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qualitative survey that the Director could complete. Further Op Assessments of the MLT via this forum run a high risk of being misleading.

Coalition Embed Contribution – UNDETERMINED

56. The CAF has been an early and consistent contributor of staff officers to CJTF-OIR. However, the nature of HQ and staff duties makes it difficult to assess how effective the CAF contribution has been in isolation of comparable data from other contributing states.

57. What can be observed is that a high proportion of the CAF contribution consists of experienced NCOs, Senior Officers and GOFOs. [redacted] of Canadian Coalition embeds occupy what has been identified as [redacted] positions which is indicative of the contribution that they are making but is in no way quantifiable without similar data from other Coalition partners for comparison. 13-1

58. The static nature of HQ billets means that this metric will not change substantially month-over-month unless the CAF bids on further positions. The implication is that there is very little to assess in this contribution unless it can be done in comparison with other contributors.

59. The operational assessment of the CAF contribution to the Coalition headquarters is UNDETERMINED. Any assessment of CAF embedded staff contribution needs to be considered in the context of other partners' contributions including their rank breakdown and dispersion of priority-identified positions.

60. The risk of the CAF ending CJTF-IOR contribution would be strategically significant and indicate a lack of commitment. However, without further metrics, the operational impact cannot be defined.

61. **Observation:** This contribution should no longer be assessed as there is currently no way to measure individual effectiveness - qualitatively and quantitatively the metrics provide no value. Any further analysis of this contribution may have value as part of larger CAF initiatives regarding gender inclusiveness in comparison to our allies but provides minimal value to an operation assessment.

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SUMMARY

Overall Assessment – POSITIVE.

62. The CAF contribution to the MESF has been assessed as CONDITIONALLY POSITIVE. Of the five CAF activities examined, the assessment team has determined that two activities have had a positive effect on coalition operations while the effect of the remaining three is UNDETERMINED.

63. ATF: POSITIVE. The CAF ATF commitment of the CC-150T air-to-air refueller and the CP-140M Aurora surveillance aircraft both have a significant positive impact on Coalition operations. The refueller provides _____ of all drogue fuel while the CP-140M conducts _____ of all manned coalition ISR flights. Over the reporting period, the CC-150T has directly contributed to approximately 550 hrs of increased aviation coverage while the CP-140M has provided the important human element of ISR operations.

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64. ASIC: UNDETERMINED. The impact of the ASIC contribution could not be quantified due to limited metrics and the short reporting period. JTF-I has already begun to address this concern through enhanced reporting in the DSR/WSR. CJOC and JTF-I have agreed to work toward developing a reporting regime that will better reflect the ASIC's contribution.

65. MLT: UNDETERMINED (NOT FOC). Despite not yet realizing FOC, the MLT appears to have made significant progress over the reporting period through positive engagement. However, the nuanced nature of the MLT and the existing available data make it difficult to assess. It is recommended that the Director of the MLT provide his or her own assessment to Comd CJOC directly or as part of the overall assessment. Technical assistance can be made available through a qualitative survey that the Director could complete.

66. CJTF-IOR EMBEDS: UNDETERMINED. The contribution made by CAF embeds is difficult to measure beyond the static metrics of TO&E. It is recommended that this contribution no longer be assessed.

67. NATIONAL SUPPORT ELEMENT (NSE). This report did not attempt to examine the contribution made by the NSE. The contribution the NSE makes by permitting the CAF to provide self-supported troops to the coalition will be assessed in future reports.

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Annex A
 CC-150-T

CC-150T (REFUELLER)						
	HRS FLOWN	VUL HRS	MSNS	SORTIES	FUEL TRANSFERRED (Mlbs)	COALITION STRIKES (Iraq)
MAY	116	55.14	26	26	1.388	
JUN	125.5	57	27	27	1.335	
JUL	100.2	48.5	21	21	1.136	
AUG	131.7	70.7	26	26	1.608	
Notes:						

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CC-150T (REFUELLER) Trends							
	Ratio of Hrs Flown to Vul Hours	Hrs per mission	Vul Hrs per Msn	Fuel per mission (lbs)	Ratio of Msn to Strikes	Ratio of Fuel to Strike (lbs)	Vul Hrs per strike
MAY	2.1	4.46	2.12	53384			
JUN	2.2	4.64	2.11	49444			
JUL	2.06	4.77	2.31	54095			
AUG	1.86	5.07	2.72	61846			
Notes:							

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Annex B
 CC-140M

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CC-140M (ISR/AURORA)						
	HRS FLOWN	VUL HOURS	MSNS	SORTIES		POINTS OF INTEREST OBSERVED
MAY	212.9	129.2	25	25	505	131
JUN	190.1	114.3	23	25	340	160
JUL	203.7	122.8	24	24	Not reported	98
AUG	215.8	110.8	23	24	Not reported	110
Notes:						

CP-140M (ISR/AURORA) Trends							
	Ratio of Hrs Flown to Vul Hours	Hrs per mission	Vul Hrs per Msn	Points of Interest Per Msn	Points of Interest Per Vul Hr	Points Observed per Tgt	
MAY	1.64		5.2	5.24	1.8	7.71	
JUN	1.66		5.0	6.96	1.34	16	
JUL	1.65		5.1	4.08	0.80	7.5	
AUG	1.94		4.8	4.78	0.99	7.85	
Notes:							

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Annex C
ASIC

INTELLIGENCE (ASIC)					
	Developed	Struck	Transferred	In Development	Coalition Strikes (Iraq)
MAY					
JUN					
JUL					
AUG					
Notes:	15-1				13-1

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Annex D
 MLT

Ministerial Liaison Team						
	Influence the development of Key Military Leaders (PM Staff) <i>OE: Achieve consistency between OIR and GoI operations</i>	Influence the development of Key Military Leaders (MOD) <i>OE: Attain consistency between OIR and GoI operations</i>	Build institutional capacity that supports current operations <i>OE: Achieve consistency in military operations despite leadership/personality</i>	Build institutional capacity that supports future operations <i>OE: Sustainment of equipment/capability. increase professionalism and retention</i>	Set conditions for long-term institution building ICW the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq. <i>OE: Achieve a Wog approach (by the GoI) towards future security and regional challenges – MoI</i>	Other
May (4)		1 25%		1 (Nahrain Centre) 25%	1 25%	Union III 25%
Jun (20)		1 (Army Comd), 1, 1 15%	1, 1, 1, 1 20%	1 5%	3 15%	1 NATO, 2 OIR, 2PDF, US Embassy, EU Rep, Cdn Charge d' Affairs, CJTF-OIR 45%
Jul (8)	1 (MOD) 12%	1, 1 25%		1 12%	1 12%	1 Cdn Embassy, NATO, Japanese Attache 37.5%
Aug (22)	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 27.2%	1, 1 9%	1, 1 9%	1, 1 9%	1, 1, 1, 1, 1 22.7%	UK Embassy, France TF Comd, US Embassy, EU Snr Police Advisor, NATO 22.7%
Total Mtgs: 54	7 (13%)	8 (15%)	6 (11%)	5 (9%)	10 (19%)	18 (33%)
<p>Notes: Developing relationships takes a long time. There will likely be little to report by way of relationship development and influence ATT, however, an analysis of where effort has been focused should be informative.</p>						

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Commander



Commandant

Canadian Joint Operations Command
Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2

3350 – Op IMPACT (J3 Middle East/RDIMS #416619)

07 November 2016

Chief of the Defence Staff

OP IMPACT - EVOLUTION
OF THE CJTF-OIR CAMPAIGN

Reference: CJOC Briefing Note for CDS – Operation (Op) IMPACT – The Evolution of the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR) Campaign dated 3 November 2016 (enclosed)

1. The enclosed briefing note addresses the implications for Joint Task Force – Iraq (JTF-I) with regards to the recent This shift
has precipitated what is anticipated to be the first of many CJTF-OIR requests to refocus he campaign progresses. Currently no change to CAF
2. This briefing note recommends that JTF-I continue to provide relevant support to CJTF-

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S.J. Bowes
Lieutenant-General

Enclosure: 1

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3350-Op IMPACT (J3 ME / RDIMS #416619)

BRIEFING NOTE FOR CDS

OPERATION (OP) IMPACT – THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR) CAMPAIGN

- References: A. SJS 3350-1 (Exped Ops 2) CDS Directive 002 – Operation IMPACT, 29 February 2016
- B. CJOC 3350-Op IMPACT (J3 ME) CJOC Operation Order 003 – Op IMPACT, 17 June 2016
- C. JTF-I 2000-1 Op IMPACT (CO ASIC), ASIC Targeting Development Evolution, October 2016 (Draft)

AIM

- 1. To provide information on the evolving CJTF-OIR campaign plan and implications for Joint Task Force-Iraq (JTF-I).

BACKGROUND

- 2. As the staging and preparation operations in the [redacted] and the [redacted] for the [redacted] has started, CJTF-OIR has [redacted] of the OIR campaign.

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DISCUSSION

- 3. In February 2016, the Government of Canada (GC) reaffirmed the continued Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) contribution to coalition efforts to degrade Daesh in Iraq and Syria and enable Iraqi Security Force (ISF) operations. GC guidance was clear and included the cessation of CF188 strike operations over Iraq and Syria; however, it permitted continued CC150T air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations [redacted] to provide an effective contribution to coalition efforts in an evolving and dynamic campaign. Military direction further restricted the operations [redacted]

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- 4. As outlined in the CDS Directive at reference A, the intent for CAF contributions is to support coalition efforts by reducing the threat posed by terrorists operating in and from contested spaces [redacted]. As such, any CAF target development inside Iraq will enable Iraqi and Kurdish operations to degrade [redacted] while targets [redacted] degrade [redacted] fighters from [redacted]. Consequently, CAF contributions to target development [redacted] directly impacts on-going operations [redacted]

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- 5. The All Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC) together with Canadian ISR and J2X collection assets support the CJTF-OIR [redacted] within Iraq, as

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10. The ASIC and CP140 will continue conducting operations in support of CJFLCC-OIR, noting that requirements may are achieved in that Consequently, there is a possibility that the employment of the Canadian Joint Targeting Enterprise and CP140 in Op IMPACT may need to be regarding the refocused Canadian military contribution to the Global Coalition efforts against Daesh. The existing ASIC and ISR capabilities to support sustainable; however, must take into consideration future potential GC direction.

RECOMMENDATION

11. It is recommended that support to CJTF-OIR be maintained. Given that the development of directly responds to CJOC recommends that this task be undertaken by JTF-I.

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Consulted:	L.J. H	CJOC POLAD, 945-2384
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Date Prepared:	3 November 2016	

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List of Flags:

- Flag A. Air Operations – Syria Op Areas
- Flag B. CJTF-OIR Targeting Priorities – Current (D/Comd CJTF-OIR Update Brief) 30 October 2016
- Flag C. Near-Term Targeting Framework (D/Comd CJTF-OIR Update Brief) 30 October 2016

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