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Washrooms/ Ablution Facilities	Coalition embedded staff/personnel live in warehouse accommodations and re-purposed vehicle bays, ablutions facilities are extremely limited, with as many as 216 personnel sharing five sinks and five showers. The ATCO trailers are dated and ablutions/bathroom facilities are not internal. Mold, fecal contamination and poor cleaning are standard. Water for showering is intermittent and periods of 48 to 72 hours without running water for ablutions is not uncommon. 15 of 16 personnel at will experience water and power outages weekly. Washrooms throughout the Camp consist of portable toilets and ablution trailers. Portable toilets are unlit and the level of sanitation is extremely poor. Many do not feature North American style toilets and have squatting pads for defecating. The running water is non-potable with faucets inoperable, doors that cannot lock, toilets out of service for long periods and frequently with no toilet paper. Further, there is limited hot water in showers because of the volume of use on the large camp. Showers are limited in duration to conserve water. Laundry facilities are limited, with washers and dryers often out of order.	Coalition embedded staff/personnel Sleep cycles are impacted when personnel need to leave their quarters to get to washrooms. Members of cope without water for ablutions or laundry several days a month. This situation is caused by the high volume of use that Camp facilities receive. The Camp is attempting to mitigate the issue by leaving main water lines exposed so that repairs can be made more rapidly. The frequent absence of working laundry facilities creates long wait times for machines and personnel must remain with their laundry throughout to prevent theft of uniforms and clothes. The high incidents of inoperable laundry facilities is caused by the fact that household grade machines are used rather than industrial machines, and the volume of use is high. Due to slow response to work orders, toilets and urinals are often plugged and filled with other people's bodily waste. Lineups are long for ablutions.
Food Supply And Preparation	All meals are provided by facilities, which is 5km away for JTF· personnel. Meals are provided on steam lines and consist of a variety of American style food including fresh fruit and vegetables. The menu is repetitive in a weekly cycle. Dining facilities are extremely crowded and loud for those working within Coalition HQ and Camp Canada. Transportation to the dining facilities is via a food shuttle service, which operates on a 45 minutes schedule for the three main meal periods. Off-hour dining options for shift workers offers significantly fewer meal choices. Coffee, drinks and toast, which would routinely be served at a CDN mess outside of meal hours, are not provided at all of the DFAC facilities. There are no food preparation or dining facilities located at Camp CANADA. The menu rotates weekly except the salad bar which is the same every day. Camp Canada has three days stock of IMPs for emergency purposes. Some restaurants are available on the base for CAF personnel.	Dependant on where pers work or live, pers who have missed the food shuttle service may have long walks to dining facilities. While the meals are nourishing, they are repetitive and mundane. Personnel working on shifts who are required to use off-hour dining are presented with a limited and unvarying choice of food. There is a bus service for Coalition HQ mbrs; however, wait times can be long. Force protection requires two pers to travel after 2200hrs. The use of military vehicles for those located at Coalition HQ for transportation to and from meals is not practical. There are only four vehicles for 16 pers who work and live in different locations, work different shifts and follow different meal hours. The requirement to travel to the dining facilities for all meals provides an opportunity for many staff to take necessary rest and nourishment breaks. Bussing is the most common means of transportation with some pers having access to vehicles. Some pers store food in their quarters but this habit contradicts camp policy to store any food in sleeping quarters to avoid attracting animals to the area among other hygiene reasons. The food quality is good however, communal living conditions challenge many pers.
Drinking Water	The only potable water for those working within Canadian units is bottled. Ablution water is non-potable. All water consumed by CAF mbrs is bottled water. Ablution water quality is unpredictable due to water storage tanks and open piping on some portions of the camp. Per-person water consumption is significant during hot periods and is closely monitored and advertised by medical staff to ensure proper hydration is maintained.	Sufficient potable water is provided in bottled form, however it is left at predetermined drop points in the sun for hours and is often too hot to comfortably consume. Some accommodations and offices have refrigeration units for water; however, this is not the standard. Adequate amounts of water are being consumed. Local contractors provide the camp with non potable ablution water.

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Personal Comms Capability	There are five Morale and Welfare stations for personnel. Each station has a laptop with web camera, Internet service and CSN phone, which are able to call within Canada. These stations are available 24/7 however, there can be waiting lines during peak periods. Some morale phones are not in enclosed spaces. There is available Welfare Wi-Fi at west side of Canada House, with limited service during peak times due to limited bandwidth. During non-peak hours, it has acceptable quality, suitable for checking personal email or voice calling services (e.g. Skype calls or FaceTime audio calls) on Personal Communications Devices. Host Nation Cellular Service has dense coverage, however members on mission are limited on the carrier and options available from local on-base kiosk. Both the Cellular Provider and the devices (Wi-Fi router "pucks" built in China) are suspect in quality and in their assurance of privacy. As such Mission members are briefed on being extra vigilant on their communications, and conducting sensitive personal business (e.g. banking) through DWAN only. Mission Communications Services (CSN phones and DWAN email) are technically able to communicate with home, however are intended for mission use as their primary purpose. There are no dedicated morale and welfare computers or phones for personal working at Coalition HQ nor is there morale/welfare WIFI available. Personnel can buy internet access from a local provider at their own expense; however the quality is poor and service is intermittent. Coalition members have access to DWAN, which is unable to access many banking sites.	The physical time zone difference between Theatre and Canada makes it difficult to align communications with North American families and friends. It is expensive to use a Personal Communication Device it is possible to purchase a plan with one local Cellular Provider. The fact that both the Cellular Service Provider, and the Wi-Fi router "pucks" have no assurance of privacy results in mission members having to rely on encrypted traffic through DWAN, or VPNs in order to communicate safely. The Morale and Welfare stations provided on Camp Canada are adequate, but are slow and used regularly. Furthermore, loud noises from within Canada House can disrupt phone calls. They are regularly maintained by CIS pers to prevent viruses, and ensure they are regularly available. CAF pers do not have access to secure comms to conduct banking or to discuss personal matters. Internet, which can be purchased for a premium, is expensive and often insufficient even for Skype. The quality is poor and sporadic in Pay phones are almost non-existent. Pers can feel disconnected from their spouses, children and friends. The sense of isolation in is exacerbated because a small number of Canadians are dispersed within a large Coalition HQ. Canadians employed within Coalition HQ are generally employed as individual augmentees. This further amplifies the sense of isolation and seclusion that may be felt by some members.This is particularly acute for Francophones who are in an English HQ with little opportunity to communicate in their first language.
Standing Restrictions on Personal Liberty	CAF personnel cannot leave their camp location except for official business. When travelling between bases, side trips or non-business stops are prohibited. IAW JTF-TSO 2.0 Personal Relationships and Fraternization is strictly prohibited anywhere while in theatre on Op IMPACT. IAW JTF-I TSO 1.0 Alcohol Consumption, personnel are not authorized to consume alcohol while deployed on Op IMPACT. For personnel co-located with Coalition HQ, personnel movement policy prohibits opposing genders from entering each others quarters. All personnel are subject to recall 24/7.	Liberty restrictions negatively impact most members in an emotional manner. Inability of CAF mbrs to leave their respective camps creates an additional level of isolation for personnel. There is no personal liberty. There is a no alcohol policy in effect.
Morale, Welfare and Recreation	At Camp Canada, there are modest tented gym facilities available 24/7, common room TVs with programming is available as well as a library of PSP provided movies on DVD. No Canadian content media is available (other than via internet).	The PSP and Entertainment Committee on Camp Canada provide excellent support in the way of organizing on-camp social events and access to a library of movies, books, and a variety of magazines. Monthly delivery of Tim Hortons coffee and donuts from the franchise is a highlight for all camp pers. Outdoor patio areas are rarely used in the summer months due to extreme heat and biting insects during the cooler months.
	Coalition Staff/Embedded mbrs There are gym facilities available for Coalition HQ mbrs (see Annex C, photo 23); however, due to external temperatures these facilities are often overcrowded. There is an video library available where personnel can get free movies and books. Accommodations have common TV rooms co-located with laundry machines but do not have CDN programming. These facilities are limited in number and heavily used due to the high density Camp population. There is no Canada House for mbrs embedded for Coalition personnel and no CDN facilities. The closest PSP rep is located on Camp Canada approximately away. There are no francophone services offered and no hard copy francophone media publications or transmissions available. There is no mess where pers can go to socialize, but there are restaurants and centres.	Books and movies are available for pers working with Coalition HQ but TVs and video players are not provided. Limited quantities can be signed out on loan from the PSP rep in It is difficult to organize CDN events due to varying shift/work schedules. Aside from dining together pers are generally solitary which contributes to a feeling of isolation. Francophones with limited language skills are further isolated. Women are disadvantaged as the prohibition on entering men's quarters and the absence of common facilities leaves some of them feeling more isolated.

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Postal Services	There is a full time postal clerk that manages the Post Office within Camp Canada. However, longer periods between CAF sustainment flights delays in mail delivery into and out of Camp Canada. From Aug-Oct 16, infrequent/unreliable service flights resulted in a backlog of mail for over a month.	Any delay in mail delivery creates a major morale issue. The longer the gaps between mail pick up and delivery the greater the frustration that the pers experience. Fewer sustainment flights mean that mail (low priority) frequently gets bumped for higher priority freight, which was experienced frequently during the build.
	Coalition Staff/Embedded mbrs There is no CDN postal section in Postal services are located at approximately away and are not readily accessible. Long periods between CAF sustainment flights has created delays in mail delivery into and out of There can be additional delay of up to one week for mail to come to from Camp Canada.	Coalition Staff/Embedded mbrs Changes in sustainment flights, transportation delays between bases or higher priority freight requirements has increased the gap in delivery of mail, resulting in high frustration and low morale. Receipt of mail can take from one to two months. Pers can order items online and have them shipped direct to the camp however, personal mail/packages from family are delayed, which negatively impacts morale and further contributes to isolation.
Access to Retail and Service Facilities	With the restrictions to off-base travel, access to camp retail facilities is nil. The has contracted a few small retail outlets to operate on the Their items, though a welcome luxury, are very expensive (especially with the current exchange rate). The has a limited variety of western style products, food, drinks, clothing, and personal hygiene products which are expensive given the current prolonged low value of the Canadian dollar. Some snack foods are often only available after their best before date.	Retail services are limited and some products can be expensive. Online ordering is available however internet security and the risk of compromising financial information is a known risk.

Hardship Part 3 – Operating Environment

Factor	Description	Effect on Deployed Contingent
Accessibility and Standard of Health Services Support	**Health Care Services/Pharmacy**: Camp Canada has embedded Role 1 health care facilities for routine and minor medical situations. More serious situations will be deferred to the located at the portion of the base (5 km from Camp Canada), which has basic medical capabilities. If Role 3 services are required, pers are Medevac to Anything above Role 3 require pers to be sent to . CAF doctors are qualified in Mental Health.	MEDEVAC of a serious injury or illness is a concern where time and distance to care is crucial. The driving and traffic conditions may threaten the golden hour the member requires for life-saving medical assistance. Some non-urgent consultations are in or host nation medical clinics which expose our members to risky driving conditions which may result in accidents and further injuries.
	Coalition: No CAF integral medical assets or spiritual services available on and CAF members wishing to see CAF health care providers are required to travel to Members are able to seek care at the ed Role 1 There is also a led Role 3 Hospital with 24/7 Emergency Room services. Several additional medical services are available to CAF members including Internal Medicine, General Surgery, Orthopedic Surgery, Psychiatry, Psychology, Social Work, Optometry, and Dental. The CAF Role 1 HSS can assist members in accessing these services if there is any difficulty. Preventive medicine services are also available in In addition to the Role 3 Hospital, several host nation hospitals have been validated for use by the as well as Accreditation Canada and undergo regular reviews. In some instances, members with significant medical illness/injury may require aeromedical evacuation to Role 4 hospitals in or Canada. There are currently no CAF Mental Health providers in theatre.	Coalition: Vehicle accidents are a serious concern due to the local driving conditions. Injuries sustained while off base may result in CAF members being treated at host nation facilities which has the potential to be overwhelming and stressful. CAF HSS is notified in all of these cases to ensure CAF members are receiving the best care possible and if necessary, arrange transfer to the most appropriate health care facility. Pers in distress or crisis would likely have to see Health Care Personnel. Some CAF members may be reluctant to seek health care via the or Host Nation medical system.

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Local Climate	**Weather/Pollution/ Population/City Life:** The local climate is harsh. During the summer, daytime temperatures can reach upwards of 55°C. Extreme humidity can compound the effects of these temperatures. Nighttime summer temperatures normally stay above 35°C. Winter daytime temperatures are usually around 20°C where nighttime temperatures drop to around 0°C. Sandstorms are frequent during the dry summer months, which see less than 1mm of rain from late-May to late-Oct. During the winter, rainstorms are common. Significant storms occur during late-Oct to early-Nov and from late-Feb to early-Mar.	The extreme daytime summer temperatures hamper outdoor work and can lead to medical emergencies. If not monitored, power outages cause the air conditioning units to cease functioning, creating uncomfortable working and sleeping conditions. Storms prompt flooding which is detrimental to the camp infrastructure and mobility of personnel. The flooding promulgates the spread of microorganisms and fungi such as mold, that could potentially lead to adverse health conditions. The inside flooding has caused electrical issues given that most powerlines run along the floors. Moreover these extreme changes in weather will cause deadly/nuisance pest (scorpions, snakes, etc.) and wildlife to seek refuge inside the tent lines. Extreme winds and constant/prolonged thunderstorms prevent members from being able to sleep. With respect to sand storms, the force of the storm necessitates the use of goggles for eye protection. In the past, pers who have been unable or failed to use their goggles have had eye infections and corneal abrasions. For those living in weather havens, the extreme wind is capable of blowing the weather heaven around which has caused damage to the structure and to personnel's furniture and effects and impacts the sleep of pers.
Exposure To Death / Use of Deadly Force	JTF-I: (S//REL CAN, Most JTF-I personnel are some are indirectly exposed to combat or battlefield situations as they are required to analyze DAESH propaganda and incidents which include gruesome images and videos of beheadings and other executions. Personnel work on targeting for extended durations and are then required to watch the destruction of these targets and produce reports analyzing the results. Some targets include casualty numbers over 200 KIA. Personnel who have to travel off-base for duty purposes are exposed to fatal accidents.	JTF-I (S//REL CAN, Some personnel are exposed to death and the use of deadly force for prolonged periods of time. This adds to workplace stress given the volume of graphic material and casualty numbers. For some, this can cause feelings of frustration and outrage. However, this is not common to all members of JTF-I.
	Coalition: personnel are involved with intelligence and targeting and contribute to the killing of the enemy through the targeting process. First hand participation in the targeting enterprise involves selecting and recommending human and material targets for strike. Their actions inform the ISR efforts of the wider coalition including JTF-I/ATF-I. Part of their duties involve the post-strike Battle Damage Assessment of coalition targets including the number of enemy killed. Civilians, including women and children are sometimes struck, in spite of Coalition efforts to avoid civilian casualties and reduce collateral damage. Intelligence and targeting personnel are aware of and see the effects of the strikes. CDN personnel work with photos, videos and reports of human remains, including women and children.	Coalition: The personnel involved in targeting are aware of, and see Battle Damage Assessments, which show combatants and may show non-combatant casualties that were present during the strike. Non-combatants would be civilians and could include women and children. For some individuals this may cause a variety of emotional responses including anger and self loathing which may lead to isolation. Deployed members received the Road to Mental Readiness Brief during in-clearance which reviews signs and symptoms of mental distress in both individuals and their peers. It also reviews when and how to access help for mental health concerns. personnel received 90 minute briefings given by the Unit Padre in on how to spot signs and symptoms of mental issues and distress. The use of culturally significant sites by the enemy and the use of human shields leads to ethically difficult decisions in both dynamic and deliberate targeting. The isolation of Canadians in makes it difficult to discuss emotional concerns. The majority of the contingent have recently expressed distress at the amount of death and suffering witnessed daily. Immediate assistance is being offered while a review of the scope of needs is assessed.

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Exposure To Human Suffering, Misery and Inhumanity	JTF-I (S//REL CAN, Many aspects of culture are dramatically different from Canadian/Western societies. Harsh treatment of non- labourers or migrant workers and of females (in general) is not uncommon. Some CAF pers are required to track DAESH atrocities and crimes against humanity. These acts are often developed into products, which include full motion video, graphic imagery, and detailed descriptions. Exposure to human suffering, misery and inhumanity by some members is prolonged, extensive, depending upon their position.	JTF-I (S//REL CAN, Some personnel are exposed to human suffering, misery and inhumanity regularly. This adds to work place stressors given the volume and graphic nature of the content.
	Intelligence and targeting personnel on are regularly exposed to human suffering during their tour. The targeters and intelligence personnel view images, reports and full motion video. This includes rape, murder, beheadings, people being burned alive, people being tortured, acts of genocide and reports of mass graves. Intelligence and targeting personnel are exposed to the depredations being committed by DAESH against a civilian population. Exposure to these facts is repetitive and extensive and a required function of their jobs. Personnel can feel they have contributed to that suffering because of their management of the bombing campaign. Additionally, many aspects of the local culture are dramatically different from CDN society.	Coalition: Exposure to human suffering can be very upsetting and stressful for individuals and in some instances could lead to significant mental health disorders such as depression, anxiety, or post traumatic stress disorder. Due to the classified nature of the targeting enterprise, these personnel cannot share their experiences with friends and family, a fact which can further contribute to emotional isolation.
Social Isolation	JTF-I: There are approximately Canadian pers accommodated at Camp Canada. There are approximately ; but they are not co-located with Canadians. There are also a number of and There is little interaction with Allied partners other then during social and sporting events. Interaction between Canadian and is minimal, normally occurring with the request for equipment and on exercises. Canadians are invited to use gym and leisure facilities which requires some mode of transportation to get to as they are nearly 5km away. Planned events are rare and usually by invite, such as the or the Battle of Britain ceremonies.	JTF-I: Most pers have only social interaction with coalition partners at . The Entertainment Committee works hard to create a positive social atmosphere, however, events often have limited attended unless considered a parade. Most pers have their own means of electronic comms for home contact and prefer to spend their off work hours listening to music, watching movies, or engaging with friends and family back home in their quarters. The oppressive heat for most of the year limits the amount of outdoor activities that can be held since there are no buildings on camp that can hold more than 60 pers at any one time.
	Coalition Embedded Mbrs There are Canadians among some oalition personnel on They work on varying shifts and are housed in various locations Canadians do not work in close proximity to any other Canadian. There are very few Canadian gatherings due to varying work schedules/locations, and no Canadian welfare areas to hold gatherings. There are no Francophone services and Francophone personnel often do not work together.	Coalition Embedded Mbrs Personnel feel isolated from friends, families and co-workers. Command strives to create bonding opportunities but these are poorly attended due to varying work schedules. This has resulted in a decline in the sense of comradery or belonging to the Mission as a whole. Francophones are more impacted as all communications and all documents are solely in English. Due to the extremely limited number of Canadians at the Francophones have limited ability to mitigate their social isolation by communicating together. This leads to stress and frustration.
Local Language and Culture	The local language is Arabic. Some and local labourers speak some English with varying capability. All documents and letters must be translated between Arabic and English, which requires translators. The main contact regarding HN affairs is through the Correspondence must be hand-delivered in all cases as the business culture does not accept signed documents as attachments to emails. The Military does not have a DWAN equivalent, as such even email communications are marginally effective. Further, locals have a tiered class system. citizens, which are few in number and mostly wealthy, put themselves at the top while Westerners fall somewhere below. For the most part, members are able to work in their preferred language.	The impact on CAF members when dealing with the locals can often be challenging given that some locals feel superior, which causes friction in day to day dealings. Further, it can be frustrating for some members to witness the mistreatment of the locals.
Local Population Attitude	There is a sense of frustration regarding administrative processes between key CAF personnel and Government Organizations. There seems to be a lack of trust in what should be normal administrative functions which takes an inordinate amount of time and unsubstantiated delays (Visa processing, visit request letters, clearances etc.). There is a mistrust of the local police who clearly treat non- with contempt. There appears to be two sets of laws applied to and foreign nationals. This lack of trust is probably not directed solely at Canadians but prevails through	Regular exposure to such negative stimuli produces frustration and stress amongst members and a challenge in accomplishing daily tasks when dealing with the local authorities. This is common when attempting to conduct exchanges of information where release information too late, or deny that any such information exists.

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HA/RA PHOTOS

November 2016

Living Quarters





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Senior Officer Living Quarters (2 person per room)



Senior Officer Living Quarters (1 person per room)



Portable washrooms near living tents



Bus station for Transportation to and from the Dining facilities (5 km)



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Landscape photos demonstrate dust/haze in the air







Washroom trailer

Laundry facilities





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Working Area





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

Morale Computers and Phones



East side Canada House

West side Canada House





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Scorpions are commonly sited





Black water stack near ablutions and accommodations constantly leaves a foul smell in the air



Various Potable Water Storage on camp (outside)

Members working outside in Extreme Heat



Temperature recording



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Camel Spider





Scorpion found in mbr's boot (6 Nov 16)

Scorpion captured inside living tent



Dust in the air during high winds



Sun shades to protect vehicles in extreme heat

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[redacted] PHOTOS

FP WARNING.



A – 1/28

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RESTRICTION TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

A – 3/28

Annex C
7210-1 (CJTF-OIR 2LNO)
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FP WARNING.



A – 2/28

Annex C
7210-1 (CJTF-OIR 2LNO)
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RESTRICTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.



A – 4/28

A0638591_10-000330

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NOTE LEFT ON ACCN BEDS.

Pest Management Bed Bug Procedures Protocol

1. Complete Thorough Inspection of the Entire Structure.
2. If no infestation is visibly present and Bed Bugs are still suspected monitoring devices such as Glue Boards should be placed for no less than 96 hours.
3. All Occupants' laundry and bedding must be specially washed at the same time in excess of 120 degrees Fahrenheit.
4. All Laundry must be heated/dried at no less than 120 degrees Fahrenheit for a minimum of 90 minutes. Subsequent heating cycles need to be utilized to fulfill this time requirement.
5. Remove all mattresses and makeshift furniture (Tables, Stands, Etc) at the same time. Mattresses and rugs should be placed in the center of building.
6. Any personal items that cannot be washed or any item the occupant can part with should be burned. All remaining loose items must be double bagged and treated with a contact non-residual pesticide (PT-565) and remain bagged in the treated unoccupied structure. Once the all clear and final inspection is completed items should be cleaned as best as possible. Make sure all bed frames are ready and cleared for treatment.
7. Thoroughly clean infested structure. No trash, posters or pictures on walls, no personal items left behind, and floors swept thoroughly.
8. Pest Management treatment of infested structure.
9. No re-entry for 8 to 10 hours.
10. Ten days after initial treatment, Pest Management will do a follow-up inspection of entire structure.
11. (Note: If Bed Bugs are still present reapply treatment and another ten day waiting period must be followed before re-inspection.

Additional Notes: Recommend work order is placed to seal all cracks with caliking material. Cover all new mattresses if possible, and make sure bedding is not touching the walls or floor. Educate and inform all camp personnel about bed bugs. Occupants could experience bed bug activity up to 10 days after treatment, do not panic Pesticides will continue to work after initial application.

A – 5/28

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7210-1 (CJTF-OIR 2LNO)
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ACCNS. NO DIVIDERS NO PRIVACY.



A – 7/28

Annex C
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18 August 2018

ACCNS. NO DIVIDERS NO PRIVACY.



A – 6/28

Annex C
7210-1 (CJTF-OIR 2LNO)
18 August 2018

ACCNS. SOLDIER ATTEMPTING TO CREATE PRIVACY OVER HIS BED WITH A SHEET.



A – 8/28

A0638591_11-000331

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COMMON ROOM IN ACCN FOR 80 PERS.

A – 9/28

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ONE STYLE OF PORT-A-POTTY ON CAMP.





A – 11/28

Annex C
7210-1 (CJTF-OIR 2LNO)
18 August 2018

OUT OF ORDER WASHROOM AT LNO BUILDING. NO LIGHTS.



BROKEN LOCK ON WASHROOM FOR LNO BUILDING.

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OPEN SEWAGE RUN OFF AT LNO BUILDING.



NO SHOWER HEAD / NO SOAP TRAY IN SHOWER.



A – 12/28

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Annex C
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SHOWERS FOR 218 PERS.

BLACK MOLD ACCN SHOWERS.



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Annex C
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ONLY ONE FEMALE WASHROOM ZONE 2 OUTSIDE DINING FACILITY.



EASTERN STYLE WASHROOM OUTSIDE ZONE 2 DINING FACILITY.



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7210-1 (CJTF-OIR 2LNO)
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MOLD SHOWER ACCN SHOWERS.

RUST, GRIME AND MOLD ACCN.

A – 14/28

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ZONE 2 DINING FACILITY WASHROOM.

ZONE 2 DINING FACILITY WASHROOM.



A – 16/28

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Annex C
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BROKEN WATER MAIN. BI-WEEKLY OCCURRENCE.

NO WATER POD ACCN BECAUSE OF BROKEN WATER MAIN. NO WATER SEVERAL DAYS A MONTH.



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3 stalls, 3 sinks, 2 showers and one urinal for ACCN pods.



WASHROOM PODS. TIGHT QUARTERS. CONSISTENTLY DIRTY SHOWERS, SINKS AND TOILETS TOGETHER.



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NOTICE NO WATER IN ACCN PODS.



BROKEN WASHROOM. NO WATER, SHOWER, SINK OR TOILETS.

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Annex C
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LAUNDRY ACCN PODS. OVER 50% NORMALLY BROKEN.



A – 20/28

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MOLD SHOWERS ACCN PODS.

MOLD SHOWERS ACCN PODS.



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GYM USED BY CDN PERSONNEL.





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MOLDY DIRTY CARPETS FOR WALK WAY ACCN PODS.

WALK WAY NO LIGHTS ACCN PODS.

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LIBRARY AND MOVIES.





A – 24/28

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DFAC OUTSIDE AND INSIDE.



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SPORTS FIELD.

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ROADS.





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18 August 2018

ROADS.



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RISK
Submission Form



Joint Task force Iraq (JTF-I)
CONTINGENT / TASK FORCE / UNIT

Op IMPACT
OPERATION NAME

LOCATION

Rotation 3-4
PERIOD



Prepared by: _____ 4 Dec 16 **Date**

Reviewed by: _____ 4 Dec 16 **Date**

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Risk Part 1 – Kinetic Activities

Factors	Description	Effect on Deployed Contingent
Threat Posed by Hostile Forces	The direct and collateral threat from terrorism to JTF-I and Coalition assets and pers within s MEDIUM. MEDIUM is defined as "An individual, organization, or nation has been identified as possessing both the capability and intention of affecting the defined threat, but may not do so for various reasons. It is probable, however, they may attempt do so at another time." Canada's anti-DAESH operations in the Middle East, along with sustained calls by Islamist groups for attacks against Western interests, make Coalition Forces /JTF-I a target for extremists in the region. Hostile Forces: DAESH is assessed to be the predominant actor in Reporting indicates that local cells of DAESH and others depend on external support to conduct major operations. s a known facilitation and financial hub for terrorist groups. Individuals suspected of belonging to, or being affiliated with, terrorist groups also conduct espionage in Threat actors include Hostile Other Intelligence Services (HoIS) and extremist sympathizers looking to collect information on Coalition members. The collection operations are primarily threats, but also includes surveillance of assets transiting to and from Coalition Forces/JTF-I facilities within JTF-I ASIC OTA assesses the threat of espionage towards Coalition Forces/JTF-I personnel as SEVERE. Targeting of Team/Msn Assets: Coalition Forces/JTF-I pers fly over Iraq and Syria a minimum of 6 days per week and are at risk from anti-aircraft guns, MANPADS, SAM systems, and fighter jets while flying over Iraq/Syria. Following the 17 Sep 16 air strike against a Syrian army unit, coalition aircraft in Syria are frequently illuminated by Russian and Syrian regime radars associated with Russian-built Surface to Air Missile systems. Multiple interactions have occurred between Russian and coalition aircraft. An example is a Russian air to air refueller refuelled two Russian fighter jets over Mosul which is within two natuical miles of the CD140M. Operations transit over DAESH areas of influence and have reported the use of high-powered laser pointers, which are used in attempts to blind aircrew and pilots (most recent incident Oct 16). Probability: Coalition Forces/JTF-I pers have reported seeing suspicious individuals trying to identify pattern of life IVO military bases from high features near the bases, indicating likely surveillance attempts. Suspicious breaches of base security perimeters have increased since the start of Op IMPACT. Soldiers transiting between bases have reported being followed by unknown vehicles. It is possible that this activity could be part of ongoing collection by terrorist elements. Coalition facilities and locations are common knowledge in and the facilities are accessible by public roads. Locally employed staff have access to most sections of these bases, including secure areas, which is a security concern. Additionally, the risk of insider threat cannot be overstated. Soft-skinned vehicles travelling between bases are the likely choice as potential targets. There have been three incidents since end Jun 16 where JTF-I pers in uniform were aggressively followed, photographed, and/or videotaped. Also, a terrorist attack was conducted along a main highway that is used daily by CAF pers, by an Egyptian-born Daesh supporter in Oct 16. He was arrested after the failed suicide attack on Coalition Forces.	Members are confined to the base for the duration of their deployment, which ranges from 6-12 months. Further, due to espionage and terrorist threats, members are prevented from travelling within except for operational requirements, which are also generally limited. Members are required to travel with PPE at all times. These trips off-base are well-coordinated; however, there have still been incidents where Coalition Forces/JTF-I pers have been followed and photographed. Some pers are required to travel into frequently, thus increasing stress and the risk of exposure to potential hostile/terrorist entities. Higher-level approval is required for all travel off-base. This produces feelings of isolation, which reinforces the continuous perception of a greater threat. CC150 Tac operate in Eastern Syria now, and CP140M continue to conduct collection operations in Iraq over DAESH-controlled territory. The threat situation in Syria is highly volatile, and challenging to predict day-to-day. Risk of midair collision with Russian aircraft in Syria is increased due to the high Russian Federation Air Force sortie rate, lack of airspace coordination, cruise missile firings at altitude, and potential for unprofessional air intercept TTPs by inexperienced fighter crews.There is increasing volatility in Western Iraq and Syria and the Surface to Air Missles and air-to-air threats could increase to HIGH with little or no warning. Based on actual observations it is evident that anti-aircraft weapons are being used against coalition aircraft. There is a risk that air crew may have to perform an emergency landing in enemy territory. Collectively these risks create elevated emotional stress levels in personnel.

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Civil Instability	s.15(1) (S//REL CAN, The government in is generally stable; however, it is not a democratic government and does not afford the same rights and freedoms to its citizens and non-citizens that are familiar to CDNs. The police do not conform to the same standards as CDN police and CJOC J2 notes that punishments are harsh. Canada has a ratified agreement with that provides diplomatic immunity for CAF members and civilians; however, not all local forces are aware of the agreement. Consequently, travel to for non-duty purposes is prohibited. permits freedom of assembly with groups of more than 20 requiring a permit. Officially, protests are only permitted within , in front of the National Assembly in the inner city, but protests have occurred outside the city centre. They are generally peaceful, although limited violence has been reported. security forces are capable of containing such violence and keeping it well away from operational bases and the city centre (where most foreigners reside). security forces have frequently used tear gas, stun guns, and other non-lethal methods to disperse demonstrators and may arrest and charge onlookers, including foreigners, even if they are not directly participating. This is a potential collateral hazard for bystanders. These demonstrations are often given a few minutes for their voices to be heard, but are then followed by mass arrests. The most likely criminal activity that poses a threat to Coalition Forces/JTF-I personnel is theft of personal belongings including items of value, personal identification, and money. It is unlikely that the organized criminal element within poses a substantial threat to Coalition Forces/JTF-I personnel, facilities, or interests. The current direct and collateral threat from crime to CAF mbrs, facilities and interests within is assessed as LOW. Reporting indicates that while there has been an increase in violent crime in the 2nd quarter of 2016, there has only been one reported kidnapping. While there is a low likelihood of this occurring, kidnapping remains a possibility. Uniforms are worn for travel between various locations, with some members receiving negative attention en route (in Nov 16, children threw rocks at military vehicles full of members in uniform). Travel to/from and elsewhere is in civilian clothing. Many personnel drive to and elsewhere on a weekly basis. There is a consistent disregard for traffic regulations off-camp, including speed limits. The traffic, road conditions and reckless driving poses a risk and challenge for the drivers. In many cases, vehicles will drive where no lane exists/on the shoulder, narrowly missing other vehicles. drivers routinely use their cell phones, are on video chat, texting, listening to music with headphones, or watching movies while driving and often speed above the 120 km/h speed limit. Severe, high speed accidents are a matter of routine rather than exception. Drivers will honk or flash their lights to make other drivers pull over and let them pass. Multiple crashes have been witnessed by personnel who travel off base.	(S//REL CAN CJOC J2 notes that organized demonstrations in are not normally anti-Western in nature, but Coalition/JTF-I members outside of the bases need to be constantly vigilant. Previous demonstrations have not been anti-Western in nature and there are no current indications of widespread anti-Western sentiment in Therefore, Coalition/CAF pers are unlikely to find themselves as the direct focus of demonstrations. However, while performing their duties, it is possible that they could find themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time due to collateral threat. Coalition and CAF pers could be a target of petty crime when they are performing operational duties in As long as Coalition / CAF pers travel in groups of two or more, it is unlikely that they would be targeted for kidnapping; however, this risk would likely increase if members are in uniform. at Coalition HQ can be required to travel in to the Airport and Embassy; these pers are at risk of harassment and potentially violence if stopped. Trips are limited to duty runs to prevent further surveillance or targeting of CAF pers and bases. Uniformed mbrs transiting on public roads in are readily identifiable by hostile actors and would likely be seen as targets of opportunity and struck if possible. Movement on roads is dangerous due to serious, high speed accidents. There is a consistent disregard for traffic regulations off-camp, including speed limits. The maintenance levels of local vehicles, inattentive drivers and aggressive driving are not norms for CDNs. CAF members outside of the bases travelling into town are not allowed to wear uniforms. Doing so would likely generate harassment and possibly violence towards the members, or lead to potential targeting or surveillance of CAF bases and assets. Members travelling in uniform between bases have experienced such harassment, further leading to feelings of stress and isolation. In addition, as a result of any overt military presence extremist sympathizers would potentially view members of the Coalition Forces/JTF as soft targets and could engage them as targets of opportunity. Members who travel off-base for operational reasons have observed vehicle accidents; and in some cases have observed fatalities.
Risk Caused By Other Contingents	(S//REL Camp Canada and JTF-I personnel are located adjacent to and up to They are tasked to defend As advised by the CO of the Camp Canada is within the and must be prepared to evacuate the camp immediately upon notification (2 km evacuation zone). is also shared with and other transient troops from other nations transiting into or out of the JOA. There is no overt threat from the military and forces; however, individual police officers are assessed to be corrupt and unreliable, with an undetermined number having embraced jihadi ideology or goals. Over the past decade, a small number of radicalized police officers have been involved in incidents with Western military personnel: two police officers were detained over suspected links to the 26 Jun 15 Shia Mosque attack. Further, military personnel drive at exceedingly high speeds on their own base and disregard the rules for the road, often parking abruptly in the middle of the road or in odd areas. as a whole do not adhere to traffic rules and regulations.	(S//REL Most of Camp Canada is within and must be prepared to evacuate the camp immediately upon notification within 4 minutes. There are currently few solutions for evacuating the entirety of the camp within 4 minutes. With forces, all cultural considerations and cautions must be observed. As previously stated the risk of insider threat is very real and cannot be discounted. DAESH do not recognize the difference between Coalition Forces working within and all are viewed as legitimate targets.

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and/or Neighbouring National Forces	Mbrs embedded with Coalition HQ (S//REL CDN personnel are located in close proximity to . They are tasked to defend CDN personnel are within the evacuation zone and must be prepared to evacuate immediately upon notification (2 km zone). There is currently no evacuation plan. Coalition Forces bases are shared with troops from other CF nations and their customs and perceptions of what is acceptable are often very different. Sexual assault is a serious problem. In Aug 16, the Area Support Group warned of "an alarming increase in sexual assaults on Notices advertising this fact have been posted in most public places around the camp and have served to curtail the activity and movement of CDN personnel. JTF-I PM met with the Commander of 23 Aug 16, which revealed that from 01 Aug 15-31 Jul 16, CID investigated 75 reported crimes of a serious nature which included fraud, drugs, property crime, sexual misconduct, sexual assault, crimes against persons, child porn and death investigations. Of the 75 reported crimes, 13 were related to "abusive sexual contact" cases (no penetration) with three reported "sexual assault" cases (penetration). One of the three "sexual assault" cases was unfounded with the remaining two cases currently ongoing. CDN personnel live in close proximity to Coalition members. Theft of unattended personal items occurs. Local nationals and contractors have keyed access to CDN living quarters and CAF members have been awakened by local nationals entering their sleeping areas without authorization or need. CDNs share dining facilities, ablutions facilities and washroom facilities with contingents that do not conform to North American standards of cleanliness. military personnel and some personnel from foreign contingents disregard the rules of the road and driving regulations.	All CDNs work in close proximity to the There is no plan for evacuating these personnel in the case of emergency. The potential for sexual assault causes stress for members and serves to curtail their movement throughout the Camp. The risk of sexual assault has caused CDN personnel to change their routines. This causes feelings of restriction, isolation and stress. The hygiene habits of other contingent personnel vary in standard and because common ablution facilities are used this effects CDN military personnel. With forces, all cultural considerations and cautions must be observed. As previously stated the risk of insider threat is very real and cannot be discounted. DAESH do not recognize the difference between Coalition forces working within Kuwait and all are viewed as legitimate targets.

Risk Part 2 – Operational Environment

Factors	Description	Effect on Deployed Contingent
Geospatial	faces air contamination issues related to the industrial and transport sectors, air quality in is most likely linked to general particulate matter related to the desert. Reports from CAF Force Health Protection note that CAF members exposed to particulate matter in the air typical of sand storms common to the location may experience short-term respiratory symptoms and this could result in temporarily decreased cardiopulmonary function. There are a large number of diesel generators powering the camps which may impact air quality. Venomous snakes and scorpions are found in see attached). In the past four months there have been multiple scorpion stings. On average 2-3 personnel receive treatment for post exposure rabies prophylaxis each month following animal bites or scratches; however, the risk of rabies is considered low. Soil contamination is a problem due to windblown sand. Despite massive demining operations, persistent hazards exist from legacy mines and UXO left from previous wars. As indicated in Joint Task Force-Iraq All Source Intelligence Centre Operational Threat Assessment dated 23 Nov 16 (P9/14), there remains a low risk of uncovering mines and UXO left from prior conflicts through wind storms, shifting sands, and erosion. Thus, mine and UXO incidents still occur, mostly in desert areas, making driving off-road hazardous. Military bases are assessed as safe, although a marked mine field is located south of the runway. There are areas of UXOs and mined areas in along the coast and in desert areas. Mine clearing operations IVO Coalition HQ in 2010 located some 3.5 tons of unexploded mines during clearance operations. Shifting sands and erosion expose mines on a regular basis. Frequent wind storms create dangerous driving conditions both by reduced visibility during the storm and by creating hazardous road conditions (sand build-up on roadways destabilizing vehicle handling). Venomous insects, spiders and snakes are present in One member was stung by a scorpion outside his quarters in Nov 16 and scorpions are frequently found around the camp (photos attached). The only scorpian anti-venom is located at Coalition HQ, which is approximately for members located with JTF Insect infestations were common both in living and workspaces. Snakes live within the living/workspaces in Limited vegetation allows sand and other contaminants to become easily airborne and decrease overall air quality. The arid environment leaves the air extremely dry.	Movement outside during windy days can lead to scratched corneas. Personnel are issued eye protection and are frequently required to wear it to avoid eye injury caused by blowing sand and dust; however, wind can pick up quickly and blow sand and debris into eyes before they can be protected. Sand in the air and lack of humidity causes frequent congestion and coughing. Bites from scorpions or snakes hiding in shoes, under bed covers or lying along the road could lead to illness and in extreme cases, death. Medical briefs provided during Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) increase awareness and provide precautionary measures. Personnel must always remain vigilant when walking around camp to avoid venomous snakes, scorpions and spiders. The most recent scorpion sting was early Nov 16, resulting in hospitalization of a member. Personnel must remain alert to these hazards which can contribute to stress. CAF personnel travel between bases/into for duty and Home Leave Travel Assistance (HLTA). Physical training and driving off road is prohibited due to UXOs. There are no armoured vehicles available.

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Health and Hygiene	s.15(1) Sand and dust are a constant discomfort. Insect, snake, and rodent incursions into work spaces and living quarters are a discomfort and potentially dangerous. Poisonous scorpions, snakes, and spiders are often seen and their subsequent removal is routine. Ablutions are separate from living quarters and the facilities are insufficient for the high density population. Consequently, ablutions and toilet facilities are overcrowded and become contaminated quickly. Portable toilets are hot during the day, when external temperatures reach upwards of 50 degrees C., and the smell is often unbearable. The facilities are frequently contaminated with urine and fecal matter. Toilets do not always conform to North American standards and squatting stalls are common for members embedded with the Coalition HQ (see att photos). Sinks are often broken, which prevents washing. Laundry machines are very limited and frequently broken, which limits regular washing of clothes (see att photos). There have been Bed bugs in certain living areas, requiring pest management and extensive cleaning. The services advises that the greatest short-term health risks include ingesting contaminated food or water and exposure to extreme heat and airborne dust and sand. (see report attached). Medical Intelligence assesses a high risk for diarrhea and hepatitis A, medium risk for typhoid/paratyphoid fever, cutaneous leishmaniosis, Q-fever and leptospirosis. Some staff are required to perform duties (maintenance and repairs) in confined spaces in extreme heat conditions. Toilets, wash sinks, and showers share a single room; there are also stand alone chemical toilets which are not lit. Portable toilet facilities on the CP140M flight line have no running water and are difficult to keep clean due to their location. Ventilation in ablution trailers is of poor quality and air within tents and hard stand infrastructure is stagnant. Common areas are kept relatively clean through contractors however personal hygiene varies by person so illness can spread rapidly. There is also a rainy season which bring torrential rain fall, high winds, and hail which results in flash flooding bringing insects and other life. Medical Services: There is a Role 1 HSS available at JTF HQ. Mbrs can receive 24/7 medical support. There is no preventative or routine dental care available. Mbrs are to deploy with adequate supplies of regular medication to last the duration of their deployment. There are limited medical supplies within the Role 1 HSS (i.e. antibiotics, basic first-aid items). Coalition HQ has a Role 3 HSS available.	CAF pers are advised to consume food, water, and ice only from sources. These sources are approved by the Preventative Medicine unit. Regular inspections are carried out in all dining facilities and commercial eating establishments. 3% of pers occasionally come into unavoidable contact with standing water IVO the accommodations. Toilets, showers and sink facilities located in common abolution areas come with hygiene issues endemic to communal facilities. Accommodations and washrooms are in separate buildings which is inconvenient and cause disruptions in sleep due to distance. The daily requirement of sewage removal perpetuates a constant foul odour of sewage and diesel fumes in areas adjacent to toilets. The UV level is consistently at 10-11 and skin burns quickly. There is potential for heat illness if proper work rest cycles are not followed. The temperatures are monitored by the Public Health Department. CAF members with dust allergies find their symptoms are exacerbated. CDN pers are advised by the CAF Force Health Protection to use DEET on all exposed skin and to treat uniforms with permethrin. The Role 3 hospital stocks both snake and scorpion anti-venom for treatment of significant venomous bites. Sun burns, dehydration, and heat stroke are significant medical concerns for 10 months of the year. For those Coalition/JTF-I pers involved in manual labour, excess exposure to heat and sun leads to dehydration which is of critical concern and is closely monitored by CAF leadership and medical staff. Even though prescription meds brought it may be spoiled from the heat and need replacing. Extreme temperatures and dry air contribute to skin conditions and illness can spread quickly with members living and working in such close proximity to each other. At least one case of gastrointestinal illness has been attributed to toilet conditions on the flight line. Occasional man-hours are lost from gastro but it is not common. Members are at an increased risk of exposure to poisonous pests due to their work and living arrangements. Bites and stings (scorpions) have occurred, which required JTF-I HQ members to be transported to a Role 3 medical facility for treatment due to limited local HSS capabilities.
Physical Geography and Effects	Wind blowing from the West is extremely dry and hot. Wind blowing from the East brings high temperatures and high humidity. Touching metal, car doors or building door handles can cause burns. Flash flooding during Oct to Feb cause extreme driving hazards. Shifting sand and flash flooding is common. Road and highway systems in and around are well designed and to the standard we would expect in North America. Extreme climatic conditions such as heat, wind (sand storms) from May to Oct produce flying debris (can cause disorientation) and flash flooding Oct to Feb creates dangerous living and in particular, extremely dangerous driving conditions. Sand drifting and flash flooding is common. CP140M maintenance personnel work on open paved surfaces in air temperatures well over 55 degrees Celsius (see att photos), away from shade or shelter. The LRP det work areas that are geo-separated by 3km. Blowing sand and dust are common on the flight line as it is very open terrain. Occasional rain creates abrasive slurry that covers all exposed surfaces.	The need for vigilance due to the effects of extreme weather such as heat illness, sun burns, and blowing sand can cause stress. The extreme heat makes it difficult to relieve tension by doing PT or outdoor sports. When A/C units malfunction it is very difficult to sleep. The physical geography contributes to already dangerous driving conditions via more accidents and flying debris. Gloves must be worn to use tools or touch aircraft surfaces in hot weather to prevent burns. Work must be carefully managed to prevent heat stress injury, resulting in extended work cycles and delays in serviceability. Windy conditions raise extensive airborne dust: protective goggles and shemagh scarves must be worn on the flight line to prevent eye and lung injury. Abrasive dust particles impede aircraft maintenance as parts require frequent additional cleaning. Reduced visibility combined with unreliable approach aids impedes aircraft recovery during blowing dust conditions. The physical environment sometimes breaks A/C units, leading to unbearable temperatures in both work and living spaces.

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JOINT TASK FOR – IRAQ DRESS STATES			
FPL 4	**FPL 3**	**FPL 2**	**FPL 1**
Dress State 4	**Dress State 3**	**Dress State 2**	**Dress State 1**
Within 30 minutes access to Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to include the following: • **Helmet** • **Ballistic Eyewear** • **Fragmentary Vest with Ballistic Plates** • **Tactical Vest** • **Gloves** **Respirator (two canisters)**	**PPE in immediate vicinity (Carried with you from location to location).** **1. Heightened alert state for ASF deployment**	**PPE worn at all times when outside and may be removed when indoors; however, PPE must remain immediately accessible.** **1. CBRN Equipment issued** **2. Weapons carried (all)** **3. ASF deployed**	**PPE to be worn at all times.** **On Order:** **1. CBRN Equipment issued** **2. Weapons carried (all)** **3. ASF deployed**

JOINT TASK FORCE – IRAQ CBRN DRESS STATE				
Dress State	Items of Dress			
	Respirator/Mask	Suit	Boots	Gloves
Four	Available (QM)	Available (QM)	Available (QM)	Available (QM)
Three	Carried	Available (workspace)	Available (workspace)	Available (workspace)
Two	Carried	Carried/worn on order	Carried/worn on order	Carried/worn on order
One	Carried	Carried/worn on order	Carried/worn on order	Carried/worn on order

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

Joint Task Force - IRAQ Immediate Actions Drills

Indirect Attack (Rocket / Missile)	Direct Attack (Small Arms)
Alarm: Wavering Tone (ASAB) or according to local SOP/procedures	**Alarm: Wavering Tone (ASAB) or according to local SOP/procedures.**
1. Hit the ground and wait 1-2 mins or wait for a lull in effective fire **2. Provide medical treatment as required.** **3. Senior ranking person in shelter location or bunker (where applicable) is to provide PERS REPORT and SITREP to respective Ops Centre.** **4. Await All Clear signal.** **5. Once clear, report to CoC and JTF-I JOC.** **6. JOC will provide SITREP to CJOC reference the attack.** **7. Assist with Triage and await further instructions.**	**1. Take immediate cover.** **2. Dress State 4 when safe to do so.** **3. Provide medical treatment as required.** **4. Await All Clear signal.** **5. Once clear, report to CoC and JTF-I JOC.** **6. JOC will provide SITREP to CJOC reference the attack.** **7. Assist with Triage and await further instructions.**

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العربية
AL ARABIYA
ENGLISH

truck collision was 'terrorist attack'

The embassy said it was not aware of specific, credible threats against private citizens in at this time. (File Photo: AFP)

A collision between a truck driven by an Egyptian and a vehicle carrying three was a "terrorist attack," not an accident as first thought, the embassy confirmed Sunday.

Embassy confirms that what at first appeared to be a routine traffic accident involving three deployed . was in fact an attempted terrorist attack," the mission said in a statement posted on its website.

The statement said the attack took place on Thursday and that the escaped unhurt.

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The soldiers also rescued the Egyptian driver when his truck caught fire, it said.

The nterior ministry said on Saturday that authorities arrested the Egyptian driver and found with him a hand-written note in which he had pledged allegiance to ISIS.

It also said that the driver, identified as Ibrahim Sulaiman, 28, also carried a belt and material suspected of being explosives.

The ministry said the attack was on without saying they were troops.

The embassy said it was not aware of specific, credible threats against private citizens ir this time.

But it warned that the attack serves as a reminder to maintain a high level of vigilance, advising citizens to review their personal security plans and remain alert.

authorities announced in July they had dismantled three ISIS cells plotting attacks, including a suicide bombing against a Shiite mosque and against an interior ministry target.

An ISIS-linked suicide bomber killed 26 worshipers in June last year when he blew himself up in a mosque of Shiite minority, in the worst such attack in the Gulf state's history.

Last Update: Monday, 10 October 2016 KSA 08:34 - GMT 05:34

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

WMO examines reported record temperature of 54°C in

26 Published 26 July 2016

WMO examines reported record temperature of 54°C in Iraq

WMO will set up a committee to examine whether set a new highest temperature record for the Eastern hemisphere and Asia, with a reported temperature of 54.0°C (129.2°F) on 21 July 2016.

Latest WMO News

Marrakesh conference promotes global climate observation (/en/media/news/marrakesh-conference-

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Large parts of the Middle East and North Africa were gripped by heatwaves since last week. Temperatures exceeding by a large margin the seasonal averages, and over a sustained period. This affected, in particular, the northern part of countries in the Arabian Gulf and North Africa.

eportedly saw a temperature of 54.0°C on 21 July and the city of Basra in Iraq recorded a temperature of 53.9°C (128°C) on Friday 22 July. Southern Morocco also saw temperatures of between 43°C and 47°C.

Governments issued heat-health warnings and took measure to minimise impacts on population. However the refugee population in the Middle East were the most affected, with heat exacerbating their fragile situation and suffering.

WMO is responsible for the official archives of World Weather and Climate Extremes (http://wmo.asu.edu/) (temperature, rainfall, wind gust, heaviest hailstone etc).

According to this archive, the hottest temperature ever recorded was in Furnace Creek, Death Valley, California at 56.7°C on 10 July 1913. The highest temperature for the Eastern hemisphere was reportedly set in July 1931 in Kebili, Tunisia, at 55.0°C. However, weather historians have questioned the accuracy of colonial temperature records from many weather stations versus the modern records at these same sites.

The investigation, as with all WMO official investigations, will consist of meteorologists and climatologists. They will examine the instrumentation used, the quality of observations, the microclimate of the location, the epresentativeness of the station to its surroundings and to its own record. The station is in a remote, sparsely populated area in the north-west of

Heatwaves

There have been a number of heatwaves in recent weeks.

A widespread heatwave has affected the central and eastern United States of America, with temperatures of 95-100 °Fahrenheit (35-38° C), and heat index

promotes-global-climate-observation)

23 November 2016

COP-22 advances global action on climate change (/en/media/news/cop-22-advances-global-action-climate-change)

22 November 2016

Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems Prioritize the Most Vulnerable (/en/media/press-release/climate-risk-and-early-warning-systems-prioritize-most-vulnerable)

17 November 2016

"Climate extremes, growing costs and losses: are we ready?" (/en/media/news/%E2%80%9Cclimate-extremes-growing-costs-and-losses-are-we-ready%E2%80%9D)

16 November 2016

A0638592_6-000347

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(http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/heat/heat_index.shtml) values to reach 110°F F (43°C), with some areas reaching 115 °F (46°C), according to the US National Weather Service.

At the peak on Friday, July 22, almost 124 million people were under an Excessive Heat Warning, Excessive Heat Watch or Heat Advisory. Above average temperatures are forecast to continue along much of the eastern U.S. through mid-week.

A unique feature of these heatwaves is its very high overnight low temperatures, which offer little relief from the oppressive heat.

Climate Change Attribution

Over the past 50 years, hot days, hot nights and heatwaves have become more frequent. The length, frequency and intensity of heatwaves will likely increase further during this century, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

The science of attribution is making it possible to analyse individual events and assess the role of climate change played, rather than natural variability.

Scientific assessments have found that many extreme events in the 2011-15 period, especially those relating to extreme high temperatures, have had their probabilities substantially increased as a result of anthropogenic climate change – by a factor of 10 or more in some cases.

In view of the health risks posed by heatwaves, WMO is working in close consultation with the World Health Organization to improve climate services like heat health warning systems and guidance, as well as more tailored forecasts for the energy sector which comes under strain during heatwaves.

Hottest Jan-June on record

The latest heatwaves come as Earth has just witnessed the hottest six month period on record, with temperatures shattering even the record levels seen in 2015. A number of countries have seen new national temperature records – for instance India saw a new national temperature record of 51°C in Rajasthan in May.

Climate Services for Africa (/en/media/news/climate-services-africa)

16 November 2016

What is trending

Climate (http://public.wmo.int/en/search?f%5B0%5D=field_cloud_tags%3A249)

Weather (http://public.wmo.int/en/search?f%5B0%5D=field_cloud_tags%3A12)

Climate change (http://public.wmo.int/en/search?f%5B0%5D=field_cloud_tags%3A335)

Greenhouse gases (http://public.wmo.int/en/search?f%5B0%5D=field_cloud_tags%3A320)

Oceans (http://public.wmo.int/en/search?f%5B0%5D=field_cloud_tags%3A280)

El Niño / La Niña (http://public.wmo.int/en/se

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The global land and ocean average temperature for January–June at 1.05°C (1.89°F) above the 20th century average, besting the previous record set in 2015 by 0.20°C (0.36°F), according to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

From January to June, January–June 2016 was characterized by warmer to much-warmer-than-average conditions engulfing most of the world's land and ocean surfaces. Record warmth was widespread across Alaska, western Canada, southern Mexico, northern South America, central Africa, Indonesia, northern and eastern Australia, North Indian Ocean, and across parts of north-central Russia, western Asia, central and eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, the southwestern Pacific Ocean, and the northwestern Atlantic Ocean.

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arch?f%5B0%5D=field_cloud_tags%3A322)

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HA/RA PHOTOS

November 2016

Living Quarters







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Senior Officer Living Quarters (2 person per room)



Senior Officer Living Quarters (1 person per room)



Portable washrooms near living tents



Bus station for Transportation to and from the Dining facilities (5 km)



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Landscape photos demonstrate dust/haze in the air







Washroom trailer

Laundry facilities



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Working Area





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

Morale Computers and Phones



East side Canada House

West side Canada House





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Scorpions are commonly sited





Black water stack near ablutions and accommodations constantly leaves a foul smell in the air



Various Potable Water Storage on camp (outside)

Members working outside in Extreme Heat



Temperature recording

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Camel Spider





Scorpion found in mbr's boot (6 Nov 16)

Scorpion captured inside living tent



Dust in the air during high winds

Sun shades to protect vehicles in extreme heat

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Joint Task Force –
All Source Intelligence Centre
Operational Threat Assessment
Date: 23 Nov 16
Cut-Off Date: 23 Nov 16

(U) OP IMPACT/ Operational Threat Assessment (Update)

(U) This JTF-I ASIC Operational Threat Assessment (OTA) for provides a brief analysis of potential threats to DND/CAF operational activities, specifically threats to CAF/DND personnel/assets involved in operations, engagements, and mission support efforts.

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(C//REL TO CAN, The primary threats to CAF personnel deployed in

(C//REL TO CAN, Given extensive interest in local and regional events, and the extensive collection capabilities deployed in and around the espionage threat to CAF interests is assessed as

(S//REL TO CAN, Based on Host Nation passive collection activities, foreign penetration of telecommunications and the ongoing use of cyber capabilities, the threat to CAF UNCLASSIFIED systems is assessed as while that to CLASSIFIED systems is

(S//REL TO CAN, While reported plots have increased and terrorist groups have declared intent to conduct attacks, local terrorist capabilities are limited and unfocused; therefore, the threat from terrorism is assessed as

(C//REL TO CAN, There are no significant operational hazards.

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(U) THREAT/HAZARD/RISK MATRIXES

Threat Factor
Military and Security Forces
Unconventional/Asymmetrical Forces
Terrorist/Extremist Entities
Espionage
Sabotage
Subversion
Government/Civil
Crime
Cyber – Unclassified Networks
Cyber – Classified Networks
CBRN

(S//REL TO CAN, FVEY) Table 1.

Operational Hazard
Mines/Unexploded Ordnance
Climate
Natural Forces
Health
Topography
Infrastructure

(S//REL TO CAN, FVEY) Table 2

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INTRODUCTION

(C//REL TO CAN, This OTA updates changes to threats and hazards to CAF interests (personnel, programs and assets) deployed to since the February 2016 CJOC J2 OTA Update for

BACKGROUND

(U) The Government of Canada has directed the CAF to act as part of an international coalition to counter the Islamic extremist group known as DAESH. As part of this operation, designated OP IMPACT, the CAF has deployed a variety of capabilities to including aerial combat support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to take part in the led coalition. CAF personnel in are deployed at (Map 1).

(U) Map 1. CAF Locations in *Source: CJOC J2, Economist Intelligence Unit)*

(U) THREAT ASSESSMENT

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(U) Military and Security Forces

(S//REL TO CAN, There is **NO RECOGNIZED THREAT** from military and forces; however, individual police officers are assessed to be corrupt and unreliable, with an undetermined number having embraced jihadi ideology or goals. Over the past decade, a limited number of radicalized police officers have been involved in incidents with Western military personnel and two police officers have been detained over suspected links to the 26 June 2015 Shia mosque attack. Notwithstanding these concerns, JTF-I ASIC assesses the direct and collateral threats from military and security forces as

(S//REL TO CAN, regional rivals currently include Iraq and Iran, both of whom remain focused on the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. currently enjoys strong relations with its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. These factors currently protect from external military aggression as does the hosting of a large number of western military forces, including those of the

(S//REL TO CAN, assesses the overall threat from military and security forces as

(U) Unconventional/Asymmetrical Forces

(S//REL TO CAN, There are no identified paramilitary forces or insurgent groups operating in Therefore, there is **NO RECOGNIZED THREAT** from unconventional or asymmetric forces.

(U) Terrorist/Extremist Entities

(S//REL TO CAN, Multiple terrorist organisations likely have connections to local groups in and some districts, such as are known to host terrorists and sympathizers. While remains an important facilitation hub for terrorist organisations, with elements of the population having provided considerable amounts of money to militant and terrorist groups, this does not appear to have led to direct support for domestic terrorist actions. According to the Security Services, the most dangerous actors are Al Qaeda (AQ) and DAESH, the latter of which is currently assessed to be the predominant actor in terrorist activities. There are indications that the local cells of both organizations depend on external support to conduct major operations.

(S//REL TO CAN, The judges that DAESH and its sympathizers will probably continue to plot attacks against were DAESH and DAESH inspired individuals have targeted military personnel, Shia mosques, and security forces since the summer of 2016. Recent NCTC assessments surmise that DAESH plots throughout the Persian Gulf, including are directed by a cell in Saudi Arabia and facilitated through a Syrian plot coordination network.

(S//REL TO CAN, NCTC reporting further indicates that security services probably have a limited capability to detect and disrupt plots, particularly those emanating from the Saudi Arabian cell, due to DAESH operational compartmentalization and use of encrypted

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communications platforms. Bureaucratic stove piping often has prevented services from sharing information quickly and effectively. services will however take prompt counter-terrorist action when presented with actionable intelligence.

(S//REL TO CAN, Most recent terrorist actions have typically been unsophisticated and disrupted by the authorities. The 26 June 2015 attack on the (a Shia mosque) in central was an exception. This attack was almost certainly carried out by DAESH's Saudi Arabian affiliate, *Wilayat Najd*, which seeks to aggravate Sunni-Shia tensions in and the region. and Saudi authorities have stated the bomber was a Saudi national who travelled from Saudi Arabia to conduct the attack; it is very likely he was provided the explosives after arrival, and driven to the mosque by a member of community. This suggests DAESH has some level of operational capability within The attack also demonstrates the increasing threat posed by DAESH's *Wilayat Najd* affiliate, which is believed to have conducted several attacks in Saudi Arabia in 2015 and early 2016.

(U) OSINT reporting indicates that in July 2016 authorities disrupted a number of DAESH plots to carry out attacks in during the Eid holidays. Operations to disrupt these plots were carried out both in and in Syria. One individual allegedly confessed to planning to carry out a suicide attack on a Shia mosque, three others, including a police officer were arrested with Kalashnikov rifles, ammunition and a DAESH flag in their possession.

(U) In early October 2016, authorities arrested an Egyptian national and DAESH sympathiser after a failed suicide attack on U.S. service members. Separately, in late October 2016, authorities arrested an allegedly DAESH-affiliated individual that had weapons, explosives, chemicals, bomb making literature.

(S//REL TO CAN, Reports indicate that soft-skinned vehicles moving between bases are most at risk. Attacks would likely be low-level, possibly involving an IED combined with small arms against targets of opportunity. It is assessed that terrorist groups cannot effectively conduct attacks against flying aircraft within airspace; however, locally employed personnel have access to most part of bases, including restricted areas, and remain a security concern.

(S//REL TO CAN, Given these factors, JTF-I assesses the overall direct and indirect threat from terrorist activities in as MEDI

(U) Espionage

(S//REL TO CAN, has a well-developed and capable domestic security and intelligence services, focused on terrorism, foreign intelligence activities, and internal dissent. All intelligences services monitor third country assets, including CAF personnel and interests. The MoI will likely sporadically monitor CAF personal, both to ensure their security and to ensure they do not mix with persons or groups of concern. Given the recent increase in the counterterrorist posture, it is highly likely that there is increased monitoring of communication data; however, interference with CAF communications by the authorities is assessed as unlikely.

(S//REL TO CAN The Government of will reportedly begin collecting DNA on all its citizens and visitors starting in March 2017. It is unknown at this time if this will include DND/CAF members.

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(S//REL TO CAN, Foreign nations continue to pose the main espionage threat in Russian, Chinese, and Iranian intelligence services likely conduct intelligence collection against Western interests in and are assessed to have highly specialized intelligence capabilities in the country. Means of collection include HUMINT and SIGINT. HUMINT networks from Hostile Intelligence Services are well embedded within communities and sometimes directly contact Westerners to collect information. Some nations—China in particular—likely have some direct access to local communication services through a combination of telecommunications ownership, overseas nationals employed in the industry, and through their involvement in the building of local or regional communication infrastructure.

(S//REL TO CAN, Individuals suspected of belonging to, or being affiliated with, terrorist groups also conduct espionage in Some terrorist groups have well established networks, especially inside the local community (the are a segment of the population, up to 180,000 in number, who were residents in at independence but were not granted citizenship). CAF personnel have reported seeing suspicious individuals trying to identify movements and procedures inside and outside of military bases from high features near the bases, likely indicating ongoing surveillance. Suspicious breaches of base security perimeters have also increased since the start of OP IMPACT. Soldiers transiting between bases have also reported being followed by unknown vehicles. While it is possible that these vehicles may belong to the MoI—or simply be harassment by local —it is also possible that this activity could be part of ongoing collection by terrorists or their supporters.

(S//REL TO CAN, On 14 Sep 16, spotted a personal UAV drone flying in the vicinity of the located to the north of Camp Canada. The drone flew north out of sight and security personnel were unable to locate the drone or its operator. No UAV drones are employed at in any official capacity and, given the proximity between the and Camp Canada, there is a possibility that the UAV drone operator was attempting to conduct surveillance on Camp Canada.

(S//REL TO CAN, Due to these factors, JTF-I ASIC assesses the overall threat from espionage to the CAF in Kuwait is

(U) Sabotage

(S//REL TO CAN, There are no indications that any group in foreign or domestic, is planning to sabotage CAF equipment or facilities; however, low-level sabotage from locals, including locally employed staff, who may be critical of coalition efforts, cannot be discounted.

(S//REL TO CAN, JTF-I ASIC assesses the overall threat from sabotage as **LOW**.

(U) Subversion

(S//REL TO CAN, There are no indications of attempted subversion of CAF personnel in

(S//REL TO CAN, JTF-I ASIC assesses the overall threat of subversion to CAF personnel in as **NEGLIGIBLE**.

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(U) Government/Civil

(S//REL TO CAN, Political protests, and associated violence, have been increasing since 2006 when the current Emir, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, came to power. Protests have largely been motivated by demands for pro-democratic reforms and an end to corruption. aw permits freedom of assembly with groups of more than 20 requiring a permit. Officially, protests are only permitted within in front of the National Assembly in the inner city, but protests have occurred outside the city centre. They are generally peaceful, although limited violence has been reported. security forces are capable of containing such violence and keeping it well away from operational bases and the city centre (where most foreigners reside). Kuwaiti security forces have frequently used tear gas, stun guns and other non-lethal methods to disperse demonstrators and may arrest and charge onlookers, including foreigners, even if they are not directly participating. This is a potential collateral hazard for bystanders. Previous demonstrations have not been anti-western in nature and there are no current indications of widespread anti-western sentiment in Therefore, CAF personnel are highly unlikely to find themselves the direct focus of demonstrations. Thus, JTF-I ASIC assesses the collateral civil threat as **LOW** and the direct threat as **NEGLIGIBLE.**

(U) Crime

(C//REL TO CAN, has a variety of criminal groups that conduct various illegal activities; however, the crime rate in is relatively low, approximating that of urban areas in Canada. Areas home to large concentrations of Third Country Nationals and *Bedoon* tend to have a higher crime-rate. Many areas of elevated crimes rates—Al Jahra, Jaleeb al-Shuyoukh, Farwaniya Souk Area, Fahaheel Bazaar, al-Kout Mall, and Stablat / Camal City—, are off limits to CAF personnel. While CAF personnel are highly unlikely to be directly targeted by criminals, they may be the target of low level opportunistic street crime.

(S//REL TO CAN, assesses the direct and collateral criminal threat to CF personnel in Kuwait as **LOW**.

(U) Cyber

(S//REL TO CAN, Foreign states and intelligence services, particularly China, Russia, and Iran, pose a standing threat to CAF networks with an ability to exploit, degrade and disrupt computer networks. Reporting indicates that China has already conducted extensive Computer Network Exploitation against Canadian information technology (IT) networks. In the extensive links that the Chinese telecommunication company Huawei has include contracts for products, service and support with some of the major telecommunication companies. Thus, it is highly likely that China maintains some capability—either overt or covert— to collect and analyze any traffic transiting Chinese-made infrastructure.

(S//REL TO CAN, Table 3 summarizes the current threats and hazards to deployed CAF networks, including those in This table excludes threats posed by Host Nation network surveillance.

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Threat Factor
Computer Network Attack (CNA)
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)
Technical Espionage
CAF/DND Error
SIGINT

(S//REL TO CAN,

(S//REL TO CAN, While there are no current indications of intentional targeting of CAF communications, personnel should be aware that any communications transiting through the telecommunications infrastructure are being collected. Given this, the threat of passive collection of **UNCLASSIFIED** network traffic in is assessed as **SEVERE**.

(S//REL TO CAN, Given the threat of Host Nation collection and surveillance, JTF-I assesses the overall threat to CAF UNCLASSIFIED systems as **SEVERE,** while the threat to CAF CLASSIFIED systems is assessed as **LOW**.

(U) CBRN

(S//REL TO CAN there is **NO RECOGNIZED THREAT** from CBRN originating from state actors. JTF-I ASIC assesses that non-state actors in are highly unlikely to have the capability to employ bacterial, radiological, or nuclear weapons; accordingly, these threats are assessed as **NEGLIGIBLE**. Likewise, given the difficulty of developing, producing, and transporting classic military chemical agents, the threat posed by such agents is assessed as **NEGLIGIBLE**. It is possible that a non-state group seeking to conduct a CBRN attack could develop a crude device utilizing locally available Toxic Industrial Chemicals. There are no current indications that any groups are planning on creating such a device for use in

(S//REL TO CAN, Given these factors, JTF-I currently assesses that the CBRN threat in is **LOW**.

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(U)HAZARD ASSESSMENT

(U) Mines/Unexploded Ordnance

(C//REL TO CAN, Despite massive demining operations, persistent hazards exist from legacy mines and UXO left from previous wars. OSINT reports indicate that continue to find mines or UXO on a regular basis, particularly after significant weather events that shift sand. Thus, mine and UXO incidents still occur, mostly in desert areas, making driving off-road hazardous. The is especially dangerous in that regard. Military bases are assessed as safe, although a marked mine field is located south of the runway. The overall hazard from mines and UXOs in is assessed as **LOW**.

(U) Climate

(C//REL TO CAN, Extreme temperatures, sand storms, and localized flash flooding are the most significant climate hazards. Overall, the climate hazard is assessed as **LOW.**

(U) Natural Forces

(U) Major sandstorms may impact operational capabilities and personnel. They may deposit sand or create sand dunes on roads which can affect driving. Overall, the natural forces hazard is assessed as **LOW**.

(U) Health

(U) Sanitation is generally good in although it may be below Western standards in rural areas. Other than sporadic cases of food-borne illnesses or infectious disease, health hazards in are low. The major vector-borne disease of concern is cutaneous leishmaniosis, a skin infection caused by a single cell parasite, transmitted through sand flies.

(U) has a modern and comprehensive public and private health care system comparable to Western standards. The majority of medical facilities are located in and several have achieved Canadian accreditation standards. Overall, the general health hazard to CAF personnel in is assessed as **LOW**, but could be slightly higher in remote and isolated areas.

(U) Topography

(C//REL TO CAN, Most of the coastline is lined with sand and mud flats, making the ground prone to flooding. Roads are subject to flooding from occasional heavy rainfall, which may restrict movement. Overall, the topographic hazard in is assessed as **NEGLIGIBLE.**

(U) Infrastructure

(S//REL TO CAN, rebuilt and improved its road, air, and maritime transportation networks after the Gulf War. Despite the absence of a railway system, has modern multi-lane expressways linking all areas of the country and multiple modern airports and ports capable of handling heavy traffic. Given these factors, the hazard to CAF interests from infrastructure is assessed as **NEGLIGIBLE.**

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(U) JTF-I ASIC ASSESSMENT

(S//REL TO CAN JTF-I ASIC assesses that the primary threats to CAF personnel deployed in on OP IMPACT are espionage, cyber, and terrorism.

(S//REL TO CAN, Given the extensive interest of a wide range of actors in local and regional events, significant collection capabilities are assessed to be deployed in and around Thus, the espionage threat to CAF interests is assessed as **SEVERE**.

(S//REL TO CAN, Given Host Nation passive collection activities, foreign penetration of telecommunications infrastructure, and the willingness of various actors to conduct cyber operations, the threat to CAF UNCLASSIFIED systems is assessed as **SEVERE**, while that to CLASSIFIED systems is **LOW**.

(S//REL TO CAN, While terrorist groups have declared intent to conduct attacks, the capabilities of local terrorist groups are assessed to be limited. In addition, the most significant groups, namely AQ and DAESH, are at odds with each other. Thus, the primary focus of their efforts remains divergent with a consequent lack of coordination; therefore, the threat from terrorism is assessed as **MEDIUM**.

(S//REL TO CAN, No significant operation hazards have been identified.

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Annex A
to OP IMPACT OTA Update

THREAT DEFINITIONS

(U) This annex sets out the common threat definitions as defined by CFINTCOM for use by the CAF intelligence community. JTF-I ASIC uses the descriptors of potential effects to describe the potential consequences if a threat event occurs.

(U) To allow a better appreciation of the potential effects associated with each threat level, effects-based indicators are provided. Further detail on associated impacts is provided in Annex C.

UNCLASSIFIED

Level	Threat	Potential Effects
No Recognized Threat	No threat has been identified.	Outside of accidents, there is no recognized potential for incidents that would impact personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. There would be no effect on the mission.
Negligible	An individual/organization/nation has been identified that could have hostile intention, but are highly unlikely to have the capability to carry out the defined threat. It is unlikely that this threat will manifest itself.	There is potential for incidents that would have very limited impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents would have minor and localized effects on the mission.
Low	An individual/organization/nation has been identified and may possess either the capability and/or the intention of affecting the defined threat. Although it is possible, there are no other indications that they will attempt to do so.	There is potential for incidents that would have minor impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents may have limited effects on the mission.
Medium	An individual/organization/nation has been identified as possessing both the capability and intention of affecting the defined threat, but may not do so for various reasons. It is probable; however, they may attempt do so at some other time.	There is potential for incidents that would have moderate impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents may have the potential to compromise mission success.
High	An individual/organization/nation has been identified as possessing both the capability and intention of affecting the defined threat, and will likely attempt to do so in the near term. Specific timings and targets have not been identified.	There is potential for incidents that would have serious impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents may have the potential to threaten mission success.
Severe	An individual/organization/nation has been identified as possessing both the capability and intention of affecting the defined threat, and will most likely attempt to do so within a specific timeframe and or against a specific target.	There is potential for incidents that would have immediate and very serious impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents may have the potential to jeopardize mission success.

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Annex B
to OP IMPACT OTA Update

HAZARD DEFINITIONS

(U) This annex sets out the common hazard definitions as defined by CFINTCOM for use by the CAF intelligence community. JTF-I ASIC uses the descriptors of potential effects to describe the potential consequences if a hazard event occurs.

(U) To allow a better appreciation of the potential effects associated with each threat level, effects-based indicators are provided. Further detail on associated impacts is provided in Annex C.

UNCLASSIFIED

Level	Hazard	Potential Effects
No Recognized Threat	No intelligence has surfaced indicating a hazard.	Outside of accidents, there is no recognized potential for incidents that would impact personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. There is no effect on the mission.
Negligible	The hazard is similar to that associated with normal peacetime service training environments in Canada; i.e. the general risk of illness or injury as the result of accidents or environmental influences.	There is potential for incidents that would have very limited impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents would have minor and localized effects on the mission.
Low	The hardship encountered and hazards posed by the mentioned factors are greater than those associated with normal peacetime service training. Serious illness, injury or deaths are moderately more likely (ie. possible) than in Canada. Precautionary measures may be necessary.	There is potential for incidents that would have minor impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents may have limited effects on the mission.
Medium	The hardship encountered and hazards associated with the mentioned factors are such that serious disease, injuries or fatalities are probable and the chances of surviving injuries are less than in Canada. Precautionary measures are usually necessary.	There is potential for incidents that would have moderate impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents may have the potential to compromise mission success.
High	The hardship encountered and hazards associated with the mentioned factors are such that serious injuries or fatalities are likely. Personnel have limited influence over their circumstances. Precautionary measures are necessary.	There is potential for incidents that would have serious impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents may have the potential to threaten mission success.
Severe	The hardship encountered and hazards associated with the mentioned factors are extreme. Prolonged exposure will result in fatalities and/or serious injury and illness. Precautionary measures are necessary.	There is potential for incidents that would have immediate and very serious impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities. Incidents may have the potential to jeopardize mission success.

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Annex C
to OP IMPACT OTA Update

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS MATRIX

(U) This annex sets out detailed operational impacts associated with the standard threat and hazard levels set out in Annexes A and B.

UNCLASSIFIED

Threat/ Hazard Level	Potential Effects
No Recognized Threat/Hazard	Any effects are expected to be extremely minor. No effect on the mission.
Negligible	Slight chance of: • Very minor injuries, deaths are highly unlikely. • Very minor damage to equipment; possible loss of some operational capability for very limited period. • Very limited compromise of IT systems, information, or operational plans. • Extremely limited damage to infrastructure. • Prolonged exposure to ongoing, long-term conditions may result in slightly elevated rates of injuries or illness to personnel; very limited damage to other assets or operational capabilities but with very minor loss of operational functionality. Minor and localized effects on the mission.
Low	Chance of: • Minor injuries, deaths are possible but not expected. • Limited damage to equipment; possible limited inoperative periods, minor equipment losses may occur. • Limited compromise of IT systems, information, or operational plans. • Limited damage to infrastructure with some loss of functionality. • Prolonged exposure to ongoing, long-term conditions may result in injuries or illness to personnel but deaths are not expected; limited damage to, and loss of, other assets or operational capabilities, some limited loss of operational functionality. Limited effects on the mission.
Medium	Chance of: • Moderate injuries, deaths are possible but unlikely. • Moderate damage to equipment; potential for extended inoperative periods, equipment losses are likely. • Compromise of IT systems, information, or operational plans is likely; any loss may contain information of use to adversarial forces. • Damage to infrastructure with some rendered unusable for limited periods. • Prolonged exposure to ongoing, long-term conditions may result in serious injuries or illness to personnel but deaths is unlikely; moderate damage to, and loss of, other assets or operational capabilities with moderate loss of operational functionality. Potential to compromise mission success.

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High	Chance of: • Serious injuries, deaths are likely. • Major damage to equipment; high potential for extended inoperative periods, equipment losses are highly likely. • Compromise of IT systems, information, or operational plans is highly likely; any loss is likely to contain information of use to adversarial forces. • Major damage to infrastructure; some will be unusable for extended periods while some will be destroyed. • Prolonged exposure to ongoing, long-term conditions may result in serious injuries or illness to personnel, including death; serious damage to, and loss of, other assets or operational capabilities with major loss of operational functionality. Potential to threaten mission success.
Severe	Chance of: • Immediate and serious human consequences, including very serious life-threatening injuries and death. • Widespread and severe damage to, and loss of, equipment. • Compromise of IT systems, information, or operational plans is expected; any loss is highly likely to contain information of use to adversarial forces. • Massive to, and loss of, infrastructure. • Prolonged exposure to ongoing, long-term conditions may result in very serious injuries and death; continuing extensive damage to, and loss of, other assets or operational capabilities with serious loss of operational functionality. Potential to jeopardize mission success.

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HARDSHIP LEVEL SUBMISSION FORM

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O

CJTF-OIR HQ FWD / MLT and
CONTINGENT TASK FORCE / UNIT

OPERATION NAME: OP IMPACT

LOCATION: BAGHDAD

PERIOD

Prepared by: ——

17 Aug 16
Date

Reviewed by:

19 Aug 16
Date

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Hardship Part 1 – Duty Circumstances

	Factor	Description	Effect on Deployed Contingent
1	**Force Protection Levels and Alert State**	Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) including: helmet, fragmentation vest and tactical vest are kept at workspaces or quarters and must be readily available at all times. Due to the known use of chemical agents by ISIL, the NBCD respirator and protective suit is kept close to the remainder of PPE. NBCD medical countermeasures, including auto-injectors and tablets, are held by the Cdn contingent on Union III ready to be issued if required. Contingent personnel dress in combats and Key buildings such as the dining hall and gym have had robust overhead protection installed to protect from indirect fire and concrete blast barriers called "T walls" encircle many of the buildings. There are also numerous concrete shelters around the camp that those caught in the open can use as shelter in case of an indirect fire attack. There is a callout plan in place to confirm 100% accountability after each attack. Baghdad is divided into two "zones", an International Zone (where Union III is located) which is secured by fencing and Iraqi checkpoints and a "Red Zone" where security is much lower. Many staff conduct numerous trips outside the camp for liaison purposes. This necessitates the wearing of PPE and travel in SUVs with a close protection detail.	Few Coalition members are permitted to travel outside of the secure International Zone. Those that do, including the MLT, must travel and When travelling in Baghdad personnel must wear PPE and maintain a heightened level of vigilance on their surroundings. At Union III, personnel must always maintain PPE in an easily and quickly accessible location. They must remain alert and attentive to their surroundings when around the camp in order to be able to respond to an alarm.
2	**Daily Routine**	The daily routine begins with PT starting between 0600-0630. Office hours vary but most personnel work from 0730 to 2100 hrs. Some meetings and events occur outside of these hours. works 12 hour night shifts only (every day, all tour). personnel have two weekly resiliency periods from 0700-1200. personnel have one half-day resiliency period per week. Travel to and from Baghdad and other locations is often at night. Personnel are not authorized to wear civilian clothing (less PT gear) in off hours and are not permitted to leave to camp except for work purposes.	There is very limited time for relaxation on the camp, for contacting NOK and/or for personal administration. Personnel are not authorized to wear civilian clothing (less PT gear) in off hours. There are no "walking out" privileges so leisure options are very limited which can contribute to increased stress levels and decreased morale. High tempo, long work days and evening travel requirements disrupt normal sleep patterns.
3	**Conditions and Equipment for Operational Tasks**	Offices are in a refurbished building and are over crowded; for instance, four to a room. Computers and office equipment are provided, but not enough to fully equip everyone. Supplies are limited due to the difficulty of getting cargo into Camp Union III. Meetings outside of Camp Union III require close protection team support. For the MLT, given that it is a new capability, equipment continues to arrive in Baghdad.	Equipment shortages have to be mitigated and work arounds found, ie/ sharing computers. Some communications have had to be improvised while the contingent awaits its full suite of gear to be purchased and sent and the overall impact is loss of productivity, delays in communications resulting in mis-communications or delays in reqs for requirements. Lack of the has hampered liaison travel for the MLT.

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4	**Foreign Contingents**	The primary contingent on Camp Union III is and the Coalition is composed of personnel from nations such as There are Iraqi forces living in and working on the camp and providing some of the perimeter security.	Working in a coalition environment creates challenges and delays working through differences in culture, operating procedures, proficiencies and language. Sharing information between and is difficult. As well, operating on numerous computer systems (NIPR, SIPR, SIPR Rel, BICES) exacerbates communications challenges.
5	**Local Forces / Police**	Personnel at Union III are co-located with an security force that is responsible for part of the camp security. They are responsive and somewhat professional. As well, there are senior Iraqi officers who work on the camp in co-operation with Coalition personnel. The dining hall is shared with personnel and there is an accommodation section on the camp. MLT personnel who regularly travel outside the camp interact with Security Forces as part of their liaison duties and as they travel through Iraqi checkpoints. Senior Iraqi officers have been professional and hospitable in meetings.	forces often have divided loyalties between the government and local militias, especially those working in the Ministry of the Interior. Others are known to be corrupt. Local checkpoints may be in control of police forces or to local militias. Cdn personnel have to maintain vigilance in their engagements at all times and be aware of OPSEC in dealing with Iraqi personnel. Force Protection must be constantly assessed and considered in all situations.

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Hardship Part 2 – Sustainment and Leisure

	Factor	Description	Effect on Deployed Contingent
1	**Accommodations, Sleep Comfort and Privacy**	Cdn pers posted to CJFLCC-I are housed individually in used Combat Housing Units (CHUs) that have been repurposed for accommodation. Prior to use they were vacant and significantly degraded. Air conditioning is available. A single bed with one set of sheets and pillow is provided. They are noisy due to the air conditioning and plumbing. Cdn pers posted to CJTF-OIR (including MLT) are housed in a repurposed warehouse that is having temporary accommodations space built into it (photos attached). Doors and walls are thin and noise carries from the hallways into the rooms. A few pers have individual rooms, but the majority are housed 2, 3 or 4 to a room in bunkbeds. The building is still a construction zone with dust and construction waste throughout, significantly reducing the air quality. There are occasional power failures. Air conditioning is provided in rooms only. There is little privacy and significant noise. Contracted personnel clean the washrooms (to a low standard) but not the hallways or communal areas.	Contingent personnel have poor sleep quality due to noise. The lower standard of hygiene, along with the poor air quality, may affect the health of individuals. Lack of privacy restricts ability to relax in the rooms.
2	**Washrooms/Ablution Facilities**	There are two standards for washroom and ablution facilities. Cdn pers deployed with CJFLCC-I have washroom and ablution facilities in each CHU, though these are degraded due to their age and heavy use. Cdn pers deployed with CJTF-OIR HQ (including MLT) use communal washrooms. Washroom facilities located in their accommodations building are not air-conditioned, are poorly ventilated, in poor repair and provide only 2 showers and 3 toilets for 50 people and this number will increase shortly. Water supply to the existing ablution facilities shuts down on occasion due to overuse. Additional washroom and ablution facilities are available in a trailer 50m from the accommodation building. Communal washrooms are cleaned by a contracted service which is not of a high standard.	Personnel have to be careful to try to maintain appropriate standards of hygiene in the washroom areas due to the standard of cleanliness and the number of personnel that use them. There are wait times for showers and the lack of air conditioning or ventilation in shower areas limits the effectiveness of the showers.
3	**Food Supply And Preparation**	Three meals a day are offered at the contracted DFAC. There are no personal food preparation areas or restaurants available. Hard rations are not consumed.	Food quality is good with some variety but becomes mundane as the same menu is repeated weekly and the same items are in the salad bar day after day. Inability to prepare own food or go to a restaurant for a change can negatively effect morale after several months.
4	**Drinking Water**	Tap water is non-potable. Bottled water is provided.	Pers must use bottled water for ablutions and hydration. Adequate amounts of water are available and pers are reminded to stay hydrated.

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5	**Personal Communications Capability**	There are no morale or welfare phones available. Personnel can purchase local Iraqi cell phones and data/calling cards from the local kiosk Expensive, and unreliable, internet service is available in some, but not all, rooms through US WICOM.	Members purchase internet access at their own expense and/or local telephones. The lack of reliable comms and intermittent connectivity creates frustration and can decrease morale as it limits contact with family and friends.
6	**Standing Restrictions on Personal Liberty**	Personnel are normally restricted to Camp Union III. Some MLT members have a requirement to conduct meetings with personnel at the US Embassy compound across from Union III. MLT members and some senior officers will visit Iraqi Ministries and other Embassy compounds in Baghdad as part of their official duties. These movements in the city are deliberate and require There is no leisure travel or movement authorized. There is a zero consumption policy in effect for alcohol.	Camp Union III is a small location with few amenities so the inability to leave the camp creates an additional level of isolation for personnel.
7	**Morale, Welfare and Recreation**	PSP has provided two game system. There are shared by a few individuals, but are not generally used because of a lack of common facilities. There are no facilities where members can go to relax or socialize. There is a basic gym that easily becomes overcrowded, a small CrossFit room, as well as a one mile outdoor route. There are no PSP provided items. There are no morale and welfare services on the camp and no place for personnel to socialize after work. There is a small common area in the American USO that is utilized by approx 550 US personnel at the other end of the camp.	Personnel have nowhere to relax and decompress after long work days. No entertainment options are provided. The coalition does not have adequate space to permit the establishment of a welfare gym/facilities.
8	**Postal Services**	Mail can be received from Canada but it takes 7-8 weeks for deliver. Mail can be sent to Canada via the US Postal Service but it is prohibitively expensive. For example, it costs $25.00 USD to send a postcard to Canada.	Almost no mail is sent or received resulting in few morale packages from Canada which increases isolation. Handling of items on coalition transport is a risk, e.g., a TV was thrown off the back of the helicopter and was damaged beyond repair, and it took over 6 wks to receive desk lamps and a coffee maker due to coalition airmov priorities.
9	**Access to Retail and Service Facilities**	There is a very small PX with only small supply of toiletries and other basic items available. There is also one local electronics retailer with a kiosk, and one small rug merchant. There are no restaurants or entertainment facilities on Union III.	Personnel have access to basic toiletries, tobacco and snack items through the PX but otherwise must bring all other items with them.

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Hardship Part 3 – Operating Environment

	Factor	Description	Effect on Deployed Contingent
1	**Accessibility and Standard of Health Services Support**	health facilities are not used. There is an (basic clinic) on Camp Union III. There are no specialist, surgical, imaging, dental or diagnostic services available at Union III. These services can only be found at the US led Role 3 hospital on the which requires helicopter transport and overnight stay. There is a Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell manned 24/7 to provide medical evacuation from Union III to for medical emergencies. Non-emergency flights have to be booked days in advance. There is a wide range of North American standard pharmaceuticals available at the role 1 clinic at Union III.	To receive dental exams, more comprehensive tests, or for any treatment beyond what a basic clinic can provide, personnel must travel by helicopter to the hospital. Wait period for non-emergency flights means that a person may have to wait additional time for tests or treatment. Helicopters are often full or cancelled and it is not uncommon to be bumped from a flight. As a result, a simple procedure at could take a person away from Union III for 3 days or more.
2	**Local Climate**	Baghdad is hot and arid. On numerous days in the summer, temperatures at Camp Union III have surpassed 50 degrees Celsius. There are frequent sandstorms and significant air pollution in the city. Vehicles are air-conditioned and some personnel, mainly CP, linguists or signallers are occasionally required to work outdoors for any length of time.	Air conditioning units are required in all accommodations, workspaces and dining facilities. Personnel must ensure adequate hydration and avoid prolonged periods outdoors. There are frequent days when the air quality at Camp Union III is degraded and outdoor exercise or prolonged exposure must be minimized.
3	**Exposure To Death / Use of Deadly Force**	There is minimal to no direct exposure to death or the use of deadly force. There have been no instances of the use of deadly force. However, personnel at CJFLCC-I ar einvolved in the targeting process which can involve observing the effects of airstrikes via live UAV feeds including death and injury. MLT teams travel in high risk areas of the city where the risk of terrorist activity is high and exposure to or witnessing of kinetic activity causing death is possible.	Regular, real-time observation of the effects of airstrikes has been known to have negative psychological effects on personnel. No Canadian mental health, social worker, chaplain is available at the camp. These services require travel which is a significant barrier for members to seek care. MLT teams travel in the Baghdad several times a week, and have increased potential of exposure to witnessing kinetic activity.
4	**Exposure To Human Suffering, Misery and Inhumanity**	There is no direct exposure to human suffering, misery and inhumanity.	Nil.

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Departmental Hardship and Risk Committee

5	**Social Isolation**	The number of Canadians at Camp Union III has increased and there are large contingents from culturally similar countries such as the and Europe. No Canadian TV or magazines are available. The provides some television programming in the Dinning Facility and gym. Movement from the Canadian Camp in Kuwait to Baghdad is difficult, time consuming, and can at times, take several days if flights are delayed or cancelled. procedures, while similar, are different enough that they take time to learn and integration into the headquarters is challenging.	The difficulty in travelling and shipping goods between Kuwait and Baghdad increases isolation and makes it challenging to find replacement items for Canadian specific equipment or to bring new equipment into Baghdad. Visits from other DND members in theatre or from Canada are awkward, travel is time consuming and very difficult to arrange. Canadians do not have access to all classified systems and this makes integrating into the headquarters challenging as most information is found on only systems. There can be increased stress from living and working in confined accommodations and on a small camp with limited social resources.
6	**Local Language and Culture**	is a Muslim country and the local language is Arabic.	For the most part, interaction with the local population and Government officials requires the use of an interpreter. Personnel have to be aware of Muslim customs, especially during times such as Ramadan, and act appropriately.
7	**Local Population Attitude**	Government officials with whom personnel interact are outwardly friendly toward the Coalition. However, many have connections to Shia militias who are known to be unfriendly towards the Coalition presence. Many checkpoints in the city are manned by Shia militia whose attitude toward the Coalition can vary from indifferent to hostile. Their actions can be unpredictable.	Few Coalition members are permitted to travel outside of the secure International Zone. Those that do, including the MLT, must travel in three car convoys with at least 6 professional Close Protection personnel and in armoured civilian SUVs. Travel occurs several times a week. Official interactions with government members have to take into account the fact that their loyalties and allegiances may be suspect.

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RISK LEVEL
SUBMISSION FORM

CJTF-OIR HQ FWD / MLT and
CONTINGENT / TASK FORCE / UNIT

OP IMPACT
OPERATION NAME

BAGHDAD
LOCATION

PERIOD



Prepared by: _____ 17 Aug 16
Date

Reviewed by: _____ 19 Aug 16
Date

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Risk Part 1 – Kinetic Activities

	Factors	Description	Effect on Deployed Contingent
1	**Threat Posed by Hostile Forces**	ISIL targets Baghdad weekly with suicide bombings, IEDs and direct fire attacks. IED attacks occur several times a week and often target Iraqi Security Force checkpoints in addition to civilian markets. There have been two indirect fire attacks near coalition compounds in recent months: one in May and one in July. Kidnappings for ransom are common in Baghdad. ISIL has also used chemical munitions against Iraqi forces. The details on the threat in Baghdad are classified and the CJOC Operational Threat Assessment for Baghdad should be consulted for these. Baghdad is divided into two "zones": an International Zone (where Union III is located) which is secured by fencing and Iraqi checkpoints and a 'Red Zone' where security is much lower. Sectarian violence not aimed at coalition forces is an almost daily event in Baghdad.	Significant travel restrictions are placed on the entire Coalition. However, the MLT, as part of its duties, must move throughout the International Zone and many parts of the Red Zone. Due to the threat, all personnel must travel in Everyone must and must keep it close at hand when in the camp, As well, personnel have been directed to wear civilian clothing when in the Red Zone to minimize their profile. NBCD medical countermeasures are kept read for issue. Despite the mitigation measures ISIL terrorist activity and other secretairan violence/attacks are by nature unpredictable thus our people may be affected when moving through the city.
2	**Civil Instability**	Iraq generally, and Baghdad specifically, is politically unstable at the moment. There is an ongoing possibility of civil disturbances. The International Zone, in which Camp Union III is located, was breached twice in the Spring 2016 by thousands of protestors demanding government reforms. They did not enter Camp Union III or any other secure compound during those protests, but there is risk that large numbers of protesters could overwhelm the camp security. Protests also occur along routes that are regularly travelled by MLT personnel. Criminal violence and activity is prevalent and there are a number of neighborhoods in Baghdad that are restricted travel zones.	There are significant restrictions on mobility as described in the paragraph above. Personnel may leave the camp only for specifically planned work requirements. Additional movement restrictions are placed on personnel on those days most likely to see protests.
3	**Risk Caused By Other Contingents and/or Neighbouring National Forces**	The main risk from other contingents is from the While many members of the are professional, some are not and may also have mixed allegiances. The are penetrated by local militias with varying agendas. Transport of personnel and cargo is reliant on coalition assets. Prioritization of contingent needs is difficult and personnel have priority.	The greatest risk from host nation forces is for those personnel travelling in the Red Zone. Various militias control their own checkpoints and their uniforms can be indistinguishable from regular police. Their attitudes towards coalition personnel can pose a problem for coalition personnel attempting to transit through those areas. The reliance on coalition airlift for both for personnel and cargo transport adds a great deal of inconvenience and causing impacts on operations due to delays and the lower priority placed on personnel.

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Departmental Hardship and Risk Committee

Risk Part 2 – Operational Environment

	Factors	Description	Effect on Deployed Contingent
1	**Geospatial**	Baghdad is subject to considerable pollution, including from vehicle exhaust and an oil refinery located 11 miles away. Living quarters are old, degraded and indoor air quality is subjectively suboptimal but has not been tested or monitored by Canadian PMed. Air quality testing apparently falls within American standards. There is no evidence to suggest a risk from existing radioactive material, toxic industrial chemicals/ material, or Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) contamination in the local area; although risk of CBRN attack exists as discussed above. There is negligible soil contamination threat or risk of exposure to hazardous flora or fauna. Flies, mosquitos, rodents, snakes, cats, and cockroaches are present in the camp and do carry a small health protection risk. There is a small risk of UXO when travelling in Baghdad.	There are some days that pollution will restrict outdoor exercise and activity on Union III. Contingent members must practice standard force heath protection measures to avoid insect bites and contact with animals. Members must clean their quarters and office spaces regularly to minimise risk. Members must also be cautious in moving about the camp as there are many loose items and equipment that may shelter flora and fauna.
2	**Health and Hygiene**	Dining Halls have contracted workers conducting food preparation. Sanitary conditions were found to be acceptable by a inspection. Potable water is provided by water bottles only. There is an assessed low risk of Leishmaniosis, Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever, and Sand Fly Fever. There have been several significant infestations of crickets and grasshoppers that have invaded both accommodations blocks, offices, and living spaces. The accumulation of dead crickets and grasshoppers combined with the poor cleaning practices of the cleaners in the communal areas and ablution facilities can create unsanitary conditions. There is only an at camp Union III. Diagnostic imaging, specialized lab testing and medical specialists are available at the Role 3 in Non-urgent transport to can take several days due to overburdened travel system and flight delays/cancellations. Medical emergencies are managed by the Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell to the Role 3 in Further evacuation to Kuwait, Arifjan or LRMC in Germany may be required. Medical Evacuation requires ground transport to the Embassy helipad and then rotary wing evacuation.	Cricket and Grasshopper infestations have required the spraying of pesticides in living spaces and work areas. They have had a negative effect on morale and hygiene. Members must clean their quarters and office spaces frequently. Due to significant travel delays, even non-urgent medical issues will have an impact on personnel and operations.

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3	**Physical Geography and Effects**	There are periodic high winds, sandstorms and extreme heat waves with temperature exceeding 50 degrees Celsius in Baghdad. There is a requirement for CJTF MLT personnel to travel by road but infrastructure (signage, traffic signals), while challenging, does not offer a significant risk. The Mosul Dam faces a serious and unprecedented risk of catastrophic failure with little warning. A catastrophic breach of the Mosul Dam would result in severe loss of life, mass population displacement, and destruction of the majority of the infrastructure within the path of the projected flood wave. The flood wave would resemble an in-land tidal wave between Mosul and Samarra. Baghdad would experience standing water for weeks to months. As floodwaters recede, mud and waste-covered remnants of previous infrastructure will be left behind. Over a million people are estimated to perish in the initial flooding, with millions more displaced. Infrastructure for much of the flood zone will be destroyed including potable water, power, communications, medical services, buildings, roads and other means of transport.	Contingent members must accommodate and adapt to extremes of weather. Travel within Baghdad requires considerable planning and consideration of alternate routes, as well as working with a translator to navigate security check points. Mosul Dam flooding that affects Baghdad is not a high probability, but it would have a catastrophic effect on the people of Iraq and the contingent in Baghdad. Contingency plans exist.

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

Individual bedrooms in a CHU – - 2 x Canadian GO
- With a pers washroom
- 1 x locker



Individual bedroom in a CHU
– (Only CJFLCC)
- 5 x Canadian
- 1 x locker
– No pers washroom

CJFLCC HOUSING – BASED ON CHU DESIGN

CJOC Op Impact (Baghdad)
Hardship Substantiation - 2016 09

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Individual bedrooms in Bldg 13 - 5 x Canadians
- 10' x 10 room
– 1 x locker storage space
– no pers washroom

2 x mbr bedrooms in Bldg 13 - 8 x Canadians
- 14' x 12' room
– 2 x locker storage space
– no pers washroom

CJTF-OIR HOUSING Building 13
– BASED ON REVAMPED GARAGE / OFFICE SPACE

CJOC Op Impact (Baghdad)
Hardship Substantiation - 2016 09

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

New quarters in Building 13
– 4 per room on bunk beds.
– 13’ x 16’
- 2 desks 2 lockers 2 night tables
- No pers washroom



4 to 6 x mbr bedrooms in Bldg 13 - 16 x Canadians
- 15’ x 15’ room
– 6 x locker storage space in separate room
– no pers washroom

CJTF-OIR HOUSING Building 13
– BASED ON REVAMPED GARAGE / OFFICE SPACE

CJOC Op Impact (Baghdad)
Hardship Substantiation - 2016 09

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

FEMALE WASHROOM
– CURRENTLY 8 X FEMALES IN BUILDING 13

CJOC Op Impact (Baghdad)
Hardship Substantiation - 2016 09

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





MALE WASHROOM – CURRENTLY 45 X MALES IN BUILDING 13
Plan is to build a set of washroom facilities on 2nd floor
– time To Be Determined

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Hardship Substantiation - 2016 09

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CRICKET PROBLEMS IN ALL ROOMS, HALLWAYS AND WASHROOM FACILITIES.
THESE PICS ARE COMMON OCCURRENCES

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Hardship Substantiation - 2016 09

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

CRICKET PROBLEMS IN ALL ROOMS, HALLWAYS AND WASHROOM FACILITIES.
THESE PICS ARE COMMON OCCURRENCES

CJOC Op Impact (Baghdad)
Hardship Substantiation - 2016 09

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



CONSTANT CONSTRUCTION IN QUARTERS

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Office Layout –
4 x Members per room
– All ranks less GO



Protective Personal Equipment
– must be within location of military Members

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

Weights and cardio room



Northern leg of the road

Running availability on road around the FOB that which is 1.6km.

FITNESS FACILITIES / ACTIVITIES AVAILABLE

CJOC Op Impact (Baghdad)
Hardship Substantiation - 2016 09

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SMALL
PX IS
AVAILABLE

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



ONLY COMMON AREA AVAILABLE IS AN
LOCATED AT ONE END OF THE FOB

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Commander Commandant

Canadian Joint Operations Command
Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2

3350-01 (J1 – RDIMS #413278)

29 September 2016

Distribution List

DESIGNATION OF COMMANDING OFFICER –
OPERATION IMPACT JOINT TASK FORCE

References: A. CDS Order – Designation of Commanding Officers, 19 August 2013
B. QR&O 101.07 – Training and Certification of Superior Commanders and Commanding Officers

1. I hereby designate to exercise the powers of a Commanding Officer in respect of all Canadian military, civilian and exchange personnel attached to the Role 2B Hospital within JTF-I for Op IMPACT.

2. Appropriate terms of reference must be developed and issued to has met the training standard in accordance with reference B, and must continue to meet the requirements during his designation as Commanding Officer. This designation is effective upon transfer of command authority and will be in effect until redeployment or until rescinded at my direction.

S.J. Bowes
Lieutenant-General

Distribution List

Action

Comd JTF-I

Information

CJOC//COS Ops/COS Sp/J1/J3/J8/LEGAD
Comd ATF-I

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Operations Assessment

Op IMPACT

October 2016

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AGENDA

1. Factors

2. Coalition Assessment

3. CAF Assessment
   - CC 150T
   - CC 140M
   - ASIC
   - MLT
   - JTF-I HQ Contribution

4. Conclusion

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Operation Assessments

Assessments are like PT … everyone agrees that it's a good idea but it's the first thing to get cut from the schedule.

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Op IMPACT Assessment

FACTORS:

The Mission: CAF's stated mission to contribute to the coalition as opposed to more specific, measurable operational objectives with associated Main Efforts and End States is largely incompatible with conventional operation assessments.

- *Mitigation -- The Assessment Team decided to focus on the CAF level of contribution.*

Data Issues: The inability of the Assessment Team to access data from coalition partners does not allow us to make a meaningful assessment of our contribution in relation to our partners.

- *Mitigation -- The Op Assessment will measure CAF contribution month over month in the context of overall Op tempo to gauge our level of contribution.*

Staff Overload: COS Ops direction was given to minimize the deployed staff effort regarding Operation Assessments that resulted in certain data sources not being explored.

- *Mitigation -- The Op Assessment will measure CAF contribution month over month in the context of overall Op tempo to gauge our level of contribution.*

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Op IMPACT Assessment

FACTORS:

Late Start: The Assessment process was introduced to an on-going mission rather than being included from the beginning in the planning process and incorporated into the Op Battle Rhythm.

- *Mitigation -- The Assessment relied upon existing metrics (DSR/WSR) largely focussed on quantitative metrics.*

Resources: The resources the J5 was able to dedicate to Operation Assessments were more constrained that that of our allies. This constraint had an affect on the Operation Assessment comprehensiveness and product.

- *Mitigation – The Assessment brief and reported will be more streamlined than conventional assessment products.*

Direction: CJOC lacks a Comd directive with respect to conducting Operation Assessments that leads to confusion as to what level of effort is to be committed to the process.

- *Mitigation – An 'Assessment Champion' volunteered to mentor and guide the Assessment Process.*

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Op IMPACT

Mission:

As part of the Coalition and in collaboration with regional state partners, CAF will contribute to international efforts to degrade ISIL and assist Iraqi Forces to further demonstrate the GC's commitment to international peace and stability.

CAF Strategic Objectives:

Strengthen partnerships & collaboration with GoI and Coalition partners;

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Op IMPACT

Strategic Themes:

Protect vulnerable populations;

Enable GoI-led military actions against ISIL;

Build regional security capacity; and

Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL.

Strategic End State:

CAF has contributed to the Coalition and helped set the conditions to stabilize IRAQ and enabled Iraqi forces to assume autonomous responsibility for the security of IRAQ.

CAF Centre of Gravity:

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s.15(1)

s.13(1)

Operations Assessment

BLUF:

persist but will require action to address.

Syrian opposition continues to Syria remains a
DAESH or a

Overall the progress being made however the throughout the CJOA.

Coalition Military Campaign Plan, Semi-Annual Assessment

18 August 2016

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s.13(1)

s.15(1)

Assessment Summary

Coalition Operations have enabled partners to regain significant terrain and

including a As a result, DAESH is using more

persist but will require action to address.

The continues to improve and being assisted by the

Coalition Military Campaign Plan (CMCP) Intermediate

18 August 2016

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Post Mosul

Recommendations for the posture the Coalition for continue momentum toward the defeat of DAESH post-Mosul:

•

•

•

Coalition Military Campaign Plan (CMCP) Intermediate

18 August 2016

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Coalition Summary

Coalition Military Campaign Plan, Semi-Annual Assessment

18 August 2016

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CAF Assessment

BLUF:

Enable coalition fast air & ISR (CC -150t refuelling):

Provide ISR capability to Coalition (CC – 140M):

Meaningful contribution to coalition HQ; in terms of number, level of influence, and role of CAF SOs and Los:

Stand Up and Lead Ministerial Liaison Team:

The second report (December 2016) will add to the above the following;

- CTAT Jordan;
- CTAT Lebanon;
- Tac Aviation; and
- Role 2.

A0638595_12-000407

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s.15(1)

Activity: CC 150T (Refuelling)

Operational Effect: Enable Coalition Fast Air and ISR

Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL





Facts (during reporting period):

- CAF is operating on a cycle.
- CAF delivered fuel during the reporting period.
- Average msn length is
- CAF delivered coalition air coverage)
- (but had little affect on CAF contribution)
- August saw a and

Contribution:

The CAF contributes on any given week.

The CAF has the ability to

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Activity: CC 150T (Refuelling)
Operational Effect: Enable Coalition Fast Air and ISR
Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

Observation:

- CAF contribution has been consistent.
-
- CC-150 is
- CAF can not be compared to coalition as stats are unavailable.
-

Recommendation:

- Reporting on missions executed v missions received.
- Efforts need to determine if we can get other coalition partner meta-data for comparison purposes.

Assessment:

throughout the reporting period and have contributed
issues during the CAF continued its level of contribution and assumed mission on behalf of other coalition partners

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s.15(1)

Activity: CC 150T (Refuelling)

Operational Effect: Enable Coalition Fast Air and ISR

Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

CC-150T (REFUELLER)						
	HRS FLOWN	VUL HRS	MSNS	SORTIES	FUEL TRANSFERRED (Mlbs)	COALITION STRIKES (Iraq)

Notes:

CC-150T (REFUELLER)						
	HRS FLOWN	VUL HRS	MSNS	SORTIES	FUEL TRANSFERRED (Mlbs)	COALITION STRIKES (Iraq)

Notes:

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Activity: CC 140M (ISR/Aurora)

Operational Effect: Provide ISR capability to Coalition

Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL





Facts (during reporting period):

- Reporting on the
- CAF observed
- Average mission
- CC 140 Capability was not impacted by serviceability issues

Contribution:

The CAF contributes
activities.

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Activity: CC 140M (ISR/Aurora)

Operational Effect: Provide ISR capability to Coalition

Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

CC-140M (ISR/AURORA)					
	HRS FLOWN	VUL HOURS	MSNS	SORTIES	POINTS OF INTEREST OBSERVED

Notes:

	CC-140M (ISR/AURORA)Trends					
	Ratio of Hrs Flown to Vul Hours	Hrs per mission	Vul Hrs per Msn	Points of Interest Per Msn	Points of Interest Per Vul Hr	Points Observed per Tgt

Notes:

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Activity: CC 140M (ISR/Aurora)

Operational Effect: Provide ISR capability to Coalition

Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

Observation:

- CAF has been a consistent contributor
- The points of interest observed
- The CAF contribution from the coalition is significant.
- Coalition partners are

Recommendation:

- Efforts need to determine if we can get other coalition partner meta-data for more accurate comparison purposes.

Assessment:

The CAF contribution has been consistent with the number of missions conducted throughout the reporting period and maintains a The consistency in hours per mission and missions per month indicates a environment. This is likely a result of but should this trend continue, the

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Activity: ASIC
Operational Effect: Coalition and Canadian Efforts
Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

Developed
Struck
Transferred
In Development

ASIC PRODUCTS

Since May	
Last 30 Days	

Facts (during reporting period):

- ASIC contribution has
-
- The last 30 days has seen

Contribution:

The ASIC contribution, as part of an overall coalition effort is
other

only measure its performance against itself.

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Activity: CC 140M (ISR/Aurora)

Operational Effect: Provide ISR capability to Coalition

Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

	INTELLIGENCE (ASIIC)				
	Developed	Struck	Transferred	In Development	Coalition Strikes (Iraq)

Notes:

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Activity: ASIC
Operational Effect: Coalition and Canadian Efforts
Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

Observation:

-
- A limited reporting period does not give enough data to determine the level to which the ASIC is contributing.
-

Recommendation:

- Efforts need to determine if we can get other coalition partner meta-data for comparison purposes.
-

they are doing.

Assessment:

The ASIC's consistency indicates a an upward trend but without additional metrics or an extended timeline, the level of ASIC contribution (with the comparative data from other participating nations)

RISK:

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Activity: Ministerial Liaison Team
Operational Effect: Set the conditions for cohesive a GoI through institution building and key leader relationships
Theme: Build Regional Security Capacity

MLT Engagements



Facts (during reporting period):

- The MLT has spent
- Existing metrics indicate that the

Contribution:

This is an important initiative, strategically and operationally, for the Coalition, the Government of Canada and Op IMPACT.

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Activity: CC 140M (ISR/Aurora)
Operational Effect: Provide ISR capability to Coalition
Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

Ministerial Liaison Team	

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Activity: Ministerial Liaison Team
Operational Effect: Set the conditions for cohesive a GoI through institution building and key leader relationships
Theme: Build Regional Security Capacity

Observation:

-
-
-
-

Recommendation:

- It is recommended that the number of engagements be noted
- It is recommended that the Director of the MLT and/or his staff be directly engaged to identify practical and attainable metrics that can be used in future assessments.

Assessment:
Before any assessment of the MLT can be performed,
the MLT has made progress in establishing relationships and has maintained a high profile among Canada's coalition partners and diplomatic community.

RISK:

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Activity: Maintain the JTF-I HQ with as required.
Operational Effect: Provide meaningful contribution to JTF-I HQ
Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

Rank Dispersion (OIR HQ)



Positions by Priority



Facts (during reporting period):

- The nature of HQ and Staff duties makes it difficult to assess the level of commitment.
- The composition of CAF contingent in terms of rank reflects of a high level of commitment to the coalition.
- The number of CAF members occupying Priority identified billets is a further indication of our level of contribution.
- Fixed positions and tour-length will render this metric static month-over-month.

Contribution:

The JTF-I HQ contribution, as part of an overall coalition effort cannot be measured without comparable data. This confirms that the CAF can only measure its performance against itself through increasing or decreasing levels of priority positions.

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DIVULGUÉ EN VERTU DE LA LAI - RENSEIGNEMENTS NON CLASSIFIÉS

Activity: Maintain the JTF-I HQ with as required.
Operational Effect: Provide meaningful contribution to JTF-I HQ
Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

Observation:

- A high proportion of the CAF contingent consists of experience NCOs and Officers.
- A high percentage of the CAF contingent occupies priority positions with nearly Priority 1 positions.
- The static nature of HQ billets means this metric will not change substantially month-to-month.
- The CAF bids for certain positions making this metric static

Recommendation:

- This metric should no longer be assessed as there is currently no way to measure individual effectiveness qualitatively and quantitatively the metrics provide no value.
- Any further action on this metric would only have value as part of larger CAF initiatives regarding gender inclusiveness, such as:
  - The level female representation;
  - Female representation compared to priority level; and
  - Above metrics compared to partners.

Assessment: UN-DETERMINED
Any assessment of JTF-I HQ contribution needs to be considered in the context of other partners' contributions including their rank breakdown and dispersion of priority-identified positions.

RISK: The risk of the CAF
However, without further metrics, the operational impact can not be defined.

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OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The CAF is achieving its results in 3 of 5 operational effects examined.

n Air Operations will see the CAF continue to make a significant contribution to the efforts to defeat DAESH.

The CAFs area of contribution remains with the ATF.

The MLT is showing despite and it is expected that a change in reporting will better reflect this progress.

Existing do not properly reflect the work they are doing.

Without comparable data from partner nations, CAF JTF-I HQ contribution can not be assessed in any meaningful way.

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Operations Assessment

Op IMPACT

October 2016

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

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

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

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

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CANADIAN JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND | COMMANDEMENT DES OPÉRATIONS INTERARMÉES DU CANADA

Op IMPACT

Strategic Themes:

Protect vulnerable populations;

Enable GoI-led military actions against ISIL;

Build regional security capacity; and

Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL.

Strategic End State:

CAF has contributed to the Coalition and helped set the conditions to stabilize IRAQ and enabled Iraqi forces to assume autonomous responsibility for the security of IRAQ.

CAF Centre of Gravity:

Legitimacy in the eyes of the Canadian Public, Iraqi citizens and the broader Middle East population.

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

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Coalition Assessment

Coalition Operations have enabled partners to regain significant terrain and impose military and economic pressure on DAESH in both Iraq and Syria.

Coalition and Russian actions have resulted in territorial and resources losses including a decrease in foreign fighters. As a result, DAESH is using more asymmetric operations to fight and defend terrain.

The Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) continues to improve and being assisted by the reinstatement of the Syria Train and Equip authority.

Coalition Military Campaign Plan (CMCP) Intermediate

18 August 2016

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

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Coalition Summary

A broad Coalition established and resourced. **MODERATE PROGRESS**.

Coalition Military Campaign Plan, Semi-Annual Assessment

18 August 2016

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CAF Assessment

BLUF:

Enable coalition fast air & ISR (CC -150T refuelling): **POSITIVE.**

Provide ISR capability to Coalition (CC – 140M): **POSITIVE**

The second report (January 2017) will also assess the following capabilities;

- CTAT Jordan;
- CTAT Lebanon;
- Tac Aviation; and
- Role 2.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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CANADIAN JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND — COMMANDEMENT DES OPÉRATIONS INTERARMÉES DU CANADA

Activity: CC 140M (ISR/Aurora)
Operational Effect: Provide ISR capability to Coalition
Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

	INTELLIGENCE (ASIIC)				
	Developed	Struck	Transferred	In Development	Coalition Strikes (Iraq)
MAY					
JUN					
JUL					
AUG					
Notes					

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CANADIAN JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND | COMMANDEMENT DES OPÉRATIONS INTERARMÉES DU CANADA

Activity: ASIC
Operational Effect: Establish Robust Intelligence presence to support Coalition and Canadian Efforts
Theme: Support Coalition efforts to degrade, disrupt and defeat ISIL

Observation:	Recommendation:
•	•
•	•
•	

Assessment:

RISK:

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CANADIAN JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND | COMMANDEMENT DES OPÉRATIONS INTERARMÉES DU CANADA

Activity: Ministerial Liaison Team
Operational Effect: Set the conditions for cohesive a GoI through institution building and key leader relationships
Theme: Build Regional Security Capacity

MLT Engagements

Facts (during reporting period):
•
•

Contribution:

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CANADIAN JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND | COMMANDEMENT DES OPÉRATIONS INTERARMÉES DU CANADA

Activity: Ministerial Liaison Team
Operational Effect: Set the conditions for cohesive a GoI through institution building and key leader relationships
Theme: Build Regional Security Capacity

Observation:	Recommendation:
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Assessment:

RISK:

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

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

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

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SOPG

IMPACT Post-Mosul: Updating Military Options for the Refocused Operation

BGen Lise Bourgon
Director-General Operations

17 October 2016

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Supporting Orgs

CJOC	CANSOFCOM
ADM(Pol)	DJAG Ops
CFINTCOM	CMP (H Svcs)
CA	RCAF
RCN	ADM(PA)
ADM(Fin)	VCDS (DFL)

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Agenda

- Introduction: Define objectives and deliverables (Chair – SJS Ops)
- CDS Direction & Guidance (Chair – SJS Ops)
-
  –
- Update: GC intentions / WoG effort / Dip efforts (ADMPol)
- Situation: Liberation of Mosul Scenarios (CFINTCOM / CJOC J2)
- Review: International Campaign Effort, Regional Initiatives (SJS DGP, DPK Pol)
  - Coalition Intent / A post-Mosul Iraq / Syria / Review Endstate
- Update: Mission Review – LoE 2 (CANSOFCOM) LoE 3,4 (CJOC)
- Discuss: FG and Other Pressures (CA, RCAF, RCN, CMP, ADMFin, et al)
- Review: Required Output / Tasks (Chair)
- Discussion / Final comments (All)

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Objectives

- Shared understanding of Strategic environment associated with GC strategy for countering Da'esh in Iraq/Syria
- Shared understanding of Operational implications of potential CAF options in IMPACT JOA
- Shared understanding of CDS intent for provision of military advice to GC
- Direction / Guidance to supporting organizations for provision of military options in support of CDS intent

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s.21(1)(a)
s.21(1)(b)
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s.21(1)(a)
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Review Previous Direction

Ref: SJS DGO Email 06 Oct 16 – Planning Guidance

-

- Immediately and update throughout; SJS plans to provide to most current appreciation of emerging capability requirements across emerging CAF missions
- NLT 14 Oct 16; Operational level OP IMPACT mission review completed
- NLT 14 Oct 16; Identification of proposed transition conditions for each capability currently employed within OP IMPACT mission
- NLT 14 Oct 16; Force generator review of Force Generator pressures in light of emerging CAF operations
-
- NLT 21 Oct; Proposed military analysis and option analysis paper concerning transfer of capabilities drafted, vetted by L1s and submitted/briefed to DOS
- NLT 28 Oct; Decision brief to CDS

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CDS Direction

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s.21(1)(c)

- **Situation:** Status quo IMPACT composition reflects intact FLOT, intact political situation. Mandate expires 31 Mar 2017
- Impending Liberation of Mosul efforts will precipitate varying geo-political scenarios. Authorization of force preparation options for next stage of CAF participation may be required well in advance of military defeat of Da'esh in Iraq
- Currently 3 broad areas – all subject to change
  -
  -
  -

- **CDS will present scenario sets and propose Force Prep options to MND for endorsement prior to 30 Nov 2016**

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Required Outputs

Scenario Sets (several)
Several short (1 para), descriptions of potential geo-political outcomes surrounding Mosul liberation efforts

Potential Coalition Responses

CAF Capability Sets (few)
Broad descriptions of capabilities that appropriately address outcomes above
Provided for MND pre-approval / endorsement as Military Response Options

MRO | MRO | MRO

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CAF Footprint : Current & Intended



Lebanon
- Capacity Building -

Jordan
- Capacity Building -

CJOC-I
- Avn Mobility: (4) x CH146
- C2: JTF-I Det
- C2: Embeds -
- Med: Role 2B Hospital
- Intel
- SOTF

CJFLCC-I HQ
CJTF-OIR HQ Fwd
- MLT -
- C2: Embeds -

Ali-Al Salem and Kuwait Intl (Kuwait)
- C2: JTF-I HQ -
- C2: ATF-I HQ
- Airborne ISR: x CP140
- Air Refueling: x CC150T
- Tgt Dev + Int Fusion (ASIC) -
- Support: JTFSC -
- Support: Op Sp Hub -

Arifjan (Kuwait)
CJTF-OIR HQ
- C2: Embeds -

Al Udeid, Qatar
CAOC-Q
- C2: Embeds

LEGEND:

Locations
COALITION HQs
- Increased CAF Capabilities (# of pers)

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ADM(PoI)

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S//REL TO CAN,

ADM(Pol) – GC Intent

- Refocused Mission and CAF support
- GAC objectives and programming in region
- GC diplomatic intentions
  - Embassy in Baghdad, Consular presence in Erbil
- NATO Training Mission / 'Reflagging'
- Authorities Required –
- Timelines / Cabinet schedule

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CFINTCOM / CJOC J2

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S//REL TO CAN,

International Campaign Update

CENTCOM/CJTF-OIR *(CJOC)*

- Coalition Resource & Authorities Conference (USCENTCOM 30 Aug – 1 Sep)
- Coalition Military Campaign Plan (CMCP) Update

International Coalition / GC partners *(SJS DGP, DPK PoI)*

- PoI updates, C-ISIL CHODS, DefMin conferences
- Iraq: Mosul and post-Da'esh Iraq
- Syria and regional concerns
- Host Nation concerns
- IDPs and imminent humanitarian crisis

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CANSOFCOM

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CJOC

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Medical Support

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Engineer and Specialist Support

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Tasks Outstanding

- CDS BN, Letter, briefing package on Military Response Options (SJS)

Dates subject to change

- **NLT 14 Nov** - Proposed military analysis and option analysis paper concerning transfer of capabilities drafted, vetted by L1s and submitted/briefed to DOS
- **NLT 21 Nov** – Decision brief to CDS
- **NLT 30 Nov** – CDS briefing to MND

Input required:

- Scenario Sets (CFINTCOM/CJOC J2)
- Potential Coalition Responses (CJOC/CANSOF)
- CAF Capability Sets (CJOC/CANSOFCOM)

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Questions

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Commander Commandant

Canadian Joint Operations Command
Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2

3350-1 (COS Sp – RDIMS #415091)

17 October 2016

Distribution List

DESIGNATION OF ACTING
COMMANDING OFFICER
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT HUB - KUWAIT

References: A. CDS Designation of Commanding Officers Order, 19 August 2013
B. QR&O 101.07 – Training and Certification of Superior Commanders and Commanding Officers

1. I hereby designate, as Commanding Officer of OSH Kuwait while LCol C.E.M. Deri is travelling outside Kuwait on official duties from:

a. 17th to 21st October 2016; and

b. 17th to 27th November 2016.

2. meets all the prerequisites for this position in accordance with reference B.

S.J. Bowes
Lieutenant-General

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Comd JTF-I Op IMPACT

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CCM #:

RDIMS #: 416885

CSNI File Path / Chemin d'accès IRSC :

CJOC TRANSMITTAL SHEET
FEUILLE DE TRANSMISSION COIC

SUBJECT / OBJET:

BRIEF DESCRIPTION / BREF DESCRIPTION: Designation of Commanding Officer – Op IMPACT JTF – IRAQ ROTO 4
SUSPENSE DATE / D'ÉCHÉANCE:

ORIGINATOR / DEMANDEUR:

Date	Name/Nom	Rank/Rang	Position/Poste	Local/Locale
03/11/2016	Riffou	Maj	J1 Exped Ops 1	2200

TO/À	REMARKS/REMARQUES	FROM/DE
CJOC/J1 Ops	For Review	4/11/16 CDR Person - J1 OPS Date Name, Rank, Position
CJOC/Leg Ad	For Review	(See Below) 4/11/16 Date Name, Rank, Position
CJOC/J1	For Review	CAPT(N) W. J. ROUTLEY CJOS J1 7/11/16 613-945-2385 Date Name, Rank, Position
CJOC/COS Sp	For Review	Date Name, Rank, Position
CJOC/COMD	For Approval and Signature	9 NOV 16. BGen Date Name, Rank, Position
		Date Name, Rank, Position
		Date Name, Rank, Position

Event Request: Required / Not Applicable
Demand Évènement: Requis / Sans Objet

ADVISOR(S) CONSULTED / CONSEILLER(S) CONSULTÉ(S)

ADVISOR(S) / CONSEILLER(S)			
LEGAD	SUPPORTED	Maj SL Collins LEGAD, CJOC LA 613-945-2336	4 NOV 16 Date Name, Rank, Position
			Date Name, Rank, Position
			Date Name, Rank, Position
			Date Name, Rank, Position

L1	EXTERNAL CONSULTATION / CONSULTATION EXTERNE	
		Date Name, Rank, Position
		Date Name, Rank, Position

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Canadian Joint Operations Command
Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2

7375-1 (J8 RDIMS #413528)

18 October 2016

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COMMAND COMPTROLLER INSPECTION
(CCI) REPORT OP IMPACT 4-8 JULY 2016

References: A. CJOC Operational Support Task Request - SAV 16-189 Op IMPACT
B. A-FN-1000-002/AG-006 Delegation of Authorities for Financial Adminsitration for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces

1. CJOC J8 staff conducted a CCI of Joint Task Force Iraq (JTF-I), OP IMPACT, 4-8 July 2016. The purpose of this inspection was to confirm that financial management is being conducted in accordance with Treasury Board and Departmental Policies.

2. Overall, it was assessed that financial functions were well managed. The CCI Team advised members of your staff of its findings during the inspection, with the detailed checklist having been provided to your J8. Observations and recommendations are provided at Annex A. Corrective actions identified should be addressed soonest in order to ensure compliance with current financial policies and to avoid repeat observations during future inspections.

3. Questions and concerns with respect to this report may be directed to the undersigned or J8 Long Term Plans and Policy, Major Berscheid-King at 613-990-4061.

R.B. Creighton
Capt(N)
CJOC J8/Compt

Annex and Distribution List (page 2)

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Annex:

Annex A: Observations

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Commander JTF-I (Brennan BGen SA@Deployed@OP IMPACT)

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COS Ops
COS Rdns
CJOC J1
CJOC J4/J4 Contracts
CJOC J8

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Annex A
7375-1 (J8 RDIMS #413528)
October 16

OBSERVATIONS

1. **Financial Management**. J8 and staff had a good system in place to monitor and track the DRMIS structure, with strong oversight on most established activities and financial implications (i.e. authorizing Section 32 via e-mail).

Recommendation: Consistent continued effort is required to ensure J8 is involved in planning new activities/procurement to ensure financial implications are communicated to CJOC staff (both J8 and J3).

2. **Delegation of Authorities (DoAs)**. Delegation documentation was well organized and well done, however the structure of Responsibility Centre (RC) Managers and RC Administrators varies notably from the chain of command in that the J8 holds RC Manager status over most funds. Although not technically in violation, the Manager and Administrator responsibility for funding should more closely reflect the chain of command for those functions and resources, allowing the J8 to provide more of an arm's length, oversight role.

Recommendation: *The DoA structure that is created for the next Roto should align RC* Managers and Administrators more appropriately with functional lines. J8 could be RC Administrator for most funds (as well as other personnel in each RC/functional line, ideally a minimum of one, i.e. 2IC), and the RC Manager delegation could be at the Officer Commanding (OC) level.

3. **Acquisition Cards**. Well managed overall. Monthly credit card statements were being approved by the Log Capt, however there was no evidence that all certification steps were completed. The RC Manager was not reviewing or certifying monthly statements IAW Section 34 of FAA. *Invoices were not being stamped paid once processed.*

Recommendation: Annex A checklist are to be used with each monthly statement, and final Section 34 certification must be done by the RC Manager. All invoices are to be stamped paid and dated. TF J8 to review all current FY files to ensure they are stamped paid.

Reference: Financial Administration Manual (FAM) 1016-3 Account Verification, para 12 (table – "Individuals Performing Steps of Account Verification - Annex A – checklist to be used), http://cfo-dpf.mil.ca/assets/FinCS_Intranet/docs/en/policy-procedure-fam/1016-3-cancelled.pdf, and FAM 1016-7-1 Acquisition Cards, para 26 Responsibilities – RC Manager, sub-para h – signing monthly statement certifying Section 34 of FAA) http://cfo-dpf.mil.ca/en/policy-procedure-fam/1016-7-1-acquisition-cards.page

4. **Invoice Processing**. Generally well done. There was some confusion regarding proper use of Payment on Due Date (PODD) when entering in DRMIS, however staff was receptive to the explanation provided and implemented corrective action for future transactions. Invoices were not consistently stamped paid (JTFSC LPO).

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Recommendation: No corrective action can be taken as payments have already been processed in DRMIS, however for future transactions, PODD process should be monitored by J8 staff during Section 33 certification to ensure staff remains clear on what is required. All invoices for FY 16/17 are to be date stamped paid.

Reference: FAM 1016-3 Account Verification, para 37, 46-54. http://cfo-dpf.mil.ca/assets/FinCS_Intranet/docs/en/policy-procedure-fam/1016-3-cancelled.pdf , and DRMIS Business Process #AP-IP-1200, Accounts Payable, steps 42-45 http://drmis-sigrd.mil.ca/doc/bpp-pg/ap-ip-1200/ap-ip-1200-eng.pdf

5. **Contracting**. Well organized files and processes. Discussion regarding limitation of Contracting Officer's delegated of authority was reviewed with TF J8 and with CJOC J8 DoA Coord. As JTF-I J8 was following templates provided, it was not clear that he was able to draft the DoA for the Contracting Officer beyond the draft limits in the CJOC template, up to those of the Commanding Officer for Contracting Officer authorities.

Recommendation: J8 to discuss with CJOC J8 Ops Desk O prior to drafting any changes to current or incoming Roto DoAs to ensure concurrence and avoid unnecessary work at all levels.

Reference: DoA Matrix http://cfo-dpf.mil.ca/assets/FinCS_Intranet/docs/en/policy-procedure/delegation-of-authority-matrix-mar-2015-archived.pdf, and the Contracting Officer template http://dfc.mil.ca/uploadinc/getfile.asp?id=8808

6. **Travel Authorization Numbers (TANs)**. The J8-2 has a good system in place and manages this process well. Very well done!

7. **Public Funds Verification of Working Capital Fund** (WCF – Cashier Operations). All activity was within standard operating procedures, with all funds and vouchers in balance with ACS/DRMIS. Security of vouchers and cashier operations (office/cage area) met the standards required given the deployed conditions. This was confirmed by the most recent Military Police Security review. It was noted that claims had been processed through the Pay system (CCPS) vice the Automated Cashier System (ACS). This process was recently amended and claims are now processed through the ACS to provide better visibility, an audit trail, and complies with regulation. CJOC J8 fully supported this change and it recommended it remain for the current and future Rotos.

Reference: FAM 1016-3 para 35. b http://cfo-dpf.mil.ca/assets/FinCS_Intranet/docs/en/policy-procedure-fam/1016-3.pdf

a. **Standing Advances**. Recent standing advances had been issued to separate/remote locations (Erbil and Baghdad), however theatre procedures ("SOP's") had not yet been drafted for how those funds would be monitored and replenished, to ensure proper management of funds in various currencies, etc.

Recommendation: The ChAFO is to draft SOP(s) for the oversight, regular verification and replenishment of standing advances to ensure holders are clear on how to manage various

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currencies and the documentation required to keep these advances in balance. These SOPs are to be provided to the J8 for review and approval. A copy shall be forwarded to CJOC J8 Ops Standing Advance Coord (Sgt).

b. **Local Bank Agreement**. The J8 was not aware of the terms nor had a copy of the agreement with the local bank.

Recommendation: The J8 should liaise with local bank regarding current agreement terms and obtain a copy. If any issues remain, the CJOC J8 Desk O is to be advised.

8. **Non-Public Funds**. Theatre operations are modest but well managed. The Task Force Constitution (NPP) was undergoing an update process during the inspection. J1 and J8 were advised to ensure a draft copy was provided to CJOC J1/J8 for review for any concerns prior to TF Comd signature.

Recommendation: TF J8 to ensure a copy of the Constitution is provided to CJOC J8 (draft or signed) within 14 days of the receipt of this report, with the goal of having a signed copy by current TF Comd NLT current J1/J8 rotation.

9. **Hospitality and Mementos**. Register and files well organized, overall process was well managed

10. **Claims**. Travel authority process was well managed, however, the overall process for the finalization of claims demonstrated notable inconsistencies: Section 32 authority not being done in advance of travel, claims paid but not signed by claimants, CCPS processing reference were missing, supporting documentation regarding exchange rates, mileage, meals were missing on many, incorrect exchange rates used, (too) frequent use of lost receipt declarations, claims not stamped paid once processed, etc. The rate of error for the approximate 100+ claims reviewed was extraordinarily high, and indicative of a lack of review prior to Section 34 authorization.

Recommendation: 100% claims verification to be done on all claims completed in FY 16/17 or by current TF staff. OR Staff to ensure claims missing signatures by personnel still in theatre are signed by claimants, all claims are stamped paid and all applicable supporting documentation is attached. Supplemental claims for payment and any recovery action will be done as required (detailed list left with ChAFO for claims reviewed during CCI). All claims are to be processed via ACS vice CCPS. J8/J1 to monitor plan and ensure action is taken/completed. (Note: ChAFO advised that the incoming RMS TAV would allow for this to be done by his current staff, to learn from their errors, with probable completion NLT end September. TAV staff to maintain current operations, not claims verification).

CJOC J8 Team Lead and Desk O are to be advised of the quantity of claims reviewed as well as how many required recovery or supplemental claim raised, by type and amount (claim amounts <$2 need not to be corrected as ACS cannot process amounts less than $2).

Reference: FAM 1016-2, 3, 4, 10 http://cfo-dpf.mil.ca/en/fam.page .

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CJOC OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TASK REQUEST FORM

Title: J8-2	**TAV 16-xxx – OP IMPACT – xxx xxx**
Force Employer:	CJOC
Location:	**ASAB, Kuwait**
Timeframe: *Note: Time required on the ground in theatre exclusive of travel. If the request is urgent, please annotate 'URGENT' and include a short paragraph to justify.*	15 Dec 16 to 31 Mar 17 URGENT – CJOC has directed all DoAs are invlaid and must be redone as per RDAO directon. A DoA register must be created. Credit card reconciiltaion, NPF accounting, staffing Event/Hospitality requests for Christmas and ACSA payments have all fallen behind. With a 2-person J8 Branch there is no depth to assume the J8-2 tasks at the same time as overhauling DoAs and the Financial Management structure, developing FPP SOPs and giving financial approvals. Risks include DND paying interest on late payments, credit cards cancelled, Event/Hospitality approvals denied for late submissions and non-compliance of ACSA Accounts Payable (international impact). Financial Polies and Procedures (FPP) SOPs are non-exisitant in theare and must be developed for compliance and fiscal accountability.
TO&E: Note: *Number of Pers at a minimum. TO&E is draft until approved by CJOC.*	**Position(s) required.** 1 x RMS Clk, MWO/WO **Assignment Status**: TAV Ref: CDIO 1000 1.2-9 Deployment Status - General
Situation: *Note: Present the" who, what, where, when and why" in paragraph form.*	There is a requirement to have a financial subject matter expert (SME) MWO/WO rank to manage critical Financial Policies and Procedures tasks as part of the J8 staff of JTF-I in ASAB Kuwait. The requirement is from 15 Dec 16 to 31 Mar 17. Tasks incl Delegations of Financial Authority, Travel, Events and Hospitality requests, FPP SOP develpment for a diverse, dispersed TF, compliance reviews, and supervise DRMIS technical trasnactions of the temporary MCpl. The J8 will concentrate on Resource Management Fund/Cost Ctr framework, NPP, M&W and the T3 budget review due 9 January. With the existing DoAs all considered invald by the RDAO and CJOC, it is mandatory to rectify the situation to be compliant with the FAA. Without an FPP SME, there is insufficient staff to complete the additional tasks at hand at the start of Roto 4.
Mission: *Note: What action is required?*	CJOC will deploy a TAV of one MWO/WO FPP SME in order to allow effective oversight for the successful integration and operational implementation of the new DoA in DRMIS process and FPP tasks.
Concept of Ops: *Note: The "how". Identify scheme of*	TAV member will deploy on SF or CAL flight in order to arrive in theatre as close to the start date in CFTPO as possible. All tasks

OSTR Revised 7 Mar 16, J3 Visits Sharepoint

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CJOC OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TASK REQUEST FORM

Title: J8-2	**TAV 16-xxx – OP IMPACT – xxx xxx**
manoeuvre and tasks that will be completed.	will be completed in ASAB in J8 office. MWO/WO SME will coord DoA in DRMIS training for selected JTF-I staff to allow future Creator profiles and direct entry of DoAs into DRMIS. SME will also provide FPP advice and guidance to phone and email queries from across the JOA and lead staffing of Travel, Events and Hospitality requests. On completion of the TAV mbr redeploys to Canada.
Assistance required: *Note: If known, identify the manpower, special tooling, and workspace required.*	R&Q will be provided on ASAB.
Materiel required to be shipped: *Note: List of materiel to be shipped must be identified to J4 Mov Ops NLT 30 days before departure.*	Nil.
Travel: *Note: National or International travel. Include Visa requirements/Official Travel contact if needed.*	**International travel approved.** If a visa must be requested, it is recommended that a minimum of 40 calendar days be used as a planning figure to get a visa. If the individual only has a blue passport, add an additional 7 calendar days to the processing time to procure a Official (green) Passport. All applications MUST go through the Official Travel Office, as only the Official Travel Office is allowed to contact the Embassy. The Official Travel Office business hours are Mon to Fri 0830 to 1630 EST. Contact info is as follows: • Telephone: 819-994-3550 or 819-956-8772; • Fax: 819-997-1255; and • Email: official_travel@pptc.gc.ca. **Iraq Visa Only** For positions in Iraq, members require an Iraqi visa. This process req a minimum of four (4) weeks to process and must be started immediately upon nomination. A valid green passport will be required and must be valid for at least six months past the duration of the deployment. There are no visa fees if travelling with a green passport. Members shall request a multi-entry 6 month visa. **Forward completed visa applications, including photos and green passport (if not held by official travel) to CJOC J1 Ops.**
Service Flight Verification: *Note: If it is not possible to align TAV with available SF, substantiation is required.*	SF shall be the primary means of travel. If SF not available with a reasonable timeframe (normaly +/- 3 days), only Economy CAL will be approved for CJOC TAVs, SAVs, and RECCEs. Business Class is not approved, regardless of the duration of the flight. Costs to change flights booked by units incorrectly will be assumed by the unit, not CJOC/OFA. For Op IMPACT only, flight requests for all CJOC funded TAVs, SAVs and RECCEs shall be forwarded to the Primary Force Generation cell at +W14 PFG Cell OP Impact @ 14Wing@Geenwood.

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CJOC OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TASK REQUEST FORM

Title: J8-2	**TAV 16-xxx – OP IMPACT – xxx xxx**

CFTPO Task Requirement:
Suggested Source is proposed Force Generator for position.

NOTE: Any civilian DND employee being considered or nominated for a tasking or deployment in support of CAF international operations shall **immediately** contact Ms Chantal.Randell@forces.gc.ca, Strategic HR Advisor (Civ in Ops SME) or Mr Robert.Ford3@forces.gc.ca, Foreign Service Program Officer within ADM(HR-Civ) for MFSI and pre-deployment information in order to ensure all requirements are met **prior to deployment**. (Action addressee on the message will be: ZEN/ADM(HR CIV)//CJOC STRAT HR ADVISOR//).

Posn Description	Low Rank	High Rank	Trade	Special Qual	Component	Start	End	Language	Suggested Source
J8-2	WO	MWO	FSA	DRMIS	Any	15 Dec 16	31 Mar 17	Eng or Fre	MARLANT

Financial: *Note: Include fin coding. Fin coding to be included in the Tasking Order as well.*	Pre-deployment, mounting and post-deployment expenditures are to be captured by force generators within their own fin structure, against fund C190. Reimbursement of incremental expenditures may be sought through the Operations Funding Account - Support (OFA-S). Force employment costs including deployment and redeployment costs to/from the Area of Operations (AO) are to be charged to: FC 0150D3 CC 0150M3 IO# 3701042 (In-Theatre Support) FUND C190 GL 2131, CO# A20150M300
Impact Statement: *Note: How is this TAV mission critical? What Ops will fail or what tasks will not be completed should this TAV not be supported?*	This TAV is critical to the mandatory Delegatons of Financial Authority overhaul for DoAs in DRMIS, new Resource Management Framework, and develpment of Op IMPACT Financial Policies and Procedures theatre SOPs. Without the TAV, OP IMPACT will be non-compliant with the FAA, lose financial expenditure authority, and incur additional interest expense.
Remarks:	1. The Lead Mounting Unit for all TAVS/SAVS to Op IMPACT is 14 Wing Greenwood. Mbr's home unit must contact the Primary Force Generation cell at +W14 PFG Cell OP Impact @ 14Wing@Geenwood to coordinate pre-deployment administration. This should be done as soon as possible upon nomination; 2. Trg Standard: CJOC OV/TR Level 1 (CDIO 3000 series Section 15 Annex D) HTTP://CJOC-COIC.MIL.CA/SITES/INTRANET-ENG.ASPX?PAGE=14477; 3. Op IMPACT Joining Instructions (JIs)s found at: http://cjoc-coic.mil.ca/sites/intranet-eng.aspx?page=17919; 4. All SAV/TAV members must bring their PPE with them to theatre as per the JIs; 5. For Op IMPACT only, flight requests for all CJOC funded TAVs, SAVs and RECCEs shall be forwarded to the Primary Force Generation cell at +W14 PFG Cell OP Impact @ 14Wing@Geenwood. 6. All TAV positions require as a minimum, the security level of the position the TAV member is replacing, if the TAV is replacing

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CJOC OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TASK REQUEST FORM

Title: J8-2	TAV 16-xxx – OP IMPACT – xxx xxx
	a TO&E position. It is the responsibility of the unit generating TAV pers to ensure the member has the appropriate security clearance. 7. CJOC POC: **Maj Serge Demers, J3 ME 4** 8. Task Force POC: **Lt(N) J.T. McNeil, J3 SDO JTF-I**

CJOC Staff Only (Desk O completes)
Comments: Supported

Submitted by: Maj C.J. Quinlan, J3 ME 3 Date:

TF Mission Staff Only
Comments: TF Comd approves this request and TF able to support.

Submitted by: Date: 01 Dec 16
Unit OPI: Lt(N) J.T. McNeil, JTF-I J3 SDO

CJOC J3 SAV/TAV
Comments: TAV supported by all stakeholders.

Reviewed by: Maj M.J. Mitchell, J3 SAV/TAV Date: x Oct 16
TAV#: 16-310
CDIO 3000 Section 15 - Visits

Authorized by: LGen S.J. Bowes, COMD CJOC *Date*

OSTR Revised 7 Mar 16, J3 Visits Sharepoint

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Commander

Commandant

Canadian Joint Operations Command
Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2

3350-1 (J1/RDIMS# 415184)

20 October 2016

Distribution List

DESIGNATION OF
COMMANDER AIR TASK FORCE
OPERATION IMPACT (ROTO 4)

References: A. CDS Directive 002 – OPERATION IMPACT, 29 February 2016
B. CJOC Operation Order 003 – OPERATION IMPACT, 17 June 2016
C. CDS Order – Designation of Commanding Officers, 19 August 2013
D. National Defence Act, Section 162.3-SC.
E. QR&O 101.07 – Training and Certification of Superior Commanders and Commanding Officers

1. I hereby designate to the position of Commander Air Task Force Iraq (Comd ATF-I) for Op IMPACT ROTO 4, as well as a Commanding Officer. This appointment is effective upon transfer of command authority and will remain in effect until redeployment or until rescinded at my direction.

2. meets all requirements for this position and was nominated with the full endorsement of his chain of command. Prior to deployment, I will provide him further guidance

3350-1 (J1/No RDIMS 415184)

Le 20 octobre 2016

Liste de Distribution

NOMINATION DU COMMANDANT DE LA FORCE OPÉRATIONNELLE AÉRIENNE EN - OPÉRATION IMPACT (ROTO 4)

Références : A. Directive du CEMD 002 – OPÉRATION IMPACT, le 24 février 2016
B. Ordre d'opération du COIC 003 – OPÉRATION IMPACT, le 27 juin 2016
C. Ordre du CEMD – Désignation des commandants, le 19 août 2013
D. Loi sur la défense nationale, art. 162.3-SC.
E. ORFC 101.07 – Instruction et attestation des commandants supérieurs et commandants d'unité

1. Je désigne par le présent le au poste de commandant de la Force opérationnelle aérienne – Irak (cmdt FOA-I) pour la ROTO 4 de l'Op IMPACT, ainsi que commandant d'unité. Cette nomination entrera en vigueur lors du transfert du pouvoir de commandement et demeurera en vigueur jusqu'au redéploiement ou à l'annulation conformément à ma directive.

2. Le répond à tous les préalables pour ce poste et a été nommé avec l'approbation complète de sa chaîne de commandement. Avant le déploiement, je lui

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and direction concerning his responsibilities. I will appoint an Acting Air Task Force Commander for any temporary absences of the Air Task Force Commander.

fournirai d'autres directives concernant ses responsabilités. Je nommerai un commandant de la Force opérationnelle aérienne intérimaire pour toute absence temporaire du commandant de la Force opérationnelle aérienne.

Le Lieutenant-général

S.J. Bowes
Lieutenant-General

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MINUTE SHEET - NOTE DE SERVICE

DESIGNATION - DÉSIGNATION	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - COTE DE SECURITÉ
PROTECTED A	
FILE NO - No DE DOSSIER 3350-1	DATED – DATÉE 04 Nov 16

SUBJECT – SUJET
Designation of Commanding Officers Op IMPACT JTF-I ROTO 4

REFERRED TO
TRANSMIS A

J1

REMARKS - REMARQUES

Sir,

1. The letter for Comd signature designates four Commanding Officers for Op IMPACT.

2. Flag synopsis:

   A. Ref D – Letter from A/Comd JTF-I Comd appointing Cos (31 Oct 16)
   B. MPRR for (DComd/COS)
   C. MPRR for (OSE CO)
   D. POCT Re-certification certificate for (09 Oct 16)
   E. MPRR for LRP Det CO)
   F. MPRR for (AAR Det CO)

3. All have the necessary prerequisites for designation as a Commanding Officer.

C. Riffou
Maj
J1 Exped Ops 1
945-2200

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Commander Commandant

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Joint Task Force - Iraq Operation IMPACT
Force Opérationnelle Interarmée - Irak Opération IMPACT

5275-1 (J1)

31 October 2016

Distribution List

DESIGNATION OF COMMANDING OFFICER-
OP IMPACT JOINT TASK FORCE- ROTO 4

References: A. CDS Order – Designation of Commanding Officers, 19 August 2013
B. Canadian Forces Organization Order (CFOO) 9518 051200Z OCT 12
C. QR&O 101.07 – Training and Certification of Superior Commanders and Commanding Officers

1. I accordance with Ref A, I hereby request that the following officers be designated as Commanding Officers (COs) to their respective organizations for Op IMPACT Roto 4:

Service Number	Rank / Name	Position	Date of POCT
		ATF-I DComd/COS	23 Jun 15
		ATF-I OSE CO	9 Oct 16
		ATF-I LRP Det CO	20 Oct 16
		ATF-I AAR Det CO	20 Oct 16

2. It is confirmed that the officers identified above all meet the training standard found at Ref C. The designation of these COs will enable JTF-I leadership to have full disciplinary powers over their own organization. Furthermore, it will cover any gaps in jurisdiction while key personnel are away on Special Leave (Mission).

J.A. Major
Colonel
Acting Commander

Distribution list (see page 2)

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ATF-I HQ Kuwait//Comd

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Commander Commandant

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Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2

3350-1 (COS Sp – RDIMS #416838)

6. November 2016

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DESIGNATION OF ACTING
COMMANDING OFFICER
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT HUB - KUWAIT

References: A. CDS Designation of Commanding Officers Order, 19 August 2013
B. QR&O 101.07 – Training and Certification of Superior Commanders and Commanding Officers
C. Designation of acting Commanding Officer Operational Support Hub – Kuwait, 17 Oct 16

Due to an error in the dates provided for Ref C the following designation supersedes its authority. Therefore I hereby designate, as Commanding Officer of OS Hub Kuwait while is travelling outside Kuwait on official duties from 12th to 27th November 2016. LCdr Fleury meets all the prerequisites for this position in accordance with reference B.

S.J. Bowes
Lieutenant-General

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Commander Commandant

Canadian Joint Operations Command
Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2

3350 – Op IMPACT (J3 Middle East/RDIMS #416619)

07 November 2016

Chief of the Defence Staff

OP IMPACT - EVOLUTION
OF THE CJTF-OIR CAMPAIGN

Reference: CJOC Briefing Note for CDS – Operation (Op) IMPACT – The Evolution of the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR) Campaign dated 3 November 2016 (enclosed)

1. The enclosed briefing note addresses the implications for Joint Task Force – Iraq (JTF-I) with regards to the recent CJTF-OIR shift in This shift has precipitated what is anticipated to be the first of many CJTF-OIR requests to refocus Canadian as the campaign progresses. Currently no change to CAF physical presence in or over Syria is proposed.

2. This briefing note recommends that JTF-I continue to provide relevant support to CJTF-OIR

S.J. Bowes
Lieutenant-General

Enclosure: 1

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3350-Op IMPACT (J3 ME / RDIMS #416619)

BRIEFING NOTE FOR CDS

OPERATION (OP) IMPACT – THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR) CAMPAIGN

References: A. SJS 3350-1 (Exped Ops 2) CDS Directive 002 – Operation IMPACT, 29 February 2016
B. CJOC 3350-Op IMPACT (J3 ME) CJOC Operation Order 003 – Op IMPACT, 17 June 2016
C. JTF-I 2000-1 Op IMPACT (CO ASIC), ASIC Targeting Development Evolution, October 2016 (Draft)

AIM

1. To provide information on the evolving CJTF-OIR campaign plan and implications for Joint Task Force-Iraq (JTF-I).

BACKGROUND

2. As the staging and preparation operations in the Mosul area are nearly complete and the fight for the city has started, CJTF-OIR has changed its focus to the next phase of the OIR campaign. On 30 October 2016,

DISCUSSION

3. In February 2016, the Government of Canada (GC) reaffirmed the continued Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) contribution to coalition efforts to degrade Daesh in Iraq and Syria and enable Iraqi Security Force (ISF) operations. GC guidance was clear and included the cessation of CF188 strike operations over Iraq and Syria; however, it permitted continued CC150T air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in Syria to provide an effective contribution to coalition efforts in an evolving and dynamic campaign. Military direction further restricted the operations in Syria to Op Area 1, per Flag A.

4. As outlined in the CDS Directive at reference A, the intent for CAF contributions is to support coalition efforts by reducing the threat posed by terrorists operating in and from contested spaces within Iraq and Syria. As such, any CAF target development inside Iraq will enable Iraqi and Kurdish operations to degrade Daesh capability, while targets inside Syria will degrade Daesh's capability to move combat power, resources and fighters from Syria to Iraq. Consequently, CAF contributions to target development in Syria directly impacts on-going operations in Iraq.

5. The All Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC) together with Canadian ISR and J2X collection assets support the CJTF-OIR current and near-term targeting priorities within Iraq, as

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depicted in Flags B and C. An opportunity exists to to empower coalition operations while remaining within the spirit of GC guidance and following the strategic guidance outlined in reference A.

s.21(1)(a)

6. While CC150T air-to-air refueling operations in Syria Op Area 1 are expected to continue, It is anticipated that the CP140 will continue to conduct operations exclusively within Iraq; however, as the campaign continues to progress and the mission evolves, the need for ISR over Iraq for the purpose of deliberate targeting will diminish.

7. As the main offensive in Mosul progresses, additional CJTF-OIR requests may be forthcoming to While JTF-I resources could continue to be marshalled in support of CJFLCC-OIR operations within Iraq,

8. Challenges to target development in Syria and The legal authority to conduct operations in Iraq is host nation consent. Legal authority to conduct operations in Syria As Daesh forces in Iraq are eliminated, the As the authority to conduct target development in Syria is unclear and the evolving situation in Iraq may affect the legal authority to conduct operations in Syria,

SUMMARY

9. GC guidance outlines the mandate to effectively contribute to efforts of the Global Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Direct support to CJTF-OIR targeting efforts in Syria would remain within the spirit of GC guidance while responding to the emergent needs of CJTF-OIR to achieve decisive campaign effects.

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10. The ASIC and CP140 will continue conducting operations in support of CJFLCC-OIR, noting that coalition targeting and ISR requirements may rapidly diminish in Iraq as CJTF-OIR objectives are achieved in that country.

RECOMMENDATION

11. It is recommended that support to CJTF-OIR be maintained. Given that the development

Prepared By:	Maj W. Stark, CJOC J3 Middle East 2, 945-2362
Prepared By:	Maj C.J .Quinlan, CJOC J3 Middle East 3, 945-2364
Reviewed By:	LCol L.J. Mossop, CJOC J3 Middle East, 998-3768
Consulted:	LCol J.L.R. Therrien, CJOC Chief JTE, 998-4043
Consulted:	L.J. Higgins-Schlagel, CJOC POLAD, 945-2384
Consulted:	J.K. MacLennan, CJOC J2 Capability Integration, 945-2674
Responsible Branch Head:	Col R.T. Ritchie, CJOC J3, 945-2324
Responsible COS:	MGen W.F. Seymour, CJOC COS Ops, 998-4038
Responsible L1:	LGen S.J. Bowes, Comd CJOC, 945-2299
Date Prepared:	3 November 2016

List of Flags:

Flag A. Air Operations – Syria Op Areas
Flag B. CJTF-OIR Targeting Priorities – Current (D/Comd CJTF-OIR Update Brief) 30 October 2016
Flag C. Near-Term Targeting Framework (D/Comd CJTF-OIR Update Brief) 30 October 2016

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is withheld pursuant to sections

est retenue en vertu des articles

15(1), 21(1)(a)

of the Access to Information Act

de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

Pages 497 to / à 498
are withheld pursuant to sections
sont retenues en vertu des articles

13(1), 15(1)

of the Access to Information Act
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Commander Commandant

Canadian Joint Operations Command
Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2

3350-OP IMPACT (J3 Middle East RDIMS#415186)

10 November 2016

COMMANDER CJOC
DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE –
COMMANDER AIR TASK FORCE-

References: See Annex A

SITUATION

1. General. This directive contains my direction and guidance (D&G) to you as the officer appointed as Commander Air Task Force – (Comd ATF-I) for Operation IMPACT (Op IMPACT). This constitutes your national terms of reference (TOR). Coordinating and support instructions are contained at Annex B.

2. Background. Since the extremist militant group known as Daesh began seizing territory throughout Iraq in 2014, Security Forces (ISF) have lost significant ground. Since then, Iraqi Forces, with the assistance of the Coalition Forces, have halted Daesh advances and re-gained some of the lost territory.

3. On 7 October 2014, the Government of Canada (GC) directed the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to join an international coalition, now referred to as the to provide aerial strike capability, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability, and aerial-refuelling assets to support the in their fight against Daesh. In March 2015, this mandate was expanded to degrade Daesh in Syria and the mission was renewed until 31 March 2016.

4. In February 2016 the GC directed a mission transition that withdrew the strike capability, left remaining air assets in place, enhanced our intelligence and targeting contribution, and introduced a The current mandate is until end-March 2017. Canada has also committed to a three-year effort to assist the international effort to build partner capacity in Jordan and Lebanon to pre-empt a resurgence of Daesh following their defeat in Iraq.

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5. To achieve those objectives, the CAF has contributed to operations by deploying Joint Task Force-Iraq (JTF-I) comprised of a JTF HQ, an Air Task Force (ATF), JTF Support Component (JTFSC), Role 2 Basic Medical Treatment and various liaison officers and embeds to coalition HQs in and

MISSION

6. CJOC will contribute to international efforts to degrade Daesh and assist to further demonstrate the GC's commitment to international peace and stability in collaboration with regional state partners.

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

7. Commander's Intent. No change from reference H.

8. Key Objectives. No change from reference H.

KEY ISSUES AND SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

9. Air Task Force Commander Role. As the commander, you are responsible to lead the operational employment of ATF-I, to include the administration and discipline of CAF personnel over which you have been assigned operational command (OPCOM).

10. Operation HONOUR. It is the duty of all personnel serving within CJOC, both domestically or deployed, to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour by providing support to victims and rigorously adhering to established policies and regulations in order to better support all of our members, uphold the values and ethical principles of the CAF and improve CJOC's operational effectiveness. See references KK, LL, and MM for additional information regarding Operation HONOUR.

SUPPORT ISSUES AND GUIDANCE

11. CJOC will, through JTF-I, provide ATF-I with the necessary support and expertise to succeed in its mission. I expect you to manage your resources with diligence within the constraints of operational tempo and necessity while ensuring accountability of the materiel entrusted to you.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

12. Command. As Commander CJOC, I am assigned operational command (OPCOM) of all operations, including Op IMPACT, while excluding those exceptional cases when Commander is assigned I exercise of all forces allocated to me in accordance with Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Direction at reference M, including JTF-I and ATF-I.

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