Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress

Updated July 30, 2024
Summary

The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. The seven other Arctic states are Russia, Canada, Iceland, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984) “provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and objectives in the Arctic.” The National Science Foundation (NSF) is the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy. The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading international forum for addressing issues relating to the Arctic. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets forth a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world’s oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS.

An array of climate changes in the Arctic is now documented by observing systems, with more expected with future greenhouse gas-driven climate change. Observed physical changes in the Arctic include warming ocean, soil, and air temperatures; melting permafrost; shifting vegetation and animal abundances; and altered characteristics of Arctic cyclones. A monitoring report of the Arctic Council concluded in 2019 that “the Arctic biophysical system is now clearly trending away from its previous state [in the 20th century] and into a period of unprecedented change, with implications not only within but also beyond the Arctic.”

Following the end of the Cold War, the Arctic states sought to maintain the Arctic as a region of cooperation, low tension, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for international law. Over the past 10 to 15 years, the emergence of great power competition between the United States, Russia, and China has introduced elements of competition and tension into the Arctic’s geopolitical environment. Russia’s war in Ukraine beginning on February 24, 2022, has further affected the region’s geopolitical environment by prompting the seven Arctic states other than Russia to suspend most forms of Arctic cooperation with Russia, by prompting Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership (they are now NATO members), and in other ways.

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard are devoting increased attention to the Arctic in their planning, budgeting, and operations. Whether DOD and the Coast Guard are taking sufficient actions for defending U.S. interests in the region is a topic of congressional oversight. The Coast Guard has two operational polar icebreakers and through FY2023 has received funding for procuring the first two of four or five planned new heavy polar icebreakers.

The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route close to Russia, and the Northwest Passage close to Alaska and through the Canadian archipelago—though the rate of increase in the use of these routes might not be as great as sometimes anticipated in press accounts. International guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters have been updated.

Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more onshore and offshore exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased vessel traffic (e.g., oil and gas exploration, cruise ships, expanded fishing activities) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in Arctic waters. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies for cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters have yet to be developed. Changes in the Arctic could result in migration of fish stocks to new waters, and could affect protected species. The United States is working with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks.
# Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
Background .................................................................................................................... 1

Definitions of the Arctic ............................................................................................... 1
  Arctic Circle Definition ............................................................................................... 1
  Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 ................................. 2
  Other Definitions ....................................................................................................... 2

Population of the Arctic ............................................................................................... 5
Eight Arctic States, Including Seven NATO Members and Five Arctic Coastal States .... 5
U.S. Identity as an Arctic Nation .................................................................................. 6

U.S. Arctic Research ................................................................................................... 6
  Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended ............................... 6
  FY2025 NSF Budget Request for Arctic Research .................................................... 7
  March 2024 Report on Federal Agency Funding for Arctic Research .................... 7

Major U.S. Policy Documents Relating to the Arctic ................................................... 7
  January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) ....................................... 7
  May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region ........................................................ 9
  January 2015 Executive Order on Enhancing Coordination of Arctic Efforts ......... 9
  October 2022 National Security Strategy Document ................................................ 9
  October 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region ............................................. 10

Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs ...................................................................... 12
Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) ............................................................ 13
Arctic Council ............................................................................................................. 13
Arctic and U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ....................................... 14
House and Senate Arctic Member Organizations ....................................................... 15

Issues for Congress .................................................................................................... 16
Climate Change, with Biophysical and Economic Impacts ......................................... 16
  Warming Temperatures and a More Intense Water Cycle ...................................... 17
  Sea Ice Decline and Mobility .................................................................................. 18
  Land-Based Changes ............................................................................................... 20

Geopolitical Environment ......................................................................................... 21
  Overview .................................................................................................................. 21
  Impact of Russia’s War in Ukraine .......................................................................... 22
  October 2021 National Intelligence Estimate ......................................................... 29
  Arctic Governance .................................................................................................... 30
  Relative Priority of Arctic in U.S. Policymaking .................................................... 31
  Russia in the Arctic ................................................................................................... 32
  NATO and European Union in the Arctic ............................................................... 35
  China in the Arctic .................................................................................................... 36

U.S. and Allied Military Forces and Operations ......................................................... 43
  Overview .................................................................................................................. 43
  Russia’s Arctic Military Modernization .................................................................... 44
  U.S. and Allied Arctic Military Activities ................................................................. 45
  Some Specific Developments ................................................................................... 48
  Sufficiency of U.S. Arctic Military Activities .......................................................... 51
  Selected FY2024 and FY2025 Legislative Provisions .............................................. 52

Polar Icebreaking ..................................................................................................... 53
Search and Rescue (SAR) .......................................................................................... 55
Commercial Sea Transportation .......................................................................................................................... 56
  Background .......................................................................................................................................................... 56
  Destination Traffic, Not Trans-Arctic Traffic ....................................................................................................... 57
  Unpredictable Ice Conditions Hinder Trans-Arctic Shipping .............................................................................. 57
  Basic Navigation Infrastructure Is Lacking ......................................................................................................... 58
  Regulation of Arctic Shipping .............................................................................................................................. 59
  Arctic Polar Code ................................................................................................................................................ 60
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration ......................................................................................................................... 61
  Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration ......................................................................................................................... 61
  Offshore Mineral Exploration ................................................................................................................................ 63
  Extent of the Continental Margin ........................................................................................................................... 65
Onshore Energy and Mineral Development ........................................................................................................ 70
Oil Pollution and Pollution Response .................................................................................................................... 72
  Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change ......................................................................................................... 72
  Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic ................................................................................................... 74
Fisheries ................................................................................................................................................................. 77
Protected Species ................................................................................................................................................. 81
CRS Reports on Specific Arctic-Related Issues .................................................................................................... 83

Figures

  Figure 1. Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA .......................................................................................... 3
  Figure 2. Entire Arctic Area as Defined by ARPA .............................................................................................. 4
  Figure 3. Arctic Research Funding by Agency, FY2022-FY2024 ..................................................................... 8
  Figure 4. 2012 Record-Low Sea Ice Extent ....................................................................................................... 18
  Figure 5. Estimated Historical, Observed, and Projected September Arctic Sea Ice Extent ............................. 19
  Figure 6. Arctic SAR Areas in Arctic SAR Agreement .......................................................................................... 56
  Figure 7. Seven Regions of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf ....................................................................... 67

Contacts

  Author Information ............................................................................................................................................... 84
Introduction

The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. Issues such as geopolitical competition in the region between the United States, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China); increased military operations in the region by Russia and other Arctic countries; growth in commercial shipping through the Arctic; and oil, gas, and mineral exploration in the Arctic could affect the region’s future.

The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial political, economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region. Decisions that Congress makes on Arctic-related issues could significantly affect these interests.

This report provides an overview of Arctic-related issues for Congress, and refers readers to more in-depth CRS reports on specific Arctic-related issues. Congressional readers with questions about an issue discussed in this report should contact the author or authors of the section of the report discussing that issue. The authors are identified by footnote at the start of each section.

This report does not track legislation on specific Arctic-related issues. For tracking of legislative activity, see the CRS reports relating to specific Arctic-related issues that are listed at the end of this report.

Background

Definitions of the Arctic

There are multiple definitions of the Arctic that result in differing descriptions of the land and sea areas encompassed by the term. Policy discussions of the Arctic can employ varying definitions of the region, and readers should bear in mind that the definition used in one discussion may differ from that used in another. This CRS report does not rely on any one definition.

Arctic Circle Definition

The most common and basic definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area north of the Arctic Circle (a circle of latitude at about 66° 34' North). For surface locations within this zone, the sun is generally above the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at the summer solstice) and below the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at the winter solstice). The land and sea area within the Arctic Circle is about 8.14 million square miles, which is about 4.1% (or between 1/24th and 1/25th) of the Earth’s surface, and more than twice the land area of the United States, which is about 3.5 million square miles.
The Arctic Circle definition of the Arctic includes the northernmost third or so of Alaska, as well as the Chukchi Sea, which separates that part of Alaska from Russia, and U.S. territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters north of Alaska. It does not include the lower two-thirds or so of Alaska or the Bering Sea, which separates that lower part of the state from Russia.

The Arctic Ocean, which is roughly at the center of the Arctic region, accounts for much of the region’s total area. By one calculation, the Arctic Ocean has an area of about 6.01 million square miles, which is about 4.3% of the Earth’s ocean area. This figure uses boundaries for the Arctic Ocean that include some waters south of the Arctic Circle. Other sources, using different boundaries for the Arctic Ocean, put the size of the Arctic Ocean at about 5.4 million square miles.

**Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984**

Section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984) defines the Arctic as follows:

As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.

This definition, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. 4111, includes certain parts of Alaska below the Arctic Circle, such as the Seward Peninsula and the Yukon Delta.

The U.S. Coast Guard states that “The U.S. Arctic encompasses some 2,521 miles of shoreline, an international strait adjacent to the Russian Federation, and 647 miles of land border with Canada above the Arctic Circle. The U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic contains approximately 889,000 square miles of ocean.” Figure 1 shows the Arctic area of Alaska as defined by ARPA; Figure 2 shows the entire Arctic area as defined by ARPA.

**Other Definitions**

Other definitions of the Arctic are based on factors such as average temperature, the northern tree line, the extent of permafrost on land, the extent of sea ice on the ocean, or jurisdictional or

---


7 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.

8 As codified, the definition reads, “As used in this chapter...”

9 Coast Guard, *Arctic Strategic Outlook*, April 2019, p. 11.

administrative boundaries. A definition based on a climate-related factor could circumscribe differing areas over time as a result of climate change.

**Figure 1. Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA**

![Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA](https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/ARPA_Alaska_only_150dpi.jpg)


For example, the 10°C isotherm definition of the Arctic—a definition sometimes used in scientific and environmental discussions of the Arctic—defines the region as the land and sea area in the northern hemisphere where the average temperature for the warmest month (July) is below 10°C, or 50°F. This definition results in an irregularly shaped Arctic region that excludes some land and sea areas north of the Arctic Circle but includes some land and sea areas south of the Arctic Circle. This definition currently excludes all of Finland and Sweden, as well as some of

---

Alaska above the Arctic Circle, while including virtually all of the Bering Sea and Alaska’s Aleutian Islands.

**Figure 2. Entire Arctic Area as Defined by ARPA**

As another example, the definition of the Arctic adopted by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP)—a working group of the Arctic Council—“essentially includes the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’ N),[12] and north of 62° N in Asia and 60° N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea.”[13]

---

[12] Regarding the precise latitude of the Arctic Circle, see footnote 2.

[13] For examples of maps of the Arctic reflecting various definitions of the Arctic, see

Some observers use the term “high north” as a way of referring to the Arctic, or make a distinction between the “high Arctic”—meaning, in general, the colder portions of the Arctic that are closer to the North Pole—and other areas of the Arctic that are generally less cold and farther away from the North Pole, which are sometimes described as the low Arctic or the subarctic.

**Population of the Arctic**

According to one estimate, about 4 million people, or about 0.05% of the world’s population, live in the Arctic, of which roughly half (roughly 2 million) live in Russia’s part of the Arctic. Another source states “Approximately two and a half million of Russia’s inhabitants live in Arctic territory, accounting for nearly half of the population living in the Arctic worldwide.” Another source, using a broader definition of the Arctic, concluded that just over 10 million people live in the Arctic, including 7 million in Russia’s Arctic.

**Eight Arctic States, Including Seven NATO Members and Five Arctic Coastal States**

Eight countries have territory north of the Arctic Circle: the United States (Alaska), Russia, Canada, Iceland, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland, a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark), Norway, Sweden, and Finland. These eight countries are often referred to as the Arctic countries or Arctic States, and they are the member states of the Arctic Council, which is discussed further below.

---


18 The northern coast of mainland Iceland is just south of the Arctic Circle, but the Arctic Circle passes through Grimsey Island, a small offshore island of Iceland that is about 25 miles north of the northern coast of mainland Iceland. The northern part of Grimsey Island is Iceland’s territory north of the Arctic Circle. See, for example, “Grimsey,” *Wikipedia*, updated October 11, 2022, accessed March 7, 2024; “Is Iceland in the Arctic Circle?” Iceland Unlimited, January 2017, accessed March 7, 2024, at https://icelandunlimited.is/blog/is-iceland-in-the-arctic-circle/.
The seven Arctic countries other than Russia are all members of NATO, and are sometimes referred to as the Arctic 7 or A7 states. Five of the eight Arctic countries—the United States, Canada, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), Norway, and Russia—are considered Arctic coastal states because they have mainland coasts that front onto waters north of the Arctic Circle.

**U.S. Identity as an Arctic Nation**

As mentioned earlier, the United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial political, economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region. Even so, Alaska is geographically separated and somewhat distant from the other 49 states, and relatively few Americans—fewer than 68,000 as of 2023—live in the Arctic part of Alaska as shown in Figure 1. A March 6, 2020, research paper on the Arctic in U.S. national identity, based on data collected in online surveys conducted in October-December 2019, stated: “We found that Americans continue to mildly disagree with the assertion that the United States is an Arctic nation with broad and fundamental interests in the region.”

**U.S. Arctic Research**

**Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended**

The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984) provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and objectives in the Arctic. The act, among other things

- made a series of findings concerning the importance of the Arctic and Arctic research;
- established the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) to promote Arctic research and recommend Arctic research policy;
- designated the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy;
- established the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to develop a national Arctic research policy and a five-year plan to implement that

---

19 Source for figure of fewer than 68,000: CRS analysis of data presented at Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development, “Alaska Population Estimates,” updated July 17, 2024, accessed July 25, 2024, at https://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/data-pages/alaska-population-estimates. Figures presented there for Alaska’s 2023 population estimates by borough, census area, and economic region show that of Alaska’s estimated population of 736,812 as of 2023, fewer than 68,000 were in areas wholly or partially north of the boundary of the Arctic area of Alaska that is shown in Figure 1.


22 These words are taken from the official title of P.L. 98-373. (Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 is the short title of Title I of P.L. 98-373.) The remainder of P.L. 98-373’s official title relates to Title II of the act, the short title of which is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.

policy, and designated the NSF representative on the IARPC as its chairperson;24 and

- defined the term “Arctic” for purposes of the act.


**FY2025 NSF Budget Request for Arctic Research**

NSF, which is the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy, carries out Arctic and Antarctic research activities through its Office of Polar Programs (OPP). NSF states that “OPP is the primary U.S. supporter of fundamental research in the polar regions. In the Arctic, NSF helps coordinate research planning as directed by the Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984, and the NSF Director chairs the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) created for this purpose.”25 NSF requested $588.83 million for OPP for FY2025, which is about 9.3% more than the enacted figure of $538.62 million for FY2023.26

**March 2024 Report on Federal Agency Funding for Arctic Research**

A March 2024 report from the National Science and Technology Council—the FY2025 edition of a congressionally mandated annual report—presents a compilation of budgetary information reported by federal agencies and departments engaged in Arctic research. The report states:

> The federal government spent over $550 million on Arctic research in fiscal year (FY) 2023.... The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Defense (DoD)—agencies with the three largest Arctic budgets—account for over 80% of the FY 2023 total. Based on agency summaries, NSF invests primarily in basic research, DoD invests primarily in applied research, and NASA invests primarily in research infrastructure.27

**Figure 3** presents the report’s summary table of Arctic research funding by agency.

**Major U.S. Policy Documents Relating to the Arctic**

The executive branch has issued a number of policy documents concerning the Arctic, including those mentioned below.


On January 12, 2009 (i.e., eight days before its final day in office), the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was issued as National Security Presidential

---

24 The IARPC currently includes more than a dozen federal agencies, departments, and offices. Additional information on the IARPC is available at https://www.nsf.gov/geo/opp/arctic/iarpc/start.jsp.


26 National Science Foundation, *FY 2025 Budget Request to Congress*, March 11, 2024, p. OPP-1 (PDF page 327 of 566). The document does not divide the total requested amount for OPP for FY2025 into subtotals for the Arctic and Antarctic.

Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD 66/HSPD 25). The directive was the result of an interagency review, and it superseded for the Arctic (but not the Antarctic) a 1994 presidential directive on Arctic and Antarctic policy. The directive, among other things

- states that the United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in the region;
- sets forth a six-element overall U.S. policy for the region;
- describes U.S. national security and homeland security interests in the Arctic; and
- discusses a number of issues as they relate to the Arctic, including international governance; the extended continental shelf and boundary issues; promotion of international scientific cooperation; maritime transportation; economic issues, including energy; and environmental protection and conservation of natural resources.

**Figure 3. Arctic Research Funding by Agency, FY2022-FY2024**
Table from March 2024 Arctic Research Crosscut Budget Report for FY2022-FY2024

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>FY 2022 ACTUAL</th>
<th>FY 2023 WITH SUPPLEMENTAL</th>
<th>FY 2023 ESTED</th>
<th>FY 2023 WITH SUPPLEMENTAL</th>
<th>FY 2024 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arctic Research Commission</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denali Commission</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>120.9</td>
<td>125.9</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Housing and Urban Development</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Interior</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
<td>154.7</td>
<td>154.7</td>
<td>177.2</td>
<td>177.2</td>
<td>181.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Science Foundation</td>
<td>151.2</td>
<td>151.2</td>
<td>142.4</td>
<td>154.1</td>
<td>124.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smithsonian Institution</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>512.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>514.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>554.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>573.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>446.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee of the National Science and Technology Council, Arctic Research Crosscut Budget Report FY 2022-2024, March 2024, p. 4.

May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region

On May 10, 2013, the Obama Administration released a document entitled National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The document appears to supplement rather than supersede the January 2009 Arctic policy directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) discussed above. The document states that the strategy is built on three lines of effort:

- advancing U.S. security interests,
- pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship, and
- strengthening international cooperation.

Actions taken under the strategy, the document states, will be informed by four guiding principles:

- safeguarding peace and stability,
- making decisions using the best available information,
- pursuing innovative arrangements, and
- consulting and coordinating with Alaska natives.

On January 30, 2014, the Obama Administration released an implementation plan for the May 2013 national strategy for the Arctic region. The implementation plan outlines about 36 specific initiatives.

January 2015 Executive Order on Enhancing Coordination of Arctic Efforts

On January 21, 2015, then-President Obama issued Executive Order 13689, entitled “Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic.” The order established an Arctic Executive Steering Committee is to “provide guidance to executive departments and agencies and enhance coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and offices, and, where applicable, with State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native organizations, academic and research institutions, and the private and nonprofit sectors.”

October 2022 National Security Strategy Document

A national security strategy document released by the Biden Administration in October 2022 includes a section on the Arctic, entitled “Maintain a Peaceful Arctic,” which states

The United States seeks an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative. Climate change is making the Arctic more accessible than ever, threatening Arctic communities and vital ecosystems, creating new potential economic opportunities, and intensifying competition to shape the region’s future. Russia has invested significantly in its presence in the Arctic over the last decade, modernizing its military infrastructure and increasing the pace of exercises and training operations. Its aggressive behavior has

---

30 National Strategy for the Arctic Region states on page 6 that the “lines of effort” it describes are to be undertaken “[t]o meet the challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, and in furtherance of established Arctic Region Policy,” at which point there is a footnote referencing the January 2009 Arctic policy directive.
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress

raised geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, creating new risks of unintended conflict and hindering cooperation. The PRC has also sought to increase its influence in the Arctic by rapidly increased its Arctic investments, pursuing new scientific activities, and using these scientific engagements to conduct dual-use research with intelligence or military applications.

We will uphold U.S. security in the region by improving our maritime domain awareness, communications, disaster response capabilities, and icebreaking capacity to prepare for increased international activity in the region. We will exercise U.S. Government presence in the region as required, while reducing risk and preventing unnecessary escalation. Arctic nations have the primary responsibility for addressing regional challenges, and we will deepen our cooperation with our Arctic allies and partners and work with them to sustain the Arctic Council and other Arctic institutions despite the challenges to Arctic cooperation posed by Russia’s war in Ukraine. We will continue to protect freedom of navigation and determine the U.S. extended continental shelf in accordance with international rules. We must build resilience to and mitigate climate change in the region, including through agreements to reduce emissions and more cross-Arctic research collaboration. As economic activity in the Arctic increases, we will invest in infrastructure, improve livelihoods, and encourage responsible private sector investment by the United States, our allies, and our partners, including in critical minerals, and improve investment screening for national security purposes. Across these efforts, we will uphold our commitment to honor Tribal sovereignty and self-governance through regular, meaningful, and robust consultation and collaboration with Alaska Native communities.

October 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region

A national strategy for the Arctic region that was also released by the Biden Administration in October 2022, and which states that it is an update of the above-noted May 2013 national strategy for the Arctic region, states the following in its executive summary:

The United States seeks an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative. The National Strategy for the Arctic Region articulates an affirmative U.S. agenda over the next ten years, from 2022 to 2032, to realize this vision. This strategy, an update of its 2013 predecessor, addresses the climate crisis with greater urgency and directs new investments in sustainable development to improve livelihoods for Arctic residents, while conserving the environment. It also acknowledges increasing strategic competition in the Arctic since 2013, exacerbated by Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine, and seeks to position the United States to both effectively compete and manage tensions.

Realizing our vision during this dynamic and challenging period will require U.S. leadership at home and abroad. We will advance U.S. interests across four mutually reinforcing pillars spanning both domestic and international issues.

• **Pillar 1—Security:** We will deter threats to the U.S. homeland and our allies by enhancing the capabilities required to defend our interests in the Arctic, while coordinating shared approaches with allies and partners and mitigating risks of unintended escalation. We will exercise U.S. government presence in the Arctic region as required to protect the American people and defend our sovereign territory.

• **Pillar 2—Climate Change and Environmental Protection:** The U.S. government will partner with Alaskan communities and the State of Alaska to build resilience to the impacts of climate change, while working to reduce emissions from the Arctic as part of broader global mitigation efforts, to improve scientific understanding, and to conserve Arctic ecosystems.

---

• **Pillar 3—Sustainable Economic Development**: We will pursue sustainable development and improve livelihoods in Alaska, including for Alaska Native communities, by investing in infrastructure, improving access to services, and supporting growing economic sectors. We will also work with allies and partners to expand high-standard investment and sustainable development across the Arctic region.

• **Pillar 4—International Cooperation and Governance**: Despite the challenges to Arctic cooperation resulting from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the United States will work to sustain institutions for Arctic cooperation, including the Arctic Council, and position these institutions to manage the impacts of increasing activity in the region. We also seek to uphold international law, rules, norms, and standards in the Arctic.

This strategy is intended to serve as a framework to guide the U.S. government’s approach to tackling emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic. Our work will be guided by five principles that will be applied across all four pillars.

• **Consult, Coordinate, and Co-Manage with Alaska Native Tribes and Communities**: The United States is committed to regular, meaningful, and robust consultation, coordination, and co-management with Alaska Native Tribes, communities, corporations, and other organizations and to ensuring equitable inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and their knowledge.

• **Deepen Relationships with Allies and Partners**: We will deepen our cooperation with Arctic Allies and partners: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. We will also expand Arctic cooperation with other countries that uphold international law, rules, norms, and standards in the region.

• **Plan for Long-Lead Time Investments**: Many of the investments prioritized in this strategy will require long lead times. We will be proactive, anticipating changes coming to the Arctic over the next several decades and making new investments now to be prepared.

• **Cultivate Cross-Sectoral Coalitions and Innovative Ideas**: The challenges and opportunities in the Arctic cannot be solved by national governments alone. The United States will strengthen and build on coalitions of private sector; academia; civil society; and state, local, and Tribal actors to encourage and harness innovative ideas to tackle these challenges.

• **Commit to a Whole of Government, Evidence-Based Approach**: The Arctic extends beyond the responsibility of any single region or government agency. U.S. Federal departments and agencies will work together to implement this strategy. We will deploy evidence-based decision-making and carry out our work in close partnership with the State of Alaska; Alaska Native Tribes, communities, corporations, and other organizations; and local communities, as well as with the U.S. Congress.33

In October 2023, the Biden Administration released an implementation plan for its October 2022 national strategy for the Arctic region.34 The implementation plan includes 13 strategic objectives in support of the October 2022 document’s four pillars.35

---

35 The 13 strategic objectives are improve our understanding of the Arctic operating environment; exercise presence to support priority goals; maximize unity of effort with allies and partners; advance community adaptation and climate resilience; pursue international initiatives to mitigate emissions in the Arctic; expand research to better understand (continued...)
Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs

On July 16, 2014, then-Secretary of State John Kerry announced the appointment of retired Coast Guard Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr., who served as Commandant of the Coast Guard from May 2010 to May 2014, as the first U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic. Papp served as the U.S. Special Representative until January 20, 2017, the final day of the Obama Administration and the first day of the Trump Administration.

The position of U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic remained unfilled from January 20, 2017, through July 29, 2020, when it was effectively replaced by the newly created position of the U.S. coordinator for the Arctic region. On July 29, 2020, the Trump Administration announced that career diplomat James (Jim) DeHart would be the first U.S. coordinator for the Arctic region; DeHart began his work in the position that day.

In the 117th Congress, H.R. 3361, the United States Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs Act of 2021, H.R. 3433, the Arctic Diplomacy Act of 2021, and H.R. 9112, the United States Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs Act of 2022, each would have established a position of United States Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs, while S. 2967, the Arctic Diplomacy Act of 2021, would have established the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Arctic Affairs. In the 118th Congress, S. 821 would establish an Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic Region.

On August 26, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that it was planning to appoint an Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic Region. On February 13, 2023, the Biden Administration announced that it was nominating Mike Sfraga, chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC), for the position of Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs. The nomination was received in the Senate on February 16, 2023. On January 3, 2024, the nomination was returned to the President under the provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules of the Senate.

---

climate change and inform policy decisions; conserve and protect Arctic ecosystems, including through indigenous co-production and co-management; invest in infrastructure; improve access to services and protect subsistence lifestyles; develop emerging economic sectors in Alaska; work with allies and partners to increase responsible Arctic investment, including in critical minerals; sustain the Arctic Council and other arctic institutions and agreements; and protect freedom of navigation and continental shelf limits.


39 For a press report discussing S. 2967, see Melody Schreiber, “A New Bill Aims to Create the US’s First High-Level Arctic Diplomatic Office,” ArcticToday, October 8, 2021.


Senate. The Biden Administration subsequently renominated Sfraga for the position; the nomination was received in the Senate on January 11, 2024.

**Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC)**

On September 24, 2021, the Biden Administration announced that it was “[r]eactivating the Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC), a mechanism to advance U.S. Arctic interests and coordinate Federal actions in the Arctic. The AESC will also facilitate the implementation of the Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area, including by standing up the Northern Bering Sea Task Force and Tribal Advisory Council. These structures reinforce collaborative partnerships—particularly with Alaska Native communities—and harness science and Indigenous Knowledge to inform management and policy.” The Administration also announced that it was hiring Ambassador David Balton as AESC Executive Director and Raychelle Aluaq Daniel as AESC Deputy Director. The AESC was initially established by the above-mentioned January 2015 Executive Order 13689 on enhancing coordination of Arctic efforts.

**Arctic Council**

The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading international forum for addressing issues relating to the Arctic. Its founding document is the Ottawa Declaration of September 19, 1996, a joint declaration (not a treaty) signed by representatives of the eight Arctic states. The State Department describes the council as “the preeminent intergovernmental forum for addressing issues related to the Arctic Region. …The Arctic Council is not a treaty-based international organization but rather an international forum that operates on the basis of consensus, echoing the peaceful and cooperative nature of the Arctic Region.”

The Arctic Council’s membership consists of the eight Arctic states. All decisions of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies are by consensus of the eight Arctic states. In addition to the eight member states, six organizations representing Arctic indigenous peoples have status as Permanent Participants. Thirteen non-Arctic states, 13 intergovernmental and interparliamentary

---

42 See the Congress.gov entry for the nomination at https://www.congress.gov/nomination/118th-congress/358. Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules of the Senate

Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they are made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again made to the Senate by the President; and if the Senate shall adjourn or take a recess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally acted upon at the time of taking such adjournment or recess shall be returned by the Secretary to the President, and shall not again be considered unless they shall again be made to the Senate by the President.


45 A September 24, 2021, press report stated: “The steering committee had been moribund for the past four years, not meeting at a high level, said David Balton, appointed to direct it. He said ‘it will step up and do more in the Arctic.’ The revamped committee will try to figure out what ‘needs to be done to get a better handle on addressing the changes in the Arctic,’ Balton said.” (Seth Borenstein, “White House Steps Up Work on What to Do About Thawing Arctic,” Associated Press, September 24, 2021. See also Melody Schreiber, “Biden Appoints New U.S. Arctic Research, Leadership Officials in Science-Based approach,” ArcticToday, September 24, 2021.)

organizations, and 12 nongovernmental organizations have been approved as observers, making for a total of 38 observer states and organizations.\textsuperscript{47}

The council has a two-year chairmanship that rotates among the eight member states. The United States held the chairmanship from April 24, 2015, to May 11, 2017, and is scheduled to next hold it in 2031-2033. On May 11, 2023, the chairmanship was transferred from Russia to Norway.

Thematic areas of work addressed by the council include environment and climate, biodiversity, oceans, Arctic peoples, and agreements on Arctic scientific cooperation, cooperation on marine oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic, and cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and rescue (SAR) in the Arctic. The Ottawa Declaration states explicitly that “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.”

The eight Arctic states have signed three legally binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council: a May 2011 agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime SAR in the Arctic, a May 2013 agreement on cooperation on marine oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic, and a May 2017 agreement on enhancing international Arctic scientific cooperation.\textsuperscript{48}

**Arctic and U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)**

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) “lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas[,] establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources.”\textsuperscript{49} UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, and modified in 1994 by an agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the treaty, which relates to the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof that are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. UNCLOS entered into force in November 1994. As of July 23, 2024, 170 parties (169 states and the European Union) were party to the treaty.\textsuperscript{50}

The United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS.\textsuperscript{51} The 1982 treaty and the 1994 agreement were transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994, during the 103\textsuperscript{rd} Congress, becoming Treaty Document 103-39. The full Senate to date has not voted on the question of whether to give its advice and consent to ratification of Treaty Document 103-39. Some Members of Congress, citing the Arctic, have introduced resolutions in favor of the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS.

\textsuperscript{47} For list of the 38 observers and when they were approved for observer status, see “Who We Are” in Arctic Council, “Arctic Council,” accessed March 7, 2024, at https://arctic-council.org/en/. For a discussion of the non-Arctic observer states, see Evan T. Bloom, “The Rising Importance of Non-Arctic States in the Arctic,” Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2022.

\textsuperscript{48} For brief summaries of these three agreements and links to the texts of these agreements, see “Arctic Region,” U.S. Department of State, accessed March 7, 2024, at https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/. For additional information on the Arctic Council’s organization and operations, see the Arctic Council’s website at https://arctic-council.org/.


\textsuperscript{50} Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as of July 23, 2-24, accessed July 29, 2024, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm. The list shows that most recent state to become a party to the treaty is San Marino, which became a party on July 19, 2024.

\textsuperscript{51} The United States is not a signatory to the treaty. On July 29, 1994, the United States became a signatory to the 1994 agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the treaty. The United States has not ratified either the treaty or the 1994 agreement.
UNCLOS. Although the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, the United States accepts and acts in accordance with the non-seabed mining provisions of the treaty, such as those relating to navigation and overflight, which the United States views as reflecting customary international law of the sea.

Part VI of UNCLOS (consisting of Articles 76 through 85), which covers the continental shelf, and Annex II to the treaty, which established a Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, are particularly pertinent to the Arctic, because Article 77 states that “The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources,” and that these natural resources include, among other things, “mineral and other nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil,” including oil and gas deposits.

Article 76 states that “the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles,” and that “Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles ... shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II.... The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.”

House and Senate Arctic Member Organizations

In the House, a Congressional Arctic Working Group is co-chaired by Representative Mary Sattler Peltola and Representative Rick Larsen. The group has been listed as a Congressional Member Organization (CMO) since the 114th Congress (2015-2017).

In the Senate, Senator Lisa Murkowski and Senator Angus King announced on March 4 and 5, 2015, the formation of a Senate Arctic Caucus.
Issues for Congress

Climate Change, with Biophysical and Economic Impacts

An array of climate changes in the Arctic is now documented by observing systems, with more expected with future greenhouse gas-driven climate change. Observed physical changes in the Arctic include warming ocean, soil, and air temperatures; melting permafrost; shifting vegetation and animal abundances; and altered characteristics of Arctic cyclones. These changes continue to affect traditional livelihoods and cultures in the region, infrastructure, and the economy, as well as the distribution and health of animal populations and vegetation. The changes raise risks of pollution, food supply, safety, cultural losses, and national security. The state government of Alaska concluded that observed climate changes “have resulted in a reduction of subsistence harvests, an increase in flooding and erosion, concerns about water and food safety and major impacts to infrastructure: including damage to buildings, roads and airports.”

A monitoring report of the Arctic Council concluded in 2019 that the Arctic biophysical system is now clearly trending away from its previous state [in the 20th century] and into a period of unprecedented change, with implications not only within but also beyond the Arctic.

A few broad points raise particular concerns about changes in the Arctic:

- Long lag times between cause and full effects: Changes once set in motion prompt further and often slow effects in different components of the Arctic system, such as the influence of rising atmospheric temperatures on ocean and permafrost temperatures. Scientists expect the full effects of near-term climate changes to play out over a period of decades to many centuries.

- Feedbacks that mostly further increase warming: Greenhouse gas-induced warming leads to positive (enhancing) and some negative (dampening) feedbacks within the Arctic system, which scientists expect in net to amplify warming and pursuant effects. For example, temperature-driven melting sea ice reduces reflection of incoming solar energy, leading to absorption by the Arctic Ocean and further warming of the ocean and the planet.

- Abrupt change risks: The freezing point for water, including permafrost, is one example of thresholds that certain Arctic systems may cross, leading to rapid state changes.

57 This section was prepared by Jane Leggett, who was a Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division until her retirement from CRS on July 15, 2023.
• Risks of irreversibilities: Some Arctic climate impacts, such as loss of sea ice and glaciers, may lead to system changes that scientists expect would be irreversible on a human timescale, even if temperatures stabilize (at a higher level than today).

Understanding remains incomplete regarding future Arctic climate changes and their implications for human and natural systems. With current knowledge, projections point to growing risks, as well as some opportunities.

The Arctic is interconnected to the rest of the globe through circulation of water, energy (e.g., heat), and carbon, including through the atmosphere and oceans. It is also connected through human systems of transport, energy and mineral production, tourism, and security. Consequently, Arctic changes are of import to both Arctic and non-Arctic regions of United States and the rest of the globe.

This section summarizes a variety of observed and projected climate changes in the Arctic and identifies some of their impacts on human and ecological systems. Other sections in this report provide further discussion of implications for, for example, national security and energy production.

Warming Temperatures and a More Intense Water Cycle

The Arctic warmed at approximately three times the global average rate from 1971 to 2019, with the region’s surface temperature increasing by more than 3°C (5.5°F). Summers have warmed more than winters. In tandem are trends of fewer cold days, cold nights, frost days, and ice days in the North American Arctic. Researchers found that warming trends as well as climate cycles, including the North Atlantic Oscillation and the Arctic Oscillation, influence observed extreme temperatures, ice distribution, and other facets of the Arctic system. In addition, positive feedbacks from the loss of summer sea ice and spring snow cover on land have amplified warming in the Arctic.

With warming, the water cycle has become more intense. The Arctic has experienced increasing precipitation and an increasing share of precipitation falling as rain. The first recorded rainfall at Greenland’s 10,500-foot Summit Station was on August 14, 2021.

Warming and increasing rainfall have led to permafrost thaw, glacier melt, and sea ice decline, leading to greater flows of organic matter and nutrients to Arctic near-coastal zones, with implications for algae, ecosystems, fisheries and other systems.

---

60 Although much of Greenland is above the Arctic Circle, and many of the changes and implications apply also to Greenland, this section emphasizes other parts of the Arctic and does not attempt to summarize the often large and complex change in Greenland.


63 Ibid.


65 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Rain at the Summit of Greenland,” August 18, 2021.
Sea Ice Decline and Mobility

Arctic sea ice has declined in extent, area, and thickness over recent decades; it has become more mobile and its spatial distribution has shifted. The record low extents of Arctic sea ice in 2012 and 2007 (Figure 4 and Figure 5), as recorded by U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center, increased scientific and policy attention on climate changes in the high north, and on the implications of projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic Ocean within decades. Recent late summer minima may be unprecedented over the past 1,000 years. (Some implications are discussed in sections of this report on Commercial Sea Transportation; Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration; and others.) The 2021 Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that “human influence is very likely the main driver of ... the decrease in Arctic sea ice area between 1979–1988 and 2010–2019 (about 40% in September and about 10% in March).”

Simulations under a wide range of future climate change scenarios indicate that the Arctic could be ice-free in late summers in the second half of this century in model simulations of low to very high greenhouse gas scenarios (Figure 5). The first instances of an ice-free Arctic in late summers could occur by mid-century in all scenarios, although model simulations provide a wide range of results. The mean results of model simulations reach ice-free seasons in the 2070s in the highest and low warming scenarios, and later in the very low scenarios. In an analysis of the most recent modeling, a selection of those models that “reasonably” simulate historical sea ice extent indicated that practically ice-free conditions may occur at global temperature increases of 1.3°C to 2.9°C above preindustrial

---

66 In scientific analyses, “ice-free” does not necessarily mean “no ice.” The definition of “ice-free” or sea ice “extent” or “area” varies across studies. Sea ice “extent” is one common measure, equal to the sum of the area of grid cells that have ice concentration of less than a set percentage—frequently 15%. For more information, see the National Snow and Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/seaice/data/terminology.html.

67 SROCC SPM 2019.


70 Global climate models do not, in general, simulate past sea ice change realistically and tend to produce less decline in sea ice extent than the latest 15-year trend.
Although sea ice would remain variable in extent and distribution, modeling of future sea ice conditions indicate opportunities for transport through the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, extraction of potential oil and gas resources, and expanded fishing and tourism, though also increasing competition and potential security risks and of oil spills and maritime accidents.

Figure 5. Estimated Historical, Observed, and Projected September Arctic Sea Ice Extent


Notes: NSIDC is the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center, the source that synthesized the satellite observation data (the bold black line) in this figure. The “historical” values result from model simulations, showing the modeled mean and the ranges. The projections (in colors) are for a range of greenhouse gas scenarios and associated climate changes, with the means of results represented by lines. SSP means “Shared Socioeconomic Pathway” scenarios produced in support of the International Panel on Climate Change depicting high (SSP585), medium high (SSP30), low (SSP245) and very low (SSP126) scenarios. The shaded areas represent the ranges of numerical model estimates (number), either historical and projected. The horizontal line represents sea-ice areal extent of 1 million square kilometers, below which scientists consider the Arctic to be practically ice-free.

The U.S. Arctic Report Card 2021 noted, in addition, the importance of melting of Arctic land-based ice to experienced sea level rise globally:

In the 47-year period (1971–2017), the Arctic was the largest global source of sea-level rise contribution, 48% of the global land ice contribution 2003–2010 and 30% of the total sea-level rise since 1992. Temperature effects are dominant in land ice mass balance.

A special report of the IPCC stated that “for Arctic glaciers, different regional studies consistently indicate that in many places glaciers are now smaller than they have been in millennia.”

The Arctic Ocean has been undergoing additional changes: It has been acidifying—with some parts acidifying more rapidly than the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans. Some scientists estimate that

71 The current temperature increase above the 1850-1900 average is about 1.1°C.
72 SROCC SPM 2019.
acidification of the Arctic Ocean may increase enough by the 2030s to significantly influence coastal ecosystems.\textsuperscript{74} Primary production in the ocean has increased, due to decreases in sea ice and increases in nutrient supply.

**Land-Based Changes**

Climate changes in the Arctic have important implications for human and natural land-based systems, through permafrost thawing, erosion, instability, and ecosystem shifts.

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) concluded that an increase in coastal erosion on the North Slope of Alaska was “likely the result of several changing Arctic conditions, including declining sea-ice extent, increasing summertime sea-surface temperature, rising sea level, and possible increases in storm power and corresponding wave action.”\textsuperscript{75} The USGS found that erosion has been occurring at an average rate of 1.4 meters annually and that, while some areas are accreting, others are eroding at rates as high as 20 meters per year. Coastal erosion poses risks for native communities, oil and gas infrastructure, and wildlife; adaptations to mitigate and manage adverse impacts can be costly and risky.

Warming temperatures have increased thawing of near-surface permafrost. “The majority of Arctic infrastructure is located in regions where permafrost thaw is projected to intensify by mid-century,” according to the IPCC special report on the cryosphere.\textsuperscript{76} Existing infrastructure was not generally placed or engineered for the instability, posing risks to human safety and property, and potentially disruption. The IPCC report assessed that “about 20% of Arctic land permafrost is vulnerable to abrupt permafrost thaw and ground subsidence,”\textsuperscript{77} increasing risks of sudden failures. According to one study, 30%–50% of critical circumpolar infrastructure may be at high risk by 2050. “Accordingly, permafrost degradation-related infrastructure costs could rise to tens of billions of U.S. dollars by the second half of the century.”\textsuperscript{78} Other costs could be incurred for relocation of infrastructure and villages, and to manage habitat for subsistence wildlife and endangered and threatened species.

Impacts of climate change on species have been positive and negative. Longer growing seasons have resulted in vegetation growth around the Arctic with overall “greening,” though also some “browning” in some regions in some years. Woody shrubs and trees are projected to expand to cover 24%–52% of Arctic tundra by 2050.\textsuperscript{79} Vegetation changes can provide amplifying feedbacks that increase temperature and permafrost instability. In particular, scientists have assessed significant methane emissions from some thawing peat bogs.

Potential area burned by wildfire could increase by 25% to 53% by 2100. This could affect, for example, forage for caribou and shifting competition between caribou and moose, with likely detriments to subsistence users of caribou.\textsuperscript{80}


\textsuperscript{75} Pacific Coastal and Marine Science Center, “Climate Impacts to Arctic Coasts,” U.S. Geological Survey, October 15, 2021.

\textsuperscript{76} SROCC SPM 2019.

\textsuperscript{77} SROCC SPM 2019.


\textsuperscript{79} SROCC SPM 2019.

\textsuperscript{80} SROCC SPM 2019.
The IPCC special report on the cryosphere also found that

On Arctic land, a loss of globally unique biodiversity is projected as limited refugia exist for some High-Arctic species and hence they are outcompeted by more temperate species (medium confidence).\(^{81}\)

It identified negative impacts also on food and water security in the Arctic, “disrupt[ing] access to, and food availability within, herding, hunting, fishing, and gathering areas, harming the livelihoods and cultural identity of Arctic residents including Indigenous populations.”\(^{82}\) More broadly, warming and ecosystem shifts have “increased risk of food- and waterborne diseases, malnutrition, injury, and mental health challenges especially among Indigenous peoples.”\(^{83}\)

Few studies have investigated the potential economic effects of the array of physical impacts. A report for the state of Alaska on the economic effects of climate change estimated that five relatively certain, large effects that could be readily quantified would impose an annual net cost of $340–$700 million, or 0.6%–1.3% of Alaska’s GDP. This significant, but relatively modest, net economic effect for Alaska as a whole obscures large regional disparities, as rural communities face large projected costs while more southerly urban residents experience net gains.\(^{84}\)

The research did not consider “nonuse” impacts, such as on culture, subsistence harvests, or other nonmarket values, as well as additional sectors, such as military installations, housing, and others.

Another study estimating the effects of climate change on Alaskan infrastructure found “cumulative estimated expenses from climate-related damage to infrastructure without adaptation measures (hereinafter damages) from 2015 to 2099 totaled $5.5 billion (2015 dollars, 3% discount) for RCP8.5 [a high climate scenario] and $4.2 billion for RCP4.5 [a moderate climate scenario], suggesting that reducing greenhouse gas emissions could lessen damages by $1.3 billion this century.”\(^{85}\) Costs were mostly due to road flooding and permafrost instability, and mostly in the interior and southcentral Alaska. It also concluded that adaptation measures could mostly reduce or entirely avoid the estimated economic losses for this land-based infrastructure.

### Geopolitical Environment\(^{86}\)

#### Overview

Following the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and particularly after the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996, the Arctic states sought to maintain the Arctic as a region

---

81 SROCC SPM 2019.
82 SROCC SPM 2019.
83 SROCC SPM 2019.
84 Berman, Matthew, and Jennifer I. Schmidt, “Economic Effects of Climate Change in Alaska.” *Weather, Climate, and Society* 11, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 245–58, https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-18-0056.1. The five effects evaluated were change in value added in Alaska (value of shipments less cost of inputs purchased from outside Alaska) for specific industries; change in household cost of living; change in purchased input costs for businesses and governments; change in nonwage benefit flows to households, including subsistence benefits; and change in value of buildings and infrastructure.
86 This section was prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade (continued...)
of cooperation, low tension, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for international law—an approach sometimes referred to as the “Arctic spirit” or “High North, low tension.” The Nordic countries in particular were committed to this approach.

Over the past 10 to 15 years, the emergence of great power competition (also called strategic competition) between the United States, Russia, and China has introduced elements of competition and tension into the Arctic’s geopolitical environment. Russia’s increased military presence and operations in the Arctic—and responding actions by other Arctic states—are one source of competition and tension. China’s increased diplomatic and economic activities in the Arctic are another.

Some observers view the Arctic as having become an arena for geopolitical competition among the United States, Russia, and China, or argue that the diminishment of Arctic ice and potentially increased maritime access to the region’s resources has prompted or could prompt a race for Arctic resources (or words to that effect) among Russia, China, the United States, and other countries. Other observers argue that competitive aspects of the region’s geopolitical environment and the notion of a race for Arctic resources are sometimes overstated.

**Impact of Russia’s War in Ukraine**

Russia’s war in Ukraine beginning on February 24, 2022, has substantially affected the Arctic’s geopolitical environment in a number of ways, including but not necessarily limited to the following, some of which have added to tensions in the region.

---


90 For general discussions of how Russia’s war in Ukraine beginning on February 24, 2022, has substantially affected the Arctic’s geopolitical environment, see, for example, Iselin Németh Winther and Andreas Østhagen, editors, The Big Picture of Arctic Geopolitics: An Actor-Oriented Analysis, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, FNI Report 1/2024, 22 pp.; Gry Thomasen, Chiara Cervasio, and Mhairi McClafferty, Arctic Diplomacy at a Crossroads, Addressing Present and Future Geopolitical and Strategic Risk, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), December 2023, 31 pp.
• **Operations of Arctic Council substantially affected.** Russia’s war in Ukraine beginning on February 24, 2022, has substantially affected the operations of the Arctic Council, prompting new or heightened questions about the future of the Arctic Council, Arctic governance, and cooperation in general among the eight Arctic states.\(^91\) Specific reported developments include the following:

- On March 3, 2022, in response to Russia’s invasion, the A7 states announced that they would be “temporarily pausing participation in all meetings of the [Arctic] Council and its subsidiary bodies.”\(^92\)

- The Nordic Council of Ministers similarly stated that it was suspending its cooperation with Russia and Belarus,\(^93\) and Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the EU suspended activities involving Russia within the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), which was established in 1993 for collaboration primarily between Russia, Norway, Finland, and Sweden to promote stability and sustainable development in the Barents region. In September 2023, Russia announced that it would withdraw from BEAC, citing what it said was a failure by Finland to confirm the transfer of the BEAC presidency from Finland to Russia as scheduled in October 2023.\(^94\)

- The suspension of Arctic Council meetings did not prevent the chairmanship of the council from being transferred from Russia to Norway on May 11, 2023.

---


• In October 2022, China’s special envoy to the Arctic reportedly stated that China would not recognize the legitimacy of an Arctic Council that does not include Russia. He also reportedly stated that China would continue to cooperate in the Arctic with both the A7 states and Russia.95

• On February 21, 2023, Russia published amendments to its Arctic policy statement that removed mentions of the Arctic Council.96

• In May and June 2023, it was reported that while all cooperation with Russia would remain suspended, other activities of the Council and its working groups would resume in mid-June 2023.97

• A June 2023 press report stated: “At the end of his tenure as chair of the Arctic Council’s senior officials committee in May, Russia’s Nikolai Korchunov said Moscow could withdraw from the organisation if it was not invited to participate in events during the Norwegian presidency.”98

• A September 2023 press report stated that an August 29, 2023, meeting of all eight Arctic Council member states and the six Arctic Indigenous groups that are permanent participants had decided on guidelines for restarting the council’s working groups.99

• In early February 2024, Russia’s ambassador-at-large for the Arctic reportedly stated that Russia would withdraw from the Arctic Council if the council’s activities council “do not correspond to Russia’s interests.”100


100 Trine Jonassen (translation by Birgitte Annie Molid Martinussen), “Russia Threatens to Withdraw From the Arctic Council,” High North News, February 7 (updated February 15), 2024; Daniel Cusick, “Russia Threatens to Quit Arctic Council,” Politico Pro, February 9, 2024.
• On February 14, 2024, it was reported that Russia had suspended annual payments to the Arctic Council until “real work” resumes at the Council with the participation of all member states.101

• On February 28, 2024, the Arctic Council stated that “consensus was reached for the gradual resumption of official Working Group meetings in a virtual format, enabling project-level work to further advance. In February [2024], the eight Arctic States, in consultation with the Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations, reached consensus to gradually resume official Working Group meetings in a virtual format. Prior to this update, Working Groups advanced project work and decision-making only via written procedures after consensus was reached in August 2023.”102

• **Concerns about Russia’s Arctic military activities heightened.** For the A7 states, Russia’s war in Ukraine has heightened concerns about the purpose behind Russia’s military modernization in the Arctic, and reinforced cooperative security links among the seven countries.103 Russia reportedly has withdrawn military personnel and equipment from its Arctic bases to help provide reinforcements for its war in Ukraine, and some of these forces reportedly have been destroyed in combat operations there.104 Other press reports state that, while Russia’s Arctic military forces have been degraded as a result of the war, Russia’s military modernization in the Arctic has nevertheless continued.105

---


• **Finland and Sweden become members of NATO.** Russia’s war in Ukraine prompted Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership.106

• On April 4, 2023, Finland became a member of NATO,107 which converted Finland’s 833-mile border with Russia108 into a NATO-Russia frontier. More than 300 miles of this border (i.e., more than 36% of the border’s length) is north of the Arctic Circle.109 (By way of comparison, Norway’s border with Russia, all of which is above the Arctic Circle, is about 123 miles in length.)110 Almost one-third of Finland’s territory is north of the Arctic Circle.111 In these ways, Finland becoming a member of NATO has increased the Arctic as an area of focus for NATO.112

• On March 7, 2024, Sweden became a member of NATO, which further increased the Arctic as an area of focus for NATO,113 given that about 15% of Sweden’s land area is north of the Arctic Circle.114

---


107 For additional discussion, see CRS Insight IN11949, *NATO: Finland Joins as Sweden’s Accession Faces Delay*, by Kristin Archick, Paul Belkin, and Andrew S. Bowen.

108 Finland’s border with Russia is usually said to have a length of 1,340 kilometers, or 832.6 miles. (See, for example, U.K. Parliament, House of Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2007–08, FRONTEX: the EU External Borders Agency, Report with Evidence, Ordered to be printed 26 February 2008 and published 5 March 2008, Tables 1, 2, and 3 [pages 13 and 14]); Salla Korpela, “A Border That Once Divided Now Unites,” *This Is Finland*, June 2008; Henry Ridgwell, “Will Finland’s 1,300-Kilometer Border Become NATO-Russia Frontier?” *Voice of America*, May 12, 2022; James Frater and Xiaofei Xu, “Finland Plans to Start Building a Fence on Russian Border Next Year,” *CNN*, November 18, 2022; Jari Tanner, “Finland to Start Building Fence on Russian Border Next Year,” *Associated Press*, November 18, 2022.

109 Source: CRS measurement, February 27, 2023.

110 Source: Norway’s border with Russia, which was previously said to have a length of 195.7 kilometers, was resurveyed and in 2018 was determined to have a length of 197.7 kilometers (or about 122.8 miles), with the difference attributed to changes in the flow of a river and improvements in measuring devices. (See Thomas Nilsen, “Russia Just Got a “Longer” Border to Norway,” *Barents Observer*, September 26, 2018. See also, for example, Nina Berglund, “Norway Tightens Russian Border Control,” *NewsinEnglish.no*, October 2, 2022; Astri Edvardsen, “Norway To Strengthen Control on the Border With Russia–And Is Ready to Close It At Short Notice,” *High North News*, October 3 [updated October 4], 2022.)


114 Source for 15% figure: “Climate of Sweden,” *Britannica*, undated, accessed March 7, 2024, at https://www.britannica.com/place/Sweden/Climate. Another source states “The two northernmost counties [of Sweden], Västerbotten and Norrbotten, are defined as Sweden’s Arctic territory. This region represents about one-third (continued...)

---
• Russia’s defense minister reportedly stated in December 2022 that in response to Finland and Sweden seeking to join NATO, Russia would reorganize some of its military forces near the Nordic countries.  

• **Increased Russian cooperation in Arctic with China.** Russia’s diplomatic isolation from the A7 states in the Arctic has led to increased Russian cooperation with China (and other countries) in the Arctic— a development that could strengthen China’s presence and activities in the region and affect views among observers in the A7 states and elsewhere regarding China’s motivations and goals for its Arctic activities and China’s ability to work with the A7 states on matters relating to the Arctic.  

• **Arctic scientific research projects disrupted.** Actions taken by governments in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine substantially disrupted international scientific research projects in the Arctic that involved Russian participation.

---

**Notes:**


117 See also Alina Bykova, “NATO Has Always Been an Arctic Alliance (Part I),” *Arctic Institute*, May 28, 2024; Alina Bykova, “NATO has always been an Arctic Alliance (Part II),” *Arctic Institute*, June 11, 2024.


• **Russian Arctic oil and gas operations and exports impacted.** Soon after the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, several major oil companies and investors announced that they were withdrawing from Russian resource development or not pursuing new projects with Russia, including in the Arctic. Western sanctions have reportedly impeded Russian energy projects in the Arctic. A July 2023 press report stated: “Major American providers of oilfield services supplied Russia with millions of dollars in equipment for months after its invasion of Ukraine, helping to sustain a critical part of its economy even as Western nations launched sanctions aimed at starving the Russian war effort.”

In September 2023, the United States announced further sanctions against Russia’s Arctic energy activities amid reports that previous Western sanctions were having only limited impact. At the same time, exports of Russian oil to India and China reportedly have increased, with some of the exports to China using the Northern Sea Route (NSR), an Arctic sea route that runs along Russia’s northern coastline.

---

119 Melody Schreiber, “Major Oil Companies and Investors Pull Back from Russian Arctic Oil and Gas,” ArcticToday, March 5, 2022.


---

**Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress**


---

**Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress**


---

**Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress**


---

**Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress**


---

**Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress**


---

**Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress**


---

**Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress**

October 2021 National Intelligence Estimate

A National Intelligence Estimate by the National Intelligence Council on climate change and international responses that are increasing challenges to U.S. national security that was released in October 2021 (i.e., a few months before the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine) states the following about the Arctic (emphasis as in original):

**Key Judgment 2:** The increasing physical effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate cross-border geopolitical flashpoints as states take steps to secure their interests. The reduction in sea ice already is amplifying strategic competition in the Arctic over access to its natural resources.

We assess that Arctic and non-Arctic states almost certainly will increase their competitive activities as the region becomes more accessible because of warming temperatures and reduced ice. Competition will be largely economic but the risk of miscalculation will increase modestly by 2040 as commercial and military activity grows and opportunities are more contested.

- Diminishing sea ice probably will increase access to shipping routes that can reduce trade times between Europe and Asia by about 40 percent for some vessels. In addition, onshore oil and natural gas deposits, as well as an estimated $1 trillion worth of precious metals and minerals will become more available, but some high-cost offshore oil and gas projects could become unprofitable if the energy transition speeds up.

- Warming ocean temperatures probably will push Bering Sea fish stocks northward into the Arctic Ocean, according to a NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] study, which could increase commercial and illegal fishing activity in the region and exacerbate regional disputes between Arctic and non-Arctic states over fishing rights.

- Coastal erosion and thawing permafrost will damage critical infrastructure. Massive investment in infrastructure would be needed to maximize the economic potential of the region, ranging from new ports to mining, offering foreign powers an opportunity to gain a foothold by investing in new infrastructure and rebuilding and hardening existing infrastructure.

Military activity is likely to increase as Arctic and non-Arctic states seek to protect their investments, exploit new maritime routes, and gain strategic advantages over rivals.

The increased presence of China and other non-Arctic states very likely will amplify concerns among Arctic states as they perceive a challenge to their respective security and economic interests. China, France, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have released Arctic strategies mostly focused on economic opportunities, but some address security issues, which has prompted Russian policymakers to repeatedly state since 2018 that non-Arctic countries do not have a military role in the region.

Contested economic and military activities will increase the risk of miscalculation, and deescalating tensions is likely to require the adaptation of existing or creation of new forums to address bilateral or multilateral security concerns among Arctic states.

---

Although the scope of the Arctic Council—the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation among Arctic states—specifically excludes military security, Russia intends to broach security concerns with the other Arctic states while chairing the council from 2021 to 2023, according to Russian officials’ public statements, and may propose alternate forums to discuss those issues....

*Overt military action, especially by a non-Arctic state, that significantly escalates tension in the region and results in a sidelining of Arctic diplomacy* would challenge our judgment that increased activity in the Arctic, while raising the possibility of miscalculation, is unlikely to result in outright conflict because of the harsh operating environment and existing mechanisms for cooperation. Persistent challenges to Russia’s supremacy of the Northern Sea Route [NSR] by a non-Arctic state’s military could result in armed conflict with Russia if diplomatic negotiations had stalled and foreign military forces continued to operate in what Moscow views as its territorial waters. Alternatively, if a non-Arctic state, especially China, were to begin regular, large-scale military operations in the area to protect an economic foothold in the region, the risk of conflict with Arctic states could increase and contribute to a buildup of forces.125

**Arctic Governance**

Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, great power competition and increased human activities in the Arctic resulting from the diminishment of Arctic ice put a spotlight on the issue of Arctic governance and the limits of the Arctic Council as a governing body.126 As noted earlier, Russia’s war in Ukraine has prompted new or heightened questions about the future of the Arctic Council and Arctic governance.

Regarding the limits of the council as a governing body, the council states that it “does not and cannot implement or enforce its guidelines, assessments or recommendations. That responsibility belongs to each individual Arctic State. The Arctic Council’s mandate, as articulated in the Ottawa Declaration, explicitly excludes military security.”127 Arctic security issues currently can be addressed, to some degree at least, through other existing mechanisms, such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and the Arctic Chiefs of Defense (ACHOD) Forum.

Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, China raised questions as to whether the Arctic Council as currently constituted and the current broader legal framework for the Arctic should continue to be

124 The NSR is an Arctic sea route connecting Europe to East Asia that runs generally along Russia’s Arctic coast.


the principal means for addressing issues relating to the Arctic, and had begun to use other approaches for influencing Arctic governance.  

Relative Priority of Arctic in U.S. Policymaking

In light of great power competition and increased human activities in the Arctic resulting from the diminishment of Arctic ice, some observers argue that there is a need to devote more U.S. attention and resources to the region. On the other hand, great power competition is also being expressed in Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. In a situation of finite U.S. policymaker attention and resources, the Arctic competes with these other regions for attention and resources. Some observers argue that the United States is not allocating sufficient attention or resources to defend and promote its interests in the Arctic. A September 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated

Management roles for advancing U.S. Arctic priorities span the federal government…. While many federal entities engage with foreign partners on Arctic issues, the Department of State serves as the lead for Arctic diplomacy efforts….

Stakeholders identified five factors that facilitated and five factors that hindered the federal government’s management of U.S. Arctic priorities. For example, stakeholders identified U.S. Arctic expertise and engagement as factors that facilitated its influence in the Arctic Council. However, some stakeholders said that the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and the broader federal government face various challenges related to interagency coordination that hinder implementation of U.S. Arctic priorities outlined in the [October] 2022 [Arctic] strategy.

Stakeholders identified three factors pertaining to State’s structures that facilitated and two factors that hindered State’s management of U.S. Arctic priorities. For example, stakeholders identified continuity within the Senior Arctic Official position and supporting office as a factor that has deepened institutional knowledge for Arctic Council work, facilitating efforts to promote U.S. priorities. However, some stakeholders identified gaps in leadership and limited convening authority as factors that had hindered management. Many stakeholders viewed the announcement of the Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic Region position positively but identified elements State and the new Ambassador should consider to manage U.S. Arctic priorities successfully going forward. These elements include consistency in position and title, a formalized office structure, clarity of


Russia in the Arctic

Overview

In considering Russia’s role in the Arctic’s geopolitical environment, points that can be noted include but are not limited to the following:

- Geographically, Russia is the most prominent of the eight Arctic states. According to one assessment, Russia “has at least half of the Arctic in terms of area, coastline, population and probably mineral wealth.” About 20% of Russia’s land mass is north of the Arctic Circle, and Russia has numerous cities and towns there. As of 2019-2020, 80% of Russia’s natural gas and 17% per cent of its oil production took place in its Arctic.
- Russia has identified the Arctic as a high-priority region critical to the country’s prosperity and security. Starting in 2008, the Russian government has adopted a series of strategy documents outlining plans to bolster the country’s Arctic military capabilities, strengthen territorial sovereignty, and develop the region’s resources and infrastructure. Russia is keen to capitalize on natural resource development in the region, both onshore and offshore.
- Over the least 10 to 15 years, Russia has invested in the construction of Arctic ports and search-and-rescue facilities, some of which are referred to as dual-use (civilian-military) facilities. Russia also has reactivated and modernized Arctic military bases that fell into disuse following the end of the Cold War, assigned upgraded forces to those bases, and increased military exercises and training operations in the Arctic.
- Russia uses its coastal Arctic waters as a maritime highway for supporting its Arctic communities. As noted later in this report (see “Commercial Sea Transportation”), the NSR that runs along Russia’s Arctic coast accounts for the vast majority of large cargo ship transits in the Arctic. Russia is promoting the


132 For an additional overview discussion, see Michael Paul and Göran Swistek, Russia in the Arctic: Development Plans, Military Potential, and Conflict Prevention, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), SWP Research Paper 3, February 2022, 42 pp.


134 Testimony of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, on “Expanding Opportunities, Challenges, and Threats in the Arctic: a Focus on the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook” before the Senate Commerce, Science, & Transportation Security Subcommittee, December 12, 2019, p. 3.

135 Ian Anthony, Ekaterina Klimenko, and Fei Su, A Strategic Triangle in the Arctic? Implications of China–Russia–United States Power Dynamics for Regional Security, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, no. 2021/3, March 2021, p. 3, which cites the following as its source [brackets as in the citation]: “President of Russia, [The strategy for the development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and national security until 2035], 26 Oct. 2020 (in Russian); and Novyye Izvestiya, [Russia invests 86 billion USD into the Arctic], 28 Mar. 2019 (in Russian).”
NSR for use by others seeking to transport goods between Europe and Asia. In July 2024 it was reported that Russia is seeking China’s help in developing the NSR.

- In light of the above points, of all the Arctic states, Russia might have the most at stake in the Arctic in absolute terms.

**Cooperation with Russia**

Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, the A7 states cooperated with Russia on a range of issues in the Arctic. One example is cooperation on Arctic SAR under the May 2011 Arctic Council agreement on Arctic SAR that is discussed later in this report. The A7 states also cooperated with Russia through the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), an organization intended to “foster safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.” The United States and Russia in 2018 cooperated in creating a scheme for managing two-way shipping traffic through the Bering Strait and Bering Sea, and in February 2021, the U.S. Coast Guard and Russia’s Marine Rescue Service signed an agreement updating a 1989 bilateral joint contingency plan for responding to transboundary maritime pollution incidents. Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, some observers saw possibilities for further cooperation by the A7 states with Russia in the Arctic. Since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, those possibilities have narrowed.

---


137 Laura Zhou, “Russia Seeking China’s Help to Develop Arctic Shipping Route – Is It Worth It for Beijing?” South China Morning Post, July 2, 2024.


139 The ACGF states at its website (https://www.arcticcoastguardforum.com/about-acgf) that it “is an independent, informal, operationally-driven organization, not bound by treaty, to foster safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic. All Arctic countries, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States are members of the forum. Chairmanship duties of the ACGF rotate every two years in concert with the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.” The ACGF holds two meetings each year.

The work of the ACGF is headed by the ACGF chair and supported by the Secretariat and Working Groups. The Secretariat is responsible for implementing strategic direction and the smooth operation of the ACGF and its Working Groups. Working Groups are subordinate to the Secretariat. The Secretariat and Working Groups are organized at the direction of the Principals and reflect issues relevant to member countries of the Arctic.


142 See, for example, Nick Lokker, “Polar Bear in the Room: America Must Talk to Russia About the Arctic,” National Interest, November 2021; Mark Piesing, “International Competition is Heating Up in the Arctic. These Norwegian Islands Show How It Can Be Managed.” Barron’s, August 26, 2021; Kari Roberts, “How Canada Should Deal with Russia in the Arctic,” Politics, August 23, 2021; Autumn Gonzales, “Towards a US-Russia Partnership in the Arctic,” Modern Diplomacy, August 11, 2021; Melody Schreiber and Krestia DeGeorge, “What the Biden- Putin Summit (continued...
considerably, but U.S.-Russian in marine safety-related cooperation in the Bering Strait reportedly continued,\(^{143}\) and some observers see some limited possibilities for additional cooperation.\(^{144}\)

**Tension and Competition**

Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and as discussed later in this report, the increase in Russian military presence and operations in the Arctic had prompted growing concerns among the A7 states that the Arctic might become a region of military tension and competition, as well as concerns about whether the A7 states are adequately prepared militarily to defend their interests in the region. As discussed later in this report in the section on military operations, the A7 states have responded to Russia’s increased military presence and operations in the Arctic by taking steps to increase their own Arctic military capabilities. Russian military exercises in the Arctic are being monitored by the A7 states, and, similar to what happened during the Cold War, Russian military aircraft that periodically fly toward the airspace (including Arctic airspace) of some of the A7 states are being intercepted by military aircraft from those states.

In February 2020, a disagreement arose between Norway and Russia regarding Russia’s access to the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard under the terms of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. In June 2022, Russian legislators reportedly questioned Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard.\(^{145}\)

Russia’s government considers certain parts of the NSR to be internal Russian waters and has asserted a right to regulate commercial shipping passing through these waters—a position that creates a source of tension with the U.S. government, which considers those waters to be international waters.\(^{146}\) The U.S.-Russian dispute over this issue could have implications not only

---


for U.S.-Russian relations and the Arctic, but for other countries and other parts of the world as well, since international law is universal in its application, and a successful challenge to international waters in one part of the world can serve as a precedent for challenging it in other parts of the world.\(^{147}\)

A March 19, 2024, press report quoted the Chairman of the Russian Parliament Committee for the Development of the Far East and Arctic as stating, “The issue of the possible denunciation [by Russia] of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Arctic is under study,” and “We will not continue to be part of it to our detriment.” The article also stated: “The Kremlin-controlled Izvestia news website article also clarifies that the statements about the withdrawal are connected to Russia’s concern about NATO ships and aviation “conducting intelligence” in, what the Izvestia calls, the “Russian sector of the Arctic, but formally they do not cross the 12-mile zone.”\(^{148}\)

### NATO and European Union in the Arctic

#### NATO

As mentioned earlier, the A7 states are all members of NATO, and the expansion of NATO to include Finland and Sweden following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has increased the Arctic as an area of focus for NATO.

---


\(^{147}\) In that context, it can be noted that the U.S. government views the part of the Northwest Passage that runs through the Canadian archipelago as an international strait, while Canada’s government considers it internal Canadian waters. In 1985, the use of the waterway by a U.S. polar icebreaker led to a diplomatic dispute between the United States and Canada. In January 1988, the two countries signed an agreement under which, observers say, the two sides essentially agreed to disagree on the issue. The agreement—formally called Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation—states in part that “the Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada,” and that “nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties.” The text of the agreement as posted by the Canadian government is available at https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/texte.aspx?id=101701.

An August 26, 2021, press report states that

A U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker embarked Wednesday [August 25, 2021] on a long Arctic mission that includes a rare transit of the Northwest Passage, conducting scientific research and a joint exercise with Canada in Arctic waters. The cutter Healy, one of two operational U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers, departed Wednesday from Seward, Alaska, for the three-week journey to Nuuk, Greenland. Healy last transited the passage in 2005. In 2017, the U.S. cutter Maple [WLB-207], a seagoing buoy tender, navigated the Northwest Passage from west to east together with the Canadian icebreaker Terry Fox to conduct research in a joint exercise with Canada. U.S. vessels may travel through the passage if they are conducting research, according to a 1988 agreement with Canada. The invocation of the 1988 agreement on Arctic cooperation means Canadian-U.S. relations are “returning back to normality,” Rob Huebert, assistant professor at the University of Calgary, told *ArcticToday*. The Coast Guard first approached Canada to request consent in summer 2020. [Jason Kung, a spokesperson for Global Affairs Canada] said, and Canadian and U.S. agencies have worked together closely on the trip.

(Melody Schreiber, “US Icebreaker Departs on a Voyage that Will Transit the Northwest Passage,” *ArcticToday*, August 26, 2021.)

During the Cold War (i.e., before Sweden and Finland joined NATO), U.S. and allied political and military officials viewed NATO member Norway and its adjacent sea areas as the northern flank of NATO’s defensive line against potential aggression by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance. With the end of the Cold War, NATO planning efforts shifted away from defending against potential aggression by Russia against NATO countries, including NATO countries in the Arctic. With the emergence of great power competition, NATO began to once again focus more on the question of how to deter potential Russian aggression against NATO countries, including NATO countries in the Arctic. Russia’s war in Ukraine has strengthened NATO’s focus on this question.149

**European Union**

Three of the eight Arctic states—Denmark, Finland, and Sweden—are members of the European Union (EU), and two other Arctic states—Iceland and Norway—have close ties to the EU as members of the European Economic Area. The EU is showing increased interest in the Arctic.150 The European Parliament—the EU’s only directly elected institution—supports an active EU role in the Arctic. In 2016, the European Commission (the EU’s executive) and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a joint communication (i.e., policy paper) on the EU’s Arctic strategy.151 In 2017, the EU appointed its first Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic, and in October 2019, the EU held its first-ever Arctic Forum, a high-level conference in northern Sweden focused on promoting EU efforts in the Arctic. The EU is also a major financial contributor to Arctic research.

**China in the Arctic**

**China’s Activities in the Arctic**

China’s diplomatic, economic, and scientific activities in the Arctic are a matter of focus and concern for U.S., Canadian, and Nordic policymakers. Observers have expressed curiosity or concern about China’s exact mix of motivations for its activities in the Arctic, and about what China’s ultimate goals for the Arctic might be.152 As noted earlier, Russia’s diplomatic isolation

---

149 For an additional short overview, see Elley Donnelly, “NATO in the Arctic: 75 years of Security, Cooperation, and Adaptation,” Wilson Center, April 3, 2024.


152 See, for example, Nicholas Tachias, “Coldest War: ‘Near-Arctic’ China Joining Power Competition in North,” *Federal Times*, July 5, 2024; Mathieu Landriault, “China’s Surging Presence Reshapes a Thawing Arctic,” *Asia Times*, June 7, 2024; Kartik Bommakanti, *China’s ‘Three Warfares’ Strategy in Action: Implications for the Sino-India Boundary, the Arctic, and Antarctica*, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), February 2024 (posted online February 7, (continued...
from the A7 states in the Arctic has led to increased Russian cooperation with China in the Arctic—a development that could strengthen China’s presence and activities in the region and affect views among observers in the A7 states and elsewhere regarding China’s motivations and goals for its Arctic activities and China’s ability to work with the A7 states on matters relating to the Arctic.

In 2013, China was one of six non-Arctic states that were approved for observer status by the Arctic Council. As mentioned earlier, prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, China had raised questions as to whether the Arctic Council as currently constituted and the current broader legal framework for the Arctic should continue to be the principal means for addressing issues relating to the Arctic, and had begun to use other approaches for influencing Arctic governance.

In January 2018, China released a white paper on China’s Arctic policy that refers to China as a “near-Arctic state.” (China’s northernmost territory, northeast of Mongolia, is at about the same

---


The other five were India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. For a list of the observer states and when they were approved for observer status, see Arctic Council, “List of Arctic Council Observers,” accessed March 7, 2024, at https://www.arctic-council.org/about/observers/.

154 “Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy,” Xinhua, January 26, 2018. The white paper states that “China is an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs. Geographically, China is a ‘Near-Arctic State’, one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle. The natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s climate system and ecological environment, and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, fishery, marine industry and other sectors. China is also closely involved in the trans-regional and global issues in the Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change, environment, scientific research, utilization of shipping routes, resource exploration and exploitation, security, and global governance. These issues are vital to the existence and development of all countries and humanity, and directly affect the interests of non-Arctic States including China.” Somewhat similarly, France’s June 2016 national roadmap for the Arctic refers to France as a “polar nation.” (Republique Francaise, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et du Developpement International, The Great Challenge of the Arctic, National Roadmap for the Arctic, June 2016, 60 pp.) The document states on page 9 that “France has established itself over the last three centuries as a polar nation, with a strong tradition of expeditions and exploration, and permanent research bases at the poles,” and on page 17 that “[b]uilding on its long-standing tradition of exploration and expeditions in high latitudes, France has carved out its place as a polar nation over the last three centuries. France has permanent scientific bases in the Arctic and in Antarctica.” It can also be noted that the northernmost part of mainland France, next to Belgium and across the Strait of Dover from England, is almost as far north as the more southerly parts of the Aleutian Islands. Also somewhat similarly, a November 2018 UK parliamentary report refers to the UK as a “near-Arctic neighbour.” The report states the following: “While the UK is not an Arctic state, it is a near-Arctic neighbour. The UK’s weather (continued...)
latitude as the Aleutian Islands in Alaska, which, as noted earlier, the United States includes in its definition of the Arctic for purposes of U.S. law.) The white paper refers to trans-Arctic shipping routes as the Polar Silk Road, and identifies these routes as a major transportation corridor for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s major geopolitical initiative, first announced by China in 2013, to knit Eurasia and other regions together in a China-anchored or China-led infrastructure and economic network. The polar regions (both the Arctic and Antarctic) are included in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, covering the period 2021-2025.

China has a Ukrainian-built polar-capable icebreaker, Xue Long (Snow Dragon), that has made several transits of Arctic waters conducting what China has said were research expeditions. A second polar-capable icebreaker (the first that China has built domestically), named Xue Long 2, entered service in 2019, and a third polar-capable icebreaker, Jidi—a ship with a reported length of 292 feet and a displacement of 5,600 tons—reportedly was completed in December 2023.

China has expanded its diplomatic activities with the Nordic countries, and increased the size of its diplomatic presence in some of them. China has also engaged in economic discussions with Iceland and with Greenland, a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark. China’s engagement with Greenland appears related in significant part to Greenland’s deposits of rare

system is profoundly affected by changes in the Arctic’s climate and sea currents. The UK has been an Observer to the Arctic Council since 1998.” (United Kingdom, House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, The Changing Arctic, Twelfth Report of Session 2017-19, November 29, 2018, p. 3. [Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report, Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed November 6, 2018]. See also pp. 6, 29, and 32.)


See, for example, Maria Shagina and Elizabeth Buchanan, “China Enters the Arctic Digitization Race,” National Interest, January 17, 2021; Nima Khorrami, “Data Hunting in Subzero Temperatures: The Arctic as a New Frontier in Beijing’s Push for Digital Connectivity,” Arctic Institute, August 4, 2020; Marc Lanteigne, “The Twists and Turns of the Polar Silk Road,” Over the Circle, March 15, 2020; Zhang Chun, “China’s ‘Arctic Silk Road,’” Maritime Executive, January 10, 2020; Sabena Siddiqui, “Arctic Ambition: Beijing Eyes the Polar Silk Road,” Asia Times, October 25, 2018. See also Atle Staalesen, “Chinese Money for Northern Sea Route,” Barents Observer, June 12, 2018; Lin Boqiang, “China Can Support Arctic Development as Part of B&R,” Global Times, August 9, 2018. The BRI’s other two main corridors, which were announced at the outset of the BRI, are a land corridor that runs east to west across the middle of Eurasia—the “belt” in BRI—and a sea corridor called the Maritime Silk Road that passes through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea—the “road” in BRI. For more on the BRI, also known as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, see CRS In Focus IF11735, China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Economic Issues, by Karen M. Sutter, Andres B. Schwarzenberg, and Michael D. Sutherland.

See, for example, Trym Eiterjord, “What the 14th Five-Year Plan says about China’s Arctic Interests,” Arctic Institute, November 23, 2023; Marc Lanteigne, “The Polar Policies in China’s New Five-Year Plan,” Diplomat, March 12, 2021.

See, for example, Atle Staalesen, “China Commissions New Icebreaker,” Barents Observer, July 10, 2024; Cyril Ip, “China’s Expanding Next-Generation Icebreaker Fleet Welcomes Jidi, Its Newest Member,” South China Morning Post, June 25, 2024; Global Times, “China’s New-Generation Ice-Breaking Research Vessel Delivered, Sets to Begin Scientific Operations This Year,” Global Times, June 24, 2024; “China’s Domestically Built Icebreaker Makes Debut,” Global Times, December 29, 2023. Prior to the reported completion of this ship, the U.S. Coast Guard had counted a total of four operational PRC polar icebreakers; see Table B-1 in CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

earth elements. Like several other nations, China has established a research station in Norway’s Svalbard archipelago. China maintains a second research station in Iceland.

China appears interested in using the NSR to shorten commercial shipping times between Europe and China\(^{159}\) and perhaps also to reduce China’s dependence on southern sea routes (including those going to the Persian Gulf) that pass through the Strait of Malacca—a maritime choke point that China appears to regard as vulnerable to being closed off by other parties (such as the United States) in time of crisis or conflict.\(^{160}\) In July 2024, it was reported that a radio station in China has begun broadcasting sea ice analyses and forecasts and weather information for the NSR.\(^{161}\)

In addition to using the NSR, China reportedly reached an agreement with Russia on July 4, 2017, to create an “Ice Silk Road.”\(^{162}\)

China has made significant investments in Russia’s Arctic oil and gas industry, particularly the Yamal natural gas megaproject located on Russia’s Yamal Peninsula in the Arctic.\(^{163}\) In February 2023, it was reported that a Russian firm had signed an agreement with a PRC firm for the development of a titanium mining project in the Russian Arctic.\(^{164}\) China’s government reportedly is also interested in mining opportunities in the Canadian Arctic, and as mentioned earlier, in Greenland.\(^{165}\) China’s leaders may also be interested in Arctic fishing grounds.

The high-altitude surveillance balloon from China that flew over parts of the United States and Canada in early 2023 reportedly entered U.S. airspace on January 28, 2023, north of the Aleutian Islands (i.e., in the U.S. Arctic as defined under U.S. law).\(^{166}\) A March 1, 2023, press report stated that “months before a Chinese spy balloon drifted across Alaska and Canada, the Canadian military discovered and retrieved Chinese spy buoys in the Arctic, a region of long interest to Beijing. The Chinese buoys were monitoring U.S. submarines and the melting of ice sheets.”\(^{167}\) A July 2023 press report stated that “China has completed the field testing and evaluation of an


\(^{161}\) Albee Zhang and Ryan Woo, additional reporting by Aizhu Chen and Emily Chow, “China Starts Regular Sea Ice Forecasts for Northeast Passage off Russian Coast,” *Reuters*, July 1, 2024.

\(^{162}\) Xinhua, “China, Russia agree to jointly build ‘Ice Silk Road,’” *Xinhuanet*, July 4, 2017.


\(^{164}\) Malte Humpert, “Russian Mining Company Partners With China to Develop Massive Titanium Deposit in Arctic,” *High North News*, February 6, 2023; “China to Assist Russia with Titanium Mining in the Arctic,” *Jane’s*, February 1, 2023.

\(^{165}\) See, for example, Regin Winther Poulsen, “How Greenland’s Mineral Wealth Made It a Geopolitical Battleground,” *Foreign Policy*, December 18, 2022.


underwater listening device that will be deployed on a large scale in the Arctic Ocean, according to the Polar Research Institute of China.”

China’s activities in the Arctic may additionally reflect a view among China’s leaders that China, like other major world powers, should be active in the polar regions for conducting research and other purposes. (Along with its growing activities in the Arctic, China has increased the number of research stations it maintains in the Antarctic.)

**Arctic States’ Response**

China’s activities in the Arctic could pose challenges to the A7 states in terms of defending their own interests in the Arctic. Some observers have also cited potential opportunities for cooperation in the Arctic between China and the A7 states. A general question for U.S. policymakers is how to integrate China’s activities in the Arctic into overall U.S.-China relations, and whether and how, in U.S. policymaking, to link China’s activities in the Arctic to its activities in other parts of the world.

One specific question could be whether to impose punitive costs on China in the Arctic for unwanted actions that China takes elsewhere. As one potential example, U.S. policymakers could consider moving to suspend China’s observer status on the Arctic Council as a punitive cost-

---


171 Paragraph 37 of the Arctic Council’s rules of procedure states the following:

> Once observer status has been granted, Observers shall be invited to the meetings and other activities of the Arctic Council unless SAOs [Senior Arctic Officials] decide otherwise. Observer status shall continue for such time as consensus exists among Ministers. Any Observer that engages in activities which are at odds with the Council’s [Ottawa] Declaration [of September 19, 1996, establishing the Council] or these Rules of Procedure shall have its status as an Observer suspended.

Paragraph 5 of Annex II of the Arctic Council’s rules of procedure—an annex regarding the accreditation and review of observers—states the following:

> Every four years, from the date of being granted Observer status, Observers should state affirmatively their continued interest in Observer status. Not later than 120 days before a Ministerial meeting where Observers will be reviewed, the Chairmanship shall circulate to the Arctic States and Permanent Participants a list of all accredited Observers and up-to-date information on their activities relevant to the work of the Arctic Council.


Paragraph 4.3 of the Arctic Council’s observer manual for subsidiary bodies states in part

> Observer status continues for such time as consensus exists among Ministers. Any Observer that engages in activities which are at odds with the Ottawa Declaration or with the Rules of Procedure will have its status as an Observer suspended.

(Arctic Council. Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies, p. 5. The document was accessed March (continued...)}
imposing measure for unwanted actions by China in the South China Sea. In a May 6, 2019, speech in Finland, then-Secretary of State Pompeo stated (emphasis added)

> The United States is a believer in free markets. We know from experience that free and fair competition, open, by the rule of law, produces the best outcomes.

But all the parties in the marketplace have to play by those same rules. Those who violate those rules should lose their rights to participate in that marketplace. Respect and transparency are the price of admission.

And let’s talk about China for a moment. China has observer status in the Arctic Council, but that status is contingent upon its respect for the sovereign rights of Arctic states. The U.S. wants China to meet that condition and contribute responsibly in the region. But China’s words and actions raise doubts about its intentions.

China’s interest and investments in Greenland are a matter of concern for U.S. policymakers. PRC firms have invested in resource extraction ventures in Greenland, including potential sites for mining rare earth elements. In February 2019, it was reported that the United States in 2018 had urged Denmark to finance the construction of airports that China had offered to build in Greenland. U.S. officials were concerned about this attempt by China to increase its presence and influence in Greenland and the broader Arctic region. The Danish government ultimately financed the construction of the airports.

In May 2019, the State Department announced a plan for establishing a permanent diplomatic presence in Greenland, and on June 2020, the State Department formally announced the reopening of the U.S. consulate in Greenland’s capital of Nuuk. In April 2020, the U.S. government announced $12.1 million economic aid package for Greenland that the Trump

---

7, 2024, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/939.)


172 For more on China’s actions in the South China Sea and their potential implications for U.S. interests, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.–China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress.

173 U.S. Department of State, “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus, Remarks, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, Rovaniemi, Finland, May 6, 2019.”


Administration presented as a U.S. action done in a context of PRC and Russian actions aimed at increasing their presence and influence in Greenland.177

Some observers argue that a desire to preclude China (or Russia) from increasing its presence and influence in Greenland may have been one of the reasons why President Trump in August 2019 expressed an interest in the idea of buying Greenland from Denmark.178

Russia-China cooperation in the Arctic (including China’s investment in Russia’s Arctic oil and gas industry) can both reflect and contribute to Russia and China’s strategic partnership. A February 4, 2022, joint statement by Russia and China about their strategic partnership stated that the two countries “agreed to continue consistently intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic.”179

On the other hand, Russian officials reportedly are also concerned that China’s continued growth in wealth and power might eventually lead to China becoming the dominant power in Eurasia, and to Russia being relegated to a subordinate status in Eurasian affairs.180 Some observers argue that actual levels of Russia-China cooperation in the Arctic are not as great as PRC or Russian announcements about such cooperation might suggest.181

**Linkages Between Arctic and South China Sea**

Observers have sometimes made a linkage between the Arctic and the South China Sea in connection with international law of the sea or international cooperation and competition.182 One

---

177 See U.S. Department of State, Briefing On the Road to Nuuk: Economic Cooperation, Special Briefing, Michael J. Murphy, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Francis R. Fannon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Energy Resources, Jonathan Moore, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Gretchen Birkle, USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator, May 15, 2020; and U.S. Department of State, Briefing on the Administration’s Arctic Strategy, Special Briefing, Office of the Spokesperson, April 23, 2020.


180 See, for example, Paul Goble, “Moscow Needs Beijing in the Arctic but Worries About China’s Expanding Role,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, February 1, 2022.


aspect of this linkage relates to whether China’s degree of compliance with international law of the sea in the South China Sea has any implications for understanding potential behavior by China regarding its compliance with international law of the sea (and international law generally) in the Arctic. A second aspect, mentioned above, is whether the United States should consider the option of moving to suspend China’s observer status on the Arctic Council as a punitive cost-imposing measure for unwanted actions by China in the South China Sea. A third aspect concerns the question of whether the United States should become a party to UNCLOS; discussions of that issue sometimes mention both the Arctic and the situation in the South China Sea.  

**U.S. and Allied Military Forces and Operations**

**Overview**

During the Cold War, the Arctic was an arena of military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, with both countries, for example, operating long-range bombers, tactical combat aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines, surface warships, and ground forces in the region. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of most elements of the Russian military establishment following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 greatly reduced this competition, leading to a post-Cold War period of reduced emphasis on the Arctic in U.S. military planning, budgeting, and operations.

Over the past 10 to 15 years, the emergence of great power competition and a significant increase in Russian military presence and operations in the Arctic has introduced renewed elements of military tension and competition into the Arctic. In response, the A7 states are placing an increased emphasis on the Arctic in their military planning, budgeting, and operations. As noted in this report’s section on the Arctic’s geopolitical environment, Russia’s war in Ukraine has increased concerns among the A7 states about the purpose behind Russia’s military modernization in the Arctic. Russian military exercises in the Arctic are being monitored by the A7 states, and, similar to what happened during the Cold War, Russian military aircraft that periodically fly toward the airspace (including Arctic airspace) of some of the A7 states are being intercepted by military aircraft from those states.

Department of Defense (DOD) officials have stated that U.S. military operations in Alaska can play a role in supporting U.S. military operations not only in the Arctic, but in the Indo-Pacific region. In July 2021 remarks at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III stated: “We are an Indo-Pacific nation and we are an Arctic nation. And here in Alaska those two critical regions intersect. This is where we can project power into both regions and where we must be able to defend ourselves from threats coming from both places.”

---


183 For further discussion of this situation, see CRS Report R42784, *U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress*.

184 This section was prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.


---
Alaska (particularly the panhandle, the southern part of mainland Alaska, and the Aleutian Islands) are situated on or near great circle routes (i.e., the shortest possible routes) linking the U.S. West Coast to locations in the Western Pacific that are close to China.

**Russia’s Arctic Military Modernization**

As noted earlier, Russia since 2008 has adopted a series of strategy documents outlining plans that call for, among other things, bolstering the country’s Arctic military capabilities. Russia has reactivated and modernized Arctic military bases that fell into disuse with the end of the Cold War, assigned upgraded forces to those bases, and increased military exercises and training operations in the Arctic.¹⁸⁶

Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, some observers expressed growing concern at these developments. Other observers noted the cooperative aspects of relations among the Arctic states, including Russia, and argued, that the competitive aspects were overstated.¹⁸⁷ Some observers argued that Russia’s military investment in the Arctic were sometimes exaggerated, reflected normal modernization of aging capabilities, or was intended partly for domestic Russian consumption.¹⁸⁸ As noted earlier, Russia’s war in Ukraine has heightened concerns among the A⁷ states and other observers about the purpose behind Russia’s military modernization in the Arctic.


¹⁸⁹ See, for example, Michael B. Petersen and Rebecca Pincus, “Arctic Militarization and Russian Military Theory,” *Orbis*, 2021; Lyle Goldstein, “Washington Should Chill Out over Russia’s Arctic (continued...
U.S. and Allied Arctic Military Activities

In General

DOD and the Coast Guard (which is part of the Department of Homeland Security [DHS]) are devoting increased attention to the Arctic in their planning, budgeting, and operations. DOD as a whole, the Army, the Navy and Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard have each issued Arctic strategy documents.189 DOD’s strategy document states that DoD, in cooperation with our Allies and partners, will pursue an end state that preserves the Arctic as a stable region in which the U.S. homeland remains secure and vital national interests are safeguarded.

The [2022] NDS [National Defense Strategy] directs that activities in the Arctic will be calibrated to reflect a “monitor-and-respond” approach that is underpinned by robust intelligence collection capabilities, security cooperation with our regional Allies and partners, and the deterrent value of DoD’s ability to deploy the Joint Force globally at the time and place of our choosing. This [DOD Arctic] strategy guides DoD’s efforts to build and sustain this monitor-and-respond approach to the Arctic. Implementing this strategy will enable DoD to achieve our desired end state for the region, aligning with efforts to strengthen homeland defense, safeguard U.S. interests, and improve interoperability with Arctic Allies and partners while preserving focus on the pacing challenge of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) globally.

Climate change and shifts in the geostrategic environment drive the need for a new strategic approach to the Arctic region. This strategy will strengthen the ability of the United States to build integrated deterrence and effectively manage risk to U.S. interests in the Arctic.


189 See the following documents, some of which are successors to documents issued in earlier years by the same organizations:

- Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy, with cover letter dated June 21, 2024, released July 22, 2024, 18 pp.;
- Department of the Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance, The U.S. Army in the Arctic, January 19, 2021, 48 pp.;
- Department of the Navy, A Blue Arctic, A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic, undated, released January 5, 2021, 25 pp.;
- Department of the Air Force, Arctic Strategy, Ensuring a Stable Arctic Through Vigilance, Power Projection, Cooperation, and Preparation, undated, with cover letter dated July 21, 2020, 14 pp.; and
- U.S. Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019, 45 pp.


Regarding the Army, see also Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate staff, “Army Developing First Arctic Doctrine in More than 50 Years,” U.S. Army, January 23, 2024.
Primary risks to the success of this strategy stem from the need to balance against other DoD global commitments or find ways to integrate with other resource requirements. As such, DoD Components should take these risks into account during resourcing deliberations through DoD’s established processes.

All U.S. military services are conducting increased exercises and training operations in the Arctic—some in conjunction with forces from the other A7 states and with non-A7 NATO allies—that are aimed at

- reacquainting U.S. forces with—and responding to changes in—operating conditions in the region,
- identifying Arctic military capability gaps,
- rebuilding Arctic-specific warfighting skills that eroded during the post-Cold War era,
- testing the performance of equipment under Arctic conditions,
- strengthening interoperability with allied forces for conducting operations in the region, and
- sending Russia and China signals of resolve and commitment regarding the Arctic.191

In addition to these increased exercises and training operations, the Coast Guard, as a major acquisition project, is procuring new polar icebreakers called Polar Security Cutters (PSCs) to replace its aging heavy polar icebreakers. (For further discussion of this program, see the next section of this report on icebreakers.)

Canada, the UK, and the Nordic countries are taking steps to increase their own military presence and operations in the region, and as noted above, have participated alongside U.S. military forces

in certain Arctic exercises.\textsuperscript{192} NATO is conducting increased exercises in the region, some of which have been large exercises involving thousands of personnel from multiple countries.

**Arctic Divided Between USNORTHCOM and USEUCOM**

Under DOD’s Unified Command Plan (UCP),\textsuperscript{193} responsibility for the Arctic is divided between U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). USNORTHCOM is responsible for the North American side of the Arctic, including the North Pole and the Davis Strait that separates Canada from Greenland. USEUCOM is responsible for the European and Russian side of the Arctic, including Greenland.\textsuperscript{194}

**U.S. Navy and Coast Guard**

The diminishment of Arctic ice is creating new operating areas in the Arctic for Navy surface ships and Coast Guard cutters.\textsuperscript{195} The Navy has increased deployments of attack submarines and surface ships to the Arctic for exercises and other operations. The Coast Guard annually deploys a polar icebreaker, other cutters, and aircraft into the region to perform various Coast Guard missions and to better understand the implications of operating such units there. Key points relating to the Navy and Coast Guard in the Arctic that have emerged over the past 10 to 15 years include the following:

- SAR in the Arctic is a mission of increasing importance, particularly for the Coast Guard, and one that poses potentially significant operational challenges.\textsuperscript{196}


\textsuperscript{193} For more on the UCP, see CRS In Focus IF10542, \textit{Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations}, coordinated by Michael J. Vassalotti.

\textsuperscript{194} For a map showing USNORTHCOM and USEUCOM areas of responsibility in the Arctic, see Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy, with cover letter dated June 21, 2024, released July 22, 2024, PDF page 2 of 28.


\textsuperscript{196} See, for example, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, \textit{Arctic Search and Rescue}, Fiscal Year 2017 Report to Congress, March 13, 2018, 16 pp.
• More complete and detailed information on the Arctic as an operating area is needed to more properly support expanded Navy and Coast Guard ship and aircraft operations in the region.  

• The Navy and the Coast Guard currently have limited infrastructure in place in the Arctic to support expanded ship and aircraft operations in the Arctic.  

• Improved communication abilities are needed, because existing U.S. military communications systems were designed to support operations in lower latitudes rather than in the polar regions. Improved capabilities for conducting surveillance and reconnaissance in the region are needed so as to support improved domain awareness (DDA), meaning real-time or near-real-time awareness of military and other activities taking place across the region. U.S. military services are taking actions to address the need for improved communications and improved surveillance and reconnaissance in the Arctic.  

• Navy officials have stated that they do not see a strong near-term need for building ice-hardened surface ships and deploying them into the Atlantic, but acknowledge that such a need might emerge in the future.  

• Cooperation with other Arctic countries will be valuable in achieving defense and homeland security goals.

Some Specific Developments

U.S. and Canada Plan to Update Warning Radars in Arctic

The United States and Canada are working together to modernize the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Efforts are to include joint investments in new sensing and command and control capabilities for defending against ballistic missile threats.  

---


198 See, for example, Identifying Potential Gaps in U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Capabilities, Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC), 2018, 100 pp.


Impact of Warmer Temperatures on Bases in Alaska and Exercises in Norway

DOD’s September 2021 draft climate adaptation plan states “In the Arctic, permafrost plays an important role regarding natural and built infrastructure. For example, it provides stability of large acreages of wetlands and lakes across the tundra. Permafrost thaw threatens to undermine roads and structural foundations.” An August 2020 press report identified Eielson Air Force Base southeast of Fairbanks, Fort Wainwright in Fairbanks, and Clear Space Force Station south of Anderson (previously known as Clear Air Force Base) as locations where facilities have been impacted by thawing permafrost.

A May 2023 congressionally mandated DOD report on the impact of changes in permafrost on DOD infrastructure, facilities, and operations examined eight DOD installations—six in Alaska, one (the Alaska Radar System and North Warning System) in multiple sites in Alaska and Canada, and one in Greenland. The report states:

Potential permafrost thaw poses no risk for facilities and assets located at three of the eight installations (Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Clear Space Force Station (SFS), and Eareckson Air Force Station (AFS)). Permafrost thaw poses minor risk to facilities at Fort Greely. The remaining four (Pituffik Space Base (SB), Eielson Air Force Base (AFB), Fort Wainwright, and the Alaska Radar System and North Warning System (61 total sites with 57 on permafrost) are susceptible to moderate to considerable risk that thaw would cause differential settlement, thus impairing structural integrity or allow ground water infiltration into ground voids leading to freeze/thaw heave. The impacts to the DoD Arctic mission and assets stationed at the at-risk installations, Pituffik Space Base (SB) [formerly Thule Air Base], Eielson AFB, and Fort Wainwright, or located at the at-risk radar sites of the Alaska Radar System and North Warning System could be significant.

A May 24, 2023, press report stated: “Climate change is rapidly altering the Arctic landscape, in particular the permafrost that serves as a foundation for buildings across the region. Warming temperatures are thawing out the frozen ground, and in the process it is threatening to unsettle structures that were built decades ago. That’s particularly worrisome for the U.S. military, which maintains facilities across the Arctic region. And it’s one reason [Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen] Hicks embarked on a two-day tour of the nation’s northernmost military bases.”


Congressional Research Service 49
A March 2022 press report stated: “The weather along Norway’s Arctic coast ... is becoming increasingly hard to predict as warming trends change the terrain and storms become more frequent.... The changing conditions mean that U.S. forces will have to adapt how they operate, both for the safety of their forces and the success of any potential future combat operations in the High North.... In the air, pilots must account for more extreme rainfall and storms.... Avalanches are also a greater risk now.”

**October 2023 Coast Guard Arctic Implementation Plan**

In October 2023, the Coast Guard released an implementation plan for its 2019 Arctic strategy document. The implementation plan includes 14 initiatives.

**September 2022 Establishment of DOD Arctic Strategy and Global Resilience Office**

In September 2022, DOD established an office for Arctic strategy and global resilience “to ensure U.S. strategy and policy protects U.S. interests in that crucial region,” and named Iris A. Ferguson as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arctic and Global Resilience.

**June 2021 DOD Creation of Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies**

In June 2021, DOD announced the creation of “a new DOD center to focus on issues related to the Arctic. The Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies will be the sixth such regional center for the department.”

**April 2021 Agreement Regarding Bases in Norway**

On April 16, 2021, “the United States and the Kingdom of Norway concluded the recently negotiated Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA).... The Agreement supplements the provisions of the 1951 NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and establishes a framework to advance our capabilities, in support of the NATO Alliance’s collective...


208 The 14 initiatives are enhance Arctic operations and exercises; expand Arctic surface capabilities and associated support infrastructure; expand Arctic aviation capabilities; expand Arctic communications capabilities; improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); strengthen the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF); preserve U.S. leadership in the Arctic Council; modernize the U.S. Arctic marine transportation system (MTS); continue implementation of the IMO Polar Code; strengthen marine environmental preparedness and response; strengthen the Center for Arctic Study and Policy; enhance the Coast Guard’s culture of Arctic innovation; communicate strategically; and formalize the Coast Guard Polar enterprise.


defense.... The SDCA includes four initial key locations as focal points for increased cooperation with Norway: Evenes Air Station, Ramsund Naval Station, Rygge Air Station, and Sola Air Station.”

**August 2018 Reestablishment of 2nd Fleet**

In May 2018, the Navy announced that it would reestablish the 2nd Fleet, which was the Navy’s fleet during the Cold War for countering Soviet naval forces in the North Atlantic. The fleet’s formal reestablishment occurred in August 2018. The 2nd Fleet was created in 1950 and disestablished in September 2011. In its newly reestablished form, it is described as focusing on countering Russian naval forces not only in the North Atlantic but in the Arctic as well.212

**Sufficiency of U.S. Arctic Military Activities**

Some observers have expressed concern about whether the United States is doing enough militarily to defend its interests in the Arctic, and in some cases have offered recommendations for doing more.213 Whether DOD and the Coast Guard are devoting sufficient resources to the Arctic and taking sufficient actions for defending U.S. interests in the region is a topic of congressional oversight.214 Those who argue that DOD and the Coast Guard are not devoting sufficient resources and taking sufficient actions argue, for example, that DOD and the Coast Guard should build ice-hardened surface ships other than icebreakers for deployment to the Arctic and/or establish a strategic seaport in Alaska’s north to better support DOD and Coast Guard operations in the Arctic.215 (Anchorage, in the southern part of Alaska’s mainland, was designated

---


a U.S. strategic seaport for supporting DOD operations in 2004.\textsuperscript{216} A June 2023 press report stated that a $600 million project to expand port facilities at Nome, Alaska, will make Nome “the nation’s first deepwater Arctic port. The expansion, expected to be operational by the end of the decade, will accommodate not just larger cruise ships of up to 4,000 passengers, but cargo ships to deliver additional goods for the 60 Alaska Native villages in the region, and military vessels to counter the presence of Russian and Chinese ships in the Arctic.”\textsuperscript{217}

Selected FY2024 and FY2025 Legislative Provisions


The conference report (H.Rept. 118-301 of December 6, 2023) on H.R. 2670/P.L. 118-31 of December 22, 2023, directs DOD to submit to the congressional defense committees on DOD roles and responsibilities in support of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (page 1245).

\textbf{FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587/Division A of H.R. 2882/P.L. 118-47)}

The House Appropriations Committee’s report (H.Rept. 118-121 of June 27, 2023) on H.R. 4365 requires DOD, in coordination with the Navy and the Department of Homeland Security, to brief the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on DOD’s current maritime polar capability and capacity and provide a threat-based assessment of future requirements in the regions (page 62).


In H.R. 8070 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 118-529 of May 31, 2024) and passed by the House,

- Section 1069A would direct the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to submit a report on a tri-service Arctic maritime strategy;
- Section 1087 would direct DOD to establish or designate one or more University Centers for Arctic National Security Studies at institutions of higher education;
- Section 1241 would direct the U.S. Special Operations Command, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Commander of the U.S. Northern Command, to develop and submit a Special Operations Forces Arctic Security


Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress

Strategy, applicable across each component of the special operations forces and within each Armed Force; and

- Section 1250 would direct DOD, in consultation with the Department of State and the Director of National Intelligence, to submit a report on any military activities of Russia in the Arctic, and any military activities of China in the Arctic.218

In S. 4638 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 118-188 of July 8, 2024), Section 1063 would direct DOD to submit a report for each fiscal year for FY2026 through FY2031 on resourcing DOD’s Arctic strategy that includes five-year cost data associated with implementing the strategy.219

**Polar Icebreaking**220

Within the U.S. government, the Coast Guard is the U.S. agency responsible for polar icebreaking. The Coast Guard’s large icebreakers are called polar icebreakers rather than Arctic icebreakers because they perform missions in both the Arctic and Antarctic.

The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers do not simply break ice—they are multimission cutters that conduct a variety of other operations that are conducted in lower-latitude waters by the Coast Guard’s general-purpose cutters. U.S. polar ice operations conducted in large part by the Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers support 9 of the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions.221

The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, *Polar Star*, and one medium polar icebreaker, *Healy*. In addition to *Polar Star*, the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, *Polar Sea*. *Polar Sea*, however, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. *Polar Star* and *Polar Sea* entered service in 1977 and 1977, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service life.

---

218 In addition, H.Rept. 118-529

- directs the Army to provide a briefing on current gaps in capabilities, training, and equipment that currently inhibit full execution of the Army’s Arctic strategy, and on a plan to align the Army’s organize, train, and equip functions to address identified gaps (page 11),
- directs the Air Force to submit a report outlining polar tactical airlift requirements (pages 36-37), and
- directs DOD to provide a briefing on DOD’s plans for developing dry or waterless decontamination requirements, and for fielding capabilities, in support of DOD’s Arctic strategy (page 124).

219 In addition, S.Rept. 118-188 “urges DOD to ensure they are appropriately staffed with experts on the conditions in the Arctic region to ensure that intelligence collection, research, and analysis are conducted effectively”; states that “[e]stablishing strategically located, scalable field research centers known as Arctic Watchtowers to conduct on-the-ground research in Arctic gateways could improve the reliability and breadth of monitoring data to inform DOD decision making”; and “encourages the Secretary of Defense to consider investments in watchtower research efforts in the Arctic and near-Arctic region as part of DOD support in execution of the Arctic strategy” (pages 237-238).

220 This section was prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. It adapts material from CRS Report RL34391, *Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*.

221 The nine missions supported by polar ice operations are search and rescue; maritime safety; aids to navigation; ice operations; marine environmental protection; living marine resources; other law enforcement (protect the exclusive economic zone [EEZ]); ports, waterways and coastal security; and defense readiness. The two missions not supported by polar ice operations are illegal drug interdiction and undocumented migrant interdiction. (Department of Homeland Security, *Polar Icebreaking Recapitalization Project Mission Need Statement, Version 1.0*, approved by DHS June 28, 2013, p. 10.)
lives. The Coast Guard has used Polar Sea as a source of spare parts for keeping Polar Star operational.\footnote{222}{See CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.}

Operations to support National Science Foundation (NSF) research activities in both polar regions account for a significant portion of U.S. polar icebreaker operations. Providing support for NSF's research in the Antarctic focuses on performing an annual mission, called Operation Deep Freeze (ODF), to break through Antarctic sea ice so as to reach and resupply McMurdo Station, the large U.S. Antarctic research station located on the shore of McMurdo Sound, near the Ross Ice Shelf. The Coast Guard’s medium polar icebreaker, Healy, spends most of its operational time in the Arctic supporting NSF research activities and performing other operations.

Even with the diminishment of polar ice, there are still significant ice-covered areas in the polar regions, and diminishment of polar ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial cargo ship, cruise ship, research ship, and naval surface ship operations, as well as increased exploration for oil and other resources, in the Arctic. Such activities could require increased levels of support from polar icebreakers, particularly since waters described as “ice-free” can actually still have some amount of ice.

Some observers have identified polar icebreaking capacity as a component of U.S.-Russia (or U.S.-China) competition in the Arctic, and express concern about what they view as a U.S. “icebreaker gap” compared to the much-larger Russian polar icebreaker fleet.\footnote{223}{See, for example, Ella Sherman, “The US Military Doesn’t Have the Icebreakers to Compete in the Arctic and Is ‘Severely Outnumbered’ by Russia, Commander Warns,” Business Insider, March 14, 2024; Mike Glenn, “U.S. Icebreaker Gap with Russia a Growing Concern as Arctic ‘Cold War’ Heats Up,” Washington Times, September 23, 2021.} Other observers disagree with that perspective.\footnote{224}{See, for example, Paul C. Avey, “The Icebreaker Gap Doesn’t Mean America Is Losing In The Arctic,” War on the Rocks, November 28, 2019.}

The Coast Guard in its FY2013 budget initiated a program, now known as the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, to acquire new heavy polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard aims to acquire four or five new PSCs, to be followed at some later point by the acquisition of new Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs) (i.e., medium polar icebreakers). The PSC program has received a total of about $1,731.8 million in procurement funding through FY2024. One oversight issue concerns the accuracy of the PSC’s estimated procurement cost, given the PSC’s size and internal complexity, as well as cost growth in other Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding programs. If substantial cost growth occurs in the PSC program, it could raise a question regarding whether to grant some form of contract relief to the PSC shipbuilder. Another oversight issue concerns the delivery date for the first PSC: the Coast Guard originally aimed to have the first PSC delivered in 2024, but the ship’s estimated delivery date has been delayed repeatedly and may now occur no earlier than 2029.

In addition to the PSC program, the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget requested, and the FY2024 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 2882/P.L. 118-47 of March 23, 2024) provided, $125.0 million in procurement funding for the purchase of an existing commercially available polar icebreaker (CAPI) that is to be modified to become a Coast Guard medium polar icebreaker. The ship the Coast Guard intends to purchase and modify is Aiviq, a U.S.-registered ship that was originally built to serve as an Arctic oil-exploration support ship, and which has an icebreaking capability sufficient for the ship to serve following modification as a Coast Guard medium polar icebreaker.
Search and Rescue (SAR)²²⁵

Increasing sea and air traffic through Arctic waters has increased concerns regarding Arctic-area SAR capabilities.²²⁶ Given the location of current U.S. Coast Guard operating bases, it could take Coast Guard aircraft several hours, and Coast Guard cutters days or even weeks, to reach a ship in distress or a downed aircraft in Arctic waters. The Coast Guard states that “the closest Coast Guard Air Station to the Arctic is located in Kodiak, AK, approximately 820 nautical miles south of Utqiagvik, AK, which is nearly the same distance as from Boston, MA, to Miami, FL.”²²⁷ In addition to such long distances, the harsh climate complicates SAR operations in the region.

Particular concern has been expressed about cruise ships carrying large numbers of civilian passengers that may experience problems and need assistance.²²⁸ There have been incidents of this kind with cruise ships in waters off Antarctica. In August 2018, a Russian-flagged passenger ship with 162 people on board ran aground on Canada’s Northwest Passage,²²⁹ and in September 2023, a Bahamas-flagged cruise ship with 206 people on board ran aground in Alpefjord, Greenland.²³⁰

The Coast Guard participates in exercises focused on improving Arctic SAR capabilities. Further increasing U.S. Coast Guard SAR capabilities for the Arctic could require one or more of the following: enhancing or creating new Coast Guard operating bases in the region; procuring additional Arctic-capable aircraft, cutters, and rescue boats for the Coast Guard; and adding systems to improve Arctic maritime communications, navigation, and domain awareness. It may also entail enhanced forms of cooperation with navies and coast guards of other Arctic countries.

On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council, meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, signed an agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime SAR in the Arctic.²³¹ The agreement divides the Arctic into SAR areas within which each party has primary responsibility for conducting SAR operations. Figure 6 shows a map of the national areas of SAR responsibility based on the geographic coordinates listed in the Annex to the agreement.

²²⁵ This section was prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
²²⁶ See, for example, Elías Thorsson, “Increased Arctic Shipping Brings Increased Risks,” Arctic Business Journal, October 21, 2023.
²²⁷ Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019, p. 11.
²²⁹ Malte Humpert, “A Cruise Ship Runs Aground in Canada’s Arctic Waters; The Akademik Ioffe’s Sister Ship Was Nearby, and Together with Canadian Coast guard Ships, Was Able to Rescue All Passengers,” Arctic.Today, August 28, 2018.
Commercial Sea Transportation

Background

The search for a shorter route from the Atlantic to Asia has been the quest of maritime powers since the Middle Ages. The diminishment of Arctic ice raises the possibility of saving several thousands of miles and several days of sailing between major trading blocs. If the Arctic were to become a viable shipping route, the ramifications could extend far beyond the Arctic. For example, lower shipping costs could be advantageous for China (at least its northeast region), Japan, and South Korea because their manufactured products exported to Europe or North

---

232 This section was prepared by John Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.

233 Extended daylight hours in the Arctic during the summer may also be an advantage.
America could become less expensive relative to other emerging manufacturing centers in Southeast Asia, such as India. Melting ice could potentially open up two trans-Arctic routes:\(^{235}\)

- **The Northern Sea Route** (NSR, a.k.a. the “Northeast Passage”), along Russia’s northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles in length. It was opened by the Soviet Union to domestic shipping in 1931 and to transit by foreign vessels in 1991. This route would be applicable for trade between northeast Asia (north of Singapore) and northern Europe. Most transits through the NSR are associated with the carriage of LNG from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula, and Russia is actively promoting the use of this route. The NSR accounts for the vast majority of large cargo ship transits in the Arctic.\(^{236}\)

- **The Northwest Passage** (NWP) runs through the Canadian Arctic Islands. The NWP actually consists of several potential routes. The southern route is through Peel Sound in Nunavut, which has been open in recent summers and contains mostly one-year ice. However, this route is circuitous, contains some narrow channels, and is shallow enough to impose draft restrictions on ships. The more northern route, through McClure Strait from Baffin Bay to the Beaufort Sea north of Alaska, is much more direct and therefore more appealing to ocean carriers, but more prone to ice blockage.\(^{237}\) The NWP is potentially applicable for trade between northeast Asia (north of Shanghai) and the northeast of North America, but it is less commercially viable than the NSR.\(^{238}\) Cargo ship transits have been extremely rare but cruise vessel excursions and research vessels are more common.

**Destination Traffic, Not Trans-Arctic Traffic**

Most cargo ship activity currently taking place in the Arctic is to transport natural resources from the Arctic or to deliver general cargo and supplies to communities and natural resource extraction facilities. Thus, cargo ship traffic in the Arctic presently is mostly regional, not trans-Arctic.

**Unpredictable Ice Conditions Hinder Trans-Arctic Shipping**

Arctic waters do not necessarily have to be ice free to be open to shipping. Multiyear ice can be over 10 feet thick and problematic even for icebreakers, but one-year ice is typically 3 feet thick or less. This thinner ice can be more readily broken up by icebreakers or ice-class ships (cargo ships with reinforced hulls and other features for navigating in ice-infested waters). However, more open water in the Arctic has resulted in another potential obstacle to shipping: unpredictable ice flows. In the NWP, melting ice and the opening of waters that were once covered with one-year ice has allowed blocks of multiyear ice from farther north and icebergs from Greenland to

---


\(^{235}\) A third but more remote possibility is a route directly over the North Pole.

\(^{236}\) Traffic statistics available at https://arctic-lio.com/.

\(^{237}\) This was the route pioneered by the *SS Manhattan*, an oil tanker modified for ice breaking in 1969 to carry Alaskan North Slope oil to the Atlantic. This was the first commercial passage through the NWP, but the building of the Alaskan pipeline was found to be the more economical means of transporting oil from the North Slope to the lower 48 states.

\(^{238}\) Although the NWP is often compared to the alternative route through the Panama Canal in terms of distance and sailing days from Asia to the U.S. east coast, another alternative to consider is the shorter and faster transcontinental rail route across Canada or the United States.
flow into potential sea lanes. The source of this multiyear ice is not predicted to dissipate in spite of climate change. Moreover, the flow patterns of these ice blocks are very difficult to forecast. Thus, the lack of ice in potential sea lanes during the summer months can add even greater unpredictability to Arctic shipping. This is in addition to the extent of ice versus open water, which is also highly variable from one year to the next and seasonally.

The unpredictability of ice conditions is a major hindrance for trans-Arctic shipping in general, but can be more of a concern for some types of ships than it is for others. For instance, it would be less of a concern for cruise ships, which may have the objective of merely visiting the Arctic rather than passing through and could change their route and itinerary depending on ice conditions. On the other hand, unpredictability is of the utmost concern for container ships that carry thousands of containers from hundreds of different customers, all of whom expect to unload or load their cargo upon the ship’s arrival at various ports as indicated on the ship’s advertised schedule. The presence of even small blocks of ice or icebergs from a melting Greenland ice sheet requires slow sailing and could play havoc with schedules. Several container shipping lines and shippers have pledged not to ship through the Arctic. Ships carrying a single commodity in bulk from one port to another for just one customer have more flexibility in terms of delivery windows, but would not likely risk an Arctic passage under prevailing conditions.

Ice is not the sole impediment to Arctic shipping. The region frequently experiences adverse weather, including not only severe storms, but also intense cold, which can impair deck machinery. During the summer months when sea lanes are open, heavy fog is common in the Arctic.

Commercial ships would face higher operating costs on Arctic routes than elsewhere. Ship size is an important factor in reducing freight costs. Many ships currently used in other waters would require two icebreakers to break a path wide enough for them to sail through; ship owners could reduce that cost by using smaller vessels in the Arctic, but this would raise the cost per container or per ton of freight. Also, icebreakers or ice-class cargo vessels burn more fuel than ships designed for more temperate waters and would have to sail at slower speeds. The shipping season in the Arctic only lasts for a few weeks, so icebreakers and other special required equipment would sit idle the remainder of the year. None of these impediments by themselves may be enough to discourage Arctic passage but they do raise costs, perhaps enough to negate the savings of a shorter route. Thus, from the perspective of a shipper or a ship owner, shorter via the Arctic does not necessarily mean cheaper and faster.

**Basic Navigation Infrastructure Is Lacking**

Considerable investment in navigation-related infrastructure would be required if trans-Arctic shipping were to become a reality. Channel marking buoys and other floating visual aids are not possible in Arctic waters because moving ice sheets will continuously shift their positions. Therefore, vessel captains would need to rely on marine surveys and ice charts. For some areas in

---


the Arctic, however, these surveys and charts are out of date or not sufficiently accurate.\textsuperscript{243} To remedy this problem, aviation reconnaissance of ice conditions and satellite images would need to become readily available for ship operators.\textsuperscript{244} Ship-to-shore communication infrastructure would need to be installed where possible. Refueling stations may be needed, as well as, perhaps, transshipment ports where cargo could be transferred to and from ice-capable vessels at both ends of Arctic routes. Shipping lines would need to develop a larger pool of mariners with ice navigation experience. Marine insurers would need to calculate the proper level of risk premium for polar routes, which would require more detailed information about Arctic accidents and incidents in the past.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, along with the state of Alaska, has studied the feasibility of a “deep-draft” port in the Arctic (accommodating ships with a draft of about 35 feet). The northern and northwestern coastlines of Alaska are exceptionally shallow, generally limiting harbor and near-shore traffic to shallow-draft barges. Coast Guard cutters and icebreakers have drafts of 35 to 40 feet while NOAA research vessels have drafts of 16 to 28 feet, so at present these vessels are based outside the Arctic and must sail considerable distances to reach Arctic duty stations. Supply vessels supporting offshore oil rigs typically have drafts over 20 feet. A deep-draft port could serve as a base of operations for larger vessels, facilitating commercial maritime traffic in the Arctic. The study concluded that the existing harbors of Nome or Port Clarence on Alaska’s west coast may be the most suitable for deepening because of their proximity to the Bering Strait and deeper water.\textsuperscript{245} However, at a July 2016 hearing, the Coast Guard indicated its preferred strategy was to rely on mobile assets (vessels and aircraft) and seasonal bases of operation rather than pursue a permanent port in the Arctic.\textsuperscript{246} Congress has provided funds for engineering and design of the Nome project.

The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, a Cabinet-level committee of federal agencies with responsibilities for marine transportation, identified a list of infrastructure improvements for Arctic navigation in a 2013 report.\textsuperscript{247} The report prioritizes improvements to information infrastructure (weather forecasting, nautical charting, ship tracking) and emergency response capabilities for ships in distress.

**Regulation of Arctic Shipping**

Due to the international nature of the shipping industry, maritime trading nations have adopted international treaties that establish standards for ocean carriers in terms of safety, pollution prevention, and security. These standards are agreed upon by shipping nations through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency that first met in 1959.\textsuperscript{248}

\textsuperscript{243} In July and August 2010, NOAA surveyed the Bering Straits area in order to update its charts but stated that it will take more than 25 years to map the prioritized areas of navigational significance in U.S. Arctic waters. See https://web.archive.org/web/20180605213143/http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100720_fairweather.html.

\textsuperscript{244} Ice reporting that currently exists is intended for scientists not mariners.

\textsuperscript{245} Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic Port System Study, March 2013; http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Library/ReportsandStudies/AlaskaRegionalPortsStudy.aspx. The navigation channel at Nome presently ranges from 10 to 20 feet in depth. Much of the harbor at Port Clarence has a natural depth of 35 to 40 feet.

\textsuperscript{246} Oral testimony of Admiral Charles D. Michel, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Coast Guard Arctic Implementation Capabilities, July 12, 2016.


\textsuperscript{248} See http://www.imo.org/ for more information.
Key conventions that the 168 IMO member nations have adopted include the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), which was originally adopted in response to the Titanic disaster in 1912 but has since been revised several times; the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which was adopted in 1973 and modified in 1978; and the Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), which was adopted in 1978 and amended in 1995 and 2010. It is up to ratifying nations to enforce these standards. The United States is a party to these conventions, and the U.S. Coast Guard enforces them when it boards and inspects ships and crews arriving at U.S. ports and the very few ships engaged in international trade that sail under the U.S. flag.

Like the United States, most of the other major maritime trading nations lack the ability to enforce these regulations as a “flag state” because much of the world’s merchant fleet is registered under so-called “flags of convenience.” While most ship owners and operators are headquartered in major economies, they often register their ships in Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, the Marshall Islands, Malta, and Cyprus, among other “open registries,” because these nations offer more attractive tax and employment regulatory regimes. Because of this development, most maritime trading nations enforce shipping regulations under a “port state control” regime—that is, they require compliance with these regulations as a condition of calling at their ports. The fragmented nature of ship ownership and operation can be a further hurdle to regulatory enforcement. It is common for cargo ships to be owned by one company, operated by a second company (which markets the ship’s space), and managed by a third (which may supply the crew and other services a ship requires to sail), each of which could be headquartered in different countries.

**Arctic Polar Code**

While SOLAS and other IMO conventions include provisions regarding the operation of ships in ice-infested waters, they were not specific to the polar regions. To supplement these requirements, a new IMO polar code went into effect on January 1, 2017. The code applies to passenger and cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more engaged in international voyages. It does not apply to fishing vessels, military vessels, pleasure yachts, or smaller cargo ships. The polar requirements are intended to improve safety and prevent pollution in the Arctic, and they include provisions on ship construction, ship equipment related to navigation, and crew training and ship operation. The code requires ships to carry fully or partially enclosed lifeboats. The code requires that the crew have training in ice navigation. Nations can enforce additional requirements on ships arriving at their ports or sailing through their coastal waters. For instance, U.S. Coast Guard regulations largely follow IMO conventions but mandate additional requirements in some areas. U.S. coastal states can require ships calling at their ports to take additional safety and pollution prevention safeguards. Canada and Russia have additional pollution regulations for Arctic waters exceeding MARPOL. The U.S. Coast Guard has studied and has recommended a specific vessel traffic separation scheme for the Bering Strait between Alaska and Russia, which experiences over 400 transits per year, and which the IMO has approved.

---

249 https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Polar-default.aspx.

250 For example, see Alaska State Legislature, HJR 19, Arctic Marine Safety Agreements; http://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Detail/30?Root=HJR%2019.

251 82 Federal Register 11935, February 27, 2017.
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration\textsuperscript{252}

Lands and waters in the Arctic region—including U.S. lands and waters in and around Alaska—have attracted interest and presented challenges in terms of oil, gas, and mineral development. Decreases in ice extent in and around the Arctic Ocean may alter options for exploration in offshore and onshore areas across the region, for the United States and other countries. Efforts to map the margins of the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS) and the continental shelves of other nations could impact oil, gas, and mineral exploration.

Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration

The shrinking Arctic ice cap, or conversely, the growing amount of ice-free ocean, has increased interest in exploring for offshore oil and gas in the region. Reduced sea ice means that ships towing seismic arrays can explore regions of the Arctic Ocean for longer periods of time with less risk of colliding with floating sea ice.\textsuperscript{253} Less sea ice over longer periods compared to previous decades also means that the seasonal window for offshore Arctic drilling remains open longer, increasing the opportunities for making a discovery.

In addition to the improved access to larger portions of the Arctic afforded by shrinking sea ice, interest in Arctic oil and gas was fueled by a 2008 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) appraisal of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle.\textsuperscript{254} The USGS stated that the “extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth.”\textsuperscript{255} In the report, the USGS estimated that 90 billion barrels of oil, nearly 1,700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may remain to be discovered in the Arctic (including both U.S. and international resources north of the Arctic Circle).\textsuperscript{256} The U.S. Energy Information Administration stated in 2012 that this would constitute approximately 13\% of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil resources and 30\% of natural gas.\textsuperscript{257} In terms of U.S. resources specifically, DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) estimated in 2021 that the Alaska portions of the U.S. OCS contain undiscovered, technically recoverable resources of approximately 25 billion barrels of oil and 124 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (although not all of these resources may be economically viable to recover).\textsuperscript{258}

\textsuperscript{252} This section was prepared by Laura Comay, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division; Emma Kaboli, Analyst in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division; Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division; and Lexie Ryan, Analyst in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.

\textsuperscript{253} A seismic array is typically a long string or streamer of geophones—acoustic devices used for recording seismic signals—toed behind a ship while the ship traverses a prospective oil and gas-bearing portion of the seafloor. The seismic signals are processed and interpreted to give a cross-section or three-dimensional image of the subsurface.


\textsuperscript{255} USGS 2008 Fact Sheet.

\textsuperscript{256} USGS 2008 Fact Sheet, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{258} Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), “Assessment of Undiscovered Technically Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources of the Nation’s Outer Continental Shelf, 2021,” at https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/documents/oil-gas-energy/resource-evaluation/2021_National_Assessment_Map_BTU.pdf. BOEM defines \textit{technically recoverable resources} as “oil and gas that could be produced as a consequence of natural pressure, artificial lift, pressure maintenance, or other secondary recovery methods, but without any consideration of economic viability” (BOEM, (continued...)}
Despite the warming trend in the Arctic, severe weather and sea ice continue to pose challenges to exploration. In addition, any discovery of new oil and gas deposits far from existing storage, pipelines, and shipping facilities could not be developed until infrastructure is built to extract and transport the petroleum.

Offshore of Alaska, the U.S. OCS covers more than 1 billion acres, including some areas with high oil, gas, and mineral potential. Some have expressed interest in expanding America’s oil and gas portfolio in the Alaska OCS. Currently, 2 of the 15 federal planning areas in BOEM’s Alaska region—the Beaufort Sea and Cook Inlet—contain active federal leases, and only the Beaufort Sea has producing wells (from a joint federal-state unit). In December 2023, the Secretary of the Interior approved an offshore oil and gas leasing program for 2024-2029 that contains no lease sales in the Alaska region. Under the Trump Administration, BOEM had issued a draft five-year offshore oil and gas leasing program that would have scheduled lease sales in all 15 Alaska planning areas, including three sales in the Beaufort Sea and three in the Chukchi Sea, both of which lie within the ARPA-defined Arctic boundary. The draft program did not advance further in the Trump Administration.

Offshore oil and gas activities in the region have fluctuated as industry weighs changing oil prices, development costs, and regulations. BOEM reported that, between February and November 2016, companies relinquished more than 90% of leases they had held in the Beaufort and Chukchi Sea planning areas, in the midst of a slump in oil prices. While there were 450 active leases in the Chukchi Sea planning area at the end of 2015, as of January 2024 there were none. In the Beaufort Sea, active leases dropped from 77 at the end of 2015 to 6 in January 2024. Despite these changes, recent discoveries onshore and in state waters on Alaska’s North Slope have contributed to ongoing interest in the region.


259 This region includes some areas within the Arctic boundary as defined by the ARPA (15 U.S.C. 4111; see Figure 1), such as the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, and some areas outside that boundary, such as Cook Inlet.


261 BOEM, 2024-2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Leasing: Proposed Final Program, September 2023 (approved in December 2023), https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/documents/oil-gas-energy/leasing/2024-2029_NationalOCSProgram_FFP_Sep_2023_Compliant.pdf. An earlier draft of the program had narrowed potential leasing in the Alaska region to the Cook Inlet planning area, which lies outside the Arctic boundary as defined by the ARPA. The final program did not include any lease sales in this area, based on “limited expressed interest of potential oil and gas producers, the lack of development on existing OCS leases, and the potential for higher environmental risks associated with new leasing in relatively undeveloped areas” (p. 7). The final program schedules leasing for the 2024-2029 period only in the Gulf of Mexico.

262 BOEM, 2019-2024 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program, January 2018, at https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-2019-2024/. The draft program also included other Alaska region planning areas in addition to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas and Cook Inlet, although industry interest in these other areas may be lower, as many are thought to have relatively low or negligible petroleum potential.


265 Ibid.
The evolving federal regulatory environment for Arctic offshore activities has been shaped by concerns about industry’s ability to respond to potential oil spills, given the region’s remoteness and harsh conditions. The section of this report on “Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change” discusses this issue in greater detail. In 2016, BOEM and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) released final safety regulations for Arctic exploratory drilling that include multiple requirements for companies to reduce the risks of potential oil spills—for example, the requirement that companies have a separate rig available at drill sites to drill a relief well in case of a loss of well control.²⁶⁶

Under authority provided in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, U.S. Presidents have withdrawn from leasing consideration certain Arctic Ocean areas deemed especially sensitive to the impacts of oil and gas activities.²⁶⁷ For example, leasing is prohibited in the Bristol Bay area of the North Aleutian Basin.²⁶⁸ In January 2021, President Biden indefinitely withdrew from leasing other large portions of the U.S. Arctic—including the entire Chukchi Sea planning area and almost all of the Beaufort Sea planning area—reinstating a withdrawal originally instituted by President Obama.²⁶⁹

Offshore Mineral Exploration

Seabed mineral deposits can form in seafloor environments within a country’s OCS and in areas beyond national jurisdiction in the deep sea. Volcanic activity at ocean ridges often increases the concentration of dissolved metals in the surrounding seawater. In these areas, minerals can precipitate from the seawater onto the seabed, forming mineral deposits. Polymetallic sulfide, or seafloor massive sulfide deposits commonly form at active and inactive hydrothermal vents along ocean ridges, and commonly contain copper, gold, zinc, lead, barium, and silver.²⁷⁰ Ferromanganese crusts and nodules have been observed on the Arctic seabed.²⁷¹

²⁶⁶ Department of the Interior, “Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf,” 81 Federal Register 46477, July 15, 2016. In December 2020, the Trump Administration published a proposed revision to the rule (85 Federal Register 79266), but in June 2021 the Biden Administration withdrew the proposed revision.

²⁶⁷ Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. §1341(a)) authorizes the President to, “from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.”


²⁶⁹ Executive Order 13990, Section 4(b), January 25, 2021. President Obama had withdrawn multiple parts of the Alaska OCS from leasing consideration (Executive Order 13754, December 9, 2016; and Presidential Memorandum of December 20, 2016). In April 2017, President Trump’s Executive Order 13795 modified President Obama’s withdrawals so as to open all the withdrawn areas for leasing consideration except for the North Aleutian Basin. However, in a March 2019 court decision (League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F.Supp.3d 1013 (D.Alaska 2019)), the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska vacated this provision in President Trump’s executive order. Additionally, in January 2021, President Biden’s Executive Order 13990 reinstated President Obama’s Arctic withdrawals in their original form.


Non-hydrocarbon mineral deposits in waters surrounding Alaska can be divided into three general categories: deposits in shallow, coastal waters, which are generally under state mining jurisdiction; deposits in federal waters in the OCS, which are generally deeper waters and are under federal jurisdiction; and deposits in areas beyond national jurisdiction, which would be regulated by an international organization established by UNCLOS. Mining in the coastal waters surrounding Alaska is relatively common; examples include various ongoing gold mining operations in Nome and in the Norton Sound, and a barite mine on Castle Island that operated from 1966 until 1980.\textsuperscript{272}

Interest in identifying potential mineral deposits in Alaska’s OCS, including in waters inside the Arctic region, has been increasing. Two potential drivers for this interest include growing demand for some minerals, and decreasing sea ice, which could lower exploration and exploitation costs. In an assessment of available geologic information, the USGS stressed caution in drawing conclusions from prior exploration efforts, noting that characterization of regions as prospective for deep-ocean minerals in the Alaska OCS, where “prospective” indicates that a region is consistent with the geologic and oceanographic criteria required to potentially host marine minerals, does not mean that a region hosts marine minerals and does not indicate that the marine minerals occurring in that region will be economically viable. Sparse geologic sampling limits knowledge of marine minerals in the Alaska region, especially in deep water regions.\textsuperscript{273}

BOEM, the federal agency authorized to oversee mineral leasing in the OCS, does not indicate that any entity has requested a mineral lease in Alaska’s OCS waters.\textsuperscript{274} According to BOEM, hydrothermal vents offshore the western Alaskan Aleutian Islands may be a potential target for certain marine minerals.\textsuperscript{275} Some Members of Congress have opposed deep-seabed mining, both on the U.S. OCS and in areas beyond national jurisdiction, while other Members have proposed legislation that would direct certain federal departments to support polymetallic nodule collection by allied partners as a strategy to provide alternative sources of minerals needed for U.S. industry.\textsuperscript{276}

Norway is the first Arctic coastal state to make a decision to advance deep-seabed mining in the Arctic. In 2008, Norwegian geologists discovered a hydrothermal vent system along the Arctic Mid-Ocean Ridge, known as Loki’s Castle, located in Norway’s EEZ.\textsuperscript{278} Massive sulfide deposits have developed around the venting system.\textsuperscript{279} On January 9, 2024, Norway’s Parliament voted in favor of allowing commercial-scale deep-seabed mining exploration, and potential exploitation, within the country’s EEZ, between Jan Mayen Island and the Svalbard archipelago.\textsuperscript{280}


\textsuperscript{273} Gartman et al., \textit{Marine Minerals in Alaska}, pp. 4-5.


\textsuperscript{275} Zoom briefing between CRS and BOEM Marine Mineral Program, March 7, 2024.

\textsuperscript{276} See in the 118\textsuperscript{th} Congress H.R. 4537 and H.R. 4536.

\textsuperscript{277} See in the 118\textsuperscript{th} Congress H.R. 7636.


\textsuperscript{279} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{280} Norway’s proposed area for seabed mining contains an estimated 280,000 square kilometers (82,000 square nautical miles). Victoria Klesty, “Norway Parliament Votes in Favour of Seabed Mining, as Expected,” \textit{Reuters}, January 9, (continued...)
thereafter, the European Parliament passed a resolution expressing its concerns about Norway’s decision.\textsuperscript{281} Citing the potential ecological damage of seabed mining, the European Parliament has supported an international moratorium on deep-seabed mining.\textsuperscript{282}

In areas beyond national jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, the International Seabed Authority (ISA), an organization established under UNCLOS, has the authority to issue seabed mining exploration and exploitation contracts to companies sponsored by countries party to UNCLOS.\textsuperscript{283} Exploration and commercial recovery of seabed minerals occurring in areas beyond national jurisdiction in the Arctic would not be limited to Arctic countries. As of February 2024, the ISA had issued no contracts for seabed mining activities in the Arctic Ocean.\textsuperscript{284}

In the Arctic Ocean, USGS scientists have identified high concentrations of critical minerals in seafloor deposits sampled more than 300 nautical miles north of Alaska.\textsuperscript{285} These USGS-identified resources fall beyond current U.S. jurisdiction. In general, a coastal country’s sovereign rights over natural resources of the seafloor, subsoil, and overlying water column extends 200 nautical miles seaward of its coastline.\textsuperscript{286} However, Arctic coastal nations, including the United States, have pursued ocean mapping efforts to extend the outer limits of their continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean in accordance with UNCLOS (see “Extent of the Continental Margin,” below).

**Extent of the Continental Margin\textsuperscript{287}**

A strategic objective of the 2022 *National Strategy for the Arctic Region* is for the United States to “delineate the outer limits of the U.S. continental shelf in accordance with international law.”\textsuperscript{288} This area of the continental shelf, beyond the limits of the 200-nautical-mile EEZ, is known as the *extended continental shelf* (ECS).\textsuperscript{289} A coastal nation with an established ECS can exercise sovereign rights over the natural resources of the seafloor and subsoil in this area, but not the overlying water column. Since 2003, the U.S. Department of State, the NOAA, and USGS have

\begin{footnotesize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[283] UNCLOS, Article 156. For more information on the International Seabed Authority, see CRS Report R47324, *Seabed Mining in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Issues for Congress*, by Caitlin Keating-Bitonti.
  \item[286] UNCLOS, Articles 56 and 77.
  \item[287] The *continental margin* comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal country and consists of the seafloor and subsoil of the continental shelf, the slope, and the rise (UNCLOS, Article 76(3)). The *continental shelf* of a coastal country comprises the seafloor and the subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea (the area 12 nautical miles seaward of the coastline) throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles (UNCLOS, Article 76(1)).
  \item[289] For more information on the U.S. extended continental shelf, see CRS Report R47912, *Outer Limits of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Caitlin Keating-Bitonti.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
worked together to collect geological and geophysical data required to map potential U.S. ECS areas through the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, a federal initiative with the aim to delineate the full extent of the U.S. ECS.\textsuperscript{290}

On December 19, 2023, the U.S. Department of State announced the outer limits of the U.S. ECS (Figure 7).\textsuperscript{291} The declared total U.S. ECS would be approximately 288,000 square nautical miles (987,700 square kilometers),\textsuperscript{292} roughly 8\% of the seafloor area beneath the U.S. EEZ.\textsuperscript{293} The U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project identified 151,700 square nautical miles (520,400 square kilometers) of the U.S. ECS in the Arctic that the United States claims to be a prolongation of the land mass of Alaska.\textsuperscript{294} The U.S. ECS in the Arctic represents 53\% of the total U.S. ECS. Much of the data to delineate the ECS in the Arctic Ocean for the United States and Canada was collected in a two-ship operation involving the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter \textit{Healy} and the Canadian Coast Guard ship \textit{Louis S. Saint Laurent}.\textsuperscript{295}

According to the U.S. Department of State, upon U.S. accession to UNCLOS, the United States will be ready to file its submission package with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an independent entity created under UNCLOS that consists of 21 experts in geology, geophysics, or hydrography.\textsuperscript{296} Under Article 76 of UNCLOS, a coastal country can file a submission to the CLCS concerning the extent of its continental shelf.\textsuperscript{297} In addition, the provisions set forth under Article 76 describe the geological and geophysical characteristics of the seabed and subsoil that are used to delineate the outer limits of the ECS.\textsuperscript{298} The CLCS does not approve or grant an ECS to coastal countries but makes recommendations to countries on the location of their ECS limits based on the scientific evidence they submit. The limits of the ECS established by a coastal country on the basis of the CLCS recommendations are “final and binding.”\textsuperscript{299}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{290}U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project: About the U.S. ECS Project,” https://www.state.gov/about-the-us-ecs-project/.


\textsuperscript{292}U.S. Department of State, \textit{U.S. ECS Executive Summary}, p. 9.


\textsuperscript{294}U.S. Department of State, \textit{U.S. ECS Executive Summary}, pp. 9 and 15.


\textsuperscript{297}UNCLOS, Article 76, paragraph 8. Annex II of UNCLOS addresses the CLCS.

\textsuperscript{298}UNCLOS, Article 76, paragraphs 4 and 5 contain two formulas and two constraint lines that can be applied in any combination to determine the outer limits of the ECS. For more information, see CRS Report R47324, \textit{Seabed Mining in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Issues for Congress}, by Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, and U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project: Issues for Congress,” at https://www.state.gov/data-collection-us-ecs-project/.

\textsuperscript{299}UNCLOS, Article 76, paragraph 8.
\end{flushright}
Figure 7. Seven Regions of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf
(as determined by the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project)


Notes: Areas of the U.S. extended continental shelf (ECS) identified by the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, a federal initiative that aims to establish the full extent of the U.S. ECS according to international law (i.e., in alignment with Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Red lines represent the outer limits of the U.S. ECS, and red shaded areas delineate the U.S. ECS beyond the 200 nautical mile limit of the continental shelf (thin dark lines), representing 288,000 square nautical miles (987,700 square kilometers). Portions of the U.S. ECS are bounded by previously established maritime boundaries with neighboring countries (i.e., Cuba, Mexico, and Russia). Other portions may overlap with ECS areas of other neighboring countries (i.e., the Bahamas, Canada, and Japan).

The U.S. Department of State also said the United States is open to filing its submission to the CLCS as a nonparty to UNCLOS. It remains unclear if the CLCS would consider a U.S. submission in these circumstances. Further, it remains unclear how the international community would respond to such a U.S. submission. One source reports objections from Russia, with a member of the Russian Federation Council quoted as saying, “The Americans act without any international legal basis at all, which means the international community has every right not

300 U.S. Department of State, U.S. ECS Executive Summary, p. 6.
to recognize new borders.’”\textsuperscript{302} A second source quoted a lawmaker who heads the Russian parliament’s Arctic committee as stating, “The unilateral expansion of boarders in the Arctic is unacceptable and can only lead to increased tensions,” in reference to the U.S. ECS announcement.\textsuperscript{303} According to the U.S. Department of State, “The United States has been, is, and will be engaged in consultations and negotiations with governments of neighboring countries concerning the delimitation of areas subject to the respective jurisdiction of the United States and of these countries.”\textsuperscript{304}

In the Arctic Ocean, portions of the U.S. ECS are bounded by Canada to the east and Russia to the west.\textsuperscript{305} The United States and Canada do not have a maritime boundary agreement in the Arctic. However, according to the U.S. Department of State, “Canada has advised the United States that it would not object to the consideration of a U.S. submission by the [CLCS], without prejudice both to the delineation of the outer limits of its own continental shelf and to the matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries in this region between the United States and Canada.”\textsuperscript{306} In 1990, Russia (then the Soviet Union) and the United States agreed to a maritime boundary to address overlapping maritime zones in the Arctic (i.e., EEZ and ECS).\textsuperscript{307} To date, Russia has not asserted ECS claims in any areas that might be considered part of the U.S. ECS. Disputes over maritime boundaries, including those with overlapping ECS, must be resolved between the countries involved in the disagreement. The CLCS has no mandate to establish boundaries or resolve disputes and cannot prejudice the resolution of boundary disputes.

Other Arctic coastal countries have collected geological and geophysical data to delineate the outer limits of their ECSs in the region. All Arctic coastal countries except for the United States, which is a nonparty to UNCLOS, have filed submissions to the CLCS for an ECS in the Arctic.\textsuperscript{308} Some experts contend that given the long queue of countries waiting for the CLCS to issue recommendations, the delineation of ECS areas in the Arctic could likely take a decade or more.\textsuperscript{309} The CLCS provided its first favorable recommendations to Norway in 2009, just over


\textsuperscript{305} U.S. Department of State, \textit{U.S. ECS Executive Summary}, p. 15.


\textsuperscript{309} For example, Andrey Todorov, “Russia’s Arctic Shelf Bid and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental (continued...)
two years after Norway filed its submission for an ECS in the Arctic.\textsuperscript{310} Iceland, though not an Arctic coastal country, filed a submission regarding an ECS in the vicinity of the Arctic Circle in 2009 and received a favorable recommendation from the CLCS in 2016.\textsuperscript{311} Denmark filed two submissions in 2013 and 2014, and in 2019, Canada filed a submission to the CLCS.\textsuperscript{312} Canada’s submission includes potentially overlapping areas with the United States’ continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean. Through regular consultations, the United States does not object to the consideration of Canada’s submission on the Arctic Ocean.\textsuperscript{313} As of February 2024, Denmark and Canada are still waiting for their respective Arctic submissions to be considered by the CLCS.

Russia was the first country to file a submission for an ECS with the CLCS in 2001.\textsuperscript{314} Russia’s initial submission to the CLCS included the Lomonosov Ridge and demonstrated its bid to extend political activities and potentially establish security infrastructure in Arctic regions.\textsuperscript{315} The CLCS found the Russian Federation’s 2001 submission to have insufficient scientific evidence.\textsuperscript{316} In 2015, the Russian Federation presented to the CLCS a revised submission that included not only the Lomonosov Ridge but also the Mendeleev Rise and the Podvodnikov Basin.\textsuperscript{317} In late March 2021, the Russian Federation submitted two addenda to its 2015 revised submission, presenting evidence for the Gakkel Ridge and the Nansen and Amundsen Basins to be components of the extended Russian continental shelf.\textsuperscript{318} The United States communicated no objections to the CLCS regarding Russia’s 2015 revised submission and 2021 addenda.\textsuperscript{319} On February 6, 2023,
the CLCS issued favorable recommendations to Russia regarding its submission related to the Mendeleev Rise, Povodnikov Basin, Lomonosov Ridge, and surrounding areas.\textsuperscript{320} Russia accepted these recommendations. The CLCS, however, rejected Russia’s submission related to the Gakkel Ridge due to insufficient documentation of morphological continuity with the Russian continental shelf.\textsuperscript{321} Russia has since submitted additional evidence for the Gakkel Ridge.\textsuperscript{322} As of February 2024, the CLCS has not provided a follow up recommendation for the Gakkel Ridge. In total, Russia’s ECS submission would capture approximately 70% of the Arctic Ocean beyond its EEZ.\textsuperscript{323}

The delineation of ECSs in the Arctic Ocean could signal to non-Arctic states (e.g., China)\textsuperscript{324} that existing and potential Arctic resources are under the legal jurisdiction of the five Arctic coastal nations.\textsuperscript{325} Because an ECS falls under national jurisdiction, the management, exploration, and exploitation of natural resources (e.g., minerals) on the ECS seafloor would be subject to domestic regulations. An established ECS would prohibit countries from pursuing exploration or exploitation contracts through the ISA for areas located within another country’s ECS.

### Onshore Energy and Mineral Development

Alaska generally, including some areas within the Arctic region, is known to contain economically viable onshore deposits of oil, gas, and minerals. A warming Arctic means new opportunities and challenges for energy and mineral exploration and development onshore. Longer summers could extend exploration seasons for areas that are only accessible for ground surveys during the warmer months. Such impacts could be felt on existing energy developments, including the Willow Project and producing oil and gas fields,\textsuperscript{326} and on existing mineral operations in the Arctic, producing gold, silver, zinc, lead, and construction aggregates.\textsuperscript{327} In addition to existing mineral operations, development of resources of critical minerals for growing technology sectors such as lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, and graphite may provide a new source of the key materials needed for energy and technology advances. Prospective exploration and development, including potential future energy developments on the 1.6-million-acre Coastal

---

320 CLCS, Recommendations to the Russian Federation in Respect to the Arctic Ocean, February 6, 2023.
322 United Nations, “Submissions to the CLCS.”
Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR)\textsuperscript{328} and the central North Slope in the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska (NRP-A), could be expanded by a warming Arctic.\textsuperscript{329}

The cost of transportation is one key factor among many that affect the economic viability of onshore energy or mineral development. Generally, onshore developments in temperate climates can be accessed by permanent roads to deliver machinery and supplies, and to transport the product to market. In contrast, the rugged terrain and harsh climate in parts of the Arctic may preclude access to onshore energy or mineral development by permanent roads and require the use of sea transport and seasonal roads. These types of transportation methods may be accessible only during certain times during the year and may also be more costly to maintain and use compared to permanent roads in more temperate climates.

Current infrastructure in the Arctic that supports energy and mineral development includes the construction and use of ice roads and bridges, which are built and used only during the season when temperatures fall and remain below a threshold. As temperatures rise in the warmer months, the roads weaken, ultimately to a point at which they can no longer be used. The months during which ice roads and bridges are accessible is referred to as the ice road transport season. The warming trend in the Arctic is shortening the ice road transport season, creating challenges to transporting machinery, supplies, and product to and from the development sites. To offset the effects of warming temperatures on ice roads and bridges, developers employ technologies and road construction strategies that extend the ice road season.\textsuperscript{330} Such technologies may also impose an additional cost on developers.

In some parts of the Arctic, where ice, gravel, and paved roads are not feasible, less sea ice could allow ships to transport heavy equipment to remote locations, and to transport ore from mines to markets. Such potential improvements in access would be limited by the onshore development’s proximity to a suitable sea harbor where a port could be established.

Another factor that could affect onshore energy and mineral developments is the thawing of the permafrost. Permafrost, which is ground, soil, rock, or other material that remains frozen from year to year, has historically served as a solid foundation base for infrastructure, including roads. Permafrost underlies most of the producing oil and gas fields in Arctic Alaska, as well as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, which transports oil through the central North Slope. Thawing permafrost creates many challenges, as roads, buildings, pipelines, drill pads, and other infrastructure can become unstable and collapse. These changes can result in higher costs to onshore energy and mineral developments, potentially requiring refreezing measures, leading existing developments to close, or rendering new projects unfeasible to pursue.

\textsuperscript{328} CRS In Focus IF12006, \textit{Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Status of Oil and Gas Program}, by Laura B. Comay, and CRS Report RL33872, \textit{Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): An Overview}, by Laura B. Comay, Michael Ratner, and R. Eliot Crafton.


Oil Pollution and Pollution Response

Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change

Climate change impacts in the Arctic, particularly the decline of sea ice and retreating glaciers, has led to increased human activities in the region, some of which have the potential to create oil pollution. A primary concern is the threat of a large oil spill in the area. Although a major oil spill has not occurred in the Arctic, potential economic activity, such as tourism (cruise ships), oil and gas exploration, and cargo transportation, increases the risk of oil pollution (and other kinds of pollution) in the Arctic. Significant spills in high northern latitudes (e.g., the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill on the southern coast of Alaska and spills in the North Sea) suggest that the “potential impacts of an Arctic spill are likely to be severe for Arctic species and ecosystems.”

Risk of Oil Pollution in the Arctic

A primary factor determining the risk of oil pollution in the Arctic is the level and type of human activity conducted in the region. Although changes to the Arctic climate are expected to increase access to natural resources and shipping lanes, the region will continue to present logistical challenges that may hinder human activity in the region. For example, unpredictable ice conditions may discourage trans-Arctic shipping. If trans-Arctic shipping were to occur frequently, it would likely represent a considerable portion of the overall oil pollution risk in the region. In recent decades, many of the world’s largest oil spills have been from oil tankers, which can carry millions of gallons of oil.

Offshore oil exploration and extraction activities in the Arctic may present a risk of oil pollution. Interest in these activities in the region has fluctuated in recent years. Historically, oil well blowouts from offshore oil operations have been a source of major oil spills, eclipsing the largest tanker spills. The largest unintentional oil spill in recent history was from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico. During that incident, the uncontrolled well released (over an 87-day period) approximately 200 million gallons of crude oil. The second-largest unintentional oil spill in recent history—the IXTOC I, estimated at 140 million gallons—was due to an oil well blowout in Mexican Gulf Coast waters in 1979.

---

331 This section was prepared by Jonathan L. Ramseur, Specialist in Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
332 For further discussion of issues relating to oil spills in general, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance.
334 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007, 2008.
335 For example, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 11 million gallons of oil, but its carrying capacity was approximately 60 million gallons.
336 Larger oil spills occurred during the 1991 Iraq War, but many of those spills were deliberate. A 1910-1911 onshore oil blowout in the California San Joaquin Valley is reported to have spilled 9.4 million barrels of crude oil (almost 400 million gallons).
337 An estimated 17% of this oil did not enter the Gulf environment but was directly recovered from the wellhead by the responsible party (British Petroleum, BP). See the Federal Interagency Solutions Group, Oil Budget Calculator Science and Engineering Team, Oil Budget Calculator: Deepwater Horizon-Technical Documentation, November 2010; and CRS Report R42942, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developments.
Until the 2010 *Deepwater Horizon* incident, the spill record for offshore platforms in U.S. federal waters had shown improvement from prior years.\(^{339}\) A 2003 National Research Council (NRC) study of oil and gas activities on Alaska’s North Slope stated “blowouts that result in large spills are unlikely.”\(^{340}\) Similar conclusions were made in federal agency documents regarding deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico before the 2010 *Deepwater Horizon* event.\(^{341}\) Some would likely contend that the underlying analyses behind these conclusions should be adjusted to account for the 2010 Gulf oil spill. However, others may argue that any activities in U.S. Arctic waters present less risk of an oil well blowout than was encountered by the *Deepwater Horizon* drill rig, because the proposed U.S. Arctic operations would be in shallower waters (150 feet) than the deepwater well (approximately 5,000 feet) that was involved in the 2010 Gulf oil spill. In addition, some have pointed out that the pressures in the Chukchi Sea would be two to three times less than they were in the well involved in the 2010 Gulf oil spill.\(^{342}\) Regardless of these differences, even under the most stringent control systems, oil exploration and extraction activities would present some level of oil spill risk in the region, as some accidents are likely to occur from equipment failure or human error. In addition, as discussed below, an oil spill in the Arctic would present unique response and cleanup challenges.

**Potential Impacts**

No oil spill is entirely benign. Even a relatively minor spill, depending on the timing and location, can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Regarding aquatic spills, marine mammals, birds, bottom-dwelling and intertidal species, and organisms in early developmental stages—eggs or larvae—are especially vulnerable. However, the effects of oil spills can vary greatly. Oil spills can cause impacts over a range of timescales, from only a few days to several years, or even decades in some cases.

Conditions in the Arctic may have implications for oil spill impacts that are less understood than in the more temperate regions.\(^{343}\) According to a 2016 study, “oil spill science in ice-covered waters is at an ad hoc level.”\(^{344}\) For example, information on the long-term effects of oil and its environmental persistence within the Arctic is limited.\(^{345}\) In addition, the historical data for the region do not provide reliable baselines to assess current environmental or ecosystem states,\(^{346}\) presenting challenges to those tasked with measuring impacts. These measurement challenges are exacerbated by several factors, including the “rapid rates of climate change” in the region.\(^{347}\)

---

\(^{339}\) See CRS Report RL33705, *Oil Spills: Background and Governance*; and Dagmar Etkin (Environmental Research Consulting), Analysis of U.S. Oil Spillage, Prepared for American Petroleum Institute, August 2009.


\(^{342}\) Letter from Marvin E. Odum, President, Shell Oil Company to S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Minerals Management Service (May 14, 2010). Cited in a staff paper from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (“The Challenges of Oil Spill Response in the Arctic,” 2011).

\(^{343}\) National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, *Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment*, 2014 (hereinafter, NRC Report, 2014).


\(^{345}\) NRC Report, 2014.

\(^{346}\) Ibid.

Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic

Conditions in the Arctic impose unique challenges for personnel charged with (1) oil spill response, which is the process of getting people and equipment to the incident, and (2) cleanup duties, either recovering the spilled oil or mitigating the contamination so that it poses less harm to the ecosystem. These challenges may play a role in policy development for economic activities in the Arctic.

Spill Response Challenges

Response time is a critical factor for oil spill recovery. With each hour, spilled oil becomes more difficult to track, contain, and recover, particularly in icy conditions, where oil can migrate under or mix with surrounding ice. Most response techniques call for quick action, which may pose logistical challenges in areas without prior staging equipment or trained response professionals. Many stakeholders are concerned about a “response gap” for oil spills in the Arctic. A response gap is a period of time in which oil spill response activities would be unsafe or infeasible. A 2016 study (prepared for the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement) estimated response gaps for two locations in the U.S. Beaufort and Chukchi Seas during the summer and winter seasons, and for the year overall. The study found that during the summer months (July-October), open water oil recovery would not be “favorable” approximately 33% of the time. By comparison, that estimate increases to 75% and 95% for the year overall and for the winter months (November-June), respectively. The response gap for the northern Arctic latitudes is likely to be extremely high compared to other regions.

In the event of an oil spill, the Coast Guard has response authority in the coastal zone. A Coast Guard official would serve as the On-Scene Coordinator with the authority to perform cleanup immediately using federal resources, monitor the response efforts of the spiller, or direct the spiller’s cleanup activities. According to a 2014 National Research Council (NRC) report, “the lack of infrastructure in the Arctic would be a significant liability in the event of a large oil spill.” The logistics in the Arctic were described as a “tyranny of distance” by the Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard.

349 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions (2009), partnership between the NOAA and the University of New Hampshire.
351 A 2017 study stated that most of the marine activities in the Arctic region occur during the summer months. See Jeremy Wilkinson et al., “Oil Spill Response Capabilities and Technologies for Ice-Covered Arctic Marine Waters: A Review of Recent Developments and Established Practices,” Ambio, 2017.
352 A 2007 estimate of Prince William Sound (PWS) also may be instructive. A 2007 study found a response gap for PWS of 38% for the time of the study period (65% during the winter season). Note that PWS has existing infrastructure for response, while the more remote Arctic areas do not. Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC, Response Gap Estimate for Two Operating Areas in Prince William Sound, Alaska (2007), Report to Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council.
353 For more details, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance.
The Coast Guard has no designated air stations north of Kodiak, AK, which is almost 1,000 miles from the northernmost point of land along the Alaskan coast in Point Barrow, AK. Although some of the communities have airstrips capable of landing cargo planes, no roads connect these Arctic communities to the main highway systems or large communities in Alaska. Vessel infrastructure is also limited. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, approximately 1,300 miles from Point Barrow.

A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report identified further logistical obstacles that would hinder an oil spill response in the region, including “inadequate” ocean and weather information for the Arctic and technological problems with communications. A 2014 GAO report highlighted steps taken by some groups (e.g., the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) to improve some of these logistical elements. The U.S. Coast Guard includes an initiative to “strengthen marine environmental response in the Arctic” as part of its 2015 Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan. A 2016 GAO Report provided an initial assessment of these efforts. In 2019, the Coast Guard issued its Arctic Strategic Outlook, which stated one of its objectives was to “enhance capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic.”

In addition, the Department of the Interior’s BOEM and BSEE issued a final rule in 2016 requiring certain safety measures for drilling operations in the Arctic, but, as discussed above, the status of that rulemaking is uncertain.

The costs of an oil spill response would likely be significantly higher than a similar incident in lower latitude locations of comparable remoteness. This could place a relatively larger burden on the oil spill liability and compensation framework. Pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), parties responsible for an oil spill may be liable for cleanup costs, natural resource damages, and specific economic damages. OPA provided both limited defenses from liability and conditional liability limits for cleanup costs and other eligible damages. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) provides an immediate source of funds for federal responses to oil spills and

---

357 NRC Report, 2014.
363 See the section above titled “Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration.”
364 For more information on this framework, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance.
367 33 U.S.C. §2703 and §2704.
compensation for certain damages. The OSRTF can be used if a responsible party’s liability limit is reached, but the fund can only provide $1 billion per incident.

**Oil Spill Cleanup Challenges**

The history of oil spill response in the Aleutian Islands highlights the challenges and concerns for potential spills in the Arctic:

> The past 20 years of data on response to spills in the Aleutians has also shown that almost no oil has been recovered during events where attempts have been made by the responsible parties or government agencies, and that in many cases, weather and other conditions have prevented any response at all.

The behavior of oil spills in cold and icy waters is not as well understood as oil spills in more temperate climates. In addition, in the summer months, the sea ice zone is a particularly challenging environment because the concentration of ice floes within a region is continuously changing. The 2014 NRC report highlights some recent advancements in understanding oil spill behavior in the Arctic climate. At the same time, the report recommends further study on a range of related issues.

The 2014 NRC report states that in colder water temperatures or sea ice, “the processes that control oil weathering—such as spreading, evaporation, photo-oxidation, emulsification, and natural dispersion—are slowed down or eliminated for extended periods of time.” In some respects, the slower weathering processes may provide more time for response strategies, such as in situ burning or skimming. On the other hand, the longer the oil remains in an ecosystem, the more opportunity there is for exposure to humans and other species in the ecosystem.

In addition, the 2014 report states the following:

> Arctic conditions impose many challenges for oil spill response—low temperatures and extended periods of darkness in the winter, oil that is encapsulated under ice or trapped in ridges and leads, oil spreading due to sea ice drift and surface currents, reduced effectiveness of conventional containment and recovery systems in measurable ice concentrations, and issues of life and safety of responders.

**Oil Spill Policy—Regional Framework**

The existing framework for international governance of maritime operations in the Arctic combines broader maritime agreements and agreements that focus on the geographic region. In terms of broader frameworks, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and other International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions include provisions regarding ships in icy waters, but the provisions are not specific to the polar regions.

The IMO’s International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) entered into force in 2017 and is mandatory under SOLAS and the International Convention for the

Prevention of Pollution from Ships (known as MARPOL). The Polar Code addresses a range of issues, including environmental protection.

In 2013, the member states of the Arctic Council signed an Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. The agreement’s objective is to “strengthen cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance ... on oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic.” The agreement entered force in 2016. A 2018 Coast Guard document describes the agreement as “binding.” The agreement includes multiple requirements for the parties, including oil spill notification, a process for requesting assistance and seeking reimbursement for costs, and joint preparation activities. Pursuant to the agreement the Arctic nations have conducted several joint training exercises.

In addition, the United States has separate bilateral agreements with Canada and Russia that address oil spill response operations. The agreement with Canada was established in 1974 for the Great Lakes and has been amended several times to add more geographic areas, including Arctic waters. According to the 2014 NRC report: “formal contingency planning and exercises with Canada have enabled both the United States and Canada to refine procedures and legal requirements for cross-border movement of technical experts and equipment in the event of an emergency.”

The U.S.-Russian agreement was made in 1989 and applies to oil spill-related activities in Arctic waters. The 2014 NRC report asserted that the agreement has not been tested to the same extent as the U.S.-Canada agreement. In 2018, officials from both nations reportedly held a tabletop exercise for an oil spill scenario in the Bering Strait.

Fisheries

The effects of climate change such as increasing sea surface temperatures, changes in regional oceanography, and decreasing permanent sea ice are altering the composition of marine ecosystems in the Arctic. In addition, ocean acidification is occurring as the increasing concentration of carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the atmosphere leads to greater absorption of CO₂ by

---

374 See the above section titled “Regulation of Arctic Shipping.”
375 Available at http://www.arctic-council.org. The agreement is sometimes described as the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA).
376 Arctic Council, Status of ratification of Agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, 2016.
381 This section was prepared by Anthony R. Marshak, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy.
the global ocean.\textsuperscript{383} The Arctic Ocean is warming and acidifying faster than most other regions of the global ocean, which is likely to affect Arctic ecosystems and their living marine resources, including the distributions and productivity of living marine resources,\textsuperscript{384} their prey, and the species that support marine fisheries (e.g., Arctic cod; juvenile stages of red king crab and tanner crab).\textsuperscript{385}

As a greater portion of the waters in the central Arctic Ocean become open for longer periods, the region’s resources are expected to become more accessible to commercial fishing.\textsuperscript{386} Approximately 15\% of the world’s marine fisheries are caught in the Subarctic and Arctic.\textsuperscript{387} A majority of these catches are from large commercial fisheries (e.g., Arctic cod, haddock, capelin) that already occur in southern inflow shelves of the Arctic, including in the Barents and Norwegian Seas north of Europe; the Central North Atlantic off Greenland and Iceland; the Bering Sea off Russia and the United States (Alaska); and the Newfoundland and Labrador Seas off northeastern Canada.\textsuperscript{388} Contrastingly, the interior Arctic shelves and the Central Arctic Ocean have generally supported small, important subsistence catches.\textsuperscript{389} The southern inflow shelves are also the most likely locations for species expansions depending on available habitat.\textsuperscript{390} For example, in U.S. waters in the eastern and northern Bering Sea, northward latitudinal shifts have been observed for Arctic cod, king and tanner crabs, sculpins, green sea urchin, and multiple

\textsuperscript{383} For more information about ocean acidification, see CRS Report R47300, Ocean Acidification: Frequently Asked Questions, by Caitlin Keating-Bitonti and Eva Lipiec.


\textsuperscript{386} Mueter, 2022, “Arctic Fisheries in a Changing Climate”; A.B. Hollowed et al., “Potential Movement of Fish and Shellfish Stocks from the Sub-Arctic to the Arctic Ocean,” \textit{Fisheries Oceanography}, vol. 22, no. 5 (2013), pp. 355-370 (hereinafter Hollowed et al., 2013, “Potential Movement of Fish and Shellfish Stocks from the Sub-Arctic to the Arctic Ocean.”


groundfish species. These latitudinal shifts are likely associated with regional warming. Additionally, unprecedented amounts of foreign commercial fishing vessel trash washed ashore across the Bering Strait region in 2020, associated with increased foreign interest in exploiting northern Bering Sea marine fisheries (e.g., Pacific cod, walleye pollock).

As the region warms, climate changes, and ocean acidification increases, fishery managers will be challenged to adjust management measures for changing ecological conditions, existing fisheries, and shifting species distributions. Uncertainties related to these changes and potential new fisheries in Arctic regions, including the central Arctic Ocean, have prompted many fishery managers to support precautionary approaches to fisheries management in the region. For example, some national governments have taken proactive measures to protect Arctic ecosystems from potential commercial fishing expansions, such as prohibitions on commercial fishing in the Norwegian Arctic north and west of the Svalbard archipelago.

For waters under U.S. jurisdiction in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, in 2009, NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service implemented the North Pacific Fishery Management Council’s (NPFMC’s) Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area (Arctic FMP). The Arctic FMP addresses concerns that unregulated or inadequately regulated commercial fisheries in the U.S. EEZ off Alaska could harm marine resources such as commercial fish populations (e.g., Arctic cod, saffron cod, snow crab), fish habitat, and other marine populations that are components of the ecosystem. The Arctic FMP prohibits commercial fishing in the Arctic Management Area and moves the northern boundary of the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands king and tanner crab fishery management plan out of the Arctic Management Area south to the Bering Strait. The Arctic FMP takes a precautionary approach by requiring the consideration of research needs that may improve scientific understanding of fish stocks and environmental conditions before developing commercial fisheries in the region. The NPFMC developed a discussion paper that examines exploratory fishing undertaken by regional fishery management organizations and potential application of these efforts to the Arctic Ocean. The FMP does not regulate subsistence or recreational fisheries in the Arctic, which are

---


392 Ibid.


394 Mueter, 2022, “Arctic Fisheries in a Changing Climate.”

395 Ibid.


generally for small local use salmonid species and some upstream freshwater finfish species managed by the State of Alaska.\textsuperscript{402}

International cooperation is necessary to manage Arctic resources because fish stocks are shared to some degree among the five Arctic coastal states.\textsuperscript{403} Further, a large portion of the central Arctic Ocean (2.8 million square kilometers) lies outside the EEZs of these nations. Ideally, regional management would recognize the need to coordinate management for fish populations that move among these national jurisdictional zones and the high seas.\textsuperscript{404}

The U.S. executive branch and Congress also have promoted international approaches for the management of stocks in the Arctic Ocean. On June 1, 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law a joint resolution (P.L. 110-243) that directed “the United States to initiate international discussions and take necessary steps with other nations to negotiate an agreement for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean.”\textsuperscript{405} The joint resolution also supported establishment of “a new international fisheries management organization or organizations for the region” and called for the United States to support international efforts to halt the expansion of commercial fishing activities in the Arctic high seas.\textsuperscript{406} On July 16, 2015, the five Arctic coastal states signed a nonbinding declaration to prevent unregulated commercial fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean.\textsuperscript{407} These five nations agreed that a precautionary approach to fishing was needed because of limited scientific knowledge of marine resources in the central Arctic Ocean.\textsuperscript{408}

The declaration was followed by negotiations among officials from the five Arctic coastal states, four major fishing nations, and the European Union.\textsuperscript{409} On October 3, 2018, the parties signed a legally binding international accord to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean as part of a long-term strategy to safeguard healthy marine ecosystems and to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks.\textsuperscript{410}

The parties also agreed that no commercial fisheries will be conducted in the Arctic high seas before an international management regime is put in place to regulate commercial fishing. The agreement also established a joint scientific program to conduct research and monitor the region’s


\textsuperscript{403} As noted in the “Background” section, the five Arctic coastal states include the United States, Canada, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), Norway, and the Russian Federation.

\textsuperscript{404} UNCLOS provides a framework for the management of fish stocks that migrate between EEZs and the high seas. For more information, see CRS Report R47744, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Living Resources Provisions, by Caitlin Keating-Bitonti.


\textsuperscript{407} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{408} The four major fishing nations include Iceland, Japan, South Korea, and the People’s Republic of China.

\textsuperscript{409} The agreement includes Arctic indigenous peoples as participants in meetings and as a source of scientific information and local knowledge.

marine ecosystem. Currently, there is no commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean, for which a 16-year moratorium is in place since June 2021. However, it remains an open question whether an Arctic Ocean regional fishery management organization will be established, which countries would be included in such an arrangement, and if sustainable commercial fisheries can be developed in the central Arctic Ocean. Additionally, continued domestic and foreign interests in Arctic fisheries, including the opening of a Russian-controlled pollock fishery in the Chukchi Sea in 2020, have furthered concerns among international stakeholders regarding the timing and implementation of such management developments. Furthermore, some concerns linger regarding the perceived fragility of the agreement, including whether certain signatory nations such as Russia and China might remain parties to the agreement.

Protected Species

There are several federal trust species in the Arctic protected by U.S. statutes such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543), Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA; 16 U.S.C. §§1361-1407), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA; 16 U.S.C. §703-712). Species included under these statutes are protected to varying degrees from factors that affect their populations. Some examples of species listed under one or more of these statutes include the polar bear (Ursus maritimus), the bowhead whale (Balaena mysticetus), and the Eskimo curlew (Numenius borealis).

Ecological changes due to climate change and human activities could affect some protected species in the Arctic. For example, the polar bear was listed as threatened under the ESA in 2008 and is protected under MMPA due to its classification as a marine mammal. Declining sea ice levels in the Arctic threaten polar bear populations. Polar bears use sea ice as a platform to hunt

---

411 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, Article 4.
414 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, Article 13.
415 Some experts debate whether existing fisheries resources in the Central Arctic Ocean could sustain a fishery. Mueter, 2022, “Arctic Fisheries in a Changing Climate.”
418 This section was prepared by Pervaze A. Sheikh, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy.
420 Covered species pursuant to the ESA, MBTA, and MMPA are listed in the Code for Federal regulations at 50 C.F.R. §§17.11-17.12 (Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants), 50 C.F.R. §10.13 (List of Migratory Birds), and 50 C.F.R. 18.3 and 216.3 (definitions).
421 There are 19 populations of polar bears inhabiting the Arctic.
for seals and other prey, travel to maternal denning areas, and seek mates, among other things.\textsuperscript{422} In contrast, changing ecological conditions in the Arctic could be helping the bowhead whale. The bowhead whale is listed under the ESA and covered by the MMPA. Bowhead whale populations declined due to hunting and commercial whaling until these activities ceased in the 1920s. According to scientists, in the past 30 years populations of bowhead whales have increased in the Pacific Arctic and East Canada/West Greenland region due to increases in ocean primary production and the availability of zooplankton, which is a food source for the species.\textsuperscript{423}

Certain activities in the Arctic have the potential to affect, directly or indirectly, species, including federal trust species, and habitat in the areas in which they are undertaken. In turn, the laws that designate or provide the authority to list and protect federal trust species and their implementing regulations may, with certain exceptions, restrict certain activities, require action agencies to seek permits, or mandate efforts to protect such species. ESA, MMPA, and MBTA, for example, prohibit \textit{take}, including in some cases nonlethal harassment, of covered species.\textsuperscript{424} For example, as described in the cases below, federal agencies that authorize, fund, or carry out activities that may affect federally listed endangered or threatened species or modify critical habitat designated under the ESA may be required to consult with FWS or NMFS pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA, and individuals undertaking actions that may harm or harass marine mammals may be required to obtain an incidental take authorization from either FWS or NMFS. For marine mammals that are listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA, action agencies may be required to obtain both an incidental take authorization pursuant to the MMPA, as well as undertake consultation pursuant to the ESA.

Section 9 of the ESA identifies prohibited acts related to species listed as endangered under the act, and Section 4(d) authorizes the listing agency, either FWS or NMFS, to establish protections, including prohibiting take, for species listed as threatened through the issuance of a special rule known as a 4(d) rule.\textsuperscript{425} Further, Section 7 of the act requires federal agencies that carry out, fund, or authorize actions that may affect listed species or designated critical habitat to consult with FWS or NMFS.\textsuperscript{426} This consultation may result in the issuance of a biological opinion, which


\textsuperscript{424} \textit{Take} is defined in statute for ESA and MMPA and defined or clarified in regulations for MMPA and MBTA. With regard to the ESA, \textit{take} “means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct” (16 U.S.C. §1532(19)). Pursuant to MMPA, take is defined “take” means to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal” (16 U.S.C. §1362(13)) and is further clarified in regulations to include “the collection of dead animals or parts thereof; the restraint or detention of a marine mammal, no matter how temporary; tagging a marine mammal; or the negligent or intentional operation of an aircraft or vessel, or the doing of any other negligent or intentional act which results in the disturbing or molesting of a marine mammal” (50 C.F.R. §18.3). For the MBTA, \textit{take} is not defined in statute but is defined in regulation to mean “to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” (50 C.F.R. §10.12). Pursuant to regulations, both ESA and MMPA allow for certain subsistence use and take by Alaska Natives (50 C.F.R. parts 17 and 18).

\textsuperscript{425} Section 9 of the ESA is at 16 U.S.C. 1538, and Section 4(d) is at 16 U.S.C. 1533(d). In the 1970s, FWS promulgated rules, collectively known as the blanket 4(d) rule that extended most of the protections afforded to endangered species to threatened species, unless they were superseded by a species-specific 4(d) rule. The blanket 4(d) rule was modified in 2019, and automatic protections were no longer provided for species listed by FWS after September 26, 2019. NMFS never implemented a similar blanket 4(d) rule, and NMFS issues 4(d) rules on a case by case basis. For more information, see CRS Report R46677, \textit{The Endangered Species Act: Overview and Implementation}, by Pervaze A. Sheikh, Erin H. Ward, and R. Eliot Crafton.

\textsuperscript{426} Section 7 of the ESA is at 16 U.S.C. 1536. For more information on Section 7 of the ESA, see CRS Report R46867, \textit{Endangered Species Act (ESA) Section 7 Consultation and Infrastructure Projects}, by Erin H. Ward, R. Eliot Crafton, and Pervaze A. Sheikh.
provides recommendations and requirements to minimize or avoid negative impacts to listed species and critical habitat and may authorize the incidental take—take that is otherwise prohibited and incidental to but not the purpose of an otherwise lawful the action—of listed species. Activities that may require Section 7 consultation could include, but are not limited to, actions related to construction, fisheries, oil and gas, research, and military. For example, the Bureau of Land Management may need to consult with FWS before authorizing oil and gas activities that may affect the polar bear (*Ursus maritimus*) or may be required to consult with FWS. Similarly, the Navy may need to consult with NMFS before undertaking military activity that may affect the arctic ringed seal (*Phoca hispida hispida*). In addition, because each of the aforementioned activities may impact marine mammals, both would also be subject to MMPA and may require an incidental harassment authorization under such act.

**CRS Reports on Specific Arctic-Related Issues**

- CRS In Focus IF10740, *The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations*, by Kristin Archick
- CRS Insight IN11161, *Greenland, Denmark, and U.S. Relations*, by Kristin Archick
- CRS Report R47620, *Canada: Background and U.S. Relations*, coordinated by Peter J. Meyer
- CRS Report R46761, *Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations*, by Andrew S. Bowen and Cory Welt
- CRS Report R44566, *The Coast Guard’s Role in Safeguarding Maritime Transportation: Selected Issues*, by John Frittelli
- CRS Report RL34391, *Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke
- CRS Report R47912, *Outer Limits of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Caitlin Keating-Bitonti
- CRS In Focus IF12006, *Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Status of Oil and Gas Program*, by Laura B. Comay
- CRS Report R45192, *Oil and Gas Activities Within the National Wildlife Refuge System*, by R. Eliot Crafton, Laura B. Comay, and Marc Humphries
- CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10943, *The Willow Project: History and Litigation*, by Adam Vann

427 Incidental taking is defined at 50 C.F.R. 17.3 as it related to the ESA.

428 For example, see FWS, Fairbanks Fish and Wildlife Office, Biological Opinion for Coastal Plain Oil and Gas Leasing Program Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Consultation with the Bureau of Land Management, March 13, 2020, at https://ecos.fws.gov/tails/pub/document/16469143.

429 For example, see NMFS, Alaska Office, Endangered Species Act (ESA) Section 7(a)(2) Biological Opinion Ice Exercise 2020 NMFS Consultation Number: AKRO-2019-02445, at https://repository.library.noaa.gov/view/noaa/24263.

430 For example, see NMFS, Takes of Marine Mammals Incidental to Specified Activities; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to U.S. Navy 2020 Ice Exercise Activities in the Beaufort Sea and Arctic Ocean, 85 Federal Register 6518, 2/05/2020.

431 The Willow Project is an oil and gas drilling and production project in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPR-A), a 23-million-acre area on the North Slope of Alaska under federal control.
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress

CRS Report RL33705, *Oil Spills: Background and Governance*, by Jonathan L. Ramseur

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Anthony R. Marshak
Analyst in Natural Resources Policy

Laura B. Comay
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Jonathan L. Ramseur
Specialist in Environmental Policy

John Frittelli
Specialist in Transportation Policy

Lexie Ryan
Analyst in Energy Policy

Emma Kaboli
Analyst in Energy Policy

Pervaze A. Sheikh
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Caitlin Keating-Bitonti
Analyst in Natural Resources Policy

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS's institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.