CJOC J2 PID: 20160606-001



# Joint Intelligence Centre

**Canadian Joint Operations Command** 

### **Operational Threat Assessment**

PID: 20160606-001 Date: 06 Jun 2016


Cut-Off Date: 31 May 2016

OP IMPACT - Baghdad: Operational Threat Assessment (U)

(U) CJOC J2 Operational Threat Assessments (OTAs) are prepared by the CJOC Joint Intelligence Centre, in consultation with other CJOC Staff Branches, and provide a brief analysis of potential threats to DND/CF operational activities, specifically threats to CAF/DND personnel/assets involved in operations, engagements, and mission support efforts.

(U) CJOC J2 OTAs are reviewed on an on-going basis and will be updated and re-issued as required.

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**



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THREAT/HAZARD/RISK MATRIXES1

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Note: These indicate the highest overall level for each Threat and Hazard Factor. In many cases, separate levels may exist for personnel/assets inside and those as part of the where such differences exist, this are indicated in the main text.

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#### INTRODUCTION

(U) The Government of Canada has directed the CAF to conduct operations as
to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As part of this
operation, designated OP IMPACT, the CAF has deployed
to coordinate with various members of the
primarily within the
This will necessitate and may consequently
pose

#### **BACKGROUND**

(U) Baghdad, like the rest of Iraq due to a number of factors, primarily a situation that creates subject to significant change with little notice. Despite continues to field a and also poses a n those areas that it

(U) In recent years, has undergone significant changes in its sectarian distribution. In 2003, most neighborhoods were a Thirteen years of sectarian violence has resulted in significant segregation of the population into largely homogenous sectarian neighborhoods. Violence continues to be a daily feature of life in along with sectarian issues, ongoing

All these factors contribute to ongoing violence and instability in the

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(S/ The security of is reportedly and the surrounding area approximately may actually be (CJOC J2 Note: Other reports indicate that These While combat attrition, desertion, and endemic corruption have left many area are generally better manned and equipped than those operating in other areas of The is responsible for the security of and controls the largest number of of any reports directly to the

#### **THREAT ASSESSMENT**

#### Military and Security Forces

(S//I

however, the predominantly

suffers from a

While they are unlikely to

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	are an except	ion as they do not currently suffer from
(S//		rn is the degree to which the and in particular, th
	ome reliant on numerous xtensive cooperation routine	many of whom are integrated into with occurs between the
	ration likely paralleled by the	., cook a company
		JOC J2 Note: As an example,
	e legally allowed to join the	has several high ranking officials in
positions of a	authority, including the	It is also possible that
100	s, as well as those of c	have joined the For further informatio
re	fer to the	) While there have been no indications of
		, the inclusion of within the means that any interaction between
and	presents an opportunity	
and	reportedly also has source	
Th	ne possible presence of both	
conjunction v	vith overall weak	may result Suc
	raise concern over the co	mpromise of that ma
be used		
(S//	Given the over	all regional situation are unlikely to
pose a	maintai	ns a significant footprint in
	including th	
		ccasionally, with the It is highly unlikely that, apa
from these		ns any significant ceases
be perceived		may then encourage, or assist in supporting any challenges to its influence in
	in an enon to remove	any challenges to its influence in
(SI	The direct thre	at posed by is
	imarily arising from i	and the collateral
hazard as	however, these leve	els may change with little to no warning.
Paramilitary	/Insurgent Forces	
(S//		The greatest unconventional threat in comes from
	such as	continues to be supported by
	Addit do	
number of		opposed to the
number of A number of		lible, stand-alone threat due to their
A number of	present a cred	dible, stand-alone threat due to their While

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# Page 4692 is withheld pursuant to section est retenue en vertu de l'article

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of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

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(S//	121 1	Many	desire to	and there are in many area	
indicating			The continuing		
	•	larly close to t		threat posed by ISIL has likely p	
	1			me and, despite calls from eleme	
		has	s so far discouraged a		uld ISIL
cease to b			and the	no longer be view	
necessary	<b>′</b> ,		nduct attacks on the	when it is perceived as	
		ma	y then authorize atta		
current de	sires		nay also conduct	t any time without permis	ssion.
(6)				could change at any time and	with little
(S//	Octoptio	l indicators m	av includo:	could change at any time and	With little
warning. F	otentia	I indicators m	ay include.		
	• Ar	increase in th	ne		
	• A	change in	activities (e.g.	shifts from	
	• A	actio	on resulting in major		
	• ^	10110	in resulting in major		
	• Ar	policy	y shift vis-à-vis the	and activities	in
	•		presence after		
				na valationa batuaan the	
	•		or deteriorati	ng relations between the	
(S//I		The	possibility of an	also represents a pe	otential
	reat to	Coalition forc		petween	could
				elements, potentially resulting in	the removal
of the					ng instability
	s would	negatively aff	fect	while any	
that gains				avourable view of the	
		he likelihood t			
(S//		) The	direct threat and colla	ateral hazard posed by	and
		aı	re both currently asse		
increase v	with little	e notice shoul	d the	deteriorate signific	cantly.

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#### **Terrorist/Extremist Entities**

(S//		While numer	ous terrorist	organizatio	ons likely	have a present	ce in
	is the most	а	nd active. Wh	nile ul	timately		
		of do	ing so due in	part to th	e large	the	ere;
however,		attacks in t	he to pre	vent the	from de	eploying its	
to fronts	s which	deems	such as		It i	s assessed to	have
approximately		dedicated					
who are likely	augmented	by			likely	y stages out of	
•					but pro	bably has limite	ed
	in r	many areas c	lue to the larg	ge number	of		
particularly in							
		_					
(S//		Reporting su		seeks	to	a variety of	in
	uding		, and			is likely to be	
responsible fo						are almos	t certainly
fo	or a number	of incidents.	Of the attack		n the		
, a	approximate	ly .	targeted	s while	e attacks	on	
	ers	onnel repres	ented just un	der			
							The
great majority	of attacks in	nvolve			а	Il of which pose	Э
significant pot	tential for		on bystand	ers and pa	assersby.	Analysis indica	ates that
approximately			-			We	ere of an
•	. Where	could	be determine	d,		were the mo	ost
prevalent (Fig	jures 2 and 3	3).					

(S/	These	sets reflect	likely three ma	in goals ir	
			the and		
Ex	acerbating :	is assess	sed to be one of		
may account fo	r the focus on	however,	the relatively low	number of attac	cks on
	may also be	e indicative of a lim	ited ability to		rather
than simply a la	ck of intent (CJOC J	2 Note: Additional	ly, the vast major	ity of	8
AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTY OF	ot regularly				
With th	ne significant security	presence in	, particularly i	n these location	s, the
odds of	nducting	against	The state of the state of the same	greatly	
mited		may also be compo	ounded by a lack	of	
as demonstrate	d by its seeming inal	bility to take advant	tage of the		
y a l	arge numbers of				
(S//		appears to have	e a limited ability	to	
gainst		Coalition force	es would be	given the	
favourable		would ha	ave for		The
most likely form	would be	however, should	I A		it
is also highly lik	ely to	probably	using some form	of	
	and			may also b	e
employed if	adequate		. Giv	ven the general	lack of
opportunity to	asset	s within the		may be activ	ely

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SECRET//F CJOC J2 PID: 20160606-001 seeking out opportunities efforts to t assets leaving the on a regular basis. (S// Given these factors, the general direct threat to CAF personnel posed by Terrorist and Extremist entities and the collateral threat Given the requirement of the the direct threat to CAF personnel **Espionage** (S//REL TO CAN, has seven which pose an inte threat to , reportedly conducts and and Given the relative lack of t these operations likely rely largely on Of note, the probably has difficulties in infiltrating and monitoring recently agreed to an i arrangement with This resulted in the establishment of the and any passed to the s likely being passed on to (S/ Several are active in I and pose a Allied reporting indicates that including the and the are active in employs robust using them to actively ikely poses the greatest throughout (S//F A variety of hostile s are also present in including who are assessed to be on and activities in While ISIL's ability to against the s likely constrained by its and a relative difficulty in t probably maintain networks in with limited reach into It is highly likely that ave significant of their own . While sources are largely limited to sources within the ikely extend the range of roughout the eportedly and s in most in which they operate, including those adjacent to the (S//R Given the high degree of interest in numerous and the significant being conducted, the overall direct

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threat of	_	Giver	n the	
between	_			directed
against	and activities ar	e highly likely t	to also	
especially any	out	side of the	herefore, the colla	ateral
hazard is				
(6))	There are no indica	tions that any	groupe in	are actively
(S//	There are no indica	ect threat from	groups in	. Given
planning to the stationing of	in the highly		ne collateral	nazard is
also .	in the night	y u	ie Collateral	lazalu is
also .				
(S/	There are a large n	umber of foreig	n actors, including	who may
some form of		Т	he potential for	attempts
against	exist. While there	are no firm inc	lications that any g	groups are
actively planning to		CJ	OC J2 assesses t	he potential direct
threat of	Attempts by	groups and fac	tions to	
	into conducting	9		are of more
concern. The collateral	hazard is			
concern. The conatoral	nazara io			
concern. The conatoral	inazara io			
concerni. The conateral	, razara re			
		o common in	ongoing	
(S/I	are	e common in	ongoing The moveme	nt
(S/I			ongoing The moveme	ent
(S/I	are the potential for viole	ent		ent
(S/) create	are the potential for viole and ongoi	ent ng	The moveme	ent
(S/I) create and	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such	ent ng With	The moveme	
create and and will likely	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary fo	ng With	The movement	ent are rarely
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted,	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary fo	ng With ocus for nd resentment o	The movement	are rarely
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted, could result in	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary fo	ng With ocus for nd resentment of interests. In	The movement	are rarely
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted, could result in	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary fo	ng With ocus for nd resentment of interests. In	The movement	are rarely
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted, could result in	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary fo	ng With ocus for nd resentment of interests. In	The movement	are rarely
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted, could result in and m	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary fo ar nay result in spontane	ng With ocus for nd resentment of interests. In	The movement	are rarely
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted, could result in and m	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary for ar nay result in spontane	ent  ng  With ocus for nd resentment of interests. In eous  er on	The movement	are rarely
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted, could result in and m	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary fo ar nay result in spontane	ent  ng  With ocus for nd resentment of interests. In eous	The movement	are rarely ghtened (Figures 3 and
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted, could result in and m	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary for ar may result in spontane Many cent ionally become	mg With ocus for and resentment of interests. In eous er on the greatest	The movement	are rarely ghtened (Figures 3 and arises from
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted, could result in and modern and	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary for ar may result in spontane Many cent ionally become	ent  ng  With ocus for nd resentment interests. In eous  er on the greatest	The movement of while certain cases, height close to the source of while the	are rarely ghtened (Figures 3 and arises from has
create and  Ill increase the pot and will likely directly targeted, could result in and modern and	are the potential for viole and ongoi ential for such the primary for ar may result in spontane Many cent ionally become t in an attempt to	mg  With ocus for nd resentment interests. In eous er on the greatest may also	The movement of the movement of the movement of the certain cases, height of the close to the source of the coveruse of the co	are rarely ghtened (Figures 3 and arises from has

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(S// increased in n early 2016, culminating in two and the occupation of the and various public areas by While the first remained largely responded to the second breach in resulting in several and numerous On neither occasion did display to the however, these incidents illustrate the potential dangers that may arise from



(U) Figure 4: Tahrir Square Protest, March 2016. (Source: NRT)

(S// While Coalition forces are operating in acceptance of the is not universal. hostile to the e may attempt to hamper s through denial of required s, or attempts to c In extreme cases, may be suppling or, in some cases, could with such to assist in and conduct against and elements. (S//I The direct o CAF personnel operating in and the collateral hazard is There is the potential for these levels to increase with little to no warning. (S// While there are few accurate it is highly likely that levels of are significant. In are common and normally the local population, foreigners are at being of particular concern. have likely been involved in the s, and certain elements of the may have also been ome of these events. Given the opportunity, may attempt

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to	In a	addition,	is rampant thro	ughout	and
there may be attem	ipts to	to gain acc	cess to certain		or
prioritize		nvolveme	ent in	could res	sult in
				either direc	tly or
through collateral e	ffects on their	support	Personnel may	be at risk for	
F	particularly out	side the			
10/15	0:		41 41 41 4	414411	4 1
(S//F	Given ti	nese factors, t	ooth the direct	threat and colla	terai
hazard is					
(S//I					
exercises a high de				on both	a regional
and national level.					deems it
necessary. Though					
While there are no				any	
	itside	that transit			will be
and the th	reat of				
(S//					
many economic inte	erests in i	ncluding the			
many comonic inc		e or have bee	n with the		The
	ar	c of flave bee	With the	are highly lik	
have an		essent	ially giving the		nd its
	access to	2000	99		
Thus, a		outside	may be sub	oject to	
The threat of		O	rganisations is		
(S//			Growi	The state of the s	
especially in	The state of the s	nake it highly l	The state of the s		view the
as a high valu		While		the same relation	
supp	oliers as		personnel in the	may attempt to	
	employees in				
efforts from inside	to colle		including	those of	in the
team. The		organisa	ations is		
(S//	While it	is highly unlik	ely that traffic using		in be
read, other nations		13 riigiliy uriik	may be able		iii bc
road, other nations		ne actual comp	A		
	517517 11110, 11	.o doldar oomp		The threa	at of
				1110 111100	anag.

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		design, and the assesse	ed inability of
either ISIL	or other major players to crea	te , it is	highly unlikely
that threat is	would be able to cut	from outside (	such a
(S//		The threat of	of CAF
within	s assessed as	will be baselined to	
	which does not use		
(S//		Given the impo	rtance placed on
b	y state actors, the threat of	operations is assessed as	\ slightly
higher thre	at exists from	however, given the secure nature o	f
inside	the overall	is assessed as	
1811	Colletoral Haz	ards. Given the support systems emp	loved within
(S//	al hazards to both		re assessed as
Jonator	a riazarda to botir		accepted ac
(S//	CJOC J2 Asse	essment.	
•	The overall threat of	outside	
		likely originating from	
		incly originating nom	
	Based on assessed capabilit	ties to	
•	Given an assumption that	will, at a minimum be	, the
	overal	tside assessed as	
	The	assets or	utside the is
•	The		
	_		
•	The		
	Collateral hazards to		
	ooatorar nazarao to		
(S//	Given these	factors, the overall threats and hazar	ds
	are assessed as:		

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Within

-	-	-	-	-	-	
S	-	(;	к	-		//ŀ

the direct threat to both

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•	Outside	he dire	ect threat to				
	and that to		and	d			
	Collateral ha	zarde to all					
	Collaterarria	zarus to air					
(S//		State Acto	rs. There is I			or colla	ateral
	from any state	actors to Ca	AF personne	I deployed	in		
(S//		Non-State			maintains a		
employing		and certa	iin			h as	While
night	aspire to				lible intelligence		
			lik		its the most real	istic threa	it; however,
	ikely to have la	ırge			ability to		
abili	ity to use				y limited by		
which	aı	nd, consequ	ently, cannot	t be			
	have no	t			their use may r	not be cor	nsidered a
high priori	ty. While there	is no		indicative	of a threat in	t	he potential
for such	a	nd both the	threat and co	ollateral ha	zard for a		
				O. II	.,		
(S//I		Non-State	The second secon	Wh	Name of the last o		
including		nterest in ob	The second secon			e is no cre	
	to indicate th	at any can	employ		ile it is unlikely t		urrently
have the o	capability to				t is possible that		an
					er from the		or
	and use it in			Given th	e potential for th	nis scenai	rio, the
and	collateral haz	ard of a					
(0)		Non Ctata	A = 4 = ==				h oo
(S/)		Non-State				suc	h as
		employed	as				
	has approxim		••		reportedly	The second second second second	.:6:
			ver, its curre	nt known	do not p	oose a sig	Initicant
		tential acce					
such as		are no indi		1100		s attempt	ed to
	empts to remov	e these		e difficult a			
	nout				knowledge, thes	se	
W	hile no credible	e reporting i	ndicates that	ISIL has s	successfully		

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the poten	itial for the	use of	; thus, the overall	
(S//I collateral	from	Non-State Actors	There is	or
(S//		Assessment. In	there is	
from			The overall threat and colla	ateral hazard

#### **HAZARD ASSESSMENT**

(U) Iraq is generally heavily contaminated with landmines and unexploded and abandoned ordnance Remnants of cluster munitions may pose a hazard on approaches to Baghdad while the storage and handling of has resulted in in and around some city scrap yards. Within the central city, there are no known concentrations of mines, I As such, the general mine/ hazard in Baghdad is however, some local areas may have higher hazard levels.

#### Climate

**(U)** Due to extremely high summer temperatures which pose a risk of heat-related injuries, the overall climatic hazard for CAF personnel operating in Baghdad is **MEDIUM**.

#### **Natural Forces**

(U) Baghdad is susceptible to occasional sand and dust storms, especially during the summer.

(S//	There is increasing conce	rn over the
will resu	ılt in significant	Large
portions of the city coul	ld experience	While
most areas within the	would not be expected	a major deterioration of the
N	ould be expected given	and the
(\$//	Vhile the general hazard	nosed by natural forces is I OW the results

of Vhile the general hazard posed by natural forces is **LOW**, the results would likely increase the hazard level to

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#### **Health**

- (U) Baghdad has significant soil and air contamination from industrial activity, poor agricultural practices, discharge of untreated sewage, and unregulated landfills. There are significant health hazards including food-borne illnesses, infectious diseases, poisonous animals and insects, and Reports suggest that Baghdad's air quality is routinely below acceptable standards. Coalition personnel may experience acute respiratory irritation during periods of heightened air contamination.
- (U) Generally, Baghdad medical facilities are below Western standards. While they are capable of basic modern medical care, facilities suffer from shortages of doctors and nurses, substandard staffing and equipment, and a lack of medication and supplies. Ambulance services are minimal, likely used more for patient transfer than pre-hospital emergency care and response. The blood transfusion service in Iraq is not safe for use by CAF personnel. It is expected that CAF personnel will rely on medical facilities in the IZ; Iraqí hospitals should be utilized only as an emergency contingency.

(S//	CJOC J2 assesses the overall	
	with the primary concerns arising from	and
esp	pecially from c	

#### **Topography**

**(U)** There is **NO RECOGNIZED HAZARD** to CAF personnel from topographical features in Baghdad.

(S//	has suffered from years of war and		
neglect. While the	s likely in better	than in most areas,	
Of particular concern to CAF personnel trave	eling outside the		
some may be		resulting from	
may require		potentially leaving	
	Given the curre	ent lack of information on the	
the hazard associated wi	th	is assessed	

#### **CJOC J2 ASSESSMENT**

(S//)	with the potential for
significant impacts on personnel and assets. The situation is	and the threat

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1		CJOC J2 asse	esses that:		
•	Tł	ne most significant t			-
	lik	elihood that	_	both assessed activi	The ties will be used to
		onduct			nay arise from the
		wh	nich may be u	used to plan actions	
•	Si	gnificant threats and hazar	ds arise fron	n the following:	
	0	The collateral hazard from of the	n neir attacks.		, given the often
	0	The collateral hazard from i rom ef		, resultinç	g from the potential fo
	0	The collateral hazard from the collateral effects			primarily arising
•	TI	ne following factors are ass	sessed as		
C		The direct threat and colleprimarily from concerns of		ds from	
C	0	primarily arising from concerns over and the collateral effects of their actions.			
	0		arisin	g from concerns over	1
	0	The potential impacts of			
	0	The direct targeting of			
	0	The direct threat of	and collater	al effects of	

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Vhile ISIL is currently focused on are currently being restrained by a number of factors, Coalition forces may be directly targeted by In terms of collateral hazards, the particularly the has the potential to cause

 The most significant operational hazards to CAF personnel deployed in Baghdad are which are both assessed

This product has been prepared by the J2 CJOC Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC). Questions or comments about this product can be directed to The JIC can also be contacted via the following email addresses:

DWAN:

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Annex A to OP IMPACT – Baghdad: Operational Threat Assessment dated XX Jun 2016

#### **THREAT/HAZARD DEFINITIONS**

(U) This annex sets out the common threat and hazard definitions as defined by CFINTCOM for use by the CAF intelligence community

#### UNCLASSIFIED

<u>Level</u>	Threat Definition	Hazard Definition  No intelligence has surfaced indicating a hazard.		
No Recognized Threat/Hazard	No threat has been identified.			
Negligible	An individual/organization/nation has been identified that could have hostile intention, but are highly unlikely to have the capability to carry out the defined threat. It is unlikely that this threat will manifest itself.	The hazard is similar to that associated with normal peacetime service training environments in Canada; i.e. the general risk of illness or injury as the result of accidents or environmental influences.		
Low	An individual/organization/nation has been identified and may possess either the capability and/or the intention of affecting the defined threat. Although it is possible, there are no other indications that they will attempt to do so.	The hardship encountered and hazards posed by the mentioned factors are greater than those associated with normal peacetime service training. Serious illness, injury or deaths are moderately more likely (i.e. possible) than in Canada. Precautionary measures may be necessary.		
An individual/organization/nation has been identified as possessing both the capability and intention of affecting the defined threat, but may not do so for various reasons. It is probable; however, they may attempt do so at some other time.		The hardship encountered and hazards associated with the mentioned factors are such that serious disease, injuries or fatalities are probable and the chances of surviving injuries are less than in Canada. Precautionary measures are usually necessary.		
High  An individual/organization/nation has been identified a possessing both the capability and intention of affectir the defined threat, and will likely attempt to do so in th near term. Specific timings and targets have not been identified.		The hardship encountered and hazards associated with the mentioned factors are such that serious injuries or fatalities are likely. Personnel have limited influence over their circumstances. Precautionary measures are necessary.		
An individual/organization/nation has been identified as possessing both the capability and intention of affecting the defined threat, and will most likely attempt to do so within a specific timeframe and or against a specific target.		The hardship encountered and hazards associated with the mentioned factors are extreme. Prolonged exposure will result in fatalities and/or serious injury and illness. Precautionary measures are necessary.		

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CJOC J2 PID: 20160606-001

Annex B to OP IMPACT – Baghdad: Operational Threat Assessment dated XX Jun 2016

#### **IMPACT MATRIX**

**(U)** To allow a better appreciation of the potential effects associated with the occurrence of a threat or hazard, the following impact matrix is provided.

UNCLASSIFIED

Impact Level	Potential Impacts	Detailed Effects
Low	There is potential for incidents that could have minor impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities.	Chance of:  Minor injuries, deaths are possible but not expected. Limited damage to equipment; possible limited inoperative periods, minor equipment losses may occur. Limited compromise of IT systems, information, or operational plans. Limited damage to infrastructure with some loss of functionality. Prolonged exposure to ongoing, long-term conditions may result in injuries or illness to personnel but deaths are not expected; limited damage to, and loss of, other assets or operational capabilities, some limited loss of operational functionality.  Negligible or limited effects on the mission.
Moderate	There is potential for incidents that could have moderate impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities.	Chance of:  • Moderate injuries, deaths are possible but unlikely.  • Moderate damage to equipment; potential for extended inoperative periods, equipment losses are likely.  • Compromise of IT systems, information, or operational plans is likely; any loss may contain information of use to adversarial forces.  • Damage to infrastructure with some rendered unusable for limited periods.  • Prolonged exposure to ongoing, long-term conditions may result in serious injuries or illness to personnel but deaths is unlikely; moderate damage to, and loss of, other assets or operational capabilities with moderate loss of operational functionality.  Potential to for failure to achieve all operational objectives or mission components.
High	There is potential for incidents that could have serious impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities.	Chance of:  Serious injuries, deaths are likely.  Major damage to equipment; high potential for extended inoperative periods, equipment losses are highly likely.  Compromise of IT systems, information, or operational plans is highly likely; any loss is likely to contain information of use to adversarial forces.  Major damage to infrastructure; some will be unusable for extended periods while some will be destroyed.  Prolonged exposure to ongoing, long-term conditions may result in serious injuries or illness to personnel, including death; serious damage to, and loss of, other assets or operational capabilities with major loss of operational functionality.  Potential for mission failure.

CJOC J2 PID: 20160606-001

Extremely High	There is potential for incidents that could have immediate and very serious impacts on personnel, equipment, information, infrastructure, or operational capabilities.	Chance of:  Immediate and serious human consequences, including very serious life-threatening injuries and death.  Widespread and severe damage to, and loss of, equipment.  Compromise of IT systems, information, or operational plans is expected; any loss is highly likely to contain information of use to adversarial forces.  Massive to, and loss of, infrastructure.  Prolonged exposure to ongoing, long-term conditions may result in very serious injuries and death; continuing extensive damage to, and loss of, other assets or operational capabilities with serious loss of operational functionality.
		Very high potential for mission failure.

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
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Northern Iraq Update

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**Mission Synopsis:** Op IMPACT will be shaped by maintaining and/or enhancing key functions and capabilities (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), air-to-air refueling (AAR), and intelligence capabilities, and Coalition HQ and liaison officers), and by implementing new components; a Ministerial Liaison Team (MLT), Tactical Aviation Det, and capacity building in Jordan and Lebanon

05 Jul 16 SECRET//I

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#### **Title**

# MND Visit to Op IMPACT

- 10 Jul
- 11 Jul
  - Bilat with Iraqi MoD; ground transport details TBC
- 12 Jul
  - programme
- 13 Jul -
  - Bilat with Kuwait MoD, possible bilat with Emir

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# **Baghdad Update**

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Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada SECRET//F **Op IMPACT JOA Update** 06 Jul 16 SECRET//F Canadian Joint Operations Command Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

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Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada SECRET/ **Baghdad Update** 07 Jul 16 SECRET Canadian Joint Operations Command

## Op IMPACT JOA Update

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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