

Exhibit A

DECLARATION OF DR ROWAN DOUGLAS WILLIAMS, MASTER OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, SOMETIME ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY.

I, Rowan Douglas Williams, am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify as follows:

1. I am a member of the British House of Lords and of Her Majesty's Privy Council, Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, Chancellor of the University of South Wales and Chair of Trustees of Christian Aid (the major church-based international development agency in the UK).
2. Prior to my current position, I was Archbishop of Canterbury and before that had a long career as priest, bishop and theologian, holding academic appointments in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. I am a Fellow of the British Academy, of the Royal Society of Literature and of the Learned Society of Wales.
3. I held the office of Archbishop of Canterbury from 2002 to 2012, maintaining a close watch on global events throughout and since that period, with a special concern for human rights, on which I have lectured in Geneva to UN bodies. I currently chair a working group of the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission. I have studied the origins and consequences of El Salvador's civil war and have met with people living in El Salvador during the conflict including the late Archbishop Romero's former secretary and the Anglican bishop in El Salvador, Martin Jesus de Barahona and his family; these were people with direct firsthand experience of conditions during the war and the levels of violence against civilians.
4. Through these contacts in particular, I have built up a clear picture of the situation in El Salvador, especially of the patterns of violent intimidation of critics of the regime during the civil conflicts, and the harassment, threat, and assault suffered by those offering help to victims of violence.
5. My interest as a Christian leader naturally focused on the late Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Romero (I am now a patron of the UK based Oscar Romero Foundation). Mgr Romero was a moral leader of exceptional stature, and an outspoken critic of the widespread violent crimes perpetrated by the then government against its own people. I have in recent years read much about and spoken and written about Archbishop Romero.
6. Romero in my view was a great gift of God to the whole people of God, in and beyond El Salvador. He gave voice to the cries of the poorest and most marginalized, embracing this role most fully and passionately after the slaughter of unarmed peasants by the Salvadorean National Guard and the murder of his Jesuit friend Fr Rutilio Grande, in March 1977.
7. Romero urged the soldiers of the government to lay down their arms rather than obey unjust orders, and commanded the leaders of El Salvador to stop the killing and intimidation. These efforts to use his role as a church leader to protect the poor and vulnerable resulted in his assassination on 24 March 1980. He is commemorated as a martyr in the Church of England (his statue can be seen on the West Front of Westminster Abbey) and the Roman Catholic Church. Earlier this year (May 2015) he was beatified by the Roman Catholic Church, the penultimate step before being officially declared a saint.
8. To be declared a martyr means that someone is recognised as having given their life in defence of the Christian faith. The significant aspect of declaring Romero a saint and martyr is that it recognizes that advocacy for the poor and the defence of justice may be counted as defence of the Christian faith.
9. I understand that the University of Washington Center for Human Rights (UWCHR) is collaborating with a human rights centre in El Salvador in an effort to gather evidence

regarding massacres of civilians which took place during the civil war, as well as evidence regarding the assassination of Mgr Romero. One purpose of this is to assist the effort to bring various charges, including war crimes, against some of those who were involved in these acts.

10. I strongly support UWCHR's efforts to obtain justice for the victims of the Salvadorean civil war.
11. I further understand that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has refused to disclose to the UWCHR records which it holds that may be relevant to these crimes.
12. Echoing Mgr Romero's call to the government of El Salvador to act transparently and ethically, I would make the same plea to the US government. The US administration, including the CIA, was deeply involved in El Salvador's civil war. The US government provided billions of dollars' worth of military and economic assistance to the government of El Salvador during the period of the war, despite widespread media exposure of the massacre of civilians and many other violations of human rights in El Salvador. In the light of this, the US administration has a particularly strong moral obligation to make available any records which will assist in bringing to justice those whom it previously aided or protected.

I declare that the foregoing is true and correct under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America.

EXECUTED on this tenth day of August, 2015, at Magdalene College, Cambridge, UK.



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Exhibit B

[REDACTED] ***** [REDACTED] ***** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] 142148Z MAR 83 [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] LTC SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] OCHOA
[REDACTED] WAS ASSIGNED TO THE SALVADORAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE 1972-74
AND ALSO AS MILITARY ATTACHE JULY 80 TO JAN 81 (?). AN OCT 72
LISTING NOTES THAT OCHOA WAS DELIVERING MESSAGES FROM GUATEMALAN
COUP PLOTTERS. (NFI) IN NOV 72 THE ARRIVAL OF CAPT. OCHOA AT
THE EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE WAS REPORTED; HE SERVED IN CHILE UNTIL
15 SET 72. UPON HIS ASSIGNMENT AS MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE SAN
JOSE EMBASSY OCT 80 TRACES INDICATED THAT MAJOR OCHOA WAS A
FORMER OPERATIONS OFFICER WITH THE TREASURY POLICE AND THAT HE
HAD PARTICIPATED IN A CANAL ZONE ORIENTATION TOUR IN 1974 AND
PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS MILATT IN PANAMA.

2. WHILE SERVING AS MILATT IN SAN JOSE, IN OCT 80 OCHOA
WAS ALLEGEDLY ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES TO SILENCE THE SALVADORAN
LEFT AND FATHER BENITO ((TOVAR)) IN COSTA RICA. HE ORGANIZED
A GROUP OF SALVADORAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS TO MONITOR
SALVADORAN LEFTIST ACTIVITIES IN COSTA RICA.

[REDACTED] IN JULY 80
[REDACTED] DESCRIBED MAJ. OCHOA AS A MILITARY INTEL
OFFICER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OCHOA TRAVELLED TO GUAPILES, A CENTER FOR
COMMUNIST LABOR SUBVERSION. [REDACTED] REPORTED IN AUG 80
THAT OCHOA WAS THE MILATT AND AN INTEL OFFICER, WHO WAS LIVING
WITH ANOTHER SALVADORAN KNOWN AS MIGUEL. [REDACTED] STATED THAT
OCHOA WAS ATTACHED TO M-5 ESTADO MAYOR DEL EJERCITO.

3. [REDACTED] FURTHER [REDACTED] LISTING NOTES THAT OCHOA PEREZ MAY BE

** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

IDENTIFIABLE WITH ONE LTC. SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) TRUJILLO, WHO WAS SUSPECTED IN OCT 80 BY SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICERS AS ONE OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO; THEY BELIEVED HIS LOCATION TO BE COSTA RICA. SEVERAL OTHER LISTINGS DATED 1982-83 REFER TO OCHOA AS COMMANDER OF CABANASS DEPT. IN EL SALVADOR.

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Exhibit C



Director of
Central
Intelligence

2

El Salvador: Government and Insurgent Prospects

Special National Intelligence Estimate

*This Estimate represents the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.*

February 1989

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or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

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[REDACTED]

El Salvador: Government and Insurgent Prospects [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

*The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:*


The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force

*This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.*

Government Brigade Headquarters



Key Judgments

El Salvador faces an increasingly unsettled political environment in the coming year—marked by a presidential election in March and changing strategies by the guerrillas. Events could have dramatic effect over the next 12 months or so on El Salvador's political landscape and the position and influence of the United States, which has been key to the country's political stability during the 1980s.

The resurgent rightist Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) appears likely (60 to 40) to capture the presidency from the incumbent Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which has been weakened by popular disillusionment with economic stagnation, corruption, incompetence, and deteriorating urban security. The Christian Democrats could still stage a comeback by combining a more aggressive campaign with smart tactical alliances, but the odds and momentum are against the party.

ARENA's candidate, businessman Alfredo Cristiani, is a capable moderate, but party President Roberto D'Aubuisson has taken an increasingly prominent campaign role, lending substance to suspicions that he and other extremists will be the real power if ARENA wins.

The guerrilla-allied Democratic Convergence continues to participate in the campaign, but apparently has been making little progress. There is a fair chance (1 in 3) that it will pull out if it appears headed for a dismal showing, is pressured by insurgent commanders, or if the government fails to deal seriously with the guerrillas' latest peace proposal. If it pulls out, the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) could make a more concerted—and at least partially successful—effort to disrupt the election.

The election is likely to be reasonably fraud free, and, although the turnout will probably be lower than in 1984, it should nonetheless be sufficient to buttress legitimacy.

The war itself is a complex arena where shifting insurgent strategies have allowed the guerrillas to mask a weakening military capability overall with more visible and politically successful efforts in the cities. The guerrillas have lost 15 to 19 percent of their force over the last two years, their base areas are less secure, and their attacks on military targets have been less effective. To compensate, they have tripled incidents in the capital, attacked previously unaffected areas, and assassinated and forced large

[REDACTED]

numbers of officials to abandon their posts; they are increasingly likely to target US nationals and facilities. The insurgents have the capability to boost less resource-intensive terrorist activities to a higher level and are likely to do so; they alter the psychological and political rather than the purely military dimension of the war. [REDACTED]

External support supplies more than 70 percent of all guerrilla ammunition needs and is critical to sustaining FMLN operations at current levels. [REDACTED] suggests a recent increase in external supplies, probably through Nicaragua. [REDACTED]

Salvadoran military performance has improved markedly since 1984, although the armed forces' efforts are still too piecemeal and not yet tied effectively to civic action. Assuming current trends, we believe that the government is likely to grind down the insurgency as a military force over the next three to five years, perhaps reducing its personnel size by one-third. [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, the guerrillas—while unable to seize power—will still be able to conduct a prolonged war, depending ever more heavily on terrorism, sabotage, and small-scale attacks. The terror campaign has the potential to destroy the always weak civil administration in large parts of the country, while further undermining civil defense and civic action programs. The government's inability to counter these tactics is a major weakness of its counterinsurgency program. [REDACTED]

We believe political trends in El Salvador—the weakening center and rightward drift of the electorate—could further polarize politics, enhance oligarchic influence, and encourage increased insurgent support. There is a better-than-even chance that an ARENA victory would signal some rollback of reforms, a tougher political and military posture against the left, and less inclination than the PDC to investigate human rights violations—attitudes that probably would encourage vigilantism. [REDACTED]

For their part, the guerrillas are likely to continue to pursue a more violent and headline-grabbing military strategy to make cooperation with the government too dangerous, convey the image that momentum favors their side, and provoke the military into further human rights abuses. If the hard right clearly dominates the new administration, the left would probably pursue an even more violent strategy—more assassinations of high-level officials and the acquisition of more advanced weapons. (S NF)

In the last year, there has been some increase in armed forces' and probably rightwing killings, pointing to the potential for escalation under an ARENA administration. In such an atmosphere, the government could

[REDACTED]

lose legitimacy at home and abroad, resulting in pressures for a curtailing of US assistance and growing sympathy—and tangible assistance—for the insurgents. [REDACTED]

Because Salvadoran Government performance is so heavily dependent on US aid levels, decisions in Washington will continue to be crucial for the country. The Salvadoran economy will maintain positive growth only by virtue of US economic assistance and emigrant remittances. A 25-percent cut in US economic aid, for example, would translate into a GDP loss of perhaps 3 to 5 percent. Some observers believe that a deep decline in annual US military aid levels would push the army toward a bloody now-or-never offensive against the insurgents or alternatively promote a highly conservative defensive posture—either of which would have negative consequences for the government. [REDACTED]

Regional peace initiatives are likely to present growing problems to a new government, especially if ARENA is in power. Only a border verification mechanism capable of interfering with Sandinista assistance to the guerrillas—a highly unlikely eventuality—would be perceived as beneficial. Otherwise, regional initiatives threaten to force negotiations with the FMLN, which the armed forces are likely to resist. [REDACTED]

The guerrillas clearly want to shift the political battle to Washington and reinvigorate US political opposition to continuing military and economic support for the Salvadoran Government, and their recent peace proposals are part of that effort. Although there are probably some linked with the guerrilla left who wish seriously to pursue these negotiations, the insurgent leadership intends the peace proposals principally to stave off military pressure and it expects rejection of the proposals to legitimate intensification of the war. [REDACTED]

Should the insurgents offer a proposal that has genuine promise for a political settlement, US involvement and pressures will be crucial to overcome institutional resistance to compromise and keep the renegade right wing from destroying the political environment. For such involvement to be effective, however, Salvadoran authorities will have to remain convinced—via US aid levels—that US commitment to preventing a guerrilla takeover remains firm. [REDACTED]

A negotiated agreement to postpone the election for six months in response to recent guerrilla proposals would not affect our judgment of the likely election outcome. In addition, we doubt that it would lead to a lasting settlement because, at a minimum, hardline insurgent elements would renew the guerrilla struggle. [REDACTED]

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Discussion ¹

The halting performance of the economy and a guerrilla war that threatens to drag into a second decade have escalated political tension and fed popular disenchantment in the runup to the March 1989 election. At stake in the election are political, economic, and strategic issues—potentially including the bilateral relationship with the United States that has been key to stability in El Salvador during the 1980s. The country's primary political actors—the incumbent centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the rightist Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), and the guerrilla and political left—dispute even the basic realities of the situation. Each of them seeks to persuade not only the domestic population but also important foreign actors to embrace its perspective and support its solutions for the economy and the war. Dramatically different scenarios are possible for the country—and US interests—depending upon who triumphs.

The Economic Equation

El Salvador, in coping with its myriad economic problems, faces the irony of relative success—due, in large part, to US aid and emigrant remittances—that nonetheless falls substantially short of popular aspirations. In 1988, El Salvador's economy registered a sixth consecutive year of GDP growth—1.5 percent—despite war costs and losses of about \$130 million. Still, economic advances have not kept pace with the rapid population growth (currently at 2.6 percent), and per capita income has declined to 75 percent of

¹ This Estimate projects economic, political, and military trends in El Salvador largely over the next year, although analysis outlines developments in some instances that look beyond 12 months. In addition, it places judgments within the framework of the 19 March presidential election, assessing the implications of a win by either the Christian Democrats or the Nationalist Republican Alliance for the prosecution of the war and economic management, and for US interests in the region.

1980 levels. Again this year, we expect real GDP growth at the outside will not exceed 3 percent, and will probably be lower—ruling out any improvement in living standards. (See figures 1 and 2.)

Tight credit and foreign exchange limited investment and production in both 1987 and 1988. The financial constraints damping agricultural and industrial production were compounded by disturbances in power and water supplies, transportation shutdowns, infrastructure damage, bad weather, bureaucratic delays in construction contracts, and high investment risk due to the war and elections. Last year, implementation of structural economic adjustments—including utility rate hikes, a federal hiring freeze, and curtailment of capital expenditures—mitigated a 30-percent fall in coffee tax revenue. Nonetheless, both underemployment and unemployment remain very high, totaling as much as 50 percent of the work force, and nutrient intake for most of the population is below international standards.


Even modest growth rates remain highly dependent on revenue from external transfers. Salvadoran remittances from the United States totaled \$300-400 million last year, contributing significantly to consumer purchasing activity. Total US aid—\$395 million for FY 1989—is equivalent to about 50 percent of El Salvador's budget. (See table 1.) Disbursement of FY 1989 funding has been delayed due to programmatic difficulties, however, and, if the holdup is extended for several months, it could eliminate positive economic growth this year.

Impact of the War

Without significant change in the domestic situation that would allow a reallocation of resources away from the military and war-related destruction and at

Figure 1
El Salvador: Selected Economic Indicators, 1982-88

Note scale change



* Estimated.

EO 1.48

the same time improve the investment climate, the government probably will continue its high levels of external dependency through the early 1990s. Indeed, much of the foreign aid is consumed as an offset to the direct and indirect economic damage done by the war. Since 1979, total economic losses are estimated at nearly \$2 billion. We estimate that in 1989 the cost of such repairs will be in the neighborhood of \$150 million (see figure 3), owing to the insurgents' more intensive economic targeting. In addition, the war has prevented a needed influx of foreign investment and led to a deterioration of industrial and agricultural productive capacity that has serious long-term implications.

Future Aid Levels


If US economic aid levels were cut significantly, this would force the government's budget deficit higher and compel a further restriction of credit and imports.

In addition, since most of the budget goes for salaries, the administration would also be confronted with the need to make politically unpalatable reductions in the public-sector work force. In rough terms, if the US economic allotment were slashed by about 25 percent, then a +2 percent growth rate would probably be driven to a GDP loss—perhaps in the neighborhood of 3 to 5 percent—in the year following the aid cut. In addition to attendant political and social difficulties, there would be an immediate psychological impact. Left, right, and center would see it as a step toward US disengagement, and the guerrillas would redouble their efforts to sever the remaining bonds between Washington and San Salvador.

Figure 2
El Salvador: External Trade, 1985-88


Current million US \$

Trade Balance



Exports

Coffee
 Sugar
 Cotton
 Other



32043 1 88

The Current Political Dynamic

The flagging economy, along with war weariness and government corruption, has helped shift political trends in El Salvador—a strengthening right; a weakening, more fractious center; and a newly formed, proguerrilla, but legal, left. The national leadership of the ruling PDC has been tarnished by scandal, internal divisions, and, most important, by the lack of clear success with the insurgency or the economy. The

rightwing ARENA party, cultivating a more moderate image, is the key beneficiary of rising dissatisfaction with the Christian Democrats. On the left, the growing realization that military pressure has little near-term chance of overturning the existing political structure probably contributed to the decision of guerrilla allies like Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora to return from foreign exile and reenter Salvadoran politics. (S NF)

Table 1 *Million US \$*
**US Economic and Military Aid
to El Salvador, 1980-88**

	Direct Economic Assistance *	Security Assistance	Total
1980	58.5	6.2	64.7
1981	116.3	10.5	126.8
1982	185.6	31.5	217.1
1983	261.9	81.3	343.2
1984	223.1	206.6	429.7
1985	428.8	136.3	565.1
1986	317.1	121.9	439.0
1987 *	506.5	111.6	618.1
1988	332.4	81.6	414.0

* Includes Economic Support Funds, Development Assistance, and PL-480.

* Includes \$52.9 million in earthquake assistance and \$147.3 million in supplemental appropriations.

This table is Unclassified.

PDC Prospects

The divided Christian Democrats face an uphill struggle, and we doubt they can finish on top in the first round of the election unless they energize their campaign and overcome the political trends evident in the last legislative and municipal elections, where they were convincingly beaten. (See figure 4.) Because they occupy the political center and because the dying President Duarte is still a charismatic figure, the Christian Democrats could still make a comeback. Their best chance is to deny the rightwing ARENA a first-round majority and then attract some of the smaller parties in a second round of balloting. With astute alliances and an aggressive campaign, the second round could be a dogfight too close to call.

To do so, however, the Christian Democrats will have to demonstrate that they are more responsive to the legislative and municipal protest votes stemming from mismanagement and corruption charges. They will also have to win back supporters from the majority bloc that [redacted] show want a new party in government. Although we cannot fully assess the


pervasiveness of official corruption, failure to do more over the last few years than reassign a few cabinet ministers for alleged misdeeds has seriously damaged the party's image and fueled the popular belief that PDC corruption is rampant. [redacted]

The Challenge From ARENA

ARENA is now the country's largest and best organized party, and its new, more moderate image, embodied by candidate Alfredo Cristiani, is enhancing the party's election prospects. ARENA's founder Roberto D'Aubuisson and others linked to past death squad activities have allowed the moderate faction a widened public role while still exerting significant influence. Most party leaders, including Cristiani, admit that the party's appeal to conservative peasants—and the businessmen who are bankrolling the campaign—would wane significantly without the presence of the charismatic D'Aubuisson. [redacted]


In addition to hammering the Christian Democrats on the corruption issue, we believe a major plus for ARENA will be its successful attack on the government's inability to provide public security in the face of increased leftist violence and its failure to deliver promised development programs. In contrast to the perceived inability of the Christian Democrats to remedy the security situation, we judge that the public perceives an ARENA government as more willing to take a tougher posture toward violent demonstrators and those suspected of terrorism and sabotage. ARENA also has spent the last several years organizing on the local level and using party resources to provide a range of services to lower income voters in the countryside. [redacted]

Figure 3
Direct and Indirect Guerrilla Damage to Infrastructure, 1987 and 1988



* Includes cost of material replacement, as well as lost profits, wages, and productivity

Figure 4
PDC Versus ARENA
Performance at the Polls



The Left and the Election

The emergence of a legal leftist party, Democratic Convergence, lends greater legitimacy to the current political system, although its activities also assist the insurgent cause by facilitating leftist opposition groups and serving as a vehicle for insurgent propaganda. Two of the three parties in the Democratic Convergence coalition are allied with the insurgent movement, and presidential candidate Ungo already has asserted that his campaign is not a serious quest for the office, but a vehicle for mobilizing popular pressure for negotiations—a key insurgent objective.

Whether the Convergence stays in the presidential race depends upon how it—and the guerrillas—read the campaign. Intimidation from rightwing extremists or the prospect of being embarrassed by its own lackluster performance at the polls could prompt a pullout. In addition, the Convergence would likely have to withdraw if pressured by guerrilla commanders. On balance, there is perhaps a 1-in-3 chance it will pull out of the presidential race before election day, and, to the extent that neither the Christian Democrats nor ARENA treats recent Convergence-backed guerrilla negotiating proposals seriously, the odds probably rise

The Presidential Contenders and Their Platforms

*Fidel Angel CHAVEZ Mena
PDC Nominee*

Key platform elements:

- *No preconditioned negotiations with FMLN.*
- *Continuation of regional peace process.*
- *Agrarian reform: no further land expropriations and greater self-management of cooperatives.*
- *Fiscal and trade policy: reduce deficit, crackdown on tax evasion and no new taxes, selective import substitution and aggressive export policy.*
- *Supports close ties to the United States. (C NF)*

*Alfredo CRISTIANI Buckhard
ARENA Nominee*

Key platform elements:

- *Open to negotiations with FMLN.*
- *Continuation of regional peace process, but make certain El Salvador is not seen as US lackey.*
- *Agrarian reform: no further land expropriations, provision for private ownership of cooperative farm plots.*
- *Fiscal and trade policy: reduce the deficit, simplify tax code, reduction of nominal rates, expansion of tax base, export-led development.*
- *Considers US involvement in domestic policy excessive. (C NF)*

(continued)

The Presidential Contenders and Their Platforms (continued)

*Guillermo Manuel UNGO Revelo
Democratic Convergence Nominee*

Key platform elements:

- *Peace process: seeks negotiated political solution to the war based on guerrilla peace proposal, with cease-fire and agreement to deescalate war as first steps. Meanwhile, both parties to the war are morally and legally bound by the Geneva Accords.*
- *Fiscal policy: "An economic plan to help the people."*
- *Sharply critical of US involvement in El Salvador*

Role of the Smaller Parties

Other than the main contenders and the leftist Democratic Convergence, only the PDC splinter group, the Authentic Christian Movement, could play a potentially significant role in the election. While a reunification of the PDC could enhance Chavez Mena's chances in a runoff, we believe the bitter party split last fall will make a conciliation difficult. Neither the Authentic Christian Movement—nor the leftist Convergence—is likely to win more than 10 percent of the vote, but each is vying for third place, which will entitle the winner to a coveted seat on the powerful Central Election Council. The remaining smaller parties realize that they are not likely to attract significant support, and most appear inclined to back the front-runner, ARENA, in a projected second round.

The Military and the Election

We believe the armed forces will remain impartial, despite reported attempts by some civilians to solicit military support for their party. Only in the unlikely

event of uncontrollable domestic violence by the left or the right would the military, as a last resort, step in to restore order. In our view, however, the military is well aware that their involvement would discredit the election and jeopardize prospects for international aid.

The Balloting

The election itself could be turbulent, especially if the left pulls out and the guerrillas ratchet up their disruptive activities—which is within their capabilities. Given restrictive voting regulations and some disillusion with the national contest, the turnout may be somewhat lower than in past years, but high enough to buttress legitimacy. The presence of international observers will also lend credibility to the process.

The Insurgents: Shifting Political-Military Strategy

More than ever, the guerrillas' strategy is also focused on the political and diplomatic arena. This is partly because of necessity forced upon them by improving Salvadoran military performance and partly because of the realization that their own declining but still dangerous military capabilities are better complemented with a talk/fight strategy that boosts their legitimacy. At the same time, their more sophisticated target selection is designed not only for maximum political and economic impact but also to exaggerate their military prowess. Especially effective psychologically has been the boost of attacks in urban areas and traditionally safe locales in the countryside.

The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla coalition has undergone major strategic shifts. (See inset, page 10.) Following its unsuccessful "final offensive" early in 1981, the insurgents attempted to match the armed forces' growth and tactics in an attempt to defeat them in *conventional warfare*. FMLN strength peaked at 9,000 to 11,000 combatants in 1984, as the guerrillas were unable to keep pace with the government's growing superiority in firepower, mobility, and strength. By the end of 1985, the insurgents had reorganized and shifted to a strategy of *prolonged warfare* that concentrated on attrition of the military and the economic infrastructure. During this period, insurgent strength fell to 7,000 to 8,000 combatants, and the FMLN force structure stressed a greater reliance on smaller, more mobile units.

In late 1986, while continuing to fight a prolonged war, the insurgents again shifted emphasis, this time preparing for a *strategic counteroffensive*. Although this strategic counteroffensive planning contained unrealistic elements, at its heart was a military offensive in which local insurgents and a greatly expanded contingent of militia forces would conduct widespread ambush and sabotage activity to tie down government forces. FMLN strategic and special forces would meanwhile attack major armed forces facilities.

More troubling and problematic will be whether the loser accepts the results. Both the PDC and ARENA have claimed publicly that the other is preparing to steal the election, and, while some of the rhetoric is only propagandizing, there are elements in the parties willing to cry foul, no matter what the process or outcome. Although it is not the most likely scenario, if one of the major candidates were to denounce the returns, the left would reap a propaganda windfall that could contribute to wider polarization and violence.

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)

The FMLN is generally Marxist-Leninist, pro-Cuban, and decidedly anti-US. All five guerrilla groups comprising the FMLN trace their origin, directly or indirectly, to the Salvadoran Communist Party. Many in the leadership of these groups drew their political training from Salvadoran student politics of the early 1970s: Marxist, violence prone, and antagonistic toward the United States.

Despite the dominance of Marxism-Leninism within the FMLN, there are periodic differences of opinion over strategic priorities and revolutionary tactics. The People's Revolutionary Army, for example, has long stressed the primacy of military action in bringing about revolution, while the Armed Forces of National Resistance has placed more emphasis on political organization. These differences do not, however, represent fundamental divisions regarding the FMLN's Marxist-Leninist ideological underpinnings. In this regard, the FMLN shares many similarities with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua. Were the FMLN to ever come to power, we believe that—as with the FSLN—it would coalesce around a Leninist domestic policy of one-party control and ultimate socialization of the economy and a foreign policy centered on close relations with Cuba and hostility toward the United States.

Implementing the Counteroffensive Plan

Tactically, FMLN operations are influenced by both the strategic counteroffensive strategy and by government operations and capabilities. The insurgents continue to emphasize low-risk actions to wear down both the economy and the armed forces, and mass only for significant operations such as attacks against garrisons. (See figure 5.) In 1988, the insurgents staged 12 attacks against large- and medium-size targets—the same number as 1987. However, 1988 attacks were less effective in terms of casualties inflicted (28 percent less).

FMLN military activity did increase dramatically in major urban centers during 1987 and 1988 with more visible and violent actions, especially in San Salvador where actions tripled between 1986 and 1988. (See figure 6.) The use of vehicle-launched "rampas"—a locally manufactured mortar-like device—has permitted the FMLN to conduct headline-grabbing daylight attacks on major government facilities without a significant risk of insurgent assets.


Local government presence is a major, continuing target for the insurgency with attacks against town-halls and civil defense units rising over the past two years. Following the assassinations of nine mayors in 1988, large numbers of local officials have received death threats and some 49 mayors have resigned in the last year, representing 18 percent of the municipal posts.

FMLN Problems

Despite its aggressive activity in several areas, however, the FMLN has been able only partially to mitigate the effect of increasingly longer government incursions into its base areas. (See figure 7.) Diversionary operations and greater exfiltration of key support and command elements out of home areas by the guerrillas have still left them vulnerable to armed forces' disruptions of their operational planning, logistic, recruitment, and training activities.

We assess current FMLN combatant strength to be 6,000 to 7,000 (see figure 8)—a 15- to 19-percent drop from 1986 strength figures. Because of the counteroffensive philosophy, there has also been a major reordering in the composition of troops, reflecting FMLN emphasis on local forces and militia at the expense of strategic forces. Although this reordering is a sophisticated adjustment to government combat effectiveness, the drop in overall combatant strength indicates that the FMLN has been unsuccessful in its goal to increase greatly the number of local and militia forces through new recruitment.

Figure 5
El Salvador: Insurgent-Initiated Incidents by Type, 1982-88



^a A forceful hostile action against a stationary government force (also called an assault).

^b A military action against a moving government force.

^c Military actions such as sniping, lobbing a small number of shells, or similar actions that seem intended to hamper government operations rather than to defeat them.

^d Dissemination of information by means such as leaflets and briefings. Dramatic actions without verbal context are not considered propaganda.

^e The destruction of facilities that support government military operations or the economy.

Note: Data reflect the continuing rise in insurgent-initiated actions over the last three years. This results from increasing emphasis on lower risk, smaller unit actions, such as harassment, sabotage, and propaganda; larger unit actions, such as attacks and ambushes, have declined.

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
The FMLN's military emphasis on the urban theater is designed to be complemented by an increasingly militarized and active front group apparatus, but here the guerrillas have made little headway. While front group demonstrations have become more violent, they remain small—an indication that popular support is not expanding in the cities. More important, they have not drawn a repressive response from government security forces. Furthermore, in spite of continuing FMLN penetration of labor unions, the FMLN is not significantly closer to being able to call an effective general strike.

Likely Insurgent Adjustments in 1989

We judge that the FMLN cannot launch a political-military offensive along the lines of its proposed strategic counteroffensive in 1989:

- Although the FMLN has developed new militia units, these forces are concentrated in or near FMLN base areas, do not operate independently, and would be of only marginal value in a strategic counteroffensive.

Figure 6
Insurgent-Initiated Military Incidents * in
San Salvador Area, 1984-88



* Includes attacks, harassment, ambushes, assassinations, sabotage, and bombings.

We believe FMLN political-military operations over the next year will focus on boosting the perception of the viability of the insurgency. Militarily, this means a heavy volume of high-visibility, low-risk operations. The insurgents already are conducting coordinated harassment sprees of up to eight actions in a single department in a single night. Electrical sabotage also is being conducted in concentrated spurts to enhance impact. The insurgents are capable of combining a harassment and sabotage spree with a significant attack to create the impression of military initiative. In terms of logistics and manpower, the insurgency probably can sustain a heavy volume of low-risk operations with only brief lulls (15 to 30 days). (See figure 9.) We judge that these operations, in spite of heavy publicity, will not significantly alter the present military balance. They will, however, result in a somewhat greater threat to US facilities and personnel—particularly since the FMLN is becoming increasingly less hesitant to employ terrorist tactics and to attack US targets.

In addition, we believe the FMLN may publicly announce a shift from the preparatory phase to the preliminary phase of the strategic counteroffensive. This rhetorical leap will mean nothing in terms of insurgent military capabilities, but may receive international attention and bolster insurgent morale.

- The FMLN has not greatly increased the pace of its purely military operations nor has it been able to bring about a lasting strategic dispersion of government forces.
- FMLN front groups and penetrations of the armed forces are not able to foment a popular or military insurrection.




Although the FMLN is unlikely to abandon its strategic counteroffensive strategy largely because of concerns about internal morale, we believe the insurgent leadership realizes that a near-term political-military victory is not possible. Without abandoning preparations for an eventual strategic counteroffensive, the FMLN now apparently believes its best opportunity is to exploit the existing domestic and international political climate to force a decrease in US aid to the Salvadoran Government and pressure the government to negotiate.

External Support

Still key to insurgent strategy and current force structure is the continuing flow of external support. Such support—especially ammunition—remains the critical factor in allowing the FMLN to conduct military operations at current levels.

Figure 7
El Salvador: Guerrilla Operating Areas

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative




Base areas - Areas where strategic mobile forces, local guerrilla units, major command elements, and service and support organizations are consistently located. In addition, these areas normally contain a sophisticated, well-established guerrilla infrastructure.


Disputed areas - Areas in which the guerrillas are contesting the military for control. Such an area may evidence some of the characteristics of a base area to include having command elements and local guerrilla units based in the area, with an occasional strategic mobile force unit being camped in it.

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
Figure 8
El Salvador: Relative Military and Insurgent
Force Levels



Government: Guerrilla Force Ratio



Salvadoran Government Military Expenditures as a Percentage of the Central Government Budget



The insurgents have attempted to alleviate their continuing dependence on external materiel support by locally manufacturing "popular" weapons. These efforts have produced an impressive number of home-made weapons that the insurgents are using with increasing success, but the programs produce little small-arms ammunition—the most critical insurgent requirement.





the FMLN must infiltrate at least 70 percent of its basic ammunition needs—and 100 percent for such items as AK-47 rifles and RPG-2/7 rocket launchers. In addition, the insurgents must infiltrate large numbers of fuses and blasting caps to make homemade mines.

In 1987, the rebels captured only 82,000 rounds of rifle ammunition from the government—compared to the 300,000 rounds stored in a single guerrilla warehouse. The insurgents have set up small ammunition manufacturing facilities, but these have done little to close the big gap between expended ammunition and domestic sources of supply and acquisition. Last year, army patrols uncovered more large caches of ammunition than previously, also pointing toward major external flows.


Weapons of various types also continue to be infiltrated into El Salvador. While weapons infiltration is at a lower level than in 1983 and 1984, the insurgents need to replace older Vietnam-era M-16s, arm their new forces, and replace weapons lost to the government. Currently, the insurgents are losing two weapons to the government for every one they capture. (See table 2.) Captured guerrillas also are reporting that some units are now being equipped with AK-47 rifles vice the M-16/AR-15. We believe that Nicaragua—often acting in concert with Cuba—continues to be the logical conduit for much of the insurgents' logistic needs.

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Figure 9
FMLN Force Structure, Strength by Faction, and Type of Force

 Special Forces Best trained insurgent force, serves as the primary penetration force for significant FMLN attacks.	 Strategic Forces Serves as the major FMLN maneuver force, primarily assigned to a specific zone, but can operate throughout the country.	 Local Forces Consists mainly of guerrilla units which operate within specific areas conducting both political expansion and low-level military operations.	 Armed Militia Low-level forces which operate in and near their home villages; responsible for conducting low-level sabotage and limited operations with local forces.
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Force Structure - 1984, 1986, and 1988




Strength by Faction and Type of Force, 1988

Number

Faction	Type of Force				Total
	Special Forces	Strategic Forces	Local Forces	Armed Militia	
ERP	160	900-1,000	1,240-1,390	200-250	2,500-2,800
FPL	164-218	401-504	1,096-1,304	436-537	2,097-2,563
FARN	72-95	200-220	353-400	55-60	680-775
FAL	26-30	0	384-460	Unknown	410-490
PRTC	15-20	26	239-291	45-53	325-390
Total	437-523 (7%)	1,527-1,750 (25%)	3,312-3,845 (55%)	736-900 (13%)	6,012-7,018

People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
 Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)
 Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)
 Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL)
 Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)
 Frente Morazanense Nacional de Liberación (FMLN)

Strength by Faction, 1988



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Figure 10
Seaborne Logistic Deliveries to
Salvadoran Insurgents, 1987-88¹



¹ Like 1987, 1985 and 1986 deliveries averaged a total of 28 per year.

Table 2
FMLN Weapons Losses

	Lost to Military ^a	Captured From Military ^b	Net Loss
1985	1,235	254	981
1986	719	336	383
1987	948	426	522
1988	983	409	574

Note: This table shows that, in the last two years alone, the FMLN has lost nearly 1,100 weapons more than it has captured from the military. These figures do not take into account the additional depletion of the guerrilla inventory due to normal wear and tear of its aging stock of M-16s.

Monetary donations from Western organizations, including some in the United States, continue to meet a significant portion of insurgent financial needs.

the dimensions of financial aid is scattered, but sufficient to underline its continued importance to the war effort.

revealed that one of the largest guerrilla factions—but still only one of five—acquired \$2.5 million courier admitted to carrying from \$40,000 to \$70,000 per month, which would equate to \$480,000 to \$840,000 per year transported by a single individual from one faction.

Various ruses are used to attract and divert funds. a guerrilla-dominated labor coalition sought in funding for a new building, and, while a organization estimated this was three times the necessary amount, other organizations serviced the request. the guerrilla-dominated human rights group COMADRES donated to one of

the insurgent factions, although the money had originally been provided by organization to aid displaced children.

Government Counterinsurgency Performance

Over the past few years, the government has implemented a two-track counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the still well-supplied and reasonably well-funded FMLN. It is based on large-scale sustained military operations and a nationwide civic action/civil defense program; the military track has been much more successful than the latter.

Salvadoran military performance has improved markedly since 1984, and the armed forces are now able to conduct more frequent and effective large-scale sweep

Figure 11
Seaborne Deliveries





Figure 12
Salvadoran Military and Insurgent
Casualties, 1981-88



Note: FMLN killed in action figures rose 23.5 percent in 1988, following a three-year gradual decline. ESAF casualty figures (combined killed and wounded) have been rising for the last five years, and 1987 and 1988 totals were the highest of the war. In those years, however, killed in action were only 16 percent of total casualties, compared to 41 percent in 1983.

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operations throughout the country. Further, the military has become somewhat more aggressive offensively, and its development and use of tactical intelligence also has improved measurably, contributing to a greater effectiveness in defensive operations as well. (See figure 12.)

Government casualties are relatively high in absolute terms, but the army will probably have little difficulty in replacing its losses in the next year or two. The morale of the armed forces is good and likely to

remain so. Officers are generally optimistic about the course of the war, although for most this is predicated on continued support from the United States.

We do not expect this situation to substantially change in 1989. The military can continue to maintain pressure on the insurgents, to temporarily disrupt

guerrilla base areas, to preempt insurgent preparations for major attacks, and to incrementally reduce guerrilla strength. (See figure 8.) Its manpower and firepower superiorities will lead to continued measured progress that is likely to reduce the military effectiveness of the insurgency without dramatically reducing its scope. [REDACTED]

Military operations tend not to be guided by overarching goals, however, but to be piecemeal. A good example are the multibattalion offensives that disrupt guerrilla base areas but only on a temporary basis since they do not result in a permanent expansion of government presence and control. Uneven leadership—because of an overreliance on seniority rather than merit for military promotion—leads to inconsistent application of the kind of aggressive small-unit tactics necessary to decisively engage and defeat the insurgents. [REDACTED]

Perhaps more important, the civic action/civil defense program has never had strong government or military support and continues to founder. The civic action program targets key rural areas with projects designed to extend government services and security, but, despite its ostensible importance, military and civilian support waned in 1988. Overall progress has been uneven over the years because of civilian bureaucratic ineptitude, inadequate funding, and the failure of a sometimes indifferent military to provide adequate security. [REDACTED]

Within the past year, there has been increased rhetoric and emphasis on a new "hearts and minds" strategy, but operations have had mixed and somewhat limited results. The government and military attempted to effect a coordinated campaign in Chalatenango Department to displace the guerrillas both militarily and politically; the operation has been plagued with delays and has been short on results. Colonel Ponce, the new Chief of Staff, also initiated a concerted campaign in eastern El Salvador by undertaking military/civil operations to establish a permanent military presence in certain FMLN zones. (See inset.) The campaign provoked an intensive and ongoing guerrilla campaign of threats and assassinations against civilians and elected officials, however, which the military was unprepared for and largely unable to counter. [REDACTED]

The FMLN's use of terror and assassinations against mayors and other government officials, while distasteful to many Salvadorans, has underscored the government's inability to protect those who support it. The terror campaign has the potential to destroy the always weak civil administration in large parts of the country, while further undermining civil defense and civic action programs. The government's inability to counter these tactics is a major weakness of its counterinsurgency program. [REDACTED]

With military assistance declining and the Salvadoran economy stagnating, it is doubtful the government could expand current programs. Even when US assistance was higher, civic action programs foundered

*Is Rightwing Violence Growing? **

The human rights situation appears to have worsened during the past year, although the overall level of politically inspired murders remains far below that of the early 1980s. While the Marxist insurgents continue to account for the majority of killings, we believe that rightwing extremists and some members of the armed forces increasingly are reacting to the government's seeming inability to control insurgent terrorism. (See figures 13 and 14.)

None of the confirmed cases of political killings has been attributed to the right, but extremists probably are responsible for some of what the [redacted] characterizes as "suspicious" killings, in which no clear motive can be established. Circumstances surrounding many of the crimes—torture, assassinations by groups, and bodies being dumped some distance from the scene of a crime—are trademarks of death squad killings in the

* Note on data: A number of organizations gather and publicize statistical information on political killings and other human rights abuses in El Salvador. Some of these groups employ questionable methodologies, and others have been revealed to be fronts for the insurgency. The data used here were obtained by [redacted]

While the figures probably are not precise, we believe they accurately reflect trends in political violence.

early 1980s. Three new groups have recently announced their existence—the Revolutionary Anti-Communist Extermination Action, the Central American Anti-Communist Hand, and the Eastern Anti-Communist Command—and are threatening to kill leftists in retaliation for guerrilla terrorism. Rightists no doubt have perpetrated some of the political killings, but we have no evidence they are acting with the explicit sanction of ARENA leaders. Even party hardliners like Roberto D'Aubuisson probably are reluctant to risk negative political fallout through the reckless use of illegal violence.

In contrast to [redacted] regarding rightwing killings, there has been a discernible increase in confirmed political killings by the armed forces. We attribute these mostly to low-ranking soldiers and policemen, rather than to a broad, high-level conspiracy. The officer corps generally is aware of the political sensitivities associated with the human rights issue and wants to avoid a cutoff of vital US military assistance. Many officers probably do cover up such crimes to avoid damage to the armed forces' prestige and legitimacy.

because of inadequate funds. In addition, although there are few officers who advocate death squad methods, there is still no indication that the officer corps is ready to investigate and punish human rights violations by officers above the rank of lieutenant. This tends to undermine efforts to win and retain support in contested areas. (See inset and figures 13 and 14.)

Armed Forces Performance Over the Longer Term


The efforts to remedy deficiencies and pursue reforms, while not likely to have a dramatic short-term impact, will have an important bearing on the broader

course of the war just as they have had a cumulative effect to date. Assuming current trends, we believe that the armed forces is likely to grind down the insurgency militarily over the next three to five years, perhaps reducing its personnel size by one-third. This would sharply reduce the FMLN's capability to conduct medium- to large-scale attacks on strategic targets. Nevertheless, the guerrillas will still be able to conduct a prolonged war, depending ever more heavily on terrorism, sabotage, and small-scale attacks. The guerrillas, while unable to seize power, will continue to threaten seriously the security and stability of the country. (See figure 15.)

Figure 13
El Salvador: Human Rights Situation


Note scale change

Confirmed Political Killings Outside of Combat



*Through November.

Suspicious Killings—No Clearly Established Motive




Most critical to any projection remains the level of external aid to the government. The military is highly dependent on assistance from the United States, which provides nearly all its arms, munitions, spare parts, maintenance, training, and medical supplies. US military aid has been declining since 1984—in part due to a leveling off in the growth of the armed forces. The military was able to cope with a sizable reduction in FY 1988 by utilizing unspent funds from the previous year. The present level of aid is sufficient to meet day-to-day operational needs, but further reductions would threaten to cut into combat capabilities and to provoke morale problems. Some observers believe that a deep decline in annual assistance would push the military toward a bloody “now or never” offensive against the insurgents and their sympathizers or a highly conservative defensive posture. Either would have clearly negative consequences for human rights and the prospects of democratic government.

Impact of the Election on the War

Regardless of which party wins the presidential election, the general prosecution of the war will remain the province of the armed forces, which tolerates little interference from civilians. A new Christian Democrat government would be especially unlikely to deviate from the way the war has been conducted. While many individual—and perhaps even the majority of—officers and soldiers are pro-ARENA, we do not believe the military would surrender very much of its authority or sublimate its institutional interests even to archconservative politicians. The armed forces will also continue to have a de facto veto over concessions the guerrillas may demand in any future negotiations regardless of the government in power. In a more

Figure 14
El Salvador: Confirmed Political Killings
Outside of Combat, 1987-88



El Salvador's corrupt and inefficient judicial system. It is also likely that the ascendancy of ARENA would be perceived by some extremists as giving tacit encouragement to anti-left vigilantism. Failure by the next government to demonstrate a commitment to democratic values and human rights could result in the loss of vital US assistance and undermine the government's popular legitimacy. An ARENA government dominated by extremists like Roberto D'Aubuisson or Sigifredo Ochoa might, in the name of nationalism, move to curtail or minimize US influence. It also could seek quick, dramatic gain against the insurgency by resurrecting death squads, prompting international condemnation of the government, and generating sympathy—possibly even tangible support—for the guerrillas.

Alternatively, an ARENA administration either dominated by moderates, or in which the hardliners curb their behavior, probably would not try to alter the current approach to the war. Such a government, recognizing the importance of continued US assistance, would attempt to maintain reasonably good relations with Washington. Should US economic and military aid levels remain relatively constant and the new government do nothing to jeopardize its own political standing, we would expect a further weakening of the insurgency, albeit at the current measured pace. ARENA, which already has contacts with rebel leaders, may continue talks in the hope of building domestic support, improving its own international image, and maintaining US funding levels.

general sense, however, the weakening of the political center threatens to interrupt the momentum of social and economic reforms, which could further polarize Salvadoran society, enhance oligarchic interests, and simultaneously encourage increased support for the insurgents.

An ARENA Victory: Two Scenarios

We believe that an ARENA victory could have an indirect—but profound—impact on the course of the war. The prospect of a government firmly in the hands of the right signals a tougher stand, politically and militarily, against the left. An ARENA government would be less inclined than a PDC administration to investigate political crimes by the right and to punish offenders—a process complicated in any event by

At a minimum, however, we would expect an ARENA administration, whether moderate or extremist, to reestablish legislation—which lapsed in early 1987—limiting civil liberties for suspected guerrillas. Such a move would facilitate operations by the military and police but also would provide ammunition for human rights critics. Any ARENA government is also likely to crack down on guerrilla front groups and pursue an aggressive legislative agenda. It probably would not move wholesale to undo all of Duarte's social and economic reforms, but the party's

Figure 15
El Salvador: Key Indicators

○ Low ⊖ Moderate ● High ▲ Increasing ▼ Decreasing

Strength of the Government		1984	1988	Strength of the Salvadoran Insurgency		1984	1988
Political				Political			
	Foreign assistance	●	●		Foreign assistance	⊖	○
	Foreign recognition/state of relations	⊖	⊖▲		Popular support/cooperation	⊖	○
	Governmental internal unity	●	⊖		Ideological cohesion and unity	⊖	⊖
	Legal/illegal immigration	⊖	●		Political strategy	●	●▲
	Local governmental control/presence	⊖	⊖▼		Psychological operations	⊖	⊖▲
	Civic action/psychological operations	○	⊖		International image	⊖	○
	Popular support/legitimacy	⊖	●	Military			
	Economic performance	○	○		Military initiative	⊖	⊖▼
Military					Combat proficiency	⊖	⊖
	Strategy and tactics	○	⊖		Weapons/logistics	⊖	⊖
	Military aggressiveness	○	⊖		Troop discipline/morale	⊖	⊖
	Civil-military relations	○	⊖		Recruitment/numbers	●	●
	Military presence in rural areas	○	⊖▲		Geographic scope of operations	⊖	⊖▲
	Urban control	⊖	⊖		Secure areas	⊖	⊖▼
	Availability of weapons/logistics	●	●		Urban effectiveness	○	⊖
	Troop morale	⊖	●				
	Use of intelligence	○	⊖				
	Respect for human rights	○	⊖▲				

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strong ties to conservative businessmen and landowners will incline it to shift the country's economic program to loosen state control of marketing and probably to roll back at least some of the agrarian reform.

The future role and agenda of ARENA hardliners, most notably D'Aubuisson, remain the critical variables in how far and fast ARENA would try to move. D'Aubuisson is politically savvy, and the moderate tone of the ARENA campaign reflects his appreciation for the practical need to distance the party from its extremist reputation. He probably understands the value of continued US assistance but is rash, and harbors deep resentment against the United States that could overwhelm other interests.

The Left's Postelection Strategy

We believe the insurgents and their allies will persist in their efforts to delink the United States from the Salvadoran Government, regardless of which party wins the presidency. An ARENA administration would sharpen the existing polarization in Salvadoran politics and enhance the effectiveness of insurgent propaganda. Nonetheless, we believe the insurgents will pursue essentially the same postelection guidelines against an ARENA or a PDC government, albeit with some differences in degree and emphasis.

Resources have been a primary determinant of leftists' tactics and so limit their options. We expect they will attempt to intensify their urban campaign of sabotage, terrorism, strikes, and demonstrations in the capital and other cities. Militarily, the guerrillas will opt for additional high-visibility, low-risk attacks on military targets, similar to those carried out in the capital in late 1988 and early 1989.

An ARENA administration, however, might also prompt the guerrillas to heighten a dirty war with efforts to assassinate high-level targets. The guerrillas would reason that the real and imagined reputations of ARENA party chiefs provide both better justification and offer greater likelihood of sparking the hardline response they have unsuccessfully sought during the Christian Democrats' tenure. In addition, the guerrillas and their Cuban and Nicaraguan benefactors might come to believe that increased or more sophisticated arms were a more justified gamble in such an environment where international scrutiny would be directed more toward the government than the guerrillas.

External Factors

Nicaragua. Under most likely scenarios for Central America, the Sandinistas will be able to devote increased attention to their goal of promoting revolution in the region:

- In the event of a regional political settlement, the Sandinistas would continue to support the FMLN with logistics and materiel, even if they were bound by the settlement to cease such support.
- Absent a settlement, a winding down of the Nicaraguan Resistance effort would have limited, but positive, effect for El Salvador's insurgents, principally through freeing up some Nicaraguan military supplies for ultimate provision to the FMLN. Some Resistance weapons might also find their way to the FMLN.

Managua—in conjunction with Havana—would, however, carefully assess increased support of the FMLN, balancing its impact in El Salvador with likely US and other international reaction. (See inset.) Managua would probably regard moderate increases

in the supply of equipment currently in the FMLN inventory as a relatively safe risk, although this would probably not have a decisive impact on the fighting. The Sandinistas probably would avoid dramatic measures—such as the introduction of new and more sophisticated weapons—that it believed could trigger a reestablishment of US lethal aid to the Resistance. But if the Resistance were completely neutralized—or if the Sandinistas did not regard US military action as a credible possibility—Nicaragua would be positioned to expand the scope of its assistance. The FMLN would become a substantially more dangerous adversary were this assistance to include SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and crew-served weapons such as heavy mortars. The effect would not simply be the military impact but the psychological one. The Salvadoran military, like their counterparts in Nicaragua, would, after initial losses, adjust to the provision of SA-7s to guerrilla forces. The momentum, confidence, and morale of government forces could be substantially eroded, however, especially if such escalation went unanswered by Washington.

The Peace Process. Prospective regional peace agreements are a double-edged sword for the Salvadoran Government that on balance are likely to present growing political and public relations problems rather than practical solutions. This is likely to be especially true if an ARENA government is in power. In almost all cases, the guerrilla left is the most obvious beneficiary.

The only regional peace initiative the government would welcome is a border verification mechanism capable of interfering with Sandinista logistic assistance to the FMLN—a highly unlikely outcome given demonstrated problems in terms of practical implementation and lack of political will. Otherwise, the Esquipulas II peace process and related regional initiatives threaten to force the government into negotiations with the FMLN, which the armed forces are likely to resist strongly, adding to civil-military problems. Indeed, if the Sandinistas and the Resistance resume talks under the Sapoa Agreement or a new

*Cuban, Soviet, and Sandinista Perspectives
on the Insurgency*

Cuba and Nicaragua have long been the principal supporters of the Salvadoran insurgency. Managua, probably reflecting Havana's guidance, openly promotes a political settlement in El Salvador while continuing to surreptitiously provide the guerrillas with military aid. Nicaragua's role consists primarily of providing transportation, warehousing, and coordination for deliveries of supplies from Cuba, including arms and ammunition support. It also encompasses training, safehaven, safe transit, and secure communications facilities to support the insurgent military network. We have no convincing evidence that the Soviets are providing direct military assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas. However, Moscow does give financial assistance and military training to the Communist Party of El Salvador, which is included in the FMLN.

We believe Cuba and Nicaragua over the short term will try to keep both the political and military options open. Havana's interest in the political track could begin to wane in the months ahead, however, and military pressure could be stepped up if the political environment changes—for example, if the Central American Peace Plan disintegrates or if a radical rightist government is elected. Similarly, if the insurgency began to pose a

credible threat of a military overthrow, we believe Havana and Managua would throw their weight behind the attempt.

Havana also provides military training, arms, and logistic support to the FMLN, in addition to more visible medical and propaganda aid. Fidel Castro, who helped the disparate factions that comprise the FMLN to unite in 1980, also continues to mediate disputes within the group and to offer tactical advice.

For their part, the Soviets see political action as the most promising means for the left to increase influence and to avoid being held responsible for any escalation in the fighting. While TASS coverage of insurgent activity is favorable, Moscow is critical of the guerrillas for being inflexible and thinks them naive for believing they can defeat the government militarily. The Soviets turned down an FMLN request for that the Soviets have expressed interest in the prospects of the Democratic Convergence and have invited Moscow. By trying to build relationships with such leaders, the Soviets hope over the longer term to broaden their influence in San Salvador.

framework, international pressure for El Salvador to pursue a parallel process could enhance the FMLN's bargaining position.

The recent FMLN negotiating proposal suggests the possibility that the guerrillas are under pressure to consider more seriously a political settlement. The proposal—presented to the government by the church—involves postponement of the election, respect for its outcome and elected officials, and drops longstanding demands for power sharing and restructuring of the armed forces. (See inset, page 26.) It is

intended at least as much for international as for domestic impact. Although there are probably some linked to the guerrilla left who wish seriously to pursue these negotiations, indicates the insurgent leadership views the peace proposal principally as designed to stave off military pressure, and it expects rejection of the proposal to legitimate intensification of the war.

If the Sandinistas are successful in redefining the Esquipulas democratization provisions using human rights criteria, Nicaragua and the FMLN will point increasingly to alleged government abuses or the inability to control death squad activity. This poses a potentially acute public relations problem, especially for an ARENA administration. Government refusal or inability to rein in human rights abuses or negotiate with the FMLN could have repercussions in the US Congress, possibly threatening bipartisan support for continuing US aid. [REDACTED]

Implications for US Interests

In the most likely scenario—a protracted war of attrition—the key political battle will shift to the United States. The FMLN will endeavor to reinvigorate US political opposition to continuing military and economic support. The FMLN's January 1989 peace plan is clearly part of this strategy—a seemingly forthcoming offer that meets many of the government's oft-repeated demands, the rejection of which will make the government appear rigid and duplicitous. [REDACTED]

For the Salvadoran Government, the task will be essentially defensive. While carefully monitoring US Congressional opinion, it will attempt to refute allegations by the guerrillas and their sympathizers of human rights abuses and corruption, remain open to the concept of a regional peace accord and dissenting strains of opinion, and ensure that the election is fair, and unmarked by significant fraud. [REDACTED]

If the government loses the public relations war with the FMLN, it may well find itself facing reduced levels of economic and military aid or conditionality on continuing aid that it will find burdensome or even intolerable. US leverage in supporting the survival of El Salvador's democratic institutions and improvement in the human rights arena derives from continuing high levels of US economic and military aid. In

particular, the armed forces' commitment to democracy and acceptable practices in the field continues to hinge on their dependence on US support. [REDACTED]

Given the strong antigringo streak in D'Aubuisson and his cohorts, if ARENA were in control of the government, a substantial reduction of US aid could spark a brutal military effort to wipe out the guerrillas and their supporters, along with reciprocal FMLN atrocities. The quick result might be a temporary but pyrrhic gain, which would be eliminated as new insurgent recruits and higher levels of external aid would gradually turn the war back to 1983-84 levels. [REDACTED]

Should the FMLN offer a proposal that has genuine promise for a political settlement, US involvement and pressures will almost certainly be crucial in overcoming institutional resistance to compromise and keeping the renegade right wing from destroying the political environment. For such involvement to be effective, however, Salvadoran civil and military authorities will have to remain convinced that US commitment to preventing a guerrilla takeover remains firm. [REDACTED]

Other scenarios could include:

- A negotiated agreement to postpone the election in response to recent guerrilla proposals. This would not affect our judgment of the likely election outcome. In addition, we doubt that it would lead to a

lasting settlement because, at a minimum, hardline elements in the FMLN would renew the guerrilla struggle.

- The splintering of the FMLN, with some factions pursuing interests through the system and others fighting on.
- A degenerative weakening of the system caused by increased political polarization and intraparty factionalism combined with more rapid economic decline, enabling the FMLN to exploit the ensuing political chaos.

In the last case, uncertainty about the reliability of US economic and military support would be a key factor contributing to government paralysis and a deteriorating military situation, possibly facilitating a Sandinista-style revolution led by the FMLN. [REDACTED]

Exhibit D

PAGE 0002
TOR: 270046Z SEP 85

SUBJ: SALVADORAN MILITARY REACTION TO EXCHANGING PRISONERS FOR
PRESIDENT DUARTE'S KIDNAPPED DAUGHTER AND RELATED PLANNING

DOI: 25 - 26 SEPTEMBER 1985

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. DURING MEETINGS WITH OFFICERS FROM THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMCFA) ON 24 SEPTEMBER 1985 AND WITH SALVADORAN BRIGADE COMMANDERS ON 25 SEPTEMBER, PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)) RECEIVED SOLID SUPPORT FOR HIS PLAN TO RELEASE PRISONERS CURRENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR THE RELEASE OF HIS DAUGHTER INES GUADALUPE ((DUARTE)) DURAN. THE ONLY EXPRESSION OF DISSENTION CAME FROM FOURTH BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL SIGFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ. OCHOA SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT GIVE IN TO THE DEMANDS OF THE KIDNAPPERS. EMCFA CHIEF GENERAL ADOLFO ONECIFERO ((BLANDON)) SUBSEQUENTLY REMARKED THAT HE HAD TAKEN OCHOA ASIDE AFTER THE SESSION AND WARNED HIM THAT HIS POSITION WAS UNWISE BUT OCHOA SEEMED UNIMPRESSED. (COMMENT: OCHOA PROBABLY BELIEVED HIS HARDLINE POSITION WOULD MEET WITH WIDE SUPPORT WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. HE NOW FINDS HIMSELF VIRTUALLY ISOLATED, HOWEVER.)

2. GENERAL BLANDON ALSO STATED PRIVATELY THAT ONCE INES DUARTE IS RELEASED, THE ESAF PLANS TO LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE OPERATION IN CHALATENANGO AND NORTHERN CUSCATLAN DEPARTMENTS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ESAF HAS CONCLUDED THAT POPULAR LIBERATION FORCES (FPL) GUERRILLAS, WHO THE ARMY BELIEVES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF INES DUARTE, ARE BASED IN THOSE AREAS. HE ADDED THAT THE EMCFA IS CONSIDERING COORDINATING THIS OPERATION WITH THE HONDURAN ARMY TO PREVENT GUERRILLAS FROM RETREATING ACROSS THE BORDER TO REFUGEE CAMPS IN HONDURAS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 022001Z OCT 85

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: DISCUSSION AMONG SALVADORAN BRIGADE AND OTHER
DEPARTMENTAL COMMANDERS CONCERNING DEMANDS MADE BY
THE KIDNAPPERS OF PRESIDENT DUARTE'S DAUGHTER

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0002
TOR: 022001Z OCT 85

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. ON 25 SEPTEMBER 1985, COMMANDERS OF SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES (ESAF) BRIGADES AND OTHER ESAF DEPARTMENTAL COMMANDERS DISCUSSED THE DEMANDS MADE BY THE KIDNAPPERS OF PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE))'S DAUGHTER, INES GUADALUPE ((DUARTE)) DURAN. THESE OFFICERS HAD GATHERED AT THE ESAF JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMCFA) HEADQUARTERS TO RECEIVE A BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION FROM PRESIDENT DUARTE. THIS DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE BEFORE DUARTE ARRIVED.

2. A CONSENSUS WAS REACHED THAT THE INSURGENTS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN MARIONA PRISON ARE ABLE TO MEET AND PLAN ACTIVITIES WITH COMPLETE SECURITY INSIDE THE PRISON WHERE THEY NO LONGER HAVE TO FEAR ATTACKS BY THE ARMED FORCES. SEVERAL SALVADORAN COMMANDERS COMMENTED THAT THEY WOULD PREFER TO RELEASE THE INSURGENT PRISONERS BECAUSE, NOW THAT THEY HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY IDENTIFIED, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO TRACK THEM DOWN AGAIN. IT WOULD DENY THEM THE SAFETY OF MARIONA TO PLAN THEIR ACTIVITIES AND THERE WAS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY OF CATCHING THEM IN AN AMBUSH OR OTHER MILITARY OPERATION. ALSO DISCUSSED WAS THE FACT THAT THE LAST GENERAL AMNESTY DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY.

3. THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMANDERS ALSO CAME TO AN AGREEMENT THAT IF ANY HARM WERE TO COME TO INES DUARTE, THEY DID NOT WANT TO FEEL RESPONSIBLE FOR NOT HAVING SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT IN HIS PLAN TO FREE INSURGENT PRISONERS TO OBTAIN HIS DAUGHTER'S RELEASE.

4. DURING THIS DISCUSSION, FOURTH BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ WAS THE ONLY OFFICER TO EXPRESS STRONG OPPOSITION TO NEGOTIATING WITH THE KIDNAPPERS AND CAPITULATING TO THEIR DEMANDS. OCHOA GAVE DETAILED ARGUMENTS IN AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THOSE PRESENT TO SUPPORT HIS POSITION. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DUARTE, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO ((VIDES)) CASANOVA ASKED WHETHER ANY OF THE OFFICERS OPPOSED THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTER. OCHOA AGAIN WAS THE ONLY OFFICER TO SPEAK, BUT HE DID NOT EXPRESS DIRECT OPPOSITION OR SPEAK AS FORCEFULLY AS HE HAD WHEN ONLY HIS FELLOW BRIGADE AND OTHER DEPARTMENTAL COMMANDERS HAD BEEN PRESENT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOT: 121728Z OCT 85

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: EMCFA OFFICER'S COMMENTS ON DISAFFECTION IN THE FOURTH
BRIGADE AND MANAGEABILITY OF MILITARY RESTIVENESS

DOI: 11 OCTOBER 1985

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. ON 11 OCTOBER 1985, SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES JOINT GENERAL
STAFF (EMCFA) CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (C-III) LT. COLONEL RENE EMILIO
((PONCE)) COMMENTED TO A COLLEAGUE THAT A SERIOUS PROBLEM EXISTS
AMONG THE OFFICERS OF THE FOURTH BRIGADE. HE SAID
THAT THIS HAS BEEN CAUSED BY FOURTH BRIGADE COMMANDER
AND COMMANDER OF MILITARY ZONE FOUR COLONEL
SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ. PONCE EXPLAINED THAT OCHOA FUNDAMENTALLY
DISAGREES WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON
((DUARTE)) IS HANDLING THE KIDNAPPING OF HIS DAUGHTER, INES
GUADALUPE ((DUARTE)) DURAN. PONCE SAID THAT OCHOA HAS COMPLAINED
TO THE EMCFA ABOUT ORDERS FORBIDDING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE
EASTERN PART OF CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT. ACCORDING TO PONCE, OCHOA
HAS STATED THAT HE CANNOT ACCEPT THE IMPACT OF THIS "POLITICAL
DECISION" ON THE MILITARY CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PAGE 0002 [REDACTED]
TOR: 120140Z OCT 85 [REDACTED]

SUBJ: EMCFA OFFICER'S COMMENTS ON DISAFFECTION IN THE FOURTH
BRIGADE AND MANAGEABILITY OF MILITARY RESTIVENESS

DOI: 11 OCTOBER 1985

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. ON 11 OCTOBER 1985, SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMCFA) CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (C-III) LT. COLONEL RENE EMILIO ((PONCE)) COMMENTED TO A COLLEAGUE THAT A SERIOUS PROBLEM EXISTS AMONG THE OFFICERS OF THE FOURTH BRIGADE. HE SAID THAT THIS HAS BEEN CAUSED BY FOURTH BRIGADE COMMANDER AND COMMANDER OF MILITARY ZONE FOUR COLONEL SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ. PONCE EXPLAINED THAT OCHOA FUNDAMENTALLY DISAGREES WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)) IS HANDLING THE KIDNAPPING OF HIS DAUGHTER, INES GUADALUPE ((DUARTE)) DURAN. PONCE SAID THAT OCHOA HAS COMPLAINED TO THE EMCFA ABOUT ORDERS FORBIDDING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PART OF CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT. ACCORDING TO PONCE, OCHOA HAS STATED THAT HE CANNOT ACCEPT THE IMPACT OF THIS "POLITICAL DECISION" ON THE MILITARY CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

2. PONCE SAID THAT OCHOA MET WITH CHIEF, EMCFA, GENERAL ADOLFO ONECIFERO ((BLANDON)) ON THE MORNING OF 11 OCTOBER; BLANDON ORDERED OCHOA TO STOP HIS OPEN COMPLAINING AND INCITING HIS OFFICERS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT.

3. PONCE COMMENTED THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTANDS THE OFFICER CORPS' FRUSTRATION OVER PRESIDENT DUARTE'S BEHAVIOR, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SITUATION WILL BECOME UNMANAGEABLE BECAUSE OF THE STRENGTH AND RESPECT WHICH GENERAL BLANDON COMMANDS OVER THESE OFFICERS.

4. PONCE ALSO REMARKED THAT THE EMCFA HAS BEEN GIVEN APPROVAL TO PLAN AN ATTEMPT TO RESCUE INES DUARTE. PONCE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF A RESCUE OPERATION AUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT HELP IN REGAINING SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM DISGRUNTLED OFFICERS.

5. PONCE ADDED THAT GRUMBLING IS OCCURRING AMONG OTHER MILITARY CONTINGENTS BUT HAS NOT REACHED THE EXTENT OF THAT IN THE FOURTH BRIGADE. PONCE SAID THAT OCHOA'S FOLLOWERS ARE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY LIMITED TO THE OFFICERS OF HIS OWN BRIGADE. HE ALSO REMARKED THAT DISCONTENT IN OTHER BRIGADES, SUCH AS THE THIRD BRIGADE, IS NORMAL IN VIEW OF THE RIGHTIST POLITICAL TENDENCIES OF SOME OF THE OFFICERS IN THE EASTERN ZONE.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PAGE 0002 [REDACTED]
TOT: 121728Z OCT 85 [REDACTED]

2. PONCE SAID THAT OCHOA MET WITH CHIEF, EMCFA, GENERAL ADOLFO ONECIFERO ((BLANDON)) ON THE MORNING OF 11 OCTOBER; BLANDON ORDERED OCHOA TO STOP HIS OPEN COMPLAINING AND INCITING HIS OFFICERS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT.

3. PONCE COMMENTED THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTANDS THE OFFICER CORPS' FRUSTRATION OVER PRESIDENT DUARTE'S BEHAVIOR, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SITUATION WILL BECOME UNMANAGEABLE BECAUSE OF THE STRENGTH AND RESPECT WHICH GENERAL BLANDON COMMANDS OVER THESE OFFICERS.

4. PONCE ALSO REMARKED THAT THE EMCFA HAS BEEN GIVEN APPROVAL TO PLAN AN ATTEMPT TO RESCUE INES DUARTE. PONCE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF A RESCUE OPERATION AUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT HELP IN REGAINING SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM DISGRUNTLED OFFICERS.

5. PONCE ADDED THAT GRUMBLING IS OCCURRING AMONG OTHER MILITARY CONTINGENTS BUT HAS NOT REACHED THE EXTENT OF THAT IN THE FOURTH BRIGADE. PONCE SAID THAT OCHOA'S FOLLOWERS ARE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY LIMITED TO THE OFFICERS OF HIS OWN BRIGADE. HE ALSO REMARKED THAT DISCONTENT IN OTHER BRIGADES, SUCH AS THE THIRD BRIGADE, IS NORMAL IN VIEW OF THE RIGHTIST POLITICAL TENDENCIES OF SOME OF THE OFFICERS IN THE EASTERN ZONE.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOT: 130034Z OCT 85

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: FRICTION WITHIN THE SALVADORAN MILITARY HIGH COMMAND
OVER DISSATISFACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING
OF INES DUARTE'S KIDNAPPING

DOI: EARLY OCTOBER 1985

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] THE SALVADORAN ARMED
FORCES (ESAF) HIGH COMMAND IS ACUTELY CONCERNED OVER THE GROWING

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PAGE 0002 [REDACTED]
TOT: 130034Z OCT 85 [REDACTED]

DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE ESAF OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF OF THE KIDNAPPING OF INES GUADALUPE ((DUARTE)) DURAN, DAUGHTER OF PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A LETTER WRITTEN IN EARLY OCTOBER BY MILITARY ZONE FOUR COMMANDER SIGFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ AND SIGNED BY OFFICERS OF OCHOA'S FOURTH BRIGADE CRITICIZING THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE CASE HAS AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION AND HAS PROMPTED THE HIGH COMMAND TO SCHEDULE AN URGENT MEETING OF ALL SALVADORAN MILITARY COMMANDERS ON 14 OCTOBER TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION.

2. [REDACTED] OCHOA'S LETTER HAD INFORMED THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE FOURTH BRIGADE'S OPPOSITION TO THE GRANTING OF CONCESSIONS TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WHO HAD KIDNAPPED A COMMON CITIZEN. OCHOA'S LETTER STATED THAT THE RESTRICTION ON THE LAUNCHING OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY HAD "TIED THE HANDS" OF THE ESAF AND HAD PUT OCHOA'S TROOPS IN A DISADVANTAGEOUS SITUATION. THE LETTER ALSO CRITICIZED THE MANNER IN WHICH DUARTE'S GOVERNMENT "CAVED IN" TO ALL THE DEMANDS OF THE GUERRILLAS WITHOUT ANY ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONCESSIONS IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS.

3. [REDACTED] OCHOA'S LETTER HAD CAUSED FRICTION WITHIN THE HIGH COMMAND ITSELF. [REDACTED] WHILE SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HIGH COMMAND DISAGREED WITH THE METHOD AND SUBSTANCE OF OCHOA'S LETTER, OTHERS, INCLUDING HIMSELF, DISAGREED WITH THE METHOD BUT AGREED WITH OCHOA'S CONCLUSIONS AND DISSATISFACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE KIDNAPPING CASE. [REDACTED] THE HIGH COMMAND WAS EXTREMELY WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT MOST OFFICERS OF THE RANK OF CAPTAIN AND BELOW SHARE OCHOA'S VIEWPOINT. AN URGENT MEETING WAS CONSEQUENTLY SCHEDULED FOR 14 OCTOBER FOR ALL MILITARY COMMANDERS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE. [REDACTED] THE KIDNAPPING CASE WAS CAUSING DIVISIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY AS WELL AS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND PRESIDENT DUARTE TO THE NET BENEFIT OF THE INSURGENCY.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PAGE 0003 [REDACTED]
TOR: 160543Z OCT 85 [REDACTED]

A. THE MANNER IN WHICH PRESIDENT DUARTE'S GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM ENDANGERS NATIONAL SECURITY BECAUSE IT ENTAILS NEGOTIATING ON THE INSURGENTS' TERMS, WHICH IS UNACCEPTABLE.

B. THE ARMED FORCES PRINCIPAL MISSION IS TO SAFEGUARD THE NATIONAL SECURITY, YET THEY HAVE NOT BEEN CONSULTED WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM.

C. THE ARMED FORCES STRESS THEIR CONVICTION OF LOYALTY TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS BUT UNDERScore THE DANGER TO THE MORALE OF AN INSTITUTION WHICH IS SHEDDING ITS BLOOD IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT.

D. THE ARMED FORCES BELIEVES, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THAT THE SECURITY OF THE NATION MUST COME BEFORE THE HUMAN SENTIMENT OF ONE FATHER. NEGOTIATING WITH THE ENEMY ENDANGERS THE SECURITY OF THE NATION; THE PRICE IS TOO HIGH AND IT IS UNFAIR TO BE OBLIGATED TO PAY SUCH A PRICE FOR THE FREEDOM OF ONE CITIZEN.

4. THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENT ARE:

A. DO NOT CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE THE FREEDOM OF ONE CITIZEN IN EXCHANGE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE NATION.

B. THE HIGH COMMAND SHOULD EXPLAIN TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES THE REAL SEQUENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE.

C. THESE CONCEPTS ARE NOT MOTIVATED BY PARTISAN INTERESTS.

D. THE ARMED FORCES ARE CONCERNED OVER DIVISIVENESS OCCASIONED BY PARTISAN INTERESTS.

E. THE HIGH COMMAND SHOULD RECALL THAT THOUSANDS OF MILITARY FAMILIES ARE IN MOURNING AND HUNDREDS OF SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN MUTILATED IN COMBAT AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS. PARTISAN ATTITUDES UNDERMINE THE SACRIFICES OF EL SALVADOR'S MARTYRS AND HEROES.

F. THE RELEASE OF ONE OR MORE TERRORISTS LOWERS THE MORALE OF SALVADORAN SOLDIERS AND WILL CREATE A LACK OF TRUST AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND.

5. DURING THE FOUR-HOUR MEETING, NONE OF THE OFFICERS WAS ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE CONFERENCE ROOM UNTIL THE COMPLETED DOCUMENT WAS SIGNED BY THE ATTENDING OFFICERS. BRIGADE CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE (S-2) MAJOR OSCAR EDGARDO ((VELASQUEZ)) RIVERA WAS AMONG THE MOST VOCAL ADVOCATES OF THE DOCUMENT AND BROWBEAT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0004
TOR: 160543Z OCT 85

SOME OF THE MORE RELUCTANT SUBORDINATE OFFICERS INTO SIGNING IT. ALTHOUGH ALL OF THE OFFICERS PRESENT WERE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE POINTS MADE IN THE DOCUMENT, SOME WERE RELUCTANT TO SIGN. IN THE END, ALL BUT ONE OF THE ATTENDING OFFICERS SIGNED THE DOCUMENT.

6. ON 11 OCTOBER, OCHOA PRESENTED THE DOCUMENT FIRST TO CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMCFA) GENERAL ADOLFO ONECIFERO ((BLANDON)), WHO ACCUSED OCHOA OF TRYING TO PUT HIM IN A COMPROMISING POSITION. OCHOA CONSEQUENTLY TOOK THE DOCUMENT BACK FROM BLANDON AND DELIVERED IT TO VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA.

7. FOURTH BRIGADE OFFICERS WHO HAD SIGNED THE DOCUMENT WERE:

COLONEL OCHOA
LT. COLONEL BENJAMIN ELADIO ((CANJURA)) ALVAYERO, EXECUTIVE OFFICER
MAJOR VELASQUEZ, S-2
MAJOR FELIX RANULFO ((RAMIREZ)) GONZALEZ, PAYMASTER
MAJOR ALFREDO ((GONZALEZ)) BRITO, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (S-3)
CAPTAIN DAVID ERNESTO ((NAVAS)) TENORIO, "COBRA" BATTALION COMMANDER
CAPTAIN FRANCISCO ANTONIO ((VILLACORTA)), CHIEF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (S-5)
LIEUTENANT FUENTES, "AZMITIA" BATTALION COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT ALBERTO ((CONTRERAS)) ROBLES, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT CRISTOBAL ((SORTO)) SANCHEZ, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT RENE ((VIERA)) TORRES, ASSISTANT LOGISTICS OFFICER (S-4)
SECOND LIEUTENANT JUAN CARLOS ((CLARAMOUNT)) VILLAFANE, RECONNAISSANCE SECTION COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT JOSE ANTONIO ((REYES)) ROJAS, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT MIGUEL ANGEL ((PEREZ)) ALFARO, CHIEF OF PERSONNEL (S-1)
SECOND LIEUTENANT JOSE MAURICIO ((ESCOTO)), COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT ARMANDO ((QUINTANILLA)), CHIEF OF SECURITY
SECOND LIEUTENANT AGUSTIN ((FLORES)) MATA, ASSISTANT S-2
SECOND LIEUTENANT EDUARDO WILFREDO ((MOLINA)) TORRES, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT JOAQUIN ((GARCIA)) LANDOS, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT MANUEL JESUS ((BARQUERO)) ELIAS, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT MANUEL DE JESUS ((DOMINGUEZ)), COMPANY

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PAGE 0005 [REDACTED]
TOR: 160543Z OCT 85

COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT RICARDO ANTONIO ((SANTOS)), COMMUNICATIONS
OFFICER
SECOND LIEUTENANT ROGELIO ((MAGANA)) EGUIZBAL, COMBAT
SUPPORT COMPANY
SECOND LIEUTENANT CARLOS RENE ((ACEVEDO)), COMPANY COMMANDER.

8. THE ONLY OFFICER AMONG THOSE WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING
WHO DID NOT SIGN THE DOCUMENT WAS THE ARTILLERY OFFICER ASSIGNED
TO THE BRIGADE. HE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN SHUNNED BY THE OTHER
BRIGADE OFFICERS.

9. [REDACTED] COMMENT: OF THE OFFICERS WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING
AND SIGNED THE DOCUMENT, CANJURA, VILLACORTA, AND NAVAS WERE
INVOLVED IN THE COUP IN 1979.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 220022Z OCT 85

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: NEGATIVE REACTION OF SALVADORAN BRIGADE COMMANDERS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PAGE 0002 [REDACTED]
TOR: 220022Z OCT 85 [REDACTED]

TO PART OF THE NEW DEMAND BY THE KIDNAPPERS OF PRESIDENT
DUARTE'S DAUGHTER

DOI: 18 - 21 OCTOBER 1985

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. ON 20 OCTOBER 1985, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND PUBLIC
SECURITY GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO ((VIDES)) CASANOVA CONTACTED ALL
SALVADORAN BRIGADE COMMANDERS TO SOLICIT THEIR VIEWS ON THE LATEST
DEMAND BY THE KIDNAPPERS OF INES GUADALUPE ((DUARTE)) DURAN. VIDES
INFORMED THE COMMANDERS THAT THE KIDNAPPERS HAVE STIPULATED
THAT AT THE SAME TIME THAT INES DUARTE AND HER COMPANION ARE
EXCHANGED FOR 22 INSURGENT PRISONERS, THE KIDNAPPED MAYORS BE
EXCHANGED FOR THE EVACUATION OF 96 MAIMED AND WOUNDED INSURGENTS
TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY AND THE RELEASE OF 29 IMPRISONED FARABUNDO
MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) LABOR AND POLITICAL
ACTIVISTS.

2. ALL BRIGADE COMMANDERS, INCLUDING FOURTH BRIGADE COMMANDER
SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ, AGREED TO THE RELEASE OF THE 22
INSURGENT PRISONERS IN EXCHANGE FOR INES DUARTE AND ANA CECILIA
((VILLEDA)) SOSA. THEY ALSO AGREED TO GRANTING SAFE PASSAGE FOR
THE EVACUATION OF THE 96 WOUNDED AND MAIMED INSURGENTS. THE
BRIGADE COMMANDERS DID NOT AGREE TO THE RELEASE OF THE FMLN LABOR

AND POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, HOWEVER. MOREOVER, THEY REQUESTED
VIGOROUSLY THAT THE GOVERNMENT REFRAIN FROM AGREEING TO ANY
POSSIBLE FUTURE DEMANDS.

3. VIDES CONVEYED THESE VIEWS TO PRESIDENT DUARTE, WHO
DISPATCHED HIS SON, ALEJANDRO ((DUARTE)), AND FIRST DESIGNATE TO
THE PRESIDENCY ABRAHAM ((RODRIGUEZ)) TO PANAMA FOR FURTHER
NEGOTIATIONS WITH FMLN REPRESENTATIVES ON THE MORNING OF 21
OCTOBER. ALEJANDRO DUARTE AND RODRIGUEZ HAD JUST RETURNED TO
SAN SALVADOR ON THE EVENING OF 20 OCTOBER FROM PANAMA, WHERE
THEY HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH FMLN REPRESENTATIVES
CONCERNING THE KIDNAPPING.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 252008Z OCT 85

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS TO EXCHANGE OF INES
((DUARTE)) DURAN AND WOUNDED INSURGENTS

[REDACTED]

FO [REDACTED]

A. DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS WHO WITNESSED INES GUADALUPE ((DUARTE)) DURAN BEING TURNED OVER TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) EARLIER IN DAY WERE SURPRISED BY THE EMOTIONAL FAREWELL THAT INES DUARTE MADE TO GUERRILLA COMMANDERS "LUCIO MARTINEZ", DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERATION (FAL), AND "FACUNDO GUARDADO" OF THE POPULAR LIBERATION FORCES (FPL). THE OBSERVERS SAID THAT UPON SAYING GOODBYE, DUARTE HUGGED AND KISSED MARTINEZ AND GUARDADO PROFUSELY.

[REDACTED]

B. DIPLOMATIC OBSERVER WHO TRAVELLED WITH ICRC REPRESENTATIVES MORNING 24 OCTOBER TO CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT TO RECEIVE 22 WOUNDED INSURGENTS FROM THE GUERRILLAS SAID THAT THE ICRC CARAVAN WAS DELAYED FOR AN HOUR AT AN ARMY CHECKPOINT NEAR EL PARAISO WHILE THEY WERE ON THEIR WAY TO THE EXCHANGE POINT. THE OBSERVER'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT FOURTH BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) HAD ORDERED THAT THE CARAVAN BE DELAYED SIMPLY OUT OF SPITE BECAUSE THEY HAD ALREADY MET WITH OCHOA AT FOURTH BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AT EL PARAISO AND BEEN ASSURED THAT EVERYTHING WOULD PROCEED SMOOTHLY IN THE CARAVAN'S ONWARD TRAVEL. FPL GUERRILLA OFFICIALS LED BY "COMMANDANTE SUSANNA," WHO LATER TURNED THEIR WOUNDED OVER TO THIS ICRC CARAVAN, GAVE THE WOUNDED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0002
TOR: 252008Z OCT 85

[REDACTED]

A HEROES' FAREWELL COMPLETE WITH A SPECIAL CEREMONY. THE MAJORITY OF THE WOUNDED WERE BETWEEN 15 AND 17 YEARS OLD. (SOURCE: CHIEF OF MISSION AT PERUVIAN EMBASSY, EDWIN ((GUTIERREZ)) PADRON.)

[REDACTED]

SPEC

/ /

22

PAGE 0001

TOT: 210307Z NOV 85

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: POLITICAL COSTS OF THE DUARTE KIDNAPPING

DOI: OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1985

SUMMARY: IN MID-NOVEMBER 1985, AN FDR OFFICIAL COMMENTED THAT THE CONTINUING SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL COSTS TO THE FDR-FMLN CAUSED BY THE DUARTE KIDNAPPING HAVE NOT CONVINCED FMLN LEADERS TO CEASE SUCH OPERATIONS. A FEW FMLN OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, HAVE RETURNED TO THINKING MORE OF PURELY MILITARY OPERATIONS AFTER THE SUCCESS OF THE ATTACK ON THE LA UNION MILITARY BASE. THE FDR DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO EXPLOIT THE DETERIORATION OF DUARTE'S RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY--ONE OF THE POSITIVE OUTCOMES OF THE KIDNAPPING.

TEXT: 1. IN MID-NOVEMBER 1985, A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR), THE POLITICAL WING OF THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN), SAID THAT THE NEGATIVE "POLITICAL COSTS" TO THE FDR-FMLN CAUSED BY THE KIDNAPPING OF INES GUADALUPE ((DUARTE)) DURAN, DAUGHTER OF THE SALVADORAN PRESIDENT, CONTINUE TO BE "VERY SUBSTANTIAL," BUT

85 9070277 ASP

PAGE 0002

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HAVE NOT CONVINCED THE FMLN COMANDANTES TO DESIST FROM SUCH OPERATIONS.

2. ACCORDING TO THE FDR OFFICIAL, FDR REPRESENTATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE HAVE DETAILED TO THE FDR POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC COMMISSION (CPD) THE ALIENATION OF FORMERLY SUPPORTIVE OFFICIALS OF ESSENTIALLY PRO-FMLN GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL PARTIES, LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND CHURCH GROUPS. FUNDS FROM THESE SOURCES HAVE VIRTUALLY DRIED UP. SUPPORT HAS BEEN VITIATED WITHIN THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL AND FORMER FRIENDS OF THE FDR AT THE UNITED NATIONS--WHICH THE FDR CONSIDERS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT TARGET FOR THE CPD--HAVE CUT OFF CONTACT WITH FDR REPRESENTATIVES. IN LETTERS TO AND PRIVATE TALKS WITH FDR LEADERS, ARGENTINE PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) HARSHLY CONDEMNED THE KIDNAPPING, AS HAVE, TO A LESSER EXTENT, VENEZUELAN AND URUGUAYAN POLITICAL-GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS WHO USUALLY SYMPATHIZE WITH THE SALVADORAN OPPOSITION.

3. THE FDR OFFICIAL STATED THAT EVEN FMLN ALLIES CHASTISED FDR AND FMLN LEADERS FOR THE OPERATION. CUBAN LEADER FIDEL ((CASTRO)) RUZ PERSONALLY AND WITH "WARMTH" TOLD FDR LEADERS IN HAVANA THAT HE HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY IN TRYING TO JUSTIFY THE KIDNAPPING OF A DEFENSELESS WOMAN TO GENERATIONS OF CUBANS WHO HAVE NEVER KNOWN VIOLENCE. THE OFFICIAL SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD LEADERS OF THE FAL, WHO PERPETRATED THE KIDNAPPING, AND LEADERS OF THE PCES THAT THE KIDNAPPING HAD BEEN TOTALLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR SOVIET-BACKED EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE FMLN. A NICARAGUAN COMANDANTE TOLD THE FDR OFFICIAL THAT "THE WHOLE THING WAS STUPID, NO MATTER WHAT THE YIELD."

4. THE REACTION OF THE SALVADORAN MILITARY TO DUARTE'S HANDLING OF THE KIDNAPPING HAS ALSO GIVEN PRESIDENT DUARTE THE "PERFECT EXCUSE" TO TURN DOWN FDR REQUESTS FOR PLANNING TOWARD A THIRD ROUND OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FDR-FMLN. SINCE THE KIDNAPPING, THE FDR OFFICIAL SAID THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE REFUSED EVEN TO LISTEN TO FDR PROPOSALS FOR CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE WHICH WERE PASSED TO THE GOVERNMENT BY CATHOLIC CHURCH OFFICIALS AND VIA MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTY.

5. THE FDR OFFICIAL STRESSED THAT FDR LEADERS RESENT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

HAVING TO CLEAN UP THE FMLN "MESS" AFTER NOT EVEN HAVING BEEN WARNED OF THE OPERATION. HE SAID THAT THE KIDNAPPING WAS PLANNED BY AN INNER CIRCLE OF FAL MILITARY COMMANDERS AND CARRIED OUT BY A FAL TEAM KEPT SEPARATED FROM OTHER FAL AND FMLN UNITS. FAL ADVISED OTHER FMLN LEADERS OF THE OPERATION FOR THE FIRST TIME 24 TO 48 HOURS AFTER THE KIDNAPPING AND LEISURELY INFORMED THE FDR ON THE THIRD DAY OF THE OPERATION.

[REDACTED] THE FAL SPECIAL FORCES (U-24) CARRIED OUT THE KIDNAPPING OF INES DUARTE. ONCE THEY HAD ACCOMPLISHED THE KIDNAPPING, THE U-24 ALLOWED VERY FEW PERSONS TO ENTER THE CAMP IN WHICH THEY HELD HER. IN THAT SENSE, U-24 PERSONNEL WERE KEPT SEPARATE FROM OTHER FAL AND FMLN UNITS. NORMALLY, HOWEVER, FAL U-24 PERSONNEL CIRCULATE AMONG OTHER FAL AND FMLN UNITS IN THE AREA TO THE EXTENT THAT ANY OTHER FMLN COMBAT UNIT WOULD.)

6. DESPITE THE BACK-LASH, THE FDR HAS YET TO CONVINCE FMLN COMANDANTES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES THAT SUCH TERRORISM SETS BACK THE STRUGGLE. THE FDR OFFICIAL SAID THAT HE HAS

PARTICIPATED IN TALKS BETWEEN LEADERS OF THE FDR AND THE FMLN, WHICH FOR PURPOSES OF SECURITY ARE BEING HELD IN NICARAGUA. THE COMANDANTES CONTINUE TO FAVOR DE FACTO TERRORISM AS THE NEED TO FIGHT FIRE WITH FIRE. THE FDR OFFICIAL EXPLAINED THAT OVER TWO YEARS AGO, THE FDR BEGAN PRESSING THE FMLN TO IMPLEMENT "DUALITY OF POWER" AS THE MAIN FMLN PROPAGANDA THRUST. THE FMLN WAS URGED TO PROVE TO THE MEDIA AND THUS TO THE WORLD THAT THE FMLN NOT ONLY WINS BATTLES AND WITHDRAWS, BUT THAT IT BETTER CONTROLS AND ADMINISTERS VAST SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY, DENOMINATED "LIBERATION ZONES." THE FMLN HAS FAILED TO CAPITALIZE PROPAGANDA-WISE. IN FINALLY ACCEPTING THE DUALITY OF POWER CONCEPT, THE FMLN HAS CHOSEN TO COPY THE WORST ELEMENTS OF THE OTHER POWER, I.E., THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT, BY DUPLICATING DISAPPEARANCES, KILLINGS AND KIDNAPPINGS OF CIVILIANS.

7. THE FDR OFFICIAL SAID THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO REAL PROGRESS IN THE FDR EFFORT TO DEFINE, AND THEREFORE, LIMIT NON-MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PREDICTED THAT THE TALKS BETWEEN FDR AND FMLN LEADERS WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE FOR QUITE SOME TIME. [REDACTED] COMMENT: IN OCTOBER, ANOTHER FDR OFFICIAL WHO ALSO HAD PARTICIPATED IN SOME OF THE TALKS BETWEEN FDR AND FMLN REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT THE FDR HAD PROPOSED THAT FMLN OPERATIONS MUST RESPECT CIVILIAN LIFE, BE DIRECTED AT PRIMARILY MILITARY OR ECONOMIC TARGETS AND MUST ASSIST FDR WORK WITH THE MASSES.)

8. ONE OR TWO (UNIDENTIFIED) FMLN OFFICIALS HAVE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 0004

TOT: 210307Z NOV 85

[REDACTED]

RETURNED TO THINKING MORE OF PURELY MILITARY OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF THE SUCCESS OF THE FMLN ATTACK ON THE "LA UNION" MILITARY BASE. WHEN FDR REPRESENTATIVES ATTEMPTED TO EMPHASIZE THE POINT IN THE CURRENT TALKS, THE FMLN REPRESENTATIVES CRITICIZED THE FDR FOR FAILING TO EXPLAIN THAT "LA UNION" IS A BASE FOR THE ADVANCED TRAINING OF COMBAT VETERANS AND NOT A BASIC TRAINING CAMP FOR RAW RECRUITS, AS SUCCESSFULLY DEPICTED IN THE PRESS BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE FDR LEADER ADDED THAT THE RAID WAS NOT MADE POSSIBLE BY INFILTRATING BASE PERSONNEL, BUT BY THE PENETRATION OF A SAPPER SQUAD WHICH MADE TWO DRY RUNS BEFORE THE ATTACK. THE SQUAD REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF A DOZEN U.S. ARMY ADVISORS WHOM THEY FAILED TO KILL BECAUSE HALF OF THE CHARGES DID NOT EXPLODE. ([REDACTED] COMMENT: THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES MILITARY TRAINING CENTER (CEMFA) IN LA UNION IS MAINLY A BASIC TRAINING CENTER. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INDICATE THAT THE FACILITY WAS IN FACT INFILTRATED BUT THAT NO DRY RUNS WERE MADE BY SAPPER SQUADS BEFORE THE ATTACK. IN ADDITION, THE INSURGENTS WERE AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS IN THE FACILITY WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE ACTUAL ATTACK; THE U.S. ADVISERS WERE DESCRIBED AS A PRINCIPAL TARGET DURING THE PLANNING FOR THE ATTACK.)

9. ACCORDING TO THE FDR OFFICIAL, THE FDR DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO EXPLOIT THE DETERIORATION OF PRESIDENT DUARTE'S RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY RESULTING FROM THE KIDNAPPING. HE SAID THAT THE FMLN AND THE FDR HAVE FAILED TO COME UP WITH A PLAN TO BENEFIT FROM AND EXACERBATE MILITARY OFFICERS' CRITICISM OF DUARTE'S NEGOTIATIONS. THE OFFICIAL DISMISSED TALK OF POSSIBLE COUPS FROM WITHIN THE SALVADORAN MILITARY, NOTING THAT EVEN COLONEL SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ REALIZES THAT IF DUARTE IS DEPOSED, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL RETALIATE SO AS TO JEOPARDIZE THE LIVELIHOOD OF SALVADORAN MILITARY LEADERS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Exhibit E

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1994

Dear Representative *Tom* Gilman:

Thank you for your letters requesting Executive Branch materials concerning the review of documents related to the 32 human rights cases studied by the El Salvador Truth Commission and materials on U.S.-Salvadoran relations going back to 1979.


The Departments of State and Defense and the CIA declassified over 12,000 documents in response to your colleagues' March 26, 1993 request. My reply to that request and the letters under which the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence conveyed the declassified documents to Senator Pell and Representative Hamilton describe clearly the parameters of the reviews the agencies performed. For this reason, I believe there is little to be gained by a review and release of administrative Executive Branch documents generated during the just-completed review, many of which are deliberative.

I will, however, direct the Departments of State, Defense and Justice and the CIA to review for possible declassification materials responsive to the attachment to your December 20 request. An initial survey suggests that the searches related to the last five items as currently described may generate an exceptionally large number of documents for review. Therefore, once completed the searches may exceed the estimated \$1 million cost of the just-completed review process. In order to avoid the delay and costs of processing documents which may be marginal to your interests, NSC and agency staff will contact your staff to define the requested items more precisely so as to limit the needed searches. The reviews will be thorough and performed in the spirit of releasing as much information as possible consistent with guidelines established by law and executive authorities. The NSC will coordinate this process and also review its own holdings.

As a first estimate, I hope that these reviews can be completed by July 31, 1994. This period is comparable to that required for the just-completed effort. It is however based on very preliminary survey by the agencies of their potentially responsive holdings and is subject to revision. As with the just-completed review, there will be a coordinated release of all documents at the end of the review process. There will be no interim releases.

Please contact the Acting Archivist of the United States directly to request access to Presidential materials now in the possession of the Jimmy Carter Library, which is part of the National Archives. The Archivist will consult with President Carter to develop the Library's response to your request.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill Clinton".

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Exhibit F

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 092037Z OCT 80 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] HAS REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
[REDACTED] WE VIEW AS LITTLE MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT TO FURTHER
BLACKEN THE IMAGE OF THE RIGHTIST OFFICERS IN EL SALVADOR.
HOWEVER, DUE DEARTH OF INFORMATION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
FORMER ARCHBISHOP ROMERO IT IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION
[REDACTED]

2. LT.COL. JULIO AGUSTIN T R U J I L L O, FORMER
COMMANDER OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS GARRISON AND A LEADING
SUPPORTER OF COLONEL ADOLFO M A J A N O OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNING JUNTA (JRG) SAID ON 3 OCTOBER
1980 THAT SUBSECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COLONEL NICOLAS
C A R R A N Z A, HAS TOLD SEVERAL MILITARY OFFICERS THAT
ONE OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP
ROMERO IS LT.COL. SIGFRIDO O C H O A. TRUJILLO
FOUND THIS INFORMATION COMPLETELY CREDIBLE.

3. OCHOA IS NOW BELIEVED TO BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY,
POSSIBLY IN COSTA RICA. STATION HAS FOLLOWING
INFORMATION ON A MAJOR SIGRIDO O C H O A PEREZ WHO
MAY BE OCHOA OF ABOVE.

- A. DPOB: 2 APR 1942, EL SALVADOR
- B. FORMERLY OPERATIONS OFFICER, TREASURY POLICE.
- C. ATTENDED MEXICAN MILITARY ACADEMY (1960-1964),
CHILEAN CALVARY SCHOOL (1970-1971), WAS MILITARY ATTACHE TO
COSTA RICA (1972-1974), AND TOOK CANAL ZONE ORIENTATION TOUR
(1974).
- D. MARRIED NIDIA ESPERANZA GOMEZ (DE) O C H O A,
AND HAS AT LEAST ONE SONE, SIGFRIDO, BORN IN 1969.
- E. SUBJECT SERVED DIRECTLY UNDER GENERAL CARLOS
HUMBERTO R O M E R O WHEN LATTER COMMANDED MIXED CALVARY

** [REDACTED]

Approved for Release
NOV 1993

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

REGIMENT, AND HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ROMERO AND HIS SUPPORTERS SINCE THEN. HE IS STAUNCHLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND ADMIRES U.S. BUT FAULTS U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AS LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE SHIELD. HE IS AN ARDENT HORSE LOVER AND ENJOYS SHOOTING AS A HOBBY.

F. SUBJECT DESCRIBED IN DEFATT REPORT AS NOT OVERLY INTELLIGENT AN OFFICER WHOSE LEADERSHIP AMONG MIDDLE-GRADE MILITARY OFFICERS STEMMED FROM A DYNAMIC PERSONALITY AND A WILLINGNESS TO VOICE HIS OPINION.

G. SUBJECT PARTICIPATED IN UNSUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT IN 1972, AND WAS SUSPECTED OF SUCH ACTIVITIES IN 1979.

H. FYI, SUBJECT WAS A CLASSMATE OF D'AUBUISSON'S, AND IS ONE NUMBER HIGHER IN LINEAL PRECEDENCE THAN D'AUBUISSON WOULD BE HAD HE NOT BEEN CASHIERED, AND ONE NUMBER LOWER THAN TRUJILLO, WHO WAS ALSO HIS CLASSMATE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Exhibit G

University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

December 15, 2013

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

RE: Request under the FOIA, in reply refer to Case #: 00102C

Dear Ms. Meeks,

All documents from 1976 to the present regarding Salvadoran Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez. The areas of his career of greatest interest are: 1) his service as Commander of military detachment #2 in Cabañas, El Salvador between February/March 1981 to March 9, 1983; and 2) his service as Commander in Chalatenango, El Salvador from August 1984 to February 1986. During both of these periods, there is ample evidence of massacres against civilians carried out by troops under his command. Provided below are additional details regarding these pertinent time periods, as well as a general outline of his military career.

Pertinent time periods:

- 1. Commander of military detachment #2 in Cabañas, El Salvador between February/March 1981 to March 9, 1983: While serving as Commander, Ochoa reported directly to Major Mario Rodriguez Sosa, and piloted U.S.-advised counterinsurgency strategies and civic action operations. Due to Ochoa's close adherence to U.S. suggested wartime strategy, his was well regarded by U.S. military advisers during this time period. In addition, Ochoa also assisted with military operations in the department of San Vicente.*
- 2. Commander in Chalatenango, El Salvador from August 1984 to February 1986: During this time period, the Salvadoran military was executing a U.S.-advised "low-intensity conflict" counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy included creating incentives for civilians to either flee guerrilla-controlled zones entirely or, if remaining, collaborate with the military. Due to this deliberate separation of civilians from guerrillas, the Salvadoran military increased its airpower to conduct both surveillance and bombing over guerrilla pervasive areas. According to numerous media reports, Ochoa and many other military officials deemed these areas "free fire zones" and therefore, operated under the assumption that any individuals found within these geographical limits were directly or indirectly a guerrilla.*

General timeline of Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez's career:


Please see attached U.S. declassified documents including biographical information and timelines of Ochoa's military career.

As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable non-exempt portions of documents. To allow me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records or portions of records and explain the reasoning for exemption.

As an educational institution serving the public interest, the University of Washington Center for Human Rights is entitled to a reduction or waiver of fees. This request is made for scholarly and research purposes that are intended for publication and are not for commercial use. For details of the University of Washington Center for Human Rights' research and public interest activities please visit our website at www.jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/.

Please notify me before incurring any photocopying costs over \$25. In an effort to expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them as they become available to you, without waiting until all relevant documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, or the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (206) 616-3585 or e-mail me at uwchr.foia@gmail.com. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty day statutory time period.

Sincerely,



Mina Manuchehri

Exhibit H

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505



30 December 2013

Ms. Mina Manuchehri
University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

Reference: F-2014-00450

Dear Ms. Manuchehri:

This is a final response to your 15 December 2013 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, received in the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator on 17 December 2013, for **all documents from 1976 to the present regarding Salvadoran Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Perez**. We have assigned your request the reference number above. Please use this number when corresponding so that we can identify it easily.

In accordance with section 3.6(a) of Executive Order 13526, the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request. The fact of the existence or nonexistence of requested records is currently and properly classified and is intelligence sources and methods information that is protected from disclosure by section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, and section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Therefore, your request is denied pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). I have enclosed an explanation of these exemptions for your reference and retention. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 45 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Michele Meeks".

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

Explanation of Exemptions

Freedom of Information Act:

- (b)(1) exempts from disclosure information currently and properly classified, pursuant to an Executive Order;
- (b)(2) exempts from disclosure information which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Agency;
- (b)(3) exempts from disclosure information that another federal statute protects, provided that the other federal statute either requires that the matters be withheld, or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. The (b)(3) statutes upon which the CIA relies include, but are not limited to, the CIA Act of 1949;
- (b)(4) exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is obtained from a person and that is privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) exempts from disclosure inter-and intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) exempts from disclosure information from personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;
- (b)(7) exempts from disclosure information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that the production of the information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source or, in the case of information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source ; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger any individual's life or physical safety;
- (b)(8) exempts from disclosure information contained in reports or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for use of an agency responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions; and
- (b)(9) exempts from disclosure geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

April 2012

Exhibit I

**University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195**

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL

February 4, 2014

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

RE: Administrative Appeal for F-2014-00450, in reply refer to Case #: 00102C

Dear Ms. Meeks,

This letter constitutes an administrative appeal under Executive Order 13526, of the determination by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of a FOIA request originally filed by the University of Washington Center for Human Rights (UWCHR) on 15 December 2013. The CIA Reference number is F-2014-00450. The request is for all documents from 1976 to the present regarding Salvadoran Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez. More specifically, we requested information pertaining to his time as Commander of Military Detachment #2 in Cabañas, El Salvador between February/March 1981 to March 9, 1983, and as Commander in Chalatenango, El Salvador from August 1984 to February 1986. We received a letter from the CIA dated December 30, 2013 informing us that it can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to our request pursuant with (b)(1) and (b)(3) FOIA exemptions. The (b)(3) exemption pertains specifically to the National Security Act of 1947, section 102A(i)(1).

First and foremost, the UWCHR appreciates the search already performed by the CIA, but we appeal its determination for the following reasons:

- 1) The documentation is further segregable
- 2) There is a high level of public interest
- 3) Documents pertaining to our request have already been declassified by other departments

1. The documentation is further segregable

Although the CIA's response can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records responsive to our request, such a response implies an existence of records responsive to our request. Through acknowledgement of the existence of records, it is difficult to comprehend how every portion of these records could be exempt from disclosure. The

FOIA requires the release of all reasonably segregable nonexempt material in a document, which requires a detailed line-by-line review on behalf of the reviewing authority. However, the CIA's response supplies no evidence that a detailed line-by-line review for segregable material was conducted. The UWCHR understands that the CIA was most likely not able to conduct such a thorough review of documents within its two week response period.

Furthermore, (b)(1) and (b)(3) connotes that the release of withheld documents would pose a threat to national security and invade the CIA's organizational structure and function. Although the UWCHR understands such precautions, according to US Code Title 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(2), there is also a simultaneous duty "to maximize the dissemination of intelligence" by providing access to documentation "(B)...both in final form and in the form when initially gathered" and through the "(C) preparation of intelligence products in such a way that source information is removed to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form to the extent practicable." Furthermore, the CIA supplied no reasoning for how the release of the withheld documents affects national security and invades the CIA's organizational structure and function.

2. There is a high level of public interest

The release of these documents is in the interest of both Salvadoran and U.S. citizens. Ochoa Pérez was a high-ranking military official that commanded regions tormented by infamous massacres during the Salvadoran Civil War. While Commander of Military Detachment #2 in Cabañas between February/March 1981, a well-known massacre occurred in Santa Marta, Cabañas in March 1981. During this massacre, Salvadoran military helicopters machine-gunned and bombed thousands of civilians as they attempted to cross the Lempa River. When confronted with the question of his culpability for this incident in recent years, Ochoa Pérez defended his actions, saying, "We did what we had to do in wartime," and "In wartime there will always be deaths."

While Ochoa Pérez was Commander of Military Detachment #2 in Cabañas, another massacre occurred in Santa Cruz, Cabañas in November 1981. According to sources, approximately 1,200 Salvadoran troops entered Cabañas on November 11, 1981 for an approximately two-week operation. It is estimated that approximately 1,000 residents of Cabañas were affected and 100 were killed. It was also reported that the Atlacatl Battalion led the operation with the assistance of Military Detachment #2. It is also important to note that this operation occurred during a series of military operations in Cabañas and Morazon, which extended from September through December 1981.

The people of El Salvador have yet to receive justice for these crimes, as well as thousands of other crimes committed during the Salvadoran Civil War mainly because of an amnesty law passed five days after the release of the Truth Commission's report. The amnesty law grants individuals like Ochoa Pérez immunity from prosecution and has consequently resulted in a culture of debilitating impunity. On 20 September 2013, however, the Constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court indicated it plans to rule on whether the amnesty law will be allowed to stand. If the amnesty law is repealed, this information will

be vital for the strengthening of criminal complaints already presented to the Salvadoran Attorney General.

The release of documents pertaining to this request is also relevant to U.S. citizens because the U.S. provided approximately \$5 billion in aid to El Salvador during the Civil War and advised the Salvadoran military on counterinsurgency tactics. Thus, U.S. citizens have the right to investigate and obtain information regarding whether such aid was misused for condemnable acts. Furthermore, several U.S. citizens were present during the aforementioned massacres in Cabañas and have the right to documents containing information related to the violence they suffered. In light of the UWCHR's support for both Salvadoran and U.S. citizens' struggle for justice, we strongly urge the CIA to reconsider its exemption of material pertaining to our FOIA request

Consistent with FOIA's presumption favoring disclosure, the legislative history on this exemption indicates that the Courts distinguish between trivial administrative matters (which would automatically be exempt) and those matters that are of genuine public interest. In the latter case, the burden is on the agency to prove that harm could come from release of the denied portions. See, for example, Founding Church of Scientology of Washington v. Smith, 721 F2d. at 830-31, n.4 (DC Cir. 1983): "If withholding frustrates legitimate public interest... the material should be released unless the government can show that disclosure would risk circumvention of lawful agency regulation." We submit that the issue is primarily a matter of the reviewing authority's discretion, and ask that the documents be given a second review for the greatest possible disclosure.

3. Documents pertaining to our request have already been declassified by other departments

Please also consider that U.S. agencies, such as the Department of State (DOS), have already released documents pertaining to Ochoa Pérez. These documents contain timelines of his military career, his biographic sketch, and military assignments and reassignments. Attached, please find examples of such documents (Attachment 1).

President Obama's New Guidance on Disclosure


As you review our appeal, please consider the recent Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act issued by President Barack Obama on January 21, 2009, which directs all agencies to "adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure" and apply this presumption "to all decisions involving FOIA."¹ In his March 19 guidelines, the Attorney General likewise directs agencies to make discretionary disclosures and segregate information for disclosure whenever possible. Under this new Department of Justice (DOJ) policy, which rescinds Attorney General John Ashcroft's 2001 FOIA memorandum, DOJ "will defend a denial of a FOIA request only if (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory exemptions, or (2) disclosure is

¹ President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 2009)

prohibited by law.”² Thus, agencies should be in a position to clearly articulate a reasonably foreseeable harm or a basis for mandatory withholding before deciding to withhold records. Pursuant to this new executive branch policy, we ask that you consider whether some or all of the information withheld in response to our FOIA request should be released in light of the new presumption of disclosure. If your review of this case suggests that there would be no foreseeable harm from disclosing the requested record(s) or that any potential harm would be limited in comparison to the public interest in disclosure, please exercise your discretion to release this information.

We appreciate your consideration of this appeal and we look forward to your timely response. Attached, please find a copy of the original FOIA request (Attachment 2). If you have any questions or concerns, please call me at (206) 616-3585 or e-mail me at uwchr.foia@gmail.com.

Sincerely,



Mina Manucehri

² Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Freedom of Information Act (March 19, 2009).

Exhibit J

✓

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

5 March 2014

Ms. Mina Manuchehri
University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

Reference: F-2014-00450

Dear Ms. Manuchehri:

We received your 4 February 2014 correspondence appealing our 30 December 2013 final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for all documents from 1976 to the present regarding Salvadoran Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Perez. Please continue to use this case reference number so that we can more easily identify your appeal.

You are appealing our determination to neither confirm nor deny you material responsive to your request. ***Your appeal has been accepted and arrangements are being made for its consideration by the Agency Release Panel.***

You will be advised of the panel's determination. In order to afford requesters the most equitable treatment possible, we have adopted the policy of handling appeals on a first-received, first-out basis. Despite our best efforts, however, the large number of public access requests CIA receives creates processing delays making it unlikely that we can respond to you within 20 working days. In view of this, some delay in our reply must be expected, but every reasonable effort will be made to respond as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Michele Meeks".

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Exhibit K

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

6 May 2014

Ms. Mina Manuchehri
University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

Reference: F-2014-00450

Dear Ms. Manuchehri:

This responds to your 4 February 2014 letter appealing our 30 December 2013 final response to your Freedom of Information Act request for all documents from 1976 to the present regarding Salvadoran Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Perez.

The Agency Release Panel (ARP) considered your appeal and determined that in accordance with Section 3.6(a) of Executive Order 13526, the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request. The "fact of" the existence or nonexistence of requested records is currently and properly classified and relates to intelligence sources and methods information that is protected from disclosure by Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

Therefore, in accordance with Agency regulations set forth in part 1900 of title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the ARP denied your appeal on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). In accordance with the provisions of the FOIA, you have the right to seek judicial review of this determination in a United States district court. Alternatively, the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) offers mediation services to resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and federal agencies. Using services offered by OGIS does not affect your right to pursue litigation. For more information, including how to contact OGIS, please consult its website, [http://ogis/archives.gov](http://ogis.archives.gov).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Michele Meeks".

Michele Meeks
Executive Secretary
Agency Release Panel

Exhibit L

University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

April 17, 2014

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

RE: Request under the FOIA, in reply refer to Case #: 00137C

Dear Ms. Meeks,


All documents from 1980 to the present regarding United States citizen, Philippe Bourgois. In the 1980s, as a doctoral student at Stanford, he travelled to Honduras to do field research in a refugee camp. In November 1981, Bourgois crossed the border and traveled to the department of Cabañas, El Salvador to continue his field research. While there, he was caught in a Salvadoran military operation in which he and 1,000 villagers were surrounded by Salvadoran military troops and subjected to heavy machine gun firing and bombing. Bourgois fled the gunfire with a group of poorly armed FMLN soldiers and lived with them for 14 days before returning to Honduras. Soon after, he returned to the United States where he contacted media outlets and wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post. In February 1982, he testified before the Subcommittee on InterAmerican Affairs about his experience. In response to Bourgois' testimony and article, the CIA released information detailing that Bourgois was allegedly traveling with the FMLN.

As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable non-exempt portions of documents. To allow me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records or portions of records and explain the reasoning for exemption.

As an educational institution serving the public interest, the University of Washington Center for Human Rights is entitled to a reduction or waiver of fees. This request is made for scholarly and research purposes that are intended for publication and are not for commercial use. For details of the Center for Human Rights' research and public interest activities please visit our website at www.jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/.

Please notify me before incurring any photocopying costs over \$25. In an effort to expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them as they become available to you, without waiting until all relevant documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, or the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (206) 616-3585 or e-mail me at uwchr.foia@gmail.com. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty day statutory time period.

Sincerely,



Mina Manuchehri

Mina Manuchehri

Exhibit M

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 August 2014

Ms. Mina Manuchehri
University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

Reference: F-2014-01396 / Case #00137C

Dear Ms. Manuchehri:

On 17 April 2014, the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator received your 17 April 2014 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for information **from 1980 to the present regarding United States citizen, Philippe Bourgois**. We have assigned your request the reference number above. Please use this number when corresponding so that we can identify it easily.

Although you have provided some of the identifying information required before we can effectively search our files on an individual, we still need additional data before we can begin processing your request. Specifically, we require the individual's *date and place of birth, and date and place of death*. Without this data, we may be unable to distinguish between individuals with the same or similar names. If the individual is deceased, we also require some *evidence of death*, such as a death certificate, an obituary, or a press statement to ensure there are no privacy considerations.

Agency regulations encourage requesters seeking information on *living* third parties to provide a signed affidavit or declaration from the third parties waiving all or some of their privacy rights. We can search without this authorization, but if we locate responsive records, privacy concerns may require us to protect the information from release.

FOIA exemption (b)(6), a copy of which I have enclosed for reference and retention, requires us to protect information "the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." In reaching this determination, we use the test our enclosed regulations outline at 32 CFR § 1900.32(b): "the Agency will balance the privacy interests that would be compromised by disclosure against the public interest in release of the requested information." Therefore, the waiver will assist us with this determination.

I must consider your request for a fee waiver under the standards the Agency FOIA regulations outline, which you will find at Part 1900 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and Department of Justice guidance. I have reviewed your request under those standards to determine "if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." Your request does


not meet these standards because disclosing the information you seek is not "likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the United States Government." I therefore deny your request for a fee waiver.

You may appeal this decision, in my care, within 45 days from the date of this letter. Should you choose to appeal the denial of your request for a fee waiver, you are encouraged to provide an explanation supporting your appeal. Agency regulations also specify that if the Agency has started to process a request, the Agency may only accept an appeal of a fee waiver denial if the requester agrees to be responsible for the costs in the event of an adverse administrative or judicial decision.

Based on the information provided in your 5 November 2013 letter, we determined that your request falls into the "educational" fee category, which means you may have to pay for the cost of reproducing released records, which would be assessed at a rate of ten cents per page after the first 100 pages, which you receive free. We note your agreement to pay photocopying costs up to \$25. We will notify you if fees exceed this amount.

We will hold your request in abeyance for 45 days from the date of this letter pending receipt of the subject's **date and place of birth, date and place of death, and evidence of death or privacy waiver** as outlined above.

Sincerely,



Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Exhibit N

University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

RESPONSE FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON FOIA SUBJECT

September 30, 2014

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505


RE: Response for additional information for F-2014-01396/Case #00137C

Dear Ms. Meeks,

Our office received a letter—dated 21 August 2014—asking for additional information for a FOIA request for information from 1980 to the present regarding United States citizen, Philippe Bourgois [Attachment 1]. The FOIA reference number for this request is **F-2014-01396**. More specifically, you asked for his date and place of birth. **Philippe Bourgois was born on December 8, 1956 in New York, NY.** Upon receiving this information, please begin an effective search of your files. Our office will also send you an affidavit from Philippe waiving all or some of his privacy rights in case privacy concerns arise after you conduct an effective search.

If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, or the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (206) 616-3585 or e-mail me at uwchr.foia@gmail.com. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty day statutory time period.

Sincerely,



Mina Manuchehri

Exhibit O

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505



15 October 2014

Ms. Mina Manuchehri
University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

Reference: F-2014-01396 / Case #00137C

Dear Ms. Manuchehri:

This is a final response to your 17 April 2014 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for information **from 1980 to the present regarding United States citizen, Philippe Bourgois**. We accepted and processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended. Our processing included a search for records that would reveal an openly acknowledged Agency affiliation existing up to and including the date the Agency started its search and did not locate any responsive records.

With respect to any other records, in accordance with section 3.6(a) of Executive Order 13526, the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request. The fact of the existence or nonexistence of requested records is currently and properly classified and is intelligence sources and methods information that is protected from disclosure by section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, and section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Therefore, your request is denied pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). An explanation of exemptions is enclosed.

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 45 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michele Meeks".

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

Exhibit P

**University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195**

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL

November 30, 2014

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

RE: Administrative Appeal for F-2014-01396, in reply refer to Case #: 00137C

Dear Ms. Meeks,

This letter constitutes an administrative appeal under Executive Order 13526, of the determination by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of a FOIA request originally filed by the University of Washington Center for Human Rights (UWCHR) on 17 April 2014. The CIA Reference number is F-2014-01396. The request is for all documents from 1980 to the present regarding United States citizen, Philippe Bourgois. We received a letter from the CIA dated 15 October 2014 informing us that it can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to our request pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) FOIA exemptions. The (b)(3) exemption pertains specifically to the National Security Act of 1947, section 102A(i)(1).

First and foremost, the UWCHR appreciates the search already performed by the CIA; however, we appeal its determination for the following reasons:

- 1) The documentation is further segregable
- 2) There is a high level of public interest
- 3) Documents pertaining to our request have already been declassified by other departments

1. The documentation is further segregable

Although the CIA's response can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records responsive to our request, such a response implies an existence of records responsive to our request. Through acknowledgement of the existence of records, it is difficult to comprehend how every portion of these records could be exempt from disclosure. The FOIA requires the release of all reasonably segregable nonexempt material in a document, which requires a detailed line-by-line review on behalf of the reviewing authority. However, the CIA's response supplies no evidence of a detailed line-by-line review for segregable material was conducted.

Furthermore, (b)(1) and (b)(3) connotes that the release of withheld documents would pose a threat to national security and invade the CIA's organizational structure and function. Although the UWCHR understands such precautions, according to US Code Title 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(2),

there is also a simultaneous duty “to maximize the dissemination of intelligence” by providing access to documentation “(B)...both in final form and in the form when initially gathered” and through the “(C) preparation of intelligence products in such a way that source information is removed to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form to the extent practicable.” Furthermore, the CIA supplied no reasoning for how the release of the withheld documents affects national security and invades the CIA’s organizational structure and function.

2. There is a high level of public interest

The release of these documents is in the interest of both Salvadoran and United States citizens. Philippe Bourgois was the victim of a massacre that occurred in Santa Cruz, Cabañas, El Salvador in November 1981. According to sources, approximately 1,200 Salvadoran troops entered Cabañas on November 11, 1981 for an approximately two-week operation. It is estimated that approximately 100 Cabañas residents were killed, while 1,000 were directly affected. The Atlacatl Battalion led the operation with the assistance of Military Detachment #2; Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez was Commander of Military Detachment #2. Furthermore, this operation was part of a series of military operations that were carried out in Cabañas and Morazon from September through December 1981.

The Salvadoran government has launched a criminal investigation against Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez for not only the Santa Cruz massacre, but for other massacres that occurred in territories under his command. Information on Philippe Bourgois will be vitally important for such investigations because the Salvadoran government has listed him—as well as many Salvadorans—as an official victim of the Santa Cruz massacre.

Philippe Bourgois and the people of El Salvador have yet to receive justice for this crime, as well as thousands of other crimes committed during the Salvadoran Civil War mainly because of an amnesty law passed five days after the release of the United Nations Truth Commission’s report. The amnesty law grants individuals like Ochoa Pérez immunity from prosecution and has consequently resulted in a culture of debilitating impunity. On 20 September 2013, however, the Constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court indicated it plans to rule on whether the amnesty law will be allowed to stand. If the amnesty law is repealed, this information will be essential for the strengthening of criminal complaints already presented to the Salvadoran Attorney General.

The release of documents pertaining to this request is also relevant to United States citizens because the United States provided approximately \$1 billion in aid to El Salvador during the Civil War and advised the Salvadoran military on counterinsurgency tactics. Thus, United States citizens have the right to investigate and obtain information regarding whether such aid was misused for condemnable acts. In light of the UWCHR’s support for both Salvadoran and United States citizens’ struggle for justice, we strongly urge the CIA to reconsider its exemption of material pertaining to this FOIA request

Consistent with FOIA’s presumption favoring disclosure, the legislative history on this exemption indicates that the Courts distinguish between trivial administrative matters (which would automatically be exempt) and those matters that are of genuine public interest. In the latter case, the burden is on the agency to prove that harm could come from release of the denied portions. See, for example, Founding Church of Scientology of Washington v. Smith, 721 F2d. at 830-31, n.4 (DC Cir. 1983): “If withholding frustrates legitimate public interest... the material should be

released unless the government can show that disclosure would risk circumvention of lawful agency regulation." We submit that the issue is primarily a matter of the reviewing authority's discretion, and ask that the documents be given a second review for the greatest possible disclosure.

3. Documents pertaining to our request have already been declassified by other departments


Please also consider that the Department of State has already released documents containing information on Philippe Bourgois. Attached, please find examples of such documents.

President Obama's New Guidance on Disclosure

As you review our appeal, please consider the recent Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act issued by President Barack Obama on January 21, 2009, which directs all agencies to "adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure" and apply this presumption "to all decisions involving FOIA."¹ In his March 19 guidelines, the Attorney General likewise directs agencies to make discretionary disclosures and segregate information for disclosure whenever possible. Under this new Department of Justice (DOJ) policy, which rescinds Attorney General John Ashcroft's 2001 FOIA memorandum, DOJ "will defend a denial of a FOIA request only if (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory exemptions, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law."² Thus, agencies should be in a position to clearly articulate a reasonably foreseeable harm or a basis for mandatory withholding before deciding to withhold records. Pursuant to this new executive branch policy, we ask that you consider whether some or all of the information withheld in response to our FOIA request should be released in light of the new presumption of disclosure. If your review of this case suggests that there would be no foreseeable harm from disclosing the requested record(s) or that any potential harm would be limited in comparison to the public interest in disclosure, please exercise your discretion to release this information.

We appreciate your consideration of this appeal and we look forward to your timely response. If you have any questions or concerns, please call me at (206) 616-3585 or e-mail me at uwchr.foia@gmail.com.

Sincerely,



Mina Manucehri

¹ President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 2009)

² Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Freedom of Information Act (March 19, 2009).

Exhibit Q



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

30 December 2014

Ms. Mina Manuchehri
University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

Reference: F-2014-01396 / Case #00137C

Dear Ms. Manuchehri:

The office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator received your 30 November 2014 administrative appeal under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for information from 1980 to the present regarding United States citizen, Philippe Bourgois. Please continue to use this case reference number so that we can more easily identify your FOIA administrative appeal.

You are appealing our failure to locate records that would reveal an openly acknowledged Agency affiliation with your subject and our determination to neither confirm nor deny you material that would reveal a classified connection between the CIA and your subject. *Your appeal has been accepted and arrangements are being made for its consideration by the Agency Release Panel.*

You will be advised of the panel's determination. In order to afford requesters the most equitable treatment possible, we have adopted the policy of handling appeals on a first-received, first-out basis. Despite our best efforts, however, the large number of public access requests CIA receives creates processing delays making it unlikely that we can respond to you within 20 working days. In view of this, some delay in our reply must be expected, but every reasonable effort will be made to respond as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John Giuffrida

Acting Information and Privacy Coordinator

Exhibit R

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

25 March 2015

Ms. Mina Manuchehri
University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

Reference: F-2014-01396 / Case #00137C

Dear Ms. Manuchehri:


This is a final response to your 30 November 2014 administrative appeal under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which was processed under the referenced case identification number by the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator. As a reminder, you appealed our failure to locate records that would reveal an openly acknowledged Agency affiliation with your subject and our determination to neither confirm nor deny you material that would reveal a classified connection between the CIA and your subject.

The Agency Release Panel (ARP) considered your appeal and determined that with respect to CIA-originated records that might reflect an open or otherwise acknowledged relationship between your subject and the CIA, we conducted a search and were unable to locate any responsive records. With respect to records that would reveal a classified connection between your subject and the CIA, if any, the ARP determined that, in accordance with Section 3.6(a) of Executive Order 13526, the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request. The "fact of" the existence or nonexistence of requested records is currently and properly classified and relates to intelligence sources and methods information that is protected from disclosure by Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Therefore, in accordance with Agency regulations set forth in part 1900 of title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the ARP denied your appeal on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). As the panel's Executive Secretary, I am the CIA official responsible for informing you of the appellate determination.

In accordance with the provisions of the FOIA, you have the right to seek judicial review of this determination in a United States district court. Alternatively, the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) offers mediation services to resolve disputes between FOIA

requesters and federal agencies. Using services offered by OGIS does not affect your right to pursue litigation. For more information, including how to contact OGIS, please consult its website, <http://ogis/archives.gov>.

Sincerely,



Michael Lavergne
Executive Secretary
Agency Release Panel

Exhibit S

**University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195**

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

September 15, 2014

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

RE: Request under the FOIA, in reply refer to Case #: 00150C

Dear Ms. Meeks,

All documents from 1976 to the present regarding Salvadoran Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez. The areas of his career that are of greatest interest are: 1) his service as Commander of military detachment #2 in Cabañas, El Salvador between February/March 1981 to March 9, 1983; and 2) his service as Commander in Chalatenango, El Salvador from August 1984 to February 1986. During both of these periods, there is ample evidence of massacres against civilians carried out by troops under his command. Provided below are additional details regarding these pertinent time periods during Ochoa's career, as well as a general outline of his military career.

Pertinent time periods:

- 1. Commander of military detachment #2 in Cabañas, El Salvador between February/March 1981 to March 9, 1983: While serving as Commander, Ochoa reported directly to Major Mario Rodriguez Sosa, and piloted U.S.-advised counterinsurgency strategies and civic action operations. Due to Ochoa's close adherence to U.S. suggested wartime strategy, his was well regarded by U.S. military advisers during this time period. In addition, Ochoa also assisted with military operations in the department of San Vicente.*
- 2. Commander in Chalatenango, El Salvador from August 1984 to February 1986: During this time period, the Salvadoran military was executing a U.S.-advised "low- intensity conflict" counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy included creating incentives for civilians to either flee guerrilla-controlled zones entirely or, if remaining, collaborate with the military. In addition and due to this deliberate separation of civilians from guerrillas, the Salvadoran military increased its airpower to conduct both surveillance and bombing over guerrilla pervasive areas. According to numerous media reports, Ochoa and many other military officials, deemed these areas "free fire zones" and therefore, operated under the assumption that any individuals found within these geographical limits were directly or indirectly a guerrilla.*

General timeline of Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez's career:


Please see attached U.S. declassified documents including biographical information and timelines of Ochoa's military career.

As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable non-exempt portions of documents. To allow me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records or portions of records and explain the reasoning for exemption.

As an educational institution serving the public interest, the University of Washington Center for Human Rights is entitled to a reduction or waiver of fees. This request is made for scholarly and research purposes that are intended for publication and are not for commercial use. For details of the University of Washington Center for Human Rights' research and public interest activities please visit our website at www.jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/.

Please notify me before incurring any photocopying costs over \$25. In an effort to expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them as they become available to you, without waiting until all relevant documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, or the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (206) 616-3585 or e-mail me at uwchr.foia@gmail.com. I look forward to receiving your response within the twenty day statutory time period.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Mina Manuchehri". The signature is written in dark ink on a light-colored background.

Mina Manuchehri

3E-



BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

EL SALVADOR
Colonel Sigifredo CHOA Perez
April 1980

(U) NAME: Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Perez (oh-CHOH-ah), Army.

(U) POSITION: Defense Attache to the US since May 1986.



(U)

1986

CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

... DOWNGRADING CLASSIFICATION
Biographical data on individuals having
connections and activities directly to CIA/ODR
Washington, D.C. 20505

RE SALVADOR
Colonel (Retired) (USA) Pedro
April 1966



(U) CAREER:

- 1960 - Cadet, Mexican Military Academy.
- 1964 - Commissioned Second Lieutenant upon graduation.
- 1964 - Various platoon-level assignments, through 1971.
- 1967 - Promoted to First Lieutenant, February 1967.

EL SALVADOR
Colonel Sigifredo ROCHA Perez
April 1986

- 1971
- Platoon Leader and Marshal Horseshoer, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Sitio del Niño.
 - Promoted to Captain, July.
 - Completed Advanced Infantry Course, graduated second in class.
 - Student, Cavalry School in Chile, until early 1972.
- 1972
- Military Attache to Costa Rica, August through 1974.
- 1974
- Instructor, Section III (Operations), Armed Forces Studies Center, San Salvador.
- 1975
- Assistant Professor, Military History and Strategy, at the Armed Forces Studies Center. Concurrently, student, Armed Forces Studies Center, 1975-1977, graduating second in class of 18, 16 November 1977.
- 1977
- S-2/S-3 (Intelligence/Operations), 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, Santa Ana, through June 1978.
- 1978
- Operations Officer, Treasury Police, San Salvador, from 1 July through 15 October 1979.
- 1979-1981
- Director of the Treasury Police, 15 October-23 October 1979.
 - S-3 (Operations), Treasury Police, late October 1979.
 - Assistant Professor, Military Studies Center, late October 1979.
 - Military Attache to Costa Rica, 29 November 1979-August 1981.
- 1981-1982
- Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, 2 February 1981.
 - Commanding Officer, Military Detachment #2, Sesuntepeque, from August.
- 1983
- Assistant Armed Force Attache to Washington, D.C., from 9 March.
- 1984-1986
- Commander, Military Zone 4, 4th Brigade; and concurrently, Commander, 3d Sector of the 1st Territorial Region, November 1984-February 1986.
 - Promoted to Colonel, 31 December 1984.
- 1986
- Defense Attache to the US, since May.

3
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Please assist us in providing correct current biographical data by immediately forwarding corrections and additions directly to DTD DB, Washington, D.C. 20340

***** [REDACTED] *****
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
142148Z MAR 83 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] LTC SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] OCHOA WAS ASSIGNED TO THE SALVADORAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE 1972-74 AND ALSO AS MILITARY ATTACHE JULY 80 TO JAN 81 (?). AN OCT 72 LISTING NOTES THAT OCHOA WAS DELIVERING MESSAGES FROM GUATEMALAN COUP PLOTTERS. (NFI) IN NOV 72 THE ARRIVAL OF CAPT. OCHOA AT THE EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE WAS REPORTED; HE SERVED IN CHILE UNTIL 15 SET 72. UPON HIS ASSIGNMENT AS MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE SAN JOSE EMBASSY OCT 80 TRACES INDICATED THAT MAJOR OCHOA WAS A FORMER OPERATIONS OFFICER WITH THE TREASURY POLICE AND THAT HE HAD PARTICIPATED IN A CANAL ZONE ORIENTATION TOUR IN 1974 AND PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS MILATT IN PANAMA.

2. WHILE SERVING AS MILATT IN SAN JOSE, IN OCT 80 OCHOA WAS ALLEGEDLY ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES TO SILENCE THE SALVADORAN LEFT AND FATHER BENITO ((TOVAR)) IN COSTA RICA. HE ORGANIZED A GROUP OF SALVADORAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS TO MONITOR SALVADORAN LEFTIST ACTIVITIES IN COSTA RICA. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN JULY 80 [REDACTED] DESCRIBED MAJ. OCHOA AS A MILITARY INTEL OFFICER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OCHOA TRAVELLED TO GUAPILES, A CENTER FOR COMMUNIST LABOR SUBVERSION. [REDACTED] REPORTED IN AUG 80 THAT OCHOA WAS THE MILATT AND AN INTEL OFFICER, WHO WAS LIVING WITH ANOTHER SALVADORAN KNOWN AS MIGUEL. [REDACTED] STATED THAT OCHOA WAS ATTACHED TO M-5 ESTADO MAYOR DEL EJERCITO.

3. [REDACTED] FURTHER [REDACTED] LISTING NOTES THAT OCHOA PEREZ MAY BE

** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IDENTIFIABLE WITH ONE LTC. SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) TRUJILLO, WHO WAS SUSPECTED IN OCT 80 BY SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICERS AS ONE OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO; THEY BELIEVED HIS LOCATION TO BE COSTA RICA. SEVERAL OTHER LISTINGS DATED 1982-83 REFER TO OCHOA AS COMMANDER OF CABANASS DEPT. IN EL SALVADOR.

4. [REDACTED]

Exhibit T

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

00150C



14 November 2014

Ms. Mina Manuchehri
University of Washington
Center for Human Rights
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195

Reference: F-2015-00214

Dear Ms. Manuchehri:

On 24 October 2014, the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator received your 15 September 2014 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for:

"All documents from 1976 to the present regarding Salvadoran Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez. The areas of his career that are of greatest interest are:

- 1) his service as Commander of military detachment #2 in Cabanas, El Salvador between February/March 1981 to March 9, 1983; and,**
- 2) his service as Commander in Chalatenango, El Salvador from August 1984 to February 1986."**

We have assigned your request the reference number above. Please use this number when corresponding so that we can easily identify it.


We cannot accept your FOIA request for "all documents from 1976 to the present regarding Salvadoran Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez" because it would require the Agency to perform an unreasonably burdensome search. You state in your request that there are two periods of time/two of his assignments in which you are most interested. May we narrow the scope of this request to these two time periods?

Based on the information provided in your letter, we determined that your request falls into the "all other" fee category, which may require you to pay charges to cover the cost of searching for and reproducing responsive records (if any) beyond the first 100 pages of reproduction and the first two hours of search time, which are free. Copies are ten cents per page. We note your willingness to pay fees up to \$25 and acknowledge your request to be notified if they exceed this amount.

A4

We will hold your request in abeyance for 45 days from the date of this letter pending receipt of a **modified request**, as outlined above.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'JG', with a horizontal line extending to the right.

John Giuffrida
Acting Information and Privacy Coordinator