


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Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

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Op IMPACT JOA Update



28 Jul 16 | SECRET//

Canadian Joint Operations Command



Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

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Op IMPACT

Mission Statement: CJOC will contribute to international efforts to degrade ISIL and assist Iraqi Forces to further demonstrate the GC's commitment to international peace and stability in collaboration with regional state partners.

Mandate: On 8 Feb 16, the GC announced the adoption of a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to better capitalize on uniquely Canadian areas of expertise including training of security forces; the provision of humanitarian assistance and social services; the promotion of diplomacy and good governance; and the rebuilding of infrastructure. CAF participation in the Coalition will continue until 31 March 2017 with a contribution of up to 830 military personnel

Key Partners: The Middle East Stabilization Force (MESF) consists of 22 troop and/or aircraft contributing nations forming a coalition under Op INHERENT RESOLVE

28 Jul 16

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Canadian Joint Operations Command

Page 4790

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Baghdad Update



Theatre Activities

1. 27 Jul 2016 –

29 Jul 16 | SECRET//

Canadian Joint Operations Command

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Op IMPACT JOA Update

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Op IMPACT

Mission Statement: CJOC will contribute to international efforts to degrade ISIL and assist Iraqi Forces to further demonstrate the GC's commitment to international peace and stability in collaboration with regional state partners.

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Canadian Joint Operations Command

Indicators

Allied Assessments

ICOD: 22 Aug 2016

Op Impact - LOAC Overview

OP IMPACT: Post-Mosul Liberation Environment (6-month Outlook)

Scenario 1: The liberation of Mosul will likely be a [redacted] changing the nature of the Iraqi conflict. The loss of this important key terrain by Daesh (ISIL) would likely lead to perceptions of a significant decrease in Daesh's strength and capability.



Joint Intelligence Centre
Canadian Joint Operations Command
Graphic Intelligence Report

Overall JOA

Expected developments:

- Increasing [redacted]
- [redacted]
- Pressures [redacted]

J5 Considerations:

Expected developments:

J5 Considerations:

Northern Iraq

Expected developments:

- Significant Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) movement from Mosul and surrounding villages.
- Growing hostility between [redacted]

- Increasing intense skirmishes over [redacted] disputed areas.

[redacted] will continue to focus on [redacted] before changing focus [redacted]

J5 Considerations:

Baghdad

Expected developments:

- Increasing government hostility to Coalition aid to Kurdish region.
- SMG preparations to attack Coalition Forces outside Green Zone.
- GoI requests Coalition forces to cease aiding Kurds and to leave

J5 Considerations:

- Withdrawal of CAF pers /eqpt from Iraq, likely through KUWAIT. Requirement for withdrawal plan, both deliberate and *in extremis*.

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Commander



Commandant

Canadian Joint Operations Command
Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2

3350 – OP IMPACT (J2)

12 September 2016

[redacted]

Dear [redacted]

Please accept my sincere gratitude for [redacted]

[redacted] The wealth of knowledge and experience shared by your subject matter experts have allowed the [redacted] to “hit the ground running” in the provision of [redacted]

I am writing you today with a proposal to deepen the relationship established between [redacted]


[redacted] With your support, I recommend that the [redacted] be included in your [redacted]

[redacted] These visits will enable further integration and standardization of best practices in the provision of [redacted]

Further, I am seeking your support in enabling the inclusion of [redacted] and other [redacted] personnel in the [redacted] in an effort to make it a [redacted] The benefits stemming from the [redacted] First, it will [redacted]

bring a diversity and depth of experience to [redacted] Second, it will e [redacted] that will further enable the timely [redacted]

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 National Défense
Defence nationale

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Canada

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With your concurrence, I would like [redacted] to commence discussions on a way ahead with this proposal. I believe that this initiative will not only increase the [redacted] in support of [redacted] but will also help [redacted] across [redacted]

The key Canadian points of contact on these issues are: [redacted] via e-mail [redacted] via e-mail at [redacted]

The cooperation and liaison between our respective organizations continues to strengthen our enduring relationship. Your leadership and support in this matter is very much appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,



S.J. Bowes
Lieutenant-General [redacted]

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11500-PA-1 [redacted]

BRIEFING NOTE FOR COMD

CAPABILITIES FOR THE OP IMPACT

Ref: CJOC SOCD – [redacted] Capability Enhancement, May 2016

ISSUE

- 1. To recommend a course of action to integrate a [redacted] capability on dedicated Op IMPACT [redacted]

BACKGROUND

- 2. Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) issued a Statement of Operational Capability Deficiency (SOCD) outlining the requirement to integrate a [redacted] capability on [redacted] employed in Op IMPACT (ref) in support of [redacted] and [redacted]. These [redacted] capabilities, hereafter referred to as [redacted] consist of three separate but integrated systems that enable; [redacted]

against [redacted]. An overview of the capability and the concept of operation (CONOP) and concept of support (CONSUP) are attached at Annex A.

DISCUSSION

- 3. PMO [redacted] conducted an evaluation of the level of effort required to integrate this capability and its impact on the [redacted] and the [redacted]. This resulted in a very general cost estimate of \$5 and an implementation schedule (Annex B). PMO [redacted] estimated that, with a Jan 17 initiation, the first prototype modification and testing could be complete within 4 months. Moreover, 2 additional months would be required for each subsequent [redacted]. Under this plan, it would take a total of 10 months to complete all modifications. Of note, this estimate was based on the assumption that no reduction in [redacted] capacity was acceptable. This would necessitate the modification of a [redacted] standard prior to starting the [redacted] installation (resulting in [redacted]).

- 4. If a decrease of the [redacted] activity in theatre is acceptable, either by a reduced [redacted] or introduction of a [redacted] a [redacted] would not be required. This would result in schedule time savings on the [redacted] (4-6 weeks) and reduction in the number of modified [redacted] leading to a reduction in overall costs. Subsequent [redacted] modifications could be completed during the [redacted] which would have to be extended for that purpose. Under this plan the time to [redacted]

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modify all [redacted] Op IMPACT [redacted] would be 7 months; the duration of reduced in-theatre capacity. However, this approach would be scalable, in that not all [redacted] would need to be modified if a reduced [redacted] capacity was acceptable to CJOC.

5. The CONOP/CONSUP in Annex A details the amount of [redacted] required depending on the battle rhythm for the related missions. In summary, to achieve [redacted] mission availability, subject to [redacted] dedicated [redacted] to Op IMPACT would need to be modified. Modifying [redacted] would ensure at least [redacted] availability all year long, with some surge capacity. If an episodic capability at [redacted] availability is acceptable then only [redacted] would need to be modified. This would provide 8 months of capability per year.

6. Three Courses Of Action (COA) have been subsequently considered to integrate this new capability on the [redacted]. Of note, based on PMO [redacted] estimates, the earliest an initial operational capability (IOC) could be delivered is end Mar 17, with FOC dependent on the COA chosen. In short, for any of the COAs below to deliver operational effect, Op IMPACT must continue in some form past end Mar 17 or the capability employed in another operation beyond this date (high potential):

- a. COA 1 - [redacted] plus modify any number of assets in theater by pulling an asset from the line and perform the [redacted] and [redacted] modifications then test, train and field.
- b. COA 2 - [redacted] only by keeping them from theatre after their maintenance period to do the modification. Either deploy a [redacted] to theatre for the duration of the [redacted] upgrades or reduce the theatre [redacted] during the modification and testing period.
- c. COA 3 - [redacted] with an option to modify further assets should the capability prove highly beneficial to operations. During the modification period either deploy [redacted] to theatre for the duration of the [redacted] upgrades or reduce the theatre [redacted]

7. Summary of impacts/outputs:

	10 months	/	IOC end Apr 17, FOC End Oct
	7 months	/	IOC end Mar 17, FOC End Aug
	/	7 months	
	3 months	/	IOC and FOC end Mar 17
	/	3 months	

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8. These COAs will also have different implications with respect to the deployment of dedicated personnel in theatre as detailed in the CONOP and CONSUP in Annex C and D. Depending on the desired battle rhythm for the capability, 4 to 10 extra personnel will need to be deployed to theatre (COA 3 to 1, respectively).

9. The structural modifications to the aircraft for the [redacted] will require support from the third line maintenance provider, [redacted]. As a result, [redacted] integration may impact the combined production schedule for the [redacted] and the [redacted].

[redacted] The exact impact cannot be assessed until a detailed design is developed. However it is expected that [redacted] which already suffers delays due to design difficulties and [redacted] capacity shortage, may be impacted by up to two months if engineering capacity at [redacted] is diverted to this project.

10. In consultation with [redacted] COA 1 or any variation of COA 2 or 3 that reduces domestic [redacted] are unsustainable from a domestic FG/FE perspective. The [redacted] has been [redacted] during Op IMPACT, [redacted] which has been exasperated due to a temporary [redacted] due to [redacted] combined reduction. A further reduction to domestic FG/FE will seriously jeopardize the community's short-term ability to FG for Op IMPACT and other mission sets, with potential medium and long-term impacts to advanced FG.

11. COA 3 with a temporary reduction in capacity in support of Op IMPACT will have the least impact on both domestic FG/FE and combined production for [redacted] and is therefore the only sustainable option from an [redacted] perspective. Moreover this COA provides a scalable option to grow the capability once it is demonstrated to be a beneficial contribution. Further, this [redacted] will provide a viable [redacted] option to continue or expand the capability should another expeditionary role be assigned to the [redacted] post-Op IMPACT or Op IMPACT evolve into a "counter-insurgency", or similar, operation.

CONCLUSION

12. The addition of the [redacted] will increase its operational value in Op IMPACT, but it cannot be achieved before end Mar 17. All COAs examined will impact operational availability, but a scalable approach to modification will ensure the sustainability of the [redacted] for both Op IMPACT FE and domestic FG/FE. A Scalable and incremental approach will have the least potential impact on [redacted] combined production and the [redacted] schedules. It also provides flexibility to evolve, extend or discontinue the capability if Op IMPACT is not extended beyond Mar 17.

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RECOMMENDATION

13. The joint operations and [redacted] community strongly believe that the addition of a [redacted] would be a highly valuable and significant contribution to the current fight in Iraq as well as emerging theatres. [redacted] support this view. It is therefore recommended that Comd [redacted] advise Comd CJOC that the [redacted] can support the initial modification of [redacted] with the [redacted] capability - with options to incrementally increase the [redacted] fitted with this operational capability. The caveat would be an operational acceptance of a short-term reduction in [redacted] to Op IMPACT to allow for modifications and testing.

Prepared by: [redacted]

Date prepared:

12 October 2016

Responsible Director:

Responsible DG:

DComd RCAF:

Annexes

Annex A: [redacted] Concept of Operations/Concept of Support

Annex B: PMO letter to [redacted] - Additional capabilities for the OP IMPACT [redacted]

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**ANNEX A - [REDACTED] CONCEPT OF [REDACTED]
OPERATIONS/CONCEPT OF SUPPORT**

REFERENCES

- A. Statement of Capability Deficiency – [REDACTED] Capability Enhancement, May 2016

INTRODUCTION

This Concept of Operations/Concept of Support (CONOP/CONSUP) was developed for the employment of the [REDACTED] at Operation IMPACT in response to a CJOC Statement of Capability Deficiency (SOCD at ref A). Command decisions for employment of the [REDACTED] with the [REDACTED] in emerging operational theatres outside the context of Op IMPACT would require a revision to this CONOP/CONSUP. Moreover, this is a living document and is expected to undergo amendments Op IMPACT progresses.

The Op IMPACT theatre of operations has an extremely high density of [REDACTED] originating from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IAW with ref A, the [REDACTED] by far the most prolific [REDACTED] in the operational area, is directly linked to [REDACTED] and subsequent [REDACTED] when it is fused with other [REDACTED] will provide the [REDACTED] with the ability to [REDACTED]

Additionally, the [REDACTED] has the ability to [REDACTED]

It is this latter capability that is of greatest significance to Op IMPACT and forms a major contribution to Allied and Coalition [REDACTED]

CAPABILITY

The requirement specified in the SOCD will be met by the integration of three capability packages with [REDACTED] integrated into a single mission kit. Specifically:

- a. Sierra 1 – [REDACTED]
- b. Sierra 2 – [REDACTED]
- c. Sierra 3 – [REDACTED]

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All three capabilities can be incorporated in the [redacted] and integrating existing [redacted] the addition of a [redacted] (see Appendix A1 for an overview). The requirement for a dedicated operator is to: (1) ensure continued operation of the systems [redacted] (2) [redacted] information to the [redacted] (3) [redacted] and [redacted] and (4), to provide [redacted] in order to improve [redacted] in the case of the Sierra 2 capability. The training on the [redacted] to achieve these tasks is specific to [redacted] and therefore, this role cannot be easily performed by existing [redacted]

The key operational capability provided by [redacted] is that it enables the [redacted] to become [redacted] employed by the [redacted] by the three capabilities is [redacted] via the [redacted] to the larger [redacted] allowing end [redacted] perform [redacted] with a high degree of precision. Additionally, [redacted] for post-mission [redacted]

The [redacted] capability is entirely compatible with all existing [redacted] IMPACT mission fitted systems such as the [redacted] used to support [redacted] It could therefore be used concurrently.

MISSION PROFILES AND MISSION SETS

The [redacted] can be incorporated into Op IMPACT missions as either a [redacted] while employing the existing [redacted] used on Op IMPACT. The anticipated [redacted] from [redacted] for the [redacted] will require some refinement/calibration after installation, but are anticipated to be [redacted] at [redacted]. Therefore, a [redacted] would be able to respect the established [redacted] and employ [redacted] consistent with the employment of other [redacted]. The addition of [redacted] and [redacted] does necessitate a small decrease in the maximum [redacted] extreme conditions (i.e. summer months) due to the added [redacted] however, as maximum [redacted] are not typically employed at Op IMPACT there is little foreseeable impact to [redacted] in the worst case scenario).

The [redacted] is currently employed in three mission sets: [redacted] of forces, and/or to [redacted] would be a major or supportive asset for all three. During any particular [redacted] one or all three missions could be accomplished as determined by the tasking authority.

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When the [redacted] s employed as the [redacted] normally be tasked to [redacted] either relating to specific [redacted] In the case of the Sierra 1 and 3 capabilities, once established in [redacted] would be obtained by [redacted] passed back to the [redacted] In the case of the Sierra 2 capability [redacted] requires some coordination with the [redacted] to improve [redacted] which would be provided by the [redacted] in the same manner employed for other [redacted] could then provide [redacted] on an as required basis to the [redacted] or further [redacted] or to cue other coalition [redacted] land assets. In addition to cueing other [redacted] this may involve hand-off to another allied platform in the [redacted]

[redacted] can also be employed as a [redacted] using the capabilities to conduct [redacted] and [redacted] with [redacted] with other mission sets. As a [redacted] end users on the [redacted] to conduct [redacted] without any impact on the [redacted] Furthermore, [redacted] would be available for post-mission [redacted]

Battle Rhythm. The battle rhythm for the employment of the [redacted] capabilities drives the number of assets that would need to be modified with the [redacted] capability and the number of personnel deployed to support both operation and maintenance. The [redacted] modifications are such that most of the installation must be completed at depot level leaving the operator workstation as the only [redacted] Table 1 below outlines the anticipated requirements in terms of [redacted] operators to attain a specified level of [redacted]. In summary, to achieve [redacted] subject to [redacted] dedicated to Op IMPACT would need to be modified. If an episodic capability at [redacted] availability is acceptable then [redacted] would need to be modified, with an option between these extremes. With respect to [redacted] Operators, while they would not be considered [redacted] r subject to formal [redacted] requirements, for practical purposes they would likely need to mirror the operational cycle of the [redacted] they are supporting to ensure they maintain their operational effectiveness in the [redacted] or the duration of the operation. At current rates, [redacted] operators would experience [redacted] exclusive of preparations required the day before a mission or for post-mission analysis and reporting the day after.

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NOTES: *subject to

** indicates dedicated operators + back-up. Back-up could be double-hatted within [redacted] with other duties.

***Assumes some risk that the [redacted] operator will be the limiting factor for some missions.

MISSION PLANNING

The [redacted] will conduct [redacted] planning to include [redacted] established procedures for Op IMPACT. Specific to the employment of the [redacted] capability [redacted] would require the following mandatory information from either the [redacted] operator and/or tasking authority prior to each mission:

- d. Mission set [redacted]
- e. [redacted]
- f. [redacted]
- g. Operations [redacted]
- h. [redacted] to include [redacted]
- i. Supported forces; and
- j. Other relevant factors.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The [redacted] would not substantially change with the deployment of the [redacted] Tactical Command (TACOM) will reside with the [redacted] with tactical direction of the [redacted] being provided by the Tactical Coordinator (TACCO), employing the advice and recommendations from the [redacted] operator, along with other [redacted]

[redacted] (and integral [redacted] all have a role to play with specific emphasis on the [redacted] identified by the [redacted] Tactical Control (TACON) would continue to be exercised under current constructs depending on whether the mission was being executed as a Coalition mission or a Nationally tasked mission. However, as some of the

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_____ would occur _____ with organizations not directly part of Joint Task Force-Iraq (JTF-I) but still supporting at the National level (both DND/CAF and OGD), some refinements and considerations would be needed. Specifically, in order to employ the _____ or in a responsive, direct support modality the flow of _____ derived from _____ back to the _____ and/or the tasking authority would need to be considered. This _____ would include details such as new _____. All of _____ which are items that could affect the original tasking and may require approval or prioritization by the tasking authority.

Whether the _____ is being used in a _____ the capability of the system is such that _____ could lead to the _____ which could be a higher priority for _____ than the assigned mission, requiring a re-tasking. In this case, _____ to ensure responsiveness of the _____ a timely process would need _____ to be established and clearly communicated to ensure these opportunities can be _____. Ideally, the _____ process should ensure responsiveness regardless of whether the _____ is operating under Coalition or National. Existing _____ in the form of _____, plus the additional capabilities inherent in the _____ should provide more than ample means for these communications; however, the processes for these communications and approvals for re-tasking would need to be specified by CJOC in conjunction with the Coalition.

15. The _____ operators are responsible for the effective operation of Sierra 1 to 3 ensuring that all _____ capabilities are operational prior _____. However, the bulk of _____ will occur _____ will be offloaded _____ the larger _____ allowing end users to _____ within a shared or distributed _____ could occur in multiple locations concurrently including Canadian _____ and/or by members of the _____. Additionally, via this _____ operator will also be able to perform _____ with a high degree of precision in order to provide _____ the _____ for tactical execution of the mission.

Onboard _____ in an amount which will greatly exceed the _____ As a result, _____ of some elements of the _____ can only be conducted post-mission. _____ operators will ensure that all post-mission actions directly related to _____ are completed. To this end, _____ systems capable of _____ will need to be deployed to theatre for _____ The management of _____

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[redacted] usage to enable the distribution of
and national authorities.

will require coordination with

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CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

The key elements of the CONSUP for the [redacted] capability include:

- k. Maintenance concept;
- l. Equipment storage
- m. [redacted] considerations;
- n. [redacted] and
- o. Personnel footprint.

Maintenance. The maintenance concept for the [redacted] equipment will be similar to that employed for the [redacted]. Qualified technicians will install and remove components of the system "as provided" in a manner complying with [redacted]. To this end, [redacted] qualified technicians will be responsible for the installation, functioning and removal of [redacted] conforming [redacted]. These [redacted] may consist of [redacted]. To achieve this [redacted] technicians will require detailed installation and functional data for the systems, as well as access to [redacted] on a periodic basis for functional testing. [redacted] technicians would not be trained in maintenance of the system beyond the installation, removal and functioning of the system. Component or assembly level maintenance and troubleshooting would require additional, specifically trained personnel. This more detailed maintenance could occur [redacted] as circumstances permit, but under the supervision of [redacted] technicians for [redacted] assurance and quality control.

The detailed maintenance and troubleshooting requirements for the system cannot be established until system design is complete. However, it is anticipated that 1-2 technicians would be required to be deployed in support of maintaining the systems. A dedicated technician would be required to be on hand for and [redacted] to assist in troubleshooting and fault rectification.

Equipment Storage. The [redacted] installed components ([redacted] and associated spares would require securing when not in operation. However, established practices for security of onboard [redacted] and [redacted] spares already employed by the [redacted] would meet the [redacted] storage requirements. [redacted] would be removed following each [redacted] and stored in a secure location by the [redacted] operator, outside the lines of the [redacted]. Storage of these items in the same facility used to conduct [redacted] of the [redacted] is preferred in collaboration with the assigned Deployable [redacted] located in the [redacted].

Considerations. [redacted] members who participate in the mission planning, come into close contact with the [redacted] system in operation, or with access to the tactical data provided by the system [redacted] as a [redacted] or with [redacted] ess. This would include the majority of members of [redacted]

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the [redacted] Mission Support Officers, integral [redacted] Maintenance personnel will be able to conduct installation, removal, and functional tests with a [redacted]. However, it may be beneficial to have some [redacted] and the maintenance supervisors cleared to [redacted] with [redacted] in order to assist fully in system troubleshooting.

[redacted] guidance will also have to be developed and provided to the [redacted] to establish what [redacted] if any can be reported on tactical communications networks. This guidance will be essential in ensuring the [redacted] obtained is assured.

The [redacted] system would require support within the context of the [redacted] designed and deployed for the operation. There would be no integration of the [redacted] with other [redacted] aside from the on [redacted] and that associated with the [redacted]. In essence the [redacted] capability would off-load some [redacted]. Prioritization of [redacted] may be required depending on the nature of the mission performed and the [redacted]. All distribution of the [redacted] beyond this point for [redacted] will need to be detailed and supported throughout the mission. Similarly, integration of the [redacted] would be required, with the most preferred location for this being the [redacted] within the [redacted] due to the [redacted] would require integration with [redacted]. The installation and integration of these components will need to be detailed and supported throughout the mission. Maintaining the support architecture may require additional deployed manning. This will be identified in more detail as the mission proceeds.

Personnel Footprint. The projected personnel footprint is scalable based on the anticipated battle rhythm. The following provides a summary of the incremental footprint to Op IMPACT. The additional personnel identified as Liaison Officer (LO) to the [redacted] would ideally be a [redacted] embedded in the [redacted] to help with mission set up and exploitation, and is recommended in all scenarios. This duty could be added to the responsibilities of an LO already in place, but the [redacted] skill set is specific and [redacted] restrictions are such that it may be of benefit to add a dedicated [redacted].

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<u>Mission availability*</u>	<u>Operators</u>	<u>Maintainers</u>	<u>In-Theatre Personnel</u>		<u>Notes</u>
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Daily missions every other day. Surge capacity back-to-back missions over [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Missions every other day for 8 month period, limited surge capacity

Notes: # One dedicated maintainer required, one back-up preferred. Back-up could be double-hatted with other [REDACTED] responsibilities.

These members would likely be employed within the [REDACTED] Depending on the construct chosen these personnel could be double-hatted with other [REDACTED] functions. This is exclusive of personnel required to maintain the system function and integration with the [REDACTED] which is unknown at this time.

@ While the capability is in-theatre

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A -
OVERVIEW

CAPABILITY

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Background Information

- **References**
 - > **CDS Directive 002 - OP IMPACT, 16 Feb 2016**
 - > **CJOC FRAG ORDER 011 TO OP ORDER 02 - OP IMPACT, 27 April 2016**
 - > **Capability Enhancement SOCD - CJOC J2 JSR, April 2016**
- **History**
 - > **First studied in September 2014 for**
 - > **Study to implement**
 - > **CJOC contacted on 29 Mar 2016**
 - > **riefed in May 2016**
- **Responsibilities**
 - > **CJOC requirement**
 - > **CJOC FRAGO 011 gives the lead to**
 - > **ADM(Mat) to support**

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ANNEX B – LETTER TO [REDACTED] - ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR THE OP IMPACT [REDACTED]



National Defence	Défense nationale
National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2	Quartier général de la Défense nationale Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0K2

30140-97-100

15 August 2016

Distribution List

ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR THE OP IMPACT [REDACTED]

1. Director General [REDACTED] Equipment Program Management/Project Management Office (PMO) [REDACTED] was informally requested by the [REDACTED] to assess the addition of [REDACTED] capabilities to the [REDACTED] supporting Op IMPACT. The PMO completed an analysis of the modification based on data provided by the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG), as well as a study completed by [REDACTED] in 2014 to install one of the three capabilities on the [REDACTED]. This analysis confirmed that the modifications are depot level work and there could be a significant impact on current [REDACTED] maintenance, [REDACTED] within the Project Management Office, and at [REDACTED]. Based on the [REDACTED] lessons learned, the actual impact will be difficult to determine until the work is actually completed.

2. Prior to issuing a tasking to execute this work, the [REDACTED] is asked to assess and provide guidance on:

- a. The operational impact of adding these new capabilities to the [REDACTED] in terms of [REDACTED] tactics and procedures, maintenance training and procedures, and the requirement to maintain other mission roles when this equipment is fitted onto the [REDACTED]
- b. The impact of any performance degradations on the center of gravity, [REDACTED] and storage space in the [REDACTED] when the equipment is installed, as the equipment is installed in transit cases, needs to be located [REDACTED]
- c. The requirement for [REDACTED] to be continuously deployed to Op IMPACT as the modifications to the [REDACTED] could result in an [REDACTED] in deployed capability unless another [REDACTED] is used to prototype and test these capabilities in Canada;

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- d. If another [redacted] is required to support the prototype efforts, the date when this [redacted] could be removed from service for modifications. The PMO believes it will take approximately 14 weeks from funding approval to conduct necessary engineering material procurement prior to induction assuming that a separate [redacted] is used to prototype and test the modification. This would be followed by a 16 week modification and test phase; and
- e. The requirement to integrate these capabilities into the [redacted] system as these [redacted] systems do not form part of the [redacted]

3. There will be an impact on other [redacted] project and in-service work as the Project Management Office, the [redacted] and the implicated contractors are already heavy engaged in [redacted] activities, supporting the exceptional operational tempo of the [redacted]. I request your assessment of and acceptance of the operational and program impact of adding these capabilities to the Op IMPACT assigned [redacted] prior to tasking ADM (Mat) to execute this work.

SIGNED

G. B. Lewis
Director
PMO

Distribution List

Action

Information

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MINUTE SHEET - NOTE DE SERVICE

DESIGNATION - DÉSIGNATION SECRET	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - COTE DE SÉCURITÉ SECRET
FILE NO - No DE DOSSIER 3350-Op IMPACT	DATED - DATÉE 21 Nov 16
SUBJECT - SUJET Current DRAFT OP IMPACT Update Deck – CJOC Provided to Cab LN prior to sharing with Central Agencies	

REFERRED TO TRANSMIS A	REMARKS - REMARQUES
Comd CJOC/ COS Ops /J5	<p>In order to keep you updated on the evolution of the deck recognising that the Deck being reviewed is for information only, and does not the speaking points, CJOC has made the following comments/recommendations to the current deck:</p> <p>SLIDE 4:</p>
	<p>SLIDE 5:</p>
	<p>SLIDE 6:</p>
	<p>SLIDE 8:</p>
	<p>SLIDE 11</p>
	<p>SLIDE 13</p>

BRIEFING NOTE FOR ADM POLICY

VISA PROCESSES AND IMPLICATIONS ON OPERATIONS

ISSUE

- Visa processing delays have increasingly affected timely deployment of personnel into operational theatres. To date, efforts to engage Official Travel (OT) to reconcile issues have yielded only limited results.
- The ability to meet a Canadian contribution to the Coalition, the Role Two Facility in Erbil, is now in jeopardy because Visas have not been issued for required personnel.

BACKGROUND

- Foreign Affairs previously provided assistance to DND/CAF to accelerate visa applications if emergency situations arose by providing a diplomatic note for the Embassy in an effort to expedite visa processing. However, in the past year, most geographic desks at Foreign Affairs, including the Middle East desks covering Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Qatar and Bahrain, indicated through ADM Pol that they would no longer provide diplomatic notes in support of DND/CAF deployments except in “extreme emergency situations”. It was made clear that GAC expected that this would not happen “more than once a year”. This spurred a concerted approach to address visa issue delays with OT directly.
- In support of Op IMPACT, DPK Pol and GAC officials met with OT and officials from the Embassy of Iraq to develop a plan prior to the significant increase of visa requests required to facilitate the refocused Op IMPACT mandate. The process identified and agreed to by the Iraqi Embassy in Ottawa as that they would receive visa applications from OT directly on behalf of DND/CAF two days a week – Monday and Wednesday. Furthermore, Iraq has stipulated that due to capacity as well as security and tracking reasons it cannot process more than 30 visa applications at one time. The set limitation of 30 passports at the Embassy is due to limited staff capacity to process and insufficient safe space to keep more passports in a secure fashion.

DISCUSSION

- Despite internal and external attempts to reduce obstacles in the timely and accurate issuance of visas, issues remain, including many that are outside DND/CAF and in some cases even Canadian control:
 - a. GAC does not have the capacity or the desire to intervene with Embassies on DND/CAF’s behalf in every instance of delay or visa mis-issue;
 - b. The Governments of the country of application retain the prerogative to issue which ever visa they see fit, regardless of which duration or conditions are requested; and

- c. Foreign governmental approval to issue visas to our members and the speed with which they do so is frequently beyond DND/CAF ability to influence.
- ADM Pol has previously assessed that DND has exhausted all efforts in regards to streamlining the visa processes on issues residing outside DND and that GAC is the only Department that may be able to address remaining issues with OT. At the levels engaged so far, there has been limited return.
- In order to conduct a handover of the Role 2 Facility in Erbil between the US and Canada in time for the required American withdrawal NLT 1 November, Canada must have specific Health Services personnel on the ground in Erbil by 22 October. 33 (thirty-three) personnel must be present to conduct this process; of those 33 personnel, only 16 have received visas. The 17 outstanding personnel are still awaiting visas which will allow them to travel to Erbil. Should these personnel not arrive in theatre on this timeline, Canada will not be in a position to relieve the American personnel currently in place as promised. This will have significant ramifications on the Coalition as well as the American Health Services.
- We are given to understand, from correspondence with Official Travel and IRCC, that Baghdad has issued the authority to the Embassy here in Ottawa to issue close to 100 visas in support of operational requirements for Op IMPACT. However, due to insufficient Embassy capacity, they have been unable to maintain a steady generation flow of Visas.

CONCLUSION

- To date, DND/CAF has been able to mitigate, with significant staff effort and cooperation from other parties, visa processing delays that have been experienced in order to ensure minimal operational effects. However, in this case, all mitigation measures have been unsuccessful to prevent this impending operational impact.
- Room for improvement exists within the Canadian process to address onerous visa processing delays, especially when operations hang in the balance. OT has implemented specific internal timelines, including built in delays to mitigate internal capacity and processing issues. These apply to all Canadian Departments and Agencies. Attempts to secure “special status and prioritisation” for DND/CAF applications have to date been unsuccessful. Ideally, DND/CAF applications for operational matters should be dealt with in priority.
- Senior level engagement within the public service to discuss the processes currently in place and recommend efficiencies and prioritisation should be pursued.

Drafted:	L. Higgins Schlagel, 945-2384, CJOC POLAD ME/Africa
Consulted:	Capt(N) W. Quinn, 945-2305, CJOC J1; Cdr C. Persson, 945-2971, CJOC J1 Ops; Maj C. Quinlan, J3ME3, 945-2364
Responsible Principal:	N. Chapdelaine, 998-3707, CJOC POLAD
Date:	13 Oct 2016

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BRIEFING NOTE FOR COMD CJOC

**SUBJECT: OP IMPACT - [REDACTED]
CAPABILITIES FOR THE [REDACTED]**

References: A. CJOC Statement of Capability Deficiency (SOCD) - [REDACTED] Capability Enhancement, [REDACTED]
B. [REDACTED] 500-PA-1 [REDACTED] Capabilities for the OP IMPACT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (Draft BN for Comd [REDACTED])

AIM

1. The aim of this BN is to advise Comd CJOC of the opportunities and risks associated with the proposed [REDACTED] solution, to be staffed to Comd [REDACTED] o the CJOC SOCD at Reference A.

BACKGROUND

2. The proposed solution to address the SOCD would significantly increase our [REDACTED] by integrating three capabilities to enable: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (a new and rapidly developing technology which would [REDACTED] Combined with other [REDACTED] and integrated with [REDACTED] these capabilities will represent an exponential enhancement to [REDACTED] in all domains [REDACTED] pabilities are hereafter referred to as the [REDACTED])

3. Our key Allies have developed a [REDACTED] which include the [REDACTED] The CAF has had a decade of experience, with full access to a [REDACTED] in this regard. As a result of this [REDACTED] hard-won experience and lessons learned, several initiatives were undertaken since [REDACTED] to develop the full potential of the [REDACTED] by installing a [REDACTED] This was seen as an addition to [REDACTED] In other words, complementing the [REDACTED] aimed at enhancing CAF [REDACTED] in support of current and emerging operations (including [REDACTED] operations conducted during the [REDACTED] In the case of the latest efforts, 12 months have been expended by a variety of [REDACTED] (in particular, [REDACTED] on re-defining the requirements, socialising the necessity, engaging and conducting operational testing and evaluation of the [REDACTED] oted above. [REDACTED] was been particularly helpful in providing advice in recognition of the great potential this [REDACTED] would bring to the fight.

DISCUSSION

4. It is fully understood that OP IMPACT was to serve both as a [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]

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Moreover OP IMPACT was to serve as an enabler
With this direction in mind, CJOC deployed [redacted] leveraged the OIR [redacted]
[redacted] in order to develop [redacted] evolved
[redacted] identified capability [redacted] set the preliminary
conditions for evolving [redacted] and evolved the [redacted]

As a result, notwithstanding some force generations challenges, the
CAF is now postured to conduct operations in three complex [redacted] and has a firm base
upon which to further develop game-changing world class [redacted]

5. Within this context, we have collaborated with both the [redacted]
community [redacted] in developing options. [redacted] installation will increase the
[redacted] value to [redacted] and emerging theatres. However, only [redacted]
equipped. To implement this capability, the [redacted] have identified three COAs (Reference B)
including:

- a. COA 1 – [redacted] modifying
assets currently in theatre [redacted]
- b. COA 2 – [redacted] by keeping them from Theatre and [redacted]
[redacted] for the duration of [redacted] and [redacted]
- c. COA 3 – [redacted] by modifying a single platform at a time and
reducing [redacted] during the modification period. A further
refinement would see an [redacted]

6. Both Command [redacted] This incremental
and scalable approach [redacted] will ensure the sustainment of
the [redacted] but will likely incur an [redacted]
[redacted] followed by only [redacted] The risks of not pressing on with the TMK
[redacted] will be the loss [redacted] to evolve the [redacted] and CAF
[redacted] with a key capability. Moreover, there is a risk [redacted] with the
Canadian [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION

7. Pending the official reply from Comd [redacted] it is recommended that Comd CJOC engage
the CDS and Comd [redacted] in order to continue with the initiative and sensitise the preferred
option (1 [redacted])

Prepared by: Col S.P. Desjardins, J2 CJOC, 998-4411
Responsible DG: MGen Seymour, COS OPS CJOC, 998-4038
Date prepared: 7 December 2016

Walcott Lt(N) MW@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull

From: Duff Maj DP@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Sent: November-05-14 3:33 PM
To: Walcott Lt(N) MW@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull; Dawe Maj AE@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Cc: Hebert Capt CR@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Subject: RE: MOU between DND and Ontario Coroner's Office

Mark/Andrea,

Agree, I can certainly staff the MOU to the appropriate level within CJOC for sign-off once the Province has approved the final text, has their TB's approval

J1 would remain the SME concerning the file.

If you see this differently or wish to discuss this further, pls let me know.

Darren

Darren Duff
 Major
 J4 Agreements | J4 Ententes
 J4 Contracts | J4 Contrats
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From: Walcott Lt(N) MW@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Sent: November-05-14 2:33 PM
To: Dawe Maj AE@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Cc: Hebert Capt CR@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull; Duff Maj DP@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Subject: MOU between DND and Ontario Coroner's Office

Ma'am

I was talking to Maj Duff about the MOU between DND and the Ontario Coroner's Office. He said that he would take over as the OPI for the paperwork to be staffed up to get the MOU finalized.

Once he receives confirmation

then he will start the MOU for signature.

Before I did anything I wanted to run it by you first. I will be away from 6-16 Nov 14 but could we please discuss this when I get back.

M.W. Walcott
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Walcott Lt(N) MW@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull

From: Mckee LCdr JDM@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Sent: November-04-14 1:34 PM
To: Walcott Lt(N) MW@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Subject: RE: OP IMPACT -

Mark,

Thank you,

JM

John McKee
LCdr
CJOC Legad
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From: Walcott Lt(N) MW@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Sent: November-04-14 13:13
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Cc: Dawe Maj AE@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull; Mckee LCdr JDM@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull; Eelhart LCdr MW@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull; Parenteau Maj RG@CMP DHSO@Ottawa-Hull; Tremblay LCol T@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull; Hebert Capt CR@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Subject: RE: OP IMPACT -

Ma'am

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From: Eastlake Maj DL@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull
Sent: November-04-14 11:15 AM

To: Walcott Lt(N) MW@CJOC HQ@Ottawa-Hull

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Subject: OP IMPACT -

Importance: High

Solicitor/Client Privilege

Mark,

Darja

Darja Eastlake

Major / Major

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