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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

SUE MI TERRY,

Defendant.

SEALED INDICTMENT

24 Cr.

24 CRIM 427

The Grand Jury charges:

INTRODUCTION

1. For more than a decade, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, who previously served as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and as a senior official of the White House National Security Council (“NSC”), has worked as an agent of the Government of the Republic of Korea (“ROK”), also known as South Korea. At the direction of ROK Government officials, TERRY advocated ROK policy positions, including in published articles and during media appearances, disclosed nonpublic U.S. Government information to ROK intelligence officers, and facilitated access for ROK Government officials to U.S. Government officials. In return for these actions, ROK intelligence officers provided TERRY with luxury goods, high-priced dinners, and more than \$37,000 in covert funding for a public policy program focusing on Korean affairs that TERRY controlled. Despite engaging in extensive activities for and at the direction of ROK Government officials, and notwithstanding her knowledge of the foreign-agent registration requirement, TERRY never registered as a foreign agent with the Attorney General, as required by law.

2. As she admitted in a voluntary interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, also was a valuable “source” of information for the ROK

National Intelligence Service (“ROK NIS”), the primary intelligence agency for the ROK. For example, as described in more detail below, in or about June 2022, TERRY participated in a private, off-the-record group meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State regarding the U.S. Government’s policy towards North Korea. Immediately after the meeting, TERRY met her primary ROK NIS point of contact, or “handler,” and passed him detailed handwritten notes from that meeting. Weeks later, at the request of her handler, TERRY hosted a happy hour for Congressional staff under the auspices of the policy institute, or “think tank,” where TERRY worked.¹ TERRY’s handler attended the happy hour – which was paid for by the ROK NIS – posing as a diplomat, and mingling with Congressional staff without disclosing that he was a ROK intelligence officer.

3. The ROK Government repeatedly rewarded SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, for her services. TERRY’s ROK NIS handlers gifted her, among other things, a \$2,845 Dolce & Gabbana coat, a \$2,950 Bottega Veneta handbag, and a \$3,450 Louis Vuitton handbag. They took TERRY to meals at upscale seafood restaurants, sushi restaurants, and multiple restaurants with Michelin stars. They also offered to provide TERRY approximately \$37,000, worked with her to devise a plan to mask the true source of those funds, and deposited the funds into an unrestricted “gift” account that TERRY controlled at the think tank where she worked. And ROK Government officials paid TERRY on multiple occasions to write articles in both the U.S. and Korean press conveying ROK Government-provided positions and phrases.

¹ A “think tank,” or policy institute, is a research institute that provides expertise and insight concerning topics such as global affairs to policymakers and the public through research, analysis, and scholarship. Think tanks, including those for which Terry worked, often present themselves as independent sources of expertise.

4. On at least three occasions between 2016 and 2022, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives regarding the U.S. Government's Korean policy. Each time, TERRY had to complete "Truth in Testimony" disclosure forms, which required TERRY to answer whether she was an "active registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)." Each time, TERRY correctly answered that she was not an active registrant, demonstrating, among other things, TERRY's awareness of FARA and FARA's registration requirement. During this time period, TERRY was, in fact, acting as an agent of the ROK without having registered with the Attorney General. As a result, Congress did not have the opportunity to fairly evaluate TERRY's testimony in light of her longstanding efforts for the ROK Government and its intelligence service.

BACKGROUND ON CERTAIN RELEVANT INDIVIDUALS

5. SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, is a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in Seoul, South Korea and raised in Virginia and Hawaii. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations. From in or about 2001 to in or about 2011, TERRY served in a series of positions in the U.S. Government, including as an analyst on East Asian issues for the CIA, as the Director for Korea, Japan, and Oceanic Affairs for the NSC, and as the Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council. Since leaving government service in or about 2011, TERRY has worked at academic institutions and think tanks in New York City and Washington, D.C., including a think tank based in New York City ("Think Tank-1") and two think tanks based in Washington, D.C. ("Think Tank-2" and "Think Tank-3"). Each of these organizations presents itself as an independent policy and research organization. During the period relevant to this Indictment, TERRY made media appearances, published articles, hosted conferences, and testified before Congress as a policy expert specializing in, among other things, South Korea, North Korea, and various broader regional issues impacting Asia.

6. From in or about June 2013 to in or about 2016, an ROK Government official not named herein (“NIS Handler-1”) served as a Minister for the ROK Mission to the United Nations in Manhattan, New York. In this position, NIS Handler-1 posed as a diplomat. As set forth below, however, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, identified NIS Handler-1 as an intelligence officer for the ROK NIS, operating in the United States under diplomatic cover. As described in more detail below, TERRY met with NIS Handler-1 on multiple occasions and, through NIS Handler-1, deepened her relationship with the ROK NIS.

7. From in or about August 2017 to in or about August 2020, an ROK Government official not named herein (“NIS Handler-2”) served as a Minister Counselor for the ROK Embassy in the United States in Washington, D.C. Like NIS Handler-1, NIS Handler-2 posed as a diplomat. As set forth below, however, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, identified NIS Handler-2 as the acting ROK NIS Chief of Station, meaning he was the highest-ranking ROK intelligence officer stationed at the ROK Embassy. As described in more detail below, TERRY met with NIS Handler-2 on multiple occasions, and NIS Handler-2 requested that TERRY take specific actions for the benefit of the ROK NIS.

8. An ROK Government official not named herein (“NIS Handler-3”) succeeded NIS Handler-2 as a Minister Counselor for the ROK Embassy in the United States in Washington, D.C., serving in that position from in or about August 2020 to in or about July 2023. As set forth below, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, identified NIS Handler-3 as the ROK NIS Chief of Station, the highest-ranking ROK intelligence official at the ROK Embassy. As described in more detail below, TERRY met with NIS Handler-3 on multiple occasions, and NIS Handler-3 requested that TERRY take specific actions for the benefit of the ROK NIS.

BACKGROUND ON THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT

9. The Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, is a registration and disclosure statute that requires any person acting in the United States as “an agent of a foreign principal” to register with the Attorney General if he or she is engaging, directly or through another person, in certain types of conduct, such as political activities, political consulting, public relations, or publicity activities, for or in the interest of the foreign principal. FARA registrations are made to the Foreign Agents Registration Act Unit (“FARA Unit”) of the Department of Justice’s National Security Division. It is a crime to knowingly and willfully fail to register when required under FARA.

10. The purpose of FARA is to prevent covert influence by foreign principals, which include, as relevant here, the government of a foreign country. Proper registration under the statute allows the U.S. Government and the American people to evaluate the statements and activities of individuals who are serving as agents of foreign principals in light of their status as foreign agents. Among other things, FARA registration reveals the identity of the foreign principal on whose behalf the registrant performs services, the type of services the registrant provides the foreign principal, the source and amount of compensation the registrant receives from the foreign principal, and any political campaign contributions made by the registrant while the registrant was acting as an agent of the foreign principal. FARA registration statements are publicly accessible on the website of the FARA Unit.

11. Public and private audiences rely on the truthful disclosure of foreign agents under FARA. For example, witnesses who testify before the U.S. House of Representatives must complete a “Truth in Testimony” disclosure form that asks, among other things, whether the witness is an active registrant under FARA. As set forth below, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, answered this question in the negative when she testified on Korean affairs before Congress in

2016, 2017, and 2022. In acting as a foreign agent without registering with the Attorney General and without disclosing her status as a foreign agent, TERRY portrayed herself as unbiased and independent, preventing Congress and the American public from fairly evaluating TERRY's testimony as the testimony of an agent of the ROK Government.

TERRY'S UNREGISTERED ACTIVITIES FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

2013–2014: TERRY Meets and Accepts Funding From ROK Government Officials, and Is Warned by the FBI

12. In or about 2013, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, repeatedly met and communicated with NIS Handler-1. For example: In or about mid-August 2013, NIS Handler-1 and TERRY arranged over email to have lunch at a sushi restaurant in Manhattan.² A few weeks later, in or about October 2013, TERRY asked NIS Handler-1 for "thoughts/material" on the role of women for the peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula in advance of a speech she intended to give at an upcoming event involving female Korea experts. In response, NIS Handler-1 provided TERRY with an outline of a speech on the topic. On or about December 18, 2013, NIS Handler-1 picked up TERRY in Manhattan in a vehicle with diplomatic plates registered to the ROK Mission to the United Nations.

13. In or about April 2014, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, told a colleague that the ROK Government was paying TERRY to write an article that would be published in the upcoming issue of an influential magazine published by Think Tank-1 ("Magazine-1"). In or about June 2014, TERRY told this colleague that TERRY had signed a contract with the ROK Ministry of

² All statements and writings described in this Indictment are presented in substance and in part, and all oral statements are based on draft transcripts and summaries. Some of the statements and writings described in this Indictment were partially or entirely in Korean. All such statements and writings are presented based on draft English translations.

Foreign Affairs (“ROK MFA”) to write the article. Shortly thereafter, on or about June 18, 2014, TERRY published an article in Magazine-1 titled “A Korea Whole and Free: Why Unifying the Peninsula Won’t Be So Bad After All.” TERRY noted in the article byline that she was a “former analyst at the CIA” and a “Senior Research Scholar” at an academic institution, but she did not disclose that she had been paid by the ROK Government to write the article.

14. In or about November 2014, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, participated in a voluntary interview with FBI agents in Manhattan. When asked about her contact with ROK NIS officers, TERRY became visibly nervous, changed her speech pattern, and began to stutter and shift in her seat. TERRY admitted to meeting an individual she understood to work for the ROK NIS but initially claimed that she could not recall his name. After some time, TERRY correctly identified the surname of NIS Handler-1. The interviewing FBI agents told TERRY that because of her status within the Korean policy expert community, the ROK NIS might try to approach her again, including by offering to covertly pay for conferences regarding Korea policy. TERRY responded that she was glad to have contact with the FBI should such a situation arise.

**September 2016: TERRY Testifies Before Congress and Affirms
She Is Not Registered Under FARA**

15. As she would in 2017 and 2022, on or about September 14, 2016, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. The topic of the hearing was “North Korea’s Perpetual Provocations: Another Dangerous, Escalatory Nuclear Test.” In connection with her Congressional testimony, as required by the Rules of the House of Representatives, TERRY signed a “Truth in Testimony” disclosure form, in which she was asked the question: “Are you an active registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)?” In response to this question, TERRY checked “No.”

December 2016: TERRY Attempts to Provide ROK Government Officials with Access to Incoming U.S. Presidential Administration Officials

16. As described in more detail below, in or about mid-December 2016, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, exchanged text messages with a ROK MFA official (“ROK Official-1”) describing TERRY’s efforts to facilitate access on behalf of the ROK Government to an individual (“Incoming U.S. Official-1”), who at the time was widely reported to be a senior national security official for the incoming Presidential administration. TERRY also attempted to contact another individual (“Incoming U.S. Official-2”), whom TERRY described to ROK Official-1 as a finalist for another senior national security position for the incoming Presidential administration.

17. On or about December 16, 2016, ROK Official-1 texted SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, “I don’t have an answer to my request to meet with [Incoming U.S. Official-1], do you know her well?” TERRY responded, “Thank you. I know her but not that well. I doubt I have much influence over her decision making! Did you want me to try anyway? Could you then send me details? Exact request, bio, etc?” ROK Official-1 replied that ROK Official-1 would email TERRY information about the ROK diplomat who hoped to meet with Incoming U.S. Official-1, adding that ROK Official-1 had been unsuccessful in contacting Incoming U.S. Official-1 “but Seoul” – the capital of the ROK – “wants me to try till the end.” TERRY acknowledged receipt of ROK Official-1’s email, writing: “Got it. Sending now and will let you know if I hear anything back. If not, it might be because she’s not ready to meet foreign officials yet and start discussing foreign issues! She might not be ready ‘substantively.’ Will try anyway.”

18. On or about December 18, 2016, ROK Official-1 wrote TERRY that a senior ROK MFA official “asked you to stress the following points to [Incoming U.S. Official-1], if you happens [sic] to meet her tonight.” TERRY responded, “Yes, but as I told you, she said she will ‘turn it over to folks who handle S. Korea.’” TERRY continued, “But as I told you, she might not

be 'ready' to talk substance. I will try to talk to her if I get to see her tonight. If she doesn't show up at the party, there's not much else I can do. Will let you know if I hear back from [Incoming U.S. Official-2], who is rumored to be a finalist to cover Asia from the NSC." Later that evening, ROK Official-1 followed up with TERRY, writing, "sorry for late night next [sic]. Have you met [Incoming U.S. Official-1]? Delegation wonders." Terry replied, "Every republican who is who was [sic] at the party but [Incoming U.S. Official-1] was not there."

19. Less than two months later, on or about February 7, 2017, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, again testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. The topic of the hearing was "Countering the North Korean Threat: New Steps in U.S. Policy." In connection with her Congressional testimony, TERRY again signed a "Truth in Testimony" disclosure form, in which she was asked the question: "Are you an active registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)?" TERRY again checked "No."

2018–2019: TERRY Provides ROK Intelligence Officers with Access to U.S. National Security Officials and Is Rewarded with Luxury Goods

20. As described in further detail below, in late 2018 and early 2019, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, arranged a private meeting in Washington, D.C. at the request of NIS Handler-2, whom TERRY contemporaneously described to Think Tank-2 as a ROK intelligence officer. The meeting was held under the auspices of Think Tank-2, where TERRY was then employed, and was attended by, among others, the Director of the ROK NIS, a senior official from the U.S. Department of Defense, and a former senior CIA official. Afterward, NIS Handler-2 thanked TERRY for organizing the meeting and, months later, gifted TERRY a \$2,845 designer coat and a \$2,950 designer handbag.

21. On or about December 28, 2018, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, spoke by phone with NIS Handler-2. That same day, TERRY emailed the head of Think Tank-2 that she had "just

received a call from the South Korean National Intelligence Service” because the Director of the ROK NIS was traveling to Washington, D.C. and wanted to have “an intimate roundtable” at Think Tank-2. Later that day, NIS Handler-2 texted TERRY a list of former U.S. Government officials who NIS Handler-2 suggested he hoped to attend the roundtable. Over the course of the next two weeks, TERRY and NIS Handler-2 continued to discuss potential attendees by text message, and NIS Handler-2 noted to TERRY that he was relaying the names of potential attendees to Seoul for review and approval. For example, on or about January 6, 2019, NIS Handler-2 texted TERRY that “I reported the list of candidates that we shared. Seoul said it looks good.” TERRY responded, in part, “Let me know who else to invite.”

22. On or about January 8, 2019, NIS Handler-2 texted SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, that he hoped to pay a “courtesy call” to the head of Think Tank-2 together with TERRY. Referencing NIS Handler-2’s position as a senior ROK intelligence officer, TERRY asked, “Acting chief of station is the title?” In response, NIS Handler-2 told TERRY to use his diplomatic cover, writing: “Minister-counselor is my official title. Use that title please. I will explain my role if I meet him.” That day, as requested by NIS Handler-2, TERRY emailed the head of Think Tank-2 that “the person I’ve been working with is [NIS Handler-2] Minister-Counselor (Acting COS),”³ who “said he would like to pay you a 5 min courtesy call this week if you have time.”

23. On or about January 15, 2019, Think Tank-2 hosted the private meeting that SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, organized at NIS Handler-2’s request. In addition to the Director of the ROK NIS, other ROK NIS officials attended the meeting, together with several current and

³ The name written in the email by TERRY appears to be that of NIS Handler-2, using an Anglicized given name and the same Korean surname, who held the diplomatic position of “Minister Counselor” at the ROK Embassy to the United States.

former senior U.S. national security officials. The U.S. attendees included a high-level U.S. Department of Defense official and a former high-ranking U.S. intelligence official, who later told FBI agents that he considered the meeting to be highly abnormal and could not think of another instance in which he was invited to a think tank to meet a current head of a foreign intelligence service. At the meeting, the Director of the ROK NIS delivered remarks to the U.S. officials on North Korea policy, including the relationship between the leaders of the United States and North Korea. After the meeting, NIS Handler-2 texted TERRY that the meeting was “very good” and thanked TERRY for her “efforts to organize the event.”

24. On or about November 13, 2019, NIS Handler-2 purchased a \$2,845 Dolce & Gabbana coat for SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, from a store in Chevy Chase, Maryland. The purchase was charged to NIS Handler-2’s credit card – and, consistent with NIS Handler-2’s diplomatic status, was charged no sales tax – but was registered in the store’s files to the account of TERRY. On or about November 15, 2019, TERRY returned the \$2,845 Dolce & Gabbana coat and purchased a \$4,100 Christian Dior coat, paying the difference.

25. Also on or about November 13, 2019, NIS Handler-2 purchased a \$2,950 Bottega Veneta handbag for SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, from a store in Washington, D.C. As with the Dolce & Gabbana coat, the Bottega Veneta handbag was charged to NIS Handler-2’s credit card. Store surveillance footage, shown below, recorded NIS Handler-2 (whose face has been blurred) at a cash register paying for the handbag alongside TERRY, and TERRY walking away from the cash register carrying the purchased handbag.

NIS Handler-2 Purchases the Designer Handbag for TERRY



2020–2022: TERRY Facilitates Another Meeting for the ROK Government and Is Rewarded with More Luxury Goods and Meals

26. As described in more detail below, in or about August 2020, NIS Handler-3, NIS Handler-2's successor at the ROK Embassy in the United States, took over NIS Handler-2's responsibilities as the primary ROK NIS handler for SUE MI TERRY, the defendant. TERRY thereafter organized a private virtual workshop attended by U.S. Government officials, non-government leaders, and ROK Government officials, including NIS Handler-3. NIS Handler-3 then purchased luxury goods and meals, including a \$3,450 designer handbag, for TERRY.

27. In or about August 2020, NIS Handler-2 completed his three-year assignment as "Minister Counselor" for the ROK Embassy in the United States in Washington, D.C. NIS Handler-3 replaced him in the position. During this transition period, on or about August 12, 2020, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, had dinner with NIS Handler-2 and NIS Handler-3 at an upscale

Greek restaurant in Manhattan. After NIS Handler-2 paid the restaurant bill, TERRY, NIS Handler-2, and NIS Handler-3 traveled by taxi to a bar. TERRY later left the bar carrying a gray gift bag, which NIS Handler-2 and NIS Handler-3 had brought into the Greek restaurant earlier that evening. NIS Handler-3 paid the bar tab. A photograph of TERRY, NIS Handler-2, and NIS Handler-3 (whose face has been blurred) at the restaurant is shown below.

TERRY Transitions Handlers from NIS Handler-2 to NIS Handler-3



28. On or about November 30 and December 1, 2020, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, hosted a private, invitation-only virtual workshop titled, “The Outlook for North Korea’s Economy Post-Pandemic.” The workshop was again hosted by Think Tank-2. Participants included senior leaders at private companies, non-profit organizations, think tanks, academic institutions, ROK government officials, and U.S. Government officials with responsibilities for North Korea. NIS Handler-3 was among the ROK government officials in attendance. Like NIS Handler-2, NIS

Handler-3 used his nominal title of “Minister-Counselor” at the ROK Embassy rather than a title reflecting his position as a ROK intelligence officer.

29. On or about April 16, 2021, NIS Handler-3 used his credit card to purchase a \$3,450 Louis Vuitton handbag for SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, from a store in Washington, D.C. Store surveillance footage, shown below, recorded NIS Handler-3 (whose face has been blurred) at a cash register paying for the handbag alongside TERRY.

NIS Handler-3 Purchases Another Designer Handbag for TERRY



TERRY and NIS Handler-3 Leave with the Designer Handbag



30. On or about April 16, 2021, after purchasing the Louis Vuitton handbag, NIS Handler-3 and SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, left the store together and entered a vehicle with diplomatic license plates registered to ROK Embassy, as shown above. TERRY and NIS Handler-3 then dined at a sushi restaurant in Washington, D.C. At the restaurant, TERRY and NIS Handler-3 discussed, among other things, TERRY's close relationship with a senior State Department official with responsibilities covering Korean affairs who had previously served in senior roles at the CIA and at the National Intelligence Council. After NIS Handler-3 paid the restaurant bill, TERRY and NIS Handler-3 traveled to a hotel bar, where they had drinks on the roof and NIS Handler-3 again paid the tab. NIS Handler-3 then dropped TERRY off at a residence in Washington, D.C.

31. Between in or about May 2021 and in or about May 2022, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, continued to dine with NIS Handler-3 at upscale restaurants. For example, on or about



May 6, 2021, TERRY and NIS Handler-3 had dinner at a Michelin-star sushi restaurant in Washington, D.C. On or about October 14, 2021, and November 1, 2021, TERRY and NIS Handler-3 shared meals at other sushi restaurants in Washington, D.C. On or about February 11, 2022 and May 1, 2022, TERRY and NIS Handler-3 had lunch at an upscale Italian seafood restaurant in Washington, D.C. On or about May 6, 2021, prior to TERRY's dinner with NIS Handler-3, TERRY was observed carrying the Louis Vuitton handbag that NIS Handler-3 had purchased for her.

June 2022: TERRY Provides an ROK Intelligence Officer with Notes of a Private Group Meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State

32. On or about June 17, 2022, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, attended a private group meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State at the Department of State building in Washington, D.C. The meeting, which lasted approximately one hour, was organized by State Department officials to provide the U.S. Secretary of State with an opportunity to engage with policy experts on North Korean issues in a discreet setting. The only attendees at the meeting were the Secretary of State, senior State Department staff, and five Korean policy experts invited by the State Department, one of whom was TERRY. The meeting was "off the record," meaning the experts were expected not to disclose the details of the meeting to external parties, including foreign governments.

33. Immediately after the event ended, NIS Handler-3 picked up SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, in a car with diplomatic plates registered to the ROK Embassy. While in the ROK car, NIS Handler-3 photographed two pages of handwritten notes that TERRY brought from her meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State. The notes were written on the letterhead of Think Tank-2, where TERRY had recently worked. Redacted copies of the photographs are shown below,

depicting the notes brought by TERRY against the backdrop of the interior of the car and TERRY's quilted tote bag:



April–October 2022: TERRY Invites ROK Intelligence Officers to an Event for Congressional Staff, and Is Rewarded with Funding and Meals

34. As described in more detail below, in or about July 2022, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, organized an event for staff members of various Congressional offices that was, undisclosed by TERRY and unbeknownst to the attendees, hosted by her ROK NIS handler, NIS

Handler-3. TERRY arranged this event, which enabled ROK intelligence officers to access and attempt to develop relationships with Congressional staffers, shortly after the ROK intelligence service provided TERRY's think-tank program with \$11,000. Those funds were deposited into an unrestricted "gift" account that TERRY controlled and in a manner designed to conceal the true source of the funds – the ROK NIS – from Think Tank-3.

35. In or about May 2022, the ROK Embassy in the United States provided a check in the amount of \$11,000 to Think Tank-3, where SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, was then working. On or about May 12, 2022, the check was deposited into the unrestricted gift account of a program at Think Tank-3 that TERRY directed; as the director of the program, TERRY had discretionary control over the expenditure of unrestricted gift funds. Although the check was nominally issued by the ROK Embassy, as set forth below, the funds were in fact provided by the ROK NIS, at NIS Handler-3's direction, for TERRY's benefit. TERRY did not disclose the source of the funding to Think Tank-3, which was not aware of having received any funding from a foreign intelligence agency.

36. On or about May 12, 2022, the same day that funds from the ROK NIS were deposited into an unrestricted account over which SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, had control, TERRY testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation. As she did in 2016 and 2017, TERRY again signed a "Truth in Testimony" disclosure form, in which she was asked the question: "Are you an active registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)?" For the third time, TERRY checked "No."

37. On or about July 8, 2022, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, hosted an event on Korean foreign policy at Think Tank-3 for staff members of various Congressional offices. After

the event, TERRY invited attendees to a “happy hour” at a restaurant in Washington, D.C. While the “happy hour” was nominally hosted by the ROK Embassy in the United States, the event was, in fact, funded by ROK NIS and attended by NIS Handler-3, among other ROK intelligence officials. This event allowed ROK officials to identify, evaluate, and potentially recruit Congressional staff whom they otherwise would not have been able to access, which is known in intelligence operations as the practice of “spot and assess.” TERRY later told FBI agents that she was aware of the practice of “spot and assess,” and that providing NIS Handler-3 with access to these Congressional staffers was like “bringing the wolf in.” The Congressional staff members who attended the happy hour received gift bags containing Yeti-brand tumblers and pamphlets with the logo of the ROK Embassy. At the end of the happy hour, one of the ROK intelligence officers accompanying NIS Handler-3 paid the bill. TERRY did not disclose to the Congressional staff members invited to the event that ROK intelligence officers planned to attend.

38. After providing the ROK NIS with secret access to Congressional staff, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, continued to meet her handler, NIS Handler-3, for meals at upscale establishments. For example, on or about September 8, 2022, TERRY and NIS Handler-3 had dinner in the private room of a high-end sushi restaurant in Washington, D.C. On or about October 6, 2022, TERRY and NIS Handler-3 had dinner at a Michelin-star restaurant in Washington, D.C.

**January–February 2023: TERRY Publicly Communicates Talking Points
Provided By a ROK Intelligence Officer**

39. On or about January 10, 2023, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, met her handler, NIS Handler-3, for dinner at an expensive sushi restaurant in Washington, D.C. At their dinner, NIS Handler-3 presented TERRY with talking points on North Korean policy, which TERRY then repeated in media appearances and in an article that TERRY published in Magazine-1. Indeed, during the dinner, TERRY texted herself some of the talking points that NIS Handler-3 dictated to

TERRY, including “Solid fuel engine will be mastered” and “Policy – extended deterrence.” TERRY then echoed these talking points in her public messaging, as further described below, without disclosing that the points were provided to her by a ROK intelligence officer.

40. For example, during their January 10, 2023 dinner, NIS Handler-3 told SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, that North Korea had recently “conducted a solid fuel engine test while KJU [Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader] was observing it personally.” NIS Handler-3 explained that “the reason I think it could be a game changer” is that “liquid fuel takes hours to do injection,” which “takes more time to launch and it’s vulnerable to US’s monitoring and uh, and even preemptive . . . strike.” In an article published in Magazine-1 on January 19, 2023, TERRY echoed NIS Handler-3’s message: “North Korean leader Kim Jong Un personally oversaw the test of a powerful solid-fuel rocket engine – a crucial new capability for the country because solid-fuel rockets can be fired more quickly than liquid-fuel ones and are harder to detect and preempt.” Similarly, in a January 26, 2023 media appearance, TERRY said: “Kim Jong-un personally oversaw test of a solid fuel rocket engine. This is a crucial new, uh, capability, uh, because solid fuel rockets can be fired more quickly than liquid filled ones and are harder to detect and preempt and so on.”

41. As another example, during their January 10, 2023 dinner, NIS Handler-3 told SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, that in a departure from the policy of its predecessor administration, the current ROK Government “wants to strengthen extended deterrence.” NIS Handler-3 elaborated that “what South Korea is now pursuing is regular deployment of US strategic assets,” such as “nuclear submarine[s] and aircraft carrier[s].” In her January 19, 2023 article, TERRY echoed NIS Handler-3’s message by recommending that the U.S. “rotat[e] more nuclear-capable U.S. weapons systems into South Korea, such as B-52s and F-35s [U.S.-made strategic bombers

and stealth fighter jets, respectively].” Similarly, in her January 26, 2023 media appearance, TERRY said: “[T]he Koreans are saying, they want to work with the U.S. to collectively establish some sort of joint ex– you know, something to do with to strengthen extended deterrence that’s more credible, it’s stronger, stronger.”

42. As a third example, during their January 10, 2023 dinner, NIS Handler-3 told SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, that the ROK Government wished to create “a nuclear consultation group with the U.S.,” which would “involve[] South Korea in decision making, like, like a nuclear decision process and more active information sharing . . . on North Korea.” “Simply put,” NIS Handler-3 added, “we want active information sharing when the U.S. does nuclear planning because we don’t know.” In her January 19, 2023 article, TERRY promoted the ROK Government’s “nuclear consultation group” concept that NIS Handler-3 had provided TERRY, writing: “The United States and South Korea should create a consultative group, bringing in both high-level security officials and unofficial observers to build greater support for sustained security cooperation and examine options for improving crisis management.”

43. During their January 10, 2023 dinner, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, and NIS Handler-3 also discussed how the ROK NIS could covertly send money to the program that TERRY controlled at Think Tank-3. NIS Handler-3 told TERRY that “the best option is that I write you an embassy check” because he preferred to “do it directly without the complicated process of involving a third party which we’ve been doing so far.” TERRY responded that NIS Handler-3 “should get a third party involved” because transferring large amounts directly from the ROK Government would “look suspicious.” TERRY and NIS Handler-3 then discussed potential ROK think tanks that could serve as the intermediary for ROK NIS funds.

**March–April 2023: TERRY Receives More Covert Funding from
the ROK Intelligence Service**

44. On or about March 9, 2023, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, met her handler, NIS Handler-3, for lunch at a restaurant in Washington, D.C. At the lunch, TERRY and NIS Handler-3 continued discussing how the ROK NIS might provide another “gift” to TERRY’s program at Think Tank-3 without the institution getting “suspicious.” NIS Handler-3 noted that “last time, only a check was given,” and then mentioned the figure “eleven thousand” – a reference to the \$11,000 check, nominally from the ROK Embassy, that was deposited in or about May 2022 into TERRY’s unrestricted gift account at Think Tank-3. TERRY and NIS Handler-3 discussed NIS Handler-3 providing another check from the ROK Embassy. NIS Handler-3 told TERRY that “what Seoul wants me to ask you is . . . if that will be ok here,” and “whether there would be an issue if [Think Tank-3] was to do an audit.” TERRY responded that she was “not sure how to go about it” because Think Tank-3 would expect a memo from the ROK Embassy supporting what was nominally a ROK Embassy check.

45. On or about March 28, 2023, an ROK MFA official (“ROK Official-2”) texted SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, with “a very urgent inquiry.” ROK Official-2 informed TERRY that a ROK think tank (the “ROK Think Tank”) was planning to hold an “event celebrating ROK-US alliance,” but needed conference room space. ROK Official-2 requested that TERRY and Think Tank-3 co-host the event with the ROK Think Tank. Over the next few weeks, at TERRY’s direction, staff at Think Tank-3 worked to organize the event with the ROK Think Tank.

46. On or about April 18, 2023, Think Tank-3 and the ROK Think Tank co-hosted the event in Washington, D.C., which was titled “70 Years of the US-ROK Alliance: The Past and the Future.” The keynote speaker was a senior White House official, who was Special Assistant

to the President and Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania at the NSC. The event advertised sponsorship by the ROK Think Tank, but not the ROK Embassy or the ROK NIS.

47. The ROK Think Tank paid \$25,418.70 to Think Tank-3 for expenses associated with the April 18, 2023 event. Consistent with her discussions with NIS Handler-3, in or about April 2023, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, separately obtained a \$26,035 check, nominally from the ROK Embassy, which was deposited into the unrestricted gift account of TERRY's program at Think Tank-3 for TERRY's discretionary use. TERRY did not disclose the true source of the funding to Think Tank-3.

March–April 2023: TERRY Publishes Opinion Articles at the Request of ROK Government Officials

48. On or about March 6, 2023, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, received a call from a ROK MFA official ("ROK Official-3"). After the call, TERRY texted ROK Official-3 that there were "already many articles written on this topic," citing articles pertaining to geopolitical relations between the ROK and Japan. TERRY then texted: "So for me to write an op ed, I need the following information," and listed a series of questions about ROK-Japan relations.

49. On or about March 7, 2023, ROK Official-3 texted SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, detailed responses to TERRY's questions. Later that day, a major U.S. newspaper published an opinion article TERRY co-authored entitled "South Korea Takes a Brave Step Toward Reconciliation with Japan." The article was broadly consistent with the responses sent by ROK Official-3. That same day, TERRY texted ROK Official-3, "Hope you liked the article," followed by a link to the opinion piece. ROK Official-3 responded that senior ROK Government officials had read and appreciated TERRY's opinion piece: "Thank you so much for your zeal and endeavors! Of course we do. Actually, Ambassador and National Security Advisor were so happy for your column."

50. On or about April 10, 2023, ROK Official-2 texted SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, requesting that TERRY write a short article for a ROK newspaper regarding a visit by the ROK President to the United States, to be followed by an expanded article to be published online. ROK Official-2 added, “We can provide you with \$500 for this.” TERRY agreed to write the articles, texting ROK Official-2, “Ideally, what would you like me to write on? (I mean angle of the Op Ed).” ROK Official-2 responded, “that the summit means a lot for the alliance and good for Korea and the alliance.”

51. On or about April 27, 2023, as requested by ROK Official-2 and consistent with ROK Official-2’s messaging, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, published a short article in the ROK newspaper titled, “ROK-US Summit, A More Solid Road Ahead for 70 Years of Alliance,” and a longer online article titled, “Biden Yoon Summit Strengthens US-ROK Alliance.”

**June 2023: TERRY Admits That She Was a “Source” for
the ROK Intelligence Service**

52. On or about June 5, 2023, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, participated in a voluntary interview with FBI agents. During the interview, TERRY admitted, in substance and in part, that she had resigned in lieu of termination from the CIA because the CIA had “problems” with TERRY’s contacts with ROK NIS officers.

53. During her June 5, 2023 voluntary interview, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, further admitted, in substance and in part, that after she left the CIA, she was in contact with NIS Handler-1, whom she understood was a ROK NIS officer in New York; that she had been in contact with NIS Handler-2, whom she understood had served as the permanent or acting ROK NIS chief of station in Washington, D.C.; and that she was then in contact with NIS Handler-2’s successor NIS Handler-3, whom she understood was the then-current ROK NIS chief of station in Washington, D.C. TERRY further admitted that she had met with NIS Handler-3 approximately

20 times since August 2020, that they typically dined at sushi restaurants, and that she had received gifts from NIS Handler-2 and NIS Handler-3, including two handbags and a coat, the latter of which TERRY exchanged for a different coat. TERRY acknowledged that she was a “source” for the ROK NIS, meaning that she provided valuable information to the ROK intelligence service.

54. During her June 5, 2023 voluntary interview, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, further admitted that she had informed NIS Handler-3 that she was invited to meet with the U.S. Secretary of State in advance of TERRY’s June 17, 2022 meeting at the State Department, and that immediately afterwards, she met with NIS Handler-3 and provided him details of the meeting with the Secretary of State.

55. During her June 5, 2023 voluntary interview, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, further admitted that she had hosted the July 8, 2022 happy hour for Congressional staff members at NIS Handler-3’s request. TERRY recalled that NIS Handler-3 brought colleagues from the ROK Embassy, some of whom TERRY believed were “probably” also intelligence officers because NIS Handler-3 was “always working someone.” TERRY confirmed that NIS Handler-3 paid for the happy hour, that TERRY did not inform others at Think Tank-3 that NIS Handler-3 was an intelligence officer, and that NIS Handler-3 introduced himself to others at the happy hour as a Minister from the ROK Embassy (and not as a ROK NIS officer). TERRY acknowledged that the happy hour allowed NIS Handler-3 to access Congressional staffers whom NIS Handler-3 otherwise would not have been able to meet.

56. During her June 5, 2023 voluntary interview, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, further admitted that during their sushi dinner on January 10, 2023, NIS Handler-3 asked TERRY to share details of her prior meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and that TERRY did so. TERRY also recalled that NIS Handler-3 was the first person to bring to her attention the idea of

a “Nuclear Consultative Group” between the ROK and the United States. TERRY stated that she thereafter used the idea in her January 19, 2023 article in Magazine-1, a draft of which she shared with NIS Handler-3 before publication.

57. During her June 5, 2023 voluntary interview, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, further admitted that NIS Handler-3 had provided ROK NIS funding for TERRY’s activities at Think Tank-3 through checks issued by the ROK Embassy. TERRY acknowledged that she did not disclose that NIS was the true source of funding because it would pose a risk to Think Tank-3’s objectivity and reputation. While discussing her contacts with NIS Handler-3, TERRY repeatedly stated that she had made “mistakes” and twice raised her voice at the FBI agents while admitting that her conduct was “bad.”

58. On or about June 5, 2023, FBI agents also executed a search of the residence of SUE MI TERRY, the defendant. Inside TERRY’s residence, the FBI seized the Bottega Veneta handbag that NIS Handler-2 had purchased for TERRY, the Christian Dior jacket that TERRY received in exchange for the Dolce & Gabbana coat that NIS Handler-2 purchased for TERRY, and the Louis Vuitton handbag that NIS Handler-3 purchased for TERRY.

59. On or about June 5, 2023, FBI agents also recovered from SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, a cellphone that TERRY used to communicate with NIS Handler-3, her handler. The cellphone contained text messages and a log of voice calls between TERRY and NIS Handler-3 using an encrypted messaging application. The log indicated that between approximately October 5, 2022 and June 5, 2023, TERRY and NIS Handler-3 exchanged more than 100 encrypted voice calls. But the application contained only three text messages between TERRY and NIS Handler-3 – all dated on June 5, 2023 – because TERRY had set the application to automatically delete her messages with NIS Handler-3 two days after they were sent or received.

TERRY Has Never Registered Under FARA Despite Receiving Repeated Reminders of FARA Obligations

60. According to records of the FARA Unit, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, has never registered as a foreign agent with the Attorney General.

61. SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, has been reminded of FARA reporting requirements on multiple occasions in explicit connection with certain of the activities detailed above. In particular, on at least three occasions in or about September 2016, February 2017, and May 2022, TERRY testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs or subcommittees thereof. Each time, in connection with her Congressional testimony, and as required by the Rules of the House of Representatives, TERRY signed a “Truth in Testimony” disclosure form, in which she was asked the question: “Are you an active registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)?” In response to this question, TERRY checked “No.” In addition, in or about November 2022, TERRY received training on FARA in connection with her employment. During this training, TERRY took photographs of various FARA-related slides, including slides concerning the purpose, focus, and reporting requirements of FARA.

COUNT ONE

(Conspiracy to Violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act)

62. From at least in or about 2013 to at least in or about June 2023, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, and others known and unknown, knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, to knowingly and willfully act as an agent of a foreign principal without registering with the Attorney General, in violation of Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612 and 618.

63. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, and others known and unknown, would and did knowingly and willfully act as an agent of a foreign principal, namely, the Government of the Republic of Korea, without registering with the Attorney General, as required by law, in violation of Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612 and 618.

Overt Acts

64. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, and others known and unknown, committed the following overt acts, among others, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:

a. On or about December 18, 2013, in Manhattan, New York, TERRY met with NIS Handler-1, a ROK NIS officer.

b. On or about June 18, 2014, pursuant to a contract with the ROK MFA, TERRY published an article on Korean unification in Magazine-1.

c. In or about mid-December 2016, at the request of a ROK MFA official, TERRY attempted to facilitate access for the ROK Government to Incoming U.S. Official-1.

d. From in or about December 2018 to in or about January 2019, in Washington, D.C. and at the request of NIS Handler-2, a ROK NIS officer, TERRY organized a private meeting at Think Tank-2 with the Director of the ROK NIS and current and former senior U.S. national security officials.

e. On or about November 13, 2019, in Washington, D.C. and Chevy Chase, Maryland, TERRY received from NIS Handler-2, a ROK NIS officer, a \$2,845 Dolce & Gabbana coat and a \$2,950 Bottega Veneta handbag.

f. On or about August 12, 2020, in Manhattan, New York, TERRY met with NIS Handler-2 and NIS Handler-3, both ROK NIS officers, and received dinner, drinks, and a gift bag from them.

g. On or about November 30 and December 1, 2020, TERRY hosted a private virtual workshop with U.S. Government officials, non-government leaders, and ROK Government officials, including NIS Handler-3.

h. On or about April 16, 2021, in Washington, D.C., TERRY received from NIS Handler-3, a ROK NIS officer, a \$3,450 Louis Vuitton handbag.

i. In or about May 2022, in Washington, D.C., TERRY caused Think Tank-3 to accept \$11,000 in funds that were nominally issued by the ROK Embassy but were in fact provided by the ROK NIS.

j. On or about June 17, 2022, in Washington, D.C., TERRY provided NIS Handler-3, a ROK NIS officer, notes and details of TERRY's meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State.

k. On or about July 8, 2022, in Washington, D.C., TERRY hosted a happy hour for Congressional staff members that was nominally hosted by the ROK Embassy but was in fact paid for and attended by NIS Handler-3 and other officers of the ROK NIS.

l. On or about January 10, 2023, in Washington, D.C., TERRY received talking points from NIS Handler-3, a ROK NIS officer, which TERRY repeated in subsequent media appearances and in an article on ROK-U.S. nuclear policy that TERRY published in Magazine-1, and also provided NIS Handler-3 with details of TERRY's meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

m. On or about April 18, 2023, in Washington, D.C. and at the request of a ROK MFA official, TERRY organized an event co-hosted by Think Tank-3 and the ROK Think Tank on the ROK-U.S. alliance.

n. In or about April 2023, in Washington, D.C., TERRY caused Think Tank-3 to accept approximately \$26,035 in funds that were nominally issued by the ROK Embassy but were in fact provided by the ROK NIS.

o. On or about March 7, 2023, at the request of a ROK MFA official, TERRY published an opinion article in a major U.S. newspaper regarding ROK-Japan relations.

p. On or about April 27, 2023, at the request of and with funding by a ROK MFA official, TERRY published articles in a ROK newspaper and online regarding the ROK-U.S. alliance.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)

COUNT TWO
(Failure to Register Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act)

The Grand Jury further charges:

65. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Indictment are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.

66. From at least in or about 2013 to at least in or about June 2023, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, knowingly and willfully acted and caused others to act as an agent of a foreign principal, namely, the Government of the Republic of Korea, without registering with the Attorney General, as required by law.

(Title 22, United States Code, Sections 612(a) and 618(a)(1); and
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.)

FORFEITURE ALLEGATION

67. As a result of committing the offenses alleged in Counts One and Two of this Indictment, SUE MI TERRY, the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offenses, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of proceeds traceable to the commission of said offenses.


Substitute Assets Provision

68. If any of the above described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant:

- a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
- b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third person;
- c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court;
- d. has been substantially diminished in value; or
- e. has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided without difficulty;

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), to seek forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of the above forfeitable property.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 981;
Title 21, United States Code, Section 853; and
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461.)


FOREPERSON


DAMIAN WILLIAMS
United States Attorney