assets to the Natuna Islands, in the South China Sea, and other locations. Indonesia has deployed an integrated unit and an air squadron, etc., and in December 2018, it was reported that the transfer of the headquarters of a naval combat group command to Natuna is almost completed, that an opening ceremony of a military base with piers that can accommodate submarines, and hangars for unmanned vehicles was conducted, and furthermore, that the ground-breaking ceremony for a submarines support

facility was held in April 2021.

Concerned about the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, which overlaps with Indonesia's EEZ in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has enhanced its patrol activities in the area. In December 2019, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a note of protest on the grounds that a Chinese Coast Guard vessel had been found to have operated illegally in the EEZ around the Natuna Islands by escorting fishing fleet.

Indonesia adopts a free and active foreign policy and emphasizes cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.

With the United States, Indonesia is strengthening its cooperative relationship in such fields as military education and training and military equipment procurement. In addition, Indonesia has carried out bilateral training including army exercise Garuda Shield, naval exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)<sup>1</sup> and counter terrorism exercise Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)<sup>2</sup> with the U.S. In 2023, Indonesia continued on from the previous year to conduct multilateral multi-service exercise Super Garuda Shield, participated by armed forces of Australia and Singapore, the Self-Defense Forces of Japan, and others.

<sup>1</sup> A general term that refers to a series of bilateral naval exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh and other Southeast Asian nations.

<sup>2</sup> Refers to counter-terrorism combined exercises that the United States conducts with Southeast Asian nations.

## 2 Malaysia

Malaysia's first defense white paper, which was published in December 2019, finds its potential to serve as a bridge between the vast Pacific and Indian Oceans as the country is divided in two territories—Peninsular Malaysia, and Sabah and Sarawak, on the island of Borneo—located between the two oceans. The white paper also recognizes the fact that, while Malaysia's strategic location and natural resources are blessing ones, they also pose a security challenge to itself. Given these attributes, Malaysia has historically been affected by the political dynamics of major powers, and even today, Malaysia sees in its defense white paper that uncertain U.S.-China relationship is the most important strategic challenge for Malaysia.

In connection with the recent continued anchoring of Chinese vessels around South Luconia Shoal, over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia has announced that its Navy and maritime law enforcement agencies would conduct around-the-clock monitoring, and that Malaysia would protect its sovereignty.

Along with this expression of protest and strengthening of its maritime defense capabilities, the Minister of Defense reportedly announced the decision to establish a new naval and air base near the airport in Bintulu, which is close to James Shoal and South Luconia Reef.

Malaysia has also striven to bolster its defense posture in eastern Malaysia including carrying out live-fire missile exercises in Sabah state, on Borneo in eastern Malaysia in July 2019.

In particular, as well as conducting bilateral exercises with the U.S. such as CARAT and SEACAT, Malaysia has been promoting military cooperation including capacity building in the maritime security field.

Malaysia also prioritizes defense relations based on the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)<sup>3</sup> and has established the headquarters of the Integrated Area Defence System (IADS), which coordinates the activities of the FPDA, at the Royal Malaysian Air Force Butterworth Air Base.

## 3 Myanmar

Myanmar shares borders with China and India and is a gateway to the Indian Ocean for China and some ASEAN countries. In light of these factors, Myanmar is

noted for its strategic significance. Its armed forces had control over the government following the collapse of the socialist regime in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the West, the transition to civilian rule was completed based on the road map to democracy.

Myanmar's parliamentary election was conducted in November 2020, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) secured an overwhelming single majority in both houses with the number of seats significantly higher than the previous election. However, in February 2021, then State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and her party's senior members were detained by Myanmar's military, which was claiming election fraud, and the armed forces declared a state of emergency to carry out a coup d'état, and powers were handed over to the commander-in-chief. The State Administration Council (SAC) chaired by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces Min Aung Hlaing was formed by the Armed Force.

Then, in April of the same year, although the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) instituted by Pro-Democracy Group declared the establishment of the National Unity Government (NUG), the Armed Forces designated them and others as Terrorist Organizations. After the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting held the same month with the presence of a Myanmar military representative, a "Five-Point Consensus" was agreed to, recognizing ASEAN's proactive and constructive role in promoting a peaceful resolution. In August of the same year, SAC announced the establishment of an "interim government" with the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces as the "provisional prime minister."

Since late October 2023, fighting has intensified in the northeast, with three ethnic armed groups launching large-scale attacks on the Armed Force, and the Armed Force retreating from several towns. In early January 2024, the ethnic minority side revealed that more than 2,300 Armed Force soldiers, including generals, had surrendered in the eastern region. Meanwhile, in mid-January, the Armed Force and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Armed Force and the three ethnic armed groups had reached a ceasefire agreement in northern Myanmar, mediated by China. The details of this ceasefire agreement have not been publicized, and its effectiveness remains to draw attention.

At the ASEAN Summit meeting held in May 2023, the

<sup>3</sup> Entered into effect in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of an aggression towards or a threat of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The five countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements.

Chairman's Statement expressing continued deep concern over the escalation of the conflict and violence was issued. In January 2024, Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar Alounkeo visited Myanmar and held talks with current "regime" officials, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and ethnic armed groups.

Myanmar has maintained a good relationship with China since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1950 and the country is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. Myanmar has also received Chinese aid for pipeline construction and the development of Kyaukpyu Port. In January 2020, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to visit Myanmar for 19 years and affirmed China's policy of promoting economic cooperation through the The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Myanmar maintains a cooperative relationship with Russia in the military field since the period of the past military regime, and Russia was a destination for students from Myanmar and a supplier of major defense equipment. In July 2022, the Commander-in-Chief visited Russia, and discussed promotion of defense cooperation with the Deputy Defense Minister. Furthermore, in September 2022, the Commander-in-Chief met President Putin for the first time, in Vladivostok, to exchange views on cooperation in all sectors, emphasizing their good bilateral relations.

Cooperative relations with North Korea, including weapons trades, were maintained under Myanmar's military regime in the past. Following the transition to democracy, although Myanmar denied its military ties to North Korea, the report issued by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea in March 2018 reported that the country received a ballistic missile system and other weapons from North Korea.

A report published by the United Nations Human Rights Council in May 2023 indicated that from February 2021, when the military launched its coup, until December 2022, at least \$1 billion worth of weapons and components for manufacturing them were exported from foreign countries to Myanmar. This included Myanmar's imports such as Su-30 fighter jets from Russia and JF-17 fighter jets from China.

#### 4 The Philippines

The Philippines considers that its archipelagic attributes and geographic location are a source of both strength and vulnerability. Moreover, the country sees that its strategic

location and rich natural resources have also provided a strong temptation to expansionist powers. Traditionally, the Philippines has positioned resolving internal armed conflicts as its greatest security concern, but it has begun to shift its focus to strengthening territorial defense against the backdrop of the recent dismantling and weakening of domestic anti-government armed groups and rising tensions in the South China Sea.

The Philippines, with a historically close relationship with the United States, has maintained a cooperative relationship with the U.S. under Mutual Defense Treaty and Military Assistance Agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992.

In February 1998, the two countries signed a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which prescribed the legal status of U.S. military personnel when the U.S. Forces conducts combined military exercises or other related activities in the Philippines.

Furthermore, in April 2014, the two countries signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allows enhanced cooperation in disaster relief, rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces, construction and improvement of agreed locations in the Philippines by the U.S., and U.S. Forces' prepositioning of equipment and others. In March 2016, the two countries agreed on five bases of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for carrying out defense cooperation under the EDCA. Although former President Duterte notified the United States its intention to terminate the VFA in February 2020, he decided to withdraw the notice in July 2021. In recent years, the two countries have been conducting various military exercises, including large-scale exercise Balikatan, amphibious exercise KAMANDAG, and maritime exercise Sama Sama.

President Marcos, who took office in June 2022, met with President Biden of the U.S. for the first time in person in September 2022 in New York. The two leaders discussed the situation in the South China Sea and underscored their support for freedom of navigation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In February 2023, defense ministers of the U.S. and the Philippines announced the agreement to designate four new bases for the EDCA. These four bases consist of three in northern Luzon Island near Taiwan and one on Palawan Island facing the South China Sea. Furthermore, in May 2023, the U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines were adopted and released for the first time, which serve as a roadmap of modernization of alliance cooperation and deepening interoperability between the



U.S. and the Philippines.

In September 2023, the U.S.-Philippines joint navigation, which had ended under the Duterte administration, was carried out, with a U.S. destroyer and a Philippines frigate conducting joint navigation in the South China Sea. In November, in the water and air surrounding the Philippines, including the South China Sea, they carried out Maritime Cooperative Activities. Thus, the defense cooperation between the two countries has begun to progress again since the inauguration of the new administration.

The Philippines and China have competing claims over the sovereignty in the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal of the South China Sea. In January 2013, seeking a settlement under international law, the Philippines started arbitral tribunal proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS against China. In July 2016, the final award was rendered, accepting nearly all of the Philippines' submissions. The Government of the Philippines released a statement that it welcomed the award by the arbitral tribunal and strongly affirmed its respect for the decision.

The conflicts between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea dispute were observed even after 2020 during which the COVID-19 infections became a global pandemic. The Philippines protested that a Chinese military vessel had directed fire-control radars at a Philippine Navy ship in February 2020, and that China had established administrative districts on islands in the South China Sea in April of the same year. In his policy speech in July 2022, President Marcos emphasized that he would not allow any attempt by foreign power to take even one square inch of the Philippines' sovereign territory. Furthermore, in the same month, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines released a statement commemorating the sixth anniversary of the award.



Chinese Coast Guard vessel firing water on a Philippine supply ship near Second Thomas Shoal (December 2023) [AFP-Jiji]

In January 2023, President Marcos met with President Xi Jinping during his state visit to China. They agreed to appropriately manage the differences between the two countries regarding the South China Sea issue through peaceful means, and also agreed to establish a direct communication mechanism between the diplomatic authorities of the two countries. However, since then, there have been frequent reports of obstructive activities by Chinese Coast Guard vessels and other vessels against the Philippine vessels in areas such as the Spratly Islands.

For example, the Philippines government announced that in December 2023, The Philippines supply ship and the Philippines Coast Guard Vessel were obstructed by the Chinese Coast Guard vessel and others through dangerous maneuvers such as intentional collisions and firing of water cannon near the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, where the Philippines warship Sierra Madre was stranded. The Philippines' supply ship, escorted by a Philippines Coast Guard Vessel, was attempting to replenish the supplies of the stranded warship. In response, President Marcos condemned the action by the Chinese vessels towards the Philippines vessels and their personnel, pointing out that it was aggression and provocation, and a clear violation of international law. The same month, Defense Minister Teodoro held a telephone conversation with U.S. Defense Secretary Austin. During the conversation, it was reiterated that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to both countries' armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft -including those of its coast guard-anywhere in Pacific, to include the South China Sea.

**See** Chapter 4, Section 5-1 (Trends Related to the "Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas," etc.)

## 5 Singapore

Given its limited land area, population, and resources, Singapore's existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy. Singapore highly prioritize its national defense, with defense spending accounting for about 10% of its national budget. In October 2022, the Digital and Intelligence Service was established as the fourth service of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), integrating existing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and cyber capabilities.

Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative relations with ASEAN and the FPDA, and has concluded

defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region.

With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific. Since signing the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (November 1990), Singapore has been allowing the United States to use military facilities in the country. In addition to the port calls to Changi Naval Base by U.S. aircraft carriers, the rotational deployment of Littoral combat ships (LCSs) began in 2013. In 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S. Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week for the first time. The two countries have committed to continue carrying out similar deployments routinely. In addition, Singapore conducts combined exercises with the U.S., such as CARAT and SEACAT.

Singapore has strong economic ties with China, and the two countries also conduct bilateral naval exercises. In October 2019, the two countries signed the enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADESC), which formalized existing defense cooperation, including regularization of dialogue and exercises. On the other hand, diplomatic relations with China have been strained partly due to Singapore's advocacy of the ruling of the arbitral tribunal to Philippines v. China when it comes to the resolution of the South China Sea disputes and partly due to Singapore's defense cooperation with Taiwan.

In March 2020, Singapore and Australia signed the Treaty on Military Training and Training Area Development in Australia. This treaty enables the Singapore Armed Forces to access Australia's training area which will be newly developed.

 See Section 6-1-3 (3) (Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries)

## 6 Thailand

Thailand's defense policy includes: strengthening defense cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations, and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive use of political, economic, and other national strengths; and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing the defense industry.

Under its flexible omni-directional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries.

In particular, Thailand has an alliance with the United

States based on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Treaty) (effective from February 1955), and the U.S. military has access to the Thai military's U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield. Thailand has been conducting the U.S.-Thailand combined exercise "Cobra Gold" since 1982, which is currently one of the largest multilateral exercises in Southeast Asia. In addition, the marine corps of the two countries have continued their combined naval training CARAT and counter-piracy and trafficking exercise SEACAT.

Thailand and China have conducted combined training such as Blue Strike between their marines and Falcon Strike between their air forces.

## 7 Vietnam

Based on its viewpoint that the sea is closely associated with the national construction and defense, Vietnam has established the objective of becoming a strong marine country, particularly prioritizing the modernization of its military forces and law enforcement forces at sea as well as ensuring the capability for maritime domain awareness, maritime independence, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national interests at sea.

Vietnam deploys its omni-directional diplomatic policy and intends to actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with every nation. In March 2016, Vietnam opened an international port in the Cam Ranh Bay, which is located in a strategically important location, and Navy vessels from many countries including Japan have called at the international Cam Ranh Bay port.

Vietnam and the United States have strengthened their military relations in recent years. This has taken such forms as combined training with the U.S. Navy and port calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In 2017, mutual visits were conducted by the leaders of both countries and an agreement was reached on the deepening of defense cooperation. In March 2018, the USS Carl Vinson became the first U.S. aircraft carrier to visit Vietnam since the Vietnam War. In September 2023, during U.S. President Biden's first visit to Vietnam as president, he met with then President Trường and agreed to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. In this context, the United States committed to continue to support Vietnam in building an independent defense capability.

Vietnam and Russia continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense, with Vietnam dependent on Russia for the majority of its defense equipment.

In April 2018, the two countries signed a military and technical cooperation roadmap, while in July 2019, a Vietnamese naval vessel visited the port of Vladivostok for the first time. In December the same year, a submarine rescue vessel from Russia's Pacific Fleet visited the port of Cam Ranh and participated in the first bilateral joint submarine rescue exercise.

**See** Section 5-5-5 (1) (Relations with Asian Countries)

Vietnam has been actively engaging in high-level government exchanges with China under their comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership. In December 2023, President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam and met with General Secretary of the Communist Party Nguyen. The joint statement noted that joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and mutual visits by warships would continue, and that the cooperation and exchange mechanisms between their navies and coastguards would be deepened.

On the other hand, there are conflicting claims over territorial issues in the South China Sea. The defense white paper published in November 2019 demonstrates an

acknowledgement that Vietnam and China need to resolve the territorial disputes with special precaution, avoiding negative impacts on general peace, friendship, and cooperation for development between the two countries. As such, it recognizes that the two countries should continue negotiations and consultations to find peaceful solutions on the basis of international law. In August 2023, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Vietnam reported that a Vietnamese fishing boat engaged in fishing activities in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands was damaged by water sprayed by a "vessel marked with Chinese characters." The report included a photo of the vessel marked with the characters "China Coast Guard."

On the other hand, it is also pointed out that, while still falling short of the scale of the China's past reclamation, Vietnam has accelerated and expanded landfill work at several of its outposts in Spratly Islands, where Vietnam is competing for territorial rights against China.<sup>4</sup>

**See** Chapter 4, Section 5-1 (Trends Related to the "Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas," etc.)

### 3 Military Modernization in the Region

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces, focusing on inducting equipment such as submarines and fighters, including fourth-generation fighters.

In addition, each country is striving to enhance their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities including naval vessels and unmanned vehicles, against a background of disputes over territorial rights in the South China Sea.

For its air force capabilities, Indonesia plans to acquire 42 Rafale fighters from France, and is negotiating with the United States for the procurement of 36 F-15EX fighters. In January 2016, Indonesia concluded a detailed agreement with ROK including a cost sharing and bilateral cooperation in the joint development of the 4.5 generation fighter jet KF-21. In July 2022, the first flight of the initial prototype aircraft took place. Indonesia introduced ScanEagle UAVs from the United States. In December 2019, Indonesia unveiled the prototype Black Eagle UAV, a domestically produced unmanned aerial vehicle that has adopted the design of the CH-4 UAV (made in China).

Regarding naval forces, Indonesia signed a contract to

purchase three 209-class submarines (made in the ROK), with two of them produced in the ROK and the other in Indonesia.

Regarding its air force capabilities, Malaysia signed a contract to purchase 18 FA-50 light combat aircraft (made in the ROK) in February 2023. It has also introduced ScanEagle unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (made in U.S.).

Regarding its naval force capabilities, Malaysia is promoting the construction of six domestically produced littoral combat ships (LCSs) and launched the first ship in August 2017. By December 2021, it introduced four littoral mission ships (LMSs) (made in China).

Myanmar received a Kilo-class submarine (made in Russia) from India in December 2019, and in December 2021, commissioned its Ming-class submarine (made in China). Myanmar's submarine procurement is drawing attention from neighboring countries. Myanmar introduced FTC-2000G light combat aircraft (made in China) in December 2022. Furthermore, Myanmar introduced Su-30 fighters (made in Russia) by December 2022.

The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea.

<sup>4</sup> According to "Vietnam's Major Spratly Expansion," Center for Strategic and International Studies (December 2022).

In terms of air force capabilities, between November 2015 and May 2017, the Philippines successively introduced 12 FA-50PH light fighters purchased from the ROK. The Philippines is currently planning to acquire multi-role fighters. The candidates are JAS-39 Gripen from Sweden and F-16 fighters from the U.S. The Philippines also received six A-29 light attack aircraft from Brazil in October 2020 and in March 2021, it announced its plan to purchase 18 more. In November 2022, it received ScanEagle reconnaissance UAVs from the United States. Furthermore, a procurement contract for a supersonic cruise missile “BrahMos” from India was concluded in January 2022.

As for naval force capabilities, the Philippines received three Hamilton-class frigates from the United States by 2016. The Philippines introduced two Indonesian-made landing dock vessels by 2017. In addition, two frigates were introduced from the ROK by March 2021. The August 2019 commissioning of a Pohang-class corvette received from the ROK marked the restoration of the antisubmarine capability that the Philippines had long lacked. That September, the Philippines conducted the DAGIT-PA multi-service military exercise involving the army, navy, and air force, during which the four AAV-7 assault amphibious vehicles that it had commissioned the previous June were operated.

Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces. Today, it is one of the largest arms importers in the world.

It introduced 40 U.S.-made F-15 fighters by 2013 and also participates in the U.S.-made F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. In January 2020, the U.S. Government officially approved the sale of F-35B fighter jets to Singapore.

Regarding naval force capabilities, Singapore signed a contract to purchase four German-made 218SG

submarines by May 2017, the first of which Singapore received in July 2023. In March 2023, the Singapore government signed a contract with a domestic company to design and build six multi-purpose combat ships to replace the existing missile corvettes.

As for the air force capabilities of Thailand, it introduced 12 Swedish-made JAS-39 Gripen fighters by 2013.

Regarding Thailand’s naval forces capabilities, the country established a Submarine Squadron Headquarters in July 2014. In April 2017, the Royal Thai Navy drew up a plan to purchase three Yuan-class submarines from China over the next 11 years, and the Thai Cabinet approved the purchase of one vessel. Although the submarines were originally planned to be equipped with German engines, the procurement has been delayed due to Germany’s refusal to export them to China. In addition, the Cabinet approved in September 2012 a plan to introduce two frigates. The first frigate was received from the ROK in December 2018. In September 2019, Thailand signed an agreement to purchase a 71 dock-type transport landing ship from the ROK.

As for Vietnam’s air force capabilities, it started to successively introduce Russian-made Su-30 fighters in 2004, and to date, the total number of delivered Su-30 fighters came to 36. In January 2020, it was reported that Vietnam had ordered 12 Yak-130 training aircraft from Russia and received the first six aircrafts in November 2021. Vietnam also introduced ScanEagle reconnaissance UAVs from the United States.

Regarding Vietnam’s naval forces capabilities, it successively introduced six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines by January 2017. By February 2018, Vietnam started the operation of four Russian-made Gepard-class frigates.

## 4 Intra-and Extra-Regional Cooperation

Southeast Asian countries are utilizing ASEAN as a framework for regional multilateral security and have made efforts to improve the security environment in the region and promote mutual trust by holding the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a venue for dialogue on security issues, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM).

In September 2023, ASEAN held its first military exercise on its own, and also held a maritime exercise in the waters surrounding Indonesia, including the North Natuna Sea.

In addition, ASEAN attaches importance to expanding its relations with countries outside of the region. It holds the ADMM-Plus framework, a platform that adds eight non-ASEAN countries including Japan to ADMM. ASEAN and the United States held their first ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX). With China, ASEAN held the first naval table-top exercise, and the first naval field training exercise. Furthermore, ASEAN countries conducted the first Naval Cooperative Exercise with Russia in inshore waters of Indonesia.

## Section 8

## South Asia

## 1 India

## 1 General Situation

India is the world's largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has significant influence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geopolitical importance. India has also increased its presence as a geopolitical player, while the international community in return has high expectations for the country's role.

India traditionally has aimed at nonaligned and omnidirectional diplomacy. The Modi administration has maintained the neighborhood first policy, which emphasizes strengthening relations with South Asian countries, while expanding the focus of strengthening India's external relations to the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with the "Act East" policy. In addition, the administration has carried out proactive foreign policy, placing priority also on India's relations with the United States, Russia, and Europe, as well as the Middle East and Africa.

On the other hand, India has non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. There are also concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as activities of Islamic extremists. Accordingly, defending its land borders and tackling the threat of domestic terrorism are major concerns for India. In addition, in recent years, India has considered efforts for maritime security as a focus point important, strengthened its presence in the Indian Ocean, and clearly recognized China's increased activity in the Indian Ocean.

## 2 Military Affairs

In the integrated doctrine published by the Ministry of Defence in 2017, India stated that India's traditional threats primarily emanate from the disputed land borders with India's neighbors. Maintaining territorial integrity and preserving national sovereignty continues to remain a major strategic challenge for India. For this,

it is pointed out that India perceives China and Pakistan as major threats with non-demarcated border issues in regard to land and India recognizes that it may have to fight a 'two-front war' with China and Pakistan, and appears to be forming its defensive strategy.

Based on this recognition, India is vigorously strengthening and reorganizing its armed forces. It is considering the creation of an integrated force with the aim of strengthening operational and organizational cooperation among military services. Under the initiatives of "Make in India" and "Self-Reliant India" (Atmanirbhar Bharat in Hindi), the Modi government is actively working towards the domestic production of military equipment and taking measures to promote exports.

While the Army is the largest ground force in the world with approximately 1,240,000 personnel, it is trying to convert Battle Squads into Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs<sup>1</sup>) in an effort towards force structuring and optimization as a part of the "Land Warfare Doctrine - 2018." It is believed that the army strengthens firepower by deploying self-propelled howitzers and howitzers, and promotes deployment of drones for attack and reconnaissance near the India-China border. Meanwhile, the Army is continuing its efforts to ease tensions, including holding the 20th corps commander-level meeting in October 2023.<sup>2</sup>



Indian Navy aircraft carrier "Vikrant" and aircraft carrier "Vikramaditya" conducting exercises [Courtesy of the Indian Navy]

- 1 IBGs consist of infantry, air defense, armored, logistics units and others with support from attack helicopters. IBGs are units of brigade size with characteristics appropriate to threats, terrain, and task. It is reported that an exercise of IBGs was conducted in 2022.
- 2 Regarding the issue of the border area between India and China, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping engaged in conversation at the BRICS summit in South Africa in August 2023, during which both leaders reportedly agreed to instruct relevant officials to intensify efforts for expeditious disengagement and de-escalation.

The Navy has placed “Sea Control<sup>3</sup>” as the key concept to operate the fleet, and aircraft carriers as the key vessels for the Sea Control concept. In addition, the Navy mentioned its plan to build three aircraft carrier battle groups. The country’s first domestically built aircraft carrier “Vikrant” was commissioned in September 2022. This brings the total number of Indian Navy’s aircraft carriers to two, including “Vikramaditya”, which was modified after purchasing it from Russia. In June 2023, the first exercise involving both aircraft carriers was held. India has also placed emphasis on the operation of submarines and is proceeding to enhance them.

The Air Force is operating French-made Rafale and Mirage 2000 fighters, as well as Russian-made Su-30MKI fighters and domestically produced Tejas light fighters. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is making it difficult for India to repair parts for Russian-made fighter jets and transport aircraft. It is working to inventorize these parts and also produce them domestically. An inter governmental agreement was signed in September 2023 between India and Russia for enabling manufacture of Russian origin spares in India. As for its air defense system, India has introduced the Russian-made “S-400” surface-to-air missile system, as well as the Israeli-made Heron MKII unmanned aircraft for ISR purposes.

In addition, India is a nuclear-weapon state with approximately 164 nuclear warheads as of January 2023, and while it maintains the nuclear doctrine<sup>4</sup> published in 2003 and policies including the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998, it has been promoting development, performance improvement, and deployment of various ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. In 2022, India succeeded in launching a supersonic cruise missile BrahMos (extended range) from a Su-30MKI fighter jet, launching the IRBM Agni-III, Agni-IV, and Agni-V, launching a ballistic missile from nuclear submarine INS Arihant, and other activities. In June 2023, India successfully conducted a nighttime launch test of the “Agni Prime,” which it calls a new generation ballistic missile, followed in December by the training launch of the “Agni-I,” a short-range ballistic missile.

### 3 Relations with Other Countries

#### (1) Relations with the United States

India and the United States being in a relationship of the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership are steadily deepening defense and security cooperation in recent years, and agreed on holding Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers’ Meetings (“2+2”) annually. In June 2023, Prime Minister Modi visited the United States and met President Biden at the White House. The two leaders highlighted the friendship and growing cooperation between the two countries, and issued the “Joint Statement”. This statement outlined wide-ranging cooperation, including the acceleration of cooperation in the defense industry, a technology transfer to produce General Electric engines for Tejas light fighters in India, the signing of a memorandum of understanding to enable U.S. naval assets in India to be maintained and repaired, and India’s procurement of MQ-9B (Sea Guardian) unmanned aircraft and their assembly in India. In November the same year, the 5th U.S.-India 2+2 was held in New Delhi, in which the two countries agreed to promote a cooperative relationship.



President Biden and Prime Minister Modi holding the U.S.-India summit meeting (June 2023) [EPA/Jiji]

#### (2) Relations with China

 Section 2-3-4 (3) (Relations with South Asian Countries)

#### (3) Relations with Russia

 Section 5-5-5 (1) (Relations with Asian Countries); Chapter 2, Paragraph 3-3 (Other Regions Responses)

3 According to the Indian Navy’s “Maritime Security Strategy”, “Sea Control” means that a defined maritime space (including surface, underwater, and air) can be used for specific period of time and for one’s own purposes and its use by adversary can be denied.

4 India raises its continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, along with credible minimum deterrent, “No First Use” policy, and its policy of no use against non-nuclear weapon state in the nuclear doctrine published in 2003.

#### (4) Relations with South Asian Countries and Southeast Asia

India exports and provides military equipment as a part of cooperation that India promotes with other South Asian countries in the security field under its “Neighborhood First Policy.” India was the only country that sent several warships to the international fleet review held by Bangladesh for the first time in December 2022. On the other hand, India keeps guard on heightening Chinese influence on South Asia countries, and showed

apprehension to Chinese tracking ship Yuan Wang 5’s port call to the Port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka from July to August 2022.

Based on its Act East policy, India continues to engage with Southeast Asian nations and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral basis. India supports capacity building and conducts joint military exercises on a regular basis using operational experience of Russian equipment.

## 2 Pakistan

### 1 General Situation

Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of India and politically unstable Afghanistan, and sharing borders with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a geopolitically significant and complex position. Particularly in the border area with Afghanistan, extremist organizations are engaging in cross-border terrorist activities, and Pakistan’s actions in the fight against terrorism could significantly impact the stability of Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> Relations with Afghanistan are increasingly complex, with the Pakistani government proceeding to deport illegal immigrants, including numerous Afghans, since November 2023.

In January 2024, Pakistan and Iran exchanged cross-border attacks targeting militant strongholds near their border, resulting in casualties.

### 2 Military Affairs

Pakistan takes the position that maintaining nuclear deterrence against attacks with nuclear and conventional weapons by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. Pakistan is believed to retain around 170 nuclear warheads as of January 2023. The development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads is still continuing. Tactical nuclear missile “Nasr” and IRBM “Shaheen-II” are already operative. In addition, the flight test of ground-to-ground missile “Shaheen-III” with the range of 2,750 km was successfully conducted in April 2022. Pakistan has been enhancing its military capabilities,

as evidenced by the October 2023 launch test of the ballistic missile “Ababeel,” which it claims has been converted into a Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV), for the first time since 2017, as well as a launch drill of IRBM “Ghauri.”

In its comprehensive policy document “National Security Policy 2022-2026” formulated in December 2021, Pakistan described its security at its borders and in the Indian Ocean and stated its intention to strengthen its information and cybersecurity capabilities, as well as to build capabilities to counter hybrid warfare, such as disinformation and influence operations.

In recent years, Pakistan has also been promoting the modernization of equipment, and while it makes attempts at domestic production through joint development of equipment and technology transfer, it promotes its relationship with China in military fields, and rising of dependence to China is observed. The Pakistan Army operates “Al-Khalid” tanks jointly developed with China as its main battle tanks and has also introduced China’s “VT-4” tanks. Pakistan is enhancing the Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defense (CLIAD) system by purchasing air defense systems such as “LY-80” and “HQ-9/P” from China.

The Pakistan Navy is replacing or augmenting its aging warships, introducing submarines, and cooperating with China and Türkiye. Regarding its other activities, the Pakistan Navy hosted the multilateral maritime joint exercise “AMAN-23” in February 2023, in which 50 countries participated, and in November the same year, it conducted the joint exercise “Sea Guardian-2023” with the Chinese Navy in the Arabian Sea.

<sup>5</sup> The Pakistan Security Report 2023, published by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), pointed out that both the number of terrorist attacks and the number of casualties in Pakistan have increased for three consecutive years since 2021. The report further noted that approximately 93% of terrorist attacks in 2023 were concentrated in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan provinces along the Afghan border, mainly perpetrated by three groups: Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K)” and the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA).

In addition to operating JF-17 fighters jointly developed with China and produced domestically, the Pakistan Air Force introduced Chinese-made J-10CE fighters in March 2022. Both aircraft participated in the “Shaheen-X” joint training exercise with China in August and September 2023. In addition, the first delivery of the attack UAV “Bayraktar Akinci” from Türkiye was reportedly made in April the same year.

### 3 Relations with Other Countries

#### (1) Relations with the United States

The United States designated Pakistan as a “Major Non-NATO ally” in 2004 and has strengthened the relationship because Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in the field of counterterrorism since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However, the two countries continued a tense relationship, with both countries blaming each other over their responses to terrorism.

On the other hand, improvement of the relationship with the United States was seen under the Sharif

administration established in April 2022. In September the same year, the U.S. Department of State decided to approve the contract of a maximum US\$450 million related to maintenance and support of F-16 fighter jets for Pakistan, to facilitate counterterrorism operations. Furthermore, General Bajwa, Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, visited the United States in October 2022 for the first time in three years and met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin. Conversely, in March 2023, the Pakistani government announced that it would not accept an invitation from the United States to attend the second Democracy Summit. Under the caretaker cabinet, which was inaugurated in August the same year, the Army Chief of Staff Munir visited the United States in December the same year, during which time he visited the U.S. Central Command headquarters, and held talks with Secretary of Defense Austin and others. Future defense cooperation between the two countries will be a focus of attention.


#### (2) Relations with China

 See Section 2-3-4 (3) (Relations with South Asian Countries).

### 3 Disputes over the Sovereignty of Kashmir

India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty of Kashmir,<sup>6</sup> and have had three armed conflicts of significant scope. In the Kashmir region, collisions often occurred along the Line of Control, and the two countries repeatedly restarted and suspended dialogue.

Finally, the countries agreed to comply with the ceasefire in February 2021. The Indian Ministry of Defense announced in December 2023 that this agreement significantly improved the situation.


 See Fig. I-3-8-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate numbers))

<sup>6</sup> India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan's independence, and contends that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 UN resolution. The two countries have taken a significantly different fundamental stance towards the resolution of the dispute.



Fig. I-3-8-1

Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate numbers)



# Section 9 Europe and Canada

## 1 General Situation

With the end of the Cold War, many European countries and Canada now recognize the need to address diverse security challenges. At the same time, these countries had recognized that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries had disappeared. Nevertheless, since the heightening of tensions in Ukraine in February 2014 and particularly with the aggression against Ukraine that began in February 2022, there is a growing need to revisit existing strategies and plan new concepts in order to deal with Russia's unilateral changes to the status quo by force as well as hybrid warfare. With regard to international terrorism, the continuity of threats has been recognized and there is a continuous need to take counterterrorism measures. In addition, border security problems remain a challenge, including those regarding refugees and migrants that have rapidly increased due to



Middle East turmoil such as the prolonged civil war in Syria.

To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe and Canada have sought to further strengthen and expand multilateral frameworks, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). At the same time, it is working to contribute to the security and stability of the international community by proactively participating in activities outside the region. Moreover, steps are taken at the national level by reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral and multilateral defense and security cooperation.

**See** Fig. I-3-9-1 (Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States); Chapter 2, Paragraph 3 (The Impact of Russia's Aggression against Ukraine on International Affairs and Various Countries' Responses to It)

Part I Chapter 3 Defense Policies of Countries

Fig. I-3-9-1 Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States



- Original EU members
- Joined the EU by 1995
- Joined the EU in May 2004
- Joined the EU in January 2007
- Joined the EU in July 2013
- Original NATO members
- Joined NATO by 1982
- Joined NATO in 1999
- Joined NATO in March 2004
- Joined NATO in April 2009
- Joined NATO in June 2017
- Joined NATO in March 2020
- Joined NATO in April 2023
- Joined NATO in March 2024

(Note) 1 The United Kingdom left the EU on January 31, 2020.

## 2 Enhancement of Multilateral Security Frameworks

### 1 NATO

Founded for the core task of collective defense among member states, NATO celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024. It has expanded the scope of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War. NATO's three core tasks are deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

Amid an increasing sense of crisis among member states in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, a new NATO Strategic Concept was adopted at the NATO Summit in June 2022 for the first time in twelve years since 2010. Although the previous Strategic Concept stated that the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low, this new Strategic Concept states that the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace and the possibility of an attack against member states' sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be discounted.

In the previous Strategic Concept, NATO had stated that it was aiming for "a true strategic partnership" with Russia. In the new Strategic Concept, however, NATO placed Russia as the most significant and direct threat to member states' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

This new Strategic Concept mentioned China for the first time, stating that China's ambition and coercive policies are the challenge against NATO's interests, security and values. The new Strategic Concept also pointed out that the deepening relationship between China and Russia and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to NATO's values and interests.

In addition to this, it mentioned the nuclear and missile development by North Korea for the first time and stated that the Indo-Pacific region is an important region and NATO will strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the partners, as it can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. NATO invited Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the ROK as the important partners to the NATO Summit held in June 2022, and decided to enhance cooperation with them on maritime security and disinformation countermeasures among other issues.

Through these actions, NATO has emphasized one of its core missions of defending member states while strengthening deterrence and defense capabilities based

on an understanding of how the situation has drastically changed.

Since 2014, NATO has overhauled its plans and structures to ensure member states can respond to any threat from any direction, with an agreement to establish a forward presence, particularly in the east. The first multinational battalion-sized battlegroups were deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in 2017, with further battlegroups having been created in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia since 2022. At the NATO summit in June the same year, it was agreed that these battlegroups would be expanded from battalion to brigade size as needed. A new force model was also agreed, on a far larger scale with far greater readiness than traditional readiness.

The NATO summit in July 2023 approved the most comprehensive and detailed regional defense plan since the Cold War. This is expected to significantly improve the consistency between NATO's collective defense plans and NATO members' own plans for force, readiness, capabilities, and command and control.

Under this new defense plan, "Steadfast Defender 2024," the largest-scale military exercise since the end of the Cold War, was conducted from January to May 2024. Involving all NATO member states, the exercise saw NATO troops rapidly deployed from North America to the Atlantic Ocean to strengthen the defense of the Euro-Atlantic region.

Additionally, alongside collective defense, NATO's core tasks include operations to prevent and control crises from inside and/or outside of member states.

In the Mediterranean, a permanent maritime force has been deployed due to increase in the influx of illegal immigrants transiting the Mediterranean. This force monitors the influx of illegal immigrants and shares information. Also, a wider array of missions including counterterrorism and capacity building assistance have been conducted. In the Middle East, with regard to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), NATO has dispatched early warning and control aircraft forces and implemented NATO surveillance and reconnaissance missions since October 2016. It is also supporting security units of Iraqi Armed Forces on training and capacity building. NATO is also carrying out missions in Kosovo and other countries.

Regarding defense spending among NATO member states, the 2014 agreement set a target of 2% of GDP,

and in November 2022, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg stated that 2% of each member country's GDP should be more as a kind of floor than a ceiling. At the July 2023 summit, NATO member states agreed to invest a minimum of 2% of their respective GDPs in defense spending. As a result, defense spending across European member states and Canada increased by 11% in 2023, and by 2024, defense spending in 18 countries is expected to reach 2% of each GDP.

In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, Finland and Sweden reversed their longstanding policy of military non-alignment and joined NATO in April 2023 and March 2024, respectively. This brought the total number of NATO members to 32.

## 2 EU

The EU is strengthening its security initiatives under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)<sup>1</sup>.

In December 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched as a defense cooperation framework comprising 26 of the member states. NATO made it clear that it promotes developing new capabilities in aviation and maritime domains, training and support for armed forces and sharing expertise of specific domains such as the cyberspace domain through this framework. Therefore, the strengthening of Europe's defense capabilities is expected.<sup>2</sup>

Furthermore, the EU is enhancing its engagement to the Indo-Pacific region, disclosing its first Indo-Pacific strategy in April 2021 followed by a joint communication detailing it in September 2021. This joint communication states that the growing tensions resulting from China's significant military buildup and show of force in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait have a direct effect on security and prosperity in Europe. To achieve the aim of a rules-

based international order, partnership with countries sharing the same values, including Japan, is necessary, along with the reinforcement of economic relations with Taiwan, including through trading and investments.

In March 2022, the European Council adopted the Strategic Compass laying out a common strategic vision for security and defense policies in the next five to ten years. The document stated that the EU will establish a fully operational EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5,000 troops by 2025 for use in rescue and evacuation operations. In response to the adoption of the Strategic Compass, the EU conducted "LIVEX23," the EU's first live exercise, as part of the EU's "MILEX23" military exercise held in September to October 2023, to improve the "EU Rapid Deployment Capacity."

## 3 Cooperation between NATO and the EU

Advancements have been seen in cooperation between NATO and the EU in addressing unprecedented challenges efficiently.

The third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation was signed in January 2023. In light of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, NATO and the EU stated in the declaration that they were at a key juncture for Euro-Atlantic security and stability, and that China's growing assertiveness and policies present challenges that need to be addressed. In addition, it was stated that NATO would further strengthen their cooperation in existing areas in order to deal with the security threats and challenges evolving in scope and magnitude, and that NATO and the EU would enhance and deepen cooperation especially to deal with growing geostrategic competition, resilience issues, protection of critical infrastructure, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, security implication of climate change as well as foreign information manipulation and interference.

<sup>1</sup> The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which covers all areas of foreign and security policy based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP to CSDP and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP.

<sup>2</sup> The EU announced that the number of ongoing joint projects was 68 as of May 2024.

## Viewpoint

## The Significance of Finland and Sweden Joining NATO



**TANAKA Ryosuke, Research Fellow, U.S.-Europe-Russia Division, National Institute for Defense Studies**

One of NATO's long-standing challenges has been to strengthen the defense of the Baltic Sea region, which lies on the front line with Russia.

In particular, if Russia were to occupy the Suwalki Gap, which connects the Russian exclave Kaliningrad with Belarus, the Baltic states would be at risk of becoming geographically isolated from the other member states. To address these concerns, since Russia unilaterally annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO has been working to expand its forward presence and reinforcement posture on its eastern flank.

The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO realized in 2023 to 2024 further strengthens the defenses of the Baltic Sea region. Both countries have been increasing their interoperability with NATO member states since 2014. Furthermore, Finland has a large number of ground forces, including reserves, and it is strengthening its air power with the procurement of F-35s while Sweden is enhancing its naval power with a focus on submarines. This strengthening of the national defenses of both countries combined with their improved interoperability with member states will contribute to a more robust NATO's defense posture in the Baltic Sea region, where both countries are located.

Additionally, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO will also lead to the enhancement of NATO's defense plans. NATO reportedly approved defense plans for the Baltic states and Poland in 2019, but it was unclear whether NATO assumed cooperation with Finland and Sweden in the plans. With both countries becoming members, however, future NATO defense plans are expected to be developed with the assumption of some degree of access to both countries. This means that both countries could become options for reinforcement routes from member states or as starting points for counterattacks, which would also lead to the development of NATO's defense plans for the Baltic Sea region.

More importantly, the accession of the two countries to NATO will link the Baltic Sea region and the Atlantic Ocean (including the Arctic region [High North]) as part of NATO territory. This will improve the connectivity of NATO's territory across North America, the Atlantic Ocean, Europe, and the Baltic Sea region, and it will also contribute to the improvement of NATO's overall defense planning. NATO approved regional defense plans for its entire territory in 2023. The membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO may lead to the further development of the regional defense plans.

(Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher's academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position.

## 3 Security/Defense Policies of European Countries and Others

### 1 The United Kingdom

After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, perceiving that there is no direct military threat against the country, has advanced national defense reform with particular focus on improving its overseas deployment capability and readiness, in order to deal with new threats such as international terrorism and proliferation of WMDs.

The Johnson administration (then) published the Integrated Review 2021 for security, defense, development, and diplomatic policy in March 2021. The administration set forth a framework of the Indo-Pacific tilt while maintaining and strengthening the relationship with the United States, European countries, and NATO.

Furthermore, the Sunak administration announced the Integrated Review Refresh 2023 in March 2023.

In the 2023 Refresh, the administration stated that the U. K. considers the Euro-Atlantic region as the first-order priority and Russia as "the most acute threat." It also stated that the U. K. would enhance NATO further, and contest the malign Russian influence by exposing disinformation. In addition, the administration evaluated that China "is posing an epoch-defining and systematic challenge." Furthermore, it stated that the U. K. consider the Indo-Pacific as a permanent pillar of the U. K.'s international policy, support for the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific and adopt a policy to enhance its commitment in the Indo-Pacific through various measures such as building deep relations anchored in decades-long economic, technological and security ties with partners including Japan.

In July of the same year, the Ministry of Defence published the Defence Command Paper (DCP23), which

outlines efforts in the defense field such as defense capability development, based on the Integrated Review Refresh. While no major changes were made from the DCP21, which comprehensively set out the design and equipment of the U.K. military for the next few decades, the DCP23 emphasizes human resources, science and technology, innovation, and enhanced cooperation with industries, based on the lessons-learned from the Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the United Kingdom, in collaboration with related countries and NATO, is strengthening its security presence in the Nordic and Baltic Sea regions. In September 2023, Carrier Strike Group (CSG) led by HMS Queen Elizabeth, was dispatched to the Nordic waters. In December of the same year, the naval and air forces conducted activities mainly in the Baltic Sea to safeguard important undersea infrastructure. In addition, more than 20,000 British troops are scheduled to be deployed across Northern Europe in 2024.

The United Kingdom remains committed to the Indo-Pacific region. In July 2023, the U.K. participated in the multilateral exercise "Talisman Sabre 23" hosted by the United States and Australia. In October, the U.K. participated in "Bersama Lima" held in Malaysia, the exercise based on the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).<sup>3</sup> These underlines the U.K.'s commitment in strengthening relationships with the regional partners. In December of the same year, the U.K. announced that the CSG, scheduled to be deployed to the Indo-Pacific in 2025, would call on Japan.

In addition, the U. K. has conducted monitoring and surveillance activities in waters around Japan, against illicit maritime activities such as ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean flagged vessels since FY2018. In early January 2023, HMS Spey conducted monitoring and surveillance activities.

## 2 France

Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence of its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by streamlining and integrating

military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the future.

The Macron administration presented in November 2022 the National Strategic Review 2022 (Revue Nationale Stratégique 2022) that showed an analysis of the security environment home and abroad, as well as its strategic goals and priorities for 2030. The administration also stated that the relationship with Russia transferred from potential competition to an open opposition, and its relationship with China transfers to a more intense contest. In addition, the review indicated enhanced strategic autonomy and secured nuclear deterrence as France's strategic objectives to be achieved by 2030.

Since France has territories in the Indo-Pacific region, it is the only EU member state that has continuous military presence in the region, with approximately 7,000 personnel and vessels permanently stationed. France places importance on commitment to the region. The Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, which was published in June 2019, states that China's growing influence is shifting the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the importance of strengthening partnerships with the United States, Australia, India, and Japan<sup>4</sup>. The National Strategic Review 2022 mentioned above stated that France will strategically strive to build partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, and play the role of a balancing power in order to maintain the strategic stability of the region.

In line with its policy of active engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, France dispatched an aircraft carrier group and other units to the region in 2019 and 2021 and conducted the multilateral exercise "ARC 21" with Japan, the United States, and Australia in 2021. In addition, from June to August 2023, the French Air and Space Forces conducted a mission for large-scale power projection to the Indo-Pacific called "Pégase 23," showcasing its capability to swiftly deploy from its mainland to the region to deal with various crises and regional instabilities. France has conducted monitoring and surveillance activities against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean flagged vessels since 2019. In 2023, the frigate

<sup>3</sup> Military arrangements concluded in 1971 among the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore

<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, the French government strongly condemned the United States and Australia because of Australia's cancellation of the purchase contract for French-built submarines resulting from the implementation of AUKUS in September 2021, and temporarily recalled French ambassadors from Washington and Canberra.

“Prairial” and the patrol aircraft “Falcon 200” monitoring and surveillance activities, the former in early April, and the latter from early to late October respectively.

France also prioritizes its involvement in the Middle East and Africa. The French military has been operating in Iraq since 2014, providing military support to Iraqi security forces fighting ISIL. The French military has been participating in the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) since its establishment in 2020.

In Africa’s Sahel region, France launched “Operation Barkhane” in 2014 and the operation of European Special Forces “Takuba” in 2020 as counter-terrorism measures centered on Mali. However, both operations ended in 2022 due to deteriorating relations with Mali and other reasons. Meanwhile, the French military was transferring troops from Mali to Niger but was forced to withdraw from Niger following the military takeover there in July 2023. After 10 years of counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel region, the only French military presence in West Africa, including Sahel, was in Chad, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire.

### 3 Germany

While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction of its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its armed forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the UN.

However, following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Germany made major changes in its security policy, acknowledging that it was at a “watershed era (Zeitenwende).” Specifically, it provided arms to Ukraine, imposed strict economic sanctions against Russia, increased its defense spending as a ratio of GDP to over 2%, strengthened its contribution to NATO, and established a special fund equivalent to 100 billion euros for the Bundeswehr.

In June 2023, the German government announced the first comprehensive national security strategy that considered security as part of all policy areas, not just the diplomatic and military. The government assessed Russia as the most significant threat in the Euro-Atlantic region, and pointed out that while China is a partner in

solving global issues, the elements of systemic rivalry and competition have increased. Regarding defense spending, the government clarified its policy of setting it at 2% of GDP on average over multiple years.

Furthermore, in November the same year, the German Ministry of Defense announced the Defense Policy Guidelines 2023 based on said strategy. Recognizing that Germany must become the backbone of deterrence and collective defense in Europe, the policy stated that the core missions of the German Bundeswehr would return to national and collective defense. In particular, it underlined Germany’s responsibility to make an ever-greater contribution to the defense of NATO’s eastern member states, and Germany decided to station one brigade permanently in Lithuania.

Germany’s defense budget for 2024 is 51.9 billion euros, the highest amount since the creation of the Bundeswehr, with 19.8 billion euros coming from special funds. Collectively, this total equates to 2.1% of Germany’s GDP. The special funds will be used to fund important procurement programs. So far, Germany has concluded contracts to procure F-35A fighter jets and CH-47F transport helicopters and has begun procuring the “Arrow” missile defense system. The Eurofighter electronic warfare program, involving radar development, is also underway.

As for the brigade’s permanent presence in Lithuania, a roadmap was signed by German Defense Minister Pistorius and then Lithuanian Defense Minister Anusauskas in December 2023. The brigade will comprise three combat battalions with a strength of approximately 5,000 personnel and is scheduled to be deployed from 2025.

Regarding the Indo-Pacific as well, the German government formulated the Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 2020 and announced that it would strengthen its involvement in security policy in this region. In recent years, Germany has continued to dispatch assets to the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen its presence, while at the same time placing emphasis on cooperation with partner countries that share common values, such as Japan.

In July 2023, the Bundeswehr participated for the first time in the multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” hosted by the United States and Australia, aiming to strengthen multilateral cooperation and interoperability in the region. In addition, following the dispatch of the German frigate “Bayern” in 2021, two naval vessels are planned to be dispatched again in 2024.

## 4 Canada

In a National Defence Policy paper published in June 2017, the Department of National Defence of Canada showed its recognition that the United States is “still unquestionably the only superpower,” while also stating the view that a degree of major power competition has returned among China, Russia, and others, which is causing the growing importance of deterrence again. In accordance with this understanding of the security environment, Canada places importance on its own national land and the North American region on the basis of the national defense policy. Based on the idea that global security has a direct connection with Canadian defense, Canada positions active international contribution as a basis of the national defense policy. In terms of the building-up of defense capability, the Canadian defense policy focuses on the fields of space, cyberspace and intelligence. It also stated plans to increase the national defense budget, which once declined in the 2010s, by more than 70% in 10 years, and the Regular Force by 3,500 (to 71,500) military personnel. Furthermore, Canada released the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework in September 2019, indicating a policy to enhance Canada’s military presence in the region, based on the recognition that strategic, military, and economic importance of the region is increasing. Canada has also been conducting “Operation Nanook”, a military exercise in the Arctic region, since 2007.

Canada regards the United States as its most important ally and conducts air defense, space defense, and maritime patrolling and monitoring activities in North America jointly with the United States through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). As a founding member, Canada also places importance on its relationship with NATO, and has been actively participating in NATO-led operations. Canada

traditionally supports the activities of the United Nations, and the Trudeau administration has expressed its stance that contributing to the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is of utmost importance.

Concerning its involvement in the Indo-Pacific region, in November 2022, Canada announced its first Indo-Pacific Strategy as a comprehensive road map to deepen its engagement in the region over the next decade. In the strategy, China is mentioned as an “increasingly disruptive global power” and that it is looking to shape the international order into a more permissive environment for China’s interests and values. The strategy also states that Canada will challenge China if it engages in behavior that undermines Canada’s national interests or those of its partners in the region. On the other hand, Canada showed its intention to cooperate with China to find solutions to global issues such as climate change.

In addition, Canada has clarified its strategic objectives such as promoting peace, resiliency, and security of the region and expanding and deepening security relationship with allies and partners including Japan. Canada has also stated its intention to continue monitoring and surveillance activities against illicit maritime activities<sup>5</sup> including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean flagged vessels, which started in April 2018. In 2023, Canada conducted monitoring and surveillance activities by patrol aircraft in early April and early October. On the other hand, Canadian warships have passed through the Taiwan Strait<sup>6</sup> several times since 2018 in accordance with international laws and Canada has stated that it strengthens its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including by increasing the number of frigates. In 2023, Canada crossed the Taiwan Strait three times, while it had only crossed just once the previous year, Canada’s future involvement in the region should be closely watched.

<sup>5</sup> Canada has deployed its assets within the framework of “Operation NEON” to execute the sanctions against North Korea from June 2019. In October 2023, a Canadian military patrol aircraft in the operation was reportedly approached in an unusual manner by Chinese military aircraft over the East China Sea.

<sup>6</sup> The activity is a part of the “Operation PROJECTION” to ensure worldwide maritime security for the purpose of showing Canadian commitment to the peace of the world.



## Section 10

## Middle East and Africa

## 1

## Middle East

## 1 General Situation

The Middle East region is a geopolitical key point which connects Asia and Europe. In addition, the Middle East is a major source of energy supply for the world and contains major routes for international commerce. Japan is also dependent on the region for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports. Peace and stability in the Middle East region is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan.

Meanwhile, in this region, clashes between Israel and Palestinian militants and attacks on ships by the Houthis have occurred and continue. In addition, in April 2024, a related facility of the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, Syria, was attacked, and Iran determined that Israel perpetrated the attack. In retaliation, Iran launched a number of missiles and drones toward Israel, prolonging high tensions.

## 2 Situation Surrounding Middle East Peace

In Palestine, the moderate Fatah, which governs the West Bank, and the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas, which effectively controls the Gaza Strip, are in conflict, splitting the area, against the backdrop of a stagnating Middle East Peace Process.

In such circumstances, after then U.S. Trump administration announced its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017 and moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018, the tensions have risen, particularly in the Gaza Strip. In 2020, the administration announced a new Middle East peace plan, but the Palestinian side refused to negotiate, opposing the plan's descriptions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian border and the possession of Jerusalem.

On the other hand, since August 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco have successively agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel as a result of active encouragement from the Trump administration to establish a peace agreement between Israel and the Arab countries. This was the first time Israel established diplomatic relations with Arab countries since that with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994).

In March 2022, the foreign ministers of Israel, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, UAE, and the United States gathered in

Israel for a meeting. A document including contents that the foreign ministerial meeting would be held annually, and working groups for various themes including regional security would be established was adopted in November the same year. In this way, cooperation in the field of security was expanding between Israel and the Arab countries that had normalized diplomatic relations with Israel.

## 3 Situation Surrounding Israel and Palestine

Clashes frequently occurred between Israel and Palestinian militants, and tensions between the two sides continued. Meanwhile, on October 7, 2023, Palestinian militants such as Hamas in the Gaza Strip fired thousands of rockets at Israel. Additionally, numerous militants invaded Israeli territory, killing and abducting Israeli soldiers and civilians, including foreigners. In response, the Israeli military began airstrikes on the Gaza Strip the same day. After that, the Israeli military conducted "localized raids" into the Gaza Strip, and since October 27, they have been conducting ground operations, deploying tanks, bulldozers, and other vehicles. A temporary truce held from November 24 to November 30, and some hostages taken by Hamas and other Palestinian militants were released. However, fighting resumed on December 1. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to destroy Hamas and recover the hostages.



An Israeli tank rolling in the north of the Gaza Strip (December 2023) [AFP-Jiji]

Since the beginning of the clashes between Israel and Palestinian militants in October 2023, attacks by

## Viewpoint

## Clashes between Israel and the Palestinian Militants.



**NISHINO Masami, Senior Fellow, Asia and Africa Division, National Institute for Defense Studies**

On October 7, 2023, militants of the Islamic fundamentalist organization Hamas, which effectively controls the Gaza Strip, invaded southern Israel, killing approximately 1,200 people and abducting over 200 others. These human casualties shocked Israel. In the past, Hamas frequently used suicide bombings, so Israel began full-scale construction of a separating wall in 2002 to contain them. Later, when Hamas focused on launching rockets, Israel began operating the Iron Dome missile defense system in 2011, which intercepted most of them. As a result, Israel believed that the threat from Hamas was reduced, but this belief was shattered.

It has been suggested that one of the factors behind Hamas's attack this time was that Saudi Arabia and Israel were close to establishing diplomatic relations. If the two countries established diplomatic relations, other Arab countries were expected to follow suit. Hamas appears to have tried to provoke the conflict to prevent the establishment of such diplomatic relations.

This attack served as a reminder of the importance of lessons from the past. On October 6, 1973, during a Jewish holiday, Israel suffered a surprise attack by Arab forces, resulting in heavy damage. Therefore, the lesson was that Israel needed to be prepared because the enemy would launch a surprise attack on holidays when its defense systems were off guard. However, half a century later, Israel was again subjected to a similar surprise attack.

The Israeli military immediately launched a counterattack, sending ground forces into the Gaza Strip in late October. In the fighting in the Gaza Strip, Israel has the advantage in military strength, so Hamas is focusing on: concealing the whereabouts of its leaders and hostages, using propaganda to win public opinion on its side, and negotiations by its leadership abroad. Israel's goal is to destroy Hamas, i.e., to disable its leadership and military wing and rescue the hostages. Hamas's goal is to maintain its existence in the Gaza Strip. To achieve its goal, Hamas will likely need to leverage hostages and public opinion to negotiate a permanent ceasefire.

The Gaza Strip is small and has been blockaded, so the longer

the fighting drags on, the more likely it is that Israel will be able to thoroughly search and neutralize Hamas leaders, and Hamas is running short of supplies and finding it more difficult to continue fighting. In light of this, it can be said that prolonged fighting is advantageous for Israel. However, even if the Israeli military wins, it is likely that some Gaza residents will continue to support Hamas, and Hamas members are also present in the West Bank and neighboring countries, so although Hamas will be weakened, it is unlikely to be destroyed.

The number of deaths in the Gaza Strip has risen, prompting more countries to criticize Israel, but countries other than the United States are unlikely to have a significant impact on Israel's military operations. The United States, which is seen as the only country that can exert enough influence to force Israel to stop the fighting, has continued to supply weapons to Israel but warned in May 2024 that it would stop supplying some weapons depending on the actions of the Israeli military. The United States has already halted the supply of some ammunition, and this change in the US stance could affect Israel's military operations in the medium to long term.

As for the full-scale spillover of the conflict beyond the Gaza Strip, both the United States and Iran, the latter of which backs pro-Iranian groups such as Hezbollah conducting attacks in solidarity with Hamas, will try to avoid such spillovers. Some pro-Iranian forces, such as the Houthis in Yemen, are not hesitating to escalate the conflict, but since the U.S. military and others are primarily dealing with the Houthis, Israel does not have to use its resources against distant adversaries. However, in April 2024, Iran directly attacked Israeli territory from its own territory for the first time using ballistic missiles, and Israel appears to have attacked Iran in response. In such a case, the United States has a policy of not cooperating with an attack on Iran in order to avoid escalation, so Israel is likely to cope with it on its own. Attacks against Hamas in neighboring countries, like the killing of a leading member of Hamas in Lebanon in January 2024, are expected to occur in the future.

(Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher's academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position.

Hezbollah, a pro-Iranian armed group in Lebanon, and other groups have intensified in northern Israel. The Israeli military has responded with airstrikes against Hezbollah sites.

Yemen's Houthi rebels have also sporadically launched missiles and drones toward Israel.

To strengthen its deterrence in the Middle East, the United States is increasing its military assets, such as dispatching aircraft carrier strike groups and aircraft, and conducting activities such as intercepting drones and missiles launched by the Houthis.

## 4 Situation in the Gulf Region

### (1) Military Trends in the Gulf Region

Various situations including military activities are created in the Gulf region in relation to the changes related to the final agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).<sup>1</sup> Since May 2019, the United States has announced the dispatch of carrier strike groups and bomber units in response to Iran's threats to its own troops and interests. The United States deployed troops in Saudi Arabia in July 2019 for the first time in around sixteen years since 2003.

In the midst of this, Iran announced its shooting down of a U.S. unmanned reconnaissance aircraft over the Straits of Hormuz in June 2019. In July of the same year, the United States announced that a U.S. amphibious assault ship had shot down an Iranian drone over the Strait of Hormuz in July of the same year.

Since October the same year, there have been multiple attacks by militant organizations on U.S. military bases in Iraq. The United States pointed out Iran's involvement in the attacks, and conducted an aerial bombing of the base of an armed organization said to be supported by Iran. In addition, in January 2020, the United States killed Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was operating inside Iraq with the militant organization's leaders, as a deterrent to further attack plans. Although Iran attacked Iraqi bases hosting U.S. Forces in Iraq with a ballistic missile in retaliation for the killing, after that, both countries clearly showed a willingness to avoid escalation.

Amid this situation, the United States scaled down its troops stationed in Iraq to 2,500 members by January 2021 and ended the combat duty of its forces in Iraq at the end of December of the same year. The mission of the U.S. Forces moved to advising, training, and information collecting.

From April the same year, it was reported that part of the fighters and air defense assets deployed in the Gulf region by the Trump administration were pulled out. The presence of U.S. Forces in the Gulf region had been shrinking since the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan left the area in September 2021, with the absence of U.S. aircraft carriers continuing for some time. However, since the outbreak of conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants in October 2023, the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower has been dispatched to the Middle East region and U.S. aircraft and air defense assets have also been additionally deployed to the same region, thus the presence of U.S. military has been enhanced.

### (2) Maritime Security in the Gulf Region

Since May 2019, sporadic events affecting the navigation safety of civilian vessels have occurred in the waters of the Middle East.

Amidst rising tensions in the Middle East, countries continue carrying out efforts to safeguard maritime security in the region. The United States proposed the Maritime Security Initiative in July 2019 and established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) with its command center opened in Bahrain in November. The IMSC has been joined by 12 countries, including the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Albania, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Seychelles, Latvia, and Jordan, in addition to the United States (as of March 2024).

Furthermore, in January 2020, eight European nations – France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Portugal – issued a joint European declaration of support for the creation of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH). This mission commenced full operations in February of the same year.

Furthermore, in response to the frequent attacks on

<sup>1</sup> JCPOA decided that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and the number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among other measures, in exchange for ending the sanctions of previous UN Security Council resolutions and the U.S. and EU's nuclear-related sanctions. In May 2018, the U.S. President Trump (then), announced the U.S. secession from JCPOA, and in November of the same year, the United States resumed all its sanctions and successively added further sanctions. In this situation, Iran announced that while it would not withdraw from JCPOA after May 2019, it would suspend its compliance with JCPOA step by step. Although Joe Biden, the new president of the United States inaugurated in January 2021, started indirect negotiations for a nuclear agreement with Iran in April the same year, they have yet to reach agreement.

civilian vessels by Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since November 2023, the United States announced the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) to conduct patrols in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. OPG is a multinational security operation under Combined Task Force 153, the mission of which is to conduct maritime security and capacity building activities from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, on January 12, 2024, U.S. and British forces, supported by Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, and Bahrain, attacked Houthi's military bases. Since then, U.S. Forces have continuously attacked Houthi's military bases, including joint attacks with British forces.

Japan needs to continue to pay close attention to the future developments surrounding the situation in the Gulf region.

 See Chapter 4, Section 5-2 (National Maritime Security Initiatives)

## 5 Situation in Syria

In Syria, violent conflicts have continued since March 2011 among Syrian government forces supported by Russia and Iran, Syrian opposition groups supported by Türkiye, and other organizations. Although it has been pointed out that Russia has been redeploying some of the troops stationed in Syria to Ukraine since the start of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, it seems that Syrian Government forces control most of the country, and the situation is advantageous to the Assad administration as a whole.

In these circumstances, a trend is observed in which the Syrian government, and Arab countries and Türkiye that have supported the opposition, attempt to improve diplomatic relations. For example, in May 2023, a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers decided to allow the return of Syria, whose membership had been suspended in 2011, and President Assad attended the summit held in the same month.

According to an estimate by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in June 2022, more than 300,000 citizens died in a series of clashes from March 2011 to March 2021 in the situation in Syria.

There has been no concrete progress in peace negotiations and political processes up to the present because of continuing conflicts. Further efforts by the international community are needed to realize the

stabilization of Syria.

## 6 Situation in Yemen

In Yemen, following anti-government protests that occurred from February 2011 and international pressure afterward, then President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to resign. Through the election held in February 2012, then Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was elected as the new president.

Meanwhile, the confrontation intensified between the government and the opposition insurgent group Houthis, based in northern Yemen. As the Houthis invaded the Yemeni capital of Sana'a and other locations, the President requested support from Arab countries. In response, in March 2015, coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia began air strikes against the Houthis. In response, the Houthis also launched attacks on the mainland of Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles, UAVs, cruise missiles, and other weapons.

In December 2018, a cease-fire in Hodeidah city, host to the biggest port in Yemen, was agreed upon between the Houthis and the Yemen government. However, the cease-fire was implemented to only a limited degree. In November 2019, the Yemeni Government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group in southern Yemen, signed the Riyadh Agreement<sup>2</sup> in the capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh. Then, the new cabinet was established in December 2020. President Hadi newly established the "Presidential Leadership Council," and announced that he would transfer all of his authority in April 2022. The council comprises delegates of all the political powers in Yemen, except the Houthis, and aims to strengthen the governance of the government and conclude the negotiation with the Houthis.

In the same month, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Yemen announced that the parties to the armed conflict agreed on a two-month ceasefire throughout Yemen. Although it was announced that the ceasefire agreement had not been renewed in October after it was first renewed in June and August of the same year, large-scale armed conflicts, aerial bombings by the coalition of the willing, and cross-border attacks by the Houthis have rarely occurred in Yemen since the ceasefire became effective. Against this backdrop, an agreement was reached in December 2023 to proceed

<sup>2</sup> As conflicts continued between the Yemeni government and the STC, which seeks autonomy for the southern part of the country, the Riyadh Agreement stipulated the establishment of a new cabinet, including ministers from the STC, to end the conflict between the two sides.

with the creation of a roadmap for the realization of a ceasefire, but the prospect of the conclusion of a final peace accord remains elusive.

## 7 Situation in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the Taliban intensified their offensive as the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) launched education, training and advice for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in the wake of withdrawal by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in December 2014. Meanwhile, the ANDSF faces challenges regarding logistics, morale, air capabilities, and troop-commander leadership, allowing the Taliban to expand their control in Afghanistan.

In February 2020, an agreement was signed between the United States and the Taliban that included the conditional phase-out of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.

In March 2020, the United States announced that it had begun the withdrawal of its forces. Moreover, peace negotiations began between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, in Qatar, in September 2020. U.S. Forces completed the withdrawal by the end of August 2021.

In this situation, the Taliban expanded their ruled area quickly and in August 2021, they brought the capital city Kabul under their control. In September the same year, they announced the establishment of a caretaker cabinet. The Taliban has attained no approval as a government from other nations as of March 2024. However, the Taliban claimed that they accepted the new Chinese ambassador's credentials in September 2023, and that China officially accepted the Taliban's ambassador to China in December the same year.

Attention will be focused on the Taliban's internal governance and international negotiations with other countries.

## 2 Africa

### 1 Challenges Facing African Countries

African countries gather interest from the international community because of the population of over 1.4 billion people, high potential, and abundant natural resources. On the other hand, the region faces many security challenges such as armed conflicts, terrorism, and piracy.

In Sudan, the national army clashed with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group, in April 2023 over the integration of the RSF into the national army and other issues, leading to an armed conflict. Since May 20 the same year, a ceasefire agreement mediated by the United States and Saudi Arabia has been repeatedly announced, but no new ceasefire agreement has been announced since the ceasefire agreement period ended on June 21. Heavy fighting continues to this day.

Since gaining independence in 2011, South Sudan has experienced two large-scale armed conflicts due to political rivalries. Following the second conflict, the parties involved, including President Kiir and former Vice President Machar, signed the "Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)," which presented a roadmap towards the establishment of an official government. An interim government was established in 2020, and a national election is scheduled for December 2024. However, the implementation of the agreements reached in the R-ARCSS remains limited, and political rivalries

and sporadic armed conflicts in local areas continue.


In recent years, West Africa has seen a series of military takeovers.

In Mali, the government collapsed due to military rebellions led by Colonel Goita in August 2020 and May 2021, and an interim government was established with Colonel Goita as interim president. The French military deployed troops to engage in counter-terrorism operations starting in 2013, but its relationship with Mali's interim government deteriorated due to slow progress in counter-terrorism operations and anti-French and pro-Russian public opinion in Mali, resulting in the withdrawal of the French troops in August 2022. In June 2023, a resolution was adopted to withdraw the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a United Nations PKO, by December the same year, raising concerns that the security situation would worsen going forward, including terrorism.

Military takeovers occurred in Mali's neighbors, Burkina Faso and Niger, in January and September 2022, and July 2023, respectively.

 See Fig. I-3-10-1 (Current UN Peacekeeping Operations); Paragraph 3-2 (Trends of Activities in Africa); Chapter 4, Section 5-2 (2) (Piracy); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-2-2 (UNMISS)

Fig. I-3-10-1 Current UN Peacekeeping Operations



(Note) According to the United Nations (as of the end of March 2024).

**Africa**

	Mission	Date Established
①	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Apr. 1991
②	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	Jul. 2010
③	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	Jun. 2011
④	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	Jul. 2011
⑤	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	Apr. 2014

**Middle East**

	Mission	Date Established
⑥	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	May 1948
⑦	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	May 1974
⑧	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Mar. 1978

**Asia**

	Mission	Date Established
⑨	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Jan. 1949

**Europe**

	Mission	Date Established
⑩	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Mar. 1964
⑪	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	Jun. 1999

## 2 Relations between African Countries and Other Countries

In terms of security, African countries have long and deep relationships with the United States, Europe, and Russia. Based on this, the relationship with Russia has been further deepening recently, and Chinese involvement to Africa is prominent.

### (1) China and Russia

While China has enjoyed economic profit in Africa since the 2000s, military involvement has also been increasing in recent years. In August 2017, China began to operate a “support base” for logistics support of the PLA in Djibouti, and it is pointed out that a large landing ship called at the “support base” in March and August 2022. PLA activities have also been seen on the west coast of Africa. In June and July 2023, Chinese naval anti-piracy units visited the Gulf of Guinea countries and conducted joint exercises. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China may be considering the establishment of Chinese military-related facilities in Tanzania and Equatorial Guinea, and China is expected to continue expanding its military presence in Africa.<sup>3</sup>

In recent years, Russia has actively conducted arms exports to African countries and further deepened its involvement through the activities of private military companies. Even after “Wagner”’s “armed rebellion” in 2023 and the death of one of its founders, Prigozhin,

Russia is believed to be maintaining significant influence in Africa.

In addition, China and Russia are strengthening cooperation with South Africa. For example, the two countries conducted joint military exercises in Africa in November 2019 and February 2023.

### (2) The United States and Europe

The U.S. have had military cooperation with African countries through the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)’s joint exercises.<sup>4</sup> The United States has showed its intention to build up its partnership with African countries through efforts to enhance the peace and security of Africa in the National Security Strategy (NSS) published in October 2022. It is expected that the United States will continue to be involved in Africa.

Europe has shown its presence in the form of stationed troops, training mission, and dispatching personnel to counter-terrorism operations for some time. Thus, Europe is expected to maintain its involvement in Africa. For example, France has conducted counter-terrorism operations and provided capacity-building assistance in multiple regions across Africa. While there is a trend to withdraw troops from countries such as Mali in the Sahel region after military takeovers, there is also a trend towards continued involvement in Africa, including the stationing of troops in Chad and ongoing support to countries in the Gulf of Guinea.

## 3 Trends in International Terrorism

### 1 General Situation

There are prominent cases where power vacuums in some countries with weak governance in the Middle East and Africa have become a hotbed for activities of international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This kind of terrorist organizations have instigated fighters to conduct terrorist attacks at their home and abroad, and are also spreading violent extremist ideologies via Internet or other means. This kind of terrorist organizations have instigated fighters to conduct terrorist attacks at their home and abroad, and are also spreading violent

extremism via Internet or other means. As a result, particularly, terrorist attacks planned and committed by individuals or small groups of people who have no official relations with international terrorist organizations but have become influenced by them in some ways, have occurred in Western and other countries. Moreover, terrorist attacks targeting certain religions or races in a right-wing extremist political context have also occurred in Western countries.

Among international terrorist organizations, ISIL established multiple “provinces” outside of their original base in Iraq and Syria as “Islamic State” territories, and these “provinces” have been conducting terrorist acts in

<sup>3</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Forces conduct exercises for the purpose of dealing with extremist organizations and enhancing maritime law enforcement capabilities. For example, the exercise “Flintlock” has been held in the Sahel region annually since 2005 for the purpose of dealing with extremist organizations. In March 2023, the exercise was held in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, and over 1,300 military personnel from 29 countries participated in it.

various places.

As for Al Qaeda, based primarily in Afghanistan, it is believed to have been weakened, as many of the group's senior members were killed through U.S. operations. However, they continue some actions such as issuing statements.

Concerning international counterterrorism measures, international cooperation has grown even more important as terrorism threats have diffused and deepened on the diversification of terrorist attacks and the improvement of terrorist groups' attack capabilities.

## 2 Trends of Activities in Africa

Organizations related to ISIL and/or Al-Qaeda are active in Africa. For example, in some areas of West Africa such as Mali and other parts of the Sahel region, conflicts between terrorist organizations as well as vigorous terrorist activities are observed. In central and southern Africa, the ISIL's "Central African Province" had been active since April 2019, mainly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and northern Mozambique. In May 2022, an armed group in Mozambique that had previously issued a statement of criminal activity under the name of the ISIL's "Central African Province" made a criminal declaration under the name of the ISIL's "Mozambique Province" and began operating as a new branch of ISIL. In eastern Africa, Al-Shabaab continuously hinders political processes in Somalia.

European and other countries have been providing counter-terrorism operations and are supporting training against such terrorist organizations' actions. For instance, in the Sahel region, the French military took the lead in conducting counterterrorism operations against Islamic extremists from 2013 to 2022. In Mozambique, anti-terrorism operations were conducted by dispatching troops from neighboring countries, and in November 2021, an EU training mission began

operations. However, since December 2023, there are signs that ISIL's activities in "Mozambique Province" have increased.

## 3 Trends of Activities in the Middle East

Since 2013, ISIL had become powerful by taking advantage of the unstable situation in Iraq and Syria, and unilaterally declared the establishment of the "Islamic State" in 2014. From that year, the U.S. led Coalition forces conducted airstrikes and education/training missions for local groups in Iraq and Syria. In 2019, the United States announced that it and the Coalition forces had liberated 100 percent of ISIL-controlled areas in the two countries. Although the United States announced the death of ISIL's leader in February and November 2022, ISIL announced the appointment of a new leader in March and November 2022 respectively and is believed to still be active in Iraq and Syria. Under these circumstances, the U.S. Forces have been continuously stationed in both countries as part of efforts to prevent the resurgence of ISIL.

In Afghanistan, while the Taliban are expanding their controlled area, the ISIL Khorasan Province has been continuously conducting terrorist attacks mainly in the capital city of Kabul and eastern Afghanistan since 2015. When the Taliban, which is in a cooperative relationship with Al-Qaeda, took control of Kabul in August 2021, the United States completed the withdrawal of U.S. Forces but declared it would continue counterterrorism operations from afar.

Even after the withdrawal of U.S. Forces, the ISIL Khorasan Province is actively continuing terrorist attacks in Kabul and other areas, although the number of attacks is on the decline. The United States announced in August 2022 that it has killed Al Qaeda's leader with a drone attack in Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan.



Risks that hinder free access and usage of cyberspace, the oceans, outer space and the electromagnetic spectrum are becoming increasingly serious. In particular, the threat of cyber attacks has grown rapidly and the theft of sensitive information, etc., has also been taking place on a routine basis, even in the form of state-backed attacks. It is likely that hybrid warfare consisting of both military and non-

military measures for the accomplishment of military objectives will be employed in more sophisticated ways through means such as information warfare, including through the dissemination of disinformation prior to armed attacks. These trends pose serious challenges to the international community, including Japan.

## Section 1 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology That Have Expanded to Information Warfare, etc.

### 1 Science, Technology and Security

The creation of science, technology and innovation is the source of Japan's own economic and social development and the appropriate use of technological capabilities is indispensable not only in national security but also in addressing global issues such as climate change. The nations of the world are focusing their efforts on research, development and military applications of cutting-edge technologies that might be game-changers in that they could change the whole situation of future battles, such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technology and next generation information and communication technology.

Our attention needs to be focused on these applications as something that will greatly improve the accuracy and speed of decision making, as information processing, which has so far been limited by the capabilities of human beings and conventional computers, could become faster and automatic. In addition, we need to focus on the fact that high-speed, large-capacity and safe communication based on these new technologies will greatly contribute to the need for automation and manpower savings in the use of future defense technologies.

Risks in the cyberspace domain and other areas are also becoming more serious. Above all, these new technologies blur the boundary between military and non-military matters, enhancing the so-called gray zone situation. There are many examples in which diverse means that are not limited to purely military ones have been used to create chaos in other countries, such as cyber attacks targeting communication or important infrastructure, or

the use of drones. Technological influence in the field of security is becoming greater; for example, the technology known as deepfake with which fake videos are created through the application of AI technology is spreading, while information warfare through the dissemination of disinformation is constantly taking place.

In addition, technology competition among nations becomes apparent, notably in the fields of next generation information communication system (Beyond 5G) and semiconductors. This competition is based on the perception that it is profitable to lead international standardization with superiority in the emerging technologies that are to become important for national economy and security. Moreover, it is commonly getting understood that securing supply chains for critical key products such as semiconductors and rare metals is important from a security standpoint.

In this situation, the concern is that some nations are stealing information related to advanced technologies developed by private companies, universities and other organizations in other countries using cyberspace, corporate acquisitions, corporate activities including investments, academic exchanges and covert operatives and using the information for their own military purposes. For this, each nation takes measures for their "economic security," such as strict export control, reinforcement of screening for investments from foreign countries and higher independence for technological development and production.

## 2 Trends of Military Cutting-edge Technology

### (1) Hypersonic Weapons

The United States, China, Russia and others are developing hypersonic weapons, including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) that would be launched from ballistic missiles, maneuvered to glide at hypersonic speed (Mach 5 or above) in the atmosphere and hit targets, as well as Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) using scramjet engines and other technologies that enable hypersonic flights. It is suggested that hypersonic weapons would fly in lower orbits than conventional ballistic missiles at hypersonic speed for a longer period of time and that their high maneuverability would make them difficult to be detected and intercepted.

A senior official in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) mentioned a development plan for hypersonic weapons in February 2021, revealing that the United States will deploy hypersonic weapons in the early to mid-2020s and build defense capabilities in the mid to late 2020s.<sup>1</sup> In the same year, the U.S. Army received the prototype products of the HGV “Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW)” and is conducting training aimed at completing their deployment. The U.S. Navy and Air Force are also developing hypersonic weapons.

In China, the DF-17 ballistic missile, which is viewed as having the capability to carry HGVs, made its first public appearance during the military parade marking the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019. The U.S. DoD pointed out that China began operating DF-17 missiles in 2020. In 2021, China launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the HGV carried by it partially entered orbit before landing in China. The DoD noted that the missile flew a distance of slightly less than 40,000 km for over 100 minutes and did not hit its target but came close.<sup>2</sup>

Russia has already deployed the HGV “Avangard” and plans to deploy the new ICBM “Sarmat” that can carry the Avangard in 2024. In 2021, Russia successfully test-launched the HCM “Zircon” from a submarine. In 2023, a Zircon-equipped frigate embarked on combat patrol missions.

North Korea seems to regard the development of hypersonic gliding warheads as one of its priority goals and is promoting related research and development. It has been launching missiles it calls “hypersonic missiles”

since 2021.

In response to the threat of such hypersonic missiles, the United States is developing glide phase interceptors (GPIs), missiles that intercept hypersonic missiles during their glide phase.

### (2) High-power Energy Technology

High-power energy weapons, such as railguns, high-energy laser weapons and high-power microwave weapons, are being developed as a means to counter various airborne threats.

A railgun is a kind of weapon that shoot bullets using a magnetic field generated from electrical energy. Unlike missiles, the bullets used for railguns have no propulsion device. For this reason, the bullets are smaller, cost less and require less space for storing. Therefore, railguns are said to be capable of coping effectively with attacks involving a large number of missiles.

Laser weapons, which use high-power laser energy to destroy targets, are being developed by the United States, China, Russia and other countries as low-cost, effective means of intercepting a large number of small, unmanned aircraft and small vessels.

The United States is developing several laser weapons. In 2023, the U.S. Army received prototypes of the 50kW class vehicle-mounted laser weapon “DE M-SHORAD (Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense)” and concluded a contract to develop 300kW-class laser weapons.

China unveiled the “LW-30,” a vehicle-mounted laser weapon with a 30 kW power output and designed to counter small, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), at the 2022 China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition. There are also indications that China has deployed anti-satellite laser weapons that appear to be designed to interfere with or damage the optical sensors of low-earth orbit satellites and that it is developing laser weapons with even higher power output.

Russia has deployed the 10 kW Peresvet laser weapon system and it is reportedly developing a megawatt-class chemical laser weapon system for attacking satellites.

In 2022, Israel successfully tested the “Iron Beam” a vehicle-mounted air defense laser weapon with a power output of 100kW class, to intercept UAVs, mortar rounds

<sup>1</sup> According to the website of the U.S. Department of Defense on February 27, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2022).

and other objects. It unveiled a ship-board version of Iron Beam at the international maritime defense exhibition “IMDEX Asia 2023.”

High power microwave weapons are weapons to destroy or cause malfunction of electronic equipment in UAVs, missiles and the like. In 2023, the U.S. Air Force used the high-power microwave weapon “Tactical

High-power Operational Responder (THOR)” against numerous UAVs simulating a swarm flight, effectively disabling many of them. The U.S. Marine Corps is also assessing the integration of AI-based UAV detection and tracking capabilities with high-power microwave weapons.

### 3 Trends of Cutting-edge Technology in the Civilian Field

#### (1) Artificial Intelligence (AI) Technology

AI technology is one of the technological areas where rapid development is taking place, including generative AI, which can generate natural text and images. It has been pointed out that the rapid AI progress has been exerting a great impact on the military field, including the application for unmanned vehicles and the cyber domain as well as supporting for command and decision-making and improving data processing capacity, among other areas.

The United States established a Generative AI Task Force in 2023 to manage the risks of introducing generative AI and published a strategy for data, analysis and AI application to strengthen the organizational environment for continued AI utilization to gain decision-making advantages. Meanwhile, China announced its 14th Five-Year Plan in 2021, stating it would foster and expand digital industries, such as AI and strengthen military-civilian collaborative development in the field of AI technology.

As an application of AI, in 2023 the United States tested data sharing across the Unified Combatant Command to enable quick, data-based decision-making in each department, as well as testing AI-based improvement of various missions. Meanwhile, China announced in July 2020 that an AI Military Simulation Competition

was held by the Central Military Commission with the purpose of researching and developing next-generation command information systems.

Different nations are also developing unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with AI.

The United States is engaged in diverse R&D initiatives, including the automation of air-to-air combat, manned/unmanned aircraft formation flights and demonstrating their capabilities in maritime surveillance missions. In 2023, the U.S. Air Force tested AI-piloted XQ-58A UAVs flying in formation with manned aircrafts and in tactical flights against simulated missions, weapons and enemies.

China revealed in May 2018 that the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation successfully performed a swarm flight of 200 AI-equipped UAVs. It is assumed that military operations including such swarm flights will become difficult to counter with conventional air defense systems. In 2023, an AI algorithm competition simulating a UAV aerial combat was held in China.

In 2019, Russia conducted a coordinated flight test between S-70 heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle “Okhotnik” and the fifth-generation fighter Su-57, with the aim of delivering them in 2024. At the international military technology forum “Army 2023,” a Russian company unveiled a UAV equipped with an AI-based target identification function.

It has also been pointed out that the military use of AI may develop into Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and this is being discussed in the international community. In 2023, as part of efforts by like-minded countries, the “Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM) Call to Action,” which confirmed responsible use in accordance with obligations under international law, as well as the “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” which confirmed the need to operate AI under a responsible human chain of command and clarify responsibility, were announced.



AI-controlled XQ-58A UAVs flying in formation with manned aircraft [U.S. Air Force]

Japan expressed its support for both. The United Nations General Assembly has adopted a resolution underlining the urgency of addressing the challenges posed by LAWS.

## (2) Quantum Technology

Quantum technology is positioned as an important technology which brings innovation to society by applying quantum mechanics, which operates in the microscopic world of atomic nuclei and electrons. In its National Defense Science and Technology Strategy published in 2023, the United States cited quantum technology as key and declared its intention to strengthen collaboration and technological innovation with its allies. Conversely, in its 14th Five-Year Plan published in 2021, China stated its intention to accelerate cutting-edge technologies like quantum computers and communications and enhance military-civilian collaborative development in the quantum technology field.

Quantum cryptographic communication, which is considered to be cryptographic communication that cannot be deciphered by a third party, is being studied in many countries. China has built a 4,600 km quantum cryptographic communication network consisting of the quantum cryptographic communication satellite “Mozi” and a ground communication network between Beijing and Shanghai. In 2022, quantum encryption services were provided to the Communist Party and government agencies in Hefei.

It has been pointed out that in the future, quantum sensors could be used for tracking missiles and aircraft, as well as for more advanced gyros and accelerometers.<sup>3</sup> In 2023, the United States successfully demonstrated magnetic navigation using quantum magnetic sensors as an alternative to the Global Positioning System (GPS) and has also been developing a satellite equipped with quantum gyros to develop inertial navigation using quantum inertial sensors.

Quantum computers are said to be able to calculate problems that would take even a supercomputer an enormous amount of time in a short time and are expected to be applied in fields such as decryption. On the other hand, post-quantum cryptography (PQC),

which cannot be decrypted by quantum computers, is being researched in many countries. The United States is urging all domestic organizations to prepare for a transition to PQC ahead of the establishment of the PQC standard scheduled for 2024.

## (3) Cutting-Edge Information and Communication Technology

As a mobile communication infrastructure, the 5th-Generation Mobile Communication System (5G) services have been launched in various countries since 2019 and research on wireless communication technologies beyond 5G is also underway.

In the Department of Defense 5G Strategy published in 2020, the United States declared that 5G was a strategic technology and that it would promote its introduction and ensure its safety. The United States has been evaluating 5G at air force bases and elsewhere. In 2022, the United States established a team to handle 5G and next-generation wireless communications and began new initiatives such as Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN)<sup>4</sup> and secure and scalable spectrum sharing<sup>5</sup> for 5G and beyond.

Conversely, in its 14th Five-Year Plan for Digital Economy Development announced in 2021, China, announced its intention to expand and match 5G and optical fiber and strengthen research and development into 6G. In 2023, Huawei announced a product with communication speeds ten times faster than 5G (equivalent to 5.5G).

## (4) Additive Manufacturing Technology

Additive manufacturing technology, as typified by 3D printers, is expected to be applied to each military sector in various countries, due to low manufacturing cost and parts procurement that does not rely on inventory.

The United States, in announcing the “Use of Additive Manufacturing Technology” in 2021, stated that it would enhance the independence and readiness of its military services and has installed 3D printers on some of its surface ships and submarines. China is also utilizing 3D printers to manufacture parts for military aircraft. Russia is developing 3D printers for drone production.

<sup>3</sup> According to the website of the U.S. Department of Defense on February 23, 2021

<sup>4</sup> A wireless access network that discloses and standardizes specifications for wireless base stations and enables interconnection of multiple suppliers

<sup>5</sup> A method in which multiple users with different purposes share the same frequency band

## Information Warfare and Intelligence Services: Adaptation to Challenges of the State-sponsored Influence Operations and Disinformation



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Liberal democracies have faced serious concerns about state-sponsored “Influence operations,” such as covertly spreading disinformation on social networking services (SNSs). They are recognized as “hybrid threats” short of armed conflict as they undermine the trust of democratic institutions like elections. In addition, they have been grave national security threats as they support “hybrid warfare,” a combination of the military and non-military means for revising the status quo while managing the escalation. Digital-enabled influence operations, in nature, exploit privately owned ICT platforms and exacerbate existing political, economic, and social vulnerabilities within the targeted community. In response, Western democracies have pursued a “whole-of-society approach” that convenes inter-agency and cross-sectoral cooperation, such as industry and civil society stakeholders, to tackle the challenges of influence operations.

While the whole-of-society approach comprises a variety of multi-stakeholder efforts, the government’s initiatives constitute a critical piece of the puzzle as well. The whole of the government’s preparedness for “integrated information warfare with special regards to cognitive dimension”<sup>1</sup>, comprising both intelligence and strategic communication functions, is vital as it shapes shared situational awareness and helps public-private partnerships and international cooperation to identify and disrupt imminent threats.

Recent examples highlight two distinctive approaches to the government’s institutional adaptation toward “information warfare” among Western democracies. One is organizing a specialized government body that is responsible for tracking and exposing digital-enabled operations leveraging open-source intelligence (OSINT), such as VIGINUM under the French General Secretariat for Defense and National Security. The other is harnessing national intelligence services to deal with the challenges of information warfare.

The latter approach was exemplified by the relentless declassification of intelligence analysis by the U.S. and UK intelligence community to expose and preempt Russia’s false flag operations and disinformation campaign, thereby disrupting Russia’s blitzkrieg military victory like the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Similar initiatives include the U.S. and U.K.-led international campaigns, in collaboration with like-minded European allies such as the Netherlands, in order to publicly expose tradecrafts of

covert cyber operations and traditional sabotage by adversaries’ foreign intelligence apparatus.

Recent academic literature has pointed out two distinctive advantages of harnessing intelligence services to respond to the challenges of information warfare. One is access to sensitive sources and methods and unique analytical insights, which are not always available to the OSINT by non-state actors. Leveraging privileged access to such capabilities enables them to identify and attribute covert nation-state sponsorship faster than other stakeholders. This aspect is something like placing the intelligence agencies as “early-warning sensors” against states-sponsored influence operations.

The second aspect is leveraging such unique insights and international media attention generated by strategic declassification efforts as a “catalyst” for reciprocal knowledge co-production and narrative amplification dynamics vis-à-vis industry and civil society partners. For example, the US/UK-led intelligence disclosure before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with exceptional international media attention, stimulated the independent OSINT-enabled verification by Bellingcat and other international research institutes, leading to shared but verified situational awareness of threats and international solidarity in support of Ukraine. Another example is the series of the Joint Cyber Security Advisory issued by the U.S. allies and partners, which aims to scale up the reciprocal sharing of cyber threat intelligence vis-à-vis persistent state-sponsored cyber campaigns beyond the specific jurisdiction.

These developments imply that intelligence services in liberal democracies have struggled to adapt to complex information environments in the 21st century, where they must build collaborative feedback loops between industry and civil society partners, as the state’s monopoly of knowledge and narrative has been eroding due to the proliferation of the ICT. Such dynamics also raise a question about the organizational identity of the national intelligence apparatus between the traditional roles of the secretive supporter serving the government decision-makers and the public-facing roles for reaching out to various stakeholders as a “whole of society approach.” In conclusion, the relationship between information warfare and intelligence agencies symbolizes the challenges of adaptation of secret intelligence in the liberal democracy vis-à-vis the information environment of the 21st century.

<sup>1</sup> For initiatives by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 5 of the White Paper.

(Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher’s academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position.

## 4 Diffusion of Information-related Technology and Information Warfare

As has been pointed out in the cases of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the 2023 clashes between Israel and the Palestinian militants as well as the presidential election in Taiwan, concerns over information warfare, such as the dissemination of disinformation and the proliferation of information aimed at eroding trust in the target government or dividing society using social networking services (SNS) and influencers have been growing.

It is believed that Russia and China are waging information warfare both domestically and abroad, aiming to build an information environment favorable to them. For example, it has been pointed out that China is spending billions of dollars to promote propaganda, spread disinformation and conduct censorship by investing in the media of other countries. It has also been noted that China and Russia are collaborating to spread propaganda and disinformation, disseminating their convenient narratives to target recipients in countries like Japan, the United States, Taiwan and Europe, as well as third countries in the Global South.

It has been pointed out that autonomous programs called bots are becoming more commonly used in tactics on social media. Major social media companies are working to remove bot accounts, but there are also moves to use fake photos generated by AI to avoid being targeted for removal.

Furthermore, advances in AI technology could make deepfakes and generative AI-created videos, images and documents even more of a serious threat, as they are highly realistic and can be created in a short time with easily accessible tools.

In response, the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security issued an advisory on the threat of deepfakes in September 2023. In November the same year, the Department of Defense developed the "Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE)," which stated the need for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and regional military forces to collaborate toward the same goal. In Europe, the EU has proposed the concept of "**Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference**" (FIMI) and is working on countermeasures.

As for technological responses, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is developing detection functions to verify the authenticity of various information in the media and private companies are also developing software that utilize AI and algorithms to automatically collect and analyze online information. This software is being introduced to public institutions in various countries as a new means of gathering information.

### KEY WORD

#### "Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference" (FIMI)

This is a concept that refers to "a series of actions by foreign governments or others that have (or may have) the intention of wielding malign influence over the sense of values, procedures, or political processes" of one's country. EU, NATO and each European country show serious concerns about the spread of FIMI in the world. FIMI is often carried out legally, deliberately and systematically by foreign countries, non-state actors, or affiliated organizations, to wield influence on public opinion of one's country or disrupt democratic processes such as presidential elections. This kind of information manipulation operation disables not only each individual but society as a whole from making its own decisions. This is one of the major threats to a democratic society based on free and open information.

## 5 Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technology Bases

Advanced technologies based on significant technological advances in the civilian field have so much power that they can completely change the way battles happen. Relative merits in industry and technology greatly influence national security. Under these circumstances, many countries are taking on a variety of initiatives in order to maintain and enhance their national defense production and technological bases.

First of all, each country enhances investments to defense research and development to ensure technological superiority. For example, about half of the nearly 16 trillion yen invested in the government

research expenditure of the United States is paid out by the DoD. This is in contrast to the situation in Japan in which the research and development budget for the Ministry of Defense (the MOD) is only around 5% of government research expenditure.

The United States also offers large-scale funds to research conducted by companies and universities. For example, DARPA, an internal organization of the DoD, has requested a budget of US\$4,370 million for FY2025 to continue active investments in innovative research at companies and universities, with the aim of maintaining the U.S. Forces' technological superiority. In addition,

the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) mediates between companies owning innovative technology and the DoD to make the most of cutting-edge technologies from the civilian field in the resolution of challenges in the security sector. The DIU has produced contracts with over 450 companies mainly in six fields, including AI, autonomous technology and the cyber field. In FY2023, the DIU moved 10 consumer solutions suggested by companies from the prototype stage to the production stage.

China is promoting Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) as a national strategy. General Secretary Xi Jinping stated in his report to the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 2022 that China would build up a series of new growth engines such as next-generation information technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, new energy, new materials and such through promoting integrated development of strategic emerging industries and clustered development.

In response to the recent utilization of dual-use technologies in defense equipment development, the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia, as well as NATO, have been funding innovative research and development in the private sector to acquire advanced civilian technologies. The United Kingdom is strengthening its investment in the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), which invests in innovations boosting security in industry and academia. It also established the Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA) in January 2023 with the aim of investing in groundbreaking research with the potential to have a significant impact on society. In Australia, an organization called the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) was established in July 2023 to replace the existing Defense Innovation Hub and the Next Generation Technologies Fund. The ASCA aims to collaborate with Australian industry and research institutions to rapidly provide the capabilities needed by the Australian military. Meanwhile, NATO established the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) in April 2022 with the aim of enabling member states to work with the private sector and academia to make advanced new technologies available for Western security.

Furthermore, foreign countries recognize the defense industrial base as an essential element of their national defense and have organized systems to implement their policies through the publication of policy documents and the establishment of organizations in charge of the

defense industry. They also take on a variety of initiatives to maintain and strengthen their defense production base, such as supporting the participation of domestic companies in government programs and promoting exports.

In the National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) announced in January 2024, the United States set out four long-term strategic priorities to build a strong defense industrial base fit for the times: resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition and economic deterrence. The United States also outlined its intention to promote various initiatives to achieve these priorities, such as strengthening cooperation with allies and friendly nations, providing financial support to companies and improving procurement methods.

The United Kingdom published its Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) in order to construct a more productive and strategic relationship with domestic defense industries in 2021. The DSIS orders the government to take on some initiatives such as large-scale procurement reforms, toughening of supply chains and accelerating export permissions in order to strengthen defense as a critical strategic asset. Furthermore, the United Kingdom published the Defence Supply Chain Strategy in 2022 and stated to aim to build up robust defense supply chains to enable the military to respond to the current severe security environment.

Australia created a new office of Minister for Defence Industry in 2016. Australia also supports small and medium sized enterprises participating in the defense industry and keeps up with financial support through the Office of Defence Industry Support established in 2021 as a One-Stop organization to support the defense industry. Furthermore, in its Defence Industry Development Strategy (DIDS) announced in February 2024, Australia set out seven Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities (SDIPs) and decided to strengthen cooperation with the defense industry, for example by providing vocational training and subsidies to businesses, as well as promoting public-private exchanges, to realize these projects.

In March 2024, the EU announced its first European Defence Industry Strategy (EDIS), which sets numerical targets for defense-related trade within the EU and the proportion of joint procurement and presents a series of actions, including financial support and strengthening relationships with other countries, to enhance the competitiveness and readiness of the European defense industry

The Republic of Korea (ROK) aims an improvement

of capabilities and higher self-containment of domestic defense industry through their Defence Industry Development Act and their Defence Science and Technology Innovation Promotion Act enforced in 2021. Furthermore, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced a policy to procure equipment taking into consideration the ripple effects for domestic industries and a policy to promote cooperation between foreign companies and domestic companies as well as the use of domestic products by foreign companies.<sup>6</sup>

Each country exports equipment strategically because trading equipment strengthens the relationship between two trading countries as well as the base for defense technology and the defense industry. For example, the United Kingdom announced in the DSIS that it would support exporting with cross-ministerial effort from different government offices such as the Department for International Trade and the Home Office. The

United States, Russia, Europe and China are still the top four in terms of export value of military equipment, while Australia formulated its export strategy.<sup>7</sup> The ROK established an export support organization,<sup>8</sup> and financially supports research and development for export. Various countries proactively promote military equipment export using a variety of measures.


 See Fig. I-4-1-1 (Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Export (2019-2023)); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1 (Reinforcing Defense Production Base); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 2 (Reinforcing Defense Technology Base)

Fig. I-4-1-1

Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Export (2019-2023)

Rank	Country or region	Shares in the total global exports of defense equipment (%) 2019-2023	Comparison with 2014-2018 (%)
1	The United States	42	17
2	France	11	47
3	Russia	11	-53
4	China	6	-5
5	Germany	6	-14
6	Italy	4	86
7	The United Kingdom	4	-14
8	Spain	3	-3
9	Israel	2	-25
10	ROK	2	12

(Note) Created based on "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database." Only the top 10 countries by export share for 2019 to 2023 are indicated (figures are rounded to the nearest whole number).

<sup>6</sup> The ROK announced the introduction of the Korea Defense Capability policy in 2021, which includes these policies.  
<sup>7</sup> Australia announced the Defence Export Strategy in 2018.  
<sup>8</sup> The Defense Export Promotion Center was established in 2018.



## Section 2 Trends in Space Domain

### 1 Space Domain and Security

There is no concept of national borders in space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables the observation of, communication with and positioning over any area on Earth.

Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), functions. Such satellites include information collecting satellites that collect various activities as images and radio waves, early warning satellites for detecting the launch of ballistic missiles, positioning satellites for enhancing the precision of weapons systems, communication satellites relays communication and the like.

On the other hand, anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to hinder the utilization of space by other countries are also under development.

Regarding destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-SATellite (DA-ASAT) missiles, China and Russia conducted tests targeting their own satellites in 2007 and 2021, respectively. As a result, a large amount of space debris has been generated, raising concerns about the risk of such debris colliding with satellites and other space assets of various countries.

Regarding China, it has been pointed out that the robot arm technologies being developed by China to inspect and repair on-orbit satellites can be diverted to ASAT weapons such as satellite-attack satellites (so-called “killer satellites”). As for Russia, it has been pointed out that the ejection of an object from its satellite against a nearby satellite was an ASAT experiment.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China and

Russia are developing jammers for interfering with communications between target satellites and ground stations, as well as high energy technology such as laser weapons designed to degrade or damage satellites. In addition, a Russian cyber-attack on a satellite communication provider in 2022 disrupted satellite communications services, raising concerns about cyber-attacks on space systems.

As threats in space continue to rise, many countries are increasingly positioning space as a “warfighting domain” or “operational domain.” These countries are working on space domain awareness (SDA) to monitor threats to their space assets.

Against this backdrop, the existing international agreements do not have direct provisions on prohibiting the destruction of space assets or avoiding actions triggering space debris. Accordingly, with peaceful usage and the need to prevent an arms race in mind, the United Nations is debating this issue in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. In recent years, topics related to disarmament, such as “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” and “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors,” have also been discussed. In 2023, the UN General Assembly also adopted a resolution to continue these discussions.

In addition, as part of the efforts of like-minded nations, the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO) meetings are being held to discuss space security, with three new countries, including Japan, joining to discuss operational cooperation and information sharing.

 See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-4 (Responses in Space Domain)

## 2 Various Countries' Outer Space Initiatives

### 1 The United States

The United States is the world's greatest space power that has been promoting a variety of space activities in military, science, resource mapping and other domains. The launch of the first reconnaissance satellite in the world and the first landing on the Moon are also among

its great achievements. The U.S. Forces clearly recognize the importance of outer space and are actively utilizing it.

In 2023, the United States demonstrated an accelerated process from satellite payload loading to operation to improve the readiness of its satellite launch capabilities. The United States is also launching numerous satellites to build a satellite constellation called “Proliferated

<sup>1</sup> According to “Challenges to Security in Space,” the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (2022)

Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA)” that detects and tracks missile threats, including hypersonic weapons, from space.

On the policy front, the National Defense Strategy states that utilizing the space domain will improve the capabilities of monitoring and decision-making systems to achieve combat objectives, regardless of enemy interference or deception, while the National Defense Space Strategy states that its goals are to ensure superiority in space, support national operations and joint and combined operations through space capabilities and ensure stability in space.

In 2023, the United States announced a “Strategic Framework for Space Diplomacy,” which stated that it would expand mutually beneficial international cooperation in space activities. The country also published the “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” which assessed China and Russia as threats and stated that the realization of the Department of Defense’s space policy requires highly resilient command and control, space-based fire and protection, flexible electronic warfare operations, enhanced SDA and cyber defense capabilities. In addition, The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office and U.S. Space Command are working on a commercial asset protection framework, including the sharing of space threat information.

As for organizations, the United States inaugurated the U.S. Space Command as a new regional unified combatant command based on the Strategic Command’s component in charge of space missions in 2019. The United States created the Space Force under the Department of the Air Force as the sixth military branch, with approximately 16,000 personnel. In 2023, the U.S. Space Force established the U.S. Space Forces Europe and Africa to strengthen space capabilities in the European and African regions, an ISR unit to analyze threats from enemy space forces and the “U.S. Space Forces - Space (S4S)” to conduct integrated space operations on behalf of the Commander of Space Command, as well as provisionally forming mission-specific units to operate electronic warfare and Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) satellites. In addition, to promote the use of commercial services, the United States established a department to coordinate their use in the Space Command and a department to

support industry-government-academia collaboration in the Space Force.

On December 15, 2023, the Commander of Space Command declared that Space Command had become fully operational.

 See Chapter 3, Section 2-2-5 (Military Posture)

## 2 China

China has been promoting space development since the 1950s and has been further intensifying its space activities, including landing an unmanned probe on the far side of the moon, completing the space station “Tiangong,” and advancing plans for a lunar base. In 2023, China launched a number of satellites, including the positioning satellite “BeiDou” and the earth observation satellite “Yaogan,” and is also working to build a satellite constellation for rapid information gathering and communication.

While traditionally emphasizing international cooperation and the peaceful use of space, it is pointed out that China proactively used space for military purposes, including information collection, communications and positioning through satellites. For example, the possibility of military use has been pointed out for “BeiDou” for aircraft and vessel navigation and guidance of missiles, and for “Yaogan” for electronic and image reconnaissance. Regarding carrier rockets such as the “Long March” series, the Chinese state-owned enterprises that developed and produced them are said to be also developing and producing ballistic missiles, and it is believed that the development of carrier rockets could also be applied to the development of ballistic missiles.

It is pointed out that China recognizes counter space operations as a means to deter and confront the United States’s intervention to regional conflicts<sup>2</sup> and carries out ASAT weapons development and the like. In addition to the satellite destruction test in 2007 mentioned above and the “non-destructive” test of an ASAT missile in July 2014, it is also pointed out that China continues to acquire and develop various ASAT capabilities and related technologies such as ground-based lasers and space robots.<sup>3</sup>

China is thus expected to focus on space development through close cooperation between government, military and private sectors. The United States estimates that

<sup>2</sup> According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>3</sup> According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023)

China pursues space capabilities the same as or higher than those of the United States.<sup>4</sup> It is also pointed out that the number of Chinese military satellites under operation is larger than that of the United States.<sup>5</sup>

In terms of policy, China insists that space is key to international strategic competition and that the safety of space is a strategic safeguard for nation building and social development. It also reveals the principle that it accelerates development of the aerospace domain. In the white paper titled “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective” issued in January 2022, it was emphasized to “build China into a space power” and it stated that China promotes the space industry. Moreover, the policy to “accelerate the construction of space development power” was raised in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Congress of the CCP in October 2022.

In terms of organization, the creation of an information support force was announced in 2024, which has been noted as a reorganization of the Strategic Support Forces established at the end of 2015. Prior to 2024, the Strategic Support Forces was said to have been tasked with space, cyber, and electronic warfare.

### 3 Russia

While Russian space activity has been reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has continued to be active in space in recent years, even after its aggression against Ukraine. For example, Russia is working on the multi-satellite constellation plan Sfera to complete a constellation of over 600 satellites for observation and communication by 2030. Furthermore, Russia has decided to extend its participation in the International Space Station until 2028 and has revealed a development plan for its own space station, with each module scheduled to be launched between 2028 and 2030.

In addition, Russia has used its space capabilities for military operations in Syria. Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu revealed at a meeting of the Ministry of Defence in 2019 that he has become aware of the need to rebuild the country’s military satellites based on this tactical experience. In 2023, Russia launched the military satellite “Lotos-S1,” which is believed to be for electronic reconnaissance, the radar observation satellite “Kondor-FKA,” and the positioning satellite

“GLONASS.”

Regarding ASAT weapons, in November 2021, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that it had successfully destroyed a Soviet satellite in orbit in an experiment.

In regard to Russian policies, Russia released in 2016 the Federal Space Program for 2016-2025 as a specific future guideline for space activities, including the development and deployment of domestic space satellites and crewed flight programs.

From an organizational perspective, ROSCOSMOS is in charge of space activities related to Russia’s scientific and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in space activities for security purposes. The Russian Aerospace Forces, into which the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces were integrated in August 2015, conduct actual space activities for military purposes and manage facilities for launching satellites.

### 4 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

North Korea has been advancing the development of its reconnaissance satellites. In 2023, North Korea claimed to have successfully launched and put into operation “Malligyong-1,” purported to be a reconnaissance satellite. It has also cited launching three additional satellites as a goal for 2024.

In terms of organization, in 2023, North Korea reorganized the National Aerospace Development Administration, which had been in charge of rocket



Pyongyang General Control Center of the National Aerospace Technology Administration  
[Korean Central News Agency - Jijj]

<sup>4</sup> According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (2023)

<sup>5</sup> According to “The Military Balance 2023,” U.K. International Institute for Strategic Studies

and satellite development, into the National Aerospace Technology Administration. The Reconnaissance Satellite Operation Office, a military intelligence organization, reportedly exists within the National Aerospace Technology Administration's Pyongyang General Control Center and reports information obtained by reconnaissance satellites to the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party (CMC) and, in accordance with the CMC's instructions, provides the information to key military units and the Reconnaissance General Bureau.

## 5 Republic of Korea (ROK)

The ROK's space development is promoted based on the Fourth Basic Space Development Promotion Plan announced in December 2022 under the Space Development Promotion Act implemented in 2005. The plan mainly aims to double the space-related budget, promote the space industry and establish an aerospace agency. The Ministry of National Defense has stated that it will acquire surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning satellites to strengthen its space-related capabilities.<sup>6</sup>

In May 2023, the ROK conducted the third launch of its domestically produced Nuri rocket. In December 2023, the ROK military's first reconnaissance satellite was launched in the United States and is scheduled to be operational during the first half of 2024. In addition, civilian commercial satellites have been launched domestically using the Agency for Defense Development's solid-fuel propulsion space projectile technology. The ROK Ministry of National Defense has stated that the country is close to securing the capability to rapidly put small satellites into low orbit.

Among organizations, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute leads research and development as an implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense Development is engaged in the development and use of various satellites. Also, to secure space surveillance capabilities above the Korean Peninsula, the country created its first space force in 2019 and reinforced and reorganized the unit into the Air Force Space Operation Battalion in 2022.

## 6 India

India is promoting space development, such as manned space missions and lunar exploration missions.

India unveiled its Space Policy 2023, outlining its intention to focus on providing public goods and services using space technology and building a fair regulatory framework to promote effective use of space by public and private sectors for socio-economic and security purposes. As for bilateral cooperation, the 2021 India-Russia Joint Statement announced the strengthening of cooperation with Russia in the fields of space and military technology. In 2023, India and the United States established the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem for defense technology innovation, with Indian companies signing joint research and development agreements with the U.S. Space Force.

India is also operating a regional navigation satellite system called "Navigation Indian Constellation (NavIC)" for the purpose of positioning around the country and launched its second-generation positioning satellite in 2023.

Regarding ASAT weapons, Prime Minister Modi announced in 2019 that the country successfully tested a missile to destroy a low-orbit satellite.

## 7 Europe

The EU allocated 14.88 billion euros to its space policy in its medium-term budget plan from 2021 through 2027. To promote the space industry and strengthen security, the EU is promoting robust PNT, precise Earth observation, enhanced space surveillance and tracking capabilities, and secure satellite communication services. It is also working to develop military PNT and space-based autonomous situational awareness.

In 2023, the EU published its Space Security and Defense Strategy, which stated that it would strengthen the use of space capabilities in security and defense, and it plans to develop new Earth observation services and provide initial SDA services. The EU also announced an agreement not to conduct DA-ASAT missile tests and is conducting penetration tests on satellite-mounted systems to understand the vulnerabilities of satellite systems to cyber-attacks.

NATO indicated its recognition that space is the fifth operational domain alongside land, sea, air and

<sup>6</sup> According to the ROK Defense White Paper 2022 (2023)

cyberspace and that armed attacks in space could trigger NATO's right to collective self-defense. In its new strategic concept published in 2022, NATO stated that it would strengthen its ability to operate effectively in the space and cyber domains. In 2023, NATO launched an initiative called "persistent surveillance from space," aiming to strengthen ISR through the integrated use of public and private satellites. Additionally, a NATO-certified Space Center of Excellence (Space COE) began operation and is expected to complement the efforts of the NATO Space Center through means such as education, training, and concept development.

In the United Kingdom, the Space Command was officially launched in 2021 and will be responsible for conducting space operations, training and developing space-related personnel, and providing space capabilities. The Defense Space Strategy announced in 2022 stated that the United Kingdom will invest 1.4 billion pounds over the next 10 years in areas such as ISR and

satellite communications. In 2023, the United Kingdom established a unit where the Space Command will take on part of the U.S. Space Force's SDA mission, thereby strengthening the UK's space operations capabilities and cooperation with the United States.

France announced its National Defense Space Strategy in 2019, stating that it aims to establish a space command and strengthen its threat recognition and space situation monitoring capabilities. In the same year, France established a space command under the Air Force. In 2020, the Air Force was renamed the Air and Space Force, adding activities to ensure free access to space and freedom of action in space to its duties. In addition, in the "Military Programming Act 2024-2030" enacted in 2023, France stated that it aims to establish a command, control, communications, and computing center for space operations and introduce patrol satellites.

## Section 3 Trends in Cyber Domain

### 1 Cyberspace and Security

The internet is becoming increasingly important as a new social domain (cyberspace) with various services and communities being formed. Therefore, cyber-attacks that compromise information assets and networks in cyberspace are real threats to security because they can have serious impacts on society.

Types of cyber-attacks include unauthorized access, information leakage and functional impairment by malware (unauthorized programs), information falsification and theft, functional impairment of networks through the simultaneous transmission of large amounts of data and the shutdown or takeover of critical infrastructure such as electric power systems and medical

systems. In addition, the methods of attack are becoming increasingly sophisticated; for example, it is pointed out that the use of AI for cyber-attacks is possible.

For military forces also, cyberspace forms the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, the dependence of military forces on cyberspace is further increasing. Since it is not easy to identify the attackers and ascertain the damage, cyber-attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede military activities of adversaries at low cost. And it is believed that many foreign armed forces are developing cyber-attack capabilities.

### 2 Threat Trend in Cyberspace

Cyber-attacks have frequently been carried out against not only government organizations and military forces but also business corporations and academic organizations in various countries, targeting their critical technology, confidential information and personal data. In addition, advanced persistent threat (APT), which refers to relentless cyber-attacks on specific organizations, is also considered to be an organized activity because it requires abundant resources, arrangements and capabilities for long-term activities.

To respond to such advanced cyber-attacks, Japan is required to share threat awareness with foreign countries for technological and operational cooperation. Amid this situation, the United States has assessed that attackers are using malicious cyber activities to gain asymmetric advantages and target critical infrastructure, thereby undermining U.S. military superiority, citing China, Russia, North Korea and Iran as particularly egregious offenders.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1 China

In China, it has been believed that cyber warfare units were organized under the Strategic Support Forces, but it has been pointed out that the Strategic Support Forces

may have been reorganized into an information support force or the like in 2024. The Strategic Support Forces prior to 2024 were estimated to be around 175,000-strong, of which 30,000 were said to be in the cyber attack force. The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense recognizes China as a security threat in cyberspace, pointing out that the country accurately grasps the targets for cyber-attacks by information correction and information theft in peacetime and in war time, aims to injure the capabilities of the government and armed forces by destructing key infrastructure and information systems, destabilizing the society and creating confusion.<sup>2</sup> China's 2019 defense white paper, released in July 2019 and titled "China's National Defense in the New Era," stated that China's armed forces are accelerating the building of their cyberspace capabilities. China is thus believed to have been enhancing its military's cyber warfare capabilities.

 See Chapter 3, Section 2-2-5 (Military Posture)

China is suspected of routinely stealing technologies and conducting surveillance of foreign adversaries in cyberspace.<sup>3</sup> In 2023, China's involvement in the following incidents was noted:

- In April 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted a Chinese government official for disrupting an online meeting of Chinese dissidents residing in the United

<sup>1</sup> According to "Cyber Strategy 2023," the U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>2</sup> According to Taiwan's National Defense Report (2021)

<sup>3</sup> According to "Cyber Strategy 2023," the U.S. DoD (2023)

States by sending a massive transmission of pro-Chinese government messages.

- In May 2023, the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries announced that “Volt Typhoon,” a cyber actor backed by the Chinese government, had infiltrated critical infrastructure in the United States. It was pointed out that to avoid leaving traces, the Volt Typhoon had used network tools in the infiltration-target environment, thereby avoiding detection.
- In July 2023, a U.S. IT firm announced that a China-based cyber actor, “Storm-0558,” had hacked the email accounts of the U.S. State Department, Commerce Department and others.
- In August 2023, a U.S. IT firm announced that a China-based cyber actor, “Flux Typhoon,” had infiltrated Taiwanese government agencies and other organizations to establish and maintain long-term access.
- In September 2023, Japan’s National Police Agency, the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, and others issued a warning, saying that the “BlackTech,” a cyber actor backed by China had carried out cyber attacks aimed at stealing information from government, industry, and technology sectors in East Asia, including Japan, and the United States.

## 2 North Korea

North Korea has four major intelligence agencies and external intelligence agencies: the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), the Ministry of State Security, the United Front Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the Cultural Exchange Bureau. It is pointed out that their main targets are the ROK, the United States and Japan.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, it is pointed out that their personnel are trained by these agencies.<sup>5</sup> This is led by the RGB of Korean People’s Army and has intensively built-up cyber units, operating some 6,800 people.<sup>6</sup>

It also is said that North Korea, which is under sanctions of every kind, uses cyber attacks to acquire foreign currency taking advantage of loopholes of sanctions.<sup>7</sup> It also commits thefts of foreign military secret intelligence and develops attack capabilities for

the critical infrastructure of other countries. The United Nations Security Council Expert Panel 2023 Final Report issued in 2024 alleged that 58 cyber-attacks against cryptocurrency-related companies suspected of North Korean involvement from 2017 to 2023 amounted to approximately \$3 billion in damages and that North Korea is earning approximately 50% of its foreign currency income through cyber-attacks and using it for its weapons of mass destruction programs. In 2023, North Korea’s involvement in the following cases was pointed out:

- In April 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted executives of the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on charges of laundering crypto-assets obtained through cyber-attacks.
- In June 2023, South Korea and the United States issued a warning that a North Korean cyber actor known as “Kimsuky” was collecting diplomatic information through unauthorized access using social engineering.
- In July 2023, a U.S. security company announced that cyber actors believed to be affiliated with the North Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau had infiltrated the system of a U.S. software provider and executed malicious scripts against the provider’s customers.
- In August 2023, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a warning that North Korean cyber actors had stolen hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of crypto-assets from multiple businesses in June.
- In October 2023, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service issued a warning, saying it had detected cyber-attacks suspected to be attempts to steal technical information by North Korean hackers against domestic shipbuilding companies and their employees in August and September.

## 3 Russia

It is pointed out that in the case of Russia, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service are involved in cyber-

<sup>4</sup> According to “North Korea Military Power,” U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (2021)

<sup>5</sup> According to the ROK Defense “2016 Defense White Paper” (2017)

<sup>6</sup> According to the ROK Defense “2022 Defense White Paper” (2023)

<sup>7</sup> According to “North Korea Military Power,” U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (2021)

attacks and it became clear that Russia's armed forces have a cyber command unit.<sup>8</sup> The cyber command unit is believed to be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities, including inserting malware into command and control systems of adversaries,<sup>9</sup> and is said to have approximately 1,000 personnel.

Moreover, Russia revealed, in its National Security Strategy released in July 2021, its perception that space and information space are under active development as a new domain for military action and declared to reinforce its sovereignty in the information space as a national priority. In 2019, Russia enacted the so-called Sovereign Internet Law, which aimed to cut off Russian networks from global networks in the event of a cyber-attack and the like, thereby ensuring the continuity of Russian networks.

Russia is said to be improving its espionage, influence and attack capabilities<sup>10</sup> and is suspected of being involved in the following incidents in 2023:

- In April 2023, Poland warned that it had observed widespread espionage by cyber actors associated with the Russian Federal Security Service targeting government ministries and agencies in EU countries. Poland pointed out that the cyber actors were posing as embassies and sent emails with links to insert malware.
- In May 2023, the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries announced that the Russian Federal Security Service had been using the malware "Snake" to conduct intelligence operations in more than 50 countries for nearly 20 years. They noted that computers infected with the malware had established encrypted networks and relayed spoofed communications.
- In June 2023, Ukraine issued a warning that the Russian cyber actor "APT28" was conducting espionage activities against Ukrainian government ministries and agencies by exploiting webmail vulnerabilities.
- In August 2023, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States warned that the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces had attempted to deploy new malware, "Infamous Chisel,"

on terminals used by the Ukrainian military.

- In December 2023, the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries accused Russia of conducting spear-phishing attacks using "Star Blizzard," a cyber actor affiliated with the Russian Federal Security Service, targeting organizations and individuals in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

#### 4 Trends Concerning Other Threats

In recent years, supply chain attacks via vulnerabilities in products used on a daily basis and business partners with lax security, as well as cyber-attacks on industrial control systems such as critical infrastructure, have also attracted attention.

Supply chain attacks by circumventing conventional security measures are a concern because they invade trusted organizations and software during the supply process ranging from procuring product parts to selling them to infiltrate targeted organizations. In 2023, the United States and the United Kingdom issued a warning that the ransomware actor "cl0p" had infiltrated government networks by exploiting vulnerabilities in software used by government agencies.

Cyberattacks on industrial control systems are a growing concern for critical infrastructure in particular, as the use of IT has made these systems easier targets for attacks, due to their transition from proprietary specifications and closed systems to open systems. In 2022, European security companies pointed out that in the Russian cyberattack on Ukrainian power transmission and substation facilities, the attackers were attempting to penetrate industrial control systems inside the IT network and deploy destructive malware.

As for space systems, satellite communications services were disrupted in 2022 due to a Russian cyber-attack on a satellite communications operator. As a result, countries are strengthening security measures through new advisories and guidelines on satellite communications and in Europe and the United States, penetration tests and hacking competitions are being conducted to clarify the vulnerabilities of space systems.

<sup>8</sup> According to the statement made by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu in an information session for Duma, the lower house, in February 2017. He said that the Russian military has a cyber command for countering political propaganda in the context of Russia's ongoing information war with Western countries. However, the minister fell short of naming the command.

<sup>9</sup> According to then the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper's written testimony on "Worldwide Cyber Threats" at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015.

<sup>10</sup> According to "Cyber Strategy 2023," the U.S. DoD (2023)



### 3 Initiatives against Cyberspace Threats

Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various initiatives are under way.

It is believed that the international community has diverging views on fundamental matters related to cyberspace, including how international law should be applied. For instance, the United States, Europe and Japan have called for maintaining a free cyberspace, while Russia, China and most emerging countries have sought to strengthen state control of cyberspace. The United Nations held an open-ended working group meeting from 2021 to 2025 to discuss a wide-ranging issue on threat perceptions, norms and the application of international law in cyberspace.

 See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-5 (Response in the Cyber Domain)

#### 1 The United States

In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting federal government networks and critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks and the Department's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works to protect the networks of government agencies.

The U.S. government has announced a National Cybersecurity Strategy, setting out the need to focus on protecting critical infrastructure and preventing and dismantling threat actors. The government has also announced a "Zero Trust<sup>11</sup> Strategy" to strengthen cybersecurity at federal agencies, calling on each ministry and agency to implement security measures based on the Zero Trust model. In addition, the government has announced a National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy to secure cyber workforce, which sets out its intention to address the long-term issue of acquiring basic cyber skills for the public and reforming cyber education.

Regarding national security, the U.S. government's National Security Strategy states that it will respond decisively to hostile actions in cyberspace with the aim of deterring cyber-attacks. Meanwhile, the National Defense Strategy prioritizes building resilience in the cyber domain and cites offensive cyber defenses as a means of direct deterrence. Furthermore, the Department

of Defense's Cyber Strategy 2023 stated that the department would track the organizations, capabilities and intentions of attackers, disrupt and degrade malicious cyber activities and defend against them, as well as support the Unified Combatant Command's operations in the cyber domain and cooperate with allies and related countries to defend against them.

At the Japan-U.S. "2+2" Meeting in 2019, the two countries agreed to strengthen cooperation in the field of cyberspace, affirming that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber-attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

The U.S. Forces include Cyber Command, which was elevated to a unified combatant command in May 2018 to control cyberspace operations. The U.S. Cyber Command, with 6,200 personnel, comprises teams that protect the Department of Defense's information networks, monitor and defend against adversary cyber activities and support the Unified Combatant Commands' operations. The U.S. military also conducts operations to defend against and disrupt malicious cyber activities on critical networks in partner nations such as Latvia and Lithuania.

#### 2 Republic of Korea

The ROK has announced a new "National Cyber Security Strategy" in 2024, which aims to develop offensive cyber defenses and ensure resilience in response to cyber threats from North Korea and other nations, as well as the evolving cyber landscape.

In terms of national defense, the ROK's military has established a structure to perform cyber operations led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2019, while developing a collaborative system among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyber Operations Command and each military branch in enhancing its cyber operations preparedness and ensuring effective response to threats in cyberspace. In 2023, a high-level U.S.-ROK consultative body, the "High-Level Steering Group," was established to strengthen U.S.-ROK cyber security cooperation.

<sup>11</sup> This concept is based on the view that human nature is fundamentally evil, with the principle of "Do not trust even insiders and be suspicious of both outsiders and insiders without distinction." This concept recommends suspecting even users and equipment such as terminals. If there is a high possibility of spoofing or similar, proactive suspension of access rights is recommended under this concept. The main targets of defense in this concept are resources such as data and equipment.

### 3 Australia

In its Defence Cyber Security Strategy released in 2022, Australia stated that it would achieve mission-focused and state-of-the-art cybersecurity adapted to the cyber threat environment through best practices and partnerships and set action goals such as operational model implementation and capability acquisition. In addition, the “2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy,” published in 2023, established a roadmap for Australia to become a global cybersecurity leader by 2030.

In its 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Australia stated that it should broadly strengthen its cyber capabilities to support integrated domain operations and in its 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program, it stated that it would improve its defense capabilities, including cyber capabilities, over the 10 years leading up to 2034.

On the organizational front, cybersecurity capabilities across the government have been centralized through the establishment of the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), which addresses major cybersecurity issues related to government agencies and critical infrastructure. In 2022, Australia announced the creation of a permanent joint task force of 100 cyber personnel selected from the Department of Communications and the Australian Federal Police to prevent cyber-attacks before they occur. The Minister for Cyber Security has clearly declared to adopt an offensive cyber defense.

The Australian Defence Force created the Information Warfare Division under the Joint Capabilities Group in 2017 and established the Defence Signals Intelligence and Cyber Command (DSCC) under the division in 2018. In 2019, the Royal Australian Air Force offered to recruit cyber skills officers to protect networks, data and information systems.

### 4 Europe

The EU announced “The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade” in 2020, which set goals such as revising regulations for resilient infrastructure and essential services and establishing a joint cyber unit across the civilian, diplomatic, police and defense sectors. In addition, the EU announced its Cyber Defense Policy in 2022 to strengthen the EU’s ability to protect its citizens and infrastructure.

Europe is also promoting the use of a common

framework for cyber defense activities by member states’ military cyber response teams for regional cyber cooperation, as well as working to ensure mutual cyber security support among member states. In 2023, an operator-level exercise was held to strengthen information-sharing and situational awareness among member states to cope with cyber-related crises.

At the NATO Summit in 2014, an agreement was reached that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyber-attacks against member states. In addition, at the 2023 NATO summit, it was decided to integrate political, military and technological aspects of cyber defense to ensure military-civilian cooperation in peacetime, crises and emergency situations and further strengthen national cyber defense, including critical infrastructure.

On the organizational front, the NATO Cyber Security Centre is protecting NATO’s own networks and the Cyber Domain Operations Center is coordinating operational actions in the cyber domain, ensuring freedom of action and providing threat resilience. In 2023, NATO launched the Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC) to counter malicious and significant cyber activities.

Furthermore, in 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was authorized to serve as a research and training institution. The CCDCOE published the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on international law applicable to cyber operations in 2017 and an initiative to revise the manual to version 3.0 is ongoing. In 2023, the CCDCOE held the cyber defense exercise “Locked Shields,” and NATO held the cyber defense exercise “Cyber Coalition,” in which NATO member states as well as Japan participated.

In its National Cyber Strategy published in 2021, the United Kingdom set out strategic objectives such as detection, disruption and deterrence of adversaries.



Cyber exercise “Cyber Coalition 2023” organized by NATO [NATO]

In addition, the “National Cyber Force: Responsible Cyber Warfare Practices,” published in 2023, stated that it would disrupt terrorist activities, counter APT threats and mitigate election interference and would pursue efforts to enhance the National Cyber Force’s scale, capabilities and functional integration going forward.

On the organizational front, in 2016, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was newly established under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to promote public-private partnerships for responses to national cyber incidents. Moreover, the 13th Signal Regiment was established in 2020 for the protection of military networks. The National Cyber Force was also established.

In its national digital security strategy published in

2015, France stated that it would protect its fundamental interests in cyberspace and strengthen its response to cybercrimes. In addition, in its “Strategic Review of Cyber Defense” in 2018, it clarified its cyber crisis management process.

On the organizational front, France established its Cyber Defense Command under the Chief of the Defence Staff in 2017 and announced a plan to increase the Command’s personnel to around 5,000 by 2025 to strengthen its cyber defense capabilities. In addition, the “Military Planning Law 2024-2030,” enacted in 2023, aims to establish a center of excellence (research base) to develop tactics, methods and procedures for cyber missions.

# Section 4 Trends in Electromagnetic Domain

## 1 Electromagnetic Domain and Security

Electromagnetic spectrum is used in various everyday applications, including televisions, mobile communications and global positioning systems (GPS). In the military field, electromagnetic spectrum is used for command-and-control communications equipment, radar systems for detecting enemies, missile guidance systems and other equipment. Securing superiority in the electromagnetic domain is indispensable for modern operations. Activities using the electromagnetic domain include “electronic warfare” and “electromagnetic spectrum management.” Electronic warfare means or approaches are generally classified into three categories - electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support.

**See** Fig. I-4-4-1 (How to Use the Electromagnetic Domain in the Defense Field)

“Electronic attack” involves jamming electromagnetic waves emitted from the adversary’s communication equipment or radar by emitting strong electromagnetic waves or fake electromagnetic waves mimicking those emitted by the adversary, thereby reducing or disabling the adversary’s communications and search capabilities. Electronic attacks include electromagnetic interference (jamming), electromagnetic wave deception and physical destruction using high-power electromagnetic waves (such as lasers and microwaves).

**See** Section 1-2 (2) (High-power Energy Technology)

“Electronic protection” is to make it difficult to be detected by adversaries and to reduce or neutralize adversary electronic attacks on communications and radar equipment by changing electromagnetic wave frequency for use or increasing its power.


“Electronic warfare support” consists of activities designed to collect information relating to electromagnetic waves used by adversaries. To effectively conduct electronic attacks and electronic protection, it is necessary to continuously monitor and analyze what kind of electromagnetic waves are used and how by the adversary’s communication equipment, radar and electronic attack aircraft.

“Electromagnetic wave management” is to grasp how electromagnetic waves are used in the battle area and to appropriately adjust frequencies, directions and durations of electromagnetic waves as well as equipment used by friendly forces to avoid electromagnetic wave interference.

Major countries recognize electronic attacks as asymmetric means of attack similar to cyber attacks that effectively prevent adversaries from demonstrating their military capabilities. They are also placing importance on and enhancing their electronic warfare capabilities, including the ability to launch electronic attacks.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-6 (Responses in the Domain of Electromagnetic Spectrum)

Fig. I-4-4-1 How to Use the Electromagnetic Domain in the Defense Field



## 2 Each Country's Electronic Warfare Initiatives

### 1 The United States and Europe

In its “Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy” announced in 2020, the United States emphasized the importance of ensuring freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum for successful operations across all domains. The strategy laid out its objectives of developing superior electromagnetic spectrum capabilities and creating a flexible infrastructure that integrates all electromagnetic spectrum information. In 2021, an implementation plan for the strategy was approved, which - the United States says - paves the way for initiatives such as establishing procedures to develop, integrate and strengthen integrated electromagnetic spectrum operations and develop guidance for acquiring electromagnetic spectrum capabilities.

In 2021, the U.S. military deployed a multidomain unit having space, cyberspace and electronic warfare functions in Germany. Furthermore, the U.S. Air Force newly established the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing to operate and maintain electronic warfare. In 2023, the Strategic Command officially opened the “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center”, which was intended to serve as the center of the U.S. military’s electromagnetic spectrum operations, including force management, planning and situational monitoring. It conducted a space electronic warfare exercise called “Black Sky,” and a command-and-control exercise under electromagnetic interference called “Heavy Rain.”

In 2023, the EU announced the “The 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities,” which laid out the policy for developing defense capabilities and cited the superiority of electromagnetic spectrum operations and the importance of a plan for electromagnetic spectrum operations and linkage capabilities. The EU is also working to develop technology for an alternative PNT system in case the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is jammed or disrupted and to strengthen the electronic attack function for aircraft and communication and radar systems in an electronic warfare environment.

In 2023, NATO conducted electronic warfare exercises such as “Dynamic Guard” by the Navy and “Ramstein Guard” by the Air Force.

### 2 China

The Chinese military considers electronic warfare an essential element of modern warfare. To protect its own information networks and prevent adversaries from using the electromagnetic domain, it will attempt to align electronic warfare and cyber to ensure its information dominance in conflicts.<sup>1</sup>

The Chinese military’s electronic warfare strategy is reportedly focused on suppressing, degrading, destroying and deceiving enemy’s electronic equipment and its electronic warfare unit is said to be regularly conducting jamming and counter-jamming exercises against multiple communication systems, radar systems and positioning systems during exercises.<sup>2</sup> It has also been pointed out that during the exercises, the Chinese military assesses the results of the research and development of electronic warfare weapons.<sup>3</sup>

While the Strategic Support Force has traditionally been responsible for electronic warfare, cyberspace, and space, it has been pointed out that this Strategic Support Force may have been reorganized into the Information Support Force or the like in 2024, and future developments will require attention.

Around Japan, Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flew over the Pacific Ocean in January and October 2023 and in June, a new Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft was confirmed to have flown over the Pacific Ocean. In the South China Sea, China has allegedly deployed radio wave jamming equipment on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands.<sup>4</sup>

### 3 Russia

Russia, in its Military Doctrine, places electronic warfare equipment as one of the critical equipment in modern military conflicts. Moreover, according to a Russian military organ’s contributed article of April 2021, Russia will ensure superiority in weapon guidance as well as force command by improving electronic warfare technology and expanding equipment, in response to the technological superiority of developed countries that have advanced information and communication

<sup>1</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023)  
<sup>2</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023)  
<sup>3</sup> According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2023)  
<sup>4</sup> According to “An Accounting of China’s Deployments to the Spratly Islands,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 2018)

technology.

In the Russian Forces, there are reportedly five electronic warfare brigades.<sup>5</sup> They mainly consist of the Land Forces and possess multiple types of electronic warfare equipment. Furthermore, Russia is further developing and deploying electronic warfare (EW) systems equipped with artificial intelligence (AI) such as the EW system Bylina that controls many EW equipment in an integrated manner and the EW system Palantin that reportedly can interfere with radio communications and electronic reconnaissance systems within a radius of 1,000 km.

During the invasion of Ukraine, Russia's electronic warfare equipment appears to have been effective in interfering with the navigation of Ukrainian drones<sup>6</sup> and degrading the guidance accuracy of GPS-guided missiles from Ukraine. In addition, to protect against Ukrainian drones, Russia is installing jammers on armored vehicles and taking measures to suppress drones' communications.

In the air space around Japan, an IL-20 information-gathering aircraft flew over the Sea of Japan in April, May, June, September and October 2023 and advanced to the Pacific Ocean also in September of the same year.

<sup>5</sup> According to "All Quiet on the Eastern Front: EW in Russia's New-Generation Warfare," Jane's International Defense Review (April 2018)

<sup>6</sup> According to "Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine" (2023), Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

## Section 5 Maritime Trends

Japan is a maritime nation surrounded by sea and depends on maritime transportation for importing energy resources. In this sense, securing maritime traffic safety is vital for the nation's existence. At the same time, ensuring the stable use of the maritime domain as infrastructure supporting international logistics is recognized as a primary concern for the international community.

Nevertheless, some countries unilaterally claim their rights or take action based on their own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, creating situations where the principle of the freedom of the high seas is unjustly violated. Attacks on ships in the Middle East and piracy seen at various locations have become a threat to maritime traffic.

### 1 Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas,” etc.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)<sup>1</sup> provides for the principles of freedom of navigation in the high seas and freedom of overflight. Nevertheless, in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan, especially in the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for China to unilaterally assert its rights or take action based on assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, creating situations where these principles are unjustly violated. In addition, North Korea's repeated launches of ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean, as well as the launches of what it claims to be satellites, not only violate related United Nations Security Council resolutions, but are also problematic from the perspective of ensuring the safety of aircraft and ships. They also threaten the peace and security of Japan, the surrounding region, and the international community.

**See** Chapter 3, Section 2-2-6 (Maritime and Airspace Activities); Chapter 3, Section 4-1-3 (WMD and Missiles)

Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent years progress has been made in efforts to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies.

As for multilateral initiatives, in April 2014, navies of participating countries of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, and China, adopted to the Code for Unplanned Encounters

at Sea (CUES).<sup>2</sup> CUES sets forth a code of conduct such as procedures and communication method to ensure safety for unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of these countries. In November 2014, the United States and China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification of military activities, together with rules of behavior to avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two countries announced an agreement concerning an additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters. Between ASEAN and China, official discussions have been held for the establishment of the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). In July 2023, the “Guidelines for Accelerating the Early Conclusion of an Effective and Substantive COC” was adopted at the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

Between Japan and China, the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan-China” came into operation in June 2018.

It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies will supplement the existing international order and that the countries concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral actions that add to tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-14 (China)

### 2 National Maritime Security Initiatives

#### (1) Maritime Security in the Middle East

The Middle East has seen intermittent attacks on ships in recent years.

In particular, since the clash between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in October 2023, attacks on civilian commercial ships have occurred in the waters

<sup>1</sup> The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted as a comprehensive treaty on the law and order of the seas in 1982 and entered into force in 1994 (Japan signed it in 1996).

<sup>2</sup> This code is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties.

surrounding the Arabian Peninsula, including the Red Sea. As high tensions continue in the Middle East, U.S. and the EU initiatives have been conducted to secure safe navigation. Against the Houthi strongholds in Yemen, which had repeatedly attacked civilian ships and other objects, the U.S. and British forces conducted attacks in January 2024.

 **See** Chapter 3, Section 10-1-4 (Situation in the Gulf Region)

## (2) Piracy

Piracy seen at various locations has become a threat to maritime traffic. The number of piracy and armed robbery incidents at sea (hereinafter “piracy incidents”)<sup>3</sup> around the world has declined in recent years after peaking at 445 incidents in 2010. (There were 120 incidents in 2023.)

The decline has depended heavily on the fall in the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden rose rapidly from 2008 to 237 incidents in 2011, accounting for more than half of the total number of piracy incidents worldwide and attracting great international concern as a threat to safe navigation. In recent years, the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has remained low as a result of various initiatives taken by the international community, including Japan. In December 2023, however, the first hijacking of a commercial ship since 2017 occurred. Moreover, in 2024 and beyond, pirates have become increasingly active and the situation remains unpredictable. Given the current situation, unless the international community further strengthens its ongoing efforts, there is a risk that the acts of piracy will even more intensify. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations) for Japan’s initiatives.)

The international counter-piracy initiatives in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden include counter-piracy operations by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151), a multinational force that was created by

the U.S. Force-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF)<sup>4</sup> based in Bahrain. So far, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Türkiye, the ROK, Pakistan and other countries have participated in the CTF151, conducting zone defense operations to counter piracy. The EU for its part has conducted Operation Atalanta to counter piracy since December 2008. In the operation, naval vessels and aircraft dispatched by EU member countries escort ships and monitor the waters off the coast of Somalia. It has been decided that the operation will continue until the end of 2024.

In addition, some countries have conducted their exclusive operations outside the abovementioned frameworks. Since December 2008, for example, China has deployed naval vessels and others for counterpiracy operations in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

Conversely, the root causes of piracy, such as Somalia’s unstable internal security and poverty, remain unresolved, and the threat posed by piracy still exists. According to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), one hijacking incident occurred in 2023, the first since 2017. The IMB has re-issued a warning regarding the hijacking incident, saying that although it is a single case, it shows that there are still entities capable of committing acts of piracy in this sea area.

Meanwhile, in Africa, piracy incidents occurred in the Gulf of Guinea (the number of incidents was 22 in 2023). The international community has continued counter-piracy initiatives in Africa.

The number of piracy incidents in Southeast Asian waters came to 67 in 2023. In particular, piracy incidents in the Singapore Strait have been increasing since 2019, with 37 incidents having occurred in 2023. Although many of these incidents are minor, such as theft of equipment, they account for nearly one-third of all piracy incidents reported worldwide.

## 3 Trends in the Arctic Ocean

In recent years, moves towards the utilization of trans-

Arctic navigation routes and the development of natural

<sup>3</sup> The number of piracy incidents stated herein is based on reports published by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The number includes attempted cases.

<sup>4</sup> The CMF is a multinational force that operates for the purpose of promoting maritime security, stability, and prosperity under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 43 countries participate in the CMF (as of April 2024), and the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet concurrently serves as the CMF Commander. The CMF is comprised of five combined task forces: the Combined Task Force 150 which is tasked with maritime security operations in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman, the Combined Task Force 151 which is tasked with counter-piracy operations, the Combined Task Force 152 which is tasked with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf, and the Combined Task Force 153 which is tasked with maritime security and capacity building operations from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and the Combined Task Force 154 which is tasked with education and training for maritime security (established in May 2023). An SDF unit participated in the Combined Task Force 151..



resources in the Arctic Ocean have gained momentum in line with a decline in sea ice. The eight arctic circle nations consisting of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States established the Arctic Council in 1996 to promote cooperation for common challenges such as sustainable development and environment protection.<sup>5</sup>

From the perspective of security, the Arctic Ocean has traditionally been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a longer period of time and more extensively than before. It has therefore been considered that the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces using military maritime transport capabilities in future. In this situation, moves to deploy new military capabilities in the ocean are seen.

Russia upgraded its Northern Fleet to military district level in January 2021, and its maritime doctrine, announced in July 2022, positioned the Arctic Ocean as an area of vital importance. Russia is promoting efforts to establish a system to protect its national interests in the Arctic region. Its various policy documents clearly state Russia's interests and the role of the Russian military in the Arctic. Furthermore, Russia is proceeding to develop a radar surveillance network as well as reconstructing airfields and deploying surface-to-air and surface-to-ship missiles along the Arctic coast. In terms of its activities, Russia is intensifying its activities in the Arctic Ocean, such as conducting strategic nuclear deterrence patrols with Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered and patrol flights with long-range bombers. The Pacific Fleet conducted the comprehensive Arctic expedition "Umka-2022" in the Chukchi Sea in September 2022 and a tactical exercise "Finnval-2023" in the Bering Sea in addition to the Chukchi Sea in September 2023, in which anti-ship missile launch training was performed under

the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

 Chapter 3, Section 5-3-5 (Trends Related to the AFRF (General))

The United States revealed its perception, in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region issued in October 2022, that the competition with Russia and China in the Arctic Region is intensifying.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, on the security front, the U.S. Government stated that it would deter the threats against the U.S. mainland and allies by enhancing the capabilities required to protect national interests in the Arctic Region, and reduce the risk of unintentional escalation through coordinating a common approach with allies and partners. In October 2018, the United States sent an aircraft carrier to the Arctic Region for the first time in 27 years for air drills in the Norwegian Sea. And, in May 2020, United States and United Kingdom warships took part in activities in the Barents Sea for the first time since the end of the Cold War. In March 2021, a B-1 bomber landed for the first time inside the Arctic Circle. In March 2022, the U.S. Navy conducted the exercise "Ice Exercise 2022" that involved the participation of two Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines as well as the Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force and British Royal Navy.

Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 13 countries including Japan, China, the ROK, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, have observer status in the Arctic Council. China shows a stance to be proactively involved in the Arctic Sea. It is pointed out that China could take advantage of scientific survey and commercial activities to increase its presence including military activities in the Arctic Sea.<sup>7</sup> As of early 2023, China was operating three icebreaking research vessels: "Xue Long," "Xue Long 2," and "Sun Yat-sen University Polar." China is said to have deployed its first autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) in the Arctic Ocean during its Arctic expedition in October 2022.<sup>8</sup>

 Chapter 3, Section 2-2-6 (Maritime and Airspace Activities)

5 Russia was supposed to be the chair country of the Arctic Council for two years from May 2021. However, in March 2022, the remaining seven Arctic region countries stated that they would stop participating in all the meetings of the Council with Russia as the chair country because of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Norway assumed the chairmanship in May 2023, and an agreement was reached to restart the working group.

6 The United States revealed its perception about Russia that the country made vast investment for its military presence in the Arctic Region in the last decade, while it also built up new economic infrastructure in the region and attempted to limit free navigation through excessive claims to territorial waters. The United States has pointed out that Russia's aggression against Ukraine has heightened geopolitical tensions even in the Arctic Region, created new risks of unintended conflict, and hampered cooperation. It also recognized that China has emphasized its intention to amplify its influence and play greater roles in the Arctic Region through expanding its economic, diplomatic, scientific, and military activities. The United States also pointed out that China doubled its investment for mining of important mineral resources in particular in the last decade, and conducted research of dual use for military application in the Arctic Region.

7 According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," the U.S. DoD (2019)

8 According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," the U.S. DoD (2023). The report has pointed out that China's expanding engagement in the Arctic region is creating new engagement opportunities between China and Russia.

# Section 6 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)

The transfer and proliferation of WMDs such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, as well as ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In addition, as competition and confrontation among states have been sharpened and the international

security environment has become complex and severe in recent years, it is concerned that the international community is presented with greater difficulties to rally together in taking on common challenges such as arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

## 1 Nuclear Weapons

During the period when the risk of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union, including the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), were widely recognized, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into effect in 1970. The treaty prohibited countries other than those that had detonated a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices in or before 1966 (the United States, the then Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, as well as France and China which acceded to the NPT later in 1992) from possessing nuclear weapons. It was agreed that negotiations would be held in good faith regarding effective measures to reduce nuclear arsenals.

While the NPT is concluded in total of 191 countries

and region as of January 2024, some countries such as India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to participate as non-nuclear countries. In addition, North Korea, which has repeatedly conducted nuclear tests and declared its development and possession of nuclear weapons, added a provision to its constitution stating that it would “develop nuclear weapons to a higher level” in September 2023. North Korea claims that it made the development and possession of nuclear capability a fundamental part of its national system.

Regarding nuclear capabilities of the United States and Russia, the two countries had agreed on a five-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in January 2021. However, as Russia

Fig. I-4-6-1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country

	The United States	Russia	The United Kingdom	France	China
Missiles	ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)	400	328		140
		Minuteman III 400	SS-18 40		DF-5 (CSS-4) 18
			SS-19 8		DF-31 (CSS-10) 86
		SS-25 9	—	DF-41 36	
		SS-27 (single-warhead) 78			
		SS-27 (multi-warhead) 121			
		SS-27 (Yars-S, multi-warhead) 72			
	—	—	—	—	212
IRBM MRBM					DF-26 140
					DF-21A/E (CSS-5) 24
	DF-17 (CSS-22) 48				
SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles)	280	192	48	64	72
	Trident D-5 280	SS-N-23 96	Trident D-5 48	M-51 64	JL-2 (CSS-N-14) / JL-3 (CSS-N-20) 72
		SS-N-32 96			
Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered	14		4	4	6
Aircraft	66	71		40	112
	B-2 20	Tu-95 (Bear) 58	—	Rafale 40	H-6K 100
	B-52 46	Tu-160 (Blackjack) 13			H-6N 12+
Number of warheads	3,708	4,489 (including 1,816 tactical nuclear warheads)	225	290	410

(Notes) 1 Data is based on “The Military Balance 2024,” the SIPRI Yearbook 2023, etc.

2 In January 2024, the United States announced that it retained 1,419 strategic nuclear warheads and 662 missiles/aircraft as the delivery vehicles for them as numbers as of May 2023 based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (the new START) between the United States and Russia. However, the SIPRI Yearbook 2023 said that, as of January 2023, the United States deployed 1,770 nuclear warheads (including 100 tactical ones) and Russia deployed 1,674 warheads.

3 The Integrated Review by the UK in March 2022 stipulated that the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.


4 According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2023, the nuclear warhead inventories of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are 164, 170, 90, and around 30, respectively. Among others, North Korea retains fissionable materials enough to produce 50-70 warheads as a whole.

continued its aggression against Ukraine while repeating words and actions that could be interpreted as threats to use nuclear weapons, talks between the two countries under the framework of the treaty was postponed in November 2022, and Russia announced that it would suspend the treaty's implementation in February 2023.

Although the United States expresses its intention to pursue a framework of arms control with China included, China repeatedly rejects to be involved in the framework between the United States and Russia. Meanwhile China is said to continuously enhance its nuclear capability, and it has been pointed out that the number of operational

nuclear warheads it possesses could exceed 1,000 by 2030 and continue to increase until 2035.<sup>1</sup>

As the post-Cold War international order now at stake with serious challenges amidst historical changes in the balance of power and intensifying geopolitical competitions, it is necessary to closely monitor relevant trends that could help understand if an effective framework of nuclear arms control and disarmament will be established in the future.

 **See** Fig. I-4-6-1 (Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country)

## 2 Biological and Chemical Weapons

Biological and chemical weapons are relatively inexpensive and easy to manufacture, as well as easy to disguise because the materials and technologies for manufacture are mostly dual-use. Therefore, development and/or acquisition by nations or terrorists seeking asymmetrical means for attack<sup>2</sup> is especially concerning. Furthermore, if those seeking biological and chemical weapons utilize emerging technologies such as big data and artificial Intelligence (AI), their ability to develop weapons will further increase.

Biological weapons have the following characteristics: (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset of the symptom; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and (5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon.

Chemical weapons were used in such incidents as the sarin attack in the subway in Japan, which

demonstrated the threat of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction in cities. Recent examples include the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as the attempted poisoning of Russian opposition leaders in which Novichok, a drug developed by Russia, was allegedly used. There have also been allegations that the Russian military used riot control agents during the fighting in Ukraine.

In recent years, with regard to biological weapons, there has been speculation that North Korea and Russia have plans for offensive biological weapons that violate their obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). There is also a concern about research and development at China's military medical institutions.<sup>3</sup> With regard to chemical weapons, there is concern about China's possible nonfulfillment of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).<sup>4</sup> North Korea does not participate in the CWC and is said to still possess chemical weapons.

## 3 Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles

Ballistic missiles are propelled by rockets for parabolic flights and are capable of attacking distant targets. They can be used as a means of delivering WMDs. As they fall at a steep angle and high speed, highly accurate systems are required for intercepting them effectively. Moreover, technologies related to ballistic missiles have been changing and developing quickly in recent years. For

example, newly emerged ballistic missiles fly at lower altitudes with irregular trajectory than typical ballistic missiles by controlling wings, aimed at complicating early detection and interception of missiles.

 **See** Fig. I-4-6-2 (Classification of Ballistic Missiles)

The deployment of ballistic missiles in areas with continuous armed conflicts is dangerous because it can

<sup>1</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," the U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>2</sup> They refer to means of attack to strike an adversary's vulnerable points and are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber-attacks.

<sup>3</sup> According to the "Biodéfense Posture Review," the U.S. DoD (2023)

<sup>4</sup> According to the annual report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," the U.S. DoD (2023)

intensify existing tensions and make the area unstable. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of attacking from a distance or threatening another country that has superior conventional forces.

Along with the threat of ballistic missiles, the threat of cruise missiles is also pointed out as a weapon which is comparatively easy to acquire for non-state actors, and has the potential for proliferation. Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles as well as easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. Moreover, some cruise missiles have relatively higher target accuracy, are difficult to detect while cruising,

and are able to approach the targets while concealed on a ship, therefore they will pose a serious threat when carrying WMDs with them.

Fig. I-4-6-2 Classification of Ballistic Missiles

Category	Range
Short-Range Ballistic Missile, SRBM	Under approx. 1,000 km or less
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile, MRBM	Approx. 1,000 to under approx. 3,000 km
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile, IRBM	Approx. 3,000 to under approx. 5,500 km
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, ICBM	Approx. 5,500 km or more

(Note) Ballistic missiles launched from submarines are collectively referred to as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while a ballistic missile that has a precision guidance system on its warhead necessary to attack aircraft carriers and other vessels is called an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).

## 4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies

Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. Some states seeking WMDs do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist organizations are active in their territories. Therefore, it is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual use of WMDs would increase.

The proliferation of WMDs and other related technologies has been noted in numerous instances. For example, it came to light in February 2004 that nuclear-related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan.

There has been significant transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as means of weapon delivery as well. The former Soviet Union and other countries exported Scud-B to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries and other actors now possess ballistic missiles.

North Korea is believed to have advanced its ballistic missile development with almost no test launches using various resources and technologies transferred from outside during the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, it is believed that North Korea continuously proliferates technologies, conventional weapons, and items used in the supply chains of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) to acquire foreign currencies and maintain foreign relations. For example, North Korea is reportedly cooperating with Iran, Syria, Myanmar, Russia, and other countries in areas such as arms trading and weapon technology transfers.

It has been pointed out that, in recent years, states of particular concern have sustained their external transfer while skillfully averting international monitoring by falsifying documentation and diversifying transport routes to illicitly export WMDs. Another concern has arisen that these states are also conducting intangible technology transfers. Specifically, these states have obtained advanced technologies that could be adapted for the development and manufacturing of WMDs and other technologies through their researchers and students dispatched to major companies and academic institutions in developed countries.

## Section 7

## Impact of Climate Change on the Security Environment and the Military

## 1

## General Situation

According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 2023 was the warmest year on record, exceeding the pre-industrial 1850-1900 baseline by about 1.4°C. Greenhouse gas levels continue to rise, causing record sea surface temperatures and sea level elevations. The maximum area of Antarctic sea ice in 2023 was the smallest on record, 1 million km<sup>2</sup> smaller than the previous lowest area. This reduced area is larger than the land areas of France and Germany combined.

Extreme weather and climate phenomena, including large-scale floods, heatwaves and droughts and wildfires, have had a major global impact. For example, flooding caused by Cyclone Daniel, which occurred in the Mediterranean Sea in September 2023, claimed many lives, especially in Libya. Heatwaves were especially severe in the second half of July that year, particularly in southern Europe and northern Africa. Hawaii had the highest death toll from a single wildfire.

To address these climate change issues, the international community is engaged in “mitigation” to reduce and absorb greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change and “adaptation” to avoid or mitigate the damage of climate change that has already occurred or is predicted to occur in future.

Climate change is seen as an urgent threat to world peace and security. From November 30 to December 13 the same year, the 28th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) was held in the United Arab Emirates. During it, the decision on the first Global Stocktake, which is a mechanism to review the situation of implementing the Paris Agreement and assess overall progress towards achieving long-term goals.

For the second year in a row, the United States has sent senior Department of Defense officials to the COP, recognizing the Department’s critical role in the government-wide approach to the climate crisis. Owens, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment, acknowledged that climate change will impact readiness, including warfighter training, mission execution, tactical planning, the acquisition and sustainment of platforms and installations, and national and global security.

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, who participated in COP28, also emphasized that climate change matters for security and therefore it matters to NATO. It is both forcing people to migrate and intensifying competition for scarce resources.

NATO also strongly supports the transition from fossil fuels to safe, renewable energy. This is also related to energy security and in light of Russia’s use of gas as a coercive tool following its invasion of Ukraine, Secretary General Stoltenberg has pointed out that, when making the energy transition, the same mistake of relying too heavily on unreliable suppliers of critical materials must not be repeated.

He has further emphasized that NATO should also achieve net zero<sup>1</sup> greenhouse gas emissions for its military sector by 2050.

In July 2023, NATO released the Secretary General’s Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment. Using specific case studies, the report revealed how extreme weather conditions create operational stress for military forces, shorten equipment lifecycles and incur additional maintenance and replacement costs.

## 2

## Impact on Security

## 1 Relation to Conflicts

Climate change has a major impact on a strategic environment. Direct hazards include drought, extreme heat, desertification and flooding, which can also have secondary and tertiary impacts like loss of land and

livelihoods and food and water insecurity.

It has been pointed out that tensions in an already fragile environment encourage migration and increase the likelihood of violent conflict. Countries most vulnerable to climate change bear the risks while causing almost no impact on climate change themselves. It is estimated that

<sup>1</sup> This refers to a state in which an equilibrium has been achieved between the amount of greenhouse gases emitted as a result of human activities and the amount of greenhouse gases absorbed by maintaining and enhancing absorption.

by 2050, more than a billion people will lack access to water and more than 200 million people will be forced to migrate.

Water and food shortages are causing violent conflicts in the Sahel Region, the Horn of Africa and other parts of the world. For example, the surface area of Lake Chad in the southern part of the Sahara Desert has decreased by 90% since the 1960s due to decreased precipitation, affecting tens of millions of people who were dependent on this water source.

It has been pointed out that the forced displacement of fishermen, farmers and herders not only creates tensions with their neighbors, but also makes them targets of Islamic extremist groups such as Boko Haram and forces them to surrender their own security to armed groups.

In addition, marine resources in East Africa, mainly along the coasts of Somalia, have drastically decreased due to the effects of rising sea temperatures and this is believed to fuel the incidence of piracy.

## 2 Impact on Militaries

Climate change will also affect military equipment, infrastructure and operations themselves.

In the United States, air bases nationwide have often suffered severe damage due to hurricane flooding to

date, requiring substantial amounts of money to rebuild. In addition, high temperatures and wildfires not only disrupt training and logistic support activities, but also cause failures of communication and various ground installations.

NATO is providing training and capacity-building support to the Iraq National Security Forces in Iraq (NATO Mission Iraq). According to the aforementioned NATO report, in the short term, temperatures are expected to exceed 50°C for roughly one-fifth of the days each year in Iraq. There is concern that extreme water shortages will cause sandstorms and disrupt aviation operations and training.

Also in oceans, naval vessels will require more frequent maintenance due to increased acidification of seawater and changes in sea surface temperature. It has been noted that seawater temperatures can affect underwater sound speeds and changes in seawater salinity can affect the buoyancy of submarines.

Aircraft are said to lose their lift and thrust under extremely high temperatures and changes in weather conditions, such as lightning and turbulence, can affect the entire spectrum of military aviation operations.

All these effects are related to the issue of military readiness.

## 3 Climate Change in the Indo-Pacific Region

Surface temperatures are also rising in many parts of the Indo-Pacific region. For example, in Asia, sea levels are exceeding<sup>2</sup> the global average and glaciers in the Himalayan Hindu Kush region continue to melt. In addition, sea surface temperatures in the Indian Ocean and near the equator of the western Pacific Ocean are warming faster than the global average.

Rising sea levels and extreme weather events make the security environment in the region complicated and various exercises<sup>3</sup> are being conducted with the possibility of an increase in military operations related to climate change in mind. The multilateral exercise “Croix Du Sud 2023” hosted by the French military stationed in New Caledonia was held from April to May 2023 as a training

exercise for post-natural disaster crisis management and humanitarian assistance. In the exercise, approximately 3,000 personnel participated from 19 countries and the amphibious assault ship “Dixmude” equipped with a hospital facility was operated.

With regard to operational aspects, the United States has important military assets in Guam, the Marshall Islands and Palau, which are considered vulnerable to disasters. In August 2023, Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks stated regarding the Indo-Pacific region, “Nations that are most resilient and best able to manage the effects of climate change will gain a strategic advantage. So the department must prepare for and adapt to climate change better and faster than its competitors.”

<sup>2</sup> It has been pointed out that sea level rises are having a major impact, not only on island countries, but also on the economically important coastal areas of mainland China, for example.

<sup>3</sup> In 2022, the U.S. Department of the Navy conducted the first climate-related tabletop exercise (TTX) to study the effects of climate change on missions, combat readiness and warfighting capability.

Part

# II

## Japan's Security and Defense Policy

Chapter 1

Basic Concepts of Japan's Security and Defense

Chapter 2

The Three Documents, including the National Security Strategy

Chapter 3

Defense Buildup and the Budget

Chapter 4

Organizations Responsible for Japan's Security and Defense

Chapter 5

Framework for the SDF Activities

# Basic Concepts of Japan's Security and Defense

## Chapter 1

### Section 1 Measures to Ensure Security

The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. In addition, peace and security are essential for the people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper. However, it is necessary for Japan to make its own proactive and autonomous efforts.

The first priority in protecting the lives and livelihoods of the people of Japan should be the development of active diplomacy. It is essential to cooperate with like-minded countries and promote multilateral cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance<sup>1</sup> with the United States, which shares fundamental values and interests with Japan while emphasizing universal values and principles such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

At the same time, defense capabilities are required to back up diplomacy. As its strategic approach, Japan will develop diplomacy under the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)<sup>2</sup> and promote the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities, including the possession of counterstrike capabilities.

Japan cannot defend itself on its own. It would be difficult for any one state to defend itself on its own now. Therefore, cooperation with allies and like-minded



Prime Minister Kishida and Defense Minister Kihara at Air Review (November 2023)

countries is essential.

From the perspective of creating the ideal security environment for Japan and preventing the emergence of threats, the importance of the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in cooperative efforts as a member of the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, Japan aims to ensure national security, as well as bring peace and security to the Indo-Pacific region, and eventually to the entire world, by exerting its utmost efforts in a variety of fields, including diplomacy and economics.

**See** Fig. III-3-1 (The MOD's Efforts for the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (image); Chapter 2, Section 2 [Commentary] (Counterstrike Capabilities))

<sup>1</sup> In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate closely in a range of areas in security, politics, and economics.  
<sup>2</sup> A vision for improving connectivity between Asia and Africa through a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and thus fostering the stability and prosperity of the whole region. This vision was put forward by then Prime Minister ABE Shinzo in August 2016.



## Section 2

## Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy

## 1 Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

After the end of World War II, Japan was determined not to repeat the ravages of war. Since then, it has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, Article 9, which prescribes the renunciation of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state. Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan's inherent right of

self-defense as a sovereign state. Thus, the Japanese Government interprets it as a constitutional right to possess the minimum armed forces needed to exercise that right.

Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, holding its exclusively defense-oriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.

## 2 The Government's View on Article 9 of the Constitution

## 1 Permitted Self-Defense Capability

Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum required self-defense capability. The specific limit is subject to change according to the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget and other deliberations by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether its capability constitutes a war potential that Japan is prohibited to possess by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan's overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such a possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

The possession of so-called "offensive weapons," which are designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country, is not permissible under any circumstance as it would directly exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

## 2 Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

It has been concluded in the Cabinet's decision made on July 1, 2014, "Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People," that the use of force should be interpreted to

be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense when the following three conditions (Three Conditions for "the use of force") are met:

- (1) When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness;
- (2) When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan's survival and protect its people;
- (3) Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.

**See** Reference 4 (Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People)

## 3 Geographic Boundaries within Which the Right of Self-Defense May Be Exercised

The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation.

Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as a general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense.

## 4 Right of Belligerency

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory.

On the other hand, it is recognized as a matter

## 3 Basic Policy

Under the Constitution, Japan has efficiently built a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic policies of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

### 1 Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.

### 2 Not Becoming a Military Power

There is no established definition for the concept of a military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten other countries means that Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense.

of course for Japan to be able to use the minimum necessary level of force to defend itself under its right of self-defense. For example, if Japan were to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force under its right of self-defense, this constitutes a different concept from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even if the two sets of actions appear to be externally equivalent. Occupation of enemy territory, however, is not permissible because it would exceed the minimum necessary level for self-defense.

### 3 Non-Nuclear Principles

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed line of national policy.

Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law.<sup>1</sup> In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a nonnuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

### 4 Securing Civilian Control

Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the military in a democratic state or democratic political control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious reflection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution.<sup>3</sup> Civilian control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people.

The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of the

1 Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.”

2 Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes...not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...”

3 The Cabinet’s control over military matters was strictly limited.

SDF. The function of national defense entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet as a general administrative function. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervises over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on national security.

At the MOD, the Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters concerning national defense, and as the competent minister also manages and operates the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense.

In addition, the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense provides the Minister of Defense with advice on important affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civilian officials and uniformed SDF personnel deliberates on basic principles



Defense Minister Kihara inspects the special guard of honor at his inauguration  
(September 2023)

concerning affairs under the Ministry's jurisdiction. Through these ways, the MOD aims to further ensure civilian control.

As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, in order to ensure that the system achieves good results, it is necessary to continue making practical efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in national defense taken by the people.



Chapter 4, Section 1 (National Security Council); Chapter 4, Section 2-1-2 (Systems to Support the Minister of Defense)

# Section 3 Security Policy Framework

Japan has three main documents pertaining to Japan’s national security policy: the National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS),<sup>1</sup> the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS),<sup>2</sup> and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP).<sup>3</sup>

The NSS was formulated in December 2013 as Japan’s first-ever basic policy on national security with a focus on diplomatic and defense strategies, replacing “Japan’s Basic Defense Policy,”<sup>4</sup> on which Japan’s defense policy had been based until then. As Japan is now facing the most severe and complex security environment since the start of the postwar period, a new NSS was formulated in December 2022 to provide strategic guidance for policies in a wide range of areas, including not only the traditional areas of diplomacy and defense, but also economic security, technology, and intelligence.

Based on the new NSS, the NDS was formulated for the first time in December of the same year as a statement of the objectives of Japan’s national defense as well as the approaches and means to achieve these objectives. The NDS replaces the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which have served as Japan’s basic guidelines for the development, sustainment, and operation of the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and

have been formulated six times since 1976. The NSS and NDS are mainly designed for the next decade or so.


The first-ever DBP was formulated in December 2022 in accordance with the NDS as a medium- to long-term plan that establishes the level of Japan’s defense capabilities, the SDF’s structure which is based on the capability level roughly a decade into the future, and the total expenditures and the quantity of major equipment to be acquired over a five-year period. The future level of Japan’s defense capabilities had been previously established in the NDPG, while the total expenditures for the buildup of defense capability over a five-year period were set forth in the MTDP, which was in turn based on the NDPG. However, the level of Japan’s defense capabilities as well as the total expenditures over a five-year period have now been integrated into a single, unified defense buildup plan.

**See** Fig. II-1-3-1 (Relationship among the NSS, the NDS, the DBP, the Fiscal Year Budget); Reference 1 (National Security Strategy of Japan); Reference 2 (National Defense Strategy); Reference 3 (Defense Buildup Program)

Part II Chapter 1 Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense



Prime Minister Kishida’s press conference at the time of the Cabinet decision regarding the Three Documents (December 2022) [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan]



**REFERENCE** : “National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS),” “National Defense Strategy (NDS),” “Defense Buildup Program (DBP)”  
**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_policy/basis/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_policy/basis/index.html)

1 The National Security Strategy of Japan, approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022  
 2 The National Defense Strategy of Japan, approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022  
 3 The Defense Buildup Program, approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022  
 4 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy, approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on May 20, 1957

# The Three Documents, Including the National Security Strategy

## Section 1 Outline of the National Security Strategy (NSS)

The National Security Strategy (NSS)<sup>1</sup> is Japan's supreme national security policy document. We live in the world of a historical inflection point and in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. To protect our national interests in such an environment, Japan needs to carry out vigorous diplomacy and possess defense capabilities that bolster the solid footing of such diplomacy. To achieve these objectives, Japan needs a strategy that integrates its national responses at a higher level by taking a panoramic view of the diverse dimensions of international relations as a whole, where confrontation and cooperation are intricately intertwined and then by taking full advantage of

comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities. This need has led to the formulation of the NSS in December 2022.

The strategic guidance and policies under the NSS will dramatically transform Japan's national security policy after the end of WWII from the aspect of its execution.

The NSS lays out Japan's national interests, basic principles concerning the national security, and the country's security challenges. On this basis, it sets out national security objectives and identifies strategic approaches to achieving them.

 See Fig. II-2-1-1 (Outline of the NSS (Structure and Main Components)); Reference 1 (National Security Strategy of Japan)

**Fig. II-2-1-1** Outline of the NSS (Structure and Main Components)

<b>I Purpose</b>	
<b>II Japan's National Interests</b>	
<b>III Fundamental Principles Concerning Japan's National Security</b>	
<b>IV Security Environment Surrounding Japan and Japan's National Security Challenges</b>	
<b>V National Security Objectives of Japan</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Japan will continue to be a nation capable of protecting its sovereignty and independence, autonomously determining its domestic and foreign policies, and defending its territory and the safety of life, person, and the properties of its nationals. Japan will deter contingencies and the like. If by any chance a threat should reach Japan, Japan will defeat the threat and minimize the damage caused, and bring it to an end on a favorable term.</li> <li>- Japan will proactively ensure, through its security policy, an international environment in which its own economy can grow. Japan will work to achieve a virtuous cycle of security and economic growth.</li> <li>- Japan will ensure the self-reliance, advantages, and indispensability of its economy. Japan will achieve a new balance in international relations, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan will prevent the emergence of situations conducive to unilaterally changing the status quo, and redouble efforts to secure a stable, predictable, free and open international order based on the rule of law.</li> <li>- Japan will generate an environment in which the international community can coexist and co-prosper through multilateral cooperation.</li> </ul>	
<b>VI Strategic Approaches Prioritized by Japan (Implementing strategic approaches by harnessing Japan's comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities)</b>	
<p>1. Developing Efforts Centered on Diplomacy to Prevent Crises, Proactively Creating a Peaceful and Stable International Environment, and Strengthening a Free and Open International Order</p> <p>a. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance</p> <p>b. Maintaining and Developing a Free and Open International Order and Strengthen Ties with its Ally, Like-minded Countries and Others</p> <p>c. Strengthen Diplomacy with Japan's Neighboring Countries and Regions as well as Efforts toward Resolution of Various Issues of Concern, including Territorial Issues</p> <p>d. Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation</p> <p>e. International Counter-Terrorism f. Climate Change Measures g. Strategic Use of ODA and Other International</p> <p>h. Promoting People-to-People Exchanges</p>	<p>3. Deepening Security Cooperation with the United States</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S.</li> </ul>
<p>2. Strengthening Japan's Defense Architecture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities as the Last Guarantee of National Security</li> <li>a. Reinforcing stand-off defense capabilities, unmanned defense capabilities, and other capabilities in addition to cross-domain operational capabilities</li> <li>b. Possessing counterstrike capabilities</li> <li>c. Taking necessary measures to make the level of Japan's budget—for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives—reach 2% of current gross national product (GDP) in FY 2027</li> <li>d. Strengthening coordination and cooperation between the SDF and the JCG, including the MOD's control over the JCG in the event of a contingency, among other measures</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reinforcing the comprehensive defense architecture Promoting efforts in four areas that complement, and are inseparable from, the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities under the frameworks of relevant ministries and agencies. These four areas are (i) research and development, (ii) public infrastructure development, (iii) cybersecurity, and (iv) international cooperation with like-minded countries and others.</li> <li>- Reconsidering the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems for possible revisions</li> <li>- Reinforcing the defense production and technology bases and solidifying the human resource base, among other measures</li> </ul>	<p>4. Strengthening Efforts to Seamlessly Protect Japan in All Directions</p> <p>a. Cybersecurity b. Maritime security and maritime law enforcement capabilities</p> <p>c. Space security d. Improving security-related technical capabilities and proactively capitalizing on them</p> <p>e. Strengthening intelligence capacities f. Reinforcing response capabilities within Japan with contingencies in mind</p> <p>g. Reinforcing mechanisms for the protection of Japanese nationals</p> <p>h. Protecting Japanese nationals and others overseas</p> <p>i. Securing resources essential for Japan's national security, including energy and food</p>
	<p>5. Promoting economic security policies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Securing Japan's self-reliance, advantages, and indispensability, among other measures Enhancing Japan's supply chain resilience, including by securing stable supply for critical goods including rare earth Making examinations to bolster Japan's information security, including security clearance</li> </ul>
	<p>6. Maintaining and Strengthening International Economic Order based on Free, Fair, and Equitable Rules</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Countering against unfair trade practices and economic coercion</li> <li>- Maintaining the high standards of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)</li> <li>- Promoting development finance in a transparent and fair manner</li> </ul>
	<p>7. Global Efforts for Coexistence and Coprosperity in the International Community</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strengthening ties with the United Nations and other international organizations and frameworks, and working on infectious disease crisis response, humanitarian assistance, human rights protection, and international peace cooperation, among other measures</li> </ul>
<b>VII Domestic Base that should be Strengthened to Support Japan's National Security</b>	
<b>VIII Duration, Evaluation, and Revision of the Strategy</b>	
<b>IX Conclusion</b>	

Note: The term "current gross national product (GDP)" refers to GDP for FY2022. Two percent of it is expected to be 11 trillion yen given that GDP for FY2022 is projected at 560.2 trillion yen in the Fiscal 2023 Economic Outlook and Basic Stance for Economic and Fiscal Management, approved by the Cabinet on December 22, 2022.

<sup>1</sup> The National Security Strategy, approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022

## Section 2 Outline of the National Defense Strategy

Until now, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) has been established as the grand design for safeguarding Japan's peace and security by prescribing the form of Japan's approach to and target levels for its defense capabilities based on an ascertainment of changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and in global military trends. The NDPG has been formulated six

times since it was first established in 1976. In light of the most severe security environment since the end of World War II, the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS)<sup>1</sup> was formulated for the first time in December 2022 to replace the NDPG as the document that comprehensively presented Japan's defense objectives, approaches to achieve these objectives, and the means to achieve them.

### 1 Transition from the NDPG to the NDS

#### 1 1976 NDPG

1976 NDPG<sup>2</sup> was formulated against the backdrop of détente<sup>3</sup> in the 1970s based on the recognition that (i) there was generally a low likelihood of an all-out military conflict between the Eastern and Western Blocs, and (ii) with regard to the area surrounding Japan, the stable balance of power between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union as well as the existence of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would continue to play a major role in preventing a full-scale aggression against of Japan.

In view of this, the defense capabilities to be possessed by Japan were determined to include (i) equipping itself with various functions that were necessary for its defense and (ii) focusing primarily on adopting a balanced posture in terms of the organization and deployment of such functions, including logistical support systems. By means of these, Japan could (iii) remain sufficiently vigilant in peacetime and (iv) be capable of effectively dealing with situations involving limited and small-scale aggression, while (v) retaining the ability to smoothly transition to a new posture in terms of its defense capabilities should circumstances change and such a posture becomes necessary. The "Basic Defense Force Concept" introduced in 1976 NDPG is thus a concept that emphasizes the concept of deterrence with a focus on preventing aggression against Japan.

#### 2 1995 NDPG

1995 NDPG<sup>4</sup> was formulated in consideration of

the end of the Cold War and other major changes to the international situation, as well as the heightened expectations for the Self-Defense Forces (the SDF), including its role in UN peacekeeping operations and its response to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

1995 NDPG determined that Japan's buildup of defense capability had until then been conducted based on the "Basic Defense Force Concept," which stated that Japan was to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capabilities as an independent nation to prevent itself from forming a power vacuum that would destabilize the area surrounding Japan, instead of directly countering military threats to Japan. This concept was basically followed by 1995 NDPG.

On the other hand, the details of Japan's defense capabilities as set forth in 1995 NDPG were notable for the fact that in addition to reviewing the scale and functions of defense capabilities, they also emphasized a greater utilization of the SDF's capabilities not only for the defense of the nation, but also in various other areas, including dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters and contributing to building a more stable security environment.

#### 3 2004 NDPG

2004 NDPG<sup>5</sup> was formulated based on the determination that it was necessary to provide new guidelines for Japan's approach to its national security and defense capabilities in response to new threats and diverse contingencies, including the proliferation of weapons

<sup>1</sup> "National Defense Strategy" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022)

<sup>2</sup> "The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1977 and Beyond" (approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on October 29, 1976)

<sup>3</sup> This refers to the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, which were engaged at the time in a conflict known as the Cold War, following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Détente ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

<sup>4</sup> The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and Beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995)

<sup>5</sup> The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as the activities of international terrorist organizations.

2004 NDPG specified two security objectives: (i) to prevent direct threats from reaching Japan, and should a threat arise, to eliminate the threat and minimize the damage caused; and (ii) to improve the international security environment and ensure that no threats are posed to Japan. To achieve these objectives, Japan would combine three approaches in an integrated manner, namely through (i) its own efforts, (ii) cooperation with the ally, and (iii) cooperation with the international community. The document stated that with regard to Japan's approach to its defense capabilities, the effective parts of the "Basic Defense Force Concept" would be retained while placing a greater emphasis on Japan's "response capabilities" and recognizing that "multifunctional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities" were required to respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies.

#### 4 2010 NDPG

2010 NDPG<sup>6</sup> was formulated based on the facts that (i) large-scale military forces, including nuclear forces, had continued to exist in the area surrounding Japan, and many states were modernizing their military capabilities and intensifying their various activities; (ii) the period of time from the emergence of signs of a threat to the actual occurrence of a situation had tended to be shorter with the rapid development of military science and technology, and there was a need to respond seamlessly to such situations; and (iii) given that many security issues transcend national borders, ongoing coordination and cooperation between different countries had become increasingly vital, with the roles of military forces diversifying as well, making it more common for military forces to be operating continuously at all times.

2010 NDPG stated that Japan's future defense capabilities should be "dynamic in form" and focused on the "operation of defense capabilities" as well as the ability to actively carry out various activities to effectively fulfill the assigned roles of such capabilities without being bound by the existing "Basic Defense Force Concept," which only emphasized the "existence of defense capabilities." To this end, it was determined that a "Dynamic Defense Force" equipped with the

qualities of readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility would be built and supported by advanced technological and intelligence capabilities that took into account trends in the levels of military technologies.

#### 5 2013 NDPG

2013 NDPG<sup>7</sup> was formulated against the backdrop of an increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan in which the defense capabilities that underpinned the various activities of the SDF could no longer be guaranteed to be adequate in "quality" and "quantity" in view of the increasing number and longer duration of situations that required a response by the SDF, including so-called "gray-zone" situations.

2013 NDPG took these considerations into account and stipulated the enhancement of Japan's deterrence and response capabilities by placing greater emphasis on joint operations, improving the operational level of equipment and its employment, and by ensuring that the defense capabilities that underpinned various activities would be adequate both in "quality" and "quantity." To this end, it was determined that capability assessments would be conducted from the viewpoint of joint operations with a focus on the functions and capabilities of the SDF as a whole, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be of particular focus from a comprehensive perspective. Harnessing the results of these capability assessments would allow Japan to adapt to the ever-changing security environment surrounding it and efficiently develop its defense capabilities in a well-balanced manner. In addition, its logistical support base would be extensively reinforced to establish a posture that ensures its most effective operation.

In the above ways, 2013 NDPG sought to develop a "Dynamic Joint Defense Force," a more effective defense force capable of conducting a variety of activities in a swift and flexible manner.

#### 6 2018 NDPG


2018 NDPG<sup>8</sup> was formulated with the aim of building a truly effective defense force by further deepening the approach of a "Dynamic Joint Defense Force" in view of the remarkably fast pace at which the security

6 The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010)

7 The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

8 The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 18, 2018)

Fig. II-2-2-1 Changes in the Roles of Defense Capabilities



environment surrounding Japan had become increasingly severe and uncertain.

Specifically, Japan would build a “Multi-Domain Defense Force” as a truly effective defense force that was capable of (i) carrying out cross-domain operations that organically would integrate capabilities in all domains, generating synergy and amplifying overall capabilities; (ii) enabling the sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to contingencies; and (iii) strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and promoting security cooperation.

In particular, as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, could substantially enhance the military’s overall capabilities to conduct operations, states are exerting efforts to improve capabilities in these fields. Japan would also focus on enhancing such capabilities as well as capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships, and missiles in combination therewith, and enhancing the sustainability and resiliency of its defense capabilities, including logistical support.

 See Fig. II-2-2-1 (Changes in the Roles of Defense Capabilities)

## 2 Outline of the National Defense Strategy (NDS)

The NDS comprehensively presents Japan’s defense objectives, approaches, and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives. The NDS replaces the National Defense Program Guidelines (hereinafter

referred to as the “NDPG”), which have served as Japan’s basic guidelines for development, sustainment, and operation of defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as the “SDF”) and have



been formulated six times since 1976.

The NDS states that the most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihood as well as Japan's territorial land, waters, and airspace and that it is the very heart of Japan's national security. It adds that the international community, of which Japan is a member, is facing serious challenges, and has entered into a new era of crisis. The NDS maintains that one cannot rule out the possibility of serious events taking place in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, that might shake the foundation of the stable post-war international order. It then states that amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and **new ways of warfare**, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals.

In addition, in April 2023, the Headquarters for the Promotion of Realization of Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities was established under Defense Minister in order to ensure thorough management of the progress of initiatives, etc. to be implemented from FY2023 onward and to ensure effective and efficient budget execution by the MOD/SDF working as one, based on the direction of fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities indicated in the National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as the "NSS") and other related

**KEY WORD****New ways of warfare**


In addition to the traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land, new ways of warfare have emerged with the combination of massive strikes by missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities, hybrid warfare including information warfare, asymmetric attacks leveraging the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum and with unmanned assets, and public remarks that could be interpreted as threat using nuclear weapons. Whether or not to be able to respond to these new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense capabilities.

documents. The Headquarters held six meetings by April 2024. Under its leadership, the MOD/SDF will forge ahead with the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities through both thorough progress management of projects and shorter and more streamlined processes for procurement and accounting.

The NDS states that to protect one's own country from opponents, it is necessary to have deterrence capability, thereby making them realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult and that it is also necessary to build one's own defense capability focusing on opponent capabilities. This statement is based on the following recognition. The military background for Russia's aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities to deter Russian aggression. Also, while no country can defend its own security by itself alone, there is a renewed recognition of the importance of cooperation with allies who have

Fig. II-2-2-2

Implementation Architecture for Fundamentally Reinforcing Japan's Defense Capabilities



the intention and capability to respond to invasions jointly. Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so; accurately gauging other's intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state's decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threat may materialize.

 See Fig. II-2-2-2 (Implementation Architecture for Fundamentally Reinforcing Japan's Defense Capabilities); and Reference 2 (National Defense Strategy)

## 1 Japan's Basic Defense Policy

Defense capability, which forms the very foundation of the defense of Japan, is the ultimate guarantor for ensuring Japan's security. It will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will disrupt and defeat the threat, thereby demonstrating Japan's resolve and capability to defend itself to the end. The NDS states that Japan must clearly demonstrate the intention that Japan will never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in any situation. It adds that to this end, Japan must fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities with a focus on opponents' capabilities and the ways they prosecute warfare and actively adapt to new ways of warfare.

Then the NDS sets out three defense objectives for Japan:

- (i) To shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force
- (ii) To deter, through cooperation and collaboration with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to bring the situation under control at an early stage
- (iii) To take primary responsibility to deal with invasion of Japan, if any, and to disrupt and defeat it, while receiving support from the ally and others

The NDS explains that in dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential. It then states that Japan will defend itself to the end in all situations through the combination of its own efforts to achieve the three defense objectives mentioned above and extended deterrence and others provided by the United States.

Then the NDS sets out three approaches to achieving

these defense objectives, as well as basic ideas behind them:

- (i) To fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities, which constitute the core of national defense, and reinforce the defense architecture of the whole country in an effort of strengthening of Japan's own architecture for national defense
- (ii) To further reinforce joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by further strengthening cooperation with the United States, our ally
- (iii) To reinforce collaboration with like-minded countries and others with whom Japan cooperate to uphold and reinforce a free and open international order

### (1) First Approach: Strengthening Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense

#### a. Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan's Defense Capabilities

With a fundamentally reinforced defense capability, Japan should be able to take primary responsibility to disrupt and defeat invasion against Japan. This means that Japan will possess a capability that makes the opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable by military means, and that the damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost. If Japan possesses such defense capability, this capability, coupled with that of the United States, will be able to deter not only an invasion against Japan, but also deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the Indo-Pacific region. This will help foster a security environment where such forcible actions are not tolerated. This is why Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities.

In addition, Japan's fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities must be able to respond to new ways of warfare. As for the functions and capabilities required for this purpose, Japan will first strengthen (i) stand-off defense capabilities and (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, in order to disrupt and defeat invading forces from a long distance, thereby deterring invasion against Japan itself. Should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, Japan will leverage, in addition to capabilities (i) and (ii), manned and unmanned assets and strengthen its (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain operation capabilities, and (v) command and control and intelligence-related functions, in order to ensure asymmetric advantage while gain superiority across domains. Moreover, Japan will strengthen (vi)

## Counterstrike Capabilities

### Q. What are counterstrike capabilities? Why are they necessary?

Counterstrike capabilities are the SDF's capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capabilities and other capabilities. In cases where an armed attack against Japan has occurred and ballistic missiles, etc., have been used as the means of such an attack, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent's territory in accordance with the Three New Conditions for the "use of force" as a minimum necessary self-defense measure that cannot be avoided to prevent such an attack.

In recent years, there has been a dramatic improvement in missile-related technologies such as hypersonic weapons and practical missile operational capabilities such as saturation attacks in the area surrounding Japan. As the quality and quantity of missile forces are being significantly enhanced, and missiles are being launched repeatedly, missile attacks on Japan have become a real threat, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to respond to them fully with the existing missile defense network alone. For this reason, it is necessary for Japan to possess counterstrike capabilities in order to prevent further armed attacks by the opponent by means of its counterstrike capabilities while defending against incoming missiles with its missile defense network.

Having the counterstrike capabilities will deter armed attacks themselves. Moreover, should missiles be launched by an opponent, Japan will be able to prevent further armed attacks by the opponent by means of its counterstrike capabilities, thereby protecting the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals.

### Q. Don't counterstrike capabilities go against the exclusively defense-oriented policy?

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. It is Japan's basic strategy of defense.

Japan's counterstrike capabilities are used in cases where an armed attack involving ballistic missiles and the like has occurred against Japan. They are used in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force as a minimum necessary self-defense measure that cannot be avoided to prevent such an attack.

The exclusively defense oriented policy and Japan's counterstrike capabilities are logically consistent in that both allow for a minimum necessary measure for self-defense to be taken in the event of an armed attack. The Japanese Government intends to remain committed to the exclusively defense-oriented policy as Japan's basic strategy of defense.

### Q. Doesn't the use of counterstrike capabilities constitute a preemptive strike?

Counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of the Constitution, international law, and domestic law; they can be used only when the Three New Conditions for Use of Force are met. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible, and Japan will not do so.

### Q. Can counterstrike capabilities be used in a Survival-Threatening Situations?

A situation will not be unconditionally confirmed as Survival-Threatening Situations whenever an armed attack on another country having a close relationship with Japan occurs. It will be confirmed as such when such an attack threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger in terms of fundamentally overturning people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Japan is allowed to use force if there are no other appropriate means available to repel the attack, ensure Japan's survival, and protect its people and if such a use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary as a measure for self-defense.


If a survival-threatening situation is confirmed, the Japanese Government will decide on the use of counterstrike capabilities on a case-by-case basis. Such a decision will be made in view of the actual situation, in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, and from the perspective of what measures to be taken as long as they are the absolute minimum measures that are unavoidably necessary to prevent attacks by guided missiles, etc. if no other means are available.

(Reference) \*1: Unified opinion of the Japanese Government (answer read by Defense Agency Director General FUNADA Naka on behalf of Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro (February 29, 1956))

If Japan were in imminent danger of an illegal invasion, and the method of invasion were a missile attack against Japan's national territory, I simply cannot believe that the spirit of the Constitution requires that we merely sit and wait to die. In such a case, I believe that we should take the absolute minimum measures that are unavoidably necessary to defend against such an attack, so that in defending against a missile attack, for example, if no other suitable means are available, striking the missile base should be legally acceptable and falls within the range of self-defense.

#### Counterstrike capabilities (image)

- (1) In case where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, Japan will protect itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network.
  - (2) At the same time, an effective counterstrike against the opponent will be made from Japan to prevent the opponent's further armed attacks as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense in accordance with the Three New Conditions for the "Use of Force."
- By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attacks itself.



mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection and (vii) sustainability and resiliency to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush to the opponent's will to invade.

Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities as when and how unilateral changes to the status quo occur is hard to predict. First, by FY2027, five years after the formulation of the NDS, Japan will strengthen its defense capability to the point where Japan is able to take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against this nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats with the support of its ally and others. The top priorities for the next five years are twofold: first, to maximize effective use of its existing equipment, Japan will improve the number of operationally available equipment, secure sufficient ammunitions and fuel, and accelerate investment in improving the resiliency of key defense facilities; and second, Japan will fundamentally strengthen its core capabilities for future operations. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will make further efforts for achieving these defense objectives and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point where Japan is able to disrupt and defeat invasion much earlier and at places further afield.

A key to deterring invasion against Japan is counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In recent years, in Japan's surroundings, there have been significant improvement of missile forces in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks have become a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, Japan will continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense network; however, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing network alone. For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of missile defenses.

Counterstrike capabilities are the SDF's capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent's territory. Counterstrikes are done as a

minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force. By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent's further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

As counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan's Constitution and international law they do not change Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy; and, they can be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible. While the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States will remain unchanged, as Japan will now possess counterstrike capabilities, the two nations will cooperate in counterstrikes.

### **b. Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country**

To defend Japan, the SDF needs to be strong. National defense cannot be achieved without a whole-of-country approach. For this reason, in addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will build an overall national defense architecture by integrating Japan's national power – diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological – as well as by systematically combining all policy means. To enhance the whole-of-government undertaking, it is essential to break down sectionalism within the Government. Japan will enhance the comprehensive defense architecture that draws upon Japan's national power. This undertaking is an indivisible part of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities. The national government will also promote cooperation with local governments and private entities.

### **(2) Second Approach: Joint Deterrence and Response by the Japan-U.S. Alliance**

The second approach is to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Alliance with the United States is a key pillar of Japan's security, and fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities will lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities and will further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. By demonstrating such joint

resolve and capabilities, Japan and the United States will deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. In addition, if an invasion against Japan occurs, Japan-U.S. joint response will disrupt the invasion.

The first measure to this end is to strengthen Japan-U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities. Japan's NDS and the United States' National Defense Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through integrating all approaches and means. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of reinforcing readiness and resiliency, imposing cost on opponents, and deterring invasion against Japan, Japan will further deepen discussion with the United States on their roles, missions, and capabilities and further reinforce joint deterrence capabilities of both countries in an integrated manner.

The next is to reinforce alliance coordination functions. To conduct aligned joint response of Japan and the United States, Japan will further upgrade the overall coordination functions centered on the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). In addition, in order to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others centered around the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will promote closer operational coordination by leveraging the ACM and others.

Furthermore, as efforts to reinforce the foundation for allied response, Japan will reinforce the foundational elements that support effective allied response in all phases, including information security, cybersecurity, and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

The last is measures to support the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan. Japan will promote various measures to provide stable support for the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan, such as steady implementation of the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and the initiatives to reinforce the readiness and resiliency of the U.S. Forces in Japan, while optimizing the bilateral joint posture to respond to the severe security environment.

### (3) Third Approach: Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others

The third approach is to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others. In order to respond to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to ensure Japan's security, it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration with not only our ally but also as many countries as possible. From such

perspective, Japan will promote efforts to contribute to realizing the vision of a FOIP. Moreover, Japan will proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account characteristics and other factors of the region and each country. In doing so, while promoting collaboration with like-minded countries and others, Japan will pay attention to communication with China and Russia.

## 2 Key Capabilities for Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities (Seven Priority Areas)








The NDS lays out the basic concepts and contents of the seven functions and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan, which are derived from the basic policies and the comprehensive operation concept in line with them. The seven functions and capabilities are (i) stand-off defense capabilities, (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain operation capabilities, (v) command and control and intelligence-related functions, (vi) mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection, and (vii) sustainability and resiliency.

The NDS notes that Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities. It states that by FY 2027, five years after its formulation, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining the support of its ally and others. In studying ways to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities, the Government has considered, from many different angles, whether it can protect the lives and livelihoods of the people of Japan to the end. In so doing, it has examined gaps in the country's defense capabilities and compiled a list of the necessary defense capabilities. As priorities for the next five years, the list includes improving the number of operationally available equipment, securing sufficient ammunition and fuel, and investing in improving the resiliency of key defense facilities to maximize effective use of the existing equipment, as well as fundamentally strengthening its core capabilities for future operations, such as stand-off defense capabilities and unmanned defense capabilities.



See Fig. II-2-2-3 (Seven Functions and Capabilities on which to Focus in Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities and Their Images)

**Fig. II-2-2-3** Seven Functions and Capabilities on which to Focus in Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities and Their Images

<p>① Stand-off Defense Capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Strengthening the defense capabilities to oppose invading forces from a safe distance where we will not be attacked</li> </ul>	 <p>Inside the opponent's threat envelope Japan</p>
<p>② Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Strengthening our capabilities to respond to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats such as missiles</li> </ul> <p>Shipbuilding of an Aegis System-Equipped Vessel <sup>(Note)</sup></p>	
<p>③ Unmanned Defense Capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Strengthening our capabilities, e.g., via intelligence gathering and combat support with unmanned assets</li> </ul> <p>Preparation of UAV for reconnaissance (for mid-range) <sup>(Note)</sup></p>	
<p>④ Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Strengthening space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, land, sea and air capabilities necessary for combat by fusing all capabilities</li> </ul> <p>Development of Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft <sup>(Note)</sup></p>	
<p>⑤ Command and Control and Intelligence-related Functions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Strengthening command and control and intelligence-related functions to accelerate and refine decision-making</li> </ul> <p>Acquisition of Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2)</p>	
<p>⑥ Mobile Deployment Capabilities/ Civil Protection</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Strengthening maritime and air transport capabilities to quickly maneuver and deploy the necessary forces</li> <li>•Implementing civil protection by utilizing the above capabilities</li> </ul> <p>Acquisition of transport vessels <sup>(Note)</sup></p>	
<p>⑦ Sustainability and Resiliency</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Preparation of necessary and sufficient ammunition, guided missiles and fuel from an early stage</li> <li>•Securing expenditures for acquiring equipment parts, equipment repairing and improving the resiliency of facilities</li> </ul> <p>Securing the ammunition storage facilities <sup>(Note)</sup></p>	

The (note) in the figure is an image.

### 3 Future of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

The NDS lays out basic concepts with regard to a number of aspects, including the roles of each service of the SDF in the seven priority areas of key capabilities for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities,

the joint operations system based on these roles, and the development of the architecture of each service of the SDF. Given the need for strategic and agile defense policy planning and making, the NDS states that the SDF will fundamentally reinforce its functions concerned.

 See Fig. II-2-2-4 (Concept for Developing the SDF's Architecture)

**Fig. II-2-2-4** Concept for Developing the SDF's Architecture


Strengthening the joint operations system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reorganizing the existing structure and establishing a permanent Joint Headquarters</li> <li>• Considering defense equipment systems that contribute to joint operations</li> </ul>
Ground Self- Defense Force (GSDF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developing a system that places importance on stand-off defense capabilities, rapid maneuver and disperse deployment capabilities, and command and control and intelligence-related functions</li> <li>• Contributing to cross-domain operations mainly in the cyber domain</li> </ul>
Maritime Self- Defense Force (MSDF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reinforcing air defense capabilities, information warfare capabilities, stand-off defense capabilities, etc.</li> <li>• Promoting labor-saving and automation measures</li> <li>• Developing a system that will allow acquiring and sustaining superiority in underwater</li> </ul>
Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reinforcing mobile and dispersed operations and stand-off defense and other capabilities</li> <li>• Renewing the ASDF as the Air and Space Self Defense Force, thereby developing a system to ensure superiority in use of space</li> </ul>
Defense Intelligence Headquarters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assuming the central role of responding to Integrated Information Warfare</li> <li>• Fundamentally reinforcing capabilities to grasp military activities of other countries and analyzing and disseminating them</li> </ul>

(Note) The SDF as a whole will reinforce its capabilities to contribute to the reinforcement of cybersecurity of the entire country.

### 4 Measures for Protection of Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals

Other aspects about which the NDS lays out basic concepts include measures for protection of the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals; measures for security cooperation against global challenges; and the reinforcement both of defense production and technology base as a virtually integral part of defense capability itself and of human resource base for SDF

personnel, the core element of defense capability, to demonstrate their abilities.

 See Figure II-2-2-5 (Measures, etc. for Protection of the Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7 (Measures for Protection of the Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3 (Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 4 (Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation); Part IV, Chapter 1 (Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability itself); Part IV, Chapter 2 (Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities)

**Fig. II-2-2-5** Measures, etc. for Protection of the Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals

Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for International Security Cooperation	
Measures for protection of life, person and property of Japanese nationals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not only an invasion of Japan, but also large-scale terrorist attacks, attacks on critical infrastructure including nuclear power plants, large-scale disasters, and infectious disease crises are serious threats, and Japan will respond to them with its utmost efforts.</li> </ul>
Measures for security cooperation against global challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For the peace and security of Japan, and from the perspective of proactive contribution to peace, Japan will make efforts toward resolving conflicts and confrontations around the world, provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the event of large-scale international disasters caused by climate change, and proactively respond to global challenges such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.</li> </ul>
Defense Production and Technological Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capabilities	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defense production and technology bases constitute an indispensable foundation for securing the stable research, development, production, and procurement of equipment in Japan and for incorporating cutting-edge technologies necessary for new ways of warfare into defense equipment. These bases are virtually defense capabilities themselves, and their reinforcement is essential.</li> <li>• Japan will promote initiatives such as building a strong and sustainable defense industry necessary for a new way of warfighting, dealing with various risks, and expanding sales channels.</li> </ul>
Strengthening the Foundation for Uniformed SDF Personnel, the Core of Japan's Defense Capabilities, to Demonstrate Their Abilities	
Reinforcing the human resource base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The MOD/SDF will secure necessary uniformed SDF personnel, the core of Japan's defense capabilities, and create an environment that enables them all to demonstrate their own abilities to their fullest while maintaining high morale and pride.</li> </ul>
Transforming the medical function	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The MOD/SDF will transform the SDF medical force—which has been placing importance on sustaining the health of uniformed SDF personnel—into an organization that saves the lives of uniformed SDF personnel who carry out their missions in a contingency in spite of danger.</li> </ul>

## Perspective

## Significance of Deterrence



**TAKAHASHI Sugio** Head, Defense Policy Division, National Institute for Defense Studies

Deterrence is to prevent what should be defended from being attacked. If a country is to make deterrence succeed, it needs to meet some conditions. First, the country has the capabilities to successfully respond and defend what should be defended when it is attacked. Second, the country has the intention to employ these capabilities if the country is attacked. Third, a potential challenger correctly recognizes such capabilities and intention and then concludes that it will not be able to achieve its objectives at any acceptable cost or achieve them physically in the first place.

The simplest situation in which deterrence fails is where a challenger underestimates the capabilities and intention of the deterring country. Deterrence is most likely to fail if a country with a clear intention to challenge the current international order underestimates the capabilities and intention of a neighboring country and thinks it will win if it attacks that country.

Simply put, for deterrence to succeed, it is important not to let the challenger think that it can win if it attacks. What matters here is to build capabilities. If a country does not have sufficient capabilities, it cannot defend what should be defended. In addition, capability development itself conveys the intention to use such capabilities.

Deterrence fails in other situations as well. The security dilemma is one such typical situation. Take relations between Country A and Country B. Let us assume that neither country has the intention to challenge the current international order or attack the other. Yet, Country A's act to build capabilities to defend what should be defended may seem to be an act of threatening the survival of Country B in the eyes of Country B. Then Country B may build their own capabilities for its security. This in turn may seem to an act of threatening Country A in the eyes of Country A. If this happens, both

countries are likely to continue building their own capabilities in an endless spiral.

This is known as the security dilemma. In such a situation, deterrence is more likely to fail. Still, that does not hold true for every state-to-state relations. The security dilemma does not apply to situations where one of two opposing countries is building its capabilities with the intention to challenge the existing international order. The term "dilemma" is used because hostility deepens although neither country has the intention to challenge the status quo. In other words, security dilemma can be avoided if either country successfully convinces the other that it values the current international order and that it has no intention to threaten the survival of the other. This is why it is deemed important for any country to make clear the concrete ideas behind its security policy to other countries for greater transparency in order to avoid the security dilemma.

Japan is on the side of maintaining the current international order in the Indo-Pacific region. This position has been underpinned by Japan's past actions and track record. Meanwhile, the security environment is becoming more and more severe by the day. To maintain peace and security in such a severe security environment, deterrence is essential as capabilities to maintain the status quo. Japan's plan to spend ¥43 trillion for its defense over a period of five years, as well as the country's move to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike capabilities, is of great significance in that regard.

As Russia's aggression against Ukraine clearly shows, once the line is crossed, it is extremely difficult to return to the status quo ante. The role of deterrence in maintaining peace is more important than ever before.

(Note) This column is an independent analysis from the researcher's academic perspective, and its contents do not represent an official government position.



## Section 3

## Outline of the Defense Buildup Program

The Defense Buildup Program (DBP)<sup>1</sup> sets out, among other things, the level of defense capability Japan should possess to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities under the National Defense Strategy (NDS),

as well as the total expenditures and the quantity of major equipment needed to achieve that level.<sup>2</sup>

 See Reference 3 (Defense Buildup Program)

## 1 Program Guidelines

The DBP states that five years after the formulation of the Strategy, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining the support of its ally and others. It adds that in approximately 10 years from now, Japan will make further efforts to better attain this defense objective and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point at which it will be possible to disrupt and defeat invasions against its nation much earlier and at a further distance.

In accordance with the NDS, the DBP sets out that the MOD/SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense capabilities based on the following guidelines.

Firstly, in terms of its seven key fields, Japan will reinforce (1) stand-off defense capabilities and (2) integrated air and missile defense capabilities to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby deterring invasion itself. Should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, Japan would need to ensure asymmetric advantage by leveraging, in addition to these capabilities, manned as well as unmanned assets and gain superiority across domains such as underwater, surface of the water, and air, and to this end, Japan will reinforce (3) unmanned defense capabilities, (4) cross-domain operation capabilities, and (5) command and control/intelligence related functions. Furthermore, to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner so as to force the opponent to give up invasion, Japan will reinforce (6) mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection and (7) sustainability and resiliency. Additionally, Japan will place emphasis on the defense production and technology bases as a virtually integral part of defense capability itself, as well as areas such as the human resource base

that supports our defense capability.

Secondly, in procuring equipment, the MOD/SDF will properly combine the introduction of new, high performance equipment, along with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, to efficiently secure necessary and sufficient quantity and quality of defense capability. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. In addition, by using advanced civilian technologies and other means, the MOD/SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment for areas that could directly affect the SDF's current and future ways of warfare and are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce the human resource base, such as strengthening recruitment efforts, utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel and others, promoting women's participation, utilizing diverse and high-quality personnel, improving the living and working environments, developing human resources, and improving their treatment.

Moreover, to further reinforce the joint deterrence capabilities of Japan and the United States in an integrated manner, Japan will promote cooperation, improved interoperability, etc. related to cross-domain operations. In order to reinforce the infrastructure to support effective joint response capabilities, Japan will also reinforce efforts related to information security and cybersecurity, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation. In addition, measures to support the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan will be steadily implemented. Furthermore, in line with the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), to strategically promote multifaceted

<sup>1</sup> The Defense Buildup Program, approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022

<sup>2</sup> Because building up necessary defense capability takes time, defense buildup must be carried out continuously and systematically based on a concrete outlook. In this context, following the formulation of the 1976 NDPG, the then Defense Agency prepared the "Mid-Term Defense Estimate" in 1978 and 1981, which were the agency's estimates for major programs to build up defense capability each fiscal year under the NDPG.1 In FY1986 onward, the government formulated the five-year Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) to indicate the direction of the defense buildup in the medium term, both in terms of content and expenditure. Each fiscal year's defense buildup is conducted based on the MTDP.

and multilayered security operations, Japan will further promote establishing policy frameworks, while also promoting defense cooperation and exchanges including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

Lastly, in fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will, while adhering to the scrap-

and-build approach, optimize the SDF's organization and authorized strength as well as equipment. We will also further our ongoing efforts toward more efficient procurement, which have achieved significant cost reductions. In addition, to account for Japan's aging population with a declining birth rate, Japan will robustly promote automation, labor-saving and optimization.

## 2 Organization of Self-Defense Forces

Based on the DBP's guidelines, each SDF service is structured mainly as follows.

### 1 Joint Operations System

A Permanent Joint Headquarters will be established as soon as possible in order to build a system capable of seamlessly conducting cross-domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations among the SDF services. In addition, the SDF will examine how each unit, including joint units, should be structured.

For further improvement of capabilities in the cyber domain, including constant and continuous monitoring of the MOD/SDF's network and systems as well as the capability to disrupt an opponent's use of cyberspace for an attack against Japan, the SDF will possess a cyber defense unit as a joint unit, in order to fundamentally reinforce cyber defense capability.

In addition, a new maritime transport unit will be established as a joint unit to improve the mobile deployment capabilities to the southwestern region.

### 2 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

In order to strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region, the 15th Brigade, which is in charge of Okinawa, will have an additional infantry regiment and be reorganized into a division. Additionally, in order to strengthen stand-off defense capabilities, surface-to-ship missile units equipped with Upgraded Type-12 SSM will be retained. Furthermore, units equipped with hyper velocity gliding projectile for the defense of remote islands, and a long-range guided missile unit equipped with upgraded hyper velocity gliding projectile for the defense of remote island and hypersonic missiles will be newly established. Moreover, in order to secure the increased personnel necessary to strengthen stand-off defense capabilities, cyber capabilities, etc., the

MOD/SDF will abolish units mainly composed of the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and allocate the regular uniformed SDF personnel belonging to the units to fulfill the personnel requirements. In addition, the MOD/SDF will manage SDF Ready Reserve Personnel as replacements.

### 3 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

To conduct persistent and multilayered information gathering and surveillance, and to respond to an increasing volume of activities, such as ensuring security of maritime traffic and conducting overseas deployment for security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will reorganize the existing Escort Flotilla and Mine Warfare Force into "Surface Vessels Units" to serve as a central force provider for patrol vessels and destroyers introduced in the future. In addition, MSDF will procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels that will primarily conduct BMD operations.

Furthermore, to organically consolidate information warfare capabilities in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and GSDF/ASDF intelligence units, MSDF will review the existing unit structure and newly establish an Information Warfare major unit.

### 4 Japan Air Self-Defense Force

To reinforce air defense capability in terms of both quality and quantity, ASDF will possess more fighters (also consider replacement with UAVs) and build a system for carrying out mobile and dispersed operations to continue the battle tenaciously.

In addition, ASDF will enhance its space domain function by, among other measures, establishing a new specialized space domain missions unit led by a general-level commander. In view of the growing importance of the space domain and the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of space operations capabilities, space

operations will be positioned as a major mission alongside air operations within ASDF. Therefore, the “Air Self-Defense Force” will be renamed the “Air and Space Self-Defense Force.”

### 5 Optimizing Organizational Capacity

The target number of uniformed SDF personnel for the end of FY2027 is the level at the end of FY2022. The number of uniformed personnel in the GSDF, MSDF,

and ASDF, respectively, will be reviewed as necessary to optimize organizational capacity. In addition, the capacity necessary to strengthen the joint operation structure will be adjusted between the SDF services, and GSDF personnel will be transferred to MSDF and ASDF to meet their increased personnel requirements. To this end, approximately 2,000 GSDF uniformed personnel will be transferred to joint units, MSDF, and ASDF, respectively.

## 3 Quantities of Major Procurement

The DBP sets out the targets to be achieved in five years and approximately in ten years for the defense capabilities to be fundamentally reinforced as shown in Appendix Table 1. It also specifies the scales of specific programs for major defense equipment as shown in Appendix Table 2. In addition, the DBP defines each SDF service’s formation and equipment quantities in

approximately ten years as shown in Appendix Table 3.

See

Fig. II-2-3-1 (Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 1 (Targets for Fundamentally Reinforced Defense Capabilities and Timeline for Achievement)); Fig. II-2-3-2 (Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 2 (Procurement Quantities of Major Defense Equipment)); Fig. II-2-3-3 (Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 3 (Each SDF Service’s Formation and Equipment Quantities in Approximately Ten Years)), Fig. II-2-3-4 (The NDPG’s Annex Tables and the DBP’s Appendix Table 3)

**Fig. II-2-3-1** Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 1 (Targets for Fundamentally Reinforced Defense Capabilities and Timeline for Achievement)

Fields	By 5 years until FY 2027 (*)	Approx. 10 Years Later
	If an invasion of Japan occurs, Japan will respond with primary responsibility and buildup defense capabilities to disrupt and defeat the invasion while gaining support from its ally and others	Further efforts to ensure the defense concept described on the left (buildup defense capabilities to disrupt or to defeat invasion at an earlier and more distant location)
Stand-Off Defense Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Acquire practical capability to operate stand-off missiles</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Acquire capabilities to operate more advanced stand-off missiles</li> <li>● Secure required sufficient quantities</li> </ul>
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Reinforce capability to respond to Hypersonic Weapons</li> <li>● Reinforce capability to respond to miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Reinforce wide-area air defense capabilities</li> <li>● More efficient and effective UAV countermeasures</li> </ul>
Unmanned Defense Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Expand the use of UAV to strengthen capabilities to practically operate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Reinforce capability to control multiple unmanned assets simultaneously, etc.</li> </ul>
Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Reinforce Space Domain Awareness (SDA), cybersecurity capabilities, and electromagnetic domain capabilities, etc.</li> <li>● Reinforce ground, sea, and air domain capabilities that become basis of cross-domain operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Further reinforce space operation capability</li> <li>● Reinforce supports in terms of cybersecurity for entities other than SDF</li> <li>● Strengthen ground, maritime, and air capabilities to work with UAV</li> </ul>
Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Accelerate decision-making through the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), etc., while strengthening the resiliency of the network</li> <li>● Strengthen information acquisition and analysis in both strategic and tactic information, including responses in the cognitive dimension</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Reinforce persistent information gathering and sharing postures, while enhancing information gathering and analysis capabilities by application of AI, etc.</li> </ul>
Mobile Deployment Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Reinforce the SDF’s transportation and supply capabilities (deployment/civil protection), including enhancement of the SDF’s transportation assets and use of PFI vessels, etc.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Further enhancements of transportation capability</li> <li>● Accelerate transportation and supply capabilities by improving supply centers, etc.</li> </ul>
Sustainability and Resiliency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Increase quantity of ammunitions and missiles</li> <li>● Ensure maximum operational availability of equipment except those under maintenance</li> <li>● Improve the resiliency of defense facilities for contingencies</li> <li>● Secure required ammunition depots, etc.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Maintain and ensure adequate inventory of ammunitions and missiles</li> <li>● Maintain the operational rates</li> <li>● Further improve the resiliency of defense facilities</li> <li>● Further secure ammunition depots and other facilities commensurate with ammunition requirements</li> </ul>
Defense Production and Technology Bases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Establish strong defense production base through measures to strengthen the supply chain, etc.</li> <li>● Focused investment in equipment areas directly linked to future warfare, and a significant reduction in research and development periods</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Maintain robust defense production base capable for realizing innovative equipment</li> <li>● Acquire technologies for securing technological superiority in the future</li> </ul>
Human Resource Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources from a wide range of sources, including the private sector, by strengthening recruitment capabilities and establishing a new SDF personnel system</li> <li>● Reinforce education and research (cyber and other domains, joint operations, medical)</li> <li>● Improvement of living and working environments and treatment by taking necessary measures against aging barracks and housing and eliminating equipment shortages</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Even amid a declining population eligible for recruitment, continuously and stably secure the necessary human resources, including those with specialized knowledge and skills</li> <li>● Further strengthen education and research</li> <li>● Foster an organizational environment in which all members can demonstrate their individual abilities while maintaining high morale</li> </ul>

\* Accelerate investment in improving operational availability, securing ammunition, and fortifying key defense facilities to maximize the use of existing equipment, while focusing on fundamentally strengthening core areas of future defense capabilities, such as stand-off defense and unmanned asset defense capabilities.

Fig. II-2-3-2 Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 2 (Procurement Quantities of Major Defense Equipment)

Classification	Equipment Type	Procurement Quantity
(1) Stand-off Defense Capabilities	Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surface-, ship-, and air-launched variants)	Surface-type 11 Units
	Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP)	—
	Hypersonic Missile	—
	Tomahawk	—
(2) Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities	Upgraded Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (modified)	14 Units
	Aegis System-Equipped Vessels	2 ships
	Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (E-2D)	5 aircraft
	Interceptor Missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense (SM-3 Block IIA)	—
	Interceptor Missiles with Upgraded Capabilities (PAC-3MSE)	—
	Long-Range Ship-to-Air Missiles SM-6	—
(3) Unmanned Defense Capabilities	Various UAVs	—
	USV	—
	UGV	—
	UUV	—
(4) Cross-Domain Capabilities	Destroyer	12 ships
	Submarine	5 ships
	Patrol Vessel	10 aircraft
	Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)	19 aircraft
	Fighter (F-35A)	40 aircraft
	Fighter (F-35B)	25 aircraft
	Fighter Upgrade (F-15)	54 aircraft
	Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft	1 aircraft
Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS)	2 sets	
(5) Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions	Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2)	3 aircraft
(6) Mobile Deployment Capabilities and Civil Protection	Transport Vessels	8 ships
	Transport Aircraft (C-2)	6 aircraft
	Aerial Refueling and Transport Aircraft (KC-46A, etc.)	13 aircraft

**Fig. II-2-3-3** Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 3 (Each SDF Service's Formation and Equipment Quantities in Approximately Ten Years)

Classification	Future Posture		
Joint Units	Cyber Defense Units		1 squadron
	Maritime Transport Units		1 group
Ground Self-Defense Force	Active-Duty Personnel		149,000 people
	Major Unit	Basic Operational Units	9 divisions 5 brigades 1 armored division
		Airborne Units	1 airborne brigade
		Amphibious Units	1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade
		Air Transport Units	1 helicopter brigade
		Stand-off Missile Units	7 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
			2 battalions (hyper velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands)
			2 long-range guided missile units
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
		Electronic Warfare Units (incl. anti-aircraft electronic warfare units)	1 electronic warfare operations unit (incl. anti-aircraft electronic warfare unit)
Unmanned Vehicle Units	1 multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle unit		
Information Warfare Units	1 unit		
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Surface Vessels Units (Destroyers and Minesweeper vessels)	6 groups (21 divisions) 6 divisions
		Submarine Units	9 divisions
		Patrol aircraft Units (Fixed-wing Patrol aircraft Units)	(4 divisions)
		Unmanned Vehicle Units	2 divisions
		Information Warfare Units	1 unit
	Major Equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)	54 (10)
		Aegis System Equipped Vessels	2
		Patrol Vessels	12
		Submarines	22
		Combat Aircraft	Approx. 170
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning & Control Units	4 Aircraft Control & Warning Wings 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units	13 squadrons
		Aerial Refueling/Transport Units	2 squadrons
		Air Transport Units	3 squadrons
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	4 air defense missile groups (24 fire squadrons)
		Space Domain Mission Units	1 squadron
		Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units	1 squadron
	Operational Intelligence Units	1 squadron	
Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft (Fighters)	Approx. 430 (Approx. 320)	

Note 1: 14 out of the 15 divisions/brigades are operated on the basis of rapid deployment.

Note 2: Regarding the number of fighter aircraft units and fighters, necessary studies will be conducted by FY 2027 and necessary measures will be taken in order to further advance the quantitative enhancement of air capability. In this regard, the possibility of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles will be studied.

Part II Chapter 2 The Three Documents, Including the National Security Strategy



## 4 Expenditures


The expenditure aiming for the implementation of defense capability buildup described in the DBP for the next five years from FY2023 to FY2027 amount to approximately ¥43 trillion.


The annual defense budgets for FY2023 to FY2027 under the DBP amount to approximately ¥40,500 billion in total (approximately ¥8,900 billion in FY2027), on the assumption that a number of additional measures will be taken. These measures include (i) further accelerating the improvement of SDF facilities in an agile and flexible manner in view of the progress of each project; (ii) utilizing settlement surplus in the general account when the surplus is larger than the expected settlement surplus; and (iii) thoroughly implementing further optimization and rationalization of defense buildup.

The expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement the DBP amount

to approximately ¥43,500 billion (excluding the amount corresponding to payments for the period outside of the program that contribute to improving project efficiency, such as maintenance).

Finally, to secure financial resources for the stable sustainment of defense capabilities after FY2027 as well as for covering the DBP from FY2023 to FY2027, necessary measures will be implemented in both expenditure and revenue areas, such as the reform in government expenditure, using settlement surplus, creation of defense buildup funds utilizing non-tax revenues, and tax measures.

 See Fig. II-2-3-5 (Structure of Expenditures for the DBP); Fig. II-2-3-6 (Breakdown of Expenditures Needed for the Next Five Years); Chapter 3, Section 2-5 (Secure Financial Resources to Reinforce Japan's Defense Capabilities)



**Fig. II-2-3-6 Breakdown of Expenditures Needed for the Next Five Years**

Field		Defense Buildup Program (FY2023 - FY2027)	Reference: Previous plans (FY2019 - FY2023)
Stand-Off Defense Capabilities		Approx. 5 trillion yen	Approx. 0.2 trillion yen
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities		Approx. 3 trillion yen	Approx. 1 trillion yen
Unmanned Defense Capabilities		Approx. 1 trillion yen	Approx. 0.1 trillion yen
Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities (Space, Cyber, SDF equipment)		Approx. 8 trillion yen	Approx. 3 trillion yen
Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions		Approx. 1 trillion yen	Approx. 0.3 trillion yen
Mobile Deployment Capabilities/Civil Protection		Approx. 2 trillion yen	Approx. 0.3 trillion yen
Sustainability and Resilience	Ammunitions and Missiles	Approx. 2 trillion yen (Approx. 5 trillion yen incl. other fields)	Approx. 1 trillion yen
	Sustainment and Maintenance for Equipment, and Securing Operational Availability	Approx. 9 trillion yen (Approx. 10 trillion yen incl. other fields)	Approx. 4 trillion yen
	Improving the Resiliency of Facilities	Approx. 4 trillion yen	Approx. 1 trillion yen
Reinforcing Defense Production Base		Approx. 0.4 trillion yen (Approx. 1 trillion yen incl. other fields)	Approx. 1 trillion yen
Research and Development		Approx. 1 trillion yen (Approx. 3.5 trillion yen incl. other fields)	
Other (education and training, fuel, etc.)		Approx. 6.6 trillion yen	Approx. 4.4 trillion yen

Expenses required over the next 5 years  
Approx. 43.5 trillion yen (contract amount)

FY2019-FY2023 planned amount  
Approx. 17.2 trillion yen (contract amount)

# Defense Buildup and the Budget

## Chapter 3

### Section 1 Buildup of Defense Capability in FY2024

The DBP calls for organically integrating capabilities in all domains, including the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains, in accordance with the NDS to fundamentally reinforce Japan's multi-domain defense capabilities for the continuous implementation of flexible and strategic activities at all phases from peacetime to contingencies, and to focus on its opponents' capabilities and new ways of warfare. This would allow Japan to take primary responsibility by FY2027, five years after the formulation of the DBP, for countering any invasion of Japan that occurs and disrupt and defeat the invasion while receiving support from its allies and other partners.

With the basic understanding that the international community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet,

and has entered a new era of crisis, the MOD/SDF has secured a budget that is necessary and sufficient for FY2024 to achieve the goal of fundamentally reinforcing Japan's defense capabilities within the period of the DBP in accordance with the NDS and the DBP.

The MOD/SDF will continue to focus on the seven fields of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities. Specifically, it will work to fundamentally reinforce core areas of its defense capabilities, such as stand-off defense capabilities and integrated air and missile defense capabilities; increase the number of operationally available equipment; secure ammunition; enhance the resiliency of defense facilities; solidify the human resource base; enhance medical functions;



Examples of equipment and other items to be acquired over the next 5 years (images)  
Excerpt from reference "Why is the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities necessary now?"



**REFERENCE :** Why is the Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities Necessary Now?

**URL :** [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_policy/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_policy/index.html)



**REFERENCE :** Overview of FY2024 Budget

**URL :** [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_act/d\\_budget/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/index.html)





and maintain and reinforce defense production and technology bases.



For details of the necessary defense-related

expenditures, see the next section.

**See** Fig. II-3-1-1 (Major Programs for the Buildup of Defense Capability in FY2024 (Seven Areas to be Focused on in the Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities))

Fig. II-3-1-1

Major Programs for the Buildup of Defense Capability in FY2024 (Seven Areas to be Focused on in the Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities)

<p>Stand-off defense capability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Development of Upgraded Type12 SSM (surface-, ship-, and air-launched variants) and mass-production of the ground-launched type.</li> <li>○Research and mass-production of hyper velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands</li> <li>○Development of upgraded velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands</li> <li>○Development of hypersonic weapons</li> <li>○Development of new surface-to-ship and surface-to-surface precision guided missiles</li> <li>○Acquisition of JSM and JASSM</li> <li>○Acquisition of Tomahawk</li> </ul> <p>etc.</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-end;">    </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-end;">    </div> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: small;">*All are images.</p>
<p>Integrated air and missile defense capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Building of Aegis System Equipped Vessels</li> <li>○Development of upgraded type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (modified)</li> <li>○Acquisition of SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6</li> <li>○Improvement of capabilities of FPS-5, FPS-7 and JADGE</li> <li>○Acquisition of TPS-102A mobile warning and control radars</li> <li>○Japan-U.S. cooperative development of GPI etc.</li> </ul> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-end;">    </div> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: small;">*All are images.</p>
<p>Unmanned defense capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Acquisition of enhanced functions type UAV (medium-range) (x 6 sets)</li> <li>○Acquisition of UAV (short-range) (Type 41)</li> <li>○Trial operation of USV (test equipment)</li> <li>○Research on combat support multipurpose USVs</li> <li>○Demonstration of a transport UAVs (medium size)</li> <li>○Development of unmanned amphibious vehicles</li> </ul> <p>etc.</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-end;">    </div> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: small;">*All are images.</p>
<p>Cross-domain operation capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Technical demonstration needed to improve capabilities to counter HGVs such as detecting and tracking them by utilizing satellites</li> <li>○Geostationary orbit optical data relay demonstration</li> <li>○Acquisition of SDA satellites</li> <li>○Implementation of the Risk Management Framework (RMF)</li> <li>○Expansion of cyber units</li> <li>○Reinforcing educational foundations for cyber workforce</li> <li>○Acquisition of Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS) (x 1 set)</li> <li>○Acquisition of counter air electronic warfare system (x 2 sets)</li> <li>○Research on High-Power Microwaves (HPMs)</li> <li>○Acquisition of signals intelligence aircraft (RC-2) (x 1)</li> <li>○Acquisition of AMV (armored personnel carrier) (x 28)</li> <li>○Acquisition of type-16 mobile combat vehicle (x 19)</li> <li>○Acquisition of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) (x 3)</li> <li>○Acquisition of patrol helicopter (SH-60L) (x 6)</li> <li>○Building of destroyer (x 2), submarine (x 1), and supply vessel (x 1)</li> <li>○F-35A (x 8) and F-35B (x 7) fighter jets</li> <li>○Upgrade of F-15 fighter jets</li> </ul> <p>etc.</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-end;">   </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-end;">   </div> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: small;">*All are images.</p>
<p>Command and control / intelligence-related functions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Enhancement of command-and-control functions</li> <li>○Strengthening of functions such as intelligence collection and analysis</li> <li>○Responding to Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the Cognitive dimension</li> </ul> <p>etc.</p>
<p>Mobile deployment capabilities / civil protection</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Building of mobile boat (x 3)</li> <li>○Acquisition of cargo helicopter (CH-47) (x 17)</li> <li>○Acquisition of utility helicopter (UH-2) (x 16)</li> <li>○Private transport capacity utilization project (PFI vessels)</li> <li>○Acquisition of various trucks</li> </ul> <p>etc.</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-end;">   </div> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: small;">*All are images.</p>
<p>Sustainability and resilience</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Procurement of various ammunition necessary for continuous unit operation</li> <li>○Sustainment and maintenance for equipment</li> <li>○Securing ammunition storage facilities</li> <li>○Improvement of resiliency of SDF facilities and others</li> </ul> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-end;">   </div> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: small;">*All are images.</p>

## Section 2 Defense-Related Expenditures

### 1 Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures for FY2024

Under the NDS and the DBP, the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities will proceed through the systematic buildup of capabilities across the following seven fields: (i) stand-off defense capabilities, (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain operation capabilities, (v) command and control and intelligence-related functions, (vi) mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection, and (vii) sustainability and resiliency. For the defense-related expenditures for FY2024, the MOD/SDF secured a budget that is necessary and sufficient to achieve the goal of fundamentally reinforcing Japan's defense capabilities within the DBP period.

On an annual expenditure basis,<sup>1</sup> the government secured a budget to steadily implement the contracts, the amount of which significantly increased in FY2023. For DBP-related expenditures, the government has allocated ¥7,724.9 billion, up by ¥1,124.8 billion or 17.0% from the previous year.

On a contract basis,<sup>2</sup> the government has allocated ¥9,362.5 billion, a year-on-year increase of ¥410 billion

or 4.6% for DBP-related expenditures. Its aim is to allow for an early launch of programs spanning multiple years to acquire equipment and develop SDF facilities and others. This budget allocation, when combined with allocations under the original and supplementary budgets for FY2023, accounts for 42% of the total contract amount needed to implement the DBP, which amounts to ¥43.5 trillion.

In allocating the budget, as in the FY2023 budget, programs will be classified into 15 categories in view of the DBP for meticulous progress management. Amid higher prices and a weaker yen, the MOD/SDF will thoroughly implement further optimization and rationalization of defense buildup. It will also thoroughly scrutinize expenses and further promote efficient equipment acquisition through such bulk purchases, long-term contracts among other means.


 **See** Fig. II-3-2-1 (Comparison between Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget) of FY2023 and FY2024); Fig. II-3-2-2 (Trends in Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget)); Fig. II-3-2-3 (Budget Allocation for FY2024 (15 categories)); Subsection 3 (Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures); Reference 8 (Trends in Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget))

Fig. II-3-2-1 Comparison between Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget) of FY2023 and FY2024

(Unit: 100 million yen)

Category	FY2023	FY2024	FY2024		
			Fiscal YOY growth		
Annual expenditure	66,001	77,249	11,248	17.0%	
	Personnel and food provisions	21,969	22,290	320	1.5%
	Material expenses	44,032	54,960	10,927	24.8%
Future obligation	99,186	135,006	35,819	36.1%	
	New contracts	70,676	76,594	5,918	8.4%
	Existing contracts	28,511	58,412	29,901	104.9%

(Notes) 1 The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), etc. If these are included, the total amounts of defense-related expenditures are 6,821.9 billion yen for FY2023 and 7,949.6 billion yen for FY2024; and for future obligation, 10,717.4 billion yen for FY2023 and 14,192.6 billion yen for FY2024.

2 The budget amounts include expenditures pertaining to the Digital Agency.

3 Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding.



**REFERENCE** : Overview of FY2024 Budget

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_act/d\\_budget/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/index.html)



**REFERENCE** : How the Defense Budget Is Spent (Graphical Summary)


**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/guideline/pamph/graphicalsummary.html>



<sup>1</sup> The total amount paid during the fiscal year in question for programs for equipment acquisition, facility improvement, and the like.

<sup>2</sup> The total amount of contracts concluded during the fiscal year in question for programs for equipment acquisition, facility improvement, and the like.

**Fig. II-3-2-2 Trends in Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget)**



(Notes) 1. Expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft are included in the budget for FY2015 to FY2022.  
 2. Expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation, and national resilience are included in the budget for FY2019 and FY2020.

**Fig. II-3-2-3 Budget Allocation for FY2024 (15 categories)**

Category	Area	Total program expenses for five years	Program expenses for FY2023	Program expenses for FY2024
Stand-off defense capability		Approx. 5 trillion yen	Approx. 1.413 trillion yen	Approx. 712.7 billion yen
Integrated air and missile defense capabilities		Approx. 3 trillion yen	982.9 billion yen	1.2284 trillion yen
Unmanned defense capabilities		Approx. 1 trillion yen	179.1 billion yen	114.6 billion yen
Cross-domain operation capabilities	Space	Approx. 1 trillion yen	152.9 billion yen	Approx. 98.4 billion yen
	Cyberspace	Approx. 1 trillion yen	236.3 billion yen	202.6 billion yen
	Vehicles, ships, aircraft, etc.	Approx. 6 trillion yen	1.1763 trillion yen	1.3391 trillion yen
Command and control/intelligence-related functions		Approx. 1 trillion yen	305.3 billion yen	424.8 billion yen
Mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection		Approx. 2 trillion yen	239.6 billion yen	565.3 billion yen
Sustainability and resiliency	Ammunition, guided missiles	Approx. 2 trillion yen (Approx. 5 trillion yen including other areas)	212.4 billion yen (828.3 billion yen including other areas)	401.5 billion yen (924.9 billion yen including other areas)
	Sustainment and Maintenance for Equipment, and Securing Operational Availability	Approx. 9 trillion yen (Approx. 10 trillion yen including other areas)	1.793 trillion yen (2.0355 trillion yen including other areas)	1.9094 trillion yen (2.3367 trillion yen including other areas)
	Improving the Resiliency of Facilities	Approx. 4 trillion yen	474 billion yen	631.3 billion yen
Reinforcing Defense Production Base		Approx. 0.4 trillion yen (Approx. 1 trillion yen including other areas)	97.2 billion yen (146.9 billion yen including other areas)	83 billion yen (92 billion yen including other areas)
Research and development		Approx. 1 trillion yen (Approx. 3.5 trillion yen including other areas)	232 billion yen (896.8 billion yen including other areas)	225.7 billion yen (822.5 billion yen including other areas)
Base measures		Approx. 2.6 trillion yen	514.9 billion yen	513.8 billion yen
Education and training expenses, fuel expenses, etc.		Approx. 4 trillion yen	943.7 billion yen	911.8 billion yen
<b>Total</b>		<b>Approx. 43.5 trillion yen</b>	<b>8.9525 trillion yen</b>	<b>9.3625 trillion yen</b>

(Note) Figure have been rounded off and may not add up to the total.

## 2 High-Priority Focuses

### 1 Procuring various types of stand-off missiles

In order to protect Japan's territory, which extends approximately 3,000 kilometers along both the north-south and east-west axes, Japan needs capabilities to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan, including its remote islands, from locations outside of threat zones. Such threats include anti-aircraft missile capabilities. Also, it is essential for Japan to possess capabilities that are necessary and sufficient to block and eliminate the opponent's vessels, landing forces, and the like from various locations in our country in a multilayered manner no matter which region an invasion may initiate.

Against this backdrop, Japan can force the opponent to complicate its measures if it diversifies its launch platforms and respond with a combination of various stand-off missiles with various features. To this end, the MOD/SDF will secure a necessary and sufficient amount of stand-off missiles by procuring foreign-made missiles early on while supporting the expansion of the domestic capacity to manufacture missiles. The MOD/SDF will also expedite R&D and mass production efforts for early acquisition of capabilities to operate more advanced stand-off missiles.

For early acquisition of stand-off missiles, the MOD/SDF will start deploying domestically-made, Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surface-launched variant) in FY2025, one year earlier than planned, in light of an increasingly severe security environment. It will also begin acquiring U.S.-made Tomahawks in FY2025, one year earlier than planned. Through these measures, the MOD/SDF will promptly secure sufficient capabilities prior to the establishment of increased production of domestic missiles.

At the same time, the MOD/SDF will advance efforts to establish a series of functions necessary for the operation of stand-off missiles, including target information gathering functions and command and control functions.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-1 (Responses to Invasion of Japan, Including Its Remote Islands)

### 2 Procuring Aegis System Equipped Vessels

Recent years have seen rapid changes and developments in missile-related technologies, most notably hypersonic

glide vehicles (HGVs) and missiles flying with irregular trajectories. This points to the urgent need to reinforce integrated air and missile defense capabilities, including ballistic missile defense capabilities. For the primary purpose of defending Japan from threats of ballistic missiles and other weapons systems that are thus increasingly sophisticated, the MOD/SDF will begin constructing Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs) during FY2024. It aims to commission them early (the first ASEV in FY2027 and the second in FY2028).

These ASEVs will be equipped with Standard Missile (SM)-6 capable of responding to HGVs and others at the terminal phase, as well as with various warfare and mobile capabilities equivalent to or above those of existing Aegis-equipped destroyers. They will also be designed to be resistant to rolling, more habitable with personal spaces, and expandable so as to enable them to operate future equipment. In addition, the ASEVs will save the necessary number of crew by some 20% compared with existing Aegis-equipped destroyers.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-2 (Response to Missile Attacks)



Aegis System-Equipped Vessels (image)

### 3 Improving the resiliency of existing SDF facilities such as SDF camps and bases across Japan

SDF facilities are the foundation for the sustainability and resiliency of Japan's defense capabilities; therefore,

it is important to ensure their sufficient functioning. Because about 40% of SDF facilities were built during periods when the old earthquake resistance standards were in effect, it is urgently required to improve the resiliency of existing facilities so as to ensure the safety

of SDF personnel on a daily basis and prevent the easy loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency.

For this reason, the MOD/SDF already began in FY2023 to work on developing a master plan for improving the resiliency of more than 20,000 SDF buildings across Japan. Under this master plan, the

MOD/SDF plans to start making such improvements in FY2024. In the process, improvements will also be made to the living and work environments for uniformed SDF personnel.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 6-4 (Improving the Resiliency of Facilities)

### 3 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures

#### 1 Classification by expenses

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into “personnel and food provision expenses,” which covers items such as wages and meals for SDF personnel, and “material expenses,” which finance the procurement, repair and maintenance of equipment, the purchase of fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel and others. Material expenses are further classified into “obligatory outlay expenses,”<sup>3</sup> which are paid based on contracts concluded in previous fiscal years, and “general material expenses,” which are paid under current-year contracts. Material expenses are also referred to as “program expenses,” and since general material expenses include repair costs for equipment, education and training expenses for personnel, and the purchase of fuel, they are referred to also as “activity expenses.”


Personnel and food provision expenses as well as obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. The remaining 20% of the budget includes spending for repairing equipment and for implementing measures to mitigate the impact on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan. As such, a high percentage of the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes.

#### 2 Classification by purpose of use

By purpose of use, defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into “personnel and food provision expenses,” which cover items such as wages and meals for SDF personnel; “equipment procurement expenses,” which cover the procurement of new equipment (e.g., tanks, destroyers, fighter aircraft, etc.); “maintenance

Part II Chapter 3 Defense Buildup and the Budget

**Fig. II-3-2-4** Classification of Defense-Related Expenditures by Purpose of Use (FY2024)



<sup>3</sup> Some projects for the buildup of defense capabilities extend over multiple years. In these cases, the fiscal year in which the contract is concluded is different from the fiscal year in which the payment to the contractor is made. Therefore, the maximum obligation over later fiscal years is first allocated to the budget as a contract resulting in a Treasury obligation (a type of budget that only grants the authority to incur obligations; the contracts can be concluded, but payment cannot be made). Based on such budgeting, in the fiscal year in which the construction is completed or the equipment is procured, the expenses necessary for payment are in principle allocated as a budget expenditure (a type of budget that grants the authority to incur obligations and to make payment; the contracts can be concluded and payment can be made). Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years is called “obligatory outlay expenses,” while expenditure for future fiscal years is termed “future obligation.”


expenses,” which cover items such as training and education of SDF personnel, fuel for vessels and aircraft, and equipment repairs; “facility improvement expenses,” which cover the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks; and “research and development expenses,” which cover investments in cutting-edge technologies. In the defense-related expenditures for FY2024, as in those for FY2023, the combined total of expenses for equipment procurement and research and development exceeds 20% of the total defense-related expenditure, while the percentage of equipment maintenance and other expenses has also increased.

 **See** Fig. II-3-2-4 (Classification of Defense-Related Expenditures by Purpose of Use (FY2024))

### 3 Future obligations concerning new contracts

Apart from the annual budget expenditure, the future

obligations concerning new contracts (the new future obligations arising in the applicable fiscal year) indicates payments for the following year and beyond. In the buildup of defense capabilities, it is common to take multiple years from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other major equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. Concerning these projects, while contracts covering multiple fiscal years are concluded in applicable the fiscal year in question, and payments for the next fiscal year and beyond (in principle, within five years) are promised in advance at the time of concluding the contract (the total of general material expenses and future obligations concerning new contracts is equal to the total amount of the contract concluded in that fiscal year (scale of projects), which is referred to as the “contract basis”).

 **See** Fig. II-3-2-5 (Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures)

## 4 Optimization Efforts

In the DBP, substantive funds will be secured by means such as thoroughly ensuring greater efficiency and streamlining of the buildup of defense capability. The FY2024 budget aims to realize a cost reduction of approximately ¥276.4 billion through initiatives shown below:

- The operation of equipment of declining importance due to obsolescence, etc., will be suspended and its use terminated. (cost reduction of ¥1.3 billion)
- Prices and procurement costs will be reduced by increasing companies’ predictability and encouraging their efficient production through bulk purchase of equipment, including through long-term contracts. At the same time, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), in which consideration for the equipment is linked to the maintenance outcomes achieved, and other umbrella

contracts will be expanded. (cost reduction of ¥99.0 billion)

- Procurement time and lifecycle costs will be reduced by narrowing down the SDF’s proprietary specifications through modularization, communalization, and the use of civilian goods. (cost reduction of ¥7.3 billion)
- In addition to reviewing projects with low cost-effectiveness, the cost of each project will be carefully managed, and the utilization of external personnel from private contractors will be expanded. (cost reduction of ¥64.4 billion)
- Prices of equipment and others will be reduced through such means as closer scrutiny of manufacturing processes and person-hours involved as well as of related expenses. (cost reduction of ¥104.5 billion)

 **See** Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 4 (Equipment Optimization Efforts)

## 5 Secure Financial Resources for Reinforcing Defense Capabilities


Fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities must be maintained and further reinforced into the future. Stably supporting such efforts requires solid financial resources. To secure financial resources for the stable sustainment of defense capabilities after FY2027 as well as for covering the DBP from FY2023 to FY2027, the DBP calls for implementing necessary measures in both expenditure

and revenue, such as government expenditure reforms, the use of settlement surplus, creation of the Defense Buildup Fund utilizing non-tax revenues, and tax measures.

The Defense Buildup Fund has been created under the Defense Financing Act,<sup>4</sup> which was enacted in June 2023.

<sup>4</sup> The Act on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources Necessary for Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities

Fig. II-3-2-5 Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures



(Notes) 1 In the SACO-related and U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses, the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities is excluded.  
 2 This is a conceptual diagram and the lengths of the graph do not necessarily correspond to the actual data.  
 3 Part of expenses, such as long-term contracts for the procurement of equipment, is paid for over five years.

Also, tax measures have been addressed by the FY2023 Tax Reform Outline.<sup>5</sup> The Outline calls for incremental measures on corporate tax, income tax, and tobacco tax over several years to secure a little more than \1 trillion yen for FY2027. It states that these measures will be implemented at an appropriate time from FY2024 onward. The FY2024 Tax Reform Outline<sup>6</sup> stated that

such tax measures will be taken in accordance with the FY2023 Tax Reform Outline. According to the outline, the supplementary provisions of the 2024 tax reform law will provide that necessary legislative measures will be taken at an appropriate time.

 Chapter 2, Section 3 (Outline of the Defense Buildup Program)

## 6 Comparison with Other Countries


It is difficult to accurately make an international comparison of defense budgets due to a number of factors: there is no internationally unified definition of a defense budget in the first place; even if defense budgets are publicly disclosed, their overall amount or their breakdown is sometimes unclear; and the budget system varies by country.

On such basis, if Japan’s defense-related expenditures and the defense budget of other countries officially published by each government were converted into dollar amounts using the purchasing power parity<sup>7</sup> of each country reported by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and if a comparison was made in terms of the ratio of the defense budget to GDP (gross national product), the results

would be as shown in Fig. II-3-2-6 (Comparison with Defense Budget of Major Countries [FY2023]).

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) member countries and other countries have committed to appropriate their defense budget that is commensurate with their respective economic capabilities in order to maintain the security environment.<sup>8</sup> In the case of Japan, looking at its defense budget as a percentage of GDP has a certain significance as an indicator for the reinforcement of its defense capabilities in light of changes in the security environment in the international community. Accordingly, in FY 2027, as per its own judgement, Japan will take the necessary measures to make the level of its budget, for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives,

Fig. II-3-2-6 Comparison with Defense Budget of Major Countries (FY2023)



(Notes) 1 This defense budget are based on those officially published by each country (DoD budget for the United States) and are converted to US dollars, using each country’s purchasing power parity for FY2023 as published by the OECD (officially published rate as of April 2024). (1 US dollar = 94.702005 yen = 3.846155 yuan = 30.128977 rubles = 796.170147 won = 1.369873 Australian dollars = 0.673315 pound = 0.678008 euros (France exchange rate) = 0.710865 euros (Germany exchange rate))  
 2 The amounts of defense budget published by China appear to be only part of its actual expenses for military purpose. According to analysis from the U.S. Department of Defense, China’s actual defense budget much more than in its published defense budget.  
 3 The percentage of GDP is calculated based on defense budget officially published by each country (in local currency) using the GDP of each country published by the IMF (in local currency).  
 4 As defense budget published by NATO (which include pensions for retired veterans, etc.) may differ from those officially published by each country, the percentage of GDP based on defense budget published by NATO (in March 2024) does not necessarily coincide with the percentage of GDP calculated based on defense budget officially published by each country.  
 5 Defense budget per person are calculated using the populations published by the UNFPA (State of the World Population 2023).  
 6 According to a SIPRI Fact Sheet (published in April 2024), global defense budget represented 2.3% of global GDP in 2023, and defense budget represented 1.2% of Japan’s GDP.

5 The FY2023 Tax Reform Outline (Cabinet Decision on December 23, 2022)  
 6 The FY2024 Tax Reform Outline (Cabinet Decision on December 22, 2023)  
 7 A gauge that measures each country’s ability to purchase goods and services by taking into account their respective price levels. Although there also exists a method of converting their defense budget into dollar amounts at respective currency rates, their dollar-based defense budget calculated in this way do not necessarily reflect the precise value based on each country’s price levels.  
 8 The United Kingdom, for example, has laid out the policy of increasing the ratio of its defense budget to GDP up to 2.5% in a national defense document.




reach 2% of the current GDP, through building on the contents of necessary defense capabilities under the NSS, and by taking into account indexes of international comparison, with a view to coordination with its ally, likeminded countries and others.<sup>9</sup>

In addition, Fig. II-3-2-7 (Trends in Defense Budget of Major Countries) shows the trends in the defense budget of major countries since 1998.

 Reference 9 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries)

**Fig. II-3-2-7** Trends in Defense Budget of Major Countries



- (Notes)1 Regarding the defense budget of the six countries, figures officially published by the government of each country were converted into US dollars amounts, using the purchasing power parity for each year (published by the OECD as of April 2024). Incidentally, the values for 2024 were converted into USD with the purchasing power parity for 2023, because the one for 2024 has not been published yet for now.
- 2 Japan's defense-related expenditure shows its original budget (excluding SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience, etc.)
- 3 The amount and year-on-year growth rate (figures rounded to one decimal place) for FY1998-FY2024 are indicated.

<sup>9</sup> The aggregate of DBP-related expenditures and expenditures for complementary initiatives for FY2024 amounts to ¥8.9 trillion which represents about 1.6% of GDP for the fiscal year in which the NSS was formulated (FY2022).

## Security-related Expenses

In the National Security Strategy of Japan, which was formulated in December 2022, Japan has decided to take the necessary measures to make the level of its budget, for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives, reach 2% (about ¥11 trillion) of the current GDP (estimated at some ¥560 trillion for fiscal 2022), through building on the contents of necessary defense capabilities, and by taking into account indexes of international comparison, with a view to coordination with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

NATO member countries and other countries have committed to spending under their defense budget that is commensurate with their respective economic capabilities in order to maintain the security environment. In the case of Japan, looking at its defense budget as a percentage of GDP has a certain significance as an indicator for the reinforcement of its defense capabilities in light of changes in the security environment within the international community. With this understanding, the government has decided to set a 2-percent target for FY2027 for the combined budget level for the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and other supplementary measures (security-related expenses).

Of the combined budget, DBP-related expenditures as part of expenditures for the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities are expected to amount to some ¥8.9 trillion yen for FY2027. Expenditures for complementary initiatives are calculated based on the items the past administrations have adopted to provisionally estimate security-related expenditures while using the NATO definition for reference. Of such expenditures, SACO-related expenses and the portion of U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses that is aimed at mitigating the impact on local communities are estimated at about ¥0.2 trillion. The portion borne by relevant ministries and agencies is estimated at around ¥0.9 trillion given the JCG budget and PKO-related expenses. Expenditures for measures to reinforce the comprehensive defense architecture—R&D, public infrastructure development, cybersecurity, and international cooperation not least for enhancing the deterrence of Japan and like-minded countries—are approximately estimated at ¥1 trillion.

Estimating the portion of security-related expenditures borne

by relevant ministries and agencies involves the moot issue of which specific expenditures contribute to Japan's defense. Yet the government has calculated this portion based on the items the past administrations have adopted to provisionally estimate security-related expenditures while using the NATO definition for reference. The calculation assumes that this portion includes (i) expenditures related to military and civilian veterans and the weapons of the former Japanese military, such as pension expenditures and expenditures related to ammunition disposal; (ii) PKO-related expenditures, such as contributions to the U.N.'s PKO; (iii) expenditures for security-related organizations, such as the JCG and the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center; (vi) SDF-related expenditures, such as personnel expenses for defense attaches; and (v) expenditures related to the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan, such as base subsidies.

Of the measures to reinforce the comprehensive defense architecture, the government will promote R&D of science and technology that contributes to the enhancement of the comprehensive defense architecture by matching R&D needs based on the views of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with the appropriate technological seeds possessed by relevant ministries and agencies.

With regard to public infrastructure development, the government will develop airports and seaports as necessary based on the needs of the SDF and the JCG to ensure their smooth utilization and deployment on a steady-state basis for effective response in light of the security environment.

As for cybersecurity, the government plans to improve its overall response capabilities to or above the levels of leading Western countries. This involves the introduction of active cyber defense. The government is now considering what specific measures to take, with the Cabinet Secretariat playing the central role.

Measures for international cooperation are best represented by Official Security Assistance (OSA), a new grant aid framework that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created to help like-minded countries reinforce their security capabilities and deterrence. The MOD/SDF will work closely with OSA in such areas as the transfer of defense equipment and technology.

## Section 1 National Security Council

Japan's security environment is the most severe and complex since the end of World War II, and the security challenges that it needs to address are becoming more serious. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to carry forward the policies pertaining to national security from a strategic perspective under strong political leadership with the Prime Minister at its core. For this reason, the National Security Council, which was established in the Cabinet to provide a platform to discuss important matters with regard to Japan's security, has been serving as a control tower for foreign, defense, and economic policies pertaining to national security. Since its establishment in December 2013, the Council has met 338 times (as of the end of March 2024). The NSS, NDS, and DBP formulated in December 2022 have also been deliberated and approved in this National Security Council.


The National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat provides constant support to the National Security Council as its secretariat. The Secretariat is also tasked with the planning, design, and overall

coordination of basic guidelines and important matters with regard to foreign, defense, and economic policies pertaining to national security. The Secretariat is provided with human resources and information by the ministries and agencies closely related in terms of policy. There are many civilians and uniformed personnel seconded from the Ministry of Defense (MOD) engaging in the planning and design of policies, with their expertise. In addition, information on global military trends and other matters is provided from the MOD/SDF in a timely manner.

The enhanced ability to formulate national security policies has led to the systematic alignment of Japan's national security, and to the provision of a direction for policies with regard to new security challenges. Furthermore, individual defense policies are formulated and efforts to accelerate decision-making are made based on the basic guidelines discussed at the National Security Council, and this is contributing significantly to improved development and implementation of policies within the MOD/SDF.

See Fig. II-4-1-1 (Organization of the National Security Council)

Fig. II-4-1-1 Organization of the National Security Council



**REFERENCE** : Meetings of the National Security Council  
**URL** : <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/kaisai.html>

# Section 2 Organization of the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

## 1 Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability

### 1 Organization of the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF)


To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/SDF consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces.

The MOD and the SDF refer to the same organization. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to

the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, the term “SDF” refers to the operational aspects of the organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan.

**See** Fig. II-4-2-1 (Organizational Chart of the MOD/SDF); Fig. II-4-2-2 (Outline of the MOD/SDF); Fig. II-4-2-3 (Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces); Fig. II-4-2-4 (Location of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2023))

Fig. II-4-2-1 Organizational Chart of the MOD/SDF



(Notes) 1 As of May 2024.  
 2 Excluding temporary or special positions.  
 3 Units and Organizations, Joint Units, and Cooperative Organizations are categorized under Attached Organizations in the National Government Organization Act.

Fig. II-4-2-2 Outline of the MOD/SDF

Organization	Outline
Internal Bureaus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the MOD and SDF (defense and security affairs, basic conduct of the SDF [political and administrative affairs such as planning and drafting of laws and regulations or government-level policies], personnel affairs, budgets, etc.)</li> <li>● Composed of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, Bureau of Personnel and Education, and Bureau of Policies for Regional Society, in addition to the Minister's Secretariat</li> </ul>
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● A staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF</li> <li>● Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs concerning joint operation and making action plans</li> <li>● The Minister's commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Staff, JS and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Staff, JS.</li> </ul>
Ground Staff Office Maritime Staff Office Air Staff Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning the duties of each SDF unit</li> <li>● Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs of each SDF unit and making plans on buildup of defense capabilities, education and training.</li> </ul>
Ground Self-Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ground Component Command                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Composed mainly of airborne brigades, amphibious rapid deployment brigades, etc.</li> <li>• Realization of unified command over GSDF troops.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Regional Armies                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery groups)</li> <li>• There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Divisions and Brigades                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Composed of combat units, combat support units, logistics support units and others</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Maritime Self-Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Self-Defense Fleet                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force</li> <li>• Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Regional Districts                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There are five regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Air Self-Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Air Defense Command                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Composed of four air defense forces</li> <li>• Primarily responsible for general air defense duties</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Air Defense Force                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
National Defense Academy of Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel</li> <li>● Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to master's or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses)</li> </ul>
National Defense Medical College	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel</li> <li>● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel</li> <li>● Offers a graduate medical course equivalent to PhD programs at medical universities based on the School Education Law</li> </ul>
National Institute for Defense Studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● National security-related academic research and education institute</li> <li>● Conducts basic research and study related to the administration and operation of the SDF                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducts research and study on security</li> <li>• Conducts research and study and compiles data on military history</li> <li>• Management and publication of data on military history</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Educates and trains SDF personnel and other senior officials</li> </ul>
Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position</li> </ul>
Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Local Bureaus in charge of comprehensive defense administration in regional areas                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducts cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to the procurement of equipment by ensuring understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and acquiring, managing, building and constructing defense facilities, and taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base</li> <li>• Consists of eight Regional Defense Bureaus (Hokkaido, Tohoku, North Kanto, South Kanto, Kinki-Chubu, Chugoku-Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● An external bureau in charge of effective and efficient procurement of defense equipment and international defense equipment and technology cooperation                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of constant project management throughout the life cycle of defense equipment from an integrated perspective</li> <li>• Smooth and prompt reflection of each unit's operational needs in equipment procurement</li> <li>• Proactive initiatives in new areas (further internationalization of defense equipment and investments in advanced technological research, etc.)</li> <li>• Achievement of procurement reform and, at the same time, maintenance and strengthening of defense production and of the technological and industrial bases of defense</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Fig. II-4-2-3 Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces





Fig. II-4-2-4 Location of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2023)



## 2 Systems to Support the Minister of Defense

The Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters related to the defense of Japan as the competent minister, and is in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Law. The Minister is supported by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two), and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. There are also the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of Defense, and the Defense Council, which deliberates on basic principles concerning affairs under the Ministry's jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs.

Moreover, the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air Staff Office, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), as an external bureau, have been established in the MOD. The Internal Bureaus of the MOD are responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the MOD/SDF. The Minister's Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal Bureaus, along with the Commissioner of ATLA who is in charge of defense equipment administration, support the Minister of Defense by providing assistance from a policy perspective.

The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides centralized support for

the operations of the SDF for the Minister of Defense from a military expert's perspective. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) acting as the top ranking expert advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these services.

In this manner, the MOD has ensured that the support for the Minister from a policy perspective and the support for the Minister from a military expert's perspective are provided in a well-balanced manner like the two wheels of a cart, so to speak, in order for the Minister of Defense to appropriately make decisions.

 See Chapter 1, Section 2-3-4 (Securing Civilian Control)

## 3 Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas

The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branches in charge of comprehensive defense administration.

In addition to implementing measures to promote harmony between defense facilities and regional societies and inspecting equipment, the Regional Defense Bureaus adopt various measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local governments and local residents towards the activities of the MOD/SDF.

 See Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 1 (Measures to Harmonize with Local Communities and the Environment)

## 2 Joint Operations System of the SDF

In order to rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint operations system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are operated integrally. Furthermore, it works towards building an architecture that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations in domains such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.

The Joint Staff is responsible for joint operations of the SDF. It is headed by the Chief of Joint Staff, who

develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert's perspective. The Minister of Defense's commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff, and the Minister of Defense's orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Defense Minister's commands and orders are delivered through the Chief of



Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force<sup>1</sup> is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond.


The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the

operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability, and education and training.

### 3 SDF Joint Operations Command


The NDS and DBP call for the establishment of a permanent Joint Headquarters that facilitates the centralized command of each SDF service. The aim is to build a system that is capable of seamless cross-domain operations at all phases from peacetime to contingencies, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations of the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF

services. To this end, the MOD/SDF will establish the SDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) in Ichigaya as a permanent Joint Headquarters, which will be headed by the Commander, SDF Joint Operations Command (C-JJOC).

 See Fig. II-4-2-5 (Operations System of the SDF and SDF Joint Operations Command(JJOC))

**Fig. II-4-2-5** Operational System of the SDF and the JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC)

#### New Self-Defense Forces' Operations System (image)



#### 1 Significance

Two or more units from GSDF, MSDF, and/or ASDF are temporarily organized as an ad hoc joint task force, as needed, under the current absence of a permanent Joint Headquarters to conduct joint operations. Under such an arrangement, however, the SDF cannot quickly develop a flexible defense posture in response to the state of the situation and its developments. It is also difficult to put in place a posture needed for cross-domain operations from peacetime.

The JJOC will centrally command joint operations by

the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF from peacetime. Its ability to train cross-domain operations from peacetime will improve the effectiveness of joint operations and enable prompt response to contingencies and decision-making constantly.

Currently, the Chief of Joint Staff coordinates with the U.S. counterparts, namely the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is in charge of longer-term military strategies, as well as the Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, who is in charge of joint operations between the SDF and U.S. Forces. The JJOC will enable closer coordination with U.S. Forces and stronger Japan-

<sup>1</sup> This applies to cases in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specific duty or when the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure based on the stipulations of Article 22, paragraphs 1 or 2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, and refers to units made up of two or more units from the GSDF, MSDF, or ASDF. In order to swiftly and effectively execute various missions such as responding to ballistic missiles and large-scale disasters, it is necessary to operate the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF in an integrated manner. To achieve this, a joint task force spanning the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF is organized under a single commander. In order to deal simultaneously with a contingency and a disaster, it is possible to organize a joint task force separately even after the JJOC is established.

U.S. joint response capabilities.

## 2 Relations between the JJOC and the Joint Staff

The Joint Staff is a staff organization that supports the Minister of Defense with regard to the operation of the SDF from a military expert's perspective. The JJOC, on the other hand, is a unit designed to centrally command GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units across Japan from peacetime, which was not a permanent function of the SDF until now. Thus, the JJOC and the Joint Staff are organizations with different purpose and position, and the role of the Joint Staff will not change with the establishment of the JJOC.

As to the current operation of the SDF, the commands of the Minister of Defense are conducted via the Chief of

Joint Staff whereas the orders of the Minister of Defense are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. Even after the JJOC is established, the Chief of Joint Staff will continue to convey the commands and orders of the Minister of Defense regarding the operation of the SDF to the JJOC and other units and give detailed guidance within such purview.

In this way, clear lines of responsibility will be drawn between the JJOC and its commander on one hand and the Joint Staff and its chief on the other. The establishment of the JJOC and its new function of centrally operating GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units across the country from peacetime will improve the effectiveness of joint operations and enable prompt response to contingencies and decision-making constantly.

## Commentary

## Deepening the SDF's Joint Operations System

Aiming for a comprehensive and effective administration of the SDF for joint SDF operations, the Joint Staff Council comprising a Chairman and the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF was established in July 1954 at the time of the foundation of the Defense Agency and the SDF. Based on this, the Internal Bureau of the Defense Agency assisted the Minister of State for Defense in his command responsibilities mainly from policy perspective, while each Chief of Staff and the Joint Staff Council did so mainly from military perspective. However, the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF all provided their own expert military advice to the Minister of State for Defense independently, with the Joint Staff Council providing coordination as a council organization when necessary. In other words, it was a posture in which operations by each SDF service were the norm.

After that, there were changes in the environment surrounding the SDF. For example, the SDF was required to deal with new threats and diverse contingencies. Recognizing that, in order to swiftly and effectively respond to these changes, the SDF must adopt a posture in which the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF can conduct operations in a systematic and coordinated fashion during normal conditions, the government established the posture required for joint operations, including the creation of the Joint Staff, the transfer of operational functions from the Staff Offices of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to the Joint Staff, and the integration of intelligence functions into the Defense Intelligence Headquarters. In March 2006, the SDF posture was shifted to the joint operations



The Joint Staff Council held the first meeting in 1954.

system, a posture in which joint operations are the norm. This shift integrated the functions of supporting the Minister of Defense from a military expert's perspective. At the SDF unit level, however, the joint operations system translated into a joint task force organized to carry out a specific duty under Article 22, paragraph 1 or 2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The SDF had yet to be able to adopt a posture in which the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF can conduct operations in a systematic and coordinated fashion during normal conditions.

This was where the Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019 - FY 2023) came in. This program stated: "For the future framework for joint operations, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to conduct the operation of organizations in which the functions in the new domains are operated unitarily, and come to conclusions after considering how the integrated structure should be during steady-state to appropriately execute instructions from the Minister based on the posture of the strengthened Joint Staff." Based on such consideration, the Defense Buildup Program endorsed by the Cabinet in December 2022 stated: "a permanent Joint Headquarters will be established in order to build a system capable of seamlessly conducting cross-domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations among each SDF services." This was how the Joint Operations Command came to be established.



Lieutenant General MASSAKI Hajime, the first Chief of Staff, Joint Chief of Japan (right)

# Framework for the SDF Activities

## Chapter 5

### 1 Duties of the Self-Defense Forces


Article 3 in the Self-Defense Forces Law divides the duties of the Self-Defense Forces into main duties (item 1 of the same article) and secondary duties (items 1 and 2 of the same article). Defense Operations to defend Japan correspond to main duties, which only the Self-Defense Forces can carry out.

Secondary duties consist of “duties for maintaining public order as necessary” (secondary duties under item 1) and duties defined by other laws “to an extent that does not interfere with performance of the main duties” (secondary duties under item 2). The former includes public security operations that police entities cannot handle alone, maritime security operations, destruction measures against ballistic missiles and other weapons, disaster relief dispatches, and measures against intrusion of territorial airspace. The latter covers responses to Important Influence Situations and international peace cooperation activities. These main and secondary duties

are jointly known as “primary missions.”<sup>1</sup>

**See** Fig. II-5-1 (Overview of the Self-Defense Forces' Duties); Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)

Fig. II-5-1 Overview of the Self Defense Forces' Duties



### 2 Defense of Japan

#### 1 Armed Attack Situations/Anticipated Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Act<sup>2</sup> is aimed at establishing a system to respond to **Armed Attack Situations** or **Anticipated Armed Attack Situations** and **Survival-Threatening Situations**, thereby contributing to the peace and independence of Japan as well as the safety of the country and the people. The Act specifies items that should be stipulated as basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response Plan), as well as the responsibilities of national and local governments, for responding to Armed Attack Situations/Anticipated

Armed Attack Situations, and Survival-Threatening Situations.

The Government will take action in accordance with the Act in the event of an armed attack, such as a missile attack on Japan or an invasion of its remote islands as described below in Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4, or an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan, which as a result, threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning Japanese people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.

When an Armed Attack Situation /Anticipated Armed Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation occurs, the Government will make a Cabinet decision on a Basic Response Plan based on the Armed Attack Situation

<sup>1</sup> Activities to be performed by the SDF to leverage its skills, experience, and organizational functions developed over years are known as “side duties” to distinguish them from primary missions. They include transportation for national guests who visit Japan to attend a Summit meeting, consignments of public park ground-leveling and road constructions performed as part of education and training, and cooperation with athletic events, such as Olympic Games, Paralympic Games, and the National Sports Festival.  
<sup>2</sup> Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People's Security in Armed Attack Situations /Anticipated Armed Attack Situations, and Survival-Threatening Situations

**KEY WORD**

**Armed Attack Situations and Anticipated Armed Attack Situations**

“Armed Attack Situations” refers to situations in which an armed attack against Japan from outside occurs or in which it is recognized that clear danger of an armed attack against Japan from outside is imminent.  
“Anticipated Armed Attack Situations” refers to situations that are not yet an armed attack situations but in which circumstances are critical and an armed attack against Japan is anticipated.

**KEY WORD**

**Survival-Threatening Situations**

“Survival-Threatening Situations” means situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning Japanese people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

Response Act. Such a plan must stipulates the following items, which are subject to approval by the Diet.

(1) The Following Items concerning Situations that Need

to Be Dealt with:

- Sequence of events of the situation, the confirmation of occurrence of an Armed Attack Situation /Anticipated Armed Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation, and the facts that support this confirmation
- The reason why there are no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and the use of force is necessary to respond to the situation when the situation is confirmed as an Armed Attack Situation/Anticipated Armed Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation

(2) An Overall Plan Related to the Response


(3) Important Matters Related to the Response Measures

Important matters related to the response measures include the issuance of Defense Operation orders or requests for Diet approval to issue such orders, as described below, in the event of an Armed Attack Situation, or a Survival-Threatening Situation.

 See Fig. II-5-2 (Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations /Anticipated Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations)

Fig. II-5-2

Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations / Anticipated Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations



## 2 Responses of the SDF

The Prime Minister can issue a Defense Operation order to the whole or part of the SDF when it is deemed necessary for the defense of Japan in Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations. Prior Diet approval is required for a Defense Operation order in principle. The SDF under Defense Operation duty is allowed to exercise the use of force only when the Three Conditions for “the Use of Force” are satisfied.

**See** Chapter I, Section 2-2-2 (Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4 (Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks)


## 3 Civil Protection

The Civil Protection Law<sup>3</sup> specifies the responsibilities

of the national and local governments as well as measures for evacuating residents, providing relief to evacuated residents, and responding to armed attack disasters in order to protect the lives, bodies, and property of the people and to minimize the impact on the livelihood of the people in an Armed Attack Situation/Anticipated Armed Attack Situation and during an emergency response<sup>4</sup>. If the Minister of Defense deems it unavoidable after receiving a request from prefectural governors or a request from the Task Force Chief,<sup>5</sup> the Minister of Defense may order SDF units and organizations<sup>6</sup> upon approval from the Prime Minister, to implement civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures (including assisting with the evacuation of residents and immediate restoration).

**See** Fig. II-5-3 (Flow of Civil Protection Dispatches); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-8 (Initiatives Related for Civil Protection)

Fig. II-5-3 Flow of Civil Protection Dispatches



3 Act Concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc.

4 A situation where actions that may kill or injure a large number of people through methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack have occurred or where it is deemed a clear and present threat that such actions may occur, and which necessitates an emergency response by the state.

5 The Prime Minister assumes the position of the Director of the Crisis Management Headquarters, but these positions are regulated as separate entities.

6 Units and organizations of the GSDF, MSDF, or ASDF

# 3

## Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount to an Armed Attack

### 1 Public Security Operations

#### (1) Public Security Operations by Order

In the event of an indirect aggression<sup>7</sup> or other emergency situations, the Prime Minister can order the whole or part of the SDF to deploy if it is deemed impossible to maintain public security with the general police force. In this instance, in principle, the Prime Minister must bring the order to the Diet for deliberation, and request for its approval within twenty days from the day the order has been given.

#### (2) Public Security Operations by Request

The governor of a prefecture, upon consulting with the Public Safety Commission of the prefecture, can request the Prime Minister to dispatch units and organizations of the SDF if it is deemed unavoidable as the situation will have a serious influence on public security. Following such a request, the Prime Minister can order the SDF to mobilize when the situation calls for such action.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-7 (Responses to Large-Scale Terrorism and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure)

### 2 Maritime Security Operations

When there is a special need to protect lives or property or maintain public security at sea,<sup>8</sup> the Minister of Defense can order the SDF units to take necessary actions at sea upon approval by the Prime Minister.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3-2 (Measures against Violations of Japan's Sovereignty)

### 3 Counter-Piracy Operations

When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy,<sup>9</sup> the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to conduct operations under the Counter-Piracy Measures Act to deal with piracy acts at sea upon approval by the Prime Minister.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations)

### 4 Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects

In cases where ballistic missiles or other objects are flying to Japan as an armed attack or flying to Japan in a Survival-Threatening Situation, and where the “Three Conditions” are met, the SDF can respond with the defense operation. In cases where ballistic missiles or other objects are flying to Japan but which are not found as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can take the following measures:


(1) If the Minister of Defense judges that ballistic missiles or other objects are likely to fly to Japan and that it is necessary to prevent damage to human lives and property due to its fall in the territory of Japan, the Minister, upon the approval of the Prime Minister, can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles or other objects actually flying to the country in the airspace over the territory of Japan or the high seas.

(2) In addition to the cases of (1), there may be cases where the situation suddenly changes with little information available on the launch, for example, and the Minister of Defense cannot have time to obtain approval from the Prime Minister. In preparation for such cases, the Minister of Defense may create an emergency response manual beforehand and obtain approval from the Prime Minister. Following the emergency response manual, the Minister of Defense can order, for a specified period of time, the SDF units to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects in the airspace over the territory of Japan or the high seas when such objects are actually flying to the country.

**See** Fig. II-5-4 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-2 (Responses to Missile Attacks)

<sup>7</sup> A major internal riot or disturbance caused by the instigation or intervention by a foreign country  
<sup>8</sup> Cases where it is extremely difficult or impossible for the JCG to respond  
<sup>9</sup> Act of Punishment and Countermeasures Against Piracy

Fig. II-5-4 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects



## 5 Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others

### (1) Disaster Relief Dispatches

Prefectural governors or other officials<sup>10</sup> may request the Minister of Defense, or an officer designated by the Minister,<sup>11</sup> to dispatch SDF units, etc., in the event of a disaster<sup>12</sup> if they deem such a dispatch necessary in order to protect lives or properties. Upon such a request, the Minister or the designated officer will, in principle, make a judgment based on a comprehensive evaluation of three conditions—urgency, non-substitutability, and public nature—and dispatch the units if it is deemed necessary for the SDF to respond to the disaster. This procedure is based on the idea that prefectural governors and other officials should grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch. However, under circumstances of particular urgency when there is no time to wait for a request, the Minister of Defense or the designated officer may discretionarily dispatch units, etc. without waiting for such a request.

In cases where emergency patients need to be transported from the sea, remote islands or elsewhere but both the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the local governments concerned have difficulty in dealing with the situation, the SDF conducts an emergency airlift of such patients under the framework of disaster relief dispatches.

### (2) Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch and Nuclear Disaster Relief Dispatch

When a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes,<sup>13</sup> or when a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order the dispatch of units upon the request of the Director of the Seismic Disaster Warning Headquarters or the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister in either case).

See Fig. II-5-5 (Flow of a Disaster Relief Dispatch); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-1 (Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc.); Reference 18 (Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years))


<sup>10</sup> The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster relief dispatch. With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake disaster prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may take measures such as evacuation (Article 4 of the Police Duties Execution Law) based on Article 94 of the SDF Law (Authority in Disaster Relief Dispatch, etc.); (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake disaster prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary.

<sup>11</sup> Most notably, the commanding officers of SDF units, etc. across Japan are designed as such in consideration of convenience for prefectural governors, etc. when they make such a request.

<sup>12</sup> Disasters include not only natural disasters such as storms, torrential rains, tremendous snowfalls, floods, storm surges, earthquakes, and tsunamis, but also human-caused disasters such as fires, maritime accidents, aircraft crashes, and train accidents.

<sup>13</sup> The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake prediction is reported by the Director-General of the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.





## 6 Measures against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take the necessary measures to make the intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (by guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, using weapons, etc.) when a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law, the provisions of the Aviation Law, or other relevant laws and regulations. It is a violation of Japanese airspace when objects of foreign countries, even if they are unmanned aircraft (including balloons), intrude into our airspace without permission. The Japanese Government has traditionally considered that the use of weapons during scrambles responding to intrusions into Japanese airspace is permissible only when such measures fall under the requirements of legitimate self-defense or necessity, assuming that such intrusions are made by manned and military aircraft. Given that the use of weapons against unmanned aircraft, including balloons that intrude into Japanese airspace, would not directly harm people, the Japanese Government in February 2023 clarified its interpretation of Article 84 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, which concerns the use of weapons against unmanned aircraft, as follows: In such a case where the safety of aircraft cannot be ensured if the situation left as it is, and when deemed necessary to use weapons to protect legal interests, such as the lives

and property of people within Japanese territory as well as the safety of aircraft flying along air routes, such use of weapons can be permitted even if such use does not fall under the requirements of legitimate self-defense or necessity.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3-2-1 (Warnings and Scrambles in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace)

## 7 Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas

The Minister of Defense can transport Japanese nationals and others in need of life or physical protection to a safe area if requested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the event of emergency situation in a foreign country. To date, the Japanese Government has amended the SDF Law three times. The latest amendment—which was made in 2022 considering the experiences including the transportation of Japanese nationals and others from Afghanistan—involved removing restrictions on the means of transportation, reviewing the safety requirements for implementation, and expanding the scope of primary transportation recipients.

The Minister of Defense can also rescue Japanese nationals and others by protecting or recovering them upon request from and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs if there is a threat of harm to life or body and all of the following are satisfied:

- Competent authorities of the country concerned are

- currently working on maintaining public safety and order, and no acts of combat are confirmed to take place in the areas where rescue measures are taken;
- The country concerned<sup>14</sup> provides consent for the SDF to take the rescue measures (including the use of weapons); and
  - Coordination and cooperation with the competent authorities of the country concerned is expected to be ensured to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-2 (Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas); Reference 19 (Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas by the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 20 (Record of Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas)

## 8 Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and other Forces

Based on Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, SDF personnel is authorized to protect weapons and other equipment<sup>15</sup> of the units of the U.S. Forces and other forces<sup>16</sup> currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF. The basic principles of this Article, and the involvement of the Cabinet in applying this Article are set forth in the Implementation Guidelines,<sup>17</sup> which is outlined below:

### (1) Purpose of Article 95-2

Protection under this Article can be applied to weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces and foreign armed forces, and other such organizations currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF (including bilateral/multilateral exercises but excluding activities carried out in places when combat activities are currently occurring). This Article allows very passive and limited use of weapons to the minimum extent necessary to protect what can be evaluated as important material means which constitute the defense capability of Japan from infringements not amounting to an armed attack.

### (2) Activities that Contribute to the Defense of Japan

“Activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” are determined on a case-by-case basis and may include the following: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities including ballistic missile surveillance; (2) transportation and logistics activities in Important Influence Situations; and (3) bilateral/multilateral exercises to enhance capabilities required for defending Japan.

### (3) Decision on Protection Missions

When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the U.S. Forces, and other forces, the Minister makes a decision on his/her initiative whether the relevant activities fall under “activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” and whether protection is necessary, by considering the objective and details of the activities, capability of the unit, and surrounding circumstances as well as the impacts on the SDF’s regular duties.

### (4) Involvement of the Cabinet

Requests for protection from the U.S. Forces, and other forces should be deliberated by the NSC prior to the decision by the Minister of Defense in the following cases. However, in urgent cases, the Minister should promptly report to the NSC.

- First request from the U.S Forces and other forces.
- Request for protection in the territory of a third country.
- Other requests deemed particularly important.

In addition, in case it is recognized that an asset protection is necessary in Important Influence Situations, the Basic Plan which stipulates its necessity should be approved by the Cabinet upon the deliberation in the NSC.

**See** Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-4 (Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-1 (Australia); Reference 11 (Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law); Reference 22 (Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces (SDF Law Article 95-2))

<sup>14</sup> It includes the organization, if any, that administers the country concerned in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN.

<sup>15</sup> Weapons, ammunition, explosives, vessels, aircraft, vehicles, wired telecommunications equipment, wireless telecommunications equipment or liquid fuels.

<sup>16</sup> “Other forces” include armed forces of foreign countries and other similar organizations (organizations of foreign countries similar to armed forces such as coast guards are assumed).

<sup>17</sup> The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, approved by the National Security Council on December 22, 2016

## 4 Responses to Important Influence Situations

The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in **Important Influence Situations**<sup>18</sup> aims to strengthen cooperation with foreign countries to respond to Important Influence Situations by carrying out measures such as logistics support activities and thereby contributing to the peace and security of Japan in the event of such situations. The Law provides the coverage and response measures as follows:

### 1 Support Target

The armed forces and other services, responding to Important Influence Situations, which the SDF may support, are (1) U.S. Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, (2) armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the UN Charter and (3) other similar organizations.

#### KEY WORD

#### Important Influence Situations

“Important Influence Situations” refers to situations that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security including situations that could result in a direct armed attack on Japan if left unattended.

### 2 Response Measures to Important Influence Situations

The following measures can be taken to respond to Important Influence Situations:

#### a. Logistics support activities

Provision of goods and services (supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, and training services), conveniences, and other support measures to the armed forces and other organizations, responding to

Important Influence Situations.

While the provision of weapons is not allowed, “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft preparing for combat operations” are allowed.

#### b. Search and rescue activities

#### c. Ship inspection operations<sup>19</sup> (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law<sup>20</sup>)

#### d. Other measures necessary to respond to Important Influence Situations

It is possible to implement response measures in foreign territories, but only with the consent of the foreign country concerned.

### 3 Measures to Avoid Forming an Integrated Part of the Use of Force

The following measures are set forth in order to avoid integration with the use of force by other countries and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:

- Japan does not implement support activities in the areas where a combat is actually taking place. Regarding search and rescue operations, however, when a victim has already been found and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities as long as their safety is ensured.
- The commanding officers or others directing activities of the SDF units, order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat activities occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in its vicinity.
- The Minister of Defense designates the area for the activities, and promptly changes the area or order to suspend the activities if it is deemed difficult to carry out activities smoothly and safely in all or part of the area.

<sup>18</sup> Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Important Influence Situations.

<sup>19</sup> Operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others ) and to request, if necessary, a change in sea route, destination port, or destination, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade and other economic activities to which Japan is a party, conducted based on UN Security Council resolutions or with the consent of the flag state (the state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea).

<sup>20</sup> Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Important Influence Situations and Other Situations

## 4 Relationship between Important Influence Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations

While both Important Influence Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations are different legal concepts that are determined separately based on the requirements set forth in the respective laws, they share common

standards such as the likelihood of Japan being embroiled in a war or the extent of damage to Japanese nationals. Therefore, Survival-Threatening Situations may be conceptually subsumed under Important Influence Situations. Accordingly, depending on how a situation evolves, Important Influence Situations may also satisfy the requirements of Survival-Threatening Situations and be determined as such.

# 5 Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community

## 1 Response to Joint International Peace Response Situations

Under the International Peace Support Act,<sup>21</sup> in order to ensure peace and security of the international community, Japan can cooperate with or support the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in operations for international peace and security in **Joint International Peace Response Situations**. From the perspective of enabling seamless responses to any situation, the International Peace Support Act, enacted as a general law, enables Japan to conduct operations more expeditiously and effectively, making it possible to proactively contribute to international peace and security on Japan's own initiative.

### KEY WORD

#### Joint International Peace Response Situations

Situations that threaten peace and security of the international community and that the international community is collectively addressing in accordance with the objectives of the U.N. Charter to remove the threat, to which Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute.

### (1) Requirements

Either of the following UN resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security Council) are required for Japan to cooperate with or support the armed forces of other countries.

- (1) Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize the country of support recipient to respond to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community
- (2) Other than (1), resolutions that acknowledge the situations as a threat to or disruption of peace and call on United Nations (UN) member states to respond to the situations concerned

### (2) Response Measures

The following response measures can be implemented in Joint International Peace Response Situations.

#### a. Cooperation and Support Activities

Provision of supplies and services to the armed forces of other countries (supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services, and construction)

While the provision of weapons is not allowed, as in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Important Influence Situations, the law allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft preparing for combat operations.”

#### b. Search and Rescue Activities

#### c. Ship Inspection Operations (Those Set Forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law)

### (3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force

The following measures are set forth in order to avoid integration with the use of force by other countries and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:

- Japan does not implement support activities in the areas where a combat is actually taking place. Regarding search and rescue operations, however, when a victim has already been found and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities as long as their safety is ensured.
- The commanding officers or others directing activities of the SDF units, order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat activities occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in its vicinity.
- The Minister of Defense designates the area for the

<sup>21</sup> Law Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities for Armed Forces of Foreign Countries in Situations where the International Community is Collectively Addressing Peace and Security

activities, and promptly changes the area or order to suspend the activities if it is deemed difficult to carry out activities smoothly and safely in all or part of the area.

**See** Reference 12 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities)

## 2 International Peace Cooperation Assignments

The International Peace Cooperation Act<sup>22</sup> is aimed at active contribution by Japan to international peace efforts centered on the United Nations. The Act serves to set forth a framework for the implementation of International Peace Cooperation Assignments so that Japan can promptly make contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO)<sup>23</sup> and Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security.<sup>24</sup> The Act also sets forth procedures for taking measures to extend contributions in kind to these operations.

### (1) Requirements for Participation

#### a. UN PKO

The so-called Five Principles as follows for Participation in PKO constitute Japan's basic policy for participating in UN PKO.

- (i) Agreements on a ceasefire have been reached among the Parties to Armed Conflict
- (ii) Consent for the conduct of UN PKO as well as Japan's participation in such operations has been obtained from the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs as well as the Parties to Armed Conflict
- (iii) The operations shall be conducted without partiality to any of the Parties to Armed Conflict
- (iv) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned principles cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps dispatched by the Government of Japan may terminate International Peace Cooperation Assignments.
- (v) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect of the lives and bodies of personnel. When the consent for acceptance is

deemed to be consistently maintained, the use of weapons in defense of the mission mandate is allowed in accordance with specific requirements.

### b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security

Japan can participate in Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security whose nature or details are similar to those of UN PKO, when the Five Principles for participation are met and one of the following exists.

- (1) Resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the UN
- (2) Requests of any of the following international organizations:
  - The UN
  - Organs established by the UN General Assembly or Specialized Agencies of the United Nations including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and those specified by a Cabinet Order
  - Regional organizations prescribed in the Article 52 of the UN Charter or organs established by multilateral treaties including the European Union and those specified by a Cabinet Order, acknowledged to have the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities.
- (3) At the requests of the countries to which the activities belong (limited to only those cases that are supported by any of the principal organs of the UN prescribed in the Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter).

### (2) Description of Major Tasks

- Ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian relief operations for affected people
- Monitoring, stationing, patrols, inspections at checkpoints, and security escorts to ensure the security of specified areas, including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against the lives, bodies, and property of local residents, affected people, and other populations in need of protection (so-called "safety-ensuring" operations)
- Protection of the lives and bodies of parties engaged in international peace cooperation operations or providing support for such operations in response

<sup>22</sup> Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations

<sup>23</sup> "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations" refer to operations that are conducted under the governing framework of the United Nations to respond to conflicts and maintain international peace and security, which are implemented by the United Nations and two or more participating countries at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with the consent of the disputing parties.

<sup>24</sup> "Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security" refer to operations under a framework not overseen by the UN to respond to conflicts and maintain international peace and security, provided that such operations are implemented under the coordination of two or more participating countries and with the consent of the disputing parties.

to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to the lives and bodies of such individuals related to these operations occur or are imminent (so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations)

- Provision of advice or guidance for establishing or reestablishing organizations of the Government related to national Defense and other organizations
- Essential work for the organizations undertaking the supervision and coordination of the activities, including planning, coordination, and the collection and organizing of information at the Headquarters Office

### (3) Others

#### a. Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the UN (Dispatch of UN PKO Force Commanders)

Uniformed SDF personnel may be dispatched to be engaged in tasks of the UN duties performed by SDF units or units of other armed forces at the request of the UN and with the consent of the Prime Minister.<sup>25</sup>

#### b. Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Forces and other forces for their operations to cope with a large-scale disaster

The SDF can provide the U.S. Forces, the Australian Defence Force, or the Armed Forces of the U.K., France, Canada, India or Germany with supplies or services upon their request when they are located in a same area as the

units of the SDF to undertake operations to cope with large-scale disasters, to the extent it does not interfere with International Peace Cooperation Assignments and other activities of the SDF.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-2 (Initiatives to Support UN PKO and other activities); Reference 12 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 60 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments)

## 3 International Disaster Relief Activities

The Japan Disaster Relief Team Law<sup>26</sup> stipulates the measures necessary for dispatching the Japan Disaster Relief Team to undertake rescue activities and provide medical services in response to large-scale disasters overseas, especially in developing regions.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs may consult the Minister of Defense with regard to the operations of SDF units if there is a special need. The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to carry out rescue and medical activities as well as transportation of personnel and supplies and other activities based on the consultation above.<sup>27</sup>

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 (International Disaster Relief Activities); Reference 12 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 60 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments)

<sup>25</sup> The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consent for UN PKO from the hosting countries and the disputing parties, if any, are expected to be maintained stably throughout the period of dispatch and where circumstances are unlikely to cause the suspension of the dispatch.

<sup>26</sup> Law Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team

<sup>27</sup> The Japan Disaster Relief Team is not to be dispatched if the use of weapons is necessary in order to protect the lives and bodies of personnel and necessary equipment engaged in international disaster relief activities or related transportation when dangers exist due to the security situation and other factors in the affected country. Therefore, members of the team will not carry weapons within the country concerned for the purpose of protecting the lives and bodies of personnel and necessary equipment engaged in international disaster relief operations.

Part

# III

## Three Approaches to Achieve the Defense Objectives

Chapter 1

Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense

Chapter 2

Japan-U.S. Alliance

Chapter 3

Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries  
and Others

# Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense

## Chapter 1

### Section 1

## Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan's Defense Capabilities and Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country

### 1

#### Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan's Defense Capabilities

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan and the basis of Japan's national security, is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihoods as well as Japan's territorial land, airspace and waters.

When threats materialize through a combination of capability and intention, difficulties arise in accurately ascertaining another party's intention from an outside perspective. In addition, if a nation's decision-making process is opaque, there will always exist conditions under which threats may materialize. In order to defend one's own country from a nation with powerful military capabilities and the intention to launch aggression, it is necessary to have deterrence capabilities that make the other nation realize the difficulties of achieving unilateral changes to the status quo by force. It is also necessary to build one's own capabilities, namely, defense capabilities, by focusing on the other nation's capabilities and ensuring it does not harbor the intention to commit aggression.


In addition to traditional forms of invasion through air, sea and land conducted through now, new ways of warfare have emerged that combine large-scale missile attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities; hybrid warfare, including information warfare such as false flag operations<sup>1</sup>; the domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum as well as asymmetric means of attack that leverage unmanned assets; and rhetoric that could be interpreted as open threats involving the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states.

Amid the most challenging and complex security environment since the start of the postwar period,

Japan needs to directly face up to the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, with a focus on the capabilities of its opponents and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

Defense capabilities are the foundation of the defense of Japan and the ultimate guarantor of Japan's national security. They serve to deter threats to Japan and should a threat to Japan arise, to block and eliminate the threat, thereby demonstrating Japan's will and ability to defend itself to the end.

Based on this recognition, the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) presents three defense objectives and three approaches to achieve them, as shown in Fig. III-1-1.

 See Fig. III-1-1-1 (Three Defense Objectives and Three Approaches to Achieve Them (image)); Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Outline of the National Strategy)

In Part III, chapters are divided based on these three approaches and the initiatives of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) /Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are stated.

Chapter 1 is entitled "Strengthening Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense," with the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities stated in Section 2 and thereafter. The reinforcement of Japan's defense architecture as a whole will also be stated mainly in this section (next item).


Chapter 2, strengthening the ability of the "Japan-U.S. Alliance" to deter and counter threats, describes initiatives regarding the Japan-U.S. Alliance with the United States, which is the cornerstone of Japan's security policy.

Chapter 3, "Reinforcing Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others," explains initiatives

<sup>1</sup> An operation to create the appearance of receiving political or military attack for the purpose of denouncing the enemy or enhancing the legitimacy of one's own country



Fig. III-1-1-1 Three Defense Objectives and Three Approaches to Achieve Them (image)



to ensure the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community as a whole, including those to strategically promote multilateral and multilayered

security cooperation and those to ensure maritime security and for international peace cooperation activities, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

## 2 Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country

The SDF must be strong in order to protect Japan, but national defense cannot be achieved without a whole-of-country approach. For this reason, besides the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities, Japan will develop a defense architecture for the whole country by integrating its national power, which includes its diplomatic, intelligence, economic and technological capabilities and systematically combining various policy means. To strengthen such whole-of-government efforts, it is essential to break down the stove-piping approach within the Government.

As part of this initiative, the government of Japan is reinforcing its comprehensive defense architecture as a complement to and an inseparable part of the fundamental enhancement of its defense capabilities and is promoting initiatives in four areas: (1) research and development (R&D), (2) public infrastructure development, (3) cybersecurity and (4) international cooperation to enhance the deterrence capabilities of Japan and its like-minded countries and others, under the

framework of relevant government agencies.

**See** Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 “Commentary”(Security-related Expenses)

### 1 Research and Development

State-of-the-art science and technology is advancing at an ever-faster rate, making it extremely difficult to distinguish between technologies for civilian and security applications. Worldwide, technology has developed in a context of interaction between innovation in civilian applications and defense applications respectively. Accordingly, in Japan as well, it is crucial to leverage R&D achievements being actively pursued by both government and private sectors for defense purposes.

With this in mind, the decision has been made to promote R&D in science and technology that helps strengthen the comprehensive defense architecture by matching R&D needs based on MOD opinions with

technological seeds possessed by the relevant ministries and agencies under a cross-governmental mechanism. In December 2023, a matching project to be implemented in FY2024 was approved based on important technological challenges organized from among research for civilian use by relevant ministries and agencies, which will be promoted for the time being as those that will also help consolidate the comprehensive defense architecture.

For approved projects, the relevant ministries and agencies will communicate with the MOD on research findings and other matters while implementing these projects in their initiatives and through such communication, identify and nurture projects with considerable potential to be linked to the MOD's R&D efficiently.

**See** Fig. III-1-1-2 (Overview of Matching Projects to be Implemented in FY2024)

Fig. III-1-1-2 Overview of Matching Projects to be Implemented in FY2024	
Important technological challenge	Overview of matching projects
Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D on solar power transmission technology</li> <li>R&amp;D on high-performance energy storage technology</li> <li>R&amp;D on high-power laser technology etc.</li> </ul>
Sensing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D on high-precision technology for PNT</li> <li>R&amp;D on electromagnetic wave measurement technology for environment</li> <li>R&amp;D on ultra-high sensitivity sensing technology</li> <li>R&amp;D on technology for fusing information from multiple sensors etc.</li> </ul>
Computing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D on quantum computers</li> <li>R&amp;D using high-speed edge systems</li> <li>R&amp;D using photonics-electronics convergence technology etc.</li> </ul>
Information processing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D on prediction and extraction technology for big data</li> <li>R&amp;D on situational awareness support using AI</li> <li>R&amp;D on effective visualization technology for sensor data etc.</li> </ul>
Information communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D into high-speed, large-capacity, low-latency communication technology</li> <li>R&amp;D on high-speed optical communication devices</li> <li>R&amp;D into secure communication technology using quantum technology etc.</li> </ul>
Information security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D on the sophistication of cyber attack observation technology</li> <li>R&amp;D on cyberspace security technology</li> <li>R&amp;D of security technology using secret computation etc.</li> </ul>
Material	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D on materials using AI</li> <li>R&amp;D on self-repairing functional materials</li> <li>R&amp;D on advanced processing technology for heat-resistant materials etc.</li> </ul>
Unmanned, autonomous	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D on environmental recognition technology for drones</li> <li>R&amp;D on brain-machine interfaces</li> <li>R&amp;D on drone group control technology etc.</li> </ul>
Machinery (structure, design, propulsion, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D on safety and reliability in harsh environments</li> <li>R&amp;D on design and manufacturing processes using numerical analysis</li> <li>R&amp;D on next-generation flight technology etc.</li> </ul>


## 2 Public Infrastructure Development

To effectively implement our necessary response on account of the security environment, mainly in

the southwestern region and also in other regions, Government of Japan (GoJ) will establish frameworks with each facility administrator, so that Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and Japan Coast Guard (JCG) can use necessary airports and seaports smoothly in peacetime, and the airports and seaports where the framework is established are specified as "Specific Use Airport and Seaport".

At the "Specific Use Airport and Seaport", necessary development or promotion of existing projects will be carried out, which contributes to primarily civilian use and also smooth use by vessels and aircraft of JSDF and JCG.

**See** Fig. III-1-1-3 (Specific Use Airport and Seaport (as of 1 April 2024))




## 3 Cybersecurity

Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), the government of Japan as a whole intends to improve its cybersecurity response capabilities to a level equal or superior to those of leading Western countries. This includes introduction of active cyber defense in cases where there is a threat of a serious cyber attack that does not necessarily lead to an armed attack but raises national security concerns.

In FY2024, projects are being planned to implement policies to ensure cybersecurity of information systems of government agencies, etc. The cybersecurity budget will be increased to a certain extent and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) will be fundamentally strengthened by newly assigning several senior officials and reinforcing the chain of command. Further, regarding projects related to the engagement in active cyber defense, those that

Fig. III-1-1-4 Strengthening Security of Government Organizations



should be implemented will continue to be closely examined while taking the progress of discussions on relative legislation into account.

**See** Fig. III-1-1-4 (Strengthening Security of Government Organizations), Section 4-5 (Responses in the Cyber Domain)

#### 4 International Cooperation to Enhance the Deterrence Capabilities of Japan and Its Like-minded Countries and Others

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) has established a new grant assistance framework, the Official Security Assistance (OSA), in addition to Official Development Assistance (ODA), to help strengthen the security and deterrence capabilities of like-minded countries.

The government of Japan is proceeding with this framework, working closely alongside not only the MOFA, but also related ministries and agencies, including the MOD.

In FY2023, it was decided to equip the armed forces of four countries - the Philippines, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Fiji – as part of efforts to help improve their

monitoring and surveillance capabilities in the maritime security field.

**See** Fig.III-1-1-5 (OSA Results in FY2023)

Fig. III-1-1-5 OSA Results in FY2023

Nation	E/N <sup>(Note)</sup> signed/exchanged	Amount	Equipment	Recipient
Philippines	November 3, 2023	600M yen	Coastal surveillance radar	Navy
Bangladesh	November 15, 2023	575M yen	Patrol boat	Navy
Malaysia	December 16, 2023	400M yen	Rescue boat	National army
Fiji	December 18, 2023	400M yen	Patrol boat	Navy

(Note) E/N is a document exchanged between the Government of Japan and the Government of the recipient country.



E/N Signing and Exchange Ceremony in the Philippines (November 2023)  
 [Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]

## Section 2

# Shaping a Security Environment that does not Tolerate Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force

The primary object of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) is to shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force.

An important part of measures to prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force is diplomatic efforts backed by the strengthening of Japan's own defense architecture. Coupled with diplomatic efforts, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self Defense Forces (SDF) will promote cooperation with the ally and multilayered coordination with like-minded countries to create a

desirable security environment.

As a maritime nation, it is extremely important for Japan to reinforce the maritime order and ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight.

For this reason, Japan implements necessary measures for the safety of Japan-related vessels in order to ensure the stable use of its vital sea lanes.

**See** Chapter 2 (Japan-U.S. Alliance); Chapter 3 (Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Promoting Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation and Transfer of Defense Equipment)

## 1 Response to Illicit Ship-to-Ship Transfers

### 1 Basic Concept

Under the UN Security Council resolution No. 2375 adopted in September 2017, UN member states are prohibited from facilitating or engaging in the transfer of goods at sea to or from North Korean-flagged vessels (so-called "illicit ship-to-ship transfers"). This is intended to prevent North Korea from smuggling to evade sanctions imposed based on the UN Security Council resolution.

Toward the common goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Japan needs to work closely with the international community, including China and Russia, as well as the United States and South Korea, to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, including responses to "illicit ship-to-ship transfers".

### 2 Response by the MOD/SDF

The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) has the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) gather information on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council resolution as part of its regular monitoring and surveillance activities in the waters surrounding Japan and cooperates closely with relevant ministries and agencies, relevant countries and relevant international organizations.

During the period from 2018 onward to the end of March 2024, MSDF vessels and other assets have so far observed 24 cases of seaborne rendezvous between North Korean-flagged tankers and foreign-flagged tankers, etc. on the high seas of the East China Sea. The information was shared with relevant agencies and ministries each time.

As a result of comprehensive judgment across the Government, the vessels concerned are strongly suspected of having engaged in "illicit ship-to-ship transfers" with North Korean-flagged vessels, which is prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions. Japan reported this to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea, shared the information with relevant countries, gave information to the relevant countries regarding the tankers concerned and made public announcements on the subject.

In recent years, there has been growing international concern about these illicit maritime activities, including "illicit ship-to-ship transfers" with North Korean-flagged vessels. Since April 2018 as of the end of March 2024, not only the United States, but also Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, France and Germany have dispatched naval vessels and aircraft in the waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea, to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities. The MOD/SDF will continue their close cooperation with concerned countries to ensure compliance with the



**REFERENCE:** Japan's Initiatives to Ensure the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council Resolution

**URL:** [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_architecture/un-s-council/s-s-transfer/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/un-s-council/s-s-transfer/index.html)

UN Security Council resolution.

### 3 Related Event

According to the Australian government, in November 2023, there was an incident in which a Chinese destroyer

approached the Australian frigate Toowoomba, which had been conducting monitoring and surveillance activities against “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” with North Korea in the waters surrounding Japan. The Chinese destroyer activated its sonar, causing an Australian Navy diver to get injured.

## 2 Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels in the Middle East

### 1 Background of the Deployment of the SDF to the Middle East

Peace and stability in the Middle East are crucial to the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. In addition, for Japan as well, it is very important to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, one of the world’s major energy sources, on which Japan depends for about 90% of its crude oil imports.

In the Middle East, amidst rising tensions, there were incidents of attacks on ships. In June 2019, Japan-related vessels suffered damage. Under these circumstances, the United States, European countries and other countries are taking steps to ensure the safety of navigation in the region by utilizing ships and aircraft.

To ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East, the Japanese Government has actively promoted diplomatic initiatives. In addition, following deliberations within the Government, in December 2019, the Cabinet approved governmental efforts to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. In this context, Japan’s own initiatives to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels are as follows: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Middle East and stabilize the situation; (2) thorough implementation of navigation safety measures, including close information sharing with relevant industries; and (3) conduct information gathering activities via the use of SDF assets.

The areas of operation of these information gathering activities consists of the high seas of three areas of water: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the coastal states) is to utilize P-3C patrol aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE), as well as destroyers of the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE).

Information gathered by the MOD/SDF is shared

with the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other relevant ministries and agencies, as well as with relevant industries through public-private liaison meetings, to be used for the government’s navigation safety measures.

### 2 Activities by the MOD/SDF

#### (1) Information gathering activities by the MOD/SDF

The MOD/SDF’s information gathering activities are part of the government’s navigation safety measures and are aimed at collecting information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels.

The activities are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph (1), item (xviii) of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, as they would need smooth decision making and order issuance in relation to maritime security operations as measures for unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, which are provided in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

#### (2) Results of the SDF’s Activities

In January 2020, P-3C patrol aircraft of the counter-piracy unit began information-gathering activities, followed by a destroyer of the Deployment Surface Force for information-gathering activities in February 2020.

Based on the November 2023 Cabinet decision, one destroyer and one patrol aircraft are conducting both counter-piracy operations and information-gathering activities.

#### a. Surface Force (Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) has been concurrently served since February 2022.)

DSPE operates in the high seas of the Gulf of Oman and in the high seas of the northern Arabian Sea. The total number of confirmed vessels as of March 31, 2024, is 90,577.

#### b. Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement

DAPE operates in the high seas of the Gulf of Aden

and in the high seas of the western side of the northern Arabian Sea. The total number of confirmed vessels as of March 31, 2024, is 82,686.

### (3) Extension of the Activity Period



Crew members of DAPE engaged in information gathering activities

In the Middle East, high tensions persist and, based on the fact that each country is continuing its own activities, including the “International Maritime Security Construct” by the United States and other countries, since 2020, the Japanese Government has been extending the SDF’s activity period by about one year every year.

In light of the need to ensure the safety of navigation for Japan-related vessels, if it is deemed before the expiration of the period that activities by the SDF are no longer necessary, then, in addition to concluding these activities at that point and without waiting for the end of the activity period, the National Security Council will consider how to respond if there is a significant change in the situation.

**See** Fig. III-1-2-1 (Units Engaged in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East); Fig. III-1-2-2 (Information Gathering Activities by the SDF (Image)); Reference 13 (Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East)

## 3 Communication and Cooperation with Relevant Countries

### (1) United States

As a result of a comprehensive review of what measures Japan should take to ensure the safe navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, Japan has started to implement efforts as Japan’s independent initiative without participating in the International Maritime Security Construct led by the United States, considering the need for ensuring a stable supply of crude oil, relations with the United States and relations with Iran. At the same time, to ensure safe navigation in the Middle East region, the SDF has been cooperating closely with the United States in various ways. In the information gathering activities, the SDF will also appropriately cooperate with the United States as an ally, while observing the government’s policy of conducting navigation safety measures independently from any other country’s initiatives. For this reason, an MSDF officer has been dispatched to the U.S. Central Naval Command in Bahrain as a liaison officer to share information with the U.S. Forces.

In addition, in November 2023, when a ballistic missile was launched from the Houthi-controlled area of Yemen toward the Gulf of Aden at the time of the temporary hijacking of the Liberian-flagged tanker Central Park operated by a British company, the U.S. promptly shared information with Japan about the launch.

### (2) Coastal States in the Middle East

It is important to gain the understanding of the coastal states, including Iran, regarding the information gathering activities that Japan is undertaking as an independent initiative and Japan has been explaining these activities to them with transparency. In addition, the coastal states play an important role in ensuring safe navigation in the Middle East region. Japan has been reaching out to the coastal states to gain their understanding of Japan’s efforts.



**REFERENCE:** The Government’s efforts to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East

**URL:** [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_architecture/m\\_east/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/m_east/index.html)

Fig. III-1-2-1 Units Engaged in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East





Fig. III-1-2-2 Information Gathering Activities by the SDF (image)

- **Purpose:** Gather information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels as part of the government's navigation safety measures (Note1) When further action of the SDF is found to be necessary due to unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, maritime security actions will be ordered (vessels to be protected are Japan-related ones (Note)), and action will be taken depending on the circumstances).
- **Assets used:** 1 destroyer (equipped with 1 or 2 patrol helicopters) and 1 P-3C patrol aircraft (using vessels and aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement)  
⇒ It is possible to continuously gather information on navigation of vessels in the relevant waters, situation of the surrounding waters, and presence of any unusual events.
- **Areas for information gathering activities:** The three high seas of the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden on the eastern side of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones (EEZ))



(Note) In addition to Japanese vessels and foreign vessels with Japanese nationals onboard, it also refers to vessels that are important to the stable economic activities of Japanese citizens, including foreign vessels operated by a Japanese ship operator, and foreign vessels transporting Japanese cargo.

## Section 3

# Responding to Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts

The second objective of the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) is for Japan to deter, through cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that concern Japan's peace and security. In addition, in the event of such a situation, Japan will swiftly take action in response, using all possible methods to prevent an invasion of our country and bring the situation under control from an early stage.

To continue demonstrating Japan's will and capability to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to influence the actions of opponents, it is necessary for the nation to improve and reinforce training and exercises conducted as flexible deterrent

options (FDO)<sup>1</sup> and strategic communication (SC)<sup>2</sup> with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with its allies, like-minded countries and others.

Moreover, from peacetime, it is important to detect indications at an early stage of situations by implementing persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as analysis while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies and for the Government as a whole to conduct rapid decision-making depending on the situation with related organizations. Due to this, Japan is reinforcing its responses by the Government as a whole.

## 1 Persistent ISR surrounding Japan

### 1 Basic Concept

Japan comprises just over 14,000 islands, surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth-largest<sup>3</sup> territorial waters (including inland waters) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) worldwide. The SDF is engaged in intelligence collection and monitoring and surveillance during peacetime over Japan's territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

### 2 Response by the MOD/SDF

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) monitors ships navigating in the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea in peacetime, using patrol aircraft<sup>4</sup> and others. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at each location nationwide and early warning and control aircraft<sup>5</sup> amongst others, to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace. These activities of the MSDF and ASDF happen 24 hours a day. Monitoring and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted around the clock by MSDF guard posts, the Japan Ground Self-Defense



**REFERENCE:** Movement of foreign naval vessels in FY2023

**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/domestic/keikai2023.html>

- 1 Carefully-considered deterrent actions to influence the opponent's behavior.
- 2 The government of Japan makes day to day SC efforts as part of its initiatives to create a desirable security environment for Japan. The MOD makes public releases on the MOD/SDF activities and their objectives by selecting its delivering methods and messages that enable effective communication, and by collaborating with the ally and like-minded countries through various languages and media.
- 3 This is the eighth largest in the world if sea areas in overseas territories of various countries are considered as belonging to the countries concerned.
- 4 Aircraft purposed to patrol for gathering information to prevent surprise attacks by enemy forces, and for other purposes. MSDF possesses P-3C patrol aircraft and P-1 patrol aircraft as fixed-wing patrol aircraft and SH-60J patrol helicopters, SH-60K patrol helicopters and SH-60L patrol helicopters as rotary-wing patrol aircraft.
- 5 Aircraft with warning control systems and radar capable of monitoring omnidirectionally. Being excellent in speed performance and boasting long cruising time, the aircraft is able to fly to distant areas to engage in warning for a long time. Moreover, as it is also able to engage in warning at high altitude, it has outstanding flight performance and the monitoring and surveillance capability, such as a long line-of-sight distance. The ASDF has been operating E-767 aircraft based on civil aircraft B-767.



Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units and other assets.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, to respond to various situations surrounding Japan flexibly, monitoring and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of vessels, aircraft and so on as required.

The information obtained through such monitoring and surveillance activities is shared with the related ministries and agencies, including the Japan Coast Guard

(JCG), to strengthen coordination.

In addition, the JCG began operation of the MQ-9B (SeaGuardian) at the MSDF Hachinohe Air Base (Aomori Prefecture) in October 2022. In addition, the JCG plans to move their operation base to Kitakyushu Airport in FY2025 and beyond.

MSDF began trial operations using the SeaGuardian at the Hachinohe Air Base in May 2023 to verify



Third Global Hawk newly arrived at ASDF Misawa Air Base



The destroyer "Hyuga" conducting surveillance and information gathering against Chinese and Russian naval vessels

### Commentary

## Senkaku Islands, Inherent Part of the Territory of Japan

The Senkaku Islands (Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture) are clearly an inherent part of the territory of Japan, both historically and under international law. Japan actually has effective control of the islands. Therefore, there is no territorial issue to be resolved in the first place.

After carefully confirming that there were no signs of any other country's control in 1895, the Japanese government decided to put the Senkaku Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture by legitimate means under international law at a Cabinet meeting and officially incorporated the islands into the territory of Japan. China began to make its own claims regarding the Senkaku Islands in the 1970s, after a UN agency pointed out possible oil reserves in the East China Sea in 1968. It had not raised any objections until this point. Nor had it given any explanation for not raised any objections.

However, since Chinese government vessels intruded into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time in 2008, such vessels and others have repeatedly intruded into our territorial waters despite our strong protests, which is utterly unacceptable. The activities of Chinese maritime patrol vessels, which are asserting their own claims in our territorial waters around the

Senkaku Islands, are a violation of international law in the first place.

Japan strongly urges China to improve its actions in response to such unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force. The MOD and the SDF will continue to deal with this situation calmly and resolutely, taking all possible measures to monitor the situation in close cooperation with the relevant ministries and agencies, in order to protect the lives and property of the people and the territory, territorial waters, and airspace of Japan.



The Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan [Website of the Cabinet Secretariat]

<sup>6</sup> Article 4(1)18 of the Act for Establishment of the MOD (Investigation and research required for the performance of duties within jurisdiction) provides the legal basis for monitoring and surveillance activities by the SDF.

whether unmanned aerial vehicles can in future serve as replacements for some of its missions, such as monitoring and surveillance currently conducted by piloted aircraft. With this background, MSDF will further promote the study, such as planning to verify its takeoff and landing at the MSDF's Kanoya Air Base (Kagoshima Prefecture) after April 2024, for full-scale introduction of unmanned aerial vehicle in the future. The MSDF and JCG have been sharing information acquired by unmanned aerial vehicles as required and will continue to promote measures to further strengthen cooperation.

Besides, in December 2022, in order to reinforce such capabilities as constant surveillance, etc., ASDF newly organized the Reconnaissance Group which operates RQ-4B (Global Hawk) aircraft in ASDF Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture). In June 2023, the third Global Hawk arrived, completing the initial planned structure.

In recent years around Japan, Chinese military vessels have become increasingly active in the waters around the Senkaku Island, and China Coast Guard vessels have

repeatedly intruded into Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. In addition, Chinese military vessels navigate in the Japan's territorial and contiguous waters. Additionally, the aircraft carriers of the PLA have also continued their activities and in April 2023, three ships, including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" were confirmed as navigating in the waters around Hateruma Island (Okinawa Prefecture). This was the first time that the "Shandong" was confirmed navigating in the Pacific Ocean.

Furthermore, it was confirmed that after implementing various exercises in the Sea of Japan in July 2023, Chinese and Russian military vessels had jointly navigated in the waters near Japan, such as passing through the Soya Strait and the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island (Okinawa Prefecture) from late July to August.

The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will continue to take all measures, including monitoring and surveillance, with a strong sense of urgency to staunchly protect Japan's territorial land,

Fig. III-1-3-1 Monitoring and Surveillance of the Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan (Conceptual Image)



waters and airspace.

**See** Fig. III-1-3-1 (Monitoring and Surveillance of the Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan (Conceptual Image))

### 3 Whole-of-Government Responses

#### (1) General Situation

To never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force, it is important for the related organizations to cooperate to take action based on decision-making by the Government as a whole during peacetime. For this reason, the Government as a whole will conduct simulations and integrated training and exercises to improve the effectiveness of responses, while establishing coordination procedures on a regular basis. In addition, with regard to the protection of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants and response to infringements that do not lead to external armed attacks or armed attack situations in areas surrounding remote islands, Japan will conduct training and exercises between the police, JCG and the MOD/SDF on a regular basis with contingencies in mind.

#### (2) Reinforcing Coordination with the Japan Coast Guard

Maintaining maritime security is primarily the mission of


the JCG, but in cases that cannot be handled by the JCG, the SDF will also respond through maritime security operations and public security operations in coordination with the JCG. In the event of an armed attack by other countries, the SDF will respond through defense operations, which are its main duty. As the situation in the waters surrounding Japan intensifies, it is becoming even more critical to reinforce coordination between the SDF and JCG to respond seamlessly to any circumstances.

The MSDF and JCG conduct joint training on a



Coast guard patrol vessel "Okushiri" (foreground) and Japan Coast Guard missile boat "Kumataka" conducting joint training with the Japan Coast Guard

**Fig. III-1-3-2** Guidelines for the Minister of Defense's Control of the Japan Coast Guard under a Defense Operation Order in Armed Attack Situations)



regular basis to improve their skills and enhance their joint response capabilities. In addition, reinforcing coordination, including in response to gray zone and armed attack situations, is also crucial in building a structure that can respond to all types of situations.

Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law states that when the Prime Minister orders defense operations or public security operations by order, the Prime Minister “when there is a special need to bring all or part of the JCG under the control of the Minister of Defense.” In response to the establishment in April 2023 of “control guidelines” regarding coordination between the two organizations in the event that an order is issued for defense operations, including specific procedures for control of the JCG by the Minister of Defense, the MOD/

SDF continues to strengthen cooperation between the JCG through joint training.

In May 2023, a tabletop exercise assuming armed attack situations were conducted for the first time in the Ichigaya area of the MOD and other locations to confirm information communication procedures in both organizations. Based on this tabletop exercise, in June, a practical exercise was conducted in the sea and airspace east of Izu Oshima to confirm the communication of information and on-site response by both organizations.

**See** Fig. III-1-3-2 (Guidelines for the Minister of Defense’s Control of the Japan Coast Guard under a Defense Operation Order in Armed Attack Situations); Part 1, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 (2) (Military Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace); Reference 14 (Number of Days and Total Incursions into the Territorial Waters Around the Senkaku Islands by Ships Belonging to the China Coast Guard Bureau, etc)

## 2 Measures against Violations of Japan’s Sovereignty

### 1 Warnings and Scrambles in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

#### (1) Basic Concept

Under international law, countries have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. Measures against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace are conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or at sea, these measures can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting the actions based on the

provisions of Article 84 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

#### (2) Responses by the MOD/SDF

The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. Furthermore, in the event that this suspicious aircraft has actually intruded into territorial airspace, a warning to leave the airspace would be issued,

Fig. III-1-3-3 Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War




Fig. III-1-3-4

Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded (FY2023)





Fig. III-1-3-5

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions (image)



among other responses.

In FY2023, ASDF aircraft scrambled 669 times (479 times in response to Chinese aircraft, 174 times in response to Russian aircraft and 16 other times).

Flight patterns of Chinese military aircraft in recent years have changed and now their range of activities are extending to not only the East China Sea, but also the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan.

In addition, joint flights by Chinese and Russian bombers have been conducted around Japan a total of seven times since the joint flight in July 2019. In June 2023, joint flights were conducted over a two-day period for the first time, and flights involving a total of 20 fighter

jets were also confirmed, showing the diversification of their activities. In this way, Chinese and Russian aircraft continue to be active in the vicinity of Japan.

The MOD/SDF will take all possible measures against intrusions into Japan’s territorial airspace while continuing to closely monitor the increasingly active movements of the Chinese and Russian militaries in future.

**See**

Fig. III-1-3-3 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War); Fig. III-1-3-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded (FY2023)); Fig. III-1-3-5 (Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions (Image)); Part I, Chapter 3, Section 2-2-6 (2) (Military Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace); Part I, Chapter 3, Section 5-5 (Relations with China); Part II Chapter 5, Section 3-6 (Measures against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace)



Personnel engaged in scramble (missions)

## 2 Response to Submarines Navigating Underwater in Japan’s Territorial Waters

### (1) Basic Concept

With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters,<sup>7</sup> an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japan’s territorial waters.

<sup>7</sup> The term “territorial waters” also includes inland waters.

## (2) Response by the MOD/SDF

The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan.

In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands (Okinawa Prefecture). In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations and continued to track the submarine with MSDF vessels until it entered the high seas. In addition, in January 2018, underwater navigation by a Chinese submarine was confirmed for the first time through Japan's contiguous zone in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands (Okinawa Prefecture).

Furthermore, on September 2021, a submarine presumed to be Chinese was confirmed to be navigating underwater through the Japanese contiguous zone in the vicinity of Amami Oshima Island (Kagoshima Prefecture) and monitoring and surveillance operations were carried out by MSDF destroyers and patrol aircraft. Although this submarine did not intrude into territorial waters, such submarine activity should be closely monitored by Japan. Under international law, a foreign submarine must display its flag while navigating in the territorial waters of a coastal state. The SDF will maintain a vigilant monitoring and surveillance posture to ensure that activities in violation of international law are not permitted.



MSDF vessels and Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels conducting training for dealing with suspicious vessels

## 3 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

### (1) Basic Concept

The JCG, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the JCG to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the JCG.

### (2) Responses by the MOD/SDF

In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula (Ishikawa Prefecture) in 1999, an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001 and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF have been making various efforts. In particular, the MSDF has been taking steps such as establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit<sup>8</sup> and equipment of destroyers with machine guns. In addition, based on “the manual for jointly dealing with suspicious vessels” formulated by the then Defense Agency and the JCG in 1999, the MSDF has regularly conducted joint training with the JCG to strengthen coordination.



**MOVIE:** UNIT-1 Aircraft warning and control

**URL:** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DKd7UEU73rM>



**REFERENCE:** Aircraft scrambles in FY2023

**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/domestic/Scramble2023.html>



<sup>8</sup> Special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of boarding inspections of the suspicious vessels under maritime security operations.

## Section 4

## Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks

The third defense objective of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) is, should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, to rapidly respond to the invasion in a tailored and seamless manner; to take primary responsibility to deal with the aggression; and, while receiving support from our ally and others, to disrupt and defeat the invasion.

In response to an invasion of Japan, including our remote islands, Japan would block and eliminate the invading forces from a long distance. Japan will also acquire superiority across domains and conduct cross-domain operations that organically integrate capabilities in the domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum as well as in the ground, maritime and air domains to secure asymmetrical superiority and block and eliminate the invading forces. Japan would also continue persistent actions to crush the opponent's will to invade.

Moreover, in response to an invasion of Japan,

including missile attacks, Japan will intercept missiles on the high seas and over our territory through missile defense. In addition, as a measure for self-defense to the minimum required level to prevent attacks in cases where no other means are clearly available, Japan will utilize capabilities including stand-off defense capabilities to enable conducting effective counterstrikes in the opponent's territory and together with missile defense, deter missile attacks.

Furthermore, in the event of a large-scale terrorist attack or an attack on critical infrastructure that poses a serious threat to the lives, health and property of Japanese citizens, Japan will cooperate with related organizations to take effective countermeasures. Moreover, if there were to be a predicted invasion of Japan, Japan will make sure that it is possible to smoothly implement measures for civil protection, including the issuance of evacuation guidance for residents.

## 1

## Responses to Invasion of Japan, Including Its Remote Islands

## 1 Basic Concept

Japan possesses numerous remote islands spanning a broad national territory which extends approximately 3,000 kilometers along both the north-south and east-west axes, across which the Government must protect the lives, health and property of its citizens, as well as its territory, territorial waters, airspace and various resources that are widely dispersed.

To precisely respond to invasions of Japan, which has such geographic characteristics, it is necessary to station units and so forth in accordance with the security environment and also to maintain a readiness to detect signs at an early stage through persistent intelligence gathering and surveillance, etc. by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Moreover, it is important to ensure maritime superiority<sup>1</sup> and air superiority<sup>2</sup> as well as swiftly maneuver and deploy them according to situations.

If our deterrence were to fail and an invasion of Japan occurred, to eliminate any violation of our territory,

Japan would organically integrate our capabilities in the domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum as well as the ground, maritime and air domains and overcome any inferiority in individual domains through cross-domain operations that amplify our overall capabilities through synergy effects. Japan would also conduct flexible and sustained activities through joint operations, continue swift and persistent actions, secure our territory and crush the opponent's will to invade.

 See Fig. III-1-4-1 (Future Cross-domain Operations (image))

## 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

## (1) Strengthening of Stand-off Defense Capabilities

Some foreign countries have significantly improved their radar detection coverage as well as the range and performance of various missile. This means that the range of these threats would be over several hundred kilometers around an invading force.

To protect and defend the territory of Japan, it is necessary to improve the level of deterrence against

1 Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force.

2 Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a significant level of obstruction by the opposing force.

armed attacks on our country by fundamentally strengthening our **stand-off defense capabilities**, such as anti-aircraft missiles and deal with naval vessels and landing forces invading our country, including islands, from outside the threat zone.

Therefore, no matter which region of Japan an invasion might begin in, firstly the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will equip itself with the necessary and sufficient capabilities to block and eliminate the opponent's vessels, landing forces

and the like from various locations in our country in a multilayered manner. Also, the MOD/SDF will, while diversifying launch platforms like enabling them to launch missiles from ground-based launchers, aircraft and naval vessels, respond to the situation by combining stand-off missiles with various different characteristics, forcing the opponent to make a complex response. In addition, the MOD/SDF will, while acquiring necessary and sufficient quantities of foreign-made stand-off missiles at an early stage, encourage the expansion of the

Fig. III-1-4-1 Future Cross-Domain Operations (image)





**KEY WORD**

**Stand-off Defense Capabilities**

The capabilities to deal with naval vessels and landing forces that invade our country, including islands, from outside the threat zone. To conduct anti-ship and anti-ground attacks from outside the threat zone, these capabilities include guided missiles with a longer range and high survivability, capable of avoiding interception and effectively disrupting an attack on Japan while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel.

domestic manufacturing system of made-in-Japan stand-off missiles to acquire necessary and sufficient quantities as soon as possible. Further, the MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to secure a series of functions necessary to operate stand-off missiles, including the collection of targeting information and command and control. After building a practical operational capability for stand-off missiles, the MOD/SDF will accelerate research, development and mass production initiatives and swiftly acquire the capability to operate more advanced stand-off missiles.


Specifically, in FY2023, the MOD/SDF began the mass production of Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surface-launched variant) for early deployment to troops. The initial plan was to deploy them in FY2026, but this has been accelerated by one year and the deployment is to begin in FY2025. Further, to ensure survivability, the



Upgraded Type-12 SSM that withstood various tests on the ground (Prototype)  
 [Courtesy of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.]

development of Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surface-, ship- and air-launched variants) is continuing so that they can be launched from various platforms (ground, naval ship and aircraft). With their delivery expected to begin in FY2026, the mass production of hyper velocity gliding projectiles for the defense of remote islands began in FY2023 and the research project continues. In addition, the development of Upgraded hyper-velocity gliding projectiles for the defense of remote islands, which began in FY2023, continues. Further, research into hypersonic missiles<sup>3</sup> has been conducted since FY2023. From FY2024, their manufacturing system has been expanded to acquire mass production and others from an early stage and in an effort to extend the range of various guided

Fig. III-1-4-2 Future Operation of Stand-off Defense Capabilities (image)



3 Speed range of 5 times faster than the speed of sound.



LOA signing ceremony to advance Tomahawk acquisition (January 2024)

missiles. Besides, while utilizing the ground equipment of Upgraded Type-12 SSM, the MOD/SDF will begin to develop new stand-off missiles with improved anti-ship and anti-surface capabilities, such as long-range flying performance, precision guidance performance, etc.

As well as acquiring mass-produced ammunition for these domestically produced stand-off missiles, the introduction of foreign-made stand-off missiles will be implemented and continued.

In this case, given a certain amount of time required to maintain the necessary quantity of domestically produced stand-off missiles, the U.S.-made Tomahawk, which is already in mass production, are to be acquired as soon as possible. The initial plan was to acquire up to 400 Tomahawks from Block V<sup>4</sup> in FY2026 and FY2027, but given the more severe security environment, negotiations were held with the U.S. side to accelerate the acquisition. As a result, some Block V will be changed to Block IV,<sup>5</sup> which will be acquired from FY2025, one year earlier than originally planned and by adding Tomahawk launch capabilities to naval vessels and promoting personnel training, sufficient capabilities will be swiftly secured before establishing a system to boost the production of domestically produced stand-off missiles.

In terms of command and control, the MOD/SDF plans to promote the development of functions, such as those necessary to smoothly implement centralized command activities, with stand-off missile operations as the core.

**See** Fig. III-1-4-2 Future Operation of Stand-off Defense Capabilities (image)

## (2) Strengthening of Unmanned Defense Capabilities

Compared to manned equipment, unmanned assets have major advantages, such as minimizing casualties and allowing for long-term continuous operation. Furthermore, combining these unmanned assets with artificial intelligence (AI) and manned equipment can be a game-changer that fundamentally transforms force structure and ways of warfare, enabling Japan to gain asymmetrical superiority in the air, sea and underwater domains.

For this reason, these unmanned assets will be effectively utilized not only for information gathering and monitoring and surveillance, but also for a wide range of missions including combat support.

The acquisition of RQ-4B (Global Hawk) began in FY2015 to enhance the constant surveillance capability over a wide area and the third RQ-4B arrived at ASDF Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture) in June 2023, completing the initially planned system. In addition, since May 2023, a MQ-9B (Sea Guardian) has been on trial operation at the Hachinohe Air Base (Aomori Prefecture) of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and from April 2024, its takeoffs and landings are to be verified at the Kanoya Air Base (Kagoshima Prefecture) of the MSDF.

Other demonstrations are underway for transport Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and reconnaissance UAV (for mid-range) (upgrading) with upgraded capabilities. In February 2024, transport UAV were used to demonstrate the transportation of supplies to the ship.

In the FY2024 budget, the MOD/SDF will acquire upgraded UAV (for mid-range)<sup>6</sup> to enhance intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT) capabilities as well as obtaining USV with proven operational records in various countries as test equipment to quickly acquire knowledge of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) operations and promote the development of domestically produced USV. The MOD/SDF will also conduct research into multi-purpose combat-support USV with low observability that selectively carry functions such as monitoring and surveillance and anti-ship missile launch to support manned naval vessels. In addition, the MOD/SDF will begin to develop unmanned amphibious vehicles, as unmanned assets capable of landing on any shore of islands, transporting supplies

<sup>4</sup> The latest-model Tomahawk

<sup>5</sup> Block IV has the same warhead, guidance system and range as Block V, but Block V uses a newer communication system.

<sup>6</sup> It is possible to capture clear images of targets even at night or in poor visibility due to bad weather conditions.

and performing other missions from the sea to ground units.

Japan is also co-developing the next-generation fighter aircraft with the United Kingdom and Italy, aiming to complete its development by 2035 and also planning to begin developing UAV that will collaborate with this next-generation fighter aircraft and support it autonomously. In December 2023, Japan and the United States agreed to conduct joint research into AI technology, which is expected to be applied to this UAV. Japan will cooperate with the United States and other countries concerned to enhance its unmanned asset defense capabilities.

**(3) Strengthening of Mobile Deployment Capabilities**

Given the geographical characteristics of Japan, which stretches 3,000 km from east to west, north to south and includes numerous islands, for responding to an invasion of Japan, Japan needs to build the capacity to ensure that its routinely deployed units remain operational at all times and that the necessary units (personnel, equipment, supplies, etc.) are swiftly maneuvered and deployed according to the situation and needs to establish the infrastructure to make this possible, to secure maritime


and air superiority and disrupt the access and landing of units invading Japan.

To this end, Japan will reinforce the SDF’s maritime and air transportation capabilities by acquiring various transportation assets such as transport vessels, transport aircraft, transport helicopters, etc. and also maximize its use of civilian transportation capabilities, including Private Finance Initiatives (PFI).

Specifically, the SDF Maritime Transport Group (tentative name) will be newly formed as a joint unit to improve the capability of mobile deployment to the southwest region. Moreover, the acquisition of transport assets like transport ships and helicopters, etc. to be used for rapid transport of troops and supplies to the islands in the southwestern region and elsewhere will be promoted. Furthermore, PFI vessels will continue to be secured to avoid creating a vacuum in the transportation system utilizing civilian vessels and the integrated transportation system will be strengthened by using civilian vessels.

In addition, to ensure smoother and more effective transport and supplies for units by the aforementioned capabilities, Japan will strengthen its integrated logistics posture, take necessary measures to use existing airports, seaport facilities and the like as operational infrastructure

Fig. III-1-4-3 Establishment Status of Major Units in Kyushu/Southwestern Region (since 2016) (conceptual diagram)





Mobile boat to be deployed in the SDF Maritime Transport Group (tentative name) (image)

and improve supply capabilities. Japan will also actively promote the improvement of supply bases located throughout the country.

 Section1-2-2 (Public Infrastructure Development)

#### (4) Strengthening Defense Architecture in Southwestern Region

To strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region, the MOD/SDF has conducted new establishment of units in the Kyushu/southwestern region. In March 2023, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) established a new camp on Ishigakijima Island, where an area security unit, surface-to-air guided missile unit and surface-to-ship guided missile unit are stationed. In March 2024, the MOD/SDF newly formed the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade's 3rd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment at the GSDF Camp Takematsu (Nagasaki Prefecture) and the 7th Land-to-Ship Missile Deployment Regiment at Camp Katsuren (Okinawa Prefecture) and deployed electronic

warfare units at GSDF Camp Yonaguni (Okinawa Prefecture). In addition, the 15th Brigade (Okinawa Prefecture) is planned to be reorganized into a division in the future.

With regard to the operation of the GSDF V-22 (Ospreys), the MOD/SDF has determined that Saga Airport is the best airfield for deployment and the governor of Saga Prefecture expressed acceptance of this arrangement. In May 2023, the MOD/SDF signed a real estate purchase contract with the Saga Prefecture fishery cooperative federation and acquired the planned camp location.<sup>7</sup>

The MOD/SDF began construction of the GSDF Camp Saga (tentative name) in June 2023 and will continue to work on the early deployment of the GSDF Ospreys to a site adjacent to Saga Airport in an effort to strengthen capabilities for the defense of remote islands, which is an urgent issue, thereby establishing a structure that enables integrated operation with the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade located in Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and others.

On the other hand, the MOD/SDF has newly created an airlift wing equipped with V-22 Ospreys at Camp Kisarazu (Chiba Prefecture) in 2020 or later with consideration of the time needed to deploy the aircraft to Saga Airport and has begun provisional deployment of V-22 Ospreys.

 Fig. III-1-4-3 (Establishment Status of Major Units in Kyushu/Southwestern Region (since 2016) (conceptual diagram))

<sup>7</sup> At Saga Airport, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 V-22 Ospreys and approximately 50 helicopters transferred from GSDF Camp Metabaru (Saga Prefecture), are expected to be deployed.

## Commentary

## Reinforcing the Defense Architecture in the Southwestern Region

The southwestern region is a vast area with a total length of approximately 1,200 km, and although necessary readiness, including surveillance and reconnaissance, has been maintained all of the time, none of the GSDF units had been deployed in that region until GSDF Camp Yonaguni (Okinawa Prefecture) was established in March 2016. In order to fulfill a void in terms of SDF deployment in the southwestern region, GSDF camps were established in Miyakojima Island (Okinawa Prefecture) and Amami Oshima Island



State Minister of Defense Oniki presenting the corps flag at the 7th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Katsuren Branch) Organization Event (March 2024)

(Kagoshima Prefecture) in March 2019, and GSDF Camp Ishigaki Island was established in Ishigakijima Island (Okinawa Prefecture) in March 2023. A new surface-to-ship missile unit was deployed in Katsuren Branch (Okinawa Prefecture) in March 2024, and the 15th Brigade in Okinawa Prefecture is scheduled to be reorganized into a division to reinforce the defense architecture in the southwestern region based on the Defense Buildup Program, which will visibly strengthen the defense architecture of the south western islands.



Members of the 7th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment giving a salute at the Organization Event (March 2024)

## 2 Responses to Missile Attacks

### 1 Japan's Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

#### (1) Basic Concept

As Japan is surrounded on all sides by water, responding to airborne threats is extremely important. In recent years, airborne threats to Japan have been becoming increasingly diverse, complex and enhanced, including capability enhancements of ballistic missiles equipped with multiple<sup>8</sup>/maneuverable warheads,<sup>9</sup> higher-speed and longer-range cruise missiles and stealth and multi-role<sup>10</sup> manned and unmanned aircraft, as well as the emergence of anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs).

Therefore, Japan will fundamentally enhance its detection, tracking and interception capabilities, as well as strengthen integrated air and missile defense

capabilities by establishing a system capable of centrally and optimally operating various sensors and shooters through a network.

In response to a missile attack on Japan by an opponent, Japan would first intercept the missile flying towards Japan over the high seas and in its territorial airspace by means of its missile defense system. Also, as a minimum necessary self-defense measure that cannot be avoided to prevent an attack by ballistic missiles and the like in cases where it is recognized that no other means are available, Japan would utilize its stand-off defense capabilities and other capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent's territory.

By equipping itself with such effective counterstrike capabilities, Japan will constrain missile launches by opponents and facilitate interceptions by its missile defense, thereby deterring the launch of missile attacks

<sup>8</sup> One ballistic missile with multiple warheads

<sup>9</sup> A warhead that can maneuver autonomously via wings, rudder, or rocket propulsion to avoid interception or increase hit probability during reentry into the atmosphere

<sup>10</sup> To enable the execution of multiple missions such as air control combat, various attacks, reconnaissance, etc. by changing equipment

themselves when coupled with its missile defense.

**See** Fig. III-1-4-4 (Intercepting Part of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) (image)); Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Commentary: Counterstrike Capabilities)

## (2) Responses by the MOD/SDF

Cases involving ballistic missiles launched against Japan as an armed attack will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, if such a situation is not yet acknowledged as an armed attack, Japan will take destructive measures against ballistic missiles, etc.

Currently, Japan's ballistic missile defense (BMD) is basically an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by PAC (Patriot Advanced


Capability)-3,<sup>11</sup> both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).<sup>12</sup>

As a response against ballistic missiles, the Joint Task Force-BMD will be formed with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander and effective defenses will be taken under a unified command through JADGE.

North Korea has forcefully conducted three nuclear tests since 2016. Especially since the beginning of 2022, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and other missiles with unprecedented high frequency and in new ways.

In 2023, as well as continuing to launch ballistic and other missiles, North Korea launched a total of three

Fig. III-1-4-4 Intercepting Part of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) (image)



(Note) GPI: Glide Phase Interceptor



11 One of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft and other targets, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.

12 A core system for command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes information regarding aircraft captured by radar equipment installed nationwide and provides fighter aircraft with instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls PAC-3, radar, etc., in responses to ballistic missiles.

satellite launches in May, August and November. It was also confirmed that the object launched in November was now orbiting the Earth. In response, the MOD/SDF issued a shoot-down order for ballistic missiles, etc.,<sup>13</sup> deployed PAC-3 units in Okinawa Prefecture and took other necessary measures to prepare for any contingency. In addition, the MOD promptly shared information about the launches with the government of Japan and related agencies and has taken other measures including collecting and analyzing related information.

The MOD/SDF continues to carefully monitor the concrete actions of North Korea toward the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and missiles and conducts the necessary collection and analyses of information, monitoring and surveillance activities and other necessary activities while closely cooperating with the United States and other countries.

Further cooperation with the U.S. Government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting).

Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW)<sup>14</sup> from the U.S. Forces and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces.

### (3) Initiatives to Reinforce Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

Japan began developing the BMD system in 2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks and other attacks and necessary amendments were subsequently made to the Self-Defense Forces Law in July 2005. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying PAC-3.

To deal with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missile attacks, Japan and the United States have jointly developed advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA),<sup>15</sup> the successor to Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers and acquired them since FY2017.

In addition, the interception capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA have been enhanced against ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched with an intention to avoid being intercepted by taking a higher than normal trajectory (lofted trajectory).<sup>16</sup> In November 2022, the MSDF conducted its first SM-3 Block IIA launch test and the Aegis destroyer Maya successfully intercepted the target.

Furthermore, the Cabinet approved the development of two Aegis system-equipped vessels instead of the land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore) in December 2020, to respond more flexibly and effectively to the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. These vessels are to be maintained by the MSDF, which will have capabilities equivalent to or above those of the most advanced Aegis-equipped destroyers, such as SM-3 Block IIA for ballistic missiles and SM-6 for HGVs, etc. and have improved seaworthiness and habitability while reducing manpower. The construction of these vessels is to begin in FY 2024.

With regard to PAC-3, the MOD has been working for procurement of the enhanced capability type, PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) and started its deployment at the end of FY2019. Introduction of PAC-3 MSE will realize the extension of interception altitude from less than 20 km to tens of km, meaning that the coverage of protection (area) will expand more than twice compared to the conventional PAC-3.

On the other hand, to use optimum means to effectively and efficiently counter airborne threats, which are growing increasingly diverse, complex and enhanced including the emergence of HGV and minimize damage, it is necessary to establish a structure to conduct integrated operation of various equipment for missile defense and air defense equipment that each SDF

<sup>13</sup> In May 2023, the Minister of Defense issued an Operation Order for the Self-Defense Forces concerning implementation for destructive measures against ballistic missiles, etc.

<sup>14</sup> Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time just after the launch (the SDF started to receive the information in April 1996).

<sup>15</sup> In comparison with SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IIA have not only extended interceptable altitude and coverage of protection, but also enhanced defeating capability and simultaneous engagement capability.

<sup>16</sup> By taking a higher trajectory than minimum energy trajectories (trajectories that enable efficient flying of a missile and maximize its range), it takes a shorter range than the maximum range, but the falling speed of the missile becomes faster.

Fig. III-1-4-5 Capabilities of Aegis System-Equipped Vessels

### Capabilities of Aegis System-equipped vessels

**SPY-7 Radar**

- Deals with lofted trajectories and multiple simultaneous ballistic missiles with five times the tracking capability of SPY-1

**SM-3 Block II A**

- Equipped with interceptor missiles with high interception capabilities against ballistic missiles.

**CEC**

- Cooperative engagement capability (CEC) allows a fleet of ships to fire and guide anti-aircraft targets tracked by the fleet

**SM-6**

- Deals with hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) at the terminal stage in addition to cruise missiles etc

**VLS**

- Increased to 128 cells by improving various response capabilities (96 cells in Maya class)
- Provided with scalability to future HGV (glide phase) corresponding equipment

★ Possesses capabilities equal to or greater than those of the most advanced Aegis-equipped destroyers

**Equipment planned to be installed after 2032 (scalable)**

- Upgraded Type-12 SSM In anti-surface warfare, deals with opponent ships from outside their threat range
- Tomahawk Deals with ground forces from outside the opponent's threat range for island defense, etc.
- High-power lasers, etc. Deals with drone saturation attacks

(Note) Details may be subject to change

service has separately used, thereby providing nationwide protection and also enhancing integrated air and missile defense capabilities that can simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats.

In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strive to standardize and streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses, including their maintenance and supply systems and, to enhance the detection and tracking capabilities of HGVs and the like, the ground-based air surveillance, warning and control radar (FPS) and the like will be procured and given enhanced capabilities and will be replaced and upgraded with the next-generation warning and control radar. In addition,

the Patriot surface-to-air guided missile system will be upgraded and a new radar (Lower Tier Air Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS))<sup>17</sup> will be introduced to improve the PAC-3MSE's capability to respond to HGVs and the like.

Moreover, the MOD/SDF will develop the Upgraded Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (modified) to continue to improve capabilities to enable the response to HGVs and ballistic missiles.

In addition, various types of interceptor ammunition such as SM-3 Block IIA, SM-6, PAC-3 and Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air missile (modified) will be prepared.



**REFERENCE:** Missile defense

**URL:** [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d\\_architecture/missile\\_defense/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/missile_defense/index.html)



**MOVIE:** UNIT-4 (Air Defense Artillery)

**URL:** <https://youtu.be/coZf5SbfC-M>



<sup>17</sup> A launch control radar for low-altitude air defense developed to deal with future threats such as HGVs.



In this way, Japan is taking measures necessary to strengthen its defense structure and will continue these efforts.

**See** Fig. III-1-4-5 (Capabilities of Aegis System-Equipped Vessels); Reference 15 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan)

## 2 Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation

### (1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country.<sup>18</sup>

### (2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation, etc.


The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative technical research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. In FY2006, Japan-U.S. cooperative development<sup>19</sup> of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD began, leading to the deployment of SM-3 Block IIA.

In addition, at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting in January 2023, the two countries agreed several matters including beginning discussions on potential joint development of a future interceptor.

Based on this, Japan and the United States decided to jointly engage in developing a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) as an asset that will help ensure intercept opportunities and secure interception by dealing with HGVs as far away as possible.

**See** Fig. III-1-4-6 (Overview of GPI and Benefits of Japan-U.S. Joint Development); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-3-1 (Joint Research and Development, etc.)

Fig. III-1-4-6 Overview of GPI and Benefits of Japan-U.S. Joint Development



<sup>18</sup> Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called X-band radar) for BMD was deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site (Aomori Prefecture) in 2006. In October 2006, PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site (Kyoto Prefecture) in December 2014. In October 2018, the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade Headquarters was deployed in Sagami-hara (Kanagawa Prefecture). In addition, BMD-capable Aegis ships of the U.S. Forces were deployed at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture) in October 2015, March 2016 and May 2018.

<sup>19</sup> With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD-related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” in June 2011. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before this decision, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles.

### 3 Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperation

All three countries: Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea, confirmed their intention to share North Korean missile warning data in real time at the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in November 2022, as part of efforts to improve each country’s capabilities to detect missiles flying from North Korea and assess their threat.

Subsequently, the three countries coordinated their

efforts and began sharing missile warning data on North Korea in real time on December 19, 2023. This mechanism has enabled the three countries to share warning data of missiles launched by North Korea on an ongoing basis at all times.

In the increasingly severe environment surrounding Japan including North Korea, cooperation among the three countries is essential for regional peace and stability and will continue to be strengthened.

 Chapter 3, Section 1-2-4 (Republic of Korea)


### 3 Responses in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Domains

The aspects of ways of warfare have changed drastically from those of the past. In addition to large-scale missile attacks and hybrid warfare including information warfare, it is necessary to respond to the traditional forms of warfare such as invasion through air, sea and land. Japan’s ground defense capabilities, maritime defense capabilities and air defense capabilities form the basis of its cross-domain operations. For invasions of Japan, including our remote islands, we will secure and maintain our maritime and air superiority to block access

and landing of invading forces.

In the event of a military attack on Japan, the SDF will respond with defensive mobilization. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and

Fig. III-1-4-7 Example of Air Defense Operations



(Notes) 1 Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments  
2 Keeping armed fighters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft

deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the Guidelines).

## 1 Air Defense Operations

Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea and the features of modern wars,<sup>20</sup> it is expected that at first, a sudden attack against Japan will be exercised by aircraft and missiles and such aerial attacks are assumed to be conducted repeatedly, in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial defense aim to quickly deal with enemy aerial attacks at as far airspace from our land area as possible, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the citizens and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy, thus making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult.




F-35B fighters

To this end, the acquisition of F-35A fighters with superior electronic warfare capabilities and F-35B fighters capable of short takeoff and vertical landing will be continued and a temporary F-35B squadron (tentative name) will be established at the ASDF Nyutabaru Air Base (Miyazaki Prefecture).

See Fig. III-1-4-7 (Example of Air Defense Operations)

Fig. III-1-4-8 Example of the Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan



<sup>20</sup> Air operations are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations.

## 2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan

If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We will protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities.

Accordingly, the construction of new FFM with improved maritime operational capabilities, including long-range missiles and enhanced antisubmarine




New type FFM (Image)

capabilities, submarines with improved detection capabilities and similar and new-model supply ships with enhanced logistical support capabilities at sea as well as other efforts are all underway.

**See** Fig. III-1-4-8 (Example of the Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan).

Fig. III-1-4-9 Example of Operations Protecting the Land



### 3 Operations Protecting the Land

To invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air.

For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to be difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.



Common tactical vehicle (Mobile Mortar combat vehicle) (Image)

Based on this, the MOD/SDF are working to acquire common tactical vehicles (infantry combat vehicles and mobile mortar combat vehicles) for coping with forces invading Japan with mobility in coordination with mobile combat vehicles and others as well as amphibious minefield clearing system, etc.

 See Fig. III-1-4-9 (Example of Operations Protecting the Land)

### 4 Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation

Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack, etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain war sustainability and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan.

In operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation, the SDF will combine various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol,<sup>21</sup> defend ships and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes<sup>22</sup> to directly defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes will be conducted by destroyers and support from fighter jets and other aircraft is provided as required.

## 4 Responses in the Space Domain

Space utilization for communications, positioning and other purposes now serves as basic infrastructure for people's lives. At the same time, it forms the core of military operational command and control and information gathering infrastructure and major countries are focusing on strengthening the capabilities and increasing the number of various satellites with early warning, communications, positioning and reconnaissance functions. The recent increase in Chinese military satellites has been remarkable, with the number of such satellites surging approximately 4.9 times in the 11 years since 2012.

In this context, some nations have been increasing their activities to interfere with other nations' space systems to secure their own military superiority and

space is becoming a warfighting domain. It is now of vital importance for nations to ensure the stable utilization of outer space.

 See Part I, Chapter 4, Section 2 (Trends in the Space Domain)

### 1 The Whole-of-Government Approach

In June 2023, based on the National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS), the Strategic Headquarters for National Space Policy formulated the Space Security Initiative for the first time, which concretized issues and policies in the field of space security, including the use of civilian technology in the defense sector and also decided on the Basic Plan of Space Policy, which reflects this initiative.

<sup>21</sup> The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.

<sup>22</sup> Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.

Formulated based on the Basic Space Act, the Basic Plan on Space Policy is the most fundamental plan for space development and utilization in Japan and aims to strengthen the comprehensive infrastructure that supports Japan's space activities.

The Space Security Initiative states that the goal of space security is for Japan, together with its allies, like-minded countries and others, to maintain the stable use of and free access to outer space, while promoting national peace and prosperity and the safety and security of its people through outer space. It also states that, based on the needs of the MOD/SDF, government research and development will be actively linked to the fundamental strengthening of defense capabilities by using government research and also developing advanced technologies conducted by government agencies for defense purposes as well.

Subsequently, in October of the same year, based on the Space Security Initiative and others, a public-private council on strengthening the stability of the space system was established to first accurately identify and analyze the situation, then respond appropriately through public-private cooperation in the event of an unforeseen space-related incident. Additionally, in March 2024, issues related to the maintenance and development of the technological, industrial and human resource base across the security and civilian sectors were examined to identify technologies for which Japan should promote development and then the Space Technology Strategy, including a technology roadmap indicating a timeline to develop such technologies, was formulated.

In addition, led by the Cabinet Office's National Space Policy Secretariat, which is in charge of planning, formulating and coordinating policies for the utilization

of space development for the entire government, space policy is being promoted based on Space Activities Act,<sup>23</sup> Remote Sensing Data Act<sup>24</sup> and Space Resources Act<sup>25</sup>.

## 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

In the space domain, the MOD/SDF will further reinforce Japan's operational capabilities in the ground, maritime and air domains by actively incorporating novel forms of space utilization, including satellite constellations and providing functions such as information gathering, communications and positioning from space. At the same time, to counter threats to the stable utilization of space, surveillance capabilities from space will be developed and a Space Domain Awareness (SDA)<sup>26</sup> system will be established and the resiliency of Japan's space assets will be bolstered to allow missions to be continued in response to various situations. In addition, the MOD/SDF will further reinforce capabilities to disrupt opponents' command and control, and telecommunication, etc.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will strengthen cooperation and collaboration, including research and development, with related organizations and private businesses, including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). They will also strengthen cooperation in areas such as human resource development through exchanges with our ally and like-minded countries such as the United States.

 See Fig. III-1-4-10 (Utilization of Space in the Security Field (conceptual image))



**MOVIE:** ASDF begins SDA.

**URL:** <https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=qoBwBWBRO-8>


<sup>23</sup> Act on Launching of Spacecraft, etc. and Control of Spacecraft

<sup>24</sup> Act on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Data

<sup>25</sup> Act on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources

<sup>26</sup> In addition to Space Situational Awareness (SSA) (understanding the position and orbit of space objects (including understanding the space environment)), understanding the operation and utilization of spacecraft and their intentions and capabilities.

**Fig. III-1-4-10 Utilization of Space in the Security Field (conceptual image)**



Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense

Part III

Chapter

1

## (1) Improvement of Capabilities by Leveraging Space Domain Including Information-Gathering, Communications and Positioning

### A. Information Gathering

With regard to information gathering, the MOD/SDF will build a seamless information gathering system through acquisition of multilayered satellite images, such as by using Information Gathering Satellites (IGS),<sup>27</sup> and civilian satellites such as small satellite constellations that enable frequent imaging. In particular, from the perspective of ensuring the effectiveness of Japan's stand-off defense capabilities, it is necessary to fundamentally strengthen our information gathering capabilities. In addition to strengthening cooperation with the United States, Japan will build a satellite constellation to acquire the capability to detect and track targets, which will be supplemented by various initiatives, including the use of civilian satellites.

### B. Communications

Regarding communications, the MOD currently owns and operates X-band defense communications satellites called Kirameki-1 and Kirameki-2 to use them for information and communications such as command and control, which is extremely important for unit

operations. Going forward, to respond to the increase in communications requirements and to further strengthen resiliency, the MOD is aiming for a system of three X-band defense communications satellites by launching Kirameki-3 in FY2024. The MOD will also procure more receiver equipment and enhance broadband ground station communications to expand equipment and related ground facilities capable of communicating with Kirameki.

Further, the MOD will develop and produce the next-generation defense communications satellite, which will succeed the 1st and 2nd satellites and conduct technical demonstrations regarding technologies and others with jamming resiliency, with a view to installing them on the next-generation defense communications satellite.

Also, regarding Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Communications Satellite Constellation Services, the MOD conducts demonstrations, etc. of their use at respective units. In addition, the MOD develops and demonstrates communications equipment towards joining Protected Anti-jam Tactical SATCOM (PATs), a framework for sharing satellite communications bandwidth among member countries, centered on the United States.

<sup>27</sup> Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) of the Japanese Government are operated by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD, along with other ministries and agencies, utilizes the imagery intelligence provided by the IGS.

### C. Positioning

With regard to positioning, the MOD/SDF mount global position system (GPS) receiving terminals on a large amount of equipment and use them as important means to support advanced troop movement, including highly accurate self-positioning and improvement of missile guidance. In addition to these efforts, the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS)<sup>28</sup> of the Cabinet Office started service in November 2018. With this in mind, the MOD/SDF will secure redundancy<sup>29</sup> by using positioning signals, including those of QZSS.

### D. Response to HGV Detection and Tracking, etc.

Small satellite constellations are attracting attention as a technological trend related to missile detection, tracking functions and others. The MOD believes that infrared observation from space using satellite constellations may be effective as a means of early detection and tracking of HGVs being developed and deployed by various countries and will, while considering the possibility of collaboration with the United States, utilize the space demonstration platform planned for the new H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV-X) to conduct space demonstrations of infrared sensors and other equipment.

In addition, the MOD will promote research on future sensors, such as high-sensitivity wideband infrared detection elements.

### (2) Efforts to Ensure Stable Utilization of Space

While utilization of satellites plays a vital role as the basic infrastructure for security, some countries appear to be developing anti-satellite weapons, including killer satellites, anti-satellite missiles and jamming weapons that interfere with electromagnetic waves.


In addition, the rapid increase in debris from anti-satellite destruction experiments and the emergence of satellite constellations are causing orbital congestion. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the resiliency of SDA and space utilization.

The MOD/SDF have been working to strengthen their capabilities to secure superiority in space utilization. As part of these efforts, they have been working to enhance Space Situational Awareness<sup>30</sup> (SSA). Going forward, the MOD/SDF will continue to strengthen SSA, which enables learning the position, orbit and other information of space objects, while also working to enhance SDA, which enables grasping the operational status, aims and capabilities of satellites.

In FY2023, the MOD/SDF began the production of the SDA satellite (scheduled to be launched in FY2026).

In addition, various initiatives, including a study on the further operation of more than one SDA satellite, will be promoted. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will develop a space operations command and control system, etc.

Fig. III-1-4-11 Initiatives for Developing the Space Domain Awareness (SDA) System



<sup>28</sup> This refers to satellites set into orbit so that the satellites are capable of staying nearly right above one specific area for a long time by tilting the orbit and adopting an elliptical orbit, while ordinary stationary satellites stay in circular orbit on the equator. Multiple satellites are usually launched since a single satellite cannot stay online for 24 hours by itself. Users are able to receive signals from such satellites without being affected by obstacles, such as mountains and buildings, since the satellites pass nearly right above the users.

<sup>29</sup> Having a backup means to cover it and maintain its original function even if something goes wrong with a particular means.

<sup>30</sup> To be aware of the position, orbit, etc. of space objects (including the awareness of the space environment)



## VOICE

## The Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Mission

**NAKATANI Kaname Staff Sergeant, Analysis Staff, 1st Space Operations Squadron, Space Operations Group, ASDF**

The Space Operations Group began its space domain awareness mission from March 16, 2023.

Space utilization is now indispensable for economic and social activities, and it also plays an important role in command and control as well as intelligence in the defense field while there are growing threats for stable space utilization, such as increasing space debris and the existence of so-called “killer satellites.” Our mission is to understand what is happening in space to cope with these threats.

“Space Domain Awareness” sounds like a grand image of something seen in science fiction movies, but in reality, it involves down-to-earth tasks, such as analyzing and evaluating orbital information that is based on huge amounts of data, such as sensor data. We also cooperate with JAXA, the space forces of the ally and like-minded countries, and others to understand the vast domain of space, and I feel that I am growing every day with new discoveries

and learning through interactions with these people.

I will continue to carry on the mission of the stable utilization of space through my space domain awareness.



A work scene in the 1st Space Operations Squadron

to strengthen the operational infrastructure for space operations.

With regard to the strengthening of resiliency of space utilization, Japan will ensure resiliency against jamming and other interference through the demonstration of technology with enhanced resiliency for satellite communications and will also ensure cybersecurity for SSA systems, etc. towards future Japan-U.S. space system cooperation. In addition, Japan will build capabilities to disrupt C4I of opponents in coordination with the electromagnetic domain.

**See** Fig. III-1-4-11 (Initiatives for Developing the Space Domain Awareness (SDA) System)

### (3) Strengthening of Organizational Systems

To strengthen the Space Domain Mission Units, in FY2023, the 1st Space Operations Squadron (Fuchu) and the 2nd Space Operations Squadron (Hofu Kita) responsible for sustainment and maintenance of space-related equipment, etc. under the Space Operations Group were newly organized. In FY2024, the system for stable operation of equipment for SDA will continue to be strengthened through expansion of personnel.

In addition, as securement of the stable utilization of space becomes vital, the MOD/SDF will promote the development of the SDA system to ensure space superiority and strengthen Japan’s space operation

capabilities through the establishment of new Space Domain Mission Units under the command of a general and other measures. For this, given the growing importance of the space domain and the qualitative and quantitative improvements that will be made to its space operation capabilities, the ASDF shall be renamed the Japan Air and Space Self-Defense Force in view of the future positioning of space operations alongside air operations as its core tasks.

To strengthen the organizational systems and human resources base in the space field, Japan will continue to strengthen cooperation, including human resources development, through exchanges with related organizations such as JAXA as well as our ally and like-minded countries such as the United States. Japan will also work to secure human resources in the space domain, including the establishment of a system to effectively utilize knowledge of the space field accumulated among relevant ministries and agencies.

### (4) Strengthening of Cooperation with Related Organizations and Space-Related Industries

With regard to outer space, it is of vital importance for both the lives of Japanese citizens and defense to ensure stable utilization of space for purposes such as information gathering, communications and positioning. The MOD/SDF are strengthening cooperation and

collaboration, including research and development, with related organizations including JAXA and the private businesses with regard to outer space. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will promote investment in technological development in the private sector by further utilizing civilian technology in the defense field and enhance Japan's overall capabilities in space.

In addition, in March 2023, with the start of the operation of the SSA system, the MOD began providing information on SSA, including orbit information on space objects, to the private businesses and others that operate satellites.

Furthermore, in October 2023, the ASDF opened the Space Collaboration & Innovation Office in a private shared office to actively exchanging opinions with private space operators and for other purposes. The ASDF will station several ASDF personnel in this office and reflect knowledge gained in future equipment introduction and from other activities.



Working at the Space Collaboration & Innovation Office (6 members of ASD on the right)

### (5) Strengthening Cooperation with Our Ally, Like-Minded Countries and Others

To ensure the sustainable and stable utilization of outer space, which is essential to the security of Japan, it is essential to strengthen cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others. Japan is also conducting cooperation towards reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors in space. In September 2022, Japan decided not to conduct satellite destruction testing with destructive, direct-ascent missiles, with the intention of actively promoting discussions in the international arena towards the formation of norms for responsible behaviors in outer space. This decision was announced in response to an announcement to the same effect by the United States in April of the same year. In addition to Japan, similar

announcements were made by Canada, New Zealand, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Australia, France and others.

Furthermore, at a plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly held in December of the same year, under the leadership of the United States, 11 countries, including Japan, made a joint proposal for not conducting the “Direct-Ascent Anti-SATellite (DA-ASAT) missile testing” resolution, which was adopted at the plenary session of the UN General Assembly with the support of 155 countries.

At the same time, to avoid risks from misunderstanding and miscalculation, it is necessary to communicate the importance of strengthening communication among relevant countries and of implementing Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM) in outer space.

#### A. Cooperation with the United States

From the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space domain between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, the two countries established the Japan-U.S. Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) at the Deputy Director General level in April 2015. The SCWG holds wide-ranging talks on space cooperation, including collaboration on space policy and strategy, cooperation between U.S. and Japanese space operations forces including SDA information-sharing and education and discussions on LEO satellite constellations. Meetings of the SCWG have been held nine times through now, most recently in July 2023.

In addition, the Japanese and U.S. governments hold the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Space Dialogue (CSD) and the Japanese and U.S. security authorities hold the Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue (SSD). The MOD participates in these meetings, in which there are exchanges of information regarding the space policies of both countries as well as discussions on future cooperation.

With regard to recent high-level exchanges, in the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting in January 2023, both sides confirmed that they consider attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance and that such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In addition, in September 2023, General Saltzman, the Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force, paid a courtesy call on Defense Minister Kihara and they confirmed that Japan and the United States were strengthening cooperation in the

## The Space Security Initiative and Efforts of the Ministry of Defense

The key points of the Space Security Initiative, which was formulated in June 2023, include the following three approaches: First of all, as a future vision, (1) Radically Expand the Use of Space Systems for National Security (Security from Space) and (2) Ensuring Safe and Stable Use of Outer Space (Security in Space) that shows the whole picture of the “space architecture for national security.” To implement (1) and (2) at an early stage, it is necessary to realize (3) a Virtuous Cycle of Security and Fostering Space Industrial Base.

The efforts of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) since the formulation of the Initiative include the following:

(1) Demonstrations of infrared ray sensors and other devices have begun using a New Space Station Resupply Vehicle (HTV [H-II Transfer Vehicle]-X) as a space demonstration platform for improving HGV detection and tracking capabilities in cooperation with JAXA to realize “security from space.” In addition, efforts to build an intelligence constellation are also underway.

(2) The SDA satellite has been tuned in preparation for the scheduled launch in FY2026 to reinforce the SDA capabilities for security in space. Japan has already participated in the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO), a multilateral framework made up of like-minded countries, including the United States, in December 2023 with the intention of strengthening international cooperation for stable space utilization using these frameworks.

(3) For realizing a virtuous cycle of security and fostering space industrial base, it was decided to use the R&D of cutting-edge technologies created by government organizations for defense purposes to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, and the resultant space-related technologies of importance have been presented in the initiative (Figure 1). In addition, some of these technologies have been included in the Space Technology Strategy that was formulated in March 2024. The MOD/SDF will promote efforts for effective R&D and the early installation of space systems that are related to national security by orchestrating the comprehensive power of the private sector and the government.

Technologies to actively utilize satellite constellations and expand space utilization	- Advancement of design, manufacturing and verification technologies with an eye on mass production - Network optimization of satellite constellations
Technologies to meet increasing communication requirements	- Full digitalization and software definition of satellites - Utilization of the EHF band
Technologies contributing to SDA and mission assurances, etc.	- Reduction in the size and weight of various types of buses and sensors - Autonomous satellite operations and decentralization of ground systems - Securing space demonstrations and recovery opportunities

Figure 1: Examples of common fundamental technologies in building a “space architecture for national security” (an excerpt from the “Space Security Initiative”)

space domain as it was becoming increasingly important in terms of the space domain security.

In terms of operations, because cooperation with the United States is indispensable for effective operation of the SSA system by the ASDF, Japan is working to materialize information-sharing with the United States. Furthermore, Japan continues to participate in the Schriever Wargame, a multilateral tabletop exercise on space security organized by the U.S. military and the Global Sentinel, a multilateral SSA tabletop exercise, to share recognition of threats in space with multiple countries, cooperate on SDA and work to accumulate knowledge on ensuring the functions of space systems. In addition, SDF personnel are dispatched to the U.S. Space Command’s Multinational Space Collaboration (MSC) Office.

### B. Cooperation with Like-Minded Countries, Etc.

Japan has been cooperating and collaborating with like-minded countries in various fields, including

strengthening relations among defense authorities, cooperation related to SDA information and cooperation among space operations forces, through consultations, information sharing and participation in multilateral exercises.

In December 2023, the MOD/SDF joined the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO) as a participating country. This is a multilateral framework including the United States and other like-minded countries and intended to discuss space security. Moreover, the MOD/SDF participated in a CSpO general-level meeting held in Germany the same month and explained Japan’s space policy and initiatives in the space field. By joining the CSpO, the MOD/SDF will further strengthen our relations with allies and like-minded countries in the space field, while actively participating in international initiatives to ensure stable space utilization.

With regard to Australia, consultations (at the director level) on space cooperation among the Japanese and



Participants in the CSPO from various countries (front row, left General Uchikura, Chief of Staff, ASDF)

Australian space authorities have been held since May 2021. In addition, in November 2022, Japan and Australia signed the Letter of Intent Concerning a Defence Space Partnership, which will deepen space cooperation. Furthermore, Japan and Australia established a Space Working Group (SWG) to discuss specific cooperation among space operations forces.

With regard to the United Kingdom, the Japanese and U.K. defense authorities have been holding space consultations since August 2022 and have been coordinating on collaboration on space policy and strategy, promotion of cooperation and exchanges among space operations forces, information sharing related to SDA and other matters.

With regard to France, Japan and France have been conducting consultations (at the director level) on space cooperation between the Japanese and French defense authorities since December 2021. The two countries are also coordinating on the promotion of unit-to-unit exchanges including participation by the SDF in the multilateral space exercise (AsterX) organized by the

French Air and Space Forces, strengthening cooperation between Japan's Space Operations Group and the French Space Command, strengthening information sharing arrangements related to SDA and other efforts. In addition, the MOD participates in the Japan-France Comprehensive Space Dialogue between the governments of Japan and France.

With regard to Germany, Japan and Germany have been holding expert meetings on space cooperation between forces and will develop coordination by holding a meeting of their SWG to deepen cooperation between space operations forces.

With regard to Canada, Japan and Canada held the first Japan-Canada space forces tabletop exercise in March 2023 and will advance promotion of cooperation among space operations forces and cooperation for information sharing.



Tabletop Exercise with the Canadian Armed Forces

With regard to Japan and the European Union (EU), their governments hold the Japan-EU Space Policy Dialogue. In addition, the Japanese and Indian governments hold the Japan-India Space Dialogue. The MOD participates in both these dialogues.

## 5 Responses in the Cyber Domain

In the cyber domain, it is important to gather and share information at all stages from peacetime to emergencies through cooperation with other countries, relevant ministries and agencies and the private sectors, as well as to strengthen Japan's overall response capabilities in the cybersecurity field.

In light of the fact that policies in the cybersecurity

field will be centrally and comprehensively coordinated throughout the Government, the MOD/SDF will promote initiatives that contribute to strengthening cooperation with related ministries and agencies, critical infrastructure operators and the defense industry, while enhancing its own level of cybersecurity.

 See Part 1, Chapter 4, Section 3 (Trends in the Cyber Domain)

## 1 The Whole-of-Government Initiatives

Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), the government of Japan as a whole intends to improve its response capabilities in the field of cybersecurity to the same level or higher than those of major Western countries, including the introduction of active cyber defense in cases where there is a threat of a serious cyber attack that does not necessarily lead to an armed attack but raises security concerns.

In FY2024, among others, projects are being planned focusing on policies to ensure cybersecurity of information systems of government agencies, etc. In addition, the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) is to be fundamentally strengthened.

 See Section 1-2-3 (Cybersecurity)

## 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The cyber domain is not only core infrastructure in the daily lives of the people of Japan, but also of vital importance for carrying out cross-domain operations to defend Japan.

In light of the severe situation in cyberspace in recent years, the NSS calls for the introduction of active cyber defense to prevent, as far as possible, a serious cyberattack that does not necessarily lead to armed attacks but raises security concerns and prevent the spread of damage if such an attack has occurred.

The MOD/SDF will coordinate with whole-of-government initiatives in the field of cybersecurity, including active cyber defense. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will achieve a high level of cybersecurity by shifting to a posture where persistent risk management

is implemented, primarily on critical systems, etc. and significantly increasing the number of cyberspace workforce capable of performing such tasks as well as utilizing highly-skilled external human resources. The MOD/SDF will protect itself from all cyber threats with its high level of cybersecurity capabilities and also will use these capabilities to strengthen the national cybersecurity as a whole.

To this end, the MOD/SDF will establish a posture that can protect its command and control capabilities as well as its high-priority equipment systems even under cyber attacks<sup>31</sup> along with a posture for supporting cyber defense for the defense industry by FY2027.

By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will have established a posture to safeguard its command and control capabilities, force projection capabilities and operational bases to assure missions to be executed even under cyber attacks and strengthened its posture for supporting the cybersecurity of entities other than the SDF.

 See Fig. III-1-4-12 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks); Reference 16 (Efforts in Recent Years by the MOD on Cybersecurity)

### (1) Establishing a System for Ensuring Cybersecurity A. Expansion of the Cyber Units Organization

The JSDF Cyber Defense Command was newly formed in March 2022 as a joint unit and deals with cyber attacks. It also provides support for training of cyber units of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF and maintains and operates the Defense Information Infrastructure<sup>32</sup> (DII), a common network for the MOD/SDF. From FY2023 onward, Japan has continued to expand the systems of the JSDF Cyber Defense Command and other cyber units of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF and promote the transition of personnel engaged in cyber-related works to



**REFERENCE:** The MOD/SDF's "I Want to Know About This!": How the SDF responds to cyber attacks  
**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/shiritai/cyber/index.html>




**REFERENCE:** Important information about cyber security  
**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/cyber/index.html>



<sup>31</sup> Illegal intrusion, information theft, alteration or destruction, operation stop/malfunction of information systems, execution of unauthorized program, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, etc., which are made through cyberspace by abusing information communication networks, information systems, etc.

<sup>32</sup> Common network for the entire SDF, the information and communications infrastructure necessary to perform the SDF's duties, which is composed of data communications networks and voice communications networks and uses various lines such as self-operated micro lines owned by the MOD, external lines rented from telecommunications carriers and satellite lines.

Fig. III-1-4-12 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks



professional cyber workforce. In addition, in July 2023, the MOD/SDF strengthened its planning and drafting function for developing cyber policies by reorganizing the Information and Communications Division of the Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning to establish the Cyber Buildup and Planning Division and Councilor (Director) to the Minister’s Secretariat.



Advertisement for Cyber Contest 2024

### B. Utilization of Private-sector Human Resources

The MOD/SDF recruits those with cybersecurity expertise and experience as uniformed SDF personnel and technical defense officials, and also promotes personnel exchanges between the public and private sectors.

In addition, since July 2021, the MOD/SDF has been hiring personnel with advanced knowledge and skills as well as abundant experience and achievements in the cyber domain as “Chief Cybersecurity Advisor.” In addition, the MOD/SDF is also working on a public-private personnel exchange system to employ people with practical experience in the private sector, as well as utilizing external personnel through service contracts and other means. Since 2021, the Ministry of Defense Cyber Contest has been held with the aim of uncovering talented individuals with cybersecurity expertise.

Additionally, since 2022, the MOD/SDF has been hiring the candidates for SDF reserve personnel equipped with cybersecurity skills.

## (2) Security Enhancement

### A. Introduction of Latest Architecture

As threats in the cyber domain are becoming more advanced and sophisticated every day, Japan has shifted its approach to information system security measures from temporary “risk elimination” to continuous “risk management,” and has implemented from FY2023 the Risk Management Framework (RMF), which continuously analyzes and evaluates risks and implements necessary security measures even after the start of the information system operation.

Additionally, the MOD/SDF will transition from the traditional idea that perimeter security is sufficient to maintain the organization’s network safety and will promote the introduction of the new security functions based on the “Zero Trust” concept. These will improve the cybersecurity level of the MOD/SDF and establish a posture that can promptly detect and respond to any intrusion into the organization’s network.

### B Security Measures including Equipment and Facility Infrastructure

To appropriately respond to the latest cyber attack threats, which are becoming more advanced and sophisticated every day, it is necessary to strengthen the posture for protection of information systems. To this end, the MOD/SDF will develop a cloud system that integrates and standardizes MOD/SDF systems, implement centralized cybersecurity measures, strengthen the protective

### KEY WORD Zero Trust

The concept of maintaining the safety of organization’s information assets (data, devices, applications, etc.) by dynamically verifying and controlling the authenticity of all access from inside and outside the organization’s network, without taking the security inside the network for granted.

posture of equipment systems and facility infrastructure systems and enhance the threat hunting function that continuously hunts for and detects potential internal threats based on the assumption that threats have already penetrated inside the network.

### C Strengthening Defense Industry Cybersecurity


In March 2022, the MOD/SDF developed the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry, the new information security standards that include the same level of control measures as NIST SP800-171<sup>33</sup> of U.S. standards. In response to this, defense-related companies have been upgrading their information systems since April 2023.

**See** Fig. III-1-4-13 Enhanced Security Functions based on Zero Trust Concept (Image); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1-2-4 (Strengthening Defense Industrial Security)

### (3) Education and Research

To fundamentally strengthen the SDF’s cyber defense capability, developing human resources who possess sophisticated and wide-ranging knowledge on cybersecurity is an urgent issue. Proactive efforts, including the expansion of education and the utilization

Fig. III-1-4-13 Enhanced Security Functions based on Zero Trust Concept (Image)



33 Security requirements as safeguards to be implemented in DFARS issued by the U.S. DoD for defense industries handling CUIs.

of knowledge of private sectors, are necessary. In this context, the MOD/SDF has developed cyber workforce by continuously and by stages assigned to cyber-related positions and providing them with both in-house and external education to acquire and maintain advanced knowledge and skills.

As general cyber education course for all SDF services to learn general and advanced knowledge of cybersecurity has started since FY2019 at then GSDF Signal School. It is also dispatching personnel to College of Information and Cyberspace International Fellows at the National Defense University of the United States and the U.S. Army's Coalition Cyber Operations Planner and establishing a specialized course in system and cyber engineering at the GSDF High Technical School. Moreover, in March 2024, the GSDF Signal School was reorganized into the GSDF System and Signal/Cyber School and newly established the Cyber Education Department, expanding the educational infrastructure for training cyber personnel. In FY 2024, the National Defense Academy also expanded its cyber literacy education and reorganized its Department of Information Engineering to the Department of Cyber and Information Engineering.

Furthermore, since cybersecurity depends on the literacy of personnel who use networks and systems, not just specialized personnel with advanced knowledge, the MOD/SDF is promoting literacy education for general SDF personnel.

In terms of research, the MOD/SDF is strengthening the research structure of the Cyber Security Division newly established in the National Institute for Defense Studies in FY2023 and Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency Future Capabilities Development Center is conducting research into cyber protection technology for equipment systems to prevent the spread of damage caused by cyber attacks and enable various equipment systems to remain in operation in the event of a cyber attack.

#### **(4) Cooperation with Private Companies and Other Countries**

To respond to cyber attacks in a swift and appropriate manner, it is necessary to keep abreast of the latest information, including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector and strategic talks, joint training and other opportunities with allies and other parties. For this purpose, the MOD/SDF will effectively cooperate

with private companies and foreign countries, including the United States, which is Japan's ally.

##### **a. Cooperation with Private Companies and Others**

In July 2013, the Cyber Defense Council (CDC) was set up with its members consisting of around ten companies in the defense industry with a high interest in cybersecurity. With the MOD serving as the hub for information sharing among companies in the defense industry, information is aggregated and efforts are made to grasp the overall picture of cyber attacks. In addition, a joint training takes place annually, simulating a situation where the MOD/SDF and defense industry are under cyber attacks as part of efforts to improve both of their cyber response capabilities.

##### **b. Cooperation with the United States**

To strengthen the foundation that supports effective Japan-U.S. joint responses at all levels, Japan will further strengthen information sharing at all levels and fundamentally strengthen efforts related to information security and cybersecurity to enable both Japan and the United States to fully exercise their capabilities.

In October 2013, the Japanese and U.S. governments set up the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) as a framework for policy consultations between the defense authorities of the two countries. In this framework, specialized and specific considerations were conducted on a wide range of fields, such as the promotion of policy consultations on cyber issues and closer information sharing.

The Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate establishment of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also cited.

In addition, at their "2+2" in April 2019, Japan and the United States confirmed that international law applied in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Furthermore, at the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting in January 2023 and the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in October 2023, the two countries agreed to strengthen cooperation in the cyber field and Japan's



## VOICE

## Studying at GSDF High Technical School

**KADOWAKI Tsubasa, third year, High Technical School, GSDF**

I have been interested in the cyber field since I was an elementary school pupil, so I decided to enter the GSDF High Technical School when I learned that the System/Cyber Specialized Course was scheduled to be launched at the school. I have been studying the System/Cyber Specialized Course since FY2023. Immediately after entering the school, I was struck with the number of confusing things I had to deal with due to the unfamiliar group life, but I was soon able to get used to it by cooperating with my classmates. Thanks to what I learnt in this specialized course, including basic knowledge on cyber technology, C language, and Linux, I could obtain the national qualification of the Fundamental Information Technology Engineer. At the end of this course, students do an exercise of building a server

and providing services by themselves, through which they learn possible routes taken by cyber attackers and how to counter them.

In recent years, we have been constantly exposed to the threat of cyber attacks, not only in times of emergency but also in normal times, and I feel a sense of crisis as I see many government agencies and private companies being affected. Given this situation, I will try hard to further refine my knowledge and skills I learned in this course and do my best to contribute in the unit I am assigned after graduation.

At GSDF High, students start learning about cyber technology while still in school. Enroll in GSDF High and protect Japan's future together.



The author presenting the final assignment of the System/Cyber Specialized Course (the analysis results using a system constructed by the students)



A group discussion

cooperation with the United States is to be further strengthened by such means as participation in the Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue, a whole-of-government framework by both nations, continuously holding the Japan-U.S. IT Forum, a framework between defense authorities.

In terms of operational cooperation, cyber response capability training has been conducted as part of the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise (field training exercises) and the Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Command Post Exercise to improve Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities.

### **C. Cooperation with Like-Minded Countries, Etc.**

Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries other than United States through

measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks and participated in multilateral exercises.

Japan has participated in the Japan-NATO Cyber Dialogue, a whole-of-government framework and organized the Japan-NATO Expert Staff Talks on Cyber Defense, etc., with the respective defense authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and others to exchange opinions on various issues related to cyberspace and participated in the CyCon International Conference on Cyber Conflict organized by NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) established in Estonia. The MOD has been dispatching personnel to the CCDCOE since March 2019. In October 2022, Japan completed the process of



Personnel of the GSDF Cyber Protection Unit participating in "Defence Cyber Marvel 3", a cyber exercise hosted by the United Kingdom (February 2024).

signing an arrangement for participation in CCDCOE activities and the MOD officially participated in the CCDCOE's activities.

In addition, Japan has held cyber talks between defense authorities with Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Estonia. Moreover, Japan holds the IT Forum with the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam and other countries to exchange views on initiatives in the information communications area including cybersecurity and current trends in technology and provides ASEAN countries with capacity building in the field of cybersecurity.

With the aim of strengthening the SDF's cyber domain capabilities and cooperation with other countries, the SDF participated in a joint Japan-Australia team

in the multilateral cyber defense exercise "Locked Shields 2023" hosted by CCDCOE by teaming up with Australia in April 2023. In February 2024, the SDF also participated in Defence Cyber Marvel 3 hosted by the United Kingdom, as it did last year.

Furthermore, in February 2024, the GSDF hosted Cyber KONGO 2024, a multilateral cyber protection competition, with a total of 16 participating countries, including the United States, Australia, Germany, France, Lithuania, Vietnam and Philippines, to strengthen capabilities in the cyber domain.

### (5) Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach

Along with the National Police Agency, the Digital Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the MOD/SDF, as one of the government agencies that are members of the Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters, contributes to the cross-government initiatives led by the NISC, including participating in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges and providing information about cyber attacks as well as sending personnel to the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT).<sup>34</sup> In addition, the MOD/SDF is cooperating by applying the knowledge and experience of the SDF to penetration tests of the IT systems of Government ministries and agencies conducted by the NISC.

## 6 Responses in the Domain of Electromagnetic Spectrum

The domain of electromagnetic spectrum is at the forefront of offense and defense in modern combat, with the scope of its utilization and applications expanding to include the land, sea, air, space and cyber domains.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, securing superiority in the electromagnetic domain is extremely important for strengthening of deterrence and the realization of cross-domain operations.

The SDF will steadily promote strengthening of its capabilities in the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, including effectively operating its electronic warfare capabilities and related support capabilities while impairing opponents' operational capabilities in this area even under challenging electromagnetic environments, such as when

encountering communication jamming by opponents. Also, the entire SDF will utilize the electromagnetic spectrum more efficiently by strengthening its electromagnetic spectrum management functions.


The MOD/SDF will closely cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies to strengthen capabilities in the electromagnetic domain so that the SDF can ensure stable and flexible use of radio waves, balancing civilian use of frequencies with the SDF's use of frequencies for the command and control and intelligence gathering activities.

**See** Fig. III-1-4-14 (Electronic Warfare Capabilities and Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Capabilities (Image)); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 4-1 (Electromagnetic Domain and Security))

<sup>34</sup> Team that provides technical support and advice to prevent the spread of damage, engage in recovery, investigate the cause and obviate recurrence when an information security-related event occurs in need of a unified response by the government.

<sup>35</sup> One of the attacks using electromagnetic waves is an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack, which places an extreme burden on systems and electronics by generating instantaneous powerful electromagnetic waves through nuclear explosions and other means, leading to their malfunction or destruction. Since this type of attack would impact not just the defense field but Japanese people's lives in general, the Government of Japan as a whole will deliberate on necessary countermeasures against it.

**Fig. III-1-4-14 Electronic Warfare Capabilities and Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Capabilities (image)**



### 1 Enhancement of Electronic Jamming Capabilities (Communications and Radar Jamming capabilities), etc.

It is effective as a means to defend Japan to neutralize the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, including radar and communications of an opponent that intends to invade Japan, based on information gathering and analysis in peacetime, to overcome the inferiority in capabilities in other domains and to accomplish the defense of Japan. The MOD/SDF is working to strengthen this capability.

In FY2024, the MOD/SDF will acquire the Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS), which functions to conduct gathering and analysis of information from radio waves on a regular basis and neutralize the use of radio waves by opponents during emergencies and counter air electronic warfare system, as well as carry out research on low-power communications jamming technology and future electromagnetic pulse (EMP) equipment technology. The MOD/SDF will also conduct research on directional energy technologies such as high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves (HPM) to improve the capabilities to deal with small unmanned vehicles.

### 2 Strengthening of Electronic Defense Capabilities

To localize the effects of interference, etc. in the

electromagnetic domain, thereby ensuring air superiority, the MOD/SDF is promoting the acquisition of F-35As fighters with superior electronic protection capability. In addition, to improve flexibility in fighter operations, the MOD/SDF will acquire F-35Bs fighters with their superior electronic protection capability and short takeoff and vertical landing capabilities and continue to improve the capabilities of F-15 fighters.

### 3 Strengthening of Electronic Warfare Support Capabilities

To gain an advantage in fighting in the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, it is important to gather and analyze information on electromagnetic spectrum at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies and appropriately share those among SDF units.

In FY2024, the MOD/SDF will acquire RC-2 signals intelligence aircraft and develop an electronic warfare aircraft to enhance the capabilities to collect information on electromagnetic waves, which is necessary for electronic jamming and electronic protection.

### 4 Enhancement of Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Function

To gain an advantage in warfare by using electromagnetic

Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense  
Part III  
Chapter 1

spectrum proactively and effectively, in addition to improving electronic warfare capabilities, it is necessary to establish an electromagnetic spectrum management posture that centrally grasps and coordinates wave frequencies and status of use and appropriately allocates frequency resources to units, etc.

For this reason, the electromagnetic wave management function will be developed to enhance the capabilities to understand and manage the usage situation of electromagnetic waves by understanding and visualizing on monitors the status of electromagnetic waves used by equipment communication devices, radars, electronic warfare devices, etc.

## 5 Training/Exercise and Human Resources Development

To strengthen the SDF's capabilities in the electromagnetic domain and to develop personnel with specialized knowledge, in addition to conducting integrated electromagnetic spectrum operations training, the MOD/SDF is collecting the latest knowledge and expertise in the electromagnetic domain by dispatching personnel to participate in educational programs on electronic warfare in the United States and other means.<sup>36</sup>

During the SDF joint exercise conducted in November 2023, the electronic warfare units of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF gathered at Iruma Air Base (Saitama Prefecture) to coordinate training for integrated electromagnetic wave operations. In addition, from September to October of the same year, MSDF dispatched multipurpose EP-3 aircraft to the United States to conduct electromagnetic maneuver warfare training with the U.S. Navy to improve interoperability with the U.S. Navy.



Electronic warfare units of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF gathered at ASDF Iruma Air Base for joint electromagnetic wave operation training during the SDF joint exercise.

# 7 Responses to Large-Scale Terrorism and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

## 1 Basic Concept

Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts as well as invasion of Japan are not the only situations that Japan needs to prepare for. Large-scale terrorism and accompanying attacks on critical infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants, are serious threats to the lives, health and property of Japanese citizens and would require Japan to respond with all-out efforts. On the other hand, Japan also has a large concentration of its industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas, as well as the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in coastal areas. Thus, protecting Japanese citizens and critical facilities from various threats is also a challenge.

In Japan, where most of the towns and cities are highly urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can

pose a serious threat against the country's peace and security. Such cases would involve various modes and forms including illegal activities by infiltrated armed agents,<sup>37</sup> etc. and sabotage carried out by guerrillas or special forces, which can be deemed to be armed attacks against Japan.


To respond to such cases, the MOD/SDF would utilize its fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities and closely cooperate with the police, JCG, fire departments, local governments and other related organizations to effectively respond to large-scale terrorism and attacks on critical infrastructure.

In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF will collect relevant information and reinforce the security of the SDF facilities. In addition, when the situation is clearer and can be dealt with by the

<sup>36</sup> In addition, the MOD/SDF are advancing the multiplication of the communications network required for information sharing among the SDF services across Japan and conducting research in light of EMP protection.

<sup>37</sup> Refers to persons committing illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant wounding and killing power.

Fig. III-1-4-15 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces



general police force, various forms of assistance such as transportation of police officers and provision of equipment to the police force will be carried out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confirmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order.

In addition, in response to ballistic missile attacks, Aegis ships will be deployed to protect the entire territory of Japan and PAC-3s of the ASDF, which are dispersed throughout the country to protect bases, will be moved and deployed flexibly according to the situation. Furthermore, Japan would respond to cruise missiles and the like with various anti-aircraft missiles launched from aircraft, naval vessels and ground-based assets.

## 2 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people and assassinations of dignitaries.

In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces, the MOD/SDF will respond with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, monitoring and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities and search and destruction of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through monitoring and surveillance and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities, such as nuclear power plants and the necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infiltration of our territory by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched

for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them.

 **See** Fig. III-1-4-15 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces)

### 3 Response to Armed Agents

While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. If this happens, it is important for the SDF to cooperate with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement<sup>38</sup> concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded.<sup>39</sup>

In addition, the GSDF has been conducting joint field training exercises nationwide with the prefectural police, in an effort to strengthen such collaboration by conducting field exercises at the premises of nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012.



Joint training with police at Tsuruga Nuclear Power Station (February 2023)

### 4 Response to Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate

mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used.

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical and medical protection units of the GSDF and other units will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured and medical activities through disaster relief and civil protection dispatches.

The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit and is also increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated initial response personnel who remain ready to mobilize quickly in the event of extraordinary disasters.

The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.

<sup>38</sup> The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission (concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000).

<sup>39</sup> In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents.

## 8 Initiatives Related to Civil Protection

### 1 Basic Concept

There has recently been heightened interest in civil protection as well as expectations for the MOD/SDF due to North Korea's repeated launches of ballistic missiles, especially with the communication of information via J-Alerts due to the launch of ballistic missiles over the Japanese archipelago. Civil protection is one of the pillars of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities in the NDS and the MOD/SDF are actively working on it.

In March 2005, based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Act, the Government established the Basic

Guidelines for the Protection of the People. It anticipates four types of armed attack: (1) a land invasion, (2) an attack by guerrillas or special forces, (3) a ballistic missile attack and (4) an air attack. It also lays out points to consider in taking measures to protect civilians depending on the type of attack.

As measures for civil protection during armed attack situations and the like, the MOD/SDF will take measures to confirm the damage, save lives and assist in the evacuation of residents, while cooperating with the police, fire departments, JCG and various other relevant ministries and agencies.

The Government is conducting consideration from

#### Commentary

### Transmission of Ballistic Missile Information via J-ALERT (Notice from the Cabinet Secretariat)

In 2023, North Korea launched at least 25 ballistic missiles (including potential ballistic missiles), during which the National Early Warning System (J-ALERT) was issued four times. It has continued to launch missiles repeatedly into 2024.

To protect the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals from the threat of ballistic missiles from North Korea, the Government of Japan is steadily strengthening its ballistic missile defense capabilities and continues to maintain a heightened surveillance posture. Accordingly, if there is a possibility of a ballistic missile

- 1) falling into Japan's territory, or
- 2) passing over Japan,

the Cabinet Secretariat will provide emergency information through the National Early Warning System (J-ALERT) to everyone in areas where precautions must be taken against the ballistic missile and encourage them to take action to increase the possibility of mitigating damage as much as possible, such as by taking shelter in a nearby building.

When J-ALERT is used, administrative radio systems for disaster prevention are automatically activated and a distinct siren and message will be broadcast over the loudspeakers outdoors. Emergency information will also be transmitted to residents through various means of information transmission, including through registration-based emails.


When transmitting information through J-ALERT, it

for the Ministry of Defense (the MOD) to provide the Cabinet Secretariat with various types of information on the ballistic missile in a timely and appropriate manner. For this reason, the process of information transfer between the two parties has been systemized and automated to ensure speed and certainty.

In April 2023, additions and changes were made to information transmission messages, including information about missiles that have passed through Japanese territory and the lifting of evacuation orders when there is no longer a possibility that a missile will pass through.

The Government will continue to strive to reliably communicate information, while also working to constantly strengthen J-ALERT's information transmission function.

J-ALERT is a system that instantly transmits information from the national government on situations that require immediate action, such as ballistic missile information, Earthquake Early Warnings, and Tsunami Warnings, to residents via emergency messages transmitted to mobile phones, municipal administrative radio systems for disaster prevention, and other means.



Overview of the National Early Warning System (J-ALERT)

the perspective that development of evacuation facilities equipped with the necessary functions to protect the lives and health of citizens from armed attack situations where ballistic missiles and the like are used is a measure for preventing damage and leads to deterrence against ballistic missile attacks and other attacks.

In March 2024, the government of Japan presented the basic concept of initiatives to secure necessary evacuation facilities, including the development of “Specific Temporary Evacuation Facilities”<sup>40</sup> as solid evacuation facilities that can be used for a certain period of time in areas where evacuation would be difficult, due to reasons such as severely restricted transportation and no evacuation sites in the vicinity. The Government also formulated the “Technical Guidelines for Specific Temporary Evacuation Facilities” to specify the technical specifications that should be provided and other matters.

## 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

### (1) Enhancement of Posture for Civil Protection

To counter invasions of Japan while protecting the lives of Japanese citizens, it is imperative for national government institutions, local governments, public institutions and private businesses to cooperate and work together in an integrated manner.

To implement swift evacuation of residents, including those in the southwestern region, well in advance of an armed attack, the Government will promptly formulate plans for smooth evacuation, secure means of public and private transportation, develop public infrastructure such as airports and seaports and coordinate its use, secure various types of evacuation facilities and coordinate with international organizations. In addition, to enhance the effectiveness of such efforts, the Government will conduct and verify various types of training, including evacuation of residents and then consider necessary measures, including institutional aspects, while promoting cooperation among the national government, local governments, designated public institutions and others.

Moreover, in addition to participating in and cooperating with these measures, the MOD/SDF will also coordinate and cooperate in the planned implementation

of civil protection measures utilizing civilian vessels and aircraft used by the SDF and various SDF transport assets. The MOD/SDF will also promote various measures such as strengthening SDF units that can also provide civil protection and utilizing SDF reserve personnel.

### (2) Daily Collaboration with Local Governments

The MOD/SDF has established departments responsible for regular and close liaison and coordination with local governments and other bodies in its main Headquarters and Commands as well as in Provincial Cooperation Offices, etc., and has stationed the Assistant Director for Civil Protection (civilian official) at the GSDF divisions/brigade headquarters since FY2023.

Civil protection councils are established in prefectural and municipal governments for comprehensive implementation of civil protection measures. Representatives of each branch of the SDF and Regional Defense Bureau have been appointed to the councils.

Moreover, local governments are recruiting retired SDF officers to serve as crisis managers. For example, they act as coordinators with the MOD/SDF, as well as developing and implementing joint response plans and exercises.



Civil Protection Expert (the Assistant Director for Civil Protection) of the 3rd Division Headquarters coordinating with related organizations during the Kobe City Civil Protection Practical Exercise in 2023 (2nd and 3rd from left)

### (3) Civil Protection Exercises


To accurately and swiftly implement civil protection measures, it is essential to establish cooperation with relevant organizations from peacetime. The Government

<sup>40</sup> For municipalities that meet the following two requirements: (1) If a wide-area evacuation of residents and others were necessary, it would prove difficult given that the means of transportation for wide-area evacuation of residents would be limited to aircraft or ships and the evacuation destination area is located on a remote island where evacuation beyond the coastal zone is necessary when transporting by ship due to the long distance; and (2) the patterns of evacuation implementation guidelines for wide-area evacuation of all residents, etc., have been prepared and publicized and utilizing said patterns, central and prefectural governments have conducted joint civil protection exercises, such municipalities are supposed to prepare evacuation facilities in the basement of public/official facilities (used for purposes other than evacuation facilities such as meeting rooms, parking lots, etc. during normal times) with financial support from the government of Japan.



as a whole is strengthening its civil protection exercises assuming armed attack situations or expected armed attack situations. The MOD/SDF, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, host exercises with the participation of local governments and others and

actively participate and cooperate in civil protection exercises conducted by relevant ministries and agencies and local governments.

 **See** Reference 17 (Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (FY2023))

## VOICE

### Voice of an SDF Member Who Participated in a Civil Protection Exercise

#### **NAGANUMA Takayuki, Major, Flight Section Member, Nyutabaru Rescue Squadron, ASDF**

In the 2023 Kagoshima Prefecture and Kumamoto Prefecture Joint Civil Protection Field/Map Exercise that I participated in, it was assumed that an evacuation order was issued for the entire Yakushima Town (Kagoshima Prefecture) due to the prediction of an armed attack on Japan and that more than 1,000 residents were to be evacuated. The mission of the Nyutabaru Rescue Squadron in this training was to transport a person requiring special care who was staying at a hospital in Yakushima Town to Kagoshima City using a UH-60J rescue helicopter. Under normal circumstances, the Nyutabaru Rescue Squadron carries out emergency airlifts from over 20 inhabited remote islands within Kagoshima Prefecture to helipads in Kagoshima City. In this training, we accomplished our mission by leveraging our experience in cooperation and coordination with local governments and other organizations. We will continue to participate in such exercise and work hard to strengthen cooperation with local governments and other organizations so that we can accomplish the missions we are assigned any time in the future.



A UH-60J landed at Miyanoura Athletics Stadium in Yakushima Town



A person requiring special care was brought onto the UH-60J.

#### **MIURA Hiroshi, Civil Protection Specialist and Defense Official, Western Air Defense Force Headquarters, ASDF**

In this training, I was assigned to liaise and coordinate with related organizations, and I was dispatched as a civil protection specialist to the Kagoshima Prefectural Response Headquarters, which was established at the Kagoshima Prefectural Office.

The training went like this: A request was received from Kagoshima Prefecture for assistance with the evacuation of a person requiring special care, and in collaboration with the ASDF Nyutabaru Rescue Squadron, we made the necessary adjustments to dispatch a UH-60J rescue helicopter.

I believe that we were able to make this training meaningful by building face-to-face relationships with local governments and other organizations from the coordination stage. In a situation like this, I have once again realized that in order to smoothly cooperate with related organizations and protect the public, relationships of trust on a daily basis are important.



The author (in front of the entrance of a government building)

**Section 5**

# Initiatives to Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities, Including Responding to Integrated Information Warfare

## 1 Strengthening of Functions Such as Intelligence Collection and Analysis

### 1 Military Intelligence Collection


With security environment is changing in a rapid, complex manner, high-quality and timely intelligence collection and analysis are essential for the Government to conduct accurate decision-making. As military activities in the vicinity of Japan become increasingly active, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is to build a seamless intelligence collection system through the appropriate use of various means.

The MOD/SDF is making efforts to collect intelligence swiftly and accurately on a daily basis by using various methods. Examples: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing military communication signals and signals emanating from electronic weapons in the air over Japan;

(2) collecting, processing and analyzing data from various imagery satellites; (3) surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other assets; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open-source intelligence (OSINT); (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection by defense attachés and other.

In addition to strengthening the system for dispatching Defense Attachés, from the perspective of implementing effective intelligence collection activities in their assigned countries, the MOD is to improve its support for Defense Attachés by enhancing and strengthening pre-dispatch trainings, ensuring their career paths and strengthening the intelligence cycle including accumulation of relevant intelligence.

Fig. III-1-5-1 Dispatched Defense Attachés (image)



**REFERENCE:** The MOD/SDF's "I Want to Know About This!": Defense attachés  
**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/shiritai/chuuzaikai/index.html>

With regard to Defense Attachés, in FY2023, the MOD, in order to strengthen intelligence collection in Europe in light of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, dispatched one additional Defense Attaché to each country in Romania, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine, as well as newly dispatched one in Qatal. In FY2024, the MOD plans to newly dispatch Defense Attaché to Cambodia, Estonia, and Sri Lanka, as well as increase the number of Defense Attachés in Vietnam.

 See Fig. III-1-5-1 (Dispatched Defense Attachés (Image))

## 2 Initiatives towards Enhancing Capabilities Such as Intelligence Analysis

As the character of warfare becomes more rapid and complex moving forward, to win battles, Japan needs to establish a system that enables real-time intelligence sharing by making maximum use of various means, including artificial intelligence (AI) and further strengthening the capabilities such as intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. Japan also needs to continuously and accurately grasp the intentions and capabilities of our surrounding countries and others more than ever before.

Therefore, to effectively collect, organize, analyze, share and preserve intelligence and to contribute to policy decisions and force operations, Japan will strengthen its capabilities by function for signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT) and OSINT, centered on the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), while fundamentally enhancing our integrated analysis capabilities, including the use of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). To this end, the budget is to be acquired for the maintenance of the intelligence systems of the DIH as well as the Japan Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces (the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF); the maintenance and improvement of various intelligence collection assets and intelligence collection equipment at each communication station and coastal surveillance unit; and the collection and organization of various intelligence materials, so that intelligence analysis and other functions can be strengthened.

In order for the intelligence division to respond appropriately to increasingly diversified intelligence requirements, the MOD/SDF is promoting the securing and training of highly capable personnel handling intelligence collection and analysis. Moreover, the MOD/SDF is taking steady measures in various

directions including recruitment, education, training and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will promote cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic organizations related to intelligence and take necessary measures to make more effective use of intelligence collected by IGS in SDF operations.

## 3 DIH

### (1) Mission of the DIH

The DIH is the central intelligence agency of the MOD and the largest intelligence agency of Japan. It was established in 1997 to develop a framework for sophisticated and comprehensive intelligence collection and analysis in the increasingly complicated security environment following the Cold War. The Headquarters gathers SIGINT, IMINT, GEOINT, OSINT, etc. and analyzes international and military situations and other matters related to Japan's swiftly changing security environment.

In addition to intelligence collection and analysis, the Headquarters is also considered in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) to play a central role in responding to Integrated Information Warfare for the defense of Japan and is to fundamentally strengthen the capabilities to collect, analyze and disseminate information on international military situations and other issues.

### (2) Activities of the DIH

The DIH is an organization consisting of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel and administrative and technical officials (specialized in language, technology, administration or general office work). The SDF personnel use the knowledge based on their experience in their own unit, etc., whereas administrative/technical officials use their expert knowledge in language, technology and other fields, to work together for their mission.

Specifically, they conduct comprehensive analysis on international situations that change day by day from diverse perspectives, including military, political and economic factors, based on information received from a wide range of sources including SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT (newspapers, internet, etc.) and opinion exchange with relevant parties.

The DIH is also strengthening information gathering and analyzing functions in new domains such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. For

example, it conducts the collection and analysis of necessary information regarding trends in threats in cyberspace through such means as collecting OSINT and exchanging information with other countries. In addition, the DIH increased the number of personnel in FY2022 to strengthen its system for gathering and analyzing information on the economic security of other countries.

Results of the DIH's intelligence service are provided as analysis products to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, as well as GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units in a timely and appropriate manner to support policy decision and unit operation. The DIH also actively exchanges information with relevant ministries and agencies and foreign counterparts.

#### 4 Initiatives for Information Security

The MOD/SDF has been working to ensure a system necessary for information security in accordance with the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets<sup>1</sup> and other relevant laws and in cooperation with relevant ministries, agencies and bureaus, to appropriately protect various types of highly classified information.

However, it came to light that the Commander of the MSDF Fleet Intelligence Command intentionally disclosed without authorization specially designated secrets and other information to his former superior, who was not eligible to handle classified information, in a situation briefing conducted in March 2020, thereby violating the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets and Article 59, Paragraph 1 (duty of confidentiality) of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

In response to this, in March 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada established measures to prevent recurrence (Minister's circular notice), including guidelines for meeting and briefing former officials and institutionalization of maintenance training for managers and retired officials and made all officials thoroughly aware of such measures.

Subsequently, taking the opportunity of about six months having elapsed since implementing recurrence-prevention measures, the effectiveness of the measures was verified after October 2023 and it emerged that some departments had experienced a

significant decrease in operational efficiency and others. Accordingly, it was decided to improve the operation of recurrence prevention measures while maintaining their effectiveness from January 2024 onward. Specifically, the following measures were implemented to improve operations: (1) For officials engaged in related work such as recruitment/support work and procurement who have daily contact with former officials, only when a former official made an unusual request were such requests reported to the head of the respective organization, etc.; and (2) As a general rule, the meetings and briefings should be conducted by multiple officials, but in cases where more than one official is not available, such as when it interferes with operations, a single official may conduct the meeting or briefing independently with the prior approval of the senior official in charge of his or her duties.

On June 2022, it was found that then commanding officer of MSDF destroyer JS "Inazuma" designated his crew newly assigned to the ship by personnel transfer as an official handling specially designated secrets, even though he/she had not undergone a security clearance assessment for specially designated secrets, and that the former commanding officer had such personnel handle specially designated secret information at the Combat Information Center (CIC) during the two-month mission operation before the ship had an accident off Suo-oshima in Yamaguchi Prefecture on January 2023, thereby violating Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, and others. In addition, on July 2023, it was found that the commander of a unit under the command of the GSDF Northern Army, when giving instructions and communicating at a training exercise held at the Kamifurano Training Area, divulged specially designated secret information to 15 personnel of the unit who were not in a position to know the specially designated secret information, thereby violating the Act on the Protection of Specified Secrets, and others.

The MOD/SDF took the occurrence of this incident seriously, and on April 2024, announced the results of the investigation and disciplinary action, and at the same time issued an instruction from the MOD regarding the prevention of recurrence. In addition, the Defense Vice Minister has decided to intensively study more effective measures to prevent recurrence of such incidents and to further ensure information security.

<sup>1</sup> Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets

## 2

## Responding to Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the Cognitive Dimension

### 1 Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the Cognitive Dimension

In the international community, emphasis is being placed on information warfare, in which countries attempt to create a favorable security environment for themselves at a stage when no conflict has arisen by disinformation and strategic information dissemination to influence public opinion and decision-making in other countries while protecting the impact on their own decision-making. In light of this situation, Japan will build a system and posture that can reliably deal with Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension.



**See** Part I, Chapter 4, Section 1-4 (Diffusion of Information-related Technology and Information Warfare)

### 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

With the increasingly severe security environment and the rapid progress of technological innovation, including information technology (IT), it is important to respond to new “ways of warfare,” including in the cognitive dimension. In particular, in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the clashes between Israel and the Palestinian militants, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, there is an urgent need to respond to Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension, with a focus on detecting and analyzing disinformation and promptly and appropriately disseminating information.

Due to various acts being committed in the international community in the name of information warfare, it is important to clearly state the outer limits for responding to Integrated Information Warfare to be implemented from the perspective of the defense of Japan to ensure credibility both domestically and overseas.

Specifically, Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension refers to the following three measures undertaken during emergencies as well as the current stage from the perspective of the defense of Japan: (1) acquiring diverse intelligence collection capabilities by strengthening intelligence functions, (2) determining the veracity and intentions of all threats, including disinformation spread by other countries and neutralizing them or taking other measures

through various means and (3) deterring and responding to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and building a more desirable security environment, while protecting Japan’s decision-making through measures such as the rapid and strategic dissemination of appropriate information at every opportunity in cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others. Furthermore, Japan will not implement efforts that damage our credibility (such as dissemination of disinformation via social media and other means, manipulation of public opinion, conspiracy, etc.).

In the MOD/SDF, the DIH plays a central role in responding to such Integrated Information Warfare and the MOD as a whole will develop intelligence capabilities that can reliably deal with Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension by 2027. The DIH takes the necessary measures at all stages of collection, analysis and dissemination, while working closely alongside the policy and operations divisions, including developing a function that automatically collects social media and other information to determine the veracity of information dissemination by each country.

In the FY2024 budget, to strengthen the system for information collection, analysis and dissemination related to responding to Integrated Information Warfare, Defense Intelligence officer and a specialized department in the DIH is established. This position and department is exclusively responsible for the task. In addition, Integrated Information Warfare Coordination Section is to be established in the Internal Bureau of the Ministry as the commanding function where the number of administrative officials and others is to be secured. Also, the Ministry as a whole is to increase the number of the necessary GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel and civilian officials and others to take necessary measures to strengthen the system. Moreover, an AI-based automatic collection and analysis function for open source information, especially SNS, will be developed and future forecasting services related to information estimation will be brought into.

Furthermore, in the units of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF as well, the Government intends to establish a solid system by reviewing major units and reorganizing units.

Additionally, the Government will strive to further

strengthen Japan's capabilities in light of trends in the international community by sharing information and conducting joint training with our ally, like-minded countries and others.

In addition to the various measures mentioned above, to ensure that SDF personnel, who are the core element of our defense capability, are not misled by disinformation and prevented from making appropriate decisions, each personnel member must understand

the dangers of disinformation and develop an attitude that enables them to calmly perceive and objectively examine matters on a daily basis. Therefore, Japan will work to further strengthen the information security system by having personnel learn necessary professional qualities, improving their cyber/media literacy, etc. through provision of education and self-improvement opportunities.

## Section 6

# Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives to Ensure War Sustainability

To defend Japan in future, the current warfighting sustainability of the SDF is not necessarily sufficient in terms of ammunitions and fuel and the number of operationally available equipment. It is necessary to squarely address these realities and strive to ensure and maintain sufficient war sustainability so that the SDF can continue persistent activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrent. Furthermore, to ensure the safety of SDF personnel on a daily basis and prevent the easy loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency, Japan will promote measures such as making major command headquarters underground and reinforcing their structures, relocate and consolidate facilities to ensure stand-off distance and steadily construct barracks and housing and maintain aging buildings. Moreover, Japan will conceal and camouflage equipment to improve resiliency. In addition, the issue of climate change, including responses to future energy shifts, will inevitably further impact future the MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, defense equipment and the security environment surrounding Japan, which requires Japan to deal with a

variety of issues related to these matters.

To this end, in the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS), Japan will improve production capacity of ammunition, storage commensurate with the amount of ammunition produced, promptly acquire the necessary and sufficient ammunition, promptly secure the necessary and sufficient amount of fuel and establish a system to enable all equipment to be operational except that under planned maintenance by FY2027. In addition, Japan will promote measures to construct major underground command headquarters, relocate and consolidate facilities in bases and camps, as well as improve the resiliency of facilities and infrastructure against disasters such as tsunamis.

One of the top priorities by FY2027 is to improve the number of operationally available equipment, secure sufficient ammunitions and fuel and accelerate improving the resiliency of defense facilities. The expenditures for enhancing sustainability and resiliency exceed 40%<sup>1</sup> of the approximately 43.5 trillion yen (contract-based amount) that the Defense Buildup Program (DBP) indicates is necessary over the next five years.

## 1 Securing Ammunition

### 1 Status of Securing Ammunition

The SDF possesses a wide variety of ammunition, including bullets used in rifles and pistols, shells fired by tanks and artillery, missiles used by fighter aircraft and naval vessels, as well as bombs, torpedoes, land mines and sea mines.

Although the budget for ammunition has remained generally flat over the past 30 years, it is difficult to say that the budget to secure ammunition has always been sufficient, due to price increases associated with the advancement of technology. Moreover, some ammunition manufacturing companies withdrew from the market due to a decrease in orders from the MOD/SDF. Although other companies have made up for the parts manufactured by the companies that withdrew,

there have been cases of prolonged initial manufacturing periods and higher manufacturing costs that made it even more difficult to secure ammunition.

In addition to lacking the necessary and sufficient ammunition storage facilities, some areas do not have enough room to flexibly operate deployed ammunition because of the increasing size of missiles and other ammunition. There have been cases, for example, of ammunition to be carried by vessels in the Maizuru area for missions being transported overland from the Sasebo area.

### 2 Efforts to Secure Ammunition

The NDS calls for resolving the shortage of required quantities of ammunition by FY2027. Regarding high-

<sup>1</sup> Expenditures for enhancing sustainability and resiliency total approximately 19 trillion yen, comprising approximately 5 trillion yen for costs of ammunitions and guided missiles, including those accounted for in other fields such as stand-off defense capabilities (approximately 2 trillion yen if not including these other fields); approximately 10 trillion yen for costs of sustainment, maintenance and ensuring the operational availability of equipment, etc. (approximately 9 trillion yen if not including other fields); and approximately 4 trillion yen for costs of improving the resiliency of facilities.


priority stand-off missiles, Japan began acquisition of Upgraded Type-12 SSM from FY2023 and will begin acquisition of Tomahawk in FY2025, one year earlier than originally planned. Japan will also promptly procure the required quantities of various ammunitions that strengthen integrated air and missile defense capabilities, including interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IIA), interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 MSE), Long-Range Ship-to-Air Missiles (SM-6) and Upgraded Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (modified).

Specifically, ammunition development costs, which were approximately 1 trillion yen in the previous Medium Term Defense Program, will be increased five-fold to approximately 5 trillion yen in five years during

the period of the DBP. On this occasion, Japan will also procure the required quantities of various ammunition necessary for continuous unit operations, including small arms and firearms other than those related to the stand-off defense capabilities and integrated air and missile defense capabilities described above, as well as various ammunition required for continuous unit operations such as ship-to-ship guided missiles, ship-to-air guided missiles and air-to-air guided missiles.

To mass-produce ammunitions quickly and stably, the MOD/SDF will encourage the defense industry to expand its domestic manufacturing capacity and strengthen the maintenance posture for the various ammunitions. In addition, to accommodate the increasing ammunition size and meet the increasing storage requirements for ammunitions, the MOD/SDF will promote the expansion

**Fig. III-1-6-1** Examples of Major Ammunition and Magazines





of ammunition storage facilities and the disposal of unused ammunitions.

 Fig. III-1-6-1 (Examples of Major Ammunitions and Magazines); Section 4-1-2 (1) (Strengthening of Stand-off Defense Capabilities)

## 2 Securing Fuel

To secure the necessary amount of fuel for the SDF operations quickly and stably, the MOD/SDF will build new fuel tanks while also renting private fuel tanks.

For example, maintenance of fuel tanks in the MSDF has been carried out in stages based on actual use and existing tank capacity, etc. and further, as a measure to

make up for fuel for ships, private tanks with the capacity to handle storage as well as acceptance and delivery operations throughout the year will be rented.

In addition, the MOD/SDF will secure the necessary quantities of food and clothing.

## 3 Improving the Operational Availability of Equipment


### 1 Current Status of the Number of Operationally Available Equipment

Equipment used by the SDF emphasizes performance over durability and is used under harsher conditions than civilian products. It thus has characteristics that result in more frequent maintenance and parts replacement compared to equipment for general use. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a certain quantity of spare parts in anticipation of parts replacement.

On the other hand, as equipment has become more advanced and achieved higher performance, the unit procurement cost of parts and costs for maintenance have risen and while there have also been increases in sustainment and maintenance budget, such increases have not always been sufficient, resulting in equipment being unable to operate due to parts shortages. For some equipment, parts are removed from equipment that is not operational and diverted to other equipment, which requires twice as much maintenance work as normal parts replacement due to the removal and installation of parts, thereby imposing an excessive burden on units in the field. Based on this, as was the case in FY2023, the MOD/SDF intends to secure a substantial budget for sustainment and maintenance in FY2024 to resolve equipment non-operational situations due to parts shortages and maximize the number of operationally available equipment by FY2027, aiming to quickly establish a system that can fully demonstrate the capabilities of the equipment in its possession.

 Fig. III-1-6-2 (Equipment Operation State Classification)

Fig. III-1-6-2 Equipment Operation State Classification



### 2 Increasing the Number of Operationally Available Equipment

#### (1) Securing Parts

By securing the necessary budget for maintenance and materials, with lead time taken into consideration, while dealing with the increasing sophistication and complexity of defense equipment, the MOD/SDF will resolve equipment non-operational situations due to parts shortages and maximize the number of operationally available equipment by FY2027. To this end, the precision of supply and demand forecasts will be improved by upgrading logistics-related systems, such as by adding a function to supply management systems to estimate

the demand for parts using artificial intelligence (AI) while the time it takes for units to receive parts will be shortened by distributing parts efficiently throughout the SDF through the maintenance of adequate inventory. In addition, major supply warehouses will be renovated to become automated, manpower-saving and systematized to enable accurate inventory control and prompt supply of parts according to the needs of the units.

## (2) Promotion of Outsourcing

In increasing the number of operationally available equipment, the MOD/SDF will promote the outsourcing of sustainment, maintenance and other operations to outside parties to make effective use of limited resources.

For some equipment, the MOD/SDF is conducting outsourcing efforts aimed at reducing the number of inspection and maintenance items by analyzing maintenance plans, collecting the necessary data and other such actions. The MOD/SDF will further promote efforts for more efficient sustainment and maintenance, such as unit maintenance and parts repair of equipment that utilize the results of such outsourcing efforts. Through these efforts, the MOD/SDF will improve the number of operationally available equipment while reducing the burden on units, especially on personnel engaged in sustainment and maintenance work.

## (3) Introduction of Digital Transformation (DX)

To efficiently carry out various types of operations, it is necessary to drastically transform the way operations are

conducted through digital transformation (DX), including the development of the latest digital. In addition, the MOD/SDF will promote the introduction of DX in the logistics support field to optimize sustainment and maintenance. Specifically, in addition to the introduction of AI-based supply management systems, the MOD/SDF will optimize its sustainment and maintenance posture in the logistics support field by improving the efficiency of inventory control and other aspects by using the results of demonstration tests for the introduction of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), an automatic authentication technology that uses radio waves to read and write information on integration circuit (IC) tags in a contactless manner to allow the inventory status of parts and other items to be grasped more accurately, as well as 3D printers, which can be used for the emergency manufacturing of equipment parts and other items.

## (4) Expansion of Performance Based Logistics (PBL)<sup>2</sup> and Other Comprehensive Contracts

After concluding a PBL contract for aircraft from FY2012, the MOD/SDF has been expanding the scope of such contracts beyond aircraft, including the conclusion of a PBL contract for gas turbine engines for naval vessels in FY2021. The MOD/SDF will work to expand the scope of PBL contracts, which will improve the number of operationally available equipment, while verifying their cost-effectiveness to achieve effective and efficient sustainment and maintenance.

# 4 Improving the Resiliency of Facilities

It is important to ensure sufficient functioning of SDF facilities, which are the foundation for the sustainability and resiliency of Japan's defense capabilities. Because approximately 40% of SDF facilities were built during periods when the old earthquake resistance standards were in effect, it is necessary to transform these facilities into ones that can ensure the safety of SDF personnel on a daily basis and prevent the easy loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency. The MOD/SDF is evaluating the performance of 20,000 or more SDF facilities owned by camps and bases as a whole (283 districts), preparing a master plan (MP) for consolidation and reconstruction, etc. and efficiently carrying out

maintenance such as updating existing facilities in priority order.

Besides, as disaster countermeasures, flood prevention measures, slope collapse<sup>3</sup> prevention measures and others are being taken.

In addition, in conjunction with the acquisition of various types of ammunition required for continuous unit operations, it is necessary to secure ammunition storage facilities. At the same time, the MOD/SDF will adopt various measures to improve resiliency in a multi-layered way by dispersing the infrastructure for SDF operations as well as by restoring and replacing infrastructure when it is damaged.

<sup>2</sup> Comprehensive contracts to improve the number of operational availability and to achieve long-term cost containment

<sup>3</sup> A steep slope that collapses rapidly following a heavy rainfall or earthquake

Furthermore, to properly execute the increasing budget for facility maintenance, including the maintenance of facilities provided by the SDF as well as the maintenance of SDF facilities, the MOD/SDF plans to further optimize the bidding and contracting system by newly establishing the Construction System Planning Division in an internal bureau of the Ministry in FY2024.

### 1 Securing Ammunition Storage Facilities

In conjunction with the acquisition of various types of ammunition, including stand-off missiles, the SDF will secure the necessary ammunition storage facilities. In securing the ammunition storage facilities, the SDF will pursue and promote efficient joint operations between the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; joint use of U.S. ammunition storage facilities; and dispersed deployment to islands from the viewpoint of ensuring the resiliency of ammunition.

### 2 Improving the Resiliency of SDF Facilities

To protect major equipment and command posts, etc. and ensure a tenacious fighting posture, the MOD/SDF will establish underground basing, reinforce facilities and take measures against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, such as installing filters on power lines and others, for major command posts. Additionally, the MOD/SDF plans to multiplex and renew aging facilities in conjunction with the renewal of existing facilities, also regarding the construction of dispersal pads for dispersedly deploying



An improved aircraft shelter for F-15 fighters at the ASDF Chitose Air Base

fighter aircraft, the hardening of shelters for fighter aircraft,<sup>4</sup> and essential utilities such as electricity and water. In addition, the base security function will be strengthened while reducing the number of personnel.

### 3 Development of Facilities Required for Formation of New Units and Introduction of New Equipment

During the period of the DBP, the MOD/SDF will continue to develop the facilities necessary for the formation of new units and the introduction of new equipment. Specifically, this will include the development of facilities for the GSDF's new Camp Saga (tentative name), the development of facilities in Sasebo (Sakibe East Area (tentative name)) for the MSDF and the development of facilities for receiving the ASDF's F-35 (A and B) aircraft.



Facilities for receiving F-35A and F-35B fighters (image)

### 4 Structural Reinforcement, Relocation, Consolidation, etc., of Facilities

When renovating existing facilities, protective measures against explosives, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, electromagnetic waves and guerrilla attacks shall be provided. Structural reinforcement of facilities in accordance with their functions and importance as well as the relocation and consolidation of facilities to ensure stand-off distance shall also be implemented in conjunction with maintenance measures for aging buildings, thereby ensuring that the facilities are fully functioning.

<sup>4</sup> Strengthening to withstand an attack

## 5 Maintaining and Strengthening the Functions of Camps, Bases, etc., that Serve as Bases for Disaster Response

To prevent the functional decline of SDF facilities in the event of large-scale disaster, the MOD/SDF will promote countermeasures against disasters such as tsunamis for bases and camps that are expected to be damaged.

Specifically, the MOD/SDF will take measures such as locating transforming equipment on high ground and installing watertight panels at entrances and exits. In future, the SDF will improve the resiliency of defense facilities and infrastructure in bases and camps to adapt and respond appropriately to various challenges associated with climate change and to fulfill the SDF's missions and roles.

## Section 7

## Measures for Protection of the Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals

## 1 Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc.

## 1 Basic Concept

Large-scale disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons, infectious disease crises such as COVID-19 and other such issues are serious threats to the lives, health and property of Japanese citizens and require Japan to respond with all-out efforts.

In the event of a large-scale disaster, etc., the MOD/SDF closely cooperate with the police, fire departments, JCG, local governments and other related organizations to effectively carry out life-saving activities, emergency reconstruction, livelihood support, etc.

Since the damage situation is unclear at the beginning of a large-scale disaster, the MOD/SDF will maintain response readiness to any damage and need for activities. In addition, while giving first priority to life-saving activities, the MOD/SDF will conduct livelihood support by coordinating with relevant parties, including local governments and the ministries and agencies concerned, on the division of roles, response policy, activity period, activities with private companies and other matters. Furthermore, with regard to support for local governments in particular, based on the premise that there will be confusion in local governments immediately after a disaster and also based on lessons learned in past disaster relief efforts, the MOD/SDF will propose specific support and later shift to activities based on the needs of local governments. For this purpose, the SDF is strengthening dissemination of information so that people who truly need support by the SDF can easily access the information related to support.

In addition, the SDF has the “FAST-FORCE” unit on standby at camps and other locations throughout Japan to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly.

 Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 3-5 (Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others)

## 2 Response by the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF

## (1) Responses to Natural Disasters, Etc.

## a. Disaster Relief in Response to Typhoon August, September in 2023

On August 7 2023, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture



Airlift of personnel and supplies for disaster relief related to Typhoon Khanun (Izena Village)

issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF to airlift personnel and supplies to Izena and Iheya villages due to Typhoon and the airlift of personnel and supplies was carried out by 5 personnel and 1 aircraft.

On September 9 the same year, the Governor of Ibaraki Prefecture issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF for search and lifesaving operations associated with the landslide disaster due to Typhoon and a total of 246 personnel and 38 vehicles were dispatched to conduct search and lifesaving activities.

## b. Disaster Relief in Response to Heavy Rain

On July 10 2023, amid continuing record-breaking heavy rain caused by a linear precipitation band over the Kyushu region due to the impact of 2023 rainy season front, the governors of Saga and Fukuoka prefectures issued a disaster relief request on the same day to the GSDF to rescue people and remove debris in Karatsu and Kurume cities, whereupon a total of 474 personnel, 181 vehicles and four aircraft were dispatched to conduct lifesaving activities.

On July 16 the same year, as heavy rainfall that had been occurring since July 14 caused landslides and other disasters in Akita Prefecture, the governor issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF for water supply activities in Happo Town, Oga City and Gojome Town; and patient transportation and the removal of disaster waste in Akita City and patient transportation and the removal of disaster waste were carried out. The scale of dispatch for these activities amounted to a total of about 820 personnel and about 270 vehicles.



Search and Rescue by ASDF personnel search dogs

### c. Disaster Relief in Response to Heavy Snow

On September 9 the same year, the Governor of Ibaraki Prefecture issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF for search and lifesaving operations associated with the landslide disaster due to Typhoon and a total of 246 personnel and 38 vehicles were dispatched to conduct search and lifesaving activities.

### d. Disaster Relief in Response to Bird Flu Outbreaks

In Hokkaido and Gunma Prefecture where bird flu outbreaks occurred between August 31, 2023 and September 5, 2023, in response to disaster relief requests from the governors of each prefecture, the SDF provided support for culling in poultry houses with bird flu outbreaks and other things. These missions engaged a cumulative total of around 5,000 personnel.



Support for culling and other activities in disaster relief related to bird flu outbreaks

### e. Disaster Relief in Response to Classical Swine Fever<sup>1</sup> Outbreaks


During the period from April 2023 to the end of March 2024, in Saga Prefecture, support was provided for culling and others (removing and driving out pigs and carrying them out of pig houses) in pig farms with classical swine fever outbreaks. These missions engaged a cumulative total of 1,529 personnel.



Support for culling and other activities in disaster relief efforts related to the swine fever outbreak

### f. Disaster Relief in Response to Forest Fires

Of the forest fires that broke out between April 2023 and the end of March 2024, local authorities conducted firefighting operations but were unable to extinguish fires in five prefectures (Gunma, Nagano, Ehime, Hiroshima and Wakayama Prefectures). Based on disaster relief requests issued by the governors of each prefecture, the SDF conducted aerial firefighting and other operations. The SDF dispatched a cumulative total of about 950 personnel, about 100 vehicles and about 80 aircraft.

 See Reference 18 (Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years))

### (2) Transportation of Emergency Patients

The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2023, out of a total of 387 cases of disaster relief, 352 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo) and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing the majority of such cases.

<sup>1</sup> A febrile infectious disease of pigs and boars caused by swine fever virus, characterized by strong contagion and high mortality

### (3) Response to Search and Rescue of U.S. Forces Osprey

On November 29, 2023, a U.S. Air Force CV-22 (Osprey) crashed at sea. In response to this, aircraft, naval vessels and ground forces of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF were voluntarily dispatched to conduct search and rescue operations from the same day to December 2. A cumulative total of about 790 personnel, about 50 aircraft, and about 10 vessels were dispatched for these operations. Following the voluntary dispatch, support for search activities was provided until the 23rd of the same month. Such operations were carried out with the cooperation of the Japan Coast Guard, local governments, local fishermen, and others.



Crew members on their way to search from the minesweeper JS Bungo

**See** Chapter 2, Section 5-2-7 (2) (Training Relocation for MV-22 (Osprey) etc.); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Initiatives for Safety Management, etc.); Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 1-4-2 (3) (Crash of the U.S. Osprey); Reference 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces)

### (4) Responses to Nuclear Disasters

In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.” The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, local governments and nuclear operators,

to confirm the effectiveness of municipal governments’ evacuation plan and to strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in a nuclear disaster emergency.

### (5) Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters

The MOD/SDF establish basic items for actions to be taken by the SDF in the event of various disasters based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan in order to take all possible measures for the initial response by promptly transporting and deploying units as well as to respond to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration by the Central Disaster Management Council.<sup>2</sup> With this, the MOD/SDF formulate various contingency plans to respond to such earthquakes with the aim of implementation of swift, systematic disaster relief.

Based on the damage assumptions for a megaquake in the Japan Trench or the Chishima Trench as well as the Basic Plan for Promotion of Disaster Management for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches announced by the Cabinet Office, the contingency plan<sup>3</sup> for this earthquake was formulated in FY2022.

### (6) Collaboration with Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations

It is important for the MOD/SDF to strengthen collaboration with local governments and other relevant organizations under normal circumstances for the purpose of conducting disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including: (1) Assignment of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices; (2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the GSDF



**REFERENCE:** Disaster relief operations

**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/index.html>



**REFERENCE:** The MOD/SDF’s (disaster management)

**URL:** [https://twitter.com/ModJapan\\_saigai?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw](https://twitter.com/ModJapan_saigai?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw)



<sup>2</sup> As one of the councils in the Cabinet Office, this council comprises the Prime Minister, all cabinet ministers, representatives of designated public organizations and academic experts and is responsible for preparing the basic plan for disaster prevention, deliberation on important matters related to disaster prevention and so on.

<sup>3</sup> The Basic Plan for Promotion of Disaster Management for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches

## Response to the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake

On January 1 2024, an earthquake with a maximum intensity of 7 (M7.6, depth of approximately 16 km) occurred with its epicenter in the Noto region of Ishikawa Prefecture. The governors of Ishikawa and Toyama prefectures issued a disaster relief request to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) the same day and January 4, 2024, respectively and it provided life-saving work, sanitation, transportation, food, water, bathing, road clearing and other services. In response, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) launched the aircraft immediately after the disaster to assess the damages, and organized a joint task force under the command of Commanding General of the Middle Army on the second day the same month, which carried out various activities using up to around 14,000 personnel.

In this disaster relief operation, under circumstances where it was difficult to access the disaster areas from land due to their location at the tip of a peninsula where the road network had been cut off, the MOD/SDF dealt with the situation by mobilizing its integrated operational capabilities, including the intensive air mobility operation of the GSDF, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), as well as the use of the SDF vessels as bases at sea.

In the operation in Ishikawa and Toyama prefectures (operations ended on January 9 in Toyama prefecture), in addition to lifesaving activities immediately after the disaster, the task force transported police, firefighters and DMAT personnel, etc. using the SDF aircraft, vessels and other means; conducted road-clearing work to allow traffic to pass through the road and other work; and did its best to provide detailed livelihood support activities close to the victims, including visits to evacuation centers to understand the requests from the victims and the operation of rest facilities using PFI ships. (As of March 31: (1) Transportation of supplies (about 4.3 million



Members of the 23rd Squadron (ASDF Wajima Air Station), commonly known as the "Wajima 40s", who began provided support to nearby residents and conducted search and rescue operations, etc. immediately after the disaster. (January 2024)

rations and about 2.3 million bottles of drinking water), (2) School lunch support (about 250,000 rations), (3) Water supply support (about 6,000 tons), (4) Bathing support (about 370,000 people, etc.)

On January 5 the same year, with the approval of the Prime Minister, up to about 100 SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up and a total of about 200 personnel, including replacement personnel, engaged in activities to support livelihoods and hygiene in the affected areas.

In terms of transportation of relief supplies and livelihood support, while the government of Japan as a whole worked to provide "push-type" support, the relief supplies were first collected at one location (Kanazawa) by SDF trucks and other vehicles, then transported to each collection point and elsewhere by helicopters and vehicles and later transported to respective evacuation centers. As for transportation by naval vessels, although the use of ports was difficult due to tsunami damage, etc. and roads were damaged, a Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) boat was launched from the transport ship "Osumi" to transport heavy equipment, including bulldozers and relief supplies.

In addition, the U.S. Forces in Japan provided support for the transportation of relief supplies to the disaster victims by air.

### Various Operations in the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake



Life-saving activities



Landing of heavy machinery and other equipment by LCAC



Transportation of goods



Medical support



Understanding requests from disaster victims





Prime Minister Kishida encouraging SDF personnel and others at the site (January 2024)



Defense Minister Kihara assessing the damages from above (January 2024)

## VOICE

## Voice of an SDF Ready Reserve Member Engaged in Disaster Relief Operations in the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake

### MORIMURA Hiromu, GSDF

Since witnessing the active role of the Self-Defense Forces during the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, I have been considering anything I could do to help in the event of disasters or emergencies in the future. When a path to the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel was opened in 2019, I immediately applied, and I now participate in training with the help of my workplace and family. Immediately after the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake on January 1, I started preparing myself for the possibility of being dispatched to the disaster relief operations, and I could respond promptly to the actual call for disaster relief. I took 10

days off from work and was sent off with many kind words from colleagues, superiors, and partner companies, who would have trouble because of my absence. This made me think of how big the expectations of Japanese people were while I prepared for the handover and dispatch. Although there were times of bad weather at the disaster-stricken area, I think I could help the disaster victims to the best of my ability while remembering my original feeling of 13 years ago. I will continue to train my mind and body and strive to balance work and training so that I can respond to the task entrusted to me in an emergency.



The author in his workplace (Boost Co., Ltd., Osaka City)



Activities the author participated in the disaster area (transporting supplies by helicopter)



**REFERENCE:** Disaster relief for the Noto Peninsula Earthquake of 2024

**URL:** <http://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/domestic/2024notohantou.html>

Middle Army and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and (3) Recommendation of retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in accordance with requests from local governments.

As of the end of March 2024, 665 retired uniformed SDF personnel are working in disaster prevention and crisis management sections, etc. in 476 local governments in 46 prefectures throughout the country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very effective way of strengthening collaboration between the MOD/SDF and local governments and its efficacy was confirmed through the responses to various kinds of disasters. In particular, each GSDF regional army headquarters establishes a forum for interaction with senior directors for crisis management and other officials from local governments and shares information and exchanges opinions to strengthen collaboration with those local governments.

In the event of a disaster, liaison officers are sent quickly from the units to the local governments in order to ensure smooth coordination.

### (7) Actions Based on the Five-Year Acceleration Measures for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Building National Resilience

In December 2020, the five-year acceleration measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national

resilience<sup>4</sup> were approved by the Cabinet. Under the measures, the MOD intensively focuses on measures for mechanical equipment materials, etc., at SDF airfield facilities and others, measures for enhancing the SDF's infrastructure and measures for strengthening the SDF's buildings, etc., from the perspective of maintaining and strengthening functions including important infrastructure for disaster prevention.

### 3 Impact on Various Trainings due to Disaster Relief Activities

Large-scale and long-term disaster relief activities have been increasing in recent years and originally planned training cannot be conducted during these disaster relief activities, which sometimes hinders the training plans.

In the future, the MOD/SDF will make the utmost effort to respond to life-saving activities during the initial response and with regards to the various types of emergency assistance, etc., the MOD/SDF will coordinate the role sharing, response guidelines, activity periods and utilization of private companies, etc., with the relevant parties such as local governments and the relevant ministries and agencies. The posture will be shifted as needed and activities will be carried out at an appropriate posture and scale.

## 2 Responses to Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas

### 1 Basic Concept

In the event of natural disasters, turmoil and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to protect and rescue or transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and upon subsequent consultations with the Minister.

**See** Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 3-7 (Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas); Reference 19 (Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas by the Self-Defense Forces).

### 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

For prompt and appropriate implementation of rescue or transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas, the SDF has prepared to dispatch its units swiftly. Specifically, each SDF designates the necessary personnel and units for dispatch: helicopter units and personnel for ground transportation units from GSDF; vessels such as transport vessel (including ship-based aircraft) from MSDF; and aircraft units and personnel from ASDF.

Since these activities require close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, the MOD/SDF

<sup>4</sup> In light of the increasingly severe and frequent occurrence of weather disasters due to climate change, the imminence of large-scale earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, as well as the aging of infrastructure that was intensively developed from Japan's period of rapid economic growth, it is necessary to accelerate and deepen efforts for disaster prevention and mitigation as well as building national resilience. It is also essential to utilize digital technology to efficiently promote measures for building national resilience. To this end, efforts are being made for further acceleration and deepening of measures in the fields of "countermeasures against increasingly severe wind and flood damage, imminent large-scale earthquakes, etc.," "acceleration of aging countermeasures towards a shift to preventive maintenance of infrastructure," and "promotion of digitization, etc. to efficiently advance measures related to national resiliency." The scale of additional projects required in the five years through FY2025 is specified and focused and intensive countermeasures are to be taken.

conducts joint exercises on a regular basis. From August to September 2022, the MOD/SDF conducted training in Japan with related organizations for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas to practice the entire process of the actions of units and coordination with the related organizations, which improved integrated operational capabilities and strengthened cooperation with the related organizations. Furthermore, from February to March 2024, the MOD/SDF took advantage of the opportunity of the annual multilateral joint exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand to rehearse on a series of activities for rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas in cooperation with the relevant ministries and agencies, the Embassy of Japan in Thailand and other organizations. The exercises strengthened the collaboration between the MOD/SDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The MOD/SDF has conducted the transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas in seven cases, two of which were carried out in 2023.

The first case was the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in the Republic of Sudan. In April 2023, considering the situations in the Republic of Sudan and at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the MOD/SDF dispatched two C-130 transport aircraft, two C-2 transport aircraft and one KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the Republic of Djibouti. One C-2 transport aircraft transported 45 Japanese nationals and their families from Sudan to Djibouti.

The second case was the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in Israel. In October 2023, considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the MOD/SDF dispatched one KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft and two C-2 transport aircraft to Jordan and other areas. One KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft transported 83 people<sup>5</sup> on October 21 and 46 people<sup>6</sup> on November 3 from Israel to Japan, respectively.

 See Reference 20 (Record of Transport of Japanese nationals and others overseas)



After landing at Haneda Airport for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others from Israel

### 3 Initiatives to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas in the Middle East and Africa Regions

The MOD/SDF has utilized the operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti used by the SDF units operating under the Counter-Piracy Measures Act<sup>7</sup>, under circumstances such as the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in South Sudan in 2016 and the dispatch of an investigation team to Ethiopia in response to the worsening situation there in 2021.

In light of this experience as well, the National Security Strategy (NSS) indicated a direction by stating that “...while gaining understanding from the Government of Djibouti, the SDF facility there, which has been in operation for counter-piracy activities, will be also utilized to protect Japanese nationals and others overseas.” On December 22 2023, the Cabinet approved the “Government Initiative to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas in the Middle East and Africa” in order for the government of Japan to take all possible measures to rescue and transport Japanese nationals and others overseas.

In response, a new mission establishing temporary arrangements for the possible rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas was newly assigned to counter-piracy units, such as the accumulation and management of equipment, defense cooperation and exchange utilizing the facility in Djibouti and the regular collection and analysis of information to ensure the rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and

<sup>5</sup> A total of 83 people comprising 60 Japanese nationals and their four foreign national family members, as well as 18 Korean nationals and their one foreign national family member.

<sup>6</sup> A total of 46 people comprising 20 Japanese nationals and their two foreign national family members, as well as 15 Korean nationals, four Vietnamese nationals, one Taiwanese and their four foreign national family members

<sup>7</sup> Act of Punishment and Countermeasures Against Piracy

others overseas. The MOD/SDF will take all possible measures to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals and others overseas.



Reference 21 (Government Initiative to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas in the Middle East and Africa)

The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states that the Alliance with the United States is the cornerstone for Japan's security policy. The fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities will lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities and further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. By representing such joint resolve and capabilities, Japan and the United States will prevent the escalation of emergencies from gray-zone situations to an invasion with conventional force and eventually the use of nuclear weapons, as well as deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts.

In addition, if an invasion against Japan occurs, Japan-U.S. joint response will defeat the invasion. To this end, both Japan and the United States will constantly modernize the Alliance and strengthen joint capabilities by aligning strategies and prioritizing goals together. In doing so, by building upon the fundamental reinforcement of Japan's own defense capabilities, Japan will play a larger role in the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the region under the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

This chapter explains activities related to the enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking account of the concepts of the NDS.

## Section 1 Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

### 1 Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

#### 1 Maintenance of Japan's Peace and Security

In the current international community, a robust defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of aggression, including the use of nuclear weapons, to coercion or intimidation by military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation.

However, it is not easy even for the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it would be difficult for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy.

Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace, security, and independence centered on the Security Arrangements with the United States, the world's dominant military power, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a capitalist economy as well as interests in maintaining the peace and security of the world and has strong economic ties.

Specifically, Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan, based on the provisions of Article 5 of the Japan-

U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on the provisions of Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to defend Japan. As a result, the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words, this serves as deterrence against attacks.

Japan intends to create a seamless posture and secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military together with Japan's own national defense architecture.

#### 2 Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the U.S. Forces in Japan is to contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. This provision is based on the recognition

that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power, including some that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition, uncertainty over the existing order is increasing due to changes in the balance of power. The so-called gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications.

In such security environment, the presence of U.S. forces in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of Japan and the United States but also providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulfilling a role of public goods.

Also, the close cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States' commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the region.

### 3 Responding to Global Issues

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States,

not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan's foreign policy. It contributes to Japan's ability to implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including the promotion of multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations.

Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are difficult for any countries to tackle alone, including risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace, acts of piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and international terrorism, and it is important for countries to work together from peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges.

In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime from a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination lays the foundation for various forms of global collaboration such as counter-piracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of the operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by advancing initiatives for resolving global issues in cooperation with the United States, which has remarkable operational capabilities, Japan will be able to further ensure its security and prosperity.

## 2 Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" (the Guidelines), which show the general outline and policy direction of roles and cooperation between Japan and the United States, were formulated in 1978, and successively revised in 1997 and 2015.

The current Guidelines, which were revised in 2015, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, as well as modernizing the Alliance. The Guidelines also manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

The Guidelines define that Japan and the United States will work on a variety of measures during peacetime, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, training and exercises, asset protection, and logistics support, and cooperate in such activities as response to a large-scale disaster in Japan to seamlessly ensure Japan's peace and security.

The Guidelines also require both countries: to cooperate in international activities and promote and improve trilateral and multilateral cooperation for regional and global peace and security; to cooperate on space and cyberspace; and to develop and enhance

bilateral enterprise through defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as intelligence cooperation and information security for further

improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation.

**See** Reference 23 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation); Reference 24 (Chronology of the Japan-U.S. Alliance)

### 3 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity not only for the two countries but also for the entire international community, including the Indo-Pacific region.

Close policy consultations on security are conducted between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at various levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC, or **Japan-U.S. “2+2”**), the Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee (SSC), and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). As the ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the “2+2” Meeting represents such policy consultations, and functions as an important consultative panel.

In addition, seizing several opportunities, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation, and furthermore, MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and respective Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings and exchange necessary opinions, etc. on a regular basis. For example, Defense Minister Kihara and U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin met face-to-face in October 2023 and May 2024, and by telephone in September 2023, December 2023, and March 2024.

In order to further improve the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the MOD is actively conducting such consultations and other activities to share information and views between Japan and the United States, and to discuss specific measures to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

#### KEY WORD

#### Japan-U.S. “2+2”

The common name for the framework under which the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the U.S. Secretary of State, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense gather to discuss security issues. Its official name is the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC). In recent years, Japan has also held consultations under the “2+2” framework with countries other than the U.S., such as European countries, Australia, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

#### 1 Recent Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting

In April, 2024, Prime Minister Kishida made the first official visit to the United States by a Japanese prime minister in nine years.<sup>1</sup> During the official visit, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting and delivered a speech at a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress, in which he set out a message for the future regarding what Japan and the United States, as global partners, intend to leave to future generations, and what efforts will be made to achieve it.



Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 2024)  
[Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]

After the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, a United States-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement titled “Global Partners for the Future” was issued. Regarding the strengthening

<sup>1</sup> Previously, then Prime Minister Abe paid an official visit to the United States from April to May 2015, as a state guest.

of defense and security cooperation, the two leaders announced that to enhance the interoperability of the SDF and the U.S. Force, the respective command and control frameworks of Japan and the United States would be upgraded; a Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) to promote co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment would be established. They reaffirmed the critical importance of continuing to enhance extended deterrence and statement called for the in-depth discussions on extended deterrence on the occasion of the next security “2+2” meeting.



Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (May 2024)

## 2 Recent Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting

In May 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a defense ministerial meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin in Hawaii, where they reaffirmed that unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts should not be tolerated in any region, including the Indo-Pacific, and that the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond need to be strengthened to that end.

The two sides also affirmed that they would work closely together to realize the initiatives to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of Japan-U.S. Alliance announced at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April of the same year, and that they would continue

to strengthen cooperation with like-minded regional partners to realize Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). In particular, the two sides agreed to continue discussions on upgrading their respective command and control framework and other issues for the purpose of enhancing interoperability between the U.S. force and the SDF, to further deepen equipment cooperation between Japan and the United States through the DICAS framework while making preparations for the early convening of DICAS, and to deepen ministerial-level discussions on extended deterrence on the occasion of the next “2+2” meeting.

Fig. III-2-1-1 Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues

Consultative Forum	Participants		Purpose	Legal Basis
	Japanese Side	U.S. Side		
Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”)	Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense	U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense (Note 1)	Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security	Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Security Subcommittee (SSC)	Participants are not specified (Note 2)	Participants are not specified (Note 2)	Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States	Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others
Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) (Note 3)	Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense, and Representative of Joint Staff	Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: the U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, USINDOPACOM	Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies	Established in the 16th “2+2” Meeting on July 8, 1976 as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Reorganized in the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial level consultation on June 28, 1996
Japan-U.S. Joint Committee (JC)	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Director-General of the Bureau of Policies for Regional Society, Ministry of Defense, and others	Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others	Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement	Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement

(Notes) 1 The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.  
 2 Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.  
 3 A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.





Fig.III-2-1-1 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues), Section 2 (Strengthening the Joint Deterrence and Response Capabilities of Japan and the United States); Reference 25 (Japan-U.S. Consultations (Since 2020)); Reference 26 (Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) (Provisional Translation) (January 2023); Reference 27 (Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Ministerial Meeting (Outline) (January 2023)

### Commentary

## Measures to Strengthen the Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, coupled with Japan's own defense system, is a key pillar of security in Japan and the cornerstone of peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Its importance has never been greater, as the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Forces are working together to strengthen the Alliance through cooperation in various fields.

As part of efforts to strengthen the Alliance between Japan and the United States, face-to-face and non-face-to-face communications have been conducted at various levels between the two countries, aside from policy consultations such as the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) and the Defense Ministers' Meeting. The related departments at the MOD and their U.S. counterparts, including those at the DoD such as section chiefs and persons in charge, exchange opinions all the time via e-mail and telephone. Video conferences are also held when face-to-face, openhearted discussions are necessary. In addition, proactive face-to-face dialogues allow the two countries to share information and their understanding in real time and provide an opportunity to show the strong human relationships between Japan and the United States domestically and internationally.

In 2023, there was a series of changes in the commanders of military services in the United States, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest-ranking U.S. military officer. What is noteworthy is that many of the newly assigned commanders chose Japan as their first destination after assuming office and met with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF. For example, General George,

servicing as the army's top uniformed official, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Smith, serving as the top marine corps, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, made their first visit to Japan after taking office. While the United States is Japan's only ally, the United States has many allies around the world, including NATO member states. In this situation, what the former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield once said, “The U.S.-Japan relationship is the unparalleled, most important bilateral relationship,” still rings true today. In recent years, there has been renewed momentum for defense cooperation between Japan and the United States in line with the formulation of national security strategies and the fundamental reinforcement of Japan's own defense capabilities. Ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance is also receiving increasing attention in the United States. The MOD/SDF will continue to work closely with the United States to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).



A meeting with the U.S. Department of Defense

## Section 2

# Strengthening the Joint Deterrence and Response Capabilities of Japan and the United States

Japan's NDS and the United States' National Defense Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through integrating all approaches and means.

Accordingly, from the viewpoint of reinforcing readiness and resiliency, imposing costs on opponents, and deterring invasion against Japan, Japan will further deepen discussion with the United States on their respective roles, missions, and capabilities, and further reinforce the joint deterrence capabilities of both countries in an integrated manner.<sup>1</sup>

Specifically, Japan will further deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-domain operations including space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum as well as to improve interoperability. Regarding Japan's counterstrike capabilities, Japan will work with the United States to establish a cooperative posture, including information gathering, in order to employ their joint capabilities more effectively. Furthermore, Japan will reinforce collaboration in such areas as air-defense; anti-surface warfare; anti-submarine warfare; mine warfare; amphibious operations; airborne operations; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT); protection of assets and facilities; and logistics support.

In order to effectively realize the division of roles and missions between Japan and the United States in light of the fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities, Japan will ensure close operational coordination with the United States through Japan-U.S. bilateral planning. In addition, Japan will work to

improve allied response capabilities, including readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical training and exercises.

In addition, in order to ensure that U.S. **extended deterrence** with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible and resilient, Japan will further actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence, including those at the ministerial level.

In order to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts as well as to deter various contingencies from occurring, Japan further expands and evolves operations such as bilateral flexible deterrent options (FDO) and joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as to the joint measures between Japan and the U.S. in peacetime. In order to effectively conduct these operations, Japan will actively make such efforts as promoting the participation of like-minded countries and others and the SDF protecting U.S. assets such as vessels and aircraft.

Furthermore, as part of efforts to strengthen allied deterrence and response capabilities, Japan will, on a regular basis, increase the joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities and promote the mutual deployment of both countries' units to both Japanese and U.S. facilities for training or other purposes.

## KEY WORD

**Extended Deterrence**

Referring to the provision of a country's deterrence capabilities to its allies and others. The purposes include to prevent invasion by hostile countries, etc. and provide reassurance to allied nations and others. Japan receives extended deterrence from its ally, the United States.

## 1

## Cooperation in the Space and Cyber Domains

The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states that Japan and the United States will further deepen efforts to enhance cooperation and interoperability for the smooth implementation of Japan-U.S. joint cross-domain operations, including in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum domains.

In particular, it was confirmed at the January 2023

Japan-U.S. SCC ("2+2") that both sides consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and that affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In September the same year, Defense Minister Kihara received a courtesy call from Gen. Saltzman, the Chief

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that there is no change in the facts that all activities of the SDF will be conducted pursuant to The Constitution of Japan, domestic laws and regulations, etc. under the independent judgments of Japan as a sovereign nation, and that the SDF and the U.S. force will each act according to their own independent chain of command.



Defense Minister Kihara and Gen. Saltzman, the Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force (September 2023)

of Space Operations, United States Space Force and both parties confirmed that the two countries would accelerate cooperation between their respective defense authorities, including SDA (Space Domain Awareness), to ensure the stable use of outer space amid an increasingly severe security environment.

In addition, Japan and the United States have continued to exchange information on topics such as the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the area of security and multilateral challenges.

**See** Chapter 1, Section 4-4 (Responses in the Space Domain); Chapter 1, Section 4-5 (Responses in the Cyber Domain); Chapter 1, Section 4-6 (Responses in the Domain of Electromagnetic Spectrum)

## 2 Integrated Air and Missile Defense

Regarding the response to airborne threats coming to Japan, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft, Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been enhanced by conducting Japan-U.S. joint air defense/missile defense exercises in addition to sharing operational information and establishing response procedures. In addition, Japan and the United States

are cooperating in the event of North Korea's repeated ballistic missile launches by utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM).

In the Missile Defense Review (MDR) released in October 2022, the United States clearly indicated the importance of cooperation with allies, including Japan.

**See** Chapter 1, Section 4-2 (Responses to Missile Attacks)

## 3 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities

With regard to joint ISR activities, it is important to implement such activities broadly in the Asia-Pacific region with cooperation between Japan and the United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of both countries.

The expansion of these bilateral ISR activities will function as deterrence, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure throughout all phases from peacetime to contingencies.

As part of these efforts, the temporary deployment of the U.S. Forces' MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles to Kanoya Air Base of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) (Kagoshima Prefecture) began in November

2022. In addition, the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC) was established at Yokota Air Base (Tokyo) in order to jointly analyze information collected by Japanese and U.S. information gathering assets, including MQ-9. At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held in June 2023, it was confirmed that MQ-9 and BIAC play a significant role in strengthening the ISR capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Based on the results of operations for about a year at MSDF Kanoya Air Base the U.S. Forces began operating MQ-9 at the Kadena Air Base (Okinawa Prefecture) in October of the same year to further enhance ISR activities in the region to meet intelligence gathering needs in the sea and airspace surrounding the southwestern region.

## 4 Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces

Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law states that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is authorized to protect the assets for the U.S. Forces and other forces engaged in activities to help defend Japan in cooperation with the SDF. In 2023, the SDF vessels provided protection for the U.S. Forces vessels four times during intelligence,


surveillance and reconnaissance activities, including the surveillance of ballistic missiles; SDF vessels provided protection for the U.S. Forces vessels on 13 occasions during bilateral/multilateral exercises and SDF aircraft provided protection for U.S. Forces aircraft five times.

**See** Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 3-8 (Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2 (Australia); Reference 22 (Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces) (SDF Law Article 95-2))

**Fig. III-2-2-1 Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)**

Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services

In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of the operations.



Japan-U.S. Alliance  
Part III  
Chapter 2

## 5 Logistics Support

Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistics support based on the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996 and revised in 1999 and 2004. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations (UN). Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, international peace cooperation assignments, international disaster relief activities, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the

other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so.<sup>2</sup>

Following the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016, ratified by the Diet in April 2017, and entered into force. This has enabled the same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA, such as settlement procedures, to be applied to the provision of supplies and services that had become possible under the Legislation for Peace and Security, so that since April 2017 food and fuel have been provided to the U.S. Forces engaged in information collection and other activities.

**See** Fig. III-2-2-1 (Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA))

<sup>2</sup> The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlifts); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage services; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance services; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (provision of weapons is not included).

## 6 Bilateral Training and Exercises

Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises in peacetime not only contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing bilateral response capabilities by improving interoperability, including mutual understanding of tactics and communication, but are also beneficial for improving tactical skills for each participant. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side learns from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities.

In addition, conducting bilateral exercises at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives



Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise in Southern Okinawa (January 2024)

to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises.



See Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 28 (Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2023)

## 7 Extended Deterrence

The Japanese and U.S. governments established the Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) in 2010 as an enduring venue to discuss ways to sustain and strengthen extended deterrence, which is at the core of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The EDD was held at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri in June 2023 and in Japan in December 2023.

In addition to the EDDs that have been held at the

administrative level, during the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting in January 2023, extended deterrence was one of the agenda items, and in-depth discussions were held at a ministerial level.

Efforts to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence will continue to be promoted through the EDD and various high-level discussions such as the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting.

## 8 Joint/Shared Use

The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas also means increasing bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enables closer operational coordination, enhanced interoperability, and improved flexibility and resiliency during bilateral activities. The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of bilateral training and exercises as well as enhance interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in case of a disaster.

Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities, Japan and the United

States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for training. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command Headquarters to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the then GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, the development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration.

Moreover, securing ammunition storage is an important issue for acquiring the various types of ammunition necessary to ensure and maintain sufficient war fighting sustainability, and specific coordination has begun for additional joint/shared use of ammunition storage by the SDF within the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, a facility and area of the USFJ.

## Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue

Japan is facing the most severe and complicated security environment since the end of World War II, and particularly in areas surrounding Japan, the arms buildup, including nuclear and missile forces, is progressing rapidly. Against the backdrop of a high level of increased defense budget, China has rapidly and extensively strengthened its military capabilities, including nuclear and missile forces, and it has been pointed out that China may possess more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. North Korea is considered to have the technical ability to attack Japan with ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear weapons and also believed to be working on establishing an institutional system for nuclear weapons, such as adopting laws and regulations that stipulate the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. Russia continues its attack on Ukraine, repeating words and actions that could be interpreted as nuclear threats, and in February 2023, it announced its suspension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which sets an upper limit on strategic nuclear forces between the United States and Russia. There is a possibility that dependency on nuclear forces will increase in Russia, given a large loss of its conventional forces in the invasion of Ukraine. Amid a trend toward military buildups in countries surrounding Japan, extended deterrence of the United States, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential to counter the threat of nuclear weapons.

The United States has confirmed on numerous occasions its defense obligations to Japan and extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan has the utmost confidence that the United States will fulfill its treaty obligations using all of its might, including its nuclear capabilities. It is important to prevent the escalation of situations to the point of using nuclear weapons and to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts through the promotion of efforts between Japan and the United States to maintain and further strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, coupled with the

fundamental reinforcing of Japan's own defense capabilities, based on the current security environment surrounding Japan.

For this reason, the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) has been held between Japan and the United States on a regular basis since 2010 as the first consultation regarding U.S. extended deterrence in the East Asian region to discuss efforts to sustain and strengthen extended deterrence, including nuclear deterrence. In 2023, the EDD was held in the United States in June and in Japan in December with attendance of the divisions in charge of security policy and arms control of both countries as well as the Self-Defense Forces, the U.S. Strategic Command, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and the U.S. Forces in Japan, etc. In these dialogues, Japan and the United States held in-depth discussions on extended deterrence and consulted on measures to further enhance relevant bilateral cooperation. They assessed the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and reviewed conventional and U.S. nuclear capabilities contributing to regional deterrence, and highlighted the importance of optimizing the Alliance's force posture and activities to bolster deterrence effectiveness. They also exchanged views on efforts to further enhance bilateral discussions on extended deterrence, measures to further improve concrete bilateral cooperation, and approaches to arms controls. Furthermore, the two sides conducted tabletop exercises which have regularly been conducted, and the delegations toured critical deterrence assets for both countries, such as the B-2 strategic bomber in the United States and the amphibious aircraft of the GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (AAV7) in Japan, and deepened common understandings on the abilities of Japan and the United States and the importance of defense of the Southwestern Islands.

Extended deterrence was also discussed at the ministerial level in Japan-U.S. "2+2" Meeting in January 2023.

In this way, efforts to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence will be promoted through the EDD and discussions at various levels.



Touring the B-2 strategic bomber at the EDD in June  
[Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense]



Discussions at the EDD in December

Section 3

# Reinforcing Alliance Coordination Functions

1

## Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)

In November 2015, based on the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” (the Guidelines), the Japanese and U.S. governments established the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) in order to seamlessly and effectively implement a well-aligned Japan-U.S. response to address any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response.


Based on the framework shown in Fig. III-2-3-1, the ACM coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness.

The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime;

(2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a largescale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of the ACM makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels.

Since the establishment of the ACM, Japan and the United States have been utilizing the ACM to coordinate

Fig. III-2-3-1 The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)



closely, including in response to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake<sup>1</sup> and the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake<sup>2</sup>, the ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and

Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands.

The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) calls

## VOICE

### What Was Felt from Coordination between Japan and the United States

#### Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division, Bureau of Defense Policy TAKAHASHI Akihiro, Commander

I have been working in the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division of the Bureau of Defense Policy since March 2022 and am in charge of coordination between Japan and the United States in the Alliance Coordination Group (ACG).

The ACG was set up with the aim of seamlessly responding to all situations, from ordinary times to times of emergency, and in reality, it works closely with the Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan located at Yokota Air Base on a daily basis regarding various kinds of coordination between Japan and the United States.

In the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake, the U.S. military gave significant support based on the prompt Japan-U.S. coordination immediately after the disaster through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to the members of the U.S. military who were engaged in the disaster relief efforts.

Through this work, I was able to realize that even the “alliance adjustment mechanism” stems from people-to-people connections. I would like to continue working side-by-side with my U.S. counterparts to further strengthen Japan-U.S. cooperation in the ACG.

#### Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan Jeremy Gardinier, Army Major

Since July 2022, I have been serving as the Deputy Chief of Government Relations in USFJ Headquarters located at Yokota Air Base.

The primary role of USFJ is to deter and counter threats to Japan and to strengthen the Japan-U. S. Alliance in order to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The most important function I believe to be assigned in USFJ is my role as an officer in charge of the Alliance Coordination Group (ACG).

ACG is a working level framework of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM), which was established based on the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U. S. Defense Cooperation, and is a framework established to respond flexibly, promptly, and effectively to various situations in a severe environment where a rapid response is required.

In the aftermath of the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake, NSS, MOFA, and other relevant ministries and agencies gathered together to make the necessary coordination based on the ACM and were able to demonstrate the utility of the ACM in a highly meaningful way.

I am very pleased to have been able to coordinate US support much faster than in the past and to contribute to its success, so that our support can reach those who need it.

I would like to continue to contribute to smoother bilateral coordination.



The authors participating in a meeting (innermost)



The authors standing together

<sup>1</sup> A series of seismic activities that occurred mainly in Kumamoto Prefecture in April 2016.

<sup>2</sup> A series of seismic activities that occurred mainly in the Noto Peninsula in January 2024.



for Japan to further upgrade the overall coordination functions between Japan and the United States centered on the ACM and to promote closer operational coordination by leveraging the ACM and others to

enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others centered around the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

**See** Fig. III-2-3-1 (The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM))

## 2 Closer Operational Coordination


Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. Forces exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate smooth coordination, and to support international activities.

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. governments established the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the Guidelines to enable effective

bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan's peace and security. In the development of bilateral plans, the BPM performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments are supposed to conduct bilateral planning through the BPM.

**See** Fig. III-2-3-2 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM))

**Fig. III-2-3-2** The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)



## Section 4 Reinforcing the Foundation for Allied Response

The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states that Japan will reinforce the foundational elements that support effective allied response in all phases.

### 1 Information Security and Cybersecurity

In order to further reinforce information sharing at all levels, Japan will fundamentally reinforce efforts related to information security and cybersecurity so that Japan and the United States can fully employ their capabilities.

In the January 2023 Japan-U.S. SCC (“2+2”),

both sides emphasized the foundational importance of cybersecurity and information security for the Alliance, and concurred to intensify collaboration to counter increasingly sophisticated and persistent cyber threats.

### 2 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In order to ensure the Alliance’s technological edge, interoperability, readiness, and warfighting sustainability, Japan will further reinforce defense equipment and technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint research in cutting-edge technology, joint development and production of defense equipment, improvement in mutual interchangeability, shared use and reinforcement of various networks, expansion of production and maintenance capabilities of U.S. military equipment in Japan, and reinforcement of supply chains.

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with the United States based on the mutual cooperation principle under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America, while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and industrial bases.

In view of the progress in technology cooperation system between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. Instead, in 1983, Japan signed the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America,<sup>1</sup> later superseded by the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America signed in 2006.<sup>2</sup> Under these frameworks, Japan has decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military

technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in January 2022, Japan and the United States concluded the framework Exchange of Notes on Cooperative Research, Development, Production and Sustainment as well as Cooperation in Testing and Evaluation. Based on this Exchange of Notes, Japan will advance cooperation with the United States on emerging technologies. Both countries consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at these forums. In September 2023, the Defense Science and Technology Cooperation Group (DSTCG) was newly established to focus on discussion about technology policy between Japan and the United



Signing of Terms of Reference to establish the Defense Science and Technology Cooperation Group (DSTCG)

<sup>1</sup> Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America

<sup>2</sup> Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America

States and the first Executive Level meeting was held.

Additionally, Japan concluded a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Arrangement with the United States<sup>3</sup> in June 2016, and the defense ministers of the two countries later signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding<sup>4</sup> (RDP MOU) at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in the same month. The MOU promotes measures based on reciprocity (providing information necessary to tender bids for businesses of the other country, protecting submitted corporate information, waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the other country, etc.), concerning the procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense authorities. The expiration of the Arrangement and the MOU was extended in May 2021.

At the “2+2” and the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in January 2023, the Ministers signed a framework for (1) accelerating joint research and development<sup>5</sup> and (2) strengthening supply chain cooperation,<sup>6</sup> and (3) confirmed substantial progress in the framework for streamlining foreign military sales (FMS).

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in April 2024, it was announced that a Forum on Japan-U.S. Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) convened. This forum is based on the existing Japan-U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) to restructure developmentally. The purpose of DICAS is to identify priority areas for partnering Japan and the U.S. industry, including co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment, considering the industrial capabilities. This initiative aims to promote mutually beneficial cooperation which will satisfy requirements for critical capabilities in the long run.

Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-3 (Deepening Relationships with the United States Regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains the production, sustainment and maintenance of common equipment (F-35 fighter aircraft and Ospreys) between Japan and the United States.

**See** Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-1 (Systems Regarding Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-3 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation); Reference 29 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects)

<sup>3</sup> Exchange of Notes between Japan and the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement  
<sup>4</sup> Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement  
<sup>5</sup> Memorandum of Understanding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Department of Defense of the United States of America  
<sup>6</sup> Security of Supply Arrangement between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Department of Defense of the United States of America

## Section 5

## Efforts Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ

Under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the presence of the United States Forces of Japan (USFJ) functions as deterrence, while on the other hand, given the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts. In particular, the realignment of the USFJ is

a very important initiative for mitigation of the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, and further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Therefore, the MOD will steadily advance the realignment and other initiatives and make continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of the local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas.

## 1 Stationing of the USFJ

## 1 Significance of the Stationing of the USFJ

Given the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, it is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and agile actions in case of emergency in Japan and the surrounding areas even in peacetime, so that the Japan-U.S. Alliance based on Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements functions enough as a deterrent power that contributes to the peace and stability of the defense of Japan and the region.

Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the U.S. Forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Also, it is essential to realize the stable stationing of the USFJ in order to make a swift joint response to an armed attack on Japan based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In addition, the actions of U.S. Forces for the defense of Japan are conducted not only by the USFJ but also by timely reinforcements. The USFJ is supposed to be the basis for them.

While Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the duty of the U.S. to defend Japan, the U.S. is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan based on Article 6 for the purpose of maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East. Therefore, though the duties of each side are not the same, they are balanced overall.

## 2 Measures concerning the Stationing of the USFJ

The Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)<sup>1</sup> stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the USFJ, including the furnishing of facilities and areas for use by the USFJ (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the USFJ. In addition, the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment<sup>2</sup> enhances cooperation for environmental stewardship relating to the USFJ, and the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component<sup>3</sup> clarifies the scope of the civilian component, etc.

## (1) Furnishing of USFJ Facilities and Areas

Japan furnishes USFJ facilities and areas under the provision of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the governments of Japan and the United States.

The Government of Japan concludes lease contracts with owners of private and public lands of USFJ facilities and areas to ensure the stable use. However, if there is no approval by the landowners, the Government obtains usage rights<sup>4</sup> under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release,<sup>5</sup> by compensating any loss by the landowners.

There are some facilities and areas temporarily furnished to the USFJ in accordance with the SOFA when the U.S. Forces use SDF facilities for a limited period,

- 1 Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan
- 2 Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship Relating to the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan
- 3 Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation with regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan
- 4 The term "title" means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.
- 5 Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

for example, during Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise.

## (2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJ

The SOFA stipulates that the manpower (labor) required by the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan.

As of the end of FY2023, there were 25,779 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “USFJ employees”) at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as clerks at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security guards and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They support the smooth operations of the USFJ.

The Government of Japan hires these USFJ employees in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the USFJ by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc.

## (3) Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship

In September 2015, the governments of Japan and the United States signed the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment, which came into force on the same day. This supplementary agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning the issuance and maintenance of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) and the establishment and maintenance, etc., of procedures for access to USFJ facilities and areas in the event of actual occurrence of an accident (leakage) that affects the environment and in the event of a field survey (including cultural property survey) related to the return of a facility or area.

 See Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 2-2 (Initiatives Related to USFJ Facilities/Areas)

## (4) Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component

In January 2017, the governments of Japan and the United States signed the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component, which came into force on the same day. This Supplementary Agreement clarifies the scope of the civilian component, which is addressed only by a general provision in SOFA, in addition to developing

criteria used in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the civilian component, and stipulates the procedures for notification and review, etc., together with the exclusion of ordinary residents from the civilian component.

## 3 USFJ-Related Costs

USFJ-related costs include Host Nation Support, or HNS (cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ),<sup>6</sup> costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report to mitigate the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that contribute to mitigating the impact on the local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.

## 4 HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ)

HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ) plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economic situation, Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs for USFJ local employees in FY1978. Then in FY1979, it started to bear costs for the Facilities Improvement Program, or FIP.


In addition, as labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions surrounding both countries, there arose a concern that the employment stability of the employees would be undermined, and then the activities of the USFJ could be affected. Therefore, in 1987, Japan and the United States concluded an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement, or SMA)<sup>7</sup> as exceptional, limited, and provisional measures relating to the cost sharing principle of the SOFA.

Based on this SMA, Japan started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the SMA was revised later on, the costs shared by Japan have expanded to cover labor costs including base pay, and utilities costs from FY1991, training relocation costs

<sup>6</sup> Based on the consensus that these costs will build the foundation to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a result of the negotiations over this SMA (Act on New Special Measures for Article 24 of the SOFA), the Japanese side has decided to refer to this budget by a Japanese phrase that points to its goal of enhancing Alliance readiness and resiliency.

<sup>7</sup> Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

Fig. III-2-5-1 USFJ-Related Costs (Budget for FY2024)



- (Notes) 1 Training relocation costs under the SMA extend into HNS (Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ) as well as SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs.  
 2 The SACO-related costs refer to the costs for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on the people of Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refer to the costs relating to the measures that contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as a part of the realignment initiatives. On the other hand, since HNS (Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ) is Japan's voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately.  
 3 The costs for the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥40.6 billion, FY2023 budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥164.4 billion, FY2023 estimate).  
 4 Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

Fig. III-2-5-2 Japan's Cost Sharing Under the SMA for HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ), etc.

SMA	Effective Period	Five years (FY2022 to FY2026)
	Labor Costs	23,178 people out of all the workers.
	Utilities Costs	23.4 billion yen for FY2022 and FY2023, 15.1 billion yen for FY2024, and 13.3 billion yen for FY2025 and FY2026.
	Training Equipment and Materials Procurement Costs	Up to 20 billion yen over the five years will be borne for costs related to the procurement of training equipment and materials that will contribute not only to the readiness of the USFJ, but also to the enhancement of interoperability between the SDF and USFJ.
	Training Relocation Costs	While maintaining the current framework and standards, Alaska will become a permissible training relocation site for the Aviation Training Relocation program. The annual training relocation costs funded by Japan will be approximately equal to the budget amount FY2021, which is approximately 11.4 billion yen.
FIP		Up to 164.1 billion yen over the five years, with focus on projects that contribute to the readiness and resiliency of the USFJ.

from FY1996, and training equipment and materials procurement costs from FY2022.



Fig. III-2-5-1 (USFJ-Related Costs (Budget for FY2024)); Fig. III-2-5-2 (Japan's Cost Sharing under the SMA for HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ), etc.)

## 2 Efforts for the Realignment of the USFJ

### 1 USFJ Realignment Plan

#### (1) Background and Overview

“The United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) was set forth in May 2006. Subsequently, the following factors were set forth: (1) the necessity of implementing measures to realize visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa promptly and steadily; (2) the necessity of balancing the Realignment Plan and the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and (3) the reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam demanded by the U.S. Congress. The Realignment Plan was coordinated during the April 2012 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” Meeting) in light of those factors.

The 2006 Roadmap stated that among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements. However, the United States decided to alter the composition of the units and to deploy the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistics support elements, in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. In addition, the governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).



Reference 30 (United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (tentative translation))

#### (2) Readjustment of the USFJ Realignment Plan

In order to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in response to the increasingly severe security environment, during the “2+2” Meeting in January 2023, Japan and the United States decided to optimize the posture of the U.S. forces by further enhancing the force posture of the USFJ to have more versatile, resilient, and mobile capabilities, and by readjusting the Realignment Plan that was adjusted in 2012. Specifically, it was agreed that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa, and that the 12th Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) by 2025.

In readjusting the Realignment Plan, the basic tenets of the current Realignment Plan are being maintained, and maximum consideration is being given to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. Specifically, Japan and the United States have confirmed that (1) the number of U.S. Marine Corps personnel in Okinawa after the realignment will continue to be approximately 10,000; (2) the realignment will not affect the lands scheduled to be returned in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, nor will it affect the progress of the FRF at Camp Schwab; and (3) there will be no change in the commencement of the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam, which will begin in 2024.

Combined with the enhanced capabilities and posture of the SDF, this initiative will greatly enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Japan will continue to hold close consultations to further optimize the posture of the USFJ.



**REFERENCE:** Policies regarding U.S. Forces in Japan

**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/index.html>




**REFERENCE:** Facility development on Mageshima

**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/mage/index.html>



Fig. III-2-5-3 Progress of Force Structure Realignment of the USFJ and SDF Described in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (1)

1 Realignment in the Kanto Area



2 Realignment in Okinawa






Fig. III-2-5-4 Progress of Force Structure Realignment of the USFJ and SDF Described in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (2)

**3 Relocation of Aircraft, etc.**

Distribution of training for the U.S. Forces aircraft deployed at Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni to Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru SDF facilities as well as to overseas (Guam, Alaska, etc.)

Relocation of carrier-based aircraft squadrons to Iwakuni (completed in March 2018)



F/A-18 [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense]



E-2D [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense]

Relocation of the KC-130 squadron to Iwakuni (completed in August 2014)



KC-130 [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense]

Development of civil air facility at MCAS Iwakuni/MSDF Iwakuni Air Base (Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport opened in 2012.)



TPY-2 Radar: deployment of so-called "X-band Radar System" (completed in June 2006)



TPY-2 radar [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense]

Deployment of a TPY-2 radar (completed in December 2014)

Constructing Mageshima Base (tentative name) that will be also used as an FCLP facility

Relocation of the functions of aircraft for contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru

Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam (Japan and the United States confirmed that the CH-53D squadron will be relocated to the U.S. mainland and then to Guam. Relocation to the U.S. mainland has been completed)




CH-53D [Photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense]

Relocation of the training of MV-22 Osprey and others to maneuver areas in Japan and overseas (Guam)

Rotational deployment of the KC-130 squadron to MSDF Kanoya Air Base and Guam

[Legend]

- Completed
- Continuing



## 2 Progress of the Realignment of the USFJ

Various efforts have been made for the realignment of the USFJ, including the relocation of carrier-based aircraft from Naval Air Facility Atsugi (Kanagawa Prefecture) to MCAS Iwakuni (Yamaguchi Prefecture), and the relocation of KC-130 air refueling aircraft from MCAS Futenma (Okinawa Prefecture) to MCAS Iwakuni, as well as their rotational deployment to Kanoya Air Base (Kagoshima Prefecture).

The MOD is continuing promotion of efforts to improve the SDF facilities on Mageshima (Nishinoomote City, Kagoshima prefecture) that will be used for field-carrier landing practice (FCLP), return of land south of Kadena including MCAS Futenma, and relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel stationed in Okinawa to Guam.

 See Fig. III-2-5-3 and 4 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (1) and (2))

## 3 Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP)

The May 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. The MOD has acquired most of the land on Mageshima, and has been explaining the facility development to the local communities of Kagoshima Prefecture, Nishinoomote City, Nakatane Town, and Minamitane Town.

The United States also welcomed the Government of Japan's decision to develop SDF facilities on Mageshima in the "2+2" Meeting joint statement issued in January 2022.

In January 2023, the MOD released the environmental impact assessment report prepared based on the view of the Governor of Kagoshima Prefecture, who had taken into account the opinions of the mayors of Nishinoomote City, Nakatane Town and Minamitane Town, and others, and started the construction work within Mageshima.

In March of the same year, construction work also began on the maritime area around Mageshima, and the development of facilities are steadily progressing in close cooperation with local municipalities.

## 4 Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma

Although over 25 years have passed since Japan and the United States agreed on the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma, it has not been achieved yet. The Government of Japan believes that the return must not be postponed any longer.

The fundamental idea shared by the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa is that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools, in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture.

The Government of Japan's view is that the current plan to relocate MCAS Futenma to Henoko, Nago City is the only solution to avoid continued use of the Air Station. This has been confirmed by the Japanese and U.S. governments on repeated occasions, including joint statements at Japan-U.S. summit meetings and the "2+2" Meetings.

In order to achieve the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible, the Government of Japan will continue to make all efforts while providing careful explanations to local residents in Okinawa building upon years of persistent dialogue.

The return of MCAS Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa, including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area (approximately 476 ha, a land area around 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome).

### (1) Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the Impact on Okinawa

The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it involves reduction in the base's functions and area in Okinawa, and contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

#### a. Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma

The relocation of MCAS Futenma involves the return of the entire area by relocating three functions: (1) operation of MV-22 (Osprey) and other aircraft, (2) operation of air refueling aircraft, and (3) accepting transient aircraft in contingencies. Of these three functions, (2) and (3) involve relocation out of Okinawa Prefecture, while (1) involves relocation to Camp Schwab.

The relocation of (2) operation of air refueling aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni was completed in August 2014. With regard to (3) accepting transient aircraft in contingencies, Japan and the United States agreed in October 2018 to develop

facilities that would be necessary for relocating the function to Tsuiki Air Base (Fukuoka Prefecture) and Nyutabaru Air Base (Miyazaki Prefecture). The construction work was completed by March 2023 except for the runway extension at Tsuiki Air Base. The MOD is moving forward with procedures for reclamation of public waters and others related to the runway extension work at Tsuiki Air Base.

**b. Reduction in Area**

The area required for the land reclamation to build the FRF is approximately 152 ha, less than one-third of the approximately 476 ha of MCAS Futenma, and the FRF will be equipped with a significantly shorter runway at 1,200 m (1,800 m including the overruns) compared to the current runway length of 2,740 m at MCAS Futenma.

**c. Reduction in Noise and Risks**

Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which enables the flight path for takeoff and landing to be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the local community. In MCAS Futenma, flight paths used daily for training and other purposes are located over residential areas, whereas flight paths in the FRF will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks.

For example, while more than 10,000 households are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near MCAS Futenma, there will be zero households requiring such insulation around the FRF.

**(2) Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility**


**a. Consideration of Relocation Site**

Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on the realignment have been made towards realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the concern of the residents living in the vicinity.

The “2+2” joint statement compiled in October 2005 calls for locating the FRF in an L-shaped configuration. However, after that, based on consultations and agreement with the local governments including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the May 2006 Roadmap that the FRF be located in a V-shaped configuration. With regard to construction of this replacement facility, a Memorandum of Basic Understanding was exchanged between then Governor of Okinawa Inamine and then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga in the same month.

After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, the governments of Japan and the United States confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting

Fig. III-2-5-5 Comparison between the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma (image)



held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a V shape.

During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa that is located in a crucial area for the security of Japan, cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the security environment in East Asia.

Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps, such as mobility and readiness, would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marines units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. This is because the U.S. Marine Corps conducts integrated operations of air, ground, logistics support, and command elements.

Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be located within Okinawa Prefecture.

#### **b. Beginning of Landfill Work**

An environmental impact assessment was conducted for approximately five years from 2007 for the FRF Project. For this assessment, the MOD received 1,561 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa, made all the required revisions, and appropriately reflected them in the content of the environmental impact assessment report.

The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the Landfill Permit Request on public waters to Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima approved this in December 2013.

After the construction began, then Governor of Okinawa Onaga revoked the landfill permit, which led to litigation between the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture. However, landfill work began in the waters of the Henoko side in December 2018. By the end of September 2023, progress to reclaim the Henoko side of the waters was at around 99.5%, leaving only areas that cannot be reclaimed at this time, such as those that need to be reclaimed in conjunction with the adjacent unbuilt areas. At present, in the reclamation area on the Henoko side, stockpiling landfill materials to be used for reclamation on the Oura Bay side is underway. (As of May, 2024)

#### **c. Consideration on Soil Improvement Work, Etc.**

Regarding the soil foundation of the landfill area, a study was conducted on the stability of seawalls and

other structures in the waters of Oura-wan area in light of the results of a boring survey, etc. As a result, it was confirmed that it is possible to implement the construction of seawalls and landfill work while ensuring the required stability through soil improvement work via prevailing and adequately proven construction methods<sup>8</sup> used for construction projects such as Tokyo International Airport and Kansai International Airport. This was also confirmed by the Technical Review Committee that has been held since September 2019 consisting of experts in the fields of geotechnical, structural, hydraulic, and pavement engineering.

In addition, in December 2019, the Okinawa Defense Bureau announced that, based on the results of studies conducted to date, it would take nine years and three months from commencement to completion of construction according to the revised plan. Around 12 years would be required to complete the admin procedures described in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, and the cost of the Futenma Air Station Replacement Facility Construction Project was estimated at about 930 billion yen.

Similarly, in terms of the environment, the Environmental Monitoring Committee, comprising experts in various fields related to the natural environment and others, which was held from January to April 2020, confirmed that the degree of impact on the environment caused by the change in the plan would be the same or less than that before the change.

#### **d. Landfill Permit Revision Request on Public Waters**

As explained above, hearing experts' insights on the environment and other aspects, after due consideration, in April 2020, the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture the Landfill Permit Revision Request given the additional implementation of the soil improvement work, etc.

However, in November 2021, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture disapproved the Permit Revision Request on the grounds that surveys of the soil foundation and environmental protection measures at the planned landfill area were inadequate. In response, in December 2021, the Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a request for review with the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism under the Administrative Complaint Review Act. In April 2022, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism determined revocation of the disapproval by

<sup>8</sup> The standard methods are the sand compaction pile method, the sand drain method, and the paper drain method. Among examples of projects in which these methods were used is the construction work to expand Tokyo International Airport (Haneda Airport).

the Governor of Okinawa, and also issued an instruction for correction against Okinawa Prefecture based on the Local Autonomy Act to approve the Permit Revision Request.

In response to this determination and the directive for correction, in August the same year, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed lawsuits at the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch to revoke the government's involvement. As for these lawsuits, in August 2023, the Supreme Court decided against the Okinawa Governor's petition to accept the appeal regarding the determination, and in September the same year, the Supreme Court issued a judgment to dismiss the Okinawa Governor's appeal regarding the directive for correction, and accordingly the judicial judgment that the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism's directive to approve the Permit Revision Request was legitimate was finalized.

Based on this judgment, the same month, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a recommendation and instruction under the Local Autonomy Act to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Permit Revision Request, but the approval remained pending.

Therefore, in October the same year, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a subrogation lawsuit at the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch for substituted execution under the Local Autonomy Law. Subsequently, in December the same year, a judgment was made ordering the governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Landfill Permit Revision Request by a deadline, but since no disposition of approval had been made by that deadline, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued approval under the law. The same month, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for acceptance of an appeal to the Supreme Court regarding this lawsuit, but, in February 2024, the Supreme Court decided to reject the petition, whereupon the judgment of the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch ordering the governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Landfill Permit Revision Request became final.

In addition, in September 2022, due to dissatisfaction with the determination of the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit with the Naha District Court to revoke the determination based on the Administrative

Case Litigation Act. In November 2023, the Naha District Court made a judgment to dismiss Okinawa Prefecture's lawsuit, but Okinawa Prefecture has appealed to the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court, and there is one lawsuit is pending between the government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture regarding the Landfill Permit Revision Request (as of May 2024).



**See** Fig. III-2-5-5 (Comparison between the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma (image)); Reference 31 (Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility); Reference 32 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena)

### (3) Construction Based on the Plan after Approval of the Landfill Permit Revision Request

#### a. Status of Construction

After receiving approval of Landfill Permit Revision Request, the Okinawa Defense Bureau began construction work based on the revised plan on January 10, 2024. Specifically, in the waters on the Oura Bay side, the construction began to develop an offshore yard that will serve as a temporary storage area for caissons (box-shaped structures made of reinforced concrete, etc.) to be used for future seawall construction. Additionally, construction of the K-5, K-6, and K-7 seawalls began in February, March, and April the same year, respectively.

#### b. Environmental Protection Initiatives

The environmental impact assessment report states that because corals inhabiting the landfill area will be lost due to the landfill work, corals will be transplanted to the extent possible as a preservation measure. Some of the targeted corals for preservation have already been transplanted with the permission of the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, and other preservation measures will also be taken for the remaining targeted corals in the future. The FRF Project expand a scope for preservation to be more careful in transplanting corals compared to landfill work to construct the second runway at Naha Airport.<sup>9</sup> Hermit crabs designated as a national natural treasure, as well as shellfish and crustaceans listed as endangered species, have also been appropriately moved to a surrounding location suitable for habitat in time for the construction. Furthermore, as part of measures for habitats that will be lost due to the landfill work, measures have been taken to transplant corals grown in land-based facilities to the waters surrounding Oura Bay and expand the growth area of seagrass beds.

These environmental preservation measures

<sup>9</sup> Specifically, in relation to the construction of the second runway at Naha Airport, around 37,000 clusters of small corals were transplanted. If the same standard as the one applicable to the construction of the alternative facility had been applied, the number of clusters of small corals transplanted would have been around 170,000.



Progress of landfill work (November 2018)



Progress of landfill work (April 2024)

have been taken based on the guidance and advice of the Environmental Monitoring Committee, and the construction of the FRF is proceeding with due consideration for environmental preservation.

**c. Consideration for Surrounding Residents**

The progress of the construction work is expected to increase construction vehicle traffic in future. Construction work will proceed while giving due consideration to the impact on the natural and living environment of the local communities of the noise and traffic congestion that may be caused as the construction work progresses.

Targeting the earliest possible total return of the MCAS Futenma, the construction work will proceed steadily in terms of relocation to Henoko, while continuing to provide detailed explanations to local residents.

thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the relocation to the FRF from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three categories, namely (1) land eligible for immediate return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad.

**(1) Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa**

Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy to dedicate all strength toward mitigating the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of land areas south of Kadena, including Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City of which Okinawa has particularly made a strong request for the return and coordinated with the United States. As

**5 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base**

The May 2006 Roadmap stated that, following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated,



**REFERENCE:** Comparison of the scales of MCAS Futenma and the FRF  
**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/frf/index.html#kibohikaku>




**REFERENCE:** Soil improvement methods  
**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/frf/index.html#kouhou>



**REFERENCE:** Environmental protection  
**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/frf/index.html#kankyohozen>

Fig. III-2-5-6

## Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa



a result, both countries announced the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (Consolidation Plan) in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specific years of return.

The return of all land according to the plan will enable the return of approximately 70% (approximately 1,048 ha, the equivalent of 220 Tokyo Domes) of six USFJ facilities for exclusive use<sup>10</sup> located in densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa. In the Consolidation Plan, it is confirmed between Japan and the United States that this plan will be implemented as soon as possible, and that the Government will continue to make the utmost efforts to return the land south of Kadena, at an early date.

 See Fig. III-2-5-6 (Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa)


## (2) Progress in the Return of Land

Since the announcement of the Consolidation Plan in April 2013, efforts have been made to return the land. By March, 2020, the return of all areas that were designated as land areas to be returned as soon as required procedures are completed based on the Consolidation Plan (shown in red in Fig. III-2-5-8) was realized. The use of returned lands is being promoted incrementally. For example, at the former site of the West Futenma Housing Area, which was returned in March 2015, the formation of Okinawa Health Medical Center requested by the local community is being promoted.

In addition, returns have been realized ahead of the schedule in the Consolidation Plan for some areas where there were strong demands for return by the

local community. This has resulted, for example, in the opening of the entire stretch of Ginowan City road 11 in March 2021 on land along the east side of MCAS Futenma, which has improved local traffic. Furthermore, in May 2022, Prime Minister Kishida visited the Lower Plaza Housing area of Camp Zukeran and announced that Japan and the United States will agree to open the area as a green space for public use ahead of its return to Japan, and its public use began in March 2024 as the “Lower Plaza Green Square”.

All-out initiatives are being continuously made by the Government to steadily implement the return of land areas south of Kadena Air Base under the Consolidation Plan in a manner that visibly mitigates the impact on Okinawa.

 See Fig. III-2-5-7 (Results of the Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base); Fig. III-2-5-8 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (Image));

Reference 32 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena)

## 6 Relocation of the Marine Corps to Guam

Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006, the governments of Japan and the United States held a series of consultations on the reduction of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.

### (1) Timing and Size of Relocation

The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III MEF and their approximately 9,000 dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land return south of Kadena from the progress on the FRF and to adjust the composition of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam.

As a result, the MAGTF is to be located in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, with approximately 9,000 personnel relocated to locations outside of Japan. Meanwhile, the end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa is to be consistent with the level of approximately 10,000 personnel envisioned in the Roadmap.

<sup>10</sup> Naha Port, Makiminato Service Area, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, Camp Kuwae, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1

Commentary

## Joint Use of the Lower Plaza Housing Area

The Lower Plaza Housing area (Kitanakagusuku Village, Okinawa City, Okinawa Prefecture), which is part of Camp Zukeran, is scheduled to be returned to Japan after the conditions set in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan are met. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is currently working towards meeting the conditions for its return. At the same time, in response to Prime Minister Kishida's announcement in May 2022 that the area will be made available to Okinawa citizens for their convenience until the return of the area is realized, a joint use agreement was concluded between Japan and the United States, and the area was opened to the public as a green space in March 2024.

While the U.S. military houses were being removed, the vacant lot was developed as a green space by taking advantage of the natural scenery of the hills, with parking lots, benches, lavatories, etc. installed, but as the area is expected to be used by local people

after being returned, it was decided that additional development of the area was to be kept to a minimum by utilizing existing roads, fences, softball fields, etc.

The former Lower Plaza housing area is located in a privileged environment, where an arterial road connecting the east, west, north, and south of Okinawa prefecture intersects, and it is also adjacent to large commercial facilities and hospitals. Now that the area has been developed as a green square, many people, including Okinawa citizens, are using the area for recreation and socializing.

The MOD will continuously and steadily implement its efforts toward the return of land based on the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, and it will do its best to reduce the impact of the bases on Okinawa.



Scenes from the opening ceremony (March 2024)



Lower Plaza Green Square


Fig. III-2-5-7 Results of the Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base

Category	Name	Returned	Transferred	Area (ha)
Areas eligible for immediate return in the consolidation plan	Makiminato Service Area (entrance road on the north side)	August 2013	August 2013	Approx. 1
	Camp Zukeran (Nishi Futenma residential area)	March 2015	March 2018	Approx. 51
	Makiminato Service Area (area near Gate 5)	March 2019	March 2021	Approx. 2
	Camp Zukeran (a portion of the facility engineering department district)	March 2020	(Note)	Approx. 11
Areas eligible for return after relocation of functions within Okinawa in the consolidation plan but returned in advance as a result of a separate Japan-U.S. agreement.	MCAS Futenma (Lands along the east side)	July 2017	March 2019	Approx. 4
	Makiminato Service Area (Lands along national route 58)	March 2018	September 2019	Approx. 3
	MCAS Futenma (Lands near Samashita Gate)	December 2020	December 2020	Approx. 0.1
	Makiminato Service Area ((Lands along national route 58) laundry area)	May 2021	May 2021	Approx. 0.2

(Note) Scheduled transfer in the future



Fig. III-2-5-8 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (image)



(Notes) 1 The time and year seem to be optimal. The time may, however, be postponed depending on the progress of overseas relocation.

2 The area of each land is an approximate figure and may be slightly modified based on the results of future surveys. Total may not match due to rounding off of each figure to the nearest unit (ha).

3 Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns.

4 The area to be returned at Camp Foster (West-Futenma Housing area) was listed as 52 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 51 ha according to actual measurements.

5 The area to be returned at Camp Foster (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound, etc.) was listed as 10 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 11 ha based on the area to be returned in the JC agreement of September 2013.

6 MCAS Futenma (lands along the east side and near Samashita Gate) and Makiminato Service Area (lands along national route 58) were returned ahead of schedule as a result of a separate Japan-U.S. agreement. Note that the Makiminato Service Area (lands along national route 58) includes the laundry area (0.2 ha) that was returned on May 31, 2021.

7 Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed in May 2022 that the two countries will prepare the transformation of the Lower Plaza Housing Area of Camp Foster into a green square for public use before the return, agreed on the joint use of the area for public use as the green square in January, 2024. The area was opened to the public on March 31, 2024.

8 Efforts will be made for the return of the southern part of Industrial Corridor as early as possible with gradual return in mind

Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to facilitate progress in implementing the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa of April 2013.

In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in January 2023, it was confirmed that the relocation from Okinawa to Guam would begin in 2024 and others.

## (2) Costs of the Relocation

Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated US\$10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 price) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide US\$6.09 billion, including US\$2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the United States would fund the remaining US\$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the

III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement).<sup>11</sup> The Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions.

As part of measures based on this Agreement, the Government of Japan has been providing cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation to the projects for which Japan has provided financial support since FY2009.<sup>12</sup>

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were adjusted and it was agreed that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation was US\$8.6 billion (in U.S. FY2012 price). With regard to Japan’s financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution of up to US\$2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 price) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement. It was also confirmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized.<sup>13</sup>

Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been provided to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of US\$2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by Japan and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the United States, and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown.

At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol Amending the Guam International Agreement was also signed to add the stipulations concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training areas by the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at US\$2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 price).

### (3) Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures

As for the environmental impact assessment for Guam, the required procedures were conducted to reflect the revisions to the project made by the adjustments to the plan for realignment, and the assessment was completed in August 2015.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), is now being implemented.

### (4) Progress of the Guam Relocation Project

While the environmental impact assessment for Guam was being conducted, the Government of the United States implemented infrastructure development projects at the Andersen Air Force Base and the Apra area of the Naval Base Guam as projects unaffected by the assessment. The U.S. Government is currently implementing relocation construction work in all project areas, following the lifting of the freeze on the Guam relocation funds pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act and the completion of the environmental impact assessment for Guam.


 See Fig. III-2-5-9 (Progress of the Guam Relocation Project (image))

11 Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam

12 As for projects for which Japan provides financial support, cash contributions totaling approximately 373 billion yen (including the use of interest generated from the funds provided) have been provided to the U.S. side using the budgets as of April 2024.

13 In line with this, the special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (investment and loan) that had been prescribed by the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan were abolished by an act revising part of the act that was enacted on March 31, 2017.

Fig. III-2-5-9 Progress of the Guam Relocation Project (image)



Construction of facilities in Finegayan

Relocation Project Areas	Status of Progress of G0J Funded Projects
(1) Andersen AFB	The on-base infrastructure project <sup>(Note 1)</sup> is in progress.
(2) Marine Corps Base in Finegayan (Camp Blaz (main camp))	The on-base infrastructure project <sup>(Note 1)</sup> is in progress. The construction project for enlisted quarters <sup>(Note 2)</sup> and other works are in progress.
(3) Marine Corps Base Andersen South	The construction project for training areas <sup>(Note 3)</sup> is in progress.
(4) Naval Base Guam in Apra	The construction projects for infrastructure <sup>(Note 1)</sup> , headquarters building <sup>(Note 4)</sup> , and medical clinic <sup>(Note 5)</sup> are completed. The construction project for the embark facility <sup>(Note 6)</sup> is in progress.

(Notes) 1 The on-base infrastructure project includes site preparation and development of roads, water supply and sewerage system and telecommunication system for construction of facilities such as office buildings for the Marine Corps.  
 2 The construction project for enlisted quarters is to develop enlisted quarters for Marine Corps.  
 3 The construction project for training areas is to develop facilities for the Marine corps to conduct basic training such as urban combat and driving vehicles.  
 4 The construction project for the headquarters building is to develop a headquarters building for the Marine Corps.  
 5 The construction project for the medical clinic is to develop a medical clinic for the Marine Corps.  
 6 The construction project for the embark facility is to develop the facilities used for boarding of Marine Corps.

## 7 Other Realignment Initiatives

### (1) Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)

Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas – Kadena, Misawa (Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni – would participate for the time being in bilateral training at SDF facilities, the Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)<sup>14</sup> has been underway since 2007. The MOD has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the training relocation.

The ATR contributes to enhancing interoperability


between the two countries, and also to relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help with noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

In addition to assisting the USFJ, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to ensure the safety and security of the local residents, such as the establishment of liaison offices, facilitating communication with related government agencies, and addressing needs of the

<sup>14</sup> USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral and other training at SDF facilities, etc.

local residents. These efforts have been contributing to successful training relocation.

Fig. III-2-5-10 Overview of the Background to the Aviation Training Relocation	
Time of reaching agreements	Overview
May 2006	In the “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” it is confirmed that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas-Kadena, Misawa and MCAS Iwakuni-would participate in bilateral training with the SDF at SDF facilities in Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru.
January and October 2011	At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to include Guam as a new training relocation site and to expand the scale of training.
March 2014	At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to add air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range (Misawa City and Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture).
July 2023	At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to include Alaska as the relocation site.

 See Fig. III-2-5-10 (Overview of the Background to the Aviation Training Relocation)

## (2) Training Relocation for MV-22 (Osprey) etc.

The Government of Japan and the United States Government decided in the “2+2” joint statement of October 2013, to utilize the opportunities to participate in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region to reduce the amount of time that MV-22s are deployed and used for the training in Okinawa, so that training outside of Okinawa Prefecture, including mainland Japan, can be increased while maintaining the deterrence of the Alliance. Based on the above, both governments have been moving forward with conducting training of the MV-22 deployed at MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture and so on.

In September 2016, it was agreed at the Joint Committee to relocate the training activities of Tilt-Rotor/Rotary Wing aircraft, such as AH-1, CH53, and the MV-22 that are currently deployed at MCAS Futenma, out of Okinawa Prefecture at Japan’s expense in order to further promote training outside of Okinawa and mitigate the impact of training activities there.

In FY2023, the MV-22 and other aircraft were incorporated into Japan-U.S. bilateral training upon being relocated to maneuver areas and other locations in Oita, Kumamoto, Miyazaki and Kagoshima prefectures in October 2023, and in Nagasaki, Kumamoto, and Kagoshima prefectures from February to March 2024. From the date of the agreement up to March 2024, a total of 20 exercises, in addition to the ones mentioned above, have been conducted in Guam as well as in Japan at the maneuver areas in Hokkaido, Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Gunma, Kanagawa, Niigata, Shizuoka, Shiga, and Kagawa prefectures.

The Government plans to continue decreasing MV-22’s amount of time deployed and training in Okinawa by relocating the exercises to mainland Japan and Guam, and will continue to promote initiatives that contribute to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

Furthermore, with regard to the safety of MV-22s, prior to the deployment of MV-22s to MCAS Futenma in 2012, the Government established an analysis and assessment team composed of aircraft pilots and experts from inside and outside the Government and confirmed the safety of MV-22 by conducting its own survey, etc. In addition, when Japan made the decision to introduce Ospreys in 2014, the Government reconfirmed their safety by collecting and analyzing all kinds of technical information, not only in the preparation phase, but also after the decision of introduction was made.

Furthermore, since 2016, the Government has dispatched GSDF Osprey personnel to the U.S. Marine Corps’ training programs, in which they pilot and maintain the aircraft. The Government has reaffirmed that the Osprey is a reliable aircraft that allows for stable maneuvering and maintenance.

Additionally, the CV-22s (Osprey) have the same propulsion system as the MV-22 and both aircraft also have the basic structure in common. Therefore, the safety of both aircraft is at the same level.

In addition, after the crash of the CV-22 in November 2023, an unprecedented level of exchange took place regarding technical information in the verification process between Japan and the United States. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has come to the recognition that the cause of the accident was a materiel failure of a specific part in the components necessary for the aircraft to perform its functions, and believes that various safety measures corresponding to this cause can be taken to prevent and address accidents caused by the same type of failure. In this context, with regard to the said materiel failure, the United States side has explained that there is no need to change the design of the aircraft itself, nor is there any problem with the safety of the aircraft itself, and that there are no structural deficiencies that affect flight safety.

The MOD has confirmed, at all levels in Japan and the United States, that flight safety remains the top priority for the resumption of operations, and that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate and take all possible measures to ensure safety.




Chapter 1, Section 7-1-2(3) (Response to Search and Rescue of U.S. Forces Osprey); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Initiatives for Safety Management, etc.); Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 1-4-2(3) (Crash of the U.S. Osprey); Reference 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces)

### (3) Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in Case of Disaster

In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central part of the Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV-22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for

Fig. III-2-5-11 Usability of Osprey Aircraft (image)



Comparison	MV-22	CH-46
Maximum speed	Approximately 520 km/h	Approximately 270 km/h
Cruising speed	Approximately 490 km/h	Approximately 220 km/h
Range	Approximately 3,900 km	Approximately 700 km
Radius of action	Approximately 600 km (With 24 troops on board)	Approximately 140 km (With 12 troops on board)
Number of troops carried	24	12
Number of crew	3 ~ 4	3 ~ 5
Cargo (inside)	Approximately 9,100 kg	Approximately 2,300 kg
Cargo (outside)	Approximately 5,700 kg	Approximately 2,300 kg
Rotor diameter	Approximately 11.6 m	Approximately 15.5 m
Angle of flight	Approximately 7,500 m	Approximately 3,000 m
Own weight	Approximately 16,000 kg	Approximately 7,700 kg
Measurement	MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size. 	

(Note) The MV-22 is the successor to the CH-46.

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to support Operation Damayan. The MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access, and transported several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of relief materials in a day. In April 2014, an MV-22 aircraft deployed in Okinawa was dispatched for search and rescue activities when a passenger ship sank in an accident off the coast of Jindo in the ROK. Furthermore, in response to the large earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22s deployed in Okinawa were dispatched to the country to transport personnel and supplies.

In Japan as well, when the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred in 2016, MV-22s were dispatched to deliver daily necessities to the disaster-stricken areas.

In this manner, the MV-22 is capable of conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities immediately and over a large range when large-scale disasters occur because of its high performance and multifunctionality. It has also been used for disaster prevention drills since 2014. In September 2016, two MV-22s participated in the comprehensive disaster prevention drills of Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and conducted delivery drills for isolated islands. Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, including search and rescue missions, both immediately and over a large range, in the case of a large-scale disaster.

As such, it is expected that the superior capabilities of the Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well.


 See Fig. III-2-5-11 (Usability of Osprey Aircraft (Image)); Reference 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces)

## 8 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the USFJ

In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the USFJ based on the May 2006 Roadmap, the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act)<sup>15</sup> was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, and other systems were established based on the law.

In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since these developments may affect the employment of USFJ employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to include education and skills training, which is to help retain their employment.

The Realignment Special Measures Act was supposed to cease to be effective as of March 31, 2017. However, since there remain realignment projects that require implementation, on March 31, 2017, an act revising part of the Act including a 10-year extension of the time limit to March 31, 2027 was enacted.

 See Reference 34 (Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan)

## 3 Measures Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ

### 1 Optimization of the Posture of the USFJ

#### (1) Reorganization of the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Okinawa

As part of the optimization of the posture of the USFJ, the 12th Marine Regiment located at Camp Hansen in Okinawa will be reorganized into the 12th MLR by 2025.

As part of this effort, the unit was renamed in November 2023. While the 12th Marine Regiment mainly has artillery firepower as an artillery unit, the reorganized MLR will have a variety of capabilities, including anti-ship strike capabilities with anti-ship missiles, air defense

capabilities, logistics support capabilities, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

#### (2) Establishment of the Composite Watercraft Company at Yokohama North Dock

In April 2023, the U.S. Army's Composite Watercraft Company was established at Yokohama North Dock to strengthen the maritime mobility of the U.S. Forces in emergency situations, including disasters, and it began operations as the 5th Transportation Company in February 2024. The established company will contribute to strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance transportation

<sup>15</sup> Act on Special Measures concerning Smooth Implementation of Realignment of United States Forces in Japan

capabilities in Japan and improve the mobility of the U.S. Forces in the region.

## 2 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa

In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to potential conflict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but at the same time has the advantage of having a certain distance from these areas that would not heighten military tension there unnecessarily. In addition, Okinawa, comprising a large number of small islands, is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands having a total length of some 1,200 km and close to key sea lanes for Japan, which depends on marine transportation for over 99% of its overall international trade. Furthermore, its location is extremely important from the perspective of security, as Okinawa serves as a strategically important target for neighboring countries in both making access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent.


Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, including the U.S. Marine Corps, which can deal with a wide range of missions with high mobility and readiness, along with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities and areas such as air bases, maneuver areas, and logistics facilities. As of January 1, 2024, approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture and approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints.

### (1) Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the

Fig. III-2-5-12 The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa (image)



Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km<sup>2</sup> for exclusive use as USFJ facilities and areas. On the other hand, USFJ facilities and areas were strongly requested to be realigned, consolidated and reduced, on the grounds that their concentration in Okinawa seriously affect the lives of the people in Okinawa.

Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, centering on those subject to strong local requests, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues,<sup>16</sup> it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required coordination and procedures toward the return of land. Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that efforts would also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa Issues: the return of Naha Port (Naha City), the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104.

Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that


occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, as well as the SACO, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

**See** Fig. III-2-5-12 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa (Image)); Fig. III-2-5-13 (Location of Major U.S. Forces Stationed in Okinawa (As of March 31, 2024)); Reference 35 (Outline of 23 Issues)

## (2) Outline of the SACO Final Report

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, noise reduction, and the improvement of operational

Fig. III-2-5-13 Location of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Okinawa (As of March 31, 2023)



(Note) Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.

<sup>16</sup> In 1990, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed to proceed with the land restitution process for 23 issues, focusing on those with strong local demand.



procedures regarding the SOFA procedures, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the implementation of contents included in the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km<sup>2</sup>) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km<sup>2</sup>.

**See** Fig. III-2-5-14 (Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report (image)); Fig. III-2-5-15 (Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa); Reference 36 (The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)); Reference 37 (Progress of the SACO Final Report); Reference 38 (Consultative Bodies on the Mitigation of Impact of Bases on Okinawa)


### (3) Return of a Major Portion of the Northern Training Area

The condition for returning the Northern Training Area was to relocate seven helipads in the area to be returned to the preexisting training area. However, the Government of Japan reached an agreement with the U.S. side to give considerations for the natural environment and to relocate not all seven but the minimum number of six helipads necessary, and proceeded with the construction work. The relocation of the helipads completed in December 2016, and the return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area located in the villages of Kunigami and Higashi, was achieved based on the SACO Final Report.


The returned land accounts for approximately 20% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa. The return is the largest one since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland, and had been an issue for 20 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996.

Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces, the MOD took measures to remove obstacles (such as soil contamination survey, etc.) so that the landowners, etc., could use returned lands effectively and appropriately, and transferred the land to the landowners in December 2017. In addition, in July 2021, the northern part of the main island of Okinawa, including the returned lands, was inscribed in the World Natural Heritage Site as part of the Amami-Oshima Island, Tokunoshima Island, Northern part of Okinawa Island, and Iriomote Island.

**Fig. III-2-5-14** Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report (image)



**Fig. III-2-5-15** Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa



## 3 The USFJ in Kanagawa Prefecture

### (1) Deployment of the U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka

The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capabilities of the Fleet.

The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered vessels anchoring in Japan's ports, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier<sup>17</sup> which is forward-deployed at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa

<sup>17</sup> Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need refueling and they are able to maintain high speeds necessary for the operations of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational capabilities.

Prefecture), adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactors will normally be shut down while the vessels are anchored, and repair of the nuclear reactors and refueling will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan will also continue to take all possible measures to ensure safety. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan departed from Yokosuka in the spring of 2024, and is scheduled to be replaced by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington later that year.

**(2) Realignment, etc. of USFJ Facilities and Areas**


With regard to the realignment of facilities and areas of the USFJ in Kanagawa Prefecture, the release of facilities and areas including Kamiseya Communication Station and Fukaya Communication Site has already been realized based on the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004.

Meanwhile, more than 10 years have passed since the

initial agreement, and security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe. Therefore, there have been changes in the U.S. Navy's posture and capabilities, as represented by the increased operations of the U.S. vessels at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. In light of such circumstances, the following were agreed at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2018: (1) development of facilities for satisfying the U.S. Navy's facility requirements; (2) start of negotiations on joint use of Negishi Dependent Housing Area to conduct site restoration works; and (3) cancellation of the construction of family housing units in the Yokohama portion of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. Subsequently, joint use of Negishi Dependent Housing Area was agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2019.


**See** Fig. III-2-5-16 (Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2024)); Fig. III-2-5-17 (Realignment of Facilities and Areas of the USFJ in Kanagawa Prefecture (image))

**Fig. III-2-5-16** Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2023)



(Note) Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.

Fig. III-2-5-17 Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture (image)



Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004

Location	Name	Location	Area (ha)	Plan for land return, etc.
①	Koshiba POL Depot	Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City	Approx. 53 ha	Returned in December, 2005
②	Tomioka Storage Area	Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City	Approx. 3 ha	Returned in May, 2009
③	Fukaya Communication Site	Izumi Ward, Yokohama City	Approx. 77 ha	Returned in June, 2014
④	Kamiseya Communication Station	Seya Ward and Asahi Ward, Yokohama City	Approx. 242 ha	Returned in June, 2015
⑤	Negishi Dependent Housing Area	Naka Ward, Minami Ward and Isogo Ward, Yokohama City	Approx. 43 ha	To be returned when the construction of family housing etc. is completed at Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex
⑥	Detached part of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex	Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City	Approx. 1 ha	Return procedures to begin upon completion of the current use
⑦	Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex	Yokohama City Area	—	Construction of family housing, etc.

Orange box : Returned

Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of November 2018

[Development of facilities]

Location	Name	Location	Details
⑧	U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka	Yokosuka City	Bachelor enlisted quarters
⑨	Urago Storage Area	Yokosuka City	A wharf
⑩	Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex	Zushi City Area	Living support facilities, fitness center, maintenance shop and fire station
⑪	Tsurumi POL Depot	Tsurumi Ward, Yokohama City	A fire station

[Joint use and return]

Location	Name	Location	Area	Details
⑤	Negishi Dependent Housing Area	Naka Ward, Minami Ward and Isogo Ward, Yokohama City	Approx. 43 ha	A Japan-US consultation concerning joint use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area will commence with the aim of promptly carrying out site restoration work. Consultation on the specific return date will be held between the two governments depending on the progress of the site restoration work.

[Cancellation of construction]

Location	Name	Location	Details
⑦	Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex	Yokohama City Area	Cancellation of construction of family housing, etc.

# Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others

## Chapter 3

In situations where the need for international cooperation in the security and defense fields is increasing in an unprecedented manner, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is required to actively contribute to ensuring the security of Japan, the peace and stability of the region and the peace, stability and prosperity of the entire international community.

The first defense objective of the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) is to shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force, in cooperation with Japan's ally, like-minded countries and others. Therefore, the NDS calls for Japan to promote efforts that contribute to realizing the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) from the perspective that it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration with not only its ally but also as many countries as possible.

In addition, it is essential to deepen cooperation and coordination with its ally and like-minded countries to counter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to safeguard the security environment of Japan.

Furthermore, Japan will also more actively advance its efforts to solve global security issues and others, including securing the freedom and safety of maritime navigation and overflight, coordination and cooperation with relevant countries in relation to the use of the space and cyber domains, international peace cooperation activities, cooperation on climate change and maritime security, arms control and disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

For the implementation of these efforts, Japan will,

### KEY WORD

#### Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA)

Its purpose is to facilitate the implementation of cooperative activities between the forces of the two countries, such as joint training and disaster relief, by establishing procedures for the cooperative activities conducted by defense force of one country while visiting the other country, and to define the status of the visiting force.

As of April 2024, it has been concluded with Australia and the United Kingdom.

### KEY WORD

#### Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)

It establishes the basic terms and conditions for the mutual provision of goods and services necessary for joint training, UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), humanitarian international relief operations, operations to deal with major disasters, and others.

As of April 2024, it has been concluded with the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and India and signed with Germany.

### KEY WORD

#### Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

An international agreement that establishes a general legal framework for the transfer of defense equipment and technology between signatory countries. Specifically, it establishes procedures for deciding and confirming individual transfers and obligates them to properly use and manage transferred defense equipment and technology.

As of April 2024, Japan has concluded the agreement with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, India, the Philippines, France, Germany, Malaysia, Italy, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Thailand, Sweden, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). (\*Arrangement on Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States and Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies)

while placing the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the key pillar of its security policy, proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country. In doing so, Japan will further promote the establishment of institutional frameworks such as **Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA), Acquisition**

**and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** from the perspective of effectively promoting the strengthening of collaboration with like-minded countries and others.



Fig. III-3-1 (MOD's Approach Under the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) (image))

		<p><b>REFERENCE:</b> Multilateral and multilayered security cooperation  <b>URL:</b> <a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/index.html">https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/index.html</a></p>
		<p><b>MOVIE:</b> The MOD's Efforts under the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific"  <b>URL:</b> <a href="https://youtu.be/HQB-WaQXXAI">https://youtu.be/HQB-WaQXXAI</a></p>
		<p><b>REFERENCE:</b> The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: A new plan for Free and Open Indo-Pacific [Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]  <b>URL:</b> <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/page3e_001336.html">https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/page3e_001336.html</a></p>

## MOD's Approach under the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)

### Background

- In August 2016, then Prime Minister Abe unveiled the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept in his keynote speech in the 6th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) held in Kenya.
- Japan's fundamental aim is to **foster regional stability and prosperity** by improving connectivity between Asia and Africa through a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
- Prime Minister Kishida announced Japan's new plan for a FOIP in his policy speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) held in India in March 2023.

### Basic concepts of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

- The Indo-Pacific region is the **center of the world vitality** and home to more than half the world population; **realizing the stable and autonomous development** in this region is **crucial for the stability and prosperity of the world**.
- The goal of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Vision is to facilitate free and robust economic activity throughout the Indo-Pacific, and to realize the prosperity in the entire region.

### New Pillars of Cooperation for FOIP

- (1) Principles for peace and rules for prosperity
- (2) Addressing challenges in an Indo-Pacific way
- (3) Multilayered connectivity
- (4) Extending efforts for security and safe use of the “sea” to the “air”

✓ Japan is pursuing the “Free and Open Indo Pacific (FOIP)” Vision through a coordinated whole-of-government approach.


### Characteristics of the Indo-Pacific Region

- The Indo-Pacific region is at the **center of global economic dynamism** and home to the **largest share of the world's population**. Key sea lanes are located in the **Indo-Pacific area**; as a result, regional stability is essential to Japan's security and prosperity.
- Meanwhile, **there are various challenges within the region**, including rapid military modernization and intensified military activities.
- **All countries in the region are taking measures** to respond to these rapid changes in the environment.

### Aspects of MOD's Approach

- **Securing the stable use of major sea lanes** by defense cooperation and exchange activities
- **Preventing contingencies** through confidence-building and mutual understanding
- **Contributing to peace and stability** through active engagement **in the region**, in cooperation with partner countries

✓ There are many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region  
 ✓ Creating a favorable security environment for Japan by leveraging defense cooperation and exchange activities



- The MOD/SDF is enhancing defense cooperation and exchanges with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. This enhanced engagement encompasses **Southeast Asia, South Asia and Pacific Islands**, in which several key sea lanes are located; Middle East, a key region in terms of energy security; and Africa and Latin America.
- The MOD/SDF is collaborating positively with Indo-Pacific countries such as the **United States, Australia, India, Canada, New Zealand**, and also countries in Europe including the **United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy**, all of which share values inherent to the FOIP Vision and have ties to the region.

✓ As “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” is an inclusive vision, Japan welcomes cooperation with all countries that share its values.

## Section 1

## Strategic Promotion of Multilateral and Multilayered Defense Cooperation

## 1 Significance, etc. of Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others

## 1 Significance and Changes of Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others

The peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region is closely related to Japan's security. In addition, with increasingly changeable and complicated global power dynamics and escalation of interstate competition encompassing political, economic, military and other aspects, they are also becoming a more important issue for the international community.

Thus, taking into account the international situation, regional characteristics and situations and security issues that other nations face, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self Defense Forces (SDF) intends to strategically promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, so that each country can build mutual trust and work together to solve regional security issues.

It is also necessary to further coordinate with each other even in peacetime to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to be able to receive support from the ally, like-minded countries, etc. in various contingencies.

Defense cooperation and exchanges have been delivered in the forms of high-level meetings; "Cooperation and exchanges among people" introducing working-level talks, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises; "cooperation and exchanges by assets" such as strategic port calls; "capacity building" in which human resource development and technical support are provided to other countries in security and defense fields; "defense equipment and technology cooperation" which is conducted to secure homeland security and promote contribution to peace/international cooperation, etc.; and others.

The MOD/SDF has long strived to alleviate any feelings of confrontation and tension, and to foster a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere by building face-to-face relationships through human cooperation and exchanges including bilateral dialogues. In addition, the MOD/SDF has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means,

including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, capacity building, defense equipment and technology cooperation and the development of institutional frameworks such as RAA and ACSA.


In addition, multilateral security cooperation and dialogue are in the process of evolving from those that focus on dialogue to those that focus on cooperation that seeks to maintain and strengthen international order.

It is important to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in a multifaceted and multilayered manner to create an ideal security environment.

At the G7 Hiroshima Summit chaired by Prime Minister Kishida in May 2023, the leaders agreed on the importance of the rule of law and the principles of the UN Charter in a session that included the leaders of the invited countries and President Zelenskyy of Ukraine.

They also agreed that the G7 will take the lead in addressing the global economy, including energy and food security and global challenges like climate change, health and development as well as strengthening its involvement in what is called the Global South.

At the Presidency Press Conference following the Hiroshima Summit, Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan would continue to lead the discussions in the G7 from the perspective of upholding the free and open international order based on the rule of law and strengthening Japan's engagement with its international partners.

 See Fig. III-3-1-1 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges); Fig. III-3-1-2 (Number of High-level Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations (April 2023-March 2024)); Fig. III-3-1-3 (Visit to Ports and Airports by SDF (April 2023-March 2024); Reference 39 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements); Reference 40 (International Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2023))



G7 Hiroshima Summit (May 2023) [the Prime Minister's Office of Japan Website]

Fig. III-3-1-1 Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Defense cooperation and exchanges

“Defense cooperation and exchanges” refers to efforts to strengthen bilateral and multilateral defense relations by using various tools, which are significant initiatives for securing the peace and stability of Japan and the international community.

Purpose of defense cooperation and exchanges

- To create a security environment desirable for Japan
- To deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential
- To prevent contingencies through promoting confidence-building and mutual understanding

Tools for defense cooperation and exchanges

Tool ① Cooperation and exchanges among people

... On such occasions as “2+2” Meetings, defense ministerial meetings, chief of staff-level meetings or other high-level meetings, working-level consultations among defense authorities, and multilateral international conferences, participants frankly exchange views on defense policies, regional affairs, defense cooperation and exchanges, etc., thereby developing mutual understanding and confidence-building among them and further promoting defense cooperation and exchanges thereafter. Exchanges of students and interchange in education and research aim to facilitate understanding of defense policies and statuses of military units of other countries and promote relations of trust through network building.



Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting



Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Senior Level Seminar



Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference hosted by Royal Australian Navy



Japan-Viet Nam mid-level officer exchange

Tool ② Cooperation and exchanges among assets

... Through goodwill exercise, mutual visits of naval ships and aircraft (calling at ports and airports), exchange events among units, and other measures, mutual trust with partner countries is developed and cooperative relationships are promoted. In joint training and exercises, the SDF will enhance the skills of each unit and strengthen nation-to-nation defense relationships through by increasing collaborative capacity with foreign military assets.



U.S.-Australia bilateral exercise with multinational participation “Talisman Sabre 23”



Multilateral exercise hosted by the U.S. Army and Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Army) “Super Garuda Shield 23”



Japan-U.S.-Australia multilateral exercise “Cope North 24” [Courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense]



Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral exercise “Noble Stingray”

Tool ③ Capacity building

... Capacity building aims to improve the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time, and help their military forces play roles in contributing to international peace and regional stability. It is conducted through activities such as seminars and practical training in various fields, the provision of technical guidance, opinion exchanges, and the observation of education and training programs, etc.



Engineering (Cambodia)



Military band training (Papua New Guinea)



HA/DR (search and rescue, military medicine) (Laos)



Cybersecurity (ASEAN countries)

Tool ④ Defense equipment and technology cooperation

... Through overseas transfers of equipment, joint research and development, participation in international exhibitions, and holding of the Defence Industry Forum, Japan seeks to maintain and strengthen its industrial base, enhance capacity of both the SDF and military forces of partner countries, and strengthen and maintain defense cooperation with those partner countries.



Transfer of air surveillance radar systems to the Philippines



International exhibition (LIMA'23)



International exhibition (DSEI London)



International exhibition (INDO PACIFIC 2023)

(Reference) Conclusion of agreements regarding defense cooperation

... Through concluding such agreements as Reciprocal Access Agreements, Agreements concerning Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), the framework of cooperation has been materialized and institutionalized with the aim of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges more smoothly and consistently.



Signing of Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement [Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]



Signing of Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement [Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]



Establishment of a joint organization to develop next-generation fighter jet by Japan, UK and Italy




Signing of Japan-Germany ACSA [Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]




**Fig. III-3-1-2** Number of High-level Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations (April 2023-March 2024)

“High-level bilateral dialogues and consultations” refers to bilateral meetings of the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and Chiefs of Staff with their respective counterparts. High-level bilateral dialogues and consultations were conducted with the following countries between April 2023 and March 2024, but had also been conducted with other countries prior to that period together with other types of defense cooperation and exchanges. It is clear from this figure that Japan has conducted high-level dialogues and consultations with various countries across the globe.



**Fig. III-3-1-3** Visit to Ports and Airports by SDF (April 2023-March 2024)



Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others

## 2 Efforts under the Vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)

### (1) Characteristics of the Indo-Pacific Region

A free and open maritime order, which relies on the rule of law, is the foundation for the stability and prosperity of the international community. The Indo-Pacific region is at the core of the world's vitality and home to half the world's population. It is important to establish this region as a "free and open global property" to ensure the peace and prosperity of the entire region.

On the other hand, a range of challenges exist for realizing FOIP in the region, including the vicinity of Japan, such as a rapid modernization of military forces and intensified military activities.

### (2) Direction of the MOD's Initiatives

Given this situation, the MOD/SDF is, for example, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to ensure that Japan can continue stable use of major sea lanes. In addition, the MOD/SDF is promoting mutual understanding and building trust with countries that modernize their military forces and intensify their military activities to prevent contingencies and ensure Japan's security. Furthermore, for countries in the region that are taking steps to respond to changes in the environment, the MOD/SDF is trying to contribute to regional peace and stability by supporting their efforts through defense cooperation and exchanges.

### (3) Expansion of FOIP

With the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone, Japan's policy is to further deepen cooperation with like-minded countries and further promote efforts toward realizing FOIP through frameworks, including Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) partnership. With respect to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacific Island countries, the Middle East, Africa and Latin American countries, cooperation will be strengthened to realize FOIP while utilizing wide-ranging means. For examples, in the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, the leaders of each country reiterated the importance of FOIP and in Quad

Leaders' Meeting held at the same time, they reaffirmed their strong commitment to the common vision of FOIP.

The MOD/SDF is also promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to realize FOIP and is working to maintain the stable use of sea lanes by establishing good relations with coastal countries in the aforementioned regions and ensuring that the SDF has stable access to their ports and airports. The MOD/SDF is also promoting initiatives, such as joint training and capacity building, to enable these countries to play a more effective role for the stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

The United States, which is the ally of Japan, Australia, India, European countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany, Canada and New Zealand, are countries that not only share fundamental values with Japan but also have geographic and historical ties to the Indo-Pacific region. The MOD/SDF has been encouraging these countries to engage more in the Indo-Pacific region and promoting defense cooperation and exchanges so that more effective initiatives can be achieved than unilateral efforts by Japan.

Japan's vision of FOIP is inclusive and the MOD/SDF will continue to promote cooperation with all countries that endorse it.

### (4) Promotion of Mutual Understanding and Trust Building

With regard to China, the MOD/SDF will, through defense exchange opportunities, continue to encourage to comply with international norms of conduct and assume a responsible and constructive role for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In doing so, by frankly conveying its concerns about the increased military activities and military expansions around it, Japan will promote mutual understanding and confidence-building and avoid unforeseen circumstances, thereby ensuring its security.

As for Russia, while condemning its aggression against Ukraine to the maximum extent possible, based on the belief that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are unacceptable, Japan will keep in touch with Russia as necessary to avoid unforeseen circumstances and unnecessary friction alongside it.

## 2 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Various Countries

In promoting security cooperation and exchanges, it is important to enhance bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges using optimal combinations

of various cooperative means, while taking matters such as regional affairs, the situations of partner countries and their relationships with Japan into account.

## 1 Australia

### (1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia

For Japan, Australia is a special strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region as both Japan and Australia are allied with the United States and share not only fundamental values but also security strategic stakes and interests.

Previously, the foundations for cooperation have been formed, including the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA), the Japan-Australia General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) (signed in January 2022, coming into force in August 2023). In addition, based on the new Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC)<sup>1</sup> signed in October 2022, the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states that the two countries will further deepen their defense cooperation and build a closer relationship second only to the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.


Based on the new JDSC as well, the two countries have been consulting Japan-Australia cooperation in contingencies and promoting cooperation in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), asset protection for the Australian Defence Force<sup>2</sup> (ADF), and bilateral and multilateral exercises to improve interoperability. They also promote support for capacity building in third countries, cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), defense equipment and technology cooperation and others.

**See** Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 3-8 (Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and other Forces); Reference 22 (Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces (SDF Law Article 95-2))

### (2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In April 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held a teleconference with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles, where he welcomed and

supported the “Defence Strategic Review<sup>3</sup>” announced by Australia the same month as it would contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region by strengthening Australia’s deterrence capabilities. The two ministers also agreed to continue actively promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to deepen Japan-Australia defense cooperation into an entity that would contribute more actively to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.



Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 2023)

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held an informal conference with Prime Minister Albanese on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. During the conference, Prime Minister Kishida stated that it was clear that Japan and Australia shared a common strategic awareness and a direction of the way forward, which was encouraging. The two leaders also welcomed the progress in security cooperation between the two countries based on the new Japan-Australia JDSC signed October 2022 and expressed their expectations for the early entry into force of Japan-Australia RAA, which will contribute to the implementation of the Declaration.

In June 2023, at the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, then Defense Minister Hamada met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles and signed “the trilateral Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Projects Arrangement”. The two Ministers agreed to promote science and technology cooperation in various fields, share strategic

<sup>1</sup> This Agreement reaffirms the special strategic partnership between Japan and Australia and states that cooperation between Japan and Australia, as well as between Japan, the United States, and Australia, will be consolidated across the board to maintain rule-based order and peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, specifying the strengthening of defense cooperation in the fields such as enhanced interoperability between the SDF and the Defence Force of Australia, cooperation in ISR, HA/DR, capacity building of regional partner countries, advanced defense science and technology and cyber and space. It also states that response measures will be considered in the event of contingencies that may affect the security interests of both Japan and Australia or the surrounding region.

<sup>2</sup> It was conducted 5 times in total in 2023.

<sup>3</sup> Announced in April 2023 in light of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Priorities were identified as improving deterrence by acquiring nuclear submarines, developing long-range precision strike capabilities, improving operational capabilities from northern Australia, deepening diplomatic and defense partnerships with key partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan and India and others. (See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6-1 (Australia))

awareness, enhance interoperability and further promote effectiveness of the defense cooperation.

In September 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Australia Summit meeting with Prime Minister Albanese and welcomed the progress made in Japan-Australia defense cooperation under the Australia-Japan RAA, which came into force in August 2023. They also agreed to strengthen concrete cooperation under the new Japan-Australia JDSC.

In October 2023, Defense Minister Kihara met with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles in Tokyo, where they confirmed the importance of steadily implementing the new Japan-Australia JDSC and promoting trilateral defense cooperation across the board, including with mutual ally the United States. Both countries also confirmed the importance of defense equipment and technology cooperation and welcomed the Australian Department of Defence's announcement<sup>4</sup> of concluding a contract for a joint development project with Mitsubishi Electric Corporation Australia.

In May 2024, Defense Minister Kihara met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles in Hawaii. During the meeting, the two ministers confirmed that advancing concrete cooperation and enhancing each other's capabilities under the aligned strategies of each country was important and that the direction of substantial cooperation between Japan's counterattack capabilities utilizing its stand-off defense capabilities and Australia's long-range precision strike capabilities would be considered. The two ministers also confirmed that in addition to ISR cooperation, their operational cooperation and joint trainings were deepening, including through the participation of ADF for the first time in the Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise "Yamasakura" (YS-85) and the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercise "Keen Edge 24", and agreed to continue strengthening cooperation in the Pacific Island region.

### (3) Initiatives of Each Service

Since April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan has held six meetings with General

Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force of Australia. During the meetings, the two sides agreed to further improve the effectiveness of defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries based on aligned strategies of each country and to strive to make this the core of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Since April 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) has met five times with Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, Chief of the Australian Army. In August 2023, he attended the Chief of Army Symposium (CAS) hosted by the Australian Army and exchanged opinions with Chiefs of Army of the participating countries in addition to the Chief of the Australian Army.

As part of various types of bilateral/multilateral training, the GSDF has continued to conduct field training between the GSDF Special Operations Group and the Australian Army's Special Operations Command. In addition, it has dispatched liaison officers to the Australian Army and vice versa, promoting the strengthening of cooperation.

Since April 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has had three meetings with Lt. Gen. Hammond, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy. At the meetings, they agreed to further strengthen cooperation between Australia and Japan, including cooperation with Pacific Island countries.

The MSDF is working to strengthen cooperation



Liaison officers aboard the destroyer JS "Shiranui" (from foreground, India, Australia, and the United States) during the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise "Malabar" (August 2023)



**MOVIE:** Field Training Exercise in Australia 2023

**URL:** <https://youtu.be/kn9inxgNUgs?si=zrNdpvwaCRoyOiw>

<sup>4</sup> A joint development project to enhance the monitoring capability and survivability of the equipment of Australian forces by utilizing Mitsubishi Electric Corporation's electronic and optical system technology (laser technology).

and improve interoperability, including high-end contents, with the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force through bilateral/multilateral exercises, such as the Japan-Australia bilateral exercise “Nichi-Gou Trident,” the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar,”<sup>5</sup> and the Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK multilateral exercise “Pacific Vanguard.” In addition, both countries have enhanced cooperation in strengthening defense cooperation with Pacific Island countries and supporting capacity building in the maritime security field, such as the Japan Australia Kiribati Goodwill Exercise conducted in June 2023 with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT) and the Australian Maritime Service Advisor.

In April 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, Japan Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) met with Air Vice-Marshal Roberts, Australian Space Defence Commander at the Space Symposium organized by the United States. In November 2023, he also met with Air Marshal Chipman, Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force at the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS) held in the United States.

After the RAA came into effect, the ASDF conducted a mobile deployment training of F-35A aircraft to the United States and Australia in August 2023 and the Japan-Australia bilateral exercise “Bushido Guardian 23” in September 2023. During the deployment training, F-35A fighter aircraft were deployed to Guam and Australia to strengthen cooperation among air force services with a view to future rotational deployments.



An ASDF F-35A fighter lands at Tyndall Air Force Base, Australia and receives a welcoming water spray. (August 2023)

**See** Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-4-1 (1) (Australia); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 41 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (FY2020 and Beyond))

#### (4) Cooperative Relationship, etc., among Japan, Australia and the United States

Japan and Australia share fundamental values and cooperate closely to resolve the various challenges the Indo-Pacific region and the international community face. To ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation and to contribute to the peace and stability of the region, it is important for Japan and Australia and their common ally, the United States, to proactively promote trilateral cooperation.

In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada attended a Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, during which the ministers committed to continue to take concrete and practical measures to improve interoperability and deepen cooperation across the spectrum among Japan, the United States and Australia, as well as to further strengthen cooperation with ASEAN countries, Pacific Island countries and others. They also committed to further strengthen cooperation among the three countries in conducting trilateral F-35 Joint Strike Fighter training in Australia, increasing complex and high-end exercises in northern Australia; regularizing asset protection by the SDF for the U.S. Forces and ADF; and information-sharing, equipment and technology cooperation and response to regional challenges.

On the same day, the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Defense Ministers’ Meeting was also held for the first time with the Philippines. The four ministers discussed common regional issues and expansion of cooperation among the four countries and confirmed their intention to work together to realize FOIP.

In May 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Hawaii. At the meeting, the ministers underscored the deep strategic alignment and shared values of the three countries and reiterated their strong opposition to any attempt by China to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the South China Sea and East China Sea. They also affirmed the critical role of the trilateral partnership in realizing FOIP and committed to expanding defense cooperation, including conducting trilateral F-35

<sup>5</sup> It began in 1992 as a bilateral exercise between the United States and India, and the MSDF has participated continuously since being invited in 2007. The year of 2022 saw the addition of Australia as a member country and Malabar 2023 was hosted by Australia for the first time.

Joint Strike Fighter trainings in all three countries, an inaugural joint and combined live fire air and missile defense exercise, and increased Japanese participation in Australia-U.S. force posture activities. Furthermore, they signed “the trilateral Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Projects Arrangement”, agreeing to further discuss opportunities for science and technology cooperation.

On the same day, the second Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines defense ministers’ meeting was held and the four ministers emphasized the importance of collaboration to advance their shared vision of free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

Japan, the United States and Australia has continued to engage in cooperation among each force, including the Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises as well as multilateral exercises involving other countries.

In June 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan had a Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Meeting with Admiral Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and General Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force of Australia on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. At the meeting, they agreed that the Indo-Pacific region was a focal point of international security and resolved to further strengthen cooperation between Japan, the United States and Australia for regional peace and stability. Additionally, at a CHOD Meeting conducted in August 2023, the participants discussed the future direction of Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation to realize FOIP.

The GSDF and the MSDF participated in the multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” hosted by the United States and Australia from July to August 2023 in Australia, to improve interoperability with U.S. and Australian forces and strengthen cooperation with participating countries. In February 2024, the ADF participated for the first time in the Japan-U.S. joint exercise “Keen Edge 24” to enhance joint operations capabilities of Japan, the United States and Australia.

In September 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF conducted the first Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK multilateral talks on the occasion of the Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (IPACC) and in December 2023, co-hosted the Land Forces Summit (LFS) with U.S. Army Pacific to hold a Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK multilateral talks and the first Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines multilateral talks with the heads of the Philippine Army and Marine Corps.

From June to July 2023, the GSDF conducted the



An operation meeting at the multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” (August 2023)

“Southern Jackaroo 23” field training exercise with the U.S. Marine Corps and the Australian Army in Australia to improve operational capabilities and interoperability with the United States and Australia regarding counter-guerrilla commando operations. In December 2023, the Australian Army participated for the first time in the Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise “Yamasakura” (YS-85) to improve cross-domain interoperability between Japan, the United States and Australia. The Philippines participated as an observer for the first time in the exercise, which also sought to strengthen cooperation among the four countries: Japan, the United States, Australia and the Philippines.

In May 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF attended a Japan-U.S.-India-Australia quadripartite meeting on the occasion of International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference (IMDEX) 2023 hosted by Singapore, where views were exchanged on strengthening cooperation, including “Malabar”, among the four countries. In September 2023, he also attended a Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Chiefs of Defense Meeting in Hawaii to share their understanding of the strategic environment and discuss the direction of cooperation among the four countries.

The MSDF carried out the Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise in June 2023 and February 2024 and its units for the Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD23) conducted the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada multilateral exercise “Noble Wolf”, the Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK multilateral exercise “Pacific Vanguard 23” and the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar 23” from June to August 2023. Additionally, in August 2023, following the results of the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Defense Ministers’ Meeting held in June 2023, the first Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines

multilateral exercise and the inspection of situations in the South China Sea by the commanders of the four countries' fleets and others were conducted. In October 2023, the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada-New Zealand multilateral exercise “Noble Caribou” was conducted in the South China Sea and in November, the MSDF Annual Exercise 2023 was carried out with the participation by the Philippines for the first time as an observer, in addition to the U.S., Australian and Canadian navies. Furthermore, progress was made to strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation and deepen Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation as the core of multilateral partnerships, represented by the implementation of the Japan-U.S.-Australia joint ISR in November 2023 and the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Maritime Cooperative Activity in the South China Sea in April 2024.

In December 2023, the ASDF conducted the Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral base defense exercise to share operational procedures. In February 2024, the ASDF also conducted various tactical exercises and joint HA/DR training collaborating with the MSDF during the Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise “Cope North 24” based in Guam, to further improve interoperability.

As just described, Japan has been continuing its efforts to improve interoperability while coordinating views on the situation and policy direction through various opportunities with the United States and Australia.

**See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 52 (Recent multilateral high-level exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))

## 2 India

### (1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India

India is increasing its influence with its population (the world's largest), its high economic growth and its latent economic power. Located in the center of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, India is an extremely important country for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India share fundamental values as well as common interests in the peace, stability and prosperity of the Indo-pacific region and the world and have established the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have promoted cooperation in maritime security and various other areas, while utilizing some frameworks including the “2+2” meeting.



Japan-India Summit Meeting on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit (May 2023)  
[the Prime Minister's Office of Japan Website]

Moreover, Japan and India signed the “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India”, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the Japan-India General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Japan-India ACSA. These agreements have strengthened the relationship between the two partners, which are capable of dealing with regional and global issues, as well as the foundation of this partnership.

### (2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In April 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka held a vice ministerial level defense policy dialogue with Indian Defence Secretary Aramane in Delhi, where they exchanged views on security strategies of Japan and India and regional affairs, and discussed wide range of topics, including defense cooperation between the two countries.

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-India Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Modi on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Both leaders emphasized the points such as the importance of upholding the principles of the UN Charter including sovereignty and territorial integrity, that unilateral change of the status quo by force must not be tolerated anywhere in the world and the maintenance of a free and open international order based on the rule of law and concurred to cooperate toward achieving peace. The two leaders also discussed bilateral relations. They shared a recognition on the importance of FOIP and confirmed to advance cooperation in various fields, including security. In September 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-India Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Modi on the occasion of

the G20 New Delhi Summit, where they agreed to work together in maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law, as well as in advanced technology fields, including space.

 See Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-4-1 (2) (India)

### (3) Initiatives of Each Service

Since April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan has held four meetings with Gen. Chauhan, Chief of Indian Defence Staff, the first of which in December 2023 was the first official visit by Gen. Chauhan, Chief of Indian Defence Staff to Japan since assuming his post. During the meeting, the two countries exchanged views on their perceptions of the strategic environment and agreed to further strengthen multilateral and multilayered efforts in Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges. The first “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India” was also held in September 2023, advancing Japan-India defense cooperation, which had previously been at the military service level, to the integrated level.


In September 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with Chief of the Army Staff Pande of India on the occasion of IPACC held in India. During the meeting, they shared the recognition that strengthening relations between the two countries, which are geopolitically located on the east and west sides of the Indo-Pacific Ocean, is essential and agreed to further deepen cooperation between the two military services. In addition, the GSDF conducted the “Dharma Guardian 23” bilateral field training exercise in Japan from February to March 2024 to further strengthen

cooperation between the armies.

In September 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF had a Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Chiefs of Defense Meeting in Hawaii, where the participants shared an understanding of the situation in the Indo-Pacific region and agreed to further expand exercises and cooperation, such as the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar.” Additionally, Admiral Sakai had a bilateral conference with Admiral R Hari Kumar, Chief of the Naval Staff of India.

Since April 2023, MSDF has conducted a total of three Japan-India bilateral field training exercises and in July 2023, carried out the Japan-India bilateral field training exercise “JIMEX 2023,” which aimed to strengthen interoperability through various tactical drills such as anti-submarine warfare. In June 2023, in the Japan-U.S.-India-Italy multilateral MCM/EOD exercise, MSDF worked to strengthen cooperation with the navies of the participating countries, including the Indian Navy and in August 2023, carried out the first Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar” in Australia to improve interoperability among the four countries through high-end exercises. In addition, since 2022, MSDF has continuously participated in the multilateral exercise “MILAN” hosted by the Indian Navy, and at “MILAN 2024”, in which MSDF participated in February 2024, MSDF sought to strengthen cooperation with the Indian Navy, and navies of participating countries, including the United States and Australia.

In November 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari, Chief of the Air Staff of India in the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS) held in the United States.

 See Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 42 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 52 (Recent multilateral high-level exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))



Gen. Chauhan, Chief of Indian Defence Staff, inspects the guard of honor, which is an official invitation to the MOD (December 2023)

### 3 European Countries

European countries share fundamental values with Japan and play a central role in initiatives to address common challenges to global security, with a primary focus on non-traditional security areas, such as counter-terrorism and response to “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” as well as



MOVIE: JIMEX2023 (Note) Facebook

URL: <https://fb.watch/q5s5riXk4q/>



international peace cooperation activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with these countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with these challenges and this is important for both Japan and European countries.

**See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)), Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))

## (1) The United Kingdom

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation with the United Kingdom by working together on global issues, such as international peace cooperation activities, counterterrorism, counter-piracy operations and cybersecurity as well as by exchanging information on regional affairs. Additionally, in recent years, the United Kingdom has made important contributions to ensuring a rule-based maritime order by dispatching a Career Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific region and permanently deploying two patrol vessels to the region to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities against illicit maritime activities, including “ship-to-ship transfers” with North Korean-flagged vessels. Accordingly, it is important for Japan to deepen cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom to realize FOIP.

The strategic partnership with the United Kingdom has been further facilitated and strengthened through the holding of Japan-U.K. “2+2” meetings, as well as the signing of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the Japan-U.K. General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), and the Japan-U.K. ACSA.

In addition, the Japan-U.K. RAA signed between Prime Minister Kishida and Prime Minister Sunak of the United Kingdom in January 2023 took effect in October 2023. The RAA will facilitate the implementation of cooperative activities between the forces of both countries, further promote bilateral security and defense

cooperation and strongly support peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In March 2024, the number of Defense Attachés was increased by one.

Furthermore, the Global Combat Air Programme<sup>6</sup>(GCAP) launched with a joint statement by the leaders of Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom in December 2022, is a project that could also serve as a cornerstone of stability and prosperity for the international community linking the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. In this way, Japan and the United Kingdom are strengthening their ties as each other’s closest security partner in Asia and Europe.

**See** Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-4-1 (3) (United Kingdom)

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

At the Japan-U.K. Leader’s Working Dinner held between Prime Minister Kishida and U.K. Prime Minister Sunak on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, the two leaders discussed the usage of the cooperation opportunities provided by the joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft, the expansion of bilateral exercises and other activities utilizing the Japan-U.K. RAA to increase interoperability, the enhancement of bilateral activities to a higher level with a view to the possible application of the SDF’s asset protection measure and the important regional and global security issues. The two countries issued the joint statement entitled “Japan-U.K. Hiroshima Accord” stating that they would address such issues cooperatively, etc. Based on of this document, the two leaders concurred to deepen Japan-U.K. relations in wide-ranging areas and affirmed to make further efforts in security and defense cooperation as each other’s closest security partners in Asia and Europe.



Japan- U.K. “2+2” (November 2023)

<sup>6</sup> A project to jointly develop next-generation fighter aircraft surpassing so-called fifth-generation fighter aircraft by 2035 by Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy

Also, prior to attending the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, U.K. Prime Minister Sunak visited Destroyer JS Izumo anchored in Yokosuka, attended a honor guard ceremony on the flight deck of Destroyer JS Izumo and toured inside the vessel.

In November 2023, the 5th Japan-UK “2+2” meeting was held and it was confirmed that specific cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom, including in the field of maritime security, would be promoted to realize FOIP. In addition, with the entry into force of the Japan-U.K. RAA, the two countries agreed to ensure the application of the agreement to improve interoperability and achieve even more ambitious plans for more frequent and complex exercises. They also agreed to work closely together in fields, such as the advancement of GCAP; cooperation in domains of cyber, space, etc.; economic security; information warfare; and women, peace and security (WPS).

On the occasion of the Japan-U.K. “2+2” meeting, Defense Minister Kihara met with the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps and confirmed that in light of the “Japan-U.K. Hiroshima Accord,” cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom in the security field is closer than ever before. They also agreed to work closely together to further improve cooperation and interoperability between Japan and the United Kingdom via the Japan-U.K. RAA and to further deepen defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and the United Kingdom, including GCAP.

In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara met with the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps and Italian Defence Minister Crosetto in Tokyo, issuing a joint statement and signing the Convention on the Establishment of the “Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation” to establish an efficient intergovernmental collaboration structure for GCAP. Additionally, during his visit to Japan, the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps announced that the U.K. Carrier Strike Group, scheduled to be deployed to the Indo-Pacific in 2025, would call on Japan.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In April and August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan had a video conference with Admiral Radakin, the U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff.

At the August video conference, General Yoshida received an explanation from Admiral Radakin about the Defense Command Paper (DCP) that had been released in the United Kingdom in July 2023 and expressed his

welcome for its emphasis on cooperation with Japan. A meeting held in September 2023 emphasized both countries’ commitment to further security and defense cooperation in wide-ranging fields as each other’s closest security partners in Asia and Europe.

In May 2023, at the Land Force Pacific Symposium and Exposition (LANPAC) event 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with General Sir Sanders, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army to discuss future defense cooperation and others. In addition, during the official visit of General Sir Sanders, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army to Japan in February 2024, he signed the revised “roadmap for Japan-British army defense cooperation.”

In November 2023, the GSDF conducted the “Vigilant Isles 23” bilateral field training exercise on island defense with the British Army, during which the Japan-U.K. RAA was applied for the first time.

In August 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF paid an official visit to the United Kingdom, where he met with Admiral Sir Key, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval staff. During the meeting, he welcomed the Royal Navy’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific, including the deployment of U.K. aircraft carriers and confirmed the further deepening of cooperation and collaboration with the Royal Navy based on the “Japan-U.K. Hiroshima Accord.” MSDF participated in the U.S.-Philippines-led multilateral exercise “SAMA SAMA 2023,” to strengthen cooperation with the participating navies, including the Royal Navy.

In October 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Air Chief Marshal Sir Knighton visiting Japan. In November 2023, they also met at the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS) held in the United States to exchange views on international affairs and the security environment, etc.

## (2) France

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with France

France is a major power that has influence not only in Europe and Africa, but also around the world. It is the only EU member state that maintains a constant military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, with territories across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It also historically has had a close relationship with Japan and is positioned as Japan’s special partner. In addition, cooperation with France, which has influence in the African region, is essential for the rescue and transportation of Japanese

nationals and others overseas in the region.

Japan and France have continued high-level exchanges such as the Japan-France “2+2,” and have concluded the Japan-France General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), the Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment, and Technology and the Japan-France ACSA. In addition, the two countries agreed to further accelerate the discussion on measures to improve each other’s administrative, policy and legal procedures for joint operations and exercises between the units of both countries on a permanent basis.

### **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges**

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-France summit meeting with French President Macron on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. At the meeting, they agreed to advance concrete cooperation in areas such as cyber and space, as well as to advance concrete cooperation such as joint training. Regarding the situation in East Asia, they also affirmed that they would continue to coordinate in addressing issues related to China and in dealing with North Korea, including on the nuclear and missile issues as well as the abductions issue.

The Seventh Japan-France “2+2” Meeting was held in the same month, during which the ministers praised the regularity and quality of operational interactions between the French Armed Forces and the SDF, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, through bilateral and multilateral port calls and exercises. They also agreed to strengthen Japan-France cooperation for Pacific Island countries and to accelerate discussions on a permanent framework to mutually improve administrative, policy and legal procedures for joint operations and exercises among the forces.

In December 2023, the “Roadmap on Japan-France Cooperation under the Exceptional Partnership (2023-2027)” was issued at a teleconference between the leaders of Japan and France. With regard to security and defense, it promotes cooperation between Japan and France in bilateral and multilateral training and exercises and port calls by military aircraft and naval vessels, etc., as well as further strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and France, such as cooperation in the fields of the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic; maritime security; defense equipment and technology; support for capacity building in third countries and protection of their citizens.

In addition, at the Japan-France Summit Working Lunch held in May 2024, the two countries agreed to

start negotiations for the Japan-France RAA and make steady progress in the negotiations.

### **c. Initiatives of Each Service**

In June 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video conference with General Thierry Burkhard, French Chief of the Defence and expressed his intention to strengthen mutual engagement on issues in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. In August 2023, at the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD) held in Fiji, he met with then Vice Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, the Chief of Operations of the French Joint Staff and expressed his gratitude for France’s support for the evacuation of Japanese nationals in the Republic of Niger that month. He also stressed the inseparability of the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region and shared his understanding on the future direction of cooperation and exchanges between Japan and France.

In April 2023, the SDF participated in the multilateral HA/DR exercise “Croix du Sud 2023,” hosted by the French Armed Forces in New Caledonia, France, to promote mutual understanding and strengthen trust with France and the participating countries.

In September 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with General Pierre Schill, Chief of the Staff of the French Army at IPACC held in India. In addition, during his official visit to France in November 2023, General Morishita met with Mr. Schill and others and they agreed on the importance of further cooperation between Japan and France to maintain a rule based international order, without allowing attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force.

In September 2023, in French New Caledonia, the GSDF conducted the bilateral exercise “Brunet-Takamori 2023” for the first time as Japan-France army services.

In September 2023, at the International Seapower Symposium (ISS) hosted by the United States, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Vaujour, Chief of the Staff of the French Navy and the two discussed cooperation between Japan and France in the Indo-Pacific region.

The MSDF annually conducts the Japan-France bilateral exercise “Oguri-Verny 23” with French forces stationed in French Polynesia and French New Caledonia and participates in the multilateral exercise “La Pérouse 23” hosted by the French forces and others. Since April 2023, the Japan-France bilateral exercise “Oguri-Verny” has been conducted four times, and in



The bilateral exercise “Brunet-Takamori 2023” for the first time as Japan-France army services (July 2023)

June 2023, as part of the “Large Scale Global Exercise (LSGE) 23<sup>7</sup>” hosted by the United States, the Japan-U.S.-Canada-France multilateral exercise “Noble Typhoon,” the Japan-U.S.-France multilateral exercise “Noble Buffalo,” etc. were held in the waters surrounding Japan and the South China Sea, etc., to strengthen cooperation and deterrence through high-end training. In January 2024, the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) conducted a counter-piracy exercise with the French Navy in the Gulf of Aden to strengthen cooperation with the Japanese and French navies.

In June 2023, having accepted an invitation from General Stéphane Mille, Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF attended the Paris Air Show and met with him. In July 2023, on the occasion of the first bilateral exercise between the ASDF and the French Air and Space Force conducted in Japan, General Mille visited Japan to inspect the exercise, hold meetings and do other work.

The ASDF had its fighter aircraft participate in “Multi Big-Deck Event” and “Oguri-Verny” conducted in June and July 2023, conducted its first bilateral exercise with the French Air and Space Force in Japan.

### (3) Germany

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Germany

Germany is a partner with which Japan shares fundamental values and cooperates in addressing issues in the international community as a member of the G7 and other organizations. Germany is increasing its

involvement in the Indo-Pacific region based on the Indo-Pacific Guidelines formulated in 2020 and since the German naval frigate called on Japan in 2021 to conduct joint training and other activities, has regularly dispatched its ground, maritime and air forces to the region. Japan and Germany have concluded the Japan-Germany Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and the Japan-Germany General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), and Japan-Germany ACSA was substantially agreed in November 2023 and signed in January 2024. In addition, high-level and other exchanges between the two countries are progressing, such as the Japan-Germany “2+2”.

#### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held talks with Chancellor Scholz of Germany on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Regarding the situation in East Asia, the two leaders affirmed that they would continue to closely coordinate in addressing issues related to China and in dealing with North Korea, including on the nuclear and missile issues as well as the abductions issue.

#### c. Initiatives of Each Service


In June 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with General Breuer, Chief of Defence of the German Armed Forces on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore. During the meeting, General Yoshida emphasized his intention to strengthen mutual engagement on issues in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region and further promote defense cooperation and exchanges with Germany.

In July 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF officially invited Lieutenant General Alfons Mais, Inspector of the Germany Army. In December 2023, he held a video conference with Lieutenant General Alfons Mais to discuss the progress and future direction of defense cooperation and exchanges between the Japanese and German army services.

In February 2024, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF made an official visit to Germany, where he met with Vice Admiral Jan Christian Kaack, Inspector of the German Navy and other high-ranking officials and attended the Munich Security Conference as the first MSDF officer.

The MSDF participated with the GSDF in the

<sup>7</sup> It is an exercise framework that incorporates multiple exercises and activities of the SDF and U.S. and like-minded forces and is intended to strengthen cooperation and improve interoperability among participating countries in the Indo-Pacific region.



A meeting between General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF and Lieutenant General Alfons Mais, Inspector of the Germany Army (July 2023)

multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” hosted by the United States and Australia that took place from July to August 2023 in Australia and strengthened cooperation through multilateral amphibious operational exercises, including with the German Navy.

In June 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF participated in the Distinguished Visitors Day of the “Air Defender 23” multilateral exercise organized by the German Air Force and attended by NATO member states and others and met Lieutenant General Ingo Gerhartz, Inspector of German Air Force. During the meeting, both sides shared their recognition of security issues in the region and agreed to further strengthen cooperation.

#### (4) Italy

##### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Italy

Italy and Japan are G7 member countries and Italy is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. The two countries have been promoting institutional development for facilitating defense cooperation, including concluding the Japan-Italy General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA) and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, as well as signing the Japan-Italy Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges.

##### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida met Prime Minister Meloni of Italy on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit, during which the two leaders shared the view to deepen discussions on concrete cooperation through the Political-Military Dialogue

and other channels. Regarding the situation in East Asia, they affirmed to continue to coordinate closely in addressing issues related to China and in dealing with North Korea, including on nuclear and missile issues as well as the abductions issue. At the meeting in December 2023, they concurred to work positively on bilateral cooperation in the security and defense areas.

In October 2023, then Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Wada visited Italy and had discussions on GCAP with Italian Defence Minister Crosetto and the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps.

In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara held a meeting in Tokyo with Italian Defence Minister Crosetto and the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps and signed the Convention on the Establishment of the “GCAP International Government Organisation.” In addition, the Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting was held, where it was agreed that they would further promote various defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Italy, including GCAP and to realize FOIP, and that they would work closely together to further deepen bilateral relations.

In February 2024, Prime Minister Kishida held a summit meeting with Prime Minister Meloni of Italy and welcomed the progress of cooperation in the field of defense and security such as joint naval exercises and port calls by naval vessels as well as the joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft by Japan, Italy and the U.K., which is proceeding as planned.

##### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In November 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited Italy for the first time in 41 years as the Chief of Staff, GSDF, meeting with Camporeale, Commander of the Operational Land Forces Command, Italian Army and visiting units.

In June 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Credendino, Chief of the Italian Navy, who visited Japan on the occasion of the port call of an Italian naval frigate in Yokosuka and they agreed to promote further strengthening of relations between the two countries.

In June 2023, the MSDF strengthened cooperation with participating navies, including the Italian Navy, which participated for the first time in the Japan-U.S.-India-Italy multilateral MCM/EOD exercise. In July 2023, the MSDF also conducted a bilateral exercise in the East China Sea with the Italian navy frigate that had completed a port call in Yokosuka, and in September 2023, DSPE conducted a counter-piracy exercise in



The first Japan-Italy bilateral exercise in Japan by their air force services (August 2023)

the Gulf of Aden with EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) (Italian Navy).

General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Lieutenant General Goretti, Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force at the Space Symposium held in the United States in April 2023 and at the international Aerospace Power Conference hosted by Italian Air Force in May 2023.

Following the first Italian stopover by aerial refueling/transport aircraft in 2022, the ASDF conducted the first Japan-Italy bilateral exercise in Japan in August 2023. Italian Air Force F-35A fighters and other aircraft participated in the exercise to strengthen cooperation between air force services.

## (5) Netherlands

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Netherlands

The Netherlands has a historical relationship with Japan that is over 400 years old and is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. Based on the Japan-Netherlands Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges signed in 2016, the two countries have agreed to further strengthen relations between defense authorities.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In May 2023, on the occasion of his visit to the Netherlands, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda met General Eichelsheim, the Netherlands Chief of Defence. During the meeting, Onoda welcomed the growing interest of the Netherlands and other European countries in the Indo-Pacific region and they agreed to continue close cooperation between the two countries

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff,

Joint Staff officially invited General Eichelsheim, the Netherlands Chief of Defence. Additionally, in June 2023, at a meeting held on the occasion of Shangri-La Dialogue, General Yoshida stressed his intention to further promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries to maintain and strengthen the rule-based free and open international order.

In August 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met Lieutenant General Martin Wijnen, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army on the occasion of CAS hosted by the Australian Army with a view to future defense cooperation. The Royal Netherlands Army also participated for the first time in the “New Year’s jump training” to be conducted by the GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade in January 2024.

In July 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met Vice-admiral Tas, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy visiting Japan and agreed to further develop the relationship between the two countries.

In November 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Lieutenant General Steur, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force at PACS held in the United States and they agreed to advance defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

## (6) Spain

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Spain

Spain is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. The two countries have agreed to further enhance the relationship between their defense authorities based on the Japan-Spain Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges signed in 2014.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In September 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Rear Admiral Sánchez, Chief of Staff of the Spanish Navy on the occasion of ISS hosted by the United States to exchange views on future defense cooperation.

In July and October of the same year, DSPE conducted a counter-piracy exercise with EUNAVFOR (Spanish Navy) in the Gulf of Aden to strengthen cooperation.

## (7) NATO

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a partner

that shares fundamental values and responsibility for global security challenges with Japan.

Based on Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between Japan and NATO<sup>8</sup> (IPCP) (revised in 2018 and 2020) formulated in 2014, female SDF personnel were dispatched to NATO Headquarters as part of the Japan-NATO cooperation in the field of women, peace and security (WPS). Furthermore, the MOD/SDF staff participate in the annual meeting of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP).

Currently, uniformed SDF personnel is dispatched to the NATO Headquarters International Military Staff, Cooperative Security Division (NHQIMSCS) as a staff member for cooperation with international organizations/ Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), where she has been involved in coordinating cooperation projects between NATO and the United Nations, African Union (AU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NGOs and others.

In addition, the MOD sent liaison officers to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and a liaison officer to the NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), and in 2018, the Mission of Japan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established as an additional role of the Embassy of Japan in Belgium.

In terms of cooperation in the cyber domain, the MOD staff has been dispatched to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) since 2019 and from that year onwards, the MOD has been participating in NATO's Cyber Defense Exercise "Cyber Coalition". In addition, since 2021, the MOD has been officially participating in the NATO CCDCOE Cyber Defense Exercise (Locked Shields).

The "NATO Strategic Concept" adopted in June 2022 stated that the Indo-Pacific region was an important region for NATO which could have a direct impact on the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and that dialogue and cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea should be strengthened.

Additionally, in light of the current international security environment and with a view to further promoting practical cooperation between Japan and

NATO in a wide range of areas, such as information warfare including cybersecurity and disinformation countermeasures, and maritime security, in July 2023, the two sides agreed on the "Japan-NATO Individually Tailored Partnership Programme<sup>9</sup> (ITPP)," which is a revised version of IPCP. Japan and NATO agree on the need to further deepen cooperation based on ITPP in future.

 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 9-2 (1) NATO

## b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In July 2023, Prime Minister Kishida attended the NATO Summit held in Lithuania, where discussions were conducted on future cooperation between NATO and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region and others, in light of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the increasingly severe security situation in the region. He also met with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg and welcomed the agreement reached for ITPP.

In November 2023, NATO and the Government of Japan held the First Japan-NATO Cyber Dialogue in Brussels, where the two sides confirmed that they would continue to work closely together in the field of cyber. In February 2024, Defense Minister Kihara received a courtesy call by General Cavoli, Commander of NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and confirmed that Japan would further strengthen its cooperation with NATO based on ITPP.

In April 2023, the MOD formed a joint team with Australia to participate in "Locked Shields 2023" to understand cybersecurity trends and respond to cyberattacks more effectively.

## c. Initiatives of Each Service

In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video conference with NATO Military Commander Chair Bauer and agreed that Japan and NATO would strengthen cooperation in international rule-making and security in the Indo-Pacific region. In the meetings, held in June and August 2023, they stressed their intention to make the Japan-NATO defense cooperation and exchanges, which had been making rapid progress, even more effective, reaffirmed that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region

<sup>8</sup> The IPCP stipulates the promotion of cooperation, such as enhancing high-level dialogue and promoting defense cooperation and exchanges, with the aim of further developing cooperation between Japan and NATO and specifies priority areas for working level cooperation. The IPCP was revised in June 2020, adding "human security" as a priority area for working level cooperation.

<sup>9</sup> A new framework cooperation document between Japan and NATO designed to take NATO-Japan cooperation to new heights to respond to the challenges of a new era, covering the four-year period from 2023 to 2026.

were inseparable and then confirmed that they would further promote Japan-NATO defense cooperation and exchanges based on ITPP. In a video conference in January 2024, the two sides shared their interests toward the NATO Military Committee in the Chiefs of Defense Session (MCCS) (attended by Vice Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office on his behalf).

In August 2023, during his visit to the United Kingdom, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Vice Admiral Maletterre, Deputy Commander, NATO's Maritime Allied Command (MARCOM) and they agreed to further strengthen cooperation between NATO and Japan.

In November 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF attended the NATO Partner Air Chiefs' Conference via online format and stated that under ITPP, Japan would strengthen cooperation with NATO and NATO member states for practical cooperation and mutual understanding on space security.



A meeting between General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan and NATO Military Commander Chair Bauer (June 2023)

## (8) EU

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the EU

Japan shares fundamental values such as freedom, democracy and the rule of law with the European Union (EU). Since the provisional application of the Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement began in 2019, Japan and the EU have been steadily expanding cooperation in the fields of security and defense. The EU is strengthening its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, such as with the announcement of the Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in 2021, as well as the Strategic Compass in March 2022

that includes a policy of increasing the frequency of naval exercises and port calls and patrols with partner countries. Amidst this, the MOD/SDF is actively and independently advancing cooperation to ensure that the EU's commitment to the region is irreversible.

 See Part 1, Chapter 3, Section 9-2-2 (EU)

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In March 2023, then State Minister of Defense Ino attended the Schuman Security and Defence Forum held for the first time by the EU. At the plenary session, he spoke as a panelist and expressed that he would like to strengthen cooperation with the EU in the fields of security and defense, under the recognition that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is now inseparable.

DSPE is strengthening its cooperation with EUNAVFOR based on the "Administrative Arrangement between EU Naval Force Atalanta and Japan's Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden for Communication and Coordination on Joint Counter-Piracy Exercises" signed in the same month between General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan and Vice Admiral Núñez, EUNAVFOR Somalia Atalanta Operation Commander. In July and October 2023, counter-piracy exercises were conducted with EUNAVFOR (Spanish Navy) and in September 2023, with EUNAVFOR (Italian Navy).

## 4 Republic of Korea (ROK)

### (1) Significance of Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

The ROK is an important neighboring country that Japan should cooperate with as a partner in addressing various issues in the international community. In the fields of security and defense, the cooperation between Japan and the ROK is increasingly important as the security environment surrounding the two countries is becoming severe and complex, including the nuclear and missile issues of North Korea, requirement to response to large-scale natural disasters, counterterrorism, counter-piracy and maritime security.

### (2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Korea Summit Meeting with President Yoon Suk-yeol of



the ROK in Tokyo. At the meeting, the two leaders agreed to activate communication between their governments in wide-ranging fields, including politics, economy and culture. Specifically, they agreed to resume the Security Dialogue, etc. at an early date and advance Japan-ROK as well as Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation in light of North Korea's recent intensification of nuclear and missile activities

In May 2023, the two leaders held the Japan-ROK Summit Meetings in Seoul and the G7 Hiroshima Summit, where they welcomed the fact that dialogue and cooperation between the two governments were moving forward in wide-ranging areas in line with the result of their meeting in March, including the resumption of the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue. They concurred on close Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation in dealing with issues regarding North Korea and advancing deterrence and response capabilities and also affirmed that they will promote cooperation to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

Prime Minister Kishida held the Japan-ROK Summit Meetings at the NATO Summit in July 2023, the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in Camp David in August, the G20 Summit in September and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' Week in November. During these meetings, the two leaders decided to communicate closely on various fields, including maintaining and strengthening of a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific, the situation in the Middle East and Russia's aggression against Ukraine, as well as response to North Korea. The two leaders also confirmed that they would work closely together bilaterally and trilaterally among Japan, the ROK and the U.S. on the response to North Korea.

In April 2023, the MOD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) held the first Japan-ROK Security Dialogue in about five years, based on the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting held in March 2023. The two countries deepened the understanding of the strategic environment and their security and defense policies, exchanged views on the response to North Korea and the strengthening of Japan-ROK bilateral and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation, including cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and agreed to communicate closely to strengthen Japan-ROK security and defense cooperation.

In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held



Defense Minister Kihara (left) and ROK Defense Minister Shin (right) and representatives of Japanese and ROK naval services at the Japan-ROK Defense Ministers' Meeting in Shangri-La Dialogue (June 2024)

a Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting with then ROK Defense Minister Lee Jong-Sup on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore. At the meeting, the ministers concurred on the importance of promoting Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation based on the necessity of responding to the severe security environment in the region such as North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, as well as global challenges. They also concurred on accelerating consultations between Japan-ROK defense authorities for recurrence prevention measures with regard to pending issues, including the incident of an ROK naval destroyer directing its fire-control radar at an SDF aircraft,<sup>10</sup> to advance cooperation between the Japan-ROK defense authorities.

In October 2023, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa held a Japan-ROK Vice Ministers' Meeting with then Vice Defense Minister Shin Boem-chul of the ROK during the Seoul Defense Dialogue held in Seoul. At the meeting, the two sides affirmed the importance of promoting Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation and concurred continuing close communication between the Japan-ROK defense authorities based on the outcomes of the Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting held in June 2023.

In June 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a Japan-ROK Defense Ministers' Meeting with ROK Defense Minister Shin Won-sik on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, where they shared the recognition that a security cooperation relationship

<sup>10</sup> In December 2018, a destroyer of the ROK Navy, directed a fire control radar at a MSDF patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance activities off the coast of the Noto Peninsula (within Japan's exclusive economic zone). For details, see the MOD website (<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/radar/index.html>).

between Japan and the ROK is beneficial for both countries, which share fundamental values and strategic interests, also serves as a foundation for robust Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation, and is essential not only for deterring North Korean threats, but also for realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific. They also concurred resuming high-level exchanges between the SDF and the ROK Armed Forces in order to activate the dialogue between defense authorities, and concurred on discussing details of future Japan-ROK security cooperation. Regarding pending issues between Japan-ROK defense authorities, as a result of discussions at the working level, including naval services of both sides, based on the fact that a document had been formulated between Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF, and the Chief of Naval Operations, the ROK Navy, which includes adhering “Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)”, improving communication at the unit level such as communication procedures, and strengthening communication at the headquarter level, the two ministers concurred that items confirmed at the working level will be implemented, and that safety will be ensured in the event of encounters between the MSDF and the ROK Navy at sea in peacetime.

Through this meeting, the MOD/SDF has concluded that measures to prevent a recurrence of the incident of an ROK naval destroyer directing its fire-control radar at an SDF aircraft, which was a long-standing issue and safety of the unit are ensured. Accordingly, in order to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific, as concurred at the Japan-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting, the MOD/SDF will continue to enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-ROK-U.S. security cooperation, while promoting cooperation and exchanges in various fields.

 See Reference 44 (Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond))

### (3) Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Relationship

Japan, the United States and ROK, have common interests in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and it is important for the three countries to work closely together at every opportunity to address various security challenges, including response to North Korea.

In April 2023, the 13th Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) were held in the United States. During the Talks, the three representatives reaffirmed ongoing work to fully leverage the existing intelligence frameworks, including the Trilateral Information-Sharing Arrangement (TISA) among the defense authorities of Japan, the United

States and the ROK, in line with the commitment to share a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism, expressed at the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting (November 2022). The representatives also discussed concrete ways to deepen U.S.-Japan-ROK security cooperation, such as the regularization of missile defense exercises and anti-submarine exercises to deter and respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and the resumption of trilateral exercises, including maritime interdiction and counter-piracy exercises.

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida exchanged views for a short time with President Biden of the United States and President Yoon of the ROK, who were visiting Japan for the G7 Hiroshima Summit. During this exchange of views, the three leaders concurred on bringing Japan-U.S.-ROK coordination to a new height, building on their respective strengthened bilateral relationships. The leaders also concurred on further enhancing strategic coordination among the three countries not only to respond to North Korea but also to maintain a free and open international order based on the rule of law. They then concurred on advancing concrete cooperation among the three countries in various areas, including trilateral security cooperation, such as a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism, strengthening of dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, economic security and engagement with Pacific Island countries.

In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and then ROK Defense Minister Lee on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. At the meeting, they confirmed the importance of deepening trilateral cooperation on key issues to promote FOIP, including information-sharing, high-level policy discussions and trilateral exercises. They also confirmed trilateral efforts to launch a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism by the end of 2023 and discussed measures to promote defense cooperation among the three countries, including regularization of missile defense exercises and anti-submarine warfare exercises.

In August 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting with President Biden of the United States and President Yoon Suk-yeol of the ROK at Camp David in the United States. At the Meeting, under the common objective of FOIP, they agreed to strengthen strategic cooperation among the Japan-U.S. and U.S.-ROK alliances, raise Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation to new heights and hold ministerial-level

meetings and others, including defense ministers, at least once a year. With regard to a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism, they confirmed that initial measures had been conducted, taking an important step toward launching the mechanism by the end of 2023. They also announced the implementation of annual trilateral exercises covering multiple domains. Furthermore, to realize FOIP, the three leaders agreed to promote cooperation among Japan, U.S. and ROK and cooperate in capacity building in the field of maritime security, etc., especially in ASEAN and Pacific Island countries.

In September 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference and based on the results of the Summit Meeting in August, the three countries agreed to work more closely together, including further accelerating cooperation toward the realization of a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism as well as formulating and implementing a multi-year exercise plan to regularize trilatera exercises.



Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in Camp David  
(August 2023)

In November 2023, Defense Minister Kihara held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and ROK Defense Minister Shin Won-sik. At the meeting, they emphasized that the coordination for a real-time missile warning data sharing mechanism had been progressing smoothly and reached the final stage for its launch by the end of 2023 and agreed to accelerate coordination to develop a multi-year plan for trilateral exercises by the end of 2023 to conduct such exercises more systematically. In addition, noting the steady progress of the trilateral exercises, they stressed the importance of continuing such activities and demonstrating the strong

will and capability of the three countries to respond to threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara, along with U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin and ROK Defense Minister Shin, issued the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers Joint Press Statement announcing that a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism had been activated and that a multi-year plan for trilateral exercises had been jointly formulated.



Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers Joint Press Statement (December 2023)

#### (4) Initiatives of Each Service

In July 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Chiefs of Defense Meeting in Hawaii. At the meeting, the participants shared their recognition of security challenges such as North Korea's activities and agreed to promote cooperation among the three countries for regional peace and stability and the realization of FOIP.

In September 2023, on the occasion of IPACC held in India, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held the first Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Quadripartite Meeting with General Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, Lieutenant General Stuart, Chief of the Australian Army and General Park Jeong-hwan, then Chief of Staff of the ROK Army and they agreed to build a close network among the four countries' army services. Also, in December 2023, at the Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Quadripartite Meeting (ROK attended it in a VTC format) held on the occasion of LFS co-hosted by U.S. Army Pacific, where they agreed to create a roadmap for promoting defense exchange steadily for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole, while promoting mutual understanding among Japan, United States, Australia and ROK.

In April, July, August, October and November 2023

and in January 2024, the MSDF conducted Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercises to strengthen cooperation through various tactical exercises such as joint ballistic missile countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare and electronic warfare by the three countries. Additionally, in May 2023, the MSDF dispatched its destroyer to the “Eastern Endeavor 23,” a multilateral PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) exercise<sup>11</sup> hosted by ROK. In July 2023, the MSDF conducted the Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK multilateral exercise “Pacific Vanguard 23” to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation with navies of other countries, etc.

In April 2023, the ASDF conducted the Japan-ROK Middle-level Officer Exchange Program (visiting ROK). In October and December 2023, the ASDF also carried out joint training with U.S. Air Force and ROK Air Force.

These Japan-U.S.-ROK exercises promote trilateral cooperation to address security challenges in the region. They also demonstrate the commitment of Japan, the United States and ROK to protect their common security and prosperity and to strengthen the rules-based international order.



**See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 52 (Recent multilateral high-level exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))



The first Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral aerial exercise (October, 2023)  
[Courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense]

## (5) Japan-ROK GSOMIA

In light of the increasingly serious situation surrounding North Korea, in November 2016, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was concluded between Japan and the ROK to further promote bilateral cooperation to exchange and share classified information regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. This agreement serves as a framework to appropriately protect classified military information shared between the Japanese and ROK governments. In August 2019, the Government of the ROK notified the Government of Japan of its intention to terminate the GSOMIA in writing. However, in November 2019, the ROK Government notified Japan that it would suspend the effect of its notice. In March 2023, the Government of the ROK withdrew its notice of termination and officially notified Japan of confirmation that the agreement remained in force.

## 5 Canada and New Zealand

Canada and New Zealand share fundamental values with Japan and play a central role in initiatives to address common challenges to global security, with a primary focus on non-traditional security areas, such as counter-terrorism and response to “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” as well as international peace cooperation activities. Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with these countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in these challenges and this is important for all of Japan, Canada and New Zealand.

<sup>11</sup> This is an initiative to examine and practice measures that can be taken jointly by participating countries to prevent the transfer and transport of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related materials which are threats to international peace and stability, within the scope of international and national laws, to prevent their proliferation. Based on this, PSI exercises are being conducted to improve the ability to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and others.

**See** Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 45 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Canada and New Zealand (FY2020 and Beyond)), Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))

## (1) Canada

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Canada

Japan and Canada are G7 members, fellow Pacific nations, and strategic partners that share fundamental values. The relationship between Japanese and Canadian defense authorities has deepened dramatically over the past few years, as exemplified by the 2019 joint statement on defense cooperation, the entry into force of the Japan-Canada ACSA, the Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEx” that has been conducted annually since 2017 and other multilateral training.

Canada has been increasing its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region in recent years, including releasing its Indo-Pacific Strategy in November 2022 and increasing the number of assets that it dispatches to the Indo-Pacific region to support FOIP.

**See** Part I, Chapter 3, Section 9-3-4 (Canada)

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Canada Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023 and the APEC Summit Meeting in November 2023. During the Meetings, the two leaders exchanged their views on the situation in East Asia and concurred that they would continue close coordination between Japan and Canada in addressing issues related to China and responding to North Korea, including the nuclear and missiles issue and the abductions issue. They also welcomed the steady progress on implementing the “Japan-Canada Action Plan for contributing to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region,” (announced in 2022) such as holding the official negotiation on the Japan-Canada General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA) and expressed appreciation for Canada’s deployment of its military assets, including monitoring and surveillance activities against “illicit ship-to-ship transfers” with North Korean-flagged vessels.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with General Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada, and agreed to further strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges toward the realization of FOIP, as cooperation with the

Canadian Armed Forces would greatly contribute to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Also, at the meeting held in June 2023 when General Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada was officially invited to Japan, the two sides agreed to promote more effective defense cooperation to ensure peace and stability in the region by maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law.

In September 2023, at the ISS hosted by the United States, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Vice-Admiral Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy to exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

As for the MSDF, its Training Squadron made a port call to Canada (Victoria) in June 2023 to conduct the Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEx23” with the Royal Canadian Navy. In addition, from June to October 2023, its IPD23 unit and others carried out the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada multilateral exercise “Noble Wolf”; the Japan-U.S.-Canada-France multilateral exercise “NobleTyphoon”; the Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral exercise “Noble Raven 23,” “Noble Chinook,” and “Noble Stingray”; and the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada-New Zealand multilateral exercise “Noble Caribou” in the sea area around Japan, East China Sea and South China Sea to strengthen cooperation through various tactical exercises such as antisubmarine warfare and antisurface warfare. Additionally, in October 2023, DSPE participated in the U.S.-Philippines-led multilateral exercise “SAMA SAMA 2023” to strengthen cooperation with participating navies, including the Royal Canadian Navy. Furthermore, the Royal Canadian Navy and Air Force participated in MSDF Annual Exercise 2023 conducted in November 2023.

In April 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff



An official visit to Canada by General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF (Canadian Space Agency) (April 2023)

made an official visit to Canada and met Lieutenant-General Kenny, Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force. At the meeting, they agreed to work on mutual understanding between air force services and further deepening and developing defense cooperation and exchanges, including in the space domain.

## (2) New Zealand

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with New Zealand

New Zealand shares fundamental values with Japan and is an important strategic cooperative partner in the Indo-Pacific region, where the strategic environment is becoming increasingly severe. The defense authorities of Japan and New Zealand actively conduct high-level exchanges, joint training and unit-to-unit exchanges.

At the Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in April 2022, the two leaders announced that they agreed to launch formal negotiations for the Japan-New Zealand General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA). The coordination is underway among the relevant authorities.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada signed the “Statement of Intent on Defence Cooperation in Maritime Security, Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief and Climate Change in the Pacific Islands Region” with then Minister of Defence of New Zealand. Little at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Both countries concurred on further promoting defense cooperation in the Pacific Islands Region under the Statement.

Around the same time, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka held a Vice Ministers’ Meeting with New Zealand Secretary of Defence Bridgeman and they concurred strengthening cooperation between the two countries and communicate more closely between the defense authorities to realize FOIP.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with Air Marshal Short, Chief of Defence Force of New Zealand on the occasion of the Indo-Pacific CHOD held in Fiji, where they agreed to take the opportunity to pursue bilateral exercises to realize FOIP.

In August 2023, at the CAS hosted by the Australian Army, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met Brigadier King, Deputy Chief of Army of New Zealand on the future defense cooperation.

In May 2023, on the occasion of IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Rear Admiral Proctor, Chief of Navy of New Zealand, and exchanged views on defense cooperation and exchanges in the Pacific Island countries.

In October 2023, the MSDF conducted the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada-New Zealand multilateral exercise “Noble Caribou” in the South China Sea to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation with the navies of participating countries.

## 6 Northern Europe and the Baltic States

### (1) Sweden

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Sweden

Sweden is a partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. December 2022 marked the signing and entry into force of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the first such agreement with a Nordic country, promoting the defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. In addition, as the relationships between NATO and our country have strengthened in recent years, progress in defense cooperation and exchanges with Sweden, which has become a new member of NATO in 2024, is expected.

#### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In May 2023, during a visit to Sweden, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda discussed with State Secretary to Minister for Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden Sandwall on regional affairs and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges and concurred to continue working closely together.

In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held a meeting with the Minister for Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden Jonson, who visited Japan. At the meeting, then Defense Minister Hamada stated that Japan supports for Sweden’s decision to apply for NATO membership and confirmed that they will continue to cooperate closely towards closely further deepening the Japan-Sweden relationship and realizing FOIP.

In February 2024, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake made a courtesy call on Defence Minister Jonsson on the occasion of the Munich Security Conference and exchanged views on the regional affairs and Japan-Sweden bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In November 2023, on the occasion of the Royal Australian Navy Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference (IP23), Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Rear Admiral Haslum, Chief of the Royal Swedish Navy to share information on the security environment and exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

## (2) Denmark

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Denmark

Denmark is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan and the two countries have accumulated a series of defense exchanges, including high-level talks and research exchanges.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In October 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a meeting with Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen visiting Japan. At the meeting, recognizing the inseparability of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security, they agreed to work to consolidate bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. They also agreed to hold discussions between defense authorities and maintain and develop cooperation in the field of maritime security.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In October 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan received a courtesy call from visiting Major General Hellebjerg, Chief of Joint Operations, Defence Command Denmark and emphasized the increasingly severe security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. They also exchanged views on the recognition sharing of strategic environments and defense policies through a working-level exchange at Joint Staff, the direction of defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries and others.

## (3) Finland

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Finland

Finland is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan and in 2019, Japan signed the Japan-Finland Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges. In addition, as the relationships between NATO and Japan have been strengthened in recent years, defense cooperation and exchanges with Finland, which became a new member of NATO in 2023, is expected to progress.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In May 2023, during a visit to Finland, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda paid a courtesy call on then Defence Minister Antti Kaikkonen of Finland and expressed the intention to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in various fields to further deepen the relationships between the two countries. Additionally, at a meeting with Permanent Secretary at Ministry of Defence of Finland Pulkkinen, Onoda stated that Japan supported Finland's major strategic decision to join NATO and celebrated the accession of Finland to NATO. They also concurred to continue working closely together.

In February 2024, on the occasion of Munich Security Conference, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake paid a courtesy call on Defense Minister Häkkinen of Finland and exchanged views on the regional affairs and defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

## (4) Estonia

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Estonia

Estonia is a partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. Estonia is implementing advanced initiatives as one of the world's leading IT countries and cooperation with the MOD/SDF is progressing in the field of cyber defense. In addition, Estonia takes an important role in the view of Japan-NATO cooperation, including being the location of the CCDCOE.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In July 2023, the first Japan-Estonia Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on the regional affairs and defense policies of both countries and they deepened the discussions on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

In February 2024, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake made a courtesy call on the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Estonia Pevkur during the Munich Security Conference. They welcomed the advance in cyber defense cooperation and discussed defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Estonia. In March 2023, PVM Miyake met with General Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces and they concurred to continue working closely together.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In September 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan officially visited Estonia. He made a courtesy call on Mr. Salm, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Estonia and held a meeting with



A meeting attended by General Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces and Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake (March 2024)

General Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces. At the meeting, they agreed that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region are inseparable and agreed to strengthen mutual engagement not only on global security issues, but also on European and Indo-Pacific challenges. In March 2024, General Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces was officially invited to Japan, reaffirming their commitment to further promote Japan-Estonia defense cooperation.

### (5) Latvia

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Latvia

Latvia is a partner that shares values and principles with Japan. With growing recognition among like-minded countries that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific are inseparable, collaboration toward the realization of FOIP and cooperation through the EU, NATO and others are becoming increasingly important.

#### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In October 2023, the first Japan-Latvia Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on issues such as defense policies of the two countries and regional affairs including Ukraine, and Israel/Palestine. They also deepened the discussion on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

### (6) Lithuania

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Lithuania

Lithuania is a strategic partner of Japan and the two countries are deepening their cooperation to uphold and reinforce the free and open international order based on the rule of law. Additionally, in October 2023, the two countries signed the Japan-Lithuania Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges.

#### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

On the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore in June 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka held a meeting with Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania Tomkus. At the meeting, they exchanged views on the regional affairs, including Russia's aggression against Ukraine and confirmed that in addition to bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, the two countries would work together to promote cooperation as well through NATO and the EU.

In October 2023, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa signed the Japan-Lithuania Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges with Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania Tučkutė, and at the following meeting, they shared the view to further strengthen the defense cooperation and exchanges under the Memorandum.

In February 2024, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake met with Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania Tučkutė during the Munich Security Conference, where they welcomed the signing of the Japan-Lithuania Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges and discussed Japan-Lithuania defense cooperation and exchanges and regional affairs.



**See** Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (FY2020 and Beyond))

## 7 Central and Eastern European Countries

### (1) Ukraine

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Ukraine

Ukraine is a partner that shares fundamental values such as freedom, democracy and the rule of law with Japan. With Ukraine, in 2018, Japan signed the Japan-Ukraine Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges and held the Japan-Ukraine Security Meeting.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which began



in February 2022, violates Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, is a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force, shakes the very foundations of the international order and is absolutely unacceptable. Based on this position, Japan has been taking decisive measures by uniting with the international community.

### **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.**

Japan has been providing non-lethal equipment and goods, such as bulletproof vests, protective masks and protective clothing, vehicles, small drones and emergency rations, sequentially after March 2022, responding to the request of the Government of Ukraine for the provision of equipment, etc. after Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, who was visiting Japan to attend the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Prime Minister Kishida conveyed Japan's intention to newly provide SDF vehicles such as trucks and approximately 30,000 emergency rations to Ukraine, based on the request from the Ukrainian side, as well as Japan's decision to accept injured Ukrainian soldiers at the SDF Central Hospital. In response, President Zelenskyy expressed his gratitude.

Following the meeting, also in May, based on a request from Ukraine, Japan announced that it would accept two injured Ukrainian soldiers with lower leg amputations (in which the leg was amputated from the knee down) to provide them with the necessary medical treatment at the SDF Central Hospital, with the Japanese side bearing



Prime Minister Kishida paying floral tribute at Cenotaph for the A-bomb Victims with President Zelenskyy (May 2023)  
[Website of the Prime Minister's Office of Japan]

the costs in principle. In addition, since June 2023, approximately 30,000 emergency rations and a total of 101 SDF vehicles (small trucks, high mobility vehicles and material handling vehicles) have been provided.

In June 2023, at the Shangri-La Dialogue meeting held in Singapore, then Defense Minister Hamada met with then Ukrainian's Defense Minister Reznikov and stated that unilateral changes to the status quo by force would not be accepted and that Japan would unite with the international community to respond with resolute determination.

In October 2023, Defense Minister Kihara held a video teleconference with Ukrainian's Defense Minister Umerov and told him that the MOD/SDF would continue to support Ukraine as much as possible in cooperation with the international community.

The MOD regularly participates in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group organized by the U.S. Department of Defense and works with participating countries to share information on assistance to Ukraine. In December 2023, based on a request from the government of Ukraine and others, the MOD has decided to provide assistance in the areas of IT and demining via the IT Coalition for Support of Ukraine and the Demining Coalition for Support of Ukraine, in which European and other volunteer countries participate.

### **c. Initiatives of Each Service**

In January 2024, Colonel General Koval, the Commandant of the National Defence University of Ukraine and ten others visited the Joint Staff College and the National Institute for Defense Studies to give lectures and exchange views with students on the current situation in Ukraine and other issues. During the visit, the Commandant of the Joint Staff College and Colonel General Koval, the Commandant of the National Defence University signed a "Letter of Intent in the Fields of Education and Scientific Research" and agreed to further deepen exchanges between the two schools.

 See Section 3-2-6 (Cooperation for the Activities Helping Ukrainian Victims); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-4-1 (8) (Ukraine)

## **(2) Czech Republic**

### **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the Czech Republic**

The Czech Republic is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. In 2017, the first Japan-Czech Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges with a Central or Eastern European country was signed. The NDS also specifies that Japan

will strengthen cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic.

### **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.**

In July 2023, the first Japan-Czech Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on the regional affairs and defense policies of the two countries and deepen discussions on future defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

### **(3) Poland**

#### **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Poland**

Poland is a strategic partner that shares values and principles with Japan. Cooperation with Poland is being advanced in accordance with the “Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategic Partnership,” including in the areas of politics and security. In February 2022, the Japan-Poland Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges was signed. The NDS also specifies that Japan will strengthen cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland.

#### **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.**

In July 2023, during her visit to Poland, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda met with Mr. Wiśniewski, then Undersecretary of State in the Polish Ministry of National Defence and acclaimed the progress in exchanges between the defense authorities of the two countries. They also exchanged views on the regional affairs, including Ukraine and defense cooperation and exchanges and agreed to continue working closely together.

#### **c. Initiatives of Each Service**

In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with General Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, then Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, where they exchanged views on strategic environment awareness and agreed to continue working closely together to maintain and strengthen a free and open international order. In September 2023, General Yoshida paid an official visit to Poland. Then, he paid a courtesy call on Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland Błaszczak and met with General Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, then Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to discuss the future direction of defense cooperation and Cooperatio between Japan and Poland.

### **(4) Romania**

#### **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Romania**

Romania is a strategic partner of Japan and in response to the increasingly severe security environment, including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the two countries are going to consolidate dialogue in the security field. In addition, in July 2023, for the first time in about 20 years, Defense Attaché was dispatched to Romania.

#### **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.**

In August 2023, during her visit to Romania, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda paid a courtesy call on Mr. Tilvar, Romanian Defence Minister and they agreed to promote defense cooperation and Cooperatio in various fields. Onoda also met with Mrs. Cojocar, Romanian State Secretary of the Ministry of National Defense and exchanged views on the regional affairs including Ukraine, defense cooperation and exchanges, as well as WPS and agreed to continue close cooperation.

 See Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (FY2020 and Beyond))

## **8 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

### **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries**

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have high potential as the world’s “open growth center” with continuous high economic growth, etc. In addition, they are situated in strategically important areas that occupy key points on Japan’s sea lanes and they play an important role in ensuring peace and prosperity for both Japan and whole of the region.

Given such importance of ASEAN countries, there is great significance in the MOD/SDF strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges with each ASEAN country while supporting efforts to reinforce ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience as the foundation for regional cooperation from the view of realizing FOIP. This will also lead to the creation of a desirable security environment for Japan.

Based on this principle, Japan is facilitating confidence building and mutual understanding through high-level and working-level exchanges as well as promoting capacity building, bilateral/multilateral training and defense equipment and technology cooperation with

ASEAN countries. In addition to bilateral cooperation, Japan also conducts cooperation within multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The “Vientiane Vision”, which Japan announced in 2016 was the first guideline for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, which presented an overall picture of the priority area of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. In 2019, at the 5th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting held in Thailand, then Defense Minister Kono announced the “Vientiane Vision 2.0”, an updated version of the “Vientiane Vision” and the ASEAN ministers welcomed it.

At the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting held in Indonesia in November 2023, Defense Minister Kihara affirmed that the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)”, adopted by ASEAN and FOIP shares fundamental principles such as openness, transparency and a rules-based framework and presented the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE) to advance the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation to a new level.

The MOD will continue to actively promote such bilateral and multilateral cooperation going forward.



Paragraph 3 (Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation); Paragraph 4 (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 46 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Member States (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 52 (Recent multilateral high-level exchanges (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 56 (Vientiane Vision 2.0); Reference 57 (Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (Since FY2020))

## (2) Indonesia

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Indonesia

Indonesia is a major regional power that exercises leadership in ASEAN and is a comprehensive and strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. Indonesia is located in the Strait of Malacca and other key areas of maritime transportation and since the Japan-Indonesia Summit in 2015 when the two countries agreed to strengthen the Strategic Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy, they have been actively engaging in defense cooperation and exchanges at various levels and fields, such as holding a Japan-Indonesia “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting.

In addition to signing the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in 2021,

Japan and Indonesia agreed in the “2+2” meeting 2023 to improve also held that year their capacity in maritime surveillance and maritime law enforcement, strengthen maritime cooperation, including the provision of fishery surveillance vessels, and strengthen cooperation in the region around the Sulu and Celebes Seas.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

Prime Minister Kishida held a Summit Meeting with Indonesian President Joko on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Prime Minister Kishida mentioned the importance of defending a free and open international order based on the rule of law, while President Joko stated that he agreed with Prime Minister Kishida's views.

During summit meetings held in September and December 2023, the two leaders confirmed that they would continue to work together on regional issues.

In November 2023, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa held a meeting with H. E. Lt Gen. Herindra, Vice Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia on the occasion of ADMM-Plus.

In July 2023, to strengthen the Japanese language education course at the Defense Language Education and Training Center of the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, the MOD provided capacity building to improve the Japanese language skills of the Center's instructors and course students.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with Admiral Yudo, the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. At the meeting, they agreed to further cooperation on various regional and international issues, including efforts to realize FOIP.

In August 2023, on the occasion of the CAS hosted by the Australian Army, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with then General Dudung, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army and they agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through expert exchange and multilateral training.

From August to September 2023, the GSDF participated in multilateral exercise “Super Garuda Shield 23” hosted by the U.S. and Indonesia and strengthened cooperation with the participating countries through various tactical exercises, including to recapture islands. Additionally, in October 2023, the MOD/SDF shared its knowledge with the Indonesian National Armed Forces in support of capacity building for HA/DR, including guidelines for cooperation between the SDF and local governments in

the event of a disaster.

In May 2023, the MSDF latest destroyer JS “Kumano” called at Jakarta as part of the IPD 23 unit and conducted a ship tour for the Minister of Defense and other high-ranking Indonesian officials, as well as goodwill exercises with the Indonesian Navy. In June 2023, it attended an international maritime security symposium and a medical assistance program during the multilateral naval exercise “Komodo 2023” hosted by the Indonesian Navy.

In June 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF, officially invited Air Chief Marshal Fadjat Prasetyo, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force to exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges, etc. among air force services.

### (3) Cambodia

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Cambodia

In 1992, Cambodia became the first country to which Japan sent an SDF unit for UN (Peacekeeping Operations) PKO. As indicated by Japan’s capacity building for Cambodia since 2013 and other programs, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have made steady progress.

#### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In September and December 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held summit meetings with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet. During the meetings, the two leaders welcomed the development of cooperation between the naval services, including port calls by naval vessels, in addition to personnel exchanges between the army services and agreed to establish the Vice Ministers’ Meeting and strengthen cooperation in the security field.

#### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Vong Pisen. During the meeting, they agreed to continue strengthening Japan-Cambodia defense cooperation and exchanges, which have made steady progress in various fields such as UN PKO and capacity building, for the sake of peace and stability in the region and the international community.

In September 2023, on the occasion of IPACC held in India, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with General Mao Sophon, Commander of the Royal

Cambodian Army and they agreed to strengthen bilateral relations through multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges.

The GSDF provided capacity building to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces on PKO (engineering) from November to December 2023.

In May 2023, on the occasion of IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF had a meeting with Vice Admiral Tea Sokha, Deputy Commander of the Royal Cambodian Navy to discuss future defense cooperation, including port calls by MSDF vessels. In April 2023, the MSDF Indo-Pacific and Middle East Deployment (IMED23) unit made a port call at Sihanoukville, where the commanding officer paid a courtesy call to Admiral Tea Vinh, Commander of the Royal Cambodian Navy and carried out goodwill exercises and exchange events, including a demonstration of emergency equipment to the Royal Cambodian Navy and sports exchanges. In addition, in February 2024, the Training Squadron made a port call at Sihanoukville to conduct goodwill exercises with the Royal Cambodian Navy.

### (4) Singapore

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Singapore

Singapore was the first Southeast Asian country to sign a memorandum on defense exchanges with Japan in 2009 (revised in June 2022). Since then, based on this memorandum, various cooperative relationships have been progressing steadily, including the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology that took effect in June 2023.

#### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada witnessed the signing ceremony of the Japan-Singapore Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with Singapore Defence Minister Ng.

In August 2023, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kimura visited Singapore and held a meeting with Mr. Heng, Singapore Senior Minister of State for Defence. At the meeting, they exchanged views on regional affairs, including North Korea and the East and South China Seas, and agreed to continue strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges. During the meeting with Mr. Chan, Singapore Permanent Secretary (Defence), Kimura also expressed their expectations to extend defense cooperation relations between the two

countries, including the materialization of equipment transfer projects.

### **c. Initiatives of Each Service**

At the Shangri-La Dialogue meeting held in Singapore in June 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with Admiral Beng, Chief of Defence Force, Singapore Armed Forces and emphasized the intention to further promote defense cooperation and exchanges for the sake of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

In May 2023, on the occasion of LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with Major-General Neo, Chief of Army, Singapore Army, and they agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through exchanges of experts and multilateral exercises.

In May 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF made an official visit to Singapore to attend IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore and had a discussion with Rear Admiral Wat, Chief of Navy, Republic of Singapore Navy. During the meeting, they agreed to strengthen cooperation between the two countries to realize FOIP and contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In November 2023, the two countries also held discussions on defense cooperation and exchanges at IP23 hosted by the Royal Australian Navy.

In April 2023, the MSDF IMD 23 unit made a port call at Changi, where it conducted a naval ship tour and goodwill exercises with the Singapore Navy. In May 2023, the latest destroyer JS “Kumano” of MSDF participated in IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore, where MSDF’s strength, technological capabilities and manpower-saving initiatives were introduced to the participating navies, including Singapore, such as opening the destroyer Kumano to them.

## **(5) Thailand**

### **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Thailand**

With Thailand, Japan has longstanding defense cooperation and exchanges based on the traditionally good relationship between the two countries, including the dispatch of Defense Attachés and consultations between their defense authorities from early years. At the National Defense Academy, a Thai student became the first foreign student to be accepted in 1958. Since then, Thailand has sent the largest cumulative number of students to the academy.

With the Agreement concerning the Transfer of

Defense Equipment and Technology entering into force in May 2022, in November 2023, Japan and Thailand upgraded their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, accelerating talks on deepening security cooperation between the two countries.

### **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.**

In August 2023, during his visit to Thailand, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kimura held a meeting with Gen. Sanitchanog Sangkachantra Permanent Secretary for Defence and General Thitichai Tiantong, Chief of Joint Staff, the Royal Thai Armed Forces to discuss regional affairs, including the East and South China Seas and to further promote bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

In November 2023, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa paid a courtesy call on Thai Minister of Defence Sutin on the occasion of ADMM-Plus.

### **c. Initiatives of Each Service**

SDF has continued to participate in the “Cobra Gold” Multilateral exercise. During the exercise held in February 2024, SDF improved its integrated operational capabilities related to protection measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas and international peace cooperation activities and strengthened cooperation with the participating countries.

In May 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with then General Narongpan Jitkaewthae, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army at LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii and they agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through expert exchanges and multilateral exercises.

In November 2023, on the occasion of IP23 hosted by the Royal Australian Navy, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF had a meeting with Admiral Adung Phaniam, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy to discuss Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing and defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

## **(6) The Philippines**

### **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the Philippines**

The Philippines faces important sea lanes for Japan, such as the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait and cooperation with the Philippines and strengthening of its coastal surveillance and maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities are important to ensure the security of these sea lanes. In addition to high-level exchanges

with the Philippines, also a U.S. ally, there are frequent mutual visits by naval vessels, working-level exchanges including Military-Military Consultation and service-to-service exchanges.

In 2016, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology came into force and in 2022, the two countries held the first “2+2” meeting, where they agreed to start considering a framework to facilitate reciprocal visits and reciprocal provision of supplies and services in the field of logistical support. Also, in February 2023, “the Terms of Reference (TOR) between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Activities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in the Republic of the Philippines”<sup>12</sup> was signed and in November 2023, the two countries agreed to begin negotiations on the RAA and others, deepening security cooperation between the two countries steadily.

### **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.**

In June 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada held the first-ever Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Quadripartite Defense Ministers’ Meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles, and then Philippine Senior Undersecretary and Officer-in-Charge of the Department of National Defense Galvez on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore. The four ministers discussed common challenges in the region and expansion of cooperation among the four countries and confirmed their commitment to work together to realize FOIP.

In November 2023, Prime Minister Kishida visited the Philippines and held a summit meeting with Philippine President Marcos. At the meeting, Kishida welcomed the signing of the exchange of notes on the provision of coastal radar systems, the first cooperation project under Official Security Assistance<sup>13</sup> (OSA) and expressed his intention to strengthen cooperation on defense equipment and technology including the transfer of air surveillance radar systems, and cooperation in enhancing maritime security capabilities including the provision of patrol ships. In addition, the two leaders

welcomed the agreement to begin negotiations on the RAA and decided to proceed with coordination to steadily implement bilateral consultations in the security and defense fields. They also agreed to promote US-Japan-Philippines cooperation and further cooperation in fields such as cybersecurity and economic security.

In the same month, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa paid a courtesy call on the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Teodoro, on the occasion of ADMM-Plus held in Indonesia.

With regard to the transfer of defense equipment, a contract was concluded in 2020 between Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Inc. for the delivery of four air surveillance radar systems. Prior to the delivery, the ASDF and the GSDF provided education for the Philippine Air Force radar personnel. As Japan’s first case of an overseas transfer of finished equipment, the first and second air surveillance radar systems were delivered to the Philippine Air Force in October 2023 and March 2024, respectively, and the Acceptance, Turnover, and Blessing Ceremonies were held in December 2023 and April 2024 with the attendance of the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Teodoro.

In April 2024, Prime Minister Kishida attended a Japan-U.S.-Philippines summit meeting in the United States. The leaders of the three countries agreed to continue strengthening security and defense cooperation through Military to Military (MM) Dialogues and trilateral exercises.

In May 2024, Defense Minister Kihara met with the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Teodoro in Hawaii. In the meeting, Secretary Teodoro expressed his appreciation for the delivery of air surveillance radar systems to the Philippines, and they exchanged views on the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Maritime Cooperative Activity conducted in the South China Sea in April 2024 and the Japan-Philippines RAA, for which negotiations were announced to begin in November 2023.

The RAA is expected to contribute to the facilitation of cooperative activities between Japanese and Philippine units, such as joint training and exercises, and the two countries agreed to work together further toward its early conclusion.

During the same period, Defense Minister Kihara held

<sup>12</sup> It simplifies the procedures for the SDF to visit the Philippines for activities related to HA/DR.

<sup>13</sup> A new framework for grant assistance established in FY2023 in which military forces and others are beneficiaries, for the purpose of strengthening security cooperation with Japan, creating a favorable security environment for Japan and helping maintain and strengthen international peace and security by consolidating the security capabilities and deterrence of the countries of the region by providing equipment and materials, infrastructure development and other activities



A U.S.-Japan-Australia-Philippines defense ministers' meeting (May 2024)

a U.S.-Japan-Australia-Philippines defense ministers' meeting, where the four ministers expressed serious concern about the situation in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and expressed strong objection to the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels in the South China Sea. They also emphasized that defense cooperation among the four countries had never been stronger, such as the Maritime Cooperative Activity conducted by Japan, the United States, Australia, and the Philippines in April 2024, and discussed opportunities to advance defense cooperation among the four countries, including cooperative activities and enhanced capacity building in the South China Sea.

 See Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-4-1 (9) (Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Countries)

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with then General Centino, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as a Japan-U.S.-Philippines video teleconference also attended by Admiral Aquilino, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. At the meetings, they agreed to further promote Japan-Philippines bilateral and Japan-U.S.-Philippines trilateral cooperation for the realization of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, various issues of the international community and FOIP. In June 2023, the three countries shared their understanding of issues in the Indo-Pacific region and reaffirmed the importance of Japan-U.S.-Philippines defense cooperation during a trilateral meeting in Shangri-La Dialogue. In August 2023, at the Indo-Pacific CHOD held in Fiji, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with General Brawner,

Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and they agreed to further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in the future. They also held a Japan-U.S.-Philippines Chief of Staff-level meeting attended by Admiral Aquilino, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. In a Japan-Philippines video teleconference held in December 2023, the two countries shared an understanding of the situation in the South China Sea, emphasized their strong opposition to any action that would increase tensions and agreed to work closely together.

In May 2023, on the occasion of LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a discussion with General Brawner, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, regarding future defense cooperation and other issues. In December 2023, during the LFS co-hosted by the U.S. Pacific Command, General Morishita held a trilateral meeting with General Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Lieutenant General Jurney, Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, Major General Rojas, the Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps. During the meeting, they shared their perceptions on the strategic environment and the future direction of cooperation among the three countries' army services and discussed a roadmap to guide cooperation over the next five years. Furthermore, for the first time, a quadripartite meeting was held with Lieutenant General Stuart, Chief of Army of Australia to exchange views on defense cooperation among the four countries.

In October 2023 and in March 2024, as part of its support for capacity building in the field of HA/DR, the GSDF shared its knowledge on how to respond to disasters with the Philippine Army and provided the



General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF holding a Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines meeting (December 2023)



**MOVIE:** IPD23 1st Surface Force activity records (the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines multilateral exercises)

**URL:** <https://youtu.be/geFXHik9eY4?si=v8HNI4wYVnLufpK8>

Army with technical guidance and advice on and how to use lifesaving equipment.

In May 2023, at IMDEX Asia 2023 hosted by Singapore, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Flag Officer-in-Command, Philippine Navy Vice Admiral Adaci to discuss strategic environment awareness and future defense cooperation. Additionally, in November 2023, during IP23 hosted by the Royal Australian Navy, Admiral Sakai met with Rear Admiral Valencia, Philippine Navy Vice Commander to discuss the situation in the South China Sea, maritime law enforcement activities and other areas of cooperation in maritime security.

In August 2023, the MSDF IPD 23 unit, along with the U.S. Navy, Royal Australian Navy and Air Force, and Philippine Navy, conducted the first multilateral exercise among the four countries. At that time, the U.S., Australian and Japanese navies made a joint port call in Manila, where the commanders of the U.S., Japan, Australian and Philippine fleets inspected the situations in the South China Sea and a meeting of the U.S.-Japan-Australia-Philippine fleet commanders was held for the first time. In October 2023, the MSDF, along with the navies of the United Kingdom and Canada, attended a meeting of experts on MDA, international law and medical care during the “Exercise SAMA SAMA 2023,” a multilateral exercise hosted by the United States and the Philippines and conducted search and rescue training at sea to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries’ navies. In November 2023, in addition to the U.S., Royal Australian and Canadian navies and air forces, the MSDF carried out the multilateral “Annual Exercise 2023” with the participation of the Philippine Navy as an observer for the first time. Moreover, in February 2024, it provided the Philippine Navy with practical training in vessel engine maintenance as part of its capacity building on vessel maintenance. Furthermore, in April 2024, as the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Maritime Cooperative Activity, the MSDF conducted multilateral exercises in the South China Sea with the U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force, and the Philippine Navy.

In August 2023, the ASDF participated for the first time in the multilateral “Pacific Airlift Rally” exercise hosted by the United States and the Philippines and conducted a joint Japan-Philippines humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise to improve HA/DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation with participating countries’

air forces, including the Philippines.

## (7) Brunei

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Brunei

With Brunei, Japan signed a memorandum of defense cooperation and exchanges in 2023, agreeing to further strengthen relationships between the defense authorities of the two countries through various exchanges, including high-level exchanges, port calls (navigation) of naval vessels, etc., joint training programs and others.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In June 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka held the first Japan-Brunei Defense Policy Dialogue with Haji Adi Ihram bin Dato Paduka Haji Mahmud, then Deputy Permanent Secretary (Policy and Strategy) of the Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam to exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Brunei, as well as regional affairs, etc.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with Major General Dato Paduka Seri Haji Muhammad Haszaimi bin Bol Hassan, Commander of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces on the occasion of the CHOD meeting held in Fiji and shared recognition on Japan-Brunei defense cooperation and exchanges for the realization of FOIP and AOIP.

In the same month, at the Australian Army’s Chief of Army Staff Symposium (CAS), General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with Brigadier General Haji Mohammad Shanonnizam bin Sulaiman, Royal Brunei Land Force Commander, and they agreed to strengthen bilateral relations through multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges.

In November 2023, at IP23 hosted by the Royal Australian Navy, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Captain Haji Mohamad Sarif Pudin bin Matserudin, Acting Commander of Royal Brunei Navy to discuss future defense cooperation and exchanges.

In April 2023 and in February 2024, the MSDF Training Squadron made a port call in Muara and conducted goodwill exercises with the Brunei Navy. In addition, from April to May 2023, the MSDF IMED23 unit called at Muara and carried out various exchange events, including opening its vessel to the Bruneian Navy and conducting joint beach cleanup volunteer activities.



## (8) Viet Nam

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Viet Nam

Viet Nam is a coastal country facing the South China Sea. Japan and Viet Nam have developed cooperation and exchanges between their defense authorities. The 2021 Defense Ministers' Meeting was an opportunity to promote high-level exchanges and others under "Japan-Viet Nam Defense Cooperation at the New Level" to contribute more actively not only to Japan-Viet Nam bilateral relations but also the peace and stability of the region as well as the international community. In November 2023, the two countries decided to develop their relationship into a comprehensive strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in Asia and the world and in the security field, they agreed on the importance of steadily advancing procedures for transfer of defense equipment, discussing OSA and others, further expanding defense cooperation and exchanges.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In May 2023, on the occasion of G7 Hiroshima Summit, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting with Prime Minister Chinh, and they confirmed their collaboration in responding to the situation in the East and South China Seas and North Korea. In addition,

Prime Minister Kishida held Japan-Viet Nam summit meetings with then Viet Nameese President Thuong during his visit to Japan in November 2023 and with Prime Minister Chinh during his visit to Japan in December 2023, respectively, where they agreed to promote cooperation toward further expansion of defense cooperation and exchanges and defense equipment transfer between the two countries.

In November 2023, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa paid a courtesy call on General Giang, Minister of National Defence of Viet Nam on the occasion of his participation in ADMM-Plus held in Indonesia. Also, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa met with Senior Lieutenant General Chien, Deputy Minister of National Defence of Viet Nam on the occasions of the 13th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and Deputy-Secretary Level Talks in January and February 2024, respectively.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with Senior Lieutenant General Cuong, Chief of the General Staff of the Viet Nam People's Army and they agreed to

continue to strengthen cooperation for peace and stability in the region and in the international community. In October 2023, General Yoshida officially invited Senior Lieutenant General Cuong, Chief of the General Staff to visit Japan to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and they agreed to further strengthen and enhance the defense cooperation and exchanges.

In August 2023, at CAS hosted by the Australian Army, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with Lieutenant General Nghia, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Viet Nam People's Army and they agreed to strengthen bilateral relations through multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges.

In May 2023, the MSDF provided capacity building on underwater unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance to the Viet Nam. Additionally, in June 2023, the IPD 23 unit made a port call at Cam Ranh to conduct various exchange events and goodwill exercises with the Viet Nam People's Navy.

In November 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF officially invited Major General Hien, Commander of the Air Defense-Air Force of Viet Nam to exchange views on defense cooperation and exchanges.

The ASDF agreed to conduct an exchange of middle-level officers with Viet Nam in 2022 and dispatched the first exchange mission to Viet Nam in November 2023.



Japan- Viet Nam Middle-level Officer Exchange  
(November 2023)

## (9) Malaysia

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Malaysia

Malaysia is located at an important place for maritime transportation facing the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. In 2018, the Japan-Malaysia Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges as well as the

Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with Malaysia came into effect. In December 2023, the two countries decided to upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive and strategic partnership to further promote security cooperation between them.

#### **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.**

In December 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a summit meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar, who was visiting Japan. During the meeting, they welcomed the signing of the Exchange of Notes on OSA for the Malaysian Armed Forces and agreed to promote training and exchanges between the SDF and the Malaysian Armed Forces.

#### **c. Initiatives of Each Service**

In May 2023, at LANPAC 2023, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with Malaysian Army Chief General Tan Sri Mohammad Ab Rahman regarding future defense cooperation and other issues.

In November 2023, the GSDF invited Malaysian military officials to support their capacity building in the field of HA/DR, including various programs at the MOD, equipment displays and exchanges of opinions with local authorities.

In April 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron made a port call at Port Klang and conducted goodwill exercises with the Malaysian Navy. In May 2023, the MSDF latest destroyer JS “Kumano” participated in the Langkawi International Maritime Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA '23) hosted by Malaysia and introduced MSDF’s strength, technological capabilities and manpower saving efforts, etc. to a wide audience. The MSDF also promoted friendship and goodwill with the navies of participating countries through various exchange events such as the international fleet review, multilateral maritime exercises and sport exchanges. In February 2024, the DSPE made a port call at Port Klang and conducted joint training with the Malaysian Navy for the first time.

### **(10) Myanmar**

In response to the coup d’état by Myanmar’s armed forces that occurred in 2021, in the same year, Japan issued a statement jointly with the chiefs of staffs of 12 countries, including the United States, condemned the use of military force by the national armed forces and related security agencies against the civilian population and calling for the national armed forces to stop the violence.

### **(11) Laos**

#### **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Laos**

In 2019, Japan signed the Japan-Laos Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges and the two countries intend to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in wide-ranging fields, including HA/DR.

#### **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.**

In November 2023, on the occasion of ADMM-Plus held in Indonesia, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa paid a courtesy call on Gen. Chansamone Chanyalath, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence of Laos

#### **c. Initiatives of Each Service**

From September to October 2023, the GSDF invited the Lao People’s Army to Japan to support capacity building in the field of HA/DR and conducted practical training, etc. in civil engineering for disaster response. In December 2023, GSDF personnel advised the Lao People’s Army on their disaster-response training based on a flooding scenario.

## **9 Mongolia**

### **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Mongolia**

Relations with Mongolia were elevated to a special strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in 2022 and progress is being made in wide-ranging fields of defense cooperation and exchanges.

### **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.**

In October 2023, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa paid a courtesy call on Mongolian Defense Minister SAIKHANBAYAR on the occasion of the Seoul Defense Dialogue held in Seoul and exchanged views on further promoting defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

In February 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a Defense Ministers’ Meeting with Defense Minister SAIKHANBAYAR, who was visiting Japan for the first time in about five years as the Mongolian Defense Minister. During the meeting, the two ministers agreed to continue promoting defense cooperation and exchanges in various fields, including defense equipment and technology cooperation and signed a revised copy of the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges between Japan and Mongolia.

### (3) Initiatives of Each Service

On the occasion of the Indo-Pacific CHOD held in Fiji in August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with Major General Ganbyamba, Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces to welcome the progress of exchanges between air force types in the recent past and share recognition of future defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Mongolia.

In May 2023, on the occasion of LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with Mr. Tsogt Jungle, Commander-in-Chief of the Mongolian People's Army, and they agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through expert exchanges and multilateral exercises.

In June 2023, the GSDF participated in the multilateral exercise “Khaan Quest 23”, the world's largest multilateral training exercise on PKO, organized by the Mongolian Armed Forces.

In April, June and October 2023, as part of capacity building on PKO (civil engineering), the GSDF also provided education and educational guidance to the Mongolian Army Engineering unit. In May and October 2023, as part of capacity building in the field of HA/DR, the GSDF provided advice and guidance to the Central Military Hospital of the Mongolian Armed Forces in the Mass Casualties Response Exercise (MCRE) in cooperation with related organizations, including the National Emergency Management Agency. Besides, in January 2024, two Mongolian military personnel participated in the Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise “North Wind 24” as observers for the first time.

In July 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made an official visit to Mongolia, the first visit by



General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF exchanging gifts with the Commander of Air Force Command, Mongolian Armed Forces during the first official visit of ASDF to Mongolia (July 2023)

the Chief of Staff, ASDF since the establishment of the ASDF. The visit was realized at the invitation of Air Force Commander Ganbat, Air Force Command, Mongolian Armed Forces, who made his first official visit to Japan in November 2022. During the visit, General Uchikura and Commander Ganbat shared their understanding of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

Based on a memorandum of understanding with the Mongolian Air Force, the ASDF has been conducting educational and research exchanges and expert exchanges. Specifically, the ASDF conducted a research exchange with the National Defense University of Mongolia in July 2023, carried out an expert exchange in the field of air traffic control with the Mongolian Air Force in October 2023 and implemented an expert exchange in the field of air surveillance in December 2023.



See Reference 47 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Asian Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))

## 10 Pacific Island Countries

### (1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries

Pacific island countries share with Japan, a maritime nation, the recognition of the importance of a free, open and sustainable maritime order based on the rule of law and are important countries that have deep historical relationships with Japan. It is also located at a strategic point where the sea lane connecting Japan and Australia and the sea lane from the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean intersect.

Japan holds Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) with Pacific Island countries on a regular basis and at PALM9 in 2022, Japan announced the “Pacific Bond (KIZUNA) Policy” to strengthen relations with Pacific Island countries. The MOD has been promoting defense cooperation and exchanges among defense authorities, including hosting the Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD) for the first time in 2021 and the NDS calls for Japan, as an important partner, to work with the ally, like-minded countries and others to cooperate in capacity building and other cooperation, including with organizations other than military forces such as coast guards.

## (2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In December 2023, the MOD participated as an observer in the 8th South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting<sup>14</sup> (SPDMM) held in New Caledonia, France.


In March 2024, the MOD hosted the 2nd JPIDD in Tokyo. At the meeting, which was the first face-to-face meeting, Defense Minister Kihara presented the "Cooperation Concept for United Security Efforts in the Pacific Islands Region" to further promote cooperation in the fields of defense and security in the Pacific Islands Region. He also paid a courtesy call on the Crown Prince of Tonga, who attended the meeting and held meetings with the Ministers of Defense of Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

## (3) Initiatives of Each Service

In August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint

Staff of Japan met with Brigadier Lord Fielakepa, Chief of the Defense Staff of His Majesty's Armed Forces of the Kingdom of Tonga on the occasion of the Indo-Pacific CHOD meeting held in Fiji. During the meeting, General Yoshida reiterated his heartfelt sympathy for the damage caused by the volcanic eruption that occurred in the Kingdom of Tonga in January 2022 and shared their understanding on defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries toward the realization of FOIP. At the same time, he also met with Major-General Kalouniwai, Commander of Republic of Fiji Military Forces and participated in a mangrove planting project in Fiji as part of the Pacific Partnership hosted by the U.S. Forces, together with the crew of LST JS "Shimokita" of the MSDF IPD 23 unit as well as GSDF personnel, to contribute to environmental protection in the country. Furthermore, the same month, General Yoshida attended the Joint Heads of Pacific Security held in Palau in an

Fig. III-3-1-4 Main Activities in Pacific Island Countries (April 2023 - March 2024)



<sup>14</sup> Comprising seven countries: Australia, Chile, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga (Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States are observers). SPDMM is the only ministerial-level security consultative body in the South Pacific region where various intra-regional security issues are discussed.

online format and demonstrated the SDF's commitment to security in the region to the military chiefs of South Pacific countries.

From June to July 2023, the GSDF invited maintenance personnel from the Papua New Guinea Defence Force Engineer Battalion to Japan to provide education on the basics of heavy engineering equipment maintenance as part of its capacity building in the field of HA/DR. In July 2023, the GSDF provided capacity building on military band training for the Papua New Guinea Defence Force military band. Furthermore, in January 2024, as the first capacity building to the Solomon Islands, the GSDF implemented a project in the field of unexploded ordnance disposal for the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Department of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force.

In June 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF attended a naval service multilateral video conference hosted by the U.S. Pacific Fleet, where he reaffirmed that IUU fishing, which is rampant in the Pacific Island region, is a security threat, expressed active support for its control and called on the naval chiefs of each country and others to strengthen cooperation to eradicate IUU fishing.

During IPD 23 held from April to September 2023, the MSDF vessels made port calls in Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Fiji and Tonga. In addition, for the first time as the MSDF, it conducted goodwill exercises with the Republic of Kiribati Police and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, as well as with the Palau Coast Guard Agency, the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force Maritime and the Royal Tonga Navy. The goodwill exercise with Kiribati was conducted jointly with the Coast Guard MCT and the Australian Maritime Service Advisor.

The ASDF participated in the Operation Christmas Drop in the Federated States of Micronesia and other countries.

**See** Fig. III-3-1-4 (Main Activities in Pacific Island Countries (April 2023 - March 2024); Paragraph 3 (Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation); Paragraph 4 (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building); Section 2-3 (Cooperation in Maritime Security); Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 48 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))

## 11 Indian Ocean Coastal Countries and Middle Eastern Countries

### (1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Indian Ocean Coastal Countries and Middle Eastern Countries

Since peace and stability in Indian Ocean coastal countries and the Middle East are extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan, from the perspective of stable use of sea lanes as well as energy and economy, the MOD/SDF has been promoting high-level exchanges and unit-to-unit exchanges to build and strengthen cooperative relations with countries in these regions. The MOD/SDF conducted the FY2022 IMED23 from January to May 2023 involving MSDF minesweepers, demonstrating Japan's deep commitment to the stability and prosperity of the region.

**See** Reference 49 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Middle Eastern Countries (FY2020 and Beyond); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))

### (2) Sri Lanka

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is an important country located at a key point on the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. In recent years, Japan has strengthened bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges with Sri Lanka.

#### b. Initiatives of Each Service

DSPE called at Colombo in June 2023 and Trincomalee in October 2023 and conducted goodwill exercises and exchange events with Sri Lanka Navy.

In July 2023, the MSDF IPD 23 unit made a port call at Colombo to inspect and maintain the hull and other parts of the ship by the Colombo Dockyard<sup>15</sup> as part of work to verify the maintenance of naval vessels overseas. In addition, various defense exchanges were conducted with the Sri Lanka Navy, including sport exchanges and goodwill exercises, to promote mutual understanding and friendship. In October 2023, MSDF personnel participated in the Galle Dialogue International Maritime Conference hosted by the Sri Lanka Navy and held discussions on maritime security with representatives of Sri Lanka Navy, India and other participating countries' navies.

<sup>15</sup> Private shipbuilding companies in Japan are providing investment and technical support.

### (3) Pakistan

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pakistan

Located at the junction of South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, Pakistan is an important state for stability in the Indo-Pacific region and it faces an important sea lane for Japan. Pakistan is a pro-Japanese country that has traditionally had a friendly relationship with Japan. Building on this relationship, the two countries have promoted defense cooperation and exchanges.

#### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In September 2023, the 12th Japan-Pakistan Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on regional affairs and defense policies of the two countries and deepen discussions on future defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Pakistan. A Japan-Pakistan Security Dialogue was also held, during which views were exchanged on wide-ranging matters, including security and defense areas and regional affairs.

### (4) Bangladesh

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Bangladesh

Located at the junction of South Asia and Southeast Asia, Bangladesh is an important state for stability in the Indo-Pacific region and it faces an important sea lane for Japan. In April 2023, the two countries decided to further strengthen security cooperation by upgrading their relationship to a strategic partnership and signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges to begin negotiations on the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, etc. to further consolidate security cooperation.

#### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

In April 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a summit meeting with Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. During the meeting, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the realization of FOIP and agreed to continue to promote mutual visits by naval vessels and aircraft, exchanges between units and goodwill exercises. They also welcomed OSA-based cooperation as well as the start of negotiations of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and agreed to strengthen dialogue among defense authorities. Furthermore, in November 2023, the exchange of notes on OSA was signed.

### c. Initiatives of Each Service

In April 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan met with visiting Lieutenant General Waker, then Principal Staff Officer, Armed Forces Division, Bangladesh to exchange views on the perception of the strategic environment and defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

In May 2023, on the occasion of LANPAC 2023 held in Hawaii, General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with General Ahmed, Chief of Army Staff of Bangladesh and they agreed to further develop the relationship between the two countries' army services.

In April 2023, the MSDF IMED23 unit made a port call in Chittagong, where it held various exchange events, including a naval ship tour, goodwill exercises with the Bangladesh Navy, a seminar on mine warfare and sports exchanges.

### (5) Maldives

#### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Maldives

The Maldives is an important country for the stability of the Indo-Pacific region, as it is located at a strategic point in the Indian Ocean and faces an important sea lane for Japan, etc. For more than 20 years, the Maldives has served as a transit point for SDF forces participating in UN PKO and cargo transport for counter-piracy deployment forces, and has also been an important refueling point for the deployment and return of counter-piracy surface forces and air force units. Japan and the Maldives intend to promote exchanges among defense authorities in the field of maritime security and other areas.

#### b. Initiatives of Each Service

From March to April 2023, the MSDF IPD 23 unit made a port call in Malé and conducted various exchange events, including a courtesy call by the unit commander to the Commander of the Maldives National Defence Force and the Commander of its Coast Guard, goodwill exercises (diving training), naval ship tours, and sports exchanges. In July 2023, the IPD 23 unit made a port call at Malé, where the unit commander paid a courtesy call to the Commander of the Maldives National Defence Force and the Commander of its Coast Guard and the unit also held various exchange events such as sports exchanges and joint beach cleanups to promote friendship and goodwill.

## (6) United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Japan and the UAE signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges in 2018. Since then, the two countries have continued to deepen bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, through high-level exchanges by defense ministers and chiefs of staff, periodical holding of military-to-military dialogues and air-to-air cooperation.

May 2023 marked the signing of the Agreement between Japan and the UAE concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the first time such agreement was concluded with a country in the Middle East region, which took effect in January 2024.

In October 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa discussed bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, including inter-air force service cooperation as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation, with HE Major General Staff Pilot Al-Alawi, Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of UAE on the occasion of the Seoul Defense Dialogue held in Seoul and they agreed on the importance of closer communication among defense authorities.

## (7) Israel

Japan and Israel signed the revised Japan-Israel Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges during the Japan-Israel Defense Ministers' Meeting held in August 2022, confirming to continue strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries, including defense equipment and technology cooperation and service-to-service cooperation.

## (8) Iran

Through opportunities for high-level exchanges among defense ministers and other officials, Japan explained to Iran about the extension of information gathering activities by SDF to ensure the safety of Japanese-related vessels in the Middle East region and the two sides agreed to continue communication between the defense authorities.

## (9) Egypt

Japan has confirmed the importance of promoting bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in fields including PKO with Egypt through high-level exchanges, including the visit to Egypt by the State Minister of Defense and others.

## (10) Oman

Japan and Oman signed a memorandum on defense exchanges in 2019. In addition to high-level exchanges, Japan and Oman have been continuing navy-to-navy cooperation, including MSDF ships' port calls and training.

In June 2023, the first Japan-Oman Military to Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on defense cooperation between Japan and Oman and the regional affairs.

In August of the same year and January 2024, DSPE conducted a goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman in the Arabian Sea, and other areas. DSPE utilizes the port of Duqm in Oman as its main port of supply and when calling at the port, it conducts various defense exchanges with the Royal Navy of Oman, including goodwill exercises, to deepen mutual understanding and friendship.

In February 2024, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF paid an official visit to Oman and had a conference with Rear Admiral Rahbi, Commander of the Royal Navy of Oman regarding future defense cooperation and exchanges.



A meeting between Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF and Rear Admiral Rahbi, Commander of the Royal Navy of Oman (February 2024)

## (11) Qatar

Japan and Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges in 2015. Since the first Defense Ministers' Meeting in 2019, the two countries have continued to deepen defense cooperation and exchanges, including high-level exchanges by defense ministers and chiefs of staff. Regarding Qatar, Defense Attaché was newly dispatched in June 2023, where the Defense Attaché in Kuwait had concurrently served.

In November 2023, the first Japan-Qatar Military to

Military (MM) Dialogue was held to exchange views on defense cooperation between Japan and Qatar and the regional affairs.

### (12) Saudi Arabia

Japan signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges with Saudi Arabia in 2016. The two countries have continued to deepen defense cooperation and exchanges, including video teleconference by the defense ministers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In July 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada held a meeting with His Royal Highness Prince Khalid, the Minister of Defense, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the meeting, the two sides explained their defense policies and confirmed that they would not tolerate any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force. They also discussed bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, including in the fields of defense equipment and technology and agreed to further close exchanges between defense authorities in future.

### (13) Türkiye

In 2012, Japan and Türkiye signed a Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges.

In October 2023, the GSDF held a staff meeting with Turkish Army and they agreed to initiate an exchange of experts in the field of HA/DR and consider mutual general officer-level visits between the two countries' army services in relation to the earthquake in southeastern Türkiye that occurred in February 2023.

In September 2023, at ISS hosted by the United States, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Tatlıoğlu, Commander of the Turkish Navy to exchange views on future defense cooperation and exchanges, including port calls by MSDF vessels to Türkiye. In October 2023, the MSDF held a staff meeting with the Turkish Navy to discuss regional affairs, defense cooperation and exchanges and other issues.

### (14) Bahrain

Japan had signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges with Bahrain in 2012 and the two countries had conducted high-level exchanges and other activities. In November 2023, the memorandum was revised to further promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

DSPE made a port call at Mina Salman in July 2023 and conducted various exchanges with the Royal Bahrain Naval Force. In March 2024, it also called at

Mina Salman and conducted goodwill exercise for the first time with the Royal Bahrain Naval Force.

### (15) Jordan

Japan signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges with Jordan in 2016 and the two countries continue to hold Politico-Military (PM) dialogues.

In December 2022, the SDF conducted its first integrated deployment and action training (training for rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas) in the Middle East region in Jordan.

In April 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada paid a courtesy call on His Majesty King Abdullah II during the king's visit to Japan and expressed his gratitude for the cooperation in exercises conducted in 2022 on protective measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas and they agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.

In the same month, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a video teleconference with General Hnaity, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan. During the teleconference, the two sides agreed that defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries, including training for rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas in Jordan, were making steady progress and that further progress should be made.

From October 2023 to January 2024, ASDF transport aircraft performed their mission by standing by in Jordan to transport Japanese nationals and others in Israel.

In February 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held a meeting with visiting Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Al-Khasawneh and expressed appreciation for Jordan's support for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in Israel and agreed to continue close communication among defense authorities while utilizing working-level consultations.

## 12 African Countries

### (1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with African Countries

African countries are becoming increasingly important and influential in the international community.

While multilateral frameworks such as the African Union (AU) are making positive efforts toward regional peace and stability, challenges such as serious inequality and poverty and political instability remain. Moreover, in recent years, the influences of complex crises



consisting of the pandemic and Russia's aggression against Ukraine, and those of climate change (natural disasters, food crises, etc.) continue. In the face of these global challenges, cooperation with African countries is becoming increasingly important to maintain a free and open international order.

The MOD/SDF is conducting activities to contribute to peace and stability in Africa, by such means as international peace cooperation activities in the African region and counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden from the SDF facility in Djibouti, such as sending uniformed SDF personnel as instructors to PKO training centers in Africa to support African countries' self-help efforts in peacekeeping operations.

**See** Section 2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations); Section 3-2 (Initiatives to Support UN PKO and other activities); Reference50 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)

## (2) Djibouti

### a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Djibouti

Djibouti is an important country as it is the only country where the SDF has an overseas facility that is used for counter piracy. The facility has been used to transport supplies to the unit dispatched to United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) as well as for trainings as part of Japan's disaster response capacity building for Djibouti.

Additionally, the SDF facility in Djibouti was used as a standby location for transportation of Japanese nationals and others in the Republic of Sudan in April 2023 and Israel in October 2023.

The National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS) and other documents state that Japan will, while obtaining the understanding of the government of Djibouti, utilize this operation facility on a long-term and stable basis to strengthen operational bases in African countries, etc., including the rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas. In December 2023, Japan concluded an exchange of notes with the government of the Republic of Djibouti enabling Notes between

the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Djibouti concerning the status of the Self-Defense Force of Japan in the Republic of Djibouti<sup>16</sup> to apply mutatis mutandis to secure the status of the SDF in Djibouti responsible to rescue and transport Japanese nationals and others overseas as well as responsible for improvement readiness for such operations.

### b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

From October to December 2023, the GSDF educational sessions for the Djibouti Armed Forces on civil engineering and other activities as part of the disaster response capacity building program for Djibouti.

In November 2023, DSPE conducted goodwill exercise with the Djibouti Navy. On that occasion, the officers of the Djiboutian Navy were invited to visit a MSDF naval vessel, where they were briefed on shiphandling techniques and exchanged information with young DSPE officers.



The disaster response capacity building program for Djibouti (November 2023)

### (c) Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other African Countries

Japan held the first Japan-Kenya military to military (MM) Dialogue with Kenya in January 2024 to discuss the regional affairs and defense cooperation and exchanges, and in February 2024, the Statement of Intent on Japan-Kenya Defense Cooperation and Exchanges was signed between the two countries.



**MOVIE:** Training cruise conducted in FY2023

**URL:** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4IKHVOiRZc>

<sup>16</sup> An exchange of notes securing the status of personnel operating in Djibouti for counter-piracy operations, which was concluded with the Djibouti government in 2009

## 13 Latin American Countries

### (1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Latin American Countries

Many Latin American countries border the Pacific Ocean and share fundamental values with Japan and Japan is promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with such countries.

### (2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

With Argentina, in August 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron conducted goodwill exercises with the Argentine Navy off the coast of Buenos Aires.

With Colombia, in December 2016, Japan and Colombia signed a memorandum on defense exchanges.


Additionally, in September 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron carried out goodwill exercises with the Colombian Navy and the U.S. Navy in the waters surrounding Cartagena.

In July 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron conducted goodwill exercises with the Chilean Navy off the coast of Valparaiso. Also, in March 2024, ADM Juan Andrés DE LA MAZA Larraín, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Navy was officially invited to Japan.

With Brazil, in 2020, the first Japan-Brazil Defense Ministers' Meeting was held online. At the meeting, the two sides signed the Japan-Brazil Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges and agreed to further develop defense cooperation and exchanges. Additionally, in August 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron conducted goodwill exercises with the Brazilian Navy off the coast of Recife and elsewhere.

With Peru, in July 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron carried out goodwill exercises with the Peruvian Navy off the coast of Callao. In September 2023, at ISS hosted by the United States, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Luis Polar, Commander in Chief of the Peruvian Navy and expressed his gratitude for their response to the sickness occurring in the MSDF Training Squadron.

With Mexico, in June 2023, the MSDF Training Squadron called at Manzanillo and conducted various exchanges, including sports exchanges with Mexican naval officers and training on naval vessels.

 See Reference 50 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))

## 14 China

### (1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China

Japan will comprehensively promote a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” and build a constructive and stable relationship with China through communication at various levels, in which Japan asserts its position and calls for responsible actions while continuing dialogue, including on issues of concern and cooperation on matters of common interests.

The MOD/SDF will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international codes of conduct and improve transparency regarding its strengthening of military capabilities buildup and its defense policies, while also conveying the concerns Japan has in a candid manner. Japan will also make use of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan-China, including the hotline, to avoid unexpected contingencies between the two countries.

### (2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, etc.

Japan and China have resumed face-to-face dialogue and exchange between the defense authorities of the two countries, including a Japan-China Security Dialogue held in Tokyo in February 2023 for the first time in about four years.

In May 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada made the first call with then State Councilor and Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu via the Hotline between Japanese and Chinese Defense Authorities established on March 31 2023. The two sides welcomed the operation of the Hotline and confirmed that the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Japan-China Defense Authorities,” including the Hotline, plays an important role in building mutual trust and avoiding unexpected contingencies between the two countries. They also confirmed that the Hotline would be operated appropriately and reliably going forward and agreed to continue communication between the defense authorities of Japan and China.

In June 2023, then Minister of Defense Hamada held a meeting with then Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore. At the meeting, then Minister of Defense Hamada stated that precisely because of the

numerous security concerns between Japan and China, it was important to have candid discussions between the defense authorities of the two countries and Minister of National Defence Li expressed the same view.

Regarding the regional affairs, then Minister of Defense Hamada reiterated serious concerns about the situations in the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea and expressed grave concerns about the continued joint military actions by China and Russia in the vicinity of Japan. In addition, Minister Hamada re-emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Besides, regarding communication between the defense authorities of Japan and China, the two ministers reaffirmed that the Hotline between Japanese and Chinese Defense Authorities, which began operating in May 2023, would operate appropriately and reliably and agreed to continue to promote dialogue and exchange going forward.

In November 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a summit meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the occasion of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting held in the United States. At the meeting, the two leaders confirmed the comprehensive promotion of a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” and Prime Minister Kishida spoke about the importance of communication in the security field, while welcoming the start of operation of the Hotline between Japanese and Chinese Defense Authorities under the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Japan-China Defense Authorities”.

### (3) Initiatives of Each Service

In July 2023, the Japan-China Field Officer Exchange Program implemented by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation resumed face-to-face exchanges for the first time in four years after its discontinuance due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors. The SDF field officer-level delegation to China visited a think tank under the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to exchange views on Japan-China relations as well as issues in the security field between the two countries,

paid a courtesy visit to senior PLA officers and visited Chinese military facilities, etc.

### (4) Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China

Utilization of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism began in June 2018. The “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” has been developed (1) to promote mutual understanding and confidence between Japan and China and to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges; (2) to avoid unexpected collisions; and (3) to prevent unforeseen circumstances in the sea and air from developing into military clashes or political or diplomatic issues. The mechanism’s main components include (1) annual and expert meetings between the two countries’ defense authorities; (2) a hotline between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities; and (3) on scene communication measures between vessels and aircraft of the SDF and the People’s Liberation Army.

 See Reference 51 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (FY2020 and Beyond))

## 15 Russia


Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that began in February 2022 clearly undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, is a serious violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations which forbids the use of force and is an absolutely unacceptable act. Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force shake the foundations of the international order and under this position, the Government of Japan condemns Russia to the utmost degree.

The Government of Japan handles the relationship with Russia appropriately while emphasizing the solidarity of the G7 and taking the Ukrainian situation into account. At the same time, it is also necessary to maintain the minimum essential contacts with Russia, as it is one of Japan’s neighbors, to avoid unforeseen circumstances or unnecessary conflicts.

## 3 Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation

### 1 Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue Initiatives

Multilateral framework initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region, especially the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),<sup>17</sup> have made steady progress and served as an important foundation for dialogue and cooperation and exchanges on the security of the Indo-Pacific region. Japan places importance on such multilateral frameworks and is contributing to the strengthening of cooperation and mutual confidence with countries in the region.

 See Reference 53 (Record of Major Multilateral Security Dialogues (Indo-Pacific Region, FY2020 and Beyond)); Reference 54 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Organized by the Ministry of Defense); Reference 55 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues)

#### (1) Security Dialogue in the ASEAN Region

##### a. Initiatives under the ADMM-Plus

ASEAN holds the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), a ministerial level meeting among defense authorities in the ASEAN region and the ADMM-Plus, which includes eight other countries outside of ASEAN,<sup>18</sup> including Japan (so-called "Plus Countries").

The ADMM-Plus is an invaluable framework that brings together defense ministers from all ASEAN member states and Plus Countries to discuss security issues and defense cooperation and exchanges in the region and the international community. The MOD/SDF has been actively participating in this framework.

In November 2023, then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa attended the 10th ADMM-Plus held in Indonesia. At the meeting, Miyazawa strongly condemned Russia's aggression against Ukraine, North Korea's launch of ballistic missiles and unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East and South China Seas. He communicated the importance of cooperation toward a peaceful resolution of the situation in Myanmar, and cross-border cooperation on

natural disasters and issues brought about by the impact of climate change as well as international terrorism. He also expressed Japan's support for the ASEAN centrality and unity and its intention to support various ADMM-Plus initiatives and to make efforts to realize FOIP and the "the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)," which shares fundamental principles with the FOIP and the AOIP. Furthermore, he expressed Japan's commitment to maintaining maritime order governed by the rule of law, not force or coercion, through the Experts' Working Group (EWG) on Maritime Security,<sup>19</sup> which Japan and the Philippines will co-chair from 2024 to 2027. In addition, he welcomed the adoption of the Joint Statement on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) at the 10th ADMM-Plus and expressed Japan's intention to continue to attach importance to the WPS agenda and double its effort in the field.

Under the ministerial level ADMM-Plus, there are (1) the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting-Plus (ADSOM-Plus), (2) the ADSOM-Plus Working Group (ADSOM-Plus WG) and (3) the Experts' Working Groups (EWGs). During the fourth term of EWG (2021-2024), Japan has co-chaired the PKO EWG with Viet Nam and held the Competency Evaluation Program for Prospective UN Peacekeepers (CEPPP) in Viet Nam in September 2023 as the flagship event of the term. In December 2023, Japan held the final EWG meeting and WPS seminar in Tokyo, and handed over the co-chairmanship to Brunei and China.

 See Fig. III-3-1-5 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus))

##### b. The ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure (ADI)

The ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure (ADI) is a permanent hotline to facilitate communication between the defense ministers of ASEAN countries, including during emergencies. Use of the hotline has been extended to Plus Countries as well.

<sup>17</sup> A forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently comprises 25 countries, one area and one organization (EU) as members and holds various inter-governmental meetings that are attended by both foreign affairs and defense officials to exchange opinions on the regional affairs and the security area. The 25 countries and one area are comprised of the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam and Cambodia (since 1995); and Myanmar (since 1996)) as well as Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996); New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Russia, the United States, and Mongolia (since 1998); North Korea (since 2000); Pakistan (since 2004); Timor-Leste (since 2005); Bangladesh (since 2006); and Sri Lanka (since 2007).

<sup>18</sup> The ADMM-Plus was founded in October 2010. Other than Japan, Australia, China, India, New Zealand, the ROK, Russia, and the United States participate in the Meeting as Dialogue Partners.

<sup>19</sup> Japan served the co-chair of the EWG on Military Medicine in the first cycle (2011 to 2013), co-chair of the EWG on HA/DR in the second cycle (2014 to 2016), actively participated in each EWG in the third cycle (2017 to 2019) and served as co-chair of the EWG on PKO with Viet Nam in the fourth cycle (2021 to 2024). Japan is going to co-chair the EWG on Maritime Security with the Philippines in the fifth cycle (2024 to 2027).


Fig. III-3-1-5 Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)

**ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)**

The ASEAN government-hosted official meeting of the defense ministers in the Indo-Pacific region that includes countries outside the ASEAN region

\* Participating countries: 10 ASEAN member states + 8 countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia, and the U.S.)

The Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) established under the framework of the ADMM-Plus take practical actions, such as joint exercises, to address security issues in the Indo-Pacific region, which is a unique feature of the ADMM-Plus.



**Experts' Working Groups (EWGs)**

EWGs are established in seven fields. Each EWG is co-chaired by one of the 10 ASEAN member states and one of the 8 Plus Countries for a term of three years.

\* Seven fields: (i) counter-terrorism, (ii) HA/DR, (iii) maritime security, (iv) military medicine, (v) PKO, (vi) humanitarian mine action, and (vii) cybersecurity

EWGs respectively take practical actions such as sharing information, holding workshops and seminars, conducting joint exercise, and submitting recommendations and reports concerning respective areas.

Japan served as the co-chair of the EWG on PKO with Viet Nam in the fourth cycle of EWGs, which is from 2021 to 2024. For the fifth term (2024-2027), Japan will co-chair the Maritime Security Expert Group with the Philippines.

In December 2021, Japan expressed its intention to join the ADI and became the first among the Plus Countries to operationalize it. Because the ADI is useful for building confidence and managing crises in the region, the MOD/SDF intends to utilize the ADI to promote closer communication with ASEAN and contribute more actively to peace and stability in the region with all parties.

### C. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Regarding the ARF, in which mainly diplomatic authorities are engaged, concrete efforts<sup>20</sup> have been made in recent years for specific initiatives in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security and peacekeeping and peace building. The MOD/SDF has been making active contributions to this forum.

### D. Multilateral Security Dialogues Organized by the MOD/SDF

#### a. ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting

The MOD/SDF has attended the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting since 2014 in conjunction with ADMM-Plus to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations with ASEAN countries.

In November 2023, Defense Minister Kihara participated in the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting held in Indonesia via online format (then State Minister of Defense Miyazawa participated in person). Also taking into account the fact that the year of 2023 marked the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, participants exchanged views on



Defense Minister Kihara participating online in the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (November 2023)

how to further strengthen the ASEAN-Japan Defense Cooperation under the theme of the “Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: History and Way Forward.”

During the meeting, Defense Minister Kihara affirmed that the AOIP and FOIP share fundamental principles such as openness, transparency and a rules-based framework and presented the “Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE)” to advance ASEAN-Japan defense cooperation to a new level, which the Ministers of ASEAN countries welcomed.

#### b. Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum

Since 2009, the MOD has hosted the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum to strengthen bilateral and multilateral ties by establishing personal connections on a Vice-Ministerial level between ASEAN countries and Japan. The 12th meeting was held in Tokyo in March 2023 for the first time in about four years, after being suspended since 2020 due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

During the 13th meeting<sup>21</sup> held in Tokyo in January 2024, the Vice Minister-level defense authorities of each country revisited the “JASMINE” presented by Defense Minister Kihara at the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting and exchanged views toward implementing the new projects. ASEAN countries expressed their support for this initiative and Japan received their inputs for advancing the initiative further. Japan and ASEAN countries also agreed to further contribute to the peace and stability of the region by advancing Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation to a new level.

#### c. Guidelines for Japan-ASEAN Security Cooperation

##### (1) Vientiane Vision 2.0

During the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting in 2016, Japan presented the “Vientiane Vision”, the guideline for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, and in 2019, Japan updated and presented “Vientiane Vision 2.0”.

The “Vientiane Vision 2.0” presents an overall picture of the priority areas of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. It retains the basic framework of the initial Vision, including its objectives, direction and means of cooperation but introduces three new principles for ASEAN-Japan defense

<sup>20</sup> In addition to the Ministers' meeting at the foreign minister level, the Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers' meeting in 2002, the ARF Defence Officials' Dialogues (DOD) has been held ahead of the main meeting.

<sup>21</sup> In addition to the ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat, Timor-Leste, which is admitted in-principle to be the member of ASEAN, participated as observers.

cooperation: (i) heart-to-heart cooperation, (ii) tailored and lasting cooperation and (iii) equal and open cooperation. It also introduces contribution to ASEAN's centrality, unity and resiliency as well as the perspective of pursuing synergies between AOIP and FOIP, as new pillars.

Based on this vision, Japan has accumulated practical cooperation through the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR, the seminar on international maritime law,

the Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program, the Professional Airmanship Program,<sup>22</sup> and the Japan-ASEAN Capacity building on Cybersecurity.

The Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program conducted in August 2023 included various seminars for naval officers of ASEAN countries aboard Destroyer JS "Izumo" and presentations on maritime security by naval officers of participating countries as well as

## VOICE

### Voice of a Staff Member of the Internal Bureau of the Ministry of Defense who Participated in the Ship Rider Cooperation Program

**WATANABE Ryohei, Defense Official of Indo-Pacific Regional Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense**

Among the international exchanges undertaken by the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ship Rider Cooperation Program is one of the most unique projects in that participants from multiple countries get on board an MSDF vessel and conduct various programs while sharing meals and accommodations. I participated in this program as a member of facilitators and had various experiences.

In the FY2023 program, seminars on international maritime law and the observation of exercises were conducted for eight days in the Destroyer JS Izumo, the MSDF's largest helicopter-carrying destroyer, as it sailed near the offshore of Australia. The most memorable program for me was the presentations given by participants from other countries. After participants presented the maritime security issues of their countries, the Self-Defense Forces personnel on board and other participants asked questions and made comments, which deepened the discussions. Participants enthusiastically delivered presentations, trying to deepen the understanding of their country's initiatives and challenges. I was actively involved in translating presentation materials and interpreting conversations for foreign participants and felt very rewarded to see Japanese participants and the participants from other countries deepening their friendships and interchanges through my translations.

Together with this program for ASEAN member countries, the 1st Pacific Island Countries and Timor-Leste Ship Rider Cooperation Program was carried out for the first time, and it is of great significance that two programs were held at the same time. Through this project, I was able to contribute to helping participants from various countries acquire important and practical knowledge and share insights about maritime security, as well as deepening the understanding of each other and building friendly relationships.

Strengthening regional unity and mutual understanding between people is essential for a stable security environment. I believe that the Ship Rider Cooperation Program will continue to serve as a bridge to the countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

This project also provided "capacity building" for myself. After graduating from university, I was assigned to the Internal Bureau of the MOD as a new recruit in 2023. This was my first overseas assignment and my first participation in an international exchange program in my first year in the MOD. Therefore, the preparations were quite hard, but it was a priceless experience. In particular, I believe that listening directly to participants from various countries about the security issues that their countries are facing and working together to resolve these issues will be an important bridge to these countries. Based on this belief, I have firmly made up my mind to engage in this issue proactively. I will continue to contribute in the field of security while keeping in mind of what I learned during this program.



The author having a meal with participants from various countries (third from the right)

<sup>22</sup> Exchange program inviting ASEAN air force officers and ASEAN secretariat officers to some seminar, for the promotion of mutual understanding, confidence building, and contribution to the consolidation of the rule of law in the region.

other events.<sup>23</sup> In November 2023, the Program invited ASEAN cybersecurity personnel to carry out practical training on cybersecurity and conducted Japan-ASEAN Cyber International Law Seminar.<sup>24</sup>

## (2) JASMINE

In November 2023, at the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting, Defense Minister Kihara newly presented the "JASMINE" to advance Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation to a new level.

Taking the current security environment into account and in line with the spirit of the "Vientiane Vision 2.0," JASMINE proposed specific defense cooperation that Japan would like to pursue together with ASEAN to realize the shared vision of the future for the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>25</sup> Its four pillars are: (1) Japan-ASEAN to carry out efforts to create a security environment that does not allow any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, (2) to continue and expand the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, (3) to pursue further friendship and opportunities between Japan and ASEAN defense officials and (4) to support defense cooperation between ASEAN, Japan, and the Pacific Island countries.

The specific initiatives proposed and announced include: the first seminar between Japan and ASEAN on the rule of law and security in the space domain; further support for confidence building and improvement of situational awareness in both maritime and air domains; seeking synergies between the Official Security Assistance (OSA) and existing projects such as the transfer of defense equipment and technology as well as capacity building in both hardware and software; cooperation between ASEAN, Japan and Pacific Island countries through the Ship Rider Cooperation Program and others, and the launch of a new Japan-ASEAN Capacity Building programs on WPS.

**See** Reference 56 (Vientiane Vision 2.0); Reference 57 (Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE))

## (2) Security Dialogues in the Pacific Islands Region

### a. South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM)

SPDMM is an important framework for the security of the Pacific Islands Region, where defense ministers from seven countries, including three Pacific Island countries (Tonga, Papua New Guinea and Fiji) that have their

own militaries<sup>26</sup> and others gather, and Japan has been attending this meeting as an observer since 2022.

The 8th meeting, held in December 2023 discussed the impacts of strategic competition on the stability of the South Pacific, as well as traditional and non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, IUU fishing and threats in cyberspace.

## B. Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the MOD/SDF, etc.

### a. Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD)

Since 2021, the MOD has been hosting the JPIDD and inviting both Pacific Island countries and regional partner countries to further promote defense and security cooperation and strengthen cooperation among Japan, Pacific Island countries and partner countries in addressing regional security challenges. Although the first meeting in 2021 was held online due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2024, Defense Minister Kihara held the second meeting in Tokyo, the first face-to-face meeting.



The 2nd Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD) (March 2024)

During the second meeting, the participants exchanged wide-ranging views on common security issues and the efforts of each country to address them and had a lively discussion on future cooperation and partnership in the Pacific Islands Region. During this meeting, Defense Minister Kihara presented the "Cooperation Concept for United Security Efforts in the Pacific Islands Region" as a pointer for future cooperation in the region and the participating countries expressed their welcome to this concept.

<sup>23</sup> This Program was held concurrently with "1st Japan-Pacific Island Countries and Timor-Leste Ship Rider Cooperation Program."

<sup>24</sup> SDF personnel serve as instructors in capacity building for ASEAN countries' cybersecurity personnel with the aim of enabling them to respond more appropriately to cyber incidents.

<sup>25</sup> Japan and ASEAN have confirmed their "shared view to promote a rules-based Indo-Pacific region that is free and open."

<sup>26</sup> In addition to the Pacific Island countries with military forces, Australia, Chile, New Zealand and France are member countries, with Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom participated as observers.



## b. Concept of Cooperation for Integrated Security Initiatives in the Pacific Islands Region

At the second JPIDD in March 2024, Defense Minister Kihara presented the “5 Point Cooperation Concept,” which combines three principles and two coordination points that Japan values in further promoting cooperation in the fields of defense and security in the Pacific Islands Region.

The three principles are (1) Respecting Centrality, Unity and Ownership of Pacific Island Countries, (2) Strengthening Equal, Mutually Beneficial and Supportive Relationships and (3) Supporting Collaboration among the Pacific Island Countries, Japan and ASEAN. Two coordination points are (1) Strengthening Coordination between JPIDD and SPDMM and (2) Strengthening Coordination between JPIDD and PALM. Based on this concept, the MOD/ SDF will further promote defense and security cooperation in the Pacific Islands Region.

### (3) Others

#### a. International Conferences Hosted by Private Organizations and Others

International conferences on security include not only intergovernmental conferences but also meetings organized by private organizations in which various people, such as government officials, scholars and journalists, participate to discuss medium- to long-term security issues.

Major international conferences organized by private bodies include the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)<sup>27</sup> and IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)<sup>28</sup> organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Munich Security Conference,<sup>29</sup> one of the most prestigious meetings on security in Europe and the United States. By actively participating in these conferences, Japan’s Defense Minister and MOD officials build trust and share understanding with high-level officials of various countries and send out positive messages through meetings with defense ministers and representatives from other countries and delivering speeches at plenary sessions.

In June 2023, then Defense Minister Hamada attended

and gave a speech at the 20th Shangri-La Dialogue. In his speech, Minister Hamada first mentioned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and as the lessons from it, underlined the importance of preventing confrontation and the importance of a free and open international order based on maritime law. He also insisted that the international community should unite to deter unilateral changes to the status quo or such attempts by force or coercion.

After pointing out that in the Indo-Pacific region, especially regarding the East China Sea and the South China Sea, unilateral changes to the status quo or such attempts by force or coercion have been made, then Defense Minister Hamada explained that to prevent confrontation and uphold the free and open international order based on the rule of law, Japan has been promoting various initiatives, such as fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities based on the National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS) and other measures and strengthening cooperation with the ally and like-minded countries.

Furthermore, he asserted that the enhancement of regional deterrence by Japan as well as its ally and like-minded countries would provide countries with a position of strength that does not succumb to force and would provide a solid footing for diplomatic efforts to resolve differences in interests and opinions through dialogue. It would also send out a message that Japan would work with other countries to create an era toward a world of “Cooperation and Harmony”, while continuing to emphasize the opportunities for dialogue provided by ASEAN-led multilayered cooperative frameworks that exist in the region, such as the ASEAN-led East Asia Summit, ARF and ADMM-Plus.

#### b. Initiatives of Each Service

In August 2023, General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan attended the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference co-hosted by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Republic of Fiji Armed Forces and the South Pacific Chiefs of Staff and Others meeting hosted by the Republic of Fiji Armed Forces to share awareness on the situation and security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, the same month,

<sup>27</sup> This is a multilateral conference hosted by IISS, a private U.K. think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related issues and regional defense cooperation. It has been held in Singapore every year since 2002 and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, named after the hotel where it takes place.

<sup>28</sup> An international conference hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), where foreign and defense authorities and other stakeholders mainly from Middle Eastern countries exchange views on security issues. It is held annually in Manama, Bahrain.

<sup>29</sup> This is one of the most prestigious international security meetings organized by private bodies in Europe and the United States and has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962. Usual participants in the meeting include officials at the ministerial level from major European countries as well as top leaders, ministers and lawmakers from countries in the world and key executives of international organizations.

he participated in the Pacific Security Conference in Palau online, demonstrating the SDF's commitment to security in the region. Furthermore, in November 2023, he attended the Indo-Pacific CHOD Online Conference to discuss security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region as well as the importance of the rule of law and multilateral cooperation.



General Yoshida, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan delivering a speech at the Indo-Pacific CHOD Conference (August 2023)

General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF participated in the Land Force Pacific Symposium and Exposition (LANPAC) 2023 held in Hawaii in May 2023 and the Chief of Army Staff Symposium (CAS) hosted by the Australian Army in August 2023. In September 2023, he also participated in the Indo-Pacific Regional Army Chiefs of Staff Conference (IPACC) held in India, where allies and like-minded countries acknowledged the need to build a network of concerned countries to collaborate and deter instability in the region. Furthermore, in December 2023, the GSDF co-hosted the Land Forces Summit (LFS) with the U.S. Army Pacific, and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges of multilayered land forces services among allies and like-minded countries to realize the FOIP.



General Morishita, the Chief of Staff, GSDF participating in a discussion at Land Force Pacific Symposium and Exposition (LANPAC) 2023

In May 2023, Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF participated in the International Maritime Defense Equipment Symposium (IMDEX Asia 2023). He discussed common issues in maritime security with the naval staff chiefs of each country and made a speech on the theme of "Safe Ocean" to share the importance of a free and open ocean with participating countries. At the naval species multilateral televised meeting hosted by the U.S. Pacific Fleet in June 2023, he reaffirmed that IUU fishing, which is rampant in the Pacific Island region, is a security threat, expressed active support for its control and called on the naval staff chiefs and others in each country to strengthen cooperation to eradicate IUU fishing. At the International Sea Power Symposium (ISS) hosted by the U.S. Navy in September 2023 and the Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference (IP23) hosted by the Royal Australian Navy in November 2023, the need for multilateral cooperation for legitimate maritime use, the protection of sovereignty and interests of each country and other topics were discussed. Furthermore,



Admiral Sakai, the Chief of Staff, MSDF attending the International Sea Power Symposium (ISS) hosted by the U.S. Navy (September 2023)

in February 2024, Admiral Sakai participated in the Munich Security Conference, where he held discussions on the security environment of the Indo-Pacific region with participants from various countries.

In April 2023, General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDF attended the Space Symposium hosted by the United States in April 2023 and the International AeroSpace Power Conference hosted by Italian Air Force in May 2023. During various meetings with participating countries and other occasions, he exchanged views on issues, including the Indo-Pacific region and the space domain and promoted defense cooperation and exchanges among air and space forces. Additionally, in November 2023, he participated online in the NATO Partner Air Chiefs' Conference and stated that Japan would strengthen cooperation with NATO and NATO member countries for practical cooperation and mutual understanding on space security. Furthermore, General Uchikura attended the Pacific Air Force Chiefs Symposium (PACS) held in the United States in the same month and the Combined Space Operations Initiative<sup>30</sup> (CSpO) General-Level Conference in December 2023, of which Japan became an official member from 2023 and exchanged views with participants from various countries on the promotion of responsible space utilization and security.



General Uchikura, the Chief of Staff, ASDFASDF participating online in the NATO Partner Air Chiefs' Conference (November 2023)

**See** Chapter 1, Section 4-4-2 (5) (Strengthening Cooperation with Our Ally, Like-Minded Countries and Others)

## 2 Promoting Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation Initiatives

### (1) Pacific Partnership

The Pacific Partnership (PP)<sup>31</sup> is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide medical care, conduct facility repair activities and engage in cultural exchange to strengthen cooperation between countries participating in the initiative and facilitate international peace cooperation activities through cooperation with governments, military forces, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in those countries. In FY2023, in Solomon Islands, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Palau and Fiji, the Initiative succeeded in strengthening ties with participating countries through exchanges such as mangrove planting, on-site inspection training, medical support on a U.S. Navy hospital ship, etc. and musical performances.



Medical support in Pacific Partnership 2023 (October 2023)

### (2) Multilateral Exercises

The multilateral relationships have recently shifted from the phase for building trust to the phase for developing more concrete and practical cooperative relationships. Various multilateral training and exercises have been actively conducted as important initiatives to effectively help this shift.

In particular, in the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF has actively participated in multilateral training and exercises in non-traditional security fields, such as HA/DR and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

<sup>30</sup> A multilateral framework comprising the United States and other like-minded countries that conduct various discussions on policy, operational, regime and legal issues necessary for space security. Launched in 2014 by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, it has been later joined by New Zealand, Germany and France.

<sup>31</sup> The U.S. forces began the Partnership in 2006 and the SDF has been participating in it annually since 2007.

(NEO), in addition to traditional training conducted in preparation for combat situations. It is important to participate in such multilateral exercises so as not only to the skill level of the SDF, but also to create a cooperative platform with relevant countries. In light of this perspective, the MOD/SDF intends to continue to actively engage in such training.

In 2017, the MSDF began the Indo-Pacific Deployment “IPD” and has been promoting initiatives to realize the FOIP, including joint training with coastal

states in the region as well as the ally and like-minded countries, etc., port calls to important ports and support for capacity building in cooperation with other ministries and agencies as well as like-minded countries, etc. The IPD is highly significant as it embodies Japan’s will to continuously engage in the Indo-Pacific region and Japan’s positive pacifism.

**See** Part IV Chapter 3, Section 1-5-2 (1) (FY2023 Indo-Pacific Deployment “IPD23”); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))

## VOICE

### Voice of a Staff Member of Indo-Pacific Deployment 2023 (IPD23) Fleet Escort Force

#### HAYASHI Daisuke, Commander, Operational Staff, Escort Flotilla 1 Headquarters, MSDF

The MSDF is proactively working to maintain and strengthen regional peace, stability and maritime order to contribute to realizing Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

The Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD), which began in 2017 with two destroyers, has now become a representative event of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces with the participation of the GSDF and the ASDF, in addition to the MSDF, and it has developed into an important mission in collaboration with the related ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japan Coast Guard.

Although my former assignment (Maritime Staff Office) was a division related to IPD planning, I was on the side of operations this time in a dispatched unit as an operational staff, which heightened my resolution and gave me a sense of fulfillment during the

deployment.

In IPD23, multiple units were dispatched for simultaneous operations over the largest area in IPD history, extending from the Maldives in the Indian Ocean to Tonga in the South Pacific from east to west and from Australia to the vicinity of Japan from north to south. Through large-scale bilateral/multilateral exercises, defense cooperation and exchanges, Japan was able to strengthen ties and build extremely good relationships with the ally and like-minded countries. In addition, the projects such as the Ship Rider Cooperation Program (SRCP) facilitated interchanges, including exchanges regarding maritime security and climate change, at sea with naval and maritime law enforcement officers from ASEAN and Pacific Island countries, and it increased mutual understanding in response to the issues faced by the participants.



The author (far right) giving a presentation at the Ship Rider Cooperation Program



With the U.S. Navy liaison officers on board (the author is fourth from the left in the last row) during exercises



**MOVIE:** [Exercise] FY2023 Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD23) / 1st Surface Force Activity Record

**URL:** <https://youtu.be/ssV5GrGDcfo?si=kMPC-jKER98v9AWa>

## 4 Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building

### 1 Significance of Capacity Building

Capacity building is an initiative to actively create regional stability and enhance the global security environment by improving recipient countries' own capacities through continuous human resource development, technical support, etc. on a steady-state basis in fields related to security and defense.

By implementing these programs with other countries, in particular those in the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF will encourage the partner countries' forces, etc., to adequately fulfill their roles in maintaining international peace and regional stability to create a desirable security environment for Japan.

Such activities also have the effects of (1) strengthening bilateral relationships with partner countries, (2) enhancing relationships with countries such as the United States and Australia by providing capacity building through cooperation with them and (3) improving trust in the MOD/SDF and Japan as a whole by raising awareness at home and abroad of Japan's proactive and independent efforts to realize regional peace and stability.

In doing so, the MOD/SDF will make effective use of the knowledge that the SDF has accumulated to date and will work efficiently to maximize effectiveness through a combination of various means, while fully coordinating with diplomatic policies.

### 2 Specific Activities

The MOD/SDF has provided capacity building in such areas as HA/DR, PKO and maritime security to 17 countries, one organization and one region mainly in the Indo-Pacific region.

The MOD/SDF's capacity building are aimed at improving the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time. Some programs are carried out by dispatching MOD/SDF officials to the partner country, by inviting the partner country's officials to Japan, or a combination of both.

With the dispatch method, SDF officials with technical knowledge are dispatched to the partner country to help said country's forces and their related organizations improve their capacity through seminars, lectures and technical guidance. With the invitation method, the

partner country's officials are invited to the MOD/SDF's units and organizations to improve their capacity and to share knowledge of current human resources development efforts by the MOD/SDF through seminars, lectures, practical exercises and training programs. In addition, online lectures and practical training have been introduced as a new means of capacity building from 2021, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In FY2023, a total of 24 dispatch and invitational and online programs were conducted for 13 countries, one organization and one region.

Specifically, as dispatch programs, the MOD/SDF conducted knowledge sharing, practical skill-building support, etc. in the following fields: underwater unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance to Viet Nam, HA/DR to the Philippines and Indonesia, PKO (engineering) to Cambodia, HA/DR (military medicine) and PKO (civil engineering) to Mongolia, Military band training to Papua New Guinea, Engineering and vehicle maintenance to Timor-Leste and HA/DR (search and rescue, and military medicine/engineering) to Laos, Military medicine to Fiji and UXO disposal to Solomon Islands.

The implemented invitational programs included knowledge sharing and practical skill-building support in the following fields: PKO (civil engineering) for Mongolia, HA/DR (engineering equipment maintenance) for Papua New Guinea, HA/DR (engineering) for Laos, HA/DR for Malaysia, Japanese language training for Indonesia, cybersecurity for ASEAN and HA/DR for the Philippines.

Furthermore, in Africa, Japan has been supporting the Djibouti Armed Forces with its capacity building program for strengthening disaster response capacity, including training on the operation of engineering equipment. From October to December 2023, 14 SDF personnel were dispatched to train 16 members of Djibouti's engineering unit.

 See Fig. III-3-1-6 (Recent Capacity Building Initiatives (from April 2023 to March 2024))

### 3 Collaboration with Related Countries

The MOD/SDF conducts capacity building for third party countries in collaboration with the United States, Australia and other countries.

Specific quadrilateral cooperation by Japan, the United States, Australia and New Zealand includes

Fig. III-3-1-6 Recent Capacity Building Initiatives (from April 2023 to March 2024)

Capacity Building

**Capacity building** ... Project aiming to improve the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time through the dispatch of SDF personnel, and invitation of personnel from recipient countries, etc.

**Dispatch** ... Dispatch SDF personnel or others with expert knowledge to partner countries to conduct seminars, exercises and lectures, and provide technical guidance, etc., with the aim of improving the capabilities of military forces and related knowledge of recipient countries.

**Invitation** ... Invite officials of partner countries to the MOD, SDF units or other related organization to enhance the capacity of partner countries' officials through training such as seminars, exercises, lectures, education drills, etc., while sharing knowledge about MOD and SDF personnel development initiatives.

Some examples of countries and fields in which capacity building has been provided (April 2023-March 2024)




are collaborative projects with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.



Philippines

HA/DR


Training to handle life-saving equipment (rope launcher)



Mongolia

PKO (civil engineering)

Lecture on surveying techniques



Viet Nam

Underwater unexploded ordnance clearance


Training to retrieve mock bombs



Timor-Leste

Vehicle maintenance and engineering

Concrete work (setting up formwork)



PNG

Military band training

Performing technique lesson



Solomon Islands

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal

Explanation of former Japanese military ammunition types

participation by the SDF, U.S. forces and others in the “Hari’i Hamutuk” capacity building exercise for Timor-Leste organized by Australian Defence Forces, during which technical guidance on engineering and vehicle maintenance was provided to logistic support units of the Timor-Leste Defence Forces.

In June 2023, the MSDF IPD 23 Unit, in cooperation with the Japan Coastguard Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT)<sup>32</sup> and the Australian Maritime Services Advisor, provided capacity building to the Republic of Kiribati Police, helping strengthen the country’s maritime law enforcement capabilities.

As such, it is important for Japan to effectively and efficiently work on capacity building by closely coordinating with and mutually complementing concerned countries.



Cooperation in capacity building to the Republic of Kiribati Police (Japan Coast Guard and Australia) (June 2023) [partially provided by Japan Coast Guard].

## 5 Initiatives to Promote Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

### 1 What is Women, Peace and Security (WPS)?

Women, Peace and Security (WPS), is a concept that encapsulates the idea that peace is more sustainable when women take the lead and actively participate in all levels of conflict prevention, reconstruction, and peacebuilding, as well as disaster prevention, response and reconstruction, while recognizing the importance of protection and relief for women and girls, and those in need, as they are more vulnerable during conflicts and disasters.

In the 1990s, the large-scale of sexual violence in conflict as seen in former Yugoslavia, the civil war in Rwanda, and other conflicts drew worldwide attention. Furthermore, the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action was adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. Increasing the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and protecting women living in situations of armed or other conflicts or under foreign occupation was stipulated as one of the key strategic objectives in the document. In addition, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in 1998 stipulated sexual violence in conflict as a war crime.

Against this international backdrop, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

in 2000. This was the first Security Council Resolution focusing on the issues surrounding women in conflict. The resolution requires gender mainstreaming<sup>33</sup> in all efforts of its four pillars: Participation, Prevention, Protection, and Relief and Recovery. Since then, nine Security Council Resolutions related to WPS have been successively adopted, complementing UNSCR 1325. The efforts described in these ten resolutions are collectively referred to as the “WPS agenda.”

In recent years, given increasing uncertainty in the international situation, the concept of WPS has increased in significance.

### 2 Initiatives of Japan

In 2015, Japan adopted its first National Action Plan to implement the Security Council Resolutions on WPS. The action plan has been since revised, and the initiatives are currently progressing in line with the third National Action Plan, which was adopted in April 2023.

A unique feature of Japan’s National Action Plan, is that it expands its scope to not only conflicts but also disasters. It is based on the experiences that Japan has overcome numerous large-scale natural disasters, such as the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, and has recognized the importance of incorporating a **gender**

<sup>32</sup> A dedicated division formed in the JCG in 2017 to provide capacity building to foreign coastguard agencies. Initially, the Team had seven members and mainly supported Japan’s sea lane coastal states. As of April 2024, the Team has 18 members and is expanding its support to the Indo-Pacific region, including Pacific Island countries. This was the first initiative for the JCG and the MSDF to assist Kiribati and also the first time for Japan and Australia to jointly assist a patrol vessel provided by Australia.

<sup>33</sup> Incorporating gender perspectives into all policies, measures and projects to achieve gender equality in all areas.

perspective into all stages of disaster prevention, disaster response, climate change, and reconstruction. The action plan prescribes not only international but also domestic initiatives, and states that the ministries and agencies of Japan, including the MOD, will promote the appointment and participation of women in decision-making related to diplomacy, security, disaster prevention, and disaster response, and promote the development and implementation of policies and measures with gender perspectives.<sup>34</sup>

### 3 MOD/SDF and WPS

#### (1) Rationales and Significance of Promoting WPS

Promoting WPS contributes to the protection of life, person, etc., of Japanese nationals and fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities as well as international peace and stability. With this standpoint, the MOD/SDF must promote WPS.

Specifically, first, with regards to the protection of life, person, etc., of Japanese nationals, there are increased opportunities in recent years to conduct operations, such as the transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas, as well as tailored livelihood support for affected population by disaster. In this context, the MOD/SDF will directly protect the life, person, etc., of Japanese nationals by systematically responding to situations by incorporating WPS perspectives, based on the needs of women and girls who compose half of the population and who are put in particularly vulnerable situation in conflicts and such.

Second, regarding the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, the WPS Agenda includes the promotion of the participation of women in decision-making processes. This includes in the field of security, and is closely related to the measures that MOD has been taking to promote the active engagement of female personnel.

#### KEY WORD

#### “Gender”

Gender refers to “the socially and culturally constructed differences that society attributes to sexes.”

While the term of “sex” defines differences of biological and physiological characteristics, gender defines socially and culturally constructed characteristics of women and men including stereotypes, roles and norms.



Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Matsumoto at the 3rd meeting of the HQ for WPS Promotion in MOD

Promoting WPS will produce an environment where diverse individuals, including women, can demonstrate their abilities. Diversity is also important for improving operational efficiency.

Accordingly, promoting WPS is essential for reinforcing defense capabilities as it will lead to the development of human resources and organizational capacity building in the MOD.

Third, with regards to contributing to international peace and stability, the New Plan for a “FOIP” announced by Prime Minister Kishida in 2023 clearly states that the principles for peace and rules for prosperity is the backbone of FOIP, and therefore it prescribes response from a perspective of WPS, in order to create an international environment where the weak are not beaten by force. WPS perspectives are essential to ensure more effective implementation of the SDF’s overseas activities, including PKO and international disaster relief activities. As a responsible member of the international community, the MOD will also promote WPS and contribute to peace and stability, while cooperating with defense authorities of other countries pursuing respect for fundamental human rights and ensuring the rule of law.

#### (2) Strengthening the WPS Promotion Structure in the MOD/SDF

The MOD/SDF has been promoting a number of initiatives to support female personnel actively engage in activities in Japan and abroad, and also been conducting activities incorporating gender perspectives as a main actor in peacekeeping operations and large-scale disaster

<sup>34</sup> Focusing on differences arising from gender-based status and power relations to examine how such differences affect the formation of men’s and women’s immediate needs and long-term interests



response. Meanwhile, there was an overall challenge of failing to make each and every personnel fully aware of WPS and appreciate the significance of reflecting gender perspectives in policy planning and development.

Given this challenge, the HQ for WPS Promotion in MOD was established in 2023, headed by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, to raise awareness among all SDF personnel and strengthen international cooperation efforts. In addition, Director for International Cooperation on WPS was newly appointed.

The first meeting of the HQ for WPS Promotion in MOD, headed by then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Onoda, was held in August 2023. The second meeting, headed by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Matsumoto was conducted in January 2024. In April 2024, the third meeting was convened, and based on previous discussions at the HQ, the MOD adopted a WPS Promotion Plan for the first time. The MOD WPS Promotion Plan sets forth items to be implemented by FY2028 for the MOD to promote WPS, and is based on the National Action Plan for WPS.

It lists four specific initiatives: (1) change of mindset, (2) structural development, (3) international cooperation and (4) reflection of gender perspectives in SDF activities. It also prescribes a follow-up system to evaluate the implementation status of the initiatives by convening an annual meeting of the HQ for WPS Promotion in MOD.

Based on the MOD WPS Promotion Plan, the MOD will strongly promote WPS as a whole of Ministry effort, and contribute to protecting Japanese nationals and international peace and stability by conducting activities incorporating gender perspectives.

### (3) Recent Major Initiatives and Activities on WPS

From 2021 to 2024, Japan co-chaired the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM-Plus) Experts' Working Group (EWG) on Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) with Viet Nam and led on the promotion of WPS initiatives. As the co-chair, Japan set the promotion of WPS as one of the main objectives of the EWG activities, and established a WPS platform.<sup>35</sup> Japan also invited experts from the U.N. to participate, including in four WPS seminars, to contribute to raising awareness on WPS in each country. At the Competency Evaluation Program for Prospective UN Peacekeepers (CEPPP) flagship event held in Viet Nam in September 2023,

women from each country were encouraged to participate. Training on WPS was provided to all participants, and coordination procedures for UN military observers, engineer personnel and medical personnel, requiring



WPS seminar conducted by SDF personnel during a capacity building program on HA/DR (Laos) (December 2023)



Courtesy call on Vice-Minister of Defense Masuda by U.S. WPS Congressional Caucus member and U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues, U.S. Department of State (April 2024)



Participation of Director for International Cooperation on WPS to an Annual Conference for the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (Belgium) (October 2023)

<sup>35</sup> Established in 2021 under the auspices of the 4th ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on PKO, which helped raise awareness on WPS by continuously consolidating the knowledge and experiences of ADMM-Plus participating countries and providing a forum to host seminars inviting WPS experts to hold seminars on a regular basis.

## VOICE

## The Initiative and Efforts of the Ministry of Defense for WPS Promotion

**MATSUZAWA Tomoko, Director for International Cooperation on WPS, Indo-Pacific Regional Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy**

The Director for International Cooperation on WPS was set up in June 2023, and the HQ for WPS Promotion in Ministry of Defense (MOD ) was established in August of the same year. Currently, the efforts of the MOD for promoting WPS are progressing at an unprecedented speed.

The MOD has carried out WPS-related activities both domestically and internationally, and now that a WPS structure has been established in the ministry, various activities can be conducted even more efficiently and effectively.

We have received invitations and requests for WPS collaborations from many countries and feel that there is a growing attention to WPS in this issue in the international community.

Previously, I worked at international organizations where I engaged in the protection and assistance of victims of conflict related sexual violence, the empowerment of women affected by conflicts, and the training and education of military personnel from various countries on the protection of women and children. With these experiences and making maximum use of insights

experiences and strengths of the MOD and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), we aim to lead the world as a WPS powerhouse by steadily promoting WPS in an integrated manner with MOD officials and SDF personnel working together.



The author (third from the left in the first row) and female SDF personnel participated in the flagship event of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus Experts' Working Groups on PKO, co-chaired by Japan, which set up WPS as one of the main objectives of its activities (September 2023).

WPS perspectives were also shared.

Since 2023, WPS elements have been newly incorporated into the ongoing capacity building programs for Indo-Pacific countries in the area of PKO and HA/DR by delivering WPS Seminars and opinion exchanges, to raise awareness among defense officials in each country. At the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting held in November 2023, Defense Minister Kihara announced the launch of a new Japan-ASEAN Capacity Building Program on WPS.

Additionally, the Director for International Cooperation on WPS and uniformed SDF personnel are dispatched as presenters to training and international conferences on WPS hosted by other countries and international bodies such as NATO to introduce MOD/SDF initiatives, and gain insights from those countries that are promoting WPS. The outcomes of these activities are referred in charting the direction of WPS promotion in the MOD/SDF.

In Japan, WPS perspectives have been applied during disasters response and similar incidents. Disasters threaten the lives of all people, but it is known that



Female SDF personnel in action during the disaster relief operations for 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake (bathing support)

different people are affected in different ways depending on their gender, age, etc. Japan is responding to the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake promptly and appropriately, for example, by involving female SDF personnel interviewing female victims, taking into consideration various needs, including sensitive details such as the kinds of infant milk required.

Moreover, the scope of Japan's disaster response goes

beyond domestic disasters. In the event of a large-scale natural disaster in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has conducted emergency humanitarian assistance activities including the dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR). Disaster response by the SDF can be expected both domestically and internationally.

The MOD/SDF, as a whole-of-ministry, will reflect

WPS perspectives in its disaster-relief activities. This will enable the MOD/SDF systematically respond to the situations with understanding and consideration to the needs of affected people, including women, in disaster relief and other activities.



Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 3-2 (Reform to Promote Women's Participation)



**REFERENCE:** Ministry's Website: Initiatives on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/wps/index.html>

## Section 2 Ensuring Maritime Security

The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS) states that for Japan, a maritime nation, reinforcing the free and open maritime order and ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight are essential for peace and security.

To this end, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Force (SDF) will promote maritime security cooperation to realize the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)

together with coastal states in the Indo-Pacific.

To secure the stable use of sea lanes, Japan will make the necessary efforts to conduct counter-piracy operations and ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in cooperation and collaboration with relevant organizations.

**See** Chapter 1, Section2-2 (Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels in the Middle East); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 5 (Maritime Trends)

### 1 Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security

#### (1) The Fundamental Idea of the Government

The National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS) states that, as a maritime nation, Japan will work with its ally, like-minded countries and others to promote efforts to ensure the freedoms of navigation and overflight and to ensure safety, as well as maintain and develop the international maritime order based on universal values, including the rule of law. Specifically, the NSS calls for Japan to enhance maritime surveillance, bilateral drills and exercises and overseas port calls, as well as conduct counter-piracy and information gathering activities.

Furthermore, the NSS states that Japan will ensure freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea and other waters, promote peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law, strengthen relations with coastal states along the sea lanes, actively utilize the Arctic sea route and continue to actively utilize the SDF facility in Djibouti and address other things.

The fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy<sup>1</sup>, approved by the Cabinet in April 2023, continues to take a broad view on ocean policy from the perspective of maritime security. It promotes government-wide efforts for “comprehensive maritime security.” Therefore, it also promotes measures necessary for the “maintenance and development of an international maritime order,” mainly through Japan’s own efforts to “secure our national interests in our country’s territorial waters” and by strengthening ties

with allies, like-minded countries and others.

Concerning the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), which China and ASEAN are continuing to discuss, Japan has expressed its position that the COC should be effective and substantial, conform with international law including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and respect the legitimate rights and interests of all parties of the South China Sea.

#### (2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The MOD/SDF is conducting counter-piracy operations to secure stable use of sea lanes and information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In addition, the MOD/SDF has also taken opportunities to appeal to the international community on the importance of strengthening the international maritime order and freedom of navigation and has been consistently appealing to ensure the “rule of law” in maritime areas, which are essential to human prosperity. In particular, the MOD/SDF also points out that the unilateral change of the status quo by force and attempts to achieve it are continuing in the East China Sea and the South China Sea and also emphasizes the importance of all parties making efforts towards the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea based on international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

<sup>1</sup> This plan is formulated by the government of Japan to comprehensively and systematically promote measures for the oceans and is reviewed approximately every five years.

## 2 Counter-Piracy Operations

### 1 Significance of Counter-Piracy Operations

Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, a maritime nation that depends on maritime transportation to secure most of resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity, it is a problem that cannot be ignored. Japan's primary response to piracy is by the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), which is a law enforcement agency, and the SDF if the JCG is unable or finds it extremely difficult to cope with the piracy.

For Japan and the international community, the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are extremely important sea lanes, connecting Europe and the Middle East with East Asia. UN Security Council Resolution 1816 was adopted in 2008 in response to the high number and rapid increase in piracy incidents armed with machine guns and rocket launchers in these waters with purposes such as receiving ransoms by detaining hostages. Thereafter, following relevant resolutions additionally adopted that called for action by countries, particularly dispatching warships and military aircraft to deter piracy in these waters, and about 30 countries including Japan and the United States have dispatched their warships and other assets to the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. As a counter-piracy initiative, Japan is working with the Combined Task

Force 151 (CTF-151) and European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) responsible for counter-piracy measures to deter piracy outside the territorial waters of the coastal states in the area of operation.

Although the number of piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden stayed low due to such successful efforts by the international community, in November 2023, a hijacking incident of the merchant vessel (Central Park) occurred, similar incidents had not been observed since 2017. Pirate activities increase in 2024 and the situation remains unpredictable. In addition, given the current situation where Somalia's piracy control capability is still insufficient, the situation could easily become serious if the international community reduces its counter-piracy efforts.

**See** Fig. III-3-2-1 (Piracy and Other Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and in Other Nearby Areas (Including Attempted Piracy)); Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10-1-4 (2) (Maritime Security in the Gulf Region); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 5-2 (National Maritime Security Initiatives)

### 2 Japan's Initiatives

#### (1) Legislation Concerning Counter-Piracy Operations


In 2009, the order for Maritime Security Operations was issued for the purpose of protecting Japan-affiliated vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Responding to this, two destroyers<sup>2</sup> began providing direct escort to Japan-affiliated vessels, while two P-3C patrol aircraft<sup>3</sup> also commenced warning and surveillance operations in the same year.

Further, Japan subsequently enacted the Counter-Piracy Measures Act<sup>4</sup> in the same year. This act allows SDF to protect the vessels of all nations from acts of piracy, and to use weapons to a reasonable extent if no other means were available to stop vessels engaged in piracy, such as approaching private vessels.

**See** Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)

Fig. III-3-2-1

Piracy and Other Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and in Other Nearby Areas (Including Attempted Piracy)



(Note) The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the

2 The number of destroyers was changed to one from December 2016.  
 3 The number of aircraft was changed to one from December 2023.  
 4 Act on Punishment of Acts of Piracy and Measures against Acts of Piracy

## (2) Activities by the SDF

### a. Dispatch of the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) and Other Units

The MOD/SDF dispatches the DSPE, the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) and the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DGPE) to carry out counter-piracy operations.

The DSPE strives to ensure the safety of ships navigating in the area by using destroyers (one destroyer dispatched) in two different manners - direct escort of private vessels across the Gulf of Aden and zone defense in allocated areas in the Gulf of Aden. There are JCG officers aboard the destroyer.<sup>5</sup>

The DAPE conducts counter-piracy activities using the P-3C patrol aircraft (one aircraft dispatched). The DAPE conducts warning and surveillance operations in the flight zone that is determined in coordination with the CTF-151 Headquarters and confirms any suspicious boats. At the same time, the unit also provides information to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, responding by such means as confirming the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. The information gathered by the MSDF P-3C is constantly shared with other related organizations and contributes significantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected as pirate ships.

To improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the DAPE, the DGPE carries out activities such as maintenance of the installation set up in the northwest district of Djibouti International Airport.

Additionally, the Airlift Squadron and other units, organized as needed, operate ASDF transport aircraft to carry out air transport of materials required mainly by



Destroyer JS "IKAZUCHI" Engaged in Direct Ship Escort in the Gulf of Aden (November 2023)

the DAPE and the DGPE.

The NDS and other documents state that the SDF operation facility in Djibouti, which is being operated for counter-piracy operations, will be utilized for the rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas, while obtaining the understanding of the Djibouti government. In December 2023, the Cabinet of Japan approved the "Government Initiative to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas in the Middle East and Africa." and added a new mission for counter-piracy unit to maintain a temporary posture for the possible rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas, including accumulating and managing equipment.

 See Chapter 1, Section 7-2 (Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas)

### b. Dispatch of Personnel to the CTF-151 Headquarters, Etc.

To strengthen coordination with the units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations and enhance the effectiveness of the SDF's counter-piracy operations, the MOD has dispatched SDF personnel to



**REFERENCE:** Counter-piracy efforts

**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/overseas.html>



**MOVIE:** Defend the sea from pirates

**URL:** [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9-VIPG\\_jsMc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9-VIPG_jsMc)




**MOVIE:** Counter-piracy operations in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

**URL:** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0GvdTkufJwU&feature=youtu.be>

<sup>5</sup> Eight JCG officers are aboard the MSDF destroyer and conducting judicial law enforcement activities, including arresting and interrogating pirates, as required.

Fig. III-3-2-2 Structure of the Deployed Forces-SDF's Counter-Piracy Operations (image)



the CTF-151 and CMF headquarters since August 2014. Of these, the SDF dispatched a CTF-151 commander for the first time in 2015, followed by respective dispatches in 2017, 2018 and 2020.

**c. Achievements**

As of March 31, 2024, the DSPE has escorted 4,076 vessels (including 121 vessels escorted based on orders for maritime security operations). The DAPE is also responsible for most of the countries' warning and surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden. As of the same date, it has flown 3,267 times, totaling approximately 23,360 flight hours and provided information 16,299 times to ships and other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations. In November 2023, upon receiving information that the Liberian-flagged tanker "Central Park," operated by a British company, had been hijacked by someone in the Gulf of Aden, MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft of the counter-piracy unit and Destroyer JS

"Akebono" were rushed to the scene. The counter-piracy unit conducted vigilant monitoring and information gathering, while quickly providing the CTF-151 with information obtained in the field.



See Fig. III-3-2-2 (Structure of the Deployed Forces-SDF's Counter-Piracy Operations (image)); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 5-2 (2) (Piracy)

**(3) Tense Middle East Situation and the SDF's Response**

Due to the clashes between Israeli and the Palestinian militants, in October 2023, amid the tense situation in the Middle East due to military clashes between Israel and Hamas, the Houthi rebel group in Yemen, which stands in solidarity with Palestine, has repeatedly attacked civilian merchant ships and other vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, causing some civilian casualties. In November of the same year, a ship operated by Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha was seized.<sup>6</sup> In the same month, at least one ballistic missile was launched toward

<sup>6</sup> The seized "Galaxy Leader" is a Bahamian-registered car carrier owned by a British company and operated by Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha and did not have any Japanese crew members on board. The Houthis justified the seizure by claiming that the ship belonged to Israel. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other relevant ministries and agencies of Japan are working with the countries concerned to ensure the early release of the ship and its crew members. In January 2024, UN Security Council Resolution 2722 condemning the attack by the Houthis on vessels in the Red Sea was adopted, which was proposed by Japan and the United States.

the Gulf of Aden from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen during the temporary takeover of “Central Park” in the Gulf of Aden.<sup>7</sup>

Under such circumstances, the MOD/SDF will continue to properly conduct counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden while taking all possible measures to ensure the safety of its units and will work closely with the international community, including units of other countries, to ensure the stable use of sea lanes in the Middle East.

 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10-1 (Middle East); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 5-2 (1) (Maritime Security in the Middle East)

### 3 Praise for Japan's Endeavors

The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been

## 3 Cooperation in Maritime Security

The fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that maritime security cooperation with other countries will be strengthened through bilateral and multilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges among defense authorities at various levels to maintain and develop the “free and open ocean.”

In response to this, the MOD/SDF has been working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS) and will co-chair with the Philippines the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Maritime Security from 2024 to 2027.

In addition, the MOD/SDF provides capacity building for maritime security to the Indo-Pacific coastal states,<sup>8</sup> helping them improve their Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities and strengthening cooperation with the ally and like-minded countries in maritime security.

In cooperation with the navies and other stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region, the MSDF conducts maritime

highly praised by the international community. For example, national leaders and others have expressed their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly well-received by the UN Security Council Resolution. Moreover, the MSDF destroyers, which are engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains and ship owners of the vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. Additionally, the Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other groups expressed appreciation for protection of Japan-related vessels and asked for continuation of efforts in fighting against piracy.

security training with the navies and police forces, etc. of coastal states in the same region. In particular, Pacific Island countries have an urgent need to strengthen their maritime security capabilities due to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing<sup>9</sup> and crime at sea. In response, the MSDF Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD) Unit 23 conducted maritime security training in Kiribati, Palau, Solomon Islands and Tonga,<sup>10</sup> in cooperation with the JCG, the United States and Australia in some training exercises.

In addition to the counter-piracy operations, the DSPE and DAPE promote defense exchanges with the forces of other countries located in Djibouti such as making port calls at ports of the coastal states in the Middle East and conduct bilateral/multilateral exercises with the EUNAVFOR and other units<sup>11</sup> and the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Somalia, and other areas for the purpose of improving their tactical skills and strengthening cooperation with the armed forces of each country.

Strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the

<sup>7</sup> The launched ballistic missile landed in the surrounding waters more than 10 nautical miles away from the “Central Park,” the U.S. vessels and the Destroyer JS “Akebono” that responded, causing no damage.

<sup>8</sup> To date, the MOD/SDF has provided capacity building on maritime security to Indonesia, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Brunei and Sri Lanka.

<sup>9</sup> Fishing activities which do not comply with the domestic laws of each country or international operation rules, including unauthorized, unreported, or falsely reported operations; proscribed operations by stateless fishing vessels, fishing vessels from countries that are not members of regional fisheries management organizations; or similar operations, posing a serious threat to the sustainable use of marine resources and directly affecting food security

<sup>10</sup> In Palau, IPD Unit 23 conducted training with the Palau Coast Guard Patrol Vessel (KEDAM) provided by Japan and in Kiribati, it carried out training with the Republic of Kiribati Police in cooperation with the JCG and the Australian Maritime Service Advisor. In Tonga, as part of the Pacific Partnership 2023 organized by the U.S. Navy, IPD Unit 23 carried out on-site inspection training, etc. together with the U.S. Coast Guard’s IUU fisheries enforcement-related advisors and the Tongan Maritime Force’s on-site inspection unit, to help strengthen Tonga’s maritime security capabilities.

<sup>11</sup> The DSPE conducted counter-piracy joint naval exercises with EUNAVFOR (Spanish Navy) in July 2023, EUNAVFOR (Italian Navy) in September 2023, EUNAVFOR (Spanish Navy) in October 2023 and French Navy in January 2024, respectively.



Indo-Pacific region through such defense exchanges and cooperation contributes to maintaining maritime security, which has extremely high significance.

**See** Section 1-2-10 (3) (Initiatives of Each Service); Section 1-4-3 (Collaboration with Related Countries); (Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))



Exercise with the Palau Coast Guard Patrol Vessel (KEDAM) provided by Japan (July 2023)

## Section 3

## Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

## 1

## Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities

## 1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities


The Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (MOD/SDF) is proactively conducting international peace cooperation activities and other activities in tandem with diplomatic activities.

International peace cooperation activities as primary missions<sup>1</sup> by the MOD/SDF include international peace cooperation assignments such as cooperation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO), international disaster relief activities in response to large-scale disasters overseas and cooperation and support activities in response to Joint International Peace Response Situations.

**See** Fig. III-3-3-1 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF); Part II, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5 (Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others); Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 12 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 60 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments)

Fig. III-3-3-1

## International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF



Legend:  Activities based on permanent acts  Activities based on time-limited acts

## 2 Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately Carry Out International Peace Cooperation Activities

To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future operations. For this reason, all the three branches of the SDF, namely the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), designate dispatch stand-by units and always maintain a state of readiness. In addition, engineering units, staff officers and others as well as C-2 transport aircraft and C-130H transport aircraft are registered with the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) to enable the UN Headquarters to grasp the PKO dispatch preparation status of each country more specifically.

The SDF is also enhancing information-gathering capabilities and protection capabilities, which are required for the SDF units to carry out their missions while ensuring the safety of personnel and units in international peace cooperation activities and other similar ones. Furthermore, in order to respond to various mission environments and prolonged missions, the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport, deployment and information communication, as well as developing a structure of logistics and medical support for conducting smooth and continuous operations.

With regard to the education necessary for engaging in international peace cooperation activities, the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, which belongs to the Ground Component Command, provides training for GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, as well as supports their training. In addition, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of the Joint Staff College offers not only basic education courses on international peace cooperation activities, but also specialized education to train personnel who can be appointed as contingent commanders of UN PKO missions and staff officers of mission headquarters. These specialized courses are conducted by using UN

1 Missions as the combination of "main duties" and "the secondary duties" defined in the Article 3 of the SDF Law. "The primary mission" is defense of Japan while "the secondary missions" are the maintenance of public order and activities in response to Important Influence Situations as well as international peace cooperation activities.

standard training materials and foreign instructors. Based on the current situation of more multi-dimensional and complicated international peace cooperation activities, JPC has also provided education for personnel from foreign militaries and other Japanese ministries and agencies. The initiative aims to promote the coordination and cooperation and contribute to more effective international peace cooperation activities.

### 3 Welfare and Mental Health Measures for Dispatched SDF Units

The MOD/SDF is implementing various family support and mental health support measures for dispatched SDF personnel and their families to alleviate any anxieties

they may go through during the dispatch. For example, depending on the characteristics of the duties of the unit to be dispatched, the MOD/SDF provide SDF personnel with necessary measures such as the following: (1) education before the dispatch on necessary knowledge on how to reduce stress; (2) mental health checks before and during the dispatch as well as after returning to Japan; (3) counseling on anxieties and concerns during the dispatch, conducted by staff specially trained for carrying out mental health care; (4) dispatch of a mental health care team mainly including a medical officer with expertise on mental health care; (5) stress reduction education upon returning to Japan; and (6) special medical checkup after returning to Japan.

## 2 Initiatives to Support UN PKO and other activities

As a means to promote peace and stability in conflict regions around the world, UN PKO have expanded their missions in recent years to include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC), the promotion of political processes, providing assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights and other fields, in addition to such traditional missions as ceasefire monitoring.

International organizations, such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments and NGOs conduct relief and restoration activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries.

Japan has been promoting international peace cooperation assignments in various regions, including Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal and South Sudan for more than 30 years and these activities have been highly praised both inside and outside of Japan.

Currently, Japan dispatches staff officers to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).

Japan will actively contribute to international

peace cooperation activities through such activities as dispatch of personnel to mission headquarters, capacity building in Japan's fields of expertise and dispatch of SDF personnel to the UN Headquarters, while using accumulated experience so far and working on human resource development.

### 1 Dispatch to the MFO

#### (1) Significance of Dispatch to the MFO

The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was established by the Protocol to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (August 1981) as an organization to undertake the tasks and responsibilities of the UN force and observer mission stipulated in the treaty. The MFO is tasked with monitoring the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel and since its inception in 1982, has contributed to peace and stability in the Middle East, which is a foundation of peace and prosperity for Japan, by helping to facilitate dialogue and confidence building between the two countries.

Amidst this, the MFO requested that Japan send staff officers to its headquarters, and, with a view to making proactive contributions to international peace efforts, Japan has dispatched staff officers to the MFO as Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security since April 2019.



**Reference:** 30th anniversary of participating in UN PKO: The journey and development of the GSDF's international activities

**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/gsd/about/pko30/index.html>

## (2) Activities by Staff Officers and Others

Currently, four uniformed GSDF personnel are engaged in the operations at the MFO Headquarters (Liaison branch and Force Engineering Office, Support branch) located in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula.



Dispatched SDF personnel operating in MFO

The Liaison branch has been staffed with two staff officers since April 2019, with staff who are working on liaison and coordination with Egypt and Israel, as well as preparing medium- and long-term operational policies related to the same.

Since June 2023, two staff officers have been dispatched to Force Engineering Office, Support branch to work on planning and progress management related to the renewal of various facilities at the MFO. Additionally, one liaison staff member has been dispatched to Cairo to liaise and coordinate with the relevant organizations in order to help the officers dispatched to the MFO carry out activities smoothly and effectively.

These activities demonstrate Japan's more active involvement in the peace and stability of the Middle East. This is also expected to promote collaboration with the U.S. and other countries dispatching officers, and to provide opportunities for human resources development.

**See** Fig. III-3-3-2 (MFO Relevant Maps); Fig. III-3-3-3 (Organizational Chart of MFO)

Fig. III-3-3-2 MFO Relevant Maps





Fig. III-3-3-3 Organizational Chart of MFO



(Note) Red line indicates a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed.



**Reference:** The Sinai Peninsula international peace cooperation assignments (Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security)

**URL:** [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai\\_heiwa/pko/201904\\_egy.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heiwa/pko/201904_egy.html)



## 2 UNMISS

### (1) Significance of the Dispatch of Personnel to UNMISS

In July 2011 following South Sudan's independence, with the objective of consolidating peace and security as well as helping South Sudan to establish necessary conditions for the development, the UNMISS was established. In response to requests from UN for cooperation with UNMISS, particularly for dispatching GSDF engineering units, Japan has dispatched units and personnel including staff officers to the Headquarters and SDF engineering units.

South Sudan shares borders with six countries and is positioned in a highly important location, connecting the African continent on all four points of the compass. The peace and stability of South Sudan is essential not only for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in its neighboring countries, which leads to those of the whole Africa, as well as a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. Based on the experiences gained through past PKO, the MOD/SDF has contributed to the peace and stability of South Sudan by providing personnel cooperation in infrastructure development, which is highly expected by the UN.

UNMISS is the only UN PKO to which Japan currently dispatches its personnel and the dispatch of staff officers supports the progress of the peace process in South Sudan together with the international community. It is significant for Japan to continue dispatching its staff officers from the perspectives of maintaining close involvement in the UN, cooperation with neighboring African countries, and securing opportunities for human resource development.

 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 10-2 (Africa)


### (2) Additional Dispatchment of Staff Officers

Following the UN's call for applications for the position of Deputy Chief of Staff (O-6 level) in charge of Personnel, Evaluation, and Training (DCOS (PET)) in UNMISS and a request for the dispatch of his/her Personal Assistant (PA), Japan decided to dispatch two additional personnel from the GSDF, Colonel and a Sergeant First Class. The dispatch to the O-6 level post is the highest rank ever as a command staff from Japan.

### (3) Activities by Staff Officers and Others

At the UNMISS Headquarters located in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, four GSDF personnel (logistics staff officer, intelligence staff officer, engineering staff officer

Fig. III-3-3-4 Organizational Chart of UNMISS



(Note) Red lines indicate a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed.

and aviation operation staff officer) have been carrying out their duties. Specifically, the logistics staff officer procures and transports necessary supplies for UNMISS activities; the intelligence staff officer collects and compiles information on public safety conditions; the engineering staff officer plans and proposes UNMISS engineering activities; and the aviation operation staff officer prepares flight plans for aircraft operated by UNMISS.

Of the two additional uniformed GSDF personnel dispatched in 2024, the DCOS (PET) operates and supervises the personnel, evaluation and training divisions at the UNMISS force headquarters, while the PA provides support to the DCOS (PET) to ensure smooth implementation of the duties.

Additionally, one liaison staff member has been dispatched to the liaison office in the Embassy of Japan in South Sudan to support the activities of Japanese staff officers. This member liaises and coordinates with the South Sudan Government and the International Peace Cooperation Corps in South Sudan to ensure Japan's smooth and efficient cooperation with UNMISS.

In this way, Japan will continue to contribute to UNMISS activities.

 See Fig. III-3-3-4 (Organization Chart of UNMISS)

## 3 Dispatch of MOD Personnel to the UN Secretariat

The MOD/SDF dispatches personnel to the UN Secretariat for the purpose of actively contributing to the UN efforts to achieve international peace and for the

purpose of utilizing their experiences in Japan's PKO activity. As of March 2024, three SDF personnel (chief level and action officer level) are involved in the military planning for UN peacekeeping mission and competency assessment of each personnel member of various countries at the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and one SDF personnel and one administrative official (both action officer level) are working on the United Nations Triangular Partnership Programme<sup>2</sup> (UNTPP) at the UN Department of Operational Support (DOS).

 **See** Reference 59 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations)

#### 4 Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Training Centers

To support the self-help efforts of African countries and others in PKO, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to PKO training centers in Africa and other countries that provide education and training for UN peacekeepers to contribute to peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of the centers.

 **See** Reference 59 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations)

#### 5 Support to the UNTPP

Japan has so far earned unquestionable trust in the areas of engineering and transport that are essential for promoting smooth peacekeeping operations. To continue to support the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions and implement high quality activities, Japan expressed its active support at the PKO Summit in September 2014 and it was embodied by the UNTPP.

The UNTPP was founded using funds from Japan as a project to support training for military engineers and the procurement of heavy equipment by the UN DOS. From the start of the program to March 2024, a total of 184 GSDF personnel have been dispatched to the African region to provide 10 training sessions for a total of 312 members from 8 African countries.

Considering that 30% or more of PKO personnel are from Asia, Japan has been conducting the program in Asia and the surrounding area since 2018. In June 2023, 24 GSDF personnel were dispatched to the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre to contribute to the acquisition of knowledge and skills necessary for infrastructure development and building camps in PKO for the military engineers of Indonesia and neighboring countries. From the start of the program until March 2024, a total of 116 GSDF personnel were dispatched to provide a total of 5 training sessions for 95 personnel from 10 countries in Asia and the surrounding regions.

Additionally, the UN decided to extend the scope of support under the UNTPP to the field of sanitation and established the UN Field Medical Assistant Course<sup>3</sup> (UNFMAC), given that strengthening sanitation capacity to ensure the safety of deployed personnel has become an issue in UN peacekeeping operations. In July 2023, the MOD/SDF dispatched one GSDF personnel as the instructor to said course held at the UN Regional Service Centre Entebbe in Uganda, providing education to 25 personnel dispatched.



SDF personnel serving as the instructor in UNTPP Field Medical Assistant Course

Besides, as part of the UNTPP, the MOD/SDF holds an online Construction Process Management Course for engineering personnel. This course provides education



**Reference:** United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

**URL:** [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai\\_heiwa/pko/201111\\_ssd.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heiwa/pko/201111_ssd.html)

- 2 A cooperative framework for training and providing necessary equipment for PKO personnel deployed to UN PKO through cooperation among the UN as well as countries dispatching the personnel and supporting UN PKO (third countries providing technology and equipment)
- 3 A course designed to train personnel to provide first aid in PKO areas of operations before specialized treatment is provided by medics or medical personnel

on construction management and problem-solving methods for UN PKO missions. In November 2023, 5 GSDF instructors provided education for 25 engineering personnel from Mongolia, Thailand and Viet Nam, as well as for 26 engineering personnel from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in December of the same year.

## 6 Cooperation for the Activities Helping Ukrainian Victims

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in

2022, UNHCR requested assistance in transporting humanitarian relief supplies. In response, from May to June the same year, as the International Peace Cooperation Assignments Helping Ukrainian Victims, humanitarian relief supplies at UNHCR's warehouse in Dubai, United Arab Emirates were transported by the SDF aircraft to countries around Ukraine (Poland and Romania). UNHCR expressed gratitude for this cooperation and Ukrainian government officials expressed gratitude and high appreciation.

## 3 International Disaster Relief Activities

In recent years, the role of military has become more diverse and opportunities to leverage military capabilities for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) are growing. The SDF has also been proactively engaged in international disaster relief activities from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improving the global security environment.

To this end, the SDF maintains its readiness to take any necessary actions based on prepared disaster relief operation plans. The SDF has proactively conducted international disaster relief activities in consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, leveraging its features and capabilities, while considering specific requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations.

### 1 Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law

Since the enforcement of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law<sup>4</sup> in 1987, Japan has been engaged in international disaster relief activities upon requests from the governments of affected countries or the international organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law was partially amended to allow the SDF to participate in international disaster relief activities and to transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose.

### 2 International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF and SDF's Posture

Considering specific requests by the governments of affected countries and the scale of disaster situations, the

SDF's international disaster relief activities encompass (1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transportation of supplies, patients and personnel by helicopter and other means; (3) water supply activities using water-purifying devices; (4) cooperation in search and other activities by MSDF fixed-wing patrol aircraft. In addition to such cooperation, (5) the SDF may use transport aircraft and ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area.

GSDF units including those of the Ground Component Command and regional Armies are always in readiness for such operations autonomously. The Self Defense Fleet of the MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF are always in readiness as well to transport personnel and supplies to affected areas.

### 3 International Disaster Relief Activities for the Earthquake Disaster in the Republic of Türkiye

The earthquake with epicenter in southeastern Türkiye on February 6, 2023 caused significant damage in the country, with more than 50,000 people killed.

At the request of the Government of Türkiye, Japan dispatched the Japan Disaster Relief and Rescue Team, a medical team and others. The MOD transported equipment and other items necessary for the Japan Disaster Relief and the medical team operating in the affected area from Japan to Türkiye from February 13 to 17 by a B-777 special transport aircraft.

Furthermore, upon a request from the Government of Türkiye and NATO, one KC-767 aerial refueling/

<sup>4</sup> The Law Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team

transport aircraft transported emergency relief supplies from Pakistan to Türkiye.

The Minister of Defense issued an order on March 24, 2023 to terminate the international disaster relief activities, in which about 60 personnel were engaged.

This was the first international disaster relief activity

undertaken by the SDF in cooperation with NATO. The Government of Türkiye and NATO expressed high appreciation and gratitude for this activity, which resulted in further deepening relations not only with Türkiye but also with NATO.



**Reference:** International Disaster Relief Activities

**URL:** [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai\\_heiwa/kokusai\\_enjyo/](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heiwa/kokusai_enjyo/)



**Section 4**

# Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and missiles that can deliver them, as well as the proliferation of not only conventional arms but also goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use, pose a pressing challenge to the peace and stability of the international community. Moreover, many countries are working on the regulation of certain conventional weapons, considering the need to maintain a balance between humanitarian perspectives and defensive needs.

In order to deal with these issues, the international frameworks for **arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation** have been developed under which Japan has played an active role.

The National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS) describes arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, including for weapons of mass destruction, etc., as one of the key measures among efforts to strengthen a free and open international order. In addition, the NSS also states that Japan will cooperate to

improve the effectiveness of international organizations and multilateral export control regimes.



Fig. III-3-4 (Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.)

**KEY WORD** // **Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation**

**Arms Control**  
Regulation and verification/inspection of armaments or weapons, confidence-building, regulation of transfers of conventional weapons, etc.

**Disarmament**  
Reduction or elimination of specific armaments or weapons under international agreements

**Non-Proliferation**  
Prevention of the proliferation of weapons that pose a threat to Japan and the international community (weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as missiles and conventional weapons that carry such weapons) and related materials and technologies used in their development

**Fig. III-3-4**

Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.

Category	Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.				Conventional Weapons
	Nuclear Weapons	Chemical Weapons	Biological Weapons	Delivery Systems (Missiles)	
Conventions on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, etc.	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)  Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on Cluster Munitions Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms U.N. Report on Military Expenditures Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
Export Control Frameworks Aimed at Non-Proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)	Australia Group (AG)		Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
New International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540				

**1**

## Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Japan actively participates in international initiatives for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in regard to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as missiles that can deliver them and associated technologies and materials.

Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the field of chemical protection since the negotiating stage. Following the entry of the CWC into force, Japan has

dispatched eight Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) experts on protection against chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established to continuously implement verification measures. In addition, small quantities of the chemical substances under the regulation of the CWC are synthesized for protection research at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City). Thus, in accordance with the CWC regulations, the



Personnel dispatched to the OPCW (at the time of the inspection)

school has submitted annual reports and undergone inspections 13 times in total since the establishment of the OPCW and it has been confirmed that there are no problems.

Moreover, Japan is also working on projects to destroy abandoned chemical weapons in China, based on the CWC.<sup>1</sup> The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-

Defense Forces (SDF) has seconded GSDF and other personnel to the Cabinet Office to be in charge of this project and since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 20 times (As of September, 2023).

In addition, MOD officials are dispatched to major meetings such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which are international export control regimes and have made proposals to contribute to non-proliferation of key technologies from security perspectives. Moreover, Japan has been cooperating to enhance the effectiveness of regulations and decisions, such as by dispatching SDF personnel to training conducted by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

Japan has concluded various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), based on humanitarian perspectives and security needs. In addition, Japan has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention),<sup>2</sup>

which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention, the disposal of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF was completed in February 2015.

In addition, the MOD/SDF dispatches its personnel also to the Group of Governmental Experts meetings related to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and other events as necessary under the CCW framework. Discussions related to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) are under way from the perspectives of their characteristics, human involvement, international law and other matters. Japan is continuing its active involvement in the discussions, while also considering the standpoints of national security.

Additionally, international discussions about the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the military domain have been intensifying in recent years, and in February 2023, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka attended the “Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM)” Summit 2023 held in the Netherlands.

Regarding the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, Japan has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international community that focus on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines by submitting annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional stocks to the Secretariat of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty).<sup>3</sup>

Japan also submits an annual Confidence-Building Measures report in relation to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and reported on the facilities of the National Defense Medical College and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) in that report.

In addition, the MOD/SDF provide an annual report under the frameworks of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the UN Report on Military Expenditures and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),<sup>4</sup> which aim to increase the transparency of military preparedness and military expenditure. The MOD/SDF also dispatch personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings and other meetings for reviewing and improving these systems.

 See Reference 59 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations)

1 Abandoned chemical weapons from the former Japanese army have been confirmed in a wide-ranging areas from Heilongjiang Province in northern China to Guangdong Province in southern China and Japan has been promoting excavation, recovery and disposal projects in various regions.

2 The United States, China, Russia and others as major producer and holder of cluster munitions have not yet concluded the Convention.

3 A convention prohibiting the use, production, transfer, etc. of anti-personnel landmines. The United States, China, Russia, the ROK, India and others have not yet concluded the Convention.

4 A treaty regulating the international transfer of conventional weapons that could be used to undermine peace and security or commit serious violations of international humanitarian law and other laws. The United States, Russia and others have not yet concluded the Treaty.

## 2

## International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Deeply concerned about the development of WMDs and missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, the United States announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)<sup>5</sup> in May 2003 and sought the participation of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken based on PSI, including PSI interdiction exercises aimed at improving the ability to thwart the proliferation of WMDs and related items and meetings to consider issues on policies and legislations.

The MOD/SDF collaborates with relevant organizations and countries, dispatching MOD officials including uniformed SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation in these exercises.

In May 2023, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Destroyer JS “Hamagiri” participated in the PSI exercise<sup>6</sup> “Eastern Endeavor 23” held in South Korea. Vessels and aircraft from the U.S., Australian and South Korean navies, coastguards and maritime police also participated in this exercise, which aimed to improve skills related to PSI and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries.

Based on the proliferation cases in the areas surrounding Japan and from the perspectives of preventing the proliferation of WMDs and improving the response capability of the SDF, the MOD/SDF strive to strengthen nonproliferation frameworks including PSI, including by holding various relevant training exercises and meetings and participating in the same kind of activities which other countries hold.



Reference 61 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since FY2013))



Personnel participating in the PSI maritime interdiction exercise (May 2023)



**Reference:** Initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation

**URL:** <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/dialogue/fukakusan/index.html>

- <sup>5</sup> An initiative that considers measures that participating countries can jointly take while complying with existing domestic and international laws in order to prevent the proliferation of WMDs/missiles as a threat to international peace and stability as well as their related materials and at the same time seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent.
- <sup>6</sup> A PSI exercise in the Indo-Pacific region has been hosted annually by six countries on a rotating basis since 2014: Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore and the United States.

# Part **IV**

## **Reinforcing Common Bases, etc.**

- Chapter 1** // **Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability itself**
- Chapter 2** // **Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities**
- Chapter 3** // **Measures Related to Training and Exercises**
- Chapter 4** // **Initiatives to Live in Harmony with Regional Societies and the Environment**

# Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability itself

## Chapter 1

Rapid advances in science and technology in recent years have brought about fundamental changes in the nature of national security. Countries are accelerating research and development to ensure their technological superiority, especially through the acquisition of cutting-edge technologies that could become so-called “**game changers**” which dramatically alter the future character of warfare.

New technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum technology, and technology for utilizing new forms of energy are being applied to equipment<sup>1</sup>, expanding the character of warfare not only in the conventional domains such as ground, maritime, and air but also into space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, including the cognitive dimension. In addition, the rapid advancements of information-related technologies and information infrastructure, such as AI and SNS (Social Networking Services), has dramatically increased the risk of hybrid warfare, in which military and non-military means are combined, and the expansion of information warfare through the spread of disinformation or by other means.

Even in Japan, there is now an urgent need to quickly acquire superior equipment that will support new ways of warfare, which can only be achieved through long-term, constant efforts to accumulate technological knowledge in Japan, develop highly skilled human resources, and maintain manufacturing equipment and facilities that meet our country’s particular needs. Therefore, the MOD has generally regarded Japan’s defense production and technology bases as essential infrastructures for securing superior equipment and makes efforts to maintain and reinforce these bases. However, in recent years, Japan’s

defense production and technology bases have been exposed to challenging conditions, such as increased costs due to technological advances and the emergence of supply chain risks due to the complex and unstable international situation. These conditions, combined with particular characteristics of defense equipment, such as limited demand and unique specifications, led to low profitability and a negative outlook for business continuity and growth, mainly in the defense industry. Recently, companies deciding to withdraw from defense businesses are appearing intermittently, and even if they are not withdrawing, companies have been reluctant to make new investments, causing concerns that this could affect the operational availability of defense equipment and interfere with the operation of the SDF.

Currently, the SDF can fully demonstrate its capabilities and accomplish its mission of defending Japan only by using equipment that incorporates advanced technologies. In the National Security Strategy formulated in December 2022 and other documents, the Government of Japan clearly stated its policy of tackling the current severe situation surrounding defense production and technology bases, which are essential infrastructures for securing superior defense equipment in Japan, making these bases virtually an integral part of defense capability itself, and making efforts to reinforce these bases fundamentally.

### KEY WORD

#### Game changers

This word regards to cutting-edge technologies that could drastically alter the future way of warfare, such as artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonic and high-power energy technologies, quantum technology. Countries are focusing on developing such technologies as some advanced technologies in the civilian sector have been converted to military technologies.

## Section 1

### Reinforcing Defense Production Base

Japan’s defense production base has several unique characteristics. As a premise, Japan, which does not have arsenals (state-run factories for defense equipment),

heavily relies on private companies to play an important role in producing defense equipment. Therefore, amid the demand for fundamental reinforcement of

<sup>1</sup> Equipment, ships, aircraft, food and other supplies used by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (including their parts and components, limited to those used exclusively by the SDF).

defense capabilities, the role of the defense industry is becoming increasingly important in securing equipment for the SDF to carry out its missions. Especially when manufacturing defense equipment<sup>2</sup>, it is necessary to meet the high level of performance requirements and security measures. From the perspective of economic rationality, indicating a certain degree of predictability is required for companies to step into investments in this sector. In addition, opportunities for companies to recover investments are limited since their customers are basically limited to the MOD / SDF.

Due in part to the above characteristics, our defense production base has been weakening. Under such circumstances, companies deciding to withdraw from

defense businesses or downsize their operations are appearing intermittently. Consequently, this not only interferes with the stable procurement of defense equipment essential for SDF operations, but also causes the loss of a proper competitive environment and innovation in the long term, resulting in Japan losing its technological superiority in security.

In addition, the risk of information theft due to cyber attacks, as well as the risk of disruption to the supply of raw materials due to the imposition of export restrictions by other countries have become apparent in recent years.

In light of this environment surrounding our bases, the MOD will take various measures to maintain and reinforce them.

## 1 Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases and its Basic Policy

Japan's defense industry is responsible for each stage of the life cycle of defense equipment (research, development, production, sustainment and maintenance, supply, decommissioning, etc.). In this context, defense equipment and the defense industry are inseparable. The Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases<sup>3</sup> was enacted in June 2023 and enforced in October of the same year in order to take necessary measures to maintain and enhance the ability of the defense industry to produce advanced equipment and ensure high operational rates. Under this Act, the Minister of Defense is supposed to establish a basic policy,<sup>4</sup> which was announced in October 2023. This basic policy prescribes the matters necessary to ensure adequate implementation of the measures stipulated in the Act. Also, it indicates the new direction on how to maintain and reinforce the bases in the future, replacing the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” that was formulated in 2014.

 See Reference 62 (Basic Policy on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases)

### 1 Main Direction for Maintaining and Enhancing Bases

#### (1) Significance of Maintaining and Enhancing Bases

The significance of maintaining and enhancing domestic bases has been pointed out in the past from



Launching ceremony of the Mogami class destroyer JS “Yubetsu” (November 2023)

the perspectives of ensuring Japan's independence in the security environment, enhancing its deterrence, and contributing economically and technologically to domestic industries. That domestic bases play an important role in acquiring advanced defense equipment at an early stage and in maintaining and securing sufficient war sustainability of the SDF, but also because the defense industry is composed of a wide range of suppliers, ranging from prime contractors which have direct contracts with the MOD to subcontractors like small and medium-sized enterprises.

In addition, in recent years, countries have been increasingly hoarding technology from the economic security perspective, and supply chains have been

2 Manufacturing, research and development, repair, and provision of other related services.  
3 Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases  
4 Basic Policy on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases

disrupted due to the spread of COVID-19. Under these circumstances, the need to maintain and reinforce bases in Japan has become even greater from the perspective of ensuring stable manufacturing of defense equipment directly concerning the defense of Japan, as well as securing technological superiority.

### (2) Approach to Procurement of Defense Equipment

On the premise of acquiring defense equipment which meets required performance for the defense of Japan, it is necessary to decide how to acquire defense equipment according to the necessity to ensure continuous acquisition, sustainment and maintenance of the defense equipment in terms of expenses, and from the viewpoints of nurturing sectors in which Japan has a comparative advantage and complementing sectors in which Japan is falling behind or lacking, in addition to the growing need to maintain and reinforce bases in Japan. Specifically, when acquiring new defense equipment, domestically produced equipment will be pursued, focusing on the following areas:

- (a) Defense equipment that can meet various conditions, such as operational concepts, performance, acquisition cost, life cycle cost, schedule, etc., with domestic technologies
- (b) Defense equipment that is essential in maintaining war sustainability in the event of a contingency as well as in ensuring for the ability to improve operations and maintenance in peacetime (e.g., ammunition and ships)
- (c) Items that should not be dependent on foreign countries from the perspective of confidentiality (e.g., communications, cryptography)
- (d) Defense equipment that is indispensable for realizing operational concepts that consider Japan's geographical and policy peculiarities
- (e) The latest technologies from foreign countries that are hard to obtain
- (f) Potential target of external threats through economic means

### (3) Approach to International Cooperation

As countries these days compete fiercely in R&D in the military field and make remarkable technological progress, it is difficult for each country to maintain necessary bases without cooperating with other countries. Promoting international cooperation in defense equipment and technology is essential, keeping in mind the basic

principle that bases related to defense equipment, which should not be dependent on other countries, should be maintained and enhanced domestically. Therefore, it is necessary to promote international joint research and development in addition to active international cooperation and licensed production, contributing to incorporating the excellent technologies of various countries into Japan's defense equipment.

The transfer of defense equipment and technology is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, create a desirable security environment for Japan, and provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat by force. Accordingly, the government and private sector will make joint efforts to promote the smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high-security significance and international joint development in various fields.

### (4) Ideal State of the Defense Industry

It is of utmost importance that the defense industry maintain the capacity to manufacture the necessary defense equipment and support high operational rates.

In addition, to make the Japanese defense industry internationally competitive like the defense industries of foreign countries including European countries and the U.S., it is important to review the industrial structure and build a defense industry led by companies with a high degree of defense demand dependence (the ratio of defense-related sales).

### (5) Roles of the Government and Defense Equipment Manufacturers in Ensuring Stable Manufacturing of Defense Equipment

While the government emphasizes creating an environment in which the defense equipment manufacturers can work on defense projects and determine to continue such projects further, defense equipment manufacturers<sup>5</sup> are expected to proactively act on the government's initiatives to maintain and enhance the bases, newly recognizing that they are essential entities responsible for national defense.

<sup>5</sup> Business operators engaged in the manufacture of defense equipment

## 2 Measures Based on the Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases

### (1) Specific Initiatives (reinforcing supply chain resilience, improving manufacturing process efficiency, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting business succession, etc.)

Various risks are assumed to impede the stable manufacturing of defense equipment, such as the risk of difficulty in importing raw materials because of export restrictions imposed by a foreign government, the risk of delay in delivery or failure to meet the performance requirements because of sluggish productivity and technological standards caused by aging facilities that have not been renewed, the risk of major concerns for any parts infected with malware or spyware in the manufacturing process, the risk of leakage of information on performance due to cyber attacks, and the risk of withdrawing from defense projects because it has become challenging to continue the business. The following specific initiatives need to be taken by defense equipment manufacturers to respond to such risks effectively and ensure the supply chain consisting of prime contractors and suppliers functions more effectively and efficiently, thereby contributing to stable manufacturing of designated defense equipment.<sup>6</sup>

- (a) Reinforcing supply chain resilience
  - Domestic production and stockpiling of raw materials
  - Research and development of alternate materials and products
- (b) Improving manufacturing process efficiency
  - Introduce state-of-the-art equipment and technologies
  - Automate inspection processes by introducing AI
- (c) Enhancing cybersecurity
  - Enhance information systems
  - Employee training
- (d) Support for business succession, etc.
  - Maintain manufacturing facilities
  - Employee training (acquisition of technology and know-how), etc.

Following the Basic Policy, the Minister of Defense shall approve plans for specific initiatives submitted by defense equipment manufacturers. The MOD then enters into a contract directly with the defense equipment

manufacturer for the specific initiatives after approval of the plans and pay compensation without delay following



“Kimishika-Oran” sign sticker is given to defense equipment manufacturers who have received plan certification and are implementing specific initiatives. (Shimizu Nozzle Inc.).

the contract’s provisions. In fiscal 2023, 36 projects with a total value of approximately ¥9.9 billion were approved.

### (2) Facilitation of Equipment Transfer and the Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation

When transferring defense equipment and technology, the defense equipment manufacturer may be required to make appropriate adjustments to specifications and performance from the national security perspective. In particular, it is necessary to appropriately address concerns of losing Japan’s technological superiority over other countries in the defense sector by securing information on advanced technologies used in Japan’s defense equipment.

The necessary grants are provided when the Minister of Defense requires a defense equipment manufacturer to adjust specifications and performance.

On February 16, 2024, the Minister of Defense designated the Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation to provide the necessary grants from the fund and to ensure that equipment transfer conducted by defense equipment manufacturers is carried out smoothly and under appropriate management, in line with the policy objectives of the MOD.

The MOD delivered 40 billion yen in FY2023 and 40 billion yen in FY2024 to the Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation to establish the fund.

**See** Section 3-2 (Efforts to Promote the Transfer of Defense Equipment)

<sup>6</sup> Defense equipment essential for the SDF to carry out its missions as designated by the Minister of Defense, appropriate procurement of which by the MOD would be hindered if its manufacture, etc., by the specific defense equipment manufacturer were to be suspended.



### (3) Protecting the Confidential of Defense Equipment

In manufacturing defense equipment, the MOD provides contractors with classified information on defense equipment, such as advanced technologies, for steady procurement of higher-quality defense equipment. On the other hand, in recent years, the threats of leakage of classified information in defense equipment including cyber attacks and corporate acquisition by countries of security concern, has become higher.


With this in mind, the classified information provided by the government to contractors has been re-designated as “Confidential of Defense Equipment,” explicitly indicating to contractors and their employees that handling such classified information requires strict management. In addition, the same penalties currently

imposed on SDF personnel will be applied to persons who intentionally leak these confidential, which will prevent leakage more effectively.

### (4) Government Ownership of Designated Defense Equipment Manufacturing Facilities by the Minister of Defense, etc.

If it is determined that stable procurement of designated defense equipment by the MOD is not possible through the various efforts described in (1) and (2) above, the MOD may acquire the designated equipment manufacturing facilities or equipment that manufacture such designated defense equipment. The acquired defense equipment manufacturing facilities will be managed by contractors commissioned by the MOD for the manufacture of

Fig. IV-1-1-1 Overview of Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases



**REFERENCE** : Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases  
**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/hourei\\_dpb.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/hourei_dpb.html)

## VOICE

## ① Initiatives for Strengthening the Development and Production Bases of Equipment

**Eiji Nakamatsu, Director, ANS Supply Chain Management Department, ANS Business Promotion Division, NEC Corporation**

Our company specializes in equipment development, production, and system integration, with our primary facility located at the Fuchu Plant in Tokyo. Through our sensor business, which includes products like surveillance radars and underwater acoustic devices; our network business, encompassing outdoor communication systems and satellite communication systems; and our IT system business, featuring automated surveillance and control systems, we leverage our advanced technological capabilities and solutions to provide products and systems across a wide range of fields—from undersea to outer space—contributing to the enhancement of defense capabilities.

We are enhancing our production infrastructure to accommodate the growing demand for equipment. This includes upgrading and expanding facilities and significantly increasing our workforce with plans to hire approximately 1,000 additional employees by the end of fiscal year 2025. Furthermore, we are constructing a new eight-story building at the Fuchu Plant, scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2024. This is the initial phase of renovating our facilities

and equipment, guided by the Grand Design that envisions the future of the Fuchu Plant. We aim to balance “advanced security measures” with “flexible work styles”, creating an integrated production hub that unites employees, customers, partners, and the local community.

By consistently implementing these measures, we will further enhance the development of defense capabilities that are the cornerstone of Japan’s national security.



Excerpt from the Grand Design for the Fuchu Plant [Photo provided by NEC Corporation]

## ② Transitioning to a Key Supplier of Equipment Through the “Kimishika-Oran” System

**Hirotsugu Inoue, Senior Managing Director, Chukin Co., Ltd., Kazuaki Teranishi, Managing Director**

-Advancing cutting-edge technological capabilities in aluminum surface treatment to foster societal development and enhance human enrichment -

With this objective, our company has subcontracted the surface treatment of aluminum components for various equipment from prime contractors (companies contracted with the Ministry of Defense). In light of the government’s efforts to significantly reinforce defense capabilities, prime contractors are strengthening their production systems for defense equipment. As a result, our company has taken over the surface treatment processes previously handled by these companies. To facilitate this transition, we have utilized the Ministry of Defense’s “Kimishika-Oran” system (a measure to strengthen the industrial base under The Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases).

A stable production system can be established through this system, which provides direct financial support to companies. We

take pride in contributing to Japan’s national security as a key supplier of defense equipment and a “Kimishika-Oran” company.



New surface treatment line is being set up with the support of the “Kimishika-Oran” system. Photo of the authors.

designated defense equipment. Therefore, being private companies, the business entities are expected to operate efficiently, no different from their regular business

activities, even when this system is applied.

**See** Fig. IV-1-1-1 (Overview of Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases); Section 3-1 (Systems Regarding Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

## 2 Main Efforts in Addition to the Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases

### 1 Making the Defense Business More Attractive

The defense business requires a considerable investment of management resources to meet the high level of performance requirements and information security measures. On the other hand, profitability tended to be less than under the procurement system standards. In calculating prices in the cost accounting system, the MOD will establish a system for the fair evaluation of business efforts and appropriate profit calculation, as well as implement a continuous review of contractual systems to encourage greater efficiency in the procurement system.

### 2 Revitalization of the Defense Industry

#### (1) Defense Industry Promotional Exhibition

Since 2016, the MOD has held exhibitions to create and promote opportunities for new entrants in the defense industry by identifying promising domestic small and medium-sized enterprises that have not yet entered the defense industry and matching them with defense-related businesses and the MOD / SDF, to maintain and reinforce the defense production and technology bases. The two-day exhibition has been held twice in total, in Osaka in October 2023 and in Tokyo from January to February 2024. In Osaka, then-Senior Adviser to the

Minister of Defense Wada explained the importance of reinforcing the defense production and technology bases. In Tokyo, then-Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Takami touched upon the same topic.

#### (2) Joint Promotion Conference for the Start-Up Utilization to Defense Industry

The MOD/SDF will work with startups to encourage the early deployment of defense equipment by actively incorporating the results of research on cutting edge technology research into defense equipment R&D, while utilizing existing civilian technologies and off-the-shelf products. As part of these efforts, the MOD and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) have collaborated to create opportunities to match the needs of the MOD/SDF with startups by utilizing METI's startup support framework and network. Joint Promotion Conference for the Start-Up Utilization to Defense Industry was established as a framework for the relevant divisions of the MOD and METI to meet. The Committee has convened four times, in June, September, October 2023 and January 2024.

**See** Fig. IV-1-1-2 (Example of Companies that have Participated in the Joint Promotion Committee)

#### (3) Industry Day

Since 2022, an exhibition (Industry Day) has been held to create matching opportunities with the U.S. Forces in Japan and the U.S. defense industry in order to encourage Japanese companies to participate in the equipment supply chains common to both Japan and the United States as well as in the sustainment and maintenance programs of the U.S. Forces in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2023, the exhibition was held in Tokyo in October.

**See** Section 4-6 (Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement)

### 3 Building a Resilient Supply Chain

In January 2023, the Security of Supply Arrangement (SoSA) was signed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial



Defense Industry Promotional Exhibition


Fig. IV-1-1-2 Example of Companies that have Participated in the Joint Promotion Committee

Examples of Companies That Participated in the Joint Promotion Committee

Company name	Product and service overview
Innophys Co., Ltd.	Develops assist suits that reduce the strain on lower back during forward-leaning posture or when lifting people and heavy objects, etc. Mainly offers assist suits that use artificial muscles. Features include: no external power required and waterproof, dustproof, lightweight, and easy to wear. The company has developed 5 back support products and 1 arm support product.
Terra Labo	Information support system for wide-area disaster measures using long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.
Metro Weather Co., Ltd.	Remote sensing observation of wind conditions using Doppler Lidar, wind condition forecasting simulation, and detection and identification of suspicious drones
Infostellar	Ground station network services for satellite operators
Serendix Inc.	Construction of houses with excellent thermal insulation and earthquake resistance using advanced 3D printers
Mitsufuji Corporation	Silver plated conductive fibers, wearable devices
TRUST SMITH & COMPANY	Solutions such as factories and warehouses automation using AI/robotics and image processing technologies
Incubate Fund	An independent venture capital with a competitive edge, for startups during their early-stage
The University of Tokyo Edge Capital Partners (UTEC Co., Ltd.)	Venture capital fund management operation through investment activities in venture companies that utilize the technology and human resources of universities and research institutions such as the University of Tokyo
Real Tech Holdings Co., Ltd.	Aims to solve social issues through investment support to deep-tech startups with innovative technologies (real tech) that contribute to solving global and human issues
JIC Venture Growth Investments Co., Ltd.	A government-backed fund that contributes to solving industrial and social issues and improving Japan's international competitiveness

(Note) One more company in addition to the above participated in the committee

Fig. IV-1-1-3 Security of Supply Arrangement (SoSA) (image)



(Note) DPAS (Defense Priorities and Allocations System): A system under which the U.S. Department of Defense obligates U.S. companies to prioritize national defense-related contracts and orders under the U.S. Defense Production Act of 1950.

Meeting. This Arrangement serves as a framework for the stable and reciprocal supply of defense equipment (including not only final products but also their parts and services) between Japan and the United States. It will contribute to building a resilient and diverse supply chain for defense equipment.

See Fig. IV-1-1-3 (Security of Supply Arrangement (SoSA) (image))

#### 4 Strengthening Defense Industrial Security

As the competition among nations for advanced technologies intensifies and nations attempt to acquire technical information from the military and civilian

sectors through various means, the defense industry has emerged at the forefront of this situation. Defense-related companies are exposed to risks such as intelligence activities involving other states, including cyber attacks. Under these circumstances, defense-related companies need to develop, produce, maintain, and improve defense equipment for the SDF while appropriately protecting Japan's classified defense information and participating in defense equipment and technical cooperation while protecting the classified information of the ally and like-minded countries.

As part of its efforts to promote the enhancement of defense industrial security based on international

standards, ATLA joined the Multinational Industrial Security Working Group (MISWG) in May 2023, which aims to standardize industrial security measures among over 30 participating countries, including Europe and the United States.

In addition, with foreign governments and companies interested in Japan's defense industry and domestic companies wishing to participate in the defense industry, the Defense Industrial Security Manual, which lays out the matters to be observed by companies having contracts with the MOD in an easy-to-understand manner, was published in June of the same year to improve the visibility of the defense industry's security system.

Defense-related companies have also been improving their information systems since April 2023 to strengthen measures for information that is not classified but requires appropriate protection. This improvement is based on the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry, which incorporates security measures at the same level as those applied to companies by the

U.S. Department of Defense (NIST SP800-171).

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section4-5-2(2) (Security Enhancement)

## 5 Strengthening Sensitive Technology Management

When transferring sensitive defense equipment, technological sensitivity is evaluated based on the technology's importance and superiority, and efforts are being made to prevent leakage of highly sensitive technologies, such as promoting reverse engineering measures.

As international competition over cutting-edge technologies has been intensifying in recent years, efforts have been made to collaborate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies to prevent technological leaks concerning the Patent Non-Disclosure System, one of the economic security measures, inward direct investment, etc.

In addition, to strengthen the management of

Fig. IV-1-1-4

Promotion for Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases through the "Kimishika-Oran Seminar"



"Kimishika-Oran Seminar" poster displayed at JR Osatsu Station in Chitose-shi, Hokkaido

"Kimishika-Oran Seminar" held in Tamano-shi, Okayama

"Kimishika-Oran" characters Hokani-Oran & Nihonni-Kimishika

(Note) Endangered species of orangutan and Japanese serow. Management of projects to certify and support invaluable businesses that are responsible for Japan's defense production and technology bases, where supply chain risks are becoming more apparent.



**REFERENCE** : Formulation of the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry  
**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/cybersecurity.html>



**REFERENCE** : Formulation of the Defense Industrial Security Manual  
**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/dism.html>



sensitive technologies, the MOD will analyze cutting-edge technologies from the perspective of defense technology experts, strive to identify and understand key technologies, and work with our ally and others to promote collaboration in technology analysis.

## 6 Communication and other initiatives

### (1) Exchange of Views with Major Prime Contractors

The MOD has conducted exchanges of views with the defense industry (major prime contractors) since February 2022 and brought together the Minister of Defense with the presidents of major prime contractors on two different occasions since April 2022. In addition, the MOD has continued to strengthen public-private cooperation and coordination through sharing problems and challenges that both sides have identified by holding six exchanges of views between the Commissioner of ATLA and the heads of the defense divisions of various companies.

### (2) “Kimishika-Oran Seminars” (Nationwide Briefing Session Tour)

For effective measures based on the Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases, the defense industry must be informed of these new systems and utilize them. In particular, since the suppliers that constitute the defense industry are located in every corner of Japan, the MOD has been conducting “Kimishika-Oran seminars” (briefing sessions held from place to place on measures to help reinforce defense production bases) in various parts of the country since December 2023.

The title “Kimishika-Oran” was created as a character and a catchphrase to familiarize defense equipment businesses with these measures. As of the end of March 2024, the seminars have been held in 11 locations across Japan, with over 500 participants from approximately 390 companies. The MOD will continue its efforts to promote and inform these measures for reinforcing the defense production and technology bases.

 See Fig. IV-1-1-4 (Promotion for Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases through the “Kimishika-Oran Seminar”)

Section 2

# Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

1

## Necessity of Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

In order to acquire defense equipment required for the new ways of warfare, the use of our domestic technologies is extremely important. The development of scientific technologies and innovations based on the country's advanced technological capabilities is at the source of Japan's economic and social development and constitutes a key element of its comprehensive national power integral to its national security. In addition, the active utilization of Japan's advanced technological capabilities developed by both its public and private sectors over the years in the area of national security without being held back by existing approaches is an essential activity for strengthening Japan's architecture for national defense.

As competition among major countries intensifies in terms of conducting research on cutting-edge technologies and leveraging its results for applications in national security, each country has focused on reinforcing its technology base for the purpose of national security by investing heavily in R&D aimed at the early operationalization of technologies that could become so-called "game changers" which dramatically


alter the future character of warfare.

Although Japan's research and development expenditures for the MOD have trailed those of the United States and other countries, they have increased significantly in recent years due to their importance. On the other hand, while the distinction between technologies developed for civilian use and for security purposes has become increasingly blurred in practice, it is important to work strategically to ensure technological superiority as a nation by actively leveraging the results of research and development in science and technology in Japan's public and private sectors for the research and development of equipment. Therefore, it is necessary to further promote research and development domestically and develop and strengthen the technology base for the technology areas on which Japan should focus.


In the cases of defense equipment and technology cooperation, such as equipment procurement and international joint development, it is important to maintain the leading role by owning important cutting-edge and other technologies. Considering ways to keep costs down taking into account the possibility of

Fig. IV-1-2-1 Current Status of Research and Development Expenditures

As of May 2024



Source: "OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators"



Source: "OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators"  
"SIPRI Military Expenditure Database ©SIPRI 2024"

(Notes) 1 Defense R&D expenditures of each country are calculated from R&D expenditures and defense-related budget ratios of each country listed under "OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators". However, the data for China is not included.

2 The figures are according to OECD statistics, and definitions may differ from country to country; therefore, attention is needed when comparing countries using just this data.

3 The data until 2023 is listed for Japan, the U.S., Germany, and Australia, which was available as of May 15, 2024.

procurement and transfer of defense equipment after development is important. This requires not only research and development by the MOD, but also the promotion of research and development by both the public and private

sectors together.

**See** Fig. IV-1-2-1 (Current Status of Research and Development Expenditures); Part I, Chapter 4, Section 1-5 (Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technology Bases)

## 2

## Direction for Reinforcing Defense Technology Base shown in Defense Technology Guideline 2023

The National Security Strategy of Japan, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program all state the necessity of reinforcing the defense technology base and call for the active utilization of Japan's advanced technology research results by both its public and private sectors for the research and development of equipment and to strengthen the framework for the research and development of new equipment. In June 2023, the MOD formulated the Defense Technology Guideline 2023 to embody the policy of reinforcing the defense technology base and serve as a guideline for the MOD to promote various initiatives in an integrated and powerful manner. The MOD publishes this Guideline to improve the predictability of our partners, foster a common understanding of reinforcing the defense technology base, and establish a foundation to promote technological cooperation actively. A summary of the Guideline is given below.

**See** Reference 63 Defense Technology Guideline 2023 (Executive Summary)

### 1 Current Status and Challenges of Defense Technology Base

Rapid advances in science and technology have added to Japan's economic and social development. These changes are also significantly impacting the national security environment and changing the face of warfare. As a result, we may fail to protect Japan's peace and independence and maintain national security by simply continuing to improve the capabilities of our equipment systems. To respond to this tense security environment, it is necessary to spin on Japan's Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) capabilities, maximize their use for security and defense purposes, and spin off the outcomes of the MOD's R&D back to society. To achieve the defense of our nation at all times, R&D at the MOD now necessitates taking new approaches and implementing methods different from those used in the past.

### 2 Vision for the Future through Reinforcement of Defense Technology Base

The Ministry of Defense and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) need sufficient defense capabilities to defend Japan. The purpose of reinforcing the defense technology base is to provide the necessary technological support. Therefore, the future vision in Defense Technology Guideline 2023 is always to defend our nation through technology.

### 3 Approaches to Realize This Vision

#### (1) 1st Pillar: Accelerating delivery of functions and equipment necessary for the defense of Japan

The MOD will develop the functions and equipment necessary to defend Japan, which are directly linked to the future ways of warfare, and deliver them in 5 years or within approximately the next 10 years.

#### (2) 2nd Pillar: Ensuring technological superiority and creating advanced capabilities

Over the next 10 years and beyond, various technologies will be put into practical and operational use as new functions and equipment under nationwide collaborations that gather Japan's STI capabilities from the public and private sectors. These efforts will create new value as functions and capabilities to defend Japan in the future, realizing defense innovation that will transform our country's defense, securing technological superiority, and achieving advanced capabilities ahead of other countries through defense innovation.

### 4 Means to Realize This Vision

To achieve the 1st and 2nd pillars, it is necessary to "create" the functions and equipment that the MOD/SDF require, "nurture" technologies strategically, and "understand" various aspects of science and technology. These efforts will be carried within the MOD and with relevant ministries and agencies, research institutes,



industry and academia to build an ecosystem that will allow us to continue to grow together, collaborating in a sustainable, autonomous and comfortable manner while creating synergies and ensuring technology preservation.

### (1) Create

The MOD will take every possible measure to rapidly strengthen our defense capability, including speeding up the time required for R&D of functions and equipment. The ministry will quickly implement the necessary functions and equipment, demonstrate them in operational fields, and reflect the results and feedback acquired in further improvements. They will also provide functions and equipment quickly and flexibly while actively introducing R&D methods for early deployment. This includes introducing new methods such as manufacturing prototypes of an operational quality that troops can use, trial fielding the prototypes, and demonstrating them in the operational field as soon as possible, leading to improved deterrence. Open innovation that actively utilizes R&D resources and ideas outside the ministry for solving any issues will be promoted.

The ministry's policy, operational, and technical divisions will work together to create the concept of future warfare, the direction for future R&D, and the acquisition of functions and equipment. In addition to predicting technologies and warfare in the future, the MOD will also engage experts from outside the ministry with extensive knowledge of science and technology in the civilian field to examine how technology can be utilized against new threats.

Technical knowledge, human resources, facilities and test equipment are the essential foundation of R&D. The MOD will share its goals with ATLA's research institutes and test centers, which have the R&D infrastructure, as well as with partners that have supported R&D projects, to improve the predictability of industries and implement projects in alignment with our direction for reinforcing the defense technology base. Investments for the continued maintenance and reinforcement of the technology base essential to advancing R&D will be made. The MOD will communicate and collaborate with companies, including start-ups unfamiliar with defense-related R&D, to establish a system that allows various industries to participate in our projects. A technology

base that will enable defense-related companies to integrate the technologies of start-ups and other companies into functions and equipment will be built. The Innovative Science and Technology Initiative for Security (ISTIS), which solicits and outsources goal-oriented basic research with the expectation that it will contribute to future R&D in the defense sector, focuses on developing technologies in niche areas that find it difficult to gain investments from the civilian sector and on identifying and developing the basic research that will expand the boundaries of the S&T field. This program will continue to be utilized to create the new technology base. To assign personnel who can fulfill diverse roles to the appropriate positions flexibly and quickly, new initiatives for human resource utilization and promotion, such as further strengthening human resource development and expanding the recruitment of experienced personnel, will be actively pursued.

### (2) Nurture

The MOD will not limit itself to past R&D experience and will also explore technologies that should be nurtured, actively taking brand-new approaches that differ from conventional R&D methods. The ministry will also encourage challenging research and create an R&D system that can accept unpredictable technological risks.

Given the MOD's limited resources and the fact that the ministry's R&D investments are just a small part of the S&T investments by the government of Japan, various science and technology activities outside the ministry will be actively utilized for defense purposes. To effectively utilize the results of R&D with different objectives for the defense sector, efforts will be made to concretely communicate the needs of the ministry and the direction of our efforts, create an environment that encourages members of the S&T community to participate in MOD projects, seek new partners, and build and expand networks among researchers. An ecosystem that rewards the efforts of industries and allows businesses to grow naturally will also be developed. The MOD will create new chemical reactions by fusing the defense sector with the non-defense sector to nurture technological solutions based on new ideas. Great efforts will be made to maximize domestic and international STI capabilities



**REFERENCE** : Defense Technology Guideline 2023 - To defend our nation at all times with technologies -

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/guideline2023/en/index.html>

to nurture technologies.

The outcomes of the MOD's R&D have also contributed to raising Japan's capabilities in STI. Various R&D activities at the MOD will be promoted to nurture Japan's capabilities in STI, with an eye on addressing global issues. Through ISTIS, the MOD will expand the human resources that conduct goal-oriented basic research, secure diverse researchers, pioneer new research areas, and establish and strengthen human connections in emerging research areas to expand STI capabilities.

### (3) Understand

The MOD will determine what it should do in the future based on an accurate understanding of the current S&T environment, such as the technological trends in the private sector in Japan and overseas, the current status of R&D in industries including startups in Japan, advanced and innovative technologies held by research institutes and academia, and the results of R&D projects.

As various science and technologies are beginning to be used in the actual battlefield nowadays, the MOD will

accurately and quickly understand how S&T is being used currently, how new technologies may be used in future warfare, and how this will change the national security environment and our nation's defense, including MOD and SDF activities. Appropriate measures will be implemented for such S&T changes.


The MOD will actively communicate outside the ministry about what it is doing regarding technology, its purpose, and how its efforts affect the national security environment and defense activities. Plans and future R&D projects will be shared with outside the ministry as far as possible to improve the predictability of stakeholders.

## 5 Important Technology Areas for the Defense of Japan

The MOD is considering the functions and capabilities necessary for defending our nation at all times. It is breaking them down to specify the important technology areas to achieve these functions and capabilities.

 See Fig. IV-1-2-2 (Functions and Capabilities Important for Defending Japan)

Fig. IV-1-2-2 Functions and Capabilities Important for Defending Japan



### 3 Development of the Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft

For the defense of Japan and to ensure air superiority well into the future, it is vital that Japan continues to employ superior, state-of-the-art fighters. Therefore, with regard to the next-generation fighter aircraft that would succeed the F-2 fighters scheduled to be decommissioned starting around 2035, it is imperative to realize Japan-led development which ensures freedom of modification for timely and appropriate upgrades in the future and domestic production and technology bases for high readiness, etc., on the premise that the aircraft maintains the capability to effectively counter numerically superior opponents. To achieve this, the MOD concluded a FY2020 project contract with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., in October 2020 as a prime company to be in charge of the holistic integration of the fighter, and the development began.

Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy then conducted a joint analysis on the extent of commonality of the aircraft, and on the basis of the results, the three nations agreed to develop a common platform. This was officially announced by the leaders of the three nations as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)<sup>1</sup> in December 2022. The program enables the three nations to bring together technological advantages and share costs and risks for the joint development of an advanced fighter aircraft which will ensure future air superiority. This cooperation will not only encourage further cooperation


among the industries of each country but also maintain and reinforce Japan's defense industrial and technology bases by increasing the number of mass-produced next-generation fighter aircraft, nurturing the next generation of engineers with international experience, and introducing advanced development and manufacturing methods such as digital engineering.

In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara met with the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps and Italian Defence Minister Crossetto in Tokyo to sign the Convention on the Establishment of the GCAP International Government Organisation,<sup>2</sup> an international organization essential to establishing an efficient tri-nation cooperation.

Furthermore, this cooperation between the three countries, which share fundamental values and are allies of the United States, will serve as the foundation for a broader cooperation with the United Kingdom and Italy for generations to come and contribute significantly to peace and stability in both the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. In December 2022, the United States have announced to support Japan's security and defense cooperation with likeminded allies and partners, including with the United Kingdom and Italy on the trilateral joint development of the next generation fighter aircraft. Japan and the United States have also agreed to launch a concrete collaboration by the end of



Image of the Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft



Defense Ministers from Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy sign the Convention for establishing GIGO (December 2023).



**REFERENCE :** Development of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft

**URL :** <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2022/12/9f3717bac3e9bca986f2e80ba73f7822065a9f2b.html>

<sup>1</sup> Joint Statement on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) (December 9, 2022)

<sup>2</sup> Convention on the Establishment of the "Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation"

2023 on autonomous systems such as UAVs that could complement Japan's next fighter program among other platforms. In December 2023, the Japan MOD and the U.S. Department of Defense signed a project arrangement for joint research on Overwhelming Response through

Collaborative Autonomy which is expected to be applied to UAVs that will be used in collaboration with the next-generation fighter aircraft.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-1-2(2) (Strengthening of Unmanned Defense Capabilities)

### Commentary

## Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft: Establishment of an International Organization


In 2022, the decision was made among Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy to jointly develop the next-generation fighter aircraft, and the leaders of the three nations announced it as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The three countries will establish the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO) to realize a collaborative framework for an efficient execution of this program. This international organization will be center of GCAP management and administration.

To carry out GCAP, personnel dispatched from the three nations will gather at the headquarters located in the United Kingdom. These personnel will possess diverse areas of expertise. First, numerous technical officials will be dispatched as technology experts. Establishing a sophisticated IT and secure environment is necessary to ensure smooth and reliable development progress. This will require the expertise of personnel beyond mere aviation technology specialists. Furthermore, the expertise of personnel from Japan's Self-Defense Forces and British and Italian military personnel who will ultimately operate the fighter aircraft is indispensable. Moreover, administrative officials responsible for contracts, accounting, and personnel affairs will be dispatched to ensure the organization's smooth operation. The workplace will feature a broad assignment of roles, including seniors and junior personnel, creating a highly diverse environment.

Coordination with external entities will be a frequent occurrence

at GIGO. To ensure the program's progress is effectively managed, coordination will take place daily through face-to-face meetings with the companies engaged in the development work. Daily consultations with the governments of all three nations are essential to ensure that the program progresses in the right direction. Given the considerable distance between Japan and Italy, we will utilize all available methods, including video conferencing, for coordination.

GIGO is an international organization founded to advance the shared interests of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Consequently, the team will collaborate beyond their national perspectives to foster the development of GCAP and create fighter aircraft that meets the requirements of all three nations.



Collaboration among 3 countries

## 4 Active Utilization of Civilian Technology

### 1 Technology Cooperation with Relevant Domestic and Overseas Entities and Collaboration with Relevant Ministries and Agencies

ATLA and domestic research institutes such as national research and development agencies proactively engage in research collaborations and technological information exchanges in order to ensure that advanced civilian

technologies are incorporated and that research and development is conducted efficiently.

Domestically, in order to create superior equipment through the utilization of cutting-edge technologies and conduct research and development efficiently and effectively, the MOD has been collaborating closely with the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation<sup>3</sup> (CSTI) and other relevant ministries and agencies on a

<sup>3</sup> One of the important policy meetings aimed at the planning and general coordination of comprehensive and basic science and technology innovation policies under the leadership of the Prime Minister and Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy, at a level higher than individual ministries

Fig. IV-1-2-3 Major Technological Cooperation with National Research and Development Agencies, etc.	
Partner	Primary fields/technologies of cooperation
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)	Aerospace field ● Hypersonic flight technology ● Ultra-wideband electromagnetic waves measurement technology
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT)	Electronics, information and communications field ● Cybersecurity technology ● Quantum cryptography and communication
Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC)	Marine field ● Marine drone system ● Underwater mobile communication
Yamaguchi Prefectural Industrial Technology Institute	Unmanned underwater vehicle field ● Sensing technology using underwater imaging

Outside Japan, the MOD will continue to actively promote technological and engineer exchanges with allies and like-minded countries, as well as consider diverse possibilities through continued exchange of opinions at various opportunities.

**See** Fig. IV-1-2-3 (Major Technological Cooperation with National Research and Development Agencies, etc.); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-2 (Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country); Section 5 (Initiatives for Economic Security)

## 2 Identification, Development and Incorporation of Innovative Cutting-edge Civilian Technologies

Active utilization of advanced civilian technology is essential for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals into the future and also beneficial for the development of Japan’s science, technology, and innovation in non-defense areas as well, similar to how investment in innovative science and technology by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States facilitated advances in science and technology as a whole, including civilian technology such as the development of the Internet and GPS. From this perspective, the MOD intends to promote relevant measures.

Specifically, the MOD has implemented a competitive research funding program called Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security to publicly seek and commission basic research in target areas, which is expected to contribute to future research and development



Railgun (electromagnetic gun) under research at the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA)

regular basis based on the Integrated Innovation Strategy 2023 (Cabinet Decision on June 9, 2023). The ministry also actively participates in the Council for Integrated Innovation Strategy Promotion<sup>4</sup> established to promote the strategy in order to further enhance collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, national research and development agencies, industry, universities, and other parties.

In addition, it is an effective initiative within the Government to promote communications between the relevant ministries and agencies that promote civilian-based initiatives, and the MOD. The NSS also states that Japan will strengthen the cross-government framework for utilizing funding and information related to research and development, and it is important for the entire Government to work together based on this strategy.

Specifically, the Government will intensively offer strong support for cutting-edge technology with multiple applications, such as AI and quantum technology, through programs, such as the Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program (K-Program). The research and development results obtained will smoothly reinforce security-related areas. Furthermore, a cross-governmental framework was established to expedite the development of technologies with the potential to contribute to strengthening comprehensive defense architecture by matching the research and development needs of the MOD with the technology seeds possessed by the relevant ministries and agencies.

<sup>4</sup> Meeting of all Ministers of State under the leadership of the Chief Cabinet Secretary for the checking, sorting, cross-sectoral and substantial coordination, and promotion of items that are included in the Integrated Innovation Strategy 2019 (Cabinet Decision on June 21, 2019) and which require coordination between the control towers related to innovation.

in defense areas. From among research proposals widely seeking from universities, research institutes, and startup companies, a total of 165 research projects have been awarded as of FY2023. This program will continue to promote the discovery and development of innovative and emergent technologies in FY2024 as well.

In the basic research areas, free thinking of researchers leads to innovative and creative results. For this reason, it is necessary to assign maximum value to freedom of research when sponsoring research, so that, for example, researchers will be able to publish all of their research results to have a wide range of academic discussions. Hence, in this program, the MOD will not intervene in research, restrict contractors' publication of research results, or designate research results as confidential, never providing any confidential data to researchers. In actuality, some research results have already been published through oral presentations, publications, etc. Also, since cooperation with startup companies and research institutes in Japan is essential for identifying and developing cutting-edge civilian technologies, we will encourage the broad participation of leading researchers, including those from academia, while obtaining the understanding and cooperation from the relevant parties.

Advanced Technology Bridging Research was launched in FY2020 to expedite the identification and development of promising, advanced technologies from the results of basic research under the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security and other sources, enhance their level of technological maturity, and apply them to the research and development of equipment. Advanced Technology Bridging Research will continue to be conducted with a vastly expanded scope in FY2024 with the aim of helping to develop equipment that will become game-changers in the future.

In addition, in order to accelerate the research and

development of equipment, the MOD launched its “Efforts to Facilitate the Early Practical Use of Game-Changers” starting in FY2022 as an initiative to commission private companies to conduct research and improve their advanced technologies to the point where they can be used in the research and development of equipment.

 **See** Reference 64 (FY2023 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” Program)

### 3 Establishment of a New Research Institutes

The Defense Innovation Technology Institute (tentative name) will be established under ATLA to enhance defense innovation creation and groundbreaking equipment production capabilities significantly, and will conduct breakthrough research to create innovative functions and equipment from a variety of rapidly evolving science and technology that will significantly change the future of warfare by adopting approaches and methods different from those used in the past with reference to U.S. institutions such as the efforts of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and DIU (Defense Innovation Unit).

### 4 New Measures for Early Deployment

For programs that are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective in areas that could directly affect the SDF's current and future ways of warfare, while extensively soliciting outstanding proposals from companies, and incorporating innovative civilian technologies, we are working to achieve the early deployment of equipment through demonstrations.



**REFERENCE** : Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security  
**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/funding.html>



**MOVIE** : [Railgun] ATLA R&D Projects Progress in FY2023  
**URL** : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYH1CqhxbdE>



**REFERENCE** : Initiatives for early deployment of cutting-edge technologies  
**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/budget/rapid\\_acquisition/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/budget/rapid_acquisition/index.html)

## Section 3 Promoting Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation and Transfer of Defense Equipment

Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the Implementation Guidelines formulated in April 2014,<sup>1</sup> Japan promotes defense equipment and technology cooperation with other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense technology and industrial bases, as well as to the promotion of our national security, peace and international cooperation.

The transfer of defense equipment and technology as outlined in the National Security Strategy describes that such transfer is a key instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force.

From this perspective, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems will be considered for revisions. The Liberal Democratic Party

and the Komeito Party have held 23 discussions of the ruling party's Working Team<sup>2</sup> (WT) since April 2023, including the history of defense equipment transfers and hearings from experts. In response, in December 2023, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its Implementation Guidelines were revised based on the recommendations of the ruling party WT. Furthermore, a Cabinet resolution was passed in March 2024 after inter-party discussions between the ruling parties. The Implementation Guidelines were partially revised to establish a stringent mechanism. It is now possible to transfer finished products regarding the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a joint development project among Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy, from Japan to countries other than partner countries.

In addition, to smoothly promote such transfers, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology through joint public and private efforts by establishing a fund and providing corporate support as needed, etc.

### 1 Systems Regarding Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

#### 1 New Three Principles

##### (1) Clarification of Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited (the First Principle)

The cases where overseas transfers of defense equipment are prohibited are clarified as follows: (1) in the case of violating the obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded; (2) in the case of violating the obligations based on the Resolution of the United Nations Security Council; or (3) in the case of transferring to countries in conflict.

##### (2) Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted As Well As Strict Examination and Information Disclosure (the Second Principle)

The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited to (1) cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, (2) cases that contribute to the security of Japan, or other

cases. In addition, it has been decided that important cases would be deliberated at the National Security Council and along with this, information concerning the cases that were deliberated would be disclosed.

##### (3) Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-Purpose Use or Transfer to Third-Party Countries (the Third Principle)

Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige the government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate for the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, cases involving participation in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases where parts are delivered to a licensor, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of the

<sup>1</sup> The term "defense equipment" is deemed appropriate for the title of "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology," since possible articles of overseas transfers play a role in contributing to peace and international cooperation, as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that technology is also provided in addition to goods, the term "transfer" was adopted rather than "export."

<sup>2</sup> Ruling Party National Security Strategy Study Working Team

control system at the destination.

**See** Reference 65 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology); Reference 66 (Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

## 2 Partial Revision of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

The National Security Strategy states that the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the Implementation Guidelines will be revised to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields.

In doing so, the necessity, requirements, and transparency of the related procedures for transfer of defense equipment and technology will be under adequate consideration, while maintaining the three principles themselves.

Based on this, the ruling party's WT was held 23 times after April 2023, discussed the revision of cases where overseas transfers may be permitted, as well as how to ensure appropriate management after the transfer, including strict examination when determining whether a transfer is allowed and prior consent for transfers to third countries, while also taking into account of examples from other countries.

In December 2023, the ruling party's WT consolidated the recommendations for the government. Based on the recommendations, the government partially revised the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the Implementation Guidelines in the same month. This is the first revision since the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology was formulated in April 2014.

In addition, this revision of the Implementation Guidelines made it possible to transfer defense equipment and technology in a broad array of fields. The first project after the revision is the transfer of patriot missiles, which Japan is manufacturing under license, from Japan to the U.S. After deliberation at the National Security Council, it was confirmed that the project falls under the category of a case that can be approved for overseas transfers.

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) intends to create a desirable safety and security environment for Japan

based on the revised system. In order to achieve this environment, the MOD will further promote the transfer of defense equipment and technology through collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies and by joint public and private efforts.

This revision makes it possible to transfer defense equipment in a broad array of fields and at the same time, requires the more strict examination for the transfer. The government will maintain its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, and promote transfer of defense equipment and technology strictly and carefully in the same manner.

A summary of the December 2023 revisions to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the Implementation Guidelines as follows.

### (1) Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

The current three principles will be maintained, and the significance of transfer of defense equipment and technology and the recognition of the security environment was added and updated in the preamble in accordance with the National Security Strategy. It is also stated that Implementation Guidelines will be amended in a timely manner in response to changes in the security environment and security needs.

### (2) International Joint Development and Production

This revision makes it possible to transfer parts and technology from Japan directly to countries other than its international joint development and production partner countries.

### (3) Transfer of Defense Equipment Related to Licensed Products

Defense equipment (including finished products) for licensed products, including those not of U.S. origin, can now be supplied to the license provider country. However, when providing defense equipment that corresponds to licensed products considered as weapons<sup>3</sup> under the SDF Law to countries other than the license provider country, it excludes the case of the provision to countries where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of

<sup>3</sup> Firearms, explosives, swords, and other machines, instruments, and devices intended to directly kill or injure people or destroy property as a means of armed struggle (includes things such as escort ships, fighter planes, and tanks that are equipped with firearms and operate to directly kill or injure people or destroying property as a means of armed struggle, and excludes parts).



an armed conflict unless there are special circumstances in consideration of the need in terms of Japan's security.

#### **(4) Provision of Repairs and Other Services to Countries Cooperating with Japan in Security Area**

This revision makes it possible to provide repairs and other services to countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.

#### **(5) Transfer of Parts**

This revision makes it possible to transfer parts to countries cooperating with Japan in security area, after clarifying the definition of parts.<sup>4</sup>

#### **(6) So-called Five Categories (Rescue, Transport, Warning, Surveillance and Minesweeping)**

It was clarified that products to be transferred can be equipped with arms under the Self-Defense forces Law necessary for the performance of their essential duties or for self-protection such as machine guns mounted on minesweeper and transport ships.

#### **(7) Assistance to the country that is subject to aggression with equipment (excluding arms)**

This revision enables to transfer equipment and technology that does not fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law to a country that is subject to aggression in violation of international law, regardless of cooperation with Japan in security area.<sup>5</sup>

#### **(8) Strict Examination**

The perspective of strict examination was expanded in light of the diversification of types of transfers, such as transfers of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law and transfers from license provider country to a third country.

#### **(9) Procedures for Deliberations**

Direct transfers of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law and transfers of such arms to third parties are basically deliberated and announced by the National Security Council.<sup>6</sup>

### **3 Direct Transfer of GCAP Finished Products to Third Countries**

In the proposal consolidated by the ruling party's WT in December 2023, it was considered that the direct transfer from Japan to third countries other than the partner countries pertaining international joint development and production requires ongoing deliberations. Under these circumstances, in particular the finished GCAP products, to realize aircraft that has the capabilities required to protect our country, it is considered necessary to hold a mechanism that allows direct transfer from Japan to third countries other than the partner countries. In this context, the government has coordinated with the ruling party and provided explanations to the Diet.

Based on this, in March 2024, the Cabinet decided that the transfer of finished products regarding the GCAP from Japan to third countries can be permitted.

In the future, when Japan transfers the finished GCAP products directly to third countries, a Cabinet decision will be made on each case, which is so-called a "double Cabinet decision".

Furthermore, the Implementation Guidelines were partially revised to include "three restrictions": (1) At present, direct transfer from Japan to countries other than partner countries is restricted to finished products regarding GCAP; (2) transfers will be restricted to countries that have concluded an international agreement obligating the use of defense equipment transferred from Japan in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and (3) it excludes the case of the transfer to a country where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed conflict.

These strict decision-making process shows clearly that Japan will maintain its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations.

The Ministry of Defense, in light of the current revision, will firmly proceed with discussions with the United Kingdom and Italy, to realize a fighter aircraft suitable for Japan's security environment to ensure the peace and stability of our country in the future.

<sup>4</sup> Refers to items incorporated as part of a finished product. However, this excludes items that can function as equipment by themselves.

<sup>5</sup> Before revision, it was stipulated as "The overseas transfer of defense equipment, which is part of the equipment transferred by the Minister of Defense according to the provisions of Article 116-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law to Ukraine, which has been invaded in violation of international law."

<sup>6</sup> The National Security Council discusses all first-time transfers of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law (direct transfer or transfer to a third country), and similar transfers of arms for the second and subsequent times are also discussed by the National Security Council if they require particularly careful consideration.

## “Transfer of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft to Third Countries (Main Points Discussed During the Parliamentary Debate)”

### Q Why is it necessary for Japan to acquire the next-generation fighter aircraft?

Our country, Japan, is an island nation surrounded by sea on all sides, and any invasion will occur via air or sea. Therefore, to secure the safety of Japan, which adheres to nonaggressive defense, attacks from the air by aircraft or cruise missiles and from the sea by naval vessels have to be prevented as early as possible while it is still distant. Fighter aircraft have been developed and operated as core equipment to carry out these defense missions.

While neighboring countries promote the development and deployment of next-generation fighter aircraft, it is indispensable for Japan too to develop cutting-edge fighter aircraft that are more advanced than those of the neighboring countries to maintain Japan's peace and stability in the future.

### Q Why is it necessary for Japan to conduct international joint development with the United Kingdom and Italy?

As equipment becomes increasingly sophisticated and expensive, countries worldwide are adopting an approach of joint development through cooperation with partner countries by mutually contributing funds and technology to acquire superior equipment. Under such circumstances, Japan thoroughly examined such possibilities as independent development and joint development with the United States to advance the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft. As a result, international joint development with the United Kingdom and Italy was determined as the most appropriate option from various perspectives, including the feasibility of realizing the required performance and schedule. Therefore, it was decided to develop an advanced next-generation fighter aircraft by bringing together the technologies of the three countries, while sharing the risk and cost.

### Q Why was the transfer of next-generation fighter aircraft to third countries allowed?

The process of international joint development involves construction of a common airframe through discussing requirements which reflect each country's security environment. Under the assumption that all countries will contribute equally each nation advocates their respective preferred performance .

While the United Kingdom and Italy consider promoting the transfer of finished products to third countries an important contribution, they also expect a similar response from Japan. If Japan lacks a mechanism for direct transfer to third countries and does not work towards cost reduction, it is likely that the United Kingdom and Italy will not compromise on the performance they seek to achieve. This situation could make it challenging to realize

the fighter aircraft Japan wishes to acquire.

Therefore, it is considered that having a mechanism for direct transfer to third countries and ensuring a position where Japan contributes equally with the United Kingdom and Italy is in the national interest of Japan.

### Q Isn't it necessary to go through strict procedures when transferring next-generation fighter aircraft to third countries?

Regarding the transfer of next-generation fighter aircraft to third countries, in addition to the cabinet decision on the recent revision of the current Implementation Guidelines, a new cabinet decision will be taken individually each time a fighter aircraft is transferred to a third country in the future. This process, known as the “Double cabinet decision”, ensures a more rigorous approach.

Furthermore, a partial amendment to the Implementation Guidelines poses three restrictions:

- (1) Direct transfer from Japan to countries other than partner countries is restricted to finished products regarding GCAP,
- (2) Transfers will be restricted to countries that have concluded an international agreement obligating the use of defense equipment transferred from Japan in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
- (3) It excludes the case of the transfer to a country where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed conflict.

In this way, Japan can clearly show that it is steadfast in observing the UN Charter and its basic principle of being a peace-loving country by establishing more stringent processes and conditions.

Japanese government's policy regarding the overseas transfer of defense equipment remains steadfast. Japan continues to uphold our basic principles as a peace-loving nation abiding by the UN Charter and the path followed thus far.



Prime Minister Kishida answering questions related to the transfer of next-generation fighter aircraft to third countries (March 2024) [Jiji Press Photo]

## Commentary


## Responses from Foreign Countries, Companies, and Others Regarding the Revision of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment

After the partial revision of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its accompanying Implementation Guidelines, the Ministry of Defense, in collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, has seized various opportunities to elucidate the revised content to representatives from foreign countries and companies. These opportunities have included briefing sessions for company representatives and military attachés from various nations, reciprocal visits by high-level officials from different countries, and international exhibitions where the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) has established booths.

Representatives from various countries have expressed appreciation for Japan's efforts to promote the transfer of defense equipment and technology to create a desirable security environment, among other objectives. They have also expressed expectations that the revision will broaden the possibilities for new defense equipment and technology cooperation between Japan and their respective countries. Additionally, following consultations with the ruling coalition parties, the revision expands the scope of defense equipment transfers across various sectors. Moreover, it mandates that the potential impact on international peace and security must be carefully evaluated under the Self-Defense

Forces Law when transferring weapons abroad. This includes assessing whether the recipient country or region is engaged in armed conflict. This amendment signifies a more rigorous review process for such transfers. The Ministry of Defense has clarified to each country that Japan will remain committed to its foundational principles as a peace-loving nation, adhering to the UN Charter. It will also highlight its historical commitment to peace to foster a wide-ranging understanding of Japan's initiatives. Furthermore, company representatives have expressed their approval of the recent revision, which permits the transfer of defense equipment across various sectors. This change not only facilitates the seamless exchange of such equipment but also promises to bolster the growth potential of the defense industry.

Acknowledging the pivotal role that defense equipment transfer plays as a policy tool for deterring unilateral force-based attempts to alter the status quo and for shaping a favorable security landscape for Japan—especially given the most challenging and complex security environment since the post-war period—the Ministry of Defense will persist in advancing defense equipment transfers. This will be achieved through rigorous collaboration with public and private sectors to sustain peace and stability across the Indo-Pacific region.



Mr. Wada, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (Note) (then) and participants from the public and private sectors at ATLA booth at "INDO PACIFIC 2023" (November 2023)



Mr. Takami, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (Note) and participants from the public and private sectors at ATLA booth at "Singapore Airshow 2024" (February 2024)

(Note) Following the enactment of the Defense Production Base Strengthening Act in October 2023, the position of Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense was created. This role is designed to bolster the support system for the Minister of Defense, ensuring that measures under this new legislation are implemented both vigorously and expeditiously. The primary responsibility of this position is to enhance the nation's defense production and technology base.

Mr. Wada was appointed the first Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense since the introduction of the "Senior Adviser System" in 2014, taking office in October 2023. Subsequently, Mr. Takami has served as the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense since January 2024.

## 2 Efforts to Promote the Transfer of Defense Equipment

In the context of transferring defense equipment, to prevent the loss of Japan's technological superiority in the defense sector over various countries, it is necessary for businesses such as equipment manufacturers, etc., to implement appropriate changes and adjustments to specifications and performance from a security perspective. This is required to preserve information about advanced technologies used in Japan's equipment.

Based on an awareness of these issues, a fund was established for the Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation, designated by the Minister

of Defense on February 16, 2024, under the Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases to promote initiatives to make equipment transfers appropriate from a security perspective. The Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation will allocate the grants to the Defense Equipment Manufacturers who are required by the MOD to make adjustments to specifications and performance of the equipment transferred, in accordance with the content of defense cooperation with partner countries.

**See** Section 1-1-2(2) (Facilitation of Equipment Transfer and Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation)

## 3 Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

### 1 Cooperative Research and Development, etc.

Since 1992, Japan has implemented 26 joint research projects and one joint development project with the United States. At present, four joint research projects ((1) High-Temperature Case Technologies, (2) Next Generation Amphibious Technologies, (3) Modular Hybrid Electric Vehicle System, and (4) Overwhelming Response through Collaborative Autonomy) are in implementation. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in September 2022, the two countries agreed to start studying the possibility of a Japan-U.S. joint research project on counter-hypersonic technologies at the level of elemental technology and component based on the progress of their joint analysis. Then, following the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting in January 2023 in which the Ministers concurred to begin discussion on potential joint development of a future interceptor, as a result of discussions between the MOD and the U.S. Department of Defense, the two countries have decided to initiate a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) Cooperative Development program in August 2023. At the Japan-U.S. summit that same month, the two leaders welcomed the decision.

In addition to this, the National Security Council has confirmed that the transfer of PAC (Patriot Advanced Capability) -2 parts, etc., to the United States since July 2014 falls under the category of projects for which overseas transfers may be authorized. The National Security Council also confirmed in December 2023 that the transfer of Patriot missiles to the United

States falls under the category of projects for which overseas transfers may be authorized. This transfer is an unprecedented initiative by Japan in response to a request from its ally, the United States, to replenish the U.S. military's inventory of Patriot missiles as quickly as possible and support the readiness of the U.S. military, since unprecedented level of demand for Patriot missiles has been experienced by U.S. military and by global supply chains, exceeding expectations. This step will take security and defense cooperation with the United States to a new level and contribute to the security of our country and the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-1-2(2) (Strengthening Unmanned Asset Defense Capabilities); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-2 (Response to Missile Attacks); Part III Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (Defense Equipment and Technical Cooperation); Section 2-3 (Development of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft); Reference 29 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects)

### 2 Production, Sustainment and Maintenance of Common Equipment between Japan and the United States

#### (1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production of the F-35A fighter aircraft and the Establishment of Regional Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability

In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A fighter aircraft to be the successor to the F-4 fighter aircraft. At the same time, the Government decided to have Japanese industries participate in the aircraft's production, aside from several completed aircraft, which

would be imported.<sup>7</sup> In light of this decision, Japan has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese industries in the manufacturing process in preparation for the acquisition of F-35A fighter aircraft from FY2013 onwards. So far, the Japanese companies have participated in Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) for the airframe and engines, as well as the manufacture of related parts.

In light of the severe financial conditions, the MOD decided in principle that it would resort to importing completed aircraft for procurement in FY2019 and after, but this would be reviewed if less expensive means were available. Subsequently, however, as a result of cost reduction efforts, by the manufacturers and others, it was confirmed that FACO by domestic companies would make the price lower than importing completed aircraft. For this reason, for procurements from FY2019 to FY2027, the MOD has decided to procure F-35A fighters for which domestic companies performed FACO.<sup>8</sup>

In addition, as F-35 fighter aircraft are operated worldwide, the U.S. Government decided to establish maintenance depot (regional MRO&U Capability) mainly for airframes and engines in the North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific regions.

The regional MRO&U in the Asia-Pacific region for Japan's F-35 fighter airframes selected by the U.S. Government in December 2014 began operations at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' Komaki South Plant located in Aichi Prefecture from July 2020. Moreover, with regard to the regional MRO&U Capability for engines, operations began at the IHI Mizuho Aero-Engine Works in Tokyo in June 2023.

The participation in the production of F-35 fighters by Japanese industries continuously, the establishment of maintenance depots for airframes, engines and others within Japan, and the contribution to maintenance in

the Asia-Pacific region not only maintain, cultivate, and reinforce Japan's defense production and technology bases but are also significant from the perspectives of securing the operational support system for F-35A fighter aircraft in Japan, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening defense equipment and technical cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

## (2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of the Common Maintenance Base for Ospreys of Japan and the U.S.

In October 2015, Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.<sup>9</sup> was selected as the maintenance company for the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys deployed at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. From February 2017, the PMI has been performed at GSDF Camp Kisarazu, with the maintenance of seven aircraft completed as of the end of March 2024 and three aircraft currently under maintenance.

The MOD intends to establish a common maintenance base for both Japan's and the United States' Ospreys by allowing the maintenance company to use the hangar at GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys and to carry out future aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Ospreys (V-22) at the same camp in view of the (1) smooth introduction of the V-22 (GSDF Ospreys);<sup>10</sup> (2) smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements; and (3) enhanced efficiency in maintenance. The establishment of a common maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu would be extremely significant in that it will contribute to mitigating the burden on Okinawa as well as to the "strengthening of the infrastructure for the repair and maintenance of common equipment" stated in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (Guidelines).

## 4 Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

### 1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Other Countries, etc.

Considering that cooperation in defense equipment is an

initiative that spans more than half a century from its conception to retirement, Japan will strengthen initiatives for defense equipment and technology cooperation, including overseas transfer of defense equipment and

<sup>7</sup> In December 2018, the number of F-35A fighter aircraft to be procured was changed from 42 to 147, of which 42 can be replaced by fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL).

<sup>8</sup> In December 2019, December 2020, December 2021, and December 2022, it was decided to opt for manufacturing arrangements involving domestic companies for F-35A fighter aircraft procurements in FY2019 and FY2020, FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023 through FY2027, respectively, as such arrangements were confirmed to be more cost-effective.

<sup>9</sup> The company was renamed SUBARU Corporation on April 1, 2017.

<sup>10</sup> The GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. As a temporary measure until the completion of maintenance facilities in Saga Airport, the aircraft will be temporarily deployed at Camp Kisarazu.


international joint development, and strive to enhance its partners' military capabilities and strengthen mid- and long-term relationships with those countries.<sup>11</sup> In particular, Japan will effectively promote these initiatives by combining them with other efforts, such as defense cooperation and exchanges, training and exercises, and capacity building, and other non-MOD measures, such as Official Security Assistance (OSA). In this regard, Japan

will consider transferring equipment that has reached a considerable number of years in service and has limited expandability to like-minded countries through early decommissioning or early removal from service.

**See** Fig. IV-1-3-1 (Main Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Other Countries); Reference 39 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements)

**Fig. IV-1-3-1** Main Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Other Countries (image)

As of March 2024



**(1) Australia**

With Australia, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology<sup>12</sup> went into effect in December 2014, and the Japan-Australia Joint Steering Committee for Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation was first held in October 2017. Since then, regular consultations have been held to

advance defense equipment and technology cooperation between Australia and Japan.

In November of 2019, the Letter of Arrangement concerning the Placement of Scientist and Engineer Personnel was signed, creating the framework for the cooperation of scientists and engineers. Based on this framework, Japan began dispatching its scientists and

<sup>11</sup> As of April 2024, Japan has signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with the following countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, India, the Philippines, France, Germany, Malaysia, Italy, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Sweden, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
<sup>12</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology

engineers to the Defence Science and Technology Group of Australia from 2021.

In May 2021, the Japan-Australia Joint Research on Marine Hydrodynamics and Hydroacoustics and the Japan-Australia Joint Research on Multi Unmanned Ground Vehicle Autonomy Technology were launched, and they are currently in progress. In June 2023, the Arrangement concerning Research, Development, Test and Evaluation was signed, creating the framework to launch joint projects quickly. In January 2024, this Arrangement was applied for the first time, and the Japan-Australia Joint Research on Robotic and Autonomous System for Undersea Warfare was launched.

At the meeting of the Australia-Japan Defense Ministers held in October 2023, Japan Defense Minister Kihara, together with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Marles, welcomed the announcement by the Australian Department of Defense regarding the signing of a contract with Mitsubishi Electric Australia for a joint development project using laser technology. This project represents the first joint development project between Japan and Australia. It is also the first time that the technology of a Japanese defense-related company has attracted the attention of a foreign government, leading to the implementation of international joint development in the defense field. This is a new step for Japan, which has been promoting the transfer of defense equipment through partnerships of public and private sectors.

In November 2023, the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency exhibited a booth at the international exhibition “INDO PACIFIC 2023” in Australia. Mr. Wada, who was then serving as Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense, took part in the exhibition. The public and private sectors collaborated to showcase the appeal of Japan’s equipment and its advanced technological capabilities.

 Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-1 (Australia)

## (2) India

Japan considers defense equipment and technology cooperation with India as an important field of cooperation

based on Special Strategic Global Partnership between Japan and India. At the Japan-India summit meeting in December 2015, both countries signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology,<sup>13</sup> which entered into force in March 2016.

To create a precedent of defense equipment and technology cooperation including dual use technologies, both countries have held the Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation seven times so far. The Cooperative Research on the Visual SLAM Based GNSS Augmentation Technology for UGV (Unmanned Ground Vehicle)<sup>14</sup>/Robotics was launched by Japan and India in July 2018, and completed successfully.

Progress has been made in discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries, including the second Japan-India Defence Industry Forum, which was held in Bengaluru in February 2019.

 Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-2 (India)

## (3) United Kingdom

With the United Kingdom, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology<sup>15</sup> was signed and went into effect in July 2013. The Japan-U.K. High-Level Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation Steering Panel held its first meeting in July 2014 and has held regular meetings since then.

In July 2013, the two countries also launched the Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project, which was the first time Japan had engaged in such bilateral research with a country other than the United States. The Cooperative Research was completed successfully in July 2017, with four other research projects<sup>16</sup> having been launched and completed successfully as well. The Japan-U.K. Cooperative Research Project on the Demonstration of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile and a new Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project were launched in December 2018 and in July 2021, respectively. The Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Japan and Great Britain Universal Advanced RF System (JAGUAR) that launched in March

<sup>13</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology

<sup>14</sup> Unmanned Ground Vehicle

<sup>15</sup> Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items

<sup>16</sup> The four projects include: Japan-U.K. Cooperative Research Project on the Feasibility of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (launched in November 2014, completed in March 2018); the Cooperative Research on Personnel Vulnerability Evaluation (launched in July 2016, completed in July 2020); the Cooperative Research on the Certification Process of Jet Engines (launched in February 2018, completed in February 2020); and the Japan-U.K. Cooperative Research Project on the Demonstration of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (launched in December 2018, completed in June 2023).

2018 transitioned into the Cooperative Research on the Technical Demonstration of a Japan and Great Britain Universal Advanced RF System (JAGUAR) in February 2022, which is currently ongoing with a view to applying the system to the next-generation fighter aircraft.

With regard to the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy have agreed to develop a common platform. The leaders of the three nations have announced it as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).

In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara convened a meeting in Tokyo with the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps and Italian Defence Minister Crosseto and signed the Convention on the Establishment of the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO). This international organization undertakes centralized management and administration of GCAP.

At the international exhibition “Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) London 2023”, held in the United Kingdom in September 2023, the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) set up a booth to promote and appeal Japan’s equipment and high technological capabilities through partnership between the public and private sectors.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (1) (The United Kingdom); Section 2-3 (Development of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft)

#### (4) France

Japan and France established committees on cooperation in the fields of defense equipment and export control, respectively, in January 2014, and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology<sup>17</sup> between the two countries went into effect in December 2016. Moreover, at the Fourth Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) held in January 2018, the two countries confirmed their intention to expeditiously begin cooperation on the Feasibility Study for Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities, with the cooperative research on this front initiated in June of the same year.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (2) (France)

#### (5) Germany

The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology<sup>18</sup> was signed between Japan and Germany and went into effect in July 2017. A Japan-Germany defense industry exchange meeting was held in November 2023, and various cooperative activities are progressing. Notably, approval was granted for participation as an observer in the joint development program of the Organization Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement<sup>19</sup> (OCCAR), headquartered in Germany.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (3) (Germany)

#### (6) Italy

With Italy, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology<sup>20</sup> went into effect in April 2019. In December 2023, the two countries held the “Italy-Japan Defence Industry Forum,” and discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries are progressing.

With regard to the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy have agreed to develop a common platform. The leaders of the three nations have announced it as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).

In December 2023, Defense Minister Kihara met in Tokyo with Italian Defence Minister Crosset and the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Shapps. They signed the Convention on the Establishment of the GCAP International Government organisation (GIGO) for the centralized management and administration of GCAP.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (4) (Italy); Section 2-3 (Development of Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft)

#### (7) Sweden

The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology<sup>21</sup> was signed between Japan and Sweden and went into effect in December 2022.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-6 (1) (Sweden)

#### (8) Ukraine

In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 and based on the request of the Ukrainian

<sup>17</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

<sup>18</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

<sup>19</sup> The Organization Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement (OCCAR), established in 1998, is an independent international organization that manages a series of processes for equipment, including the review of program specifications, development, manufacturing, operational support, and disposal, primarily for European countries and others.

<sup>20</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Italian Republic concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology

<sup>21</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology





SDF vehicles arriving at a transit point in Poland

Government to provide equipment, etc., the MOD partially revised the Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology at the meeting of the National Security Council on March 8, 2022, in order to provide non-lethal supplies within the scope of the Three Principles in accordance with the

Self-Defense Forces Law, and provided the Ukrainian Government with bulletproof vests, helmets, winter battle dress uniforms, tents, cameras, hygiene products and medical supplies, emergency rations, binoculars, lighting devices, personal equipment, protective masks, protective clothing and small drones via SDF aircraft and other means. Additional civilian vehicles (vans), etc. were also provided based on the request of the Ukrainian Government. Furthermore, based on President Zelenskyy's request to Prime Minister Kishida at the Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting in May 2023, Japan has additionally provided a total of 101 SDF vehicles (half-ton trucks, high-mobility vehicles, and multipurpose material handling vehicles) as well as approximately 30,000 emergency rations to Ukraine since June 2023.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-7(1) (Ukraine); Reference 65 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

### (9) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Countries

Japan and ASEAN member states have exchanged views regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors, such as humanitarian assistance (HA), disaster relief (DR), and maritime security, through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions. Participating countries have expressed their expectation for Japan's cooperation in effectively dealing with these issues. In the "Vientiane Vision" announced by Japan at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting

held in November 2016, it was stated that Japan's defense equipment and technology cooperation with ASEAN countries would be promoted with a focus on the following three points: (1) equipment and technology transfer, (2) human resources development, and (3) holding seminars on defense industries.

In terms of the specific initiatives implemented, Japan and Indonesia held the second Japan-Indonesia "2+2" in Tokyo in March 2021. The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology<sup>22</sup> was signed by both countries and went into effect immediately.

With Singapore, at the Shangri-La meeting held in Singapore in June 2023, the two countries signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology<sup>23</sup>, which came to immediate effect.

With Thailand, the two countries signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which went into effect during Prime Minister Kishida's visit to Thailand in May 2022.<sup>24</sup>

With the Philippines, after the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology between Japan and the Philippines<sup>25</sup> went into effect in April 2016, a total of five training aircraft (TC-90) of the MSDF were delivered to the Philippine Navy by March 2018, with pilot training support provided by the MSDF and maintenance and repair assistance provided by a Japanese company. In addition, parts and maintenance equipment of utility helicopters (UH-1H) that became unnecessary for the GSDF were also delivered to the Philippine Air Force by September 2019. These two transfers are cases of applying the provision of the SDF Act that went into effect in June 2017 that enables the MOD to grant equipment which is decommissioned by the SDF.

Further, in January 2019, a framework was established for regular consultations of the Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and



The first air surveillance radar system turnover ceremony hosted by the Philippine Air Force (December 2023)

<sup>22</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

<sup>23</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Singapore concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

<sup>24</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

<sup>25</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

## Technology Cooperation.

In August 2020, a contract was concluded between Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Inc., which would supply four air surveillance radar systems for approximately US\$100 million. This was the first case of an overseas transfer of finished equipment since the establishment of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in 2014. The first radar system was delivered to the Philippine Air Force in October 2023 and the second radar system was in March 2024. Acceptance, turnover and Blessing ceremonies for the radar systems were held in December 2023 and Aril 2024 respectively, in the presence of the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Teodoro. In addition, ASDF and GSDF also provided education for personnel of the Philippine Air Force along with this transfer project.

Japan and Vietnam signed the Terms of Reference (TOR) for regular consultations concerning defense equipment and technology cooperation at the Japan-Vietnam Defense Vice-Ministerial Level Meeting in



ATLA's booth at LIMA 2023

November 2016. Concerning the specific fields of cooperation, the Memorandum between Japan and Vietnam Defense Authorities on the Orientation of Promotion of Defense Industry Cooperation was signed during the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting in May 2019. Following this, during then Minister of Defense Kishi's visit to Vietnam in September 2021,

## VOICE

### Acceptance of the Japanese-made Air Surveillance Radar Systems (Voice from the Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Philippine Air Force)

**Brigadier General Ronie D Petinglay, Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Philippine Air Force**

In October 2023 and March 2024, the first and second units of the Japanese-made air surveillance radar system were handed over to the Philippine Air Force, and we held the Acceptance, Turnover and Blessing Ceremonies. I am pleased that this is Japan's first transfer of finished equipment to overseas, and I view this transfer as a symbol of cooperation between Japan and the Philippines.

The successful journey to the commemorative ceremony was made possible by the trust built through close coordination among the Philippine Air Force, the Japanese government, and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Inc., including series of mutual visits and face-to-face discussions between officials from both countries. In addition, JASDF and JGSDF also trained the Philippine Air Force radar personnel, which helped them acquire knowledge about the radar and deepened the relationship between each service.

The Philippines need to cooperate with like-minded countries against any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the South China Sea. In this context, I believe that the Japanese-made air surveillance radar systems will contribute to defending

the Philippines' sovereign territory, territorial waters, and airspace and will improve the maritime and air capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces, enabling us to further contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan is a strategic partner for the Philippines, and I hope we can further strengthen cooperation between our two countries based on the relationship of trust built through this transfer.



Brigadier General Petinglay

the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology<sup>26</sup> was signed by both countries and went into effect. In December 2023, the delivery of technology of anti-corrosion pre-treatment processing for equipment was completed under a contract concluded between the Vietnamese side and a Japanese company, which was indicated as required by the Vietnamese military.

With Malaysia, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology<sup>27</sup> was signed and went into effect in April 2018. In May 2023, ATLA exhibited a booth at the Langkawi International Maritime Aerospace Exhibition 2023 (LIMA 2023) and introduced their equipment by cooperation with the MSDF destroyer “Kumano” that participated in this exhibition as well.

 See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-8 (Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN))


## (10) Middle Eastern Countries

The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology<sup>28</sup> was signed between Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in May 2023, which is the first time for Japan to sign this type of agreement with a country in the Middle East region. The Agreement entered into force in January 2024.

Israel and Japan signed a Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technology<sup>29</sup> in September 2019 to ensure the appropriate protection of such classified information provided between Japanese and Israeli defense authorities.

With regard to Jordan, Japan loaned a retired GSDF Type-61 main battle tank without charge to Jordan in 2019, while an armored vehicle developed in Jordan was donated to the GSDF by Jordan. In response to this exchange, a ceremony was held at the MOD, where a memorandum of understanding was signed and exchanged. The GSDF Type-61 main battle tank loaned to Jordan was then unveiled at the Jordan Royal Tank Museum along with

the installation of an explanatory panel.

 See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-11 (6) (United Arab Emirates (UAE)); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-11 (7) (Israel), Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-11 (7) (Jordan)

## 2 Provision of Defense Equipment to Developing Countries

Surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment, it has become even more important for Japan that the nations which have a cooperative and friendly relationship with Japan in terms of security and defense have appropriate capabilities. It is also critical to develop a foundation that will serve as the basis for the international community to cooperate towards improving the security environment.

Among these friendly nations, some have difficulties in acquiring an adequate level of defense equipment on their own because of the scale of their economy and fiscal situation. Some of these states have been requesting to use SDF equipment that is no longer in use.

Under these circumstances, to respond to the needs of such friendly nations, the MOD established a special provision under Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act<sup>30</sup> in the SDF Law, which came into force in June 2017. The provision enables the MOD to grant or transfer SDF equipment that is no longer in use to the governments of developing states at a lower price than the current price.

Even in the case of granting or transferring equipment at a lower price than the current price as per this provision, whether or not to transfer such equipment, and to which government such equipment is to be transferred, will be determined case-by-case in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and other regulations. In addition, the Government of Japan and partner countries must conclude an international agreement to prevent extra-purpose use and transfer to third-parties without the prior consent of Japan.

<sup>26</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

<sup>27</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Malaysia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology

<sup>28</sup> Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Arab Emirates concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

<sup>29</sup> Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technology between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel

<sup>30</sup> Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act (Act No. 34 of 1947) states that governmental assets, unless otherwise provided for, may not be exchanged and used as other means of payment, or transferred or leased without reasonable consideration.



ATLA Booth at INDO PACIFIC 2023



ATLA Booth at Singapore Airshow 2024

## 5 Other Initiatives for Defense Equipment and Technical Cooperation

### 1 Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions

ATLA participates in international defense equipment exhibitions to introduce Japan's defense equipment policies and advanced technology. These initiatives help foreign government officials to better understand Japan's equipment policies and technology, and contribute to build bases for the promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation.

At "LIMA 2023," held in Malaysia in May 2023, we exhibited ships, their components, and aircraft considering Japan's cooperative relationship as a neighboring country, and for the purpose to transfer equipment in the field of HA/DR based on the past achievements in international disaster relief activities, as well as in the field of transportation (maritime and air) and surveillance as a maritime nation in the Indo-Pacific region like our country. In light of the fact that international joint development and production of equipment has become mainstream, Japan's exhibition at DSEI London 2023 held in the United Kingdom in September of the same year focused on creating a broader appeal through its superior technological capabilities at the component level, including the components of radars, combat vehicles, ships, aircraft, and AI technology. This concept was created based on the idea of actively pursuing cooperation not only through the transfer of finished products but also through the supply of components and parts.

Furthermore, at "INDO PACIFIC 2023," held in Australia in November of the same year, we widely disseminated information about our high technological

capabilities through the exhibition of ships, their components, aircraft, radar, satellites, etc.

In addition, at "Singapore Airshow 2024" held in Singapore in February 2024, we exhibited aircraft models, components, and other related materials. By meeting government and business officials from various countries, we demonstrated our commitment to promoting the transfer of defense equipment and technology through joint public and private efforts.

### 2 Public-Private Collaboration for Appropriate Overseas Transfer of Equipment

With regard to the overseas transfer of defense equipment, the DBP states that the Government will take the lead in promoting the appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology under further cooperation between the public and private sectors. In cooperation with trading companies and manufacturing companies, ATLA has conducted Feasibility Studies to grasp the potential needs of target countries and carried out activities to solicit proposals since FY2020. As a matter of fact, this study realized the transfer of Japan's technology of anti-corrosion pre-treatment processing to Vietnam in December 2023.

The ATLA has held the Defense Industry Forum, in which defense authorities and companies from both countries meet to exchange views on the overseas transfer of defense equipment between Japan and the partner country, with six countries so far: Indonesia (held in August 2017), India, Vietnam, Australia, Italy, and the Philippines.

As part of the ATLA's efforts to enhance knowledge

within the public and private sectors regarding overseas transfers to other countries, it holds webinars on the overseas transfer of defense equipment in Japan to create opportunities for learning about cases from the private business sector involving other countries and the current status of defense equipment and technology cooperation. In 2020-2022, we conducted webinars on business practices in India, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Besides holding webinars for India, Vietnam, and Malaysia since its first webinar in December 2020, the MOD also held a webinar in October 2022 on the systems and experiences of equipment exporters in the western countries with extensive experience in the export of equipment. In December 2023, a webinar was conducted on effectively utilizing international exhibitions.

Additionally, the ATLA developed a portal site in March 2022 designed to provide a platform for sharing information on the overseas transfer of defense equipment

between the public and private sectors, which has long been requested by the defense industry. The portal site provides information on countries' procurement systems and Japan's defense equipment transfer system for defense-related companies that are working on overseas transfers.

### 3 Preventing Leakage of Key Technologies for Defense Equipment

In promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation internationally, the MOD will work to strengthen defense industrial security and the management of sensitive technologies and intellectual property in order to prevent the leakage of key technologies for defense equipment.

**See** Section 1-1-2 (3) (Protecting the Confidential of Defense Equipment); Section 1-2-4 (Strengthening Defense Industrial Security); Section 1-2-5 (Strengthening Sensitive Technology Management)



**REFERENCE** : Guides and promotional videos (in English) disseminated overseas by ATLA to promote defense equipment and technology cooperation

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/en/policy/defense\\_equipment.html#guides\\_and\\_movies](https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/en/policy/defense_equipment.html#guides_and_movies)

## Section 4

## Equipment Optimization Efforts

## 1

## Initiatives for Construction of Optimized Equipment Structure

In order to acquire sufficient capabilities for cross-domain operations in view of the aging population with a declining birth rate and the severe fiscal situation, it is essential to further promote initiatives to optimize equipment structure.

The DBP stipulates the suspension of use of equipment whose importance has decreased and the review of projects with low cost-effectiveness. In particular, with regard to the GSDF, in order to optimize the air structure, the air units of divisions and brigades will be abolished with some exceptions, and helicopter functions will be concentrated in each district unit. In addition, the functions of the AH-1S anti-tank helicopter, AH-64D combat helicopter, and OH-1 observation helicopter will be transferred to utility/attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and reconnaissance UAVs, and the use of these helicopters will be discontinued. In doing so, the minimum functions necessary for the defense of remote

islands and for countering guerillas and special forces will be maintained by arming existing helicopters, etc.

The MSDF will review the number of P-1 fixed-wing patrol aircraft to acquire in conjunction with the acquisition of long-endurance UAVs to enhance offshore surveillance capabilities over a wider sea area. The MSDF will also revise the number of SH-60L patrol helicopters to procure due to a review of the shipboard requirements, including equipping Izumo-class destroyers with F-35B fighter aircraft. In addition, the U-36A multi-purpose aircraft will be discontinued since its training support will be outsourced to private companies.

With regard to the ASDF, in order to optimize aircraft types, the use of the U-125A search and rescue aircraft and other aircraft tasked with initial response will be discontinued with the introduction of a new type of emergency locator transmitter that can easily locate survivors.

## 2

## Initiatives to Make the Most of Limited Human Resources (Labor-Saving and Automation)

In view of the severe security environment surrounding Japan and the rapid development of the aging population with a declining birth rate, it is important to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost. In view of the severe security environment surrounding Japan and the rapid development of the aging population with a declining birth rate, it is important to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost.

support manned naval vessels will begin in FY2024 to enhance operational functions. In addition, the development of unmanned amphibious vehicles that can act autonomously in amphibious operations and perform missions such as transporting supplies from the sea to the vicinity of troops will begin in FY2024, along with research and development on combat support UAVs that will be collaborating with manned aircraft such as the next-generation fighter aircraft.

## 1 Initiatives for Automation

The DBP calls for reviewing existing equipment systems and personnel assignments in order to promote unmanned and labor-saving defense equipment. Therefore, in the underwater domain, research on stealthy, combat-supporting, multi-purpose unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) that selectively carry functions such as warning and surveillance and launching of anti-ship missiles to




Illustration of combat support type multi-purpose USV

## 2 Initiatives for Manpower Saving

The DBP stipulates increasing the number of labor-saving frigates (FFM)<sup>1</sup> at an early date, as well as the

continuation of research on technologies related to USVs in order to further reduce personnel and achieve unmanned waterborne vessels.

## 3 Project Management throughout Equipment Life Cycle


### 1 Acquisition of Defense Equipment through Focused Project Management

As defense equipment is becoming more sophisticated and complex, its entire life cycle (concept study, research and development, mass production, deployment, operation and maintenance) cost has a tendency to increase in recent years. It has become extremely important to streamline acquisition throughout the life cycle of equipment and

to establish a systematic management to realize the streamlining in order to efficiently acquire equipment of assured quality at appropriate cost in a required timeline as planned. Therefore, since the establishment of ATLA in October 2015, ATLA undertakes project management throughout the life cycle of equipment upon selecting important equipment, and promotes efforts to realize the optimized equipment acquisition.

Specifically, the MOD has selected 33 designated

Fig. IV-1-4-1 Equipment of Major Programs and Semi-Major Programs Designated for Project Management



Images marked with (Note) are computer-generated images.



REFERENCE : Project management  
 URL : [https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/soubiseisaku\\_project.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/soubiseisaku_project.html)

<sup>1</sup> New destroyers that combine improved multi-mission capabilities with compact hulls

items for major programs designated for project management and 12 items for semi-major programs for project management<sup>2</sup> as of the end of March 2024. For major programs designated for project management, the MOD designates a Project Manager (PM) dedicated to each specific major program, following which project management for that program is conducted by an Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is composed of officials from relevant divisions within the MOD.

For each of the 45 major and semi-major programs designated for project management as of the end of March 2024, the MOD has formulated an Acquisition Strategy and an Acquisition Plan (Designated Item Plans), which specify the basic matters necessary to systematically implement project management until the present, such as the purpose of the acquisition program, acquisition policy, and life cycle cost.

Furthermore, in principle, ATLA annually reviews the implementation status of the Designated Item Plans and endeavors to promote appropriate project management that reflects the latest status by conducting analysis and evaluation, on the basis of which the Designated Item Plans are reviewed as necessary. In August 2023, analysis and evaluation of the acquisition program were implemented for the 34 major and semi-major programs which had been designated for project management.

 See Fig. IV-1-4-1 (Equipment of Major Programs and Semi-Major Programs Designated for Project Management)

## 2 Initiatives to Promote and Strengthen Project Management

### (1) Past Initiatives

The following initiatives have been implemented to promote and strengthen project management.

#### a. Cost and Schedule Management Using WBS (Work Breakdown Structure)

For certain kinds of equipment, etc., produced in Japan,

the MOD promotes the introduction of a management method to visualize the progress of work and cost generated by component (WBS).<sup>3</sup> Since April 2020, efforts have been made for the public and private sectors to jointly manage costs and schedules through the use of an incentivized risk-sharing management contract system, which allows for the early detection of cost increases and schedule delays and for action to be taken promptly.

#### b. Method for More Accurate Cost Estimate

Life cycle cost has been estimated based on actual cost data of similar equipment developed or introduced in the past. However, as a larger amount of cost data is needed for a more accurate estimate, the MOD promotes the establishment of a cost database by collecting cost data and accumulating them into a database.

#### c. Accumulation and Development of Expertise

For further improving the management skills of PMs and enhancing human resources among those who engage in project management, the MOD provides opportunities to study project management methods from overseas and the private sector on a regular basis.

### (2) Future Initiatives

In order to further promote effective and efficient equipment acquisition, the MOD needs to enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of project management throughout equipment life cycles. Therefore, the DBP stipulates that further efforts for effective and efficient acquisition of equipment will include cost reduction through planned and stable acquisition of equipment by expanding the application of long-term contracts, improving the predictability of companies and promoting efficient production, procurement in consideration of the supply-demand situation of equipment including that of other countries, and narrowing down the SDF's own unique specifications that cause costs to rise.

## 4 Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters

### 1 Reviewing Acquisition Systems

In order to promptly respond to changes in the

surroundings, the MOD has been reviewing acquisition systems through meetings of the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007 and the

<sup>2</sup> A semi-major program is an acquisition project of a specific equipment with a limited application of project management without the designation of a PM or IPT but which focuses on the risks in functions, performance, costs, schedules, and other risk factors in a manner equivalent to the case of equipment of major programs designated for project management.

<sup>3</sup> WBS is a hierarchical structure used to implement project management that systematically divides the project into manageable units, for which the schedule and cost of each deliverable (component, service, etc.) are allocated.



Contract Systems Study Group comprising experts since 2010. Since FY2016, a special research officer system<sup>4</sup> has been adopted to properly implement the review results in practice.

## 2 Long-Term Contracts, etc.

The production of defense equipment requires a significant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain amount is to be procured in bulk, a contract for more than five years is needed in many cases. With regard to defense equipment and services, economies of scale<sup>5</sup> tend not to work mainly due to the following reasons: (1) the MOD is the only customer; and (2) companies that provide such defense equipment, etc., are limited. In addition, it is difficult for companies to systematically move forward with their businesses with a high degree of predictability, a trait that is peculiar to the defense industry.

For these reasons, although the period of expenditure for acts that incur national debt is limited to five years in principle under the Public Finance Act, this period has been extended to a maximum of ten years for specific equipment through the enactment of the Long-term Contract Act.<sup>6</sup> The introduction of this change regarding long-term contracts will make stable procurement possible, leading to the realization of the systematic improvement of defense capability. At the same time, for companies, given that the procurement amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel and equipment, as well as cost reductions due to bulk orders, will be made possible.

In addition, by implementing longer-term, multiple-year contracts utilizing the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Act,<sup>7</sup> the planned acquisition and execution of budgets is achieved through the equalization of national expenditure. At the same time, certain benefits, such as

lower equipment procurement costs by reducing risks for the parties taking orders and by promoting the entry of new suppliers, can be obtained.

In addition, regarding the procurement of certain equipment for which little competitiveness can be expected due to its characteristics, and for companies that work on cost reduction by utilizing the MOD's programs, the MOD ensures transparency and fairness and promotes the appropriate use of limited tendering contracts after clarifying and categorizing the targets, with a view to implementing prompt and efficient procurement and enhancing predictability for companies.

## 3 Measures to Lower Procurement Costs and Incentivize Companies to Reduce Cost

With regard to the procurement of defense equipment, the cost is tending to increase because a large variety of equipment has no market price. Based on those characteristics, it is necessary to achieve both the reduction of procurement cost and improvement of companies' incentives to reduce cost simultaneously.

In order to achieve this, ATLA has applied the incentivized risk-sharing management contract system to the next-generation fighter aircraft project and the stand-off electronic warfare aircraft project since April 2020, under which the public and private sectors jointly manage the performance and progress of the contract and the cost, with a certain percentage of any cost reduction achieved awarded to the contractor. In addition, a system to provide incentives for cost reductions has also been implemented from the same month in order to evaluate the companies' own cost reduction efforts. The expansion of its scope of application and other approaches to encouraging such efforts are constantly being considered.

## 5 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement and Other Related Initiatives

### 1 Effective and Efficient Maintenance and Replenishment

With regard to periodic maintenance of defense

equipment, the MOD has been working to improve efficiency by extending the maintenance interval, after making sufficient efforts to ensure safety. Moreover, the MOD is working to expand umbrella contracts such

<sup>4</sup> This is a system of conducting research that contributes to the procurement system of equipment by inviting experts, such as associate professors from universities specializing in the areas of concern, on a part-time basis to effectively review the procurement system based not only on the viewpoints of MOD personnel involved in actual operations but also on theories proposed in the fields of business administration and economics.

<sup>5</sup> "Economies of scale" refer to the cost advantage that arises from an increased output of a product. For example, the cost per unit can be reduced with the bulk purchase of materials.

<sup>6</sup> "Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specific Defense Procurement" (enacted in April 2015. Made permanent by an amendment in March 2024.)

<sup>7</sup> Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative

as Performance Based Logistics (PBL)<sup>8</sup> with a view to improving the number of operationally available equipment and keeping long-term costs under control.

## 2 Achieving Further Efficiency in the Acquisition of Defense Equipment

In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high performance equipment, along with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, the MOD/SDF will efficiently secure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capability. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. In addition, by incorporating advanced civilian technologies, the MOD/SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment for areas that could directly affect the SDF's current and future ways of warfare and are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective.

**See** Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-4 (Optimization Efforts); Section 2-4-4 (New Measures for Early Deployment)

## 3 Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency

The MOD implements measures for making contracts more appropriate and strengthening checking functions

# 6 Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement

## 1 Streamlining Initiatives

FMS (Foreign Military Sales) is a form of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), etc., that enables U.S. allies and partners to purchase defense equipment and services from the U.S. government. The characteristics of FMS include: (1) prices are estimates, (2) payments are made in advance in principle and balanced out after fulfillment, and (3) delivery dates are estimates. FMS is critical to reinforcing the defense capabilities of Japan.

Meanwhile, there are FMS-related various issues,

to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials.

As part of its efforts to achieve more appropriate public procurement across the whole government, the MOD continues to carry out the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system<sup>9</sup> and make bidding procedures more efficient. In addition to these, based on the lessons learned from past incidents such as overcharging and falsification of the results of equipment testing by defense-related companies, measures such as strengthening system investigation, reviewing penalties, and ensuring the effectiveness of supervision and inspection have been steadily implemented to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. Through these measures, the MOD strives to prevent the recurrence of misconduct, enhance fairness and transparency, and ensure proper contracting.

In addition, ATLA carries out multilayered checks on the contracts it administers through both internal and external checking systems and checks and balances within the organization. Specifically, ATLA will further enhance internal inspections by the Inspection and Audit Department as well as defense inspections conducted by the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance and deliberations by the Defense Procurement Council, which is composed of external experts. Moreover, ATLA has also improved its education department and strives to enhance compliance awareness by providing thorough education pertaining to compliance for ATLA personnel.

such as late delivery and late case closure. As the FMS procurement amount is hovering at a high level in recent years, the governments of Japan and the U.S. have been actively working together to make improvements in these issues.

Specifically, ATLA and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) have held the Security Cooperation Consultative Meeting (SCCM) to discuss the issues over FMS procurement eight times since 2016.

At the 8th SCCM held in January 2024, Japan and the United States agreed to continue strengthening case management between them in terms of late delivery

<sup>8</sup> Comprehensive contracts to improve the number of operational availability and to achieve long-term cost containment

<sup>9</sup> Unlike the automatic bid system, which focuses only on price, this is a system in which the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of both the price and other elements. This method is adopted when it is appropriate to evaluate technological elements, etc.

and late case closures in view of the increase of FMS procurement going forward, and to advance efforts aimed at reducing the number of late deliveries and late case closures while improving the transparency in pricing.

In addition, in April 2023, ATLA and the U.S. Department of Defense concluded a framework to confirm reciprocal and free-of-charge quality assurance services for equipment, etc. This framework exempts quality assurance fee for FMS procurement, which reduces FMS procurement costs and strengthens collaborative relations within Japan-the U.S. Alliance in procurement, thereby advancing the effectiveness of FMS procurement.

## 2 Other Initiatives

With regard to imported procured equipment, including equipment procured through foreign military sales (FMS), Japan intends to pursue the sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment by Japanese companies and further promote international joint research and development of high-capability equipment with the United States and other countries. As part of these efforts, an exhibition (Industry Day) was held in


October 2023 to create matching opportunities with the U.S. Forces in Japan and the U.S. defense industry in order to encourage Japanese companies to participate in the equipment supply chains common to both Japan and the United States as well as in the sustainment and maintenance programs of the U.S. Forces in the Indo-Pacific region.



Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake inspects Industry Day (second from left) (October 2023)

**See** Fig. IV-1-4-2 (Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement; Section 1-2-2(3) (Industry Day))

**Fig. IV-1-4-2** Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement



### Major equipment acquired through FMS

- [Ground Self-Defense Force]
  - V-22 Osprey
- [Maritime Self-Defense Force]
  - SM-6
  - SM-3 Block IB
  - SM-3 Block IIA
  - Tomahawk
- [Air Self-Defense Force]
  - F-15 fighter jet (capabilities improvement)
  - F-35A fighter jet
  - F-35B fighter jet
  - AIM-120 (air-to-air missile)
  - KC-46A aerial refueling/transport aircraft
  - E-2D airborne early warning aircraft
  - Global Hawk

○ [Reference] Examples of FMS procurement \* The amount of FMS



F-35B fighter jet  
[Lockheed Martin]  
FY2024 budget: 112 billion yen



F-35A fighter jet  
[Lockheed Martin]  
FY2024 budget: 128.2 billion yen



E-2 airborne early warning aircraft  
[Northrop Grumman]  
FY2024 budget: 194.1 billion yen



SM-3 Block IIA  
[Raytheon]  
FY2024 budget: 69.9 billion yen

## Section 5

## Initiatives for Economic Security

The National Security Strategy states that economic security is to ensure Japan's national interests, such as peace, security, and economic prosperity, by carrying out economic measures. In the face of various threats imposed through economic means, Japan needs

to comprehensively, effectively, and intensively execute necessary economic measures to enhance Japan's autonomy and to secure the superiority and indispensability concerning our technologies and others.

## 1

## Developments within the Japanese Government

To date, Japan has promoted initiatives that contribute to strengthening economic security within its existing legal framework.

In May 2022, the Economic Security Promotion Act<sup>1</sup> was established to comprehensively and effectively promote economic measures related to ensuring national security. The act developed frameworks for strengthening the resiliency of supply chains, ensuring the safety and reliability of critical infrastructure, public-private collaboration on important cutting-edge technologies, and non-disclosure of selected patent applications.

In May 2024, systems for the non-disclosure of patent applications and core infrastructure became operational, and all systems stipulated by the law were put into operation. Various measures related to economic security are constantly being reviewed and revised. For example, in December 2022, 11 resources including semiconductors and batteries were designated as specific important resources to strengthen the resiliency of supply chains, and efforts are underway to secure their stable supply. In February 2024, new initiatives were also implemented, such as the designation of advanced electronic components (capacitors, high-frequency filters) as important resources (bringing the total to 12) and adding uranium as a target mineral to the list of designated important minerals.

The Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program (K Program) is led by the relevant ministries and agencies. The

K Program implements research and development projects on advanced technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum technology, and others, to meet the country's needs. The results of the research are intended for not only for civilian use but also for public use, including for national security. The key technologies to be supported by the K Program are defined in the R&D vision. In 2023, the Research and Development Vision (Second Round) was decided to reinforce and complement the Research and Development Vision (First Round) by particularly strengthening efforts in the cyberspace and other areas, and research and development began in sequence. In addition, regarding the security clearance system in the economic security field, a bill on the protection and utilization of critical economic security information was approved by the Cabinet and submitted to the Diet in February 2024, which was enacted as a law in May of the same year.

Furthermore, interest in economic intimidation has increased in recent years, and various discussions have been held on this topic. At the G7 Hiroshima Summit held in May 2023, it was confirmed that a "Coordination Platform against Economic Coercion" would be established for responding to economic intimidation, and cooperation with allied and like-minded countries would be promoted.



**See** Section 2-4-1 (Technology Cooperation with Relevant Domestic and Overseas Entities and Collaboration with Relevant Ministries and Agencies)

## 2

## Initiatives of the MOD

As inter-state competition intensifies in domains that cross the border between security and the economy, it is extremely important to enhance Japan's autonomy and safeguard Japan's superiority and indispensability through economic security measures, such as preserving

and fostering advanced technologies as well as maintaining and reinforcing Japan's defense production and technology bases as a virtually integral part of defense capability in accordance with the NDS.

The MOD, as the government agency in charge

<sup>1</sup> Act for the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures

of security, actively participates in government-wide initiatives by sharing its knowledge and needs related to maintaining and reinforcing Japan's defense production and technology bases, which has been amassed over the years. Specifically, in addition to dispatching personnel to the Office of the Director-General for Economic

Security in the Cabinet Office, the MOD contributes to resolve economic security challenges by fundamentally strengthening its internal systems, including the expansion of its staff, to proactively offer its knowledge and needs related to security to government-wide initiatives.

# Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities

## Chapter 2

### Section 1 Reinforcing Human Resource Base

The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. To demonstrate defense capability, the MOD/SDF will secure the necessary personnel and reinforce the human resource base to create an environment that enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride.

In light of severe recruitment environment of SDF personnel the changes taking place across the entire society, such as trends in the private-sector labor market and changing attitudes toward working styles, need to be taken into consideration when considering measures to reinforcing the human resource base of the SDF. Given these circumstances, an “Expert Panel on Reinforcing the Human Resource Base of the MOD/SDF” consisting of experts from outside the MOD was established in February 2023 under the purview of the Minister of Defense, to increase the effectiveness of measures for reinforcing the human resource base. After discussions at six review meetings, a report was compiled in July of the same year which recommended that to ensure the sustainability of Japan’s defense capabilities even in a society with a declining birthrate and a declining population, measures like securing diverse human resources, including those from outside SDF, and effective measures throughout the entire life cycle of



Expert Panel on Reinforcing the Human Resource Base of the MOD/SDF (January 2024)

SDF personnel has to be taken more broadly and in more detail than ever before.

Based on these recommendations, at the 7th review meeting in January 2024, the MOD made a report on the progress of various measures aimed at securing diverse human resources, including those from outside the SDF, and promoting active participation throughout the life cycle of SDF personnel. Experts have expressed their opinions on future issues, and based on these opinions, measures to strengthen the human resources base will be proceeded with.

### 1 Enhancing Recruitment Efforts

#### 1 Recruitment

In order for the MOD/SDF to execute their various missions properly, it is vital to stably secure excellent human resources even in the severe recruiting environment with a decreasing number of people eligible for recruitment due to a declining birth rate. There is an increasingly fierce competition to secure human

resources, and the number of recruitments in FY2023, especially for the so-called “shi”(E1-E3) candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and general candidates for enlistment (Upper), decreased by approximately 1,900 compared to FY2022, which is cause for great concern. For this reason, it is necessary to recruit those with a strong desire to join the SDF by sufficiently explaining to potential applicants the missions, roles, and duties of



REFERENCE : The Report of the Expert Panel on Reinforcing the Human Resource Base of the MOD/SDF (Japanese Only)

URL : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/meeting/kiban/index.html>

the SDF.

To strengthen the recruitment capabilities, the MOD/SDF is promoting digitalization and online dissemination of recruitment PR materials, dissemination of information via SNS, and partial adoption of online recruitment examinations for candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and general candidates for enlistment (Upper).

In addition, the Provincial Cooperation Offices based in 50 locations throughout Japan, have been enhancing their recruitment system by increasing the number of part-time staff in FY2023, recruiting and employing uniformed SDF personnel, etc., attentively and perseveringly with the cooperation of obtaining local governments, schools, recruitment counselors, and others. Moreover, local governments carry out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, including announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, with the MOD bearing the requisite cost. At the same time, the MOD is strengthening collaboration with local governments to ensure necessary cooperation, including information provision on recruitment targets, which is indispensable for smooth administrative activities regarding recruitment.

## 2 Employment

### (1) Uniformed SDF Personnel

Based on a voluntary system that respects individuals' free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories. The upper age limit for the recruitment of candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and general candidates for enlistment (Upper) was raised in 2018 from “under 27” to “under 33” in order to secure diverse human resources from a broader range, including people with work experience in private companies. Also, the upper age limit for the recruitment of ASDF aviation cadets has been raised from “under 21” to “under 24” starting in FY2024. In addition, the name of the SDF scholarship student system<sup>1</sup> has been changed to “Self-



Briefing session on the various duties of the SDF at an SDF Provincial Cooperation Office

Defense Force Scholarship System”, and in an effort to enhance and improve the system, the eligible educational institutions and academic fields have been expanded so that qualified human resources can be secured at an early stage based on the DBP.


Furthermore, in terms of utilizing human resources from the private sector, efforts have been made to strengthen mid-career recruitment, including recruiting mid-career executives with national qualifications and licenses for specialized skills and recruiting more former uniformed SDF personnel who had retired mid-career. In addition, a bill was submitted to the Diet in February 2024 and passed in May of the same year for the introduction of a Fixed-Term Uniformed SDF personnel System, under which highly skilled individuals from outside the MOD/SDF with specialized knowledge and skills in domains such as cyberspace will be hired as uniformed SDF personnel for a term of up to five years.

Personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees<sup>2</sup> due to the need to maintain the SDF's strength. With consideration given to the knowledge, experience, physical strength, and other factors necessary to perform the duties of the respective ranks, the SDF has an “Early Retirement System” where the majority of uniformed personnel retire after their mid-50s and a “Fixed-Term System” where one term lasts two or three years.

<sup>1</sup> A system aimed at securing human resources in academic fields such as science and engineering by providing undergraduate and graduate students who intend to serve in the SDF in the future, and after graduation, will enlist as general officer candidates, with a monthly loan of a fixed amount (54,000 yen/month). In addition to the above requirements, the number of institutions and number of academic fields covered by loans have been expanded, and the name of the system has been changed since FY2024.

<sup>2</sup> SDF personnel are designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law.

**Fig. IV-2-1-1** Changes in the Number of People Eligible for Recruitment



Material sources: The numbers for FY1993, FY1994 and FY2019 are based on "Population Estimates of Japan 1920 - 2000" and "Current Population Estimates," Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.  
 Data from FY2020 onward are based on "Population Projection for Japan" (medium estimates in April 2024), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

**Fig. IV-2-1-2** Status of Recruitment of Candidates for Uniformed SDF Personnel and General candidates for enlistment (Upper) (FY 2014 to FY 2023)

Fiscal Year	Number of planned recruits	Number of applicants	Number of recruits	Plan achievement rate
FY2014	8,595	31,361	8,239	96%
FY2015	8,989	28,137	7,838	87%
FY2016	7,981	29,067	7,610	95%
FY2017	9,404	27,510	7,513	80%
FY2018	9,882	28,145	7,075	72%
FY2019	7,505	28,844	7,359	98%
FY2020	6,280	28,903	6,664	106%
FY2021	6,190	28,272	5,350	86%
FY2022	9,245	23,834	3,988	43%
FY2023	10,628	19,033	3,221	30%

Fiscal Year	Number of planned recruits	Number of applicants	Number of recruits	Plan achievement rate
FY2014	3,850	31,145	4,436	115%
FY2015	4,420	25,092	4,328	98%
FY2016	4,720	24,312	5,011	106%
FY2017	5,050	29,151	5,044	100%
FY2018	6,300	27,580	6,464	103%
FY2019	6,140	28,310	6,647	108%
FY2020	6,500	29,848	6,744	104%
FY2021	6,510	28,426	6,450	99%
FY2022	6,980	24,841	6,132	88%
FY2023	7,230	19,960	4,969	69%

Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities



**See** Fig. IV-2-1-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible for Recruitment); Fig. IV-2-1-2 (Status of recruitment of candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and general candidates for enlistment (Upper) (FY 2014 to FY 2023)); Reference 67 (Authorized and Actual Strengths of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Changes in Them (Over the Past 10 Years)); Reference 68 (Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel)

## (2) Civilian officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel

There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel—civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others—in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD/SDF.<sup>3</sup> Civilian personnel are mainly recruited from those who have passed the Comprehensive or General Service National Public Employee Recruitment Examinations conducted by the National Personnel Authority (NPA) and those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Ministry of Defense Specialists conducted by the MOD.


Civilian officials and others are engaged at defense-

related policy planning in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), etc.; analysis and evaluation at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH); and administrative works at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country.

Technical and engineering officials are engaged in policy planning related to defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.) and physical infrastructure such as defense equipment at the Internal Bureaus of the MOD and ATLA, etc.; analysis and evaluation at the DIH; and constructing various defense facilities, carrying out research and development, efficient procurement, maintenance and development of a range of equipment, providing mental health care for SDF personnel, and other duties at SDF facilities, Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations nationwide.

Instructors conduct advanced research on defense and

Fig. IV-2-1-3 Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel



(Notes) (1) The graduates from prescribed education and training course are commissioned as a Second Lieutenant (GSDP and ASDP) or an Ensign (MSDF) while the graduates with master's degree of civilian universities and colleges passed through the master's degree graduate exam as well as the graduates from National Defense Medical College School of Medicine, Dental Officer Candidates, and Pharmacist Officer Candidates are commissioned as a First Lieutenant (GSDP and ASDP) or a Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF).

(2) Fixed-term enlistees are to engage exclusively in fundamental education and training as non-regular MoD personnel three months from enlistment, in order to enrich their initial education and training from July 2010.

3 Among the employees of the MOD, special national government employees are called "SDF personnel," including civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others, in addition to uniformed SDF personnel.

provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, and other organizations.

In addition, efforts are being made to secure the civilian

officials and others necessary to steadily implement the DBP.

 See Reference 69 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.)

## 2 Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and others

It is essential to secure the required number of uniformed SDF personnel promptly depending on situational changes in the event of a crisis. To secure the required number promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains the following three systems<sup>4</sup>: the SDF Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and the Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel system.

SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel upon issuing a defense call-up order or other orders and carry out logistical support and base guard duties. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel and are assigned to carry out their mission together with active-duty uniformed SDF personnel as part of frontline units following the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders. Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, some of whom are recruited among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training.

Until now, SDF Reserve Personnel and Ready Reserve Personnel have been summoned during large-scale disasters such as earthquakes or typhoons, and the COVID-19 pandemic. During the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake Disaster Relief Operations, SDF Reserve Personnel and Ready Reserve Personnel qualified as doctors or nurses were dispatched to provide medical support (mobile medical visits) and daily life support (transportation of goods) in the affected areas.

Since SDF Reserve Personnel and others are engaged in their respective jobs under normal circumstances, the understanding and cooperation of the companies, etc., that employ these personnel are essential for them to attend regular training, etc.

For this purpose, the MOD provides a special subsidy to the companies that employ SDF Ready Reserve

Personnel and take necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days a year, by taking into consideration the burden on such companies.



The SDF Reserve Personnel in action during the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake Disaster Relief Operations

Moreover, in order to secure their understanding and cooperation regarding the duties of SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, companies, etc., that employ these personnel are provided with a subsidy in the event that (1) SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel respond to a defense operation call-up order, civil protection dispatch call-up order, or disaster relief call-up order, etc., or if (2) they have no choice but to leave their regular occupations due to injuries during their duties, etc.

In addition, a special subsidy for companies that cooperate with the training of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel is paid to companies, etc., that employ individuals who, after being Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel with no prior experience as uniformed



**REFERENCE** : Overview of systems related to SDF reserve personnel (Japanese Only)

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/gsd/reserve/>

<sup>4</sup> Many other countries also have reserve personnel systems.

Fig. IV-2-1-4 Overview of the System for SDF Reserve Personnel and Others

	SDF reserve personnel	SDF ready reserve personnel	Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
Basic concept	● Upon the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders, serve as SDF Personnel	● Serve as SDF Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability	● Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel in the GSDF or MSDF upon completion of education and training
Call-up duty and other duties	● Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	● Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster callup, training call-up	● Education and training call-up
Eligibility	● Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel	● Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel	(Common to General and Technical Employment Categories) ● Those with no experience as SDF personnel (including those with less than a year of SDF experience)
Rank designation	● Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel and former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel; Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ● Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel ● General: Private ● Technical: Designated according to skills and length of experience	● Former SDF Personnel and former SDF Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle	● Not designated
Term of service	● Three Years (continuation of appointment is possible) [Maximum age limit for appointment: Under 65 years]  * The age limit has been temporarily lifted for the continuation of appointment of certain SDF Reserve Personnel with specific skills [Common] Medical [GSDF] Maintenance, electricity, construction and radiation management [MSDF] Vessels [ASDF] Language	● Three Years (continuation of appointment is possible) [Maximum age limit for appointment: Same as the mandatory retirement age of SDF personnel]	● General: Within three years ● Technical: Within two years
(Education) Training	● Although the Self-Defense Forces Law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year as a standard	● 30 days per year	● General: 50 days within three years (equivalent to Candidate SDF personnel (private level) course) ● Technical: 10 days within two years (training to serve as SDF Personnel by utilizing their special skills)
Promotion	● Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	● Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	● Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion
Benefits, allowances, and other terms	● Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day* ● SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month * The Training Call-up Allowance of ¥8,300/day supports the training of SDF Reserve Personnel who are former candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel in order for them to become SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.	● Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400-14,200/day ● SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ● Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term	● Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,800/day
Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel	● Special subsidy for companies cooperating with training of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥560,000/personnel * Provided when an SDF Reserve Personnel who is a former candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as an SDF Ready Reserve Personnel. ● Special subsidy to secure understanding and cooperation from employers regarding the duties of SDF Reserve Personnel: ¥34,000/day	● Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month	—

Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities

Part IV Chapter 2

SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training as SDF Reserve Personnel, and which take the necessary measures to ensure that such employees can attend training sessions with peace of mind.

The DBP states that the current system of SDF Reserve Personnel and others will be reviewed so that they can effectively supplement regular uniformed SDF personnel amid the changing operational environment and diversifying missions of the SDF. This will involve

expanding recruitment to include civilians with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel and reviewing age limits, training periods, and other issues. In view of this, the upper age limit for the continued appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel who possess certain skills was abolished in April 2023 on a trial basis, while the age requirement for recruitment of Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel (general), who are recruited among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, was relaxed from 18 to 34 years to 18

## VOICE

## Voices from an SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and his Employer

**Ayumi Sou, Sergeant First Class, 13th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Unit, Ready Reserve Self-Defense Force, GSDF**

First and foremost, I extend my sincere condolences to all those affected by the ‘2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake.’

Prior to my retirement upon completion of service in 2020, I attended a joint job fair for retiring Self-Defense Force personnel. The atmosphere of the booth staff was exceptionally positive, and the presence of the “Reserve Self-Defense Force Registration System” and the “Rent Subsidy System” led me to decide to join ART MOVING COMPANY.

After joining the company, I became a Reserve Self-Defense Force member and then a Ready Reserve Self-Defense Force member in 2021.

For the annual 30-day training, I avail myself of special leave under the company’s unique “Training Special Leave System” and participate in training sessions at the Nihonbara Camp for 2 to 4 days each month. I can reunite with former colleagues and participate in the training with great enjoyment. Thanks to the “Training Special Leave System”, I am eligible for up to 20 days

of special leave designated for training purposes. By coordinating these days with non-working days and paid leave, I can effectively participate in a 30-day training program. Furthermore, my participation in training sessions is accommodatively scheduled around my shifts, with my branch manager and colleagues demonstrating considerable understanding and support.

While the training is certainly demanding, I maintain that serving as a reserve member of the Self-Defense Force continues to reinforce the values and significance of caring for others—principles I honed during my active duty. This commitment not only benefits society but also enriches our company.

Thanks to the support of my colleagues, I have been able to engage fully in the training program. Having been informed of my upcoming promotion to Sergeant in the Ready Reserve Self-Defense, I am even more determined to diligently balance my professional duties and training responsibilities.

**Takao Honda, Executive Officer, Human Resources Strategy Division, ART MOVING COMPANY  
(Former Sergeant Third Class, 3rd Company, 25th Infantry Regiment, GSDF)**

Since our establishment in 1976 as Japan’s first dedicated moving company, we have attentively heeded our customers’ suggestions, often prefaced with ‘It would be nice if...’ Based on this valuable feedback, we have innovated numerous services, transforming the moving business from a mere transportation endeavor into a comprehensive service industry. In recent years, our company has annually recruited approximately 20 new graduates from the Self-Defense Force throughout Japan. Currently, we have six Ready Reserve Self-Defense Force members and eleven Reserve Self-Defense Force members on our staff.

In 2020, intending to support our employees who are retired members of the Self-Defense Force, we implemented a system where special leave is granted for training call-ups, and attendance is counted for situations such as disaster dispatches.

Having been a member of the Self-Defense Force myself and having had various experiences, including ranger training, which allowed me to grow, I have a deep attachment to the new graduates from the Self-Defense Force who join our company. I will support their achievements after joining, both in terms of their mindset and through our systems.



Sergeant So (Ready Reserve Self-Defense Force) expresses his joy after receiving a “thank you” from a customer after completing a moving job.



Mr. Takao Honda, Executive Officer, Human Resources Strategy Division.  
ART MOVING COMPANY

to 52 years in January 2024. The appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel up to the maximum age allowed under the system has also been allowed. The number of years within which the completion of education and training for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel can be extended was increased. The government will continue to review the current system of SDF Reserve Personnel and others to improve the sufficiency rates of

SDF Reserve Personnel and others.

Also, the MOD is promoting the use of SDF Reserve Personnel in a wide range of fields, such as the appointment of retired SDF pilots who are re-employed in the private sector through the re-employment system as SDF Reserve Personnel.<sup>5</sup>

 See Fig. IV-2-1-4 (Overview of the System for SDF Reserve Personnel and Others)

### 3 Measures to Achieve Effective Use of Human Resources, etc.

#### 1 Effective Use of Human Resources

With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the authorized number of uniformed SDF personnel has been on a decline. On the other hand, there has been the need for personnel with skills and expertise in order to respond to the sophistication of equipment as well as the diversification and internationalization of SDF missions.

In light of such circumstances, the NDS and DBP call for raising the mandatory early retirement age of uniformed SDF personnel in order to ensure further utilization of older human resources with rich knowledge, skills, and experience, while paying attention to their military strength. Based on this, the retirement ages of personnel from the rank of Ichii (Captain (Ground Self-Defense Force [GSDF], Air Self-Defense Force [ASDF])/Lieutenant (Maritime Self-Defense Force [MSDF])) to Isso (Master Sergeant (GSDF, ASDF)/Petty Officer 1st Class (MSDF)) was raised by one year in 2023, while the retirement ages of personnel from the rank of Issa (Colonel (GSDF, ASDF)/Captain (MSDF)) to Sansa (Major (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Commander (MSDF)) as well as those from the ranks of Niso (Sergeant First Class (GSDF)/Technical Sergeant (ASDF)/Petty Officer 2nd Class (MSDF)) and Sanso (Sergeant (GSDF)/Staff Sergeant (ASDF)/Petty Officer 3rd Class (MSDF)) will be raised by one year in 2024.

In addition, in order to further promote the reappointment of retired uniformed SDF personnel (after their retirement age but before reaching the age of 65), a portion of vessel crew operations and aircraft pilotage tasks were made available to uniformed SDF reappointed personnel in FY2023, as well as cyberspace and flight inspection tasks were in FY2024.

At the same time, the MOD/SDF is creating a support

system for Artificial Intelligence (AI) application through the outsourcing of advisory functions regarding matters such as the promotion of AI application, etc., while building a necessary environment for AI application by

Fig. IV-2-1-5 Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel


Rank Designation	abbrev.	Retirement Age
General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)	Sho	60
Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)	Shoho	
Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)	Issa	57
Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)	Nisa	56
Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)	Sansa	
Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)	Ichii	56
First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)	Nii	
Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)	Sani	
Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)	Juni	
Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Socho	
Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Isso	
Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)	Niso	54
Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)	Sanso	
Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)	Shicho	—
Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)	Isshi	
Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)	Nishi	

(Notes)1 The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ASDF Chief of Staff, is 62.

2 The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, musician, military police officer, or information analyst, is 60.

5 The re-employment system for SDF pilots aims to prevent the outflow of active young SDF pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner. This system is also designed to utilize SDF pilots over a certain age as pilots of commercial airlines, and it is also significant from the perspective of the development of the airline industry in Japan as a whole.

**Fig. IV-2-1-6** Changes in the Number of Suicide Counts among MOD Personnel



educating MOD/SDF personnel with outsourced courses, etc., with the aim of promoting manpower saving and automation.

In addition, a crew system of rotating shift duty among multiple teams of crew has been introduced on some vessels in order to ensure an adequate operating ratio with a limited number of personnel.

**See** Fig. IV-2-1-5 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel)

## 2 Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among MOD Personnel

The suicide count among MOD personnel was 64 in FY2023. The fact that MOD personnel have lost their precious lives to suicide is truly tragic for the families of

the deceased and a huge loss to the organization.

In 2022, the MOD developed “The Basic Policy on Mental Health in the Ministry of Defense” and adopted various measures with a view to preventing suicide among its personnel.

Specifically, the MOD has engaged in improving the work environments by raising awareness of mental health checks for all employees and by educating them to make use of counseling services, as well as by promoting measures related to work-life balance. The MOD is also strengthening its support system by securing qualified counselors, collaborating with supervisors, counselors, and medical institutions, and diversifying consultation channels.

**See** Fig. IV-2-1-6 (Changes in the Number of Suicide Counts among MOD Personnel)


# 4 Improving Living and Work Environments

## 1 Initiatives to Improve Living and Work Environments

The NDS calls for the continued improvement of the living and work environments to enable all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride. Specifically, to ensure

readiness, the SDF is developing the necessary housing and is promoting measures against aging and earthquake proofing of barracks, government office buildings and housing. Additionally, it will work to gradually improve the living environment to ensure the privacy of SDF personnel, for example, by turning barracks into private rooms, and steadily renew worn-out living- and work-

## Turning barracks into private rooms



Current situation



Private rooms for privacy

## Developing housing



Before



After

Initiatives to improve the living and work environments of SDF personnel (turning barracks into private rooms, developing housing)

related equipment and secure the requisite amount of daily consumables.

In addition, in order to improve the education, living, and work environments for female SDF personnel, women's quarters will be set up in buildings and on

vessels and submarines, while women's restrooms and bathrooms will be built or renovated at training areas and other locations.

## 2 Initiatives to Support Families

In addition to exchanges between units and personnel's families, as well as between the families, the MOD in cooperation with relevant external groups and organizations is also actively working to develop a family support system to be implemented in the event of large-scale natural disasters and other events, which will include receiving cooperation in confirming the safety of the family members of SDF personnel and providing them with assistance in their livelihoods.

In addition, the MOD is promoting various types of support measures for the families of SDF personnel. For units dispatched overseas or to vessels for operations expected to continue for an extended period of time, the MOD has been creating a communication environment that allows the personnel and their families to get in direct contact. Moreover, the MOD has been implementing a range of support measures for the families of the personnel, including supporting additional shipments of comfort items sent from families to SDF personnel deployed overseas, holding briefing sessions and establishing consultation desks (family support centers) for families, and creating a website for the families of SDF personnel.

## 5 Human Resources Development

Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential for the execution of the units' duties. For this purpose, the respective SDF training units and schools provide opportunities for phased and systematic education according to ranks and duties to nurture necessary qualities and instill knowledge and skills.

Based on the DBP, the GSDF High Technical School will be jointly operated by the Ground, Maritime and Air SDF as well as transformed into a coeducational school. The MOD/SDF will strengthen the joint education in each SDF service as well as education and research including those of the cyber domain in each SDF service and at the National Defense Academy. At the same time, the MOD/SDF will promote standardization of the educational curriculum and utilization of state-of-the-

art technologies. In order to strengthen the content and structure of education and research, including in the cyber domain, the National Defense Academy is providing cyber literacy education and education on cross-domain operations for all grades to acquire cyberspace-related knowledge. Additionally, from FY2024, the Department of Information Engineering will be reorganized as the Department of Cyber and Information Engineering, to carry out more specialized education and research focused on the cyber domain.

Furthermore, education requires considerable human, time, and economic commitment, including securing instructors with special skills as well as improving equipment and educational facilities. In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or that it is difficult for them to

acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, the MOD/SDF commissions education to external institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic

companies and research institutes.

 Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-5-2(3) (Education and Research)

## 6 Improvement of Treatment and Re-employment Support

### 1 Improvement of Treatment

Because SDF personnel execute their missions in a challenging environment, efforts have been made to improve their treatment based on the special nature of their missions and work environments. In FY2024, a number of improvements will be implemented, including raising the allowances paid to crew members of destroyers and submarines as well as those serving in the JSDF Cyber Defense Command and the Amphibious Task Force, and providing new allowances to personnel working at radar sites, snipers, and personnel undergoing ranger training. From FY2023, in accordance with the DBP, surveys are being conducted on overtime work performed by uniformed SDF personnel and the salary systems of military personnel in other countries. In the future, the treatment of SDF personnel will be improved in light of not only the special nature of their missions and work environment but also the increase in the number of new missions, taking into account the results of these surveys.

At the same time, to ensure that SDF personnel can execute their missions with high morale and pride, measures related to honors and privileges, including expanding the scope of conferment of decorations and the appropriate commendation of achievements, will be promoted.

### 2 Commemorating Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty

Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950, SDF personnel have endeavored to complete their noble missions to protect the peace and independence of Japan with a strong sense of responsibility, regardless of danger. During this time period, however, more than 2,000 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty.

In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out by the respective units to which SDF personnel who

perished in the line of duty belonged in order to express condolences. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the personnel who perished in the line of duty and to express the deepest respect and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the Memorial Service for members of SDF personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister. Achievements of 26 SDF members (20 GSDF, 5 MSDF, and 1 ASDF members) who lost their lives in the line of duty were recognized in a Memorial Service in FY2023.<sup>6</sup>

### 3 Dealing with Retirement and Re-employment of SDF Personnel and Related Matters

In order to maintain the SDF's strength, most uniformed SDF personnel retire after their mid-50s, while fixed-term uniformed SDF personnel retire in their 20s or mid-30s. For many uniformed SDF personnel, re-employment is essential to safeguard their livelihood. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to provide re-employment support for active uniformed SDF personnel in order to relieve their anxiety about the future and allow them to devote themselves to their duties.

The DBP also states that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of uniformed SDF personnel after their retirement. It also calls for the MOD/SDF to further improve and strengthen re-employment support such as by enhancing the career guidance system and job training opportunities for SDF personnel scheduled to retire, and by strengthening cooperation with local governments, relevant organizations and private companies.

Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness, and responsibility gained through their work performance, education and training. Furthermore, they have various qualifications and licenses acquired through

<sup>6</sup> The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, led by the Minister of Defense and with the attendance of surviving family members and the Prime Minister. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.





Prime Minister Kishida offers flowers at the FY 2023 Memorial Service for Members of the Self-Defense Forces Who Lost Their Lives on Duty (October 2023)



Personnel receiving skills training for re-employment

their duties and vocational training. Therefore, they are making positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, including manufacturing and service industries, as well as finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, in addition to the disaster prevention and crisis management departments of local governments.

Specifically, as of the end of March 2024, a total of 665 retired SDF personnel work as crisis management officers and others at the disaster prevention and crisis management departments of local governments: 46 prefectural bureaus have 109 of them in total, and 476 municipal bureaus have 556 all over Japan. Since strengthening cooperation between the MOD/SDF and local governments will help to reinforce the crisis management capabilities of local governments, efforts are also being made to strengthen re-employment support in this regard.

Furthermore, the MOD offers disaster prevention and crisis management education for retiring uniformed SDF personnel seek employment in the disaster prevention and crisis management departments of local governments. An individual who completes the course is certified as a regional disaster prevention manager by the Cabinet Office upon request. The requirement for this certification is a rank of at least Ichii or a rank of Nii (First Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF)) with the effective work experience of an Ichii (Captain (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant (MSDF)). In addition, exchange of opinions regarding re-employment support for SDF personnel scheduled to retire with the security industry, where many SDF personnel are reemployed, will be continued, and in December 2023,

the All Japan Security Service Association and the Ministry of Defense agreed to collaborate on initiatives related to securing human resources in the security industry and provide smooth reemployment support for SDF personnel scheduled to retire.

Additionally, in order to increase the number of SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, in addition to maintaining and increasing the number of uniformed SDF personnel under the fixed-term system, it is decided that a scholarship would be provided to support the education of individuals who enter a university in Japan after completing their tenure as fixed-term uniformed SDF personnel and who are appointed SDF Reserve Personnel while at university.

Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of SDF personnel, the following three regulations, as are the cases in other national government employees have been put in place to ensure public trust regarding the fairness of official duties: (1) regulation on requesting re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel and on requesting information; (2) regulation on seeking employment opportunities at companies in which the retired personnel had a stake whilst in office; and (3) regulation on requests (lobbying) by re-employed personnel.<sup>7</sup> Compliance with these regulations is monitored by bodies comprised of academic experts with no history of serving as SDF personnel. Any violation of these regulations will be strictly dealt with through the imposition of penalties.

Additionally, for the purpose of the appropriate implementation of centralized management and disclosure of re-employment information by the

<sup>7</sup> Stipulated in Parts 2, 3 and 4 of Article 65 of the SDF Law

Cabinet, it has been decided that information on the re-employment status of retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions (equivalent to the position of Senior Coordinator in the MOD or higher) is to be published every fiscal year by the Cabinet.



Fig. IV-2-1-7 (Major Vocational Training Provided to Support Re-employment); Fig. IV-2-1-8 (Re-employment Support in FY2023), Reference 70 (Main Measures for Re-employment Support), and Reference 71 (Employment of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Local Government Disaster Prevention Agencies)

**Fig. IV-2-1-7 Major Vocational Training Provided to Support Re-employment**

In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or in their 20s to mid-30s (uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system).

Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility of the Japanese Government (the MOD) as the employer, and is crucial both for resolving any concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future as well as for securing qualified human resources, the MOD conducts support measures such as occupational training useful for their re-employment.

**Re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system**



**Re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age**




**Major Occupational Training Provided to Support Re-employment (Accomplishment in FY2023)**

Vehicle operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large-sized</li> <li>Regular-sized</li> <li>Special (large-sized)</li> <li>Semi-medium-sized</li> <li>Medium-sized</li> </ul>
Operation of facility machines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Forklifts and shovel loaders</li> <li>Boiler engineer</li> <li>Heavy-duty vehicle</li> <li>Crane</li> </ul>
Telecommunication technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Electrician</li> <li>Licensed electrician</li> <li>Telecommunication equipment works worker</li> <li>Maritime II-category special radio operator</li> </ul>
Handling of dangerous materials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hazardous material engineer</li> <li>Person responsible for class 3 refrigerating machiner</li> <li>Person responsible for manufacturing safety of high pressure gas</li> </ul>
Labor management practice, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Drone operator</li> <li>Security guard certification examination</li> <li>Operation manager</li> <li>Marine technician (Grades 3 to 6)</li> <li>Career consultant</li> </ul>
Information processing technique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Microsoft Office Specialist</li> <li>Examination for basic computer skills</li> <li>OA equipment</li> <li>IT Passport</li> <li>Fundamental (applied) information technology engineer</li> </ul>
Social welfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>First-level training for nursing care workers</li> <li>Mental health management</li> <li>Certified caregiver</li> <li>Care fitter</li> </ul>
Medical affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medical affairs</li> <li>Pharmacy administration</li> <li>Nursing care administration</li> <li>Registered vendor</li> </ul>
Legal practice, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Real estate transaction specialist</li> <li>Administrative scrivener</li> <li>Certified professional secretary examination</li> <li>Certified coach</li> </ul>
Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disaster prevention and crisis management education</li> <li>Financial planner</li> <li>Welding technician(Gas/arc welding, etc.)</li> <li>Preparatory course for civil service examination</li> <li>Fire defense equipment officer</li> <li>Official Business Skill Test in Book-keeping</li> <li>Health officer</li> <li>Condominium manager</li> <li>TOEIC</li> <li>Fire prevention manager</li> </ul>

(Note) The names of the occupational training topics for each category are listed in descending order of the number of participants.

Fig. IV-2-1-8 Re-employment Support in FY2023



Note: Due to rounding off, figures may not add up to the total.

<b>Termination of a term</b> Result of re-employment support for retired personnel	Number of personnel who applied for re-employment support	<b>1,171</b>
	Number of personnel who found a job	<b>1,166</b>
	Percentage of personnel who found a job	<b>99.6%</b>
<b>Early age retirement</b> Result of re-employment support for retired personnel	Number of personnel who applied for re-employment support	<b>3,005</b>
	Number of personnel who found a job	<b>2,992</b>
	Percentage of personnel who found a job	<b>99.6%</b>

		<b>REFERENCE</b> : Re-employment support (assistance) by the MOD (Japanese Only) <b>URL</b> : <a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/reemploy/index.html">https://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/reemploy/index.html</a>	
		<b>REFERENCE</b> : Retired SDF personnel employment guide (GSDF) (Japanese Only) <b>URL</b> : <a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/g sdf/retire/index.html">https://www.mod.go.jp/g sdf/retire/index.html</a>	
		<b>MOVIE</b> : The GSDF is a rich reservoir of talent – Ready to meet your HR needs! (GSDF) <b>URL</b> : <a href="https://youtu.be/wnLmn9VwIVY?si=_DbLnb2L2PkX-WL_">https://youtu.be/wnLmn9VwIVY?si=_DbLnb2L2PkX-WL_</a>	
		<b>REFERENCE/MOVIE</b> : Retired SDF personnel recruitment guidance (MSDF) (Japanese Only) <b>URL</b> : <a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/recruit/engo/">https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/recruit/engo/</a>	
		<b>REFERENCE/MOVIE</b> : Re-employment support (assistance) by the MOD (ASDF) (Japanese Only) <b>URL</b> : <a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/rehire/">https://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/rehire/</a>	

## VOICE

## Voices of Re-employed Personnel and Their Employers/Chiefs

**MIWA Asuka, Senior Manager, Public Sector Sales Section, Tokyo Office, INFINITY Inc.**  
(Served in the General Affairs Group of the MSDF Communications Command)

I joined INFINITY Inc. after completing my service with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. I am currently in-charge of sales operations.

When I first joined INFINITY, I felt quite anxious due to the difference in work culture between the SDF and private-sector companies. In the SDF, you follow the instructions of your superior officers. However, in a private company like INFINITY, once you are entrusted with work, you have to take the initiative to create and proceed with a schedule on your own. With the advice of my supervisors and senior colleagues, I was able to gradually find my way and learn the ropes of the business. I feel a sense of accomplishment when I can complete the work I am responsible for and contribute to the company. I am in my third year with INFINITY, and my workload has increased. I enjoy working every

**MURANAKA Akio, Representative Director and President, INFINITY Inc.**

INFINITY Inc. was founded in 1994 as a cable manufacturer in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture. The Tokyo office was opened in September 2010, selling products to all ministries and agencies (mainly the Ministry of Defense).

We have been supporting the re-employment of retired SDF personnel to facilitate business operations for some time now, and the former soldiers we have hired have received very high praise from outside the company for their courtesy, polite language, and clean appearance, which they inculcated during their service in the SDF.

Among them, Ms. Miwa, who joined the company the year before last, is excellent in performing her duties, an ability that she

day, striving to meet the expectations of my supervisors.

During my time with the SDF, I served as a deputy adjutant. My main duties were assisting the adjutant, such as in reception, coordinating with external parties, and preparing documents. This experience of providing support is still useful today in supporting my supervisors with their work. The etiquette I learned in the SDF also applies to my current workplace and still serves as my foundation.

While I was job hunting, I received considerable support from the Employment Assistance Office and was able to balance my work with my duties at the unit. It was very reassuring to be able to consult with them when I was worried about my future career.

I will continue to value the knowledge and experience I gained in the SDF as I pursue my new career.

cultivated in the SDF, such as being able to quickly and appropriately provide the required products and services by carefully observing his surroundings, reading the atmosphere, and paying careful attention to the situation during negotiations with external parties, and contributes greatly to improving the company's performance. He has always maintained good interpersonal relationships at the workplace and a positive work environment with his natural communication skills and cooperativeness.

We will continue to hire retired SDF personnel and strive to improve our quality and services further, aiming to make even greater strides.



MIWA Asuka, Senior Manager, Public Sector Sales Section, Tokyo Office, INFINITY Inc.



MURANAKA Akio, Representative Director and President, INFINITY Inc.

## Section 2

## Creating an Organizational Environment of Zero Tolerance for Harassment of Any Kind

The Japanese people have high expectations of the MOD/SDF, and it is indispensable for us to gain their support and trust all the time to fully exercise our ability to complete our duties. In order to meet their expectations to this end, the SDF personnel are required to be an invariably disciplined existence more than ever.

The MOD/SDF has taken various measures such as thorough instructions on service discipline in order to foster well-disciplined personnel. However, disciplinary action has been taken in recent years for a number of cases of harassment. In order to exert organizational strength and respond decisively to a wide range of situations, the MOD/SDF must create a working environment that

enables SDF personnel, who are the core of Japan's defense capability, to perform their tasks confidently with high morale and peace of mind. Harassment, in particular, must not be tolerated, as it destroys mutual trust among the personnel of MOD/SDF, which are fundamentally based on unit actions and shakes the very foundation of the organization.

Given this understanding, the MOD/SDF is committed to addressing harassment cases and fundamentally reviewing harassment prevention measures with a sense of urgency to create an environment where harassment is absolutely not tolerated.

## 1 Response to Harassment Incidents

The MOD/SDF have established a hotline for consultation from SDF personnel. The annual number of consultations was 109 when the hotline was permanently established in FY2016 and has since increased to 857 in FY2023.

Power harassment, in particular, which accounts for about 80% of the total number of such consultations, is a major problem; such harassment could lead to a violation of the dignity and human rights of MOD/SDF personnel, suicide incidents, and adversely affect the work environment. Power harassment is caused by inadequate knowledge of it and the communication gap between superiors and their subordinates. In order to resolve and prevent these issues, the MOD/SDF has (1) provided classroom training and remote learning to enhance understanding and raise awareness of power harassment among MOD/SDF personnel; (2) conducted education to promote understanding and enhance leadership capabilities among MOD/SDF personnel (particularly those in managerial positions); and (3) taken measures to improve and strengthen the consultation system.

In order to eradicate disciplinary violations, such as assault and battery, power harassment, and so on, the standards of disciplinary actions were tightened in 2020. The number of cases of harassment for which disciplinary actions were taken was 549 in FY2022. Of these, 30 personnel were subject to the heaviest

disciplinary action of discharge<sup>1</sup> (3 power harassment cases and 27 sexual harassment cases).

Furthermore, as some personnel are reluctant to seek advice at the SDF consultation desk, a consultation desk staffed by counselors and other professionals outside of the SDF on weekends, holidays, and after-hours has been established in addition to the existing consultation desk staffed by lawyers.


However, despite the various harassment prevention measures that have been adopted so far, there have been cases where harassment has occurred and the response was inadequate. For example, there was a case of a former GSDF personnel who had lodged a complaint that they were subject to sexual harassment during training and on a daily basis at their unit, but the information was not reported to the commanding officer, and the facts of the case were not properly investigated. Following the complaint by the individual, an investigation conducted by a higher-level unit, it was determined in September 2022 that sexual harassment, including sexual violence, had indeed occurred, and disciplinary actions for those involved were taken in the same year.

Such incidents suggest that the effects of the MOD's existing harassment prevention measures are inadequate in terms of effectiveness, and is extremely serious and deeply regrettable.

<sup>1</sup> Types of disciplinary action include dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in pay, and reprimand. The disciplinary actions taken are determined based on a comprehensive evaluation of the causes, motives, and circumstances of the disciplinary violation, the position and rank of the offender, as well as the impact of the disciplinary violation both inside and outside the unit.

**See** Fig. IV-2-2-1 (The Number of the Personnel Subject to Have Taken Disciplinary Action for the Substantiated Harassment Case); Fig. IV-2-2-2 (Changed in the Number of Consultations to the MOD Harassment Hotline)

**Fig. IV-2-2-1** The Number of the Personnel Subject to Have Taken Disciplinary Action for the Substantiated Harassment Case



**Fig. IV-2-2-2** Changed in the Number of Consultations to the MOD Harassment Hotline

(Unit: No. of Cases)

Category	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023
Power Harassment	519	1,010	1,706	1,217	782
Sexual Harassment	73	60	82	136	59
Maternity Harassment	8	7	23	44	16
Consultation Desk for Each Institution	474	391	500	725	850
Total	1,074	1,468	2,311	2,122	1,707

## 2 Directive, etc., of the Minister of Defense on Measures to Eradicate Harassment

On September of 2022, then Defense Minister Hamada issued a directive on measures to eradicate harassment, in which (1) all personnel once again be informed of harassment consultation helpdesk’s and counselor’s availability and encourage them to seek consultation and report any harassment accordingly, (2) urgent review of the current status of harassment-related consultations and the appropriate follow-up in all cases, (3) special defense inspection of the entire MOD/SDF, and (4) establishment of an advisory panel to conduct a fundamental review of harassment prevention measures.

Furthermore, in August 2023, following the recommendations of “The Ministry of Defense Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention Measures” described below, the then Minister of Defense Hamada issued a message to all personnel, emphasizing that each member is responsible for creating an environment in which



Minister of Defense Kihara instructed to eradicate harassment, etc.

harassment is not tolerated and that it is urgent to review and create fundamental measures promptly.

In October of the same year, in response to

harassment incidents<sup>2</sup> that occurred in the Maritime Self-Defense Force, Minister of Defense Kihara issued “The Minister of Defense Instructions on Strict Measures for Harassment Response.” He directed the immediate investigation of cases reported through special defense inspections, urgent review of individual cases, and swift reporting of unreported cases to ensure strict handling of all harassment incidents. Additionally, Minister of

Defense Kihara issued a message to all personnel and commanders/management personnel, urging each member to be aware of their role, actively work on harassment prevention, consult without hesitation if they experience harassment, and support victims promptly if they witness or receive reports of harassment, taking appropriate action without delay.

### 3 The Ministry of Defense Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention Measures

Based on the directive of the Minister of Defense in September 2022, “The Ministry of Defense Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention Measures” was established in November 2022. This panel conducted a fundamental review of harassment prevention measures, which included eight discussions in total, on-site inspections at each Self-Defense Force unit, and interactions with personnel. The panel also exchanged views with a former member of the Ground Self-Defense Force who was a victim of sexual harassment and considered the results of special defense inspections on harassment prevention status, which will be described later. In August 2023, after reviewing these issues, the panel submitted recommendations to the MOD regarding “The Fundamental Review of Harassment Prevention Measures.”

The panel pointed out in the recommendations that

the MOD/SDF is still in the process of fostering an organizational culture that does not tolerate harassment and that efforts in this regard are inadequate. It also highlighted that the responsibility of the supervisor (commanders) are unclear regarding harassment prevention measures and that they lack awareness of their duties and outlined strategies that the MOD should undertake in the areas of (1) preventive measures, (2) response to incidents, and (3) post-incident measures. Specifically, the panel proposed reforms to organizational culture through measures such as regular issuance of messages from the top management, reviewing of training, improving the qualifications of counselors, accelerating the resolution of problems (disciplinary actions), and disseminating information on disciplinary measures.

### 4 The Special Defense Inspection on Harassment Prevention Status

Based on the directive of the Minister of Defense in September 2022, the Defense Inspection General’s Office of legal compliance conducted a special defense inspection on the status of harassment prevention status and accepted harassment reports and/or complains from MOD/SDF personnel regarding harassment consultation and response.

The Defense Inspection General’s Office of legal compliance interviewed the complainants to determine the basic facts of the harassment incidents, and eventually reviewed regarding the final 1,325 cases that were reported by the end of November 2022 deadline. Taking into account the complainants’ preferences, they notified the relevant agencies where the incidents



**REFERENCE** : Ministry of Defense Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention Measures (Japanese Only)

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/meeting/harassment/index.html>



**REFERENCE** : Results of Special Defense Inspection (August 2023) (Japanese Only)

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2023/08/18a.html>



<sup>2</sup> In December 2022, a Maritime Self-Defense Force member reported to their superior that they had been subjected to sexual harassment while on duty. Despite the individual’s wishes, the individual was compelled to meet with the perpetrator, another member of the unit, and receive an apology. The perpetrator and the superior received suspensions in November 2023, with the former receiving a 10-month suspension and the latter a 3-month suspension.

occurred and proceeded with detailed investigations. “Results of Special Defense Inspection” were publicly announced in August 2023.

The results of the special defense inspection revealed that the counselors and consultation desk were not being adequately utilized. More than 60% of the complaints alleging inadequate handling of harassment incidents revealed that the complainants had not even sought advice from counselors or consultation desk. There are concerns about the adequate response by counselors and consultation desk, and the situation arising after consultations, casting doubts about whether the

harassment consultation system was effectively fulfilling its intended role. Moreover, numerous complaints were voiced about dissatisfaction with the responses received despite seeking consultation.

Dissatisfaction with responses to complaints was confirmed to potentially contribute to the ineffectiveness of the harassment consultation system. Therefore, this Special Defense Inspection indicated a need to improve and thoroughly implement harassment prevention measures, including the consultation system, as a corrective measure.

## 5 The Fundamental Review of Harassment Prevention Measures

As part of its future actions, the MOD, based on the results of the expert committee and the Special Defense Inspection, formed a Harassment Prevention Measures Review Team in August 2023 to examine effective measures, including a review of consultation systems and education. Specifically, the aim is to reform organizational culture that may contribute to harassment, with plans for regular messages from the top management including the Minister of Defense, as well as utilizing educational opportunities to reform personnel awareness. Additionally, there are plans to review harassment prevention education, provide training to improve the qualifications of managers (commanders) and counselors, standardize and clarify disciplinary action criteria, expand the harassment consultation system, and increase awareness of consultation services.

In November 2023, Minister of Defense Kihara convened “The Meeting on Harassment Prevention.” He instructed ministry officials to raise the awareness of each member, especially supervisors and commanders of the organization, to take leadership in preventing harassment, to prioritize support for the victim members first, and to respond promptly to harassment. He stated that team members who had been victimized should not hesitate to report it to their supervisors or the reporting desk and that any member who witnessed the victimization should report it on behalf of the victimized



Conference on Harassment Prevention convened by the MOD (November 2023)

members of the team. Furthermore, during “The Defense Ministry Employee Harassment Prevention Month” in FY2023, efforts were made to intensively raise awareness of harassment prevention measures through various educational activities and discussions, including those conducted by external experts.

We will continue to ensure that all SDF personnel are thoroughly educated on harassment. We will also continuously review and update our measures to keep up with the times, incorporating insights from external experts. Our goal is to create an environment in which harassment is not tolerated at all.



**REFERENCE** : Promotion of harassment prevention measures and consultation desk (Japanese Only)

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/harassment/index.html>



## Section 3 Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women's Participation

Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, and the situations that require a response by the MOD/SDF are increasing in number and becoming longer in duration. On the other hand, Japan faces rapid declining and falling birth rate, making it more difficult than ever to secure SDF personnel who are the core of defense capabilities. Under these circumstances, it is expected that an increasing number of MOD/SDF personnel, both male and female, who are responsible for various duties, will face time and commuting constraints for childcare, and nursing care and other reason due to major changes in the social structure.

Amid such challenging circumstances, ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires creating an environment that enables staff to be sound both mentally and physically, maintain high morale and pride, and fully demonstrate their abilities.

To this end, the MOD/SDF will promote better work-life balance and the active participation of female personnel based on the NDS, etc.

Specifically, the MOD/SDF established the Action Plan in 2015 in order to promote work-life balance of female personnel and conducted various initiatives. In 2021, the MOD/SDF established a new action plan based around the pillars of (1) reform of promoting work-life balance, and (2) promoting women's active participation. In March 2023, the MOD/SDF is further advancing initiatives through revising the Action Plan focused on the following five items, (1) promotion of work from home, (2) transition to paperless work environment, (3) rigorous management of working hours, (4) promotion of paternity leave, and (5) establishment of a workplace environment in which all personnel can work comfortably.

### 1 Working Style Reform to Promote Work-Life Balance

#### 1 Value and Mentality Reform

In order to promote working style reform, focus needs to be placed especially on reforming the values and mentality of staff in managerial positions regarding working style. The MOD/SDF has been issuing top management messages and conducting seminars and lectures aimed at raising awareness of working style reforms and the concept of work-life balance. With the increase of personnel facing time/commuting constraints for child/family care, the MOD/SDF is also promoting correction of long working hours, encouraging taking leave, and telework to ensure proper work-life balance so that all personnel can exert his/her full potential.

In addition, the MOD/SDF is conducting initiatives for "management reform" aimed at enhancing the management ability of administrative staff.

#### 2 Working Style Reform in the Workplace

Efforts aimed at the promotion of work-life balance will lead to effective initiatives and the creation of a

culture in which personnel consider specific measures for improving their workplace environment based on the actual conditions of their workplace. Based on this perspective, the MOD has been holding the "Competition for Initiatives to Promote Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense" with awards presented to particularly outstanding initiatives, which are then introduced within the MOD to help other personnel reform their working styles.

#### 3 Flexible Working Hours and Location

In light of workload fluctuations and the time constraints faced by individuals such as childcare, nursing care, etc., the MOD/SDF has introduced an early/late shifts and a flextime system to allow for the flexible selection of working hours. In April 2023, further flexibility is being pursued, including a reduction in core hours under the flextime system.

In the MOD/SDF, considering the uniqueness of certain jobs, work from home has now been made possible at all institutions, except for those jobs where work from



**REFERENCE** : Ministry of Defense website: Promote active participation and work-life balance of female personnel (Japanese Only)

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/worklife/index.html>

home is not feasible. The MOD/SDF will continue to promote digitalization, including the computerization of documents as well as the installation of more terminals, in order to establish business processes in which tasks can be completed with work from home.

#### 4 Rigorous Management of Working Hours

Through the systemization of working hour management, surveys conducted on overtime work, etc., efforts are being made to rectify the long working hours that may be detrimental to the physical and mental health and welfare of personnel.

#### 5 Development of an Environment that Enables Personnel to Play an Active Role while Engaging in Childcare and Nursing Care

The MOD/SDF has developed various schemes that enable its personnel to balance work with their childcare/nursing care commitments, such as hiring fixed-term staff who take over those on childcare or other leave. In particular, the MOD/SDF is working to enable all male personnel with a newborn child to take paternity leave or time off work. As part of the efforts, the MOD/SDF is encouraging all male personnel with a newborn child to take paternity leave or time off work for approximately one month or more.

The MOD/SDF is also developing an environment that enables its personnel to balance work life with their family life through various initiatives, such as by providing explanations on systems related to childcare and nursing care, introducing role models, and creating “childcare forms” to help managers and the human

resources department better understand the details of the situation surrounding their personnel’s childcare. A system has also been established to allow SDF personnel who retired mid-career due to childcare or nursing care commitments to be re-employed.

#### 6 Ensuring Childcare Services

Developing an environment in which MOD/SDF personnel are able to devote themselves to their duties without worrying about childcare or other concerns is important in maintaining a permanent state of readiness. The MOD/SDF has set up workplace nurseries at camps and bases in eight locations across Japan. In addition, in the event of situations where a quick response is required such as disaster relief, the MOD promotes support measures to provide temporary childcare in SDF camps and bases for children of SDF personnel.



Emergency attendance support for SDF personnel engaged in disaster relief during the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake

## 2 Reform to Promote Women's Participation

For the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel, the MOD/SDF has been making various efforts to promote the activities of motivated and qualified female personnel by setting up specific goals under the Action Plan.

Moreover, as part of its efforts related to Women, Peace and Security<sup>1</sup> (WPS), Japan is promoting the

participation of women in disaster prevention and disaster response efforts and decision-making for security policy. The MOD/SDF, which is the main entities in these efforts, is working on promoting women’s participation and conducting various activities related to the WPS field both in Japan and overseas. As the importance of activities considering the needs of women and girls who

<sup>1</sup> A concept that encapsulates the idea that peace is more sustainable when women take the lead and actively participate in all levels of conflict prevention, response and reconstruction, and peacebuilding, as well as disaster prevention, while recognizing the importance of protection and relief for women and girls, and those in need, as they are more vulnerable during conflicts and disasters.

are placed in particularly vulnerable situations during conflicts and disasters grows both in Japan and overseas, the MOD/SDF recognizes that all personnel are the main contributors to WPS and aims to further contribute to the promotion of WPS through the promotion of women's participation, etc.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-5 (Initiatives to Promote Women, Peace and Security (WPS))

## 1 Expansion of the Recruitment and Promotion of Female Personnel

The MOD/SDF has set numerical targets in the Action Plan for the systematic expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel. In addition, based on NSS, the MOD/SDF plans to develop an educational infrastructure that supports women's activities, and to develop women's quarters in military buildings and naval vessels to increase the number of female SDF personnel.

### (1) Female SDF Personnel

As of the end of March 2024, the number of female SDF personnel is about 20,000 (about 9% of the total SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2014 when female SDF personnel made up about 5.6% of the total SDF personnel), this is a rise of 3.3 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female SDF personnel has been on the rise in recent years.

Regarding the recruitment of female SDF personnel, the targets for the proportion of newly employed female SDF personnel among total newly employed SDF personnel in and after FY2021 and the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel by FY2030 have increased to at least 17% and 12%, respectively. In addition, the MOD/SDF is improving education, living, and work environments for female SDF personnel in line with the increasing number of female SDF personnel recruited.

With regard to promotion, the MOD/SDF aims to increase the proportion of women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher to at least 5% by the end of FY2025.

### (2) Female Civilian Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Others

As of the end of March 2024, the number of female civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others is approximately 5,500 (about 27.6% of the total civilian officials and others). Compared

with ten years ago (end of March 2014 when females made up about 23.4% of the total civilian officials and others), this is a rise of 4.2 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female civilian officials and others has been on the rise in recent years.

With regard to recruitment, in line with the overall government target, the MOD has set the goal of ensuring that women account for over 35% of recruits in and after FY2021. Regarding promotion targets to be achieved by the end of FY2025 include increasing the proportion of women of the unit chief level at the MOD proper or its equivalent to 35%, division director at local organizations/ division deputy director level at the MOD proper or its equivalent to 10%, the division director level at the MOD proper or its equivalent to 6%, and designated official or equivalent to 5%.

**See** Fig. IV-2-3-1 (Women's Participation at the MOD and Targets and Current Values for the Action Plan); Fig. IV-2-3-2 (Changes in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel); Fig. IV-2-3-3 (Major Technological Cooperation with National Research and Development Agencies, etc.)

## 2 Significance of Promoting Active Engagement of Female SDF Personnel and Personnel Management Policy

With SDF duties becoming increasingly diverse and complex, SDF personnel are required more than ever to have multifaceted capabilities, including higher levels of knowledge, decision-making ability, and skills. In addition, under a severe recruitment environment due to the declining birth rate and continuing trend of higher education, it is anticipated that the number of SDF personnel with time and location restraints, including those involved in childcare, nursing care, and other responsibilities, will significantly increase.


In light of these changes, the SDF is required to evolve from a conventional organization with an emphasis on homogeneity among the members, into an organization that is capable of incorporating diverse human resources in a flexible manner.

At present, the largest human resource that the SDF has not been able to fully utilize is women, who account for half of the population targeted for recruitment. Promoting the active engagement of female SDF personnel has the following significance: (1) securing useful human resources; (2) utilizing diverse perspectives; and (3) reflecting values of the nation. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has decided to open up a path for female personnel with motivation, ability, and aptitude to have

**Fig. IV-2-3-1 Women's Participation at the MOD and Targets and Current Values for the Action Plan**

	Items	Target	Current value
Recruitment and promotion of female SDF personnel	Proportion of newly employed female SDF personnel among total newly employed SDF personnel	17% or more (After FY 2021)	18.0% (FY2023)
	Proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel	12% or more (By FY 2030)	8.9% (FY2023)
	Proportion of women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher	5% or more (By FY 2025)	4.4% (FY2023)
Recruitment and promotion of female civilian personnel	The proportion of female SDF personnel recruited from those who passed the recruitment examination for national public employees	35% or more (every year)	39.3%(April 1, 2023)
	Proportion of women at the unit chief level in the MOD (Level (I) Class 3 or 4 personnel working at the MOD (MOD consists of the internal bureau of the MOD and the internal bureau of Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA))	35% (By 2025)	33.2% (July 1, 2023)
	The proportion of women as director of the regional agency division, equivalent to the assistant director in MOD or its equivalent (Level (I) Class 5 or 6 personnel)	10% (By 2025)	8.2%(July 1, 2023)
	The proportion of women at the division director level in MOD or its equivalent	6% (By 2025)	4.1%(July 1, 2023)
	The proportion of women at the designated official level or equivalent	5% (By 2025)	1.8%(July 1, 2023)

**Fig. IV-2-3-2 Changes in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel**




(Note) As of the end of March 2023, the total number of female SDF personnel is 19,886 (approximately 8.7% of the total number of the SDF personnel)

Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities

Part IV Chapter 2

**Fig. IV-2-3-3 Major Technological Cooperation with National Research and Development Agencies, etc.**



opportunities to demonstrate their abilities in various fields, with the aim of doubling the ratio of female SDF personnel.

In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person's motivation and ability/apptitude.

### 3 Removal of the Assignment Restriction of Female SDF Personnel

The MOD/SDF has completely removed the assignment restriction of female SDF personnel with the exception of units to which female personnel cannot be assigned for reasons of maternity protection (namely, part of the GSDF Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit [chemical] as well as Tunnel Company Units).

As a result, the assignment of female personnel to vocations, such as fighter pilots, paratroopers, and submarine crew members, is currently underway.



**MOVIE** : Ministry of Defense website: Activities of female GSDF personnel members following their dreams  
**URL** : <https://youtu.be/-bcA9G417vU>



**MOVIE** : Ministry of Defense website: Female MSDF personnel members who also value their own time while working  
**URL** : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tsk6VAV6LP4>



**MOVIE** : Ministry of Defense website: Activities of female ASDF personnel members  
**URL** : [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzUcZITk\\_bs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzUcZITk_bs)

## Section 4 Transformation of Medical Functions

The NDS stipulates that, from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency, the SDF medical force, which has been placing importance on sustaining the health of SDF personnel, will transform into an organization that saves the lives of SDF personnel who carry out their missions in a contingency in spite of danger.

Under circumstances where the SDF's missions are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it is important to accurately address the needs of various medical activities, such as providing medical support in disaster relief operations and international peace cooperation activities, as well as capacity building on military medicine.

The MOD/SDF, therefore, is enhancing the medical functions: (i) Strengthening seamless medical care and evacuation posture from the frontlines to the destination hospital, (ii) Reinforcement of integrated medical operational posture, and (iii) Fundamental management reform of the National Defense Medical College as the three pillars to improve the combat trauma care capabilities. In addition, the MOD/SDF is further enhancing and strengthening its medical capabilities so that they can appropriately respond to various emergency events and carry out its multiple missions in Japan and abroad.

### 1 Fundamentally Strengthen the Combat Trauma Care Capabilities

#### 1 Strengthening Seamless Medical Care and Evacuation Posture


In order to improve the life-saving rate of injured SDF personnel on the front line, it is necessary to strengthen the respective functions of first aid at the front line, providing emergency measures near the site of injury, medical evacuation, and destination SDF hospitals.

 See Fig. IV-2-4-1 (Conceptual Image of a Seamless Posture for Medical Care and Evacuation)

#### (1) Enhancement of the First Aid at the Front Line and Medical Care During Evacuation

In response to injured SDF personnel at the frontline, Frontline Medics<sup>1</sup> first provide life-saving procedures<sup>2</sup> to the personnel while damage control surgery (DCS)<sup>3</sup>

Fig. IV-2-4-1 Conceptual Image of a Seamless Posture for Medical Care and Evacuation



- 1 Frontline medics refer to those who have been certified as Licensed Assistant Nurses (see "Assistant Nurse" as defined in the Act on Public Health Nurses, Midwives, and Nurses) or Emergency Life-Saving Technicians (see "Emergency Life-Saving Technician" as defined in the Emergency Life-Saving Technicians Act), and who have completed the training curriculum approved by the council stipulated in the Directives Relating to Emergency Life-Saving Actions.
- 2 First aid treatment for those with symptoms such as airway obstruction and tension pneumothorax caused by injuries, and other treatments such as administration of analgesic for pain relief.
- 3 Emergency operations to stop hemorrhage by pressing/placing gauze and sutures, etc. on damaged internal organs, and to prevent contamination with intestinal tract contents. The purpose is to stabilize the patient's condition to the level where transfer is possible.



Joint Logistics and Medical Training during the FY2023 Joint Exercise "05JX" (November 2023)

is performed at medical bases equipped with the field operation system,<sup>4</sup> etc. After these measures, the patients are safely and quickly sent back to the Self-Defense Forces Hospitals for specialized treatment and complete cure.

For improving the life-saving rate of our SDF personnel, a medical support system and posture is being established that allows for aid to be received within 10 minutes of injury, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF have been educating and training SDF personnel who are licensed as Licensed Assistant Nurses and Emergency Life-Saving Technician so that they are able to provide life-saving procedures<sup>4</sup> to SDF personnel who have been injured in the course of executing their missions near the scene of injury while promoting their designation and deployment to units as frontline medics.

In addition, for the construction of a rapid and reliable evacuation posture using all means of evacuation, the SDF will enhance education and training tailored to the characteristics of the units and equipment of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, which include medical care during evacuation on board ships and aircraft while promoting the development of training equipment for medical transport by air and teaching materials for improving first aid capability.

The SDF will also promote development and integration of medical training infrastructure necessary for combat injury education and common to all SDFs, aiming to improve common knowledge and skills.

## (2) Enhancing the Functions of SDF Hospitals and Establishing Medical Bases

The role of SDF hospitals is to admit and treat injured SDF personnel and other persons transported from their area of activity in various emergency situations. In peacetime, these hospitals also provide medical care to SDF personnel and their families, etc. These hospitals also play the role of educational institutions that train medical personnel to maintain and enhance their skills.

In response to the recommendations of this discussion meeting in February 2024, the MOD/SDF is promoting studies to establish a system for administering blood transfusion during combat trauma care. Furthermore, there are plans to provide equipment to stockpile blood products in the FY 2024 budget.

## (3) Securing medical materials and equipment such as blood products

Most deaths in war are due to exsanguination from bomb wounds, gunshot wounds, and other similar causes. To prevent such deaths, it is extremely important to secure blood products for transfusion. For this reason, to establish an operational posture for the MOD/SDF to autonomously secure and stockpile blood products based on NDS, in October 2023, under Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Matsumoto, the "Expert Panel on Blood Transfusion during Combat Trauma Care of the MOD/SDFs" was established with external experts having specialized knowledge, and a total of five discussion meetings have been held.

In response to the recommendations of this discussion meeting in February 2024, the MOD/SDF is promoting studies to establish a system for administering blood transfusion during combat trauma care. Furthermore, there are plans to provide equipment to stockpile blood products in the FY 2024 budget.

## 2 Reinforcement of Integrated Medical Operational Posture

Many of the medical functions are common among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and to strengthen the integrated operational posture in the medical field, which is closely involved in supporting unit operations, unification of joint medical training and various medical education is being promoted.

<sup>4</sup> Mobile operating room sheltered in a large truck with one of the four functions necessary for operation (operation, operation preparation, sterilization, medical supply vehicles). Thoracotomy, laparotomy, craniotomy, and other operations to save lives can be conducted.

## Commentary

## Initiative to Enhance Combat Casualty Care Capabilities: The Blood Transfusion Strategy of the Ministry of Defense for Treatment of Combat Injuries

Most deaths in war are due to exsanguination from bomb wounds, gunshot wounds, and other similar causes. Securing and using blood products for transfusion to prevent such deaths is extremely important. However, it is necessary to gather the opinions of external experts on measures concerning blood products and medical treatment using blood products from the perspective of medical efficacy, safety, and ethics. Thus, the Study Meeting on Blood Transfusion in Combat Casualty Care by the MOD/SDF was established under the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Matsumoto.

Based on the common understanding that simple, safe, and speedy use and management of blood transfusion is required in combat casualty care, which is subject to geographical, human, and material constraints, the panel of experts determined that, given the unique environment surrounding combat casualty care, it would be appropriate for the MOD/SDF to prepare a blood transfusion protocol manual that takes every possible measure to improve the survival rate of soldiers, in addition to transfusion procedures based on domestic guidelines prescribed by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The panel of experts also identified various issues to be addressed when preparing the

protocol, such as human resource development, establishment of a system within the ministry, and preparation of safety management and utilization procedures, and gave recommendations for solving these issues.

Based on the recommendations, the MOD/SDF will formulate a blood transfusion strategy that can be used appropriately and ensures safety so that the lives of as many members as possible can be saved.



Panel of experts discussing at the Study Meeting

Furthermore, an information system will be established to standardize medical supplies and equipment to ensure interoperability among various SDFs and ensure that medical information for each SDF personnel can be accessed on time without distinction.

### 3 Strengthening the Function of the NDMC

As the only educational institution of the MOD/SDF for the training of SDF personnel who are physicians (medical officers), SDF personnel who are public health and registered nurses (nursing officers), and technical officers, the NDMC plays the role of training and producing primary medical staff as well as maintaining and improving their skills.

The DBP stipulates that the NDMC will strengthen education and research, including combat trauma care capabilities improvement. Specifically, it calls for strengthening education for medical and nursing officers in areas such as trauma surgery and treatment,

as well as promoting the necessary research in defense medicine to advance the quality of the SDF's medical services in areas such as the treatment of trauma, burns, and physical injuries, infectious disease control, and mental health. In particular, research on artificial platelet could be beneficial in treating combat injuries if it can be successfully put to practical use.

In addition, in FY 2024, a “Center for Trauma, Burn and Tactical Medicine” will be newly established at the NDMC to train medical and nursing officers capable of providing medical care for combat trauma care.

In addition, an operational posture will be established to provide highly advanced medical care at the NDMC Hospital to allow it to play the role of admitting severely injured SDF personnel who cannot be treated at SDF hospitals.

The MOD / SDF will drastically reform the operation of the NDMC Hospital, which is a clinical site for medical officers and others who provide treatment for combat injuries.



## 2 Strengthening the Medical Function to Respond to Various Situations and Diverse Missions

### 1 Securing and Training Medical Personnel

The MOD/SDF is working to secure and nurture medical officers and maintain and improve their medical skills by enhancing clinical education at the NDMC and other institutions, promoting various initiatives for ensuring more opportunities for medical officers to engage in medical practice, and helping them acquire and improve specialized knowledge and skills in areas such as infectious diseases and emergency medicine.

Similar measures are taken for nursing officers to maintain and improve their knowledge/skills through practice at external hospitals, etc.

Moreover, medical personnel and medical staff, such as radiological technologists, clinical laboratory technicians, and emergency life-saving technicians, are educated and trained at SDF hospitals, schools and other relevant institutions so that the SDF can perform diverse missions and missions under special circumstances, including international peace cooperation activities and large-scale disasters.

### 2 Improving Preparedness Necessary for International Cooperation

The MOD/SDF has dispatched instructors for the United Nations Field Medical Assistant Course (UNFMAC) as a part of the UN Triangular Partnership Programme (UNTPP), participated in medical care, etc., in overseas disaster areas as part of international disaster relief activities. They have also actively conducted capacity building and joint exercises in underwater medicine,

aviation medicine, disaster medicine, and other medical fields for the benefit of various countries, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Every year, the SDF participates in the Pacific Partnership sponsored by the U.S. military and carries out medical support activities in various regions. In 2023, the SDF performed medical treatment on a U.S. Navy hospital ship and conducted joint Japan-U.S.-UK medical operations in Palau. In addition, SDF members are also deployed to various medical training programs held overseas, such as the Medical Civic Actions Program (MEDCAP), which was held on the occasion of the multilateral joint exercise “Komodo 2023” hosted by the Indonesian Navy, and the multilateral joint exercise “Cobra Gold” etc.

It has been reinforcing its capability to respond to infectious diseases by training personnel who can contribute to overseas activities, improving equipment for transporting infectious disease patients, and providing the necessary facilities and equipment to units, the NDMC Hospital, and the SDF Central Hospital to treat patients suffering from Category I Infectious Diseases,<sup>5</sup> which are classified as the most dangerous among known infectious diseases.

Moreover, the MOD/SDF has been developing the postures necessary for various international cooperation initiatives, which include upgrading mobile medical systems that are effective for overseas medical activities and dispatching SDF personnel to the medical departments of international organizations, the U.S. Department of Defense, etc.

**See** Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-3-2(1) (Pacific Partnership); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-2-5 (Support to the UNTPP)



**MOVIE** : NDMC introduction video: “The Power of Smiles”

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/g sdf/jieikanbosyu/about/recruit/boueiidai-igaku.html>

<sup>5</sup> These include Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, smallpox, South American hemorrhagic fever, plague, Marburg disease, and Lassa fever.

## Section 5

## Reinforcing Policy-Making Function

The NDS stipulates that, for the SDF to fully exert its capabilities and respond to the severe, complex, and fast-paced strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required, including in domains such as space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum. To fundamentally strengthen these functions, the NDS calls for closely cooperating with relevant

ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies, particularly those in the defense industry, as well as reviewing and reinforcing the research system of the MOD/SDF led by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) and reinforcing its function as an intellectual base.

## 1 Efforts for Reinforcing Policy-Making Function

It was clearly stated in the NDS that the need to fundamentally reinforce strategic and agile defense policy planning functions, a consultation framework will be established to obtain policy advice from experts. Based on this policy, the first meeting of the “Advisory Panel on the Fundamental Strengthening of Defense Capabilities” was held in February 2024, bringing together experts and specialists from various fields. During this meeting, candid discussions were held on the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and the relationship between security and economic growth.

In addition, the National Defense Strategy states that the MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to comprehensively advance, from a strategic perspective, the SDF’s future ways of warfare and the utilization and nurturing of cutting-edge technologies and application of those technologies to defense equipment necessary for future SDF operations, while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies, particularly those with the defense industry as their core.

The MOD’s research and educational institutions, including the National Institute for Defense Studies,

are working to improve the quality of their research on a routine basis to produce results that contribute to Japan’s policy-making and strengthen its function as an intellectual foundation. In addition, from the perspective of promoting public understanding of knowledge and information about Japan’s national security policies, including the results of such research:

- (1) review and strengthen the research system of the MOD/SDF by building networking and strengthening institutional collaboration with research and educational institutions, universities, think-tanks, etc., in Japan and abroad;
- (2) provide policy-making departments, etc., with high-quality research results backed by advanced expertise and research capabilities;
- (3) disseminate highly trustworthy information based on the aforementioned research results, etc.; and
- (4) contribute to the promotion of security education by dispatching instructors to educational institutions, etc., holding public symposiums, etc., in order to reinforce its intellectual base through NIDS and various schools, among other initiatives.

## 2 Efforts by the National Institute for Defense Studies

The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) conducts policy-oriented research and studies primarily on security and military history and policy simulations to promote collaboration with policy-making departments by taking advantage of its unique position as a national academic research and educational institution focused on national security. In addition, as an educational

institution equivalent to the National Defense University of other countries, it also functions as a university-level national defense educational institution for the training of senior MOD/SDF officials, and employees of other ministries and agencies. NIDS manages and publishes a large volume of data on military history as a facility possessing historical materials, etc. in accordance with



**REFERENCE** : Advisory Panel on the Fundamental Strengthening of Defense Capabilities (Japanese Only)

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/meeting/drastic-reinforcement/index.html>

the Public Records and Archives Management Act<sup>1</sup>, and serves as the largest research center on military history in Japan.

In April 2023, the Cyber Security Division was established at NIDS in response to research needs in the increasingly important field of cybersecurity based on the Defense Buildup Program, which calls for a review of the research system to support the augmentation of the functions of strategic and agile defense policy planning and formulation, and reinforcement of its functions as an intellectual foundation.

NIDS, an institution that plays a role in defense exchange and security dialogue also emphasizes international exchange and conducts research exchanges with defense universities, security research institutes, etc., in other countries with the main objective of improving the quality of its research and education and contributing to national security by strengthening relations of trust with said countries. Specifically, activities include mutual dispatch of researchers for lectures, holding study groups and participating in international conferences, receiving visits from foreign government and military officials, and inviting foreign researchers and experts. Through these exchanges, the NIDS is improving the quality of its research and studies and strengthening its intellectual network.

In FY2023, the International Symposium on Security was held under the theme “New Horizons in the Nuclear Age,” and the International Forum on War History Studies was held under the theme “Japan’s Security and the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War.” In addition, the International Conference on Policy Simulation



International Conference on Policy Simulation “Connections Japan 2023/24” held by the National Institute of Defense Studies (January 2024)

“Connections Japan 2023/24” was held under the theme “Development of Policy Simulation Techniques for the Security Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region,”

This international conference was held as an opportunity to introduce the latest knowledge and discussions held in Japan and abroad on various security issues, and it will continue focus on timely themes to help address policy-related issues and reinforce Japan’s intellectual base.

In addition, NIDS proactively disseminates information by publishing major research results on its website and issuing various publications, such as the “NIDS China Security Report” and “Security & Strategy,” which have been published annually to date. Researchers at NIDS have also published many books, articles, and essays on their research findings, some of which have received awards for the outstanding research conducted.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4-5 (Responses in the Cyber Domain)

### 3 Efforts by Other Institutions

The National Defense Academy of Japan (NDA) is responsible for training and educating individuals who are expected to become SDF officers, providing more advanced training and education for SDF personnel, etc., and conducting the research needed to perform these functions.

In its role, the NDA conducts a large volume of fundamental research related to general academic and defense policy-related research, and upholds and

improves a high standard of research. In addition, the results of the NDA’s research that is mainly centered on the themes handled by the Center for Global Security<sup>2</sup> are widely disseminated outside the academy through presentations at seminars and colloquia held by the NDA as well as through online publications, such as the Global Security Seminar Series and the Global Security Study Series.

SDF Command and Staff Colleges, etc., periodically

<sup>1</sup> Act on Management of Official Documents, etc.

<sup>2</sup> The Center for Global Security is a department established within the Institute for Advanced Studies and is responsible for planning, drafting, and implementing research and joint research projects related to global security (research conducted jointly with ATLA, etc.), as well as disseminating the results of such global security-related research externally.

hold various security-related seminars and symposiums that are attended by researchers, including overseas researchers and foreign military personnel, etc., from industry (companies), government (national and local), and academia (universities, etc.), which contributes to research and studies regarding Japan's national security in the future through discussions and the exchange of opinions from a variety of different perspectives.

The colleges also strive to obtain knowledge and

information necessary for research and studies to maintain and improve the quality of their education and research by hosting visiting researchers as well as participating in exchanges, etc., with educational and research institutions, etc., in Japan and overseas. The colleges proactively disseminate information<sup>3</sup> by publishing major research results and initiatives on their websites, issuing various publications, and through other means.

### Commentary

## National Defense Academy Graduation Ceremony

The National Defense Academy's graduation ceremony was held on March 23, 2024. Prime Minister Kishida attended the ceremony and addressed the graduates as the Supreme Commander of the Self-Defense Forces.

In his address, Prime Minister Kishida quoted the ancient Roman maxim, "If you want peace, prepare for war", emphasizing the necessity of deterrence to avert wars and safeguard peace. He affirmed that Japan must strive to enhance its diplomatic power and significantly strengthen its defense forces.

Prime Minister Kishida motivated the graduates, emphasizing that the strengthening of the defense forces cannot be achieved merely by increasing and renewing the SDF's equipment, and said the graduates performing important duties to make the defense forces function in the future, themselves form the core of the defense forces, that their efforts are indispensable for the

strengthening of the defense forces, and that the very existence of each graduate will act as a deterrent to war.



Prime Minister Kishida at the graduation ceremony of the National Defense Academy (March 2024)



**REFERENCE** : Publications issued by NIDS

**URL** : <https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/index.html>

<sup>3</sup> The JGSDF Training Evaluation Research and Development Command publishes "Ground Defense," the JMSDF Command and Staff College publishes the "Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Command and Staff College Review," and the Air Command and Staff College publishes "Air & Space Power Studies," etc.

# Measures Related to Training and Exercises

## Chapter 3

### Section 1 Training and Exercise Initiatives

In order for the MOD/SDF to fulfil its mission of defending our nation, it is essential for all personnel and every unit, which is the core of the defense force, to maintain a high level of training and improve upon their skills on a regular basis. It can be said that a high level of capabilities and skills is the foundation of our nation's deterrence and response capabilities.

The MOD/SDF actively conducts various high-level bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, and various exercises involving other ministries and local governments to further improve deterrence and response capabilities.

It is essential to strengthen deterrence and response

capabilities and stabilize the security environment surrounding Japan to maintain peace in Japan. To this end, the MOD/SDF is actively promoting bilateral/multilateral exercises with Japan's ally, like-minded countries, and others in the wider Indo-Pacific region as part of its efforts to achieve the vision of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." In particular, MOD/SDF is strengthening its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, which is closely connected to Japan's national security, and is working to create a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, by maintaining and improving the capabilities and skills of each country through common

Fig. IV-3-1-1 Major Training Undertaken by Japan and the Japan-U.S. Alliance



efforts such as bilateral/multilateral exercise with allied, like-minded countries, and by strengthening deterrence and response capabilities through collaboration and cooperation, thereby creating a synergistic effect. In addition to these efforts, the MOD/DF is also working to

strengthen cooperation in responding to global security challenges and destabilizing factors to which it is difficult for any individual country to respond.

**See** Fig. IV-3-1-1 (Major Training Undertaken by Japan and the Japan-U.S. Alliance)

## 1 Training that Contributes to Reinforcing Japan's Capability to Respond to Various Contingencies

### 1 Joint Training of the SDF

It is of paramount importance that the SDF be prepared to seamlessly and fully demonstrate its deterrence and response capabilities through repeated training involving joint operations of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF on a routine basis.

To this end, the SDF has been conducting SDF joint exercises since 1979 to rehearse joint operations by alternating between field training exercises and command post exercises almost every year. In addition, in order to respond to large-scale disasters and various other disasters in an expeditious and appropriate manner, the SDF organizes various disaster prevention drills while also actively participating in disaster prevention drills organized by the Japanese Government and local governments as part of its efforts to strengthen cooperation with various ministries and agencies, local governments, etc.

Furthermore, the SDF has been conducting training regularly so that it can immediately rescue or transport Japanese nationals and others overseas, in emergency situations.

#### (1) SDF Joint Exercise (JX)

In November 2023, the SDF conducted "05JX," a



FY2023 Amphibious Operations during the SDF Joint Exercise "05JX" (November 2023)

nationwide joint exercise for FY 2023 as a field training exercise. This was the SDF's largest-scale field training exercises, with approximately 30,000 participants from the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. The exercise was conducted in a comprehensive manner based on a series of hypothetical scenarios ranging from gray-zone situations to armed attack situations in order to respond to armed attacks in various domains, including in the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains. U.S. forces engaged in some exercises to maintain and strengthen Japan-U.S. coordination. In addition to ASDF fighter jets using civilian airports for the first time as joint training, the exercise also included maneuver deployment training of units using civilian vessels and ports, joint use of U.S. military bases, and disaster drills on remote islands. This realistic and advanced exercise maintained and improved the SDF's joint operation capabilities.

#### (2) Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR)

In order to maintain and enhance its disaster response capabilities, the SDF conducts disaster drills revolving around its command and staff activities in the event of a large-scale earthquake, the coordination between major units, and its coordination with disaster prevention organizations as well as the U.S. Forces in Japan. During this exercise conducted in June 2023 based on the hypothetical scenario that a Nankai Trough earthquake had occurred, the SDF tested its response plan by conducting drills for emergency transportation of troops and equipment to isolated areas and transportation of supplies to isolated disaster areas along the coast, assuming a situation where isolated areas have occurred, thereby improving its ability to respond to disasters.

#### (3) Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX) and Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX), a Japan-U.S. Bilateral Integrated Disaster Response Exercise

The SDF conducts field training exercises on responding to sudden large-scale disasters on remote islands to maintain and enhance the SDF's ability to respond

to disasters on remote islands as well as strengthen collaboration with the U.S. Forces and relevant disaster prevention organizations.

#### (4) Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Drill “Disaster Prevention Day”

The MOD/SDF conducted an operation drill at the

Disaster Response Headquarters of the MOD on September 1, 2023, assuming the occurrence of an earthquake directly under the Tokyo metropolitan area, so that the SDF can be quickly and systematically dispatched when a disaster such as a large-scale earthquake occurs. In addition, participated in disaster drills conducted by local governments.

#### Commentary

### 2023 Self-Defense Forces Joint Exercise “05JX”

To help achieve a drastic reinforcement of defense capabilities amid the increasingly tense security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF conducted their largest-ever military exercise in November 2023, designated 05JX.

The SDF was able to use this exercise to improve operational capability by including the space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains into ground, maritime, and air operations, such as integrated anti-ship attack and integrated air and missile defense, and through cross-domain training. In addition, where training for ground operations and amphibious operations had previously been conducted by function, these operations were now organically linked and carried out comprehensively, closely connecting command post activities at the operational command center with the movements of field units to achieve integrated operational and tactical levels. 05JX was thus more practical and sophisticated

than ever.

Thanks to the deep understanding of residents and the cooperation of the relevant local governments, the SDF was able to conduct fighter aircraft takeoff and landing training at the Okayama, Oita, Amami, and Tokunoshima airports during 05JX. The participation of the U.S. armed forces in part of this exercise, along with countries like Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Philippines, the ROK, the UK, Germany, and NATO attending as observers, also contributed to strengthening cooperation with allies and like-minded countries.

With a strong determination to prevent any unilateral change in the status quo or attempts to do so by force, the MOD/SDF are committed to further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities to protect the peace and security of Japan through these training exercises.



F-2 fighter aircraft deployed at Okayama Airport



Aegis Maya-class CIC during Integrated Air and Missile Defense training



**REFERENCE** : Unit training in the SDF

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/training/index.html>



**REFERENCE** : Joint exercises and training

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/training.html>



## (5) Drills for Medical Treatment Activities Following a Large-Scale Earthquake

The MOD/SDF participates in drills organized by the Cabinet Office involving medical treatment activities to be carried out in the aftermath of a large-scale earthquake, and maintains and enhances its disaster response capabilities by rehearsing various actions for disaster relief and coordination procedures with disaster prevention. These drills conducted in September 2023, in which field training exercises were conducted based on the hypothetical scenario that a Nankai Trough earthquake had occurred, saw participation from the MOD/SDF and other relevant organizations (National Police Agency, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (including Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT)), Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Japan Coast Guard, etc.), as well as several local governments (Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, Kochi, Oita and Miyazaki Prefectures).



SDF personnel training for disaster response in cooperation with various local governments, DMAT, etc. (September 2023)

## (6) Joint Deployment and Action Training (Middle East and Africa), Furnace Darter (FD)

In December 2022, with the cooperation of Djibouti and Jordan, training on protection measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas was conducted in an actual operating environment in the Middle East and Africa region. In this training, the cooperation with related organizations, the U.S. military, the Italian military,

and the French military was strengthened regarding actions ranging from post-deployment of the dispatched Joint Task Force, to the protection and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas. Furthermore, the lessons learned from this training were utilized in the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in the Republic of Sudan in April 2023 and in the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in Israel in October of the same year.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-2 (Responses to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-11 (15) (Jordan); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-12 (2) (Djibouti)

## 2 Training of Each SDF Service

A high-level of training by each SDF is a fundamental prerequisite for being able to fully exert joint defense capabilities. As such, each SDF continuously conducts individual training for its troops and organizational training for its units, forming the foundation of a strong SDF.

### (1) GSDF

The GSDF conducts field training exercises at the regional army level to improve its response capabilities for various contingencies and other situations. Furthermore, GSDF units from across the country conduct Ground Self-Defense Force exercises. They strive to improve their operation execution capabilities and operational effectiveness by demonstrating various unit actions while contributing to enhancing deterrence and response capabilities.

In addition, it conducts parachute drop training from U.S. Air Force and other aircraft in Japan and overseas, training for amphibious operations, and live-fire training for Medium range SAM/SSM (Surface-to-Air Missile / Surface-to-Ship Missile) units to enhance various tactical skills necessary for joint cross-domain operations.

### (2) MSDF

The MSDF conducts training between naval units, and between naval vessels, aircraft (including the ASDF) and ground units (including the GSDF), as well as mine warfare training in Japan and deployment training that leverages superior U.S. training infrastructure with the



**REFERENCE** : Overview of GSDF education and training  
**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/g sdf/about/training/index.html>





ANNUAL Exercise 2023 (November 2023)



ASDF patriot live-fire exercises

cooperation of the U.S. Navy in order to improve various tactical capabilities. In addition, the MSDF conducts MSDF exercises (field training exercises) in which units all over Japan are mobilized, as part of efforts to enhance readiness.

The “ANNUAL Exercise 2023,” conducted in November 2023, rehearsed commanders’ tactical decisions and unit operational procedures, based on a series of hypothetical situations ranging from the gray zone to an armed attack. In this largest-ever exercise by the MSDF, in addition to the U.S., Australian, and Canadian navies and air forces, the Philippine Navy participated as an observer for the first time. Various tactical training exercises, including anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare, were conducted to improve the MSDF’s operation execution capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the navies of participating countries.

The MSDF has also strengthened cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard, and in June 2023, conducted field training exercise with the Japan Coast Guard for the first time after the Minister of Defense established the Control Procedures for the Japan Coast Guard. This exercise was conducted under the assumption that the Japan Coast Guard would be placed under the control of the Minister of Defense in an armed attack situation and would evacuate residents, provide information to vessels, and perform evacuation support. Through the


exercise, the MSDF rehearsed and verified information communication procedures with the Japan Coast Guard. In addition, bilateral exercises with the Japan Coast Guard were conducted to enhance joint response capabilities, including training related to comprehensive response and strengthening of cooperation, and training to deal with suspicious vessels.


**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3-1-3(2) (Reinforcing Coordination with the Japan Coast Guard)

**(3) ASDF**


The ASDF focuses on enhancing the professional expertise of its personnel in phases in order to fully utilize equipment with cutting-edge technologies, such as fighter aircraft, radars, surface-to-air guided missiles, etc. It also conducts unit-specific training and training on inter-unit coordination procedures involving units, such as fighter units, air warning and control units, and surface-to-air guided missile units, as well as comprehensive training that includes air transport units and air rescue units.

For example, the ASDF conducts the field training exercise Air Defense Command Comprehensive Training, in which all relevant units in Japan are mobilized, as well as PAC-3 maneuver and deployment training, overseas flight training, etc., to enhance maneuver and deployment capabilities and responsiveness. In addition, the ASDF






**REFERENCE :** MSDF training and exercise  
**URL :** <https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/operation/training/>



**REFERENCE :** ASDF exercises  
**URL :** <https://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/report/cat-kunren/>



is strengthening its operation execution capabilities through Patriot live-fire training in the United States

and training that leverages the Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Center (AATTC) in the United States.

## 2 Training that Contributes to Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Alliance is essential to Japan's national security, and Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises play a significant role in enhancing Japan's deterrence and response capabilities. The SDF has consistently conducted joint training involving different SDF services as well as Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercises (field training exercises and command post exercises) to improve the SDF's tactical skills and strengthen collaboration with the U.S. Forces, demonstrating Japan and the United States' unified commitment to and capacity for achieving peace and stability in the region.

### 1 Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises

Since 1986, the SDF has been conducting the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercises "Keen Sword" (field training exercise) and "Keen Edge" (command post exercise) to rehearse SDF operational procedures and the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan for armed attack situations, etc., as well as to improve the readiness of the SDF and the interoperability of Japan and the United States.

In FY 2023, the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercise for FY 2023, "Keen Edge 24" (command post exercise), was conducted to rehearse command and staff activities for Japan-U.S. joint response to a variety of contingencies and joint operations of the SDF. Australian defence forces

participated in this exercise for the first time and rehearsed command and control to improve the effectiveness of Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation. In addition, Japan-U.S. joint response drills against ballistic missiles were also conducted to maintain and enhance the SDF's joint operation capabilities and Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities.

### 2 Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises of Each SDF Service

#### (1) GSDF

In recent years, the GSDF has strengthened its operational and strategic coordination with the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines both centrally and at the Pacific level. Bilateral exercises, in conjunction with high-level exchanges, have continued to evolve and develop as part of ongoing efforts to fundamentally strengthen the Japan-U.S. joint response posture.

In FY 2023, Japan and the U.S. worked together to materialize the coordination procedures and improve interoperability through bilateral exercises, including "Orient Shield 23" with the U.S. Army and "Resolute Dragon 23" with the U.S. Marines. In addition, for the first time in nine years, Japan and the U.S. conducted "North Wind 24," a bilateral exercise with the U.S. Army



Troopers coordinating with U.S. forces during "Keen Edge 24" (February 2024)



Joint anti-ship combat exercise (GSDF MLRS) (September 2023)



**REFERENCE** : The evolution of Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/about/japan-us/index.html>

in snowy and cold regions, to share know-how on tactical operations in snowy regions and improve the ability to cope with all kinds of situations.

### a. Field Training with U.S. Army in Japan “Orient Shield 23”

In September 2023, the GSDF conducted a training aimed at reinforcing Japan-U.S. coordination capabilities in light of its cross-domain operations and the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations. In this exercises, in addition to the command post training such as Japan-U.S. joint anti-ship combat, a field training exercise was conducted, which included anti-ship combat training with live-fire training using the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and joint combat training with U.S. Army infantry units, including live-fire training with anti-tank missiles, artillery and mortars, etc. In addition, the first-ever training exercise was conducted on Amami Oshima Island for the prepositioning and transportation of supplies in cooperation with U.S. small landing craft utility, thereby rehearsing mutual coordination procedures and improving Japan-U.S. mutual response capabilities through field training.

### b. Field Training with U.S. Marines in Japan “Resolute Dragon 23”

In October 2023, the GSDF rehearsed a series of operations for island defense, with a focus on cross-domain operations and coordination based on the U.S. Marines’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).<sup>1</sup> This exercise, which consisted of a command post exercise and a field training exercise, was the largest-ever exercise with the U.S. Marines in Japan, conducted from Hokkaido and Kyushu to Okinawa. The field training exercise necessary for island defense, such as anti-ship and anti-air combat, anti-landing combat, including joint logistics and medical support services, was conducted utilizing the Surface-to-Ship Missile (SSM), Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and High Mobility Rocket Artillery System (HIMARS) of the

U.S. Marines, in conjunction with the combat guidance by Japanese and U.S. command organizations, based on the results of the command post exercise. In addition, the GSDF V-22 (Osprey) participated in this exercise for the first time, conducted patient evacuation training by Japan-U.S. Osprey, and implemented joint Japan-U.S. runway restoration, etc., to improve the sustainability of operations on the islands.



Live exercise during Resolute Dragon 23 (October 2023)

### (2) MSDF

The MSDF has traditionally conducted bilateral exercises with the U.S. Navy proactively, and is working to enhance the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. joint response as well as cross-domain operation capabilities through Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises with naval vessels and aircraft, anti-submarine special exercises, minesweeping special training, medical special training, and Japan-U.S. medical joint training.

For example, the MSDF has consistently conducted bilateral exercises with U.S. navy carrier strike groups and conducted a wide range of Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises in the waters surrounding Japan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, thereby ceaselessly strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In September 2023, the MSDF conducted its first bilateral exercises with the U.S.



**MOVIE** : 2024 “Resolute Dragon” live-fire training with U.S. Marines in Japan

**URL** : <https://youtu.be/rClkaLSKXW4>



**MOVIE** : Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises “Rescue Flag Okinawa”

**URL** : <https://youtu.be/2wjXvLuzOwg?si=XFaa8P4RQaUVycJT>



<sup>1</sup> Expeditionary Advanced Base Operation. An operational concept in which frontline operations are executed by rapidly dispersing and deploying within the enemy’s firepower zone and establishing temporary bases.

Navy's unmanned surface ship. In addition, the MSDF is actively conducting Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises involving other services, including bilateral exercises with the GSDF and U.S. Marines, and "Rescue Flag Okinawa," a search and rescue exercise with the ASDF and the U.S. Air Force, to strengthen comprehensive deterrence and response capabilities.



Destroyer JS "ISE" conducting bilateral exercise with the U.S. Navy's Theodore Roosevelt and Carl Vinson carrier strike groups in southern Okinawa (January 2024)

### (3) ASDF

The ASDF is working to reinforce the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through "Red Flag-Alaska," the U.S. Air Force exercise that the ASDF has been participating in since 1996, and the bilateral exercise with the U.S. Air Force "Cope North," which has been conducted in Guam since 1999. In addition, the ASDF is working to enhance the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. joint response as well as cross-domain operation capabilities through air combat training, intercept training, defensive counter air training, tactical attack training, aerial refueling training, search and rescue training, and navigation and formation training with the U.S. Navy and Marines, as well as other Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises.

For example, the exercises conducted in FY2023, including the F-35A/B fighter jets and B-1 and B-52 bombers of the U.S. Forces, affirmed the readiness of the SDF and the U.S. Forces under the robust Japan-U.S. Alliance, and demonstrated both domestically and internationally the strong will and close cooperation between Japan and the United States when responding to various contingencies.

## VOICE

### Voice from JSDF personnel who participated in the field training exercise Resolute Dragon 23 with the U.S. Marine Corps

**Major Kenji Yamada, General Company Commander, GSDF 42nd Rapid Deployment Regiment, GSDF**

I participated in Resolute Dragon 23 as a General Company Commander of the 42nd Rapid Deployment Regiment, conducting anti-landing combat training and combined combat shooting training with the U.S. joint forces.

During this exercise, the joint anti-landing combat training we participated in with the company under the command of Major McNeil of the U.S. Marine Corps provided many achievements and lessons learned through the combined demonstration of firepower and fluid defensive combat between the U.S. and Japan. Witnessing the noble sense of duty, high level of discipline and morale, and capabilities of the U.S. Marines, I felt an unwavering sense of trust in them as comrades-in-arms, and it reminded me once again of the importance of the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. alliance in the defense of the Southwest.

We faced many difficulties due to language and cultural differences. However, we overcame the challenges and carried out our operations by communicating our opinions and ideas to the U.S. Marines while respecting their input. I am filled with a sense

of fulfillment and accomplishment in building good interpersonal relations and cooperative attitude through the bonds and mutual trust born from shared values.

I will continue to train daily with a strong will and conviction to defend Japan and maintain peace in the nation.



Front-line coordination between U.S. and Japanese company commanders (Author on the left)

The SDF and the U.S. Forces will continue to cooperate closely in peacetime to safeguard the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the region while maintaining the necessary posture to swiftly respond to

various contingencies.



Reference 28 (Major Achievements in Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises (FY 2023))

### 3 Multilateral Exercises Involving Japan, the United States, and Third-Party Countries

Each SDF service is actively engaged in high-level multilateral training exercises with the participation of not only the United States but also third-party countries. By conducting training with Australian and European forces, the SDF has been working to enhance its tactical skills and strengthen its coordination and interoperability with the armed forces of other countries to reinforce Japan's deterrence and response capabilities.

#### 1 GSDF

##### (1) Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia "Southern Jackaroo 23"

From June to July 2023, the GSDF participated in a field training exercise with the U.S. and Australian forces in Australia, which included gunnery exercises in various terrain conditions, including protection of critical facilities, attack and defense, and artillery and mortar gunnery, to improve the operation execution capabilities of GSDF units and strengthen cooperation with the U.S. and Australian forces.



GSDF exercise with U.S. and Australian forces for Operation Guerrilla Commandos (July 2023)

##### (2) Japan-U.S.-Australia Multilateral Command Post Exercise "YS-85"

YS-85, conducted in Japan from November to December

2023, is the largest command post exercise between Japan and U.S. land forces, in which the Australian Forces participated for the first time this year.

With the participation of the Japanese and U.S. naval and air forces, the exercise demonstrated command and staff activities from the strategic to operational levels, and elements such as logistics, medical service, and personnel, which support operations, were also enhanced. The exercise also demonstrated the Japan-U.S. coordination procedures concerning the SDF's cross-domain operations, including space, cyber, and electromagnetic operations, and the multi-domain operations by the U.S. Army, thereby improving Japan-US joint response capabilities, and strengthening cooperation among Japan, U.S., and Australia.

In addition, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Canada, Singapore, and France participated in the exercise as observers for the first time, strengthening mutual cooperation.

#### 2 MSDF

##### (1) U.S. hosted large scale global exercise "LSGE 23"

As part of the U.S. hosted LSGE to strengthen deterrence, in June 2023, the MSDF conducted the "Multi Big-Deck Event," a Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise in the waters and airspace from east of Okinawa to the East China Sea, with the U.S. Navy, including two aircraft carriers, U.S. Air Force, French Navy and the ASDF F-15 fighter aircraft. In addition, several other multilateral exercises were conducted in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada multilateral exercise "Noble Wolf," the Japan-U.S.-Canada-France multilateral exercise "Noble Typhoon," the Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral exercise "Noble Raven 23," and the Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise "Noble Buffalo," through various exercises such as anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare, thereby seeking to improve



MOVIE : 2023 Field training exercise with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia

URL : [https://youtu.be/FRO-cFToS8I?si=y\\_yJs\\_XWpyh\\_YLC9](https://youtu.be/FRO-cFToS8I?si=y_yJs_XWpyh_YLC9)

cooperation with the participating countries.



U.S. aircraft carriers USS “Ronald Reagan” and USS “Nimitz,” the destroyer JS “Izumo,” the newest French frigate “Lorraine,” and ASDF F-15 fighter aircraft participated in the “Multi Big-Deck Event” a Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise (June 2023)

### (2) Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK multilateral exercise “Pacific Vanguard 23”

The MSDF conducted a multilateral exercise in July 2023 with the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marines, the Royal Australian Navy, and the Republic of Korean Navy in the sea and airspace near Guam. The exercise included anti-surface gunnery, anti-ground gunnery, anti-surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare, aimed at improving MSDF’s tactical capabilities and strengthening cooperation with the participating countries.

### (3) Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar 23”

In August 2023, the MSDF conducted a multilateral exercise involving the U.S. Navy, the Indian Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Australian Air force in the Eastern sea and airspace of Australia and in Sydney. The destroyer “Shiranui” and the special boarding unit of the MSDF participated in the exercise, which included anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, and replenishment at sea, aimed at improving interoperability with the participating countries. Malabar 2023 was hosted for the first time by Australia, which became an official member in 2022. Malabar has major significance as it continues to be

conducted under the framework of the four countries at the heart of the vision of FOIP, and efforts will be made to continue strengthening the relationships between the participating countries.

## 3 ASDF

### (1) U.S.-Australia deployment training

In August 2023, the ASDF conducted a mobile deployment training of the F-35A fighter jets to the U.S. and Australia, the Japan-Australia bilateral exercise “Bushido Guardian 23,” in September of the same year, respectively after the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) came into effect. In the mobile deployment training, the F-35A fighter jets and other aircraft were deployed to Guam and Australia to strengthen cooperation among air forces for future rotational deployment.

### (2) Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral base defense exercise

In December 2023, the ASDF conducted the first trilateral base defense exercise among Japan, the U.S., and Australia to strengthen the base defense system by sharing mutual operational procedures and other measures.

### (3) Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise “Cope North 24”

In February 2024, the ASDF, during the Japan-U.S.-Australia multilateral exercise, “Cope North 24” based in Guam, along with the MSDF, conducted a multilateral HA/DR (Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief) exercise to further improve interoperability.



Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise “Cope North 24” [Courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense]

## 4 Bilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries

### 1 GSDF

#### (1) Field exercise with the French Army in Japan “Brunet-Takamori 23”

In September 2023, the GSDF conducted the first bilateral exercise of its kind between French Army and the GSDF in the French New Caledonia. In this exercise, combat shooting and comprehensive field training exercises were conducted to improve operation execution and tactical capabilities for counter-guerilla and commando operations, and to promote mutual understanding and trust with the French Army.

#### (2) Field exercise with the U.K. Army in the United Kingdom “Vigilant Isles 23”

In November 2023, the GSDF conducted a bilateral exercise with the British Army in Japan. During this exercise, the two countries conducted exercises such as infiltration and reconnaissance, joint fire coordination, combat shooting, and joint fire guidance for island defense, improving operational capability and tactical capabilities and promoting mutual understanding and trust with the British army. The RAA, which came into effect in October of the same year, was applied for the first time during this exercise.

#### (3) Bilateral Exercise with the Indian Army in Japan “Dharma Guardian 23”

The GSDF conducted bilateral exercise “Dharma Guardian 23” with the Indian Army in India from February to March 2024. The joint exercise was designed to improve operation execution and tactical capabilities for the war against terrorism and to promote mutual understanding and trust with the Indian Army.

### 2 MSDF

The MSDF conducts bilateral exercises and goodwill exercises with other countries, taking advantage of port calls by naval vessels and aircraft, and regularly conducts bilateral exercises such as “Trident” with the Royal Australian Navy, “JIMEX” with the Indian Navy, “Oguri-Verny” with the French Navy, and “KADEX”

with the Royal Canadian Navy. “JIMEX 2023” with the Indian Navy has improved interoperability between the MSDF and the Indian Navy, including anti-submarine warfare training using Indian submarines.




Japan-India Maritime Exercise “JIMEX 2023” (July 2023)

### 3 ASDF

#### (1) Japan-France bilateral training

In July 2023, the ASDF conducted the first-ever bilateral training with the French Air and Space Force in Japan. In this training, the F-15 fighter jets of the ASDF and Rafale fighter jets of the French Air and Space Force conducted tactical training to promote mutual understanding between the French and Japanese air forces, further deepen defense cooperation, and improve the ASDF’s tactical capabilities.



ASDF interacting with participants from the French Air and Space Force during the bilateral training between France and Japan (July 2023)



MOVIE : Vigilant Isles 2023

URL : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PICrAT-rSI>

## (2) Japan-Italy bilateral exercise

In August 2023, the ASDF conducted the first-ever bilateral exercise with the Italian Air Force in Japan. In this exercise, the F-15 fighter jets of the ASDF and F-35A fighter jets of the Italian Air Force conducted

tactical exercises to promote mutual understanding between Italian and Japanese air force services, deepen defense cooperation, and improve the ASDF's tactical capabilities.

### VOICE

#### Comments from a Crew Member who Participated in Japan-France Bilateral Exercise

**Tomoko Kondo, Airman 1st Class, Vehicle and Equipment Maintenance Squadron, Maintenance Supply Group, 9th Wing, ASDF**

C'est une grande chance! (= A perfect opportunity!)

I participated as a French interpreter in a bilateral exercise between the ASDF and the French Air and Space Force in July 2023. It was the first time I had been offered a position as an interpreter for this exercise, and I still remember my excitement upon receiving this offer. This was because my motive to join the military had at last been fulfilled. On one hand, I felt overwhelmed by the expectations of those around me, as I had to engage in highly specialized interpretation. However, I wanted to make the most of my friendly nature, the spirit of Japanese hospitality, and my love for the French language and do my best to promote defense cooperation and exchange.

One month before the exercise, I was temporarily assigned to a unit at Nyutabaru Air Base to make various preparations. Since this was the first-ever bilateral exercise during which French Air and Space Force aircraft visited Japan, it was necessary to prepare everything from scratch. This involved various activities, including meetings for each event, preparing menus for luncheons, sharing images of French culture and national identity, arranging Japanese-French bilingual moderators, and preparing commentary manuscripts. I also served as an interpreter at receptions, interprofessional exchanges, tea ceremonies, and welcome parties for VIPs from both France and Japan. At times, I had to think beyond the role of an interpreter and act flexibly according to the situation. Though I had a hard time, I am deeply

moved by the fact that I could serve as a bridge between France and Japan and contribute to the success of this bilateral exercise.

In this way, the SDF provides opportunities to fulfill one's dreams and hopes and maximize one's abilities. For example, in the field of languages, the sphere of activities is expanding in bilateral exercises with various countries, including the U.S. military. I participated in this exercise and was inspired by discoveries and encounters, which increased my desire to work hard. I will continue to hone my language skills and strive to make my dreams come true.

Merci pour tout et à très bientôt! (= Thank you for everything! See you soon!)



Author engaged in interpretation work (Left)



**MOVIE** : Japan-France bilateral training

**URL** : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MsUBOUlcqbM>



**MOVIE** : Japan-Italy bilateral exercise

**URL** : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-jE2KtNAns>





## 5 Multilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries and Others

### 1 GSDF

#### (1) Exercise Super Garuda Shield 23 (Multilateral Exercise)

From August to September 2023, the GSDF participated in Super Garuda Shield 23, a multilateral exercise hosted by the U.S. and Indonesian armies and participated by Australia, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. In this exercise, the GSDF jointly conducted through airborne and amphibious operations. In addition, during combat shooting, the countries demonstrated joint attack combat with live fire and live bombs to strengthen their operational capabilities in island recapture and cooperation with the participating countries.

#### (2) Multilateral Exercise “Khaan Quest 23”

The GSDF participated in a multilateral exercise organized by Mongolia and the United States from June to July 2023. This exercise conducted in Mongolia is one of the world’s largest multilateral exercises aimed at improving capabilities associated with UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and the GSDF has been dispatching units for the exercise since 2015. During the “Khaan Quest 23” exercise, the GSDF participated in command post training, convoy escort operations, civilian protection, and other field training exercises to preserve and improve various capabilities that are useful when dispatched for PKOs, to acquire and accumulate the relevant expertise, and to promote mutual understanding and strengthen relationships of trust with the military forces of various participating countries.

### 2 MSDF

#### (1) FY2023 Indo-Pacific Deployment “IPD23”

The MSDF dispatched surface and submarine units,

including 5 destroyers and 1 submarine for more than four months from April to September 2023, to visit 16 countries and 19 ports of call while sailing in the Indo-Pacific region, and conducted 17 bilateral/multilateral exercises and 8 goodwill exercises.

Some IPD units participated in the U.S.-hosted LSGE and conducted training that included high-end content in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition to the “JIMEX 2023” with the Indian Navy and the “Noble Stingray,”<sup>2</sup> the Japan-U.S.-Canada multilateral exercise with the U.S. and Canadian navies, the MSDF participated in multilateral exercises hosted by the Royal Australian Navy, including the U.S.-Australia hosted multilateral exercise “Talisman Sabre 23” and the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise “Malabar 2023”.

Furthermore, following the first-ever multilateral exercise by Japan, U.S., Australia, and the Philippines, the IPD units made a joint port call in Manila with the U.S. and Australian navies, fleet commanders of Japan, U.S., Australia, and Philippines inspected the situation in the South China Sea, and fleet commanders of Japan, U.S. and Philippines held discussions, thus strengthening Japan-U.S.-Philippines and Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines cooperation.

In the Pacific island countries, the first-ever goodwill exercise was conducted with the Papua New Guinea Armed Forces and the Kiribati Police Force, demonstrating Japan’s willingness to continue its involvement in the region and promoting mutual understanding through various exchanges with the 6 Pacific island countries in which port calls were made.

#### (2) The Indo-Pacific and Middle East Deployment “IMED23”

From January to May 2023, the MSDF dispatched minesweeper carriers and other vessels to the Indo-



MOVIE : “Super Garuda Shield 23” (GSDF)

URL : <https://youtu.be/IPs9uibILOE?si=h8sBleNXVcRQc7VN>



MOVIE : FY 2023 Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD23), 1st surface unit, activity record

URL : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x386tnv96MA>

<sup>2</sup> This exercise was the first Japan-U.S.-Canada multilateral exercise (anti-submarine warfare) using MSDF submarines, together with the U.S. Navy and the Canadian Navy, which is strengthening its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region.

Pacific region and the Middle East to participate in the International Maritime Exercise/CUTLASS EXPRESS 2023 (IMX/CE23) held in the Persian Gulf (Kingdom of Bahrain and its surrounding waters), and strengthened cooperation with the U.S., which hosted the exercise, and the navies of participating countries (the United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, etc.). Through this dispatch, the MSDF made port calls in India, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and other countries, and demonstrated Japan's deep commitment to stability and prosperity of the region through goodwill exercises with the navies of various countries including these countries.

### (3) “Talisman Saber 23,” a multilateral exercise hosted by the U.S. and Australia

The GSDF and MSDF participated in “Talisman Saber 23” held in Australia from July to August 2023. This is the largest multilateral exercise hosted by the U.S. and Australian forces, and this year, 13 countries, including Japan, the U.S., and Australia, participated in the exercise. The GSDF's Amphibious Task Force and 2nd Anti-aircraft Artillery Group conducted amphibious operations, and anti-aircraft and anti-ship combat exercises, including live firing of missiles.<sup>3</sup> The MSDF participated in the exercise with the IPD units, destroyer Izumo and transport ship Shimokita, and conducted amphibious operation exercises with the U.S. Navy,

to improve their tactical capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries.

## 3 ASDF

### (1) U.S.-Philippines hosted multilateral exercise “Pacific Airlift Rally”

In August 2023, the ASDF participated for the first time in the “Pacific Airlift Rally,” a multilateral exercise hosted by the U.S. and the Philippines and conducted in the Philippines. This exercise aimed to improve ASDF's HA/DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries' air forces, including airdrop exercises and joint loading and unloading drills. In conjunction with the exercise, the Japan-Philippines Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief bilateral exercise was also conducted to improve HA/DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries' air forces, including those of the Philippines.

### (2) Multilateral HA/DR exercise “Christmas Drop” hosted by the U.S. Air Force

In December 2023, the ASDF participated in “Christmas Drop” conducted by the U.S. Air Force in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. From the ASDF, a C-130H transport aircraft participated in the exercise, during which airdrop training was conducted to drop daily



GSDF and MSDF participating in “Talisman Saber 23” (July to August 2023)



**MOVIE** : Talisman Saber 23

**URL** : <https://youtu.be/VQd81bYj31k?si=jALGVethhKM-rE9a>

<sup>3</sup> During the anti-aircraft and anti-ship combat exercises, the Type 03(MARUSAN) surface-to-air guided missile (medium-range SAM) and the Type 12(HITONI) surface-to-ship missile (12SSM) were fired for the first time outside the United States.

VOICE

Comments from a Crew Member who Participated in “Talisman Saber 23”, a Multilateral Exercise Organized by the U.S. and Australia

Takashi Matsumura, Petty Officer 1st Class, LCAC Maintenance Chief, Landing ship tank JS “Shimokita”, MSDF

I participated in “Talisman Saber 23” conducted in 2023 as an ordnance man for Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC). These hovercraft-type transport boats carry personnel and equipment to sandy beaches inaccessible to conventional boats. LCACs are indispensable for this exercise, which primarily involves multilateral amphibious operations. There was a malfunction in the LCAC on board the transport vessel “Shimokita” during this exercise. However, we worked together with the U.S. Navy LCAC maintenance personnel, who were also participating in

the exercise and were able to correct the malfunction with their support. I appreciate the cooperation of the U.S. Navy LCAC maintenance personnel who worked day and night.

I hope that there are more opportunities for mutual collaboration between Japan and the U.S. in the future. This experience has reaffirmed the importance of regular collaboration between Japan and the U.S., including logistics, to strengthen Japan-U.S. cooperation.




U.S. Navy maintenance personnel and MSDF LCAC crew and maintenance personnel (Author (second from the right in the second row))



Housing the LCAC on board the ship

necessities and other donated goods collected by the U.S. military at sea, to improve the ASDF’s HA/DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries.

**See** Fig. IV-3-1-2 (Major Bilateral/Multilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries and Others); Reference 58 (Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2020 and Beyond))



“Christmas Drop”

Fig. IV-3-1-2 Major Bilateral/Multilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries and Others



## Section 2 Establishing the Respective Training Environments and Safety Management

### 1 Training Environment


Given the increasingly severe security situation surrounding Japan, it is important to work to establish units and other organizations and enhance the quality of the training so that the SDF can exert its capabilities to the fullest. Because of this, SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet it is necessary to further enhance the training environment in order to maintain and enhance the readiness of the SDF. It is against this background that the MOD/SDF is promoting initiatives to enhance the training infrastructure in Japan and abroad to conduct efficient and effective training and exercises.

As part of these efforts, the MOD/SDF is working to expand the establishment and utilization of domestic maneuver areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere. Furthermore, the SDF is also facilitating expanded joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas located in Japan by the SDF while accounting for relations with local communities.

Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas, and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas, such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively.

Elsewhere, facilities are in the process of being established on Mageshima (Kagoshima Prefecture), where the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces will be able to conduct training and other activities.

Further, to maximize the capabilities of the SDF in any situation, it is necessary to conduct training using civilian airports regularly. Based on this belief, ASDF fighter aircraft trainings are conducted at civilian airports as part of the SDF Joint Exercise.

 See Section 1-1-1 (1) (SDF Joint Exercise “JX”)

#### 1 GSDF

Maneuver areas and ranges are unevenly located and do not have sufficient space. Thus, it is challenging for the GSDF is unable to conduct exercises with large units or artillery training with extended-range cannons for example. These constraints tend to grow as equipment is modernized. There are also constraints imposed by the



Rising Thunder, a maximum range firing exercise utilizing the extensive U.S. firing training range (November 2023)

urbanization of the areas surrounding maneuver areas and ranges.

Due to the circumstance, the GSDF conducts live-fire training of surface-to-air guided missile units and surface-to-ship guided missile units in the United States and the like, as it cannot be conducted in Japan. In addition, the GSDF is improving its tactical skills through participation in field training by utilizing excellent training bases that are not available in Japan, such as multilateral exercises overseas.

In addition, it conducts field training exercises at the division and regional army levels by maximizing the use of limited domestic maneuver areas, and also conducts more practical training outside of SDF facilities and areas while obtaining the understanding and cooperation of local communities.

#### 2 MSDF

The timing and location for using sea areas for training around Japan are limited by such factors as weather, ocean conditions, marine traffic, and fisheries. Because of this, for example, training that must be conducted in relatively shallow sea areas, such as minesweeping training and submarine rescue training, is being conducted in places such as parts of Mutsu Bay and Sagami Bay. A new minesweeping exercise was conducted at the Sea of Sumounada in western Kyushu in March 2024. In addition, the MSDF is improving its tactical skills through participation in bilateral/multilateral exercises overseas, such as sending a minesweeper unit to the

U.S.-hosted International Maritime Exercise-Cutlass Express (IMX-CE) held in the Middle East.

Furthermore, with the increase in the number of overseas missions, the MSDF also strives to conduct training systematically and efficiently so that a large number of units will be able to produce training results in a short amount of time. Through participation in multilateral exercises conducted overseas and entering the same training areas, and bilateral and multilateral exercises etc., when returning to base, we are working to improve efficient and effective tactical skills and strengthen cooperation and response capabilities with our ally and like-minded countries.

### 3 ASDF

Currently, since much of the training airspace surrounding Japan is not broad enough, the performance and features of aircraft cannot be fully demonstrated in some training.

In addition, long trips to and from the training airspace are required in the case of some bases. Furthermore, in operating airports, it is necessary to take great care regarding aircraft noise in conducting early morning and nighttime flight training.

Because of this, the ASDF strives to ensure that its training is systematic and efficient. In the Iwo-To training airspace, for example, aircraft are dispatched successively from the units to conduct training intensively, focusing on training that cannot be conducted sufficiently on the mainland and other exercises. In addition, it conducts bombing and gunnery training with live ammunition by such means as joint use of USFJ bombing and gunnery areas.

Other efforts are being made to utilize the overseas training environment such as the live-fire training for Patriot missiles by anti-aircraft units in the United States.

 See Reference 58 (Participation in multilateral exercises, etc. (FY2020 and Beyond)); reference 72 (List of Maneuver Areas)

## 2 Initiatives for Safety Management, etc.

The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF constantly strive as one for safety management, such as by implementing the highest level of safety measures and precautions during routine training.

In April 2023, a UH-60JA, a multipurpose helicopter (with 10 crew members) from the GSDF Vice-Camp Takayubaru (Kumamoto Prefecture) was involved in an accident in which it disappeared from radar when flying over the ocean north-northwest of Miyakojima Island, Okinawa, during an aerial reconnaissance and all 10 members died in the line of duty. In March 2024, the MOD announced the results of an investigation into an accident involving a two-engine aircraft in which a gradual loss of power in the second engine, followed by a loss of power in the first engine, occurred, which had never been reported before, making it difficult to maintain altitude and causing the aircraft to crash. As measures to prevent recurrence, we will conduct more detailed checks and inspections to identify the causes of the decrease in the output of both engines and thoroughly implement measures such as training on how to respond to similar incidents to prevent recurrence and ensure flight safety.

Following the crash of the U.S. Air Force CV-22 (Osprey) off the coast of Yakushima in November 2023, the MOD has requested the U.S. side that the Ospreys deployed in Japan be flown after the safety of the flight

has been confirmed, except the aircraft conducting the search and rescue operations. The MOD has also requested early provision of information regarding the circumstances and causes of the accident. Flights of GSDF V-22 (Osprey) have been suspended temporarily until the circumstances of the accident are clarified. Ospreys of the U.S. Air Force deployed in Japan have not flown since December 1, 2023. From December 7 of the same year, the U.S. military suspended operations of Ospreys by all military services using Ospreys.

On March 8, 2024, the U.S. Forces announced that it would lift the grounding measures of Ospreys and the MOD has received extremely detailed information from the U.S. side regarding the circumstances, causes, and safety measures of the accident. Based on the professional perspectives of the MOD/SDF and from the stand point of possessing and operating Ospreys, the MOD independently assessed that the U.S. Forces' cause analysis and safety measures regarding the accident are reasonable, and has concluded that operations of Ospreys, including the GSDF Osprey, can be resumed safely. Japan and the United States confirmed that flights would resume in sequence. From 14 of the same month, Japanese and U.S. Ospreys in Japan will resume flight operations, starting with flights deemed safe by taking necessary safety measures. Regarding the resumption of Osprey operations, Japan and the U.S. have confirmed at

every level that ensuring flight safety is the top priority. Japan and the U.S. will continue cooperating to take all possible measures to ensure safety.

Furthermore, in light of the collision between a Japan Airlines aircraft and a Japan Coast Guard aircraft at Tokyo International Airport in January 2024, MOD/SDF is advancing necessary measures to prevent similar accidents by working closely with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT).

In April 2024, during a nighttime anti-submarine warfare training exercise, two MSDF SH-60K patrol helicopters crashed in the ocean east of Torishima Island in the Izu Islands. A search is underway for the crew on board and the aircraft, and an investigation is underway into the cause of the accident.

In addition, in June 2023, an incident occurred at the Hino Basic Shooting Range (Gifu Prefecture), during a live-fire training for new personnel, in which one SDF cadet fired at three members, resulting in two members being killed in the line of duty. This incident should never occur in any organization handling weapons,

and the MOD/SDF will continue to make every effort to prevent recurrence and thoroughly implement safety management, which includes training the personnel and reviewing the firing procedures.

In this way, any accident and incidents that may cause injury to Japanese nationals, damage their property, or lead to the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be prevented at all costs. After thoroughly investigating the causes of these accidents and incidents, the MOD/SDF will ensure that each and every member of SDF personnel is reminded of the latest safety management guidelines. At the same time, the MOD/SDF as a whole will make every effort to ensure safety in the operation of vessels, aircraft, vehicles, etc., through conducting safety education for SDF personnel and the steady maintenance of equipment, etc., so as to ensure that public confidence is not undermined.

**See** Chapter 4, Section 1-4-2 (3) (Crash of the U.S. Osprey); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-1-2(3) (Response to Search and Rescue of U.S. Forces Osprey); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 5-2-7(2) (Training Relocation for MV-22 (Osprey) etc.); Reference 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces)

# Initiatives to Live in Harmony with Regional Societies and the Environment

## Chapter 4

Various activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/ Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are hard to implement without the understanding and cooperation of each and

every person and local governments. Therefore it is necessary to further deepen the trust between regional society and people, and the SDF.

### Section 1 Measures to Harmonize with Local Communities and the Environment

The National Defense Strategy of Japan provides that in order to enable the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan to seamlessly and effectively conduct activities on a daily basis, the MOD will strive to gain understanding and cooperation of local governments and residents in the areas around the SDF and the U.S. Forces facilities.

To this end, the NDS provides that the MOD/SDF will actively engage in public relations activities on a regular basis regarding the policies and activities of the MOD/SDF, and also the roles of the U.S. Forces in Japan on a regular basis, and coordinate to accommodate the requests and situations of local communities, while fulfilling accountability. At the same time, the MOD/

SDF will continue to promote measures to improve the living environment of areas around defense facilities including those against noise to further strengthen the cooperation for the defense of Japan.

Furthermore, in some communities, the existence of SDF units themselves are a major contribution to the communities' maintenance and, vitalization, and in other communities, the SDF's emergency patient transportation support the community healthcare. In conducting unit reorganization, establishing as well as administering camps and bases, the MOD/SDF will give due consideration to regional characteristics so as to gain understanding of local governments and residents.

### 1 Supporting Civilian Life

The MOD/SDF conducts activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fields, in response to requests from local governments and relevant organizations. Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and confidence.

The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance and other dangerous explosives found throughout Japan. In FY2023, there were 2,348 cases (approximately 37.5 tons). In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approximately 19% of the total number of cases. The MSDF clears and disposes of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives; in FY2023, there were 197 pieces (approximately 4.1 tons) handled.



Experience of "Doran" at Camp Ishigaki 1st Anniversary Commemorative Event (March 2024)



**REFERENCE** : Cooperation between the MOD and local communities

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/sesaku/index.html>



The SDF not only tries to have interactions with local residents by doing things like opening its camps and bases to the public to the extent that they do not interfere with unit activities, but also provides transportation and other assistance at a variety of athletic events. In addition, it supports regional medical treatment efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF hospitals<sup>1</sup> and National Defense Medical College as well as conducting urgent transport for emergency patients from isolated islands.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF promotes various measures in line with national and other policies<sup>2</sup> that contribute to the local economy by ensuring opportunities for local small and medium-sized enterprises to receive orders while taking efficiency into account. Such measures include the promotion of separated/divided ordering,<sup>3</sup> ensuring competition among companies within the same qualification and grade divisions,<sup>4</sup> and the introduction of the open counter method.<sup>5</sup>

 See Reference 73 (Activities in Civic Life)

## 2 Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF

### (1) Cooperation on Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Re-employment Support

Amid the harsh recruitment and employment environment, the cooperation from local governments and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to support the re-employment of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at relatively young ages.

### (2) Support for and Cooperation with SDF Activities

The SDF camps and bases maintain close relations with regional society, and therefore, various forms of

support and cooperation from the local community are indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities, including education and training, and disaster relief. Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international peace cooperation operations and other duties receive support and cooperation from the relevant organizations for the procedures involved.


The MOD/SDF are further strengthening cooperation with relevant entities such as local governments, police and fire services in order to ensure immediate and sure activities by the SDF in various contingencies.

## 3 Measures for Securing the Understanding and Cooperation of Local Governments and Local Residents

Regional Defense Bureaus established in eight locations nationwide make efforts to build cooperative relationships with their respective local communities, through collaboration with SDF units and SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices. In FY2023, the bureaus provided local communities with explanations on a variety of training and exercises, including Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises, the deployment of the U.S. Forces' UAV MQ-9 to Kadena Air Base (Okinawa Prefecture), the development of SDF ammunition storage facilities, etc. In addition, in order to promote understanding of Japan's defense policy in general, seminars on defense-related issues were held for local residents and explanations regarding the Defense White Paper were provided to

local governments and other organizations.

 See Fig. IV-4-1-1 (Work to Develop Regional Cooperation)



Seminar on defense issues in Omitama City, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan (November 2023)

1 As of March 31, 2024, the SDF hospitals that provide general medical care include SDF Central Hospital, SDF Sapporo Hospital, SDF Sendai Hospital, SDF Iruma Hospital, SDF Yokosuka Hospital, SDF Fuji Hospital, SDF Hanshin Hospital, and SDF Fukuoka Hospital.

2 "Basic Policy Regarding Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises on Contracts with the Government, etc., in FY2024" (Cabinet decision on April 19, 2024)

3 For example, this is a method in which grouping of products, etc., takes place when the order is put up for general competitive bidding before a successful bidder is determined for each group.

4 This means that out of the bidding participation eligibility categorized into grade A-D, there is competition between grade C or D only, which comprise mostly small and medium enterprises.

5 A method in which the ordering party publicly announces the procurement details, etc., without specifying the counterparty and solicits quotations from a wide range of interested parties.

Fig. IV-4-1-1

## Work to Develop Regional Cooperation

**1 Measures concerning coordination with local governments for smoothly implementing projects**

Coordination with local governments regarding the reorganization, etc., of SDF units and training, etc., of the U.S. Forces

**2 Measures concerning responses to incidents and accidents wherein the SDF, etc., are involved**

Required cooperation in collaboration with the SDF, etc., such as information provision to local governments

**3 Measures for the purpose of taking effective actions for various contingencies**

Required support for those such as SDF units and local governments under large-scale disasters or other events and participation in training

**4 Measures with the aim of obtaining understanding of the defense policy in general**

Holding of sessions to explain the content of Defense of Japan and seminars on defense issues, targeting local governments and residents

**4****Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas****1 Features of Defense Facilities and Projects Related to Harmony with the Surrounding Areas****(1) Measures around Defense Facilities**

Defense facilities are diverse in their use, and often require large volumes of land. In addition, as of January 1, 2024, approximately 29% of the land area and 30 of the 76 facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the USFJ are jointly used by the SDF in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, with the purpose of enhancing the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. Meanwhile, problems related to restricted establishment and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many of the defense facilities. Also, another problem is that frequent aircraft operations such as takeoffs and landings cause noise and other issues, impacting the living environment of local residential communities.

With that being said, defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable for Japan's national security. Therefore, in order for the facilities to exert their full function, it is necessary to maintain the conditions for their constant and stable

utilization by ensuring harmony between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas and by obtaining the understanding and cooperation of local residents.


For that purpose, the MOD has taken measures to prevent, reduce or mitigate aircraft noise and other impacts caused by activities of the SDF or the USFJ, or by the existence/operations of airfields and other defense facilities in the surrounding areas since 1974 based on the Living Environment Improvement Act,<sup>6</sup> etc.

In addition, in order to relieve the impact caused by the existence and operation of defense facilities, subsidies are provided for the development of facilities for stabilizing the everyday lives of residents while Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants are given to municipalities around defense facilities that have particularly significant impact on the living environment. Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants are utilized not only for the development of facilities but also for so-called "soft projects" such as aid for medical expenses.

In 2023, in order to respond with greater precision to the operational modes of specified defense facilities and their impact on surrounding areas, the criteria for the calculation of Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants was reviewed and


<sup>6</sup> Act on Improvement of Living Environment around Defense Facilities

Fig. IV-4-1-2 Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots)




(Note) Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Fig. IV-4-1-3 Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities)



(Note) Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Fig. IV-4-1-4 Joint Use Status of U.S. Forces in Japan Facilities/Areas (Dedicated Facilities) with the SDF



(Note) Area figures are rounded.

Fig. IV-4-1-5 Costs for Measures in Areas Around Defense Facilities in FY2024 (Contracts Base)

(Unit: 100 million yen)

Project	Mainland	Okinawa
Disturbance prevention projects	109	6
Noise prevention projects	650	148
Measures related to relocations	51	5
Subsidized projects for stabilizing people's lives	257	161
Road improvement projects	62	17
Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants	217	38
Other projects	18	4

governments, the MOD continues to study how the measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas should be in an attempt to make them more suitable, effective and efficient, in consideration of the severe fiscal situation.

**See** Fig. IV-4-1-2 (Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots)); Fig. IV-4-1-3 (Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities)); Fig. IV-4-1-4 (Joint Use Status of U.S. Forces in Japan Facilities/Areas (Dedicated Facilities) with the SDF); Fig. IV-4-1-5 Costs for Measures in Areas Around Defense Facilities in FY2024 (Contracts Base); Reference74 (List of U.S. Forces Japan Facilities/Areas (including joint use facilities))

**(2) Grants, etc., to Promote the USFJ Realignment**

Over the course of a period of time before and after

Training Grants for training of the SDF, the U.S. Forces, etc., at defense facilities other than specified defense facilities was established in view of the diversification of training, etc. In addition, the subsidiary framework has been revised to take into account the actual circumstances of the operation of the SDF, impact on the local area, requests from local communities, etc., by further extending the subsidized projects for the development of facilities for stabilizing the everyday lives of residents based on the requests of local governments, etc.

In response to the requests by the relevant local



“Sakaiminato Citizens Exchange Center (Minato Terrace)” established as part of an urban development support project (Sakaiminato City, Tottori Prefecture)

the implementation of USFJ realignment, Realignment Grants<sup>7</sup> are provided to help cover the expenses of projects<sup>8</sup> that contribute to improving the quality of life of residents in local municipalities affected by the realignment and stimulate local industries. These grants are provided in accordance with the progress of the realignment after the Minister of Defense has designated the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment.

As of April 2024, 11 municipalities affected by seven defense facilities are eligible to receive the Realignment Grants. In order to promote the realignment, additional measures are taken with budgetary provision.

 **See** Reference 75 (Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas)

### (3) Other Measures

#### (1) Compensation for Fisheries

The MOD defines the confined water for training, etc. carried out by the SDF or the USFJ using water surface based on laws or a contract and compensates for losses incurred from the restriction.

#### (2) Base Subsidy, etc.

The MOD provides cooperation by doing such things as providing various information also for the subsidy for municipalities where national defense facilities are located (“Base Subsidy”), and the Adjustment Grants

for municipalities where defense facilities are located (“Adjustment Grants”), both of which are under the defense facilities-related subsidy system under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

The Base Subsidy was established in view of the fact that the facilities used by the U.S. Forces and the SDF such as airports have a significant impact on the finances of municipalities. The subsidy generally takes the form of a substitute for fixed property tax and is granted to municipalities where these facilities are located.

The Adjustment Grants are provided to municipalities where USFJ properties are located in view of the fact that such properties are exempt from fixed property tax, and U.S. military personnel and civilian employees are exempt from municipal tax, etc.

## 2 Efforts to Develop Understanding and Cooperation Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, maintaining the presence of the USFJ and its readiness is vitally important for ensuring the security of Japan. For stable stationing of the USFJ, it is essential to obtain the understanding and cooperation of local governments and residents in the vicinity of defense facilities. Various efforts will continue to be undertaken tirelessly in this regard.

### (1) Coordination with Local Governments, etc., for Unit Operations of the USFJ

The MOD is working to promote understanding among local communities regarding the maintenance of USFJ facilities and unit operations by providing prior explanation to the relevant local governments and residents in the event of any USFJ realignment, training, unit deployment, new equipment deployment, etc.

### (2) Ensuring Safety during USFJ Operations

Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime



**REFERENCE** : Subsidies and Grants

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/sesaku/hojokin\\_jigyo.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/sesaku/hojokin_jigyo.html)

<sup>7</sup> The amount allocated is approximately ¥5.3 billion in the FY2024 budget.

<sup>8</sup> The specific scope of the projects is stipulated in Article 2 of the “Enforcement Order of the Act on Special Measures concerning Smooth Implementation of Realignment of United States Forces in Japan” as 14 projects, including projects related to the promotion of education, sports, and culture.

importance in USFJ operations. The Government has been fully communicating its approach to the U.S. side, including at summit and ministerial levels, with the two countries cooperating to ensure safe operations as a top priority.

In the event of a crash or missing parts, etc., of a U.S. military aircraft, the MOD requests the United States to promptly provide information and adopt rigorous measures for safety management and recurrence prevention. The MOD then promptly explains the obtained information to the relevant local governments, etc., and adopts measures to ensure prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage incurred.

In addition, Japan and the United States have established guidelines<sup>9</sup> for aircraft accidents and will take prompt and appropriate action in response to the situation in the scenario of a crash of a U.S. military aircraft outside of the facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces within Japan.

In addition, with regard to accidents/incidents caused by the consumption of alcohol by U.S. military personnel, etc., the MOD has requested the U.S. side on multiple occasions to tighten discipline and conduct personnel education.

The U.S. side, for its part, has taken measures such as putting in its place guidelines for off-duty activities (liberty policy), including imposing restrictions on the consumption of alcohol at night as well as curfews for U.S. military personnel under the age of 19. Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate to prevent the recurrence of incidents related to drinking.

### (3) Crash of the U.S. Osprey

In November 2023, a U.S. Air Force CV-22 (Osprey)

crashed off the coast of Yakushima (Kagoshima Prefecture), resulting in the death of 8 crew members.

In returning to its flight operations after the accident, the MOD has been making efforts to alleviate anxieties and concerns of local communities. The MOD has been making thorough explanation and appropriately providing information, such as by personally visiting more than 30 municipalities and explaining to them that the cause of the accident has been identified, and that it is possible to prevent and address accident resulting from similar failure by taking various safety measures corresponding to the cause.

Through such efforts, the MOD plans to provide detailed explanation regarding the circumstances and causes of the accident to relevant local governments once the accident investigation report is released.

**See** Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-1-2 (3) (Response to Search and Rescue of U.S. Forces Osprey); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 5-2-7(2) (Training Relocation for MV-22 (Osprey) etc.); Reference 33 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces)

### (4) Promoting Exchange between the USFJ and Local Residents

The MOD holds a Japan-U.S. exchange program to deepen mutual understanding between Japan and the United States with the understanding and cooperation of the local governments and U.S. Forces. Under the program, residents living near USFJ facilities and areas together with USFJ personnel enjoy sports, music and cultural exchanges.

The USFJ also has initiatives to deepen mutual understanding with people of the local communities, which include opening up of its bases (Friendship day) and information provision through websites and SNS (Social Networking Service).

## 5 Participation in National Events

The SDF presents ceremonies including guards of honor, lining up and gun salutes to the Emperor, state guests and others at national events. A guard of honor to state

guests from foreign countries at their welcome reception is essential for diplomatic procedure.

## 6 Support for the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition

The SDF has been providing transportation for personnel and supplies and other cooperation for the scientific research in Antarctica conducted by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

(MEXT) since 1965, when Antarctic research was resumed, with the icebreaker JS Fuji, since 1983 with icebreaker JS Shirase, and since 2009 with the second-generation icebreaker JS Shirase.

<sup>9</sup> Guidelines regarding Off-Base U.S. Military Aircraft Accidents in Japan.

For the 65th Antarctic Research Expedition from November 2023 to April 2024, the SDF provided support for the transportation of a total of 75 people and

approximately 1,160 tons of supplies, support for sea and land observations, and support for base construction.

 See Reference76 (Achievements of Antarctic Research Expedition)

## 7 Civil Engineering Consignments from Third Parties

The SDF receives consignments of civil engineering projects, etc., conducted by the state and local governments when the projects conform to the purpose of the SDF training. The GSDF, since its establishment, has received 8,272 consignments of civil engineering

projects from third parties.

The GSDF is contributing to local disaster prevention countermeasures and strengthening cooperation with local communities through these activities.

 See Reference 77 (External Construction Project Achievements)

## 8 Other Initiatives

### 1 Response to Laser Irradiation and Kite Flying towards SDF and U.S. Forces Aircraft

There have been cases of SDF and U.S. Forces aircraft being interfered by laser irradiation and kite flying during flight operations. These extremely dangerous and malicious acts could disrupt a pilot's ability to operate the aircraft, which could result in a catastrophe, such as plane crash. Therefore, the MOD works closely with relevant local governments to disseminate information to local residents regarding the risks involved in these acts by putting up posters and requesting to report to the police. Additionally, the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Act was revised in December 2016, making these interference acts subject to regulation as well as fines and other penalties.

facilities and areas, which if attacked, would seriously affect the function of the national security defense foundation. To address such concern, “The Drone Act” came into effect on June 13, 2019, to prohibit small drones from flying over and around SDF/USFJ facilities and areas designated by the Minister of Defense. As of the end of May 2024, 304 SDF facilities, including areas of SDF Headquarters and 63 USFJ facilities and areas have been designated as No Drone Zone.

### 3 Response to the Act on Review and Regulation of Real Estate Usage<sup>10</sup>

In line with the previous iteration of the National Security Strategy formulated in December 2013, which called for Japan to review issues related to the use of land in areas such as the areas surrounding defense facilities from the standpoint of national security, the MOD has been conducting research since FY2013 to ensure a systematic understanding of the situation of land ownership in areas surrounding defense facilities.

Under the Act on the Review and Regulation of the Use of Real Estate Surrounding Important Facilities and on Remote Territorial Islands, the Cabinet Office designates areas around facilities that are important for

### 2 Response to Flight Activities over Defense Facilities and Surrounding Airspace, including Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

In recent years there have been terror small drones, including commercial drones, some of which are targeted at military facilities. Given such circumstances, there is a possibility of drone terror attacks in Japan on SDF/USFJ



**REFERENCE** : Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs

**List of target defense-related facilities of SDF:**

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/drone/list.html>

**List of target defense-related facilities of USFJ:**

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/drone/list\\_zai beigun.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/drone/list_zai beigun.html)



<sup>10</sup> Act on the Review and Regulation of the Use of Real Estate Surrounding Important Facilities and on Remote Territorial Islands

national security<sup>11</sup> (“important facilities”) and areas within remote territorial islands as “monitored areas”<sup>12</sup> or “special monitored areas,”<sup>13</sup> and reviews the use of real estate and buildings in these areas. If the Cabinet Office identifies any acts that impede the functions of important facilities and remote territorial islands (adverse acts), it recommends or orders the real estate user to stop the adverse acts. So far, zones have been designated four times under the same act. Regarding defense-related facilities, 13 locations were designated with the initial announcement in December 2022, 48 locations in the second announcement in July 2023, 176 locations in the third announcement in December of the same year, and 157 locations in the fourth announcement in April 2024.

This Act has major significance from the perspective of ensuring that defense-related facilities, which constitute the foundation of Japan’s national defense, are able to

function properly. The MOD will adopt the appropriate measures in this regard in cooperation with the Cabinet Office.

#### 4 Initiatives to Increase Consumption of Marine Products

After the release of ALPS-treated water<sup>14</sup> into the ocean, countries China, etc., have enacted measures such as strengthening regulations on imports of marine products from Japan. In light of this, recognizing the need for supportive measures to protect the Japanese fishery industry, the government has decided to actively promote the increased consumption of domestic seafood. As a result, the MOD/SDF is further committed to actively supporting the expansion of domestic seafood consumption.

- 
- 11 Defense facilities (SDF and USFJ facilities in Japan), establishments of the Japan Coast Guard, and life-related facilities.
- 12 Areas approximately 1,000 m around important facilities and areas within the border such as remote islands, where special prevention measures are required to prevent the use of land and buildings for activities that could disrupt their operations.
- 13 In the monitored areas, priority is given to areas where the functions of important facilities and areas within the border such as remote islands are particularly important or those that can easily obstruct these functions, and where finding alternatives for these functions from other important facilities or areas within the border such as remote islands can be challenging.
- 14 Contaminated water containing radioactive substances, generated at the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, which has been purified until the regulatory standards are met.

## Commentary

## Initiatives Aimed at Increasing Consumption of Japanese Marine Products

The MOD/SDF is undertaking various initiatives to increase the consumption of Japanese marine products.

In addition to actively disseminating information about menus and recipes that use domestic marine products on SNS and the websites of various agencies and units, the MOD/SDF are urging contract cafeterias and bento stores to use domestic marine products, and many of the stores are now offering domestic marine products.

The GSDF designates days with the number “3” or “7” of each month as “Sakana-no-hi (Fish Day. In Japanese, “the 3rd or 7th day” can be called as “san ka nana”, respectively meaning, san (3) ka (or) nana (7), then twisting the phrase into sakana, which means fish in Japanese)”. On those days, each garrison of GSDF raises a banner announcing “Sakana no hi” and makes efforts to actively use domestic marine products in the menu served at each



Domestic marine products being sold using the “Kan-me Seafood” logo at the “Autumn Festa 2023” held at the MSDF Yokosuka District Headquarters (October 2023)

of the garrisons.

The MSDF is using its new “Kan-me Seafood (connecting kanmeshi (a phrase known as “rations for the MSDF”) and seafood)” logo to communicate its efforts to increase domestic marine product consumption and is actively disseminating information via social media and posting recipes on its official website. In October 2023, the Hokkaido Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations and Hokkaido Scallop Promotion Fishery Association presented a letter of appreciation to the MSDF for the great encouragement given to the fishermen of Hokkaido who make their living from the sea.

The ASDF displays its original poster on domestic marine products (map of domestic local marine specialities) at each of its bases and sub-bases and has also prepared and distributed coloring books of the maps to increase consumption among its personnel and their families.

In the FY 2024 budget, approximately 1.3 billion yen has been allocated for making menus at garrisons, etc., more appealing, including an increase in the rate of expenditure on food provisions to increase the consumption of Japanese marine products.



(“Kan-me Seafood” logo)



## Section 2 Responding to Climate Change and Environmental Issues

A sense of crisis regarding the sustainability of the global environment has been mounting internationally. Countries around the world have been making efforts on this front following the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the UN and the Paris Agreement, an international framework on climate change, in 2015.

Japan has also formulated the Fifth Basic Environment Plan, which was approved by the Cabinet in 2018, and has been working to realize a sustainable society while expressing its intention to further accelerate initiatives in Japan and abroad. In addition, the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures and the Climate Change Adaptation Plan were approved by the Cabinet in October 2021, and specific climate change measures aimed at achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 as well as

the targets for FY2030 are underway.

In response to the acceleration of domestic and overseas efforts, the MOD/SDF, as a member of the Government, also needs to respond to various climate change and environmental issues and contribute to their resolution while implementing measures with a greater focus on the coexistence of SDF/USFJ facilities/areas with the surrounding areas.

In addition, it is inevitable that the issue of climate change will have an even greater impact on future MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, and equipment, as well as on the security environment surrounding Japan, including responses to future energy shifts, all of which must be addressed in an appropriate manner.

 See Part 1, Chapter 4, Section 7 (Impact of Climate Change on the Security Environment and the Military)

### 1 Efforts Related to The MOD/SDF Facilities

As a member of the Government, the MOD/SDF has complied with the laws and regulations related to the environment and strived to be thorough in protecting the environment and to reduce the burden on the environment. It will work to promote initiatives related to the environment under the “Policy of the Ministry of Defense on Consideration for the Environment.” In FY2021, the MOD established the Environmental Policy Division in its Internal Bureau to take charge of the overall environmental policy of the MOD/SDF, and in FY2022, the MOD/SDF established environmental affairs offices in Regional Defense Bureaus across Japan as part of its efforts to develop the necessary infrastructure to address environmental issues in a centralized and effective manner and to continue working to promote further measures.

#### 1 The Ministry of Defense’s Response Strategy on Climate Change

The growing trend toward viewing climate change as a security issue is spreading among defense organizations globally, including the UN Security Council. In May 2021, the MOD established the MOD Climate Change Taskforce to evaluate and analyze the impact of climate change on Japan’s national security and to extensively study the measures required to address this issue.

In August 2022, the MOD formulated the Ministry of Defense’s Response Strategy on Climate Change. The same strategy sets forth 10 specific measures that the MOD should promote going forward to appropriately adapt and respond to the direct and indirect effects of climate change in the future. The MOD/SDF will promote measures aimed at addressing climate change while maintaining and reinforcing Japan’s defense capabilities in line with the document.



**REFERENCE** : The MOD’s Response Strategy on Climate Change

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/meeting/kikouhendou/pdf/taishosenryaku\\_202208.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/meeting/kikouhendou/pdf/taishosenryaku_202208.pdf)



**REFERENCE** : Initiatives concerning environmental measures

**URL** : [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/kankyo\\_taisaku/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/kankyo_taisaku/index.html)



Based on the same strategy, the government aircraft were operated using Sustainable Aviation Fuel<sup>1</sup> (SAF) during the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023. In June of the same year, F-15 and F-2 fighter jets also utilized Sustainable Aviation Fuel for their operations.

## 2 Procuring Renewable Energy Electricity

As the largest consumer of electricity among government institutions, the MOD/SDF, which has approximately 250,000 SDF personnel and operates facilities and various equipment all around Japan, has actively promoted the procurement of electricity generated by renewable energy sources (hereinafter “renewable energy electricity”) for the MOD/SDF facilities since FY2020 in order to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and other goals.

In FY2024, the MOD held 968 contracts related to the procurement of electricity for its facilities, etc., nationwide, of which 213 facilities, etc., procured renewable energy electricity. Furthermore, 157 facilities, etc., procured 100% of their electricity from renewable energy sources. The amount of renewable energy electricity procured in FY2024 is expected to be around 560 million kWh (annual electricity consumption of more than 130,000 general households). This means that approximately 43% of all electricity expected to be used by the MOD/SDF in FY2024 (approximately 1310 million kWh) will be procured in the form of renewable energy electricity. Although the amount of renewable energy electricity procured in FY2024 increased significantly from the previous fiscal year, as a member of the Government, the MOD will continue to make efforts to increase the ratio of renewable energy electricity.

## 3 Balancing Renewable Energy Electricity and Security

The introduction of renewable sources of energy, including wind power, is being promoted in response to the issue of climate change, and wind power generation facilities are expected to increase moving forward. Depending on the location and specifications of these wind power generation facilities, they may potentially impact the activities of the SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan, for example, by interfering with the operations of the warning and control radars making it difficult to detect aircraft and missiles, etc. Because of this potential impact, the MOD/SDF coordinates with project operators and other related parties meticulously from the early stages of project planning. Additionally, in line with the National Defense Strategy,<sup>2</sup> the Bill for Adjustment between Defense and Wind Power<sup>3</sup> was submitted to the regular session of the Diet in 2024 as a legislative measure to institutionalize current efforts, with the act passed and enacted in May 2024.

## 4 Response to PFOS<sup>4</sup>

The MOD has formulated the Action Plan for PFOS Disposal for aqueous film-forming foam containing PFOS and is working.

In addition, the analysis results of water in the dedicated tanks of SDF facilities nationwide where aqueous film-forming foam containing PFOS was or may have been used in the past were made public in July 2022. Following this investigation, the water in tanks in which PFOS, etc., has been detected will continue to be managed appropriately, and its disposal has been carried out progressively since FY2022, intending to complete the disposal by the end of FY2024.



**REFERENCE** : Impact of wind power generation facilities on the operations of the SDF/USFJ and Requests to related business operators

**URL** : <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/windpower/index.html>

- 1 In November 2022, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) utilized Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) for the first time during government aircraft operations. (SAF was also used during operations in January and May 2023.)
- 2 The National Defense Strategy states that “Japan will establish an effective mechanism to balance defense requirements with socioeconomic activities such as the installation of wind power generation facilities so that the defense-related facilities can fully function through the smooth use of sea, airspace and radio waves.”
- 3 The bill concerning a measure in securing smooth and safe activities by the SDF, etc. with the use and by avoiding transmission failure of radio wave due to the installation, etc. of wind power generation facilities.
- 4 PFOS is an organic fluorine compound with water-repellent, oil-repellent, and heat-resistant properties that has hitherto been used in aqueous film-forming foam, anti-reflection agents/resists for semiconductors, and metal plating treatment agents.

## 2 Initiatives Related to USFJ Facilities/Areas

USFJ is committed to the appropriate environmental management to protect the environment in the surrounding areas and ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel and residents in the surrounding areas according to the Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship<sup>5</sup> and the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) established by USFJ.

### 1 Efforts to Save Utilities

In USFJ facilities and areas, efforts are made to save utilities, which include changes to energy-efficient heating/ventilation/air-conditioning equipment; installation of motion sensors for lights-out during absence; installation of solar panels; reduction of the period to use cooling/ heating equipment and review of the preset temperature; and control of lighting and lights-out for night lighting, for example.

### 2 Response to PFOS

Also, as of June 2023, the USFJ has completed the

replacement of aqueous film-forming foam at all U.S. Army facilities in Honshu as well as at all U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines facilities in Japan, including Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture). By the end of September 2024, it is planned to replace all aqueous film-forming foam held by the USFJ across all facilities and areas in Japan with non-fluorinated foam extinguishing agents that do not contain PFAS<sup>6</sup> or transition to water suppression systems. The MOD/SDF have been briefed to this effect and the USFJ as a whole is progressively replacing the aqueous film-forming foam in its possession.

When water containing PFOS or similar substances leaks from U.S. military facilities or areas into the surrounding environment, access to facility and sampling investigations are carried out in collaboration with relevant local governments, based on the Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship. The MOD will continue to cooperate closely with the relevant ministries and agencies, related local governments, and the U.S. side, and take necessary measures.

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- 5 This is an agreement between Japan and the United States regarding cooperation in environmental management associated with the U.S. forces in Japan. It supplements the agreement between Japan and the U.S. regarding the Status of the U.S. military in Japan pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the U.S. and the Facilities and Areas and the Status of the U.S. military in Japan. The agreement was concluded in 2015 to supplement the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement in the environmental field. It stipulates procedures for gaining access to U.S. military facilities and areas in the event of environmental incidents. Furthermore, it outlines the responsibility of the U.S. side in establishing and upholding environmental standards.
- 6 A collective term for perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl compounds from among organic fluorine compounds. It includes PFOS, which has water-repellency, oil-repellency, and heat-resistance properties. It has been used in aqueous film-forming foam, anti-reflection agents/resists for semiconductors, metal plating treatment agents, etc.

## Section 3

## Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives Management, Disclosure of Administrative Documents, and Related Activities

## 1 Various Public Relations Activities

As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, public relations activities are important to gain the trust and cooperation of the public.

Hence, the MOD/SDF will be more proactive in undertaking public relations activities in a variety of ways that are easily comprehensible to the public.

In addition, given that understanding and support from foreign countries are also of utmost importance for the SDF to conduct its missions successfully, it is essential that the MOD strengthens efforts to provide information to the international community about MOD/SDF initiatives, including SDF activities abroad.

 See Reference78 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)

### 1 Providing Information Both Domestically and Internationally











The MOD/SDF conducts active PR activities using the Internet, including through official websites, SNS (Social Networking Service), and video distribution. The MOD has also been making great efforts to provide accurate information in a more extensive and timely fashion by creating brochures and PR videos, assisting

in editing the PR magazine “MAMOR,” cooperating with media coverage, dispatching instructors to give lectures and talks, etc. In addition, as part of our efforts to disseminate information to young people, the MOD/SDF will be posting content for young people, including videos, on the “Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces KIDS SITE,” and also publish “Maru wakari! (I know everything) Japan’s Defense: The First Defense White Paper” aimed at elementary school to high school students.

Furthermore, as MOD/SDF’s activities reach out worldwide, it is important to accurately publicize those activities to the international community and secure the understanding and trust of the respective countries. To achieve this, the MOD/SDF is disseminating information in English and, in particular, upgrading the MOD’s English website and actively sharing timely, easy-to-understand information through social media in English. At the same time, it is engaging in PR activities aimed at the international community through various means, such as providing opportunities for interviews by overseas media, creating an English version of the Defense White Paper, and issuing the English-language PR pamphlet “Japan Defense Focus” (JDF).

 See Fig. IV-4-3-1 (Usage Status of Social Media (number of followers) of The MOD/SDF); Appendix: “Make Peace Your Job”

Fig. IV-4-3-1 Usage Status of Social Media (number of followers) of The MOD/SDF

(as of March 31, 2024)	 X (former Twitter)	 Facebook	 Instagram	 YouTube
 MOD / SDF	Approx. 1,240,000	Approx. 160,000	Approx. 80,000	Approx. 60,000
 JSO	Approx. 310,000	Approx. 40,000	Approx. 30,000	Approx. 10,000
 GSO	Approx. 870,000	Approx. 230,000	Approx. 10,000	Approx. 290,000
 MSO	Approx. 910,000	Approx. 250,000	Approx. 120,000	Approx. 340,000
 ASO	Approx. 690,000	Approx. 100,000	Approx. 150,000	Approx. 160,000
 MOD ATLA	Approx. 50,000	—	—	Approx. 50,000

## 2 Events and PR Facilities

The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise,<sup>1</sup> cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and Blue Impulse demonstration flights by the ASDF. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on occasions such as the anniversary of the unit's foundation. Furthermore, as part of the commemorative activities for the SDF's anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held every year.

In addition, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF take turn at conducting either a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review every year. In 2023, an air review was held at the Iruma Base (Saitama) of Air Self-Defense Force.

The MOD has also been actively opening its PR facilities to the public. The number of visitors who

participated in tours of the MOD's PR facilities in the Ichigaya area (Ichigayadai Tour), where the underground bunker of the Imperial General Headquarters is now open to the public, reached approximately 489,700 persons as of the end of March 2024. In addition, each SDF service also has PR facilities and archives, and these facilities open to the public.

## 3 Enlistment Experience Programs

The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours for women as well as undergraduate and graduate students,<sup>2</sup> and Enlistment Experience Programs for groups, companies, and other organizations.<sup>3</sup> These programs are intended to promote participants' understanding of the SDF by offering opportunities to experience the daily life and training of the MOD/SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel.



JSDF Marching Festival (November 2023)



Living Experience at Obihiro Garrison (Hokkaido)



**MOVIE** : Fuji Firepower Review 2023

**URL** : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GY2bqfCaSGk>



**MOVIE** : 2023 SDF Music Festival

**URL** : <https://youtu.be/nqy0J0fFq70>



**MOVIE** : The Air Review 2023

**URL** : [https://youtu.be/sLA7dvZsH2g?si=N9w6\\_V7dTFbx1H10](https://youtu.be/sLA7dvZsH2g?si=N9w6_V7dTFbx1H10)

- 1 The Fuji Fire Power Exercise will be closed to the public from FY 2023. The video footage will be distributed to allow the human resources of the unit to focus on their original purpose of education and training.
- 2 Members of the general public may apply to participate in various SDF Life Experience Tours on the MOD/SDF website.
- 3 These tours are designed for participants to experience everyday life in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. They are held upon request by private companies and other organizations through the Provincial Cooperation Offices.

## Commentary

## The Air Review 2023

On November 11, 2023, the MOD/SDF held the The Air Review 2023, under the review of Prime Minister Kishida, at the ASDF's Iruma Air Base (Saitama Prefecture).

The purpose of this Air Review was to raise awareness of the mission and morale of the personnel. The ceremony was conducted without spectators, with Prime Minister Kishida, the Supreme Commander of the Self-Defense Forces, delivering a speech and inspecting the troops.

In his speech, the Prime Minister greatly boosted the morale of the personnel by referring to concrete achievements concerning the transportation of Japanese nationals and others in Israel, such as "The sincere manner in which the personnel performed their duties on board the aircraft and at the transit points, and their meticulous attention to the evacuees, significantly eased the anxiety of the evacuees". In addition, during the inspection of the troops, Prime Minister Kishida was briefed on the duties and activities of the ASDF and inspected ASDF's main equipment, including F-15J and F-2A fighter jets, as well as C-2 transport

aircraft participating in international peace cooperation activities and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas.

During this Air Review, Prime Minister Kishida directly communicated with the personnel and listened to the opinions of personnel from the field.

The visuals from the day of the Air Review are available for the public to view on the ASDF's online channel.



Inspection of troops by Prime Minister Kishida

## 2

## Initiatives for Public Document Management and Disclosure of Administrative Documents

### 1 Necessity of Proper Management of Public Records and Archives and Proper Operation of the Disclosure System of Administrative Documents

Democracy, which is the most important system of the country, is founded on the principle that the public has access to accurate information, thereby making appropriate judgment and exercise of sovereignty. Administrative documents held by the government are of the utmost importance for the public's access to accurate information. For this reason it is an important responsibility for the government, including the MOD/SDF, to manage information in an appropriate manner and appropriately respond to the public's disclosure requests for administrative documents.

### 2 Promotion of Proper Management of Public Records and Archives and Proper Operation of the Disclosure System of Administrative Documents

The MOD/SDF takes it seriously that the issues over daily reports in South Sudan and Iraq brought about the public's distrust in the MOD/SDF.

The MOD/SDF is making every effort to prevent recurrence based on measures<sup>4</sup> necessary for the proper management of public records and archives by the entire government. The MOD/SDF is also working on ensuring proper management and responding to disclosure requests for administrative documents by reforming the awareness of personnel and the organizational culture, enhancing the supervisory framework, etc.

We will promote systematic and efficient management by managing administrative documents electronically,

<sup>4</sup> "Measures for Ensuring Appropriate Management of Public Records" (adopted by the Ministerial Council on the Management of Administrative Documents and Related Matters on July 20, 2018)

from their creation to storage, disposal, and transfer, facilitating tracking administrative documents, history management, and search. At the same time, we also promote improvement in the efficiency of document management operations by reducing the use of paper-

based administrative documents, contributing to improved work environment and work style reforms such as telework.

 **See** Reference 79 (Record of Disclosure of Administrative Documents by the Ministry of Defense [FY2023])

### 3 Initiatives for Policy Evaluation, etc.

#### 1 Engagement in Policy Evaluation

The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various policies based on its policy evaluation system. In FY2023, the MOD conducted policy evaluations of research and development (R&D) programs and projects concerning Special Taxation Measures.

#### 2 Promotion of Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM)

The MOD, under the supervision of Director-General for Evidence-based Policymaking, practices EBPM through the Administrative Project Review and promotes its initiatives such as in decision-making process.

#### 3 Initiatives for the Personal Data Protection System

In light of respecting individual rights and interests in line with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information<sup>5</sup>, the MOD/SDF has adopted measures to manage the security of personal information under its control and responds appropriately to requests for the disclosure of such information.

#### 4 Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower Protection System

The MOD/SDF sets up a system to handle whistleblowing made by its officials, employees and outside workers, establishing internal and external contact desks to deal with whistleblowing and to protect whistleblowers.

<sup>5</sup> Act on the Protection of Personal Information

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**70th Anniversary of the  
SDF's Establishment**



DEFENSE  
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