DEFENSE of JAPAN 2023

MINISTRY of DEFENSE
The world is at a turning point in history. The international community is facing its greatest trial since World War II (WWII), and we have entered a new era of crisis.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is an unprecedented situation. A permanent member of the United Nations Security Council has shown disregard for international law by launching an aggression against a sovereign country and repeating rhetoric and actions that can be interpreted as threats of nuclear weapons use. Additionally, China is rapidly enhancing its military capability qualitatively and quantitatively, including nuclear and missile forces, while continuing and amplifying its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Furthermore, North Korea is rapidly advancing its nuclear and missile development, repeatedly launching missiles.

Under these circumstances, it goes without saying that diplomatic efforts are the foremost priority of Japan, which has experienced WWII and has since been pursuing the path of a peace-loving nation. Japan remains unwavering in its commitment to respecting the rule of law and settling any disputes not through the use of forcible measures but peacefully and diplomatically. At the same time, in order to protect the lives and livelihood of Japanese nationals, it is essential to make efforts to “defend our country by ourselves” and increase deterrence. In other words, we need to make the opponent think that “attacking Japan will not achieve its goals.”

Japan’s intentions and tangible measures for achieving them are articulated in our new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program that were adopted by the Cabinet last December. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) will follow
through on them, including reinforcement of our defense production and technology bases. In doing so, we will focus on two priorities: first, to maximize effective use of our current equipment by improving operational rates, securing sufficient munitions, and accelerating investments in improving the resiliency of major defense facilities; and second, to strengthen the core areas of our future defense capabilities, including stand-off defense capabilities that can be utilized as counterstrike capabilities and unmanned assets.

However, no matter how much advanced equipment the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) procure, our defense capability cannot be demonstrated without personnel to operate them. The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. We will speed up our efforts to improve their lives, work environments and treatment.

In recent years, diplomatic efforts have also gained importance for defense. Since my appointment as Minister of Defense, I have held discussions on numerous occasions with defense ministers, including Secretary of Defense Austin of the United States, Japan’s only ally, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles of Australia, working to deepen our cooperation and collaboration. Building upon these discussions, we will continue to pursue various cooperation, including the joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft by Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy.

Even if my counterparts and I were to have different views, it is important to make persistent efforts to maintain and increase our communication through dialogue, aiming to build trust and avoid unforeseen circumstances. As such, I will continue to make these endeavors.

From this perspective, Defense of Japan 2023 outlines the security environment surrounding Japan and the activities and efforts of the MOD/SDF. The beginning focuses on the changes before 2013 (when the previous National Security Strategy was formulated) and the changes through 2022 (when the current National Security Strategy was formulated), which includes a special feature titled, “An Era of Upheavals: 10 Years of Change.” Additionally, the National Defense Strategy is explained concisely and clearly with photos and diagrams to deepen readers’ understanding.

It is important above all that initiatives for defense of Japan have the understanding and cooperation of the people and are highly transparent to the international community. In this regard, this white paper has played a critical role. We sincerely hope that Defense of Japan 2023 will be read by as many people as possible and help increase their understanding of the activities and efforts of the MOD/SDF.
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The terms below will be abbreviated as follows in this White Paper, and other terms may also be abbreviated appropriately (Official names may be used in some cases for explanatory purposes):

1. Ministry of Defense → MOD
2. Self-Defense-Forces → SDF
3. Ground Self-Defense-Forces → GSDF
5. Air Self-Defense Force → ASDF
8. Defense Buildup Program → DBP

Maps in this White Paper may contain omissions depending on the design and layout and may not necessarily show the entire Japanese territory.

The period covered by this White Paper is up to the end of March 2023, in principle.
The international community is facing its greatest post-war trial yet and has entered a new era of crisis. In view of these circumstances, the title on the cover of this year’s “Defense of Japan” has been hand-lettered by a member of the Self-Defense Forces, the core of Japan’s defense capabilities that protect the lives and livelihoods of Japanese nationals. With his smooth, spirited, and firm brush strokes, these characters represent all 270,000 members of the Self-Defense Forces and embody the renewed determination of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces.

**Lettering of title**

MATONO Makoto, Technical Sergeant, ASDF, 3rd Wing, Support and Logistics Group, Repairs Squadron

(Technical Sergeant MATONO has received the Prime Minister’s Award and the Defense Minister’s Award in succession under the calligraphy division of the All-Japan Self-Defense Forces Art Exhibition.)

**Design support**

[Company Profile]

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URL: https://8105.jp/

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**Regarding the purpose of Defense of Japan and the target period of its descriptions**

The Defense of Japan white paper was first published in 1970, and has been published annually since 1976. The purpose of publishing this paper is to make the current status, issues and initiatives of Japan’s defense common knowledge for as many people as possible, as simply as possible.

This edition of Defense of Japan covers the defense and security environment of Japan and the initiatives of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) during the one year period from April 2021 to March 2022. However, certain important events that took place in the latter half of May 2022 are also described.

In addition, maps in this paper may contain omissions depending on the design and layout and may not necessarily show the entire Japanese territory.

To facilitate access to the latest information even after this White Paper is published, QR codes have been included to link readers to the relevant pages on the MOD website. Previous editions of Defense of Japan, including this edition, can be viewed on the MOD website, so please feel free to make use of it.

**Defense of Japan web page**

Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. Over the past decade, countries and others neighboring Japan have been significantly strengthening their military capabilities as well as rapidly expanding and intensifying missile launches and demonstrations of their military force.

**Military developments in countries and others neighboring Japan since 2013**

- **North Korea**
  - North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.

- **Russia**
  - Russia’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong security concern.

**China**

- China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge.

Since 2013, China has been flying military aircraft over the Pacific Ocean, expanding and intensifying the scope of its activities.

- First confirmation of passage by Chinese military aircraft (Y-8 early warning aircraft and Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft) over the Sea of Japan (January 2016)
- First confirmation of passage by Chinese military aircraft (H-6 bombers) over Japan (August 2016)
- First confirmation of a formation including fighters (December 2017)

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- First confirmation of passage by Chinese military aircraft (H-6 bombers) over Japan (August 2016)
- First confirmation of a formation including fighters (December 2017)

Promotion of unilateral changes to the status quo by force and the creation of a fait accompli in the South China Sea

- Since 2014, China has engaged in large-scale and rapid land reclamation and infrastructure development on seven features in the Spratly Islands
- China has had de facto control over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012

Continuous activities of Chinese warships and others around the Senkaku Islands

- Entry into Japan’s contiguous zone by Chinese navy surface ships (June 2016, January and June 2018, July 2022)
- Frequent cases in recent years of China Coast Guard vessels attempting to approach Japanese fishing vessels in Japan’s territorial waters (8 cases in 2020; 14 cases in 2018; 11 cases in 2022)
- First intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters by China Coast Guard vessels, etc., equipped with a gun-like armament (from 2015)

Intensified activities by China around Taiwan

- Although China is maintaining its policy for peaceful reunification with Taiwan, it has not ruled out the possibility of the use of force.
- Five Chinese ballistic missiles landed in Japan’s EEZ (August 2022)
- Significant increase in number of Chinese aircraft entering Taiwan’s airspace (2022)

Activities by Chinese aircraft carriers in the Pacific Ocean

- First confirmation of entry into the Pacific Ocean by “Lianning” (first aircraft carrier) (2016)
- Flights by carrier-based fighters (including presumed ones) carried by “Lianning” over the Pacific Ocean (April 2018, April 2020, April and December 2021, May and December 2022)
- “Lianning” had the highest number of shipboard takeoffs and landings (more than 300) during its operational period (2022)
- First confirmation of entry into the Pacific Ocean by “Shandong” (second aircraft carrier). More than 600 shipboard takeoffs and landings were confirmed. (2022)

China’s attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea / Rapid expansion and increase of military activities

- Airspace intrusion into the Senkaku Islands (2012)
- Airspace intrusion into the Senkaku Islands (2017)
- Airspace intrusion into the Senkaku Islands (2019)
- Airspace intrusion into the Senkaku Islands (2020)
- Airspace intrusion into the Senkaku Islands (2021)
- Airspace intrusion into the Senkaku Islands (2022)
- Joint navigation by warships (2017)
- Joint navigation by warships (2018)
- Joint navigation by warships (2019)
- Joint navigation by warships (2020)
- Joint navigation by warships (2021)
- Joint navigation by warships (2022)
- Joint navigation by warships (2023)

**Issues concerning Taiwan**

- Taiwan is making progress on creating a fait accompli in the Fiery Cross Reef

**Issues concerning the South China Sea**

- China is reclaiming land, which was an April 2022 Chinese Coast Guard vessel equipped with a gun-like armament present near the Senkaku Islands
An Era of Upheavals: 10 Years of Change

Supported by the increase in its defense budget at a high level, China is extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability, with focuses on its naval and air forces as well as its nuclear and missile forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Announced defense budget</th>
<th>Modern naval forces</th>
<th>Modern air forces</th>
<th>Nuclear warheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(100 million yen)</td>
<td>(Vessels)</td>
<td>(Aircrafts)</td>
<td>(Number)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 2.2 times</td>
<td>Approx. 2.2 times</td>
<td>Approx. 1.5 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,503</td>
<td>14,505</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rapid progress in nuclear and missile development. It is believed that North Korea has the ability to attack Japan with nuclear weapons fitted to ballistic missiles.

Activities around the Senkaku Islands

China has relentlessly continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force around the Senkaku Islands for many years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of launched ballistic missiles, etc.</th>
<th>Number of nuclear warheads in stock*</th>
<th>Improvement of secrecy and promptness</th>
<th>Improvement of capability to breach ballistic missile defense (BMD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Number)</td>
<td>(Number)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 8.4 times in number of launches</td>
<td>Approx. 2 to 3.3 times</td>
<td>Intracontinental missiles (ICM)</td>
<td>Development of various platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>Approx. 5.1 times</td>
<td>[Source: EPA(UJ)]</td>
<td>Enables launches from any point and concealment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 ~ 8</td>
<td>Space</td>
<td>Pursuit of solid-fueled missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 ~ 8</td>
<td>Atmosphere</td>
<td>Easier to store and handle than liquid fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996~2012</td>
<td>Before 2012</td>
<td>Image</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013~2022</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>Conventional ballistic missile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Irregular trajectory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russia is promoting the modernization of various types of equipment, including its nuclear capabilities, and reinforcing its armaments by deploying new types of equipment in Japan's Northern Territories and the Chishima Islands. In addition, Russia is moving to deepen its coordination with China by increasing joint activities.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shaken the very foundation of the International order and is perceived as the most significant and direct threat to security in the European region.

Over the past 10 years, Russia has strengthened its missile capabilities with the deployment of new equipment in the Far East, including Japan’s Northern Territories.

- "Bastion" surface-to-ship missiles
  - Range of 300 km
  - Deployed to Etorofu Island in 2016

- "Bal" surface-to-ship missiles
  - Range of 133 km
  - Deployed to Kunashiri Island in 2016

- Su-35S fighters
  - Deployed to Etorofu Island from 2018

* According to SIPRI Yearbook, 2022. (Overall, North Korea has enough fissile material to produce 45 to 55 nuclear warheads)

** Annexation of Crimea (2014)

Armored men seized govenment buildings and military facitilies on the Ukrainian peninsula in Ukrainian territory (December 2014)

[Source: AP]
Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities:
Buildup of Defense Capabilities, etc. Promoted Since 2013

Japan’s defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantor of national security and demonstrate Japan’s resolve and capability to defend itself. Defense capabilities cannot be replaced by any other means. The SDF play a central role as the “last stronghold.” Japan has consistently committed to modest and efficient development of defense capabilities since the end of World War II.

2013

- Establishment of the National Security Council
- Passage and promulgation of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets
- Formulation of the NSS, 2013 NDPG, and 2014 Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP)

2014

- Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People (Cabinet decision)
- Entry into force of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets

2015

- Cabinet decisions to expedite procedures for promulgating security operations, maritime security operations, etc. ("Responses to foreign naval vessels navigating through the territorial waters or the inland waters of Japan that do not constitute innocent passage under international law,” "Government responses to incidents such as unlawful landings on remote islands, etc., by armed groups,” and “Responses to acts of infringement when SDF ships, etc., detect foreign ships committing said acts against Japanese private ships on the high seas”)

Changes in Defense-Related Expenditures by Item (Fiscal Year) *On a contract basis with the exception of annual budget expenditures (initial)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022*</th>
<th>FY2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual budget expenditures (initial)</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses for sustainment and maintenance</td>
<td>7,862</td>
<td>11,424</td>
<td>20,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildup expenditures for ammunition</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>8,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>2,911</td>
<td>8,968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures for FY2022 include the FY2021 supplementary budget.

Strengthening of the Defense Architecture in the Southwestern Region

- Deployment of units to the southwestern region, which has become a void in terms of SDF deployment
  - Establishment of the GSDF Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit (2016)
  - Establishment of GSDF Area Security Force units (2019: Amami Oshima Island, Miyakojima Island; 2023: Ishigaki Island)
  - Acquisition of GSDF Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles (from 2012) and GSDF Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missiles (from 2014)
  - Deployment of GSDF surface-to-ship missile units and surface-to-air missile units (2019: Amami Oshima Island; 2020: Miyakojima Island; 2023: Ishigaki Island)
  - Deployment of ASDF mobile air surveillance radars (2022: Yonaguni Island)

- Development of a full-scale amphibious operations capability
  - Refurbishment of an MSDF landing ship
  - Enhancement of the functions of the MSDF Minesweeper Squadron (from 2016)
  - Establishment of the GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (2018: Ainoura)

- Reinforcement to ensure air superiority
  - Establishment of the early warning aircraft unit (2014: Naha)
  - Reinforcement of the Fighter Aircraft Units and establishment of the 9th Air Wing (1+2 squadron) (2016: Naha)
  - Establishment of the Southwestern Air Defense Force (2017: Naha)

*The numbers related to equipment held and units in this document are a comparison of the numbers in FY2013 and those in FY2022. For example, “Acquisition of GSDF V-22 Ospreys (8→13 aircraft)” indicates that Japan had zero such aircraft at the end of FY2013 and 13 at the end of FY2022.
Squaresly facing the reality of the increasingly severe security environment, Japan decided to build truly effective defense capabilities under the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the 2018 NDPG, and has strengthened our defense capabilities as well as resolutely defended the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihoods as well as Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace. However, Japan’s neighboring countries and others are increasing their military activities while strengthening their military capabilities. With regard to future defense capabilities, Japan must clearly demonstrate its intention to never tolerate any unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts at any point in time.

**Enhancement of Maneuver and Deployment Capabilities**
- Acquisition of GSDF V-22 Ospreys (0 ➔ 13 aircraft)
- Acquisition of C-2 transport aircraft (1 ➔ 16 aircraft)
- Establishment of Rapid Deployment Regiments (0 ➔ 6 regiments)
- Procurement of Type-16 mobile combat vehicles (0 ➔ 160)

**Strengthening of Command and Control Capabilities; Utilization of the Space Domain**
- Launch of X-band defense communications satellites (Kirameki-1 and Kirameki-2) (2017, 2018)
- Strengthening the capabilities of various communication systems

**Strengthening of Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capabilities**
- Deployment of the PAC-3 MSE surface-to-air guided missiles (2020–2022)
- Increase in the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers (6 ➔ 8 ships) (completed by 2020)

**Utilization of Unmanned Assets**
- Acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (Global Hawk) (0 ➔ 2 aircraft) (from 2015)
- Establishment of the Reconnaissance Group (2022: Misawa)

**Strengthening of Capabilities in the Maritime and Air Domains**
- Acquisition of F-35A/B fighters (0 ➔ 33 aircraft) and P-1 patrol aircraft (5 ➔ 34 aircraft)
- Acquisition of KC-46A aerial refueling/transport aircraft (0 ➔ 2 aircraft)
- Increase in the number of submarines (16 ➔ 22 submarines) (completed in 2022)
- Refurbishment of Izumo-class destroyers as well as takeoff and landing testing of F-35B fighters (2021)
- Acquisition of a new type of frigates (FFM) (0 ➔ 4 vessels)

**Strengthening of the Joint Operational Architecture**
- Establishment (in Asaka) of a new command center (Ground Component Command) to conduct integrated operations of the various regional units for nationwide operation of the GSDF (2018)
- Strengthening of the Joint Staff’s posture in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum (from 2020)

**Strengthening of Capabilities in the Domains of Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Spectrum (From 2020)**
- Establishment of the ASDF Space Operations Squadron (2020: Fuchu), as well as the ASDF Space Operations Group (2022: Fuchu) with expanded units
- Establishment of the GSDF Electronic Warfare Operations Unit (2020)
- Acquisition of the GSDF Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS) (from 2017)
- Development of the ASDF stand-off electronic warfare aircraft (since 2020)
3 Ties with Japan’s Ally, Like-Minded Countries, and Others: Deepening of Cooperation and Collaboration

The Japan-U.S. Alliance has become stronger than ever, and its deterrence and response capabilities have been enhanced. Protection of U.S. Forces weapons, etc., has also become possible.

Japan has promoted mutual understanding and confidence building with partner countries and strengthened bilateral and multilateral defense relations.

### Cooperation and Exchanges Among People and Troops

#### “2+2” Meetings and Defense Ministerial Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“2+2”</td>
<td>3 times</td>
<td>5 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>20 times</td>
<td>37 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries with a “2+2” framework</td>
<td>4 countries</td>
<td>9 countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Defense ministerial meetings are meetings with defense ministers of other countries.

#### Participation in Multilateral Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Times</td>
<td>19 times</td>
<td>43 times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See the reference materials in the 2014 and 2023 editions of the Defense White Paper. Exercises with participation by two or more branches of the SDF are counted as one exercise.

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2015 Establishment of the new Guidelines

Passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security

The Japan-U.S. Alliance has become stronger than ever, and its deterrence and response capabilities have been enhanced. Protection of U.S. Forces weapons, etc., has also become possible.

2017 Entry into effect of the new Japan-U.S. ACSA

Expansion of activities subject to the provision of goods and services in accordance with the implementation of the Legislation for Peace and Security

2017 SM-3 Block IIA, Reached the stage of joint production and deployment

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Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Japan has promoted mutual understanding and confidence building with partner countries and strengthened bilateral and multilateral defense relations.

### Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

- **Japan-U.S. Alliance**

- **Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting**

- **Talisman Sabre**

- **The Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD)**

Note: See the reference materials in the 2014 and 2023 editions of the Defense White Paper. Exercises with participation by two or more branches of the SDF are counted as one exercise.
No country can now protect its own security alone. While deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is the cornerstone for Japan’s security, Japan has also been strengthening cooperation with various countries.

2023

The Japan-U.S. “2+2”
Confirmation that a cyber attack can constitute an armed attack under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

2020
60th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
Expression of determination to continue to strengthen the Alliance

2023
The Japan-U.S. “2+2”
Confirmation that an attack in space could lead to invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Times</th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 times</td>
<td>108 times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See the reference materials in the 2014 and 2023 editions of the Defense White Paper. Exercises with participation by two or more branches of the SDF are counted as one exercise.

Improvement of interoperability and Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities

Capacity Building
Capacity-building involves utilizing Japan’s capabilities to help other countries build their own capabilities. Japan has been combining more practical and diverse means to further strengthen and deepen defense cooperation and exchanges.

Steady deepening and expanding

Cumulative numbers of recipient countries and projects for capacity-building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of recipient countries</td>
<td>5 countries</td>
<td>16 countries, 1 organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects</td>
<td>9 projects</td>
<td>51 projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capacity-building to Mongolia (PKD (engineering))
Capacity-building to the Philippines (vessel maintenance)

Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
Japan has been promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation with other countries in order to contribute to the promotion of our national security, peace, and international cooperation, as well as contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense technology and industrial bases.

Steady deepening and expanding

Number of countries with which Japan has concluded agreements on the transfer of defense equipment and technology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries with agreements</td>
<td>2 countries</td>
<td>13 countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transfer of the air surveillance radar systems to the Philippines (since 2020)
Japan-U.K.-Italy joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft (since 2022)
Japan faces the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, with a focus on the capabilities of its opponents and new ways of warfare, in order to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of the Japanese nationals.

Thinking strategically, Japan’s deterrence will be enhanced by fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities as well as reinforcing the defense architecture for national defense as a coherent whole.

Based on this recognition, the government of Japan finalized the NDS to comprehensively present Japan’s defense objectives, approaches and means to accomplish those objectives, and the means to achieve them. The NDS replaces the NDPG, which was formulated six times since 1976. The NDS represents a major turning point for postwar defense policy and provides the direction and content for strengthening defense capabilities over the mid-term to long term. The Government will make every effort to deepen the public’s understanding of the significance of this major turning point.

Defense Challenges

The military background for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities to deter Russia’s aggression.

Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so; accurately gauging other’s intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threats may materialize.

To protect one’s country from such states, it is necessary to possess deterrence capability that makes others realize the difficulty of making unilateral changes to the status quo by force, as well as to develop defense capability that are focused on opponent capabilities.

In addition, whether Japan will be able to respond to these emerging new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense capabilities. Japan’s future security and defense policy will directly affect the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

Emerging new ways of warfare

Large-scale missile attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles
- It is necessary to intercept incoming missiles and prevent them from landing in Japan
- It is necessary to constrain missile launches by opponents and make it difficult for them to conduct missile attacks
- Even if missiles hit facilities, runways, etc., it is necessary to conduct persistent response by minimizing damage and quickly restoring the affected facilities, runways, etc.

Asymmetric attacks via the domains of space, cyber, or electromagnetic spectrum, unmanned vehicles, etc.
- Strengthening of detection, protection, and other response capabilities in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum is an urgent issue
- It is necessary to introduce a variety of unmanned equipment that can operate on land, sea, and in the air, and develop capabilities to respond to unmanned vehicles of opponents

Hybrid warfare including information warfare
- Detect suspicious signs promptly and share that information in as real-time as possible
- Be able to deploy SDF units ahead of opponents to where they are expected to attack, and also to have the transportation capabilities to quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from dangerous areas
- Win information warfare including the dissemination of disinformation, etc., and prevent confusion and such
Special Feature 2 covers the NDS, which was formulated in December 2022. It particularly focuses on the part regarding strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense, and concisely explains the content on the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities to defend Japan.

### Japan’s Three Defense Objectives

1. **Shape a security environment** that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force.

2. **Deter and respond to** unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts through cooperation and collaboration with Japan’s ally, like-minded countries, and others, and bring the situation under control swiftly.

3. **Should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, take primary responsibility** to deal with the aggression and, while receiving support from our ally and others, disrupt and defeat the invasion.

### Three Approaches to Realize the Defense Objectives

1. **Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense**
   - “Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities”
   - “Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country”

2. **Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance**
   - “Demonstrating the joint resolve and capabilities of Japan and the United States”

3. **Reinforcement of collaboration with like-minded countries and others**
   - “Reinforce collaboration with as many countries as possible”

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**Prime Minister Kishida participating in the G7 Summit Meeting (May 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan]**

**Japan-U.S. bilateral training with U.S. Air Force aircraft (February 2023)**

**Photo of training for amphibious operations (February 2023)**

**Three Approaches to Realize the Defense Objectives**

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**Next-generation fighter aircraft**

**Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (January 2023)**

**Signing of the Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) (January 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan]**

**Operation of the Space Situational System has started in collaboration with JAXA [Courtesy of JAXA]**

**F-35B takeoff and landing testing on the destroyer JS “Izumo” (October 2021)**

**Multilateral exercise with Japan, U.S., U.K., NLD, CA, NZ (October 2021)**
Japan will work to fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities by emphasizing seven pillars as the necessary functions and capabilities for national defense. In particular, the top priorities for the next five years are to improve equipment operational rates, secure sufficient ammunition and fuel, and expedite investment in key defense facilities in order to effectively maximize the use of current equipment, as well as to reinforce future core capabilities such as stand-off defense capabilities and unmanned defense capabilities.

### Seven Fields of the Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities

#### Stand-off defense capabilities
- Strengthening of capabilities to respond to opposing forces from a safe distance without being attacked.
  - Development of upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile
  - Acquisition of Tomahawk missiles

#### Integrated air and missile defense capabilities
- Strengthening of capabilities to respond to increasingly diverse and complicated airborne threats, including missiles.
  - Building Aegis System Equipped Vessels (image)

#### Unmanned defense capabilities
- Enhancement of intelligence gathering and combat support capabilities through unmanned assets.
  - Acquisition of middle range reconnaissance UAVs (image)

#### Cross-domain operation capabilities
- Enhancement of capabilities in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum as well as ground, maritime, and air capabilities needed for combat fusing all capabilities.
  - Development of stand-off electronic warfare aircraft (image)

#### Command and control and intelligence-related functions
- Reinforcement of command and control and intelligence-related functions for quick and accurate decision-making.
  - Utilization of images using AI technologies (image)

#### Mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection
- Reinforcement of maritime and air transportation capabilities for rapid maneuvering and deployment of necessary units. These capabilities are used to protect the people of Japan.
  - Acquisition of transport vessels (image)

#### Sustainability and resiliency
- Buildup of sufficient ammunition, guided missiles, and fuel at an early stage. Japan will also secure funds for the acquisition and repair of equipment as well as for improving the resiliency of facilities.
  - Securing ammunition storage facilities

#### “Counterstrike capabilities”
**Key to deterring invasion against Japan**

The capabilities which, in the case of missile attacks by an opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network. This discourages the opponent from attacking and deters armed attack itself.
Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases

The rapid progress of science and technology has fundamentally changed the nature of security, and various foreign countries are now working to surround themselves with such technology. In order to ensure stable procurement of equipment, it is essential to maintain and strengthen the defense production and technology bases in Japan as a virtually integral part of its defense capabilities.

Reinforcing Defense Production Base

- Building a strong and sustainable defense industry
- Responding to various risks
- Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

- Research and development that will lead to fundamental strengthening of defense capabilities at an early stage
- Active use of cutting-edge civilian technologies

Reinforcing Human Resource Base and Transformation of Medical Functions

It is the SDF personnel who demonstrate the defense capabilities. No matter how much advanced equipment the MOD/SDF procures, it will not be able to demonstrate its defense capabilities without human resources to handle that equipment. The MOD/SDF will promote efforts to strengthen our defense capabilities in terms of human resources.

We will also strengthen our readiness to protect the lives of SDF personnel who fight.

Reinforcing Human Resource Base

- Reinforcement of recruitment measures
- Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and others
- Improvement of living and work environments and treatment
- Human resource development
- Improving reemployment
- The award of honors for more SDF personnel

Transforming Medical Functions

- Establishment of a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation of patients between the frontline and medical evacuation destinations
- Strengthening of education and research on medical treatment for war injuries
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Previous plan (FY2019–FY2023)</th>
<th>Current plan (FY2023–FY2027)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stand-off defense capabilities</td>
<td>0.2 trillion yen</td>
<td>5 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated air and missile defense</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
<td>3 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned defense capabilities</td>
<td>0.1 trillion yen</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-domain operation capabilities</td>
<td>3 trillion yen</td>
<td>8 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(space, cyber, land, maritime, and air</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equipment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control and</td>
<td>0.3 trillion yen</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intelligence-related functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile deployment capabilities/</td>
<td>0.3 trillion yen</td>
<td>2 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition and guided missiles</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
<td>2 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair of equipment, etc.</td>
<td>4 trillion yen</td>
<td>9 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Approx. 5 trillion yen including other</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Approx. 10 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>areas)</td>
<td></td>
<td>including other areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the resiliency of facilities</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
<td>4 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing defense production base</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
<td>0.4 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Approx. 1 trillion yen including other</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Approx. 0.4 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>areas)</td>
<td></td>
<td>including other areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and development</td>
<td>4 trillion yen</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Approx. 3.5 trillion yen including other</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Approx. 1 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>areas)</td>
<td></td>
<td>including other areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.4 trillion yen</td>
<td>6.6 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Planned amount for FY2019–FY2023
17.2 trillion yen (contract-based amount)

Necessary expenditure over the next 5 years
43.5 trillion yen (contract-based amount)

11 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2023
Necessity of Securing Expenditure

Improved missile and radar capabilities of various foreign countries

Strengthening of capabilities to counter opposing forces from a safe distance without being attacked

Increasing diversity and complexity of airborne threats, such as missiles flying at extremely high speeds (hypersonic speeds), at low altitudes, and on irregular trajectories

Strengthening of interception and other capabilities to respond to airborne threats

Deal with new aspects of combat using unmanned equipment

Strengthen intelligence gathering capabilities for missiles and other assets of opponents, through the utilization of satellites
Reinforce the defense posture to respond to increasingly sophisticated, skillful cyber attacks
Improve the capabilities of various types of equipment as well as acquire them at an early stage in order to respond to the rapid buildup of military capabilities in neighboring countries and others

Conduct seamless, continuous intelligence gathering on the increasingly intensifying military activities in various countries
Strengthen intelligence functions to win information warfare as seen in the aggression against Ukraine

Strengthen maritime and air transport capabilities for rapid deployment of units to remote islands and other areas
Promote acquisition of transport vessels, etc.

Resolve the shortage of ammunition and guided missiles in order to prevent an invasion against Japan during a contingency

Occurrence of situations where equipment cannot be operated due to parts shortages, etc.
Secure sufficient funds for repairs, etc., to eliminate situations where equipment cannot be operated due to parts shortages, etc.

Of all SDF facilities, approx. 20% have protection performance and approx. 60% have earthquake resistance performance
Roughly 10 years later, 100% of facilities will have both protection and earthquake resistance performance

The defense industry is defense capability itself. Need to respond appropriately to diverse issues such as successive withdrawals of companies, disruption of raw materials supply from overseas, and cyber attacks on companies

Amidst the rapid progress of science and technology, if we lag behind in research and development of future equipment it is difficult to recover from a delay
Strengthening of investment, etc., in advanced technologies necessary for future ways of warfare

Secure the necessary budget for training and education of personnel, fuel for equipment, etc.
International Community is Facing the Greatest Post-War Trial Yet

States that do not share universal values nor political and economic systems based on these values are expanding their influence, and unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, represent a serious challenge to the existing international order. The international community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, and has entered a new era of crisis. In addition, changes to the power balance have brought about interstate competition across the political, economy, military, and other spheres, and the competition between the United States and China is growing particularly intense. The international community is presented with greater difficulties to rally together in taking on common challenges.

Furthermore, rapid development in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that prove to become “game changers” and that are resulted in fundamental changes to the way the military is organized as well as the way warfare is prosecuted, and the security sphere is expanding into the economic sphere, encompassing areas such as the competition for control over advanced technologies.

In addition, risks in cyber and other domains are becoming more serious. It is highly likely that information warfare, including the dissemination of disinformation, will be conducted on a regular basis, and that hybrid warfare combining military and non-military methods will be employed in an even more sophisticated manner.

The Security Situation Intensifies in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Indo-Pacific region in which Japan is situated faces a host of security challenges. In particular, the number of arms including nuclear weapons and missiles is rapidly building up around Japan, and the tendency towards unilateral changes to the status quo by force is further increasing.

Russian Aggression and Defense by Ukraine

Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force Shake the Foundation of the International Order, Including in Asia

The Russian aggression against Ukraine undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is a serious violation of international law prohibiting the use of force and of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force have shaken the very foundation of the international order, including in Asia.

The situation in which a permanent member of the Security Council, which is supposed to take primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, openly engages in military actions challenging international law and the international order, claims innocent lives, and repeatedly uses language and actions that can be interpreted as threats involving nuclear weapons, is unprecedented. While the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimates the number of noncombatant victims in Ukraine may be over 8,000 as of April 2023, the actual number is possibly much larger as accurate numbers cannot be determined due to the ongoing fighting, and the number is likely still increasing now. If such Russian aggression is tolerated, it could send a message with the wrong implication that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are acceptable in other regions as well, including Asia. Therefore, the international community, including Japan, should never tolerate Russia’s action.

It is possible that Russian national strength will decline and the military balance between Russia and surrounding countries will change in the medium- and long-term, because of significant casualties of conventional forces in this aggression. Furthermore, through Russia’s deepening cooperation with China and other factors, this may have an impact on global affairs, including the development of the strategic competition between the United States and China and its impact on Asia. Therefore, it is necessary to monitor related trends with keen interest.
New U.S. Strategy Places Emphasis on Alliances and Partnerships

The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy released by the United States in October 2022 characterize China as a “pacing challenge,” Russia as an “acute threat,” and North Korea as a “persistent threat.” In the Nuclear Posture Review released at the same time as the National Defense Strategy, it was noted that, the United States will face two major nuclear powers by the 2030s with China’s emergence as a major nuclear power.

In this context, the United States showed its recognition that mutually-beneficial alliances and partnerships are a center of gravity for its national defense strategy because it cannot meet these complex and interconnected challenges alone. In particular, it states that it will promote partnerships with allies and efforts to form multilateral frameworks such as the Quad and AUKUS to counter China’s coercive behavior in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States also continues to demonstrate its commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” through ongoing “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea and the passage of U.S. Navy vessels through the Taiwan Strait.

China’s Intensification of Unilateral Change to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts

China has been increasing its defense budget at a rapid pace for an extended period of time, and supported by this, it has been extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability in a qualitative and quantitative manner, with focuses on its naval and air forces as well as its nuclear and missile forces.

For example, it has been pointed out that China may possess 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035, and it is proceeding rapidly with the construction of its second indigenous aircraft carrier, which has been noted to be equipped with an electromagnetic catapults systems, as well as the development of a wide variety of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Backed by these tremendous military capabilities, China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly the area around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean including areas around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, extending beyond the so-called first island chain to the second island chain. It is increasing military pressure on Taiwan and continues to entrench its military foothold in the South China Sea.

Regarding Taiwan, in particular, China launched nine ballistic missiles in August 4, 2022, five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a threat to local residents.

China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others.
U.S.-China Strategic Competition Escalates; Tension Grows in Taiwan

China regards unification with Taiwan as “a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and is highly wary of the United States’ involvement in issues concerning Taiwan.

In 2022, then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi and other members from both parties of Congress visited Taiwan. Following this, the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to reinforce security cooperation with Taiwan was passed, indicating that both the U.S. government and Congress plan to further strengthen support for Taiwan.

Responding to this, China has further intensified military activities around Taiwan.

North Korea Makes Advances in Nuclear and Missile Development

In recent years, North Korea has been repeatedly launching ballistic missiles and other missiles at an unprecedentedly high frequency. It is also concentrating on enhancing its nuclear and missile related technologies and operational capabilities. For example, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles that fly with irregular trajectories and missiles it calls “hypersonic missiles,” and it is also pursuing the implementation of long-range cruise missiles with the intention of mounting them with tactical nuclear weapons. In October 2022, it launched a ballistic missile that passed over Japan, and it has also repeatedly launched ICBM-class missiles. Such military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before and significantly undermine the peace, stability and security of the region and international community.

Russia Adopts the “Strong State” Model and Ramps Up Strategic Coordination with China

Russia has been developing and deploying a variety of new weapons under its “strong state” model. Since the start of its aggression against Ukraine, it has also been making moves to increase troop numbers and expand and reorganize its military units. Russia has actively continued it’s military operations in the Far East even in the midst of its aggression against Ukraine, and the “Vostok-2022” strategic command post exercise was conducted with more than 50,000 troops and the participation of a total of 14 countries including China and India. Russia has also been making moves to strengthen a strategic tie with China. The repeated joint bomber flights and joint navigations of vessels by Russia and China are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan and are of grave concern from the perspective of the security of Japan and the region. We must continue to monitor actions by the Russian military in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, with strong concern.
Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology That Extend into Information Warfare, etc.

Science & technology, and the creation of innovation are sources of Japan’s economic and social development. Appropriate use of these technologies is essential not only for security, but also for addressing global-scale issues such as climate change. Countries are making efforts for the research, development, and military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technology, next generation information and communication technology, and other advanced, potentially game-changing technologies that could dramatically change the future character of warfare.

In addition, there is concern about information theft of advanced technologies for military use by abusing cyberspace or corporate activities, including acquisitions and investments. Countries are taking measures from the perspective of so-called “economic security,” such as strengthening export controls and screening mechanisms for foreign investments, as well as increasing the independence of technological development and production.

Trends in the Domains of Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Spectrum

Space-based technologies and information and communication networks have become core infrastructure in people’s everyday lives and for the military. Meanwhile, countries such as China and Russia have been pointed out to be strengthening their capabilities to interfere with other countries’ use of space, and their nations and militaries are being involved in cyber attacks.

Countries are to improve their capabilities in the domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum while recognizing these capabilities as methods of warfare that effectively deter enemies from demonstrating their war potential.

Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)

The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, as competition and confrontation among states have been sharpened, and as the current international security environment becomes complex and severe, there is concern that it is becoming difficult for the international community to rally together in taking on common challenges such as arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

Impact of Climate Change on Security and the Military

Armed Forces of many countries strive for resiliency in order to continue their activities regardless of climate change, and also work on security crises arising from climate change diligently.
Peace and security are essential for Japanese people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper, but these cannot be secured by simply wishing for them.

What we must prioritize first and foremost is developing proactive diplomacy to protect the lives and livelihood of Japanese nationals. It is essential to promote multilateral cooperation with like-minded countries through the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a cornerstone. At the same time, diplomacy needs to be backed by defense capabilities. As its strategic approach, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike capabilities, while developing its diplomacy under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Moreover, from the perspective of preventing the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of the role played by defense capabilities in cooperative efforts in the Indo-Pacific region is increasing.

Recognizing the role of such defense capabilities, Japan will ensure its peace and security by exerting efforts in a variety of fields, including diplomacy and economy.

In addition, adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan has efficiently built a highly effective, integrated defense force, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, civilian control of the military, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

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Recognizing the role of such defense capabilities, Japan will ensure its peace and security by exerting efforts in a variety of fields, including diplomacy and economy.

In addition, adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan has efficiently built a highly effective, integrated defense force, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, civilian control of the military, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
the status quo by force occur are hard to predict, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities by FY2027, in five years, to the point Japan will be able to take primary responsibility for countering any invasion of Japan that occurs and disrupt and defeat the invasion while receiving support from its ally and others. In addition, further efforts will be made by approximately ten years from now to better ensure these defense objectives are met, and to reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities so that any invasion of Japan can be disrupted and defeated earlier and at places further afield.

In addition, Japan will also reinforce its defense production and technology bases as virtually integral part of a defense capability, as well as the foundation for SDF personnel, who are at the core of defense capability, to demonstrate their abilities.

The DBP indicates the level of defense capability Japan should possess, including what needs to be done to reach that level. It describes various measures to realize the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities at a budget of approximately 43 trillion yen for the next five years, which is on a completely different level from the past. In particular, Japan will work to fundamentally reinforce areas at the core of its future defense capabilities, such as stand-off defense capabilities and unmanned defense capabilities; improve operational rates, secure ammunition, and accelerate investment in fortifying key defense facilities to maximize the use of existing equipment; and further reinforce defense production and technology bases and the human resource base.

### Budget for the “First Year” of Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities

Regarding defense-related expenditures for FY2023, the MOD has secured a budget appropriate for the content of the first year of the “buildup program” (budget for the “first year” of fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities), which will build up the initiatives necessary to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities within five years.

The annual budget expenditure includes ¥6,600.1 billion (year-on-year increase of ¥1,421.3 billion (27.4%)) allocated for DBP-related expenditures, an amount that rises to ¥6,821.9 billion when U.S. Force realignment-related expenses are included, with the “substantial increase of the defense budget” having been secured.

In addition, future obligation concerning new contracts (new programs) includes ¥7,067.6 billion (2.9 times that of the previous fiscal year) allocated for DBP-related expenditures. Contracts will be fulfilled in the first fiscal year as much as possible so that the necessary equipment can be delivered to each unit for operation as expeditiously as possible. Specifically, budgets for areas that constitute the core of Japan’s future defense capabilities, such as “stand-off defense capabilities” and “unmanned defense capabilities,” have been significantly increased, while investments aimed at improving operational rates, securing ammunition, and enhancing the resiliency of key defense facilities (including the construction of key command centers underground and development of barracks, etc.) have been expedited in order to maximize the use of existing equipment.

In allocating the budget, programs for the buildup of defense capability that have hitherto been managed by being classified under one of the two categories of “procurement expenditures for major equipment, etc.” and “other expenditures” will now be classified under one of the 15 new categories for each staff office and organization. The resulting budget is allocated after having accumulated budget items with greater precision, which prevents issues of insufficient funding for expenditures related to ammunition, maintenance, facilities, living and work environments, etc.

### Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense

The MOD and the SDF develop policies and execute missions based on the fundamental stance discussed at the National Security Council, which is a part of the Cabinet.

In addition, the MOD/SDF have adopted a joint operations architecture in which GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units are operated in an integrated manner. In order to realize seamless cross-domain operations at all phases from peacetime to contingencies with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations, various issues are being discussed with the goal of promptly establishing permanent Joint Headquarters to unite command of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF services by reviewing the existing organization.

### Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others

The 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security defined new situations to be addressed, such as “Survival-Threatening Situations” and “Situations that Will Have an Important Influence,” enabling seamless response to any situation. The Government of Japan will continue to take all possible measures to respond to such situations.
Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities and Strengthening Its Architecture for National Defense

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor ensuring Japan’s security. It will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will be disrupted and defeated, thereby demonstrating Japan’s resolve and capability to defend itself to the end.

A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so, yet accurately gauging other’s intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threats may materialize. To protect one’s nation from such states, it is necessary to have deterrence capability that makes others realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult, as well as to develop defense capabilities focusing on opponent capabilities. Regarding future defense capability, Japan needs to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities so that it can respond to new ways of warfare, and thereby discourage opponents from harboring the intention to launch aggression against Japan.

Japan will also build an overall national defense architecture by integrating its national power, which includes its diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological capabilities, and systematically combining all policy means.

Creating a Security Environment That Does Not Tolerate Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force

Responses to Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts

Japan must deter, through cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that concern Japan’s peace and security. In order to influence an opponent’s actions, it is necessary to improve and enhance training and exercises such as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) and Strategic Communication (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with our ally, like-minded countries and others. The MOD/SDF is conducting continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) from peacetime as well as analysis in cooperation with relevant government ministries and agencies to detect indications of contingencies at an early stage, and are scrambling fighters and other aircraft.

Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks

In response to an invasion against Japan, including our remote islands, Japan would disrupt and defeat the invading forces from a long distance. We will also acquire superiority across domains and conduct cross-domain operations that organically integrate capabilities in the ground, maritime, and air domains, as well as in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum to secure asymmetrical superiority, and disrupt and defeat the invading forces. Japan would also continue persistent actions to crush the opponent’s will to invade.

Moreover, in response to an invasion of Japan, including missile attacks, Japan will intercept missiles flying over the high seas and our territorial airspace with its missile defense system. In addition, as a measure for self-defense to the minimum required level to prevent invasion, including missile attacks, Japan will utilize capabilities including stand-off defense capabilities to enable itself to conduct effective counterstrikes in the opponent’s territory, and thereby deter missile attacks from happening.
Large-scale terrorist attacks and attacks against critical infrastructure including nuclear power plants are also serious threats. The MOD/SDF will take effective measures in the event of such attacks in close cooperation with relevant organizations. In addition, when an invasion of Japan is predicted, the MOD/SDF will utilize mobile deployment capabilities to facilitate initiatives for civil protection, including evacuation guidance for residents.

**Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Responses to Information Warfare**

As military activities around Japan become more active, while striving to gather information quickly and accurately through various means on a regular basis, the MOD/SDF is reinforcing functions such as information gathering and analysis.

In the international community, emphasis is being placed on information warfare, a method of warfare that uses the spread of disinformation and strategic information to influence public opinion and decision-making in other countries while creating a security environment favorable to one’s own country, even when a conflict has not yet erupted. In light of this situation, the MOD/SDF, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, will build a system and posture that can reliably handle integrated information warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension, with a focus on fact-checking and analyzing disinformation and promptly and appropriately disseminating information.

**Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives to Ensure Warfare Sustainability**

In order to defend Japan in the future, the current warfighting sustainability of the SDF is not necessarily sufficient in the form of ammunitions and fuel, and the number of operationally available equipment. It is necessary to squarely address these realities and strive to ensure and maintain sufficient warfare sustainability so that the SDF can continue persistent activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrent. To this end, the MOD/SDF will urgently possess adequate ammunition as necessary, build up ammunition storage facilities and fuel tanks, and improve equipment availability. In addition, major command headquarters will be moved underground and structurally reinforced, and other facilities will be relocated.

**Measures for Protection of the Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals**

Besides invasions of Japan, large-scale disasters and infectious disease crises are other serious threats that require the utmost efforts by the nation to respond. In the event of a large-scale disaster, etc., the MOD/SDF will cooperate closely with relevant organizations to effectively carry out life-protecting activities, emergency, livelihood support, and other essential services.

**SDF Activities Since the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security**

Since the Legislation for Peace and Security went into effect in 2016, various preparations and trainings related to this legislation have been made. In 2022, the MOD/SDF participated for the first time in a field training exercise based on a scenario with a declaration of a Survival-Threatening Situation by the Government of Japan. In addition, in accordance with the Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, the first coordinated asset protection was conducted among Japan, the U.S., and Australia and the SDF provided security for the U.S. and Australian forces.
Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as a Cornerstone for Japan’s Security

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security. Japan has maintained its peace, security, and independence centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a capitalist economy as well as interests in maintaining the peace and security of the world and has strong economic ties.

The NDS calls for further deepening of discussions with the United States on both countries’ respective roles, missions, and capabilities to further reinforce Japan-U.S. joint deterrence capabilities in an integrated manner from the perspective of deterring invasion against Japan. Specifically, Japan will further deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-domain operations of the Alliance, including in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum, and to improve interoperability. Furthermore, Japan will reinforce collaboration in such areas as air defense, anti-surface warfare; anti-submarine warfare; mine warfare; amphibious operations; airborne operations; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR); protection of assets and facilities; and logistics support. In order to effectively realize the division of roles and missions between Japan and the United States in light of the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities, Japan will ensure close operational coordination with the United States through Japan-U.S. bilateral planning. In addition, Japan will work to improve response capability of the Alliance, including readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical exercises and training. In order to ensure that the United States extended deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible and resilient, Japan will further actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence, including those at the ministerial level. To deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, as well as to deter various contingencies from emerging, Japan will further expand and evolve operations including joint flexible deterrent options (FDO) and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities as a part of routine bilateral efforts by Japan and the United States on a regular basis.

In addition, while the presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) functions as deterrence, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents. In particular, the realignment of the USFJ is a very important initiative for mitigation of the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, and maintaining the deterrence capability of the U.S. Forces. Therefore, the MOD will advance the realignment and other initiatives and make continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of the local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas.
Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others

Chapter 3

Promoting Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others to Realize FOIP

The MOD/SDF is actively promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered defense cooperation and exchanges in order to strengthen ties with as many countries as possible under the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

In recent years, the MOD/SDF have been advancing high-level exchanges, bilateral/multilateral training and exercise, capacity building, and other defense cooperation and exchanges not only with Japan’s ally, but also with a wide variety of countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

The MOD/SDF is also expanding the establishment of institutional frameworks such as Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, with like-minded countries and others.

Maritime Security

As a maritime nation, it is extremely important for Japan to reinforce the maritime order and ensure the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and safety. For this reason, the MOD/SDF are promoting multilateral cooperation concerning maritime security, such as the monitoring of maritime situations, including ongoing counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

International Peace Cooperation Activities

The MOD/SDF have been dispatching two headquarters personnel to MFO, whose mission is to monitor the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel, and has decided to dispatch two additional headquarters personnel. Also, four SDF personnel are working for the UNMISS Headquarters in South Sudan. In addition, the MOD/SDF actively contributes to international peace cooperation activities by dispatching personnel to the UN Secretariat and PKO training centers, and by providing various support to the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.

From May to June 2022, the SDF transported humanitarian relief supplies by the aircraft from the UNHCR warehouse in Dubai to the countries surrounding Ukraine.

Additionally, from February to March 2023, the SDF transported disaster relief supplies in response to the earthquakes which occurred in Turkey and Syria, under the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) Law.

The SDF is always prepared to respond to such urgent requests.

Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

The MOD/SDF are working with related ministries and agencies to develop an international posture and training program for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation on weapons of mass destruction and missiles that could serve as their means of delivery, conventional weapons, and cargo and sensitive technologies that could be adapted for military use.
Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability, etc.

Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases

Science and technology are rapidly advancing, and countries are developing cutting-edge technologies that could become so-called “game changers” which dramatically alter the future character of warfare. In addition, the development of new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) has expanded the character of warfare not only in the ground, maritime, and air domains, but also in the space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains, including the cognitive dimension. In response to these changes, each country is actively engaged in research and development to ensure its technological superiority. On the other hand, Japan’s defense production and technology bases have been exposed to challenging conditions resulting from growing issues such as supply chain risks and a series of withdrawals from the industry. In light of these circumstances, the NDS states that Japan’s defense production and technology bases are essential infrastructure for securing the stable research and development, production, and procurement of equipment in Japan and for incorporating the cutting-edge technologies necessary for new ways of warfare into its defense equipment, making these bases virtually defense capability itself, and that efforts will be made to reinforce these bases.

In addition, in order to acquire the necessary equipment for new ways of warfare, it is imperative for Japan to leverage the technology that it possesses. The development of scientific technologies and innovations based on Japan’s advanced technological capabilities is at the source of its economic and social development and constitutes a key element of its comprehensive national power integral to its national security. In addition, actively utilizing technological capabilities developed by Japan’s public and private sectors in the area of national security without being held back by existing approaches is an essential activity for strengthening Japan’s architecture for national defense. It is important to work strategically to ensure technological superiority as a nation by actively leveraging the results of research and development in science and technology in Japan’s public and private sectors for the research and development of defense equipment. Therefore, it is necessary to further promote research and development domestically and develop and strengthen the technology base for the technology areas on which Japan should focus.

Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

The transfer of defense equipment overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and to create a desirable security environment for Japan. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems are to be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In addition, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts by establishing a fund, and implementing measures including providing corporate assistance as necessary to smoothly promote such transfers.
Reinforcing Human Resource Base

The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. The MOD/SDF will reinforce the human resource base to create an environment that enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride.

Despite a severe recruitment environment with a declining number of people eligible for recruitment due to a declining birthrate, the MOD/SDF is working on recruitment activities and also reinforcing mid-career recruitment to utilize human resources from the private sector in order to ensure stable recruitment of excellent human resources. Regarding SDF Reserve Personnel and Others, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to utilize personnel with specialized skills etc.

In addition, the MOD/SDF will work to improve the living and work environment of personnel, improve their salary treatment, support their re-employment, promote measures related to award of honors and privileges, and provide family support measures.

Response to Harassment

In September 2022, an investigation of a harassment incident involving a former member of the GSDF who was sexually harassed while on active duty resulted in a substantiated finding. This is an extremely serious incident that was not properly handled despite the fact that the victim reported the incident.

In light of the current situation, including the ever-increasing number of consultations, the Minister of Defense has instructed the implementation of a fact-finding inspection for the entire SDF by Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance and the establishment of a committee of experts to conduct a fundamental review of the anti-harassment policy.

Based on the findings of the study by this committee of experts, the MOD/SDF will implement new policies and strive to create a work environment with zero tolerance for harassment of any kind.

Work-life Balance and Women’s Participation

Ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires creating an environment in which staff are both mentally and physically healthy and are able to maintain high morale and fully demonstrate their abilities.

To this end, the MOD/SDF is adopting working style reforms to correct working long hours and measures such as teleworking to make work hours and locations more flexible.

In addition, the MOD/SDF is working to promote the participation of highly motivated and capable women, such as by lifting restrictions on the assignment of female SDF personnel.
Medical Organization that Saves the Lives of SDF Personnel

The NDS states that, from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency, the SDF will transform the SDF medical force into an organization that saves the lives of SDF personnel.

In particular, the MOD/SDF needs to establish a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation from the frontlines to the destination hospital, in order to improve the life-saving rate of injured personnel.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will reinforce education and research on combat trauma care in the National Defense Medical College and improve management necessary to further enhance the clinical experience of medical and nursing officers.

Reinforcement of Policy-making Function

For the SDF to respond to the increasingly severe strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required. To this end, the MOD/SDF is closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies particularly defense industry as their core. In addition, the MOD/SDF is reinforcing their intellectual base by reviewing and reinforcing research systems, centered on the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS).

Measures Relating to Training and Exercises

In order to fulfill its challenging mission of defending Japan, the SDF constantly conducts joint exercises and training by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF services. The content of these trainings is not limited to conventional domains, but extends into new domains, including that of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. Efforts are being made to improve cross-domain operations in order to better utilize these domains and enhance defense capabilities.

In addition, in order to reinforce the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, each service of the SDF conducts bilateral trainings with the corresponding U.S. military service and Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercises, the contents of which have been deepened year after year.

Furthermore, in order to strategically promote multi-faceted and multi-layered defense cooperation based on the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the SDF is actively engaged in bilateral training and exercises with ally and like-minded countries and others in the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Moreover, in recent years, the SDF actively promotes bilateral training and exercises not only with coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region, but also with like-minded countries and others outside the region, with a view to improving interoperability and deepening ties with these countries.
In order to protect Japan’s peace and independence in an increasingly severe security environment, the SDF must become more powerful on its own while improving its ability to cooperate and collaborate with Japan’s ally and like-minded countries and others, rather than be content with its current capabilities. For this reason, the SDF is striving to acquire further deterrence and response capabilities through training and exercises.

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**Initiatives on Coexistence with Regional Society and the Environment**

**Measures Concerning Harmony with Regional Society**

The various activities of the MOD/SDF are hard to implement without the understanding and cooperation of each and every person, as well as local governments and other organizations. Based on this idea, the MOD/SDF will continue to promote various measures necessary in order to further deepen the trust between regional society and people, and the SDF.

**Responding to Climate Change and Environmental Issues**

It is inevitable that the issue of climate change, including responses to future energy shifts, will have an even greater impact on future MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, and defense equipment, as well as the security environment surrounding Japan. The MOD/SDF has long complied with environmental laws and regulations and has made efforts to thoroughly conserve the environment and reduce environmental impact. In August 2022, the MOD/SDF formulated the Ministry of Defense Response Strategy on Climate Change, which outlines strategic measures for the MOD to address climate change. Going forward, the MOD will promote concrete measures to combat the impacts of climate change based on this strategy.

**Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives Management, Disclosure of Administrative Documents**

In order to gain the trust and the cooperation from the Japanese people and other countries, the MOD/SDF strives to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities regarding its operations in various ways.
Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1
Overview

Chapter 2
Russia’s Aggression and Defense by Ukraine

Chapter 3
Defense Policies of Countries

Chapter 4
Trends and Challenges Facing the International Community Concerning the Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains and Information Warfare
Current trends in the security environment are, first, following the development of information society and the expansion of international trade, economic and culture interactions among states further expand and deepen. On the other hand, states that do not share universal values or political and economic systems based on these values are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts represent significant challenges to the free and open international order underpinned by the rule of law. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has revealed this in a most blatant way. The international community is facing its greatest post-war trial yet and has entered a new era of crisis. In addition, the global power balance has significantly changed and interstate competition across the political, economy and military spheres is emerging. The interstate competition between China and the United States in particular is expected to further intensify in various fields.

Second, rapid advances in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that could dramatically alter the character of warfare and thus prove to become “game changers,” resulting in fundamental changes to the way the military is organized as well as the way warfare is prosecuted. Also, some nations are illegally stealing information related to advanced technologies developed by private companies, universities, and other organizations in other countries and using it for their own military purposes.

Third, there exist a range of global security challenges such as increasingly serious risks in cyber and other domains, the expansion of information warfare, including the spread of disinformation, and climate change.

In cyber, maritime, space, and electromagnetic domains and other areas, the risks that impede free access to and utilization of these areas are becoming increasingly serious. In particular, the threat of cyberattacks, in which the risk of exposure is relatively low and where attackers have an advantage, is growing rapidly. Cyberattacks have been used constantly to disable or destroy critical infrastructures, interfere in foreign elections, demand ransoms, and steal sensitive information, even in the form of state-sponsored cyberattacks. It is highly likely that hybrid warfare, combining military and non-military means to achieve military objectives, such as information warfare that utilizes the spread of disinformation prior to an armed attack, will be conducted in an even more sophisticated form in the time ahead.

Furthermore, addressing those issues not necessarily deemed as security targets in the past, such as supply chain vulnerabilities, increasing threats to critical infrastructures, and leadership struggles over advanced technologies, has also become a major security challenge. As a result, the scope of security has expanded to include the economic sector, making economic measures even more important.

**Key Words**

“Grey Zone Situations” and “Hybrid Warfare”

So-called “grey zone” situations simply represent a wide range of situations that are neither peacetime nor wartime.

In a grey-zone situation, for example, a country that confronts another over territory, sovereignty or maritime and other economic interests uses some forceful organization to demonstrate its presence in the relevant disputed region in a bid to alter the status quo or force other countries to accept its assertions or demands.

The so-called “hybrid warfare” represents methods intentionally blurring the boundaries between the military and non-military realms, forcing affected actors to take complex measures that are not limited to military actions. The means of hybrid warfare include operations using military units of unidentified nationality, cyberattacks to affect communications and other critical infrastructure, the spread of false information through the internet and the media, and other influential operations. The combination of these measures is considered as amounting to hybrid warfare. In hybrid warfare, a country takes measures that are difficult to identify definitively as an “armed attack” based on its outward appearance. It is said that such an approach is taken with an intent to make it difficult for the target country to address the situation, such as delaying the military’s initial response, while denying the attacker country’s own involvement.
more necessary to ensure security.

On the other hand, due to the changing power balances and diversifying values around the world, strong leadership is being lost in the global governance structure at large. As a result, the international community is presented with greater difficulties to rally together in taking on common challenges such as climate change, free trade, arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, terrorism, global health including measures against infectious diseases, and food and energy issues.

2 Security Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region

The global security environment and challenges articulated above are particularly prominent in the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is situated, and its severity may be on the rise in the future. The Indo-Pacific region is the core of global vitality, home to more than half of the world’s population. The dynamism of the intersection of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans is a growth engine for the global economy. Japan, situated in this region, is well positioned to benefit from this. At the same time, the Indo-Pacific region faces a host of security challenges. For example, several nations and regions that possess large military forces, including nuclear weapons, do not share universal values, nor political and economic systems based on such universal values. Furthermore, there exists a complex intertwining of diplomatic and other relations based on historical backgrounds. With regard to Japan, territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved. In addition, Japan faces threats and challenges of various types and intensities, such as unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East and South China Seas and other areas, piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and natural disasters.

In the vicinity of Japan, military buildups, including those of nuclear weapons and missiles, are rapidly advancing, coupled with mounting pressures from unilateral changes to the status quo by force. Moreover, grey zone situations over territories, cross-border cyberattacks on critical civilian infrastructures, and information warfare through the spread of disinformation, are constantly taking place, thereby further blurring the boundary between contingency and peacetime. Furthermore, the scope of national security has expanded to include fields previously considered non-military such as economic, technological, and others, and thus the boundary between military and non-military fields is no longer clear-cut either.

REFERENCE: Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan, etc.

Large-scale military capabilities are concentrated surrounding Japan.

**Military Forces in Major Countries/Regions**

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<th>Ground forces (10,000 troops)</th>
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(Note 1) Figures for ground forces are basically the numbers of Army personnel in "The Military Balance 2023." Figures for maritime forces show their tonnages compiled by the MOD based on "Jane’s Fighting Ships 2022-2023." Figures for air forces are the total numbers of bombers, fighters, attack aircraft, surveillance aircraft, etc., compiled by the MOD based on "The Military Balance 2023."

(Note 2) Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2022; the number of combat aircraft (air forces) is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).

* Figures are rounded off to the nearest 10,000 personnel. Figures for the United States include 460,000 Army personnel and 170,000 Marines personnel. Russia’s strength is including 350,000 Ground Force personnel, 40,000 Airborne troops personnel, and the 30,000 personnel of “the separatist in Eastern Ukraine” forces that Russia announced to incorporate to AFRF. Ukraine’s strength is including 250,000 Ground Force personnel, 30,000 Airborne troops personnel, and 350,000 Territorial Defense Force personnel mainly consists of reservists. Figures for Iran include 150,000 ground force personnel of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in addition to 350,000 Army personnel.
Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan

China’s broad and rapid change of military forces

- First nuclear test in 2006 and a total of six nuclear tests thereafter
- Enhancement of missile technologies, including missiles with increasingly longer ranges and ones that fly on irregular trajectories
- Declared the completion of the nuclear force in 2017
- Continued systematic development of various weapons, including nuclear weapons

North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Development

- First nuclear test in 2006 and a total of six nuclear tests thereafter
- Enhancement of missile technologies, including missiles with increasingly longer ranges and ones that fly on irregular trajectories

Russia continuing active actions

- Deployed new equipment also in the Far East region
- Steregushchik II-class frigates Assigned to the Pacific Fleet in 2020
- Ground-to-ship missile system Bastion
- Newly deployed to Paramushir Island of Shishma Islands in 2022

Indo-Pacific region has many security challenges.

- There are several nations and regions in this region with large military forces, including nuclear weapons, do not share universal values, nor the political and economic systems based on such universal values.
- There exists a complex intertwining of diplomatic and other relations based on historical backgrounds.
- Diverse threats and challenges of various types and intensities exist in this region, such as unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East and South China Seas and other areas, piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and natural disasters.

(Note) Figures for modern destroyers and frigates for China show the total number of Renhai-class, Luhu-class, Luhai-class, Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class, and Luzhou-class destroyers and Jiangwei-class and Jiangkai-class frigates. Additionally, China has 61 Jiangdao-class corvettes (in 2023).
Main Military Forces surrounding Japan (Approximate Strength)

**Russian Far East**
- 80,000 troops (33)
- 250 vessels 670,000 tons
- 320 aircraft
- 4,477 (*)
  (*) Number held by Russia as a whole

**China**
- 970,000 troops (219)
- 40,000 marines (8)
- 720 vessels
- 2,320,000 tons
- 3,190 aircraft
- 350

**North Korea**
- 1.1 million troops (35)
- 790 vessels 100,000 tons
- 550 aircraft

**ROK**
- 420,000 troops (52)
- 29,000 marines (4)
- 230 vessels
- 290,000 tons
- 660 aircraft

**U.S. Forces Korea**
- 2,000 troops (5)
- 80 aircraft

**Japan**
- 140,000 troops (15)
- 138 vessels
- 520,000 tons
- 130 aircraft

**U.S. Forces Japan**
- 20,000 troops (1)
- 130 aircraft

**U.S. 7th Fleet**
- 30 vessels
- 440,000 tons
- 50 aircraft (carrier-based)

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(Notes)
2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2022; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).
3. Figures for the ground forces of U.S. Forces Japan/Korea indicate the combined total for Army troops and U.S. Marines.
4. Figures for combat aircraft include naval and marine aircraft.
5. Figures in parentheses indicate the total number of major units such as divisions and brigades. That for North Korea includes only divisions.
6. The figures for the U.S. 7th Fleet indicate forces forward-deployed to Japan and Guam.
7. The figures for the combat aircraft of U.S. Forces Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet include only fighter aircraft.

**Legend**
- Ground forces (200,000 troops)
- Vessels (200,000 tons)
- Combat aircraft (500 aircraft)
- Number of nuclear warheads (500)
In recent years, missile forces in the area around Japan have been significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched, making missile attacks against Japan a palpable threat.

Neighboring countries and regions have improved their launch secrecy and instantaneity by launching missiles from a variety of platforms, such as the Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) and submarines, and have also improved their precision strike capabilities. In addition, they are also developing and deploying hypersonic weapons, including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), which are said to glide and maneuver at hypersonic speeds (Mach 5 or above) in inner space to hit their targets, and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs), which use scramjet engines and other technologies that enable hypersonic flight, as well as missiles that fly on irregular trajectories at low altitudes. For example, China is noted to have already begun operating DF-17 medium-range ballistic missiles, which are said to be capable of carrying HGVs, and to have conducted an orbital launch of an ICBM with HGVs in 2022. North Korea has also improved its missile launch capabilities by developinghypersonic gliding flight warheads as well as missiles that fly on irregular trajectories at low altitudes. As for Russia, the short-range ballistic missile “Iskander-M” used in the aggression against Ukraine is said to be capable of flying on an irregular trajectory at low altitudes, and the country is also deploying the HGV “Avangard” and HCM “Zircon.” It is possible that such hypersonic weapons and missiles that fly on irregular trajectories at low altitudes are designed to penetrate the missile defense network, as they are said to take longer to detect by radar because they fly at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles, and their maneuverability makes their trajectories and impact positions difficult to predict (see image in right).

Furthermore, neighboring countries and regions are not only improving missile-related technologies such as the above, but also improving their practical missile operational capabilities. China, which falls outside the framework of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and Russia and possesses a large number of ground-launched missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, which are regulated by the treaty, launched about 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training in 2021, which is noted to be more than the combined total of missiles launched elsewhere in the world. In addition, on August 4, 2022, China conducted training in the area around Taiwan, launching a total of nine ballistic missiles, five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which was perceived as a threat to local residents. In recent years, North Korea has been repeatedly launching ballistic missiles in new ways at an unprecedentedly high frequency. It has launched multiple missiles simultaneously, consecutively at extremely short intervals, and from different points aimed at a specific target, and may be attempting to improve its practical missile operational capabilities, such as saturation attacks. Russia, in its aggression against Ukraine, fired a large number of missiles throughout Ukraine. This caused many casualties, including civilian casualties, as Ukraine had only a limited capacity to deal with ballistic missiles.

Under such circumstances, the MOD is working to ceaselessly strengthen the quality and quantity of Japan’s missile defense capabilities. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to fully respond to this threat with the existing missile defense network alone, particularly if Japan continues to rely solely on the means of missile defense. Therefore, in the event of a missile attack by an adversary, Japan will use its missile defense network to intercept incoming missiles while preventing further armed attacks from the adversary through counterstrike capabilities as an absolute minimum self-defense measure that is unavoidably necessary.

1 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2022)
Russia’s Aggression and Defense by Ukraine

1 General Situation

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is a serious violation of international law prohibiting the use of force and of the United Nations Charter. Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force have shaken the very foundation of the international order, including in Asia. In addition, brutal and inhumane acts committed by Russian soldiers have been revealed in many parts of Ukraine. The murder of numerous innocent civilians is a grave violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and a war crime, and is utterly unforgivable.

After the end of World War II, denial of unilateral changes to the status quo by force became one of the foundations of international order. But, Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is supposed to take primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, is now openly taking military actions challenging international law and the international order, claiming innocent lives, and repeatedly making threatening mention about nuclear weapons, which can be called an unprecedented situation. If such Russia’s aggression is tolerated, it could send a message with the wrong implication that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are acceptable in other regions as well, including Asia. Therefore, the international community, including Japan, should never forgive Russia’s action.

The international community works together in solidarity against this Russia’s aggression by imposing sanctions against Russia and continuing to provide Ukraine with defense equipment such as tanks, artillery, and ammunition in order to support Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself and eject Russian military from Ukraine. The future developments surrounding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine remain unpredictable. But Japan needs to monitor the related situation closely with grave concern.

2 Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine and the Future Outlook

1 The Failure of Russia’s Blitzkrieg and Ukraine’s Successful Defense

On February 24, 2022, Russia started full scale aggression against Ukraine. Mr. Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, clearly expressed his intention to remain in Kyiv from the early stage of the aggression, and Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and other military and para-military units obstructed the advance of the main units of Armed Forces of Russian Federation (AFRF) at suburbs of the capital, which caused heavy losses for AFRF aiming at taking control of the city within short time period. It is pointed out that Russia’s goal to eliminate Zelenskyy administration was finally failed after AFU fought off the AFRF in the Kyiv direction in the end of March through the early April.

The AFU successfully defended Kharkiv, the second largest city in Ukraine as well as a major transportation hub. But after having failed to capture the city, the AFRF further intensified their indiscriminate attacks against noncombatants including bombarding residential areas by multiple launch rocket system(MLRS). In addition, it is considered that atrocities such as slaughtering civilians were committed in the areas seized by the Russian military.

Meanwhile, it is believed that the Russian military
made territorial gains in southern Ukraine adjacent to the Crimean Peninsula, which was illegally “annexed” by Russia in 2014, more quickly than in other areas. The AFRF occupied Kherson, the capital city of Kherson oblast on the western bank of the Dnieper River, in early March 2022, and advanced further west in the direction of Mykolaiv, the capital city of Mykolaiv oblast. It is probable that the AFRF made territorial gain in the northern Zaporizhzhia oblast and the southern Donetsk oblast on the coast of the Sea of Azov, encircled an industrial port city of Mariupol and attempted to seize the city by indiscriminate bombarding on the area where noncombatants remained.

2 Redeployment of Russian Forces and Start of Ukrainian Counteroffensive

(1) Russia’s Redeployment of troops and territorial expansion in Eastern and Southern Ukraine

Russian forces, which failed to take control of the capital Kyiv, on March 25, 2022, announced that previous military action had been at “the first phase of operation” and that the primary goal of its operation would shift to the “liberation” of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in eastern Ukraine, that is, pursuing expanded territorial gains in the regions.

It is said that after withdrawing its forces from the Kyiv area and regrouping, the AFRF seized Sieverodonetsk, the temporary capital city of Luhansk oblast, and its surroundings from late June to early July of the same year.

The AFRF concentrated its forces on seizing Mariupol, Ukraine’s last stronghold in southern Donetsk oblast on the coast of the Sea of Azov. On May 16, 2022, AFU General Headquarters announced that it ordered all commanders of Ukrainian units surrounded by Russian troops at the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol to give first priority to soldier’s lives. On May 20, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Defense Minister Shoigu reported to President Putin that the AFRF completed the operation in Mariupol with the surrender of Ukrainian units at the iron works.

As a result of the seizure of Mariupol, Russia secured the whole coast of the Sea of Azov and land bridge connecting to the Crimean Peninsula that made it easier to make further territorial gains for the AFRF in southern Ukraine.

(2) Start of Ukrainian Counteroffensive

After repelling the Russian attack on large cities such as Kyiv and Kharkiv, the Ukrainian military kept fierce resistance to the AFRF along the entire front line as well as intensified its attacks on Russian positions from April 2022, which seemed to be prepared for the future counteroffensive.

In mid-May of the same year, the AFU reportedly regained some areas around Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military reportedly sank a Slava-class guided missile cruiser “Moskva”, the flagship of Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, by a domestically produced surface-to-ship cruise missile “Neptune” on April 13 of the same year in southern Ukraine where Russian forces achieved relatively considerable successes. On June 30, 2022, General Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, announced that the AFU attacked AFRF units on Zmiinyi (Snake) Island in the Black Sea, occupied in the early stages of the war, and forced them to withdraw from the island.

These Ukrainian attacks degraded the Russian air defense network that had been provided by the vessels of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in southern Ukraine, which made it difficult for Russian Air Forces to conduct operations in the area, as a result of which made it easier for Ukraine to launch counteroffensive in the region.

It can further be seen that the AFU used M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), supplied by the United States, in action from late June 2022. The AFU announced an attack on fuel and ammunition depots in a Russia’s base near Nova Kakhovka, Kherson oblast, on the night on July 11, and mentioned starting a counteroffensive in the south. The Ukrainian military effectively attacked Russian command posts and logistics bases using a long-range precision strike weapons system such as HIMARS in the region, and interdicted bridges and other crossing sites over the Dnieper River. Difficulties in logistics had been caused by these attacks decreased fighting capabilities and morale of Russian troops to the north of the river and improved conditions for the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

In August 2022, there were explosions in several AFRF facilities including air bases in the Crimean Peninsula in southern Ukraine which had been occupied by the AFRF since 2014. While Ukraine does not officially acknowledge involvement in these incidents, several AFRF facilities for military air power and logistics have been based on the peninsula since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
3 Full-fledged Ukraine Counteroffensive and Russian Response

(1) Full-fledged Ukraine Counteroffensive

In early September 2022, the Ukrainian military conducted a successful counteroffensive in Kharkiv oblast in eastern Ukraine, and regained most of the Russian-occupied area in the oblast. It is probable that the Ukraine military strived to conceal its plan and intent for the counteroffensive in the east, unlike the south where the counteroffensive was conspicuous. It is also pointed out that the Russian troops in the east had become vulnerable after redeployment of its troops to the south to prepare for the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive, which led to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive in the east.

On the other hand, in the south, as a result of efforts to cut off and undermine each AFRF unit using the Dnieper River, the AFU forced Russian troops to withdraw and successfully regained the northern part of the Dnieper of Kherson oblast including Kherson, the capital city of the oblast, in mid-November 2022. It is seen that, since then, the AFU and the AFRF have faced each other on both sides of the Dnieper River, and the Russian military continues bombardment and shelling of cities and towns on the western bank of the Dnieper with multiple rockets and artillery.

Furthermore, there was some damage inside the Russian territory caused by an explosion and destruction of a girder of the bridge connecting Krasnodar of Russia and Crimea Peninsula of Ukraine in October 2022, and reported in December, explosions and fires in several Russian military facilities including air bases, where long-range bombers that have been used to target Ukraine are based.

(2) Russia’s Response

Russia responded in various ways to Ukraine’s full-fledged counteroffensive, such as with troop buildups and making its occupation of Ukrainian territory a fait accompli.

In respect of buildup of forces, President Putin signed executive orders related to partial mobilization to replenish forces, as it is pointed out there were as many as about 80,000 casualties as of early August 2022, explained the necessity of the actions, and asked people for their support on September 21. On the same day, Defense Minister Shoigu said that he was planning to mobilize some 300,000 reservists. In other measures, on September 30, an executive order was announced, which simplifies procedures for foreign citizens to acquire Russian nationality if they signed a contract to join AFRF. It is pointed out that the decision was made with former Soviet citizens in mind.

Regarding Russia’s fait accompli of the occupied areas in Ukraine, Russia illegally “annexed” four regions of the occupied areas in the oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk,
Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson in September 30, based on the results of what they called a “referendum” conducted in the area from September 23 to 27 to ask the people whether their territory was to be “annexed” to Russia or not.

At the same time, the AFRF intensify bombardments with missiles and loitering munitions all over Ukraine. It is pointed out that this was aimed at depleting Ukraine’s air defense missile reserves, as well as weakening war sustainability and the fighting spirit of Ukrainian people by damaging power grids critical for civilian life in cold winter. While the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimates the number of noncombatant victims caused by Russian attack in Ukraine amount to be over 8,000 as of April 2023, the actual number is possibly much larger as accurate numbers cannot be determined due to the ongoing fighting, and the number is likely still increasing now.

As May started, a private military company (PMC) Wagner and some units of AFRF strengthened offensive actions, and announced the Bakhmut city came under complete Russian control.

Russia repeatedly takes dangerous actions around nuclear facilities in ongoing aggression against Ukraine. Russia occupied the Chernobyl nuclear power plant near the Belarusian border on February 24, 2022, and also occupied the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southeastern Ukraine on March 4 of the same year. In addition, Russia attacked the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) multiple times on and after March 6, which has experimental reactors and handles nuclear substances.

On April 20, 2022, when the Russian military conducted its first flight test of “Sarmat” the new large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in development, President Putin made a statement showing off his country’s nuclear force. Furthermore, President Putin repeatedly mentioned nuclear weapons probably with the intention of intimidation. For example, he said Russia would use every possible means to bounce back threats to territorial integrity of the nation in his statement to people to promulgate an executive order about partial mobilization on September 21, 2022. He was clearly keeping nuclear weapons in mind in the statement. Other high officials make similar statements repeatedly as well.

Russia has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine may use chemical and biological weapons. But the United States and the United Kingdom evaluate it as showing that Russia is preparing for the so-called “false flag campaign.”

5 Future Outlook and Effects on Military Balance

(1) Future Outlook

While there is no predicting about what may happen in the future regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, there are many indications about strategy, tactics, and human and material war sustainability of both the AFRF and the AFU which may impact future developments.

Some difficulties in the chain of command of the AFRF were indicated from the very early stages. It is pointed out that, at the start of aggression, the AFRF allocated the chain of command and assigned troops of a Joint Strategic Command (Military District) to each operational front as it is in peacetime, and did not have a centralized command chain covering the entire projected force consisting of mechanized infantry forces said to be as many as 200,000-strong, and missile units belonging to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, as well as sea power and air power. In early April 2022, a Joint Task Force Commander was reportedly appointed to command all actions of the AFRF. This is seen as a measure to improve cooperation among services and theaters. Also, on January 11, 2023, Russia announced that Army General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the AFRF, was named as the Joint Task Force Commander, aiming to improve cooperation among services, the quality of logistics support, and command efficiency of the unit.

The AFU continues fighting until today undauntedly against the AFRF that has superior quality and larger numbers. Continuation of fighting is made possible by several factors such as a number of reservists with combat experience derived from the eastern front campaign since 2014, significant progress in training non-commissioned officers who assume leading roles in battle realized with
reorganization of the Defense Ministry and the AFU aiming to achieve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard, and the introduction of rapid and highly accurate fire coordination systems based on commercial off-the-shelf technologies.

For human war sustainability, it is pointed out that the number of casualties was 180,000 for the AFRF, and 100,000 for the AFU, both as of January 2023.\(^3\) It is said that the AFRF is supported in training for mobilized soldiers by Belarus because it has deployed even units taking on educational and training roles in peacetime. The AFU is supported in education and training for new recruits by Western countries.

It is pointed out that Russia’s war sustainability for material has been undermined with hindered equipment acquisition caused by economic sanctions against the country. Even in this situation, the Russian military maintains its power by various means such as the munitions industry operating around the clock, diverting missiles not for ground attacks, the acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) made in Iran, and taking over tanks from Belarus. Furthermore, it is pointed out that Russia is capable of prolonged battle, even under sanctions, because it has sufficient production capacities for equipment including ammunition belonging in the technical scope of the former Soviet Union.

The Ukrainian military, on the other hand, can acquire only limited parts and ammunition from outside of Russia because most of its equipment was made in the former Soviet Union. Although there is some equipment that can be repaired or acquired domestically, it is difficult to carry out, because the major ammunition industrial cities, such as Kharkiv and Dnipro, are within the attack range of the AFRF. Therefore, support from foreign countries is important in the acquisition of equipment and ammunition as well as in education and training to change over former Soviet Union equipment to western equipment in order to maintain war sustainability.

It is seen that the AFU will continue the counteroffensive with strong will to resist invaders. However, it is pointed out that there is a possibility for a prolonged battle, considering Russia’s attempt to build up its strength through the partial mobilization.

(2) Influence on Other Regions

Although Russia has relied on military power in order to persist in its opinion, it is possible that Russian national strength will decline and the military balance between Russia and surrounding countries will change in the medium- and long-term, because of significant casualties of conventional forces in this aggression. It is possible that Russia will maintain and strengthen relationships with the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)\(^4\) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)\(^5\) as well as make much account of nuclear power as a deterrent.

In Europe, Russia is seen to move to strengthen further its military involvement with Belarus which is a member state of CSTO. For example, both countries agreed that equipment modification and deployment of new equipment for the Armed Forces of Belarus (AFB) can be conducted in order to make it possible for the AFB to transport Russian nuclear weapons.\(^6\)

While Belarus reportedly allows Russia to use its territory and provides equipment, logistics support, and education and training to the AFRF in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it is pointed out that Minsk is reluctant to enter the war.

In the Caucasus region, Nikol Pashinyan, the prime minister of Armenia, which is a member state of CSTO, stated in January 2023 that his government refuses to host exercises for CSTO Peace Keeping Troops scheduled to take place in Armenia in 2023. It is pointed out that this refusal is because Armenia considers measures taken by CSTO against the armed conflict at the border with Azerbaijan in September 2022 to be inadequate.\(^7\) In the

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\(^3\) According to the remark of General Kristoffersen, Chief of Defense of Norway, on January 22, 2023.

\(^4\) CSTO is a military alliance consisting of six member states, namely Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Article 4 of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty, which is the grounds for establishing the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), states that, in the event of an act of aggression against any of the participating States, “all other participating States at the request of this participating State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary assistance, including military, and provide support by the means at their disposal in accordance with the right to collective defense pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter.”

\(^5\) Regional organization in which China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan participate. The purpose of this organization is security and economic cooperation. Conducts “Peace Mission” anti-terror exercises.

\(^6\) President Putin stated that Russia could deliver Iskander-M surface-to-surface ballistic missiles that can be equipped with either a conventional warhead or a nonstrategic (tactical) warhead, and could provide modifications to enable nuclear weapons to be loaded to Su-25 attacker jets of the Belarus Air Force in a meeting with President Lukashenko of Belarus on June 25, 2022.

\(^7\) Armenia expressed dissatisfaction about CSTO’s action at a CSTO summit meeting in November 2022, because when the country requested military support from CSTO for the conflict against Azerbaijan in accordance with Article 4 of Collective Security Treaty on September 14, 2022, CSTO only dispatched observers. This conflict in September occurred at the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, not in the Nagorno-Karabakh area.
Middle East region adjacent to the Caucasus, it is seen that Russia will strengthen its military cooperation with Iran and continue its military involvement with Syria as a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, which are CSTO member states in the Central Asia region, do not support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In this way, while Russia desires for CSTO to be maintained and strengthened after it started the aggression against Ukraine, the degree of cooperation of each member state is not clear.

In the Indo-Pacific region, Russia is deepening linkage with China taking into consideration competition against the United States.

While ground forces and air forces in the Eastern Military District seem to be depleted from the actions of aggression against Ukraine, it is seen that military action in Japanese Northern Territories and Kuril Islands on the outer skirt of the Sea of Okhotsk will be continued to defend the maneuvering area for strategic missile submarines playing a part of the AFRF’s strategic nuclear force. In addition, it is seen that large sea and air power should remain in the Far East region even after aggression against Ukraine, and it is necessary to observe their action carefully.

The Impact of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine on International Affairs and Various Countries’ Responses to It

1 General Situation

For Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Russia has had to pay a high price not only because Ukraine itself strongly resists Russia’s aggression but also because the international community imposes strong coordinated sanctions against Russia and continues to support Ukraine. In addition, European countries stand more united against Russian threats, and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine marks a significant turning point in the European security environment. Clearly, the aggression by Russia, which saw NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to itself, prompted European countries to shift their security policies in this manner. The aggression has made it hard for Russia to say that it has achieved its strategic goal of gaining security for itself through maintaining its “sphere of influence.” In this regard, based on the recognition that the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific region including Eastern Asia are indivisible, Japan needs to pay attention to the future developments of the situation in Europe, including its strategic effects. This is because Japan is a close ally of the United States, a NATO member state, and is located on the opposite side of Europe across the Eurasian Continent where Russia also sits. In addition, the change in the European situation in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine can also have an impact on global affairs including developments of the strategic competition between the United States and China and impact on Asia. In any case, it is necessary to monitor the related situations closely with great interest.

8 Military cooperation between Iran and Russia is progressing. It is probable that Russia acquired Iranian UAVs to compensate for the missile shortage, and it was reported on January 15, 2023, that Iran was scheduled to receive in spring of that year Russian Su-35 jets (a 4.5 generation fighter held only in the AFRF and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA)), and had ordered Russian air defense systems, missile systems, helicopters, and other equipment.

9 Above all, Kazakhstan reacts most severely. The country clearly denied according governments of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” diplomatic recognition, and approved a law to prohibit weapon export to other countries for one year.

10 According to announcements by the Ukraine General Staff Office and articles of Russian media related to the Ministry of Defense, the AFRF 29th Army, 35th Army, and 36th Army from the Eastern Military District, and 68th Corps controlling troops placed in Southern Sakhalin and Northern Territories were transferred to eastern Ukraine after participating in the attack of Kyiv, and 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades of the Pacific Fleet were deployed in the battle of Ukraine.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine prompted a rapidly growing alarm amid European countries, and Russia’s aggressive actions are being viewed as the most significant and direct threat to European and northern Atlantic security. With renewed awareness of the threat of Russia, NATO member states direct their efforts at enhancing defense cooperation under the collective defense system of NATO, and pursue the development of defense capabilities in each country. For example, the unit scale in the eastern direction is expanded as needed, and an agreement has been made to put 300,000 and more troops into high readiness conditions in place of NATO Response Forces.

The United States also intends to enhance the strength of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. In June 2022, the United States announced among other measures the establishment of U.S. Army V Corps permanent headquarters in Poland, increasing the number of U.S. destroyers based on Spanish ports, rotation deployment of U.S. troops in Romania, and additional deployment of an F-35 squadron to the United Kingdom.

Furthermore, several nations including NATO member states provide equipment, training support, and the like to Ukraine depending on the progress of the war. At the beginning of the war, the donor countries provided portable anti-tank missiles and man-portable surface-to-air missiles that seemed to contribute to prevent front line expansion by delaying advancement of Russian military armored units and reducing the strength of airborne troops. After the AFU stopped Russia’s full-scale invasion, the countries moved towards providing large equipment that helps suppression and securing wide area in ground fighting, such as tanks, armored vehicles, and howitzers, for the Ukrainian military’s counteroffensive. They also came to provide longer range artillery to attack enemy bases, following the concentration of AFRF troops in the eastern Ukraine region. Furthermore, handing over of air defense systems from various countries was rapidly progressed as a result of Russia commencing missile attacks targeting all over Ukraine including civil facilities from October 2022. As continuous missile attacks by Russia are expected, the donor countries announced that they will provide missile systems capable of defending ballistic missiles. In January 2023, the countries for the first time announced provision of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles manufactured outside former Soviet Union states, and in February, the delivery to Ukraine was started with the handing over of German-made tanks from Poland. Some NATO member states stated that they would deliver fighter jets made by former Soviet Union in March 2023, and the United Kingdom and the Netherlands stated in May that the two countries would establish an “international coalition” for fighter jets acquisition and flight trainings. Furthermore, the United States stated in the G7 summit meeting that it would support the multilateral initiative for the flight trainings of fourth generation fighter jets including F-16s.

Among all of this support from various countries, the contribution of the United States is prominent. The cumulative security support from the United States to Ukraine under the Biden administration is USD 38 billion, including USD 37.3 billion announced after start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (as of May 21, 2023). The United States clearly shows a strong supporting attitude towards Ukraine providing not only a variety of equipment in large quantities but also familiarization training for newly delivered equipment and boot camp training outside Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the United States in December 2022, and said support from the United States is “an investment in global security and democracy” in his speech to U.S. Congress appealing to American people to continue support.

The United Kingdom also provided continuous support to Ukraine through equipment support and dispatching training instructors with the United States and other countries from when Russia “annexed” the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, and since the regime change from the Johnson administration to the Sunak administration, it has continuously and actively supported Ukraine by providing a variety of equipment and conducting boot camp training. In particular, the United Kingdom took the plunge to announce that it would provide its main battle tanks in January 2023 ahead of any other country, and this

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11 NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept for the first time since 2010 in the summit meeting held in June 2022. Although the previous Strategic Concept stated that the Euro-Atlantic area was peaceful and that there was low possibility of attack against NATO territory, this new Strategic Concept states that the Euro-Atlantic area is not peaceful and the possibility of attack against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member countries cannot be overlooked. Furthermore, NATO placed Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area” in this version, while in the previous version NATO stated that it was aiming for “true strategic partnership” with Russia.
was the first announcement about delivery of main battle tanks other than ones made in former Soviet Union states. The United States and the United Kingdom actively disclose information about Russian military movement for the purpose of countering Russia’s disinformation and containing the action of the AFRF through announcements by high officials and posting on social media.

France, which acted as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine together with Germany in the “Normandy format” aiming to bring the conflict in eastern Ukraine to a peaceful resolution, announced delivery of equipment such as wheeled combat vehicles and missile air-defense systems to Ukraine. Germany drastically changed its defense strategy after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, announcing to deliver infantry fighting vehicles and surface-to-air missile systems, and took the plunge to deliver its main battle tanks directly to Ukraine as well as permit the transfer of German-made main battle tanks from third party countries to Ukraine in January 2023. Canada that has been supporting the AFU through providing training support from 2015, has turned to more proactive support through enhancing its military support since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine to over CA$1 billion as of the end of March 2023.

Other NATO member states also announced that they would supply a considerable amount of equipment. In particular, some Central and Eastern European countries, which are considered to have a keen sense of alarm towards Russia due to their historical circumstances and geographical relations, have expressed active support to Ukraine.

Furthermore, non-NATO member states have also delivered military equipment to Ukraine. Among them, notably, Sweden has decided to supply equipment against its principle of not supplying weapons to countries involved in a conflict.

The European Union (EU) also announced military support to Ukraine of the whole sum of 3.6 billion euros until March 2023 through the European Peace Facility, a fund of the EU, and started a military support mission to train 300,000 AFU soldiers within EU territory from November 2022.

Technical support provided by private companies to Ukraine is also attracting attention. Satellite internet services using a small satellite constellation provided by U.S. companies in response to the request from the Ukrainian government are used not only as a means of communications for the Ukrainian people but also are utilized to operate the Ukrainian military’s unmanned aircraft. Moreover, it is pointed out that some European and U.S. IT/security companies have been supporting Ukraine’s cybersecurity since before the aggression against Ukraine began, and have successfully reduced and localized damage from Russian cyber attacks.

While actors such as NATO member states and other countries moved towards supporting Ukraine, Turkey that has deep relations with both Russia and Ukraine shows consideration for Russia to some extent. Concretely, Turkey declares support for Ukraine while basically not implementing economic sanctions against Russia. The country also mediates the restarting to export grains from Ukraine. Hungary that deeply depends on Russia economically has not provided weapons to Ukraine stating that it is not in its national interests, and takes a conciliatory attitude to Russia among NATO member states, as, for example, Hungary was initially against the EU’s economic sanctions against Russia.

### 3 Other Regions’ Response

A United Nations general meeting resolution that demands immediate stop of Russia’s aggression was adopted by approval of 141 member states, that is over 70% of UN member states, on February 23, 2023, one year since the start of the aggression against Ukraine. On the other hand, in addition to Russia, some countries and regions do not sympathize with this movement. For example, six countries and regions including Belarus and North Korea were against the resolution, and thirty-two countries including India and China abstained from voting.

North Korea is showing its stance of standing by Russia, for example, as it voted against the UN General Assembly’s resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and claims that the United States and other Western countries are to be blamed for the conflict in Ukraine. Furthermore, Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, announced in December 2022 that North Korea completed its first weapons delivery including infantry rocket launchers and missiles to Russian private military forces.

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12 The framework of dialogue between Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany that have had consultations for a settlement of the situation based on the Minsk agreements since 2014 when the Ukraine situation deteriorated.
company Wagner. While both Russia and North Korea deny this, if weapons are actually being delivered from North Korea, it not only benefits Russia’s aggression, but also is unacceptable because it violates the related Security Council resolution prohibiting all acquisition of weapons and related supplies from North Korea. The international community must monitor future actions to enhance the relationship of these countries under close coordination.

While Iran has been increasingly opposed to Western countries since its secession from the nuclear agreement with the United States in 2018, it is enhancing its relationship with Russia, particularly in the economic and military domains. Iran made an argument for a diplomatic solution in regard to the aggression against Ukraine, but shows sympathy to Russia’s standpoint to the extent of insisting that if Russia had not acted then NATO would have provoked the war. President Raisi of Iran and Secretary Patrushev of the Security Council of Russia talked together in November 2022. The Iranian side stated it would raise its level of strategic relationship with Russia in various fields and criticized sanctions against Russia by the United States and its allies. The United States announced in July 2022 Iran’s plan to provide UAVs to Russia, and in September 2022, pointed out that Russia was using Iran-made UAVs for attacks as well as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The Ukrainian military also announced that Russia conducted attacks in various points of Ukraine using Iranian UAVs. To this, Iran claims that the delivery of Iranian UAVs to Russia was carried out before the aggression against Ukraine and suggests that their purpose was not for use in war with Ukraine. William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), pointed out in February 2023 that Russia investigates possibilities to support Iran’s missile plan and provide fighter jets as consideration for Iran’s support, and therefore it is necessary to observe closely the progression of cooperation between the two countries.

China avoids direct criticism of Russia in respect of the aggression, requesting “self-restraint and dialogue” to both Russia and Ukraine, and takes a standpoint from which China will play constructive roles in its own ways towards a solution to the Ukraine issues. However, China insists that Russia’s actions are caused by the “Cold War mentality” of the United States and other NATO countries, and that it understands Russia’s reasonable concerns about security issues, and criticizes sanctions against Russia and equipment delivery to Ukraine from Western countries. President Xi Jinping stated that China would strongly support Russia on issues about mutual core interests at the China-Russia Summit Meeting in September 2022 that was held face-to-face for the first time after the start of the aggression. He also announced in regard to the aggression against Ukraine, that “China will continuously maintain an objective and fair standpoint, encourage the formation of collaborated influence in the international community, and take a constructive role towards peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crises” in an online China-Russia Summit Meeting in December 2022. Furthermore, he stated that China will play constructive roles in peace negotiations and reconstruction after the conflict in a document titled “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” published in February 2023. Xi also rated highly Russia’s intention to reopen dialogue with Ukraine as quickly as possible and was opposed to unilateral sanctions without the resolution of United Nations Security Council in the joint communique resulting from the meeting with President Putin held in Russia in March 2023. Russia, which is internationally isolated with its aggression against Ukraine, especially in its ground forces, will likely find its political and military cooperation with China more important than ever.

On the other hand, it is seen that Western counties are taking actions to contain China that is deepening cooperation with Russia. In September 2022, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg pointed out that China continued to cooperate with Russia and opposed expanding NATO even after the aggression against Ukraine, and the notion that NATO should regard China as a challenge for international security was adequately reasonable. The United States added Chinese entities including companies regarded as providing satellite images to Russian private military company Wagner to the list of entities subject to regulations for export from the United States. Furthermore, Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, warned Wang Yi, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, during their meeting in February 2023 that delivery of lethal weapons to Russia would have serious consequences for the U.S.-China relationship.

Russia and China have been taking actions to
strengthen military cooperation in the area around Japan since the aggression against Ukraine; for example, bombers of both countries conducted joint flights in the airspace surrounding Japan, warships of both navies conducted joint navigations in the area near Japan, and joint naval training was conducted in the area from the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk as a part of the “Vostok 2022” exercise. Japan must closely monitor the possibility of deeper military cooperation between China and Russia with concern, including cooperation in the Far East and East Asia where the two countries are situated, considering Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

India emphasized the need for an immediate stop of hostile operations and violence, as well as the need for a solution through diplomatic means and dialogue regarding the aggression against Ukraine, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated “now is not the age of war” to President Putin at the Indo-Russia Summit Meeting in September 2022, while India, which has traditionally deep relations with Russia, avoids explicit criticism of Russia. As stated above, India maintains a strong military cooperative relationship with Russia, and responses such as increasing import of Russian crude oil with lower prices due to the economic sanctions have been observed. Close attention should be paid to India’s movement in future.

Lessons from Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine

The fact that Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, launch aggression against Ukraine teaches us that the maintenance of Japan’s sovereignty and independence can only be realized through its own proactive and autonomous efforts, and that it is important to expand the role that Japan can play to prevent aggression by other countries.

The military context underlying Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine’s defense capabilities against Russia were not sufficient to discourage and deter it, i.e., Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities. There has also been a renewed recognition that no country can defend its own security by itself alone, and that cooperation with allies who possess the will and capability to jointly counter invasions is integral to deterring invasion from the outside. Another point worth noting in this case is that a nation with powerful military capabilities has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. When threats materialize through a combination of capability and intention, difficulties arise in accurately gauging party’s intention from the outside. If a nation’s decision-making process is opaque, there will always exist conditions under which threats may materialize. In order to defend one’s own country from such a nation, it is necessary to have deterrence capabilities that make the other nation realize the difficulties of achieving unilateral changes to the status quo by force. It is also necessary to build one’s own capabilities, namely, defense capabilities, by focusing on the opponent capabilities and ensuring it does not harbor the intention to launch aggression.

Moreover, ways of warfare have also changed dramatically from those of the past. In addition to the traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land conducted until now, new ways of warfare are emerging that combine large-scale missile attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities; hybrid warfare, including information warfare such as false flag campaigns; asymmetric means of attack that leverage space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains as well as unmanned assets; public rhetoric or conduct by nuclear powers that could be interpreted as threats involving the use of nuclear weapons; and other methods. Whether Japan will be able to adapt to these new ways of warfare is a major challenge for developing its future defense capabilities.

Thus, amid the most severe and complex security environment since the start of the postwar period, Japan will need to squarely face up to the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, with a focus on the capabilities of its opponents and new ways of warfare, in order to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals. Undertaking the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country by integrating the strength of the nation through strategic thinking is the path that will bolster Japan’s deterrence capabilities and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, while forming the foundation for security cooperation with like-minded countries and others.
Section 1 The United States

1 Security and Defense Policies

In the National Security Strategy (NSS)\(^1\) released in October 2022, the United States expressed its recognition that it faces two strategic challenges of “geopolitical competition between the major powers” with China and Russia, and “shared challenges” which are cross-border issues such as climate change. To deal with the strategic challenges, the United States shows its stance that it focuses on investment in national power as the source of its strength and calls on its allies to invest in capabilities required for enhancing deterrence while positioning its alliances and partnerships as the most important strategic asset. Also, it states that it has a vital interest in deterring aggression by China, Russia and other states and expresses its intention to promote Integrated Deterrence\(^2\) that achieves maximum effect in deterring acts of aggression through combining capabilities with domestic agencies and allied countries, based on the understanding that the United States cannot afford to rely solely on conventional forces and nuclear deterrence against competitors promoting new strategies.

In addition, the Department of Defense (DoD) released the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in October 2022 and expressed its intention to advance “Integrated Deterrence,” “Campaigning,” and “Building enduring advantages” while identifying top level priorities that the DoD must pursue to strengthen deterrence such as defending homeland and deterring strategic attacks. On top of that, the DoD showed its recognition that mutually-beneficial alliances and partnerships are the greatest global strategic advantage of the United States and are a center of gravity for the NDS, with the understanding that the United States cannot meet these complex and interconnected challenges alone.

The NSS states that China presents America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge and is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Based on those recognition, the DoD shows its idea to out-compete China while constraining Russia which poses an immediate threat to the international system. The NDS also states that China remains the most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades and is the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security. The NDS directs the DoD to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with China as the “pacing challenge” for the Department, which indicates Biden administration’s stance to prioritize addressing challenges posed by China.

The United States has been working to address human

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\(^1\) Both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) are required by law to be submitted to Congress within a certain period of time. Titles 50 and 10 of the United States Code respectively stipulate that the NSS shall be submitted to Congress no later than 150 days after the date on which a new President takes office, and the NDS shall be submitted as soon as possible after a newly elected President has nominated a new Secretary of Defense, once the Senate has approved the nomination.

\(^2\) The approach in which a seamless combination of capabilities including integration among areas and integration with allies deter aggression by convincing an opponent the cost of hostile behavior would outweigh the benefit of it.
rights issues in its relations with China. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act went into effect in June 2022, banning the import of all products produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region unless the company could prove the products were not made with forced labor. Also, the United States hosted a summit-level meeting on the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in May 2022. The IPEF launched by thirteen countries in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan presented an idea to aim for resilient and integrated supply chains as one of the four IPEF pillars. At the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India (the Quad) Summit Meeting held in May 2022, the leaders also announced a joint statement regarding critical technology supply chains, promoting cooperation to improve resilience against various risks to the region.

While it competes strategically with China, the United States has stated its policy to seek greater strategic stability through the following measures; manage the competition responsibly, reduce the risk of unintended military escalation, and ultimately engage China on more formal arms control efforts. In addition, the Biden administration always shows a cooperative attitude to China where their interests align with challenges requiring cooperation such as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation.

In regard to Russia, the United States evaluates that Russia poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and it is a source of disruption and instability globally but it lacks the across the spectrum capabilities of China as Russian government has chosen to pursue an imperialist foreign policy with the goal of overturning key elements of the international order. Based on the above, the United States expressed its policy to prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over China while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia. Furthermore, the Biden administration evaluates Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as a strategic failure that profoundly has diminished Russia’s status vis-a-vis China and other Asian powers such as India and Japan. On the other hand, together with NATO allies, the United States evaluates that they are strengthening their defense and deterrence and welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO will further improve their security and capabilities.

In regard to relations with North Korea, the administration announced the completion of a review of its policy toward North Korea in April 2021, and has indicated that it intends to advance diplomacy with North Korea through a “calibrated, practical approach” with the goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The administration has also made clear its intention to advance its consideration in consultation with allies and partners, such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, at every step of the response to North Korea.

In regard to the Middle East, the U.S. military withdrew from Afghanistan at the end of August 2021, ending the 20-year U.S. military presence in the region. The termination of the combat mission of the U.S. military in Iraq was announced in December of the same year. U.S. forces stationed there continue to have the duties of providing advice, support, and training to the Iraqi military. In addition, regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran, from which the former Trump administration declared its withdrawal in May 2018, the Biden administration has continued talks with Iran towards rebuilding the agreement since April 2021, but conclusion of negotiations has not been reached.

The Biden administration has indicated that its foreign policy direction will be based on international cooperation and that its responses will be made in close collaboration with allies and partners. As a concrete move for this, in September 2021, the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India (Quad) summit meeting was held for the first time in-person. The leaders affirmed that their countries, as democratic partners with a common vision, would unite to address major contemporary challenges such as critical and emerging technologies, and affirmed their commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” In the same month, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the establishment of AUKUS, a new trilateral security cooperation framework aimed at deepening diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. AUKUS will deepen cooperation on various security and defense capabilities such as cyber and artificial intelligence. As the first initiative, the countries agreed to cooperate for the acquisition of nuclear submarines by Australia. In April 2022, the countries announced that they will also deepen cooperation on hypersonic capabilities, electronic
warfare capabilities, information sharing and innovation.

On the domestic political front in the United States, attention will be focused on how the result of midterm elections in November 2022 will affect future U.S. security and defense policy because the ruling Democratic Party still makes up the majority in the Senate, but the Republican Party took hold of the majority of the House of Representatives.

1 Perception about Security Environment

The NSS raises “geopolitical competition between the major powers” and “shared challenges” as the two strategic issues the United States faces now. Based on the understanding that the most pressing strategic challenge to pursuing a free, open, prosperous, and secure world is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy, the NSS also shows its recognition that the next ten years would be the decisive decade in setting the terms of the competition with China, managing the acute threat posed by Russia, and in its efforts to deal with shared challenges, particularly climate change and pandemics. The NDS states that China seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and the People’s Liberation Army’s growing strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests. As a result, the United States regards China’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor as the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security. On the other hand, the NDS indicates that the DoD would support robust deterrence of aggression by Russia that poses acute threats such as its aggression against Ukraine with its allies and partners. North Korea is mentioned as a persistent threat continuing to expand its nuclear and missile capability to threaten the U.S. homeland and East Asia, and Iran is mentioned as further undermining Middle East stability by supporting terrorist groups and malicious cyber operations. Also, the NDS shows the perception that these competitors seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone methods. Furthermore, the Biden administration has shown great interest in the effects of climate change on security. In October 2021, Secretary of Defense Austin announced the Department of Defense Climate Adaptation Plan, which will serve as a guide for maintaining the readiness and resilience of the U.S. military in the future under increasingly severe environmental conditions. The Plan calls for addressing climate change challenges not only through DoD efforts but also across the entire federal government as well as with allies and partners.

2 NSS and NDS

The NSS presents three lines of effort to realize free, open, prosperous, and secure international order; namely, 1) investing in the U.S. national power, 2) building the strongest coalition of nations, and 3) modernizing and strengthening the U.S. Military. The NSS also indicates six pillars as concrete approaches to realize these directions; namely, 1) breaking down the dividing line between foreign policy and domestic policy, 2) alliances and partnerships, 3) perception of geopolitical challenges, 4) involvement in other areas, 5) correspondence with new economic situations, and 6) maintaining and increasing international cooperation. On top of that, the NSS shows the policies that the United States focuses on investment in domestic strength as a source of American power, positions alliances and partnerships as its most important strategic asset, and deals with strategic challenges. Furthermore, the NSS presents a policy that the United States will cooperate with any countries including non-democracies that are willing to work constructively with the U.S. to address “shared challenges” which are cross-border issues including climate change.

The NDS presents four top-level defense priorities to support a stable and open international system and defense commitments; namely, 1) defending the U.S. homeland, 2) deterring strategic attacks, 3) deterring aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict, 4) building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem. The NDS also indicates an idea to advance the top-level defense priorities through 1) Integrated deterrence, 2) Campaigning, and 3) Building enduring advantages. With regard to deterring aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflicts, the DoD indicates a policy prioritizing the China’s challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then Russia’s challenge in Europe. As such, attention will be focused on how the United States will deal with these challenges.

3 Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region

The NSS presents a stance to deepen partnerships with allies including Japan in the Indo-Pacific region,
and promote a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” through multilateral frameworks such as the Quad and AUKUS. With regard to the relationship with Japan, the United States reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under mutual security treaty, which covers the Senkaku Islands. In addition, the NSS shows an intention to expand its regional diplomacy, development, and economic engagement, with a particular focus on Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. Regarding the relationship with India, which is the world’s largest democratic country and a major defense partner, the NSS states that the United States and India will work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, to support their shared vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and that the United States will promote prosperity and economic connectivity across the Indian Ocean region by addressing climate change and China’s coercive behavior with regional partners in South Asia, including India.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was released in February 2022, clearly indicated that the United States will continue to place the highest priority on the Indo-Pacific region where faces increasing challenges from China. It also made clear that the United States will cooperate with allies and partners in efforts to advance a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and strengthen regional security.

In July 2020, regarding China’s maritime expansion, after the U.S. DoD expressed concern about China’s decision to conduct military exercises in the South China Sea, the United States deployed two Carrier Strike Groups in the South China Sea for the first time in about six years and conducted naval exercises. Since then, the United States has continued Carrier Strike Group operations in the same region to demonstrate continuously its commitment to promote a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” to allies in the region. In January 2022, the State Department released a study examining China’s claims regarding its maritime rights in the South China Sea in light of international law. The study noted that China’s claims over most of the South China Sea are inconsistent with international law and gravely undermine the rule of law in the ocean. In addition, U.S. Vice President Harris visited the Philippines and met with President Marcos in November 2022 and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the mutual defense obligation against armed attack on the Armed Forces of Philippines in the South China Sea. Also, both countries agreed at the U.S.-Philippine Defense Ministers’ Meeting held in February 2023 to expand the list of bases available for U.S. Armed Forces.

As part of its activities around strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. Navy which promotes Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO)4 deployed the USS America, an amphibious assault ship with enhanced ability to carry F-35B fighters and other carrier-based aircrafts to Sasebo in December 2019, and deployed for the first time the MQ-4C Triton unmanned maritime reconnaissance vehicle in Guam in January 2020. The U.S. Air Force which promotes Agile Combat Employment (ACE)5 conducts ACE exercises in the Indo-Pacific region using fighter jets and unmanned aircraft. Furthermore, the U.S. Army which promotes the Multi-Domain Operations concept announced in September 2022 the deployment of a Multi-Domain Task Force6 in Hawaii to undertake operations simultaneously in all domains including the aspect of human cognition. The U.S. Marine Corps which promotes Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)7 deployed its first Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) with capabilities to conduct EABO activities in Hawaii in March 2022, and announced in January 2023 that it would reorganize the 12th Marine Regiment stationed in Okinawa into a MLR by 2025. In March 2018, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier in over 40 years in Vietnam. Another port call in the country was made in March 2020, by the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt.

The United States has continued to conduct “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea, and U.S. Navy vessels have passed through the Taiwan Strait in order to show the U.S. commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” At this announcement, the United States clearly indicated that it would bear a number of responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region, with the protection of the rights and freedom of navigation in accordance with international law being one of

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4 An operational concept that concentrates overwhelming combat power by dispersing each asset and integrating them through a network.
5 An operational concept aiming to rapidly deploy Air Force powers from dispersal airfields they have been located.
6 The Multi-Domain Task Force is an army unit with the mission of forward execution of the “multi-domain operational concept,” an operational concept that aims to defeat the enemy’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy by conducting operations in all domains (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, the information environment including cognitive aspects, etc.).
7 An operational concept that executes front-line operations by rapidly dispersing and deploying within the enemy’s firepower zone and establishing temporary bases.
the responsibilities, and therefore, the country would continue the “Freedom of Navigation Operations.”

Based on the posture towards the Indo-Pacific described above, the United States appears to continue to be undertaking initiatives based on its vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

In contrast, while talks between the United States and North Korea have been conducted since their first summit meeting in history held in June 2018, no specific progress has been seen with regard to the dismantlement of North Korea’s missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and South Korea took steps including cancelling or downgrading scheduled Joint U.S.-ROK exercises in response to the meeting. Then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan expressed in regard to the U.S.-ROK exercises a willingness to maintain U.S. Forces in the ROK, stating that close coordination between the military activities of the United States and the ROK will continue to support diplomatic efforts and that the two countries were committed to ensuring the continued combined defense posture of U.S.-ROK combined forces and maintaining firm military readiness. The United States and the ROK have been expanding the scope and scale of exercises since the Yoon Suk-yeol administration of ROK, which exhibits a firm stance against North Korea, was inaugurated in May 2022. In the context of this situation, Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, is reacting sharply, such as he reportedly stated the aim of the United States was “to disrupt my regime anytime,” and, to restrain the United States on a long-term basis, “we can never abandon nuclear weapons.”

The U.S. Government expresses in the NSS its intention to seek a sustained diplomatic relationship with North Korea in order to achieve concrete progress towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while it states in the NDS that the DoD will deter attacks through forward posture of U.S. forces and nuclear deterrence against North Korea, which continues to expand its nuclear and missile capability and has been trying to drive wedges among the allies. At the present point, no concrete progress can be seen in the disarmament of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and missiles. However, attention will be paid to how the United States advances its policy toward North Korea going forward.

### 4 Innovation in the National Defense Field

In President Biden’s remarks at the DoD in February 2021, the President, emphasizing the importance of technologies in national defense strategies, stated that the United States would deal with dangers and opportunities generated through emerging technologies, enhance its capabilities in cyberspace, and lead in a new era of competition from deep sea to outer space. In addition, the NDS states that the DoD will support the innovation ecosystem to develop defense equipment through cooperation among research institutes, private companies, and government agencies as one of the approaches to building enduring advantages. It also aims to promote research and development for advanced capabilities including in directed energy and cyber as well as create opportunities in biotechnology and quantum science. Attention will be focused on activities in this field.

### 5 Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy

In October 2022, the DoD released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the Missile Defense Review (MDR) on the same day as NDS, which had previously been published individually, to ensure tight linkages between each strategy.

In the NPR, the DoD expresses that China is the overall “pacing challenge” for U.S. defense planning and a growing factor in evaluating its nuclear deterrent, and evaluates that China will become a major nuclear power following Russia by the 2030s and the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers. It also states that Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in its strategy, modernize and expand its nuclear forces, and brandish its nuclear weapons in support of its revisionist security policy, while recognizing that Russia’s modern nuclear arsenal presents an enduring existential threat to the United States and its Allies and partners, and the possibility of the limited use of nuclear weapons in order to avoid a defeat. The NPR mentions that North Korea is not a rival on the same scale as China and Russia, but it poses a persistent threat as it expands non-nuclear capabilities as well, including its chemical weapon stockpile, in addition to nuclear and ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the DoD evaluates that a crisis or conflict on the Korean Peninsula could involve a number of nuclear-armed
actors, raising the risk of broader conflict.

In showing such recognition across nuclear situation, the U.S. Government expressed its intention to continue to pursue engagement with other nuclear-armed states where possible to reduce nuclear risks, setting a key goal of reducing the role of nuclear weapons. The following were raised as the roles for U.S. nuclear weapons: (1) deter strategic attacks; (2) assure allies and partners; and (3) achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, while “hedging against an uncertain future,” which was raised as one of the roles for nuclear weapons in the NPR released under the Trump administration in 2018, was eliminated this time. Also, as the U.S. declaratory policy, the administration expressed that the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks by adversary, and the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances. Although the U.S. Government conducted a thorough review of a broad range of options for nuclear declaratory policy including both “No First Use” and “Sole Purpose” policies, it concluded that those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light of the range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict strategic-level damage to the United States and its allies and partners, but it indicated that the government retains the goal of moving toward a sole purpose declaration.

Based on the understanding that the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies require tailored strategies for potential adversaries, the NPR mentioned that the United States would maintain a flexible deterrence strategy and force posture against China, while it would bolster the nuclear Triad against Russia through fielding a modern nuclear Triad and with flexible, tailorable nuclear forces to deter both large-scale attacks and limited strikes. It also indicated that the United States would work on the replacement program for the nuclear triad, which most systems are operating beyond their original design life, to avoid any gaps in its nuclear deterrent, ensuring that the United States can withstand any strategic attack, tailor its deterrence strategies as needed, and assure Allies in support of its extended deterrence commitments by maintaining a modern Triad. Furthermore, the NPR expressed that the government cancelled the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) program which was introduced in the previous NPR, while maintaining currently operating low yield submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) as flexible, tailorable nuclear forces. Also mentioned is a plan to transfer the roles of dual-capable aircraft (DCA) from F-15E fighters to F-35A fighters in order to support NATO nuclear missions.

Moreover, the U.S. Government withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on August 2, 2019 as the government alleged that Russia violated the treaty. In the same month, the United States conducted a flight test of a conventionally configured ground-launched missile with a range of more than 500 km. In this regard, the United States has been working on the development of intermediate-range, conventional, and ground-launched missiles whose test launches, production and possession had been restricted by the treaty.

President Putin stated in his annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly of Russia in February 2023 that the implementation of the New START Treaty (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), extended for five years in February 2021 based on the agreement between the United States and Russia, has been halted. Attention will be focused on future movement of nuclear arms control.

The MDR, whose contents strongly reflect the “integrated deterrence” concept mentioned in the NDS, expresses a concept that in order to protect the United States and deter attacks, missile defenses are positioned as a top priority area, and that they offset benefits of an enemy attack and are useful to limit damage when deterrence has been breached. Also, the U.S. Government declares that it will recognize attacks on any U.S. territory overseas including Guam as attacks directed at the U.S. mainland, and states that Guam is vital as an operation base to maintain a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” and that defending Guam helps realize integrated deterrence.

6 FY2024 Budget

In March 2023, the United States government released the President’s budget request for FY2024 discretionary funding. The budget request for the DoD is approximately US$842 billion, an approximately 3.2% increase from the previous year. The DoD explains that this budget request is to support the implementation of the NDS
which indicates a policy to prioritize responding to China by positioning China as a “pacing challenge.”

Based on above, the DoD requests US$9.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative in order to strengthen deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific region and expresses its intention to invest in maintaining support for Ukraine and European allies confronting Russia’s aggression.

The budget also requests a record US$315 billion for acquisition and R&D of equipment, and a record US$145 billion for R&D on innovation and modernization. The goals for military end strength include securing 1,305,400 troops, an increase of around 9,100 from FY2023, and, in terms of equipment, the procurement of 83 F-35 fighter jets.

Fig. I-3-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. DoD Budget)

### 2 Military Posture

#### 1 General Situation

The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces; rather it is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of four commands with functional responsibilities and seven commands with regional responsibilities.

The U.S. ground forces have about 460,000 Army soldiers and about 170,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries.

The U.S. maritime forces have about 970 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 7.2 million tons. The 7th Fleet is responsible for the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; the 2nd Fleet in U.S. East Coast, North Atlantic Ocean, and Arctic Ocean; the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea and Africa; and the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the northwest Indian Ocean.

The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,500 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK, among others.

In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States proceeded with its reduction based on the New START that came into force in February 2011. It announced that its deployed strategic warheads\(^9\) stood at 1,420, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 659.\(^10\)

Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, in May 2018, the Cyber Command, which was previously a sub-unified command under U.S.

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\(^9\) Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads equipped in deployed heavy bombers (a deployed heavy bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead).

\(^10\) The figure as of September 1, 2022.
Strategic Command, was elevated to a unified combatant command.

In August 2019, the United States founded the Space Command to serve as a geographic unified combatant command and then established the Space Force as the sixth branch of the military within the Department of the Air Force in December 2019.

The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region by deploying the Indo-Pacific Command, a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force, in the region. The Indo-Pacific Command is a geographic combatant command which is responsible for the largest geographical area, and its subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea.


The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,500 personnel to commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.

The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The 7th Fleet mainly consists of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. An aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 20,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which employs F-35B fighters and other aircraft, and other divisions in Japan. In addition, the force deploys maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others in the Western Pacific.

The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighter jets, C-130 transport aircraft, and others) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighter jets) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of September 30, 2022), and could change according to unit deployment.
### U.S. Forces Deployment Status

**European Region**
- Army: approx. 27,000 personnel
- Navy: approx. 7,000 personnel
- Air Force: approx. 30,000 personnel
- Marines: approx. 2,000 personnel
- Total: approx. 67,000 personnel

**Indo-Pacific Region**
- Army: approx. 35,000 personnel
- Navy: approx. 38,000 personnel
- Air Force: approx. 29,000 personnel
- Marines: approx. 26,000 personnel
- Total: approx. 128,000 personnel

**U.S. Forces**
- Army: approx. 461,000 personnel
- Navy: approx. 340,000 personnel
- Air Force: approx. 328,000 personnel
- Marines: approx. 175,000 personnel
- Total: approx. 1,304,000 personnel

(Notes)
1. Source: Documents published by the DoD (as of September 30, 2022), etc.
2. The number of personnel deployed in the Indo-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

### U.S. Engagements to the Indo-Pacific Region (image)

- **India**
  - Provided Apache Longbow attack helicopters, and C-17 transport aircraft
  - Rotationally deploys Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)
  - Rotationally deploys P-8

- **Vietnam**
  - A U.S. aircraft carrier visited the Da Nang Port (for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War)
  - U.S. Navy vessels visited the Cam Ranh Port

- **Singapore**
  - Deploys Apache Longbow attack helicopters
  - Deplois THAAD

- **South China Sea**
  - Implements Freedom of Navigation Operations by U.S. vessels
  - Conducts exercises with multiple U.S. Carrier Strike Groups
  - In the 2021 NDAA announced in January 2021, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative was included with the aim of strengthening U.S. deterrence in Indo-Pacific region.

- **Japan**
  - Deploys MV-22 Osprey and F-35B
  - Additionally deploys Aegis BMD destroyers
  - Additionally deploys an amphibious transport dock
  - Deploys amphibious assault ship USS “America,” capable of carrying F-35Bs
  - Temporarily deploys MQ-9 UAVs

- **Taiwan**
  - Decided to sell arms
  - U.S. vessels passed through the Taiwan Strait
  - In the 2023 NDAA, Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act was passed into law, including authorization of Foreign Military Funding up to USD 10 billion in five years

- **Guam**
  - Deploys a maritime surveillance unmanned aircraft system

- **Philippines**
  - Provides anti-terrorism equipment to the Philippines
  - Landing training in multilateral exercise (Balikatan)
  - Agreed expansion of military sites available to U.S. Forces from five to nine

- **Australia**
  - Rotationally deploys marines
  - Increases rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft
  - Announced the future rotational deployment of Army and Navy
  - Increases the port calling by nuclear powered attack submarines under AUKUS starting from 2023
China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline as well as a long coastline. It also has various races, religions, and languages. China’s pride in its unique history of having shaped a distinct culture and civilization, as well as its semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century are driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism.

China faces various domestic problems including human rights issues. Among the problems emerging are the spread of bribery and corruption among the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and such issues as disparities between urban and rural areas, and between coastal and inland regions, as well as disparities within cities and environmental pollution. More recently, the pace of China’s economic growth has slowed and the country is also expected to face issues associated with the rapid aging of the population, including problems related to pensions and other aspects of the social security system. The range of factors potentially destabilizing government administration has thus been expanding and becoming increasingly diverse. Additionally, there have been protests about human rights violations against ethnic minorities of the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. The international community has grown interested in human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In addition, in Hong Kong, in response to a series of large-scale protests occurring since 2019, the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” was established and entered into force in June 2020. This has resulted in people being arrested for violating the Act. Moreover, popular concern over the measures has spread, including the fact that under the electoral system in Hong Kong which was changed touting the idea of “Patriots governing Hong Kong,” “pro-China” candidates took nearly all the seats in the December 2021 legislative election.

Amid these circumstances, the Chinese Government has been tightening its control over society. While it has been suggested that the development of the Internet and other areas of information and communications technology (ICT) has made it difficult to control activities of the masses, it has been noted that rapidly developing ICT technologies are exploited for social control. Since 2014, China has enacted laws based on “a holistic view of national security” that covers not only external threats but also culture and society. Those laws include the Anti-Spy Law enacted in November 2014 to enhance domestic counter-espionage arrangements, a new National Security Law in July 2015, the Anti-Terrorism Law in December 2015 to strengthen state control, the Law on Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas Non-governmental Organizations in April 2016 to enhance control on foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the National Intelligence Law in June 2017.

The “anti-corruption” movement following the launch of the Xi Jinping leadership has made inroads under the policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and “flies,” targeting both dominant figures and junior officials. People including former prominent leaders of the Party and military have strictly been charged with “corruption.” General Secretary Xi has stated that “corruption is the greatest threat our Party faces,” indicating that the “anti-corruption” movement will continue.

He has been making his power base in CCP stronger through these and other activities. “Two Safeguards” meaning “uphold General Secretary Xi’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole and uphold the Central Committee’s authority and its centralized, unified leadership” was incorporated into the Party constitution as an obligation at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (20th CCP Congress) held in October 2022. In addition, in the 1st Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP held immediately after the 20th CCP Congress, Xi Jinping secured his third term, and personnel changes that allow persons close to Xi to occupy the majority of the CCP leaderships were announced. An environment in which the intent of Xi Jinping can be reflected more directly on China’s policy decisions is thought to be being arranged by way of these actions.

China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China and that the Taiwan issue is a domestic one.
China maintains that the “One China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for dialogue between China and Taiwan. China is also strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan, and has repeatedly stated that although it will strive with utmost effort to realize a peaceful reunification, it will not promise to renounce the use of force. “The Anti-Secession Law,” enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out China’s policy of not renouncing the use of force, providing that in the event that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. General secretary Xi stated in his report at the 20th CCP Congress held in October 2022, in respect of cross-strait issues, the position to “continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort” while he stated again “resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.” Furthermore, the text the CCP “resolutely oppose and deter separatists seeking ‘Taiwan independence’” was added to the revised Party constitution adopted at the Congress, and blocking the independence of Taiwan was placed as a party duty.

2 Military Affairs

1 General Situation

For more than 30 years, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In doing so, it has attached importance to strengthening its operational capabilities for steadily acquiring information superiority for the purpose of enhancing operational capabilities throughout the Chinese military and gaining asymmetrical capabilities to effectively impede enemies with overall military superiority from exerting their strength. Specifically, China has been increasingly emphasizing endeavors to achieve dominance in new domains. For example, it has been rapidly expanding its capabilities in the cyber domain, enabling it to disrupt enemy communications networks, and in the field of electromagnetic spectrum, which offers the potential to render enemy radar and other equipment ineffective, thereby hampering their ability to exercise their military might. In addition, it continues to build capacity to make it possible to restrict enemies’ use of space. Bolstering these capabilities will reinforce China’s “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)” capabilities and lead to the establishment of operational capabilities further afield. China is also prioritizing efforts to increase practical joint operational capabilities through military modernization.

Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities

The A2/AD capabilities represent a concept given by the United States. Anti-Access or A2 capabilities refer mainly to long-range capabilities to block adversaries from entering some operating zones. Area-Denial or AD capabilities refer to short-range capabilities to limit adversaries’ freedom of action within operating zones.

Civil-military fusion

Civil-military fusion is an initiative promoted by China as a national strategy designed to promote the military use of civilian resources and the civilian use of military technologies in peacetime as well as emergency, in addition to the traditional development of defense mobilization arrangements for emergency. In particular, initiatives in seas, outer space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence (AI), which are referred to as “emerging areas” for China are viewed as priority areas for civil-military fusion.
including reforms. Additionally, while implementing a development strategy of civil-military fusion across the board, with the aim of promoting two-way links between military and civilian resources in technology development and various other fields, China is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes. Cutting-edge technologies that China seeks to develop and acquire include game changing technologies that would dramatically change future warfare.

Xi Jinping also reported at the 20th CCP Congress “we will continue integrated development of the military through mechanization, informatization, and the application of smart technologies (intelligentization).” Attention should be paid to measures related to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Along with the reinforcement of its operational capabilities, China has intensified the unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the maritime and air domains including in the East and South China Seas, such as its intrusions into the territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, and has expanded and intensified its military activities that affect Japan’s national security in the Sea of Japan, the Pacific Ocean, and other areas as well. China, particularly regarding maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, which includes dangerous acts that could cause unintended contingencies. China has also been intensifying its military activities around Taiwan. Moreover, moves to strengthen China-Russia cooperation, including on military activities, have been further intensifying.

The Chinese military leadership has exhibited the “struggle” against the Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan, the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),” its Navy and Air Force’s “regular patrols,” and others as the achievements of the military forces’ activities and emphasized to continue improving the Chinese military’s operational capabilities. Furthermore, the Chinese military forces have rapidly expanded and intensified activities including those in the areas surrounding Japan, such as the East China Sea, Pacific Ocean and Sea of Japan. Given these facts, there is a high probability that China would not only attempt to make such activities routine but also further expand and intensify them both qualitatively and quantitatively. China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power including its defense capabilities and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries, and others.

2 Defense Policies

China has described the objectives of its defense policies and the missions of its military forces as: supporting the CCP’s leadership, China’s characteristic socialism system, and the modernization of its socialism; defending the nation’s sovereignty, unification and security; backing the nation’s sustainable “peaceful development” through protecting its maritime and overseas national interests; building strong national defense and massive military forces commensurate with the interests of the nation’s security and the interests of development; and providing strong assurances for realizing the “Chinese dream” of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. China contends that these national defense policies are “defensive” in nature.2

For the development of national defense and military forces, China has employed a policy of building the “system of modern military power with Chinese characteristics” by sustaining the military development under the party, the military buildup through reforms, military promotion based on science and technology, and law-based military governance, by pursuing practical capabilities that “can fight and win a war” by giving greater priority to the civil-military fusion, by promoting the fusion and development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. This might have apparently deepened a policy of giving priority to the

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1 On November 23, 2013, China established the “East China Sea ADIZ” including the Senkaku Islands misleadingly indicated as if they were China’s territory. China requires aircraft flying in the zone to abide by rules set by its Ministry of National Defense and claims to take military “defensive emergency measures” against aircraft failing to do so, unduly infringing on the principle of freedom of overflight. Over the move to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, not only Japan but also the United States, the ROK, Australia, and the European Union (EU) expressed concerns.

2 According to the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (July 2019)
Informatization of military forces based on a military strategy to win informatized local wars in response to the global trend of military development. Such military buildup in China apparently indicates that China has given top priority to dealing with a Taiwan contingency by improving its capabilities to deter or deny Taiwan’s independence and foreign military support for the Taiwanese independence, and has recently considered the improvement of operational capabilities in more distant waters to protect its expanding overseas interests.

Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare. It regards the concept of “Three Warfare” - “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” - as part of the political work of the military. In addition, China has set forth a policy of coordinating military struggle closely with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors.

As for the future goals of the development of national defense and military forces, General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017 and the defense white paper released in 2019 noted that China would try to (1) basically achieve mechanization and make great progress in informatization to dramatically improve strategic capabilities by 2020, (2) basically complete the modernization of national defense and military forces by 2035, and (3) generally transform Chinese forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century.

In the 5th Plenary Session held in October 2020, the goal year for 1st stage mentioned above, China’s determination to achieve a struggle goal for the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the PLA in 2027 was announced. The new “three-step development strategy” was stipulated in the so-called “historic resolution” in 6th Plenary Session in 2021, which consists of the achievement of the 100th anniversary struggle goal of the PLA by 2027 as the first step, and achievement of the aforementioned goals by 2035 and the mid-21st century as the second and third steps respectively. Furthermore, the report of 20th CCP Congress in 2022 newly stated that elevating the PLA to world-class standards “more quickly” is a strategic task for building a modern socialist country in all respects, and it is possible that the CCP is considering moving forward its target of “establishing world-class forces,” scheduled for the mid-21st century.

However, China has recognized a wide gap between the real military modernization level and the level required for national security, and between Chinese and world-class military forces. Although China has not defined what it means by “world-class forces,” it has been pointed out that China may seek to develop military forces that equal to - or in some cases superior to - the U.S. military. Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that China aims to build “world-class forces” capable of “intelligentized warfare” by acquiring advanced technology and becoming an “innovation superpower.”

In light of this, it is suggested that China is planning to offset its military power gap with the U.S. military, and may recognize that the “intelligentization” of its forces is a necessary condition for this. It is thought that China will aim to build an army that can “fight and win a war” against the U.S. military in the “intelligentized warfare” of the future.

Based on that recognition, it is expected that China will further accelerate the military modernization against the backdrop of national power development and General Secretary Xi’s enhancement of his power base in the CCP in his third term and expansion of his power as Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

China has neither set out a clear and specific future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs. Although China has released a defense white paper roughly every two years since 1998, it has not fully disclosed information such as specific equipment in its possession, procurement goals and results, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and training, and a detailed breakdown of its national defense budget, even in the latest white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” released in July 2019 for the first time approximately in four years.

Incidents in which Chinese authorities provide factually

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4 There is a view that “intelligentization” of the military provides an excellent opportunity for a latecomer’s military to leap ahead in development and thereby rapidly surpass other advanced-level militaries.
5 The Central Military Commission is a leading and commanding organ to China’s armed forces. Formally, there are the CCP CMC and the People’s Republic of China CMC. However, each consists of the same members, indicating both commissions as an organ for the party to control the armed forces.
inaccurate explanations or refuse to admit facts regarding Chinese military activities have been confirmed, inciting concerns over China’s military decision-making and actions. For example, the submerged transit of a Chinese Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but China did not acknowledge this. In the same way, in the cases of submarines in the contiguous zone around Amami Oshima Island presumed to belong to China confirmed in June 2020 and September 2021, China did not acknowledge this fact. On the contrary, there were some Chinese media reports that criticized the Japanese side by claiming they were making exaggerations.

Similarly, explanations that stoke concerns about Chinese military decision-making and actions are also evident in comments about the South China Sea, where China is seeking to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and to create a fait accompli, including through militarization. At the press conference after the U.S.-China summit meeting in September 2015, President Xi Jinping stated “China does not have any intention to pursue militarization” in the South China Sea, but in February 2016, then Foreign Minister Wang Yi described the facilities in the South China Sea as “necessary self-defense facilities” that China was developing in accordance with international law. In 2017, reports in official media asserted that China had rationally expanded the area of its “islands and reefs” in the South China Sea to “strengthen the necessary military defense.”

China’s influence in the international community has risen politically, economically, and militarily. It has become increasingly important for China to improve its transparency regarding defense policies and military affairs, provide fact-based explanations about its activities, and share and observe international rules as a responsible country in the international community to allay concerns about China. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency through such efforts as specific and accurate information disclosure.

4 National Defense Budget

China announced that its national defense budget for FY2023 was approximately RMB 1,553.7 billion (approximately JPY 31,740 billion when the value is mechanically converted at 20 JPY per RMB). This is around 7.2% growth from the budget of the previous fiscal year according to China’s announcement. China’s announced national defense budget recorded a double-digit increase almost every year between FY1989 and FY2015. The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget grew approximately 37-fold in the 30 years from FY1993 and approximately 2.2-fold in the 10 years from FY2013. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development. It is believed that China has continued to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development. However, there have been many years in which the announced annual national defense budget increase rate exceeded the economic growth (an increase in gross domestic product). Attention is to be paid to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth would affect its national defense budget.

In addition, it is noted that the amount of the announced defense budget is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include foreign equipment procurement costs or research and development (R&D) expenses. According to an analysis of the U.S. DoD, actual defense spending in FY2021 was significantly higher than the announced national defense budget.

As for a breakdown of the national defense budget, past defense white papers specified personnel, training and sustainment, and equipment expenses for the announced national defense budgets for FY2007, FY2009 and FY2010-2017 (and expenses for active, reserve and militia forces for FY2007 and FY2009). However, no more details have been given.

5 Military Posture

China’s armed forces are composed of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), and the militia. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The PLA is defined as a people’s force created and led by the
CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Rocket Force, the Strategic Support Force, the Joint Logistics Support Force, etc.

The PAP is designed to engage mainly in patrol, emergency response, counterterrorism, maritime rights protection and law enforcement, emergency rescue, defense operations, etc. The militia is planned to engage in economic construction, etc., in peacetime and undertake logistic support missions in an emergency.

(1) Military Reforms

In recent years, China has been carrying out military reforms seen as the largest in its history. In November 2015, Chairman Xi unveiled China’s official position on a specific direction of the military reforms for the first time, announcing that the military reforms would be carried out by 2020.

By the end of 2016, the so-called “above-the-neck” reforms in the center of the military were reported to have basically been completed. Specifically, they abolished the PLA’s seven Military Regions and created five new Theaters with primary responsibility for command of operations, namely, the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater. In addition, they also formed the PLA Army (PLAA) Headquarters-ranked equally with the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Headquarters-, the Rocket Force (PLARF), the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and the Joint Logistics Support Force. Moreover, the headquarters for the entire PLA were replaced by 15 functional sections under the CMC, including the Joint Staff Department, Political Work Department, Logistics Support Department, and Equipment Development Department. Since 2017, military reforms have been making steady progress with the start of what are called full-scale “below-the-neck” military reforms at the field level. For example, the expansion of the Navy Marine Corps, whose missions include amphibious landing operations, has been confirmed along with the unification of PAP leadership and command system under the CMC, and the reorganization of 18 Group Armies into 13, a reduction of 300,000 soldiers, the transfer of the coast guard to the PAP, etc.

It is considered that these series of reforms are designed to build more practical military forces by improving their joint operational capabilities and strengthening the military’s readiness, including the development of military capabilities and organizational management in peacetime. In addition, it has been noted that the reorganization of the headquarters is a means of tackling corruption at the center of the military by decentralizing the leading organs. Persons close to and deeply trusted by Xi Jinping are actively appointed...
as members of the CMC; for example, Zhang Youxia remained in his position as Vice Chairman of the CMC in the 1st Plenary Session after the 20th CCP Congress held in October 2022. Given these points, it is thought that Chairman Xi is attempting to further enhance his leadership in the CMC and the military.

(2) Nuclear and Missile Forces

China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missiles for their delivery since the mid-1950s, indicating its apparent attempt to ensure nuclear deterrence, supplement its conventional forces with nuclear capabilities and secure its influence on the international community. It is regarded that China’s nuclear strategy is to deter any nuclear attack on its territory by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a limited number of targets such as cities in adversary countries, should China be subject to nuclear attacks. China has explained that it is committed to “no first use” of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, to “unconditional negative security assurance” that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally, and to keeping its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. In recent years, however, doubts have been expressed about the explanation.8

Furthermore, the United States has been inviting China to participate in the framework of the New START Treaty (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), with the upper limit of strategic nuclear forces determined between the United States and Russia, but China has consistently been denying its participation.

China is viewed as having given priority to conventional missile capabilities since the 1990s because of the growing significance of precision-strike capabilities in the global military trend. China is aiming to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear capabilities. It is investing in and increasing the number of means to deliver nuclear weapons by land, sea, and air. It has been pointed out that China’s operational nuclear warheads stockpile surpassed 400 in 2021 and China will likely field a stockpile of about 1500 warheads by 2035 if China continues the pace of its nuclear expansion.9 It is believed that China plans to strengthen deterrence against the United States, and will continue to place importance on nuclear and missile capabilities in the future.

China possesses ballistic missiles of various types and ranges, including ICBMs, SLBMs, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability and readiness. Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase their performance by such means as extending ranges, improving targeting accuracy, and employing maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

China’s main ICBMs, its strategic nuclear asset, had been the fixed-site liquid-propellant DF-5 missiles. However, China has in recent years deployed the DF-31, which is a mobile-type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a transporter erector launcher (TEL). China is developing the new DF-41 ICBM, which is viewed to be able to fly up to approximately 11,200 km and carry 10 warheads. It made its first appearance in the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 2019. Also, it is pointed out that China continues building ICBM silos, and that the number of new ICBM silos reached at least 300 in 2021.10

With regard to submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), it is considered that Jin-class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) equipped with JL-2 SLBMs with an estimated range of approximately 7,200 km are operational. It is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve significantly through nuclear deterrence patrols using the Jin-class SSBNs. Furthermore, it is pointed out that JL-3 extended range SLBMs reportedly with the range of 12,000 km have already been loaded into the Jing class SSBNs.

China’s missile forces have been put outside the framework of the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and China holds numerous amounts of ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km that had been subjected to the INF treaty. It is also deemed that China is ahead of

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the United States in relation to ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. As for the IRBMs/MRBMs covering the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, China has the mobile solid-propellant DF-21 and DF-26, which can be transported and operated on TELs. These are viewed as capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. China possesses ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), called “carrier killer,” which carries conventional warheads to attack overwater ships including aircraft carriers. The DF-26, which has a range including Guam and is called “Guam killer,” is considered a “second-generation ASBM” developed on the basis of the DF-21D. It was announced in April 2018 that the DF-21D had “formally joined the order of battle.” China also possesses the CJ-20 (CJ-10) long-range land-attack cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6 bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise missile. It is deemed that these missiles complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Indo-Pacific region including Japan. In the military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of its founding in October 2019, CJ-100/DF-100, which is said to be a supersonic cruise missile, also made its first public appearance. The deployment of these ASBMs and cruise missiles is expected to strengthen China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. Concerning SRBMs, China has deployed a large number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF-11 missiles facing Taiwan. It is believed that their ranges cover a part of Japan’s Southwestern Islands including the Senkaku Islands.

Furthermore, China is believed to be rapidly developing several HGVs that would be launched with ballistic missiles to penetrate missile defenses. Their flight tests have reportedly been conducted since 2014. In the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019, the DF-17 MRBM viewed as capable of carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle made its first public appearance. The U.S. DoD has pointed out that China began DF-17s operations in 2020 and some older SRBMs may be replaced with DF-17. In August 2018, China is believed to have tested a hypersonic vehicle featuring the “waverider” design. Furthermore, China conducted its first orbital launch of an ICBM carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle in July 2021. The vehicle reportedly flew approximately 40,000 km in over 100 minutes, and did not strike its target, but came close.

HGVs have evolved remarkably. It has been pointed out that multiple warheads can be attached to the aforementioned new ICBM, the DF-41, and that China is testing an intercontinental range HGV. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that it is highly likely that the launch vehicle is derived from the DF-41. It will not only be capable of significantly extending the effective range...
of HGVs compared to the DF-17, but will also be capable of carrying larger, heavier hypersonic glide vehicles.

These vehicles are said to be more difficult for missiles to intercept because they fly low at very high speeds and are highly maneuverable.

China also seems to be making efforts to develop missile defense technologies, such as the HQ-19 ballistic missile defense system. It is believed that China has been conducting missile interceptor tests in the mid-course phase since 2010. The most recent test was in February 2021. It has been pointed out that this is an attempt to acquire capabilities to respond to IRBMs and other missiles. In addition, in May 2019, two S-400 surface-to-air missile systems introduced from Russia were reportedly deployed near Beijing. In October of the same year, Russian President Putin stated that Russia was helping China build a “missile-attack early warning system.” Furthermore, the U.S. DoD has pointed out that China likely has at least three early warning satellites in orbit as of 2022.

Given that ballistic missile defense technology has the potential to be applied to missiles capable of destroying satellites, attention will focus on future Chinese missile defense trends.

Fig. I-3-2-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing) (image)); Fig. I-3-2-3 (Changes in the Number of China’s Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile Launchers)

(3) Ground Forces

China has the third largest ground forces in the world, following India and North Korea, with approximately 970,000 personnel. China has sought to improve the operational capabilities of ground forces pursuing the downsizing, multifunctionality, and modularization of military units. Specifically, it is believed to be improving ground forces’ mobility using measures such as shifting from theater defense to trans-theater mobility and working to motorize and mechanize infantry units.

It is said that the Navy Marine Corps is still in the process of reinforcement. It is reportedly acquiring equipment and conducting training necessary to become

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an expeditionary force. On the other hand, it repeatedly conducts training for amphibious operation including using civilian RORO vessels. It is also pointed out that these activities suggest that Navy Marine Corps troops are to be flexibly utilized in multiple roles in a scenario surrounding Taiwan.

China has annually conducted Stride, Firepower, and Sharp Sword maneuver-exercises that cut across multiple regions. They are aiming at verifying and improving the capabilities necessary to deploy army troops to remote areas, such as long-distance maneuvering capabilities of the Army, and logistical support capabilities that include mobilizing militias and public transportation. China has also conducted combined military branch and service exercises under Joint Action since 2014. Furthermore, it has been reported that force-on-force training has been frequently conducted to improve practical operational capabilities. The U.S. DoD pointed out that PLA Army continued to emphasize joint training in 2021, and conducted new types of exercises such as coastal defense, sea crossing, and landing exercises, in addition to conventional training. These facts suggest China’s attempt to improve its practical joint operational capabilities.

The above described PAP consists of internal security corps, which are organized and established based on administrative divisions such as provinces and autonomous regions, mobile corps, which do not have fixed areas in charge and perform missions across different areas, and the Coast Guard, described later, which is said to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and maritime interests as well as implements law enforcement. The PAP is said to own various equipment such as armored vehicles, rotary-wing aircraft, and heavy machine guns. Furthermore, it is reported that the PAP focuses on maintaining internal security and joint operations with the PLA, and is developing capabilities for readiness, mobility and counter-terrorism operations.

(4) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets: North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. China’s naval forces, which own a larger scale of ships exceeding the U.S. Navy and are said to be the largest navy in the world, are rapidly modernizing. The Chinese Navy promotes the mass production of its indigenous Yuan-class submarines with improved quietness, as well as surface combatant ships such as Jiangkai II-class frigates with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities. Furthermore, at least eight Renhai-class destroyers, the largest destroyer class in the PLA Navy,
have been commissioned by April 2023. The Renhai-class destroyer is said to be equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) with 112 launch cells, almost twice the number of launch cells as the new Luyang III-class destroyer. This VLS is said to be capable of launching long-range land-attack cruise missiles and YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles with a supersonic terminal attack capability, as well as ASBMs. It has also been pointed out that the destroyer is being considered as a launch vehicle to defend against ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase, and that this suggests a plan for capability of carrying anti-ship HGVs. The destroyer could be key for the Chinese Navy’s long-range missile capabilities in the future. Large landing ships and supply ships also are increasing. For example, Yushen-class (Type-075) large landing ships have been launched in succession since September 2019, with “Hainan” commissioned in the Southern Theater Command in April 2021, the second ship in the class, “Guangxi,” commissioned in the Eastern Theater Command in October 2021, and the third, “Anhui,” is believed to have been commissioned already. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Type-076 landing ships may be built following on from the Yushen-class landing ships. Since September 2017, Fuyu-class fast combat support ships (comprehensive supply ships) have been in operation for replenishment for the aircraft carrier group.

China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning has been in action in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean since its commission in September 2012. China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier (its second carrier) was launched in April 2017, and then it was named “Shandong” and commissioned in Sanya of Hainan Island in December 2019. The “Shandong,” with a ski-jump flight deck, is an improved version of the “Liaoning,” reportedly carrying a greater number of aircraft than the “Liaoning.” China is reportedly building its second indigenous aircraft carrier “Fujian,” its third carrier, which could be equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system to operate fixed-wing early warning aircraft. It has also been pointed out that China has plans to build nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

China is believed to have been developing and deploying unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) that are available for military purposes. Such equipment, though

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being relatively cheap, are viewed as representing an asymmetric force to effectively prevent adversaries from winning maritime supremacy, particularly underwater supremacy.

Given these developments concerning the naval forces, China appears to be steadily building up capabilities for conducting operations in more distant waters in addition to near sea defense. It has also been pointed out that in the near future, the PLA Navy will have the capability to make long-range precision strikes against land targets using land-attack cruise missiles from submarines and surface combatant ships, and its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of surface combatants and fixed and rotary wing aircrafts are significantly improved, while it continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.\textsuperscript{22} It is necessary to continue to monitor the related developments.

The PAP, one of the China’s armed forces other than the military, has the Coast Guard under its umbrella, one of whose missions is the protection of maritime interests. The Coast Guard consists of three groups: North, East and South Sea Sub-bureaus. Chinese government ships belonging to the Coast Guard have recently been designed to be larger and armed. At the end of December 2022, the China Coast Guard possessed 157 ships\textsuperscript{23} with full displacement of 1,000 tons or more, including two 10,000-ton-class patrol ships, among the world’s largest ones. The vessels equipped with a gun-like armament were observed as well. It is pointed out that the newer ships are significantly larger and more capable than older ships, and are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, guns ranging from 20mm to 76mm, and other equipment, so that they are viewed as being able to withstand long-term operations and engage in distant-water activities.\textsuperscript{24}

The enhanced cooperation between the PLA and the China Coast Guard has also been confirmed. In July 2018, the China Coast Guard that had been conducting maritime surveillance operation under the direction of the State Council’s Ministry of Public Security was transferred to the PAP under unified control and command of the CMC and renamed PAP Coast Guard. After the transfer, former naval officers were reportedly given major Coast Guard posts, indicating enhanced cooperation between the military and Coast Guard. It has been noted that retired naval destroyers and frigates were delivered to the Coast Guard, suggesting that the military has been supporting the Coast Guard in terms of equipment as well as personnel. It has been pointed out that the military forces and the Coast Guard have conducted joint exercises. The enhanced cooperation between the PLA and the PAP including the Coast Guard is believed to be intended to steadily strengthen their joint operational capabilities through the enhancement of cooperation.

Amid such a situation, in June 2020, “Law of the People’s Republic of China in the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP Law) was revised, and “protection of maritime interests and law enforcement” were added to the duties of the PAP. The revised version also stipulates that the PAP shall be centrally and uniformly guided by the Central Committee and the CMC of the People’s Republic of China. In the revision of this law, the duty of “protection of the maritime interests and law enforcement” was supposed to be stipulated separately by law. However, the Coast Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China (Coast Guard Law), which stipulates the Coast Guard’s responsibilities and authority including the use of weapons, was newly enacted in January 2021 and entered into force in February 2021. A Spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains that the establishment of the CCG Law is merely a normal legislative activity of the National People’s Congress and that China’s maritime policy has not changed. However, the Coast Guard Law includes problematic provisions in terms of their inconsistency with international law. Sources of inconsistency include,

\textsuperscript{22} According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2022)
\textsuperscript{23} According to “Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2023,” Japan Coast Guard Defense
\textsuperscript{24} According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2022)
among others, ambiguity as to geographical areas the Coast Guard Law applies and how the rules governing the use of weapons are implemented. The Coast Guard Law must not be allowed to infringe on the legitimate interests of the relevant countries including Japan. Furthermore, the raising of tensions in the East China Sea and other sea areas is completely unacceptable. The United States and some neighboring countries have expressed concerns about the law. In order to allay other countries’ concerns regarding China, it is strongly hoped that China will improve transparency through specific and accurate outward-facing explanations in the future.

It is pointed out that, among the militia, whose status is China’s armed force other than the military, the so-called maritime militia is playing the role of the front guard for supporting China’s maritime interests. The maritime militia is said to operate in the South China Sea, etc. and consist of fishermen and residents of isolated islands.

China’s air forces consist mainly of the Navy’s air units and the Air Force. As for fourth-generation fighters, China has introduced from Russia the Su-27 and Su-30.

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25 In addition, it is pointed out that while the maritime militia often rents fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, China has built a state-owned fishing fleet in the South China Sea for the maritime militia. It is also pointed out that the Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands. Since this maritime militia unit recruits military veterans as its members to create a unit on par with a career soldier unit, it is reported that salary is paid separately from its commercial fishing activities.
and the Su-35 latest fourth-generation fighter. China is also developing its own domestic modern fighters. China has started the mass production of the J-11B fighter, a suspected copy of the Su-27, and the J-16 fighter, a suspected copy of the Su-30, as well as the domestic J-10 fighter. The J-15 fighter aboard the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” is viewed as a copy of the Russian Su-33. China is deploying J-20 fifth-generation fighters and developing J-31 (J-35) fighter. It has been pointed out that J-31 (J-35) fighter could be the base for developing the replacement for the J-15 carrier-based fighter.

As China is continuing the modernization of its bombers as well, the Air Force has increased the number of H-6 bombers, which are believed to be capable of carrying long-range land-attack cruise missiles with nuclear capability. In an attempt to improve bombers’ long-range operation capabilities, the Air Force has reportedly begun to operate H-6N bombers that can take advantage of aerial refueling to fly longer. It is believed to be developing a new long-range stealth bomber called H-20. It is also pointed out that China is developing an air-launched ballistic missile with nuclear capability to be carried by such bombers. Moreover, it has also been pointed out that China is developing a stealth bomber.

China is also making continuous efforts to improve capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air power by introducing the H-6U and IL-78M aerial refueling tankers and the KJ-500 and KJ-2000 early warning and control aircraft. Since July 2016, China has promoted the deployment of the indigenously developed Y-20 large transport aircraft. The Y-20U, an aerial refueling tanker based on this transport aircraft, has also been deployed since June 2021.

China is rapidly developing a variety of domestic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes as well as those capable of carrying weapons such as missiles. Some of these are deployed and actively exported. In fact, it is suggested that the Chinese Air Force has created a UAV unit for attack missions and frequently used UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes in waters and airspace surrounding China. Several unmanned vehicles such as the FH-97A which is reported to be operative in supporting manned fighters, and the unmanned reconnaissance/attack vehicle WL-3 which is reported to have a range of over 10,000 km were first shown publicly at the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition held in November 2022. Moreover, it has been noted that China is improving “Swarm” technology to operate a large number of small low-cost UAVs.

Given such modernization of the air forces, it is believed that China is steadily improving not only its defense capabilities for its national airspace but also capabilities for conducting combat operations, and supporting ground and maritime forces in more distant areas.

(6) Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Spectrum Capabilities

Information gathering, and command and communication in the military sector have increasingly relied on satellites and computer networks. As such, China stated that “outer
space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights (capture point) in strategic competition among all parties,” indicating that it has recognized the importance of taking on information mastery in wartime when it must protect its own information systems and networks while neutralizing those of its adversaries. In fact, the PLASSF established at the end of 2015 apparently takes charge of outer space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare missions for intelligence support for all military forces.

It is pointed out that China actively utilizes outer space for military purpose, and given that administrative organizations and state-owned enterprises involved in the use of outer space in China are pointed out as having close cooperative ties with the military, it is considered that China is planning to improve its capabilities for military operations in outer space. China is said to have developed its space program in the shortest time in the world. Specifically, China has rapidly increased the number of satellites available for military purposes in recent years. For example, the “BeiDou” global satellite positioning system, which is called a Chinese-version GPS and pointed out as available for ballistic missiles and other guided weapons systems, started its global operation service in late 2018, and it is deemed that the launch of all satellites constituting the BeiDou system was completed in June 2020.

As for the cyber domain, it has been noted that current major military training of China always contains cyber

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operations covering both attacks on and defense of command systems. Cyber attacks on enemy networks are likely to bolster China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. The militia as a part of China’s armed forces reportedly includes “cyber militias” with excellent cyber domain capabilities.

With regard to electromagnetic spectrum domain, the presence of aircraft with electronic warfare capabilities has been noted. Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft, which frequently fly near Japan, are pointed out along with J-15 carrier-based fighters, J-16 fighters and H-6 bombers that appear to be equipped with electronic warfare pod systems giving them electronic warfare capabilities.

(7) China’s “Intelligentization” of its Military Forces
The “intelligentized warfare” advocated by China is described as “integrated warfare waged in land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic, cyber, and cognitive domains using intelligentized weaponry and equipment and their associated operational methods underpinned by the IoT information systems”. The “cognitive domain” is believed to be recognized as important in the future aspects of warfare.

Also, in respect of “intelligentized warfare,” it is pointed out that the PLA
• has recognized that new technologies will increase the speed and tempo of future warfare, and that operationalization of AI will be necessary to improve the speed and quality of information processing by reducing battlefield uncertainty and providing decision making advantage over potential adversaries.
• is exploring next-generation operational concepts for intelligentized warfare, such as attrition warfare using intelligentized swarms.
• considers unmanned systems to be important intelligentized technologies, and is pursuing greater autonomy for unmanned land, sea, and air assets to enable swarm attacks, optimized logistics support, as well as dispersed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.27

(8) Efforts to Develop Comprehensive Operational Capabilities
In recent years, initiatives have been under way to improve joint operational capabilities in areas from the front line to logistics. The CMC Joint Operations Command Center is believed to have been established under the initiatives for the CCP to carry out decision making at the highest strategic level. The five new theaters established in February 2016 are seen as representing permanent joint operation headquarters. Attention will be focused to movement towards integration in personnel affairs as well; for example, General He Weidong who has experienced as a commanding officer of a joint force as Commander of the Eastern Theater Command was assigned as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission in October 2022.
In recent years, China has implemented joint service trainings giving priority to practicality and other drills to improve its joint operational capabilities. These drills are apparently designed to secure the effectiveness of the abovementioned organizational reforms and other initiatives to improve joint operational capabilities.

Xi Jinping stated in his report in the 20th CCP Congress held in October 2022 that China will optimize the command system for joint operations, intensify military training under combat conditions, and lay emphasis on joint training. Given these remarks, the abovementioned moves towards joint operations are expected to progress further.

6 Maritime and Airspace Activities
(1) General Situation
Recently, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities for operations in more distant waters and airspace, including those to project power to waters including the so-called second island chain, beyond the first island chain. In such efforts, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the maritime and aerial domains using its naval and air powers. In waters and airspace surrounding Japan, particularly, Chinese naval vessels, and naval and air force aircraft suspected as conducting training and information gathering activities have been observed frequently, along with Chinese naval ships heading for the Pacific and Indian Ocean and numerous China Coast Guard vessels operating under the name of protecting maritime interests. Their activities include China Coast Guard vessels’ intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters, and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, such as the directing of fire-control radar at Japanese Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) ships and aircrafts. Chinese military fighters’ abnormally close approach to Japanese SDF and U.S. military aircraft, and the establishment of the “East China Sea ADIZ” and other activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight. These activities have become a grave matter of concern and are very deplorable. Furthermore, flying objects that were confirmed within Japanese territorial airspace are strongly presumed to be unmanned reconnaissance balloons flown by China. In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, expanding and intensifying its activities in the air and sea space in the area, and creating a fait accompli of unilateral changes to the status quo by force. It is strongly hoped that China will act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law and play active roles in the region and the international community in a more cooperative manner.

(2) Military Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace

The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensified their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. These activities include those allegedly based on China’s unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities, creating a situation of great concern to Japan. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has continued to make frequent scrambles against Chinese aircraft, as indicated by an all-time high of 851 scrambles in FY2016. China has also continued naval ships’ passage through waters near Japan for navigation to distant waters such as the Indian Ocean, as well as activities viewed as training of maritime and air forces making forays to the Pacific and the Sea of Japan.

It appears that China continues to improve the complexity of its activities in recent years. Given that Chinese efforts are also seen to improve practical joint operational capabilities, Chinese military activities in Japan’s surrounding waters and airspace should be closely watched with grave attention.

a. Activities in the East China Sea (including the Areas around the Senkaku Islands)

Chinese naval vessels have been conducting operations in the East China Sea continuously and actively. Stating its own position regarding Japan’s Senkaku Islands, China claims that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely justifiable and lawful. Chinese naval vessels have been continuously operating in the areas near Japan’s Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate became the first ever Chinese Navy combatant vessel to enter Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, in January 2018, a Shang-class submarine and a Jiangkai II-class frigate passed into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on the same day. This was the first time a Chinese submarine was identified and announced as conducting submerged transit through the contiguous waters off the Senkaku Islands. In June 2020 and September 2022, submerged transit of a submarine presumed to belong to China was confirmed in the contiguous zone surrounding Amami Oshima Island.

In recent years, Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessels (AGIs) have also been found conducting activities in multiple cases. A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI repeatedly navigated back and forth outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands in November 2015. In June 2016, an AGI of the same type sailed in Japan’s territorial waters near Kuchinoerabujima Island and Yakushima Island, and then passed Japan’s contiguous zone north of Kitadaitojima Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducted east-west passages outside the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands.

A Jiangwei II-class frigate entered the contiguous zone southwest of Uotsurishima Island in July 2022. Furthermore, a PLA Navy Shupang-class survey ship sailed through Japan’s territorial waters near Kuchinoerabujima Island, Kuchinoshima Island, and Yakushima Island in November 2021, in April, July, September, November, and December 2022 as well as in February 2023.

PLA Air Force aircraft are also actively conducting actions in the East China Sea including air space near the Senkaku Islands on a routine basis. Their activities are thought to include warning and surveillance, combat air patrols (CAPs), and training. Chinese military aircraft have recently become more active in airspace closer to Japan’s Southwestern Islands. Their activities have possibly been intended to operate the “East China Sea
ADIZ.” Moreover, actions of UAVs are activated; for example, aerial unmanned reconnaissance/attack vehicle TB-001, aerial unmanned reconnaissance vehicles BZK-005 and WZ-7 flew past alone in the air space between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island in July and August 2022, and in January 2023, one presumed Chinese UAV flew from the East China Sea, after passing south, and flew off in the direction of the continent in November 2022.

b. Advancements into the Pacific Ocean

Chinese Navy combatant vessels continue to transit the waters near Japan to advance into the Pacific Ocean and return to base with high frequency. The advancement routes are multiplying. Chinese naval vessels have been confirmed as transiting the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and have been found passing through the Osumi Strait, the sea area between Yonagunijima Island and Nakanokamishima Island near Iriomotejima Island, the sea area between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoatejima Island, the Tsugaru Strait, and the Soya Strait. Through these activities, China has apparently attempted to “regularize” naval ships’ advancements into the Pacific Ocean through waters near Japan and improve its capabilities for accessing the open ocean and conducting operations there. In December 2016, the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” navigated the East China Sea together with other vessels and passed the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to advance to the Pacific for the first time. After that, Liaoning also went into the Pacific Ocean with other ships in April 2018, June 2019, April 2020, and in April and December 2021, and in May and December 2022. It was observed that Liaoning navigated from the South China Sea passing through the Bashi Channel, and from the East China Sea passing through sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean. Also, during navigations of the fleet that includes aircraft carrier Liaoning, landings and takeoffs of carrier-based fighters and other aircraft in the Pacific Ocean were frequently observed. Furthermore, the actions of aircraft carrier Shandong including landings and takeoffs of fighters in the Pacific were observed for the first time in April 2023.

The activities are worthy of attention as indicating the enhancement of the capabilities of China’s naval forces, including the aircraft carrier, and the improvement of its capabilities to project power to more distant areas.

Regarding air forces, the advancement of a PLAN Y-8 early warning aircraft into the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, was confirmed for the first time in July 2013. The advancement of Air Force aircraft into the Pacific was also confirmed in 2015. Since 2017, advances into the Pacific Ocean via this airspace have become more active. The types of aircraft passing through the airspace have also diversified year by year. H-6K bombers and Su-30 fighters were confirmed by 2016 and the Y-8 EW aircraft in July 2017. At least one bomber was confirmed as carrying objects in the form of missiles. The U.S. DoD has pointed out that such Chinese bomber flights indicated the Chinese forces’ training targeting the United States and its allies. Flight patterns of Chinese military aircraft have also been changing. Flights from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and from the direction of the Bashi Channel to the Pacific Ocean, both with the return trips on the same shuttle routes, have been repeatedly made. Since November 2016, H-6K bombers and other aircraft were confirmed as flying around Taiwan. In August 2017, H-6K bombers were confirmed as flying to waters off the Kii Peninsula after advancing to the Pacific Ocean via waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island for the first time. Through frequent long-distance flights of bombers and other aircraft, including advancements to the Pacific, and their advanced flight paths and composition, China is thought to be demonstrating its presence around areas including those surrounding Japan, and planning further enhancements to more practical operational capabilities.

Additionally, activities considered planned to improve sea and air joint operational capabilities in more distant areas, such as what seemed to be air-to-ship attack drills including advancements to the Pacific Ocean, have been seen in recent years. China is expected to further expand and intensify naval and air activities in the Pacific Ocean.

c. Activities in the Sea of Japan

While the Chinese Navy has been active in the Sea of Japan during training and on other occasions for some time, its Air Force activities in the area have also intensified of late. “Force-on-force training” in the Sea of Japan by Chinese Navy ships were announced for
the first time in August 2016. Three aircraft apparently participated in the trainings, including two H-6 bombers that passed through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan for the first time.

In December 2017, Chinese Air Force aircraft (H-6K bombers) passed through the Tsushima Strait and advanced to the Sea of Japan. Then, Chinese fighter aircraft (Su-30 fighters) were confirmed as advancing to the Sea of Japan for the first time. In February 2018, it was confirmed for the first time that the Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft entered the Sea of Japan via the Western Channel of Tsushima Strait (the strait between Tsushima in Nagasaki Prefecture and the Korean Peninsula). The PLA conducted five joint flights of bombers with Russia from 2019 to 2022; in every case, the bombers flew over the Sea of Japan, and a case in which PLA aircraft passed through Russian airspace and moved into Sea of Japan directly was observed. In regard to sea power, AGIs passing through Tsushima Strait have been frequently observed in recent years.

Since 2018, China’s sea and air forces have further intensified activities in the Sea of Japan involving passages through the Tsushima Strait. It is considered that the PLA will continue to expand and intensify its activities in the Sea of Japan.

(3) Activities of Chinese Ships Including Coast Guard Vessels, and Aircraft around the Senkaku Islands, etc.

China Coast Guard vessels have been seen almost every day in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands, Japan’s inherent territory, and repeatedly intruded into Japan’s territorial waters. Since the activities of China Coast Guard vessels based on China’s own assertion conducted in Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands are violating international law in the first place, Japan has been strongly protesting against these activities and requested them to leave many times. Despite Japan’s strong protests, however, Chinese Coast Guard vessels continued to intrude into the Japanese territorial waters in FY2022. Almost every month in 2022, China Coast Guard vessels entered Japan’s territorial waters. Incidents occurred in which China Coast Guard ships attempted to approach Japanese fishing boats when those Japanese boats were navigating in Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. China Coast Guard vessels entered Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands and stayed there for more than 80 hours, the longest period ever, from the end of March to beginning of April 2023.

Providing the background, in December 2008, China Maritime Surveillance vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial waters for the first time and hovered and drifted, running counter to international law. Later, China Maritime Surveillance and China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels gradually intensified their activities in the Japanese territorial waters. Such activities have greatly intensified since September 2012, when the Japanese Government acquired the ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsurishima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). The number of Chinese government ships intruding into the Japanese territorial waters in a day had been limited to two or three until August 2016. Later, however, the number has reached four frequently.

China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use Coast Guard vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. Since December 2015, Chinese ships armed with gun-like armament have repeatedly intruded into the Japanese territorial waters.

Cases indicating the improvement of China Coast Guard vessels’ operational capabilities have been also confirmed. From February to July 2021, China Coast Guard vessels were seen in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands for a record 157 consecutive days. China Coast Guard vessels were seen in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands on 336 days of 2022, the highest number of days ever. In that year, the total number of China Coast Guard vessels seen in the zone was 1,201, which was a high level continuing from 2021.

Additionally, cases indicating China’s capabilities to send numerous China Coast Guard vessels and other ships to waters around the Senkaku Islands simultaneously have also been identified. In early August 2016, approximately 200 to 300 Chinese fishing boats advanced to the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands. At that time, as many as up to 15 China Coast Guard vessels and other ships were confirmed in the contiguous zone simultaneously. Over five days, a large number of China Coast Guard vessels, other ships, and fishing boats repeatedly intruded into Japan’s territorial waters.

In December 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration was identified as the first Chinese aircraft to intrude into Japan’s airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Until March 2014, aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration were frequently confirmed as approaching the airspace. In May 2017, it
was confirmed that an object that appeared to be a small drone was flying above a China Coast Guard vessel intruding into the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This flight also constitutes an invasion of Japan’s territorial airspace.

China has thus relentlessly continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter of concern. Japan cannot accept China’s actions to escalate the situation.

(4) Trends of Activities around Taiwan

China has intensified military activities around Taiwan. According to announcements from the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan, entry into airspace around Taiwan has been increasing since September 2020. The total number of aircraft that entered was over 970 in 2021, and that number increased significantly from the previous year to over 1,700 aircraft in 2022. Furthermore, the Ministry announced that other aircraft such as attack helicopters, air refueling tankers, and UAVs came to be seen entering the airspace from 2021, in addition to conventional fighters and bombers.

On August 2, 2022, China announced the setting of six training areas surrounding Taiwan, and conducting “a series of integrated military operations” around Taiwan, in conjunction with the visit of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (then) to Taiwan. China launched nine ballistic missiles on August 4, 2022, five of which were landed within the Japanese Executive Economic Zone (EEZ), another landed at the closest point to Japanese territory, which

Fig. I-3-2-8 (PLA’s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image))

Legend

Sea power

Air power

Frequent advancement into the Pacific Ocean passing between Okinawa and Miyakojima Island

Conducted military exercises with a number of PLA aircrafts and PLA warships in the sea and air areas around Taiwan

Launched nine ballistic missiles towards the training area they set in the sea near Japan, including Japan’s EEZ (August 2022)

China-Russia joint naval exercise “Joint Sea 2022”

PLA’s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image)
Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ Activities around the Southwestern Islands and the Soya and Tsugaru Straits

Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage between the Main Island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island

Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ Passage through the Tsushima Strait

Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage through the Tsushima Strait

Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft

Activities by China Coast Guard Vessels, etc., around the Senkaku Islands

Identification in the contiguous zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of days (days)</th>
<th>Total number of identified vessels (vessels)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>211</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>1,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>332</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The figure for 2012 is that from September to December, and the figure for 2023 is as of the end of March.
was about 80 km from Yonagunijima Island. This was perceived as a threat to local residents. In addition, some of the missiles passed over Taiwan. After that, the PLA continued the large-scale military exercise covering subjects such as joint blockage, sea and ground attack, air superiority combat, and anti-submarine warfare in air space and sea space around Taiwan for about one week. It is probable that, in this military exercise, China may have rehearsed some parts of a Taiwan invasion operation, such as the blockade of Taiwan, ground/ship attacks, the acquisition of sea/air superiority in wartime, and gray-zone situations, including cyber attacks and “cognitive warfare.”

Furthermore, according to an announcement of the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, PLA aircrafts repeatedly entered air space east of the China-Taiwan “median line” over the Taiwan Strait, since the U.S. Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

In addition, in response to President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with Kevin McCarthy, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives on April 5 (local time), during her visit to the United States as a stepover for her tour of Central America in 2023, China conducted large-scale military exercises in the sea and airspace around Taiwan from April 8 to 10, involving numerous naval vessels and aircraft, including the aircraft carrier “Shandong.” China announced that simulated joint accurate attacks to important targets in Taiwan and the sea area around Taiwan and joint blockage by several services were executed in these exercises. It is viewed that China may have rehearsed some parts of a Taiwan invasion operation, following the exercise in August 2022.

It is believed that through the series of activities around Taiwan, China seeks to create a fait accompli where the Chinese military is continuously operating, and improve its actual combat capabilities.

**5) Trends of Activities in the South China Sea**

China has also been intensifying its activities based on assertions, which are conflicting with existing laws and orders of the seas, in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors, including some member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Since 2014, on seven features of the Spratly Islands (Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reefs, Hughes Reef, and Johnson South Reef), China pressed ahead with large-scale and rapid land reclamation. The Philippines-China arbitration award issued in July 2016 denied the “historic rights” as the basis of the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, and determined the illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation. However, China has made it clear that it would not comply with the award and is currently continuing military activities while promoting the development of military facilities, such as batteries, and various kinds of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, including runways, ports, hangars, and radar facilities, to militarize these features.

On Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs, called the Big Three of the Spratly Islands, China has developed batteries for anti-aircraft guns, missile shelters, underground storage facilities pointed out to be munitions storage, large ports capable of accommodating combatant ships and runways available for takeoff and landing of fighters and bombers.

On Fiery Cross Reef in April 2016, a Navy patrol aircraft flying over the South China Sea landed for a nominal purpose of evacuating emergency patients. On Subi and Mischief Reefs in July of the same year, China forced aircraft test flights on runways available for the takeoff and landing of large aircraft. Reportedly, there was confirmation of a Y-7 transport aircraft on Mischief Reef in January 2018, a Y-8 special mission aircraft on Subi Reef in April that year, a Y-20 transport airport on Fiery Cross Reef in December 2020, and a KJ-500 early warning and control aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef in June 2019. Additionally, in April 2019, it was reported that anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles were deployed on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs for military training and that radar jamming systems were deployed on Mischief Reef. Furthermore, it was reported in May 2020 that China possibly deployed aircraft including Y-8 patrol and Y-9 early warning aircraft and other aircraft to the Fiery Cross Reef in rotation.

On the other four features, it is pointed out that the construction of facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars, has made progress and that what appears to be large anti-aircraft guns and close in weapon systems

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30 The line that supposed to have been set over the Taiwan Strait by the United States in the 1950s. Taiwan insists on the existence of the median line, and published the coordinates of it, while China claims “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, hence the so-called the ‘median line’ does not exist.” Chinese military aircrafts hardly crossed over the line until now.
On the evening of August 2, 2022, while on a tour of Asian countries, Ms. Pelosi, then speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taiwan as the current speaker of the house for the first time in approximately 25 years. That same day, China announced that it would launch a series of integrated military operations in the sea and airspace around Taiwan, and publicly disclosed the establishment of a training area in close proximity to and encircling Taiwan.

The Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced that from the night of August 2, it implemented live-fire joint training that mobilized all services in the sea and airspace around Taiwan, and that during the exercise period, which lasted until August 10, it exercised joint blockade, sea and ground attack, air superiority combat, aerial reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and other operations. During this period, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that there were numerous Chinese naval and aircraft operations in the vicinity of Taiwan and that China was conducting mock strike drills against the main island of Taiwan and Taiwanese surface ships. On August 4, China launched a total of nine ballistic missiles into pre-designated training areas, five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while the closest one landed at a point about 80 kilometers from Yonagunijima Island. This is a grave issue that concerns Japan’s security and the safety of its people, and was perceived as a threat to local residents. Furthermore, according to an announcement by Taiwanese authorities, drone flights over remote islands close to the Chinese mainland, such as Kinmen Island and the Matsu Islands, cyber attacks on Taiwanese authorities’ websites and public facilities, and “cognitive warfare” such as the dissemination of disinformation in an apparent attempt to arouse unease among Taiwanese residents and undermine the authority of the Taiwanese authorities were also conducted during the exercise period.

In the area surrounding Japan, two Chinese UAVs were confirmed to have passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and engaged in activities over the Pacific Ocean near Taiwan on August 4, and one presumed Chinese UAV that flew from the East China Sea was confirmed to have engaged in activities over the ocean northeast of Taiwan. It is possible that these activities may have been related to this military exercise.

From this series of circumstances, it is probable that, in this military exercise, China may have rehearsed some parts of a Taiwan invasion operation, such as the blockade of Taiwan, ground/ship attacks, the acquisition of sea/air superiority in wartime, and gray-zone situations, including cyber attacks and “cognitive warfare.”

Even after the end of this exercise, the PLA has continued to intensify its military activities around Taiwan. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has announced that the number of Chinese military aircraft that entered the airspace around Taiwan in 2022 totaled more than 1,700 aircraft, far exceeding the number in 2021, and that Chinese military aircraft activity that crosses the “median line” of the Taiwan Strait has increased significantly since this exercise.

Furthermore, in response to President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with Kevin McCarthy, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives on April 5 (local time), during her visit to the United States as a stepover for her tour of Central America in 2023, China conducted large-scale military exercises in the sea and airspace around Taiwan from April 8 to 10, involving numerous naval vessels and aircraft, including the aircraft carrier “Shandong.”

It is believed that through the series of activities around Taiwan, China seeks to create a fait accompli where Chinese military is continuously operating, and improve its actual combat capabilities. At the 20th CCP National Congress in October 2022, General Secretary Xi Jinping expressed his stance on cross-strait relations, stating that China will “strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort,” but “will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we [China] reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.” In this context, and due to the aforementioned increase in coercive military activities by the PLA, concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait—which are indispensable to security and prosperity of the international community—are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan but also in the entire international community.
(CIWS) may have already been deployed. If these features are used for full-scale military purposes, it could significantly change the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, it was reported in December 2022 that China is carrying out new construction activities on another four features of the Spratly Islands.

China carried out the militarization of the Paracel Islands before that of the Spratly Islands. China has reportedly extended the runway to nearly 3,000 m on Woody Island since 2013. In October 2015, October 2017, and June 2019, China was reported to have deployed J-11, J-10 and other fighters on the island. In February 2016 and January 2017, the existence of equipment likely to be surface-to-air missiles was confirmed. It has been noted that the takeoff and landing training of the H-6K bombers in the South China Sea announced by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in May 2018 was carried out on Woody Island.

In recent years, Chinese vessels have allegedly been conducting what are likely to be survey activities in Scarborough Shoal, where a standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine government ships in April 2012. It is pointed out that new land reclamations on the shoal might be seen in the future. It is also pointed out that if China conducts land reclamations and installs radar facilities, runways, and other infrastructure on Scarborough Shoal, it could possibly increase its ability for situation awareness and power projection capabilities in the surrounding sea area and ultimately enhance its operational capabilities throughout all the areas of the South China Sea.

Also, it has been pointed out that if China were to consider bastion operations (fortification) to enhance the survivability of new types of long-range SLBMs capable of hitting the U.S. mainland, the South China Sea would be the suitable choice. Attention must continue to be paid to the situation in the South China Sea going forward.

The activities in sea and airspace in the area are expanding and intensifying as well. In March 2009, December 2013 and September 2018, Chinese naval and other vessels approached and intercepted U.S. Navy vessels navigating in the South China Sea. In May 2016, February 2017 and May 2017, PLA fighters allegedly flew close to U.S. Forces aircraft. In July and August 2016, after the Philippines-China arbitration award was rendered, PLAAF H-6K bomber aircraft conducted “combat air patrol” in the airspace close to Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that this patrol would “become normal.” In December 2016, H-6 bombers reportedly flew along the so-called nine-dash line. In September of the same year, the China-Russia bilateral naval exercise “Joint Sea 2016” was conducted for the first time in the South China Sea.

A field training exercise by naval vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and a naval review ceremony, regarded as the largest since the founding of China, were conducted in the same area from the end of March until April 2018. In 2019, anti-ship ballistic missile tests were reportedly conducted in the South China Sea for the first time. In 2019 and 2020, the deployment of the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” accompanied by Fuyu-class fast combat support and other ships in the South China Sea was reported. Furthermore, China Coast Guard vessels reportedly fired warning shots at fishing boats of neighboring countries. When China Coast Guard vessels interrupted Vietnam’s oil and natural gas development within its exclusive economic zone from July to October 2019, they reportedly visited Fiery Cross Reef for supply.

In April 2020, China unilaterally announced the establishment of Xisha (Paracel) District and Nansha (Spratly) District under Sansha City in the Hainan province. China conducted simultaneous military exercises in three sea areas (South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea) in July and is believed to have launched middle-range ballistic missiles in August 2020.

Furthermore, it was announced that the aircraft carrier “Shandong” conducted an exercise in the South China Sea in May 2021, and reported that another exercise was conducted in early winter of the same year. In June of the same year, the Malaysian Air Force announced that 16 Chinese military aircraft had flown over the Luconia Shoal and approached as far as the Malaysian coast. In addition, in December of the same year, it was also reported that the aforementioned Yushen-class landing ships conducted a series of exercises in the South China Sea, and that exercises were conducted at several locations on Hainan Island facing the South China Sea. It was pointed out that the latter exercises in particular were possibly exercises simulating an amphibious operation using Hainan Island against Taiwan. It was
announced that aircraft carrier Shandong conducted training including landings and takeoffs of J-15 fighters in the South China Sea in August 2022.

In this way, it appears that China seeks to expand its presence and enhance war-sustaining and other joint operational capabilities including military and other means in the South China Sea.

Such activities conducted by China based on its own assertions, which are conflicting with existing laws and orders of the seas, further advance unilateral changes to the status quo by force and efforts to create a fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned about these activities, and the concern is shared with the international community, including the United States and other G7 Member States.

For example, in July 2020, the United States issued a statement from the U.S. Secretary of State saying that China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea were unlawful. In January 2022, the State Department issued a study stating that China’s unlawful territorial and jurisdictional claims gravely undermined the rule of law in the oceans.

China asserts that some of the ASEAN member states including the Philippines and Vietnam are illegitimately occupying features. However, China’s development work on the features is of a scale incomparable to the activities carried out by other countries and is conducted at a rapid pace.

In any case, the issues surrounding the South China Sea are directly related to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and are a legitimate concern not only for Japan, which has major sea lanes in the South China Sea, but also for the entire international community. Countries concerned, including China, are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.

See Fig. I-3-2-15 (Example of China’s Advancement and Militarization Utilizing the Power Vacuum in the South China Sea (image))
Section 2 China

(6) Trends in the Indian Ocean and Other More Distant Waters

The Chinese Navy is considered to be shifting towards “protection missions on the far seas” and has been steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters, such as the Indian Ocean, in recent years. Progress has been seen in the Navy’s development of such equipment as large combatant ships and replenishment ships and in its operational initiatives. For example, since December 2008, Chinese Navy vessels have been deployed off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to take part in international counter-piracy efforts. In March 2023, the Chinese Navy conducted its third trilateral exercise with its Russian and Iranian counterparts in the northern Indian Ocean.

Chinese forces have expanded activities not only in the Indian Ocean but also in other waters. In September 2016, China-Russia “Joint Sea” bilateral naval exercises took place in waters including the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, Chinese Navy conducted a trilateral exercise offshore of Durban in eastern South Africa in February 2023 with its Russian and South African counterparts for the second time since November 2019. China has also deployed a space observation support ship in the southern Pacific and dispatched a military hospital ship to waters including the southern Pacific as well as those near Latin America under “Mission Harmony.”

In September 2015, five Chinese military vessels reportedly sailed in the high seas of the Bering Sea and in U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands. China has deployed the vessels such as the polar research vessel Xue Long to the Arctic Ocean in total twelve times since 1999; moreover, in January 2018, China published a white paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy,” which mapped out a policy of active involvement in Arctic initiatives, including efforts to build a “Polar Silk Road” through the development of Arctic sea routes. It is pointed out that China could take advantage of scientific survey and commercial activities to increase its presence including military activities in the Arctic sea.

Additionally, China has been remarkably trying to secure overseas outposts such as harbors, which would help support its operations in far seas. For example, in August 2017, China began to operate a “support base” for logistics support of the PLA in Djibouti, a strategic point in Eastern Africa facing the Gulf of Aden. It is reported that a Fuchi-class replenishment ship entered the “support base” port in March 2022, and a Yuzhao-class dock landing ship entered the port in August 2022. Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that in addition to these, China may be considering or planning military logistics facilities in several other countries, including Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the UAE, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan. In recent years, China has been promoting its “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) whose main purpose is advertised as establishing an economic zone in regions including the Eurasian continent, with the Chinese military possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counter-terrorism capabilities in coastal states through bilateral and multilateral exercises. While it is thought that the initiative includes a strategic intention to expand its influence in the region, it is possible that the initiative will further improve the PLA’s operational capabilities in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean and elsewhere. For example, China’s support for the construction of port infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other Indian Ocean countries as well as Pacific island countries including Vanuatu could lead China to secure outposts available for its military purposes.

(7) Objectives of Activities in Waters and Airspace

The development and activities of Chinese naval and air forces, descriptions in defense white papers, China’s

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32 In 2012, Xue Long became the first polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, the cargo freighter Yong Sheng became the first Chinese commercial ship to cross the Arctic Ocean. Canadian scientists took part in Xue Long’s voyage to the Arctic Ocean in 2017, and they succeeded for the first time in trial navigation of the Arctic Northwest Passage (along the north coast of Canada). Furthermore, its second polar research vessel Xue Long 2 completed its first Arctic Sea cruising in September 2020, and China is promoting research and construction of a heavy icebreaker.


geographical conditions and globalizing economy, and other factors indicate that the recent water and airspace activities of the Navy, Air Force and other Chinese organizations have the following objectives:

The first is to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territorial land, waters and airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in the effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second is to develop capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. To ensure the prevention of foreign intervention in the Taiwan issue, China needs to enhance its operational capabilities at sea and airspace as Taiwan is surrounded by the sea in all directions.

The third is to weaken the control of other countries on islands subject to China’s territorial claims and enhance the claims through various surveillance activities and use of force in waters and airspace surrounding these islands. Such activities are considered to also have the purpose of creating a fait accompli as part of the reasons for unilaterally changing the status quo and justifying China’s claims based on its own concept of “legal warfare.”

The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying in the East and South China Seas. It has been confirmed that in addition to the existing four platforms, China has built 12 additional offshore platforms on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013, and was also confirmed to be moving towards installing a new structure in May 2022 and June 2022 respectively as well. In late June 2016, the installment of an anti-surface vessel radar and a surveillance camera was confirmed on one of the platforms. Attention is to be paid to matters regarding the platforms, including the purpose of such equipment. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateral development and demanded the termination of such work.

The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In the background is the fact that its sea lanes, including its oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are essential for the Chinese economy. Given the recent strengthening of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they have been expanding military capabilities to cover distant waters beyond China’s near seas.

Given these objectives of China’s water and airspace activities and recent trends, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, as well as in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

7 International Military Activities

In recent years, the PLA has been indicating its positive attitude on nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterpiracy, dispatching numerous units for such overseas missions.

China has vowed to consistently support and actively participate in UN PKO, increasing its presence in UN PKO. According to the UN, as of the end of November 2022, China had a total of 2,224 personnel including troops and police members - the largest number of peacekeepers among the permanent members of the UN Security Council - engaged in UN peacekeeping activities, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Chinese share has remained the second largest, after the U.S. share, since 2016.

Moreover, China has been actively participating in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities.

It is pointed out that factors behind such Chinese attitude include the growing need for protecting and promoting China’s national interests overseas following the expansion of national interests beyond its national borders, China’s attempt to verify military capabilities including units’ long-distance deployment, its intent to raise its status by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community, its hope to diffuse the military’s peaceful and humanitarian images, and its attempt to enhance relations with PKO regions including African countries.

8 Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA under the policy of building a military that “can fight and win a war” has promoted practical exercises including large-scale ones such as
joint exercises led by theater commands, force-on-force exercises, landing exercises, inter-theater exercises, and large exercises including distant ones, as well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other countries, in order to strengthen its operational capabilities.

In the education spectrum as well, the PLA aims to train soldiers who have the ability to execute joint operations. It was reported in 2017 that the PLA National Defense University began training to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations.

China has been developing defense mobilization systems and others in order to effectively utilize private resources in case of emergencies, including wars. The military use of civilian resources includes civilian ships’ transportation of military equipment. As such initiative generally augments China’s forces available for military missions and is expected to proactively be promoted in the future, the initiative’s implications for the Chinese military forces’ operational capabilities should be watched closely.

### 9 National Defense Industry Sector

Under the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, a department of the State Council, China’s main national defense industry had consisted of 12 corporations to develop and produce nuclear weapons, missiles and rockets, aircraft, vessels, information systems and other military equipment. It is pointed out that China was the fifth largest weapon supplier in the world as of 2021. In 2018, China National Nuclear Corporation and China Nuclear Engineering & Construction Corporation was reorganized. After China State Shipbuilding Corporation merged with China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation in 2019, the industry now comprises 10 corporations including China State Shipbuilding Corporation.

While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed that China places emphasis on the enhancement of its military industrial sector, including the domestic production of equipment, to modernize its military. It has been pointed out that China is acquiring technologies ambitiously not only through domestic technology research and development and foreign direct investment, but also via illegal means in the form of secret information theft. The trend of the national defense industry sector is directly linked to the modernization of the military and should be closely watched with strong attention.

China’s civil-military fusion policy has been evident in the technology area. China promotes two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy while civilian technologies are absorbed for national defense development. It also seems interested in absorbing foreign technologies available both for military and civilian purposes. It is pointed out that China’s civil-military fusion policy gives priority to initiatives in seas, outer space, cyber, AI, and other emerging areas for China. The U.S. DoD has pointed out that civil-military fusion includes six mutually related efforts: (1) fusion of China’s defense industrial base with its civilian technology and industrial base, (2) integration and use of scientific and technological innovation across military and civilian sectors, (3) human resources development and mixing of military and civilian expertise and knowledge, (4) incorporation of military requirements into civilian infrastructure and use of civilian structures for military purposes, (5) use of civilian services and logistics capabilities for military purposes, and (6) expansion and deepening of China’s defense mobilization system in a manner that includes all relevant aspects of society and economy for use in competition and war.

In addition, in recent years, China has reportedly promoted the standardization of civilian products for their military adoption from the production stage under the civil-military fusion policy. This initiative is expected to allow the military to more effectively utilize civilian resources.

As the growth rate of defense spending has slowed in recent years, the civil-military fusion policy is expected to become increasingly important for China, which must balance building up its defense and its economy. In addition, in order to realize the aforementioned

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35 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database
38 The existence of the “Hundred Talents Program” and the “Thousand Talents Plan” to invite to China highly specialized human resources from overseas, including people of Chinese descent, is pointed out. As part of this, for example, it is noted that there are researchers with research experience in Japan who are engaged in the development of wind tunnel test facilities necessary for the development of hypersonic weapons.
“intelligentized warfare” advocated by China, it is key to acquire advanced civilian technologies, including so-called game-changing technologies, that would dramatically change future warfare. Therefore, because China’s civil-military fusion policy is seen as an indispensable means to achieve this, this policy, including its relationship to “intelligentized warfare,” must continue to be monitored with serious concern.

3 Relations with Countries and Regions

1 General Situation

China, particularly regarding maritime issues over which its interests conflict with others’, continues to demonstrate its attitude of realizing its unilateral assertions without compromise, while promoting assertive actions including those to unilaterally change the status quo by force and create a fait accompli for such changes, based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order. China has been promoting its BRI as a national strategy, but some BRI-participating countries have recently reconsidering BRI projects due mainly to their fiscal deterioration. Furthermore, it has been pointed that there have been moves towards creating China’s own international order, including the establishment of China-led multilateral mechanisms in many fields such as security, growth, and development to influence political decisions in other countries through efforts such as winning over foreign politicians.

At the same time, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China’s overall national power. Based on such recognition, China has advocated building a “community of shared future for mankind” and referred to promoting the building of “a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, equity and justice, and win-win cooperation.” China proactively carries out military exchanges with other countries. In recent years, China has been engaged in active military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin America. Furthermore, movement to strengthen relationships with Pacific countries is observed. The objectives of China’s promotion of military exchanges are thought to include alleviating other countries’ concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with these countries, creating a favorable security environment for China, enhancing China’s influence in the international community, exploring overseas arms markets, securing stable supplies of natural resources, and ensuring foreign bases.

2 Relations with Russia

Ever since the so-called China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, China and Russia have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the deepening of their “strategic partnership” since its establishment in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was concluded. In 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries came to a settlement. The two countries have a common view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order, and have further deepened their relations. At the China-Russia summit meeting in early February 2022, the two countries assessed China-Russia relations as “superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era.” Furthermore, for example, amid growing tensions in U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations, China and Russia have consistently deepened their cooperation. Each country is believed to be planning to create an international environment favorable to itself by taking a united stance on security issues, such as Taiwan and issues surrounding NATO’s eastern expansion, which are in conflict with the United States and others.

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently

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39 For example, President Xi put forward the “Global Security Initiative” consisting of advocacy of the United Nation’s authority and status as well as opposition to security build up sacrificing the security of other countries in April 2022.

40 According to the statement by then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in December 2017
the largest supplier of weapons to China. Although China-Russia arms transactions in value in recent years have been lower than in some past period, China has apparently continued to indicate its strong interests in importing advanced Russian defense equipment and in joint equipment development with Russia. For example, China has introduced what are believed to be the latest fourth generation Su-35 fighters and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia. China has been reported as the first country to import the Russian S-400 missile system. It is also suggested that Russia has concerns about competing with China in arms exports taking into consideration China’s improvement of technological power.

Military exchanges between China and Russia take place in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior military officers and bilateral and multilateral exercises. For example, China participated in the Vostok 2018 exercise in 2018, viewed as one of the largest Russian military exercises since the end of the Cold War, the Tsentr 2019 exercise in 2019, Maneuvers “Kavkaz 2020” in 2020, Zapad/Interaction 2021 in 2021, and Vostok 2022 in 2022. It is believed that in total over 2,000 troops from PLAA, PLAN, and PLAAF as well as aircraft and naval vessels participated in the Vostok 2022 exercise. Additionally, the two countries have held the large-scale bilateral naval exercise “Joint Sea” since 2012. The annual exercise for 2016 took place in the South China Sea for the first time, and that for 2017 was held in the Baltic Sea and Sea of Okhotsk for the first time. In October 2021, a group of vessels, including a Renhai-class destroyer, participated in the exercise, which was conducted in the Sea of Japan. Furthermore, China and Russia continued this by conducting their first joint navigation around Japan by a total of 10 vessels from both countries. “Joint Sea” exercises in December 2022 were conducted in the East China Sea for the first time in eight years since 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the two countries held the “Aerospace Security” missile defense computer-simulated exercise. Furthermore, China has held the counterterrorism joint exercise “Peace Mission” between China and Russia or among the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established in June 2001 and includes Russia. China likely regards these exchanges as an opportunity to learn about how to operate Russian-made weapons and the operational doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces, which have combat experiences.

In addition, moves indicating deepened China-Russia relations have been confirmed in recent years. In the two countries’ “first joint strategic flight” of bombers in July 2019, their bombers joined in the Sea of Japan and flew to the East China Sea. In September 2019, China and Russia signed a series of documents on cooperation in the military and military technologies. Similar trends continued in 2020. In December that year, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and then Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe held a video teleconference and signed a protocol on the extension of the intergovernmental agreement on mutual notifications of ballistic missile and carrier rocket launches for 10 years.

Furthermore, bombers of Russia and China have flown long distance jointly around Japan a total of five times since the first time mentioned above in July 2019, namely, in December 2020, November 2021, May 2022, and November 2022. The joint flight in May 2022 was with stronger provocation than ever because it was intended for demonstration of force against Japan, which was holding a Japan-U.S.-Australia-India summit meeting at that time. Furthermore, diversified action was seen. Russia announced for the joint flight in November 2022 that Russian aircraft landed on airfields in China for the first time after the joint flight and vice versa. Warships of Russia and China jointly navigated in October 2021, as mentioned above, and warships of both countries navigated separately one week apart around Japan in almost an orbital manner. Warships of both countries participated in the Vostok 2022 exercise mentioned above, conducted machine gun shooting on the sea area west of Hokkaido, and jointly navigated around Japan.

These repeated joint actions conducted by Russia and China are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan and are of grave concern from the perspective of the security of Japan.

In this way, China and Russia demonstrate actions to enhance cooperation further even while aggression against Ukraine is ongoing. There is a possibility for the two countries to enhance military cooperation further, and these developments, including the strengthening
of military cooperation between China and Russia, not only have a direct impact on the security environment surrounding Japan, but may also have strategic effects on the United States and Europe, and should be watched with concern.

3 Relations with North Korea

China has kept close relations with North Korea under the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president to visit North Korea in 14 years, and held his fifth summit meeting with the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un. Chairman Kim sent a congratulatory telegram to President Xi Jinping on his election as President for his third term saying “we will shape a more beautiful future of the North Korea-China relationship meeting demand of the times” in October 2022. President Xi stated in his reply that he would put a great emphasis on the China-North Korea relationship and make it great in the new state of affairs while the world is changing.

China has reportedly adopted three principles on the Korea Peninsula - (1) the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, (2) the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and (3) the resolution of problems through dialogue and consultations - indicating that China gives priority to the maintenance of stability and dialogue as well as the denuclearization. Under these principles, China, while agreeing to UN Security Council resolutions until 2017 to enhance sanctions on North Korea, cooperated with Russia in proposing a draft resolution including lifting some of the sanctions based on UNSC resolutions recently. In May 2022, China exercised its power of veto with Russia to a draft resolution for sanctions proposed by the United States in response to North Korea’s launching of ICBM-class ballistic missiles.

Although China has vowed to have seriously observed its international obligations, it has been pointed out that Chinese ships have been involved in illicit ship-to-ship transfer prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions.

4 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, reciprocal summit-level visits and other activities continue to be actively carried out. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and the ROK), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the ASEAN-China Special Summit in November 2021, there was an announcement on the elevation to the ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Furthermore, China has developed bilateral relations through infrastructure development support, etc., under the BRI.

On the military front, there seems to be moves that China has made efforts toward military confidence building, such as the first ASEAN-China Maritime Field Training Exercise, which took place in October 2018. Moreover, it was reported about the possibility of China using part of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base exclusively in July 2019 and June 2022. Concerning this matter, the Cambodian side denied the existence of such a fact, saying that hosting foreign military bases is against its Constitution. In addition, in June 2021, Cambodia’s Minister of National Defense acknowledged that China had contributed to the development of the Ream Naval Base, which the United States is considered to have concerns about in regard to its military use by China. However, he stated that access to the base facilities was not limited to China alone.

In July 2016, an arbitration award based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South China Sea was rendered, accepting most of the Philippine claims. After that, the Philippines was said to have refrained from referring to the arbitration award. In September 2019, however, a Philippine Presidential Office spokesperson noted that the arbitration award was still a subject in bilateral talks, and in September 2020, then President Duterte remarked at the United Nations General Assembly that, “The (Arbitral) Award is now part of international law beyond compromise and beyond the reach of passing governments to dilute, diminish, or abandon.” In November 2022, the Philippines announced that China Coast Guard interrupted a Philippine navy boat that collected a floating object and tried to take it back with them, and the Chinese ship then took it by
force. China admitted the subject was the debris of Chinese rocket, and insisted it was handed over to China peacefully after discussion on the site.

In July 2017 and March 2018, the Vietnamese government reportedly made foreign companies, engaged in oil drilling in the South China Sea with the permission of the Vietnamese government, cancel the drilling under the pressure from China. Chinese and Vietnamese government ships staged a standoff over oil and natural gas drilling within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone from July 2019 until Vietnam withdrew its HAKURYU-5 drilling rig in October of that year to end the standoff. The Government of Vietnam also announced in April 2020 that it had protested the Chinese side concerning the incident in which a China Coast Guard vessel rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands. On the other hand, in December 2021, the joint medical exercise “Peace Rescue 2021” was conducted for the first time by the Chinese and Vietnamese militaries to improve the medical support capabilities of both militaries. During the exercise, the Chinese side provided the Vietnamese side with medical masks, protective clothing, and PCR test equipment.

Indonesia has had frequent disputes with China over Chinese fishing boats’ operations within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and taken strong actions against foreign fishing boats engaging in alleged illegal operations. Recently, the Indonesian government filed a strong protest against Chinese fishing boats’ illegal operations near Indonesia’s Natuna Islands from December 2019 to January 2020, rejecting China’s assertion on the nine-dash line anew.

China and ASEAN have continued talks to discuss the formulation of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). In July 2019, China announced at the Chinese and ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting that they had completed the first reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text. Subsequently, a second reading was initiated. At the August 2021 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, it was noted that a provisional agreement on the Preamble had been reached. Despite the effects of COVID-19 and other factors, in the Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit in November of that year, there was mention of expectations for the early conclusion of an effective and substantive COC in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political stability and security situations, such as terrorism by Islamic extremists, in Central Asian states. Such concerns of China appear to be reflected in China’s tightened border control and its engagement in the SCO and the stabilization of Afghanistan. Moreover, China is strongly interested in Central Asia, with a view to diversifying its supply sources and procurement methods for resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations.

(3) Relations with South Asian Countries

China has a close relationship with Pakistan under their “all-weather strategic partnership,” and mutual visits by their summit leaders take place frequently. Their cooperation in the military sector, including bilateral exercises, exporting weapons, and transferring military technology, is also deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for China, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China accordingly, partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean.

Although economic ties between China and India are strengthening, the two countries have not demarcated their borders in areas such as Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh.

In May 2020, a clash between Chinese and Indian forces occurred near the China-India border in Ladakh, India, and tensions between the two countries escalated with the first deadly clash in 45 years on June 15 of the same year. Since then, China and India have regularly held commander-level meetings based on the management agreement for the Line of Actual Control, a temporary border between the two countries. They agreed to separate their forces at Pangong Lake in February 2021 and in the Gogra area in July of the same year. The countries are currently still continuing efforts to gradually ease tensions.

In recent years, China has also been deepening its relations with Sri Lanka. To Sri Lanka, which is located at a strategic point in the Indian Ocean and supports the BRI, China has provided massive economic and technical cooperation in infrastructure development, including for railroads, ports, and airports. On the other hand, in July
2017, an agreement was reached to lend interests for 99 years to Chinese enterprises at the Port of Hambantota, which is being constructed with Chinese loans. Some have noted that this constitutes what has been described as a “debt trap.” President Wickremesinghe took office in July 2022, and continues discussions with creditor countries including China to resolve the debt problem. Chinese tracking ship Yuan Wang 5 reportedly operated by the PLA Strategic Support Force entered the Port of Hambantota in August 2022.

Additionally, China is deepening its relations with Bangladesh through its port development in Chittagong where a naval base is located, arms exports including Ming-class submarines, and other deals.

(4) Relations with European Countries

For China, the European Union (EU) countries are increasingly in its presence especially in the economic field.

European countries possess more advanced military technologies than China or Russia regarding information and communication technology, avionics/aeroengines, air independence propulsion (AIP) systems for submarines, and other areas. The EU countries have maintained their arms embargo on China since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, and China has requested them to lift the embargo. If the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, sophisticated military technologies could be transferred to China and to third countries via China, dramatically changing the security environment in the Indo-Pacific and other regions.

China’s recent rise has attracted attention from NATO as well. The new strategic concept announced at a NATO summit meeting in June 2022 states that “China’s ambition and coercive policies challenge NATO’s interests, security, and values,” and expressed concern over rapid enhancement of nuclear forces, absence of transparency, and malicious hybrid and cyber activities. Based on this, it mentioned that NATO will be engaged with China for the alliance’s security interests, and to prevent China’s coercive actions to divide the NATO.

China’s relations with European countries, including EU discussions on the arms embargo on China and NATO’s policy on engagement with China, should be continuously watched.

(5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries, Pacific Island countries, and Central and South American Countries

China has been enhancing its relations with Middle Eastern and African nations in the economic realm. In recent years, it has also strengthened military relations with them. Not only intensive interactions among state leaders and senior military officials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted. China also actively dispatches personnel to undertake UN PKO in Africa. Some suspect that underlying these movements could be China’s aim to ensure a stable supply of natural resources and to secure overseas bases in the future.

China is Australia’s biggest trade partner. However, there has been economic friction between the two countries such as China’s successive restriction on importing Australian beef and other goods since Australia suggested the necessity for an independent investigation into the origin of COVID-19. China has also been boosting its relations with Pacific island countries by providing them with proactive and continuous economic support and medical services deploying a military hospital ship. China has promoted resources development in Papua New Guinea and signed an agreement with the island country on military cooperation. Moreover, it was announced in April 2022 that China and the Solomon Islands signed the “Framework of Security Cooperation.” It was reported in March 2022 that the draft framework included items that allow China to deploy police and troops and allow Chinese warships to call at ports and get supplies. China has also been moving to enhance military relations with Vanuatu, Fiji, and Tonga. In addition, when a volcanic eruption occurred in Tonga in January 2022, China dispatched transport aircraft and supply ships. While China has been enhancing relations with Pacific island nations, Australia and some other countries have expressed concerns about such Chinese moves.

China has been striving to further deepen its relations with Central and South American countries, holding ministerial meetings with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) since 2015. In the military field, China has dispatched senior officials and sold arms to these countries and enhanced relations with them in medical services, counterterrorism and
other areas. In Argentina, China operates an outer space observation facility.

5 International Transfer of Weapons

China has been expanding exports of weapons such as missiles, tanks, aircraft including drones, and ships. China’s major arms export destinations include Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. China has also been reportedly exporting arms to Algeria, Tanzania, Nigeria, and other African countries, countries in South East Asia including Thailand and Indonesia, Venezuela and other Latin American countries, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern countries, and Turkmenistan and other former Soviet Union countries.44

Some claim that China has transferred weapons to foreign countries in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with friendly nations, enhance its influence in the international community, and secure natural resources. China has not participated in some of the frameworks for international arms export control, and some point out that missile-related and other technologies have been transferred from China to other countries.

REFERENCE: Security Environment Surrounding Japan (China)

44 According to SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
With regard to the relationship between the United States, the world’s largest economic power, and China, the second largest, competitions between the two countries across the political, economic and military realms have become increasingly apparent in recent years. This is due to various concerns such as changes in the balance of power caused by China’s growing national power, trade issues, issues concerning the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, the Hong Kong issue, and human rights issues in China regarding Uighur and Tibet. In particular, since the former Trump administration, the moves of the United States and China that had kept each other in check have come to the surface. Under the Biden administration as well, there has been strong interest in the irreversible developments in the strategic competition between the two countries.

In October 2022, the Biden administration published the National Security Strategy (NSS), and placed China as the United States’ most consequential geopolitical challenge, and positioned it as the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological powers to do it. It stated that China has ambitions to become the world’s leading power, invests in its rapidly modernizing military power, enhances its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, and attempts to erode U.S. alliances. The NSS also expressed the idea that the world is at an inflection point, and the next ten years will be the decisive decade in determining the competitive position of the United States against China. Based on this perception, the administration raises three points as the axis for its policy towards China, that is, (1) investment in competitiveness, innovation, resiliency, and democracy, (2) cooperation with allies and partners, and (3) responsible competition with China to defend the interests of the United States and build a vision for the future. The government stated it will pursue greater strategic stability through measures to responsively manage competition, lower risks of unintended military escalation, and ultimately engage with China through measures on arms control efforts. On the other hand, the administration expresses that it is willing to work with China where both interests align because China, being central to the global economy, has a strong influence on shared challenges. Climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and the global food crisis are indicated as some of the challenges requiring cooperation. In this way, the Biden administration takes over from the former Trump administration the deterrence stance against China while considering dealing with cross-border challenges important, and thus it announces managed competition with China and cooperation in specific fields.

The administration, in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) published in October 2022, placed China’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor, to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences, as the most comprehensive and serious challenge to the security of the United States. It further stated that China was a “pacing challenge”, and that the Department of Defense should take actions rapidly to maintain and enhance deterrence against China, because China has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with a focus on offsetting U.S. military advantages.

Taking a strict attitude towards China is becoming common nonpartisan policy. For example, a resolution to establish a nonpartisan “Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party” was passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in January 2023.

On the other hand, China opposes this, stating that this type of attitude is an old-fashioned representation of a Cold War mentality and zero-sum game, and is stirring up competition between superpowers. China shows a non-compromising attitude over its own “core interests and material concerns,” and uses special caution regarding involvement with the United States especially in regard to Taiwan issues that China values as “the core of the core interests.” When then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, China conducted large scale military exercises in various areas around Taiwan, and showed an uncompromising attitude against the United States. For example, China announced countermeasures that it withholds various discussion between the two countries. Both countries agreed on the importance of working out
a competition management policy, continued dialogue, and cooperation to deal with international challenges such as climate change and food security at the U.S.-China summit meeting held for the first time in person under the Biden administration in November 2022. However, they made no concessions in areas of conflict such as the Taiwan issue, human rights issues, and on trade issues. United States Armed Forces shot down a Chinese reconnaissance balloon that was detected over the U.S. homeland in February 2023. The U.S. Government communicated to China that the flight was a clear violation of its sovereignty and of international law, and postponed Secretary of State Blinken’s visit to China scheduled in the same month. China insisted that it was a privately owned weather observation airship that strayed into U.S. territory due to force majeure, and expressed strong discontent with the shooting down of the balloon by the United States, and protested against it.

In this way, strategic competition between the United States and China in various fields is becoming more and more apparent and has enhanced a sense of caution in the United States especially regarding the field of sensitive technologies and key technologies in which the fierce competition is most perceptible. China promotes the “intelligentization” of the PLA; for example, General Secretary Xi of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), stated in his report in the 20th CCP Congress in October 2022 that China “will continue integrated development of the military through mechanization, informatization, and the application of smart technologies (intelligentization).” Based on these movements, the Biden administration puts effort into protecting and fostering sensitive technologies and key technologies recognizing that U.S. security will be threatened as a result of the strengthening of Chinese military power due to leakage of sensitive and key technologies from the United States and its allies. Aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of the United States in the semiconductor field, the “Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act” was passed in August 2022 to support semiconductor manufacturing companies in the United States financially, while making it compulsory that the supported companies agree with the Secretary of Commerce not to enhance advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities in countries of particular concern including China for ten years. In addition, the administration announced the enhancement of Export Administration Regulations related to semiconductors in October 2022 to limit the ability of China to obtain and manufacture technologies and products used in advanced military systems to increase the accuracy and speed of military decision making. It also took measures to add Chinese AI semiconductor-related companies to the entity list in December 2022 to restrict exportation from the United States because the companies are supporting the modernization of the PLA. In February 2023, Chinese companies and institutes related to the aerospace industry were added to the entity list for supporting the PLA’s aerospace plans including plans for balloons.

On the other hand, China criticizes these measures taken by the United States as malicious blockage of Chinese companies. Moreover, in response to the tightening of regulations by the United States and other foreign countries, China has been enforcing a series of countermeasures, such as laws and regulations, since 2020. In September 2020, China implemented its Unreliable Entity List in response to the U.S. Entity List. In December of the same year, China’s Export Control Law entered into force to control the export of technology and the like related to China’s national security and interests. As further pushing back against the United States measures, in January 2021, China passed new rules to protect its firms from “unjustified extra-territorial application of foreign legislation and other measures.” In addition to this, in June 2022, China announced the entry into force of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and implemented sanctions against U.S. individuals and organizations, including the former U.S. Secretary of Commerce. China’s Ministry of Commerce then criticized the U.S. Export Administration Regulations related to semiconductors as disruptive to the order of the international economy and trading, and presented a case to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2022. In February 2023, China for the first time added two U.S. companies to the entity list of alleged unreliable business connections because, in Chinese opinion, the companies compromise the safety of China by frequently selling weapons to Taiwan.

Competition in the technology field between the United States and China is likely to intensify further in the future as both sides continue to reciprocate each other’s efforts to set forth new regulations. For example, the United States made a move to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the effects of which can be seen to be spreading internationally.
Military Trends of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific Region

1 General Situation

The Biden administration released its “Indo-Pacific Strategy” in February 2022 clearly stating that it places the highest priority on the Indo-Pacific region because the region is facing mounting challenges from China. The administration pointed out in the NSS published later that competition with China was most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific region. The NDS also pointed out that China attempts to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests using its growing capabilities, including its economic influence, the PLA’s growing strength and military footprint in order to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and stated that the challenges from China in the Indo-Pacific region have the priority.

The Biden administration that puts the Indo-Pacific region utmost importance announced in NSS that it was going to deepen its tightest partnerships with five allies, namely Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand based on the recognition that a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is achievable only with the collective capacity of alliances and partnerships. Furthermore, it was stated that the Quad (comprising Japan, Australia, India, and the United States) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are also important for dealing with regional challenges, because total power can be strengthened through cooperation between Indo-Pacific countries and European countries. The administration also stated that it places emphasis on Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands regions to enhance regional diplomacy, development, and economic involvement. Moreover, it discloses in the NDS the direction of the United States to reinforce and build out resilient security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region in order to sustain a free and open regional order, and deter attempts to resolve disputes by force. With this view, it is stated that it is necessary to modernize the alliance with Japan and strengthen combined capabilities by aligning strategic planning and priorities in a more integrated manner.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 passed through Congress in December 2022 places importance on strategic competition with China and Russia. Newly added to the NDAA are initiatives relating to strengthening the posture and capacity of the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific region, such as the “Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act” with various provisions to strengthen security cooperation with Taiwan, and to establish an inter-departmental task force to confront economic threat from China, as well as for the assignment of a headquarters in command of joint operations within the area of responsibility of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

The United States expressed its determination to optimize its force posture in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan in the joint statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”) held in January 2023. Furthermore, the United States repeatedly states that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is applied to the Senkaku Islands as well. The Biden administration also reconfirms in the NSS its unwavering commitment to defense of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and this policy is continuously reconfirmed in various situations including Japan-U.S. summit meetings.

On the other hand, China resists this U.S. posture, saying these are acts of repressing the growth of China and protecting U.S. hegemony. It is seen that China is wary of the growth of initiatives such as the Quad into strong alliances, as well as with the growing involvement of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, the military power balance between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region is changing because China is rapidly strengthening its military power against a background of economic growth and other factors. China is out of the framework of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty) and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START Treaty) and has been enhancing ground-launched missile power unilaterally. Although the United States has insisted that China should be included in arms control negotiations and expressed its intention to apply brakes to China’s missile power build up, China consistently refuses, asserting that the United States should take the initiative in conducting disarmament.

1 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on December 11, 2019
The changes in the military power balance between the United States and China can affect peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the U.S.-China military trends in the region concerning the South China Sea and Taiwan will require further attention.

2 South China Sea

With regard to the issues over the South China Sea, the United States is concerned about such dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of navigation in sea lanes, restrictions on the activities of U.S. Forces, and the worsening security situation in the entire region. The United States has requested China comply with international norms, and has repeatedly criticized China’s unilateral and assertive actions. On the other hand, China expresses opposition saying the United States is the largest threat to peace and stability in the South China Sea, and confrontation between these two countries is deepening.

China has been advancing into the South China Sea taking advantage of the power vacuum there since the 1950s, and promoting the militarization of the Paracel Islands. It has also been conducting rapid reclamation of the Spratly Islands on a large scale since 2014. Even after the illegality of the Chinese activities such as land reclamation was determined at the Philippines-China arbitration in 2016, China has made it clear that it would not comply with the decision and has been promoting its plan to militarize the area.

In addition, China enhances and activates its actions in the sea and air space in the region, and has repeatedly conducted military exercises and launched ballistic missiles in the South China Sea. Also, in August 2022, China announced that aircraft carrier Shandong conducted training in the South China Sea. Actions that heighten the tension between China and its neighboring nations have also been seen. For example, the Malaysian Air Force announced that 16 aircraft of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) approached the coast of Malaysia in June 2021. Furthermore, China has repeatedly interrupted armed forces of other countries operating in the South China Sea. For example, Australia announced that a Royal Australian Air Force patrol aircraft in flight over the South China Sea received dangerous interference from PLAAF jets in June 2022, and the United States announced an anomalous approach to a U.S. Forces aircraft by a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea in December 2022.

Moreover, China utilizes not only its military forces but also the Coast Guard, which is a “maritime law enforcement organization” in the Coast Guard law, and so-called maritime militia to increase pressure on the neighboring countries, attempting to change the status quo. Actions by China asserting sovereignty have been seen in attempts to interfere with the activities of other countries. There have been cases in which fishing activities of neighboring countries have been interrupted by actions such as the firing of warning shots at fishing boats from China Coast Guard machine guns.

In addition, President Marcos summoned the Chinese ambassador in the Philippines and stated his serious concerns to the incident in which a China Coast Guard ship shone a military-grade laser at a Philippine Coast Guard ship supplying the Philippine Navy near the Second Thomas Shoal in February 2023. The China Coast Guard Law that entered into force in February 2021 includes problematic provisions in terms of their inconsistency with international law. Sources of inconsistency include, among others, ambiguity as to geographical areas the Coast Guard Law applies and how the rules governing the use weapons are implemented, and neighboring countries started expressing concerns about Chinese moves. In addition, in March 2021, the Philippine government announced that it had confirmed approximately 220 Chinese militia ships near Whitsun Reef and expressed concern over the action of maritime militia. It is pointed out that maritime militia play major roles in forceful activities, but not to the extent of provoking armed conflict, in order to fulfill China’s political objectives. It is necessary to pay attention to these asymmetric strategies.

The United States has been criticizing China’s action about issues concerning the South China Sea hitherto, and conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations and other activities.

The Biden administration has continued to show its consistent and strict deterrence stance against China. For example, it stated that the United States will reject China’s claims about maritime interests in the South

China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China and that the Taiwan issue is a domestic one. China maintains that the “One China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for dialogue between China and Taiwan. China is also strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan and has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force in respect of the Taiwan issue. “The Anti-Secession Law,” enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out China’s policy of not renouncing the use of force, providing that in the event that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. General Secretary Xi stated in the report to the 20th Party Congress held in October 2022, in respect of cross-strait issues, China’s position to “continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort” while he stated again “resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”

On the other hand, the United States stated in the NSS that it has an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, does not support Taiwan independence, and remains committed to the “One China” policy which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. Based on this, the United States also makes it clear that it intends to uphold its commitments under the TRA to support Taiwan’s self-defense, and to maintain the United States’ capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.

The Biden administration has positioned China as America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge as well as the only competitor with the intent and power to reshape the international order, and has made clear its diplomatic stance to contain China through cooperation with allies and partner countries on issues concerning Taiwan and other matters. For example, since the start of Biden administration, the importance of “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” has been repeatedly mentioned at international meetings such as the Japan-U.S. summit meetings, the G7 Summit, and the U.S.-EU summit meetings. Furthermore, the Biden administration has been promoting efforts to enhance Taiwan’s international standing, including calling on UN member states to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in
the UN system.

The United States has decided to sell weapons to Taiwan based on the TRA. Since the inauguration of the Biden administration also, the United States has continued to sell weapons such as self-propelled howitzers, aircraft-launched missiles, and maintenance and repair packages for air defense missile systems. The Biden administration also continued to have U.S. warships pass through the Taiwan Strait periodically. Moreover, President Tsai Ing-wen acknowledged that the U.S. military was visiting Taiwan for training purposes in an interview with U.S. media in October 2021.

With regard to the United States, not only the government but also Congress has indicated its intention to further enhance support for Taiwan. Congressional delegations of the United States including then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi, visited Taiwan repeatedly and met with President Tsai and others, and exchanged views on strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations and other matters during 2022. Moreover, the FY2023 NDAA that passed through Congress in December 2022 includes approvals for the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to enhance security cooperation with Taiwan, and military financing of up to US$10 billion over five years from 2023 to 2027, among other items.

Responding to this, China has further intensified military activities around Taiwan. According to announcements from the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan, the number of Chinese military aircraft entering airspace around Taiwan has been increasing since September 2020. The total number of aircraft entering the airspace was over 970 in 2021, and that number increased significantly from the previous year to over 1,700 aircraft in 2022. Furthermore, the Ministry announced that other aircraft such as attack helicopters, air refueling tankers, and UAVs came to be confirmed entering the airspace from 2021, in addition to conventional fighter jets and bombers.

China announced that it will conduct “a series of integrated military actions” and set six training areas around Taiwan, in conjunction with then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, on August 2, 2022. China launched nine ballistic missiles on August 4, 2022, five of which were landed within the Japanese Executive Economic Zone (EEZ), and another, the closest, was landed at a point of about 80 km from Yonagunijima Island. This was perceived as a threat to local residents. It is probable that, in this military exercise, China may have rehearsed some parts of a Taiwan invasion operation, such as the blockade of Taiwan, ground/ship attacks, the acquisition of sea/air superiority in wartime, and gray-zone situations, including cyber attacks and “cognitive warfare.”

Furthermore, according to the announcement of National Defense Ministry of Taiwan, PLA aircraft intermittently entered air space east of the China-Taiwan “median line” over Taiwan Strait, since the U.S. Congress Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

Due to these increasing military activities by China in the vicinity of Taiwan and the response from the Taiwanese side to the situation, the possibility of military tension between China and Taiwan to become further heightened cannot be denied.

While the Biden administration is clarifying its stance of supporting Taiwan in the military-related area, it is deemed unlikely that China, which position Taiwan issues as “the core of the core interests,” will show a compromising attitude towards the U.S. stance. It is viewed that the U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan may become more apparent. Stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important not only for Japan’s security but also for the stability of the international community. Therefore, it is necessary that we pay close attention to the situation with a sense of crisis more than ever before.
1 Relations with China

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party, who took office in 2016, has noted that she has never accepted the “1992 Consensus” that China claims as embodying the “One-China” principle. In response, China has criticized the Democratic Progressive Party for destroying the political foundation of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations by rejecting the “1992 Consensus” unilaterally, emphasizing that the maintenance of the “1992 Consensus” would be the unshakable foundation for peace and stability of cross-Strait relations.

In a January 2019 speech at an event commemorating the 40th anniversary of China’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” regarding the application of the “one country two systems” model to Taiwan, General Secretary Xi stated that “the specific form of the ‘one country, two systems’ model in Taiwan will give full consideration to the situation in Taiwan.” In her immediate response to the speech, President Tsai issued a statement firmly rejecting the “one country, two systems” model and called for negotiations between “government-authorised agencies.” Moreover, in October 2021, at the ceremony commemorating the 110th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution, General Secretary Xi sought to check the Tsai administration again, stating, “Those who… seek to split the country will come to no good end; they will be disdained by the people and condemned by history.” On the other hand, in her speech for the Double Tenth National Day Celebration that month, President Tsai said, “We call for maintaining the status quo,” stating that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other,” and emphasized the stance that cross-strait conflicts should be resolved through dialogue between the two sides on equal footing.

In regard to relations between the international community and Taiwan, since around the inauguration of President Tsai for her first term, Taiwanese delegates were refused attendance at or had their invitations deferred from meetings held by international organizations, including ones in which they had participated up to that point. As Honduras severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established such relations with China in March 2023, the number of countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan declined to 13 from 22 in May 2016, when President Tsai took office. Taiwan is strongly protesting these actions, claiming them to be “actions taken by China that compress the international space of Taiwan.”

2 Taiwan’s Military Power and Defense Strategy

With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a total of approximately 104,000 personnel. In regard to the organization of the army, plans are underway to abolish the traditional Army Corps and the like and establish “theaters of operation” as permanent organizations of joint operation. The Taiwanese Minister of National Defense explained the reason for this as being advantageous for the execution of integrated operations during conflict or peacetime. In addition, it is assessed that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. In January 2022, the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency was established to integrate the reserve forces and public and private organizations involved in wartime mobilization to optimize the efficiency of the mobilization system in the event of an emergency. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses the indigenously built “Tuo Chiang” stealth corvette, among other vessels. Taiwan is currently promoting a national shipbuilding program to independently build its own military vessels, which includes plans to build eleven Tuo Chiang-class corvettes by 2026 and ultimately about eight indigenously built submarines. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 fighters (A/B and F-16V upgraded from A/B), Mirage 2000 fighters,

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4 The “1992 Consensus” refers to what represents a common understanding reached between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities in 1992 on the “One-China” principle. The CCP and Taiwan’s Kuomintang Nationalist Party (Taiwan’s ruling party at the time), viewed as parties to the consensus, have reportedly differed over the interpretation of the consensus. In addition, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has clarified that it has not accepted the “1992 Consensus.”

5 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan on September 24, 2019
Ching-kuo fighters, and other assets. In November 2021, Taiwan’s first unit composed of F-16V fighters upgraded from F-16A/B fighters was established at Chiayi Air Base, and the deployment of fighters capable of carrying longer-range missiles is being strengthened, including the new F-16V fighters scheduled to be introduced from the United States.

Taiwan adopted conscription in 1951, but it has been switching to a volunteer system mainly to improve the expertise of its military personnel, and the last of the conscripts were enlisted by the end of 2018. After that, while the four-month mandated military training for males aged eighteen to thirty-six has been maintained, the Tsai administration decided in December 2022 to revive the one-year obligatory military service for males of conscription age from 2024. The administration stated that the new military service will include more enhanced training than conventional mandated military training, such as compulsory enhanced training for new equipment and compulsory practical engagement training.

On the other hand, since China has consistently expressed its intention of not renouncing the use of force to Taiwan, the country may make a decision on military options such as air and maritime blockade, limited use of force, air and missile operations, and invasion of Taiwan. If that happens, it is deemed that China will deter or delay any potential interventions by the United States. It was reported in December 2021 that according to an unpublished report submitted from the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan to the Legislative Yuan about the Chinese invasion process for Taiwan, in the initial phase, China will assemble its military forces on the Chinese coast under the guise of exercises and use “cognitive warfare” to cause panic among the Taiwanese people. China will then gather its naval vessels in the western Pacific to prevent foreign military intervention. Next, under the strategy of transformation from exercises to war, the Rocket and Air Forces will launch ballistic and cruise missiles to attack Taiwan’s key military facilities, while the Strategic Support Forces carry out cyber attacks on Taiwan’s key military systems. Finally, after gaining sea and air superiority, landing operations by amphibious assault ships, transport helicopters, and more will be carried out, thus achieving total control of Taiwan before foreign forces intervene.

In response to such moves of China, Taiwan under President Tsai Ing-wen has put forth defense strategy called as “Resolute Defense and Multi-domain Deterrence” preventing the invasion from China at the farthest points possible within its territory with a multi-layered defense posture, which combines major equipment such as fighters and vessels with asymmetric force. The strategy raises a defense concept comprising “force protection” to contain the initial destruction caused by the enemy and ensure integrity of military power through mobility, concealment, dispersion, deception, camouflage, and other tactics, “decisive battle in littoral zone” to gain a partial superiority by air assets and shore-based firepower, and deploying integrated forces in order to intercept and destroy the enemy’s landing forces, and “destruction of enemy at landing beach” to destroy the enemy at breathing, landing beach and coastal areas by integrating forces, firepower and prepositioned barriers of three services during the enemy’s landing and maneuvering operations on shore, and give them no places to set foot on.6 This is believed to be aimed at exhausting the operational capabilities of the Chinese military and preventing or reducing the landing of Chinese troops in the face of the overwhelming gap in military strength between China and Taiwan, as well as delaying an invasion by the Chinese military and buying time until intervention by the U.S. military. It is believed that Taiwan plans to constrain any Chinese military invasion from a long distance by expanding the development and production of domestically produced asymmetric capabilities and long-range weapons, as well as introducing high-performance, long-range weapons from the United States, in order to successfully execute “Resolute Defense and Multi-domain Deterrence.”

Taiwan is currently strengthening its domestic development of sea and air capabilities, long-range missiles, and the like. In November 2021, a special budget bill for the expansion of sea and air capabilities was passed, and it was decided to invest 240 billion Taiwan dollars (approximately 950 billion yen) over five years for the acquisition of self-developed equipment. In addition to these, Taiwan has decided to acquire from the United States the “M142” (HIMARS) high mobility artillery rocket system, the “RGM-84L-4” (Harpoon) surface-to-ship missile system, and the “AGM-84H”

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6 Note that the 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Report present tactical principles of “resist the enemy on the opposite shore, attack it at sea, destroy it in the littoral area, and annihilate it on the beachhead.” It will impose multiple interdictions and joint fire strikes to degrade the enemy’s capabilities, disrupt its offensive and prevent it from landing, so as to ultimately defeat its aggression.
(SLAM-ER) long-range air-to-surface missile.

In November 2021, a national defense report (the National Defense Report 2021) was released for the third time under the Tsai administration, presenting to the people the defense policy initiatives of the past two years. While maintaining the defense strategy of “Resolute Defense and Multi-domain Deterrence,” the report indicates China’s strong wariness of China’s gray zone tactics, including a new section on China’s gray zone threats. The report recognizes China’s gray zone tactics as a means of “seizing Taiwan without a fight.” Specific examples raised of China’s gray zone tactics include cyber attacks through information gathering, attacks on infrastructure and systems, and other means, and “cognitive warfare” to create disorder in Taiwan’s society by manipulating and disturbing the public’s mentality through the development of the “Three Warfares” (psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare) and disseminating disinformation via social media and other such means. In response to these threats from China, Taiwan has expanded its asymmetric capabilities and domestically produced weapons, purchased weapons from the United States, strengthened integrated training, enhanced cyber operations capabilities, enhanced literacy education on Chinese cognitive warfare, and strengthened its mobilization system through the establishment of the “All-out Defense Mobilization Agency.”

In addition to this, Taiwan annually conducts the “Han Kuang” large-scale military exercise that simulates an invasion by Chinese forces. It is believed that the Taiwan military’s defense strategy is verified through this series of drills. In the “Han Kuang” exercises in recent years, in addition to anti-landing and interception programs, drills are conducted with an awareness of anti-gray zone tactics, such as anti-cyber warfare and joint drills between the Navy and the Coast Guard Administration. It is said that training in the “Han Kuang 38” Exercise in 2022 was set based on the aggression against Ukraine, and included counterattack training using Javelin anti-tank missiles, combat drills with reservists deployed on front lines, air defense drills conducted with the participation of all citizens, and anti-cyber and cognitive warfare exercises.

### 3 Military Balance between China and Taiwan

While China has continued to increase its defense budget by a significant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget, at approximately 409.2 billion Taiwan dollars for FY2023, has remained almost unchanged for nearly 20 years. China’s announced military budget in the same year totals approximately 1,553.7 billion yuan, roughly 17 times the amount of Taiwan’s in terms of U.S. dollars based on exchange rates announced by the Taiwanese Central Bank. It is pointed out that China’s actual defense expenditure has been larger than the published defense budget, indicating that the China-Taiwan defense expenditure gap could be greater. Amid this situation, President Tsai has ordered an increase in Taiwan’s defense budget.

The U.S. Department of Defense evaluates the PLA’s invasion capabilities against Taiwan as the following, according to the 2022 Report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” released in November 2022:

- The PLA Army organized six combined arms brigades capable of carrying out amphibious operations, comprising four brigades in the Eastern Theater the operational range of which includes Taiwan, and two brigades in the Southern Theater.
- The PLA Navy is building up a system to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter third-party intervention by deploying new attack submarines and modern surface combat vessels with anti-air capabilities. While it has not invested in landing ships and craft considered to be enough in number for large-scale assault on Taiwan, it may intend to make up for the shortage with civilian transport ships and other vessels.
- The PLA Air Force has acquired advanced aircraft to conduct air and ground-attack operations. It also has a high ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capability to support military operations in the event of a Taiwan invasion. Furthermore, it is improving its ability to operate further from China through enhanced refueling capabilities.
- The PLA Rocket Force intends to degrade Taiwan’s defense and break the will to fight through missile attacks against high-value targets including Taiwan’s military facilities.
In addition to this, it is pointed out in the report that the Strategic Support Force would conduct cyber and psychological warfare in the event of a Taiwan invasion, and the Joint Logistic Support Force, newly formed in 2016, would be responsible for integrated logistical support missions.

The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows:

(1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an overwhelming number of troops, its capability of landing and invading the main island of Taiwan is limited at present. In recent years, however, China has been steadily improving its landing invasion capabilities through building and commissioning large landing ships, and it is also improving transportation capabilities by mobilizing civil transport ships and the like. Confronting this, in recent years, Taiwan also has been taking actions to improve anti-landing capabilities such as by conducting enhanced training using asymmetric weapons including Javelin anti-tank missiles, and combat drills with reservists and would-be draftees from conscription who will be reinstated in the future.

(2) In regard to China’s naval and air forces, the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force are being rapidly reinforced both in terms of quality and quantity. This includes the launching of the second domestic-built aircraft carrier which reportedly could be equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system, and operational deployment of the J-20 fifth-generation fighter. While Taiwan strives to enhance its naval and air forces by passing special budgets for them, the capability gap is expanding in an advantageous direction for China.

(3) Regarding missile strike capabilities, China has many missiles including short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and multiple launch rockets and other assets with enough range to strike Taiwan. Although Taiwan is enhancing its missile defense capabilities such as by upgrading its PAC-2 system imported from the United States and newly acquiring the PAC-3 system, it is pointed out that the ability to counter enemy’s saturation attacks is limited. In addition, Taiwan attempts to enhance stand-off attack capabilities, including by developing and producing long-range cruising missiles such as the “Hsiung Sheng” surface-to-surface missile, which is said to have a range of 1,200 km, and it is considered to be aiming to introduce the AGM-158 long-range air-to-surface missile from the United States.

Comparison of military capabilities should be made based not only on the troop strength and the performance and quantity of equipment but also on various other factors such as the purpose and aspects of assumed military operations, operational arrangements, the skill level of personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is rapidly tilting to China’s favor.

China has intensified its coercive military activities around Taiwan, and concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, which is indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community, are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, but also in the entire international community.

Recognizing that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are a challenge not only for the Indo-Pacific region but one common to the entire world, Japan, in cooperation with its ally, the United States, like-minded countries, and the international community, will pay close attention to the relevant situation with a greater sense of crisis.
Fig. I-3-3-1 Placement of Taiwan military
### Fig. I-3-3-2  Comparison of China and Taiwan Military Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground forces</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total military forces</td>
<td>Approx. 2.04 million troops</td>
<td>Approx. 0.17 million troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground troops</td>
<td>Approx. 0.97 million troops</td>
<td>Approx. 94,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks, etc.</td>
<td>Type-99/A, Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others, Approx. 6,050 vehicles</td>
<td>M-60A3, CM-11 and others, Approx. 750 vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warships</td>
<td>Approx. 720 vessels, Approx. 2,300,000 tons</td>
<td>Approx. 250 vessels, Approx. 210,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates</td>
<td>Approx. 90 vessels</td>
<td>Approx. 30 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>Approx. 70 vessels</td>
<td>4 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>Approx. 40,000 troops</td>
<td>Approx. 10,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 3,200 aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 510 aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reference

- **Term of service**: 2 years
- **Population**: Approx. 1.42 billion
- **Term of service**: Approx. 23.5 million

*(Note) Data from “The Military Balance 2023,” etc.*

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### Fig. I-3-3-3  Changes in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense Budget

![Graph](chart-image)

- **Defense budget (in 100 million Taiwan dollars)**
- **Year-on-year growth rate (%)**

*Note* the website of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan

*(Note) Data from “The Military Balance 2023,” etc.*
Fig. I-3-3-4  Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan

(Note) Data from “The Military Balance” (of respective years)

China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, Su-35, J-10, J-15, J-16, J-20)
Taiwan (Ching-kuo, F-16, Mirage 2000)
The Korean Peninsula has been split for more than half a century, with people of the same ethnicity divided between south and north parts. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under such security environment is an extremely important challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region of East Asia.

### Fig. I-3-4-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>U.S. Forces Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total military forces</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 1.28 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 560,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 30,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground troops</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 1.1 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 420,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 20,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanks</strong></td>
<td>T-62, T-54/55, etc.</td>
<td>M-48, K-1, T-80, etc.</td>
<td>M-1A2SEPv2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 3,500</td>
<td>Approx. 2,150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warships</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 790 vessels 100,000 tons</td>
<td>Approx. 230 vessels 290,000 tons</td>
<td>Supporting corps only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Destroyers</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frigates</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 29,000 personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat aircraft</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 550</td>
<td>Approx. 660</td>
<td>Approx. 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third, fourth and fifth generation fighters</strong></td>
<td>MiG-23 × 56</td>
<td>F-4 × 29</td>
<td>F-16 × 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-29 × 18</td>
<td>F-16 × 161</td>
<td>F-15 × 59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-35 × 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>25.96 million</td>
<td>51.84 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Term of service</strong></td>
<td>Men: 10 years</td>
<td>Navy: 20 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women: 7 years</td>
<td>Air Force: 21 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) Data from “The Military Balance 2023,” etc.
1 North Korea

1 General Situation

Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea (hereinafter “Chairman Kim”) made it clear that he adhered to the so-called “Byungjin line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear forces development as well as “Songun politics” in May 2016. In fact, North Korea pushed ahead and conducted three nuclear tests and launched numerous ballistic missiles from 2016 to 2017 and stated that it had completed development of the state nuclear force. This intensified sanctions based on resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and other independent sanctions by several countries including Japan and the United States.

On the other hand, in early 2018, Chairman Kim declared that the “Byungjin line” had been successfully carried out and announced the “new strategic line” in which it would “fully concentrate efforts on the construction of a socialist economy.” Chairman Kim decided to discontinue “nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic rocket test-fire” and announced the nuclear test ground had been blown up, while momentum towards dialogue between the United States or the ROK and North Korea grew. He also expressed during the summit meeting with the U.S. in June 2018 the intention to work towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

However, the February 2019 U.S.-North Korea summit meeting ended without the two sides reaching an agreement. In December of the same year, Chairman Kim announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolled back its hostile policy towards North Korea. Furthermore, Chairman Kim showed his hostile stance towards the United States in January 2021 and stated to “further strengthen the nuclear war deterrent,” showing the intention to continue developing nuclear and missile capabilities.

After that, North Korea criticizes the U.S. attitude towards it and continuously states its intention to strengthen military power including nuclear weapons as “self-defense”. During 2022, North Korea repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and other missiles with an unprecedented frequency. North Korea resumed launching intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM)-class ballistic missiles from February 2022 and passed a law stipulating the terms for using nuclear weapons in September; Chairman Kim insisted, “we can never abandon nuclear weapons.” After launching ICBM-class “Hwasong-17” on November 18, North Korea stated that it had verified its performance clearly and would continue to enhance and strengthen its nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, North Korea has been concentrating on enhancing nuclear and missile related technologies and operational capabilities. For example, ballistic missiles flying with irregular trajectories and missiles referred to as “hypersonic missile” are repeatedly launched. In addition, operationalization of long-range cruise missiles is being pursued with a view to arming them with “tactical nuclear weapons.”

North Korea has continued to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and enhancement of their operational capabilities by conducting six nuclear tests and repeatedly launching ballistic missiles as a nuclear delivery system so far. It is assessed that North Korea already possesses the technological capabilities to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles, whose range includes Japan and is able to attack Japan with such a missile. Still, it will continue to make further efforts to maintain and enhance its military capabilities and combat readiness, including its nuclear and missile capabilities, as stated above.

Moreover, it is probable that North Korea promotes enhancement of cyber troops and keeps special operations forces on a large scale. While the defense budget of North Korea was said to make up 15.9% of its annual budget according to the statement of the Supreme People’s Assembly in January 2023, this seems to be only a part of the actual defense budget. While facing serious economic difficulties without any improvement in its human rights situation to date, North

1 As of May 2016, Kim Jong-un held the position of the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was renamed the State Affairs Commission, and Kim Jong-un assumed the position of Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. Reflecting this change, “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” is used for the title of Kim Jong-un throughout this white paper.

2 In a written decision of the 7th Congress of the KWP, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016), it has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force.
Chapter Ⅰ
Part 3
Defense Policies of Countries

Section 4 Korean Peninsula

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DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2023

Korea continues to heavily allocate its resources to military affairs. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly used provocative rhetoric and behavior against relevant countries, including Japan.

North Korea’s military activities described above pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community.

Needless to say, North Korea’s development and possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. At the same time, sufficient attention needs to be paid to its development and deployment of ballistic missiles, military confrontation of the Korean Peninsula and proliferation of WMDs and missiles. As for North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, utmost efforts continue to be made to realize the return of all abductees to Japan as quickly as possible by close cooperation with related countries, including the United States.

2 Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has continued to enhance its military forces consistently in the situation of south-north division, however, reduction in military assistance from the former Soviet bloc due to the end of the Cold War, its sluggish economy and modernization of ROK Forces have resulted in much of its equipment being outdated, and there is significant qualitative disparity between North Korea’s conventional forces and those of the ROK’s military and U.S. Forces Korea. Nevertheless, North Korea’s military forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength reaching roughly 1.28 million personnel. It still maintains a large-scale military force, including artillery units deployed near the DMZ. North Korea also retains special operations forces and the like on a large scale for information gathering and sabotage. In addition, many military underground facilities seem to exist all over the land, which is a peculiarity of North Korea.

Furthermore, in order to maintain its regime, North Korea is believed to be planning to build its own nuclear deterrent and improve capability to respond to conflicts with U.S. and ROK forces by concentrating on building up its WMD and ballistic missile arsenal, etc. In recent years, North Korea has repeatedly launched short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and other missiles capable of flying at low altitudes with irregular trajectories in a simultaneous process of promoting the development of ICBM-class ballistic missiles covering a range of the whole U.S. territory, rapidly improving related technologies and operational capabilities and diversifying their launch platforms to include rail-launched and submarine-launched types. At the same time, North Korea has been striving to expand more practical SRBM capabilities. Furthermore, since Chairman Kim mentioned the development of “ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including intermediate-range cruise missiles” in January 2021, North Korea announced that it had succeeded in conducting test launches of long-range cruise missiles and launched ballistic missiles in what it called training for “tactical nuclear weapons operation units.”

The background for North Korea’s series of development and launches appears to be that in addition to acquiring nuclear deterrent capabilities through the possession of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles for the maintenance and survival of the regime, North Korea aims to acquire the means to be able to respond to an armed conflict that could occur between itself and United States as well as ROK forces in which conventional forces or tactical nuclear weapons are used. North Korea repeatedly stated it would enhance its military power including nuclear weapons and missiles according to the “five-year plan for the development of the defense science and the weapon system” (hereinafter “five-year plan”) said to have been presented at the 8th Congress of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) in January 2021, and it is likely that it is focusing efforts

3 North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines, consisting of extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country, adopted at the 5th plenary meeting of the 4th KWP Central Committee in 1962.

4 For example, at the 8th Congress of the KWP in January 2021, Chairman Kim stated that North Korea would “develop tactical nuclear weapons which can be used for various missions according to the purpose of operational duty and target of strike in a modern war” and “thoroughly contain, control and handle various military threats on the Korean peninsula which inevitably accompany the nuclear threat on our own initiative.” He also stated in September 2022 that North Korea “will be enhancing tactical nuclear operation measures relentlessly, realize higher level of diversity of applying means, and strengthen nuclear combat posture from multiple directions.”

5 There was no direct reference to the name “five-year plan for defense scientific development and weapons system development” in North Korea’s announcement at the same Congress of the KWP in January 2021. However, when there was an announcement of the launch of long-range cruise missiles on September 13 of the same year, the North Korean media mentioned it publicly for the first time by stating that this missile development project was significant for “achieving the key objectives of the five-year plan for the development of defense science and weapon system presented at the 8th Congress of the KWP.”
on research and development (R&D) and enhancement of operational capabilities for various weapons under this five-year plan.

(2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about 1.10 million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them seem to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled artillery guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including Seoul.

The Navy retains about 790 ships and boats with a total displacement of approximately 100,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model Romeo-class submarines, about 30 midget submarines and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and other actions of the special operations forces.

The Air Force has approximately 550 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces.

Moreover, North Korea retains a large-scale special operations force as so-called asymmetric capabilities. Also, it is likely in recent years that it has been strengthening its cyber forces as asymmetric forces as well in order to steal military secret intelligence and funds for developing nuclear weapons and missiles, and develop capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of other countries.

3 WMD and Missiles

At the 8th Congress of the KWP held in January 2021, Chairman Kim indicated a stance of further enhancing nuclear and missile capabilities and continuously improving North Korea’s military power. He referred specifically, as future objectives, to the advancement of nuclear technology including the development of “tactical nuclear weapons,” preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike capabilities and development of various weapons including “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” and submarine-launched and ground-launched solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It is said that the “five-year plan” was presented at the same Congress, and since that year, North Korea actually has been improving related technologies and operational capabilities based on this plan, including the successive launches of ballistic missiles flying with irregular trajectories, missiles called “hypersonic missile” and new ICBM-class ballistic missiles.

The launches of ballistic missiles and other missiles by North Korea have continued; moreover, from early 2022, in particular, it has forced through launches with an unprecedented frequency. North Korea resumed launches of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)-class and longer-range ballistic missiles including new ICBM-class ballistic missiles which it had not launched since 2018. At the same time, North Korea likely intends to enhance further surprise attack capabilities, complicating indication of warning detection and interception of its missiles, by pursuing the operationalization of ballistic missiles that can fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories as well as by launching these missiles from various platforms such as Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs), submarines and trains. In addition to this, it is also a recent distinctive feature that North Korea likely aims to enhance and display its operational capabilities by escalating provocation, implying actual war situations; for example, it repeatedly launched ballistic missiles almost every day in training of “tactical nuclear weapons operation units” from late September to October 2022.

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6 James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK notes about North Korea’s Special operations force: “The forces are estimated at approximately 200,000 strong.”

7 The signs of a launch from a fixed launcher are easy for the adversary to detect and are vulnerable to attack by the adversary. TEL was developed mainly by the former Soviet Union, among others, in order to make the detection of launch signs more difficult and increase survivability. According to the U.S. DIA’s “North Korea Military Power” of October 2021, North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs for Scud B and Scud C, 100 TELs for Nodongs, and 50 TELs for IRBMs (Musudans). As for a TEL-mounted missile launch, it is deemed difficult to detect individual specific signs in advance concerning the detailed location and timing of the launch. This is because it is operated by being mounted and transported on a TEL, and furthermore, military-related underground facilities are thought to exist all over North Korea.
In addition, given the technological maturity obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed to possess the technological capabilities to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles, at least such ballistic missiles as Nodong and Scud-ER, whose range includes Japan and is able to attack Japan with such a missile. Still, it repeatedly states the intention to enhance its nuclear forces further.

Recent remarkable development of nuclear and missile-related technologies by North Korea cannot be overlooked for the security of Japan and the region. Such military trends in North Korea pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Considering that North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests so far, it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program.

With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons, North Korea has suggested its production and extraction on several instances. Recently, it has been pointed out that the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon that was believed to have been out of operation since 2018 restarted operations in July 2021. As the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, those activities are causes of great concern.

As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. In November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in recent years; in this regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. Furthermore, it is also pointed out that there are some uranium enrichment facilities that have not been disclosed by North Korea. The series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium. In general, facilities used for uranium enrichment are more secretive in appearance than reactors used for plutonium production, and it is difficult to ascertain their activities from the outside. On the other hand, plutonium has a smaller critical mass than uranium, and it is pointed out that it is easier to make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter. In light of both these advantages, North Korea may continue to promote the development of both plutonium and uranium types of nuclear weapons.

North Korea conducted nuclear tests on October 9, 2006, May 25, 2009, February 12, 2013, January 6, 2016, September 9, 2016 and September 3, 2017. It is highly likely that North Korea has made strides in its nuclear weapons program, while miniaturizing nuclear weapons to be loaded on ballistic missile, by collecting the necessary data through these nuclear tests. For example, in September, 2017, it was announced that Chairman Kim had visited North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute and had seen a hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded onto an ICBM, in addition to which, following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test that was forced through on the same day, North Korea announced that it “successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for ICBM.”

In regard to miniaturization of nuclear weapons small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile, considering the fact that the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in

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8 Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to weapon levels (over 90%).

9 North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods. The 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK estimates that North Korea possesses around 70 kg of plutonium.


11 The 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK assesses that North Korea possesses a substantial amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It has been noted that a uranium enrichment facility different from the one in Yongbyon exists in Kangson.

12 The yield of the sixth nuclear weapons test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a maximum yield of approximately 160 kt. Given the size of the estimated yield, the possibility cannot be discounted that the test was of a hydrogen bomb. North Korea also insisted that its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb test. However, given that the yield of that test is estimated at 6 to 7 kts, it is difficult to conceive that this was a hydrogen bomb test as generally defined.
acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s as well as the North Korean technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached through previous six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already achieved necessary miniaturization of its nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missiles, whose range includes Japan. There have also been reports that North Korea possesses approximately 20 nuclear warheads—overall enough fissile material to produce 45 to 55 nuclear warheads.\(^{13}\)

Furthermore, it is likely that North Korea has been preparing for additional nuclear tests, as has been suggested that North Korea has been working on restoring its northern nuclear test site since March 2022, which it publicly announced it had blown up in 2018.

**b. Background of the Nuclear Program and Future Outlook**

North Korea’s ultimate goal appears to be maintaining its existing regime. It has been developing nuclear weapons to accomplish this goal through constructing its own nuclear deterrence to counter U.S. threats, including threats with nuclear weapons. These perceptions are obvious as can be seen in Chairman Kim’s speech that North Korea can never abandon its nuclear weapons because the objective of the United States is to collapse “our government.”\(^{14}\) It is likely that North Korea will continue to focus on advancing development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles capable of attacking the whole U.S. territory in order to acquire deterrence against the United States.

Meanwhile Chairman Kim showed his perception that it is revealed that “the importance and necessity of a mass-production of tactical nuclear weapons” in the light of the current state that the ROK “assumed our undoubted enemy” in December 2022. North Korea has repeatedly stated that the ROK under the stern policy of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration confronting North Korea will not be excluded from potential targets of its nuclear attacks. Furthermore, North Korea shows its stance to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons with a view to dealing with a possible armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

In September 2022, North Korea passed “the law on the state policy on the nuclear forces” that stipulates mission and command and control of its nuclear forces as well as conditions of using its nuclear weapons. The law notes the main mission of nuclear forces is “to deter a war.” If deterrence fails, its nuclear forces “shall carry out an operational mission for repulsing hostile forces’ aggression and attacks and achieving decisive victory of the war.” Chairman Kim insisted on the justification of North Korea’s nuclear development, saying that by promulgating the law, “our country’s status as a nuclear-weapons state has become irreversible” and “no one can accuse us falsely or question about our nuclear forces.” Furthermore, it is stipulated in the law that nuclear weapons can be used when an attack deemed imminent, regardless of whether it is nuclear or conventional, on “leadership” or “important strategic objects” and, in particular, that a “nuclear strike” will be conducted automatically and immediately in the case that “command and control system over the state nuclear forces” are exposed to any danger. From these factors, it is possible that North Korea assumes a possible use of nuclear weapons in an actual combat.

In fact, North Korea has repeatedly launched missiles, allegedly, for practical training; for example, it launched missiles in “tactical nuclear operation units” training several times from late September to October 2022 and exploded test warheads simulating nuclear warheads above the targets in what was called “comprehensive tactical training for simulated nuclear counterstrike” among others in March 2023. North Korea also announced in March 2023 that Chairman Kim received explanation about tactical nuclear weapons from the department in charge and “instructed about weaponizing of nuclear weapons,” giving direction to expand the production of weapon-grade nuclear materials and nuclear weapons.

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13 According to SIPRI Yearbook 2022.

14 Chairman Kim stated in his speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly held in September 2022 that “while the United States aims to have us remove our nuclear weapon, its final goal is even forcing us to abandon our executive ability for the right to self-defense or to weaken it, and to disrupt my regime anytime” and “we can never abandon nuclear weapons, ... no matter what difficulty we may face.”
Furthermore, it is possible that North Korea will conduct additional nuclear tests in the near future to arm ICBM-class ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and operationalize tactical nuclear weapons pursuing further miniaturization of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to look closer at North Korea’s actions in the future under its policy to enhance nuclear forces both qualitatively and quantitatively as fast as possible, accelerating movement against denuclearization.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to chemical weapons, North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North

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15 Chairman Kim mentioned “progressing R&D project to complete multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology” and “further development of downsizing and weight saving of nuclear weapons and tactical weaponization” at the 8th Congress of the KWP in January 2021.
Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for the production of biological weapons. Possession of sarin, VX, mustard and other chemical weapons and of anthrax, smallpox, pest and other biological agents that could be used as biological weapons have been pointed out. The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on warheads.

(3) Missile Forces

The missiles deemed to be possessed and developed by North Korea are the following.

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**Fig. I-3-4-3** Range of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles

- **ICBM-class “Hwasong-17”** (Range: more than 15,000km*)
- **ICBM-class “Hwasong-15”** (Range: more than 14,000km*)
- **ICBM-class “Hwasong-14”** (Range: more than 5,500km)
- **ICBM-class “Hwasong-12”** (Range: approx. 5,000km)
- **Taepodong-2 variant** (Range: more than 10,000km*)
- **Musudan** (Range: approx. 2,500 to 4,000km)
- **Nodong** (Range: approx. 1,300km/1,500km)
- **Scud-ER** (Range: approx. 1,000km)

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(Note 1) For simplicity, the distance from Pyongyang is displayed in concentric circles as an image.
(Note 2) Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.

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a. Types of Ballistic Missiles Possessed or Developed by North Korea

(a) New SRBMs first launched since 2019

North Korea has launched various kinds of short-range ballistic missiles different from traditional liquid fuel propelled type ones such as Scud missiles since 2019. From published images, it can be ascertained that these SRBMs were launched from a wheeled-drive or continuous-tracked TEL or railway cars with radial exhausts a typical characteristic of solid fuel propelled engines. Many of these SRBMs are being launched towards the east coast of North Korea. It is assumed that North Korea aims to advance operational capabilities, as some images that show impact on a specific target have been released.

(i) SRBM A

The SRBMs, described by North Korea as a “new type of tactical guided weapon,” launched on May 4, May

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16 The 2022 Defense White Paper of the ROK pointed out that North Korea began the production of chemical weapons in 1980s and has stored around 2,500-5,000 tons of them. Furthermore, it is estimated that North Korea has capabilities to cultivate and produce various kind of biological weapons such as anthrax, smallpox, and the plague on its own. North Korea ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987 but has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

17 According to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in March 2023) North Korea possesses 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles in total, 45% of which are presumed to be Scud-class, 45% Nodong-class, and the remaining 10% other intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles.

18 In addition, it is presumed that the second ballistic missile launched on May 25, 2022, and the one launched on November 9, 2022, were SRBMs, and might be SRBM A or SRBM D.
**Fig. I-3-4-4  Major Trends in North Korea’s Ballistic Missile and Other Missile Launches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles Launched by North Korea</th>
<th>(as of May 31, 2023)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taepodong</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taepodong-2 variant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRBM/MRBM (Scud, Nodong, and “Pukguksong-2”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM-class (Musudan, and “Hwasong-12”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM-class (“Hwasong-14,” “Hwasong-15,” “Hwasong-17” and “Hwasong-18”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (what could have been ballistic missiles or presumed to have failed, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enhancement of missile-related technologies:
1. Enhancement of launch secrecy and instantaneity
2. Enhancement of capabilities to breach Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
3. Development of long range missiles

Enhancement of missile operation capabilities:
North Korea conducted simultaneous launches of multiple missiles, launches at very short intervals, and launches from different locations to a specific target, etc.

**Fig. I-3-4-5  Cases of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles Overflying Japan**

- Launches of ballistic missiles allegedly as launches of satellites after reporting supposed falling areas to international organizations (three times)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Presumed type of missile</th>
<th>Number of launches</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Flight distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009.04.05</td>
<td>Taepodong-2 or variant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Taepodong Area</td>
<td>3,000 km or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012.12.12</td>
<td>Taepodong-2 variant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tongch’ang-ri Area</td>
<td>Approx. 2,600 km (second stage landfall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016.02.07</td>
<td>Taepodong-2 variant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tongch’ang-ri Area</td>
<td>Approx. 2,500 km (second stage landfall)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Launches of ballistic missiles without prior notice (four times)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Presumed type of missile</th>
<th>Number of launches</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Flight distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998.08.31</td>
<td>Taepodong-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Taepodong Area</td>
<td>Approx. 1,600 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017.08.29</td>
<td>IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Sunan</td>
<td>Approx. 2,700 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017.09.15</td>
<td>IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Sunan</td>
<td>Approx. 3,700 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022.10.04</td>
<td>Ballistic missiles over IRBMs in the range</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inland</td>
<td>Approx. 4,600 km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* After the launch of Taepodong-1 on August 31, 1998, North Korea announced that it was the launch of a satellite.
* Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.
9, July 25, and August 6, 2019, January 27, June 5, October 1, October 6, and October 14, 2022, as well as on March 19 and March 27, 2023, are all presumed to be the same system and flew up to approximately 800 km. In terms of the shape, the launched missiles have a similarity to that of the Russian short-range ballistic missile “Iskander.” It is also presumed that this missile is able to fly at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles with an irregular trajectory and can be mounted with a nuclear warhead.

North Korea also launched two SRBMs on both September 15, 2021 and January 14, 2022. Based on images released by North Korea, these missiles were launched from railway cars that appear to have been converted from ordinary freight cars. They have external similarities with SRBM A, and it is possible that they were developed based on that missile. North Korea has announced that it was a firing exercise by the “railway-borne missile regiment” and has also expressed its intention to expand the units in the future.

In this way, North Korea has been pursuing the operationalization of the SRBM A, while diversifying its launch platforms, towards its mass production and deployment, and future developments need to be closely watched.

(ii) SRBM B

The SRBMs, described by North Korea as “new weapon” or as “tactical guided weapon,” launched on August 10, and August 16, 2019, March 21, 2020, and January 17 and June 5, 2022, are all presumed to be the same system and flew up to approximately 400 km. It is also presumed that this missile is able to fly at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles with an irregular trajectory.

(iii) SRBM C

The SRBMs, described by North Korea as “super-large multiple rocket launcher,” launched on August 24, September 10, October 31, and November 28, 2019; March 2, March 9, and March 29, 2020; May 12, June 5, September 29, October 6, October 9, November 3, 22 November 17, and December 31, 2022; January 1, and February 20, 2023, are all presumed to be the same system and flew up to approximately 400 km. Some of the intervals between launches were estimated less than 1 minute, suggesting that North Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire capability required for saturation attacks and the like. Chairman Kim mentioned that they can be loaded with tactical nuclear warheads. Regarding TELs, various types can be confirmed in images published by North Korea.

(iv) SRBM D

It is pointed out the SRBMs (North Korea calls a “new-type tactical guided missile”) launched on March 25, 2021 and September 28, 2022, are presumed to be the same system, and they were developed based on the SRBMA. They are capable of flying at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles with irregular trajectories, and their maximum range could reach about 750 km.

In addition, North Korea carried out two launches of what could have been SRBMs on July 31, 2019 and another two a couple of days later, on August 2. Furthermore, the analysis of the details of two missiles launched on November 2, 2022 that flew approximately 150 km and 200 km respectively is still ongoing.

(b) Scud

The Scud is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile and is operated on a TEL.

Scud B is an SRBM with a range of 300 km, and Scud C is an SRBM with an extended range of 500 km. It is believed that North Korea has manufactured and retained them and has exported them to the Middle East and other countries. On November 3, 2022, North Korea launched three Scud C missiles with an estimated flying distance of about 500 km each. North Korea announced later that the missile launches including these were a part of a “countermeasure military exercise” against the U.S.-ROK joint air training exercise Vigilant Storm.

The Scud-ER (Extended Range) is a ballistic missile that has an extended range due to the extension of the Scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of the Scud ER is estimated to reach approximately 1,000 km, and it appears that a part of Japan falls within this range. Regarding the two ballistic missiles that were launched on December 18, 2022, North Korea announced that their launch was for an important test for development of
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and is being operated mainly as a test vessel. In addition, North Korea is believed to be upgrading its existing Romeo-class submarines to carry SLBMs. In January 2021, Chairman Kim mentioned the goal of possessing nuclear submarines.

North Korea has been developing SLBMs to be mounted on these submarines, and in May 2015, it announced the first successful test launch of an SLBM. It is deemed that through developing the SLBM and a new submarine to carry it, North Korea intends to diversify its ballistic missile attack capabilities and improve survivability.

(i) SLBM “Pukguksong”

Following North Korea’s launch of an SLBM (the “Pukguksong” type according to the North Korean designation) from a Gorae-class submarine on April 23, 2016, it launched the same missile a total of three times in July and August of the same year.

Judging from the images and footage that it has made public so far, North Korea may have succeeded in operating the “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air. Moreover, it appears, based on observations such as the shape of the flame coming out of the missile and the color of the smoke, that the solid fuel-propelled system was adopted.

The “Pukguksong” missile that was launched in August 2016 flew about 500 km but was on a somewhat higher trajectory compared to the normal altitude of a ballistic missile with a firing range of 500 km. If it were launched on a nominal trajectory, the firing range is expected to surpass 1,000 km.

(ii) SLBM “Pukguksong-3”

On October 2, 2019, North Korea launched one SLBM (referred to as the “Pukguksong-3” by North Korea) different from the “Pukguksong” SLBM. This SLBM is estimated to have flown about 450 km. As it reached a maximum altitude of about 900 km, it is surmised to have been launched with a lofted trajectory. If launched with a nominal trajectory, it is estimated that it could have a range of approximately 2,000 km. The radial exhausts, a typical characteristic of solid fuel-propelled engines are...
identifiable on images published by North Korea. The SLBM in question could potentially have been launched from an underwater launch test equipment.

In addition, North Korea showcased two possible new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) referred to as “Pukguksong-4” and “Pukguksong-5” in the military parades in October 2020 and January 2021 respectively. In addition, an exhibition titled Defence Development Exhibition “Self-Defence-2021” held in October 2021 featured an exhibited item that had external similarities to the “Pukguksong-5.”

(iii) New Type of SLBM
North Korea’s new types of SLBM launched on October 19, 2021, May 7 and September 25, 2022 flew up to approx. 650 km. Two SLBMs are believed to have been launched from a Gorae-class submarine in October 2021 and May 2022 respectively and flew with an irregular trajectory at a low altitude before falling into the Sea of Japan. The trajectory of the October 2021 launch in particular is believed to have been a so-called pull-up trajectory, in which the SLBM descended once, maneuvered again and then ascended. The launch in September 2022 is assumed to have been carried out using an underwater launching test device from inland underwater. On this point, North Korea announced later that launch training for a ballistic missile loaded with simulated tactical nuclear warhead was conducted at a “water reservoir underwater launch site” in the north western region and revealed the existence of a “water reservoir underwater launch site construction” plan.

Based on images released by North Korea, it is possible that the missile was developed based on the SRBM A, as it has external similarities with that missile.

(e) Ballistic Missile Modified from the SLBM
North Korea launched a ballistic missile on both February 12 and May 21, 2017, both of which appeared to be a modified version of the SLBM “Pukguksong” for ground launch (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong-2”). This ballistic missile is estimated to have flown approximately 500 km on both occasions, with somewhat higher trajectories than normal. If it were launched with a nominal trajectory, the firing range is assessed to surpass 1,000 km. A day after the launch in February of the same year, North Korea announced that it was developed as a ground-to-ground ballistic missile based on the results of the August 2016 SLBM launch. It also announced a day after the launch in May 2017 that it had again successfully conducted the test launch of the missile and that Chairman Kim had authorized its “operational deployment.”

Moreover, the launch by a “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air from a continuous-tracked TEL and radial exhausts, a typical characteristic of solid fuel-propelled engines can be confirmed from each of the images that North Korea released. It has the characteristics of appearing to be using “cold launch system” and solid fuel-propelled engines in common with the SLBM “Pukguksong.”

(f) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)-Class
To date, North Korea has launched four liquid fuel-propelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-12”). One of these ballistic

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26 In addition, a missile that could be a new type of SLBM and is believed to not have been publicly announced in North Korea was shown at the military parade on April 25, 2022. However, there was no name on it, and details are unknown.
missiles was launched on each of May 14, 2017 and January 31, 2022, and based on their flight patterns, it is presumed that they were launched with a lofted trajectory. Had they been launched with a nominal trajectory, the maximum firing range is assessed to be close to approximately 5,000 km. In addition, the straight-line exhausts, a typical characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed from the images released by North Korea a day after the launch.

On August 29 and September 15, 2017, single “Hwasong-12” missiles were launched and flew over Japan’s territory in the vicinity of the Oshima Peninsula and Cape Erimo. In view of their flight paths, “Hwasong-12” missiles appear to demonstrate a certain level of function as an IRBM. Also, the fact that missiles that overflew Japan were launched in succession in a short time period would suggest that North Korea is steadily improving its ballistic missile capabilities.

Furthermore, in the May and August launches of the same year, it was confirmed that the missiles were launched after being separated from the wheeled-drive TEL. However, in the September launch, it was confirmed that the missile was launched while still mounted on the wheeled-drive TEL.27

North Korea also launched a missile passing over Aomori Prefecture, Japan on October 4, 2022. It is presumed that this missile was a ballistic missile with a range over that of an IRBM, based on the flight distance of around 4,600 km achieved at that time. North Korea announced later that a “new type of surface-to-surface long-range ballistic missile” was launched. From images released at the time, although the date of photography was not mentioned, the straight-line exhausts, a typical characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine and the TEL similar to ones for the “Hwasong-12” missile were visually confirmed. On the other hand, since the shape of the warhead and engine structure were different to that of the “Hwasong-12,” the possibility that the missile North Korea launched at that time was a new type of IRBM-class ballistic missile cannot be ruled out.

(g) Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-Class

(i) ICBM-class “Hwasong-14”

North Korea launched ICBM-class ballistic missiles, referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-14,” on July 4 and 28, 2017. From the flight pattern, it is presumed that the two missiles were launched with a lofted trajectory. If they were to have been launched with a normal trajectory, it is estimated that they would have a maximum range of at least 5,500 km. The images suggest that the missiles were of two-stage configuration.

On July 4 of the same year, the day of the launch, North Korea made an “important announcement,” announcing that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a new type of ICBM. Furthermore, on the day following the July 28 launch, North Korea asserted that the “nuclear bomb detonation device” had functioned normally, and the safety of the warhead in an atmospheric reentry environment had been maintained.

Based on the released images, the “Hwasong-14”-type ICBM-class ballistic missiles have the following in common with the “Hwasong-12”-type IRBM-class ballistic missile: (1) the configuration of engine system (one main engine and four auxiliary engines); (2) the shape of the lower part of the propulsion system (conical shape); and (3) the straight-line flame of liquid-propulsion systems can be confirmed. Based on the respective ranges that can be estimated for the missiles and other matters, it can be assumed that Hwasong-14 type was possibly developed on the basis of the Hwasong-12 type IRBM-class ballistic missile.

Also, based on images published by North Korea, it can be confirmed that the “Hwasong-14”-type missiles had been mounted on the wheeled eight-axle TEL. However, it can be confirmed from the images at the time of the launches that they were launched from simplified launch pads, not TELs.

(ii) ICBM-class “Hwasong-15”

On November 29, 2017, North Korea launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile, referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-15,” with a lofted trajectory. On the day of the launch, North Korea made a “government statement,” declaring that it had successfully conducted a test launch of the “Hwasong-15,” a newly developed type of ICBM with the capability to strike all areas of the U.S. mainland and asserting that it had completed development of its state nuclear force.

Moreover, another “Hwasong-15” missile was launched with a lofted trajectory on February 18, 2023.

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27 North Korea repeatedly launched the Musudan that is believed to be a ballistic missile in 2016. Although the missile launched in June of the same year flew a certain distance on a lofted trajectory, the fact that there were two successive launch failures in October would suggest that there may still be obstacles remaining towards the operationalization of the Musudan and that North Korea may be concentrating on the development and operationalization of the “Hwasong-12” as an IRBM instead. It is pointed out that the range of the Musudan is up to approximately 2,500-4,000 km. This missile is liquid fuel propelled and transported and operated loaded on a TEL.
Then on the following day, North Korea announced that "ICBM launch training" had been conducted and that "the reliability of the weapon system was reconfirmed and verified."

"Hwasong-15" is loaded on a nine-axle TEL, and from released images, two-stage configuration and its straight-line exhausts, a typical characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed.

Moreover, the range of "Hwasong-15" is estimated to be over 14,000 km based on the trajectory of maximum altitude around 5,700 km and flight distance around 1,000 km when it was launched in February 2023, depending on factors such as its warhead weight. In this case, the range would cover the whole U.S. territory including the East Coast.

(iii) ICBM-class "Hwasong-17"

North Korea launched one ballistic missile on both February 27 and March 5, 2022. Both are estimated to have been launched with a lofted trajectory, flying approximately 300 km and reaching maximum altitudes of approximately 600 km and 550 km respectively. North Korea announced the day after each launch that they were "reconnaissance satellite" development tests, but it is believed that a new type of ICBM-class ballistic missile, referred to by North Korea as "Hwasong-17," was launched at that time.

The ICBM-class missile launched on March 24, 2022, recorded a lofted trajectory of maximum altitude over around 6,000 km and flight distance over around 1,100 km, greatly exceeding the trajectory and distance of "Hwasong-15" launched in November 2017. North Korea announced on the following day that it conducted test launching of "Hwasong-17." While North Korea repeatedly launched missiles after that, the launches on May 4 and 25, and November 3 and 18, 2022 and March 16, 2023 are presumed to be of the ICBM-class ballistic missile "Hwasong-17." The range of "Hwasong-17" is estimated to be over 15,000 km based on the past flight trajectories depending on factors such as its warhead weight. In this case, the range would cover the whole U.S. territory including the East Coast. North Korea's efforts to extend the range of its ballistic missiles is a matter of concern once again. Furthermore, North Korean media later reported on the launch on November 18, 2022, stating that the "final test launch" of "Hwasong-17" was successfully conducted.

From released images, "Hwasong-17" is presumed to be two-stage, and the straight-line exhausts, a typical characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed. The missile is mounted on an 11-axle TEL, believed to be the largest in North Korea's possession, and its size is thought to exceed that of the existing "Hwasong-15"-type. It has been suggested that North Korea is possibly pursuing a greater yield and multiple warheads which are generally considered difficult to intercept, based on the increased warhead weight.

(iv) ICBM-class ballistic missile Hwasong-18

On April 13, 2023, North Korea launched a single ICBM-class ballistic missile (referred to by North Korea as Hwasong-18). This was a new type of three-stage solid-fuel propelled missile, and it is estimated that it flew approx. 1,000 km shifting its direction to left (north). North Korea announced the day after the launch that "the first-stage was in the standard ballistic flight, and the second-stage and third stage were in the lofted flight," and "we could check the performance of high-power solid-fueled multi-stage engines and blowing off technology of each stage."

The launch by so-called a "cold launch system," in which the missile is ignited after being ejected into the...
air from a TEL assumed to be the same as the 9-axle TEL shown for the first time in the military parade in February 2023, and radial exhausts, a typical characteristic of solid fuel-propelled engines, can be confirmed from each of the images that North Korea released.

It is viewed that North Korea put the top priority to the completion of solid-fuel propelled ICBMs since Chairman Kim set it as a goal in January 2021. It is possible that there will be further launches for achieving operationalization, based on the fact that the launch in April was, allegedly, “the first test launch”.

(h) Taepodong-2

Taepodong-2 is a long-range ballistic missile launched from a fixed launch pad.\(^{31}\) It is believed that this missile is equipped with four and one Nodong-base engines at its first and second stage respectively. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over approximately 1 ton. Taepodong-2 missiles and its variants have been launched a total of five times so far.

Most recently, in February 2016, North Korea conducted a launch of a missile disguised as a “satellite” from the Tongch’ang-ri district in the northwest coastline of North Korea using a Taepodong-2 variant after notifying international organizations. It is assessed that North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability had been advanced by this launch because it is estimated that (1) it successfully launched two similar types of ballistic missiles in a row; (2) the missile flew in almost the same way as the last launch; and (3) it put an object into orbit around the Earth.

(i) Ballistic Missiles Referred to as “Hypersonic Missiles”

On January 5 and 11, 2022, North Korea launched one ballistic missile each day, which it referred to as a “hypersonic missile”. Both missiles are believed to have flown at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. In particular, the missile launched on January 11 may have flown at a maximum speed of approximately Mach 10 with an irregular trajectory that included horizontal maneuvers.\(^{32}\)

Based on images released by North Korea, it is confirmed that the missiles were launched from a wheeled TEL and that they had a conical warhead and were equipped with an engine appearing to be a liquid-fuel propulsion system. It has been pointed out that its conical warhead may have been based on Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV)-related technology. In any case, based on announcements to date, it is clear that North Korea continues to pursue the development and enhancement of hypersonic missiles and the like in an attempt to breach other countries’ missile defense networks. It is necessary to monitor its future technological progress, including its application of these technologies on longer-range missiles and moves for the development of a possible ballistic missile with a flat warhead (referred to as the “Hwasong-8” by North Korea), which was launched on September 28, 2021 with the designation as “hypersonic missile.”

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\(^{31}\) There is also Taepodong-1, which may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2.

\(^{32}\) It is presumed that the ballistic missile launched on December 23 2022 was the same as the ballistic missiles launched on January 5 and January 11, 2022 that North Korea referred to as hypersonic missiles.
b Other Missile Forces under Development by North Korea

(a) Cruise missiles

While North Korea has been supposed to develop and retain anti-ship cruise missiles with relatively short range including ones modified from Chinese-made cruise missiles, in recent years it stated its intention to develop new cruise missiles which are supposed to load tactical nuclear weapons on them. For example, Chairman Kim mentioned the development of “ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including intermediate-range cruise missiles” in January, 2021. In fact, North Korea announced that it successfully conducted a test launch of a newly developed long-range cruise missile in September 2021, then that a long-range cruise missile that is believed to be of another type was launched in January 2022. These cruise missiles were repeatedly launched after that and announced as launches of “strategic cruise missiles” said to be deployed in the “tactical nuclear weapons operation unit.” It is clear that these missiles have come to be known as “Strategic Cruise Missile Hwasal-1” and “Strategic Cruise Missile Hwasal-2” respectively. According to North Korea’s statement, these cruise missiles flew up to 2,000km. Besides, North Korea has announced to have launched a “Strategic Cruise Missile” from a submarine in March 2023.

While many of the details, including their actual performance, are still unknown, it is obvious that North Korea pursues operationalization not only of ballistic missiles but also of long-range nuclear capable cruise missiles. If the series of the announcements about flying distances and the like are factual, there is a need for concern, as these missiles pose threats peace and stability in the region.

(b) “New Type of Tactical Guided Weapon”

On April 17, 2022, North Korea announced that a “new type of tactical guided weapon” was launched. The missile was seen at the military parade on April 25 and also later appeared in North Korean media. It can also be confirmed that the missile is transported on a three-axe wheeled TEL and that radial exhausts are a typical characteristic of solid fuel propelled engines. This missile is believed to be one of the weapons that North Korea is developing as potentially tactical nuclear weapons, in aiming to respond to armed conflicts that may occur with U.S. Forces and ROK Forces involving conventional forces and/or tactical nuclear weapons. This belief is based on North Korea’s announcements stating that these missiles are significant in drastically improving long-range artillery firepower and strike capabilities on each front and enhancing “effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons operation.”

c Trends in Ballistic Missile Development

North Korea has driven ballistic missile development and attempted to improve related technologies and operational capabilities quite rapidly and in continuous manner. These trends have the following characteristics.

(a) Improvement of missile-related technologies

(i) Improvement of concealment and promptness

North Korea appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing concealment and promptness to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch.

North Korea has repeatedly launched missiles from various platforms such as TELs, submarines and railway cars in recent years. Using these platforms, launchers can be concealed, and missiles could be launched from any given site. It appears that North Korea aims to complicate indication of warning detection and interception by improving concealment.

In addition, particularly since 2019, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles using solid fuel. It is therefore believed that North Korea is proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Generally, solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles are not only relatively easier to store and handle, but are also preloaded with solid fuel. Therefore, in comparison to liquid fuel-propelled missiles, they can be launched promptly, and the signs of their launch are more difficult to detect. Furthermore, they can be reloaded more quickly. In this respect, they are considered to be superior militarily. Such characteristics are expected to contribute to improving the ability to conduct surprise attacks. While in the past solid fuel propelled ballistic missiles developed and retained by North Korea were mainly short-range missiles, Chairman Kim raised the development of solid fuel propelled ICBMs as a task in January 2021, and a new-type solid-fuel propelled ICBM-class ballistic missile was actually launched on April 13 2023. Attention should be focused on future trends.

(ii) Enhancement of penetration capabilities for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

North Korea is advancing the development of ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories in an attempt to breach other countries’ missile defense networks. The SRBM A, SRBM B and SRBM D, as
well as rail-launched ballistic missiles and a new type of SLBM with a similar outline to the SRBM A, are believed to be capable of flying at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles with irregular trajectories.

Furthermore, North Korea raised the development of “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” as one of its priority targets. Actually, it has repeatedly launched missiles it called “hypersonic missile” since September 2021. In this way, North Korea is persistently pursuing missile development to make interception difficult and to breach missile defense networks.

(iii) Developing long-range missiles
North Korea consistently pursues development of SRBMs flying with irregular trajectories as well as long-range missiles with ranges covering the United States. The ICBM-class ballistic missile Hwasong-17 is thought to have a range of over 15,000 km depending on the weight of its warhead, etc. In such a case, the whole U.S. territory including the East Coast is within its range.

For the operationalization of these ballistic missiles, it is said that technology to protect the re-entry vehicle from the extremely high temperature generated during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead is required. Although North Korea announced that the reliability of warheads in the re-entry environment had been proven after launching ICBM-class missiles “Hwasong-14” and “Hwasong-15” in 2017, careful analysis is still needed to determine whether this technology actually has been established.

On the other hand, should North Korea make further progress in the development of long-range ballistic missiles, it may unilaterally come to have a recognition that it has secured a strategic deterrence against the United States. If North Korea has such a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, it could lead to an increase and escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region, a situation that Japan needs to be deeply concerned about.

(b) Enhancement of missile operation capabilities
North Korea has launched ballistic missiles in various patterns such as multiple and simultaneous launches, consecutive launches at very short intervals and multiple launches from various locations at specific targets.

First, there have been some cases since 2014 in which it launched multiple missiles from unprecedented locations, cutting across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late at night using TELs. In recent years, North Korea has conducted launch drills and other training combining SRBMs with various types of artillery, showing that it has the capability to launch multiple missiles simultaneously at a given time and place.

Second, North Korea attempts consecutive launches at very short intervals. For example, the SRBM C which North Korea refers to as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher” is thought to be developed in order to enhance continuous fire capabilities. In fact, from 2019, there was a case, in which two SRBM C were launched at estimated intervals of less than one minute.

Third, there have been some cases since 2019, in which North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles and other weapons from various places and hit specific targets.

Through these launches, North Korea is believed to pursue the enhancement of not only missile-related technologies but also practical missile operational capabilities with saturation attack and the like in mind.

(4) Future Trends in Weapons Development
Chairman Kim specifically mentioned the development of various weapons as future military objectives at the
In 2022, North Korea repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and other missiles with an unprecedented frequency, with a total of at least 59 missiles.

At the Congress of the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) in 2021, Chairman Kim Jong-un mentioned specific objectives, including the creation of smaller and lighter nuclear weapons and development of tactical nuclear weapons, “super-large nuclear warheads,” “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” and solid-fuel ICBMs. North Korea is believed to be systematically pursuing nuclear and missile development in order to realize these objectives. In 2022, North Korea first launched a ballistic missile it referred to as “hypersonic missile” on January 5, followed by various types of ballistic missile launches for five more times during the same month.

Around this time, Chairman Kim also expressed that North Korea would “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily-suspended activities” and suggested that the decision made in 2018 to suspend “nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic rocket test-fire” be abandoned. Subsequently, North Korea repeatedly launched new “Hwasong-17” ICBM-class missiles from February to March. Since March, it began to be reported that North Korea was restoring its nuclear test site, which it had announced to have blown up in 2018.

While advancing the development of long-range missiles for the purpose of building nuclear deterrence against the United States in this manner, North Korea has also intensified its provocative stance towards the ROK. In April, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee Kim Yo-jong stated that North Korea would not rule out a nuclear attack on the ROK, and North Korea subsequently announced the launch of missiles it called a “new-type tactical guided weapon,” while referring to the operation of tactical nuclear weapons. From May onward, North Korea launched ICBM-class missiles, as well as SLBMs that flew with irregular trajectories, and in June, it launched as many as eight short-range ballistic missiles from multiple locations in a short time, presumably to verify its missile-related technologies and operational capabilities, which are believed to be aimed at acquiring deterrence against the United States through the possession of nuclear and long-range missiles and developing tactical nuclear weapons and various missiles as their delivery systems that enable North Korea to respond to an armed conflict against U.S. and ROK forces.

At the end of 2022, Chairman Kim signaled that North Korea would continue its nuclear and missile development program in 2023 and beyond, with the goals of mass-producing tactical nuclear weapons, increasing nuclear arsenal and developing a new ICBM system. If North Korea gains more confidence in its ability to deal with situations at all stages of a conflict, it could further escalate military provocations. Thus, North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat toJapan’s national security than ever before. Japan will work closely with the United States, ROK and other countries to collect and analyze information and to monitor the situation vigilantly.
8th Congress of the KWP in January, 2021. It is said that the “five-year plan” was presented at this time.

With regard to nuclear weapons and missiles, Chairman Kim also mentioned development of “tactical nuclear weapons” as further advancement of nuclear technology, miniaturization and weight reduction of nuclear weapons and development of tactical weapons. He also stated that North Korea would promote the production of “super-sized nuclear warheads,” improve its hit rate on targets within a 15,000 km range and upgrade its “preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike capabilities.” In addition, North Korea mentioned the promotion of research and development of multi-warhead technology, “hypersonic gliding flight warheads,” nuclear-powered submarines, “underwater-launched strategic nuclear weapons” and solid fuel-propelled ICBM, demonstrating its stance of relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack. In addition, besides the nuclear and missile capabilities, development of reconnaissance means, including military reconnaissance satellites and unmanned reconnaissance aerial vehicles, was also mentioned.

In fact, since this year, North Korea has launched missiles repeatedly as if to advance the process of the development plan presented at the Congress.

North Korea insisted that the guided maneuverability of “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” was demonstrated and stated that the hypersonic missile R&D project was “belonging to the five high priority challenges in the strategic weapons division of the five-year plan” when it launched a missile referred to as “hypersonic missile Hwasong-8” in September, 2021. North Korea stated in December 2022 that the “captive firing test of high-thrust solid-fuel engine” was completed successfully and that Chairman Kim rated this highly, saying, “another significant problem is solved to realize the five high priority challenges in the strategic weapons division of the five-year plan,” and stated that he expected to “show another new strategic weapon” in the shortest period of time. From these statements, North Korea is believed to promote R&D of “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” and solid fuel-propelled ICBMs in particular, raising them as priority issues of the “five-year plan.”

In addition, following the February 27 and March 5, 2022 launches of ICBM-class ballistic missiles, allegedly “reconnaissance satellite” development tests, North Korea publicly announced that Chairman Kim had actually inspected a facility related to the “reconnaissance satellites,” during which he stated that the objective of the military reconnaissance satellites is to obtain real-time military information on South Korea, Japan and the Pacific Ocean, that a large number of “reconnaissance satellites” will be deployed during the period of the “five-year plan” and that the Sohae satellite launching station in Tongch’ang-ri district will be renovated and expanded in order to do so. North Korea stated on the day following the launch of the ballistic missile on December 18, 2022 that an “important test in the final phase” for development of “reconnaissance satellites” was completed and that its “first military reconnaissance satellite” would be prepared by April 2023. Furthermore, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the KWP Kim Yo-jong stated in December 2022 and February 2023, “try right now” and “the frequency for us to use the Pacific Ocean as our shooting range” was dependent on the action of U.S. Forces in refuting views questioning North Korea’s acquisition of atmospheric re-entry technologies for ICBM-class ballistic missiles. It is pointed out that this was suggesting the possibility for North Korea to decide to verify whether its ICBM-class missiles can tolerate practical use through launching them towards the Pacific Ocean if North Korea escalates provocation in the future.

In addition, North Korea showed its stance to pursue diversified its nuclear delivery systems through the statement made in March and April 2023 that tests for a weapon called an “underwater nuclear attack boat” were conducted.

In this way, while there does not appear to be any progress in dialogues with the United States or the ROK, North Korea constantly focuses on the R&D of related technologies in line with the “five-year plan,” claiming
that these are “defensive” actions. It is possible that North Korea may continue to repeatedly launch various missiles and the like to accomplish the “five-year plan”, as it is constantly demonstrating its stance to strengthen nuclear and missile capabilities. It is necessary to observe weapon development and other trends closely.

**4 Domestic Affairs**

(1) **Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime**

In North Korea, the power base centered on Chairman Kim is being solidified. The constitution of North Korea stipulates that the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission is “the supreme leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who represents the state,” and it is pointed out that North Korea is run under the leadership of the KWP. Chairman Kim took the office of the general secretary of the party in January 2021.

On the other hand, since 2020, cases have begun to be seen of senior party officials providing “guidance” during site inspections and various meetings, which had previously been performed only by Chairman Kim, suggesting that some authority may have been delegated to senior officials. It is believed that Chairman Kim keeps senior party officials tense by promoting and demoting them in a short period of time.

Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that amid the difficult economic and food situation, the regime is wary of social unrest caused by the influx of information from abroad and is further strengthening its ideological control. This is notable from the perspective of the stability of the regime.
**Part 3  Defense Policies of Countries**

**Chapter 3  Defense Policies of Countries and Regions**

### (2) Economic Conditions

In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, it faces enhanced independent sanctions by countries including Japan and the United States and sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions adopted in response to nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches.\(^{35}\)

Furthermore, it is believed that COVID-19 infections and natural disasters largely affected North Korea’s economy from 2020. In particular, North Korea demonstrated a stance to deal with COVID-19 with all its strength, undergoing a major change from conventional passive and closed disclosure of information, announcing that the first infected individual was confirmed in May 2022 and that epidemic prevention project was transitioned to a “maximum emergency epidemic prevention system.” In addition, Chairman Kim mentioned that COVID-19 was “the greatest turmoil since our founding.” Although North Korea declared the “victory” and eradication of COVID-19 in August 2022, the actual situation in respect of infections has many unclear points. It is believed that North Korea continues to face major constraints on economic and other activities.

Chairman Kim presented the “five-year plan for the national economic development” based on self-reliance and self-sufficiency in January 2021. In December 2022, Chairman Kim presented “to build up decisive assurance for completion of the five-year plan” as the challenge of 2023, and as such, even under difficult circumstances, it is believed that North Korea continues to consider rebuilding the economy in accordance with “the plan” important. Nevertheless, as North Korea is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system, it faces various challenges in making fundamental improvements to its current economic situation.

North Korea is presumed to be evading the UN Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions.\(^{36}\) The final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee (“Final Report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to resolution 2627 (2022)”), released in April 2023, points out that during the January-August period in 2022, North Korea illicitly imported a volume of petroleum products that exceeded the annual aggregate 500,000-barrel cap by tankers of North Korean registry.

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35 In recent years, North Korean fishing boats and Chinese fishing boats have been conducting illegal operations within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding Yamato tai, creating a situation that threatens the safety of Japanese fishing boats operating in the EEZ. In this sea area, the Fisheries Agency and the Japan Coast Guard in cooperation crack down on illegal operations by foreign fishing boats. See the Cabinet Office Annual Report, “The situation of the oceans and the implemented measures by the Government with regard to the oceans,” the White paper on Fisheries and the Japan Coast Guard Report for further details of the control activities.

36 Between the beginning of 2018 and the end of March 2022, MSDF patrol aircraft and ships have observed 24 cases in which a North Korean-flagged tanker and a foreign-flagged vessel were anchored side-by-side on the high seas. As a result of comprehensive judgment by the government, there are strong suspicions that the observed vessels were engaging in illicit ship-to-ship transfers.
Korea relationship. Then, in January 2022, Chairman Kim ordered North Korean officials to “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily suspended activities” based on the assessment that the “hostile policy and military threat by the United States have reached a danger line that cannot be overlooked anymore.” In fact, North Korea restarted launching ICBM-class ballistic missiles from February 2022. Chairman Kim stated that North Korea will thoroughly prepare for long term confrontation against the United States and also stated in his speech in September 2022 that the aim of the United States is “to disrupt our government anytime” and “we can never abandon nuclear weapons” to keep the United States in check in the long term.

North Korea could further escalate its provocation while the deadlocked relationship between the two is continuing. Chairman Kim stated, “we have no contents for dialogue with the enemy, and we do not feel any necessity.” Attention will be focused on future trends.

(2) Relations with the ROK
The three inter-Korean summit meetings in 2018 led to major progress in inter-Korean relations, including an agreement on the “Panmunjom Declaration,” which confirms, among other matters, that the two parties agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain and confirmed the common goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The summit meetings also led to an agreement on the “Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018,” which refers to the ending of military hostilities, and the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” which prescribes concrete measures to ease inter-Korean military tensions. However, there has been no progress in inter-Korean relations since the breakdown of the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in 2019, and North Korea has taken a hard and soft approach to the ROK.

Furthermore, in April 2022, after President Yoon Suk- yeol, who demonstrates a strict stance against North Korea, assumed the presidency in the ROK, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the KWP, stated in her press statement that while the ROK was not a main enemy and that the north and the south were of the same nation who should not fight each other, if the ROK selected a military confrontation, “our nuclear combat forces will fulfill their duty.” Chairman Kim also stated in his speech in July 2022 that if the ROK conducted preemptive strikes, North Korea would retaliate immediately and the “Yoon administration and his armed forces will be annihilated.” North Korea’s attitude to the ROK began to turn harsh. In particular, in September 2022, North Korea escalated provocations such as launching ballistic missiles in succession when the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan called at a ROK port and conducted joint training after that. Furthermore, regarding a series of launches, North Korea announced it had conducted training of “tactical nuclear weapons operation units,” targeting hypothetically airfields in the ROK in October. Moreover, until December, North Korea repeatedly conducted shelling towards the area in which military exercises are banned by the military agreement between the south and north.

North Korea opposed the Yoon administration’s “audacious initiative” stating that if North Korea accepts denuclearization, the ROK will provide economic and public support to North Korea according to the progress of denuclearization. Chairman Kim stated in December 2022 that the ROK was an “absolute and obvious enemy” and mentioned “the importance and necessity of mass production of tactical nuclear weapons” as well as increasing “inventory of nuclear warheads.” Attention needs to be focused on the trend of inter-Korean relations amid rising tensions.

(3) Relations with Other Countries
(i) Relations with China
China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea. The “Sino–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance” signed in 1961 is still effective, and China is currently North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2021, trade volume between China and North Korea was very large, accounting for over 90% of North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between North Korea and the ROK), suggesting North

37 North Korea announced on October 10, 2022, that a series of ballistic missiles launch from late September to October were the training of “tactical nuclear weapons operation units.” It was revealed that at the time of this announcement, Chairman Kim stated, “we would sharply watch the instable security circumstance on the Korean peninsula and all military moves of the enemies which cannot be overlooked and strongly take all military countermeasures if necessary”.
38 Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the KWP Kim Yo-jong published an announcement and condemned the “audacious initiative” proposed by the Yoon administration saying that it was “the perfection of stupidity” and “the hypothesis of if the north takes denuclearization measures is the wrong prerequisite in the first place” in August 2022.
39 According to an announcement by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)
Korea’s dependence on China.

In regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has stated that the issues should be resolved through dialogue and consultations based on the concept of a “dual-track approach” (denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the transition from the armistice mechanism to a peaceful mechanism) and the principle of phased and synchronized actions. In recent years, China has demonstrated a stance of defending North Korea’s repeated provocations through exercising its power of veto with Russia over a draft UNSC sanction resolution proposed by the United States for North Korea’s launching of ICBM-class ballistic missiles, and it stated that the current worsened situation on the Korean Peninsula was caused by the United States.

The China-North Korea summit meeting was held five times from March 2018 to June 2019. Chairman Kim submitted a congratulatory telegram on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s reelection in October 2022, and the General Secretary Xi submitted a thank you telegram in which he stated China thought the relationship between their countries was highly important and would make it great in the new state of affairs changing in the world.

(ii) Relations with Russia

Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. In October 2021, Russia submitted a draft UN Security Council resolution on North Korea jointly with China stating that North Korea had already taken many denuclearization measures and that there should be adjustment of some sanctions concerning the economy and livelihoods, and in May 2022, Russia exercised its veto with China against the draft sanction resolution proposed by the United States, mentioned above.

North Korea continuously shows the stance to protect Russia, insisting since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 that the cause of the situation in Ukraine is the United States and Western countries.
national defense. The Yoon administration is promoting “Defense Innovation 4.0” based on cutting-edge science and technology such as artificial intelligence (AI) from the fourth industrial revolution. The administration also stated that it will construct stepwise combined combat systems of manned and unmanned platforms to resolve the shortage of soldiers and minimize casualties in war.

3 Military Posture of the ROK

The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 19 army divisions with approximately 420,000 personnel and 2 marine divisions with approximately 29,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of approximately 230 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 290,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 660 combat aircraft.

The ROK Forces has been modernizing its military forces- not only its Army but also its Navy and Air Force- in order to establish an omni-directional defense posture. The Navy has been introducing submarines and domestically built destroyers. The Air Force plans to increase the number of F-35A fighters from the current 40 and is also promoting the introduction of domestically built fighters.

The ROK Forces are focused on building the “Korean three axis system” consisting of kill chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) and will establish the strategic command for joint operation of forces in the system in 2024.

The missile guidelines agreed upon by the United States and the ROK in 1979 had placed restrictions on the range and warhead weights of the missiles for the ROK’s missile development. These restrictions had been lifted gradually, and finally the termination of the guidelines was announced at the U.S.-ROK summit meeting in May 2021.

In terms of ballistic missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed Hyunmoo-2 missiles with an estimated range of 300-800 km. The ROK also promotes the development of “high power” type missiles; for example, it is said that the test launch of Hyunmoo-4 missile with a two-ton warhead and 800 km firing range was successfully conducted in 2020, and a missile under development that is said to be Hyunmoo-5 and equipped with a heavier warhead was announced in October 2022. Moreover, the ROK announced that it successfully conducted the test launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 2021. By developing and possessing these various ballistic missiles, the ROK is believed to be planning to augment and diversify its own conventional strike capabilities without relying on the

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40 The ranges of ballistic missiles were limited to 800 km at the time of the termination of the guideline.
United States and to improve survivability.

With regard to cruise missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed the Hyunmoo-3 surface-to-surface cruise missile, which is believed to have a range of about 500-1,500 km, and the Haeseong series ship-to-ship/ship-to-surface cruise missiles, which are believed to have a maximum range of 1,000-1,500 km.

Furthermore, the ROK has been actively working on equipment export in recent years. In particular, in 2022, the annual export resulted more than doubled that of previous years on a contract basis, reaching US$17.3 billion, including a large-scale export contract with Poland that is striving to enhance its defense capabilities after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Considering these movements, it is believed that interest in ROK-made equipment is growing in the international market including in Europe. The ROK set the goal to rank 4th in export of defense industries by 2027. Attention will be focused on future trends.

Defense spending in FY2023 (regular budget) increased by about 4.4% from the previous fiscal year to nearly KRW 57.0143 trillion, marking the 24th consecutive year of increases since 2000. In addition, according to its 2023-2027 Defense Mid-term Plan, the ROK will increase its defense budget by 6.8% on an annual average over five years to 2027.

![See Fig. I-3-4-7 (Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget)](image)

## 4 U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea

The United States and the ROK have taken various steps to deepen the U.S.-ROK Alliance in recent years. The two countries regularly confirm the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK Alliance at the summit level.

As specific undertakings, the two countries signed the U.S.-ROK Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s provocations in March 2013. They also approved the Tailored Deterrence Strategy, designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, at the 45th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October of the same year.

At the 46th SCM in 2014, the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D Operational Concept was approved.

Additionally, after North Korea went ahead with a nuclear test in January 2016, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) was temporarily deployed by the U.S. Forces Korea in September 2017.

Recently, at the 53rd SCM in 2021, the United States and the ROK expanded their alliance from the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia to the Indo-Pacific region, approved new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) for the first time in 11 years and updated their operation plans based on the SPG. Moreover, at the 54th SCM, the first for the Yoon administration, in November 2022, both countries agreed to several measures to enhance extended deterrence such as revising the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) by the next SCM, strengthening deployment of U.S. strategic assets around the Korean Peninsula and regularly conducting tabletop exercises including a North Korea nuclear use scenario. The ROK stated in the Washington Declaration of the U.S.-ROK summit meeting in April 2023 that the country recognized the importance to trust the U.S. commitment for extended deterrence and reaffirmed ROK’s commitment to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The United States and ROK also announced in the Declaration the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) as well as a visit by a U.S. SSBN and others as initiatives to strengthen extended deterrence.

While the United States and the ROK had aborted or reduced the scale of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises from 2018, considering the progress of dialogue with North Korea, both countries have been expanding the scope and scale of the exercises since the Yoon administration was established. The regular joint
military exercises has been changed to the form that the Freedom Shield (FS) exercise is conducted in first half of a year and the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise is in the latter half. In the UFS exercise from August to September 2022, a large-scale field exercise was conducted in parallel with command post exercises for the first time in four years. After that, the joint maritime exercise with aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and joint air training exercise Vigilant Storm with U.S. B-1B bombers were conducted in 2022. In addition, large-scale joint field training Warrior Shield was conducted with U.S. bombers, aircraft carrier and amphibious assault ship deployed from March to April 2023.

At the same time, the two countries deal with such issues as the transition of operational control (OPCON) to the ROK and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea.

For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the United States and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces.

Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM in 2014 to re-postpone the transition of OPCON and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing the transition when conditions such as the ROK Forces’ enhanced capabilities are met. At the 50th SCM in October 2018, it was decided that following the transition of OPCON, a ROK military officer will serve as the commander of the Future Combined Forces Command, replacing the current arrangement of a U.S. military officer serving as the commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces.

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) verification is conducted as the first step to evaluate ROK Forces’ capability in combined command post exercise in August 2019, and the important role of the exercise to verify IOC was confirmed. Furthermore, Full Operational Capability (FOC) evaluation was conducted as the second step in the UFS exercise in 2022, and at the 54th SCM in November 2022, it was confirmed that the FOC evaluation was successfully conducted and that all assessment task met the criteria.

ROK Forces stated that the United States and the ROK comprehensively consider the results of combined evaluation about ROK Forces’ military capabilities of leading U.S.-ROK combined defense and ability to respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, which are necessary for the transition of OPCON, then steadily promote evaluation of the Future Combined Forces Command according to procedures for each of the steps.

With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea, an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongson Garrison located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of Seoul and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river. Subsequently, however, the agreement has been partially revised, due to various factors, including: in relation to the postponement of the transition of OPCON, it has been necessary for some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongson Garrison; and it was decided that the counter-fires forces of U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their location north of the Han River to counter the threat of North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery.

In July 2017, the U.S. Eighth Army headquarters relocated to the Pyeontaek area; in June 2018 the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea and UN Command, and in November 2022, the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command Headquarters also relocated to the same area. The realignment of U.S. Forces Korea could have a significant impact on U.S. and ROK defense postures on the Korean Peninsula, and as such it will be necessary to follow closely in the future.

Concerning defense burden sharing, whereby the ROK government bears a portion of the total stationing costs of the U.S. Forces Korea to ensure a stable stationing environment, in March 2021, the United States and the ROK reached an agreement on the 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA). This agreement is valid for six years from 2020 to 2025. Total amount for FY2020 remains unchanged at the FY2019 level and 13.9% increase for FY 2021, compared to FY2020, while for
FY2022-FY2025 the rate of increase in the ROK defense spending from the previous year will be applied.

5 Relations with Countries and Regions

(1) Relations with China
China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to strengthen their relations. China opposes the deployment of the THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea, saying that it undermines the strategic security interests of China. Although both countries agreed in October 2017 to continue communicating on the THAAD-related issues that China was concerned about through channels established between their respective military authorities, conflicting views still remain. The Yoon administration raises the realization of China-ROK relations based on “mutual respect” as a goal. Attention will be focused on future trends in China-ROK relations.

(2) Relations with Russia
The ROK and Russia have agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and military supplies. Both countries held Defense Strategy Dialogue in August 2018 and agreed to promote the dialogue to vice minister level and, in November 2021, also agreed to set up hotlines between Navies and between Air Forces.

The ROK has implemented sanctions against Russia and provided military supplies and other resources to Ukraine in a show of solidarity with the international community following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since February 2022. Although ROK still maintains a cautious attitude to deliver military equipment to Ukraine, President Yoon suggests possible support outside the scope of humanitarian and economic ones when Ukraine civilians receive attacks in a large scale. An attention will be focused on what measures ROK will take based on the situation in Ukraine and considering the relationship with Russia.

REFERENCE: Security Environment Surrounding Japan (North Korea)

REFERENCE: Information related to North Korean missiles, etc.
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/surround/defense/northKorea/index.html

49 After the China-ROK foreign ministers’ meeting in August 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China insisted that the ROK government stated the policy of “One Restriction” in which the ROK limits the operation of the THAAD already deployed to U.S. Forces Korea, in addition to the “Three Nos” (no participation in the United States’ missile defense system, no consideration for additional THAAD deployment, no development of Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation to military allies) that the ROK government is said to have announced externally in 2017. For this, the ROK brings forward a counterargument that those standpoints of the previous administration were not a promise or an agreement, and issues related to security sovereignty cannot be a subject for discussion.
Section 5 Russia

1 General Situation

President Putin, who has been seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and influential power, commenced full aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and it is also a serious violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, which forbid the use of force. The aggression shakes the foundations of the international order, and is understood as the most serious and direct threat to defense in the European area.

Russia also makes clear its stance that it continues to work on the modernization of strategic nuclear weapons, and repeats speech and behavior that can be taken as nuclear weapons threats in the middle of the aggression against Ukraine.

Russian forces around Japan in recent years have shown indications of introducing new types of equipment and increasing activities. Also, movement to enhance strategic cooperation with China, such as the joint flight of Russian and Chinese bombers, joint navigation of warships, and Chinese troops’ participation in a Russian large-scale annual exercise in Strategic Command (Military District) level is observed. Military trends of Russia in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, combined with this strategic cooperation with China, are strong concerns for security. Also taking into account movements in the aggression against Ukraine, close observation of the situation is required.

Chapter 2 (Russia’s Aggression and Defense by Ukraine)

2 Security and Defense Policies

1 Strategic and Policy Documents

Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security Strategy” revised in July 2021.

The National Security Strategy states that Russia’s policies through now to strengthen its defense capabilities, domestic unity, and political stability, and modernize its economy, and develop its industrial base, have strengthened Russia as a sovereign state capable of pursuing an independent domestic and foreign policy and effectively opposing external pressures. This indicates Russia’s awareness of the existence of external threats and its belief that it is a “strong state” that will not succumb to them. It also states that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military activities around Russia are a military threat and that the deployment of U.S. intermediate- and short-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region is a threat to strategic stability.

In the defense section, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia’s military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and combat readiness of Russian military forces, including the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF).

The Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and
deployment of strategic missile defense (MD) systems. In addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defining the following as new military risks: NATO’s military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; the rise of global extremism (terrorism); the formation of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia.

In addition, the doctrine raises characteristics of modern military warfare as being the massive use of precision weapons, hypersonic weapons, electronic warfare equipment, all types of autonomous vehicles, and the like, as well as the phenomena of automation and centralization of operations through a network of automatic management systems. In addition, without using the phrase “hybrid warfare,” the doctrine also points out the integrated use of military force and political, economic, informational and other non-military measures, as well as participation in hostilities by irregular armed groups and private military companies.

The doctrine positions nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and military conflicts that use conventional weapons. Regarding the criteria for its use, it states Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation not only for the use of nuclear or other WMDs, but also in the event of invasion using conventional weapons, where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

In June 2020, for the first time, Russia released a policy document, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” which is equivalent to the so-called nuclear doctrine. Criteria for the use of nuclear weapons are the same as the criteria described in the military doctrine, but the document clarifies the conditions for Russia to newly proceed to the use of nuclear weapons. In the “Basic Principles,” it is explained that, in addition to the “individual states [...] that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary,” “military coalitions (blocs, alliances)” in which these countries participate are also subject to Russia’s “red lines” for nuclear deterrence.

2 Defense Budget

With regard to Russia’s defense budget, the amounts executed from FY2011 to FY2016 (implemented amount) showed year-on-year double-digit growth and reached 4.4% of GDP. After that, it has generally remained at a level of around 3% of GDP. Furthermore, the budget to be implemented in FY2022 (provisional amount) increased 30.8% from the previous year, and the original budget for FY2023 increased 6.5% from the previous year due to the aggression against Ukraine.¹

3 Military Reform

Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization.

Regarding the downsizing of military forces, troop reductions and systems reorganization (with services and military districts consolidated, and fundamental organizational units of land forces transferred from divisions to brigades) have been progressed. As a result, by January 2021, joint strategic commands were placed instead of four military districts (Western, Southern,
Central and Eastern Districts) as well as the Northern Fleet (in charge of units facing the Arctic) respectively. The entire military forces such as Land Forces, Navy, and Aerospace Forces units are jointly operated under each District Commander in this system.

However, since the commencement of the aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defence and the AFRF show some movements to increase strength as well as to enlarge and reorganize units. Defence Minister Shoigu proposed to increase total strength to 1.5 million troops, establish two military districts in Moscow and Leningrad, reorganize several existing brigades into divisions, strengthen artillery units, newly deploy one corps to the Finland border region, and other measures to President Putin at the Ministry of Defence staff conference expanded meeting in December 2022.

Regarding the modernization of the military forces, the AFRF has achieved its goal of increasing its percentage of new equipment to 70% by 2020. It was announced that the percentage reached 71% (as of the end of 2021) for conventional forces and 91% (as of the end of 2022) for strategic nuclear forces.

Regarding the professionalization of the military forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system which selects personnel who would serve under contracts from the conscripted military personnel. The number of contracted soldiers exceeded that of draftees in 2015 for the first time, and the number of contracted soldiers is said to have grown to about double the number of draftees in 2020.

The partial mobilization of reservists started from September 2022, because of a shortage of strength from the heavy loss of soldiers as well as low morale and skills of Russian troops noticeable in the aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, volunteers are recruited in companies related to government and prisons. It is pointed out that some of these draftees and volunteers are brought to the frontline without sufficient equipment and skills.

### 3 Military Posture and Trends

Russia’s military forces are comprised of forces such as the AFRF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The AFRF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace Forces; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces.

In developing its military capabilities, after having been conscious of the United States, which it has confronted in the past, and ensured a balance in its nuclear forces, Russia is expanding equipment similar to that of advanced nations, such as land-attack cruise missiles capable of being precision-guided and unmanned vehicles, for its conventional forces that it perceives as inferior to those of advanced nations. As for its asymmetric responses, it is believed that Russia places importance on improving its so-called “A2/AD” capabilities through long-range surface-to-air and surface-to-ship missile systems and electronic warfare equipment.

### 1 Nuclear and Missile Forces

Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. Russia is thus making efforts to maintain readiness, and is renewing various platforms, early-warning systems, and other equipment.

Regarding strategic nuclear forces, Russia possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers comparable to the United States in scale.

In 2011, Russia started the deployment of ICBM Yars, which is considered a multi-warhead version of ICBM Topol-M. It says it is currently testing the large ICBM Sarmat for deployment scheduled to start in 2023 in order to replace ICBM Voyevoda made in Ukraine during the Soviet era. Six Borey-class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) which carry the new-type SLBM Bulava, were commissioned. Also, there are plans to deploy five of such vessels each to the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet in the future. Russia also continues to carry out the modernization renovation of
Location and Strength of Russian Military (image)

**Russia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total military forces</th>
<th>Approx. 1,150,000 personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground troops</td>
<td>Approx. 620,000 personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>T-90, T-80, T-72, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 2,070</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 7,070 including mothballed ones)</td>
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<td>Warships</td>
<td>1,170 vessels, Approx. 2,100,000 tons</td>
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<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
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<td>Modern fighter aircraft</td>
<td>MiG-29 × 109 Su-30 × 122 Su-33 × 17 Su-25 × 185 Su-35 × 99 Su-57 × 6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Fourth generation fighter aircraft: Total 915)</td>
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<td>Bombers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tu-95 × 60</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tu-22M × 61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term of service</td>
<td>1 year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) Data from “The Military Balance 2023,” etc. Ground force’s strength is including 550,000 Ground Force personnel, 40,000 Airborne troops personnel, and the 30,000 personnel of “the separatist in Eastern Ukraine” forces that Russia announced to incorporate to AFRF.
Tu-95s and the new production of Tu-160 long-range bombers.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia is working to deploy various non-strategic missiles such as the ground-launched missile system “Iskander,” which is believed to be capable of carrying either conventional or non-strategic nuclear warheads, the sea-launched cruise missile system “Kalibr,” the air-launched cruise missile Kh-101, and the air-launched ballistic missile “Kinzhal.” Russia places these missiles as “non-nuclear deterrence by precise guided weapons,” and considers them important. In particular, Russia has been promoting the deployment of warships capable of carrying the “Kalibr” submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) system in the Far East. It is necessary to closely watch this trend because it could have a major impact on the security environment around Japan.

### 2 New Types of Weapons

Russia has opposed ongoing missile defense system build ups by the United States domestically and abroad in recent years.

Russia announces that it develops the following various advanced weapons in order to penetrate missile defense systems deployed in the United States and other countries, that can be countermeasures for Russian ballistic missiles which are the foundations of Russia’s nuclear forces.

- **Hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) “Avangard,”** which is claimed to be capable of flying at speeds greater than Mach 20 in the intercontinental atmosphere
- **Sea-launched hypersonic cruise missile (HCM) “Zircon,”** which has a believed range of 1,500 km with the maximum speed of Mach 9
- **Nuclear cruise missile “Burevestnik,”** which is capable of flying at lower altitudes with no substantial range limitation
- **Nuclear-powered unmanned underwater drone weapon “Poseidon,”** which is claimed to be able to navigate at high-speed in the deep sea

Of these new weapons, HGV “Avangard” is deployed already, and HCM “Zircon” is believed to be deployed because Russia announced in January 2023 that the Gorshkov-class missile frigate RFS Admiral Gorshkov, equipped with HCM “Zircon,” is going to be deployed to the high seas as a part of the Northern Fleet.

Regarding Russia’s own missile defense equipment,
it is reported that the delivery of advanced surface-to-air missile system “S-500” to each unit started in spring of 2022, and it was announced that test launches of an advanced ballistic missile intercept missile system were conducted in November 2022.

3 Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Russia has conducted research and development for equipment based on its State Armament Program (GPV). However, it is pointed out that several factors, such as the need to cover the loss of equipment from the aggression against Ukraine, and very low availability of machine tools and various parts due to economic sanctions, are hindering the continuation of the GPV.

Land Forces continue tests for advanced equipment such as T-14 tanks and Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled 155 mm howitzers.

The Aerospace Force announced that deployment of the pre-production model of the so-called “fifth-generation fighter” Su-57 was started, and that it is putting effort into integration of unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft for UAV development.

The Russian Navy plans to increase the rate of modernization of its equipment to 70% by 2027. Because the development of surface vessels for coastal waters is being completed, the Navy will now move on to building surface vessels for the open sea.

4 Space and Electromagnetic Domain

The AFRF has also been stepping up its activities in the realms of space and electromagnetic spectrum in recent years. Russia is believed to be promoting the development of anti-satellite weapons such as the “Nudol” anti-satellite missile system. In November 2021, Russia announced that it would conduct a satellite destruction test using an anti-satellite missile. Since 2013, Russia has put satellites into both low and geostationary orbits to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), which have repeatedly been observed engaging in frequent RPO with other countries’ satellites on geostationary orbits.

In the electromagnetic spectrum domain, since 2009, the AFRF has established an Electronic Warfare (EW) Unit, and many new EW systems have been procured and distributed or allocated to each service and force. In December 2021, it was announced that the EW Unit belonging to the Central Military District conducted an exercise to deceive the enemy by sending fake orders and signals to conceal the activities of their own forces. This indicates that the AFRF places importance on improving electronic warfare capabilities as a response to “network-centric warfare.”

5 Trends Related to the AFRF (General)

Since 2010, the AFRF has been conducting large-scale round-robin exercises in each military district, with the objective of verifying the combat readiness of the military districts, etc. These exercises are helping to improve the long-distance mobilization capability of the AFRF. In 2022, the strategic command and staff exercise Vostok 2022 was conducted in the Eastern Military District with over 50,000 troops, and 14 countries including China and India participated.

Among exercises for nuclear and missile forces, in February 2022, just prior to the start of the aggression against Ukraine, a large-scale missile exercise was...
conducted across Russia as a “strategic deterrence forces exercise” using strategic nuclear forces such as ICBMs and SLBMs as well as missile forces capable of carrying conventional or tactical nuclear warheads (Iskander, Kalibr, Kinzhal, and Zircon). In addition, a similar missile exercise for strategic nuclear forces also was conducted as “strategic deterrence training” in October 2022.

In the Arctic Region, Russia is developing coastal surveillance radar networks for enhanced vigilance and surveillance. At the same time, Russia is rebuilding airfields and deploying Tu-22M medium-range bombers and MiG-31 interceptor fighters, while also deploying surface-to-air missiles and surface-to-ship missiles to develop sufficient preparedness for dealing with airborne threats from the north and attacks from ships. Along with these developments, Russia has built a large-scale residential facility for personnel at the base in two places within the Arctic Region. In addition to the development of such military facilities, the AFRF has also been conducting such activities as strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol flights by long-range bombers. For example, Tu-95 and Tu-160 long-range bombers have frequently been observed flying through international airspace off the Alaskan coast and over the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea.

Against the background of such activities in the Arctic Region, this region had been attracting attention from many countries because of increased mining potential of reserve resources and enhanced usefulness as a sea route identified with sea ice melting caused by global warming in recent years. For this reason, Russia has been promoting the system to defend the national interests in the Arctic Region, and clearly stating in various policy documents the interests in the Arctic Region and the roles of the AFRF in defending them. For example, in the Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security until 2035, revised in October 2020, Russia clearly states “ensuring operational system adequate for the Arctic Circle,” “developing modern weapons, and military and special equipment suitable for the Arctic environment,” and “developing base infrastructure” as specific issues to be addressed in order to ensure the military security in the Arctic Region. Russia thus appears to be stepping up military activities, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required.

6 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan

Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. Land Forces, the Pacific Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military
District Commander, who conducts unified operation of these services.

The current presence of the AFRF in the Far East region is significantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity, including the trend related to the deployment of new units and military facility. In recent years, Russia has also been deploying the latest equipment in the Far East. It announced that the percentage of new equipment in the Eastern Military District was 56% as of December 2021.

Given that the AFRF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with conflicts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to keep our attention on the trends of the AFRF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions.

(1) Nuclear Forces
As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, three Borey-class SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk, and approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed in Ukrainka. Russia is prioritizing the reinforcement of its maritime strategic deterrence posture which had been scaled down after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and as part of these efforts, it plans on deploying five Borey-class SSBNs to the Pacific Fleet in the future.

(2) Ground Forces
The Eastern Military District now consists of 31 brigades and two divisions with approximately 80,000 personnel in total, including motorized rifles (mechanized infantry), tanks, artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, material and technology security (logistics), and air defense, as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, “Bal” and “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile system.

(3) Naval Forces
The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The fleet is comprised of approximately 250 ships with a total displacement in the region of approximately 670,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 15 submarines (approximately 10 of which are nuclear powered submarines). Warships equipped with cruise missile Kalibr have also been deployed sequentially to the Pacific Fleet since 2021. As of the end of FY2022, such warships as one Udaloy-class destroyer (modified type) and four improved Kilo-class submarines in Vladivostok, as well as one Steregushchiy II-class frigate and one Yasen-class nuclear-powered attack submarine in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy are deployed.

(4) Air Forces
In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately 320 combat aircraft from its Aerospace Forces and Navy combined. Existing models are being modernized and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters and the Su-34 fighter-bombers, are being introduced to improve their capabilities.

(5) Operations in the Vicinity of Japan
In the vicinity of Japan, the AFRF has been generally increasing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform.

The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, its activities are generally increasing.

With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, various exercises and long-distance voyages have been carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels, along with patrols by nuclear-powered submarines.

From the end of January to mid-March 2022, a large-scale naval exercise, believed to be a part of the Russian Navy’s whole fleet exercise, was conducted in the Sea of Okhotsk and other areas with the participation of more than 20 naval vessels. During the exercise period, a total of 49 vessels, including those not announced as participating in the exercise, sailed through the Soya and Tsugaru Straits. The exercise was unique in terms of both its timing and scale. In addition, given the characteristics of the sea area in which the exercise was conducted, it is believed that it was intended to demonstrate Russia’s ability to actively operate in the Sea of Okhotsk, which
Russia places importance on as an area of operation for strategic nuclear-powered submarines even during the aggression against Ukraine.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long range bombers. Also, there were flights of Tu-95 bombers refueled in mid-flight and supported by A-50 early warning and control aircraft and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160. In December 2021, an IL-20 intelligence-gathering aircraft flew from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk, and another eight Russian aircraft (presumed) were confirmed to have flown over the Sea of Japan. In June 2022, four Russian aircraft (presumed) were confirmed to have flown from the Sea of Japan toward Japan’s airspace in Hokkaido. As these examples illustrate, Russian aircraft have continued to be active.

4 Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories

Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed Land Forces units on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan.

While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division, which belongs to a corps still stationed in South Sakhalin, is located on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, anti-air missiles, and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles are deployed.

Furthermore, in recent years, Russia has been upgrading the facilities of its troops located in the Northern Territories. It is also deploying new equipment such as coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles belonging to its Navy and fighter aircraft belonging to its Aerospace Forces, conducting large-scale exercises, and implementing other such activities as it increases its military activities under the illegal occupation of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan.

Some point out the background for such moves as being the rising military importance of all of the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN, as well as the trend of increasing Russian military activities not only in
the Northern Territories but also in South Sakhalin and the Chishima Islands, whose jurisdiction has not been determined.

In recent years, the deployment of major new equipment in the Northern Territories has included the announced deployment of coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands in 2016, and in August 2018, three Su-35 fighters were reportedly deployed at the new civilian airport on Etorofu Island, which was opened to military and civilian dual use in January of that year.

As for equipment of the Land Forces, in December 2020, media related to the Russian Ministry of Defence reported the deployment of “S-300V4” surface-to-air missile (maximum firing range of 400 km) in Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. Furthermore, in January 2022, it was announced that in the previous year, the tanks of the units located in the Northern Territories had been replaced with the “T-80BV,” which is suitable for operation in cold regions.

Military exercises have also continued in the Northern Territories. In June 2021, landing and anti-landing exercises were conducted on Etorofu Island, Kunashiri Island, and South Sakhalin, involving over 10,000 military personnel, 500 ground equipment and machines, 32 aircraft, and 12 vessels.

In addition, in the vicinity of Sakhalin and the Chishima Islands, which, like the Northern Territories, are adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, it is reported that the AFRF newly deployed the S-400 surface-to-air missile system to South Sakhalin in February 2021, the surface-to-ship missile system Bastion to South Sakhalin at the end of 2021, to Matua (Matsuwa) Island of the Chishima Islands in December 2021, and to Paramushir Island of the Chishima Islands in December 2022. There are reports on the establishment of a new coastal (surface-to-ship) missile brigade placed in South Sakhalin, with jurisdiction over units located on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. It is necessary to monitor with strong concern the Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories, while taking into account developments in the aggression against Ukraine.

5 Relations with Countries and Regions

1 General Situation

On March 31, 2023, President Putin approved the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation for the first time since 2016. In this document, Russia condemns Western countries for adopting anti-Russian policies and emphasizes cooperation with countries such as China and India, while stating that it aims to build a multipolar international order. Moves to strengthen collaboration with China in particular have been seen since the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, seemingly in inverse proportion to the deepening of Russia’s conflict with Western countries, and is significant especially since the aggression against Ukraine in February 2022.

2 Relations with the United States

President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s strategic interests.”

On the military front, feeling that the United States’ installation of missile defense systems both at home
As Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine, the country is believed to have suffered significant losses in conventional forces, primarily ground forces, including units deployed in the Far East region. These losses will likely further deepen its reliance on nuclear forces in the future. In the area surrounding Japan, Russia is expected to further focus on the defense of the area surrounding the Sea of Okhotsk, which is its waters of operation for strategic nuclear-powered submarines.

Regarding its strategic nuclear-powered submarines, Russia has deployed three Borey-class SSBNs since 2015 and one Yasen-class Nuclear-Powered Surface-to-Surface Missile Submarine (SSGN) in 2022, both of which are new types of nuclear-powered submarines. In the future, Russia is expected to have a total of five Borey-class SSBNs and four Yasen-class SSGNs, and it is modernizing and upgrading some of its existing nuclear-powered submarines.

In recent years, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) has newly deployed “Bastion” and “Bal” surface-to-ship missiles and S-400 and S-300V4 surface-to-air missiles in the Kamchatka Peninsula, which is in the vicinity of the Sea of Okhotsk, Russia’s waters of operation for nuclear-powered submarines; in the Chishima Islands and South Sakhalin, which are disputed territories; and in Japan’s Northern Territories. These moves are thought to be part of Russia’s so-called “bastion” strategy, in which it seeks to prevent other countries’ militaries from approaching the area around the Sea of Okhotsk, the waters where it operates its strategic nuclear-powered submarines.

In addition, from the perspective of strengthening the “bastion” strategy, the AFRF is expected to develop and utilize naval and air forces based in Primorsky Krai and the Kamchatka Peninsula. Specifically, Russia is in the process of upgrading the Pacific Fleet with ships armed with “Kalibr” cruise missiles, which are precision-guided munitions capable of carrying tactical nuclear and conventional warheads. In Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, it is newly deploying Steregushchiy II class frigates, and in Vladivostok, it is newly deploying Improved Kilo-class submarines, both of which are capable of carrying “Kalibr” cruise missiles. “Zircon” hypersonic cruise missiles, which were deployed in January 2023, will also be equipped on Gorskov-class missile frigates that are currently under construction and may be deployed in the Far East region in the future.

These naval and air forces are expected to be utilized on a regular basis to act as a deterrent to the United States and its allies, including Japan. Increased naval and air force activity was seen even before the start of aggression against Ukraine. For example, in December 2017, Russia deployed Tu-95 bombers to Biak in eastern Indonesia, and in the summer of 2021, the Pacific Fleet reportedly conducted a large-scale exercise in the central Pacific west of the Hawaiian Islands. Furthermore, with China, Russia has been conducting joint flights of bombers from 2019 onward and joint naval maneuvers of warships from 2021 onward in the area surrounding Japan.

We must watch Russia’s military developments in the Indo-Pacific region, including the area surrounding Japan, as well as trends in Russia’s cooperation with China, with strong concern.

A Russian Navy Kilo-class submarine that moved westward through the Soya Strait from October 6 to 7, 2022. It is believed to be the “Magadan,” the third Improved Kilo-class submarine in the Pacific Fleet capable of carrying the “Kalibr” cruise missile.

and abroad - including in Europe and the Asia-Pacific - undermines global and regional security, Russia has criticized these moves for upsetting the strategic balance. Russia is also moving forward with the development of new strategic weapons that are said to be capable of reliably penetrating missile defense systems.

In regard to arms control between the United States and Russia, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended in August 2019 during the former Trump administration after having gone through a series of processes originating from the withdrawal announcement of the United States side. In November 2020, the United States pulled out of the Open Skies Treaty, which was signed by the Western countries and Russia allowing its participants to mutually conduct unarmed observation and surveillance flights, and this was followed by Russia announcing its withdrawal in January 2021.

On the other hand, with regard to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which set the upper
Chapter 3

3 Relations with China

Russia has exported military equipment such as surface-to-air missiles, fighter jets, and submarines to China since the 1990s until recent years. Russia also continues to advance close military cooperation even during the aggression against Ukraine, and Russia and China conduct various joint military actions.

In May and November 2022, the “China-Russia joint air patrol,” which has been conducted annually since 2019 by Russian Tu-95 bombers and Chinese H-6 bombers, was conducted in the airspace from the Sea of Japan through the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

In September 2022, warships of Russia and China conducted joint training as a part of Russia Eastern Military District strategic command and staff exercise Vostok 2022. After the exercise, warships of both navies, consisting mainly of vessels that participated in the exercise, conducted the China-Russia Joint Naval Patrol for the second time since October 2021, in the sea area around Japan. These joint military actions frequently conducted by Russia and China are intended to be demonstrative behavior against Japan, so they are a significant concern from the perspective of the security of Japan and the region.

Navies of China and Russia conducted a regular joint exercise “Maritime Cooperation” in the East China Sea in December 2022.

4 Relations with Former Soviet Republics

Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with former Soviet republics as one of its most important foreign policy objectives. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the region. It deploys its troops in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), members Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), and Ukraine (Crimea). Through the conclusion of an alliance and strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November 2014, the conclusion of an alliance and integration treaty with South Ossetia in 2015, and other efforts, Russia has been working to ensure its military influence.

However, today, after more than thirty years have passed since the collapse of USSR, none of the former Soviet Union countries except Belarus support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It is also pointed out that former Soviet countries are opposed to Russia’s recruitment of their citizens, and some consider that Russia’s influence on the former Soviet area will decline still further in the wake of the aggression against Ukraine.

Russia strengthens military cooperation with Belarus along with the start of the aggression against Ukraine. Belarusian President Lukashenko asked President Putin to modernize his country’s aircrafts to allow them to carry nuclear weapons in June 2022, and President Putin agreed. It was announced in February 2023 that Belarusian forces deployed surface-to-surface missile system Iskander received from Russia. In March 2023, President Putin announced that Russia would complete the construction of a special storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus by July 2023, while mentioning the nuclear-
5 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Asian Countries
Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East, and security. In Asia, in addition to its relations with China, Russia assigns an important role to its Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership with India. In December 2021, in conjunction with the annual summit meeting, the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue of the Foreign and Defence Ministers was held in New Delhi. As for military arrangements, another example of the ongoing wide-ranging military cooperation between Russia and India is the joint exercise “INDRA,” which has been taking place since 2003 with the involvement of the armies and navies of both countries, with their air forces also taking part in the recent years. Furthermore, Russia is working to strengthen its relations with ASEAN, and conducted the Naval Cooperative Exercise with ASEAN countries firstly in the inshore waters of Indonesia in December 2021.

(2) Relations with European Countries
Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of common interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia thereafter, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings. Moreover, with the aggression against Ukraine, the relationship between Russia and European countries is the tensest it has been since the Cold War era.

(3) Relations with Middle Eastern and African Countries
In the Foreign Policy Concept published in March 2023, comprehensive mutual cooperation with Iran, total support for Syria, and deepened partnerships with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other countries are
stated definitely.

Above all, for Syria, the AFRF has continued to secure the Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base in Syria since September 2015 to conduct operations to support the Assad administration. In operations in Syria, Russia has conducted bombings using fighter bombers and long range bombers, as well as attacks using cruise missiles from surface ships and submarines deployed in the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. It has been pointed out that Russia maintains a military presence in Syria and is building permanent “A2/AD” capabilities by deploying long-range surface-to-air missiles, as well as expanding cooperation with neighboring countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Taking this into account, Russian influence over the eastern Mediterranean region, especially Syria, cannot be ignored.

Russia is increasing its influence over both the Syrian situation and peace in Libya, while at the same time coordinating its interests with Turkey. In May 2020, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) announced that Russian MiG-29 fighters were delivered to Libya after military aircraft insignia had been removed in Syria, and accused of Russia’s involvement in creating the war situation in Libya using private military companies (PMC) that the Russian government supports. It is also reported that approximately 2,000 personnel from the Russian PMC Wagner Group are operating in Libya.

In December 2020, the Russian government announced an agreement with the government of Sudan to set up a naval base on the Red Sea in Sudan, northeastern Africa. If a base of the Russia Navy were to be established in Sudan in the future, it is believed that deployment capabilities of the AFRF would be improved in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

In January 2022, the Malian military spokesman stated that Russian instructors had been dispatched to the country under a bilateral agreement to train Mali’s military, and it is noted that 300 to 400 personnel of the Russian PMC Wagner Group have been operating inside Mali.

In February 2023, warships of the Russian Navy Northern Fleet including an Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate conducted a joint naval exercise with navies of China and South Africa in the Indian Ocean east of South Africa, for the second time since 2019.

6 Arms Exports

Russia actively promotes the export of arms not only to maintain the defense industrial base and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. Export control is exclusively conducted by the Rosoboronexport State Corporation. Currently, Russia has the third largest share of arms exports in the world after the United States and France, exporter fighters, vessels and surface-to-air missiles to regions including Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. In recent years, Russia has actively tried to sell not only to conventional importers of its products but also to U.S. allies and U.S. friendly countries such as Turkey. However, the U.S. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) passed in 2017, and sanctions against Russia from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine are seen to be having a severe impact on Russia’s defense industry.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia had the second largest share of arms exports in the world (16%) after the United States between 2018 and 2022.
1 General Situation

Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with Japan and shares universal values, such as strategic interests, respect for freedom and human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Japan’s relationship with Australia is becoming more important than ever before.

2 Defense Strategies

In July 2020, the former Morrison Coalition Government released the 2020 Defence Strategic Update to reconsider its defense strategy in response to the strategic environment that had deteriorated more rapidly than anticipated. The document identified the changes in the country’s strategic environment which included: military modernization in the Indo-Pacific and intensifying major power competition involving the United States, China. It also stated that the conduct of gray-zone activities had also expanded. The use of para-military forces, militarization of disputed features, exploiting influence, interference operations and the coercive use of trade and economic levers were listed as its examples.

Based on the assessment of these situations, the Government decided to focus on the immediate region ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland of Southeast Asia, to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific. Furthermore, the objectives for Australia are to deploy military power: (1) to shape Australia’s strategic environment, (2) to deter actions against the country’s interest, and (3) to respond with credible military force when required. In order to achieve the objectives, the Government plans to invest approximately AUD$270 billion over the coming decade until 2030 in upgraded defense capabilities for the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

In September 2021, the leaders of the Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the establishment of AUKUS, a new trilateral security cooperation framework aimed at deepening diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The announced items for cooperation were (1) deeper information and technology sharing, (2) deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains, and (3) deeper cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities. The first initiative under AUKUS is to cooperate on Australia’s acquisition of at least eight nuclear-powered submarines and to work together to seek to determine the optimal pathway to achieve this over the eighteen months.

In April 2022, they announced that they would deepen cooperation in additional areas: undersea robotics autonomous systems, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, and hypersonic capabilities under AUKUS. In addition, Australia has announced its intention to advance cooperation with the United States on the introduction of Tomahawk cruise missiles and standoff missiles (JASSM-ER and LRASM), as well as on the development of hypersonic missiles for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

The Albanese Labor Party Government formed in May 2022 after the general election had clearly stated that it would follow the basic direction of the previous government’s defense policy, and announced that it

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1 Australia had planned to procure 12 conventional submarines (attack-class submarines) from France, but this plan was suspended when it was decided to acquire nuclear-powered submarines within the framework of AUKUS.
would conduct the Defence Strategic Review in order to implement this policy and optimize the ADF.

The leaders of Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. met in San Diego, California in March 2023 to announce that they will deliver conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines for Australia through three-phase approach, while meeting the commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. In the first phase, the U.K. and the U.S. plan to establish a rotational presence of their nuclear attack submarines (SSN) from as early as 2027 at HMAS Stirling, Western Australia. Opportunities for Australian sailors on-board the nuclear submarines will build practical experience for Australian crews. In the second phase, Australia intends to acquire up to five U.S. Virginia class SSNs in the early 2030s. In the third phase, AUKUS partners will deliver a trilaterally-developed submarine for both Australia and the U.K. based on the U.K.’s next-generation design that incorporates cutting edge U.S. submarine technologies. The two countries intend to build the submarine in their domestic shipyards.

In April 2023, following the completion of the Defence Strategic Review, conducted by the former Minister of Defence and the former Chief of the ADF, the Government released National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, which includes the Review itself and the response to the recommendations presented by the Review on agendas set for Defence’s posture and structure. The Albanese Government agreed or agreed in-principle with the recommendations of the Review and identified priority areas for immediate action, including the following.

• Acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS to improve Australia’s deterrence capabilities
• Developing the ADF’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer-range
• Improving the ADF’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases

In order to achieve the above, the Government intends to release National Defence Strategy in 2024 and formulate a Strategy every two years henceforth.

Currently, Australia has approximately 59,800 personnel, and possesses high-performance tanks, vessels, and aircraft to implement joint operations with the U.S., which is an Australia’s alliance partner. Australia also owns air refueling aircraft and amphibious assault ships to deploy those assets to distant places. In March 2022, the Australian Government announced that it would add 18,500 ADF personnel by 2040, an increase of about 30%.

### 3 Relations with Foreign Countries

#### (1) Relations with the United States

Australia and the United States are alliance partners based on the Security Treaty among Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS). In the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, the Australian Government clearly states that it will continue to deepen the alliance with the United States acknowledging that the alliance, including intelligence sharing and defense industrial and technological cooperation, is critical.

Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic and security issues. In the Joint Statement of AUSMIN held in Washington D.C. in November 2022, the two countries stated that the U.S.-Australia alliance had never been stronger or more vital to regional peace and stability. They also committed to deepening cooperation, bilaterally and with regional partners and institutions, to ensure an Indo-Pacific that is free, open, stable, peaceful, prosperous, and sovereign of sovereignty.

The United States and Australia have increased the presence of the U.S. Forces in northern Australia near the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. Marines began rotational deployment to northern Australia including Darwin in 2012 based on the Force Posture Initiatives announced by the leaders of both countries in November 2011 as part of the rebalance policy of the Obama Administration. Approximately 2,200 Marines were deployed to the region in 2022. In addition, the U.S. Air Force have deployed B-52 strategic bombers and F-22 fighters to Australia as needed, to conduct combined exercises and training with the RAAF. The above-mentioned AUSMIN Joint Statement mentioned to the future rotations of U.S. Navy and Army capabilities.

The U.S. Armed Forces and the ADF have biennially conducted the U.S.-Australia combined exercise Talisman Sabre since 2005 with the objective of enhancing combat readiness and interoperability. In 2021, amphibious landings and ground force maneuver

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2 A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand due to its adoption of a non-nuclear policy. The treaty is thus effective only between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand.
were conducted by the U.S. Forces and the ADF, with the participation of the Canadian, British, and ROK forces, the SDF, and others.

(2) Relations with China
For Australia, China is the biggest trade partner, and the two countries have conducted various exchanges in the defense area such as dialogues between the defense authorities, bilateral exercises, and mutual visiting of vessels, in addition to exchanges and cooperation in the political and economic areas.

Meanwhile, Australia has been showing clearly its wariness toward China including by delivering Australia’s stance on China.

The Australian Government has been expressing strong concerns over China’s land reclamation and construction activities in the South China Sea, and oppose any unilateral attempts to change or influence the status quo through militarization of disputed features and coercive or intimidating actions, while also clearly expressing its intention to continue to exercise its rights to freedom of navigation and overflight. Furthermore, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper contained statements to the effect that China was challenging the position of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, the most important region for Australia.

People within and outside Australia expressed their concerns over the lease of facilities by China, including Port Darwin, which has been used by the Australian and the U.S. forces fleets. In December 2020, Australian enacted a law that allows the government to veto negotiations for future arrangements and terminate existing agreements between Australian local entities and foreign entities, that are inconsistent with Australia’s foreign policy.

As Australia had suggested the necessity for an independent investigation into the origins of the novel coronavirus in April 2020, China successively imposed trade blockages on Australian beef and other goods, which resulted in the rapid deterioration of the Australia-China relation.

In addition, in February 2022, the Australian Department of Defence announced that a P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft of the RAAF had been pointed a laser by a PLA Navy vessel in the Arafura Sea, Australia’s northern approaches. Former Prime Minister Morrison condemned the laser as “an act of intimidation” that Australia would never accept. In response, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Australia’s claims were “untrue.”

Afterward, the change of Australian government triggered the restart of foreign and security dialogue between the countries, and Australia and China held a defense ministers’ meeting in June 2022 for the first time in about three years.

Regarding AUKUS, China has claimed that the export of sensitive nuclear submarine technology to Australia poses a serious risk of nuclear proliferation and harms peace and stability of the region although Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. commit to set the highest nuclear non-proliferation standard, and have continued to consult with the IAEA.

(3) Relations with India
Australia sees India as a security partner in the Indo-Pacific region that shares national interests.

At the Australia-India summit meeting (held online) in June 2020, the two countries agreed to elevate the bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and at the summit meeting (held online) in March 2022, they committed to holding Annual Summits.

In September 2021, the two countries held their inaugural Australia-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in New Delhi; and particularly in the defense field, they agreed to strengthen cooperation in defense technologies, maritime domain awareness, and operational logistics support.

Richard Marles, Deputy Prime Minister of Australia and Minister of Defence, met with Defence Minister Singh of India in June 2022, and welcomed the increased diversity and frequency of military exercises and exchanges between their countries. The two ministers agreed to build on operational participation through the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement.

In November 2022, the Royal Australian Navy participated in the Multilateral Naval Exercise Malabar among the U.S. Navy, Indian Navy, and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, as it did in 2021.

(4) Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries
As mentioned earlier, in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Australia decided to focus on the immediate region ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua
New Guinea and the South West Pacific.

Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense fields following the signing of the Lombok Treaty, a security cooperation framework, in November 2006, the September 2012 conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement, which included the enhancement of cooperation in the fields of anti-terrorism measures and maritime security, and the elevation of their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in August 2018. The bilateral relationship has been strengthened through initiatives, including regular Foreign and Defense Ministers Meetings (2+2), and the signing of an agreement on maritime security and terrorism, and of a Maritime Cooperation Plan of Action in 2018.

With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out regular combined exercises in the South China Sea and other areas under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA; entered into force in 1971) framework, whereby the two countries, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand would consult together in the event of any form of armed attack or threat of such attack against Singapore or Malaysia, for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken. Australia considers that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner, and that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime trading environment. The defense cooperation between the two countries is also deepening, including the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Military Training and Training Area Development in Australia under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in October 2016. Regarding Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force Base Butterworth, and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean.

The Albanese Government criticized the former Morrison Government for failing to intervene the signing of a framework agreement between Solomon Islands and China on security cooperation in April 2022, and announced its basic policy to strengthen engagement with Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste. Based on this policy, the government announced the establishment of Australia Pacific Defence School to provide training programs for members of Pacific Island country and Timor-Leste defense and security forces, and of a Pacific Climate Infrastructure Financing Partnership to work with Pacific Island countries for which climate change is critical, to build new climate resilient infrastructure.

Australia plays a leading role in assisting these countries in fields such as security maintenance, natural disasters response, and maritime patrol. In addition, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. It also plans to supply the Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste with 21 new Guardian-class patrol boats by 2023.

New Zealand

New Zealand is located in the Indo-Pacific, and is an important strategic cooperative partner that shares fundamental values with Japan.

In July 2018, the New Zealand Government announced the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018.

The Statement presented New Zealand’s security objectives, including ensuring public safety, maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity, strengthening international order, maintaining democratic institutions and national values, and protecting the natural environment. In order to achieve these objectives, New Zealand prioritizes the securing of operational capabilities in New Zealand’s territory and the primary operation area that stretches from the South Pole to the Equator. The Statement also mentioned other priorities, including capabilities to operate effectively with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, and the maintenance of the scale and quality of New Zealand’s military contributions.

Moreover, the Statement was the first document that mentioned the impact of climate change and the role of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) regarding this issue, which made a commitment to support the Pacific Island countries that have been exposed to disasters. As for the issues in the South China Sea, the Statement specifically noted China’s militarization in the South China Sea, stating, “China’s more confident assertion of its interests has at times raised tensions with neighboring states and with the United States.”

In addition, New Zealand released the Defence
Assessment 2021 in December 2021, which analyzed New Zealand’s strategic environment and cited challenges and other issues, suggesting that the construction of military facilities and unilateral resource development, as seen in the South China Sea, could also occur in the island country region.

In July 2022, then Minister of Defence Henare announced that the government would review its defense policy due to issues such as the escalating impacts of climate change, intensification of geo-strategic competition including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

As for diplomatic relations, New Zealand has maintained close relationships with the U.S. and Australia, and sees Australia as its only formal defense ally.

The U.S. suspended its defense obligation to New Zealand based on the ANZUS Treaty in 1986, when New Zealand refused the entrance of a U.S. ship following New Zealand’s adoption of a nuclear-free policy. On the other hand, the two countries have strengthened their relationship in the diplomacy and defense fields through the Wellington Declaration (2010), which primarily focuses on strengthening strategic relations in the fields of foreign policy and military affairs, and the Washington Declaration (2012), which mainly deals with expanding defense cooperation. The U.S. has become a close strategic partner.

While New Zealand has deepened its bilateral relationship with China through such initiatives as cooperation for the Belt and Road Initiative and joint air exercises, it also looks at China with a cautious eye as noted in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 and Defence Assessment 2021.
Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffic, linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important region for Japan, which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people.

Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, and separatist and independence movements. Moreover, there has also been problems with Islamic extremist groups and piracy incidents obstructing the safe passage of ships. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Each country is also pursuing cooperation respectively with such countries as the United States, China, Russia, Australia, and India to this end. Recently, given the backdrop of economic development, countries have been modernizing their military forces, mainly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capabilities.

1 Indonesia

Indonesia is a major country in Southeast Asia, with the world’s largest Muslim population. At the same time, it is the largest archipelago country in the world as it has vast territorial waters and occupies a strategic position for maritime traffic.

As part of its military force reform, Indonesia aims to meet the minimum requirements for defense capabilities—what it calls “Minimum Essential Force (MEF).” In particular, Indonesia acknowledges that its maritime defense capabilities are still very much inadequate. Accordingly, Indonesia has announced a defense budget increase as well as a policy to bolster its deployment of assets to the Natuna Islands, in the South China Sea, and other locations. Indonesia has deployed an integrated unit and an air squadron, etc., and in December 2018, it was reported that the transfer of the headquarters of a naval combat group command to Natuna is almost completed, that an opening ceremony of a military base with piers that can accommodate submarines, and hangars for unmanned vehicles was conducted, and furthermore, that the ground-breaking ceremony for a submarines support facility was held in April 2021.

Concerned about the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, which overlaps with Indonesia’s EEZ in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has enhanced its patrol activities in the area. In December 2019, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a note of protest on the grounds that a Chinese Coast Guard vessel had been found to have operated illegally in the EEZ around the Natuna Islands by escorting Indonesia’s fishing fleet.

Indonesia adopts a free and active foreign policy and emphasizes cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. With the United States, Indonesia is strengthening its cooperative relationship in such fields as military education and training and military equipment procurement. In addition, Indonesia has carried out bilateral training including army exercise Garuda Shield, naval exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)\(^1\) and counter terrorism exercise Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) with the U.S.\(^2\) In 2022, Indonesia conducted multinational multi-service exercise Super Garuda Shield, participated by armed forces of Australia and Singapore, and the Self-Defense Forces of Japan, and announced that the U.S. 7th Fleet participated in an exercise in the Natuna Sea.

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1 A general term that refers to a series of bilateral naval exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste.
2 Refers to counter-terrorism combined exercises that the United States conducts with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
2 Malaysia

Malaysia’s first defense white paper, which was published in December 2019, finds its potential to serve as a bridge between the vast Pacific and Indian Oceans as the country is divided in two territories—Peninsular Malaysia, and Sabah and Sarawak, on the island of Borneo—located between the two oceans. The white paper also recognizes the fact that, while Malaysia’s strategic location and natural resources are blessing ones, they also pose a security challenge to itself. Given these attributes, Malaysia has historically been affected by the political dynamics of major powers, and even today, Malaysia sees in its defense white paper that uncertain U.S.-China relationship is the most important strategic challenge for Malaysia.

Based on this recognition, the white paper set up three pillars in order to defend national interests in each of three concentric areas, consisting of the Core Area, which includes both the country’s land masses and territorial waters; the Extended Area, which encompasses the surrounding waters and airspace; and the Forward Area, which incorporates locations beyond the extended area where Malaysia’s national interests are affected. The three pillars are: (1) Concentric Deterrence, which aims to dissuade all forms of external intrusion or conflicts by strengthening the capability of the nation’s armed forces; (2) Comprehensive Defense, which seeks to enhance Malaysia’s internal resilience by whole-of-government and whole of society approaches; and (3) Credible Partnerships, which focuses on the promotion of regional stability via the expansion and enhancement of defense cooperation with other countries as a highly credible partner.

In connection with the recent continued anchoring of Chinese vessels around South Luconia Shoal, over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia has announced that its Navy and maritime law enforcement agencies would conduct around-the-clock monitoring, and that Malaysia would protect its sovereignty. In October 2021, a Chinese survey vessel and other vessels entered Malaysia’s EEZ, which the Malaysian government protested.

Along with this expression of protest and strengthening of its maritime defense capabilities, Malaysia has also striven to bolster its defense posture in eastern Malaysia including by reportedly identifying suitable land for the establishment of a new naval base in Bintulu, which is close to James Shoal and South Luconia Shoal, and by Air Force carrying out live-fire missile exercises in Sabah state, on Borneo in eastern Malaysia in July 2019.

Since December 2019, Malaysia has also been confirming Chinese ships’ activities around its own drillship West Capella. In April 2020, the United States and Australia carried out combined exercises in the area surrounding this ship, and in May 2020, U.S. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) also conducted presence operations near this ship.

In particular, as well as conducting bilateral exercises with the U.S. such as CARAT and SEACAT, Malaysia has been promoting military cooperation including capacity building in the maritime security field.

3 Myanmar

Myanmar shares borders with China and India and is a gateway to the Indian Ocean for China and some ASEAN countries. In light of these factors, Myanmar is noted for its strategic significance. Its armed forces had control over the government following the collapse of the socialist regime in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the West, the transition to civilian rule was completed based on the road map to democracy.

Myanmar’s parliamentary election was conducted in November 2020, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) secured an overwhelming single majority in both houses with the number of seats significantly higher than the previous election. However, in February 2021, then State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and her party’s senior members were detained by Myanmar’s military, which was claiming election fraud, and the armed forces declared a state of emergency to carry out a coup d’état, and powers were handed over to the commander-in-chief. The State Administration Council (SAC) chaired by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces Min Aung Hlaing was formed by the Armed Force. The Armed Forces controlled information and used force to suppress civil disobedience movements and protests against their administration, resulting in numerous casualties. This unleashed a storm of condemnation from the international society.

Then, in April of the same year, although the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) instituted by Pro-Democracy Group declared the establishment of the National Unity Government (NUG), the Armed Forces
designated them and others as Terrorist Organizations. After the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting held the same month with the presence of a Myanmar military representative, a “Five-Point Consensus” was agreed to, recognizing ASEAN’s proactive and constructive role in promoting a peaceful resolution. In August of the same year, SAC announced the establishment of an “interim government” with the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces as the “provisional prime minister.”

It is pointed out the Armed Forces is expanding the number of mobilizable manpower including by announcing its intention to implement the conscription, and by officially announcing a new police law which gives the Armed Forces the authority to make the police engage in defense-related matters.

In March 2022, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia Prak Sokhonn visited Myanmar for the first time as the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair to Myanmar, and, from June to July, made his second visit to Myanmar. Although he met with the Commander-in-Chief and junta cabinet members, he could not meet with pro-democracy groups and others. In July 2022, despite strong appeals from the international community, the executions of four Myanmar citizens, including pro-democracy activists, were carried out.

The Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Summits adopted in November 2022 included ASEAN’s disappointment at the little progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus by the Myanmar Armed Forces.

Myanmar has maintained a good relationship with China since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1950 and the country is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. Myanmar has also received Chinese aid for pipeline construction and the development of Kyaukpyu Port. In January 2020, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to visit Myanmar for 19 years and affirmed China’s policy of promoting economic cooperation through the BRI.

Myanmar maintains a cooperative relationship with Russia in the military field since the period of the past military regime, and Russia was a destination for students from Myanmar and a supplier of major defense equipment. In July 2022, the Commander-in-Chief visited Russia, and discussed promotion of defense cooperation with the Deputy Defense Minister. Furthermore, in September 2022, the Commander-in-Chief met President Putin for the first time, in Vladivostok, to exchange views on cooperation in all sectors, emphasizing their good bilateral relations.

As for India, since the transition to civilian rule, Myanmar has deepened cooperative relations in the fields of the economy and military, which resulted in defense cooperation and exchanges such as the hosting of various seminars and friendly visits to Myanmar by Indian naval vessels.

Cooperative relations with North Korea, including weapons trades, were maintained under Myanmar’s military regime in the past. Following the transition to democracy, although Myanmar denied its military ties to North Korea, the report issued by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea in March 2018 reported that the country received a ballistic missile system and other weapons from North Korea.

4 The Philippines

The Philippines considers that its archipelagic attributes and geographic location are a source of both strength and vulnerability. Moreover, the country sees that its strategic location and rich natural resources have also provided a strong temptation to expansionist powers. Based on this perception, although resolving internal armed conflicts remains its top security concern, rising tensions in the South China Sea have prompted the Philippines to give the same attention to territorial defense as it does to internal security threats.

The Philippines, with a historically close relationship with the United States, has maintained a cooperative relationship with the U.S. under Mutual Defense Treaty and Military Assistance Agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992.

In February 1998, the two countries signed the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which prescribes the legal status of U.S. military personnel when the U.S. Forces conducts combined military exercises or other related activities in the Philippines.

Furthermore, in April 2014, the two countries signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that allows capability development of the Armed Forces of the Philippine (AFP), enhanced cooperation in disaster relief, rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces, construction and improvement of agreed locations in the Philippines by the U.S., and U.S. Forces’ prepositioning of equipment, supplies and material. In March 2016,
the two countries agreed on five bases of the AFP for carrying out defense cooperation under the EDCA. Although former President Duterte notified the United States its intention to terminate the VFA in February 2020, he decided to withdraw the notice in July 2021. In recent years, the two countries have been conducting various military exercises, including large-scale exercise Balikatan, amphibious exercise KAMANDAG, and maritime exercise Sama Sama.

President Marcos, who took office in June 2022, met with President Biden of the U.S. for the first time in person in September 2022 in New York. The two leaders discussed the situation in the South China Sea, and underscored their support for freedom of navigation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In November 2022, Vice President Harris of the U.S. clearly stated that an armed attack on the Philippines armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the South China Sea would invoke the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. In February 2023, defense ministers of the U.S. and Philippines announced the agreement to designate four new agreed locations for the EDCA, and, in April, announced the location of the four sites. Furthermore, in May 2023, the U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines were adopted and released for the first time, which serve as a roadmap of modernization of alliance cooperation and deepening interoperability between the U.S. and the Philippines. Thus, the defense cooperation between the two countries has begun to progress again since the inauguration of the new administration.

The Philippines and China have competing claims over the sovereignty in the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal of the South China Sea. In January 2013, seeking a settlement under international law, the Philippines started arbitral tribunal proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS against China. In July 2016, the final award was rendered, accepting nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions. The Government of the Philippines released a statement that it welcomed the award by the arbitral tribunal and strongly affirmed its respect for the decision.

In July 2022, President Marcos emphasized in the state of the nation address his stance that he would preside over any process that will abandon even one square inch of Philippine territory. Furthermore, in the same month, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines released a statement commemorating the sixth anniversary of the award.

The conflicts between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea dispute were observed even after 2020 during which the COVID-19 infections became a global pandemic. The Philippines protested that a Chinese military vessel had directed fire-control radars at a Philippine Navy ship in February 2020, and that China had established administrative districts on islands in the South China Sea in April of the same year.

Moreover, regarding the fact that 220 Chinese militia ships swarmed at Whitsun Reef in March 2021, the Department of National Defense of the Philippines accused China of conducting “a clear provocation of the militarization” of the South China Sea and demanded China to remove ships. In response, China claimed its sovereignty over Whitsun Reef, and then denied the existence of Chinese militia ships and explained “some fishing ships had to shelter at Whitsun Reef from the bad weather.”

In January 2023, President Marcos met with President Xi Jinping during his state visit to China. The two leaders had an in-depth and frank discussion on the South China Sea and agreed to appropriately manage differences through peaceful means. In addition, they also agreed on the arrangement to establish a “direct communication mechanism” to prevent possible miscommunication between the foreign authorities of the two countries.

Given its limited land area, population, and resources, Singapore’s existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in a globalized
economy. Singapore gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about 10% of its national budget. In October 2022, the Digital and Intelligence Service was established as the fourth service of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), integrating existing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and cyber capabilities.

Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative relations with ASEAN and the FPDA, and has concluded defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region.

With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports United States’ presence in the Asia-Pacific and permits it to use military facilities in Singapore. Since 2013, U.S. littoral combat ships (LCSs) began their rotational deployments. In December 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S. Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week for the first time. The two countries have committed to continuing to carry out similar deployments routinely. In addition, Singapore conducts combined exercises with the U.S., such as CARAT and SEACAT.

Singapore has strong economic ties with China, and the two countries also conduct bilateral naval exercises. In October 2019, the two countries signed the enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADESC). On the other hand, diplomatic relations with China have been strained partly due to Singapore’s advocacy of the ruling of the arbitral tribunal to Philippines v. China when it comes to the resolution of the South China Sea disputes and partly due to Singapore’s defense cooperation with Taiwan.

Singapore concluded the Bilateral Agreement for Navy Cooperation with India in November 2017, and the two countries undertake the maritime exercise Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX), ground exercise “Agni Warrior,” and air exercise Joint Military Training (JMT) among other activities.

In March 2020, Singapore and Australia signed the Treaty on Military Training and Training Area Development in Australia. This treaty enables the Singapore Armed Forces to access Australia’s newly developed training area.

**6 Thailand**

Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations, and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive use of political, economic, and other national strengths; and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing the defense industry.

Under its flexible omni-directional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries.

Particularly with the United States, the U.S.-Thailand combined exercise Cobra Gold has been conducted since 1982, and is currently one of the largest multilateral training in Southeast Asia. In addition, the marine corps of the two countries have continued their combined naval training CARAT and counter-piracy and trafficking exercise SEACAT.

Thailand and China have conducted combined training such as Blue Strike between their marines and Falcon Strike between their air forces.

**7 Vietnam**

Based on its viewpoint that the sea is closely associated with the national construction and defense, Vietnam has established the objective of becoming a strong marine country, particularly prioritizing the modernization of its military forces and law enforcement forces at sea as well as ensuring the capability for maritime domain awareness, maritime independence, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national interests at sea.

Vietnam deploys its omni-directional diplomatic policy and intends to actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with every nation. In March 2016, Vietnam opened an international port in the Cam Ranh Bay, which is located in a strategically important location, and Navy vessels from many countries including Japan have called at the international Cam Ranh Bay port.

Vietnam and the United States have strengthened their military relations in recent years. This has taken such forms as combined training with the U.S. Navy and port calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In 2017, mutual

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3 Entered into effect in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of an aggression towards or a threat of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The five countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements.
visits were conducted by the leaders of both countries, and an agreement was reached on the deepening of defense cooperation. March 2018 marked the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier to Vietnam after the end of the Vietnam war. In addition, the U.S. aircraft carrier and cruiser made a call at Da Nang in March 2020. In June 2022, Minister of Defense Phan Van Giang of Vietnam met with Secretary of Defense Austin of the U.S., and the two agreed to seek additional opportunities to advance practical cooperation in support of both nations’ shared security objectives.

Vietnam and Russia continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense, with Vietnam dependent on Russia for the majority of its defense equipment. In April 2018, the two countries signed a military and technical cooperation roadmap, while in July 2019, a Vietnamese naval vessel visited the port of Vladivostok for the first time. In December 2019, a submarine rescue vessel from Russia’s Pacific Fleet visited the port of Cam Ranh and participated in the first bilateral joint submarine rescue exercise.

Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership relations, proactively conduct high level government official exchanges while the countries have conflicts over territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.

The defense white paper published in November 2019 demonstrates an acknowledgement that Vietnam and China need to resolve the territorial disputes with special precaution, avoiding negative impacts on general peace, friendship, and cooperation for development between the two countries. As such, it recognizes that the two countries should continue negotiations and consultations to find peaceful solutions on the basis of international law. On the other hand, it is also pointed out that, while still falling short of the scale of the China’s past reclamation, Vietnam has accelerated and expanded landfill work at several of its outposts in Spratly Islands, where Vietnam is competing for territorial rights against China.\(^4\)

Vietnam and India have been deepening their cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas, including security and the economy, under a comprehensive strategic partnership. In the area of defense cooperation, it is noted that the Indian Armed Forces support the training of Vietnam’s Navy submarine personnel and Air Force pilots, and Indian Navy vessels make friendly visits to Vietnam. In June 2022, Minister of Defense Phan Van Giang of Vietnam met with Minister of Defence Singh of India, and set forth the policy under which the scope and scale of bilateral defense cooperation are enhanced significantly by signing the Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030.

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces, focusing on inducting equipment such as submarines and fighters, including fourth-generation fighters.

In addition, each country strives to enhance ISR capabilities including by acquiring vessels and unmanned vehicles, against a background of disputes over territorial rights in the South China Sea.

Indonesia plans to acquire 42 Rafale fighters from France, and is negotiating with the United States for the procurement of 36 F-15EX fighters. With the ROK, Indonesia concluded an agreement to purchase three ROK-made 209-class submarines, the first two of which were built in Korea and the third was built in Indonesia. In January 2016, the two countries also concluded a detailed agreement on cost sharing and bilateral cooperation in the joint development of the 4.5 generation fighter jet KF-21. Indonesia introduced ScanEagle UAVs from the United States. As well as showcasing Chinese CH-4 UAVs at an October 2019 celebration for Indonesian National Armed Forces Day, in December 2019 Indonesia unveiled the prototype Black Eagle UAV, a domestically produced unmanned aerial vehicle that has incorporated several aspects of the

Malaysia announced a plan to build six indigenous LCSs. The first of these vessels was launched in August 2017. Furthermore, by December 2021, Malaysia introduced four littoral mission ships (LMSs) from China. Malaysia also introduced ScanEagle reconnaissance UAVs from the United States.

Myanmar received a Kilo-class submarine from India in December 2019, and in December 2021, commissioned its Ming-class submarine received from China. The procurement of the country’s submarine is attracting attention from neighboring countries. Furthermore, Myanmar introduced Su-30 fighters from Russia by December 2022.

The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea. In terms of air force capabilities, between November 2015 and May 2017, the Philippines successively introduced 12 FA-50PH light fighters purchased from the ROK. The Philippines is currently planning to acquire multi-role fighters. The candidates are JAS-39 Gripen from Sweden and F-16 fighters from the U.S. The Philippines also received six A-29 light attack aircraft from Brazil in October 2020, and ScanEagle reconnaissance UAVs from the United States in November 2020. Furthermore, a procurement contract for a supersonic cruise missile “BrahMos” from India was concluded in January 2022.

As for naval forces, the Philippines received three Hamilton-class frigates from the United States by 2016. The Philippines introduced two Indonesian-made landing dock vessels by 2017. In addition, two frigates were introduced from the ROK by March 2021. The August 2019 commissioning of a Pohang-class corvette received from the ROK marked the restoration of the antisubmarine capability that the Philippines had long lacked. That September, the Philippines conducted the DAGIT-PA multi-service military exercise involving the army, navy, and air force, during which the four AAV-7 assault amphibious vehicles that it had commissioned the previous June were operated.

Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces. Today, it is one of the largest arms importers in the world. It introduced 24 U.S.-made F-15 fighters by 2012 and also participates in the F-35 JSF Program. In January 2020, the U.S. Government officially approved the sale of F-35B fighter jets to Singapore.

As for Thailand, in July 2014, the country established the Submarine Squadron Headquarters. In April 2017, the Royal Thai Navy drew up a plan to purchase three Yuan-class submarines from China over the next 11 years, and the Thai Cabinet approved the purchase of one vessel. However, in April 2020, Thailand announced that it would postpone the procurement of two Yuan-class submarines from China in order to secure the budget for COVID-19 countermeasures. In addition, the Cabinet approved in September 2012 a plan to introduce two frigates. The first frigate was received from the ROK in December 2018. In September 2019, Thailand signed an agreement to purchase a Type 071 landing platform dock from China. In addition, by 2013, Thailand had introduced 12 Swedish-made JAS-39 Gripen fighters and received 35 of the 60 Stryker armored vehicles purchased from the United States.

By January 2017, Vietnam successively introduced six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines. By February 2018, Vietnam started the operation of four Russian-made Gepard-class frigates. As for its air force capabilities, Vietnam started to successively introduce Russian-made Su-30 fighters in 2004, and to date, the total number of delivered Su-30 fighters came to 36. In January 2020, it was reported that Vietnam had ordered 12 Yak-130 training aircraft from Russia. Thailand also introduced ScanEagle reconnaissance UAVs from the United States.
Southeast Asian countries utilize ASEAN as the multilateral security framework of the region. ASEAN holds mechanisms such as the ARF and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM), which provide opportunities for dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN has made efforts to improve the security environment in the region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR). In addition, ASEAN attaches importance to expanding its relations with countries outside of the region. It holds the ADMM-Plus framework, a platform that adds eight non-ASEAN countries including Japan to ADMM. ASEAN and the United States held their first ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX) in September 2019. With China, ASEAN held the first naval table-top exercise in August 2018, and the first naval field training exercise in October 2018. Furthermore, ASEAN countries conducted the first Naval Cooperative Exercise with Russia in inshore waters of Indonesia in December 2021.
1 General Situation

India is the world’s largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has significant influence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geopolitical importance. India has also increased its presence as a geopolitical player, while the international community in return has high expectations for the country’s role.

India traditionally has aimed at nonaligned and omnidirectional diplomacy. The Modi administration has maintained the neighborhood first policy, which emphasizes strengthening relations with South Asian countries, while expanding the focus of strengthening India’s external relations to the Asia-Pacific region, in accordance with the “Act East” policy. In addition, the administration has carried out proactive foreign policy, placing priority also on India’s relations with the United States, Russia, and Europe, as well as the Middle East and Africa.

On the other hand, India has non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. There are also concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as activities of Islamic extremists. Accordingly, defending its land borders and tackling the threat of domestic terrorism are major concerns for India. Furthermore, in recent years, India has considered efforts for maritime security with the Indian Ocean as a focus point important.

2 Military Affairs

In the integrated doctrine published by the Ministry of Defence in 2017, India stated that India’s traditional threats primarily emanate from the disputed land borders with India’s neighbors. Maintaining territorial integrity and preserving national sovereignty continues to remain a major strategic challenge for India. For this, it is pointed out that India perceives China and Pakistan as major threats with non-demarcated border issues in regard to land and India recognizes that it may have to fight a ‘two-front war’ with China and Pakistan, and appears to be forming its defensive strategy.

In addition, India emphasized the importance of the Indian Ocean in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy published in October 2015, defining the nation’s primary areas of maritime interest as an extensive marine area centered on India, encompassing the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Strait of Malacca. In addition, the strategy clearly states that India will become a “net security provider” in the maritime neighborhood, and clearly recognized China’s increased activity in the Indian Ocean.

Based on these perceptions, India is working on strengthening and reorganizing its armed forces. For example, a new recruitment scheme was launched in June 2022. The scheme has been designed to enable a youthful profile of the armed forces and bring about a transformational shift towards a more tech-savvy military. The establishment of an integrated force aiming to augment operational and organizational cooperation system between all three services is also being considered.

While the Indian Army is the largest ground force in the world with approximately 1,240,000 personnel, it is trying to convert Battle Squads into Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) in an effort towards force structuring and optimization as a part of the “Land Warfare Doctrine-2018.” It is believed that the army strengthens firepower by deploying self-propelled howitzers and howitzers, and promotes deployment of drones for attack and reconnaissance near the India-China border.

The Indian Navy placed “Sea Control” as the key concept to operate the fleet, and aircraft carriers as the key vessels for the Sea Control concept. In addition, the Navy mentioned its plan to build three aircraft carrier battle groups. The country’s second and first indigenously conventional-powered aircraft carrier “Vikrant” was

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1 IBGs consist of infantry, air defense, armored, logistics units and others with support from attack helicopters. IBGs are units of brigade size with characteristics appropriate to threats, terrain, and task. It is reported that an exercise of IBGs was conducted in 2022.

2 According to the Indian Navy’s “Maritime Security Strategy,” “Sea Control” means that a defined maritime space (including surface, underwater, and air) can be used for specific period of time and for one’s own purposes and its use by the adversary can be denied.
commissioned in September 2022. The Navy also places importance on the “Sea Denial” concept by operating submarines and through other means. While there is a plan to introduce 24 attack submarines by 2030, only five Scorpène-class submarines have been commissioned as of March 2022. The Navy is currently working on the plan to build six conventional-powered submarines with air-independent propulsion (AIP). Attention will be focused on future advances. Furthermore, the Indian Navy reinforces its presence in the Indian Ocean. It is pointed out that the Navy is constructing bases on Andaman and Nicobar Islands on which the joint command is to be placed, and on the Agalega Islands of the Republic of Mauritius.

Two fighter squadrons consisting of French-made Rafale fighter aircraft became fully operational in December 2022 for the Indian Air Force. On the other hand, it is pointed out that the deployment of enough squadrons to deal with two-front operations is a matter requiring immediate attention, because disbanding of several squadrons is expected in the future. India introduces the Russian-made ground-to-air missile system S-400. It is reported that missiles for two regiments are deployed near the India-Pakistan border and India-China border, and the delivery of systems for a third regiment started in November 2022.

In addition, India is a nuclear-weapon state with 160 nuclear warheads as of January 2022, and while it maintains the nuclear doctrine published in 2003 and policies including the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998, it has been promoting development, performance improvement, and deployment of various ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. In 2022, India succeeded in launching a supersonic cruise missile BrahMos (extended range) from a Su-30MKI fighter jet, launching the IRBM Agni-III, Agni-IV, and Agni-V, launching a ballistic missile from nuclear submarine INS Arihant, and other activities.

Outer space, cyberspace, and special operations domains are mentioned in the Joint Doctrine, and agencies for each were placed under Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff. In addition, cooperation with other countries including the United States is also being promoted.

### 3 Relations with Other Countries

#### (1) Relations with the United States

India and the United States being in a relationship of the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership are steadily deepening defense and security cooperation in recent years, and agreed on holding Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers’ Meetings (“2+2”) annually. They stated in the fourth meeting held in the United States in 2022 that they acknowledged the importance of deepening collaboration in science and technology in the India-U.S. Joint Technical Group (JTG), and in evolving new

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3 According to the Indian Navy’s Maritime Security Strategy, “Sea Denial” is a concept of denying the adversary the use of a particular maritime space, for a period of time when it is not required for one’s own use.

4 India raises its continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, along with credible minimum deterrence, “No First Use” policy, and its policy of no use against non-nuclear weapon state in the nuclear doctrine published in 2003.

5 A forum to control technical cooperation, and approve U.S.-India joint projects. The meeting held annually with cooperation of all defense agencies of both countries.
India did not join either the U.S. or Soviet camp during the Cold War, but instead promoted non-aligned, omni-directional diplomacy in order to emerge as a leader of the Third World. On the other hand, India needed a partner who could provide diplomatic and military support because of military conflicts that were occurring due to border disputes with Pakistan and China.

Under such circumstances, India sometimes approached the United States, which sought cooperation with India with a view to prevent the spread of communism. However, the cooperative relationship with the United States did not always progress smoothly, as the United States provided military support to Pakistan and later approached China with the aim of deterring the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, whose conflict with China had been deepening since the 1950s, approached India with a view to deterring China and provided India with a wide variety of equipment, including fighter aircraft and tanks. This increased India’s dependence on Russia, mainly in terms of military equipment.

After the end of the Cold War, India has tended to remain dependent on Russia in terms of military equipment. However, in order to enhance its self-reliance, India has been working to promote the indigenous production of military equipment and diversify its cooperative relationships beyond dependence on Russia.

After Russia, France is the second-largest supplier of equipment to India (2018–22, SIPRI). In 2022, India adopted the French-made “Rafale” 4.5-generation fighters and has also been building submarines domestically with technical cooperation from France. At India-France Strategic Dialogue held in January 2023, the two countries agreed to strengthen bilateral defense and security cooperation.

In addition, India has purchased equipment such as UAVs, radar systems, and missiles from Israel for use in ISR activities in its border areas and the Indian Ocean. It has also successfully co-developed the “Barak 8” surface-to-air missile system and is still working on the development of a new type of surface-to-air missile with Israel.

India has concluded various agreements and conducted joint exercises to enhance military interoperability with the United States. As the United States has identified China as its most consequential geopolitical challenge, it is further deepening its cooperation with India. For example, at the first U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) held at the end of January 2023, the United States promised to expedite its consideration of the application to jointly produce jet engines for indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, which India has been importing from a U.S. company. Furthermore, the two countries plan to expand international cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum technology, and work to reinforce the semiconductor supply chain. Cooperation on such advanced technologies is also expected to contribute to the development of India’s military technology and defense industries.

From the perspective of engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and securing access to the vast Indian market, India’s efforts to diversify its defense cooperation are thought to be beneficial to the countries with which it is cooperating, and are likely to continue in the future.

Sources of India’s equipment purchases over the past five years (2018–22, SIPRI)

Prime Minister Modi and President Macron meeting on the occasion of the G20 Summit (November 2022) [EPA/Upi]
defense domains, including space, artificial intelligence (AI), and cyber.

The two countries also concluded various agreement such as Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and conduct various multilateral trainings and exercises in a regular basis, such as Exercise “Malabar”\(^6\) in which Japan participates and Army Exercise “Yudh Abhyas” for enhancement of interoperability.

As an aside, the United States repeatedly voiced concern about India’s procurement of S-400 missiles from Russia. Secretary of State Blinken said in April 2022 that “the possibility of sanctions or waivers based on The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)\(^7\) has not been decided yet.”

(2) Relations with China

(3) Relations with Russia

(4) Relations with South Asian Countries and Southeast Asia

India exports and provides military equipment as a part of cooperation that India promotes with other South Asian countries in the security field under its “Neighborhood First Policy.” India was the only country that sent several warships to the international fleet review held by Bangladesh for the first time in December 2022. On the other hand, India keeps guard on heightening Chinese influence on South Asia countries, and showed apprehension to Chinese tracking ship Yuan Wang 5’s port call to the Port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka from July to August 2022.

Based on its Act East policy, India continues to engage with Southeast Asian nations and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral basis. India supports capacity building and conducts joint military exercises on a regular basis using operational experience of Russian equipment. In June 2022, India agreed with Vietnam on the significant enhancement of scope and scale of existing defense cooperation, and concluded a memorandum related to mutual logistics support. India tries to play an active role in the ASEAN relationship; for example, in November 2022, they established the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and held the first India-ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting.

2 Pakistan

1 General Situation

Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of India and politically-unstable Afghanistan, and sharing borders with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a geopolitically significant and complex position.

Pakistan places importance on cooperation with other Islamic countries because much of the population is Muslim, while friendly relations with Western countries are maintained. Pakistan is promoting its relationship with China in all fields under the All Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership. Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan becomes more and more complicated because the border is still not concluded with Taliban “temporary government,” and there have been some incidents, such as casualties among Pakistani citizens caused by cross-border gunning by Taliban soldiers in December 2022. Furthermore, there is concern over increased activities by domestic terrorist organizations. For example, in November 2022, Sunni extremist organization Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) denounced the ceasefire agreement concluded with the Pakistan government in June 2022.

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\(^6\) Malabar was initially a bilateral maritime exercise between the United States and India, while Japan has first participated in this exercise in 2007. From 2017 to 2019, Malabar was conducted as a trilateral training among Japan, the United States and India. From 2020, Malabar was conducted as a quadrilateral training among Japan, the United States, Australia and India.

\(^7\) The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) signed in the United States in 2017 prescribes the imposition of sanctions to individuals or groups involved in a grave trade with an organization related to Russian defense or intelligence agencies. The United States invoked sanctions on Turkey’s Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) and SSB President pursuant to CAATSA for acquiring Russian S-400 in December 2020.
2 Military Affairs

Pakistan stated in its comprehensive policy document “National Security Policy 2022-2026” formulated in December 2021 that it will deter any aggression by maintaining highly adaptable armed forces that are highly cost effective, with a focus on modernization and optimization of force structure. It also stated that at the same time it will build up the capabilities to combat against hybrid warfare including disinformation and influence operations by enhancing information and cybersecurity capabilities. In recent years, Pakistan has also been promoting the modernization of equipment, and while it makes attempts at domestic production through joint development of equipment and technology transfer, it promotes its relationship with China in military fields, and rising of dependence to China is observed.

Pakistan is believed to have a large and well trained army to ensure safety in the border region and to deal with extremists. AL-Khalid tanks developed jointly with China are operated as main battle tanks (MBTs), and Chinese VT-4 tanks were introduced in October 2021. Pakistan also enhanced the Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defense (CLIAD) system by purchasing air defense systems such as LY-80 and HQ-9/P from China.

The Pakistan Navy promotes replacement of deteriorated warships and reinforcement, and the introduction of submarines. Pakistan agreed with China on the procurement of eight Hangor-class submarines, of which four will be built domestically with technical transfer. The building of Pakistan’s first domestic submarine started in the Karachi dockyard in December 2022. Furthermore, a purchase contract for four MILGEM-class corvettes was concluded with Turkey, and two of those vessels will be built domestically as a part of a technology transfer agreement. The launching ceremony of the third corvette was held in Turkey in November 2022.

The Pakistan Air Force operates JF-17 Block I/II fighters jointly developed with China and produced domestically, and stated that the production of JF-17 Block III fighters had begun. It also announced the introduction of Chinese J-10C fighters in March 2022. Furthermore, the Turkish company Baykar announced that it finished flight training for attack UAV Bayraktar Akinji for the Pakistan Air Force in October 2022. Introduction of the UAV is anticipated in the future.

Pakistan takes the position that maintaining nuclear deterrence against attacks with nuclear and conventional weapons by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. Pakistan is believed to retain around 165 nuclear warheads as of January 2022. The development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads is still continuing. Tactical nuclear missile Nasr and IRBM Shaheen-II are already operative. In addition, the flight test of ground-to-ground missile Shaheen-III with the range of 2,750 km was successfully conducted in April 2022.

3 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with the United States

The United States designated Pakistan as a “Major Non-NATO ally” in 2004 and has strengthened the relationship because Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in the field of counterterrorism since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However, Pakistan has repeatedly protested against counterterrorism operations of the United States, such as in its request for the immediate stop of drone attacks in Pakistani territory. In response to this, the United States has condemned Pakistan over the government’s approval for Islam extremists taking actions in Afghanistan to take haven in Pakistan, which poses a threat to the United States, and halted support related to security. In this way, tension in the bilateral relationship continues.

On the other hand, improvement of the relationship with the United States has been seen under the Sharif administration established in April 2022. The minister of foreign affairs of Pakistan visited the United States in May 2022 by invitation of the U.S. Secretary of State, and at the meeting of foreign ministers, peace in the region, counterterrorism, stabilization of Afghanistan, and importance of cooperation for support for Ukraine were emphasized. In September 2022, the U.S. Department of State decided to approve the contract of a maximum US$450 million related to maintenance and support of F-16 fighter jets for Pakistan, to facilitate counterterrorism operations. Furthermore, General Bajwa, Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, visited the United States in October 2022 for the first time in three years and met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin. Attention will be focused on bilateral defense cooperation including counterterrorism in the future.
India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty of Kashmir, and have had three armed conflicts of significant scope. In the Kashmir region, collisions often occurred along the Line of Control, and the two countries repeatedly restarted and suspended dialogue. Finally, the countries agreed to comply with the ceasefire in February 2021. The Ministry of Defence of India stated in December 2022 that the situation was relatively peaceful because both countries adhere with the agreement.

8 India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 UN resolution. The two countries have taken a significantly different fundamental stance towards the resolution of the dispute.
Section 9 Europe and Canada

1 General Situation

With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize the need to address diverse security challenges, such as outbreaks of regional conflicts within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and the growing seriousness of cyber threats. At the same time, these countries had recognized that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries had disappeared. Nevertheless, since the heightening of tensions in Ukraine in February 2014 and particularly with the aggression against Ukraine that began in February 2022, there is a growing need to revisit existing strategies and plan new concepts in order to deal with Russia’s unilateral changes to the status quo by force as well as hybrid warfare. With regard to international terrorism, the continuity of threats has been recognized and there is a continuous need to take counterterrorism measures. In addition, border security problems remain a challenge, including those regarding refugees and migrants that have rapidly increased due to Middle East turmoil such as the prolonged civil war in Syria.

To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe has sought to further strengthen and expand multilateral frameworks, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). At the same time, it is working to contribute to the security and stability of the international community by proactively participating in activities outside the European region. Moreover, steps are taken at the national level by reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral and multilateral defense and security cooperation.

Fig. I-3-9-1 (Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States)

Chapter 2, Paragraph 3 (The Impact of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine on International Affairs and Various Countries’ Responses to It)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO (31 countries)</th>
<th>EU (27 countries)</th>
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<td>Albania</td>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
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*As of April 2023

*Current members

- Original EU members
- Joined the EU in January 2007
- Joined the EU in July 2013
- Original NATO members
- Joined NATO by 1992
- Joined NATO in 1999
- Joined NATO in March 2004
- Joined NATO in April 2009
- Joined NATO in June 2017
- Joined NATO in March 2020
- Joined NATO in April 2023

(Note) The United Kingdom left the EU on January 31, 2020.
Chapter 3
Defense Policies of Countries

Part I

Section 9
Europe and Canada

2 Enhancement of Multilateral Security Frameworks

1 NATO

Founded for the core task of collective defense among member states, NATO has expanded the scope of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War. NATO’s three core tasks are deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

Amid an increasing sense of crisis among member states in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, a new NATO Strategic Concept was adopted at the NATO Summit in June 2022 for the first time in twelve years since 2010. Although the previous Strategic Concept stated that the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low, this new Strategic Concept states that the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace and the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be discounted.

Furthermore, NATO placed Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area in this version, while in the previous version NATO stated that it was aiming for “a true strategic partnership” with Russia.

This version mentioned China for the first time, stating that China’s ambition and coercive policies are the challenge against NATO’s interests, security, and values. The Strategic Concept also pointed out that the deepening relationship between China and Russia and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to NATO’s values and interests.

In addition to this, it mentioned the nuclear and missile development by North Korea for the first time, and stated that the Indo-Pacific region is an important region and NATO will strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the partners, as it can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. NATO invited Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the ROK as the four Asia-Pacific partners (AP4) to the NATO Summit held in June 2022, and decided to enhance cooperation with them on maritime security and disinformation countermeasures among other issues.

Through these actions, NATO has emphasized one of its core missions of defending member states while strengthening deterrence and defense capabilities based on an understanding of how the situation has drastically changed.

Even before Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, NATO and its member states have recognized the threat posed by Russia and worked to bolster deterrence following Russia’s development of hybrid warfare and frequent “unusual flights” by Russian Armed Forces aircraft over northern and eastern Europe, including the Baltic states.

At the NATO Summit in September 2014, leaders adopted a joint declaration demanding Russia to retract its “annexation” of Crimea and adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) for enhancing existing readiness forces. Based on this plan, NATO has continued to maintain its presence in eastern allies, while steps have been taken to significantly improve the readiness of the existing multinational NATO Response Force (NRF) and create a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can be mobilized within two to three days. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in July 2016, members decided to deploy four multinational battle groups to the three Baltic nations and Poland on a rotational basis. These became fully operational in 2017.

Meanwhile, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has started and NATO has further shifted its emphasis to the defense of Eastern Europe with Russia in mind.

At an extraordinary summit held in February 2022 after the aggression, NATO announced the deployment of the NRF to the East European region to provide reassurance. At a summit in March 2022, it decided to deploy four newly organized battle groups to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia respectively.

In addition, at a NATO Summit in June 2022, in response to the new security environment, NATO stated that some of the battle groups deployed in Eastern Europe would be enhanced from battalion level to brigade level, the NRF would be enhanced from 40,000 to 300,000 personnel in strength, and a new model with

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1 The RAP was approved as one of the concrete efforts of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). The CFI is intended to provide a framework for conducting joint training and exercises among member states. Furthermore, it is designed to strengthen joint training among member states and with partner countries, enhance interoperability, and make use of advanced technology.
high flexibility and readiness would be established, including the introduction of an Area of Responsibility (AOR) system, and so on.

Additionally, alongside collective defense, NATO’s core tasks include operations to prevent and control crises from inside and/or outside of member states.

In the Mediterranean, a permanent maritime force has been deployed due to increase in the influx of illegal immigrants transiting the Mediterranean. This force monitors the influx of illegal immigrants and shares information. Also, a wider array of missions including counterterrorism and capacity building assistance have been conducted. In the Middle East, with regard to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), NATO has dispatched early warning and control aircraft forces and implemented NATO surveillance and reconnaissance missions since October 2016. It is also supporting security units of Iraqi Armed Forces on training and capacity building. At the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defense in February 2021, participants agreed to increase strength from approximately 500 to 4,000 personnel and on the expansion of mission locations. NATO is also carrying out missions in Kosovo and other countries.

It was decided in the Madrid Summit Declaration at the NATO Summit in June 2022 that the commitment to defense expenditure from 2024 onwards is to be decided after 2023. In addition, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg suggested in November 2022 that the target for defense expenditures of member states would be raised in the future, and stated that spending 2% of GDP for defense should be more as a kind of floor than a ceiling.

In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Finland reversed its longstanding policy of military non-alignment and applied for NATO membership in May 2022. Finland became a full member of NATO on April 4, 2023. This brought the total number of NATO member states to 31.

### 3 Cooperation between NATO and the EU

Advancements have been seen in cooperation between NATO and the EU in addressing unprecedented challenges efficiently. NATO and the EU published joint declarations in 2016 and 2018. The two are still promoting cooperation in a complementary manner, including enhancing cooperation in the fields such as dealing with hybrid threats, the cybersecurity, and counterterrorism.

The Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation was
signed in January 2023, for the first time in four years. NATO and the EU stated in the declaration that they were at a key juncture for Euro-Atlantic security and stability, and that China’s growing assertiveness and policies present challenges that need to be addressed. In addition, it was stated that NATO would further strengthen their cooperation in existing areas in order to deal with the security threats and challenges evolving in scope and magnitude, and that NATO and the EU would enhance and deepen cooperation especially to deal with growing geostrategic competition, resilience issues, protection of critical infrastructure, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, security implication of climate change as well as foreign information manipulation and interference.

3 Security/Defense Policies of European Countries and Others

1 The United Kingdom

After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, perceiving that there is no direct military threat against the country, has advanced national defense reform with particular focus on improving its overseas deployment capability and readiness, in order to deal with new threats such as international terrorism and proliferation of WMDs.

The Johnson administration (then) published the Integrated Review 2021 for security, defense, development, and diplomatic policy in March 2021. The administration set forth a framework of the Indo-Pacific tilt while maintaining and strengthening the relationship with the United States, European countries, and NATO.

Furthermore, Prime Minister Sunak announced the Integrated Review Refresh 2023 in March 2023. In the 2023 Refresh, the administration stated that the U.K. considers the Euro-Atlantic region as the first-order priority and Russia as “the most acute threat.” It also stated that the U.K. would enhance NATO further, and contest the malign Russian influence by exposing disinformation. Furthermore, it stated that the U.K. consider the Indo-Pacific as a permanent pillar of the U.K.’s international policy, support for the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific and adopt a policy to enhance its commitment in the Indo-Pacific through various measures such as building deep relations anchored in decades-long economic, technological and security ties with partners including Japan. In addition, the administration evaluated that China “poses an epoch-defining and systematic challenge.”

In respect of the U.K.’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, the U.K. Government showed its posture to work with Indo-Pacific partners to uphold freedom of navigation and international law through various measures. For example, a carrier strike group led by aircraft carrier HMS “Queen Elizabeth” was deployed to the Indo-Pacific, conducted bilateral training with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and executed capacity building and enhanced training with ASEAN countries in 2021.

In addition, the U.K. has conducted monitoring and surveillance activities in waters around Japan, including in the East China Sea, against illegal maritime activities such as illicit ship-to-ship transfer with North Korean ships since 2018. For example, the offshore patrol vessel HMS “Tamar” conducted monitoring and surveillance activities in mid-January, early February, late February, and late September 2022.

In addition, the United Kingdom and France agreed during a U.K.-France Summit meeting held in March 2023 that the two countries would coordinate the deployment of aircraft carriers in regions with shared interests, and stated that they would show the presence of European carrier strike groups in the Indo-Pacific region in a more sustained manner.

2 France

Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence of its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by streamlining and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the future.

The Macron administration presented in November 2022 the National Strategic Review 2022 (Revue Nationale Stratégique 2022) that showed an analysis of
the security environment home and abroad, as well as its strategic goals and priorities for 2030. The administration also stated that the relationship with Russia transferred from potential competition to an open opposition, and its relationship with China transfers to a more intense contest. In addition, the review indicated enhanced strategic autonomy and secured nuclear deterrence as France’s strategic objectives to be achieved by 2030.

Since France has territories in the Indo-Pacific region, it is the only EU member state that has continuous military presence in the region, with approximately 7,150 personnel and vessels permanently stationed. France places importance on commitment to the region. The Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, which was published in June 2019, states that China’s growing influence is shifting the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the importance of strengthening partnerships with the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. The National Strategic Review 2022 mentioned above stated that France will strategically strive to build partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, and play the role of a balancing power in order to maintain the strategic stability of the region.

In line with its policy of active participation in the Indo-Pacific region, France deployed an aircraft carrier group including the aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle” to the Indian Ocean in March 2019 and dispatched the training fleet “Jeanne d’Arc” to the Indo-Pacific region in May 2021 to participate in the Japan-France-U.S.-Australia quadrilateral naval training “ARC 21,” during which time the frigate “Surcouf” and amphibious assault ship “Tonnerre” called at ports of Japan. France has also conducted monitoring and surveillance activities against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfer with North Korean vessels since 2019. The Frigate “Vendémiaire” conducted for the fourth time monitoring and surveillance activities by French Navy vessels in mid-March 2022, and a “Falcon 200” reconnaissance aircraft conducted for the third time monitoring and surveillance activities by French aircraft from mid-October to early November.

In addition, having positioned the fight against ISIL as one of its top national defense priorities, France has been conducting airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq since September 2014 and in Syria since September 2015. In addition, France has continued to provide education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, as well as humanitarian assistance for refugees.

Although France had conducted the Operation Barkhane for counterterrorism in five countries in the Sahel region from 2014 and French-led European special force “Task Force Takuba” started its operation in July 2019, France announced in June 2021 the reduction of troops dispatched in Mali because of continued political unrest in the area. France announced the withdrawal of dispatched units from Mali and redeployment to Niger in February 2022, due to the worsening relations with Mali, which had strengthened its relations with Russia. France concluded the activities of “Takuba” in Mali in June 2022, completed withdrawal from Mali in August 2022, and announced the completion of the Operation Barkhane in November 2022.

In January 2020, France and seven other European nations, including the Netherlands and Denmark, issued a political statement supporting the creation of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) surveillance mission, which has been launched in response to a series of incidents affecting the safe passage of civilian vessels in the Gulf of Oman since May 2019.

3 Germany

While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction of its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its armed forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the UN. However, following a worsening in the security environment, in May 2016 Germany changed policy and announced that it would increase military personnel by around 7,000 by 2023.

The country’s defense white paper released in July 2016 for the first time in about 10 years explains that Germany’s security environment has grown more complex and unstable, causing gradually rising
uncertainty, citing specific threats such as international terrorism, cyber attacks, interstate conflict, and the influx of refugees and immigrants. The white paper also states that Germany would continue to emphasize multilateral cooperation and cross-government approaches, while striving to realize rules-based international order.

The German government greatly changed its defense policy in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, started weapon provision to Ukraine, and stated that the government will raise the defense budget from 1.5% of GDP to 2% of GDP and maintain it every year, devoting energy to building up its defense capability. In response to this, Germany’s parliament passed a legislation related to reform of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) in order to establish and execute a Bundeswehr special fund of 100 billion euros in June 2022.

In addition, a cabinet decision was made to conclude the Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region, which stipulated diplomatic guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, in September 2020. In the guidelines, Germany stated its intention to strengthen its security policy engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and articulated its stance of emphasizing cooperation with partner countries with shared values, including Japan. As specific initiatives, monitoring UN sanctions against North Korea, taking part in exercises in the region, expanding the forms of maritime presence, expanding cybersecurity cooperation and other efforts are mentioned. The German Navy deployed a frigate “Bayern” to the Indo-Pacific region in August 2021. After “Bayern” conducted joint training with the MSDF and called at a port in Japan for the first time in two decades in November of that year, it has undertaken maritime surveillance operations against illegal maritime activities in Japan’s surrounding waters, including in the East China Sea, such as illicit ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean vessels, the first time a German warship has done this.

A deployment training Rapid Pacific 2022 was commenced in August 2022, in which thirteen aircraft including Eurofighter 2000 fighter jets departed Germany and landed in Singapore within 24 hours. After that, German troops participated in the multilateral air exercise Pitch Black as well as the multilateral naval exercise Kakadu hosted by Australia and conducted Japan-Germany a joint fighter training for the first time in Japan to strengthen Germany’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Attention will be gathered on German engagement to the area, because Germany is considered to be a continuous assets provider for this region in the future.

4 Canada

In a National Defence Policy paper published in June 2017, the Department of National Defence of Canada showed its recognition that the United States is “still unquestionably the only superpower,” while also stating the view that a degree of major power competition has returned among China, Russia, and others, which is causing the growing importance of deterrence again. In accordance with this understanding of the security environment, Canada places importance on its own national land and the North American region on the basis of the national defense policy. Based on the idea that global security has a direct connection with Canadian defense, Canada positions active international contribution as a basis of the national defense policy. In terms of the building-up of defense capability, the Canadian defense policy focuses on the fields of space and cyberspace and intelligence. It also stated plans to increase the national defense budget, which once declined in the 2010s, by more than 70% in 10 years, and the Regular Force by 3,500 (to 71,500) military personnel. Furthermore, Canada released the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework in September 2019, indicating a policy to enhance Canada’s military presence in the region, based on the recognition that strategic, military, and economic importance of the region is increasing.

Canada regards the United States as its most important ally and conducts air defense, space defense, and maritime patrolling and monitoring activities in North America jointly with the United States through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). As a founding member, Canada also places importance on its relationship with NATO, and has been actively participating in NATO-led operations. In addition, as a member of the Five Eyes (FVEY), an intelligence-sharing alliance, Canada receives a great deal of benefits and intends to continue deepening the relation with it. Canada traditionally supports the activities of the United Nations, and the Trudeau administration has expressed its stance that contributing to the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is of utmost importance.

Concerning its involvement in the Indo-Pacific region,
in November 2022, Canada announced its first Indo-Pacific Strategy as a comprehensive road map to deepen its engagement in the region over the next decade. In the strategy, China is mentioned as an “increasingly disruptive global power” and that it is looking to shape the international order into a more permissive environment for China’s interests and values. The strategy also states that Canada will challenge China if it engages in behavior that undermines Canada’s national interests or those of its partners in the region. On the other hand, Canada showed its intention to cooperate with China to find solutions to global issues such as climate change.

In addition, Canada raised promoting peace, resiliency, and security of the region as one of its strategic objectives, and expanding and deepening security relationship with allies and partners including Japan. Canada also stated its intention to continue warning and surveillance activities against illegal maritime activities including illicit ship-to-ship transfer with North Korean vessels, which started in April 2018. On the other hand, Canadian warships have passed through the Taiwan Strait several times since 2018 in accordance with international laws, and Canada has stated that it would strengthen its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including by increasing the number of frigates deployed to the region. Attention will be focused on Canada’s involvement in the region in the future.
The Middle East region is a geopolitical bastion connecting Asia and Europe. In addition, the Middle East is a major source of energy supply for the world and contains major routes for international commerce. Japan is also dependent on the region for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports. Peace and stability in the Middle East region is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan.

However, highly tense situations continue in this region over circumstances in recent years in the Gulf region and peace of the Middle East. In addition, civil wars are ongoing in some countries prompted by the confused situation after the Arab Spring that occurred at the beginning of 2011. On the other hand, there are signs of easing tensions, such as an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume diplomatic relations in March 2023 after a seven-year break in diplomatic relations.

2 Situation in the Gulf Region

(1) Military Trends in the Gulf Region

While the situations surrounding the final agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) were changing, various events including military moves have occurred in the Gulf region. Since May 2019, the United States has announced the dispatch of carrier strike groups and bomber units in response to Iran’s threats to its own troops and interests. For example, in July, it stationed troops in Saudi Arabia for the first time in nearly 16 years since 2003.

In the midst of this situation, Iran announced its shooting down of a U.S. unmanned reconnaissance aircraft over the Straits of Hormuz in June 2019, and it was also implicated in an attack on an oil facility in eastern Saudi Arabia in September of the same year. Meanwhile, the United States announced that a U.S. amphibious assault ship had shot down an Iranian drone over the Strait of Hormuz in July of the same year.

Since October 2019, there have been multiple attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq. The United States pointed out Iran’s involvement in the attacks, and bombed the stronghold of an armed organization supported by Iran. In addition, in January 2020, the United States killed Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was operating inside Iraq with the organization’s leaders, as a deterrent to further attack plans. Although Iran attacked Iraqi bases hosting U.S. Forces in Iraq with a ballistic missile in retaliation for the killing, after that, both countries made it clear that they wanted to avoid any further escalation.

In 2021, there were some alleged UAV attacks by armed organizations to U.S. military bases. Given this situation, during that year, the United States scaled down its stationed troops to 2,500 members until January, and ended the combat mission at the end of December. The mission of the U.S. Forces moved to advising, training, and information collecting.

The presence of U.S. Forces in the Gulf region has been decreasing. After April 2021, it was reported that part of the fighter aircraft and air defense assets deployed in the Gulf region by the Trump administration were withdrawn. Furthermore, there has been no U.S. aircraft carriers in the Middle East since the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan left the area in September 2021. The Biden administration stated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) published in October 2022 that in future it would aim to de-escalate regional tensions and terminate conflicts via diplomatic measures instead of military power which had been the core measure to deal with crises in the Middle East.

1 JCPOA decided that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and the number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among other measures, in exchange for ending the sanctions of previous UN Security Council resolutions and the U.S. and EU’s nuclear-related sanctions. In May 2018, the U.S. President Trump (then), announced the U.S. secession from JCPOA, and in November of the same year, the United States resumed all its sanctions and successively added further sanctions. In this situation, Iran announced that while it would not withdraw from JCPOA after May 2019, it would suspend its compliance with JCPOA step by step. Although Joe Biden, the new president of the United States inaugurated in January 2021, led indirect negotiations for a nuclear agreement with Iran in April 2021, they have been suspended since August 2022.
(2) Maritime Security in the Gulf Region

Since May 2019, events affecting the navigation safety of civilian vessels have occurred sporadically in the waters of the Middle East. With regard to Japan-related vessels, in June 2019, two vessels, including the chemical tanker Kokuka Courageous operated by a Japanese shipping company, were attacked in the Gulf of Oman. While the United States and others have pointed out that the attack was committed by Iran, Iran has denied any involvement. Based on a comprehensive review of the information from related countries, technical analysis of the damage to the vessel, and testimony from the parties concerned, Japan believes that the damage to the vessel is highly likely to have been caused by limpet mines.\(^2\)

In addition to above, as major incidents of attack against civilian vessels, a Japanese company-owned ship operated and administrated by a British company chaired by an Israeli businessman was attacked in July 2021 off the coast of Oman, and in November 2022 an Israeli-owned vessel operated by a Singaporean company was also attacked. U.S. Central Command announced that Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles were used in both these attacks.

Amidst rising tensions in the Middle East, countries continue carrying out efforts to safeguard maritime security in the region. The United States proposed the Maritime Security Initiative in July 2019 and established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) with its command center opened in Bahrain in November. The IMSC has been joined by 11 countries, including the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Albania, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Seychelles, and Latvia, in addition to the United States (as of March 2023).

In Europe, eight countries (France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Portugal) issued a statement in January 2020 to politically support the creation of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) mission. In November 2021, Norway joined these countries. France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Greece and Italy have dispatched their assets so far.

Japan needs to continue to pay close attention to the future developments surrounding the situation in the Gulf region.

Debris from an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle believed to have been used in an attack on a ship operated by a Singaporean company, which was announced by the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (November 2022) [DVDS]

As the Middle East peace process is in a stalemate, in Palestine, the moderate Fatah, which governs the West Bank, and the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas, which effectively controls the Gaza Strip, are in conflict, splitting the area.

In such circumstances, after then U.S. Trump administration announced its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017 and moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018, the tensions have risen, particularly in the Gaza Strip. In 2020, the administration announced a new Middle East peace plan, but the Palestinian side refused to negotiate, opposing the plan’s descriptions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian border and the possession of Jerusalem.

On the other hand, the Trump Administration actively encouraged Israel and Arab countries to achieve peace agreements. In and after August 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco successively reached agreements for the normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Arab countries and Israel was the first such event since that with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994).

In March 2022, the foreign ministers of Israel, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, UAE, and the United States gathered in Israel for a meeting. A document including contents that

\(^2\) A type of underwater weapon. Generally, they are placed on the hull of a ship and denoted for the purpose of making it impossible for the ship to navigate.
the foreign ministerial meeting would be held annually, and working groups for various themes including regional security would be established was adopted in November 2022. This way, security cooperation is widening between Israel and the Arab countries that normalized diplomatic relationship with Israel.

In May 2021, between Israel and Palestinian armed forces, intermittent series of rockets and other projectiles were fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip, leading to an exchange of fire with the Israel Defense Forces, which fired back. Although a ceasefire was announced within the same month, tension between both sides continues.

Amid the changing situations surrounding the Middle East peace process, a close eye will be kept on future developments regarding the Middle East peace process, including the United States’ engagement.

4 Situation in Syria

In Syria, violent conflicts among Syrian Government forces, opposition forces, and other organizations have been continuing since March 2011. Conflicts between the government forces supported by Russia and Iran and opposition forces supported by Turkey and others occur intermittently even today. Although it is pointed out that Russia has been redeploying some of the troops stationed in Syria to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it seems that Syrian Government forces have power over the most of the country, and the situation is advantageous to the Assad administration as a whole. In these circumstances, a trend is observed in which the Syrian government, and Arab countries and Turkey that have supported the opposition, attempt to improve diplomatic relations.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which had become powerful in Iraq and Syria since 2014, lost its base in Syria in 2019 as the anti-ISIL operation by U.S.-led coalition forces had been progressing since 2015. Since then, the U.S. Forces have been continuously stationed in northeastern Syria as part of efforts to prevent ISIL regaining power.

According to an estimate by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in June 2022, more than 300,000 citizens died in a series of collisions from March 2011 to March 2021 in the situation in Syria. Furthermore, the earthquake that occurred in southeastern Turkey in February 2023 also caused significant damage in Syria. There were some delays for support to reach affected areas where there are opposition bases; for example, it was not until three days after the occurrence that support from the UN reached Idlib, a city in northwestern Syria.

There has been no concrete progress in peace negotiations and political processes up to the present amid continuing conflicts. Further efforts by the international community are needed to realize the stabilization of Syria.

5 Situation in Yemen

In Yemen, following anti-government protests that occurred from February 2011 and international pressure afterward, then President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to resign. Through the election held in February 2012, then Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was elected as the new president.

Meanwhile, the confrontation intensified between the government and the opposition insurgent group Houthis, based in northern Yemen. As the Houthis invaded the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and other locations, the President requested support from Arab countries. In response, in March 2015, coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia began air strikes against the Houthis. In response, the Houthis also launched attacks on the mainland of Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles, UAVs, cruise missiles, and other weapons.

In December 2018, a cease-fire in Hodeidah city, host to the biggest port in Yemen, was agreed upon between the Houthis and the Yemen government. However, the cease-fire was implemented to only a limited degree. In November 2019, the Yemeni Government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group in southern Yemen, signed the Riyadh Agreement in the capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh. Then, the new cabinet was established in December 2020. President Hadi newly established the “Presidential Leadership Council,” and announced that he would transfer all of his authority in April 2022. The council comprises delegates of all the political powers in Yemen, except the Houthis, and aims to strengthen the governance of the government and conclude the negotiation with the Houthis.

In the same month, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen announced that the parties to the armed conflict agreed on a two-month ceasefire throughout Yemen. Although it was announced that the ceasefire agreement had not been renewed in October
after it was first renewed in June and August of the same year, large-scale armed conflicts, aerial bombings by coalition forces, and cross-border attacks by the Houthis have rarely occurred in Yemen since the ceasefire became effective. Against this backdrop, negotiations between the parties to the armed conflict to renew the ceasefire are still continuing, but the prospect of the conclusion of a final peace accord remains elusive.

6 Situation in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the Taliban intensified their offensive as the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) launched education, training and advice for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in the wake of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’s withdrawal in December 2014. Meanwhile, the ANDSF faces challenges regarding logistics, morale, air capabilities, and troop-commander leadership, allowing the Taliban to expand their control in Afghanistan.

In February 2020, an agreement was signed between the United States and the Taliban that included the conditional phase-out of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In March 2020, the United States announced that it had begun the withdrawal of its forces. Moreover, peace negotiations began between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, in Qatar, in September 2020. U.S. Forces completed the withdrawal by the end of August 2021.

In this situation, the Taliban expanded their ruled area quickly and in August 2021, they brought the capital city Kabul under their control. In September 2021, they announced the establishment of a caretaker cabinet. The Taliban has attained no approval as a government from other nations as of March 2023.

Attention will be focused on the Taliban’s internal governance and international negotiations with other countries.

2 Africa

1 Challenges Facing African Countries

African countries gain interest from the international community because of the population of over 1.4 billion people, high potential, and abundant natural resources. On the other hand, the region faces many security challenges such as armed conflicts, terrorism, and piracy.

In Sudan, the national army clashed with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group, in April 2023 over the integration of the RSF into the national army and other issues, leading to an armed conflict. Both parties have announced temporary ceasefires on several occasions, and while a temporary ceasefire was agreed to in May through the mediation of the United States and Saudi Arabia, the situation remains volatile.

In South Sudan, between its gaining of independence in 2011 and the time the current transitional government was established in 2020, large-scale armed confrontations have occurred twice due to political conflicts between President Salva Kiir and then First Vice President Riek Machar. In addition, First Vice President Machar’s faction split into sub-factions and conflicts occurred from August 2021 to January 2022. Based on these conflicts, the timeline for the general election and following establishment of the official government has been postponed; for example, the end of the transitional government’s ruling which started in 2020 was extended to February 2025. Attention will be focused on future trends.

Armed conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) occurred in Ethiopia in November 2020. While the confrontation grew violent and a state of emergency was declared in the whole country in November 2021, it was lifted in February 2022 and a peace agreement was concluded in November 2022. Attention will be focused on the implementation status of the peace agreement towards stable security.

In Libya, while the Libya National Army (LNA) on the side of the House of Representatives in the east advanced into the suburbs of the capital Tripoli in the west and clashed with the army of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in April 2019, the GNA and the LNA signed a ceasefire agreement in October 2020.

3 After the Qaddafi administration (then) of Libya collapsed in 2011, the election for a House of Representatives was conducted in 2014. The country then fell into the situation with two assemblies existing in parallel – General National Congress based in Tripoli, the capital city in western Libya, and House of Representatives based in Tobruk in eastern Libya. Based on the UN mediated political agreement in 2015, the Government of National Accord (GNA) was established in Tripoli, but confrontation continued.
The interim Government of National Unity (GNU) was established in Tripoli in March 2021. However, the presidential election and general election scheduled for December 2021 have been postponed for an unspecified period, and the prospects for the establishment of an official government are uncertain.

Fig. 1-3-10-1 (Current UN Peacekeeping Operations); Paragraph 3-2 (Trends of Activities in Africa); Chapter 4, Section 5-2 (Piracy); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-2-2 (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS))

2 Relations between African Countries and Other Countries

In terms of security, African countries have long had deep relationships with the United States, Europe, and Russia. Based on this, the relationship with Russia has been further deepening recently, and Chinese involvement to Africa is prominent.

(1) China and Russia

While China has enjoyed economic profit in Africa since the 2000s, military involvement has also been increasing in recent years. In August 2017, China began to operate a “support base” for logistics support of the PLA in Djibouti, and it is pointed out that a large landing ship called at the “support base” in March and August 2022. Furthermore, it is pointed out that China may be considering the establishment of PLA logistics facilities in some countries including Kenya and Equatorial Guinea.4 Considering these trends, the U.S. Government points out that China sees Africa “as an important arena to challenge the rules-based international order and advance its own commercial and geopolitical interests.”5

Russia has been actively exporting weapons to African countries.6 In addition to this, the activity of private military companies (PMCs) has been prominent in recent years. Among them, Wagner is said to have dispatched mercenaries to Libya, Central Africa, Mali, and other countries.7

In addition, China and Russia are strengthening cooperation with South Africa. For example, the two countries conducted joint military exercises with South Africa in November 2019 and February 2023.

(2) The United States and Europe

The U.S. have had military cooperation with African countries through the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)’s joint exercises.8 The commander of AFRICOM sounded an alert, indicating that China’s economic and military presence poses a challenges for both African nations and American interests and that Russia is expanding its African operations, including via the private military company Wagner and they will bring destabilization, democratic backsliding, and human rights abuses to Africa.9 The United States has demonstrated its intention to build up its partnership with African countries through efforts to enhance the peace and security of Africa in the National Security Strategy (NSS) published in October 2022. It is expected that the United States will continue to be involved in Africa.

Europe also is said to have shown its presence in the form of stationed troops, training mission, and dispatching personnel to counter terrorism operations for some time. However, European troops have tended to withdraw from Mali, against a backdrop of inside rebellion in the Mali government and its approach to Wagner since June 2021.

4 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2022)
5 According to “the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” the U.S. Government (2022)
6 For example, according to SIPRI, the weapon exports from Russia to Africa increased 23% in 2016-2020 from 2011-2015.
7 According to testimony of the commander of the U.S. Africa Command in a Senate hearing in March 2023.
8 The U.S. Forces conduct exercises for the purpose of dealing with extremist organizations and enhancing maritime law enforcement capabilities. For example, the exercise “Flintlock” has been held in the Sahel region annually since 2005 for the purpose of dealing with extremist organizations. In March 2023, the exercise was held in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, and over 1,300 military personnel from 29 countries participated in it.
9 According to the document submitted by the commander of the U.S. Africa Command to the Senate Armed Services Committee (March 2023).
(Note) According to the United Nations (as of the end of March 2023)

### Africa

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### Asia

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<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)</td>
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3 Trends in International Terrorism

1 General Situation

There are prominent cases where power vacuums in some countries with weak governance in the Middle East and Africa have become a hotbed for activities of international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIL. This kind of terrorist organizations have instigated fighters to conduct terrorist attacks at their home and abroad, and are also spreading violent extremist ideologies via Internet or other means. This kind of terrorist organizations have instigated fighters to conduct terrorist attacks at their home and abroad, and are also spreading violent extremism via Internet or other means. As a result, terrorist attacks planned and committed by individuals or groups who have no official relations with international terrorist organizations but have become influenced by them in some ways, have occurred in Western and other countries. Moreover, terrorist attacks targeting certain religions or races in a right-wing extremist political context have also occurred in Western countries.

Among international terrorist organizations, ISIL established multiple “provinces” outside of their original base in Iraq and Syria as “Islamic State” territories, and these “provinces” have been conducting terrorist acts in various places.

As for Al Qaeda, based primarily in Afghanistan, it is believed to have been weakened, as many of the group’s senior members were killed through U.S. operations. However, they continue some actions such as issuing statements.

Concerning international counterterrorism measures, international cooperation has grown even more important as terrorism threats have diffused and deepened on the diversification of terrorist attacks and the improvement of terrorist groups’ attack capabilities.

2 Trends of Activities in Africa

ISIL or Al Qaeda affiliated organizations are active in Africa. For example, in some areas of West Africa such as Mali and other parts of the Sahel region, conflicts between terrorist organizations as well as vigorous terrorist activities are observed. In Southern Africa, raids by armed groups such as the one later known as the ISIL Central Africa Province, based mainly in Mozambique, lead to the suspension of the development of a natural gas field led by a French company in March 2021. In eastern Africa, Al-Shabaab continuously hinders political processes in Somalia.

European and other countries have been providing counter-terrorism operations and are supporting trainings against such terrorist organizations’ activities. For example, in June 2022, France, which has dispatched troops since 2013, finished the operations of French-led multinational special forces which had been conducted in the Sahel region since 2020. Also, France completed the withdrawal of French troops from Mali in August 2022, and announced the termination of military operations in the Sahel region in November 2022. In Mozambique, in August 2021, units dispatched from neighboring countries contributed to the recapture of the area occupied by armed groups, and an EU training mission began operations in November 2021.

3 Trends in of Activities in the Middle East

Since 2013, ISIL had become powerful by taking advantage of the unstable situation in Iraq and Syria, and unilaterally declared the establishment of the “Islamic State” in 2014. From that year, the U.S. led Coalition forces conducted airstrikes and education/training missions for local groups in Iraq and Syria. In 2019, the United States announced that it and the Coalition forces had liberated 100 percent of ISIL-controlled areas in the two countries. Although the United States announced the death of ISIL’s leader in February and November 2022, ISIL announced the appointment of a new leader in March and November 2022 respectively and is believed to still be active in Iraq and Syria.

In Afghanistan, while the Taliban are expanding their controlled area, the ISIL Khorasan Province has been continuously conducting terrorist attacks mainly in the capital city of Kabul and eastern Afghanistan since 2015. When the Taliban, having a cooperative relationship with Al-Qaeda, took control of Kabul in August 2021, the United States announced to continue counterterrorism operations through over-the-horizon capabilities, despite the completion of the U.S. Forces’ withdrawal.

Even after the withdrawal of U.S. Forces, the ISIL
Khorosan Province is actively conducting terrorist attacks in Kabul and other areas, although the number of attacks is on the decline. The United States announced in August 2022 that it has killed Al Qaeda’s leader with a drone attack in Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda has not announced the inauguration of the successor as of March 2023.
Risks that hinder free access and usage of cyberspace, the oceans, outer space, and the electromagnetic spectrum are becoming increasingly serious. In particular, the threat of cyber attacks has grown rapidly, and the theft of sensitive information, etc., has also been taking place on a routine basis, even in the form of state-backed attacks. It is likely that hybrid warfare consisting of both military and non-military measures for the accomplishment of military objectives will be employed in more sophisticated ways through means such as information warfare, including through the dissemination of disinformation prior to armed attacks. These trends pose serious challenges to the international community, including Japan.

The creation of science, technology, and innovation is the source of Japan’s own economic and social development, and the appropriate use of technological capabilities is indispensable not only in national security but also in addressing global issues such as climate change. The nations of the world are focusing their efforts on research, development and military applications of cutting-edge technologies that might be game-changers in that they could change the whole situation of future battles, such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technology, and next generation information and communication technology.

Our attention needs to be focused on these applications as something that will greatly improve the accuracy and speed of decision making, as information processing, which has so far been limited by the capabilities of human beings and conventional computers, could become faster and automatic. In addition, we need to focus on the fact that high-speed, large-capacity, and safe communication based on these new technologies will greatly contribute to the need for automation and manpower savings in the use of future defense technologies.

Risks in the cyber domain and other areas are also becoming more serious. Above all, these new technologies blur the boundary between military and non-military matters, enhancing the so-called gray zone situation. There are many examples in which diverse means that are not limited to purely military ones have been used to create chaos in other countries, such as cyber attacks targeting communication or important infrastructure, or the use of drones. Technological influence in the field of security is becoming greater; for example, the technology known as deepfake with which fake videos are created through the application of AI technology is spreading, while information warfare through the dissemination of disinformation is constantly taking place.

In addition, technology competition among nations becomes apparent, notably in the fields of next generation information communication system (Beyond 5G) and semiconductors. This competition is based on the perception that it is profitable to lead international standardization with superiority in the emerging technologies that are to become important for national economy and security. Moreover, it is commonly getting understood that securing supply chains for critical key products such as semiconductors and rare metals is important from a security standpoint.

In this situation, the concern is that some nations are stealing information related to advanced technologies developed by private companies, universities, and other organizations in other countries using cyberspace, corporate acquisitions, corporate activities including investments, academic exchanges, and covert operatives, and using the information for their own military purposes. For this, each nation takes measures for their “economic
security,” such as strict export control, reinforcement of screening for investments from foreign countries, and higher independence for technological development and production.

## 2 Trends of Military Cutting-edge Technology

### (1) Hypersonic Weapons

The United States, China, Russia, and others are developing hypersonic weapons, including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) that would be launched from ballistic missiles, maneuvered to glide at hypersonic speed (Mach 5 or above) in the atmosphere, and hit targets, as well as Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) using scramjet engines and other technologies that enable hypersonic flights. It is suggested that hypersonic weapons would fly in lower orbits than conventional ballistic missiles at hypersonic speed above Mach 5 for a longer period of time and that their high maneuverability would make them difficult to be detected and intercepted.

A senior official in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) mentioned a development plan for hypersonic weapons in February 2021, revealing that the United States will deploy hypersonic weapons in the early to mid-2020s and build defense capabilities in the mid to late 2020s. A prototype Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) was delivered to the U.S. Army in October 2021, and training aimed at the completion of its deployment in FY2023 is being conducted. In addition, the U.S. Air Force announced the successful test launch of an Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) in December 2022.

In China, the DF-17 ballistic missile, which is viewed as having the capability to carry HGVs, made its first public appearance during the military parade marking the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019. The U.S. DoD has pointed out that China will have operational DF-17 missiles by 2020. Moreover, it has been pointed out that China launched an ICBM in July 2021, and the HGV it had carried flew over a distance of just under 40,000 km over 100 minutes and did not strike its target but came close.

Russia deployed the HGV “Avangard” in 2019. During the expanded executive meeting of the Defence Ministry held in December 2022, Minister of Defence Shoigu said that the new ICBM Sarmat, which is believed to be capable of carrying Avangard, is scheduled to be deployed in 2023. Furthermore, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that the test launch of the HCM Zircon from a submarine was successfully completed in October 2021, and a frigate armed with Zircon embarked on combat patrol in January 2023.

North Korea also seems to have made the realization of “hypersonic gliding warheads” one of its priority issues and is conducting research and development in this regard. It has been launching missiles it calls “hypersonic missiles” since September 2021.

The United States carries out the development of the interceptor missile for hypersonic missiles, and signed a contract related to the development of missiles to intercept hypersonic missiles in their glide phase in November 2021.

### (2) High-power Energy Technology

High-power energy weapons, such as railguns, high-energy laser weapons, and high-power microwave weapons, are being developed as a means to counter various airborne threats.

A railgun is a kind of weapon that shoot bullets using a magnetic field generated from electrical energy. Unlike missiles, the bullets used for railguns have no propulsion device. For this reason, the bullets are smaller, cost less, and require less space for storing. Therefore, railguns are said to be capable of coping effectively with attacks involving a large number of missiles.

The United States, China, Russia and others are developing high-energy laser weapons to destroy targets with laser energy. Laser weapons are a low-cost, effective means of intercepting large numbers of small unmanned vehicles and small vessels. Laser weapons are expected to become a new missile defense system if their power can be increased to the extent they are capable of intercepting missiles.

The United States is developing several laser weapons. In August 2022, the first tactical laser weapon system

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1. According to the website of the U.S. Department of Defense on February 27, 2021.
HELIOS to be equipped on conventional warships was delivered to the U.S. Navy.

China unveiled the 30-100 kW “Silent Hunter” laser weapon system, which is capable of countering small unmanned aircraft, at the international defense exhibition IDEX 2017. There are also indications that China has deployed anti-satellite laser weapons that appear to be designed to interfere with or damage the optical sensors of low-earth orbit satellites, and that it is developing laser weapons with even higher power output.

Russia has deployed the 10 kW Peresvet laser weapon system and it is reportedly developing a megawatt-class chemical laser weapon system for attacking satellites.

Israel announced in June 2021 that it successfully completed a series of tests to intercept more than one unmanned aircraft by an airborne laser weapon in flight. Israel also successfully completed a test to intercept unmanned aircraft, mortar shells, and other objects by a land vehicle mounted laser weapon in April 2022.

High power microwave weapons are weapons to destroy or cause malfunction of electronic equipment in UAVs, missiles, and such. The United States Air Force made a prototype of Phaser high power microwave weapon in 2019. The system reportedly countered two to three small unmanned aircraft at one time and 33 in total during an army exercise. In July 2021, the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory revealed that it signed the development contract for new high-power microwave weapon Mjolnir based on outcomes from the experiment to counter swarm attacks by small unmanned aircraft using technology demonstration system THOR.

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3 Trends of Cutting-edge Technology in the Civilian Field

(1) Artificial Intelligence (AI) Technology

AI technology is one of the technological areas that shows rapid progress in recent years. It has been pointed out that the rapid AI progress has been exerting a great impact on the military field, including the application for unmanned vehicles and the cyber domain as well as supporting for command and decision-making and improving data processing capacity, among other areas.

As an application of AI, the United States conducted demonstration tests on the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), in which AI analyzes collected information and rapidly shares it via networks with combat units and others, in December 2019. Meanwhile, China has announced in July 2020 that an AI Military Simulation Competition was held by the Central Military Commission with the purpose of researching and developing next-generation command information systems.

Different nations are also developing unmanned vehicles equipped with AI. The United States revealed that the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is developing various unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including swarm flights of small UAVs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions that can be air-launched, recovered, and reused, as well as unmanned surface vessels for detecting submarines. Moreover, it promotes research on conceptions related to the cooperation of manned vehicles and unmanned vehicles such as research and development for automated air-to-air battle and the development of Skyborg system, which successfully completed its second flight test in June 2021.

China revealed in May 2018 that the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation has successfully performed a swarm flight of 200 AI-equipped unmanned vehicles, and in September 2020, a Chinese state-owned munition company publicly released the status of the UAV swarm test. It is assumed that military operations including such swarm flights will be difficult to counter with conventional air defense systems. A UAV CH-4
supposedly equipped with identification function with AI was exhibited for the first time at the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition held in November 2022.

In September 2019, Russia conducted a coordinated flight test between S-70 heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle “Okhotnik,” stealth heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle, and the fifth-generation fighter Su-57, and released the flight test footage publicly. There is a reported possibility that around four Okhotniks may accompany each double-seated Su-57 fighter to attack targets in the air and on land.

Since it has also been pointed out that there is a possibility for these unmanned vehicles to be developed into Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), discussions within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) are underway.

Furthermore, at the Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM) summit held in February 2023, REAIM Call to Action to affirm the responsible military use of AI technology in accordance with obligations of international law and in a manner that does not compromise international security, stability, and accountability was published with the support of 60 countries including Japan.

(2) Quantum Technology
Quantum technology is positioned as an important technology which brings innovation to society by applying quantum mechanics that differ from familiar physics that people sense every day. In December 2019, quantum cryptography communication, quantum sensors, and quantum computers were given as examples of quantum technologies expected for military application by the Defense Science Board, which is a consultation body for the U.S. Department of Defense.

Many countries are researching quantum cryptography communication which cannot be decoded by third parties. China has developed the world’s longest quantum cryptographic communications network, extending over approximately 3,000 km and connecting Beijing and Shanghai. In addition, in August 2016, China launched “Mozi,” the world’s first satellite to test quantum cryptographic communications. In January 2018, China said that it succeeded in using Mozi for long-distance quantum cryptographic communication between China and Austria.

It has been pointed out that in the future, quantum sensors could be used for tracking missiles and aircraft, as well as for more advanced gyros and accelerometers. Quantum computers are thought to be capable of computing problems in a significantly shorter amount of time and with less electricity consumption than existing supercomputers, and are expected to be applied to areas such as decryption. China stated in its 14th Five-Year Plan announced in 2021 that it would accelerate the development of advanced technologies such as quantum computers and enhance joint development by the military and private sectors in the field of quantum technology. On the other hand, post-quantum cryptography which cannot be solved by quantum computers is being researched in many countries.

(3) Cutting-Edge Information and Communication Technology
The fifth generation wireless mobile network system (5G) has been gaining traction since commercial services were launched in countries one after another in April 2019 as a mobile communications infrastructure.

In March 2020, the United States announced the National Strategy to Secure 5G, and in May 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense 5G Strategy was announced, which lays out the defense policy approaches for the National Strategy. The DoD’s strategy has indicated 5G as an extremely important strategic technology and that countries with proficient knowledge in cutting-edge technology developed via this will gain economic and military advantages. Furthermore, the DoD started experiments following the completion of a 5G network experimental facility in the Hill Air Force Base in Utah in December 2021.

In addition, in February 2022, the DoD announced its Technology Vision for an Era of Competition, and raised FutureG, the next generation of wireless communication technology and successor to 5G, as one of the critical technology areas essential for maintaining national security.

(4) Additive Manufacturing Technology
Additive manufacturing technology, as typified by three-dimensional printing, allows for the production of goods with shapes too complex to be produced...
conventionally, at a lower cost, and acquisition of parts without depending on stock. Many nations expect to apply additive manufacturing technology to military technologies. For example, the U.S. Navy conducts tests and evaluation to produce various parts using metal 3D printers on board during exercises.

4 Diffusion of Information-related Technology and Information Warfare

There is growing concern about information warfare, such as the dissemination of disinformation and the proliferation of information aimed at eroding trust in the target government or dividing society using social networking services (SNS) and such. It has been pointed out that this was observed during the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the alleged intervention by Russia in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, China’s activities surrounding the 2020 Taiwan presidential election, and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022. It is also pointed out that autonomous programs called bots are used a lot for this kind of SNS operation. Major social media companies have announced that they deleted accounts used for propaganda operations by governments such as China and Russia, including bot accounts.

Information warfare by dissemination of disinformation like these may become stronger when done in conjunction with more effective use of AI and computing technologies. For this, the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act requires the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security to issue a report about technologies used to imitate digital contents and their effect on security if used by foreign states. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) conducts research on algorithms to automatically detect imitated contents, focusing on consistency of images and sounds. Ukraine has taken various countermeasures against Russian disinformation in response to Russia’s aggression, such as disseminating its military achievements and the military situation through government websites and various social media platforms, conveying messages of Russian prisoners of war to their mothers, and encouraging to report of accounts spreading disinformation as inappropriate content, and so on. Through these well-tuned information transmission strategies, it is succeeding in shaping internal and external public opinions regarding Ukraine as a humanitarian country and Russia as inhumane country.

KEY WORDS

Information Warfare

Information warfare refers to attempts to create a favorable security environment by influencing the public opinion and decision-making of other countries through disinformation and strategic communications, etc., and minimizing the impact to one’s own decision-making, even when conflict has yet to arise. Emphasis is being placed on such information warfare in the international community.

5 Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technology Bases

Advanced technologies based on significant technological advances in the civilian field have so much power that they can completely change the way battles happen. Relative merits in industry and technology greatly influence national security. Under these circumstances, many countries are taking on a variety of initiatives in order to maintain and enhance their national defense production and technology bases.

First of all, each country enhances investments to defense research and development to ensure technological superiority. For example, about half of the nearly 16 trillion yen invested in the government research expenditure of the United States is paid out by the DoD.

The United States also offers large-scale funds to research conducted by companies and universities. For example, DARPA, an internal organization of the DoD, has requested a budget of US$4,388 million for FY2024 to continue active investments in innovative research at companies and universities, with the aim of maintaining the U.S. Forces’ technological superiority. In addition, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) mediates between

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5 Propagation of a particular principle or ideology.
companies owning innovative technology and the DoD to make the most of cutting-edge technologies from the civilian field in the resolution of challenges in the security sector. The DIU has produced contracts with over 350 companies mainly in six fields, including AI, autonomous technology, and the cyber field. In FY2022, the DIU moved seventeen consumer solutions suggested by companies from the prototype stage to the production stage.

China is promoting Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) as a national strategy. General Secretary Xi Jinping stated in his report to the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 2022 that China would build up a series of new growth engines such as next-generation information technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, new energy, new materials, and such through promoting integrated development of strategic emerging industries, and clustered development.

In response to the recent utilizations of dual-use technologies in defense equipment development, the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia provide funding to innovative research and development of private sectors in order to acquire advanced civilian technologies.6

Furthermore, foreign countries recognize the defense industrial base as an essential element of their national defense and have organized systems to implement their policies through the publication of policy documents and the establishment of organizations in charge of the defense industry. They also take on a variety of initiatives to maintain and strengthen their defense production base, such as supporting the participation of domestic companies in government programs and promoting exports.

The United Kingdom published its Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) in order to construct a more productive and strategic relationship with domestic defense industries in 2021. The DSIS orders the government to take on some initiatives such as large-scale procurement reforms, toughening of supply chains, and accelerating export permissions in order to strengthen defense as a critical strategic asset. Furthermore, the United Kingdom published the Defence Supply Chain Strategy in 2022, and stated to aim to build up robust defense supply chains to enable the military to respond to the current severe security environment.

Australia created a new office of Minister for Defence Industry in 2016, and announced the Defence Industry Policy Statement in which projects to drive the partnership between the Department of Defence and defense industries were laid down. Australia also supports small and medium sized enterprises participating in the defense industry and keeps up with financial support through the Office of Defence Industry Support established in 2021 as a One-Stop organization to support the defense industry.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) aims an improvement of capabilities and higher self-containment of domestic defense industry through their Defence Industry Development Act and their Defence Science and Technology Innovation Promotion Act enforced in 2021. Furthermore, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced a policy to procure equipment taking into consideration the ripple effects for domestic industries, and a policy to promote cooperation between foreign companies and domestic companies as well as the use of domestic products by foreign companies.7

Each country exports equipment strategically because trading equipment strengthens the relationship between the two trading countries as well as the base for defense technology and the defense industry. For example, the

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6 In the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSS) published in 2021, the United Kingdom announced that it will invest at least 6.6 billion pounds to defense research and development in four years, and that it will increase investments to the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) that invests in industrial and academic innovations that are useful for national security. Australia invests mainly in emerging technologies via the Next Generation Technologies Fund established in 2016.

7 The ROK announced the introduction of the Korea Defense Capability policy in 2021, which includes future policies.
United Kingdom announced in the DSIS that it would support exporting with cross-ministerial effort from different government offices such as the Department for International Trade and the Home Office. The United States, Russia, Europe, and China are still the top four in terms of export value of military equipment, while Australia formulated its export strategy. The United States strategically and continuously attempts to build robust economies by anticipating and evading supply chain disruptions. ROK established an export support organization, and financially supports research and development for export. Various countries proactively promote military equipment export using a variety of measures.

6 Trends Concerning Economic Security

With science, technology, and innovation being the focal points of competition between different nations, attention is being paid to security initiatives in each country focusing on the economic and technological fields depending on changes in the conditions.

Each nation continuously deals with export control, prescreening of inward investment, core infrastructure, and so on in order to prevent leakage of their own sensitive technologies. For example, China has been putting the export control system in order, while trying to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used in the military sector through Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) policies. Specifically, China published the Export Control Regulations for Dual-Use Items (Draft for Public Comment) in April 2022. This regulation is described as having been prepared in order to thoroughly implement the Export Control Law (enforced in December 2020) and for other purposes.

The United States strategically and continuously renews the investment screening system and export control policies in order to protect core technologies. The Executive Order on Ensuring Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (EO14083) was issued to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in September 2022. The fact that there are some nations that utilize investments into the United States in order to violate security of the United States is recognized in this executive order.

In October 2022, the United States issued measures for export control in order to limit China’s capabilities to acquire advanced computer chips, develop and retain super computers, and manufacture advanced semiconductors. In addition to this, Alan Esteves, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, revealed that the United States is making approaches to allies and partners. In response to this, China referred the export control of the United States for chips and other products to the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2022.

Canada announced its plan to adopt measures such as prohibition of the use of new 5G devices and services of Huawei and ZTE in May 2022, and submitted the cybersecurity bill including the provisions for the grounds for those measures to the House of Commons in June 2022. In October 2022, influenced by U.S. sanctions in 2020, the United Kingdom designated Huawei as a high-risk vendor of devices and services for 5G networks and prohibited immediately thirty-five companies from installing new Huawei devices in 5G networks, pointing out that the quality of Huawei products and services are heightening the risks of hostile theft and system failure.

In addition, some countries continue to take required measures for their own supply chains in order to contribute to the stable supply of resources, and some movement for international cooperation is also observed. The fourteen countries participating in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), started up by the United States in May 2022, are attempting to build up robust economies by anticipating and evading supply chain disruptions.

9 The Defense Export Promotion Center was established in 2018.
8 Australia announced the Defence Export Strategy in 2018.
10 According to the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) Brief Note “The Export Control Regulations for Dual-Use Items has been published, clarifying the review period and application requirements for comprehensive approval (China),” May 26, 2022.
11 Meaning the change of the foreign-direct product rule introduced in the Export Control Regulation in May and August 2020, under the 2018 Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) of the United States.
12 Huawei is no longer permitted to acquire or manufacture semiconductors designed or manufactured using specific technologies of the United States under this law. Huawei has transferred the vital parts of supply chains to China, and has become dependent on Chinese technologies.
chain interruptions. In the ROK, “The Fundamental Law to Support Stabilizing Supply Chains for Economic Security” was proposed in October 2022. In addition, it is pointed out that the ROK would further promote current movement to rebuild internal and external supply chains without China, recognizing the threat to many countries including the United States caused by excessive dependence on potential opponents for vital industrial products and raw materials in the recent circumstances that Russia attempted to use its energy resources as a countermeasure.

In many countries, investment is being significantly enhanced, setting science, technology, research, and development at the core in order for countries to secure their own influence in the international community. The Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act was passed in the United States in August 2022. In this act, funds of US$52.7 billion for research, development, production, and fostering the work force for semiconductors as well as measures to promote U.S. leadership related to future technologies have been set forth.

See Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 5 (Initiatives for Economic Security)

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Section 2  Trends in Space Domain

1  Space Domain and Security

There is no concept of national borders in space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables the observation of, communication with, and positioning over any area on Earth.

Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), functions. Such satellites include information collecting satellites that collect various activities as images and radio waves, early warning satellites for detecting the launch of ballistic missiles, positioning satellites for enhancing the precision of weapons systems, communication satellites relays communication and the like.

The United States is promoting the satellite mega-constellation plan with hundreds of small satellites for detection and tracking of missiles, communication, reconnaissance, and other activities. It is pointed out that through this plan the United States is expected to be able to detect and track hypersonic weapons, which are difficult to detect using ground-based radar, from space without delay.

On the other hand, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to hinder the utilization of space by other countries are also under development.

China conducted a destructive test by a ground-launched missile targeting its own satellite in January 2007, and Russia did the same test in November 2021. The amount of space debris resulting from these tests is a concern as a collision risk to space assets such as satellites of many countries.

It is pointed out that the robot arm technologies being developed by China in order to inspect and repair satellites on its orbit can be diverted to ASAT such as satellite-attack satellites (so-called “killer satellites”). It is also pointed out that Russia ejected an object from a satellite to near another Russian satellite as an ASAT test.\(^1\)

Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China and Russia are developing jammers for interfering with communications between target satellites and ground stations, as well as high energy technology such as laser weapons to attack satellites.

Under these circumstances in which the threats in space are increasing, the tendency to place space as a “warfighting domain” or “operational domain” is spreading among many countries. The countries attempt to realize space domain awareness (SDA) to monitor threats to their space assets.

Against this backdrop, the existing international agreements do not have direct provisions on prohibiting the destruction of space objects and refraining from actions triggering space debris. Discussion has been underway recently by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). In December 2021, the resolution “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors,” jointly proposed by Japan, the United Kingdom and others, was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and related working groups were held in 2022 through 2023. In December 2022, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution not to conduct destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-SATellite (DA-ASAT) missile tests.

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Various Countries’ Outer Space Initiatives

1 The United States

The United States is the world’s greatest space power that has been promoting a variety of space activities in military, science, resource mapping, and other domains. The launch of the first reconnaissance satellite in the world and the first landing on the Moon are also among its great achievements. The U.S. Forces clearly recognize the importance of space for their actions, and on this point, actively utilize space for security purposes.

On the policy front, the United States released its National Space Strategy in March 2018, demonstrating its recognition that its adversaries had turned space into a warfighting domain and vowing to deter and defeat threats in the space domain to protect the national interests of the United States and its allies. Additionally, the DoD appraises China and Russia as the most serious and eminent threats in their Defense Space Strategy (DSS). It also establishes the three targets of (1) build a comprehensive military advantage in space; (2) integrate military space power into national, joint, and combined operations; and (3) secure a stable space domain. Furthermore, the United States government says it will continue to use space for national security activities under the principles of the peaceful use of space found in the National Space Policy (NSP) announced in December 2020.

In April 2022, the United States issued a voluntary moratorium on destructive DA-ASAT missile tests and requested other countries to adopt similar initiatives. In response to this, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United Kingdom, France, and other countries, including Japan, issued the same declaration. The DoD also stated in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) issued in October 2022 that the capabilities of surveillance and decision systems to achieve combat objectives despite adversaries means of interference and deception will be improved.

Among U.S. government organizations, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under direct control by the President is responsible mainly for non-military space development, while the DoD undertakes research, development, and operation of military observation and reconnaissance satellites. In August 2019, the United States inaugurated the U.S. Space Command as a new geographic unified combatant command based on the Strategic Command’s component in charge of space missions. In December 2019, the United States created the Space Force under the Department of the Air Force as the sixth military branch, with approximately 16,000 personnel. Furthermore, in November 2022, the United States established a “Combined Joint Task Force-Space Operations” under the Space Command in order to coordinate operations related to space. Space units were established under the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and in December 2022, under the U.S. Central Command respectively.

2 China

China has been promoting space development since the 1950s, and among other achievements, was the first in the world to successfully land an unmanned probe on the far side of the Moon. China is further intensifying space activities. For example, in October 2022, China launched the laboratory cabin module Mengtian and got it docked with the core module Tianhe, completing the space station Tiangong.

While traditionally emphasizing international cooperation and the peaceful use of space, it is pointed out that China proactively used space for military purposes, including information collection, communications, and positioning through satellites. For example, it has been pointed out that the Beidou satellite positioning system can be used for missile guidance as well as the navigation...
of aircraft and ships, while the Yaogan system launched several times in 2021 and 2022 can be used for electronic and image reconnaissance. Both systems are said to have the potential for military applications. Moreover, a Chinese state-owned corporation that develops and manufactures transport rockets such as the Changzheng series also reportedly develops and produces ballistic missiles, so it is likely that the technology for transport rockets can be applied to ballistic missiles.

It is pointed out that China recognizes counter space operations as a means to deter and confront the United States’s intervention to regional conflicts and carries out ASAT development and the like. In addition to the satellite destruction test in 2007 mentioned above and the “non-destructive” test of an anti-satellite missile in July 2014, it is also pointed out that China continues to acquire and develop various ASAT capabilities and related technologies such as ground-based lasers and space robots.3

China is thus expected to focus on space development through close cooperation between government, military, and private sectors. The United States estimates that China pursues space capabilities the same as or higher than those of the United States.4 It is also pointed out that the number of Chinese military satellites under operation is larger than that of the United States.5

In terms of policy, China insists that space is key to international strategic competition, and that the safety of space is a strategic safeguard for nation building and social development. It also reveals the principle that it accelerates development of the aerospace domain. In the white paper titled “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective” issued in January 2022, it was emphasized to “build China into a space power” and it stated that China promotes the space industry. Moreover, the policy to “accelerate the construction of space development power” was raised in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Congress of the CCP in October 2022.

The Strategic Support Force, established in December 2015 as a force under direct control by the Central Military Commission, is considered to be in charge of space, cyber, and electronic warfare missions, including the launching and tracking of satellites, although the details of its missions and organization have not been published. The Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission is believed to be in charge of crewed space programs.

3 Russia

While Russian space activity has been reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has continued to be active in space in recent years, even after its aggression against Ukraine. For example, Russia is working on the multi-satellite constellation plan Sfera to complete a constellation of over 600 satellites for observation and communication by 2030. Furthermore, Russia has decided to extend its participation in the International Space Station until 2028 and has revealed a development plan for its own space station.

Meanwhile, Russia has used its space capabilities for military operations in Syria. Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu revealed at a meeting of the Ministry of Defence in 2019 that he has become aware of the need to rebuild the country’s military satellites based on this tactical experience. Russia launched military satellites that may be for electronic reconnaissance in April and December 2022. Russian missile defense capability is continuously being strengthened. For example, its sixth early warning satellite Tundra was successfully put into orbit in November 2022. In addition, in November 2021, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that it had successfully destroyed a Soviet satellite in orbit in an experiment.

On the other hand, the director general of the State Space Corporation ROSCOSMOS stated that the agency completely stopped the cooperation with the European Space Agency because of the influence of Western countries’ sanctions.

In regard to Russian policies, in March 2016, Russia released the Federal Space Program for 2016-2025 as a specific future guideline for space activities, including the development and deployment of domestic space satellites and crewed flight programs.

From an organizational perspective, ROSCOSMOS is in charge of space activities related to Russia’s scientific and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in space activities for security

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4 According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (February 2022)
purposes. The Russian Aerospace Forces, into which the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces were integrated in August 2015, conduct actual space activities for military purposes and manage facilities for launching satellites.

4 Republic of Korea (ROK)

The ROK’s space development is promoted based on the Fourth Basic Space Development Promotion Plan announced in December 2022 under the Space Development Promotion Act implemented in 2005. The ROK stated in this plan that it will double its space-related budget, promote the space industry, and establish an aerospace agency by the end of 2023, with the goal of landing on the Moon and Mars by 2045. Furthermore, the ROK is accelerating aerospace development, aiming to have on its own launch means, after the U.S. lifted restrictions on South Korea’s ability to develop missiles under an agreement about missiles reached by the two countries in May 2021. For example, the ROK launched a domestically produced rocket called Nuri for the second time and successfully put the satellite into orbit for the first time in June 2022, and is also planning four other launches by 2027.

Among organizations, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute leads research and development as an implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense Development is engaged in the development and use of various satellites. Also, to secure space surveillance capabilities above the Korean Peninsula, the country created its first space force in 2019, and reinforced and reorganized the unit into the Air Force Space Operation Battalion in 2022.

In addition, the ROK’s Ministry of National Defense says it plans to secure surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning satellites in order to strengthen space related capabilities.  

5 India

India has promoted programs to develop manned space missions, communications, positioning, observation, etc. The United States and India emphasized the importance of cooperation in space, and welcomed the plan to implement defense and space dialogue in the fourth U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue held in April 2022.

India is believed to have operated the Navigation Indian Constellation (NavIC) satellite as a positioning satellite that can position locations around India. In February 2017, India successfully launched a satellite launch vehicle loaded with 104 satellites at low cost, which indicates its high technological capabilities. In March 2019, Prime Minister Modi announced that the country successfully tested a missile to destroy a low-orbit satellite. In February 2021, India revealed its manned spacecraft policy, and in December 2022 stated that India is aiming to launch its first manned space flight in 2024 according the plan Gaganyaan.

6 Europe

Regarding European space activities, the European Union (EU), the European Space Agency (ESA), and European countries are promoting their own unique space activities and are cooperating with each other to implement space activities.

The EU allocated 14.88 billion euros to its space policy in its medium-term budget plan from 2021 through 2027, and in May 2021, established the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), which will be responsible for the execution of EU space programs, including the safety management of satellite positioning systems. A satellite positioning system called “Galileo” and an earth observation program named “Copernicus” under planning by the EU and ESA, and a reconnaissance satellite project called “Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS)” of the European Defense Agency (EDA) are expected to be utilized for the security field in Europe. Furthermore, the EU stated in the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence issued in March 2023 that it would enhance the use of space capabilities in security and defense domains, and plans the development of a new earth observation service and the delivery of early SDA services.

Also, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared that space was the “fifth tactical domain” next to land, sea, air and cyberspace. This shows NATO’s awareness concerning the importance of security in the space domain. In October 2020, the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting was held, during which an agreement was reached to establish a new space center. Furthermore,
in the Communiqué issued at the June 2021 NATO Summit, it was stated for the first time that an armed attack in space could lead to the invocation of NATO’s right of collective self-defense. In addition, NATO stated in the New Strategic Concept issued June 2022 that it would enhance the capability for effective activity in space and cyberspace domains.

The United Kingdom, which exited the EU at the end of 2020, announced in January 2021 that it would not participate in the Galileo Program. Moreover, the Space Command was formally established in April 2021, and reportedly bears three functionalities, namely: space operations; training and education for space related personnel; and space capability (development and service of space equipment plan). In regard to strategy, it announced to invest 1.4 billion pounds to some fields including ISR and satellite communication in the next ten years in the National Space Strategy released in September 2021 and Defence Space Strategy published in February 2022.

France made reference to the creation of a space command and the enhancement of threat identification and space situation surveillance capabilities in the Space Defence Strategy released in July 2019. In September 2019, France created the space command under the Air Force to integrate functions and personnel of a military space surveillance operation center, a joint space command and a military satellite surveillance center within the Armed Forces Ministry. Also, in September 2020, the country changed the name of the Air Force to the Air and Space Force, adding activities for guaranteeing freedom of behavior in space and free access to space within the operations of the Air Force.
The internet is becoming increasingly important as a new social domain (cyberspace) with various services and communities being formed. Therefore, cyber attacks that compromise information assets and networks in cyberspace are real threats to security because they can have serious impacts on society.

Types of cyber attacks include unauthorized access, information leakage and functional impairment by malware (unauthorized programs), information falsification and theft, functional impairment of networks through the simultaneous transmission of large amounts of data, and the shutdown or takeover of critical infrastructure such as electric power systems and medical systems. In addition, the methods of attack are becoming increasingly sophisticated; for example, it is pointed out that the use of AI for cyber attacks is possible.

For military forces also, information and communications capability form the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, the dependence of military forces on information and communications networks is further increasing. Since it is not easy to identify the attackers and ascertain the damage, cyber attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede military activities of adversaries at low cost. And it is believed that many foreign armed forces are developing cyber attack capabilities.

Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against not only government organizations and military forces but also business corporations and academic organizations in various countries. Attacks attempting to steal critical technologies, secrets or personal information have been confirmed. In addition, advanced persistent threat (APT), which refers to relentless cyber attacks on specific organizations, is also considered to be an organized activity because it requires abundant resources, arrangements, and capabilities for long-term activities.

To respond to such advanced cyber attacks, Japan is required to share threat awareness with foreign countries for technological and operational cooperation. Based on this situation, the number of countries and cyber attack organizations that have the capacity to conduct information theft and influence operations to the people, as well as inflict damage to industry and critical infrastructure tends to increase, and the United States judges in particular Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea to be most concerning.  

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1 According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (February 2022)
2 According to Taiwan’s National Defense Report (November 2021)
China is suspected of conducting cyber attacks and other activities to steal confidential information even in peacetime.\(^3\) Its involvement in the following incidents has been pointed out in recent years.

- In July 2021, the United States revealed that the cyber attack detected in March 2021 aiming a vulnerability of Microsoft Corporation’s mail server software was conducted by a responsible organization related to the Ministry of National Security of the People’s Republic of China. The allied countries of the United States, including Japan, condemned China all together on the same day.
- A U.S. security company pointed out that APT41, which is said to be supported by the Chinese government, invaded the networks of some U.S. state governments in 2021 through 2022.
- In June 2022, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory to provide information on ways in which People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors, since 2020, have continued to exploit vulnerabilities associated with network devices in order to target a variety of public and private sector organizations, and on applying mitigations.
- In July 2022, the Belgian government accused Chinese state-sponsored hackers, including APT27, APT30, APT31, and others, of conducting malicious cyber activities against its interior and defense ministries.
- In August 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan announced that the IP addresses used in a cyber attack against Taiwanese government agencies and other organizations that occurred just before U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Pelosi landed there were those of China and Russia, among others.

### 2 North Korea

North Korea has four major intelligence agencies and external intelligence agencies: the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), the Ministry of State Security, the United Front Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and the Cultural Exchange Bureau. It is pointed out that their main targets are the ROK, the United States, and Japan.\(^4\) Moreover, it is pointed out that their personnel are trained by these agencies.\(^5\) This is led by the RGB of Korean People’s Army, and has intensively built up cyber units, operating some 6,800 people.\(^6\)

It also is said that North Korea, which is under sanctions of every kind, uses cyber attacks to acquire foreign currency taking advantage of loopholes of sanctions.\(^7\) It also commits thefts of foreign military secret intelligence, and develops attack capabilities for the critical infrastructure of other countries. The United Nations Security Council Expert Panel 2022 Final Report issued in April 2023 noted that North Korea’s cyber attack methods have become more sophisticated, leading to an amount between US$630 million and US$1 billion worth of cryptocurrencies stolen in 2022 alone. It is pointed out that North Korea has been involved in following cases in recent years.

- In February 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice prosecuted three North Koreans working under the North Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau on suspicion of involvement in a cyber attack.
- Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) revealed in May 2021 that the North Korean cyber group invaded the internal network of KAERI making a bad use of a VPN server’s vulnerability.
- In April 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department announced that thefts of cryptocurrency worth US$600 million in a popular online game were committed by a cyber actor called the Lazarus Group, which is allegedly sponsored by North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau.
- In July 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it seized approximately US$500,000 from a North Korean state-sponsored cyber actor deploying ransomware “Maui,” including the ransom paid by a health care provider in Kansas in May 2021.
- In January 2023, the U.S. FBI revealed that the culprit of the theft of cryptocurrencies worth US$100 million that occurred in June 2022 was the Lazarus Group, and that US$60 million worth of it was laundered into other cryptocurrencies.

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1. According to “Cyber Strategy,” the U.S. DOD (September 2018)
2. North Korea
3. According to “Cyber Strategy,” the U.S. DOD (September 2018)
6. According to the ROK Defense White Paper 2022 (February 2023)
Section 3 Trends in Cyber Domain

It is pointed out that in the case of Russia, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the Federal Security Service, and the Foreign Intelligence Service are involved in cyber attacks, and it has become clear that Russia’s armed forces have a cyber command unit. The cyber command unit is believed to be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities, including inserting malware into command and control systems of adversaries, and is said to have approximately 1,000 personnel.

Moreover, Russia revealed, in its National Security Strategy released in July 2021, its perception that space and information space are under active development as a new domain for military action, and declared to reinforce its sovereignty in the information space as a national priority. In November 2019, the so called Sovereign Internet Law went into effect to ensure Russian network’s continuity. The law stipulates that the internet would be cut out from the global network in the event of a cyber attack or other circumstances.

The United States recognizes that Russia is refining its spy activities, influence exercise behavior, and attack capabilities, and that it will continue to be the greatest threat in the cyberspace. It is pointed out that Russia has been involved in following cases in recent years.

- In April 2021, the U.S. Government sanctioned 32 entities and individuals who carried out attempts led by the Russian Government to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election, and other disinformation and interference.
- The Security Service of Ukraine revealed in November 2021 that, since 2014, cyber groups affiliated with Russia’s Federal Security Service have conducted cyber attacks on Ukraine’s public institutions and critical infrastructure with the intention of seizing control of such infrastructure, conducted intelligence activities and influencing operations, and disrupted Ukraine’s information systems.
- In February 2022, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia pointed out that the cyber attacks on Ukraine financial institutions were conducted by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.
- In March 2022, the U.S. FBI announced the indictment of three personnel of Russia’s Federal Security Service and one employee of a research institute affiliated with the Defence Ministry of Russia accused of launching cyber attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure.
- In April 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a court-authorized operation to disable a computer network that was under the command and remote control of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces through the use of malware.

Supply chain risks, including products embedded with deliberately and fraudulently altered programs, and the existence of advanced malware designed to attack industrial control systems are also pointed out.

The U.S. Congress in August 2018 passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019 including provisions prohibiting government agencies from using products of major Chinese communications equipment manufacturers, such as Huawei. The United States has provided its allies with information about risks accompanying Chinese communications equipment and urged them not to use such equipment. In response, Australia has banned China’s Huawei and ZTE from taking part in its fifth-generation mobile communications system development project, while the United Kingdom has announced its policy to remove all Huawei products from its fifth-generation mobile communications system network by the end of 2027.

In addition, in July 2022, a U.S. IT company pointed out that various online services facilitating crimes by using billing forms needed for cyber attacks such as distribution of ransomware are increasing, and the economy around those services is continuously growing. Furthermore, in December 2022, a U.S. health academic organization pointed out that cyber attacks using ransomware on the U.S. public health sector from 2016 to 2021 resulted in the leakage of personal information of approximately 42 million people, and that there was more than a two-fold increase in the number of annual

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8 According to the statement made by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu in an information session for Duma, the lower house, in February 2017. He said that the Russian military has a cyber command for countering political propaganda in the context of Russia’s ongoing information war with Western countries. However, the minister fell short of naming the command.
9 According to then the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015.
10 According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (February 2022)
occurrences of incidents of interference in health care provision.

3 Initiatives against Cyberspace Threats

Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various initiatives are under way.

It is believed that the international community has diverging views on fundamental matters related to cyberspace, including how international law should be applied. For instance, the United States, Europe, and Japan have called for maintaining a free cyberspace, while Russia, China, and most emerging countries have sought to strengthen state control of cyberspace. Against this backdrop, there has been a movement to promote the rule of law in cyberspace in the international community. For instance, discussions are being held on the establishment of international rules within the framework of global conferences on cyberspace.

In addition, new life styles including telework, education using ICT, and web conference services have been established all over the world as a result of the response to COVID-19 since 2020. On the other hand, new security measures are being considered in many countries as it is pointed out that the “perimeter security”\textsuperscript{11} concept that has been a major premise for traditional cybersecurity measures, has limits with the development of the digital services mentioned above.

1 The United States

In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting federal government networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, and the Department’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works to protect the networks of government agencies. In April 2022, the State Department newly established the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy that works to address issues such as international cyber security and international digital policy.

The United States pointed out in the DoD Cyber Strategy issued in September 2018 that the United States is engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia, and that China and Russia have expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that pose long-term strategic risk to the United States as well as to its allies and partners. Also, the government stated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) issued in October 2022 that it would deal with hostile behavior in cyberspace in an uncompromising manner in order to deter cyber attacks, and stated in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) issued in the same month that priority would be placed on building up resiliency in the cyber domain, and direct deterrence means would be the offensive cyber activities.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a zero trust strategy in January 2022 in order to strengthen cybersecurity of federal government agencies, requiring agencies to implement security measures according to the zero trust\textsuperscript{12} model. The Biden administration stated in the National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) issued in March 2023 that the security and prosperity of the United States were threatened by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and others proactively carrying out cyber attacks, and the administration would put its energy into defense of critical infrastructure, and interrupting and dismantling threat actors.

At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in 2019, the two countries agreed to strengthen cooperation in the field of cyberspace, affirming that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

The U.S. Forces include Cyber Command, which was elevated to a unified combatant command in May 2018.

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\textsuperscript{11} A security concept to block the traffic between the inside and the outside of a perimeter to defend against attacks from the outside and prevent information spillage from the inside. The perimeter security concept is based on the assumption that nothing untrustworthy gets into the inside of the perimeter and that everything inside it is trustworthy. The main targets of this defense are networks.

\textsuperscript{12} A security concept based on the view of human nature as fundamentally depraved. In this concept, regardless of something being on the inside or the outside of one’s perimeter, nothing is trusted and everything is doubted. Users, equipment such as terminal units, or even access rights arouse suspicion, and if there is a high possibility of spoofing etc., the right to access is immediately suspended. The main targets of this defense are assets such as data or equipment.
to control cyberspace operations. The Command consists of the Cyber Protection Force (68 teams), which operates and defends the DoD Information Network, the Cyber National Mission Force (13 teams), which supports the U.S. defense against national-state threats, and the Cyber Combat Mission Force (27 teams), which supports the operations conducted by unified combatant commands on the cyber front. These three forces are collectively referred to as the Cyber Mission Force and consist of 133 teams and 6,200 personnel in total, including 25 support teams.

In addition, the Cyber Command held a multilateral cyber exercise, “Cyber Flag 23-1,” in October 2022 in which over 250 cyber troops from eight countries including Japan participated.

### 2 Republic of Korea

The ROK formulated its first “National Cybersecurity Strategy” in April 2019 to protect the safety of the people and enhance national security, and released the “National Cybersecurity Basic Plan” to materialize the strategy in September 2019.

In terms of national defense, the ROK’s military has established a structure to perform cyber operations led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2019, while developing a collaborative system between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyber Operations Command, and each military branch in enhancing its cyber operations preparedness and ensuring effective response to threats in cyberspace. The Military Cyber Command was restructured into the Cyber Operations Command in February 2019. In addition, the Cyber Protection Center of each military branch was restructured into the Cyber Operations Center with an increased number of personnel.

### 3 Australia

In the Cybersecurity Strategy announced in August 2020, Australia clearly states it will ensure not only its defense capabilities in cyberspace, but also its authority and technical strength of offensive capabilities in order to ensure the country’s network safety. Moreover, leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced in September 2021 the establishment of the new security cooperation framework AUKUS, under which they will cooperate in the joint development of nuclear submarines as well as in cyber capabilities, AI, and quantum technology.

On the organizational front, cybersecurity capabilities across the government have been centralized through the establishment of the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), which addresses major cybersecurity issues related to government agencies and critical infrastructure. In addition, Australia announced in November 2022 the formation of a new Joint Standing Operation task force aimed at disrupting and stopping criminal cyber attacks. The Minister for Cyber Security stated that this task force consisted of 100 personnel from the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Federal Police and would implement offensive cyber defense.

Moreover, the Australian Defence Force created the Information Warfare Division under the Joint Capabilities Group in July 2017 and established the Defence Signals Intelligence and Cyber Command (DSCC) under the division in January 2018. In October 2019, the Royal Australian Air Force offered to recruit cyber skills officers to protect networks, data and information systems.

### 4 Europe

At the NATO Summit in September 2014, an agreement was reached that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyber attacks against member states.

On the organizational front, in November 2017, an agreement was reached on the creation of a new Cyber Operations Center and the integration of NATO member countries’ cyber defense capabilities into NATO missions and operations. The Cyber Operations Center located in Belgium is expected to be fully operational with cyber attack capabilities by 2023.

Furthermore, in 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was authorized to serve as a research and training institution. The CCDCOE published the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on international law applicable to cyber operations in February 2017, and started an initiative to revise the manual to version 3.0 in December 2020. In addition to this, the CCDCOE held the cyber defense exercise “Locked Shields 2022” in April 2022, and NATO held the cyber defense exercise “Cyber Coalition 2022” in

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13 According to the ROK Defense White Paper 2022 (February 2023)
November 2022 in which NATO member states as well as Japan participated.

The EU announced its decision to sanction six individuals of Chinese and Russian nationality and three organizations from China, North Korea, and Russia that launched cyber attacks within Europe in July 2020. In addition, it made a joint announcement with the United Kingdom in October of the same year that it would impose sanctions on Russia for cyber attacks on the German parliament building. In December 2020, the EU pointed out the lack of collective situational awareness on cyber threats within the region, and advocated for the establishment of a cross-disciplinary Joint Cyber Unit between the private, diplomatic, police and defense sectors in the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade. In June 2021, a concrete structural conception of this Joint Cyber unit was announced. In addition, the EU unveiled the European Cyber Defence Policy in November 2022 in order to enhance capabilities to protect the citizens and infrastructure of the EU.

The United Kingdom held up five strategic objectives including detection, disruption, and deterrence of adversaries in its National Cyber Strategy published in December 2021, and announced to invest 2.6 billion pounds to the cyber field in the next three years.

On the organizational front, in October 2016, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was newly established under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to promote public-private partnerships for responses to national cyber incidents.

Moreover, the 13th Signal Regiment was established in June 2020 for the protection of military networks. In November 2020, the establishment of the National Cyber Force (NCF) was announced, which consolidates personnel from GCHQ, the Ministry of Defence, and others to carry out activities such as preventing serious crimes and disrupting adversary weapon systems.

France established their Cyber Defense Command under the Chief of the Defence Staff in May 2017. In September 2021, then Minister of the Armed Forces Parly pointed out the increase in frequency and severity of cyber attacks on the country and announced an increase of the Command’s troop strength to around 5,000 members by 2025 to strengthen France’s cyber defense capabilities.
Electromagnetic waves are used in various everyday applications including in televisions, mobile communications, and global positioning systems. In the military field, electromagnetic waves are used for command and control communications equipment, radar systems for detecting enemies, missile guidance systems, and other equipment. Securing superiority in the electromagnetic domain is indispensable for modern operations. Activities using the electromagnetic domain include “electronic warfare” and “electromagnetic spectrum management.” Electronic warfare means or approaches are generally classified into three categories - electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support.

“Electronic attack” is to jam radio waves coming from adversary communications or radar equipment to reduce or neutralize their communications and search capabilities by emitting strong electromagnetic spectrum or electromagnetic spectrum pretending to be those sent out by the adversary. It includes electromagnetic spectrum jamming, electromagnetic spectrum deception and physical destruction using high-power electromagnetic spectrum (such as lasers and microwaves).

“Electronic protection” is to make it difficult to be detected by adversaries, and to reduce or neutralize adversary electronic attacks on communications and radar equipment by changing electromagnetic spectrum frequency for use or increasing its power.

“Electronic warfare support” consists of activities designed to collect information relating to electromagnetic spectrum used by adversaries. It is necessary for effective electronic attacks or protection to detect and analyze what electromagnetic spectrum is usually used by adversaries for communications equipment, radar and electronic attack aircraft.

“Electromagnetic spectrum management” is to grasp how electromagnetic spectrum is used in a theater of operation and to adjust frequencies, directions and durations of electromagnetic spectrum used for friendly forces and equipment to avoid electromagnetic spectrum interference.

Major countries recognize electronic attacks as an asymmetric means of attack similar to cyber attacks that effectively prevents adversaries from demonstrating their military capabilities. They are also emphasizing and enhancing their electronic warfare capabilities, including the ability to launch electronic attacks.
Each Countries’ Electronic Warfare Initiatives

1 The United States and Europe

The United States is committed to expanding electronic warfare training and equipment and to enhancing cooperation with its allies under an initiative to aggressively achieve its dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, the Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy announced by the U.S. Department of Defense in October 2020 recognizes the importance of ensuring freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum to the success of operations in all areas.

As an example of a military operation using electronic warfare equipment, it is pointed out that the Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS), an anti-UAV jamming system with electronic attack capabilities, was used to down an Iranian drone over the Strait of Hormuz in July 2019.

The United States Army announced in September 2021 that a multidomain unit having space, cyberspace and electronic warfare functions was deployed in Germany. Also, the U.S. Air Force newly established the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing in June 2021 to provide operational, maintenance, and technical expertise in electronic warfare for the Air Force.

Many other NATO member states are also developing equipment for severe electronic warfare environments and allegedly conducting electronic warfare-oriented training with Russian forces’ electronic warfare equipment in mind.1 For example, NATO conducted the electronic warfare exercise Dynamic Guard 22-2 in November 2022 in order to enhance interoperability in the electromagnetic spectrum with allies.

2 China

China has reportedly set forth an initiative to place cyber warfare and other electronic elements along with physical destruction and other non-electronic elements under unified command.2 Also, it has been pointed out that its electronic warfare strategy is focused on suppressing, degrading, damaging, and deceiving the enemy’s electronic equipment.3 Under the initiative, China conducts force-on-force exercises on a routine basis so that it can effectively accomplish missions in complex electromagnetic environments, thereby improving its practical capabilities. It is pointed out that China’s armed forces have taken advantage of such training to assess electronic warfare weapon research and development achievements.4 The Strategic Support Force, established at the end of 2015 for improving overall military operational capabilities, is said to be responsible for such domains as electronic warfare, cyber and space.

China’s Tu-154 information gathering and Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft have been seen flying around the Nansei Islands and the Sea of Japan in the vicinity of Japan. In addition, Y-9 electronic warfare aircraft flew over the Pacific Ocean in April 2022. In the South China Sea, China has allegedly deployed radio wave jamming equipment on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands.5 In January of the same year, a J-16D electronic warfare aircraft entered the southwestern airspace of Taiwan.

3 Russia

Russia, in its Military Doctrine, places electronic warfare equipment as one of the critical equipment in modern military conflicts. Moreover, according to a Russian military organ’s contributed article of April 2021, Russia will ensure superiority in weapon guidance as well as force command by improving electronic warfare technology and expanding equipment, in response to the technological superiority of developed countries that have advanced information and communication technology. It is pointed out that while Russia has been improving practical capabilities in recent years6, for example it executed a training using electronic warfare equipment in the military exercise “Vostok 2022” in September 2022, it is thought that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation did not demonstrate effects as

1 According to “All quiet on the eastern front: EW in Russia’s new-generation warfare,” Jane’s International Defence Review (April 2018)
3 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2022)
5 According to “An Accounting of China’s Deployments to the Spratly Islands,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 2018)
6 According to “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025,” Estonian Ministry of Defense
anticipated in the aggression against Ukraine.

In the Russian Forces, there are reportedly five electronic warfare brigades. They mainly consist of the Land Forces\(^7\) and possess multiple types of electronic warfare equipment. Furthermore, Russia is developing and deploying electronic warfare (EW) systems equipped with artificial intelligence such as the EW system Bylina that controls many EW equipment in an integrated manner and the EW system Palantin that reportedly can interfere with radio communications and electronic reconnaissance systems within a radius of 1,000 km.

In the air space around Japan, an IL-20 information-gathering aircraft entered over the Pacific Ocean in December 2021, and flight of an IL-20 was confirmed when bombers of China and Russia conducted joint flight in the air space above the Sea of Japan in May 2022.

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\(^7\) According to “All quiet on the eastern front: EW in Russia’s new-generation warfare,” Jane’s International Defence Review (April 2018)
Japan is a maritime nation surrounded by sea and depends on maritime transportation for importing energy resources. In this sense, securing maritime traffic safety is vital for the nation’s existence. At the same time, ensuring the stable use of the maritime domain as infrastructure supporting international logistics is recognized as a primary concern for the international community.

Nevertheless, some countries unilaterally claim their rights or take action based on their own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, creating situations where the principle of the freedom of the high seas is unjustly violated. Attacks on ships in the Middle East and piracy seen at various locations have become a threat to maritime traffic.

1 Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas,” etc.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides for the principles of freedom of navigation in the high seas and freedom of overflight. Nevertheless, in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan, especially in the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for China to unilaterally assert its rights or take action based on assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, creating situations where these principles are unjustly violated. In addition, repeated launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea over the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean threaten the peace and security of Japan, the region and the international community, as they not only violate related United Nations Security Council resolutions but also pose problems for the safety of aircraft and vessels.

Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent years progress has been made in efforts to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies. First, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting in May 2018, Japan and China agreed to establish a “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” with the aim of avoiding unintended confrontations between the naval vessels and aircraft of the SDF and PLA. The mechanism went into operation in June of the same year.

As for multilateral initiatives, in April 2014, navies of participating countries of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, and China, adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). CUES sets forth a code of conduct such as procedures and communication method to ensure safety for unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of these countries. In November 2014, the United States and China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification of military activities, together with rules of behavior to avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two countries announced an agreement concerning an additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters. Between ASEAN and China, official discussions have been held for the establishment of the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC).

It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies will supplement the existing international order and that the countries concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral actions that add to tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.

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1 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted as a comprehensive treaty on the law and order of the seas in 1982 and entered into force in 1994 (Japan signed it in 1996).

2 This code is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties.
(1) Maritime Security in the Middle East
The Middle East has seen intermittent attacks on ships in recent years.

For example, in the Strait of Hormuz and its vicinity, attacks on private sector oil tankers have been seen since May 2019. As high tensions including those over the U.S.-Iran relations continue in the Middle East, U.S. and French initiatives have been conducted to secure safe navigation.

(2) Piracy
Piracy seen at various locations has become a threat to maritime traffic. The number of piracy / armed robbery at sea incidents (hereinafter “piracy incidents”) around the world has declined in recent years after peaking at 445 incidents in 2010. (There were 115 incidents in 2022.)

The decline has depended heavily on the fall in the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden rose rapidly from 2008 to 2011 with 237 incidents, accounting for more than half of the total number of piracy incidents worldwide and attracting great international concern as a threat to safe navigation. In recent years, however, the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has remained low as a result of various initiatives taken by the international community, including Japan. (There were no incidents in 2022. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations) for Japan’s initiatives.)

The international counter-piracy initiatives in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden include counter-piracy operations by the Combined Task Group 151 (CTG151), a multinational force that was created by the U.S. Force-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF) based in Bahrain. So far, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, the ROK, Pakistan and other countries have participated in the CTG151, conducting zone defense operations to counter piracy. The EU for its part has conducted Operation Atalanta to counter piracy since December 2008. In the operation, naval vessels and aircraft dispatched by EU member countries escort ships and monitor the waters off the coast of Somalia. It has been decided that the operation will continue until the end of 2024.

In addition, some countries have conducted their exclusive operations outside the abovementioned frameworks. Since December 2008, for example, China has deployed naval vessels for counterpiracy operations in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

The number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has remained low as a result of these international initiatives. However, the root causes resulting in piracy, such as Somalia’s unstable internal security and poverty, have not yet been resolved.

Meanwhile, in Africa, piracy incidents occurred in the Gulf of Guinea (the number of incidents was 19 in 2022). The international community has continued counter-piracy initiatives in this region.

The number of piracy incidents in Southeast Asian waters came to 58 in 2022. In particular, piracy incidents in the Singapore Strait have been increasing since 2019 and have reached one-third of all reported piracy cases in the world in 2022; however, they are all minor incidents, such as theft of fittings.
3 Trends in the Arctic Ocean

In recent years, moves towards the utilization of trans-Arctic navigation routes and the development of natural resources in the Arctic Ocean have gained momentum in line with a decline in sea ice. The eight arctic circle nations consisting of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States established the Arctic Council in 1996 in order to promote cooperation for common challenges such as sustainable development and environment protection.\(^5\)

From the perspective of security, the Arctic Ocean has traditionally been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a longer period of time and more extensively than before. It has therefore been considered that the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces using military maritime transport capabilities in the future. In this situation, moves to deploy new military capabilities in the ocean are seen. In addition, Russia is promoting the establishment of a system to defend its national interests in the Arctic Region and has clearly stated in various policy documents Russia’s rights in the Arctic Region and the roles of the AFRF in defending these national interests.

Russia has been developing natural gas on the Yamal Peninsula and elsewhere. In 2018, liquefied natural gas produced on the peninsula was transported to China for the first time via an Arctic Ocean route. Also, on the military front, Russia is deploying radar surveillance networks, ground-to-air missiles, and surface-to-ship missiles, as well as rebuilding airfields on the shoreline of the Arctic Sea. Furthermore, in addition to the development of such military facilities, the AFRF has also been conducting such activities as strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol flights by long-range bombers.

The United States revealed its perception, in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region issued in October 2022, that the competition with Russia and China in the Arctic Region is intensifying.\(^6\) Moreover, on the security front, the U.S. Government stated that it would deter the threats against the U.S. mainland and allies by enhancing the capabilities required to protect national interests in the Arctic Region, and reduce the risk of unintentional escalation through coordinating a common approach with allies and partners. In addition, U.S. Marine forces used to be deployed in Norway on a rotation basis for a period of six months each year for training since 2017, but this rotation deployment has been changed to a format under which forces with a larger number of personnel are dispatched for a shorter period of time in conjunction with training since October 2020. In October 2018, the United States sent an aircraft carrier to the Arctic Region for the first time in 27 years for air drills in the Norwegian Sea. And, in May 2020, United States and United Kingdom warships took part in activities in the Barents Sea for the first time since the end of the Cold War. In March 2021, a B-1 bomber landed for the first time inside the Arctic Circle. In March 2022, the U.S. Navy conducted the exercise “Ice Exercise 2022” that involved the participation of two Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines as well as the Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force, and British Royal Navy.

Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 13 countries including Japan, China, the ROK, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, have observer status in the Arctic Council. China shows a stance to be proactively involved in the Arctic Sea. It is pointed out that China could take advantage of scientific survey and commercial activities to increase its presence including military activities in the Arctic Sea.\(^7\)

\(^5\) Russia was supposed to be the chair country of the Arctic Council for two years from May 2021. However, in March 2022, the remaining seven Arctic region countries stated that they would stop participating in all the meetings of the Council with Russia as the chair country because of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

\(^6\) The United States revealed its perception about Russia that the country made vast investment for its military presence in the Arctic Region in the last decade, while it also built up new economic infrastructure in the region and attempted to limit free navigation through excessive claims to territorial waters. The United States has pointed out that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has heightened geopolitical tensions even in the Arctic Region, created new risks of unintended conflict, and hampered cooperation. It also recognized that China has emphasized its intention to amplify its influence and play greater roles in the Arctic Region through expanding its economic, diplomatic, scientific, and military activities. The United States also pointed out that China doubled its investment for mining of important mineral resources in particular in the last decade, and conducted research of dual use for military application in the Arctic Region.

\(^7\) According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2019)
Apart from that, in October 2021, the EU unveiled their new Joint Communication about the Arctic Region that stipulated specialized items for foreign affairs and security for the first time.\(^8\)
The transfer and proliferation of WMDs such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, as well as ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In addition, competition and confrontation among states have been sharpened and the international security environment has become complex and severe in recent years. As a result, it is concerned that the international community is presented with greater difficulties to rally together in taking on common challenges such as arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

### 1 Nuclear Weapons

During the period when the risk of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union, including the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), were widely recognized, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into effect in 1970. The treaty prohibited countries other than those that had detonated a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices in or before 1966 (the United States, the then Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, as well as France and China which acceded to the NPT later in 1992) from possessing nuclear weapons and stipulated that arms control and disarmament of nuclear forces were to be pursued through two-way negotiations.

While the NPT is concluded in total of 191 countries and region as of January 2023, some countries such as India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to participate as non-nuclear countries. In addition, North Korea, which has repeatedly executed nuclear tests and declared to develop and retain nuclear weapons, adopted a legislation stipulating conditions of using its nuclear weapons, and...

![Fig. I-4-6-1](image_url)
expressed a firm commitment not to abandon its nuclear weapons in September 2022.

Regarding nuclear capabilities of the United States and Russia, the two countries had agreed on a five-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in January 2021. However, as Russia continued its aggression against Ukraine while repeating words and actions that could be interpreted as threats to use nuclear weapons, talks between the two countries under the framework of the treaty was postponed in November 2022, and Russia announced that it would suspend the treaty’s implementation in February 2023.

Although the United States expresses its intention to pursue a framework of arms control with China included, China repeatedly rejects to be involved in the framework between the United States and Russia. Meanwhile China is said to continuously enhance its nuclear capability, as well as it might retain 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1

The post-Cold War international order faces serious challenges amidst historical changes in the balance of power and intensifying geopolitical competitions. It is necessary to closely monitor relevant trends to see if an effective framework of nuclear arms control and disarmament will be established in the future.

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2 **Biological and Chemical Weapons**

Biological and chemical weapons are relatively inexpensive and easy to manufacture, as well as easy to disguise because the materials and technologies for manufacture are mostly dual-use. Therefore, development and/or acquisition by nations or terrorists seeking asymmetrical means for attack2 is especially concerning.

Biological weapons have the following characteristics: (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset of the symptom; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and (5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon.

Regarding chemical weapons, North Korea is an example of an actor that is still presumed to possess these chemical weapons and has not entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The threat of terrorist attacks by weapons of mass destruction in urban areas was materialized with incidents such as the sarin attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995. Recent years, some incidents were also pointed out, including that chemical weapons have been used by Syria’s Assad administration and that the “Novichok” developed by Russia was allegedly used for the murder attempt of leaders of political opposition.

The U.S. DoD, in a report published in 2022, voiced its concern about China’s possible nonfulfillment of the obligations specified in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the CWC.3

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3 **Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles**

Ballistic missiles are propelled by rockets for parabolic flights and are capable of attacking distant targets. They can be used as a means of delivering WMDs. As they fall at a steep angle and high speed, highly accurate systems are required for intercepting them effectively. Moreover, technologies related to ballistic missiles have been changing and developing quickly in recent years. For example, newly emerged ballistic missiles fly at lower altitudes with irregular trajectory than typical ballistic missiles by controlling wings, aimed at complicating early detection and interception of missiles.

The deployment of ballistic missiles in areas with continuous armed conflicts is dangerous because it can intensify existing tensions and make the area unstable. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of attacking from a distance or threatening another country...

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1 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2022)
2 They refer to means of attack to strike an adversary’s vulnerable points and are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks.
3 According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the U.S. DoD (2022)
that has superior conventional forces.

Along with the threat of ballistic missiles, the threat of cruise missiles is also pointed out. This is because cruise missiles are comparatively easy to acquire for non-state actors such as terrorists, and can potentially be proliferated. Cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles as well as easy to maintain and train with, therefore many countries are producing or modifying cruise missiles. Moreover, some cruise missiles have relatively higher target accuracy, are difficult to detect while cruising, and are able to approach the targets while concealed on a ship, therefore they will pose a serious threat when carrying WMDs with them.

4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies

Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred WMDs and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and attempt to offset this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek WMDs do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist organizations are active in their territories. Therefore, it is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual use of WMDs would increase.

Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can effectively manage the related technology and materials, there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states with high likelihood. For example, there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies would use a dirty bomb to release radioactive materials for pollution as a means of attack so long as they gain access to such materials. Nations across the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists and other non-state actors.

The proliferation of WMDs and other related technologies has been reported in numerous instances. For example, it was revealed in February 2004 that nuclear-related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan.

There has been significant transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as means of weapon delivery as well. The former Soviet Union and other countries exported Scud-B to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries and other actors now possess ballistic missiles.

North Korea is believed to have advanced its ballistic missile development with almost no test launches using various resources and technologies transferred from outside during the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, it is believed that North Korea continuously proliferates technologies, conventional weapons, and items used in the supply chains of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) to acquire foreign currencies. For example, North Korea reportedly cooperates militarily with Iran, Syria, Myanmar, and other countries, including in areas such as arms trading and weapon technology transfers.

The decisive attitude of the international society pressured nations involved in transferring and proliferation of mass-destruction weapons, and has resulted in acceptance of inspections by international organizations. Meanwhile, it is pointed out that, in recent years, states of particular concern have sustained their external transfer while skillfully averting international monitoring by falsifying documentation and diversifying transport routes to illicitly export WMDs. Another
concern has been arisen that these states are also conducting intangible technology transfer. Specifically, these states have obtained advanced technologies that could be adapted for the development and manufacture of WMDs through their researchers and students dispatched to major companies and academic institutions in developed countries.
Impact of Climate Change on the Security Environment and the Military

1 Impact of Climate Change

Armed forces of many countries strive for resiliency in order to continue their activities regardless of climate change, and also work on security crises arising from climate change diligently.

The impacts of climate change are not regionally uniform. Climate change is also believed to affect not only meteorology and environment but also a wide range of fields, including society and economy. Various countries of the world came to be acutely aware of a variety of impacts on security due to climate change because of unprecedented meteorological phenomena they experienced in 2022, such as heat waves, heavy rains, droughts, and tropical cyclones.

For example, water, food, and land shortages as a result of combined influences from climate change are believed to contribute to and exacerbate conflicts over limited land and resources, as well as induce large-scale migration, and social and political tensions and conflicts.

Moreover, widespread impact of climate change can burden each country’s response capabilities. In particular, it can shake the stability of countries with political and/or economic problems, thus increasing the need for international support, including in the area of military operations, for these destabilized countries. For example, in Pakistan, one-third of the country was submerged after massive flooding caused by record heavy rain in 2022. Armed Forces of Pakistan took support and rescue actions in responding this disaster, and the U.S. Central Command airlifted goods for life-saving and humanitarian support. Besides many casualties and victims, damage and economic losses are said to have amounted to over 30 billion dollars, and the burden of reconstruction has added to the country’s economic crisis with continuing economic downturn due in part to the COVID-19 pandemic. International support is therefore required.

Furthermore, as melting of sea ice in the Arctic Sea can increase opportunities for use as a sea route and lead to easier access to undersea resources, coastal nations, trying to ensure ocean interests, have begun to embark on seafloor investigations to claim an extension of continental shelves and enhance military posture in the Arctic areas.

And it was pointed out that attention should be put on the impact of glacier melting in the Tibetan Plateau, which is the source of many big rivers in Asia, including the Yellow River, Yangtze River, Mekong River, Indus River, and Brahmaputra River.

Additionally, it was pointed out that tensions among countries may be heightened over regulations of greenhouse gas emissions, use of geoengineering (climate engineering), and changes in the international demand structure for resources, such as rare-earth elements, arising from decarbonization.

Regarding the direct impact of climate change on each country’s military, armed forces are expected to have more opportunities to be dispatched for such missions as disaster relief operations and humanitarian and reconstruction support activities, with the demanding environments of these activities likely to negatively impact the physical condition of military personnel. In addition, it is pointed out that the rising temperatures, extreme weather, and rising sea levels increase the burden on military equipment, bases, and training facilities, and also have an impact on military actions. In addition, demand for armed forces to take further environmental measures, such as mitigation greenhouse gas emissions is growing.
2 Initiatives for Climate Change

The United States is accelerating its initiatives to deal with climate change. The U.S. Government sets climate change into the center of its foreign policies and national security, and aims to achieve Net Zero\(^1\) by 2050. In 2022, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued the Climate Adaptation Plan Progress Report.\(^2\) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force also issued a series of strategic documents and materials related to climate change in 2022.

The U.S. Department of the Army issued the Army Climate Strategy (ACS) in February 2022. In the ACS, the increasing demand for humanitarian and disaster response and the challenges to the army’s readiness are mentioned as impacts of climate change. In addition, it is pointed out that, as secondary impacts, adversaries and other malign actors may seize dwindling resources while seeking new opportunities to threaten U.S. national interests. The U.S. Army also set the goals of reducing the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to 50% by 2030, compared to 2005 levels, achieving Net Zero by 2050, introducing microgrids\(^3\) to its installations, supplying 100% carbon-free electricity, and deploying electric vehicles and other actions. In February 2022, the hybrid type of main infantry fighting vehicle Bradley was made public. Furthermore, in October 2022, the U.S. Army issued the Climate Strategy Implementation Plan,\(^4\) in which it set specific objectives and tasks over the next five years to achieve the objectives raised in the ACS and clarified each supervising department, target completion date, evaluation index, priority, and resources.

The U.S. Department of the Navy issued the Climate Action 2030 in May 2022. The department pointed out in this document that climate crisis directly threatens the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to execute those missions. It stated that the Department has an urgent charge to build a climate-ready force, and that to do so, it will work towards building robust forces against climate change and mitigating the threat from climate change. The department also stated that it will achieve a 65 percent reduction by 2030, compared to 2008, and achieve Net Zero by 2050. Furthermore, it announced that the Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany became the first installation in the entire Department to achieve Net Zero energy, by implementing a range of innovative energy technologies including a biomass steam turbine and landfill gas generators.

The U.S. Department of the Air Force that is responsible for the largest portion of the DoD’s GHG emissions\(^5\) pointed out in its Climate Action Plan published in October 2022 various impacts brought to the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Space Force by climate change, and stated that they recognized that they are contributing to global climate change. The department also stated that aviation fuel and energy to power aircraft comprised over 80 percent of the department’s energy use, and that for optimizing energy use and pursuing alternative energy sources as one of its priorities, it is aiming to reduce aviation fuel usage with advanced technologies and new design for aircraft\(^6\) working with industry and is piloting the micro-reactor.

Countries other than the United States are promoting initiatives in response to climate change as well.

For example, in April 2022, electric vehicles (EVs) were demonstrated to the Defence Minister and others for introduction to the Indian Army. According to a press release from the Ministry of Defence of India, General Naravane, Chief of Army Staff (then), stated that the future in transportation is EVs, and that the Indian Army has to be a torch-bearer to adopt this technology,

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1. Net Zero refers to the balanced condition between the amount of GHGs produced artificially and the amount that is removed artificially from the atmosphere during a specific period of time.
2. Executive Order 14008: Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, and EO 14057: Catalyzing Clean Energy Industries and Jobs Through Federal Sustainability call for preparing annual adaptation plans and annual progress reports to convey the activities of each agency in the government in order to strengthen adaptation to climate and resilience. This report corresponds to the Annual Progress Report and summarizes important steps taken by the DoD on the initiatives stated in the Climate Adaptation Plan issued in 2021.
3. A microgrid is a small regional electric network with control units to manage several power sources and load that is not dependent on supply from power stations. It can be operated independently from regular power grids when regular power grids are down.
4. “Army Climate Strategy Implementation Plan (ACS-IP), Fiscal Years 2023-2027,” U.S. Department of the Army
5. According to “Fiscal Year 2020 Energy Operations Annual Report” issued by the DoD, the energy used in operations of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and the Air Force in FY2020 were 10%, 36%, and 53% respectively of the whole DoD.
6. For example, as a stream drag reduction project with the cooperation of private companies, the U.S. Air Force is evaluating wiper blades on the KC-135 air-to-air refueling tanker and the test confirmed the possible fuel savings by the change of the direction of wiper blades of KC-135 from horizontal to vertical. Furthermore, the Air Force is collaborating with NASA and industrial partners to develop prototyping of ultra-efficient aircraft designs, for example, blended wing body aircraft.
even if the world armies are still only contemplating introduction of EVs.

The British Royal Air Force completed the test flight of Voyager air-to-air refueling tanker using 100% sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) for the first time in the world as a currently used military aircraft in November 2022. According to the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, SAF is made from used cooking oil, which could reduce lifecycle carbon emissions by up to 80%, lessen the RAF’s reliance on global supply chains, and improve operational resilience.

Furthermore, International cooperation is also developing.

NATO stated that it aims to become a leading international organization in understanding the impacts that climate change has on security and adapting to these impacts. The new Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid Summit held in June 2022 notes that climate change is a defining challenge of our time and has profound impact on NATO’s security. It also emphasizes the importance of integrating climate change and other challenges with NATO’s core missions and taking action in a cross-sectional manner, as climate change also affects how militaries operate. NATO held its first High-Level Dialogue on Climate Change and Security in conjunction with this summit, with the participation of its allies and partners. This dialogue is intended to be an annual platform for international consultations on climate change, address security impacts in a collaborative way and exchange best practices.

This allows climate change to be recognized as a high-priority issue by all countries, and the defense ministries and armed forces directly and indirectly affected by climate change have demonstrated their commitment to address the issue at all levels.
Part II

Japan’s Security and Defense Policy

Chapter 1 Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense

Chapter 2 National Security Strategy

Chapter 3 The National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS)

Chapter 4 Defense Buildup Program and Buildup of Defense Capability

Chapter 5 Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense

Chapter 6 Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others
The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. In addition, peace and security are essential for the people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper. However, it is necessary for Japan to make its own proactive and autonomous efforts.

The first priority in protecting the lives and livelihoods of the people of Japan should be the development of active diplomacy. It is essential to promote multilateral cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance\(^1\), in which the United States and Japan shares fundamental values and interests, while emphasizing universal values and principles such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

At the same time, defense capabilities are required to back up diplomacy. As its strategic approach, Japan will develop diplomacy under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) and promote the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities, including the possession of counterstrike capabilities.

Japan cannot defend itself on its own. It would be difficult for any one state to defend itself on its own now. Therefore, cooperation with allies and like-minded countries is essential.

From the perspective of creating the ideal security environment for Japan and preventing the emergence of threats, the importance of the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in cooperative efforts as a member of the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, Japan aims to ensure national security, as well as bring peace and security to the Indo-Pacific region, and eventually to the entire world, by exerting its utmost efforts in a variety of fields, including diplomacy and economics.

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\(^1\) In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate closely in a range of areas in security, politics, and economics.
After the end of World War II, Japan was determined not to repeat the ravages of war. Since then, it has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, Article 9, which prescribes the renunciation of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state. Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan’s inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Thus, the Japanese Government interprets it as a constitutional right to possess the minimum armed forces needed to exercise that right.

Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, holding its exclusively defense-oriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.

The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution

1 Permitted Self-Defense Capability

Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum required self-defense capability. The specific limit is subject to change according to the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget and other deliberations by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether its capability constitutes a “war potential” that Japan is prohibited to possess by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan’s overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such a possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

The possession of so-called “offensive weapons,” which are designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country, is not permissible under any circumstance as it would directly exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

2 Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

It has been concluded in the Cabinet’s decision made on July 1, 2014, “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” that “the use of force” should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense when the following three conditions (Three Conditions for “the use of force”) are met:

1. When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness;
2. When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people;
3. Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.

See Reference 9 (“Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People” (National Security Council Decision and Cabinet Decision on July 1, 2014))

3 Geographic Boundaries within Which the Right of Self-Defense May Be Exercised

The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation.

Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as a
general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense.

4 Right of Belligerency

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory.

On the other hand, it is recognized as a matter of course for Japan to be able to use the minimum necessary level of force to defend itself under its right of self-defense. For example, if Japan were to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force under its right of self-defense, this constitutes a different concept from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even if the two sets of actions appear to be externally equivalent. Occupation of enemy territory, however, is not permissible because it would exceed the minimum necessary level for self-defense.

3 Basic Policy

Under the Constitution, Japan has efficiently built a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

1 Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.

2 Not Becoming a Military Power

There is no established definition for the concept of a military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten other countries means that Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense.

3 Non-Nuclear Principles

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed line of national policy.

Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law. In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a nonnuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons.

4 Securing Civilian Control

Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the military in a democratic state or democratic political control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious reflection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following

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1 Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.”

2 Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes...not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...”
strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution. Civilian control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people.

The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of the SDF. The function of national defense entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet as a general administrative function. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervises over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on national security.

At the MOD, the Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters concerning national defense, and as the competent minister also manages and operates the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. In addition, the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense provide the Minister of Defense with advice on important affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civilian officials and uniformed SDF personnel deliberates on basic principles concerning affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Through these ways, the MOD aims to further ensure civilian control.

As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, in order to ensure that the system achieves good results, it is necessary to continue making practical efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in national defense taken by the people.

3 The Cabinet’s control over military matters was strictly limited.
Section 3 Japan’s Security Policy Framework

1 Background of the Formulation of the Three Documents

Japan must protect its territory, territorial waters and airspace, and the lives and property of its people without disregarding the realities of the North Korean ballistic missile issue, unilateral changes made to the status quo and persistent attempts to continue to do so, rapid changes in the military balance, domains such as space and cyber, and economic security challenges.

In his October 2021 policy speech, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced his commitment to revise the National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as the “NSS”), the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY2019 and beyond, as well as the Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) (FY2019-2023). In his December 2021 policy speech, Prime Minister Kishida stated that in order to protect the lives and livelihoods of the people of Japan, it was necessary for Japan to realistically consider all options, including so-called strike capabilities on enemy bases, without excluding such options, as well as to engage with a sense of urgency in the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities, and to this end, the formulation of a new security strategy over a period of around one year. In response to this, the government has held ministerial-level meetings at the National Security Council a total of 18 times since November 2021, with related ministries and agencies holding consultation sessions a total of 17 times since January 2022 with 52 experts from a wide range of fields that span not only diplomacy and defense, but also economic security, technology, space, cyber, and climate change. Active discussions have also taken place at meetings held by the “Advisory Panel on the Comprehensive Exploration of Defense Capabilities as Japan’s National Power,” which met four times since September of the same year, as well as those held by the ruling party’s working team, which met 15 times since October.

Following these discussions, the government obtained the Cabinet’s approval in December 2022 for three documents (the “Three Documents”) that serve as the main documents pertaining to Japan’s national security policy: “the NSS” “the National Defense Strategy of Japan” (hereinafter referred to as the “NDS”), and “the Defense Buildup Program” (hereinafter referred to as the “DBP”).

2 Japan’s National Security Policy Framework

The NSS was formulated in December 2013 as Japan’s first-ever basic policy on national security with a focus on diplomatic and defense strategies, replacing “Japan’s Basic Defense Policy,” on which Japan’s defense policy had been based until then. In the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, a new NSS was formulated in December 2022 to provide strategic guidance for policies in a wide

range of areas, including not only the traditional areas of diplomacy and defense, but also economic security, technology, and intelligence.

Based on the new NSS, the NDS was formulated for the first time in December of the same year as a statement of the objectives of Japan’s national defense as well as the approaches and means to achieve these objectives. The NDS replaces the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which have served as Japan’s basic guidelines for the development, sustainment, and operation of the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and formulated six times since 1976. The NSS and NDS are mainly designed for the next decade or so.

The first-ever DBP was formulated in December 2022 in accordance with the NDS as a medium-term plan that establishes the level of Japan’s defense capabilities, the SDF’s structure which is based on the capability level roughly a decade into the future, and the total expenditures and the quantity of major equipment to be acquired over a five-year period. The future level of Japan’s defense capabilities had been previously established in the NDPG, while the total expenditures for the buildup of defense capability over a five-year period were set forth in the MTDP, which was in turn based on the NDPG. However, the level of Japan’s defense capabilities as well as the total expenditures over a five-year period have now been integrated into a single, unified defense buildup plan.

Fig. II-1-3-1 Relationship among the NSS, the NDS, the DBP, and the Fiscal Year Budget

Fig. II-1-3-2 Changing Strategic Document System

National Security Strategy (2013)
- Contains strategic plans for national security, including diplomatic and defense policies (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

- Basic guidelines for development, maintenance, and operation of defense capability
- Sets forth the organization of Self-Defense Forces that Japan should possess (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

Medium-Term Defense Program (2018)
- Details the total cost (limit) over five years and inventories key capital equipment

National Security Strategy
- Provides strategic guidance for Japan’s national security policy areas in addition to diplomacy and defense, including economic security, technology, cyber, intelligence etc. (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

National Defense Strategy
- Sets defense objectives and demonstrates approaches and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives
- Fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities (including seven key capabilities)
- Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country
- Policy for cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

Defense Buildup Program
- Sets the level of defense capability that Japan should possess, and sets mid- to long-term buildup program to achieve such level that includes the following:
  - Organization of Self-Defense Forces (by approx. ten years from now)
  - Total expenditures for the next five years and quantities of major procurement (research and development programs and target fiscal year for the delivery etc. of defense equipment including key defense equipment are described in the main text)
Fig. II-1-3-2 (Changing Strategic Document System); Reference 1 (National Security Strategy of Japan (National Security Council Decision and Cabinet Decision on December 16, 2022)); Reference 2 (National Defense Strategy); Reference 3 (Defense Buildup Program); Reference 4 (National Security Strategy (National Security Council Decision and Cabinet Decision on December 17, 2013)); Reference 5 (The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond); Reference 7 (The Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023))
This chapter outlines the background of the revision of the NSS, the purpose of formulating the NSS, and its details. For the background of its formulation, refer to Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Japan’s Security Policy Framework).

1 Purpose

The NSS presents its goals and awareness of issues in the part “Purpose” as follows.

The international order is at stake with serious challenges amidst historical changes in power balances and intensifying geopolitical competitions. At the same time, cooperation is required in other global issues such as climate change. Today, we are in an era where confrontation and cooperation are intricately intertwined in international relations.

Japan’s security environment has been most severe and complex since the end of World War II. In addition, in the vicinity of Japan, military buildups are rapidly advancing, coupled with mounting pressures by unilaterally changing the status quo by force.

Moreover, cyberattacks and dissemination of disinformation, among others, are constantly taking place, thereby further blurring the boundary between contingency and peacetime. Furthermore, the scope of national security has expanded to include economic and other fields, and thus the boundary between military and nonmilitary fields is no longer clear-cut either.

Under these circumstances, taking a panoramic view of the diverse dimensions of international relations as a whole, where confrontation and cooperation are intricately intertwined, and then taking full advantage of comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defense, and economic capabilities, to protect national interests – the NSS is Japan’s supreme national security policy document.

The strategic guidance and policies under the NSS will dramatically transform Japan’s national security policy after the end of WWII from the aspect of its execution.

Fig. II-2-1 (National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS))

2 Japan’s National Interests

The NSS identifies Japan’s national interests to be preserved and developed as the following three points.

〇 Japan will maintain its sovereignty and independence, defend its territorial integrity, and secure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals. Japan will ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded in freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and traditions. Furthermore, Japan and its nationals will continue to strive so that Japan and its nationals are respected and favorably regarded around the world.

〇 Japan will achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic growth, thereby consolidating its own peace and security. And, while working to realize Japan’s economic prosperity, Japan will maintain and strengthen an open and stable international economic order and achieve an international environment in which Japan and other countries can coexist and prosper together.

〇 Japan will maintain and protect universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, and international order based on international law. In particular, Japan will maintain and develop a free and open international order, especially in the Indo-Pacific region where Japan is situated.
3 Fundamental Principles Concerning Japan’s National Security

As a prerequisite for the execution of Japan’s national security policy in pursuit of protecting its national interests, the following are the fundamental principles concerning Japan’s national security.

○ Japan will maintain the policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on international cooperation. In order to further embody this principle in the international community and to protect our own national interests in the time ahead, and based on the recognition that the primary responsibility for defending Japan lies with itself, Japan will squarely face the ever-changing security environment by decisively taking on necessary reforms and reinforcing our national security capabilities and roles.

○ Japan will execute its security policy in a manner that maintains and upholds universal values such...
as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. As one of the most mature and stable advanced democratic countries in the world, even amidst the most complex and severe security environment since the end of WWII, Japan will strive to maintain and uphold universal values and principles in cooperation with other countries, and lead the international community by example.

- As a peace-loving nation, Japan will adhere to the basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
- The Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the provision of extended deterrence, will remain the cornerstone of Japan’s national security policy.
- Japan will attach importance to coexistence and coprosperity alongside other countries, cooperation with like-minded countries, and multilateral cooperation.

### 4 Security Environment Surrounding Japan and Japan’s National Security Challenges

In defining its national security objectives, the security environment surrounding Japan and its national security challenges are as follows.

#### 1 Global Security Environment and Challenges

The international community has gone through rapid changes, in conjunction with the center of gravity of...
global power shifting to the Indo-Pacific region. Actions to challenge the international order are accelerating. The following are prominent examples of the complexity and severity of the current international environment.

〇 Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts against the territorial sovereignty and others of other nations are taking place.
〇 In the domains of cyber, maritime, space, and electromagnetic spectrum, and other areas, the risks are becoming increasingly serious.
〇 Economic security is increasingly necessary. Some nations are trying to expand their own influence by economically coercing other nations.
〇 Global governance is being undermined, and the international community is presented with greater difficulties to rally together in taking on common challenges such as climate change.

2 Security Environment and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region

Guided by the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (hereinafter referred to as the “FOIP”), Japan has the vital importance to its national security of striving to realize a free and open international order based on the rule of law and securing regional peace and stability.

(1) China’s Activities in the Area of Security

China has been extensively and rapidly enhancing its military power without sufficient transparency and has continued and intensified unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East and South China Seas. Furthermore, China is strengthening its strategic ties with Russia and attempting to challenge the international order. Furthermore, there have been instances of China’s development finance lacking adequate transparency and China taking advantage of other countries’ dependence on China to exert economic pressure on other countries. With regard to Taiwan, China has not denied the possibility of using military force. In addition, China has been intensifying its military activities around Taiwan.

China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

(2) North Korea’s Activities in the Area of Security

North Korea is making rapid progress in its missile-related technologies and operational capabilities. Furthermore, North Korea intends to bolster its nuclear capabilities at the maximum speed.

North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.

Moreover, the issue of abductions is a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and safety of Japanese citizens. It is an urgent issue for the Government to resolve under its responsibility.

(3) Russia’s Activities in the Area of Security

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its other actions clearly demonstrate that it does not hesitate to resort to military forces to achieve its own security objectives. Russia is strengthening its armaments and accelerating its activities in the Northern Territories as well. Furthermore, Russia has been doubling down on strategic coordination with China.

By its recent aggression against Ukraine and others, Russia’s external and military activities and others have shaken the very foundation of the international order, and are perceived as the most significant and direct threat to security in the European region. In addition, Russia’s external and military activities and others in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong security concern.
5 National Security Objectives of Japan

The following are the national security objectives of Japan to ensure its national interests.
〇 Japan will continue to be a nation capable of protecting its sovereignty and independence, autonomously determining its domestic and foreign policies, and defending its territory and the safety of life, person, and the properties of its nationals. To this end, Japan will reinforce its own capabilities and roles, and together with its ally, the United States, and like-minded countries and others, deter contingencies and attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in Japan and its vicinity. If by any chance a threat should reach Japan, Japan will disrupt and defeat the threat and minimize the damage caused, and bring it to an end in a manner favorable to protecting its national interests.
〇 Japan will proactively ensure, through executing its security policy, an international environment in which its own economy can grow. By doing so, Japan will work to achieve a virtuous cycle of security and economic growth, in which economic growth promotes the improvement of the security environment surrounding Japan. Concurrently, Japan will ensure the self-reliance of its economic structure, as well as advantages over other countries and ultimately the indispensability of its technologies.
〇 As a major global actor, Japan will join together with its ally, like-minded countries and others to achieve a new balance in international relations, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In so doing, Japan will prevent the emergence of situations in which any one state can unilaterally change the status quo easily, and redouble efforts to secure a stable, predictable, free and open international order based on the rule of law.
〇 Japan will work on multilateral cooperation in the fields of international economy, response to global issues such as climate change and infectious diseases, and the formation of international rules and regulations, and then generate an environment in which the international community can coexist and coproser.

6 Strategic Approaches Prioritized by Japan

1 Main Elements of Comprehensive National Power for Japan’s National Security

Japan will implement strategic approaches, harnessing its comprehensive national power (diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities).

2 Strategic Approaches and Major Ways and Means

Strategic approaches and major ways and means are as follows.

(1) Develop Efforts Centered on Diplomacy to Prevent Crises, Proactively Create a Peaceful and Stable International Environment, and Strengthen a Free and Open International Order
(i) Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance
(ii) Maintain and develop a free and open international order and strengthen ties with its ally, like-minded countries and others
(iii) Strengthen diplomacy with Japan’s neighboring countries and regions as well as efforts toward resolution of various issues of concern, including territorial issues
(iv) Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation
(v) International counter-terrorism
(vi) Climate change measures
(vii) Strategic use of ODA and other international cooperation (including a new cooperation framework in view of strengthening security capacities of like-minded countries and improving their deterrence)
(viii) Promotion of people-to-people exchanges

(2) Strengthening Japan's Defense Architecture
While details on the strengthening of Japan’s defense architecture will be elaborated in the NDS, the key points in the NSS are as follows.
〇 Japan will fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities as the last guarantee of national security.
(i) Reinforce stand-off defense capabilities, unmanned defense capabilities, and other capabilities in addition to cross-domain operational capabilities

(ii) Possess counterstrike capabilities

(iii) Take the necessary measures to make the level of Japan’s budget, for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives, reach 2% of the current GDP\(^1\) in FY 2027

(iv) Strengthen coordination between the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as the “SDF”) and the Japan Coast Guard (hereinafter referred to as the “JCG”), including control over the JCG by the Minister of Defense in the event of a contingency

○ Japan will reinforce its comprehensive defense architecture (research and development, public infrastructure, cybersecurity, and international cooperation with like-minded countries and others)

○ The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems are to be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance, among others. In doing so, the necessity, requirements, and transparency of the related procedures will be under adequate consideration, while maintaining the three principles themselves. In addition, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts by implementing measures including providing various forms of assistance to smoothly promote such transfers.

○ Japan will reinforce its defense production and technology base and solidify the human resource base (organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment).

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\[\text{See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2 (Details of the National Defense Strategy); Column “Counterstrike Capabilities”}\]

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(3) Deepening Security Cooperation with the United States

Japan will further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S.

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(4) Strengthening Efforts to Seamlessly Protect Japan in All Directions

(i) Cybersecurity

○ Japan will reinforce cyber defense and advance efforts to consider to realize the introduction of active cyber defense and necessary measures to implement it. To this end, Japan will establish a new organization which will comprehensively coordinate cybersecurity policies, work on legislation, and strengthen operations.

(ii) Maritime Security and Maritime Law Enforcement Capabilities

○ Japan’s maritime law enforcement capabilities will be significantly reinforced, in conjunction with efforts to strengthen its organization. In addition, the coordination between the JCG and the SDF will be strengthened, including the Minister of Defense’s control over the JCG in the event of an emergency.

(iii) Space Security

○ Japan will promote the use of the space domain by the SDF and the JCG, while strengthening cooperation between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the SDF and advancing the utilization of civilian technology.

○ Japan will put together the Government’s concept on space security and reflect it in the Basic Plan on Space Policy and other relevant documents.

(iv) Enhancing Security-related Technical Capabilities and Proactively Capitalizing on Them

○ A whole-of-government mechanism will be

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\[\text{The “current GDP” refers to the GDP for the FY2022. In this light, given that the GDP forecast for FY2022 is 560.2 trillion yen in the Fiscal 2023 Economic Outlook and Basic Stance for Economic and Fiscal Management (Cabinet Understanding on December 22, 2022), two percent of it is expected to be 11 trillion yen.}\]
established to match research and development needs based on the views of the Ministry of Defense with the appropriate technological seeds possessed by relevant ministries and agencies, in addition to implementing these projects. On top of that, Japan will promote active utilization of the Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program and other programs.

(v) Strengthening Intelligence Capacities
○ Japan will significantly strengthen its information-gathering capabilities (human intelligence capabilities in particular) and establish a mechanism to aggregate information in an integrated manner. Japan will bolster the ability to respond to Integrated Information Warfare in the cognitive dimension, while establishing a new structure against disinformation.

(vi) Reinforcing Response Capabilities within Japan with Contingencies in Mind
○ Japan will establish a mechanism to develop and enhance the functions of public infrastructures based on the needs of the SDF and the JCG. Japan will also take measures to ensure the smooth activities of the SDF and U.S. forces, and others and to secure critical infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants.

(vii) Reinforcing Mechanisms for the Protection of Japanese Nationals
○ For the purpose of achieving prompt evacuation of residents, Japan will take measures such as securing evacuation facilities. Japan will also consider the necessary policies, after conducting and assessing drills for the evacuation of residents.

(viii) Protection of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas
(ix) Securing Resources Essential for Japan’s National Security including Energy and Food

(5) Promoting Economic Security Policies
○ Japan will take measures such as securing its self-reliance, advantage, and indispensability. Japan will enhance its supply chain resilience, including by securing stable supply for critical goods including rare earth, and make examinations to bolster its information security, including security clearance.

(6) Maintaining and Strengthening International Economic Order based on Free, Fair, and Equitable Rules
○ Japan will counter against unfair trade practices and economic coercion and conduct measures such as maintaining the high standards of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Japan will also promote development finance in a transparent and fair manner.

(7) Global Efforts for Coexistence and Coprosperity in the International Community
○ Japan will strengthen ties with the United Nations and other international organizations and frameworks, while tackling infectious disease crisis response, humanitarian assistance, protection of human rights, and international peace cooperation, among others.

7 Domestic Base That Should be Strengthened to Support Japan’s National Security

The domestic base that should be strengthened to support Japan’s national security is as follows.

1 Strengthening the Economic and Fiscal Bases
○ Japan will achieve a virtuous cycle of security and economic growth, ensure sustainable response capabilities in the event of contingencies, and reinforce the economic, monetary, and fiscal bases.

2 Reinforcing the Social Base
○ Japan will consistently engage in efforts to deepen the understanding of and cooperation on national security among the people of Japan.
○ Japan will pay respect to other countries and their citizens, and foster love for its own country and homeland.
○ Japan will further promote efforts to ensure that activities of those who dedicate themselves to hazardous duties for the peace and security of Japan
be appropriately appreciated across its society.

3 Enhancing the Intellectual Base

〇 Japan will promote measures to foster practical cooperation among the Government, business community, and academia in the security field and facilitate effective communication at home and abroad.

8 Conclusion

Japan will ensure its security on the basis of comprehensive national power in areas where the international community is in confrontation. In areas where the international community should engage in cooperation, by contrast, we will continue to fulfill a leading and constructive role in resolving a broad array of issues. Japan’s action in this way will further enhance its presence and credibility in the international arena and expand the circle of like-minded countries and others, thereby leading to improve the security environment surrounding Japan.

Even standing at this crossroads between a world of hope and a world of adversity and distrust amidst the most severe and complex post-war security environment, Japan, blessed with a stable democracy, the established rule of law, a mature economy, and rich culture, will advocate policies grounded in universal values and then lead the way in undertaking efforts to reinforce the international order with steadfast resolve.

REFERENCE: National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS)
Through now, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) has been established as the grand design for safeguarding Japan’s peace and security by prescribing the form of Japan’s approach to and target levels for its defense capabilities based on an ascertainment of changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and in global military trends. The NDPG has been formulated six times since it was first established in 1976. In light of the most severe security environment since the end of World War II, the NDS was formulated for the first time in December 2022 to replace the NDPG as the document that comprehensively presented Japan’s defense objectives, approaches to achieve these objectives, and the means to achieve them.

### Section 1 Transition from the NDPG to the NDS

#### 1976 NDPG

1976 NDPG was formulated against the backdrop of détente in the 1970s based on the recognition that (i) there was generally a low likelihood of an all-out military conflict between the Eastern and Western Blocs, and (ii) with regard to the area surrounding Japan, the stable balance of power between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union as well as the existence of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would continue to play a major role in preventing a full-scale aggression against Japan.

In view of this, the defense capabilities to be possessed by Japan were determined to include (i) equipping itself with various functions that were necessary for its defense and (ii) focusing primarily on adopting a balanced posture in terms of the organization and deployment of such functions, including logistical support systems. By means of these, Japan could (iii) remain sufficiently vigilant in peacetime and (iv) be capable of effectively dealing with situations involving limited and small-scale aggression, while (v) retaining the ability to smoothly transition to a new posture in terms of its defense capabilities should circumstances change and such a posture becomes necessary. The “Basic Defense Force Concept” introduced in 1976 NDPG is thus a concept that emphasizes the concept of deterrence with a focus on preventing aggression against Japan.

#### 1995 NDPG

1995 NDPG was formulated in consideration of the end of the Cold War and other major changes to the international situation, as well as the heightened expectations for the Self-Defense Forces (the SDF), including its role in UN peacekeeping operations and its response to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

1995 NDPG determined that Japan’s buildup of defense capability had until then been conducted based on the “Basic Defense Force Concept,” which stated that Japan was to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capabilities as an independent nation to prevent itself from forming a power vacuum that would...
destabilize the area surrounding Japan, instead of directly countering military threats to Japan. This concept was basically followed by 1995 NDPG.

On the other hand, the details of Japan’s defense capabilities as set forth in 1995 NDPG were notable for the fact that in addition to reviewing the scale and functions of defense capabilities, they also emphasized a greater utilization of the SDF’s capabilities not only for the “defense of the nation,” but also in various other areas, including “dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to building a more stable security environment.”

3 2004 NDPG

2004 NDPG was formulated based on the determination that it was necessary to provide new guidelines for Japan’s approach to its national security and defense capabilities in response to new threats and diverse contingencies, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as the activities of international terrorist organizations.

2004 NDPG specified two security objectives: (i) to prevent direct threats from reaching Japan, and should a threat arise, to eliminate the threat and minimize the damage caused; and (ii) to improve the international security environment and ensure that no threats are posed to Japan. To achieve these objectives, Japan would combine three approaches in an integrated manner, namely through “its own efforts,” “cooperation with the ally,” and “cooperation with the international community.” The document stated that with regard to Japan’s approach to its defense capabilities, the effective parts of the “Basic Defense Force Concept” would be retained while placing a greater emphasis on Japan’s “response capabilities” and recognizing that “multifunctional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities” were required to respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies.

4 2010 NDPG

2010 NDPG was formulated based on the facts that (i) large-scale military forces, including nuclear forces, had continued to exist in the area surrounding Japan, and many states were modernizing their military capabilities and intensifying their various activities; (ii) the period of time from the emergence of signs of a threat to the actual occurrence of a situation had tended to be shorter with the rapid development of military science and technology, and there was a need to respond seamlessly to such situations; and (iii) given that many security issues transcend national borders, ongoing coordination and cooperation between different countries had become increasingly vital, with the roles of military forces diversifying as well, making it more common for military forces to be operating continuously at all times.

2010 NDPG stated that Japan’s future defense capabilities should be “dynamic in form” and focused on the “operation of defense capabilities” as well as the ability to actively carry out various activities to effectively fulfill the assigned roles of such capabilities without being bound by the existing “Basic Defense Force Concept,” which only emphasized the “existence of defense capabilities.” To this end, it was determined that a “Dynamic Defense Force” equipped with the qualities of readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility would be built and supported by advanced technological and intelligence capabilities that took into account trends in the levels of military technologies.

5 2013 NDPG

2013 NDPG was formulated against the backdrop of an increasingly severe security environment surrounding

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5 “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)
6 “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010)
7 “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)
Japan in which the defense capabilities that underpinned the various activities of the SDF could no longer be guaranteed to be adequate in “quality” and “quantity” in view of the increasing number and longer duration of situations that required a response by the SDF, including so-called “gray-zone” situations.

2013 NDPG took these considerations into account and stipulated the enhancement of Japan’s deterrence and response capabilities by placing greater emphasis on joint operations, improving the operational level of equipment and its employment, and by ensuring that the defense capabilities that underpinned various activities would be adequate both in “quality” and “quantity.” To this end, it was determined that capability assessments would be conducted from the viewpoint of joint operations with a focus on the functions and capabilities of the SDF as a whole, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be of particular focus from a comprehensive perspective. Harnessing the results of these capability assessments would allow Japan to adapt to the ever-changing security environment surrounding it and efficiently develop its defense capabilities in a well-balanced manner. In addition, its logistical support base would be extensively reinforced to establish a posture that ensures its most effective operation.

In the above ways, 2013 NDPG sought to develop a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force,” a more effective defense force capable of conducting a variety of activities in a swift and flexible manner.

2013 NDPG took these considerations into account and stipulated the enhancement of Japan’s deterrence and response capabilities by placing greater emphasis on joint operations, improving the operational level of equipment and its employment, and by ensuring that the defense capabilities that underpinned various activities would be adequate both in “quality” and “quantity.” To this end, it was determined that capability assessments would be conducted from the viewpoint of joint operations with a focus on the functions and capabilities of the SDF as a whole, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be of particular focus from a comprehensive perspective. Harnessing the results of these capability assessments would allow Japan to adapt to the ever-changing security environment surrounding it and efficiently develop its defense capabilities in a well-balanced manner. In addition, its logistical support base would be extensively reinforced to establish a posture that ensures its most effective operation.

In the above ways, 2013 NDPG sought to develop a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force,” a more effective defense force capable of conducting a variety of activities in a swift and flexible manner.

2018 NDPG was formulated with the aim of building a truly effective defense force by further deepening the approach of a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” in view of the remarkably fast pace at which the security environment surrounding Japan had become increasingly severe and uncertain.

Specifically, Japan would build a “Multi-Domain Defense Force” as a truly effective defense force that was capable of (i) carrying out cross-domain operations that organically would integrate capabilities in all domains, generating synergy and amplifying overall capabilities; (ii) enabling the sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to contingencies; and (iii) strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and promoting security cooperation. In particular, as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, could substantially enhance the military’s overall capabilities to conduct operations, states are exerting efforts to improve capabilities in these fields. Japan would also focus on enhancing such capabilities as well as capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships, and missiles in combination therewith, and enhancing the sustainability and resiliency of its defense capabilities, including logistical support.

See Fig. II-3-1 (Change of Role of Defense Capabilities)

8 “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 18, 2018)
**Change of Role of Defense Capabilities**

**[Background]**
- Detente and Cold War coexisting in global community
- Balanced relationship among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Japan
- Need to show the target of defense force buildup

**[The Role of Defense Capabilities]**
- The concept of Basic Defense Capability
- Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan

- Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability
  - “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation”

- Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies
  - Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of Basic Defense Capability

- Development of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic Defense Capability)
  - Developing defense capabilities with attention to the opponent’s capabilities and new ways of warfare
  - Development defense capabilities to forbid unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts as well as deter invasion to Japan by radical enhancement of multi-domain defense force; and if the worst comes to the worst and the deterrence does not work, to be able to disrupt and defeat the invasion by our own initiative

- Development of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force
  - Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe
  - U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region
  - Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake

- Development of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force
  - Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe and uncertain at extremely high speeds
  - Rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum
  - Clear trends observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities

- Japan is currently faced with the most challenging and complex security environment since the start of the end of WW II
  - Japan is on the front line of activated military actions of neighboring countries enhancing their military powers
  - Whether Japan will be able to adapt to these emerging new ways of warfare is a challenge when developing its future defense capabilities

- Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe and uncertain at extremely high speeds
  - U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region
  - Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake
Section 2 Details of the National Defense Strategy

This section outlines the objectives of formulating the NDS and its details. As the details of the NDS have already been published on the website of the Ministry of Defense (hereinafter referred to as the “MOD”), this section focuses on the key points of the NDS and outlines its background and concept and other matters. For the background of its formulation, see Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Japan’s Security Policy Framework).

1 Basic Concept – Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities

Based on the recognition below, the NDS comprehensively presents Japan’s defense objectives, approaches, and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives. The NDS replaces the National Defense Program Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as the “NDPG”), which have served as Japan’s basic guidelines for development, sustainment, and operation of defense capability with the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as the “SDF”) as its core and formulated six times since 1976.

The policies concerning the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and the levels of defense buildup that underpin it, which have been decided by the Government through the NDS and DBP, represent a major turning point for post-war defense policy. By formulating the NDS, which provides mid- to long-term directions and a breakdown of the reinforcement of defense capabilities, the Government will make efforts to deepen the Japanese public’s understanding about the significance of this major turning point.

In addition, in April 2023, the Promotion Headquarters for Realization of Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities was established under Defense Minister Hamada in order to ensure thorough management of the progress of initiatives, etc. to be implemented from FY2023 onward and to ensure effective and efficient budget execution by the MOD/SDF working as one, based on the direction of fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities indicated in the NSS, NDS, and DBP. Under such a system, Japan will achieve fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities.

2 Objectives of the National Defense Strategy

The defense of Japan cannot be accomplished by the MOD/SDF alone but requires the understanding and cooperation of each and every Japanese national with regard to defense policy. From this perspective, “Objectives of the National Defense Strategy” in the NDS presents the goals and awareness of issues of the NDS in a clear and concise manner to the public as follows.

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihoods as well as Japan’s territorial land, waters, and airspace and it is the very heart of Japan’s national security. The international community, of which Japan is a member, is facing serious challenges, and has entered into a new era of crisis. One cannot rule out the possibility of serious events taking place in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, that might shake the foundation of the international order.

As Japan is situated on the very frontline of these trends, it is no exaggeration to say the future shape of
Japan’s security and defense policy has a direct link to the peace and stability of the region and the international community. Amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals. Japan also needs to strengthen Japan’s architecture for national defense. Thinking strategically, Japan should promote these two lines of effort as a coherent whole. It is this undertaking that provides the way forward to bolster Japan’s deterrence capabilities and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and which forms the foundation of security cooperation with like-minded countries and others. In particular, in October 2022, the United States also devised a new National Defense Strategy. The formulation of Japan’s NDS is therefore timely for Japan and the United States in aligning their respective strategies.

Based on this recognition, the Government finalizes the NDS, replacing the NDPG. The policies concerning the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and the levels of defense buildup that underpin it represent a major turning point for post-war defense policy. The Government will make efforts to deepen the Japanese public’s understanding about the significance of this major turning point.

3 Changes in the Strategic Environment and Defense Challenges

1 Changes in the Strategic Environment

It is imperative to carefully analyze the harsh reality of the security environment surrounding Japan, which serves as the backdrop against which the NDS was formulated. The NDS has analyzed the changes in the strategic environment as follows.

First, states that do not share universal values or political and economic systems are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts represent significant challenges to the existing international order. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has revealed this in a most blatant way. The international community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, and has entered a new era of crisis.

In addition, the global power balance has significantly changed and interstate competition across the political, economy, and military spheres is emerging. Such trends are especially notable in the Indo-Pacific region, where China has been continuing and amplifying its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts.

Furthermore, as the interstate competition between China and the United States is expected to further intensify in various fields, the United States has presented a view that the next ten years will be the decisive decade for its competition with China.

Rapid advances in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that could dramatically alter the character of warfare and thus prove to become “game changers.” In addition, there exist a range of global security challenges such as increasingly serious risks in cyber and other domains, the expansion of information warfare including the dissemination of disinformation, and climate change.

2 Military Trends of Japan’s Neighboring Countries and Regions

In the report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the “NCCPC”), China sets the goals of “basically completing modernization of national defense and the military” by 2035 and building “a world-class forces” by the middle of this century. And in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Communist Party of China Central Committee in 2020, the achievement of “the centenary goal of the People’s Liberation Army” by 2027 was added as a target. In a report to the NCCPC in 2022, it was newly stated that elevating the People’s Liberation Army to a “world-class standards” at an early stage is a strategic task for fully building “a modern socialist country.”

With these goals in mind, China has been extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability in a qualitative and quantitative manner. China defines the next five years as the crucial period to start the full-scale construction of a “modern socialist country.” Supported by the rapid growth of defense expenditures, China has been reinforcing its military capabilities, including by possessing modern naval and air assets in larger
numbers than does Japan. China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan and is increasing military pressure on Taiwan. In the South China Sea, it continues to entrench its military foothold. Moreover, China has launched nine ballistic missiles on August 4, 2022, five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a threat to local residents. China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power including defense capabilities and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

In order to maintain its regime, North Korea has concentrated its efforts on enhancing its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles. It is assessed that North Korea already possesses the technological capabilities to mount a nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles, whose range includes Japan and is able to attack Japan with such a missile. North Korea is rapidly improving its missile-related technologies and operational capabilities in particular, such as by repeatedly launching missiles from various platforms. North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is perceived as the most significant and direct threat to defense in the European region. As for the areas surrounding Japan, the Russian forces are also accelerating their military activities in the Far East region including the Northern Territories. Russia’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong concern from a defense perspective.

In case that these activities are conducted simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific region, it would be necessary to take a close look at what implication they would have for the region.

### 3 Defense Challenges

The military background for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities to deter Russian aggression. Also, while no country can defend its own security by itself alone, there is a renewed recognition of the importance of cooperation with allies who have the intention and capability to respond to invasions jointly.

Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so; accurately gauging other’s intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threat may materialize. To protect one’s own country from such states, it is necessary to have deterrence capability, thereby making said states realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult; it is also necessary to build one’s own defense capability focusing on opponent capabilities.

Regarding the way of warfare, in addition to the traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land, new ways of warfare have emerged with the combination of massive missile strike by precision strike capabilities, hybrid warfare including information warfare, asymmetric attacks leveraging the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum and with unmanned assets, and public remarks that could be interpreted as threat using nuclear weapons. Whether or not to be able to respond to these new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense capabilities.

### 4 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

#### 1 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

**Basic Policy**

Defense capability, which forms the very foundation of the defense of Japan, is the ultimate guarantor for ensuring Japan’s security. It will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will be disrupted and defeated, thereby
demonstrating Japan’s resolve and capability to defend itself to the end. Based on the security environment surrounding Japan and defense challenges described above, Japan must clearly demonstrate the intention that Japan will never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in any situation. To this end, Japan must fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities with a focus on opponents’ capabilities and the ways they prosecute warfare and actively adapt to new ways of warfare.

(2) Three Defense Objectives

Japan’s defense objectives are, firstly, to shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force. The second is to deter, through cooperation and collaboration with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to bring the situation under control at an early stage. The third is, should invasion of Japan occur, to take primary responsibility to deal with the aggression and to disrupt and defeat the invasion, while receiving support from the ally and others.

In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential. Japan will defend itself to the end in all situations through the combination of its own efforts to achieve the first, second, and third defense objectives and extended deterrence and others provided by the United States.

(3) Three Approaches to Realize Japan’s Defense Objectives

Regarding approaches to realize Japan’s defense objectives, the first approach is, in an effort of strengthening of Japan’s own architecture for national defense, to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, which constitute the core of national defense, and to reinforce the defense architecture of the whole country. The second is to further reinforce joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and demonstrate the joint resolve and capabilities of Japan and the Unites States. The third is to reinforce collaboration with like-minded countries and others and reinforce collaboration with as many countries as possible. In addition, Japan will reinforce its defense production and technology bases as a virtually integral part of defense capability itself and the foundation for SDF personnel, the core element of defense capability, to demonstrate their abilities.

2 First Approach: Strengthening Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense

(1) Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s security. Japan has aimed to build a defense capability that can respond to and deter a range of possible situations in a truly effective manner. In accordance with the 2018 NDPG, Japan, in order to operate seamlessly across all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies, has striven to build the Multi-Domain Defense Force (which organically fuses capabilities in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum with those in ground, maritime, and air domains and is capable of sustained and flexible activities through joint operations). Under the NDS, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the current Multi-Domain Defense Force through further accelerated efforts.

With a fundamentally reinforced defense capability, Japan should be able to take primary responsibility to disrupt and defeat invasion against Japan. This means that Japan will possess a capability that makes the opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable by military means, and that the damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost. If Japan possesses such defense capability, coupled with that of the United States, will be able to deter not only an invasion against Japan, but also deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the Indo-Pacific region. This will help foster a security environment where such forcible actions are not tolerated. This is why Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities.

Moreover, a fundamentally reinforced defense capability should include persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); training and exercises conducted as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO); and measures against aircraft intruding into Japan’s territorial airspace. Such a defense capability should also be able to swiftly respond to and address a range of situations in a seamless manner. Such a defense capability must come with high readiness and response capability. We need to prepare training infrastructures both inside and outside Japan; we also need a flexible
In recent years, in Japan’s surroundings, there have been dramatic advances in missile-related technologies including hypersonic weapons, and practical skills for missile operations such as saturation attacks. Missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat, and it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defense network alone. For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities.

Counterstrike capabilities are the SDF’s capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force.

By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent’s further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

Counterstrike capabilities are the capabilities on which the Government expressed its view on February 29, 1956, which stated that, under the Constitution, as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible. These are also capabilities that the Government has chosen not to acquire up to now as a matter of policy decision.

This Government view squarely applies to measures for self-defense taken under the Three New Conditions for “Use of Force” presented in the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, and the capabilities that Japan has now decided to acquire can be used when the above mentioned Three Conditions are met in compliance with this view.

The Japanese Government has until now explained with regard to the object of the use of counterstrike capabilities that it is possible under the law to take “the minimum necessary measures” to prevent attacks by guided missiles, etc. if no other means are available. The question of what measures fall within the range of self-defense is judged on a case-by-case basis, and the same thinking applies to counterstrike capabilities. On the other hand, this does not mean that Japan may attack anywhere, but rather that, under the given premise of compliance with international law, such as strictly limiting attacks to military targets, the object of the absolute minimum measures that are unavoidably necessary to prevent a missile attack is to be determined in light of each specific situation.

In addition, the Government has long understood that the war potential that Japan is prohibited from sustaining under Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution refers to that which exceeds the minimum armed forces necessary for self-defense. While the question of whether or not it falls under this category is a matter of the overall forces sustained by Japan, the possession of so-called “offensive weapons” which are designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another county, is not permissible under any circumstance as it would directly exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense, and we do not intend to change this consistent view.

*1: Unified opinion of the Japanese Government (answer read by Defense Agency Director General Funada Naka on behalf of Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro (February 29, 1956))

If Japan were in imminent danger of an illegal invasion, and the method of invasion were a missile attack against Japan’s national territory, I simply cannot believe that the spirit of the Constitution requires that we merely sit and wait to die. In such a case, I believe that we should take the absolute minimum measures that are unavoidably necessary to defend against such an attack, so that in defending against a missile attack, for example, if no other suitable means are available, striking the missile base should be legally acceptable and falls within the range of self-defense.

*2: ICBMs, long-range strategic bombers, and attack carriers, for example.

Counterstrike capabilities (image)

(1) In case where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, Japan will protect itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network.

(2) At the same time, an effective counterstrike against the opponent will be made from Japan to prevent the opponent’s further armed attacks as an minimum necessary measure for self-defense in accordance with the Three New Conditions for the “Use of Force.

By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstikes, Japan will deter armed attacks itself.
work environment so that the SDF can, even in the face of ever-increasing volume of peacetime operations, conduct sufficient volume of training and exercises necessary for improving the ability of SDF personnel and the proficiency of SDF units.

As the functions and capabilities required for adapting to new ways of warfare, Japan will first strengthen (i) stand-off defense capabilities and (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, with which to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby deterring invasion itself. Japan will strengthen (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain operation capabilities, and (v) command and control/intelligence-related functions, in addition to the capabilities (i) and (ii), to gain superiority across domains and ensure asymmetric advantage, in case where deterrence should fail. Japan will also strengthen (vi) mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection and (vii) sustainability and resiliency to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush to the opponent’s will to invade.

Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities as when and how unilateral changes to the status quo occur is hard to predict. First, by FY2027, five years after the formulation of the NDS, Japan will strengthen its defense capability to the point where Japan is able to take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against this nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats with the support of its ally and others. The top priorities for the next five years are twofold: first, to maximize effective use of its existing equipment, Japan will improve operational rates, secure sufficient munitions and fuel, and accelerate improving the resiliency of key defense facilities; and second, Japan will fundamentally strengthen its core capabilities for future operations, such as stand-off defense capabilities and unmanned defense capabilities. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will make further efforts and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point where Japan is able to disrupt and defeat invasion much earlier and at places further afield.

This fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities entails significant costs and a commensurate increase in personnel strength. In a way that serves to realize fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, Japan will, while adhering to a scrap-and-build approach, optimize the SDF’s authorized strength as well as equipment. We will also further the ongoing efforts toward more efficient procurement, which have achieved significant cost reductions, while giving due consideration to the defense production base. In addition, to account for population decrease and declining birthrates/aging population, Japan will robustly promote automation, labor-saving, and optimization.

A key to deterring invasion against Japan is counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In recent years, in Japan’s surroundings, there have been significant improvement of missile forces in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks have become a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, Japan will continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense network; however, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing network alone. For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of missile defenses. “Counterstrike capabilities” are the SDF’s capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force. By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent’s further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals. Counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan’s Constitution and international law; they do not change Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy; and they can be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible.
United States will remain unchanged, as Japan will now possess counterstrike capabilities, the two nations will cooperate in counterstrikes.

(2) Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country

To defend Japan, the SDF needs to be strong. National defense cannot be achieved without a whole-of-country approach. For this reason, in addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will build an overall national defense architecture by integrating Japan’s national power – diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological – as well as by systematically combining all policy means. To enhance the whole-of-government undertaking, it is essential to break down sectionalism within the Government. Japan will enhance the comprehensive defense architecture that draws upon Japan’s national power. This undertaking is an indivisible part of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities. The national government will also promote cooperation with local governments and private entities.

As part of specific efforts, diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan’s enhanced defense architecture come first, and Japan will promote robust diplomatic efforts through the promotion such as the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Also, in order to continue to demonstrate the intention and capability to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and influence opponent’s actions, it is necessary to improve and enhance training and exercises as FDO and Strategic Communication (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with our ally and like-minded countries and others.

Japan will also enhance the whole-of-government response to Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension from peacetime to armed contingencies.

Furthermore, in order to act collaboratively between relevant agencies from peacetime and improve the effectiveness of the response, the SDF will conduct training and exercises assuming contingencies with the police and Japan Coast Guard (hereinafter referred to as the “JCG”) from peacetime, and establish necessary collaboration procedures, including the procedure to have the Minister of Defense control the JCG in an armed attack situation.

Since the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum are basic infrastructure in people’s daily lives and are vitally important for carrying out cross-domain operations in defense of Japan, Japan will reinforce relevant capabilities across the whole government.

In an era where victory or defeat is determined by the mastery of new ways of warfare underpinned by advanced technologies, it has become critical to leverage cutting-edge technologies for defense purposes. Under the whole-of-government mechanism for strengthening comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will leverage research and development conducted by relevant government organizations for defense purposes based on the needs of the MOD/SDF.

National administrative agencies, local governments, public entities, and private enterprises must make joint efforts in a cooperative and collaborative manner, in order to respond to an invasion against Japan while protecting the lives of Japanese nationals and in order to respond to various contingencies including large-scale disasters. As such, based on defense needs, under the inter-agency mechanism for strengthening comprehensive defense architecture, the Government will develop and upgrade airports, seaports, and other facilities, particularly in the southwestern region and take various measures such as the establishment of a framework for interagency coordination to enable the SDF to use facilities such as airports and seaports on a daily basis and the reinforcement of whole-of-government civil protection training. Furthermore, Japan will establish an effective mechanism to balance defense requirements with socioeconomic activities such as the installation of wind power generation facilities so that the defense-related facilities can fully function through the SDF’s smooth use of sea, airspace, and electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, concerning the transportation and storages of ammunition and fuel, Japan will take measures for further facilitation.

In order to work to secure the national interest in Japan’s territorial and other waters and the stable use of its important sea lanes, the SDF and the JCG will closely cooperate and collaborate with each other, while promoting maritime security cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others.

Lastly, to enable the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan to seamlessly and effectively conduct activities on a daily basis, Japan will strive to gain further understanding and cooperation from local governments and residents around their facilities. In some communities, the SDF’s emergency patient transport and the very existence of SDF units themselves are making a major contribution to the communities’ maintenance and
vitalization. In conducting unit reorganizations, as well as placing and operating camps and bases, Japan will give due consideration to regional characteristics and the SDF’s contribution to local economy so as to gain understanding of local governments and residents.

3 Second Approach: Joint Deterrence and Response by the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The second approach is to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Alliance with the United States is a key pillar of Japan’s security, and fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities will lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities and will further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. By demonstrating such joint resolve and capabilities, Japan and the United States will deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. In addition, if an invasion against Japan occurs, Japan-U.S. joint response will disrupt the invasion. To this end, both Japan and the United States constantly modernize the Alliance and strengthen joint capabilities by aligning strategies and prioritizing goals together. In doing so, building upon the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s own defense capabilities, Japan will play a larger role for the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the region under the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Specifically, Japan will work on the following measures.

The first is to strengthen Japan-U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities. Japan’s NDS and the United States’ National Defense Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through integrating all approaches and means. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of reinforcing readiness and resiliency, imposing cost on opponents, and deterring invasion against Japan, Japan will further deepen discussion with the United States on their roles, missions, and capabilities and further reinforce joint deterrence capabilities of both countries in an integrated manner. The next is to reinforce alliance coordination functions.

4 Third Approach: Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others

The third approach is to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others. In order to respond to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to ensure Japan’s security, it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration with not only our ally but also as many countries as possible. From such perspective, Japan will promote efforts to contribute to realizing the vision of a FOIP. Moreover, Japan will proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account characteristics and other factors of the region and each country. In doing so, while promoting collaboration with like-minded countries and others, Japan will pay attention to communication with China and Russia.

5 Key Capabilities for Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities (seven key fields)

The following are the basic concepts and contents of the seven functions and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan, which are derived from the comprehensive operation concept in line with the basic policies set forth in the NDS and other documents.
1 Stand-off Defense Capabilities

In order to protect Japan’s territory, which stretches approximately 3,000 km along the both north-south and east-west axes, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its stand-off defense capabilities to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan from locations outside of threat zones. First of all, Japan will possess necessary and sufficient capabilities to be able to disrupt and defeat these vessels and others in a multilayered manner and from various locations. Also, Japan will reinforce capabilities that can be launched from various platforms with such capabilities as hyper velocity glides and hypersonic glides which are difficult to intercept. To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce capability to enable operation of stand-off missiles. In doing so, to promptly secure sufficient capability prior to the establishment of increased production of domestic missiles, Japan will procure stand-off missiles manufactured overseas. In the future, by approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its capability to enable operation of aircraft-launched stand-off missiles and will acquire capability to operate missiles with difficult-to-intercept gliding capabilities such as hyper velocity gliding missiles, hypersonic guided missiles, and other stand-off missiles.

2 Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

In order to respond to hypersonic and other weapons, Japan will fundamentally reinforce response capabilities such as detecting, tracking, and intercepting capabilities. As a response to the missile attacks from an opponent’s country to Japan, Japan will first intercept missiles over the high seas and Japan’s territorial airspace with its missile defense system. Subsequently, as a measure for self-defense to the minimum required level to prevent attacks, Japan will utilize capabilities including stand-off defense capabilities to enable itself to conduct effective counterstrike in the opponent’s territory. By having capability to conduct counterstrike and facilitate interception by its missile defense system, Japan will restrict the opponent’s missile launches and thereby deter missile attacks from happening. To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce the capabilities of warning and control radar and surface-to-air missile and procure Aegis system equipped vessels. Japan will also reinforce the capability to respond to small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with weapons including directed-energy weapons. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its integrated air and missile defense capabilities by efforts such as introducing research on capability to respond to hypersonic weapons in the gliding phase.

3 Unmanned Defense Capabilities

The combination of unmanned equipment with AI and manned equipment enables Japan to gain asymmetrical advantages. For this reason, these unmanned assets will be effectively utilized not only for information gathering and surveillance, but also for a wide range of missions including combat support. Japan will also promote initiatives to optimize the equipment system and organization of the SDF. To this end, the SDF will acquire practical capabilities in a wide range of missions by introducing unmanned assets through early production and deployment or leasing by FY2027. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further materialize the style of warfare using unmanned assets, accelerate the development and introduction of equipment based on the geographical characteristics of Japan, and expand full-scale operation.

4 Cross-domain Operation Capabilities

It has become increasingly important for Japan to overcome inferiority in individual domains by conducting cross-domain operations which organically fuse capabilities in all domains including space, cyber, electromagnetic...
spectrum, land, sea, and airspace to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, and thereby ensuring Japan’s national defense. The MOD/SDF will first enhance and expand capabilities necessary to disrupt or neutralize the opponent’s use of the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum and then work on the following.

(1) In the space domain, the MOD/SDF will reinforce its operational capabilities in the land, sea, and air domains by proactively integrating novel form of space use including satellite constellation. Also, in order to respond to threats to the stable use of space, the MOD/SDF will build up a Space Domain Awareness (hereinafter referred to as the “SDA”) structure, and bolster the resiliency of our space assets to enable the continuation of missions in response to various situations. To this end, by FY2027, the MOD/SDF will utilize space to develop essential infrastructure for unit operations and enhance our SDA capability. By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will further enhance our space operation capabilities by increasing multi-layering and redundancy in space use and also by acquiring new space capabilities.

(2) In the cyber domain, the MOD/SDF will cooperate with whole-of-government initiatives in the field of cybersecurity, including active cyber defense. The MOD/SDF will realize advanced cybersecurity posture by shifting to a posture that is able to conduct continuous risk management primarily on critical information systems and by significantly increasing the number of cyber personnel. To this end, by FY2027, the MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities and high-priority equipment systems even under cyberattacks and to support cyber defense of the defense industry. By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to perform its missions even under cyberattacks, while reinforcing its posture to support cybersecurity of entities other than the SDF.

(3) In the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, the MOD/SDF will make its electronic warfare capabilities and its support capabilities function effectively while impairing the opponent’s capabilities of accomplishing missions even under a severe electromagnetic spectrum environment including communication jamming by the opponent. Also, the MOD/SDF will reinforce electromagnetic spectrum management function for the entire SDF to utilize electromagnetic spectrum more effectively.

(4) Regarding ground, maritime, and air defense capabilities, which form the basis of cross-domain operations, Japan will fundamentally reinforce these capabilities including by steadily introducing naval ships and fighter aircraft to maintain and enhance maritime and air superiority.

5 Command and Control and Intelligence-related Functions

The character of warfare will continue to increase in speed and complexity. In order to win in future battles, Japan needs to ensure superiority in decision-making, whereby commanders at various levels can make decisions more promptly and more accurately than their opposites. For this purpose, Japan will enhance its network resiliency and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (hereinafter referred to as the “ISRT”) capabilities, including the introduction of AI. By FY2027, Japan will develop intelligence capabilities capable of responding to hybrid warfare and Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension. Japan will also develop near-real-time information gathering capabilities by utilizing assets such as satellite constellations By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities by utilizing various means including AI to the greatest extent.

In addition, the necessity to continuously and accurately grasp the intentions and capabilities of Japan’s neighboring countries is more crucial than ever. To this end, Japan will reinforce the analysis capabilities mainly of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (hereinafter referred to as the “DIH”). Moreover, in order to respond to Integrated Information Warfare, including the dissemination of disinformation, Japan will fundamentally reinforce such efforts, and conduct information sharing and bilateral/multilateral exercises with its ally, and like-minded countries and others.

6 Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection

In response to an invasion of Japan including its remote islands, Japan needs to ensure that deployed units are always operational, and that necessary units are swiftly
maneuvered and deployed according to situations to secure maritime and air superiority and disrupt the access/landing of units invading Japan. For this purpose, Japan will make maximum use of civilian transportations, while reinforcing maritime and air transport capabilities of the SDF. In addition, in order to enable smooth and effective operation of SDF units, Japan will expand airport and seaport facilities usage and improve logistics capabilities from peacetime. The SDF will not only defeat the infringements upon remote islands but also carry out civil protection missions by utilizing its reinforced mobile deployment capabilities for evacuating residents. To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce its transportation capabilities by measures such as expanding the use of Private Finance Initiative (hereinafter referred to as the “PFI”) vessels. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will have further reinforced its transport capabilities and accelerated transport and replenishment through the improvement of supply bases.

7 Sustainability and Resiliency

In order to defend Japan in the future, the current warfighting sustainability of the SDF is not necessarily sufficient in terms of ammunition and fuel, and the number of operationally available equipment. Therefore, Japan will improve ammunition production capacity, secure ammunition storage commensurate with the amount of ammunition produced, promptly acquire necessary and sufficient ammunition and fuel, and establish a system to improve the operational rates of equipment. To this end, by FY2027, Japan will acquire necessary ammunition and install more ammunition storage facilities. Furthermore, Japan will resolve parts shortages and ensure that all equipment except that under planned maintenance is operationally available. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will complete the installation of further ammunition storage facilities and maintain appropriate inventory of ammunition and parts.

Furthermore, in order to ensure the safety of SDF personnel on a daily basis and prevent an easy loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency, Japan will promote measures such as making major command headquarters underground and reinforcing their structures, relocate facilities, and steadily construct barracks and housing and maintain aging buildings. In addition, the issue of climate change will further impact future MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, which demand Japan to deal with a variety of issues. To this end, by FY2027, Japan will promote measures to construct underground command headquarters, and relocate and consolidate facilities in major bases and camps to improve the resiliency of respective facilities. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will have further improved the resiliency of defense facilities. Lastly, Japan will also strengthen medical functions to enhance the warfighting sustainability of SDF personnel.
Future of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

1 Role of the SDF in the Seven Key Fields

In the seven fields of key capabilities, the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Force (hereinafter referred to as the “GSDF,” “MSDF,” and “ASDF,” respectively) will fulfill the following roles.

Regarding stand-off defense capabilities, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will build required and sufficient number of stand-off missiles launched from vehicles, ships, and aircraft.

Regarding integrated air and missile defense capabilities, as a basic role, MSDF destroyers will assume interception in the upper layer and the GSDF and ASDF will assume interception by surface-to-air missiles in the lower layer, and Japan will reinforce capabilities to respond to future airborne threats. Also, each SDF service will utilize capabilities such as stand-off defense capabilities etc., as counterstrike capabilities.

Regarding unmanned defense capabilities, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will significantly reinforce their defense capabilities in unmanned aerial, maritime, underwater, and ground assets in accordance with their respective division of roles, concurrently with their review of existing units.

Regarding cross-domain operations, in the space domain, the ASDF will reinforce various functions including SDA capabilities. In the cyber domain, the MOD/SDF as a whole will reinforce its capabilities to contribute to the reinforcement of cybersecurity of the entire country; and in particular, the GSDF will play a core role to expand foundations such as for human resource development. In the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will acquire and reinforce defense equipment for the electronic warfare.

Regarding command and control and intelligence-related functions, Japan will reinforce the information gathering capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF and take other measures. Also, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the intelligence functions of the DIH, including the ISRT required for the operation of stand-off missiles, and reinforce collaboration with the command and control function.

Regarding mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection, Japan will reinforce the SDF’s mobile deployment capabilities by securing medium-sized and small vessels by the GSDF, transport vessels by the MSDF, and transport aircraft by the ASDF. Additionally, the GSDF will reinforce its architecture including unit reinforcement for the protection of civilians in Okinawa.

Regarding sustainability and resiliency, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will secure the necessary amount of ammunition, fuel, and mobile equipment on a daily basis, and improve the resiliency of defense facilities, which serve as the foundation for exercising capabilities.

2 Concept for Developing the SDF’s Architecture

Based on the roles in seven fields, development of joint operational architecture as well as development of architectures of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will be conducted under the following basic concepts.

In order to reinforce its joint operational posture, Japan will establish Permanent Joint Headquarters by revision of the existing organization. Furthermore, Japan will promote defense equipment system benefitting joint operation.

The GSDF will develop a system that places importance on stand-off defense capability, rapid maneuver and disperse deployment capabilities, and command and control and intelligence-related functions.

The MSDF will develop a system to reinforce air-defense capability, Integrated Information Warfare capability, and stand-off defense and other capabilities, promote labor-saving and automation measures, and allow acquiring and sustaining underwater superiority.

The ASDF will strengthen maneuver and disperse operations and stand-off defense and other capabilities. Also, the ASDF will be renewed as the Air and Space Self-Defense Force, developing a system to ensure superiority in use of space.

The DIH will assume the central role of responding to Integrated Information Warfare and fundamentally reinforce the capability to grasp and analyze military activities of other countries and disseminate information about them.

In addition to these efforts, the entire SDF will fundamentally reinforce itself to contribute to the cybersecurity of Japan as a whole country.
3 Reinforcing Policy-making Function

For the SDF to fully exert its capabilities and respond to the increasingly severe, complex, and rapid-paced strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required, and the MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its functions. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will establish a consultation framework to obtain policy advice from experts. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to comprehensively consider and advance future ways of warfare for the SDF and utilize and nurture cutting-edge technologies and apply those technologies to defense equipment necessary for future SDF operations from a strategic perspective, while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies particularly the defense industry as their core. Furthermore, in order to promote such efforts and support the formulation of policies, Japan will review and reinforce the research system of the MOD/SDF led by the National Institute for Defense Studies and reinforce its functions as an intellectual base.

7 Protection of Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for Global Security Cooperation

1 Measures for Protection of Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals

Not only an invasion of Japan, but also large-scale terrorist attacks and attacks on critical infrastructures including nuclear power plants, large-scale disasters, and infectious disease crises are serious threats, and Japan must respond to them with its utmost efforts. As such, the MOD/SDF, in close cooperation with relevant organizations such as the police and JCG will respond by utilizing fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities. Furthermore, in the event of natural disasters or civil disturbances overseas, the MOD/SDF will work closely with the diplomatic authorities to promptly and properly rescue and transport Japanese nationals. Moreover, Japan will establish a collaborative framework with relevant organizations from peacetime to facilitate initiatives for civil protection, including evacuation guidance for residents.

2 Measures for International Security Cooperation

For the peace and security of Japan, and from the perspective of proactive contribution to peace, Japan must make considerable efforts toward responding to global challenges. Regarding International Peace Cooperation Activities, Japan keeps making contributions with a focus on the areas where Japan has advantages such as engineering and medicine. Furthermore, Japan will continue to dispatch SDF personnel to local mission headquarters and provide capacity building, among other measures.

8 Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability

The defense production and technology bases are indispensable foundation for a country to secure the development, production, and procurement of defense equipment in a stable manner on its own and to incorporate the cutting-edge technology necessary for new ways of warfare into defense equipment; They are a virtually integral part of defense capability itself, and their reinforcement is essential. Therefore, Japan will promote initiatives such as building a strong and sustainable defense industry necessary for a new way of warfighting, dealing with risks, and expanding sales channels.

1 Reinforcing Defense Production Base

Japan’s defense industry is important, considered as a partner responsible for national defense along with the MOD/SDF in terms of securing equipment for the SDF to carry out its missions, and it is necessary to maintain and reinforce the capability to produce high performance...
equipment and secure high operational rates. In order to ensure that the defense industry can play this significant role, Japan will reinforce the bases including the entire supply chain. In doing so, Japan aims to make business attractive by introducing a new profit margin calculation method to secure appropriate profits, while promoting measures to maintain and reinforce existing supply chains and promote the entry of new suppliers.

Additionally, Japan will place more emphasis on the viewpoint of maintaining and strengthening the domestic base in acquiring defense equipment, and strive for technological, qualitative, and production-time improvements while ensuring predictability for companies, and if there are no other means available, Japan will consider owning manufacturing facilities and others itself.

Furthermore, Japan will reinforce industrial security including cybersecurity based on international standards, as well as strengthen the security of sensitive technologies.

2 Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

In order to acquire defense equipment required for the new way of warfare, the use of our domestic technologies is extremely important. Therefore, the MOD/SDF will proactively promote initiatives to accelerate efforts to achieve operational capability of technologies both from defense and non-defense industries.

Furthermore, Japan will promote cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others by leading international joint development. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will establish a framework for actively exploiting cutting-edge civilian technologies and will utilize a whole-of-government mechanism for comprehensively strengthening defense architecture.

3 Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. From this perspective, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems are to be considered for revisions. In addition, Japan will establish a fund and provide corporate assistance to smoothly promote the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts.

9 Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate Their Abilities

1 Reinforcing Human Resource Base

The MOD/SDF must secure necessary SDF personnel, the core element of defense capability, and create an environment that enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities to their fullest. To this end, the MOD/SDF will continue to work on improving living and work environments, improving treatment, and fostering an environment in which female SDF personnel can play a more active role, among other measures. In addition, each SDF personnel must recognize anew that harassment shakes the foundation of the SDF, a human organization, and develops an organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment of any kind.

Regarding recruitment, the MOD/SDF will further reinforce SDF recruitment capabilities to secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources and secure talents with specialized knowledge and skills, including personnel in the private sector. In particular, the MOD/SDF will strengthen efforts concerning crew members in naval vessels, radar site surveillance personnel, and other personnel who work in a harsh environment as well as human resources in the cyber domain. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will work to reinforce the human resource base by securing the civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, who are needed for fundamentally reinforcing defense capability, designing policies associated with the fundamental reinforcement, and providing operational support to units, and by further considering necessary systems.
In this way, the MOD/SDF will implement bold measures focusing on the entire life cycle of SDF personnel, while considering the creation of an organizational environment that enables SDF personnel to demonstrate their abilities to their fullest even when they are in the middle of various life events including childbirth, childcare, and nursing care.

2 Transformation of Medical Function

Regarding the SDF medical force, the MOD/SDF will transform it from an organization that has been placing importance on sustaining health of SDF personnel into one that saves the lives of SDF personnel in a contingency. For the purpose, the MOD/SDF will develop a joint medical system and posture so that the SDF can undertake diverse missions both in Japan and abroad. The MOD/SDF will establish a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation from the frontlines to the destination hospital such as by developing a medical base in the southwestern region and secure medical equipment and materials including blood and oxygen that are essential for combat trauma care. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will build a posture to mobilize the full strength of the SDF medical force including the National Defense Medical College and improve the combat trauma care capabilities.

10 Points of Attention

The NDS, under the NSS, will be implemented in alignment with strategies in other fields, with regular and systematic evaluations conducted by the National Security Council. In addition, Japan will constantly evaluate the capabilities necessary for building defense capabilities that can effectively deal with changes in the security environment, particularly focusing on the opponent’s capabilities, based on joint operational concepts. Moreover, the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities based on the NDS must be maintained and reinforced in the future. To this end, Japan will continuously consider how to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities from a mid- to long-term perspective.

The NDS will be executed approximately over the coming decade; should Japan expect any significant changes including in international situation and trends in technological level, it will make necessary revisions.

REFERENCE: National Defense Strategy (NDS)
Chapter 4

Part II

Defense Buildup Program and Buildup of Defense Capability

Section 1

Defense Buildup Program

This section outlines the purpose and details of the DBP. As the DBP is already available on the MOD website, this section focuses on the main points of the DBP, including its background and concept. Regarding the formulation process, see Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Japan’s Security Policy Framework).

1 Significance of the Defense Buildup Program

National defense forms the basis of the nation’s existence, and it must not be forgotten that building up necessary defense capability takes time. While the buildup is ultimately up to the budget of each fiscal year, in the case of the F-35A fighter, for example, it takes five years from contract signing to delivery to ASDF units. To utilize the aircraft effectively as defense capability, the MOD/SDF must not only purchase the aircraft but also maintain hangars and other facilities, educate personnel such as pilots and maintenance personnel, and train SDF units, all of which cannot be done in a short timeframe. Furthermore, R&D of new equipment, such as the next-generation fighter aircraft, requires a long period of time. Therefore, defense buildup must be carried out continuously and systematically based on a concrete outlook.

In this context, following the formulation of the 1976 NDPG, the then Defense Agency prepared the “Mid-Term Defense Estimate” in 1978 and 1981, which were the agency’s estimates for major programs to build up defense capability each fiscal year under the NDPG. Since FY1986, the government has formulated the five-year Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) to indicate the direction of the defense buildup in the medium term, both in terms of content and expenditure. Each fiscal year’s defense buildup is conducted based on the MTDP.

The latest DBP is the first buildup program formulated under the NDS. It sets out the levels of defense capability that Japan should possess, the corresponding total five-year expenditures, and the quantity of major equipment to be procured in order to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s Multi-Domain Defense Force as stipulated in the NDS.

2 Program Guidelines

In accordance with the NDS, the DBP sets out that the MOD/SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense capabilities based on the following guidelines.

Firstly, in terms of its seven key fields, Japan will reinforce “stand-off defense capabilities” and “integrated air and missile defense capabilities” to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby deterring invasion itself. Should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, Japan would need to ensure asymmetric advantage by leveraging, in addition to these capabilities, manned as well as unmanned assets and gain superiority across domains such as underwater, surface of the water, and air, and to this end, Japan will reinforce “unmanned defense capabilities,” “cross-domain operation capabilities,” and “command and control/intelligence related functions.” Furthermore, to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner so as to force the opponent to give up invasion, Japan will reinforce “mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection” and “sustainability and resiliency.”

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1 These are so-called the 1978 MTDE and the 1981 MTDE.
Additionally, Japan will place emphasis on the defense production and technology bases, characterized as a virtually integral part of defense capability itself, as well as areas such as the human resource base that supports our defense capability.

Secondly, in procuring equipment, the MOD/SDF will properly combine the introduction of new, high performance equipment, along with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, to efficiently secure necessary and sufficient quantity and quality of defense capability. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. In addition, by using advanced civilian technologies and other means, the MOD/SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment for areas that could directly affect the SDF’s current and future ways of warfare and are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce the human resource base, such as strengthening recruitment efforts, utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel and others, promoting women’s participation, utilizing diverse and high-quality personnel, improving the living and working environments, developing human resources, and improving their treatment.

Moreover, to further reinforce the joint deterrence capabilities of Japan and the United States in an integrated manner, Japan will promote cooperation, improved interoperability, etc. related to cross-domain operations. In order to reinforce the infrastructure to support effective joint response capabilities, Japan will also reinforce efforts related to information security and cybersecurity, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation. In addition, measures to support the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan will be steadily implemented. Furthermore, in line with the vision of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security operations, Japan will further promote establishing policy frameworks, while also promoting defense cooperation and exchanges including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

Lastly, in fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will, while adhering to the scrap-and-build approach, optimize the SDF’s organization and authorized strength as well as equipment. We will also further our ongoing efforts toward more efficient procurement, which have achieved significant cost reductions. In addition, to account for Japan’s aging population with a declining birth rate, Japan will robustly promote automation, labor-saving and optimization.

### 3 Major Programs regarding the SDF’s Capabilities

In order for Japan to build up defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining support of its ally and others by FY2027, Japan will place emphasis on implementing seven major programs. They encompass mainly the following.

#### 1 Stand-off Defense Capabilities

Japan will reinforce capabilities to conduct diverse responses from outside of the threat envelope and against vessels and other forces invading Japan. To this end, by FY2027, Japan will acquire practical operational capability while encouraging the defense industry to expand its domestic manufacturing capacity and accelerating R&D and mass production. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will secure the required and sufficient quantities of stand-off missiles with longer ranges and more effective flying forms.

In addition, in order to ensure the effectiveness of stand-off defense capabilities, the MOD/SDF will enhance functions of information collection and analysis as well as command and control, using satellite constellations and introducing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and target observation rounds, etc. Since the operation of these stand-off missiles requires a series of command and control, including the collection of target information and the assignment of targets to each unit to be conducted in a unified manner, a posture based on joint operation will be established.
2 Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

By FY2027, the MOD/SDF will procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels. In addition, it will enhance capabilities to detect and track threats including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV) by improving the capabilities of existing assets, such as upgrading the surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system and introducing a new radar (LTAMDS), while developing capabilities to deal with small UAVs, etc. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further enhance capabilities to detect and track threats using shooters, etc. that respond to HGVs in the gliding phase, as well as acquire capabilities to deal with small UAVs, etc. through full-scale introduction of non-kinetic interception means. Furthermore, various assets will be connected by a network to realize efficient combat.

In doing the above, Japan will leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities to conduct effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory (counterstrike capabilities) as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense to prevent ballistic missile and other attacks.

3 Unmanned Defense Capabilities

In order to accomplish missions while minimizing human loss, by FY2027, the SDF will expeditiously procure, by leasing and other means, domestic and overseas unmanned assets (equipment), such as existing UAVs and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), as well as carry out operational verifications and reinforce the SDF’s practical capability to operate unmanned equipment, promoting initiatives to optimize the existing equipment system and personnel deployment. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further materialize the style of warfare using unmanned assets, accelerate the development and introduction of equipment based on the geographical characteristics of Japan, and expand full-scale operation. Furthermore, the SDF will develop the ability to simultaneously control multiple unmanned assets using systems such as AI.

4 Cross-domain Operation Capabilities

In the space domain, by FY2027, various capabilities such as information gathering and communications utilizing the space domain, e.g., building satellite constellations, will be further improved in order to increase cross-domain capabilities, including the operation of stand-off missiles. Additionally, in view of the growing threats to the stable use of the space domain, the SDF will further enhance its capability to disrupt C4I and other capabilities of the opponent. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will enhance the capability for Space Domain Awareness (SDA). By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will further enhance its space operation capabilities by increasing multi-layering and redundancy in space use and also by acquiring new space capabilities.

In the cyber domain, by FY2027, the MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities and high-priority equipment systems even under cyberattacks and to support cyber defense of the defense industry. By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities and force projection capabilities to assure the SDF’s ability to perform its missions even under cyberattacks, while reinforcing its posture to support cybersecurity of entities other than the SDF. Furthermore, efforts to develop capability to disrupt the opponent’s use of cyberspace for an attack against Japan will be strengthened. In order to strengthen the capability to implement these initiatives as an organization as a whole, the number of cyber personnel belonging to cyber-related units such as the SDF Cyber Defense Command will be expanded to approximately 4,000 by the end of FY2027, and the MOD/SDF will provide training to its personnel engaged in cyber-related tasks such as system procurement, maintenance, and operations. In addition to the increase of cyber personnel belonging to cyber-related units, these efforts will bring the total number of MOD/SDF cyber personnel to approximately 20,000 by around FY2027. Further reinforcement of cyber defense architecture is intended in the future.

In the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, by FY2027, the MOD/SDF will accelerate programs, which are already underway to acquire means and improve capability, etc. and enhance communication and radar jamming capabilities that lower the opponent’s command-and-control functions. In addition, the MOD/SDF will take measures for early deployment of directed energy technologies for responding to small UAVs, etc. By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will steadily upgrade assets with superior electronic warfare capabilities and enhance capabilities for responding to
### 5 Command and Control / Intelligence-related Functions

By FY2027, Japan will develop intelligence capabilities capable of responding to hybrid warfare and Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities by utilizing various means including AI to the greatest extent. Japan will also establish a system to share information in real time through further reinforcement of information gathering assets. For enhancing command-and-control functions, the MOD/SDF will establish resilient communications, system network, and data infrastructure, as well as a real-time command and control posture to operate various capabilities including stand-off defense capabilities and integrated air and missile defense capabilities in an integrated manner. The MOD/SDF will also conduct studies on command and control capabilities that enable unified command of each SDF service, and take measures as necessary.

### 6 Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection

By FY2027, in order to secure capabilities for swift and reliable transportation of necessary units to defeat the invasion of islands to the southwest region, Japan will procure various SDF transportation assets. In addition, the MOD/SDF will secure additional Private Finance
Initiative (PFI) vessels to supplement its maritime transportation capability. Furthermore, to enhance self-sufficiency in transportation to southwestern regions, the MOD/SDF will procure transportation vehicles (container trailers) and cargo handling equipment (large cranes and large forklifts). By approximately ten years from now, while further reinforcing its transport capabilities, the MOD/SDF will conduct R&D of a landing support system to improve the efficiency of transportation to islands where the size of seaports is limited, and further accelerate transport and replenishment through the improvement of supply bases.

In addition, in order to enhance the effectiveness of mobile deployment and civil protection, the government will work to develop and strengthen airports and seaports, and others, as well as coordinate and cooperate to implement civil protection measures employing SDF assets and reinforce SDF units capable of responding to civil protection.

7 Sustainability and Resiliency

By FY2027, the MOD/SDF will promptly procure various types of ammunition and fuel required, as well as expand ammunition storage facilities. In addition, in order to mass-produce ammunitions quickly and stably, the MOD/SDF will encourage the defense industry to expand its domestic manufacturing capacity. By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will maintain appropriate inventory of ammunitions, including parts for new equipment, and complete the installation of ammunition storage facilities for storing all of the planned ammunition stock.

By securing the necessary budget for maintenance and material, with lead time in consideration, while dealing with the increasing sophistication and complexity of defense equipment, the MOD/SDF will eliminate non-operational state caused by parts shortages and maximize the number of operationally available equipment by FY2027. By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will maintain appropriate inventory of parts, including those for new equipment.

In order to protect major equipment and command posts, etc. and ensure a tenacious fighting posture, by FY2027, the MOD/SDF will improve the resiliency of facilities by establishing underground bases for particularly important command headquarters in the southwest as well as relocating and consolidating facilities at key bases and camps. In addition, the MOD/SDF will secure required ammunition depots, etc. The MOD/SDF will also promote countermeasures against disasters such as tsunamis, starting from bases and camps that are expected to be damaged significantly and are important for operations. By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will further improve the resiliency of defense facilities and complete the installation of ammunition storage facilities for storing all of the planned ammunition stock.

4 Organization of Self-Defense Forces

Based on the program guidelines, each SDF service is structured mainly as follows.

1 Joint Operation Structure

Permanent Joint Headquarters will be established as soon as possible in order to build a system capable of seamlessly conducting cross-domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations among the SDF services. In addition, the SDF will examine how each unit, including joint units, should be structured.

For further improvement of capabilities in the cyber domain, including constant and continuous monitoring of the MOD/SDF’s network and systems as well as the capability to disrupt an opponent’s use of cyberspace for an attack against Japan, the SDF will possess a cyber defense unit as a joint unit, in order to fundamentally reinforce cyber defense capability.

In addition, a new maritime transport unit will be established as a joint unit to improve the mobile deployment capabilities to the southwestern region.

2 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

In order to strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region, the 15th Brigade, which is in charge of Okinawa, will have an additional regiment and
The newly formulated DBP calls for the development of a joint operation structure and the structures of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), based on the seven key fields* for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities. The key points for strengthening the structures of each SDF service are as follows.

In order to strengthen the effectiveness of joint operations among each SDF service, it is necessary to promptly build a system capable of seamlessly conducting cross-domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency. The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF will establish Permanent Joint Headquarters as soon as possible by examining how an integrated system for the proper execution of the Minister’s commands and orders should be organized from peacetime and reviewing the existing organization. In addition, the JSDF Cyber Defense Command and other structures will be significantly expanded to further improve capabilities in the cyber domain.

Regarding the GSDF, in order to strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region, the GSDF plans to reorganize the 15th Brigade located in Okinawa Prefecture into a division, and is considering increasing the current one infantry regiment into two infantry regiments. In order to strengthen stand-off defense capabilities, it will deploy units equipped with various types of stand-off missiles, including the upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missiles.

Regarding the MSDF, in addition to introducing patrol vessels that will be primarily used for surveillance in peacetime, the MSDF will establish “Surface Vessels Units” that manage destroyers, mine sweepers, and patrol vessels in the same unit, in view of the increase in the number of frigates (FFMs) with both destroyer and minesweeping functions. In addition, MSDF will newly establish an Information Warfare major unit to organically consolidate its capabilities related to information warfare.

Regarding the ASDF, the ASDF will accelerate the pace of F-35 acquisition and promote the upgrading of F-15 and F-2 capabilities, while considering a further increase in the number of fighter aircraft. It will also investigate the possibility of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition, in order to continue to battle tenaciously in various air operations of increasing intensity, the ASDF will build a structure to carry out mobile and dispersed operations. Furthermore, in light of the growing importance of the space domain and the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of space operation capabilities, it will create new Space Domain Mission Units and rename the Air Self-Defense Force the “Air and Space Self-Defense Force.”

(1) Stand-off defense capabilities, (2) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, (3) unmanned defense capabilities, (4) cross-domain operation capabilities, (5) command and control and intelligence-related functions, (6) mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection, (7) sustainability and resiliency

3 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

To conduct persistent and multilayered information gathering and surveillance, and to respond to an increasing volume of activities, such as ensuring security of maritime traffic and conducting overseas deployment for security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will reorganize the existing Escort Flotilla and Mine Warfare Force into “Surface Vessels Units” to serve as a central force provider for patrol vessels introduced in the future, destroyers and mine sweepers. In addition, MSDF will procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels that will primarily conduct BMD operations.

Furthermore, to organically consolidate Integrated Information Warfare capabilities in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and GSDF/ASDF intelligence units, MSDF will review the existing unit
structure and newly establish an Information Warfare major unit.

4 Japan Air Self-Defense Force

To reinforce air defense capability in terms of both quality and quantity, ASDF will possess more fighters (also consider replacement with UAVs) and build a system for carrying out mobile and dispersed operations to continue the battle tenaciously.

In addition, ASDF will enhance its space domain function by, among other measures, establishing a new specialized space domain missions unit led by a general-level commander. In view of the growing importance of the space domain and the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of space operations capabilities, space operations will be positioned as a major mission alongside air operations within ASDF. Therefore, the “Air Self-Defense Force” will be renamed the “Air and Space Self-Defense Force.”

5 Optimizing Organizational Capacity

The target number of uniformed SDF personnel for the end of FY2027 is the level at the end of FY2022. The number of uniformed personnel in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, respectively, will be reviewed as necessary to optimize organizational capacity. In addition, the capacity necessary to strengthen the joint operation structure will be adjusted between the SDF services, and GSDF personnel will be transferred to MSDF and ASDF to meet their increased personnel requirements. To this end, approximately 2,000 GSDF uniformed personnel will be transferred to joint units, MSDF, and ASDF, respectively.

5 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

In order to further reinforce deterrence capabilities of Japan and the United States in an integrated manner, Japan will promote cooperation with the United States in cross-domain operations and cooperation in the use of Japan’s counterstrike capabilities, air-defense, anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations, and ISRT. In addition, Japan will improve its responsive capabilities through more advanced and practical exercises and training.

Japan will further expand and deepen joint Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) with the United States, and will promote activities such as increasing joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities.

In addition, Japan will further develop coordination functions between Japan and the United States, and will realize closer operational coordination with like-minded countries and others with Japan and the United States as its core.

At the same time, in order to support effective joint responses, Japan will further enhance measures related to information security and cybersecurity, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint research in cutting-edge technology, joint development and production of defense equipment, and reinforcement of supply chains.

Furthermore, Japan will steadily secure funding for expenses related to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan, including Host Nation Support, and advance measures such as those for the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan to mitigate the local impact, including Okinawa Prefecture.
6 Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others

While guided by the vision of a FOIP, Japan will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. In particular, considering the policy on collaboration with like-minded countries and others indicated in the NDS, in addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues, service-to-service exchanges and personnel exchanges such as liaison officers, Japan will appropriately combine, depending on the characteristics of each SDF service, and strategically implement, specific initiatives taking into account the characteristics of the region as well as the situation of each country, such as strategic port calls and air visits, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building, and International Peace Cooperation Activities, in order to improve interoperability among the SDF and armed forces of like-minded countries and to strengthen Japan’s presence.

7 Elements Supporting Defense Capabilities

1 Training and Exercises

To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance the deterrence effectiveness, the MOD/SDF will conduct bilateral and multilateral training and exercises with like-minded countries and others, in addition to the SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises, in a planned and visible way to demonstrate Japan’s intention and capability not to tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, including seeking to enhance and strengthen training and exercises as FDO which are flexibly implemented according to the situation.

In addition, to maximize the capabilities of SDF units in a contingency, the MOD/SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of training areas and other facilities in Hokkaido and other areas in Japan, and steadily establish and enhance the necessary training infrastructure in Japan. In addition to expanding the joint/shared use of U.S. military facilities and areas by Japan and the United States and the use of civilian airport and seaport facilities, the MOD/SDF will enhance training for rapid deployment of its units to islands such as those in the southwestern region, joint training, and civil protection training, etc., with relevant organizations such as the police, Japan Coast Guard, firefighting services and local governments to appropriately respond to infringements that do not amount to armed attacks from outside as well as armed attacks in the vicinity of remote islands.

In order to expand such training, it is necessary to obtain the understanding and cooperation of related local governments and local residents. Therefore, while taking all possible measures to ensure the safety of training, the MOD/SDF will give due consideration to the surrounding environments of training infrastructures, including training ranges in Hokkaido and other areas in Japan.

2 Reinforcing Coordination and Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard

The MOD/SDF will deepen the information sharing and coordination mechanism with Japan Coast Guard, as well as enhance various response procedures and training, including developing procedures to have the Minister of Defense control the Japan Coast Guard in an armed attack situation and conducting joint training.

3 Collaboration with Local Communities

Japan will actively engage in public relations activities regarding the policies and activities of the MOD/SDF and also the role of the U.S. Forces in Japan on a regular basis, and coordinate to accommodate the requests and situations of the local communities, while fulfilling accountability.

The MOD/SDF will give due consideration to the characteristics of the regions in order to gain understanding of the local governments and residents upon reorganization of units as well as placement and operation of SDF camps and bases.
4 Reinforcing Policy-Making Functions

The MOD/SDF will establish a consultation framework to obtain policy advice from experts. Also, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to comprehensively advance the future way of “warfare” for the SDF and how to utilize and nurture cutting-edge technologies as well as apply those technology to defense necessary for this from a strategic perspective, while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies with particularly the defense industry as their core. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will review and reinforce its research system led by National Institute for Defense Studies and reinforce its functions as an intellectual base.

In addition, the MOD/SDF will promote various measures to enhance its ability to disseminate information, such as disseminating information efficiently and reliably to improve the public’s accessibility to research findings that contribute to promoting security education. They include dispatching lecturers to educational institutions and enhancing public symposiums so that citizens can accurately recognize knowledge and information on security policy. In addition, in order to further strengthen the research and education functions of the MOD/SDF, centering on National Institute for Defense Studies, the MOD/SDF will expand networks and organizational collaboration with domestic and foreign research and education institutions, universities, think tanks, and other organizations.

8 Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for International Security Cooperation

1 Response to Large-Scale Disasters

In the event of various types of disasters including natural disasters such as the Nankai Trough Earthquake, nuclear disasters, and other special disasters, the MOD/SDF will take all possible measures to ensure initial response promptly by transferring and deploying units of sufficient scale, while maintaining joint operations as the basis of its operations. At the same time, measures will be taken to strengthen the response posture, such as the procurement of UAVs (near-field) and helicopter satellite communication systems (helicopter SATs).

In addition, in close coordination and cooperation with related ministries and agencies, local governments, and other entities, the MOD/SDF will promote various measures such as conducting various training and exercises, formulating plans, and securing alternative functions and deployment infrastructure in the event of a disaster.

2 Measures for Maritime Security and Use of the Airspace based on Existing International Rules

Based on the vision of a FOIP, the MOD/SDF will promote efforts such as port calls by naval vessels and aircraft on various occasions with other countries that share awareness of maritime security and the use of airspace based on existing international rules, such as through joint training and exercises. In this way, the MOD/SDF will actively and visibly demonstrate its willingness and capability for the stability of the maritime order and the use of the airspace based on existing international rules.

3 International Peace Cooperation Activities

In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will continue to promote international peace cooperation activities, considering all the factors involved such as the mission objectives, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and
host countries. In particular, Japan will actively promote activities such as dispatch of embedded personnel to mission headquarters, capacity building related to UN PKO, and dispatch of staff members to UN headquarters. In addition, for further support for the international activities including rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, the Central Readiness Regiment and the International Operations Training Unit will be integrated into a new international operations force with high readiness and technical capabilities in the fields including facilities and unmanned aircraft operation, etc.

Additionally, while expanding in the curriculum of the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center, the MOD/SDF will leverage the Center’s expertise to provide educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel but also other personnel from various backgrounds.

Regarding the SDF’s operation facility in Djibouti, the MOD/SDF will promote renewal/upgrade to ensure its long term and stable utilization for security cooperation, including rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas in the Middle East and Africa.

### 9 New Measures for Early Deployment of Defense Equipment

The MOD/SDF will incorporate advanced civilian technologies and steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment which is particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective in such areas as stand-off defense capabilities and AI. To this end, the MOD/SDF will boldly review the administrative procedures of the MOD to establish a new framework to deploy defense equipment within the next five years and realize its full-scale operation within approximately the next ten years.

### 10 Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability

**1 Reinforcing Defense Production Base**

While Japan’s defense industry is responsible for each stage of the equipment life cycle, the equipment and defense industry are inseparable. In this context, the defense production and technology bases are a virtually integral part of defense capability itself. Conversely, for companies, defense industry is less attractive: the business requires a large investment of management resources to meet sophisticated performance requirements and information security measures, while profitability is low and sales channels are limited to the SDF. Moreover, issues have become apparent, such as a weakened domestic manufacturing structure as shown by companies’ withdrawal from the defense business, aging manufacturing facilities, supply chain risks, and the threat of cyberattacks.

In order to address these issues, the MOD/SDF will make the defense business more attractive by ensuring appropriate company profits, etc. In order to cope with various risks and maintain and strengthen the bases, appropriate fiscal measures and financial support will be provided for companies’ initiatives such as upgrading manufacturing and other facilities, strengthening cybersecurity, making supply chains more resilient, and business succession.

**2 Reinforcing Defense Technology Base**

The MOD/SDF will realize acceleration of defense equipment development through various efforts concerning R&D by identifying specific projects necessary for future warfare and organizing the entire picture up to the acquisition. Based on the integrated equipment system, which is systematically organized for future battles from the viewpoint of joint operations, the MOD/SDF will intensively invest in equipment/technology fields that are directly linked to future battles, such as stand-off defense capabilities, capabilities to respond to HGVs, etc., capabilities to respond to drones and swarm attacks, unmanned assets, and measures for next-generation fighter aircraft. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will improve the efficiency of the R&D process, including improving the capabilities of conventional equipment. It will also introduce a new agile methodology that quickly deploys prototypes to units and makes improvements to perfect equipment while
obtaining operational feedback, rather than adopting the conventional waterfall methodology of moving through the phases step by step while repeating design and testing based on performance requirements. Doing so will shorten the time required for R&D and accelerate defense equipment deployment.

In order to secure technological superiority in the future and realize advanced capabilities ahead of other countries, the MOD/SDF will pursue and implement technological cooperation, including R&D that incorporates a wide range of advanced civilian technologies as well as international joint R&D to leverage overseas technologies. At the same time, the MOD/SDF will invest heavily in technologies that can be directly linked to defense applications, aiming to acquire technologies at an early stage.

3 Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

The government will take the lead in promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology through further cooperation between the public and private sectors. The government will also establish a fund and provide corporate assistance as necessary.

4 Promotion of Various Measures and Institutional Development

In order to implement the above policies, in addition to necessary budgetary measures and legislation, financing will be provided for projects with a high policy nature through the use of government financial institutions, etc. Furthermore, the status of their execution will be constantly verified, and the system will be revised as necessary.

11 Strengthening the Foundation for SDF Personnel to Fulfill Abilities as Core of Defense Capabilities

For reinforcing the SDF’s human resource base, by FY2027, the MOD/SDF will secure the necessary number of talents from a wide range of sources, including the private sector. The MOD/SDF will also strengthen education and research on cyber and other domains, joint operations training, and medical training. Furthermore, new measures will be established based on the findings of the MOD Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention and Measures and other reviews, and ensure that all SDF personnel are fully aware of them. In addition, the MOD/SDF will constantly review its measures to ensure that they are in line with the times and develop an organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment. Moreover, the living and working environments and treatment of SDF personnel will be improved by taking measures against aging barracks and housing and eliminating equipment shortages.

By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will continuously and stably secure the necessary human resources, including those with specialized knowledge and skills, and foster an organizational environment in which all personnel can demonstrate their individual abilities while maintaining high morale. For the transformation of the medical function, the MOD/SDF will build a posture to mobilize the full strength of the SDF’s medical force and promote fundamental reforms to improve combat trauma care capabilities.
12 Optimization Efforts

The MOD/SDF will eliminate or reduce equipment based on the changes in the character of warfare, as well as reduce the number of manned equipment by accelerating the introduction of labor-saving and automated equipment. Further efforts for effective and efficient acquisition of equipment include cost reduction through planned and stable acquisition of equipment by expanding the application of long-term contracts, procurement in consideration of the supply-demand situation of equipment including that of other countries, and narrowing down SDF-unique specifications that cause costs to rise, which will enhance the effectiveness of project management throughout the equipment life cycle.

In addition, during the buildup period, a significant increase in personnel will be required in the cyber, space, and other areas. To meet this demand, it is essential that the MOD take bold steps to optimize the allocation of resources amid the extremely difficult recruitment environment. To this end, the current total capacity of SDF personnel (247,000) will not be increased, but optimization measures will be taken, such as reviewing existing units and using outside labor force such as private-sector contractors.

13 Quantities of Major Procurement

Targets to be achieved in five years and approximately in ten years for the defense capabilities to be fundamentally reinforced under this program are shown in Appendix Table 1. The procurement quantities of major defense equipment are shown in Appendix Table 2. In addition, each SDF service’s formation and equipment quantities in approximately ten years are shown in Appendix Table 3.

14 Expenditures

The expenditure aiming for the implementation of defense capability buildup described in this program for the next five years from FY2023 to FY2027 amount to approximately ¥43 trillion.

The annual defense budgets for FY2023 to FY2027 under this program amount to approximately ¥40,500 billion in total (approximately ¥8,900 billion in FY2027), on the assumption that the following measures will be taken.

1) Considering the progress of each project, further accelerate the improvement of SDF facilities in an agile and flexible manner (approximately ¥1,600 billion);

2) Utilize settlement surplus in the general account when the surplus is larger than the expected settlement surplus (approximately ¥900 billion). The MOD/SDF will secure financial resources virtually such as by thoroughly implementing further optimization and rationalization of defense buildup.

The expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this program amount to approximately ¥43,500 billion (excluding the amount corresponding to payments for the period outside of the program that contribute to improving project efficiency, such as maintenance), and the future obligation for each fiscal year is to be managed appropriately.

In addition, to secure financial resources for the stable sustainment of defense capabilities after FY2027 as well as for covering this program from FY2023 to FY2027, necessary measures will be implemented in both expenditure and revenue areas, such as the reform in government expenditure, using settlement surplus, creation of defense buildup funds utilizing non-tax revenues, and tax measures.
In order to reduce the impact on Okinawa Prefecture and other local communities, specific measures regarding the review of the U.S. military force posture in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related projects will be steadily implemented.

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### Notes

Fig. II-4-1-2 (Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 1 (Targets for Fundamentally Reinforced Defense Capabilities and Timeline for Achievement)); Fig. II-4-1-3 (Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 2 (Procurement Quantities of Major Defense Equipment)); Fig. II-4-1-4 (Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 3 (Each SDF Service’s Formation and Equipment Quantities in Approximately Ten Years)); Fig. II-4-1-5 (Changes in the Annex Tables of the NDPG and Annex Table 3 of the DBP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fields</th>
<th>By 5 years until FY 2027 (*)</th>
<th>Approx. 10 Years Later</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stand-Off Defense Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquire practical capability to operate stand-off missiles</td>
<td>Acquire capabilities to operate more advanced stand-off missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure required sufficient quantities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Air and Missile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Capabilities</td>
<td>Reinforce capability to respond to Hypersonic Weapons</td>
<td>Reinforce wide-area air defense capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforce capability to respond to miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)</td>
<td>More efficient and effective UAV countermeasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned Defense Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expand the use of UAV to strengthen capabilities to practically operate</td>
<td>Reinforce capability to control multiple unmanned assets simultaneously, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Domain Operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities/Civil Protection</td>
<td>Reinforce Space Domain Awareness (SDA), cybersecurity capabilities,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and electromagnetic domain capabilities, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence-related Functions</td>
<td>Accelerate decision-making through the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), etc., while strengthening the resiliency of the network</td>
<td>Reinforce persistent information gathering and sharing postures, while enhancing information gathering and analysis capabilities by application of AI, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Deployment Capabilities</td>
<td>Reinforce the SDF’s transportation and supply capabilities (deployment/ civil protection), including enhancement of the SDF’s transportation assets and use of PFI vessels, etc.</td>
<td>More efficient and effective UAV countermeasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure enhanced transportation and supply capabilities by improving supply centers, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability and Resiliency</td>
<td>Increase quantity of ammunitions and missiles</td>
<td>Maintain and ensure adequate inventory of ammunitions and missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure maximum operational availability of equipment under maintenance</td>
<td>Maintain the operational rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve the resiliency of defense facilities for contingencies</td>
<td>Further improve the resiliency of defense facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure required ammunition depots, etc.</td>
<td>Further secure ammunition depots and other facilities commensurate with ammunition requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Production and</td>
<td>Establish strong defense production base through measures to strengthen the supply chain, etc., Focused investment in equipment areas directly linked to future warfare, and a significant reduction in research and development periods</td>
<td>Maintain robust defense production base capable for realizing innovative equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological Bases</td>
<td>Secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources from a wide range of sources, including the private sector, by strengthening recruitment capabilities and establishing a new SDF personnel system</td>
<td>Acquire technologies for securing technological superiority in the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resource Base</td>
<td>Secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources from a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>wide range of sources, including the private sector, by strengthening</td>
<td>Further strengthen education and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>recruitment capabilities and establishing a new SDF personnel system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforce education and research (cyber and other domains, joint operations, medical)</td>
<td>Further strengthen education and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improvement of living and working environments and treatment by taking necessary measures against aging barracks and housing and eliminating equipment shortages</td>
<td>Foster an organizational environment in which all members can demonstrate their individual abilities while maintaining high morale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Accelerate investment in improving operational availability, securing ammunition, and fortifying key defense facilities to maximize the use of existing equipment, while focusing on fundamentally strengthening core areas of future defense capabilities, such as stand-off defense and unmanned asset defense capabilities.*
### Defense Buildup Program Appendix Table 2 (Procurement Quantities of Major Defense Equipment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Procurement Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Stand-off Defense Capabilities</td>
<td>Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surface-, ship-, and air-launched variants)</td>
<td>Surface-type 11 Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hypersonic Missile</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ship-to-surface cruise guided missile</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tomahawk</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities</td>
<td>Upgraded Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (modified)</td>
<td>14 Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aegis System-Equipped Vessels</td>
<td>2 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (E-2D)</td>
<td>5 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interceptor Missiles for Ballistic Missile</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defense (SM-3 Block IIA)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interceptor Missiles with Upgraded Capabilities (PAC-3MSE)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long-Range Ship-to-Air Missiles SM-6</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Unmanned Defense Capabilities</td>
<td>Various UAVs</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USV</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UGV</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UUV</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Cross-Domain Capabilities</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>12 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>5 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Vessel</td>
<td>10 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)</td>
<td>19 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighter (F-35A)</td>
<td>40 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighter (F-35B)</td>
<td>25 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighter Upgrade (F-15)</td>
<td>54 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft</td>
<td>1 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS)</td>
<td>2 sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2)</td>
<td>3 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Mobile Deployment Capabilities and Civil Protection</td>
<td>Transport Vessels</td>
<td>8 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Aircraft (C-2)</td>
<td>6 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aerial Refueling and Transport Aircraft (KC-46A, etc.)</td>
<td>13 aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REFERENCE:** Defense Buildup Program (DBP)

**URL:** https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_policy/basis/index.html
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Future Posture</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Defense Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Transport Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active-Duty Personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Operational Units</td>
<td>9 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Units</td>
<td>5 brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Units</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand-off Missile Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Transport Units</td>
<td>1 airborne brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol aircraft Units</td>
<td>1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Vessels Units (Destroyers and Minesweeper vessels)</td>
<td>6 groups (21 divisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Units</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol aircraft Units (Fixed-wing Patrol aircraft Units)</td>
<td>9 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned Vehicle Units</td>
<td>(4 divisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Warfare Units</td>
<td>2 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)</td>
<td>1 unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegis System Equipped Vessels</td>
<td>54 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Vessels</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Warning &amp; Control Units</td>
<td>4 Aircraft Control &amp; Warning Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Aircraft Units</td>
<td>1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Refueling/Transport Units</td>
<td>13 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td>2 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Domain Mission Units</td>
<td>4 groups (24 fire squadrons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Intelligence Units</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Equipment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft (Fighters)</td>
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(Note 1) 14 out of the 15 divisions/brigades are operated on the basis of rapid deployment.

(Note 2) Regarding the number of fighter aircraft units and fighters, necessary studies will be conducted by FY 2027 and necessary measures will be taken in order to further advance the quantitative enhancement of air capability. In this regard, the possibility of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles will be studied.
### Changes in the Annex Tables of the NDPG and Annex Table 3 of the DBP

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Section 2 Buildup of Defense Capability in FY2023

1 Basic Concept

The DBP calls for organically integrating capabilities in all domains, including the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains, in accordance with the NDS to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s multi-domain defense capabilities for the continuous implementation of flexible and strategic activities at all phases from peacetime to contingencies, and to focus on its opponents’ capabilities and new ways of warfare. This would allow Japan to take primary responsibility by FY2027, five years from now, for countering any invasion of Japan that occurs and disrupt and defeat the invasion while receiving support from its allies and others. This fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities focuses on seven key fields.

Firstly, in order to reinforce its deterrence capabilities and its capability to disrupt threats from as far away from the opponent’s threat envelope as possible in the interest of safeguarding the safety of its personnel to the greatest extent possible, Japan will reinforce its (i) stand-off defense capabilities. In addition, in order to respond appropriately to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats, it will reinforce its (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities.

Next, should deterrence fail and an invasion of Japan occurs, Japan will need to maintain its asymmetric edge by leveraging, in addition to stand-off defense capabilities and integrated air and missile defense capabilities, its manned as well as unmanned assets and gain superiority across domains such as underwater, surface of the water, and air. To this end, Japan will reinforce its (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain operation capabilities, and (v) command and control and intelligence-related functions.

Furthermore, to continue operating swiftly and tenaciously to crush its opponent’s will to invade, Japan will also reinforce its (vi) mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection, as well as its (vii) sustainability and resiliency in terms of securing ammunition and fuel, increasing the number of operationally available equipment, enhancing the resiliency of facilities, etc.

2 Buildup of Defense Capability in FY2023

For the buildup of defense capability in FY2023, by accumulating the initiatives required to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities by FY2027, the MOD/SDF has secured the contents and budget scale appropriate for the first fiscal year of the DBP.

Specifically, budgets for areas that constitute the core of Japan’s future defense capabilities, such as stand-off defense capabilities and unmanned defense capabilities, have been significantly increased. In addition, the necessary funding has also been secured for the reinforcement of its integrated air and missile defense capabilities; cross-domain operation capabilities, including in space and cyber domains; command and control and intelligence-related functions; mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection; sustainability and resiliency; defense production and technology bases, etc.

In particular, the MOD/SDF has expedited investments in improving operational availability of equipment and securing ammunition in order to maximize the use of existing equipment, as well as enhancing the resiliency of key defense facilities. The MOD/SDF has also secured the necessary funding for improving the living and working environments of SDF personnel. As a specific example, air conditioning, which has a direct impact on the health of SDF personnel and is in high demand by SDF units, is addressed to the greatest possible extent.

For details of the necessary defense-related

REFERENCE: Overview of FY2023 Budget
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/budget/yosan_gaiyo/index.html
increasingly severe fiscal conditions and other factors. In addition, Japan will strive to ensure even greater efficiency and streamlining in consideration of increasingly severe fiscal conditions and other factors.

### Fig. II–4–2–1

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<th>Outline</th>
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<td>○ Development of Upgraded Type12 SSM (surface-ship- and air-launched variants) and mass-production of the ground-launched type</td>
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<td>○ Research and mass-production of hyper velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands</td>
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<td>○ Development of upgraded hyper velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands</td>
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<td>○ Research of hypersonic weapons</td>
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<td>○ Acquisition of JASSM</td>
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<td>○ Acquisition of Tomahawk missiles and others</td>
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<td><strong>Integrated air and missile defense capabilities</strong></td>
<td>○ Introduction of Aegis System Equipped Vessel</td>
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<td>○ Development of upgraded type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (modified)</td>
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<td>○ Acquisition of SM-3 Block IA, SM-8, PAC-3 MSE and others</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Research for guided missile system respond to HGVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Improvement of capabilities of FPS-5, FPS-7, and JADGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of E-2D early warning aircraft (x 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of TPS-102A mobile warning and control radars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unmanned defense capabilities</strong></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of UUVs (middle range) enhanced functions type (x 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Demonstration of operation of utility/attack UUVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Demonstration of operation of ground reconnaissance/warning/surveillance USV and UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Research related to smaller UGVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of oceanographic observation UUVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of OZZ-5 mine-countermeasures UUVs and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-domain operation capabilities</strong></td>
<td>○ Precedence demonstration of common key technologies needed to utilize space domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Technical demonstration needed to improve capabilities to counter HGVs such as detecting and tracking them by utilizing satellites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of SDA satellites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Introduction of the Risk Management Framework (RMF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Reinforcing cyber-related units organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Reinforcing educational foundations for cyberspace personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Improving capabilities of Network Electronic Warfare Systems (NEWS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of high-power microwave (HPM) radiation systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of 26 new wheeled armored personnel carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Procurement of type-16 mobile combat vehicles (x 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1) (x 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of SH-60K (enhanced capability) patrol helicopters (x 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Building of destroyers (x 2), patrol vessels (x 4) and a submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ F-35A (x 8) and F-35B (x 8) fighter jets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of UH-60J rescue helicopters (x 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Upgrade of F-15 fighter jets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command and control and intelligence-related functions</strong></td>
<td>○ Enhance command control functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Strengthen functions such as intelligence collection and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Responding to Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection</strong></td>
<td>○ Building of small class vessels (x 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of C-2 transport aircraft (x 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of UH-2 utility helicopters (x 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of MCH-101 mine-sweeping and transport helicopters (x 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Acquisition of various trucks and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability and resilience</strong></td>
<td>○ Procurement of various ammunition necessary for continuous unit operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Maintenance and upgrade expenditures for equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Securing ammunition storage facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Improvement of resiliency of SDF facilities and others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities will proceed through the systematic buildup of capabilities across the following seven pillars: (i) stand-off defense capabilities, (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, (iii) unmanned defense capabilities, (iv) cross-domain operation capabilities, (v) command and control and intelligence-related functions, (vi) mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection, and (vii) sustainability and resiliency. For the defense-related expenditures for FY2023, by accumulating the initiatives required to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities within the next five years, the MOD/SDF has secured the contents and budget scale appropriate for the first fiscal year of the newly established DBP (Year 1 budget for the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities).

The annual budget expenditure includes ¥6,600.1 billion (year-on-year increase of ¥1,421.3 billion (27.4%)) allocated for DBP-related expenditures, an amount that rises to ¥6,821.9 billion when U.S. Force realignment-related expenses are included, with the “substantial increase of the defense budget” having been secured. In addition, future obligation concerning new contracts (new programs) includes ¥7,067.6 billion (2.9 times that of the previous fiscal year) allocated for DBP-related expenditures. Contracts will be fulfilled in the first fiscal year as much as possible so that the necessary equipment can be delivered to each unit for operation as expeditiously as possible.

Specifically, budgets for areas that constitute the core of Japan’s future defense capabilities, such as “stand-off defense capabilities” and “unmanned defense capabilities,” have been significantly increased. At the same time, the MOD/SDF has expedited investments in improving the operational availability of equipment and securing ammunition in order to maximize the use of existing equipment, as well as enhancing the resiliency of key defense facilities (including the construction of key command centers underground and development of barracks, etc.).

In addition, the second supplementary budget for FY2022 included ¥446.4 billion allocated for urgent expenditures required to strengthen the capability to respond to various disasters, reinforce the SDF’s infrastructure base, improve living and work environments, etc.

In allocating the budget for FY2023, programs for the buildup of defense capability that have hitherto been managed by being classified under one of the two categories of “procurement expenditures for major equipment, etc.” and “other expenditures” will now be classified under one of the 15 new categories for each staff office and organization. The resulting budget is allocated after having accumulated budget items with greater precision, which prevents issues of insufficient funding for expenditures related to ammunition, maintenance and upgrades, infrastructure, living and work environments, etc.
## Fig. II-4-3-1  
**Comparison between Defense-Related Expenditures of FY2022 and FY2023**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
<th>FY2023</th>
<th>Fiscal YOY growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual expenditure (note)</td>
<td>51,788</td>
<td>66,001</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and food provisions</td>
<td>21,740</td>
<td>21,969</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material expenses</td>
<td>30,048</td>
<td>44,032</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future obligation (note)</td>
<td>53,342</td>
<td>99,186</td>
<td>85.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New contracts</td>
<td>24,583</td>
<td>70,676</td>
<td>187.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing contracts</td>
<td>28,759</td>
<td>28,511</td>
<td>▲248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note 1) The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), etc. If these are included, the total amounts of defense-related expenditures are 5,400.5 billion yen for FY2022 and 6,821.9 billion yen for FY2023; and for future obligation, 5,864.2 billion yen for FY2022 and 10,717.4 billion yen for FY2023.

(Note 2) The budget amounts include expenditures pertaining to the Digital Agency.

(Note 3) Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding.

## Fig. II-4-3-2  
**Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures (Initial Budget)**

(Excluding SACO, reorganization, government aircraft, and building national resilience)

Including SACO, reorganization, government aircraft, and building national resilience

- Decrease for 10 consecutive years
- Increase for 11 consecutive years
High-Priority Projects

1 Improving Operational Availability and Securing Ammunition

In order to eliminate parts shortages and increase the number of operationally available equipment, the allocation for sustainment and maintenance expenditures for equipment (material expenses (contract basis)) will be ¥2,035.5 billion (1.8 times that of the previous fiscal year), and in order to secure the various ammunition required for continuous unit operations, the allocation for ammunition procurement expenditures (material expenses (contract basis)) will be ¥828.3 billion (3.3 times
that of the previous fiscal year). This will fundamentally reinforce Japan’s sustainability and resiliency.

2 Improving the Resiliency of SDF Facilities

The allocation for facility improvements (material expenses (contract basis)) will be ¥504.9 billion (3.1 times that of the previous fiscal year), which will be used to expedite improvements of the resiliency of SDF facilities. In particular, measures will be implemented with an intensive focus on reinforcing the SDF’s infrastructure base (airfields, ports, etc.) as well as earthquake proofing and addressing the aging of SDF facilities (buildings, etc.) based on the “Actions Based on the Five-Year Acceleration Measures for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation, and Building National Resilience.”

3 Research and Development

The allocation for research and development expenditures (material expenses (contract basis)) will be ¥896.8 billion (3.1 times that of the previous fiscal year) in order to make intensive investments in the areas of equipment and technology with direct connections to future ways of warfare, including stand-off defense capabilities, capabilities to counter HGVs, and capabilities to counter drone and swarm attacks, etc., while developing next-generation fighter aircraft in a steady manner.

4 Improving the Living and Work Environments of SDF personnel

The allocation for the living and work environments (equipment, daily consumables, clothing, housing, etc.) of SDF personnel (material expenses (contract basis)) will be ¥269.3 billion (2.5 times that of the previous fiscal year) in order to make intensive improvements in this regard. Specifically, air conditioning, which has a direct impact on the health of SDF personnel and is

![Fig. II-4-3-5](Trends in Sustainment and Maintenance Expenditures for Equipment and Ammunition Development Expenditures); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 6 (Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives to Ensure War Sustainability)

![Fig. II-4-3-6](Trends in Facility Improvement Expenditures (Excluding Housing)); Part III, Chapter 1, Section 6 (Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives to Ensure War Sustainability)

![Fig. II-4-3-7](Changes in Research & Development Expenditure); Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 2 (Reinforcing Defense Technology Base)
highly needed by SDF units, will be addressed to the greatest possible extent.

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**Fig. II-4-3-6** Trends in Facility Improvement Expenditures (Excluding Housing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>1,587</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>5,049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The amount for FY2022 budget includes the FY2021 supplementary budget.

**Fig. II-4-3-7** Changes in Research & Development Expenditure

Unit: 100 million yen

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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>2,116</td>
<td>2,911</td>
<td>8,968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

3 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures

1 Classification by expenses

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into “personnel and food provision expenses,” which covers items such as wages and meals for SDF personnel, and “material expenses,” which finance the repair and maintenance of equipment, the purchase of fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel and the
procurement of equipment and others. Material expenses are further classified into “obligatory outlay expenses,” which are paid based on contracts concluded in previous fiscal years, and “general material expenses,” which are paid under current-year contracts. Material expenses are also referred to as “program expenses,” and since general material expenses include repair costs for equipment, education and training expenses for personnel, and the purchase of fuel, they are referred to also as “activity expenses.”

Personnel and food provision expenses as well as obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 70% of the total defense-related budget. The remaining 30% of the budget includes spending for repairing equipment and for implementing measures to mitigate the impact on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan. As such, a high percentage of the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes.

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into “personnel and food provision expenses,” which cover items such as wages and meals for SDF personnel; “equipment procurement expenses,” which cover the procurement of new equipment (e.g., tanks, destroyers, fighter aircraft, etc.); “maintenance expenses,” which cover items such as training and education of SDF personnel, fuel for vessels and aircraft, and equipment repairs; “facility improvement expenses,” which cover...
the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks; and “research and development expenses,” which cover investments in cutting-edge technologies.

In the defense-related expenditures for FY2023, the combined total of expenditures for the procurement of new equipment and for research and development exceeds 20%, while the percentage of expenditures for the maintenance of existing equipment has also increased. For reference, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries have aimed to allocate at least 20% of their respective defense budget to the procurement of major equipment and related research and development by 2024.

Apart from the annual budget expenditure, the future obligation concerning new contracts (the new future obligation arising in the applicable fiscal year) indicates payments for the following year and beyond. In the build-up of defense capabilities, it is common to take multiple years from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. Concerning these projects, while contracts covering multiple fiscal years are concluded in the applicable fiscal year, payments for the next fiscal year and beyond

![Fig. II-4-3-9](See Classification of Defense-Related Expenditures by Purpose of Use (FY2023))

**Future obligation concerning new contracts**

When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years. Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the government promises in advance at the time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future. Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond under such contracts, which extend for multiple years.

(Example) A case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract that runs for four years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract</th>
<th>Obligatory outlays</th>
<th>General materials</th>
<th>Activity expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY2023</td>
<td>1.885 billion yen (28.6%)</td>
<td>Remaining sum paid (6 billion yen)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2024</td>
<td>Obligatory outlays paid in part (1 billion yen)</td>
<td>Obligatory outlays paid in part (1 billion yen)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2025</td>
<td>Obligatory outlays paid in part (2 billion yen)</td>
<td>Obligatory outlays</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2026</td>
<td>Obligatory outlays</td>
<td>Obligatory outlays</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FY2023 Defense-related expenditures 6,600.1 billion yen

*Excluding U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses, etc.*
Optimization Efforts

In the DBP, substantive funds will be secured by means such as thoroughly ensuring greater efficiency and streamlining of the buildup of defense capability. The FY2023 budget aims to realize a cost reduction of approximately ¥257.2 billion by suspending the operation of equipment of declining importance, leveraging long-term contracts, and optimizing procurement through greater scrutiny of costs. Concrete initiatives introduced in the FY2023 budget are as follows.

- The operation of equipment of declining importance due to obsolescence, etc., will be suspended and its use terminated. (cost reduction of ¥5.2 billion)
- Prices and procurement costs will be reduced by enhancing predictability and encouraging efficient production by companies through the bulk purchase of equipment, including through long-term contracts. At the same time, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), in which consideration for the equipment is linked to the maintenance outcomes achieved, and other umbrella contracts will be expanded. (cost reduction of ¥145.6 billion)
- Procurement time and life cycle costs will be reduced by narrowing down the SDF’s proprietary specifications through modularization, communalization, and the use of civilian goods. (cost reduction of ¥21.4 billion)
- In addition to reviewing projects with low cost-effectiveness, the cost of each project will be carefully managed, and the utilization of external personnel from private contractors will be expanded. (cost reduction of ¥84.9 billion)
5 Comparison with Other Countries

It is not possible to accurately compare the amounts of defense budget of countries due to a number of factors: there is no internationally unified definition of defense budget in the first place; even if defense budget were publicly disclosed, their overall amount or their breakdown is sometimes unclear; and the budget system varies by country.

On such basis, if Japan’s defense-related expenditures and the defense budget of other countries officially published by each government were converted into dollar amounts using the purchasing power parity of each country reported by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the results would be as shown in Fig. II-4-3-11 (Comparison with Defense Budget of Major Countries [FY2022]).

NATO member countries and other countries have committed to spending under their defense budget that is commensurate with their respective economic capabilities in order to maintain the security environment. In the case of Japan, looking at its defense budget as a percentage of GDP has a certain significance as an indicator for the reinforcement of its defense capabilities in light of changes in the security environment within the international community. In addition to the programs aimed at the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, Japan will supplement these efforts by reinforcing its comprehensive architecture for national defense through spending targeted at the JCG’s capabilities and PKO, research and development, the development of public infrastructure, etc. The necessary measures will be adopted to ensure that the combined budget level for the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and other supplementary measures reaches 2% of Japan’s current GDP in FY2022 by FY2027.

In addition, Fig. II-4-3-12 (Changes in Defense Budget of Major Countries) shows the trends in the defense budget of major countries since 1998.

Reference 14 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries)

5 A gauge that measures each country’s ability to purchase goods and services by taking into account their respective price levels. Although there also exists a method of converting their defense budget into dollar amounts at respective currency rates, their dollar-based defense budget calculated in this way do not necessarily reflect the precise value based on each country’s price levels.
Changes in Defense Budget in Major Countries

(Uunit: 10 billion USD)

Japan (2.3 times)
ROK (3.7 times)
Australia (4.8 times)
Russia (6.9 times)
China (11.9 times)
The United States (3.0 times)

(Note 1) Regarding the defense budget of the six countries, figures officially published by the government of each country were converted into US dollars amounts, using the purchasing power parity for each year (published by the OECD as of April 2023). Incidentally, the values for 2023 were converted into USD with the purchasing power parity for 2022, because the one for 2023 has not been published yet for now.

(Note 2) Japan’s defense-related expenditure shows its initial budget (excluding SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience, etc.)

(Note 3) The amount and year-on-year growth rate (figures rounded to one decimal place) for FY1998-FY2023 are indicated.
Section 1 National Security Council

Japan’s security environment is the most severe and complex since the end of World War II, and the security challenges that it needs to address are becoming more serious. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to carry forward the policies pertaining to national security from a strategic perspective under strong political leadership with the Prime Minister at its core. For this reason, the National Security Council, which was established in the Cabinet to provide a platform to discuss important matters with regard to Japan’s security, has been serving as a control tower for foreign, defense, and economic policies pertaining to national security. Since its establishment in December 2013, the Council has met 318 times (as of the end of March 2023). The NSS, NDS, and DBP formulated in December 2022 have also been deliberated and approved in this National Security Council.

The National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat provides constant support to the National Security Council as its secretariat. The Secretariat is also tasked with the planning, design, and overall coordination of basic guidelines and important matters with regard to foreign, defense, and economic policies pertaining to national security. In recent years, an “Economy Security Team” was set up in April 2020 to address economic security challenges. The Secretariat is provided with human resources and information by the ministries and agencies closely related in terms of policy, therefore, there are many civilians and uniformed personnel seconded from the Ministry of Defense (MOD) engaging in the planning and design of policies, with their expertise. In addition, global military trends and other information are shared in a timely manner.

The enhanced ability to formulate national security policies has led to the systematic alignment of Japan’s national security, and to the provision of a direction.
for policies with regard to new security challenges. Furthermore, individual defense policies are formulated and efforts to accelerate decision-making are made based on the basic guidelines discussed at the National Security Council, and this is contributing significantly to improved development and implementation of policies within the MOD.

See Fig. II-5-1 (Organization of the National Security Council)
Organization of the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/SDF consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces. The MOD and the SDF refer to the same organization. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, the term “SDF” refers to the operational aspects of the organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan.
### Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense

#### Section 2

### Outline of the MOD/SDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Outline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Bureaus</strong></td>
<td>Responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the SDF (defense and security affairs, basic conduct of the SDF [political and administrative affairs such as planning and drafting of laws and regulations or government-level policies], personnel affairs, budgets, etc.)&lt;br&gt;Composed of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, Bureau of Personnel and Education, and Bureau of Policies for Regional Society, in addition to the Minister's Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Staff</strong></td>
<td>A staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF&lt;br&gt;Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs concerning joint operation and making action plans&lt;br&gt;The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Staff, JS and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Staff, JS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Staff Office</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Maritime Staff Office</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Air Staff Office</strong></td>
<td>Staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning the duties of each SDF unit&lt;br&gt;Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs of each SDF unit and making plans on buildup of defense capabilities, education and training, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Self-Defense Force</strong></td>
<td>Ground Component Command&lt;br&gt;Regional Armies&lt;br&gt;Divisions and Brigades&lt;br&gt;Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and anti-aircraft artillery groups)&lt;br&gt;There are five regional armies, each mainy in charge of the defense of their respective regions&lt;br&gt;Composed of combat units, combat support units, logistics support units and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime Self-Defense Force</strong></td>
<td>Self-Defense Fleet&lt;br&gt;Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force&lt;br&gt;Regional Districts&lt;br&gt;There are five regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Self-Defense Force</strong></td>
<td>Air Defense Command&lt;br&gt;Primary responsibility for general air defense duties&lt;br&gt;Primary responsibility for general air defense duties&lt;br&gt;Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Defense Academy</strong></td>
<td>An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel&lt;br&gt;Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Defense Medical College</strong></td>
<td>An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel&lt;br&gt;Offers a graduate medical course equivalent to PhD programs at medical universities based on the School Education Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Institute for Defense Studies</strong></td>
<td>Organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense&lt;br&gt;Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF&lt;br&gt;Conducts research and studies on security&lt;br&gt;Conducts research and compiles data on military history&lt;br&gt;Management and publication of data on military history&lt;br&gt;Educates and trains SDF personnel and other senior officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense Intelligence Headquarters</strong></td>
<td>Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects, analyzes and reports on information related to Japan's national security&lt;br&gt;Collects various military information including imagery and geographical information, signal data, and publicized information; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides intelligence to related organizations within the ministry and relevant ministries and agencies&lt;br&gt;Consists of the Directorate for Administration, Directorate for Planning, Directorate for Joint Intelligence, Directorate for Assessment, Directorate for Geospatial Intelligence, and Directorate for Signal Intelligence, as well as six communication sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance</strong></td>
<td>An organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)</strong></td>
<td>Local Bureaus in charge of comprehensive defense administration in regional areas&lt;br&gt;Ensures understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conducts cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base, and procurement of equipment&lt;br&gt;Consists of eight Regional Defense Bureaus (Hokkaido, Tohoku, North Kanto, South Kanto, Kinki-Chubu, Chugoku-Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency</strong></td>
<td>An external bureau in charge of effective and efficient procurement of defense equipment and international defense equipment and technology cooperation&lt;br&gt;Implementation of constant project management throughout the life cycle of defense equipment from an integrated perspective&lt;br&gt;Smooth and prompt reflection of each unit's operational needs in equipment procurement&lt;br&gt;Proactive initiatives in new areas (further internationalization of defense equipment and investments in advanced technological research, etc.)&lt;br&gt;Achievement of procurement reform and, at the same time, maintenance and strengthening of defense production and of the technological and industrial bases of defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Location of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2022)
2 Systems to Support the Minister of Defense

The Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters related to the defense of Japan as the competent minister, and is in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Law. The Minister is supported by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two), and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. There are also the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of Defense, and the Defense Council, which deliberates on basic principles concerning affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs.

Moreover, the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air Staff Office, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), as an external bureau, have been established in the MOD. The Internal Bureaus of the MOD are responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the SDF. The Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal Bureaus, along with the Commissioner of ATLA who is in charge of defense equipment administration, support the Minister of Defense by providing assistance from a policy perspective.

The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides centralized support for the operations of the SDF for the Minister of Defense from a military expert’s perspective. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) acting as the top ranking expert advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these services.

In this manner, the MOD has ensured that the support for the Minister from a policy perspective and the support for the Minister from a military expert’s perspective are provided in a well-balanced manner like the two wheels of a cart, so to speak, in order for the Minister of Defense to appropriately make decisions.

3 Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas

The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branches in charge of comprehensive defense administration.

In addition to implementing measures to promote harmony between defense facilities and regional societies and inspecting equipment, the Regional Defense Bureaus adopt various measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local governments and local residents towards the activities of the MOD/SDF.

2 Joint Operations System of the SDF

In order to rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint operations system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are operated integrally. Furthermore, it works towards building an architecture that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations in domains such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.

1 Outline of Joint Operations System

(1) Role of Chief of Joint Staff

a. The Chief of Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective.

b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations
of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff, and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister’s commands and orders are delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond.

(2) Relationship between Chief of Joint Staff and Other Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability, and education and training.

In line with the NDS, it is necessary to build a system that is capable of seamless cross-domain operations at all phases from peacetime to contingencies, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations. To this end, a permanent Joint Headquarters will be expeditiously established through reviewing the existing organization to facilitate the centralized command of each SDF service. Issues such as how to ensure that it fulfills the necessary functions and has an effective chain of command and control, including the approach to command by the Minister of Defense and support for the Minister, as well as how the command of units within the SDF should be organized, are examined.

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1 This applies to cases in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specific duty or when the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure based on the stipulations of Article 22, paragraphs 1 or 2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, and refers to units made up of two or more units from the GSDF, MSDF, or ASDF. In order to swiftly and effectively execute various missions such as responding to ballistic missiles and large-scale disasters, it is necessary to operate the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF in an integrated manner. To achieve this, a joint task force spanning the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF is organized under a single commander.
As the security environment surrounding Japan rapidly intensifies, it is necessary to promptly establish a structure to realize seamless cross-domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingencies, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of the joint operations of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF.

For this reason, as a more future-oriented approach to joint operations, the MOD/SDF have examined approaches to an integrated architecture for the proper execution of the Minister’s commands and orders from peacetime. Accordingly, the MOD/SDF has decided to promptly establish the Permanent Joint Headquarters.

Going forward, in preparation for the establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters, the MOD/SDF is examining issues such as how to ensure necessary functions and effective chains of command and control, including the approach to command and supervision by the Minister of Defense and support for the Minister, as well as the approach to the command of units within the SDF.

See Fig. II-5-2-5 (Operational Architecture of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces)
This chapter gives an outline of the institutional framework for the Government’s responses to various contingencies as well as the main operations of the SDF.

responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Act\(^1\) is aimed at establishing a system to respond to Armed Attack Situations or Expected Armed Attack Situations ("Armed Attack Situations, etc.")\(^2\) and Survival-Threatening Situations\(^3\), thereby contributing to the peace and independence of Japan as well as the safety of the country and the people. The Act specifies items that should be stipulated as basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response Plan), as well as the responsibilities of national and local governments, for responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations.

The Government will take action in accordance with the Act in the event of an armed attack, such as a missile attack on Japan or an invasion of its remote islands as described below in Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4, or an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan, which in turn poses a clear risk of threatening Japan’s survival and of fundamentally overturning the people’s rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.

1 Armed Attack Situations, etc. and Survival-Threatening Situations

In situations such as an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the Government will seek a Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law, which stipulates the following items, and request approval by the Diet.

a. The Following Items concerning Situations that Need to Be Dealt with:

   (1) Sequence of events of the situation, the confirmation of occurrence of an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, and the facts that support this confirmation

   (2) When the situation is confirmed as an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the reason why there are no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and the use of force is necessary to respond to the situation

b. An Overall Plan Related to the Response

c. Important Matters Related to the Response Measures

Important matters related to the response measures include the issuance of defense operation orders or requests for Diet approval to issue such orders, as described below, in the event of an Armed Attack Situation, or a Survival-Threatening Situation.

2 Responses of the SDF

The Prime Minister can issue a Defense Operation order to the whole or part of the SDF when it is deemed

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1 Official title: Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations

2 "Armed Attack Situations" refers to situations in which an armed attack against Japan from outside occurs or in which it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of an armed attack. “Expected Armed Attack Situations” refers to situations in which an armed attack is not yet made but the tension increased and an armed attack is expected. Both situations are collectively called “Armed Attack Situations, etc.”

3 A "Survival-Threatening Situation" means a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses a clear risk of threatening Japan’s survival and of overturning people’s rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness fundamentally
necessary for the defense of Japan in Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations. Prior Diet approval is required for a Defense Operation order in principle. The SDF under Defense Operation duty is allowed to exercise the use of force only when the “three conditions for ‘the use of force’” are satisfied.

3 Civil Protection

The Civil Protection Law specifies the responsibilities of the national and local governments as well as measures for evacuation, relief, and responding to armed attack disasters in order to protect the lives, bodies, and property of the people and to minimize the impact on the livelihood of the people in an Armed Attack Situation, etc., and during an emergency response. If the Minister of Defense deems it unavoidable after receiving a request from prefectural governors or a request from the Task Force Chief, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units, etc., upon approval from the Prime Minister, to implement civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures (including assisting with the evacuation of residents and immediate restoration).

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4 A situation where actions that may kill or injure a large number of people through methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack have occurred or where it is deemed a clear and present threat that such actions may occur, and which necessitates an emergency response by the state.

5 Official title: Act Concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc.

6 The Prime Minister assumes the position of the Director of the Crisis Management Headquarters, but these positions are regulated as separate entities.
The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security aims to strengthen cooperation with foreign countries to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security (i.e., situations that may result in a direct armed attack on Japan if left unchecked) by carrying out measures such as logistics support activities and thereby contributing to the peace and security of Japan in the event of such situations. The Law provides the coverage and response measures as follows:

1 **Coverage**

The armed forces, etc., responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, which the SDF may support, are “U.S. Armed Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” “armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the UN Charter” and “other similar organizations.”

2 **Response Measures to Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security**

Measures for responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security are: (1) logistics support activities, (2) search and rescue...
activities, (3) ship inspection operations, and (4) other measures necessary to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.

It is possible to implement response measures in foreign territories, but only when the foreign country concerned consents.

3 Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force

The following measures are set forth in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:

- Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where a combat is actually taking place. Regarding search and rescue operations, however, when stranded personnel have been located and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities as long as the safety of these units is ensured.
- the commanding officers of the SDF units order a temporary suspension of activities if acts of combat operations occur or are expected to occur at or near the site of their activities.
- the Minister of Defense designates the area for the activities, and if changes the area or order to suspend the activities it is deemed difficult to carry out activities smoothly and safely in all or part of the area, the Minister must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there.

4 Relationship between Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Survival-Threatening Situations

While both situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security and survival-threatening situations are different legal concepts that are determined separately based on the requirements set forth in the respective laws, they share common requirements such as the likelihood that Japan may be embroiled in a war and the extent of damage that may be suffered by Japanese nationals. In other words, survival-threatening situations may be conceptually subsumed under situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Accordingly, depending on how a situation evolves, a situation that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security may also satisfy the requirements of a survival-threatening situation and be determined as such.

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8 Operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a change in sea route, destination port, or destination, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade and other economic activities to which Japan is a party, conducted based on UN Security Council resolutions or with the consent of the flag state (the state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). Operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a change in sea route, destination port, or destination, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade and other economic activities to which Japan is a party, conducted based on UN Security Council resolutions or with the consent of the flag state (the state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea).
3 Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount to an Armed Attack

1 Public Security Operations

(1) Public Security Operations by Order
In the event of an indirect aggression or another emergency situation, the Prime Minister can order the whole or part of the SDF to deploy if it is deemed impossible to maintain public security with the general police force. In this instance, in principle, the Prime Minister must bring the order to the Diet for deliberation, and request for its approval within twenty days from the day the order has been given.

(2) Public Security Operations by Request
Upon consulting with the Public Safety Commission of the prefecture concerned, the governor of that prefecture can request the Prime Minister to dispatch units, etc., of the SDF if it is deemed unavoidable as the situation will have a serious influence on public security. Following such a request, the Prime Minister can order the SDF to mobilize when a situation calls for such action.

2 Maritime Security Operations
When there is a special need to protect lives or property or maintain public security at sea, the Minister of Defense can order the SDF units to take necessary actions at sea upon approval by the Prime Minister.

3 Counter-Piracy Operations
When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to conduct operations to deal with piracy acts at sea upon approval by the Prime Minister.

4 Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects
In cases where ballistic missiles or other objects are flying to Japan as an armed attack or flying to Japan in a Survival-Threatening Situation, and where the “Three
Conditions” are met, the SDF can respond with the defense operation. In cases where ballistic missiles or other objects are flying to Japan but which are not found as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can take the following measures:

(1) If the Minister of Defense judges that ballistic missiles or other objects are likely to fly to Japan and that it is necessary to prevent damage to human lives and property due to its fall in the territory of Japan, the Minister, upon the approval of the Prime Minister, can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles or other objects actually flying to the country in the airspace over the territory of Japan or the high seas.

(2) In addition to the cases of (1) above, there may be cases where the situation suddenly changes with little information available on the launch, for example, and the Minister of Defense cannot have time to obtain approval from the Prime Minister. In preparation for such cases, the Minister of Defense may create an emergency response manual beforehand and obtain approval from the Prime Minister. Following the emergency response manual, the Minister of Defense can order, for a specified period of time, the SDF units to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects in the airspace over the territory of Japan or the high seas when such objects are actually flying to the country.

The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take the necessary measures to make the intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (by guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, using weapons, etc.) when a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law, the provisions of the Aviation Law, or other relevant laws and regulations.

The Minister of Defense can transport Japanese nationals and others in need of life or physical protection to a safe area if requested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the event of emergency situation in a foreign country. Considering the experiences including the transport of Japanese nationals from Afghanistan in August 2021, the SDF Law was amended in 2022 (enacted and put into force in April 2022); this amendment removed the restriction on the means of transportation which required to use the government aircraft and reviewed the safety requirements for implementation. In addition, the scope of transportation recipients was expanded to include some foreign nationals who are (1) spouses and children of Japanese nationals, (2) honorary consuls-general, honorary consuls, and local personnel of overseas diplomatic missions, and (3) local employees of independent administrative institutions.

The Minister of Defense can also “rescue” Japanese nationals and others by protecting or recovering them upon request from and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs if there is a threat of harm to life or body and all of the following are satisfied:

a. Competent authorities of the country concerned are currently working on maintaining public safety and order, and no acts of combat are confirmed to take place in the areas where rescue measures are taken;

b. The country concerned provides consent for the SDF to take the rescue measures including the use of weapons; and

c. Coordination and cooperation with the competent authorities of the country concerned is expected to be ensured to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers.

Based on Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, SDF personnel
may protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces and other forces currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF. The basic principles of this Article and the involvement of the Cabinet in applying this Article are set forth in “The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law,” approved by the National Security Council, which is outlined below:

(1) Purpose of Article 95-2
Protection under this Article can be applied to weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces and other forces, as well as equivalent organizations currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF (including bilateral/multilateral exercises but excluding activities taking place at the site of actual combat). This Article allows very passive and limited use of weapons to the minimum extent necessary to protect important material means which constitute the defense capability of Japan from infringements not amounting to an armed attack.

(2) Activities that Contribute to the Defense of Japan
“Activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” are determined on a case-by-case basis and may include the following: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities including ballistic missile alert; (2) transportation and logistics in situations that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security; and (3) bilateral/multilateral exercises to enhance capabilities required for defending Japan.

(3) Decision on Protection Missions
When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the U.S. Forces and other forces, the Minister makes an independent decision whether the relevant activities fall under “activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” and whether protection is necessary, by considering the objective and details of the activities, capability of the unit, and surrounding circumstances as well as the impacts on the SDF’s regular duties.

(4) Involvement of the Cabinet
Requests for protection from the U.S. Forces and other forces should be deliberated by the NSC prior to the decision by the Minister of Defense in the following cases. However, in urgent cases, the Minister should promptly report to the NSC.
(1) First request from the U.S Forces and other forces.
(2) The request for protection in the territory of a third country.
(3) Other requests deemed particularly important.
In addition, in case protection is necessary under the situations that have an important influence, the necessity should be approved by the Cabinet following the inclusion in the Basic Plan and the deliberation by the NSC.

4 Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others

1 Disaster Relief Dispatches
In principle, a Disaster Relief Dispatch is conducted as follows: prefectural governors or other officials request the Minister of Defense, or an officer designated by the Minister, to dispatch SDF units, etc., in the event of a natural disaster; the Minister or the designated officer will make a judgment based on a comprehensive evaluation of three conditions (urgency, non-substitutability, and publicness nature) and dispatch the units if it is deemed necessary for the SDF to respond to the disaster. This procedure is based on the idea that prefectural governors and other officials should grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch.

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11 The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster relief dispatch. With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake disaster prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may take measures such as evacuation (Article 4 of the Police Duties Execution Law) based on Article 94 of the SDF Law (Authority in Disaster Relief Dispatch, etc.); (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake disaster prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary.
2 Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch and Nuclear Disaster Relief Dispatch

When a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes, or when a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order the dispatch of units upon the request of the Director of the Seismic Disaster Warning Headquarters or the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 7-1 (Response to Large-Scale Disasters, etc. (Including Response to COVID-19))

5 Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community

1 Responding to Joint International Peace Response Situation

Under the International Peace Support Act, in order to ensure peace and security of the international community, Japan can cooperate with or support the armed forces of other countries engaged in operations for international peace and security on the occasion of Joint International Peace Response Situation. From the perspective of seamless responses to any situation, the International Peace Support Law, enacted as a general law, allows Japan to conduct operations more expeditiously and effectively, making it possible to proactively contribute to international peace and security on Japan’s own initiative.

(1) Requirements

Either of the following UN resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security Council) are required for Japan to cooperate with or support the armed forces of other countries.

a. Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize the country of support recipient to respond to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community
b. Other than (a), resolutions that acknowledge the situations as a threat to or disruption of peace and call on UN member states to respond to the situations concerned

(2) Response Measures

The following response measures can be implemented in Joint International Peace Response Situation.

a. Cooperation and Support Activities

Provision of supplies and services to the armed forces of other countries (supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services, and construction).

Similar to the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, the international Peace Support Act allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft preparing for combat operations while the provision of weapons is excluded.”

b. Search and Rescue Activities

c. Ship Inspection Operations (Those Set Forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law)

(3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force

The following measures are set forth in order to avoid integration with the use of force by other countries and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:

- Japan does not engage in activities in the areas where a combat is currently taking place. However, when a victim has already been found and rescue operations have been commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities as long as their...
safety is ensured.

● the commanding officers of the SDF units, order a temporary suspension of activities if acts of combat occur or are expected to occur at or near the site of their activities.

● the Minister of Defense designates the area for the activities, and changes the area or order to suspend the activities if it is deemed difficult to carry out activities smoothly and safely in all or part of the area.

2 International Peace Cooperation Assignments

The International Peace Cooperation Act\textsuperscript{16} is aimed at active contribution by Japan to international peace efforts centered on the United Nations. The Act serves to set forth a framework for the implementation of International Peace Cooperation Assignments so that Japan can properly make contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO)\textsuperscript{17} and Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security\textsuperscript{18}.

(1) Requirements for Participation

\textbf{a. UN PKO}

The so-called “Five Principles for Participation in PKO”\textsuperscript{19} constitute Japan’s basic policy for participating in UN PKO. In addition, the acceptance consent of countries to which the activities belong must be stably maintained throughout the period of the activities if the SDF conducts so-called “safety-ensuring” activities or “rush-to-guard” operations.

\textbf{b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security}

Japan can participate in Internationally Cooperated Operations for Peace and Security whose nature or details are similar to those of UN PKO, when Five Principles for Participation are met and one of the following exists.

(1) Based on resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the UN

(2) At the requests of any of the following international organizations:

● The UN

● Organs established by the UN General Assembly or Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes of the UN including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and those specified by a Cabinet Order

● Regional organizations prescribed in the Article 52 of the UN Charter or organs established by multilateral treaties including the European Union and those specified by a Cabinet Order, acknowledged to have the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities.

(3) At the requests of the countries to which the activities belong (limited to only those cases that are supported by any of the principal organs of the UN prescribed in the Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter).

(2) Description of Tasks

● Ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian relief operations for affected people

● Monitoring, stationing, patrols, inspections at checkpoints, and security escorts to ensure the security of specified areas including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against the lives, bodies, and property of local residents, affected people, and other populations in need of protection (so-called “safety-ensuring” operations)

● Protection of the lives and bodies of parties engaged in international peace cooperation operations or providing support for such operations in response to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to the lives and bodies of such individuals related to these operations occur or are imminent (so-called “rush-to-guard” operations)

● Provision of advice or guidance for establishing or reestablishing organizations of the Government related to national Defense and other organizations

● Essential work for the organizations undertaking the

\textsuperscript{16} Official title: Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations

\textsuperscript{17} “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” refer to operations that are conducted under the governing framework of the United Nations to respond to conflicts and maintain international peace and security, which are implemented by the United Nations and two or more participating countries at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with the consent of the disputing parties.

\textsuperscript{18} “Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security” refer to operations under a framework not overseen by the UN to respond to conflicts and maintain international peace and security, provided that such operations are implemented under the coordination of two or more participating countries and with the consent of the disputing parties.

\textsuperscript{19} (1) A ceasefire agreement shall have been reached among the disputing parties; (2) Consent for the UN PKO and Japan’s participation in it shall have been obtained from the countries to which the areas of those operations belong as well as from the disputing parties; (3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality without favoring any of the disputing parties; (4) Should any of the above requirements are no longer satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps participating from Japan may terminate their activities; and (5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary in principle to protect the lives of personnel dispatched.
supervision and coordination of the activities, including planning, coordination, collecting and organizing of information at the Headquarters Office.

(3) Others

a. Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the UN (Dispatch of UN PKO Force Commanders)

Uniformed SDF personnel may be dispatched to be engaged in tasks of the UN duties performed by SDF units or units of other armed forces at the request of the UN and with the consent of the Prime Minister. The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consents for UN PKO from the hosting countries and the disputing parties if any are expected to be maintained stably throughout the period of dispatch and where circumstances are unlikely to cause the suspension of the dispatch.

b. Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Forces and other forces for their operations to cope with a large-scale disaster

SDF can provide the Armed Forces of the U.S., Australia, the U.K., Canada, France or India with supplies or services upon their request when they are located in a same area as the units of the SDF to undertake operations to cope with large-scale disasters, to the extent it does not interfere with International Peace Cooperation Assignments, etc., of the SDF.

3 International Disaster Relief Activities

The Japan Disaster Relief Team Law stipulates the measures necessary for dispatching the Japan Disaster Relief Team to undertake rescue activities and provide medical services in response to large-scale disasters overseas, especially in developing regions.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs may consult the Minister of Defense with regard to the operations of SDF units if there is a special need. The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to carry out rescue and medical activities as well as transportation of personnel and supplies based on the consultation above.

20 The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consents for UN PKO from the hosting countries and the disputing parties if any are expected to be maintained stably throughout the period of dispatch and where circumstances are unlikely to cause the suspension of the dispatch.

21 Official title: Law Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team

22 The Japan Disaster Relief Team is not to be dispatched if the use of weapons is necessary to protect the lives and bodies of personnel and necessary equipment engaged in international disaster relief activities or related transportation when dangers exist due to the security situation and other factors in the affected country. Therefore, members of the team will not carry weapons which the country concerned for the purpose of protecting the lives and bodies of personnel and necessary equipment engaged in international disaster relief operations.
The Ministry of Defense (the MOD) and the Self Defense Forces (the SDF) are national administrative entities and obviously require a legal basis in carrying out their respective duties. The Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense defines the administrative scope of the Ministry of Defense, and Article 5 of the Act states that the Self Defense Forces Law determines the duties, actions, and authority of the Self Defense Forces. The Self Defense Forces Law provides a list (similar to an index) of what the Self Defense Forces are allowed to do in accordance with specified procedures to address various situations.

Article 3 in the Self Defense Forces Law divides the duties of the Self Defense Forces into main duties (item 1 of the same article) and secondary duties (items 1 and 2 of the same article). Defense actions to defend Japan correspond to main duties, and only the Self Defense Forces can carry out these duties.

Secondary duties consist of “duties for maintaining public order as necessary” (secondary duties under item 1) and duties defined by other laws “to an extent that does not interfere with performance of the main duties” (secondary duties under item 2). The former includes public security operations that police entities cannot handle alone, maritime security operations, destruction measures against ballistic missiles and other weapons, disaster relief dispatches, and measures against intrusion of territorial airspace. The latter covers responses to situations that will have an important influence (logistics support activities), international peace cooperation activities (international peace cooperation operations and international disaster relief operations), and activities related to Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security (Cooperation and Support Activities, etc.). These main and secondary duties are jointly known as “inherent duties.”

Activities handled by the Self Defense Forces (the SDF) on the basis that it is appropriate to utilize skills, experience, and organizational functions cultivated by the Self Defense Forces over many years are known as “additional duties” (separate from “inherent duties”). These include transportation for national guests who visit Japan to attend a Summit meeting, consignments of public park ground-leveling and road constructions as part of education and training, and cooperation with athletic events, such as Olympic Games, Paralympic Games, and the National Sports Festival.

Overview of the Self Defense Forces’ duties

- **Defense of Japan**
  - (Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s peace, independence, and national security)

- **Sustaining public order**
  - (Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s public peace and protects the lives and assets of Japanese people (including mine disposal and Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas))

- **Responding to situations that will have an important influence**
  - (Activities that contribute to Japan’s peace and security through responses to situations that will have an important influence)

- **International peace cooperation activities**
  - (Activities that contribute to maintaining peace and security in international society, including Japan, through promotion of international cooperation)
Part III

Three Approaches to Achieve the Defense Objectives

Chapter 1: Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense

Chapter 2: Japan-U.S. Alliance

Chapter 3: Cooperation with Like-Minded Countries and Others
Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities and Reinforcing the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country

1 Significance of Defense Capability

Defense capabilities are the foundation of the defense of Japan and the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national security. They will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will be disrupted and defeated, thereby demonstrating Japan’s will and ability to defend itself to the end. In this sense, defense capabilities are not something that can be replaced by any other means. The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) exist as such defense capabilities essential to Japan.

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan, and the basis of Japan’s national security, is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihoods as well as Japan’s territorial land, airspace, and waters.

It goes without saying that Japan must defend itself through its own efforts. It is only when a nation has a strong will and makes efforts to protect itself that it can protect and support itself and its allies, etc., in times of emergency.

When threats materialize through a combination of capability and intention, difficulties arise in accurately ascertaining another party’s intention from an outside
perspective. If a nation’s decision-making process is opaque, there will always exist conditions under which threats may materialize.

In order to defend one’s own country from a nation with powerful military capabilities and the intention to launch aggression, it is necessary to have deterrence capabilities that make the other nation realize the difficulties of achieving unilateral changes to the status quo by force. It is also necessary to build one’s own capabilities, namely, defense capabilities, by focusing on the other nation’s capabilities and ensuring it does not harbor the intention to commit aggression.

Amid the most challenging and complex security environment since the start of the postwar period, Japan will directly face up to the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, with a focus on the capabilities of its opponents and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

In light of the above, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities and further accelerate its efforts to protect the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihoods from unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts.

2 Future Defense Capabilities

Japan has been building a Multi-domain Defense Force capable of conducting flexible and sustained activities through joint operations while organically integrating capabilities in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum domains with those in ground, maritime, and air domains.

However, in addition to traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land conducted through now, new ways of warfare have emerged that combine large-scale missile attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities; hybrid warfare, including information warfare such as false flag operations; the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum as well as asymmetric means of attack that leverage unmanned assets; and rhetoric that could be interpreted as open threats involving the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states. Therefore, Japan’s fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities must be able to respond to new ways of warfare.

Furthermore, with fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities, Japan must be able to take primary responsibility to disrupt and defeat any invasion of the country, which is a defense objective of Japan. In light of this, with regard to future defense capabilities, it is imperative for Japan to focus on the capabilities and ways of warfare of any opponents, fundamentally reinforce its capabilities for national defense more than ever before, and clearly demonstrate its intention to never tolerate any unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts at any point in time.

The functions and capabilities necessary to respond to new ways of warfare set forth in the NDS are as follows. Firstly, there are (1) stand-off defense capabilities and (2) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, which are capabilities that can block and eliminate invading forces from a long distance. Next, if deterrence were to fail, in addition to the aforementioned capabilities, there are (3) unmanned defense capabilities, (4) cross-domain operation capabilities, and (5) command and control and intelligence-related functions, which enable gaining superiority and preserving Japan’s asymmetric edge across various domains. Furthermore, there are (6) mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection as well as (7) sustainability and resiliency, which enable Japan to continue operating swiftly and persistently to crush any opponent’s will to invade.

Based on the above concepts, capabilities in all domains, including space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum, will be organically integrated to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s Multi-domain Defense Capabilities that enable the constant and continuous implementation of flexible and strategic activities at every stage from peacetime to emergencies.
its diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological capabilities, and systematically combining various policy means. To strengthen such whole-of-government efforts, it is essential to break down the stove-piping approach within the Government. This requires Japan to reinforce the comprehensive defense architecture that mobilizes its national power by taking the initiatives shown in Fig. III-1-1-2, an undertaking that is integral to supplementing the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.

See Fig. III-1-1-2 (Specific Initiatives to Reinforce the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country)

**Fig. III-1-1-2  Specific Initiatives to Reinforce the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country**

- **Operation of Situation Surveillance System**
  - Started in collaboration with JAXA [by courtesy of JAXA]

- **Dealing with saturation attacks with drones using high-output microwaves**
  - Utilization of cutting-edge technologies

- **Securing ammunition storage facilities**

- **Reinforcing coordination of SDF with Police and Japan Coast Guard**

- **Emblem symbolizing the cooperation between the MOD and local communities**
Section 2
Shaping a Security Environment that does not Tolerate Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force

1 Response to Illicit Ship-to-Ship Transfers

1 Basic Concept

It has been pointed out that North Korea is attempting to evade United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions through smuggling. As part of its regular monitoring and surveillance activities, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council sanctions in sea areas surrounding Japan.

2 Response by the MOD/SDF

During the period from 2018 onward, MSDF vessels and other assets have so far observed 24 cases of seaborne rendezvous between North Korean tankers and foreign-flagged tankers, etc. on the high seas of the East China Sea. The information was shared with relevant agencies and ministries each time.

As a result of comprehensive judgment across the Government, the vessels concerned are strongly suspected of engaging in ship-to-ship transfers with the North Korean vessels, which is prohibited by UN Security Council resolution. Japan reported this to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea, shared the information with relevant countries, gave information to the relevant countries regarding the tankers concerned, and made public announcements on the subject.

In recent years, there has been growing international concern about these illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean vessels. Since April 2018, not only the United States, but also Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, France, and Germany have dispatched naval vessels and aircraft to the waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea, to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities. The MOD/SDF will continue their close cooperation with concerned countries to ensure compliance with the UN Security Council resolution.

2 Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East

1 Background of the Deployment of the SDF to the Middle East

Peace and stability in the Middle East are crucial to the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. In addition, it is very important to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, which is the world’s major energy source and on which Japan depends for about 90% of its crude oil imports.

In the Middle East, amidst rising tensions, there were incidents of attacks on ships. In June 2019, Japan-related vessels suffered damage. Under these circumstances, the United States, European countries, and other countries are taking steps to ensure the safety of navigation in the region by utilizing ships and aircraft.

In order to ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East, the Japanese Government has actively promoted diplomatic initiatives. In addition, following deliberations within the Government, in December 2019 the Cabinet approved governmental efforts to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. In this context, Japan’s own initiatives to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels are as follows: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Middle East and stabilize the situation; (2) thorough implementation of navigation safety measures, including close information sharing with relevant industries; and (3) conduct information gathering activities via the use

REFERENCE: Information Gathering Activities by the SDF in the Middle East
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/m_east/index.html
of SDF assets.

Since the Cabinet decision in December 2021, these information gathering activities have been utilizing two P-3C patrol aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE), as well as one destroyer of the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE).

The areas of operation consist of the high seas of three areas of water: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states).

Information gathered by the SDF is shared with the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and other relevant ministries and agencies, as well as with relevant industries through public-private liaison meetings, to be used for the government’s navigation safety measures.

2 Activities by the SDF

(1) Information gathering activities by the SDF

The SDF’s information gathering activities are aimed at collecting information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels as a part of the government’s navigation safety measures.

The activities are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph (1), item (xviii) of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, as they would need smooth decision making and order issuance in relation to Maritime Security Operations as measures for unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, which are provided in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

(2) Results of the SDF’s Activities

In January 2020, two P-3C patrol aircraft of the counterpiracy unit began information gathering activities. In addition, in February 2020, a destroyer of the Deployment Surface Force for Information Gathering Activities began information gathering activities.

Based on the December 2021 Cabinet decision, since February 2022, DSPE has been conducting both counterpiracy operations and information gathering activities. To date, no information has been received that there were unusual events for Japan-related vessels in the sea areas where the surface units and aerial units are active.
a. Deployment Surface Force for Information Gathering Activities until February 2022, Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement from February onward

DSPE operates in the high seas of the Gulf of Oman and in the high seas of the northern Arabian Sea. The total number of confirmed vessels as of March 31, 2023, is 85,599.

b. Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement

DAPE operates in the high seas of the Gulf of Aden and in the high seas of the western side of the northern Arabian Sea. The total number of confirmed vessels as of March 31, 2023, is 66,819.

(3) Extension of the Activity Period

In the Middle East, although there is no immediate need to protect Japan-related vessels, high tensions persist, and, based on the fact that each country is continuing its own activities, including the “International Maritime Security Construct” by the United States and other countries, since 2020, the Japanese Government has been extending the SDF’s activity period by about one year every year.

In light of the need to ensure the safety of navigation for Japan-related vessels, if it is deemed before the expiration of the period that activities by the SDF are no longer necessary, then, in addition to concluding these activities at that point and without waiting for the end of the activity period, the National Security Council will consider how to respond if there is a significant change in the situation.
3 Communication and Cooperation with Relevant Countries

(1) United States

As a result of a comprehensive review of what measures Japan should take to ensure the safe navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, Japan has started to implement efforts as Japan’s independent initiative without participating in the International Maritime Security Construct led by the United States, considering the need for ensuring a stable supply of crude oil, relations with the United States, and relations with Iran. At the same time, to ensure safe navigation in the Middle East, the SDF has been cooperating closely with the United States in various ways. In the information gathering activities, the SDF will also appropriately cooperate with the United States as an ally, while observing the government’s policy of conducting navigation safety measures independently from any other country’s initiatives. For this reason, an MSDF officer has been dispatched to the U.S. Central Naval Command in Bahrain as a liaison officer to share information with the U.S. Forces.

(2) Coastal States in the Middle East

It is important to gain the understanding of the coastal states, including Iran, regarding the information gathering activities that Japan is undertaking as an independent initiative, and Japan has been explaining these activities to them with transparency. In addition, the coastal states play an important role in ensuring safe navigation in the Middle East. Japan has been reaching out to the coastal states to gain their understanding of Japan’s efforts.

REFERENCE: The Government’s efforts to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/m_east/index.html
The second objective of the NDS is for Japan to deter, through cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that concern Japan’s peace and security. In addition, in the event of such a situation, Japan will swiftly take action in response to it using all possible methods to prevent an invasion of our country and bring the situation under control at an early stage.

In order to continue demonstrating its will and capability of deterring unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, and to influence the actions of opponents, it is necessary for Japan to improve and reinforce training and exercises conducted as flexible deterrent options (FDO)\(^1\), and strategic communications (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with our ally, like-minded countries and others.

Moreover, in peacetime, it is important to detect indications at an early stage of situations by implementing persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as analysis while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, and for the Government as a whole to conduct rapid decision-making depending on the situation with related organizations. Due to this, Japan is reinforcing its responses by the Government as a whole.

### 1 Persistent ISR surrounding Japan

#### 1 Basic Concept

Japan is comprised of a little over 14,000 islands, surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest territorial waters (including inland waters) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is engaged in intelligence collection and monitoring and surveillance in peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

#### 2 Response by the MOD/SDF

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) monitors ships navigating in the waters surrounding Hokkaido.

### Column

**The Promotion of Measures for Strategic Communication**

To deal with security issues, it is necessary to create a security environment desirable to Japan through various activities from peacetime, such as bilateral training and exercises, defense cooperation and exchanges, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and capacity building support, as well as diplomatic efforts. It is also necessary to implement flexible deterrent measures according to changes in the situation and to prevent the situation from going in a more serious direction.

To this end, it is necessary to choose media and messages that make it possible to send effective communication about various activities carried out by the Ministry of Defense (the MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (the SDF), and their purposes, and to send out information to the international community in coordination with allies and like-minded countries. We will actively promote measures for such a strategic communication.

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1. Carefully-considered deterrent actions to influence the opponent’s behavior
2. This is the eighth largest in the world if sea areas in overseas territories of various countries are considered as belonging to the countries concerned.
the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea in peacetime, using patrol aircraft and others. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at each location nationwide, and early warning and control aircraft amongst others, to conduct monitoring and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace. These activities of the MSDF and ASDF are done 24 hours a day. Monitoring and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units, and other assets. Furthermore, in order to maintain a posture to swiftly respond to various situations surrounding Japan, monitoring and

3 Aircraft for monitoring with the purpose of gathering information and preventing a surprise attack by an opposing force. The MSDF possesses P-3C and P-1 fixed-wing patrol aircraft, and SH-60J and SH-60K patrol helicopters.

4 Aircraft with warning control systems and radar capable of monitoring omnidirectionally. Being excellent in speed performance and boasting long cruising time, the aircraft is able to fly to distant areas to engage in warning for a long time. Moreover, as it is also able to engage in warning at high altitude, it has outstanding flight performance and the monitoring and surveillance capability, such as a long line-of-sight distance. The ASDF has been operating E-767 aircraft based on civil aircraft B-767.

5 Article 4(1)18 of the Act for Establishment of the MOD (Investigation and research required for the performance of duties within jurisdiction) provides the legal basis for monitoring and surveillance activities by the SDF.
The Senkaku Islands (Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture) are clearly an inherent part of the territory of Japan, both historically and under international law. Japan actually has effective control of the islands. Therefore, there is no territorial issue to be resolved in the first place.

After carefully confirming that there were no signs of any other country’s control in 1895, the Japanese government decided to put the Senkaku Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture by legitimate means under international law at a Cabinet meeting and officially incorporated the islands into the territory of Japan. China began to make its own claims regarding the Senkaku Islands in the 1970s, after a UN agency pointed out possible oil reserves in the East China Sea in 1968. It had not raised any objections until this point.

However, since Chinese maritime patrol vessels intruded into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time in 2008, such vessels and others have repeatedly intruded into our territorial waters despite our strong objections, which is utterly unacceptable. The activities of Chinese maritime patrol vessels, which are asserting their own claims in our territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, are a violation of international law in the first place.

Japan cannot make any concessions to such an attempt to make unilateral changes to the status quo by force. The MOD and the SDF will continue to deal with this situation calmly and resolutely, taking all possible measures to monitor the situation in close cooperation with the relevant ministries and agencies, in order to protect the lives and property of the people and the territory, territorial waters, and airspace of Japan.

3 Whole-of-Government Responses

In order to never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force, it is important for the related organizations to cooperate to take action based on decision-making by the Government as a whole during peacetime. For this reason, the Government as a whole will conduct simulations and integrated training and exercises to improve the effectiveness of responses, while establishing coordination procedures on a regular basis.

In addition, with regard to the protection of critical
Maintaining maritime security is primarily the mission of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), but in cases that cannot be handled by the JCG, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will also respond through maritime security operations and public security operations in coordination with the JCG. In the event of an armed attack by other countries, the SDF will respond through defense operations, which are its main duty. As the situation in the waters surrounding Japan intensifies, it is becoming even more critical to reinforce coordination between the SDF and JCG in order to respond seamlessly to any circumstance.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the JCG conduct joint training on a regular basis to improve their skills and enhance their joint response capabilities. Cooperation in peacetime extends to the operation of UAVs. Since October 2022, the JCG has been operating the SeaGuardian, which is capable of long-duration monitoring and surveillance flights, at the MSDF Hachinohe Air Base, and the MSDF began trial operations of the SeaGuardian at the Hachinohe Air Base in May 2023. Regarding the operation of UAVs, the MSDF and the JCG will share information that they have respectively acquired and improve operational efficiency through mutual use of their facilities.

Reinforcing coordination, including in response to armed attack situations, is also crucial in building a structure that can respond to all types of situations.

Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law states that when the Prime Minister orders defense operations or public security operations by order, the Prime Minister “may, if deemed necessary, bring all or part of the Japan Coast Guard under the control of the Minister of Defense.” This is to enable the Minister of Defense to command and operate the JCG in a unified and centralized manner during a serious emergency situation, when it is difficult for the SDF and JCG to effectively and appropriately respond under their usual cooperative relationship. The JCG, under the control of the Minister of Defense, is to ensure an appropriate division of roles and take measures for civil protection and the protection of lives at sea in order to effectively achieve the purpose of the SDF’s operations, while maintaining a non-military character within the scope of affairs under its jurisdiction as stipulated in the Japan Coast Guard Law.

In April 2023, the Government of Japan established control guidelines regarding coordination between the two organizations in the event that an order is issued for defense operations. These guidelines include specific procedures for “control of the JCG,” such as the division of roles described above. The MOD will continue to strengthen cooperation between the SDF and the JCG by verifying the procedures through joint training.
2 Measures against Violations of Japan’s Sovereignty

1 Warnings and Scrambles in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

(1) Basic Concept
Under international law, countries have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. Measures against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace are conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or at sea, these measures can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting the actions based on the provisions of Article 84 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

(2) Responses by the MOD/SDF
A. General Situation
The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. Furthermore, in the event that this suspicious aircraft has actually intruded into territorial airspace, a warning to leave the airspace would be issued, among other responses.

In FY2022, ASDF aircraft scrambled 778 times (575 times in response to Chinese aircraft, 150 times in response to Russian aircraft, and 53 other times).

Flight patterns of Chinese military aircraft in recent years have changed, and now their range of activities are extending to not only the East China Sea, but also the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In addition, Chinese
and Russian aircraft continue to be active in the vicinity of Japan, including the intrusion into Japan’s territorial airspace by Russian aircraft in March 2022 as well as the long-range joint flights by Chinese and Russian bombers near Japan in May and November 2022.

The MOD/SDF will take all possible measures against intrusions into Japan’s territorial airspace while continuing to closely monitor the increasingly active movements of the Chinese and Russian militaries in the future.

B. Responses to Balloons and Other Such Objects of Foreign Countries

After further analysis, the MOD made an announcement in February 2023 that certain balloon-shaped flying objects that had been confirmed in Japanese airspace in the past, including those in November 2019, June 2020, and September 2021, were strongly presumed as unmanned surveillance balloons flown by China.

It is a violation of Japanese airspace when objects of foreign countries, even if they are balloons, intrude into our airspace without permission. If a foreign balloon intrudes into Japanese airspace without permission, Japan will make a judgment as to whether or not it is a balloon of a foreign government and its impact on the lives and property of Japanese citizens, taking into consideration information gathered through various means including diplomatic channels and specific individual circumstances, while conducting necessary confirmation and monitoring of the balloon’s behavior by fighter aircraft and the like. If the balloon is determined to belong to a foreign government, warnings and the like will be issued to that foreign government. If the balloon still continues its intrusion in Japanese airspace and other such cases, SDF aircraft will respond with “necessary measures” as stipulated in Article 84 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, including the use of weapons.

The Japanese Government has traditionally considered that the use of weapons during scrambles responding to intrusions into Japanese airspace is permissible only when such measures fall under the requirements of legitimate self-defense or necessity. This consideration assumes manned and military aircraft. Given that the use of weapons against unmanned aircraft, including
balloons that intrude into Japanese airspace, would not directly harm people, the Japanese Government clarified the interpretation of the Article concerning the use of weapons against unmanned aircraft as follows: in such a case where the safety of aircraft cannot be ensured if the situation is left as it is, and when deemed necessary to use weapons to protect legal interests, such as the lives and property of people within the Japanese territory as well as the safety of aircraft flying along air routes, such use of weapons can be permitted even if it does not fall under the requirements of legitimate self-defense or necessity.

In order to protect the lives and property of Japanese citizens and to safeguard Japan’s sovereignty, Japan takes more rigorous measures in accordance with international laws and customs amid increasing threats of intrusions into Japanese airspace by various means, including unmanned aerial vehicles such as balloons.

In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and continued to track the submarine with MSDF vessels until it entered the high seas. In addition, in January 2018, underwater navigation by a Chinese submarine was confirmed for the first time through Japan’s contiguous zone in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands.

Furthermore, on September 10, 2021, a submarine presumed to be Chinese was confirmed to be navigating underwater through the Japanese contiguous zone in the vicinity of Amami Oshima Island, and monitoring and surveillance operations were carried out by MSDF destroyers and patrol aircraft. Although this submarine did not intrude into territorial waters, such submarine activity should be closely monitored by Japan. Under international law, a foreign submarine must display its flag while navigating in the territorial waters of a coastal state. The SDF will maintain a vigilant monitoring and surveillance posture to ensure that activities in violation of international law are not permitted.

**2 Response to Submarines Navigating Underwater in Japan’s Territorial Waters**

(1) **Basic Concept**
With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters, an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese territorial waters.

(2) **Response by the MOD/SDF**
The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan.

**3 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels**

(1) **Basic Concept**
The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a...
situations, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

(2) Responses by the MOD/SDF

In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF have been making various efforts. In particular, the MSDF has been taking steps such as establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit and equipment of destroyers with machine guns. In addition, based on “the manual for jointly dealing with suspicious vessels” formulated by the then Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, the MSDF has regularly conducted joint training with the JCG in order to strengthen coordination.

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7 A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of boarding inspections of the suspicious vessels under maritime security operations.
Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks

The third defense objective of the NDS is, should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, to rapidly respond to the invasion in a tailored and seamless manner; to take primary responsibility to deal with the aggression; and, while receiving support from our ally and others, to disrupt and defeat the invasion.

In response to an invasion of Japan, including our remote islands, Japan would block and eliminate the invading forces from a long distance. Japan will also acquire superiority across domains and conduct cross-domain operations that organically integrate capabilities in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum as well as in the ground, maritime, and air domains to secure asymmetrical superiority and block and eliminate the invading forces. Japan would also continue persistent actions to crush the opponent’s will to invade.

Moreover, in response to an invasion of Japan, including missile attacks, Japan will intercept missiles on the high seas and over our territory through missile defense. In addition, as a measure for self-defense to the minimum required level to prevent attacks, Japan will utilize capabilities including stand-off defense capabilities to enable conducting effective counterstrikes in the opponent’s territory, and together with missile defense, deter missile attacks.

Furthermore, in the event of a large-scale terrorist attack or an attack on critical infrastructure that poses a serious threat to the lives, health, and property of Japanese citizens, Japan will cooperate with related organizations to take effective countermeasures. Moreover, if there were to be a predicted invasion of Japan, Japan will make sure that it is possible to smoothly implement measures for civil protection, including the issuance of evacuation guidance for residents.

1 Responses to Invasion of Japan, Including Its Remote Islands

1 Basic Concept

Japan possesses numerous remote islands spanning a broad national territory which extends approximately 3,000 kilometers along both the north-south and east-west axes, across which the Government must protect the lives, health, and property of its citizens, as well as its territory, territorial waters, airspace, and various resources that are widely dispersed.

In order to precisely respond to invasions of Japan, which has such geographic characteristics, it is necessary to station units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to maneuver and deploy them according to situations during peacetime. Moreover, it is important to ensure maritime superiority and air superiority by detecting signs at an early stage through persistent ISR and other measures conducted by the SDF.

If our deterrence were to fail and an invasion of Japan occurred, in order to eliminate any violation of our territory, Japan would organically integrate our capabilities in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum as well as the ground, maritime, and air domains and overcome any inferiority in individual domains through cross-domain operations that amplify our overall capabilities through synergy effects. Japan would also conduct flexible and sustained activities through joint operations, continue swift and persistent actions, secure our territory, and crush the opponent’s will to invade.

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

(1) Strengthening of Stand-off Defense Capabilities

Some foreign countries have significantly improved their radar detection coverage as well as the range and performance of various missiles. This means that the
range of these threats would extend over several hundred kilometers around an invading force.

The MOD needs to improve its deterrence against armed attacks against our country by possessing a multilayered stockpile of stand-off missiles in necessary and sufficient quantities, in various locations and on various platforms. In addition, in the event of an invasion of Japan, it would be necessary to block and eliminate the invading forces from outside the opponent’s threat envelope as early and as far away as possible, while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel as much as possible.

Therefore, no matter which region of Japan an invasion might begin in, firstly Japan will equip itself with the necessary and sufficient capabilities to block and eliminate the opponent’s vessels, landing forces, and the like from various locations in our country in a multilayered manner. Secondly, Japan will reinforce capabilities that can be launched from various platforms and are diverse and difficult to intercept, such as hyper velocity glides and hypersonic flights.

Specifically, the MOD will conduct and continue research and development on Upgraded Type-12 SSM (surface-, ship-, and air-launched variants), hyper velocity gliding projectiles intended for the defense of...
As each country’s early warning and control capabilities and the performance of all types of missiles markedly improve, the MOD/SDF has been working to strengthen its stand-off defense capabilities due to the need to effectively prevent attacks on Japan while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel.

As stated in the NDS, in order to protect Japan’s territory, which extends approximately 3,000 kilometers along both the north-south and east-west axes, the MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its stand-off defense capabilities to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan, including its remote islands, from locations outside of threat zones. The MOD/SDF will also possess the necessary and sufficient capabilities to be able to disrupt and defeat these vessels and landing forces in a multilayered manner and from various locations in Japan, and reinforce diverse and difficult-to-intercept capabilities, such as hyper velocity glides and hypersonic glides, that can be launched from various platforms.

Specifically, the MOD/SDF will promote the development of the upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship guided missile, which can be operated from diverse platforms, and begin mass production of the ground-launched type in FY2023 for early unit deployment. In addition, the improved performance of other countries’ radars and anti-air missiles has enhanced their interception capabilities. In order to conduct anti-ship and anti-ground attacks from outside threat zones, in the future, the MOD/SDF will require longer-range guided missiles, etc., with high survivability to avoid interception. The MOD/SDF will steadily promote research on necessary technologies in order to achieve guided missiles and gliding flight vehicles capable of longer range and improved survivability.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will acquire imagery data and other intelligence using satellite constellations and develop UAVs and target observation rounds to enhance its intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities.

*Stand-off generally means “at a distance.”

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remote islands, and hypersonic missiles, and extend the range of various types of guided missiles. Moreover, in addition to acquiring mass-produced stand-off missiles manufactured domestically, Japan will also implement and continue the steady introduction of U.S.-produced Tomahawk missiles and other foreign-made stand-off missiles.

Furthermore, Japan will advance research and development to further diversify launch platforms, and develop and maintain a vertical launching system (VLS) that submarines can be equipped with, a system that transport aircraft can be equipped with, and other systems with the aim of improving the operational capabilities of stand-off missiles.

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3 Speed range of 5 times faster than the speed of sound.
**(2) Strengthening of Unmanned Defense Capabilities**

Compared to manned equipment, unmanned assets have major advantages, such as minimizing casualties and allowing for long-term continuous operation. Furthermore, combining these unmanned assets with AI and manned equipment can be a game-changer that fundamentally transforms force structure and ways of warfare, enabling Japan to gain asymmetrical superiority in the air, sea, and underwater domains.

For this reason, these unmanned assets will be....
effectively utilized not only for information gathering and monitoring and surveillance, but also for a wide range of missions including combat support. In addition, Japan is planning operational verification and research in FY2023 for various unmanned assets, including the acquisition of UAVs.

(3) Strengthening of Mobile Deployment Capabilities

For responding to an invasion of Japan, including its remote islands, Japan needs to ensure that its routinely deployed units remain operational at all times and that the necessary units (personnel, equipment, supplies, etc.) are swiftly maneuvered and deployed according to the situation, in order to secure maritime and air superiority and disrupt the access and landing of units invading Japan.

To this end, Japan will reinforce the SDF’s maritime and air transportation capabilities, and also maximize its use of civilian transportation capabilities, including Private Finance Initiatives (PFI).

In addition, in order to ensure smoother and more effective transport and supplies for units by the aforementioned capabilities, Japan will strengthen our integrated logistics posture, take necessary measures to use existing airports, seaport facilities, etc. as operational infrastructure, and improve supply capabilities. Japan will also actively promote the improvement of supply bases located throughout the country. In conjunction with these, Japan will strengthen its transportation capabilities by acquiring various transport assets such as transport vessels, transport aircraft, and transport helicopters.

Apart from this, the SDF has conducted a number of training exercises, including bilateral/multilateral training with the United States and other relevant countries, in order to improve its mobile deployment capabilities.

(4) Strengthening of the Defense Architecture in the Southwestern Region

In order to strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region, new establishment of units is being conducted in the Kyushu/southwestern region. In March 2023, the GSDF established a new camp on Ishigakijima Island, where an area security unit, surface-to-air guided missile unit, and surface-to-ship guided missile unit are stationed, and the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade’s 3rd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment (tentative name) will be newly formed at Camp Takematsu (Oura City, Nagasaki Prefecture) in FY2023. In addition, the 15th Brigade (Naha City, Okinawa Prefecture) is planned to be reorganized into a division in the future.

With regard to the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD has determined that Saga Airport is the best airfield for deployment, and the governor of Saga Prefecture expressed acceptance of this arrangement. In May 2023, the MOD signed a real estate purchase contract with the Saga Prefecture fishery cooperative federation and acquired the planned camp location. On the other hand, the MOD newly created an airlift wing equipped with V-22 Ospreys at Camp Kisarazu in 2020 with consideration of the time needed to deploy the aircraft to Saga Airport, and began provisional deployment of the aircraft.

See Fig. III-1-4-2 (Establishment Status of Major Units in Kyushu/ Southwestern Region (since 2016) (conceptual diagram))

2 Responses to Missile Attacks

1 Japan’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

(1) Basic Concept

As Japan is surrounded on all sides by water, responding to airborne threats is extremely important. In recent years, airborne threats to Japan have been becoming increasingly diverse, complex and enhanced, including capability enhancements of ballistic missiles equipped with multiple/maneuverable warheads, higher-speed and longer-range cruise missiles, and stealth and multi-role manned and unmanned aircraft, as well as the emergence of anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs).

Therefore, Japan will fundamentally enhance its detection, tracking, and interception capabilities, as

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4 At Saga Airport, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22 Ospreys and approximately 50 helicopters transferred from GSDF Camp Metabaru, are expected to be deployed.
well as strengthen integrated air and missile defense capabilities by establishing a system capable of centrally and optimally operating various sensors and shooters through a network.

In response to a missile attack on Japan by an opponent, Japan would first intercept the missile flying towards Japan over the high seas and in its territorial airspace by means of its missile defense system. Also, as a minimum necessary self-defense measure that cannot be avoided to prevent an attack by ballistic missiles and the like, Japan would utilize its stand-off defense capabilities and other capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory.

By equipping itself with such effective counterstrike capabilities, Japan will constrain missile launches by opponents and facilitate interceptions by its missile defense, thereby deterring the launch of missile attacks themselves when coupled with its missile defense.

See Fig. III-1-4-3 (Intercepting Part of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) (image)); Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-4 (Column “Counterstrike Capabilities”)
Responses by the MOD/SDF

North Korea has forcefully conducted three nuclear tests since 2016. Especially since the beginning of 2022, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and other missiles with unprecedented high frequency and in new ways. These military actions pose a threat to Japan’s security that is more grave and imminent than ever before.

For responding to ballistic missiles, currently the SDF maneuvers and deploys, according to situation, Aegis-equipped destroyers for defense of the entire territory of Japan and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), which is deployed across the country for the defense of stationing locations. On April 22, 2023, the Minister of Defense issued a “General order for the Self-Defense Forces concerning preparation for destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc.” in light of matters such as North Korea’s announcement that it would shortly finish final preparations for the launch of a completed “military reconnaissance satellite.” In response, the MOD/SDF implemented the necessary preparations for the deployment of PAC-3s to Ishigakijima Island, Miyakojima Island, and Yonagunijima Island in Okinawa Prefecture, as well as the deployment of Aegis-equipped destroyers.

On May 29 of the same year, in response to an advance notification from North Korea that the “satellite” was to be launched, the Minister of Defense issued an “Operation Order for the Self-Defense Forces concerning implementation for destructive measures against ballistic missiles, etc.” on the same day to take necessary preparations for contingencies. Upon the launch on May 31, the MOD promptly shared information within the government and with related organizations, and collected and analyzed related information. The MOD, in close cooperation with the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other countries, will continue to make all efforts to collect and analyze information and conduct surveillance in order to protect the lives and property of Japanese citizens.

Cases involving ballistic missiles launched against Japan as an armed attack will be dealt with by issuing a

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5 The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft and other targets, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.
defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, if such a situation is not yet acknowledged as an armed attack, Japan will take destructive measures against ballistic missiles, etc.\(^6\)

Currently, Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) is basically an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).\(^7\)

As a response against ballistic missiles, the Joint Task Force-BMD will be formed with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and effective defenses will be taken under a unified command through JADGE.

The MOD/SDF continues to carefully monitor the concrete actions of North Korea toward the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and conducts the necessary collection and analyses of information, monitoring and surveillance activities, and other necessary activities while closely cooperating with the United States and other countries.

Further cooperation with the U.S. Government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting).

Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by

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\(^6\) On May 31, 2023, North Korea attempted to launch a satellite, but since it was determined that there was no risk of the satellite flying into Japan, no measures to destroy ballistic missiles, etc. under Article 82-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law were implemented.

\(^7\) JADGE is a core system for command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes information regarding aircrafts captured by radar equipment installed nationwide, and provides fighter aircrafts with instructions required for scrambling against aircrafts intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot, radar, etc., in responses to ballistic missiles.
means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW)\textsuperscript{8} from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces.

\textbf{(3) Initiatives to Reinforce Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities}

Japan began developing the BMD system in 2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks and other attacks, and necessary amendments were subsequently made to the Self-Defense Forces Law in July 2005. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying PAC-3.

In order to deal with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missile attacks, Japan and the United States have jointly developed advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), the successor to Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers, and acquired them since FY2017. In comparison with SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IIA have not only extended interceptable altitude and coverage of protection, but also have enhanced defeating capability and simultaneous engagement capability.

In addition, the interception capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA have been enhanced against ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched with an intention to avoid being intercepted by taking a higher than normal trajectory (lofted trajectory).\textsuperscript{9} In November 2022, the MSDF conducted its first SM-3 Block IIA launch test, and the Aegis destroyer Maya successfully intercepted the target.

Furthermore, the Cabinet approved the development of two Aegis system-equipped vessels instead of the land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore) in December 2020, as part of measures to be taken to respond more flexibly and effectively to the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. These vessels are maintained by the MSDF and have high defense capabilities with SM-6 which have the capability to respond to anti-ship ballistic missiles and the like, and long-range guided missiles such as the Upgraded Type-12 SSM, as well as various warfare and mobility capabilities equivalent to those of existing Aegis-equipped destroyers. In addition, there will be consideration for the expandability of the vessels to enable them to operate future equipment, such as new interceptor missiles respond to HGVs currently being developed by the United States, and their seakeeping ability and habitability will also be improved.

With regard to PAC-3, the MOD has been working for procurement of the enhanced capability type, PAC-3 MSE ( Missile Segment Enhancement), and started its deployment at the end of FY2019. Introduction of PAC-3 MSE will realize the extension of interception altitude from less than 20 km to tens of km, meaning that the coverage of protection (area) will expand more than twice compared to the conventional PAC-3.

On the other hand, in order to use optimum means to effectively and efficiently counter airborne threats, which are growing increasingly diverse, complex, and enhanced including the emergence of HGV, and minimize damage, it is necessary to establish a structure to conduct integrated operation of various equipment for missile defense and air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing nationwide protection and also enhancing integrated air and missile defense capabilities that can simultaneously deal

\begin{itemize}
  \item Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time just after the launch (the SDF started to receive the information in April 1996).
  \item By taking a higher trajectory than minimum energy trajectories (trajectories that enable efficient flying of a missile and maximize its range), it takes a shorter range than the maximum range, but the falling speed of the missile becomes faster.
\end{itemize}
with multiple, complex airborne threats. In this regard, the SDF will strive to standardize and streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses, including their maintenance and supply systems.

Therefore, in order to enhance the detection and tracking capabilities of HGVs and the like, the ground-based air surveillance, warning and control radar (FPS) and the like will be procured and given enhanced capabilities, and will be replaced and upgraded with the next-generation warning and control radar. In addition, the Patriot surface-to-air guided missile system will be upgraded and a new radar (Lower Tier Air Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS))\(^\text{10}\) will be introduced to improve the PAC-3MSE’s capability to respond to HGVs and the like. Moreover, Japan will develop the upgraded Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (modified), and conduct research on a guided missile system for countering HGVs in order to deal with the threat of HGVs flying at hypersonic speeds and with high mobility in the high altitude range.

In this way, Japan is taking measures necessary to strengthen its protection structure and will continue these efforts.

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\(^{10}\) The new radar (LTAMDS) for the Patriot system is a fire control radar for low-altitude air defense developed to deal with future threats such as HGVs.
In 2022, North Korea launched at least 59 ballistic missiles (including possible ballistic missiles), a frequency unprecedented in history, and has continued to launch missiles repeatedly into 2023.

To protect the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals from the threat of ballistic missiles from North Korea, the Government of Japan is steadily strengthening its ballistic missile defense capabilities and continues to maintain a heightened surveillance posture. Accordingly, if there is a possibility of a ballistic missile
1) falling into Japan’s territory, or
2) passing over Japan,
the Cabinet Secretariat will provide emergency information through the National Early Warning System (J-ALERT) to everyone in areas where precautions must be taken against the ballistic missile and encourage them to take action to increase the possibility of mitigating damage as much as possible, such as by taking shelter in a nearby building.

When J-ALERT is used, administrative radio systems for disaster prevention are automatically activated and a distinct siren and message will be broadcast over the loudspeakers outdoors. Emergency information will also be transmitted to residents through various means of information transmission, including through registration-based emails. Area Mails and emergency messages will also be delivered to mobile phones via mobile phone companies to notify users of emergency information.

When transmitting information through J-ALERT, it is important for the Ministry of Defense (the MOD) to provide the Cabinet Secretariat with various types of information on the ballistic missile in a timely and appropriate manner. For this reason, the process of information transfer between the two parties has been systemized and automated to ensure speed and certainty.

The Government will continue to strive to reliably communicate information, while also working to constantly strengthen J-ALERT’s information transmission function.
Section 4 Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country.\(^{11}\)

(2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation, etc.

The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative technical research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. In FY2006, Japan-U.S. cooperative development\(^ {12}\) of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD began, leading to the deployment of SM-3 Block IIA. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in January 2022, the two countries agreed to conduct a joint analysis focusing on future cooperation to counter hypersonic technology. Moreover, at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting in January 2023, based on the progress of this joint analysis, the two countries agreed to initiate joint research on advanced materials and key elements, including testing in hypersonic environments, and to begin discussions on the possibility of joint development of future interceptors.

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\(^{11}\) Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called X-band radar) for BMD was deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTGS) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014. In October 2018, the 36th Air Defense Artillery Brigade Headquarters was deployed in Sagamihara. In addition, BMD-capable Aegis ships of the U.S. Forces were deployed at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture) in October 2015, March 2016 and May 2018.

\(^{12}\) With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD-related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” in June 2011. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before this decision, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles.
Responses in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Domains

The aspects of ways of warfare have changed drastically from those of the past. In addition to large-scale missile attacks and hybrid warfare including information warfare, it is necessary to respond to the traditional forms of warfare such as invasion through air, sea, and land. Japan’s ground, maritime, and air defense capabilities form the basis of its cross-domain operations. For invasions of Japan, including our remote islands, we will secure and maintain our maritime and air superiority to block access and landing of invading forces.

In the event of a military attack on Japan, the SDF will respond with defensive mobilization. Their operations are categorized into (1) air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters surrounding Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime transportation. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and conduct operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

1 Air Defense Operations

Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars, it is expected that at first, a sudden aerial attacks against Japan will be exercised by aircraft and missiles, and such aerial attacks are assumed to be conducted repeatedly, in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial defense aim to quickly deal with enemy aerial attacks at as far airspace from our land area as possible, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the citizens and the
sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy, thus making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult.

See Fig. III-1-4-6 (Example of Air Defense Operations)

2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan

If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We will protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities.

See Fig. III-1-4-7 (Example of the Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan)

3 Operations Protecting the Land

In order to occupy Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air.

For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to be difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.

See Fig. III-1-4-8 (Example of Operations Protecting the Land)
4 Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation

Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack, etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain war sustainability and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan.

In operations to ensure the security of our maritime transportation, the SDF will combine various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol, defend ships, and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes to directly defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes will be conducted by destroyers, and support from fighter jets and other aircraft is provided depending on the situation.

4 Responses in the Space Domain

Space utilization for communications, positioning, and other purposes now serves as basic infrastructure for people’s lives. At the same time, it forms the core of military operational command and control and information gathering infrastructure. In this context, some nations have been increasing their activities to interfere

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14 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.
15 Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.
with other nations’ space systems in order to secure their own military superiority, and space is becoming a warfighting domain. It is now of vital importance for nations to ensure the stable utilization of outer space.

**Part I, Chapter 4, Section 2 (Trends in Space Domain)**

1. **The Whole-of-Government Approach**

The Cabinet Office’s National Space Policy Secretariat engages in the planning, drafting, coordinating, and other policy matters relating to the Government’s development and utilization of space. Formulated based on the Basic Space Act, the Basic Plan on Space Policy is the most fundamental plan for space development and utilization in Japan, and aims to strengthen the comprehensive infrastructure that supports Japan’s space activities. The current plan was formulated in June 2020 and is scheduled to be revised in June 2023.

Moreover, the NDS will compile the challenges in the field of space security as well as the Government’s ideas for materializing its policies, and this will be reflected in the Basic Plan on Space Policy and other areas.

In addition, space policy is being promoted based on the Act on Launching of Spacecraft, etc. and Control of Spacecraft (Space Activities Act), the Act on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Data (Remote Sensing Data Act), and the Act on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources (Space Resources Act), which recognizes ownership rights to water, minerals, and other natural resources that exist on the Moon and in outer space.

2. **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF**

In the space domain, the MOD/SDF will further reinforce its operational capabilities in the ground, maritime, and air domains by actively incorporating novel forms of space utilization, including satellite constellations, and providing functions such as information gathering, communications, and positioning from space. At the same time, in order to counter threats to the stable utilization of space, surveillance capabilities from space.

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**Fig. III-1-4-9** Conceptual Image of Utilization of Space in the Security Field

- **Distance to the moon:** approx. 380,000 km
- **From Earth orbit:** approx. 36,000 km (approx. 1/10 of the distance to the moon)
- **Altitude:** approx. 20,000 km
- **Altitude:** approx. 36,000 km (approx. 1/10 of the distance to the moon)
- **Geostationary orbit**
  - Altitude: approx. 36,000 km (remain stationary to the earth)

**Positioning satellite**
- For ascertaining exact locations and guiding missiles, etc.
- For synchronizing time for the system

**Early warning satellite**
- For early detecting launches of ballistic missiles

**Communications satellite**
- For communicating with troops at a long distance

**Meteorological satellite**
- For ascertaining and predicting weather conditions

**Imagery gathering satellite**
- For conducting gathering information
will be developed and a Space Domain Awareness (SDA)\textsuperscript{16} system will be established and the resiliency of the MOD/SDF’s space assets will be bolstered to allow missions to be continued in response to various situations. In addition, the MOD/SDF will further reinforce capabilities to disrupt opponents’ command and control, information and communications, etc.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will strengthen cooperation and collaboration, including research and development, with related organizations and private businesses, including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). The MOD/SDF will also strengthen cooperation in areas such as human resource development through exchanges with our ally and like-minded countries such as the United States.

See Fig. III-1-4-9 (Conceptual Image of Utilization of Space in the Security Field)

\textbf{(1) Improvement of Capabilities by Leveraging Space Domain Including Information Gathering, Communications and Positioning}

The MOD/SDF have been utilizing satellites for information gathering, communications, and positioning and so on, and will also respond to the recent expansion of space utilization through satellite constellations.

In September 2021, the MOD established the Task Force on Satellite Constellations, chaired by the State Minister of Defense and having discussions on future space policies and consideration towards utilization of satellite constellations by the MOD/SDF, bearing cooperation with the United States.

\textbf{A. Information Gathering}

With regard to information gathering, the MOD/SDF will build a seamless information gathering system through acquisition of multilayered satellite images, such as by using Information Gathering Satellites (IGS),\textsuperscript{17} and civilian satellites such as small satellite constellations that enable frequent imaging. In particular, from the perspective of ensuring the effectiveness of Japan’s stand-off defense capabilities, it is necessary to fundamentally strengthen our information gathering capabilities. In addition to strengthening cooperation with the United States, the MOD/SDF will build a satellite constellation to acquire the capability to detect and track targets, which will be supplemented by various initiatives, including the use of civilian satellites.

\textbf{B. Communications}

Regarding communications, the MOD/SDF launched X-band defense communications satellites called Kirameki-2 in January 2017 and Kirameki-1 in April 2018, owned and operated by the MOD for the first time, to be used for the information and communication, which is essential for command and control in unit operations. Going forward, in order to respond to the increase in communications requirements and to further strengthen resiliency, the MOD/SDF is aiming for a system of three X-band defense communications satellites by launching Kirameki-3 in FY2023. The MOD/SDF will also procure more receiver equipment and enhance broadband ground station communications in order to expand equipment and related ground facilities capable of communicating with Kirameki.

In addition to conducting demonstrations of the use of Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Communications Satellite Constellation Services, the MOD/SDF will also develop and demonstrate communications equipment towards joining Protected Anti-jam Tactical SATCOM (PATS), a framework for sharing satellite communications bandwidth among member countries, centered on the United States.

\textbf{C. Positioning}

With regard to positioning, the MOD/SDF mount global position system (GPS) receiving terminals on a large amount of equipment and use them as important means to support advanced unit operations, including highly accurate self-positioning and improvement of missile guidance accuracy. In addition to these efforts, the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS)\textsuperscript{18} of the Cabinet Office started service in November 2018. With this in mind, the MOD/SDF will secure redundancy by using positioning signals, including those of QZSS.

\textbf{D. Other Uses of Outer Space}

Small satellite constellations are attracting attention as a technological trend related to missile detection,

\begin{itemize}
\item In addition to Space Situational Awareness (SSA) (understanding the position and orbit of space objects (including understanding the space environment)), understanding the operation and utilization of spacecraft and their intentions and capabilities.
\item Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) of the Japanese Government are operated by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD, along with other ministries and agencies, utilizes the imagery intelligence provided by the IGS.
\item This refers to satellites set into orbit so that the satellites are capable of staying nearly right above one specific area for a long time by tilting the orbit and adopting an elliptical orbit, while ordinary stationary satellites stay in circular orbit on the equator. Multiple satellites are usually launched since a single satellite cannot stay online for 24 hours by itself. Users are able to receive signals from such satellites without being affected by obstacles, such as mountains and buildings, since the satellites pass nearly right above the users.
\end{itemize}
early warning, and tracking functions. The MOD believes that infrared observation from space using satellite constellations may be effective as a means of early detection and tracking of HGVs being developed and deployed by various countries, and will conduct a demonstration in space of an infrared sensor equipped to satellites.

In addition, the MOD will promote research on future sensors, such as high-sensitivity wideband infrared detection elements.

(2) Efforts to Ensure Stable Utilization of Space
While utilization of satellites plays a vital role as the basic infrastructure for security, some countries appear to be developing anti-satellite weapons, including killer satellites, anti-satellite missiles, and jamming weapons that interfere with electromagnetic waves. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the resiliency of SDA and space utilization.

The MOD/SDF have been working to strengthen their capabilities to secure superiority in space utilization. As part of these efforts, they have been working to enhance Space Situational Awareness (SSA). Going forward, the MOD/SDF will continue to strengthen SSA, which enables learning the position, orbit, and other information of space objects, while also working to enhance SDA, which enables grasping the operational status, aims, and capabilities of satellites. In order to enhance the MOD/SDF’s SDA-related capabilities on a regular basis, in addition to the development of the SDA satellite scheduled for launch in FY2026, various initiatives will be promoted, including consideration of further operations with multiple satellites. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will develop a space operations command and control system, etc. to strengthen the operational infrastructure for space operations.

With regard to the strengthening of resiliency of space utilization, the MOD/SDF will ensure resiliency against jamming and other interference through the demonstration of technology with enhanced resiliency for satellite communications, and will also ensure cybersecurity for SSA systems, etc. towards future Japan-U.S. space system cooperation. In addition, the MOD/SDF will build capabilities to disrupt C4I of opponents in coordination with the electromagnetic domain.

(3) Strengthening of Organizational Systems
In order to strengthen the Space Domain Specialized Units, the 1st Space Operations Squadron (Fuchu) which is responsible for operating the system to gather
information on space objects approaching Japan’s satellites, the 2nd Space Operations Squadron (Hofu Kita) which is responsible for operating equipment to monitor interference with Japan’s satellites and the like, and the Space Systems Management Squadron (Fuchu) were newly organized in FY2022 under the Space Operations Group. In FY2023, the system for stable operation of equipment for SDA will be strengthened through expansion of personnel, and the command and control functions and the like will be enhanced.

In addition, the MOD/SDF’s space operation capabilities will be strengthened through the establishment of new Space Domain Specialized Units under the command of a general. For this, given the growing importance of the space domain and the qualitative and quantitative improvements that will be made to its space operation capabilities, the ASDF shall be renamed the Air and Space Self-Defense Force in view of the future positioning of space operations alongside air operations as its core tasks.

In order to strengthen the organizational systems and human resources base in the space field, the MOD/SDF will continue to strengthen cooperation, including human resources development, through exchanges with related organizations such as JAXA as well as our ally and like-minded countries such as the United States. The MOD/SDF will also work to secure human resources in the space domain, including the establishment of a system to effectively utilize knowledge of the space field accumulated among relevant ministries and agencies.

(4) Strengthening of Cooperation with Related Organizations and Space-Related Industries

With regard to outer space, it is of vital importance for both the lives of Japanese citizens and defense to ensure stable utilization of space for purposes such as information gathering, communications, and positioning. The MOD/SDF are strengthening cooperation and collaboration, including research and development, with related organizations including JAXA and the private businesses with regard to outer space. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will promote investment in technological development in the private sector by further utilizing civilian technology in the defense field, and enhance Japan’s overall capabilities in space.

In addition, in March 2023, with the start of the operation of the SSA system, the MOD began providing information on SSA, including orbit information on space objects, to the private businesses and others that operate satellites.

(5) Strengthening Cooperation with Our Ally, Like-Minded Countries, and Others

In order to ensure the sustainable and stable utilization of outer space, which is essential to the security of Japan, it is essential to strengthen cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries, and others. Japan is also conducting cooperation towards reducing space threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors in space. In September 2022, Japan decided not to conduct satellite destruction testing with destructive, direct-ascent missiles, with the intention of actively promoting discussions in the international arena towards the formation of norms for responsible behaviors in outer space. This decision was announced in response to an announcement to the same effect by the United States in April of the same year. In addition to Japan, similar announcements were made by Canada, New Zealand, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Australia, France, and others. Furthermore, in December of the same year, under the leadership of the United States, 11 countries, including Japan, made a joint proposal for the “Direct-Ascent Anti-SATellite (DA-ASAT) missile testing” resolution, which was adopted at a plenary session of the UN General Assembly with the support of 155 countries.

At the same time, in order to avoid risks from misunderstanding and miscalculation, it is necessary to communicate the importance of strengthening communication among relevant countries and of implementing Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM) in outer space.

A. Cooperation with the United States

From the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space domain between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, the two countries established the Japan-U.S. Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) at the Deputy Director General level in April 2015. The SCWG holds wide-ranging talks on space cooperation, including collaboration on space policy and strategy, cooperation between U.S. and Japanese space operations forces including SDA information-sharing and education, and discussions on LEO satellite constellations. Meetings of the SCWG have been held eight times through now, most recently in May 2022.

In addition, the Japanese and U.S. governments hold the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Space Dialogue (CSD),
and the Japanese and U.S. security authorities hold the Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue (SSD). The MOD participates in these meetings, in which there are exchanges of information regarding the space policies of both countries as well as discussions on future cooperation.

With regard to recent high-level exchanges, in October 2022, Chief of Space Operations John Raymond of the U.S. Space Force paid a courtesy call on Minister of Defense Hamada to exchange views on the importance of ensuring the stable utilization of outer space and cooperation, including for SDA. The two sides agreed to accelerate cooperation towards further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the space domain. In addition, during the Japan-U.S. “2+2” in January 2023, both sides confirmed that they consider attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and that such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

In terms of operations, because cooperation with the United States is indispensable for effective operation of the SSA system by the ASDF, the MOD/SDF is working to materialize information-sharing with the United States. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF continues to participate in the Schriever Wargame, a multilateral tabletop exercise on space security organized by the U.S. military, and the Global Sentinel, a multilateral SSA tabletop exercise, to share recognition of threats in space with multiple countries, cooperate on SDA, and work to accumulate knowledge on ensuring the functions of space systems. In addition, SDF personnel are dispatched to the U.S. Space Command’s Multinational Space Collaboration (MSC) Office.

**B. Cooperation with Like-Minded Countries, Etc.**
Japan has been cooperating and collaborating with like-minded countries in various fields, including strengthening relations among defense authorities, cooperation related to SDA information, and cooperation among space operations forces, through consultations, information sharing, and participation in multilateral exercises.

With regard to Australia, consultations (at the director level) on space cooperation among the Japanese and Australian defense authorities have been held since May 2021. In addition, in November 2022, Japan and Australia signed the Letter of Intent Concerning a Defence Space Partnership, which will deepen space cooperation. Furthermore, Japan and Australia established a Space Working Group (SWG) to discuss specific cooperation among space operations forces.

With regard to France, Japan and France have been conducting consultations (at the director level) on space cooperation between the Japanese and French defense authorities since December 2021. The two countries are also coordinating on the promotion of unit-to-unit exchanges including participation by the SDF in the multilateral space exercise (ASTERX) organized by the French Air and Space Forces, strengthening cooperation between Japan’s Space Operations Group and the French Space Command, strengthening information sharing arrangements related to SDA, and other efforts. In addition, the MOD participates in the Japan-France Comprehensive Space Dialogue between the governments of Japan and France.

With regard to the United Kingdom, the Japanese and U.K. defense authorities have been holding space consultations since August 2022, and have been coordinating on collaboration on space policy and strategy, promotion of cooperation and exchanges among space operations forces, information sharing related to SDA, and other matters.

With regard to Germany, Japan and Germany have been holding expert meetings on space cooperation between forces, and will develop coordination by holding a meeting of their SWG to deepen cooperation between space operations forces.

With regard to Canada, Japan and Canada held the first Japan-Canada space forces tabletop exercise in March 2023, and will advance promotion of cooperation among
space operations forces and cooperation for information sharing.

With regard to Japan and the European Union, their governments hold the Japan-EU Space Policy Dialogue.

In January 2015, with the enactment of the Basic Act on Cybersecurity, the National Information Security Center (NISC) was reorganized as the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). 19

Illegal intrusion, information theft, alteration or destruction, operation stop/malfunction of information systems, execution of unauthorized program, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, etc., which are made through cyberspace by abusing information communication networks, information systems, etc.

In addition, the Japanese and Indian governments hold the Japan-India Space Dialogue. The MOD participates in both these dialogues.

5 Responses in the Cyber Domain

In the cyber domain, it is important to gather and share information at all stages from peacetime to emergencies through cooperation with other countries, relevant ministries and agencies, and the private businesses, as well as to strengthen Japan’s overall response capabilities in the cybersecurity field.

In light of the fact that policies in the cybersecurity field will be centrally and comprehensively coordinated throughout the Government, the MOD/SDF will promote initiatives that contribute to strengthening cooperation with related ministries and agencies, critical infrastructure companies, and the defense industry, while enhancing their own level of cybersecurity.

1 The Whole-of-Government Approach and Other Initiatives

In order to deal with increasing cybersecurity threats, in November 2014, the Basic Act on Cybersecurity was enacted. The Act aims to contribute to the security of Japan by comprehensively and effectively promoting measures regarding cybersecurity.

Based on the Act, in January 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters was established in the Cabinet, and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) 19 was established in the Cabinet Secretariat. The Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters and NISC are responsible for planning, drafting, and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and serve as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures.

In addition, the current Cybersecurity Strategy, which was formulated in September 2021, states that the various policies should be promoted based on three directions, including enhancing initiatives from the perspective of security, in order to ensure a “free, fair, and secure cyber space.”

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The cyber domain is not only core infrastructure in the daily lives of the people of Japan, but also of vital importance for carrying out cross-domain operations for the defense of Japan.

The MOD/SDF will coordinate with whole-of-government initiatives in the field of cybersecurity, including active cyber defense. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will shift to a posture where persistent risk management is implemented, primarily on critical systems, etc., and significantly increase the number of cyberspace personnel capable of performing such tasks. the MOD/SDF will also achieve a high level of cybersecurity, especially by utilizing highly-skilled external human resources. the MOD/SDF will protect itself from all cyber threats with our high cybersecurity capabilities, and will use these capabilities to strengthen the cybersecurity of our country as a whole.

To this end, the MOD/SDF will establish a posture that can protect its command and control capabilities as well as its high-priority equipment systems even under cyber attacks 20 along with a posture for supporting cyber defense for the defense industry by FY2027.

By approximately ten years from now, the MOD/SDF will have established a posture to safeguard its command and control capabilities, force projection capabilities, and operational bases to allow missions to be executed even under cyber attacks, and strengthened its posture for supporting the cybersecurity of entities other than the SDF.

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19 In January 2015, with the enactment of the Basic Act on Cybersecurity, the National Information Security Center (NISC) was reorganized as the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC).

20 Illegal intrusion, information theft, alteration or destruction, operation stop/malfunction of information systems, execution of unauthorized program, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, etc., which are made through cyberspace by abusing information communication networks, information systems, etc.


(1) Establishing an Environment for Ensuring Cybersecurity

A. Strengthening of the Cyber-Specialized Units Organization

The JSDF Cyber Defense Command was newly formed in March 2022 as a joint unit and deals with cyber attacks. It also provides support for training of cyber-specialized units of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and maintains and operates the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), a common network for the MOD/SDF. From FY2023 onward, the MOD/SDF will continue to expand the systems of the JSDF Cyber Defense Command and other cyber-specialized units of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and promote hiring and training of cyber personnel. In addition, the MOD will strengthen its planning and drafting function for cyber policies by reorganizing the Information and Telecommunications Division of the Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning to create the Cyber Planning Division (tentative name), creating the position of Counselor to the Minister’s Secretariat, and newly establishing the Cyber Security Division in the National Institute for Defense Studies.

B. Introduction of a Risk Management Framework (RMF)

As threats in the cyber domain are becoming more advanced and sophisticated every day, the MOD/SDF will shift its approach to information system security measures from temporary “risk elimination” to continuous “risk management,” and implement an RMF from FY2023 onward. The RMF will continuously analyze and evaluate risks and implement necessary security measures even after information system operation and management.

C. Protection of Information Systems

In order to appropriately respond to the latest cyber attack threats, which are becoming more sophisticated and complex every day, it is necessary to strengthen the posture for protection of information systems. To this
end, the SDF will develop a cloud system that integrates and standardizes SDF systems, implement centralized cybersecurity measures, strengthen the protective posture of equipment systems and facility infrastructure systems, and enhance the threat hunting function that continuously searches for and detects potential internal threats based on the assumption that threats have already penetrated inside the network.

(2) Cooperation with Private Companies and Other Countries

In order to respond to cyber attacks in a swift and appropriate manner, it is necessary to keep abreast of the latest information, including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks, joint exercises and other opportunities with allies and other parties. For this purpose, the MOD/SDF will effectively cooperate with private companies and foreign countries, including the United States, which is Japan’s ally.

a. Cooperation with Private Companies and Others

In July 2013, the Cyber Defense Council (CDC) was set up with its members consisting of around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cybersecurity. With the MOD serving as the hub for information sharing among companies in the defense industry, information is aggregated, and efforts are made to grasp the overall picture of cyber attacks. In addition, a joint training takes place annually, simulating a situation where the MOD/SDF, and defense industry are under cyber attacks as part of efforts to improve both of their cyber response capabilities.

b. Cooperation with the United States

In order to strengthen the foundation that supports effective Japan-U.S. joint responses at all levels, Japan will further strengthen information sharing at all levels and fundamentally strengthen efforts related to information security and cybersecurity to enable both Japan and the United States to fully exercise their capabilities.

In October 2013, the Japanese and U.S. governments set up the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) as a framework for policy consultations between the defense authorities of the two countries. Under this framework, meetings have been held eight times to conduct specialized, specific consideration on a wide range of fields, including (1) promotion of policy consultations regarding cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint training incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) cooperation for training and retaining experts.

The Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate establishment of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also cited.

In addition, at their “2+2” in April 2019, Japan and the United States confirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Furthermore, Japan’s cooperation with the United States is to be further strengthened by such means as participation in the Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue, a whole-of-government framework by both nations, and holding the Japan-U.S. IT Forum.

In terms of operational cooperation, cyber attack countermeasure training has been conducted as part of the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise (field training exercises) and the Japan-U.S. Joint Regional Army command post exercise. Efforts are continuing to improve Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities.

C. Cooperation with Like-Minded Countries, Etc.

Regarding the use of the cyber domain, Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries through measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks, and participating in multilateral exercises.

Japan has organized the “Japan-NATO Expert Staff Talks on Cyber Defense,” etc., with the respective defense authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and others to exchange opinions on various issues related to cyberspace, and participates in the CyCon International Conference on Cyber Conflict organized by NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) established in Estonia. The MOD has been dispatching personnel to the CCDCOE since March 2019. In October 2022, Japan completed the process of signing an arrangement for participation in CCDCOE activities, and the MOD officially participated
in the CCDCOE’s activities.

In addition, Japan has held cyber dialogues with Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Estonia. Moreover, Japan holds the IT Forum with the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and other countries to exchange views on initiatives in the information communications area including cybersecurity and current trends in technology, and provides capacity-building support in the field of cybersecurity.

With the aim of strengthening the SDF’s cyber domain capabilities and cooperation with other countries, the SDF participated in a joint Japan-U.K. team in the multilateral cyber defense exercise “Locked Shields 2022” hosted by CCDCOE in April 2022. The SDF also participated for the first time in the Cyber Skills Challenge, a multilateral cyber training exercise held by Australia from November to December 2022, as well as the Defense Cyber Marvel 2 exercise held by the United Kingdom in February 2023. Furthermore, in February 2023, the GSDF held Cyber KONGO 2023, a multilateral cyber protection competition, with a total of 11 participating countries, including the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Romania, Indonesia, Vietnam, and others, to strengthen capabilities in the cyber domain.

(3) Development and Securing of Human Resources
In order to fundamentally strengthen the SDF’s cyber defense capability, securing human resources who possess sophisticated and wide-ranging knowledge on cybersecurity is an urgent issue. Proactive efforts, including the expansion of education and the utilization of civilian knowledge, are necessary.

In this context, personnel are continuously and by stages assigned to cyber-related departments, and provided with both internal and external education in order to acquire and maintain advanced knowledge and skills.

As general education for all SDF services, the SDF is conducting general cyber training to learn general and advanced knowledge of cybersecurity. It is also dispatching personnel to College of Information and Cyberspace International Fellows at the National Defense University of the United States and the U.S. Army’s Coalition Cyber Operations Planner, and establishing a specialized course in system and cyber engineering at the JGSDF High Technical School. In FY2023, the GSDF Signal School will be reorganized into the GSDF System and Signal/Cyber School (tentative name) to expand the educational infrastructure for training cyber personnel, and the National Defense Academy will also expand its cyber literacy education.

In addition, since July 2021, the MOD/SDF has been hiring personnel with advanced knowledge and skills as well as abundant experience and achievements in the cyber domain as “Chief Cybersecurity Advisors.” In addition, the MOD/SDF is also working on a public-private personnel exchange system to employ people with practical experience in the private sector, as well as utilizing external personnel through service contracts and other means. Since FY2022, the MOD/SDF has also begun recruiting candidates for SDF reserve personnel with cybersecurity skills. In August 2022, the Ministry of Defense Cyber Contest was held with the aim of uncovering talented individuals with expertise in cybersecurity.

Furthermore, since cybersecurity depends on the literacy of personnel who use networks and systems, not just specialized personnel with advanced knowledge, the MOD/SDF is promoting literacy education, including information assurance training, for general personnel and administrative officers.

(4) Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach
Along with the National Police Agency, the Digital Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD, as one of the government agencies that are members of the Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters, participates in cyber-attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. to the cross-government initiatives led by the NISC as
well as sending personnel to the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT). In addition, the MOD is applying the knowledge and experience of the SDF Team that provides technical support and advice to prevent the spread of damage, engage in recovery, investigate the cause, and obviate recurrence when an information security-related event occurs in need of a unified response by the government.

22 Team that provides technical support and advice to prevent the spread of damage, engage in recovery, investigate the cause, and obviate recurrence when an information security-related event occurs in need of a unified response by the government.

23 One of the attacks using electromagnetic waves is an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack, which places an extreme burden on systems and electronics by generating instantaneous powerful electromagnetic waves through nuclear explosions and other means, leading to their malfunction or destruction. Since this type of attack would impact not just the defense field but Japanese people’s lives in general, the Government of Japan as a whole will deliberate on necessary countermeasures against it.

6 Responses in the Domain of Electromagnetic Spectrum

The domain of electromagnetic spectrum is at the forefront of offense and defense in modern combat, with the scope of its utilization and applications expanding to include the land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains. Therefore, securing superiority in the electromagnetic domain is extremely important for strengthening of deterrence and the realization of cross-domain operations.

The SDF will steadily promote strengthening of its capabilities in the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, including effectively operating its electronic warfare capabilities and related support capabilities while impairing opponents’ operational capabilities in this area even under challenging electromagnetic environments, such as when encountering communication jamming by opponents. Also, the entire SDF will utilize the electromagnetic spectrum more efficiently by strengthening its electromagnetic spectrum management functions.

The MOD/SDF will closely cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies to strengthen capabilities in the electromagnetic domain so that the SDF can ensure stable and flexible use of radio waves, balancing civilian use of frequencies with the SDF’s use of frequencies for the command and control and information gathering activities.

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Fig. III-1-4-12 Electronic Warfare Capabilities and Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Capabilities (image)

In order to effectively and proactively utilize electromagnetic spectrum, the following capabilities need to be enhanced.
1 Electronic warfare capabilities: capabilities to effectively and proactively utilize electromagnetic spectrum
2 Electromagnetic spectrum management capabilities: capabilities to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum by ascertaining the status of electromagnetic spectrum in the theater and preventing interference with the aim of securing electronic warfare capabilities

[Electronic attack] Emit radio waves to communication devices and radars of an enemy, thereby reducing or disabling their communication

[Electronic protection] Reduce or nullify the impact of electromagnetic spectrum used by an enemy by using stealth technology

[Electronic warfare support] Collect and analyze such information as electromagnetic spectrum used by an enemy

[Electromagnetic spectrum management] Ascertain the status of electromagnetic spectrum in the theater
Appropriately manage and coordinate electromagnetic spectrum used by SDF units

The figure is for illustrative purposes

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1 Enhancing the Ability to Appropriately Manage and Coordinate the Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum

In order to gain an advantage in warfare by using electromagnetic spectrum proactively and effectively, in addition to improving electronic warfare capabilities, it is necessary to establish an electromagnetic spectrum management posture that centrally grasps and coordinates wave frequencies and status of use, and appropriately allocates frequency resources to units, etc.

For this purpose, the electromagnetic spectrum management function is being strengthened, such as through research on electromagnetic spectrum management support technologies to understand the status of the electromagnetic spectrum used by equipment communication devices, radar, and electronic warfare devices, etc., and visualize them on monitors.

2 Strengthening Information Gathering and Analysis Capabilities Related to Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Building an Information Sharing Posture

In order to gain an advantage in fighting in the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, it is important to gather and analyze information on electromagnetic spectrum at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies and appropriately share those among SDF units.

In FY2023, the SDF to acquire equipment such as RC-2 signals intelligence aircraft with improved capabilities, including an expanded range of frequency reception bands.

The MOD/SDF will also continue to promote the connection of each SDF service’s system, including the DII.

3 Strengthening Capabilities to Neutralize Radar and Communications of an Opponent who Intends to Invade Japan

It is effective as a means for the defense of Japan to neutralize the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, including radar and communications of an opponent that intends to invade Japan based on information gathering and analysis in peacetime, to overcome the inferiority in capabilities in other domains and to accomplish the defense of Japan.

For this reason, the MOD/SDF took measures to reinforce the GSDF electronic warfare units in FY2022, including by deploying electronic warfare units to Camp Yonago (Tottori Prefecture) and other locations and will continue to strengthen the GSDF electronic warfare units in FY2023 and beyond. In addition, the MOD/SDF will enhance the capabilities of the Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS), which functions to conduct gathering and analysis of information from radio waves on a regular basis, and neutralize the use of radio waves by opponents during emergencies. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will develop stand-off electronic warfare aircraft that primarily jam aircraft communications and radar from outside the opponent’s threat zone (stand-off range).

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will acquire equipment for reflector-type decoy munitions for naval vessels. the MOD/SDF will also acquire and conduct demonstration research on high-power microwave (HPM) irradiation equipment, operate high-energy vehicle-mounted laser equipment, and promote research on high-energy laser systems from the perspective of effectively dealing with the threat of swarm attacks utilizing a large number of drones.

4 Strengthening Capabilities to Localize the Effects of Interference, Etc. in the Electromagnetic Domain

In order to localize the effects of interference, etc. in the electromagnetic domain, thereby ensuring air superiority, the MOD/SDF is promoting the acquisition of F-35A fighters with superior electronic protection capability. In addition, to improve flexibility in fighter
operations, the MOD/SDF will acquire F-35B fighters with their superior electronic protection capability and short takeoff and vertical landing capabilities.

5 Training/Exercise and Human Resources Development

To strengthen the SDF’s capabilities in the electromagnetic domain and to develop personnel with specialized knowledge, in addition to conducting integrated electromagnetic spectrum operations training, the MOD/SDF is collecting the latest knowledge and expertise in the electromagnetic domain by dispatching personnel to participate in educational programs on electronic warfare in the United States and other means.\(^\text{24}\)

From February to March 2023, the MSDF dispatched the multipurpose EP-3 aircraft to the United States for the first time to conduct electromagnetic maneuver warfare training with the U.S. Navy in order to improve interoperability with the U.S. Navy.

7 Responses to Large-Scale Terrorism and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

1 Basic Concept

Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts as well as invasion of Japan are not the only situations that Japan needs to prepare for. Large-scale terrorism and accompanying attacks on critical infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants, are serious threats to the lives, health, and property of Japanese citizens, and would require Japan to respond with all-out efforts. On the other hand, Japan also has a large concentration of its industry, population, and information infrastructure in urban areas, as well as the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in coastal areas. Thus, protecting Japanese citizens and critical facilities from various threats is also a challenge.

In Japan, where most of the towns and cities are highly urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and security. Such cases would involve various modes and forms including illegal activities by infiltrated armed agents,\(^\text{25}\) etc., and sabotage carried out by guerrillas or special forces, which can be deemed to be armed attacks against Japan.

To respond to such cases, the MOD/SDF would utilize its fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities and closely cooperate with the police, JCG, fire departments, local governments, and other related organizations to effectively respond to large-scale terrorism and attacks on critical infrastructure.

In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF will collect relevant information and reinforce the security of the SDF facilities. When the situation is clearer and can be dealt with by the general police force, various forms of assistance such as transportation of police officers and provision of equipment to the police force may be carried out as required. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confirmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order.

In addition, in response to ballistic missile attacks, Aegis-equipped destroyers will be deployed to protect the entire territory of Japan, and PAC-3s of the ASDF, which are dispersed throughout the country to protect bases, will be moved and deployed flexibly according to the situation. Furthermore, Japan would respond to cruise missiles and the like with a variety of anti-aircraft missiles launched from aircraft, naval vessels, and ground-based assets.

2 Responses to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces

Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations of dignitaries.

In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces,
the MOD/SDF will respond with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, monitoring and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and destruction of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through monitoring and surveillance, and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, and the necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infiltration of our territory by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others, and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them.

26 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission (concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000).

27 In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents.

3 Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. If this happens, it is important for the SDF to cooperate with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded.

Fig. III-1-4-13 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces

See Fig. III-1-4-13 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces)
**Initiatives of the MOD/SDF**

The GSDF has been conducting joint field training exercises nationwide with the prefectural police, in an effort to strengthen such collaboration by conducting field exercises at the premises of nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012.

**4 Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons**

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used.

**1 Basic Concept**

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. In addition, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical and medical protection units of the GSDF and other units will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief and civil protection dispatches.

**Initiatives of the MOD/SDF**

The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit, and is also increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated initial response personnel who remain ready to mobilize quickly in the event of extraordinary disasters.

The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.

**Initiatives Related to Civil Protection**

**1 Basic Concept**

There has recently been heightened interest in civil protection as well as expectations for the MOD/SDF due to North Korea’s repeated launches of ballistic missiles in 2022, especially with the communication of information via J-Alerts due to the launch of ballistic missiles over the Japanese archipelago. Civil protection is one of the pillars of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities in the NDS, and the MOD/SDF are actively working on it.

In March 2005, based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Act, the Government established the Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the People. It anticipates four types of armed attack: (1) a land invasion, (2) an attack by guerrillas or special forces, (3) a ballistic missile attack, and (4) an air attack. It also lays out points to consider in taking measures to protect civilians depending on the type of attack.

As measures for civil protection during armed attack situations and the like, the MOD/SDF will take measures to confirm the damage, save lives, and assist in the evacuation of residents, while cooperating with the police, fire departments, JCG, and various other relevant ministries and agencies.

The Government is conducting consideration from the perspective that development of evacuation facilities equipped with the necessary functions to protect the lives and health of citizens from armed attack situations where ballistic missiles and the like are used is a measure for preventing damage, and leads to deterrence against ballistic missile attacks and other attacks.
Initiatives of the MOD/SDF to Facilitate Civil Protection Measures

(1) Enhancement of Posture for Civil Protection
In order to counter invasions of Japan, it is imperative for national government institutions, local governments, public institutions, and private businesses to cooperate and collaborate in an integrated manner.

To implement swift evacuation of residents, including those in the southwestern region, well in advance of an armed attack, the Government will promptly formulate plans for smooth evacuation, secure means of public and private transportation, develop and coordinate the use of public infrastructure such as airports and sea ports, secure various types of evacuation facilities, and coordinate with international organizations. In addition, in order to enhance the effectiveness of such efforts, the Government will conduct and verify various types of training, including evacuation of residents, and then consider necessary measures, including institutional aspects, while promoting cooperation among the national government, local governments, designated public institutions, and others.

Moreover, in addition to participating in and cooperating with these measures, the SDF will also coordinate and cooperate in the planned implementation of civil protection measures utilizing civilian vessels and aircraft used by the SDF and various SDF transport assets. The SDF will also promote various measures such as strengthening SDF units that can also provide civil protection and utilizing SDF reserve personnel.

(2) Daily Collaboration with Local Governments
The MOD/SDF are establishing liaison departments in Regional Armies and Provincial Cooperation Offices to ensure daily and close collaboration with local governments and other bodies.

Civil protection councils are established in prefectural and municipal governments for comprehensive implementation of civil protection measures. Representatives of each branch of the SDF and Regional Defense Bureau have been appointed to the councils.

Moreover, local governments are recruiting retired SDF officers to serve as crisis managers. For example, they act as coordinators with the MOD/SDF, as well as play a role in developing and implementing response plans and exercises.

(3) Civil Protection Exercises
In order to accurately and swiftly implement civil protection measures, it is essential to establish posture of cooperation with relevant organizations from peacetime. The Government as a whole is strengthening its civil protection exercises assuming armed attack situations, etc. The MOD/SDF, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, host exercises with the participation of local governments and others, and actively participate and cooperate in civil protection exercises conducted by relevant ministries and agencies and local governments.

See Reference 20 (Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (2022))
In order to protect the lives, bodies, and property of the people in an armed attack situation, etc., while carrying out the main duty of eliminating the armed attack and minimizing damage to the public, the MOD and the SDF will implement civil protection measures such as confirming the damage situation, saving lives, and supporting the evacuation of residents in cooperation with the police, fire department, and other authorities, based on the Civil Protection Plan of the MOD and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency.

In addition, the MOD and the SDF have been working to strengthen coordination with related ministries, agencies, and local governments by cooperating with local governments during their advance deliberations on the evacuation of residents, including in the preparation and revision of the Civil Protection Plan formulated by local governments and in the development and review of the format for evacuation implementation guidelines, as well as by participating in joint exercise conducted by the national and local governments on the implementation of civil protection measures.

The development and prevalence of evacuation facilities equipped with the functions necessary to protect the lives and bodies of residents from armed attack disasters, such as those triggered by ballistic missiles, is critical not only to prevent damage to the people in the event of armed attack situations, but also from the perspective of deterring armed attacks. The Cabinet Secretariat is spearheading various efforts to develop such evacuation facilities, including promoting the designation of temporary emergency evacuation facilities. The MOD also intends to secure various types of evacuation facilities in conjunction with these government-wide efforts.

The DBP formulated in December 2022 clearly states that Japan will reinforce “mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection” as necessary functions and capabilities for the defense of Japan. Specifically, it states that the Government will coordinate and cooperate to systematically implement civil protection measures employing various transport assets of the SDF, as well as promote various other measures such as reinforcing SDF units capable of also responding to civil protection, and utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel.

Although the specific details of the buildup of units and others responding to civil protection are to be examined, the GSDF will reorganize the 15th Brigade into a division in order to strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region and improve the effectiveness of civil protection. In addition, the Government will also consider the use of civilian vessels and aircraft, the use of various SDF transport assets, and the utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel, and implement initiatives to increase the effectiveness of civil protection.

*The Cabinet Secretariat’s Civil Protection Portal Site (https://www.kokuminhogo.go.jp) provides information on government-wide civil protection efforts and the designation status of evacuation facilities.
With security environment is changing in a rapid, complex manner, high-quality and timely intelligence collection and analysis are essential for the Government to conduct accurate decision-making. As military activities in the vicinity of Japan become increasingly active, the MOD is to build a seamless intelligence collection system through the appropriate use of various means.

The MOD/SDF are making efforts to collect intelligence swiftly and accurately on a daily basis by using various methods. Examples: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing military communication signals and signals emanating from electronic weapons in the air over Japan; (2) collecting, processing, and analyzing data from various imagery satellites; (3) surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other assets; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open-source intelligence (OSINT); (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection by defense attachés and others.

In addition to strengthening the system for dispatching defense attachés, from the perspective of implementing effective intelligence collection activities in their assigned countries, the MOD is to improve its support for defense attachés by enhancing and strengthening pre-dispatch trainings, ensuring their career paths, and strengthening the intelligence cycle itself including accumulation of relevant intelligence.

With regard to defense attachés, in FY2022, the
MOD dispatched one to Lithuania in order to strengthen intelligence collection in Europe in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and another to Canada considering the significant progress in exchanges in the field of space, joint training, and other matters. In FY2023, the MOD plans to increase the number of defense attachés by one each in the United Kingdom and Ukraine, as well as newly dispatch one to Qatar.

### 2 Initiatives towards Enhancing Capabilities Such as Intelligence Analysis

As the character of warfare becomes more rapid and complex moving forward, in order to win battles, Japan needs to establish a system that enables real-time intelligence sharing by making maximum use of various means, including artificial intelligence (AI), and further strengthening intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. Japan also needs to continuously and accurately grasp the intentions and capabilities of our surrounding countries and others more than ever before.

Therefore, in order to effectively collect, organize, analyze, share, and preserve intelligence, and to contribute to policy decisions and force operations, Japan will strengthen its capabilities by function for signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and OSINT, centered on the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, while fundamentally enhancing our integrated analysis capabilities, including the use of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). In order for the intelligence division to respond appropriately to increasingly diversified intelligence requirements, the MOD/SDF are promoting the securing and training of highly capable personnel handling intelligence collection and analysis. Moreover, the MOD/SDF are taking steady measures in various directions including recruitment, education, training, and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will promote cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic organizations related to intelligence, and take necessary measures to make more effective use of intelligence collected by IGS in SDF operations.

### 3 Initiatives in Response to Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information

The MOD/SDF have been working to ensure a system necessary for information security in accordance with the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets and other relevant laws, and in cooperation with relevant ministries, agencies, and bureaus, in order to appropriately protect various types of highly classified information.

However, it came to light that the Commander of the MSDF Fleet Intelligence Command intentionally disclosed without authorization specially designated secrets and other information to his former superior, who was not eligible to handle classified information, in a situation briefing conducted on March 19, 2020, thereby violating the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets and Article 59, Paragraph 1 (duty of confidentiality) of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

This is the first case of unauthorized disclosure of specially designated secrets since the enactment of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets in 2014. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information must not be allowed in the MOD/SDF, which should be in the position to properly protect classified information necessary for the defense of Japan.

Taking this incident seriously, the Minister of Defense issued instructions to prevent recurrence. In addition, the “Committee for Studying Recurrence Prevention of Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information including Specially Designated Secrets,” chaired by the State Minister of Defense, was established to eradicate similar cases of unauthorized disclosure of classified information and to consider more effective concrete measures to prevent recurrence.

The Committee conducted serious consideration on more effective concrete measures to prevent recurrence, including guidelines for meetings with former MOD personnel, in order to eradicate similar cases of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The results of the consideration were compiled, and on March 31, 2023, the Minister of Defense made personnel thoroughly aware of measures taken to prevent recurrence in response to the unauthorized disclosure case.

Based on the recent measures to prevent recurrence, the MOD/SDF continue to further reinforce information security.
4 Defense Intelligence Headquarters

(1) Mission of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters
The Defense Intelligence Headquarters is the central intelligence agency of the MOD and the largest intelligence agency of Japan. It was established in 1997 in order to develop a framework for sophisticated and comprehensive intelligence collection and analysis in the increasingly complicated security environment following the Cold War. The DIH gathers SIGINT, IMINT, GEOINT, OSINT, etc., and analyzes international and military situations, and other matters related to Japan’s swiftly changing security environment.

In addition to intelligence collection and analysis, the Headquarters is also considered in the NDS to play a central role in responding to Integrated Information Warfare for the defense of Japan, and is to fundamentally strengthen the capabilities to collect, analyze, and disseminate information on international military situations and other issues.

(2) Activities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters
The Defense Intelligence Headquarters is an organization consisting of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF personnel, and administrative and technical officials (specialized in language, technology, administration or general office work). SDF personnel use the knowledge based on their experience in their unit, etc., whereas administrative/technical officials use their expert knowledge in language, technology, and other fields. They are working together for their mission.

Specifically, they conduct comprehensive analysis on international situations that change day by day from diverse perspectives, including military, political and economic factors, based on information received from a wide range of sources including SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT (newspapers, internet, etc.) and opinion exchange with relevant parties.

The Defense Intelligence Headquarters is also strengthening information gathering and analyzing functions in new domains such as space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum. For example, it conducts the collection and analysis of necessary information regarding trends in threats in cyberspace through such means as collecting OSINT and exchanging information with other countries. In addition, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters increased the number of personnel in FY2022 in order to strengthen its system for gathering and analyzing information on the economic security of other countries.

Results of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters’ intelligence service are provided as analysis products to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, as well as GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units in a timely and appropriate manner to support policy decision and unit operation. The Defense Intelligence Headquarters also actively exchanges information with relevant ministries and agencies and foreign counterparts.

2 Responding to Integrated Information Warfare including the Cognitive Dimension

1 Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the Cognitive Dimension
In the international community, emphasis is being placed on information warfare, in which countries attempt to create a favorable security environment for themselves at a stage when no conflict has arisen by using disinformation and strategic information dissemination to influence public opinion and decision-making in other countries while limiting the impact on their own decision-making. In light of this situation, Japan will build a system and posture that can reliably deal with Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension.

See Part I, Chapter 4, Section 1-4 (Diffusion of Information-related Technology and Information Warfare)

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF
With the increasingly severe security environment and the rapid progress of technological innovation, including information technology, it is important to respond to new “ways of warfare,” including in the cognitive dimension.

In particular, in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, there is an urgent need to respond to Integrated Information Warfare with special regard to the cognitive
In recent years, tools such as social media have become common via the Internet, enabling anyone to easily access and disseminate “specific information” from a multitude of information, as needed.

While the convenience of the Internet has increased, the vast amount of information flooding online becomes a mixture of not only accurate information, but also misinformation, which is not true, and disinformation, whose content is intentionally fabricated, and malinformation aimed at attacking specific things, making the use of such information fraught with danger and risk. It is important for each of us living in these times to acquire knowledge and discernment to choose appropriate information.

Also, some of this information have a profound impact on national security itself. For example, in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, non-military methods, such as influence operations through the dissemination of disinformation via the Internet and media, are being used in a complex manner in addition to military methods.

Thus, from a security perspective, it has become increasingly important to determine the authenticity of information on a day-to-day basis and deal with it appropriately. The MOD will continue to detect and fact-check disinformation and such, on social media and take appropriate actions quickly in order to ensure the safety of Japan if such information is detected.

The Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which plays a central role in responding to Integrated Information Warfare, will take necessary measures at all stages of collection, analysis, and dissemination in close cooperation with the policy and operations divisions, such as:

- Strengthening the system for information collection, analysis, and dissemination
- Establishing automatic collection and analysis functions for OSINT using artificial intelligence (AI), which will enable continuous collection and analysis of information on developments in various countries and other matters
- Developing a function that automatically collects social media information and other information to determine the veracity of information disseminated by various countries
- Exchanging information with relevant organizations.

Furthermore, in the units of the GSDF, MSDF, and
ASDF, the Government intends to establish a solid system by reviewing major units and reorganizing units. Specifically, the Government will build a system to effectively execute Integrated Information Warfare by maintaining electronic warfare units, cyber warfare units, and other units in an integrated manner.

Additionally, the Government will strive to further strengthen Japan’s capabilities by sharing information and conducting joint training with our ally, like-minded countries, and others.

In addition to the various measures mentioned above, to ensure that SDF personnel, who are the core element of our defense capability, are not misled by disinformation and prevented from making appropriate decisions, each personnel member must understand the dangers of disinformation and develop an attitude that enables them to calmly perceive and objectively examine matters on a daily basis. Therefore, Japan will work to further strengthen the information security system through provision of education and self-improvement opportunities, having personnel learn necessary professional qualities, improvement on cyber/media literacy, and other efforts.
In order to defend Japan in the future, the current warfighting sustainability of the SDF is not necessarily sufficient in terms of ammunitions and fuel and the number of operationally available equipment. It is necessary to squarely address these realities and strive to ensure and maintain sufficient war sustainability so that the SDF can continue persistent activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrent. Furthermore, in order to ensure the safety of SDF personnel on a daily basis and prevent the easy loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency, Japan will promote measures such as making major command headquarters underground and reinforcing their structures, relocate and consolidate facilities to ensure stand-off distance, and steadily construct barracks and housing and maintain aging buildings. Moreover, Japan will conceal and camouflage equipment to improve resiliency. In addition, the issue of climate change, including responses to future energy shifts, will inevitably further impact future MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, defense equipment and the security environment surrounding Japan, which requires Japan to deal with a variety of issues related to these matters.

To this end, in the NDS Japan will improve ammunition production capacity, secure ammunition storage commensurate with the amount of ammunition produced, promptly acquire the necessary and sufficient ammunition, promptly secure the necessary and sufficient amount of fuel, and establish a system to enable all equipment to be operational except that under planned maintenance by FY2027. In addition, Japan will promote measures to construct major underground command headquarters, relocate and consolidate facilities in bases and camps, as well as improve the resiliency of facilities and infrastructure against disasters such as tsunamis.

One of the top priorities for the next five years is to improve operational rates, secure sufficient ammunitions and fuel, and accelerate improving the resiliency of defense facilities. The expenditures for enhancing sustainability and resiliency exceed 40% of the approximately 43.5 trillion yen (contract-based amount) that the DBP indicates is necessary over the next five years.

## Securing Ammunition

### Status of Securing Ammunition

The SDF possesses a wide variety of ammunition, including bullets used in rifles and pistols, shells fired by tanks and artillery, missiles used by fighter aircraft and naval vessels, as well as bombs, torpedoes, land mines, and sea mines.

Although the amount budgeted for ammunition has remained generally flat over the past 30 years, it is difficult to say that the budget to secure ammunition has always been sufficient, in part due to price increases associated with the advancement of technology. Moreover, some ammunition manufacturing companies withdrew from the market due to a decrease in orders from the MOD and other factors, and although other companies have made up for the parts manufactured by the companies that withdrew, there have been cases of prolonged initial manufacturing periods and higher manufacturing costs that made it even more difficult to secure ammunition.

In addition to lacking the necessary and sufficient ammunition storage facilities, some areas lack sufficient redundancy for ammunition deployed because of the increasing size of missiles and other ammunition. There have been cases, for example, of ammunition to be carried by vessels in the Maizuru area for missions being transported overland from the Sasebo area.

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1 Expenditures for enhancing sustainability and resiliency total approximately 19 trillion yen, comprising approximately 5 trillion yen for costs of ammunitions and guided missiles, including those accounted for in other fields such as stand-off defense capabilities (approximately 2 trillion yen if not including these other fields); approximately 10 trillion yen for costs of sustainment, maintenance and ensuring the operational availability of equipment, etc. (approximately 9 trillion yen if not including other fields); and approximately 4 trillion yen for costs of improving the resiliency of facilities.
In the NDS calls for Japan will resolve the situation of ammunition shortage by FY2027. Japan will promptly procure the required quantities of various ammunitions, including high-priority stand-off missiles such as the upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (SM-3 Block IIA), interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3 MSE), long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6), and upgraded Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles (modified). Specifically, ammunition development costs, which were approximately 1 trillion yen in the previous Medium Term Defense Program, will be increased five-fold to approximately 5 trillion yen over the next five years during the period of the DBP.

In order to mass-produce ammunitions quickly and stably, the MOD/SDF will encourage the defense industry to expand its domestic manufacturing capacity and strengthen the maintenance posture for the various ammunitions. In addition, in order to accommodate the increasing ammunition size and meet the increasing storage requirements for ammunitions, the MOD/SDF will promote the expansion of ammunition storage facilities and the disposal of unused ammunitions.

See Fig. III-1-6-1 (Examples of Major Ammunition and Magazines)
2 Securing Fuel

The MOD/SDF will secure the necessary amount of fuel for SDF operations. In addition, in order to secure the required fuel quickly and stably, the MOD/SDF will build new fuel tanks while also renting private fuel tanks. For example, maintenance of fuel tanks in the MSDF has been carried out in stages based on actual use and existing tank capacity, but this has given rise to restrictions on unit operations. Therefore, as a measure to make up for the shortage of fuel for ships, private tanks with the capacity to handle storage as well as acceptance and delivery operations throughout the year will be rented.

In addition, the MOD/SDF will secure the necessary quantities of food and clothing.

3 Improving the Operational Availability of Defense Equipment

1 Current Status of the Number of Operationally Available Equipment

Equipment used by the SDF emphasizes performance over durability and is used under harsher conditions than civilian products. It thus has characteristics that result in more frequent maintenance and parts replacement compared to equipment for general use. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a certain quantity of spare parts in anticipation of parts replacement.

On the other hand, as equipment has become more advanced and achieved higher performance, the unit procurement cost of parts and costs for sustainment and maintenance have risen, and while there have also been increases in maintenance budgets, such increases have not always been sufficient, resulting in some non-operational cases due to parts shortages. For some equipment, so-called “cannibalization maintenance,” in which parts are removed from an equipment that is not operational and diverted to other equipment, it requires twice as much maintenance work as normal parts replacement due to the removal and installation of parts, thereby imposing an excessive burden on units in the field.

See Fig. III-1-6-2 (Classification of Equipment Availability)

2 Increasing the Number of Operationally Available Defense Equipment

(1) Securing Parts

By securing the necessary budget for maintenance and materials, with lead time taken into consideration, while dealing with the increasing sophistication and complexity of defense equipment, the MOD/SDF will eliminate non-operational state caused by parts shortages and maximize the number of operationally available equipment by FY2027. To this end, the precision of supply and demand forecasts will be improved by upgrading logistics-related systems, such as by adding a function to supply management systems to estimate the demand for parts using AI, while the time it takes for units to receive parts will be shortened by distributing parts efficiently throughout the SDF through the maintenance of adequate inventory. In addition, major supply warehouses will be renovated to become automated, manpower-saving, and systematized to enable accurate inventory control and prompt supply of parts according to unit needs.

See Fig. II-4-3-5 (Trends in Sustainment and Maintenance Expenditures for Equipment and Ammunition Development Expenditures)
(2) Promotion of Outsourcing

In increasing the number of operationally available equipment, the MOD/SDF will promote the outsourcing of sustainment, maintenance and other operations to outside parties in order to make effective use of limited resources.

For some equipment, the MOD/SDF is conducting outsourcing efforts aimed at reducing the number of inspection and maintenance items by analyzing maintenance plans, collecting the necessary data, and other such actions. The MOD/SDF will further promote efforts for more efficient sustainment and maintenance, such as unit maintenance and parts repair of equipment that utilize the results of such outsourcing efforts. Through these efforts, the MOD/SDF will increase the number of operationally available equipment while reducing the burden on units, especially on personnel engaged in sustainment and maintenance work.

(3) Introduction of Digital Transformation (DX)

In order to efficiently carry out various types of operations, it is necessary to drastically transform the way operations are conducted through digital transformation (DX) based on the development of the latest digital infrastructure and other means. In addition, the MOD/SDF will promote the introduction of DX in the logistics support field to optimize maintenance and upkeep. Specifically, in addition to the introduction of AI-based supply management systems, the MOD/SDF will optimize its maintenance posture in the logistics support field by improving the efficiency of inventory control and other aspects by using the results of demonstration tests for the introduction of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), an automatic authentication technology that uses radio waves to read and write information on IC tags in a contactless manner to allow the inventory status of parts and other items to be grasped more accurately, as well as 3D printers, which can be used for the emergency manufacturing of equipment parts and other items.

(4) Expansion of Performance Based Logistics (PBL)\(^2\) and Other Comprehensive Contracts

After concluding a PBL contract for aircraft from FY2012, the MOD/SDF has been expanding the scope of such contracts beyond aircraft, including the conclusion of a PBL contract for gas turbine engines for naval vessels in FY2021. The MOD/SDF will work to expand the scope of PBL contracts, which will improve the operational availability of equipment, while verifying their cost-effectiveness in order to achieve effective and efficient sustainment and maintenance.

4 Improving the Resiliency of Facilities

It is important to ensure sufficient functioning of SDF facilities, which are the foundation for the sustainability and resiliency of Japan’s defense capabilities. Because about 40% of SDF facilities were built during periods when the old earthquake resistance standards were in effect, it is necessary to transform these facilities into ones that can ensure the safety of SDF personnel on a daily basis and prevent the easy loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency.

In addition, in conjunction with the acquisition of various types of ammunition required for continuous unit operations, it is necessary to secure ammunition storage facilities. At the same time, the MOD/SDF will adopt various measures to improve resiliency in a multi-layered way by dispersing the infrastructure for SDF operations as well as by restoring and replacing infrastructure when it is damaged.

1 Securing Ammunition Storage Facilities

In conjunction with the acquisition of various types of ammunition, including stand-off missiles, the SDF will secure the necessary ammunition storage facilities. In securing the ammunition storage facilities, the SDF will pursue and promote efficient joint operations between the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF, joint use of U.S. ammunition storage facilities, and dispersed deployment to islands from the viewpoint of ensuring the resiliency of ammunition.

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\(^2\) Multi-year umbrella contracts for equipment inspections, repairs, and other maintenance and upgrade work with added conditions shortening repair times, ensuring a certain level of parts inventory, etc. in order to improve operational availability of equipment.
2 Improving the Resiliency of SDF Facilities

In order to protect major equipment and command posts, etc., and ensure a tenacious fighting posture, the MOD/SDF will establish underground basing, reinforce facilities, and take measures against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, such as installing filters on power lines, for major command posts, construct dispersal pads for the dispersed deployment of fighter aircraft, build hardened alert shelters, and establish redundancy for utility infrastructures such as electricity and water in order to maintain their functionality. In addition, the base security function will be strengthened while reducing the number of personnel.

See Fig. III-1-6-3 (Measures to Improve the Resiliency of Facilities (Image))

3 Development of Facilities Required for Formation of New Units and Introduction of New Equipment

During the period of the current DBP, the MOD/SDF will continue to develop the facilities necessary for the formation of new units and the introduction of new equipment. Specifically, this will include the development of facilities for the GSDF’s new Camp Saga (tentative name), the development of facilities in Sasebo (Sakibe East Area (tentative name)) for the MSDF, and the development of facilities for receiving the ASDF’s F-35 (A and B) aircraft.

4 Structural Reinforcement, Relocation, Consolidation, etc., of Facilities

When renovating existing facilities, protective measures against explosives, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, electromagnetic waves, and guerrilla attacks shall be provided. Structural reinforcement of facilities in accordance with their functions and importance as well as the relocation and consolidation of facilities to ensure stand-off distance shall also be implemented in conjunction with maintenance measures for aging buildings, thereby ensuring that the facilities are fully functioning.

5 Maintaining and Strengthening the Functions of Camps, Bases, etc., that Serve as Bases for Disaster Response

In order to prevent the functional decline of SDF facilities in the event of large-scale disaster, the MOD/SDF will promote countermeasures against disasters such as tsunamis for bases and camps that are expected to be damaged. Specifically, the MOD/SDF will take measures such as locating transforming equipment on high ground and installing watertight panels at entrances and exits. In the future, the SDF will improve the resiliency of defense facilities and infrastructure in bases and camps in order to adapt and respond appropriately to various challenges associated with climate change and to fulfill the SDF’s missions and roles.
Measures to Improve the Resiliency of Facilities (Image)

Making Facilities Resilient against Various Threats

About 23,000 buildings, as well as airfields, port facilities, and utilities such as electricity and water

(1) Large-scale natural disasters (crises unknown the time of occurrence)

Simulate the damage of facilities from anticipated external force

Acquire vital facilities as priority in order to limit functional degradation of defense capabilities from natural disaster (including from disaster relief action)

(2) Armed attacks, terrorist attacks, and others (intended attacks)

Confront external force with whole defense capabilities (troops, equipment, intelligence, and facilities)

Acquire facilities needed for the ways for warfare (scenario) sequentially

(3) Take all possible measures to deal with deterioration so to speak threats by time

Promote upgrading (including relocating, integrating and others) facilities systematically in order to maintain the function of defense capabilities based on (1) and (2)
1 Basic Concept

Large-scale disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons, infectious disease crises such as COVID-19, and other such issues are serious threats to the lives, health, and property of Japanese citizens, and require Japan to respond with all-out efforts.

In the event of a large-scale disaster, etc., the MOD/SDF closely cooperate with the police, fire departments, JCG, local governments, and other related organizations to effectively carry out life-saving activities, emergency reconstruction, livelihood support, etc.

Since the damage situation is unclear at the beginning of a large-scale disaster, the MOD/SDF will maintain response readiness to any damage and need for activities. In addition, while giving first priority to life-saving activities, the MOD/SDF will conduct livelihood support by coordinating with relevant parties, including local governments and the ministries and agencies concerned, on the division of roles, response policy, activity period, activities with private companies, and other matters. Furthermore, with regard to support for local governments in particular, based on the premise that there will be confusion in local governments immediately after a disaster, and also based on lessons learned in past disaster relief efforts, the MOD/SDF will propose specific support and later shift to activities based on the needs of local governments. For this purpose, the SDF is strengthening dissemination of information so that people who truly need support by the SDF can easily access the information related to support.

In addition, the SDF has the “FAST-FORCE” unit on standby at camps and other locations throughout Japan to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly.

REFERENCE:
Disaster relief operations
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/index.html

REFERENCE: The MOD/SDF’s disaster management Twitter account
URL: https://twitter.com/ModJapan_saigai?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
2 Response by the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF

(1) Responses to Natural Disasters, Etc.
A. Disaster Relief in Response to Typhoon Nanmadol and Typhoon Talas in 2022
On September 19, 2022, due to Typhoon Nanmadol, the Governor of Miyazaki Prefecture issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF for search and rescue operations for residents whose safety was unknown owing to landslides and provision of water supply support. Life-saving activities, water supply support activities, and information gathering activities by GSDF and ASDF aircraft were conducted.

On September 26 of the same year, the Governor of Shizuoka Prefecture issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF for removal of disaster debris and provision of water supply support following the landslides caused by Typhoon Talas. Support activities for removal of disaster debris, water supply support activities, and evacuation support for residents in isolated communities were conducted.

B. Disaster Relief in Response to Heavy Snow in December 2022
On December 20, 2022, the Governor of Niigata Prefecture issued a disaster relief request to the GSDF for snow removal support along National Route 8 and part of National Route 17, where many vehicles were stuck due to heavy snowfall. Support for snow removal, rescue of stranded vehicles, distribution of food and water, and refueling were carried out.

C. Disaster Relief to Prevent the Spread of Community-Acquired Infections of COVID-19
COVID-19 has resulted in a global pandemic and become a serious security threat to the international community including Japan. In order to prevent the spread of infections, the MOD/SDF have been carrying out various activities by combining their strengths since 2020.

From April 2022 to the end of March 2023, at the request of prefectural governors, the MOD/SDF transported a total of approximately 20 COVID-19 patients who became ill on remote islands in four prefectures.

D. Disaster Relief in Response to Bird Flu Outbreaks
In 13 prefectures (Hokkaido, Aomori, Ibaraki, Gunma, Chiba, Niigata, Aichi, Tottori, Okayama, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima prefectures) where bird flu outbreaks occurred between April 2022 and the end of March 2023, in response to disaster relief requests from the governors of each prefecture, the SDF conducted culling in the vicinity of poultry houses with bird flu outbreaks and poultry houses which were highly...
suspected to have outbreaks. These missions engaged a cumulative total of around 33,000 personnel.

E. Disaster Relief in Response to Forest Fires
Of the forest fires that broke out between April 2022 and the end of March 2023, local authorities conducted firefighting operations but were unable to extinguish fires in four prefectures (Aomori, Fukushima, Tochigi, and Miyazaki prefectures). Based on disaster relief requests issued by the governors of each prefecture, the SDF conducted aerial firefighting and other operations. The SDF dispatched a cumulative total of about 1,300 personnel, about 140 vehicles, and about 50 aircraft.

(2) Transportation of Emergency Patients
The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2022, out of a total of 381 cases of disaster relief, 317 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo), and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing the majority of such cases.

(3) Responses to Maritime Accidents
On April 23, 2022, the 1st Regional Coast Guard Headquarters issued a disaster relief request to the ASDF to search for persons in need of rescue due to a tour boat accident off the coast of Shiretoko, Hokkaido, and the request was accepted on the same day. From April 23 to June 1, search and rescue activities were conducted by aircraft and naval vessels of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF.

(4) Responses to Nuclear Disasters
In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.” The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, local governments, and nuclear operators, to confirm the effectiveness of municipal governments’ evacuation plan and to strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in a nuclear disaster emergency.

(5) Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters
The MOD/SDF establish basic items for actions to be taken by the SDF in the event of various disasters based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan in order to take all possible measures for the initial response by promptly transporting and deploying units as well as to respond to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration by the Central Disaster Management Council. With this, the MOD/SDF formulate various contingency plans to respond to such earthquakes with the aim of implementation of swift, systematic disaster relief.

Based on the damage assumptions for a megaquake in the Japan Trench or the Chishima Trench as well as the Basic Plan for Promotion of Disaster Management for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches announced by the Cabinet Office, the Self-Defense Forces Contingency Plan for Responses to Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches was formulated in FY2022.

(6) Collaboration with Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations
It is important for the MOD/SDF to strengthen collaboration with local governments and other relevant organizations under normal circumstances for the purpose of conducting disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including:

(1) Assignment of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices;
(2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and
(3) Recommendation of retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in accordance with requests from local governments.

As of the end of March 2023, as many as 640 retired uniformed SDF personnel are working in disaster prevention and other sections in 455 local governments in 46 prefectures throughout the country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very effective way of strengthening collaboration between the MOD/SDF and local governments, and its efficacy was confirmed through the responses to various kinds of disasters. In particular, each GSDF regional army headquarters
establishes a forum for interaction with senior directors for crisis management and other officials from local governments, and shares information and exchanges opinions to strengthen collaboration with those local governments.

In the event of a disaster, liaison officers are sent quickly from the units to the local governments in order to ensure smooth coordination.

3 Impact on Various Trainings due to Disaster Relief Activities

Large-scale and long-term disaster relief activities have been increasing in recent years, and originally planned training cannot be conducted during these disaster relief activities, which sometimes hinders the training plans.

In the future, the MOD/SDF will make the utmost effort to respond to life-saving activities during the initial response, and with regards to the various types of emergency assistance, etc., the MOD/SDF will coordinate the role sharing, response guidelines, activity periods, and utilization of private companies, etc., with the relevant parties such as local governments and the relevant ministries and agencies. The posture will be shifted as needed, and activities will be carried out at an appropriate posture and scale.

1 In light of the increasingly severe and frequent occurrence of weather disasters due to climate change, the imminence of large-scale earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, as well as the aging of infrastructure that was intensively developed from Japan’s period of rapid economic growth, it is necessary to accelerate and deepen efforts for disaster prevention and mitigation as well as building national resilience. It is also essential to utilize digital technology to efficiently promote measures for building national resilience. To this end, efforts are being made for further acceleration and deepening of measures in the fields of “countermeasures against increasingly severe wind and flood damage, imminent large-scale earthquakes, etc.” “acceleration of aging countermeasures towards a shift to preventive maintenance of infrastructure.” and “promotion of digitization, etc. to efficiently advance measures related to national resiliency.” The scale of additional projects required in the five years through FY2025 is specified, and focused and intensive countermeasures are to be taken.
Since these activities require close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, the MOD/SDF conducts joint exercises on a regular basis. From August to September 2022, the SDF conducted training in Japan with related organizations for the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas to practice the entire process of the actions of units and coordination with the related organizations, which improved integrated operational capabilities and strengthened cooperation with the related organizations. Furthermore, from February to March 2023, the MOD/SDF took advantage of the opportunity of the annual multilateral joint exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand to rehearse on a series of activities for rescue of Japanese nationals overseas in cooperation with the relevant ministries and the Embassy of Japan in Thailand. The exercise strengthened the cooperation between the MOD/SDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The MOD/SDF has transported Japanese nationals overseas six times. Most recently, Japanese nationals and others were transported from the Republic of Sudan in April 2023, which was the first case after the amendment of Article 84-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. In this case, considering the situation in the Republic of Sudan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs requested the Minister of Defense on April 19 to take preparatory actions necessary for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others staying in the country. On April 20, the Minister of Defense issued an order for the ASDF transport aircraft to move to the Republic of Djibouti and stand by. In response, the “Joint Task Force for the Transportation of Japanese Nationals and others from the Republic of Sudan” was formed with the Commander of the ASDF Air Support Command as its commander. From April 21, C-130 transport aircraft, C-2 transport aircraft, and KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft departed for the Republic of Djibouti in sequence.

On April 23, upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the transportation of Japanese nationals and others from the Republic of Sudan, the Minister of Defense issued an order to conduct transport activities on the same day. On April 24 (local time), one C-2 transport aircraft carried 45 Japanese nationals and their families from the Republic of Sudan to the Republic of Djibouti. Through this operation, two C-130 transport aircraft, two C-2 transport aircraft, one KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft, and approximately 180 personnel were dispatched to the Republic of Djibouti. Later, on April 28, the Minister of Defense issued an order to terminate the operation upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Part II, Chapter 6, Paragraph 3-6 (Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas); Reference 22 (Record of Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas / Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas by the SDF (Cabinet Decision on April 22, 2022))
Section 8 SDF Activities since Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security

1 Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based on the Legislation for Peace and Security

The Legislation for Peace and Security entered into force in March 2016. With regard to various new missions based on the Legislation, the MOD/SDF have conducted necessary training related to the Legislation using the various units of the SDF as well as in coordination with relevant countries for bilateral or multilateral training, including between Japan and the United States. Recently, during the multilateral joint training “RIMPAC 2022” held from June to August 2022, Japan participated for the first time in field training the premise that the Japanese government had recognized the situation as a Survival-Threatening Situation.

The MOD/SDF will continue to conduct such training to ensure that the Legislation for Peace and Security is effectively implemented and that all possible measures are taken to respond to all contingencies.

2 Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces (SDF Law Article 95-2)

In 2022, under the Article 95-2 of the SDF Law (Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces), the SDF protected; U.S. military vessels by SDF vessels for four times during ISR activities including ballistic missile alerts and for 18 times during joint exercises; Australian military vessels by SDF vessels for four times; and U.S. military aircraft by SDF aircraft for five times. They result in 31 times of asset protection in total.

In November 2022, the coordinated asset protection among Japan, the U.S., and Australia was conducted for the first time. This took place on the occasion of a trilateral joint exercise during which MSDF vessels protected U.S. Navy and Royal Australian Navy vessels. It made a contribution to improving interoperability among three forces and closer coordination.

See Part II, Chapter 6, Paragraph 3-7 (Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces); Reference 23 (Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S. Forces and Other Forces (SDF Law Article 95-2))

3 Other Efforts and Activities, etc.

In addition, based on the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, since April 2019 the MOD/SDF have dispatched staff officers to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) as Internationally Coordinated

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Operations for Peace and Security.

With regard to the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), since April 2017, the same framework, such as for settlement procedures, can be applied to the provision of supplies and services from the SDF to the U.S. Forces, which had become possible from the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security.

In addition to the United States, the ACSA based on the Legislation for Peace and Security also came into effect for Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and India.

See Part II, Chapter 6, Paragraph 5 (Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-5 (Logistics Support); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3 (Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities)
With regard to the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan’s NDS states that the Alliance with the United States is the cornerstone for Japan’s security policy. The fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities will lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities and further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. By representing such joint resolve and capabilities, Japan and the United States will prevent the escalation of emergencies from gray-zone situations to an invasion with conventional force and eventually the use of nuclear weapons, as well as deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts.

In addition, if an invasion against Japan occurs, Japan-U.S. joint response will defeat the invasion. To this end, both Japan and the United States will constantly modernize the Alliance and strengthen joint capabilities by aligning strategies and prioritizing goals together. In doing so, by building upon the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s own defense capabilities, Japan will play a larger role in the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the region under the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

This chapter explains activities related to the enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking account of the concepts of the NDS.

### Section 1 Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

#### 1 Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

**1 Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security**

In the current international community, a robust defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of aggression, including the use of nuclear weapons, to coercion or intimidation by military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation.

However, it is not easy even for the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it would be difficult for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy.

Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace, security, and independence centered on the Security Arrangements with the United States, the world’s dominant military power, with which it shares basic values such as democracy,
respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a capitalist economy as well as interests in maintaining the peace and security of the world and has strong economic ties.

Specifically, Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan, based on the provisions of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on the provisions of Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to defend Japan. As a result, the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words, this serves as deterrence against attacks.

Japan intends to create a seamless posture and secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military together with Japan’s own national defense architecture.

### 2 Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the U.S. Forces in Japan is to contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power, including some that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition, uncertainty over the existing order is increasing due to changes in the balance of power. The so-called gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications.

In such security environment, the presence of U.S. forces in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of Japan and the United States but also providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulfilling a role as public goods.

Also, the close cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitutes the foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the region.

### 3 Responding to Global Issues

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including the promotion of multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations.

Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are difficult for any countries to tackle alone, including risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace, acts of piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and international terrorism, and it is important for countries to work together from peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges.

In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime from a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination lays the foundation for various forms of global collaboration such as counter-piracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of the operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by advancing initiatives for resolving global issues in cooperation with the United States, which has remarkable operational capabilities, Japan will be able to further ensure its security and prosperity.
Fig. III-2-1-1 | Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

<table>
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<th>Item</th>
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</table>
| I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines | The Guidelines provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. In this way, the Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. 
- By means of the Japan-U.S. bilateral security and defense cooperation, the following points will be emphasized:  
  - synergy across the two governments' national security policies;  
  - a whole-of-government Alliance approach;  
  - cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and  
  - the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. |
| II. Basic Premises and Principles | A The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, will remain unchanged.  
B All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law.  
C All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.  
D The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures. However, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, in their specific policies and measures. |
| III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination | Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.  
A Alliance Coordination Mechanism  
In order to address issues seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan's peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.  
B Enhanced Operational Coordination  
The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.  
C Bilateral Planning  
In peacetime, the two governments develop and update bilateral plans through the Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.  
- The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan's peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.  
- The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as flexible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels.  
A Cooperative Measures during Peacetime  
- The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.  
- The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.  
B Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan's Peace and Security  
- The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries' respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation.  
- In addition to continuing cooperative measures during peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to: (1) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (2) Maritime Security; (3) Measures to Deal with Refugees; (4) Search and Rescue; (5) Protection of Facilities and Areas; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.  
C Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan  
Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.  
1 When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated  
The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.  
2 When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs  
- Principles for Coordinated Actions  
The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks. The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the SDF.  
- Concept of Operations |

### Table: Self-Defense Forces (SDF) vs. United States Armed Forces

| Operations to Defend Airspace | Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan |
|------------------------------| Have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority |
| Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks | Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan |
| Operations to Defend Maritime Areas | Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication |

- Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations |
- Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations |
- Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations |

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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security</strong></td>
<td><strong>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operations to Counter Ground Attacks</strong></td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-domain Operations</strong></td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyber domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space / cyberspace</td>
<td>Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special operations</td>
<td>May provide support, as necessary, for the strike operations of the United States Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Strike operations</td>
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- **Operational Support Activities**
  - The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities: (1) Communications and Electronics; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Logistic Support; (4) Use of Facilities; and (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection.

- **Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan**
  - When Japan and the United States decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks.
  - The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.
  - Examples of cooperative operations are: (1) Asset Protection; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Maritime Operations; (4) Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks; and (5) Logistics Support.

- **Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan**
  - When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SDF, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.
  - The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

- **V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security**
  - In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
  - When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below.
  - The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.
  - Common areas for cooperation will include: (1) Peacekeeping Operations; (2) International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Partner Capacity Building; (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (7) Training and Exercises; and (8) Logistics support.

- **Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation**
  - The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promote cooperation based upon international law and standards.

- **VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation**
  - The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions.
  - The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to all Japanese and U.S. government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises.
  - In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

- **VII. Bilateral Enterprise**
  - The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:
    - **A Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation**
    - **B Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security**
    - **C Educational and Research Exchanges**

- **VIII. Processes for Review**
  - Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.
Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” (the Guidelines), which show the general outline and policy direction of roles and cooperation between Japan and the United States, were formulated in 1978, and successively revised in 1997 and 2015.

The current Guidelines, which were revised in 2015, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, as well as modernizing the Alliance. The Guidelines also manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity not only for the two countries but also for the entire international community, including the Indo-Pacific region.

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through ordinary diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC, or “2+2” Meeting), the Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee (SSC), and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the “2+2” Meeting represents such policy consultations, and functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs,
and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange necessary information. For example, in January 2023, a meeting was held between Defense Minister Hamada and Secretary of Defense Austin. In April of the same year, then Vice-Minister of Defense Suzuki held consultations with Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Hicks and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Kahl.

Such sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is conducive to the increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives.

Reference 26 (Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2019)); Reference 27 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) (Provisional Translation) (January, 2023)); Reference 28 (Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Outline) (January, 2023)); Fig. III-2-1-2 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials Concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues); Fig. III-2-1-3 (Recent Japan-U.S. Bilateral Meetings)

See Fig. III-2-1-2

**Fig. III-2-1-2** Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultative Forum</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Legal Basis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”)</td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security</td>
<td>Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Subcommittee (SSC) Security Subcommittee</td>
<td>Participants are not specified (Note 2)</td>
<td>Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States</td>
<td>Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) (Note 3)</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Deputy Director General for Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense Representative from Joint Staff; Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: the U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, USINDOPACOM</td>
<td>Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies</td>
<td>Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Committee (JC) Joint Committee</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of the Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others</td>
<td>Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
<td>Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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</table>

(Note 1) The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
(Note 2) Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
(Note 3) A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.
The two leaders concurred on the importance of information security and cyber security which is the basis for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, and agreed to work together to strengthen them. Both sides concurred to further deepen cooperation in the area of equipment and technology including cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology.

Both sides welcomed the realignment initiatives of the U.S. Forces in Japan so far including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki and facility development of Mageshima and agreed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely work together for steady progress.

Both sides shared the importance of continuing to closely work together and further expedite the cooperation to mitigate impact on Okinawa this year, which marks the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.

**Summary of the outcome**

- The Ministers severely condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, stating that it is a unilateral change to the status quo by force that poses serious challenge to the international order and such actions are absolutely unacceptable. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to work together to support Ukraine as much as possible.
- The US side expressed appreciation to Japan’s leadership in supporting Ukraine. Japanese side stated its vision to strengthen the commitment to security in Europe from the viewpoint that security of the Indo-Pacific region and Europe cannot be regarded separately.
- Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
- Both sides discussed the recent behaviors of China in the Indo-Pacific region such as coercive actions in the East and South China Seas. Both sides determined that any change to the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region cannot be condoned, and confirmed that both countries would continue to strengthen cooperation to deter and, if necessary, respond to such actions.
- The US side affirmed that the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan and that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. The US side also expressed opposition to any unilateral attempts to undermine the administration of Japan.
- Both sides also reiterated the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.
- Both sides agreed on the view that North Korea’s repeated missile launches and nuclear development, etc. are a serious threat against peace and stability of the region and the international community and that such actions cannot be tolerated. Both sides also confirmed to advance close bilateral and trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea in response to North Korea’s provocations.
- Both sides concurred to strengthen defense cooperation with partner countries in the region and beyond such as Australia, India, Southeast Asian and Pacific Island nations, and European nations.
- Both sides agreed that Japan and the United States would promptly materialize various measures to enhance the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond.
- Japanese side expressed their determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities through formulating the NSS, etc. The US side welcomed the statement and both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States would align their respective strategies through close consultations.
- The US side stated that the U.S. commitment to providing the extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. Japanese side stated that bilateral efforts at various levels to ensure nuclear deterrence remains credible and resilient is more important than ever under the current international security situation, and shared the recognition with the US side.
- Both sides concurred on the importance of information security and cyber security which is the basis for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, and agreed to work together to strengthen them. Both sides concurred to further deepen cooperation in the area of equipment and technology including cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology.
- Both sides welcomed the realignment initiatives of the U.S. Forces in Japan so far including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki and facility development of Mageshima and agreed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely work together for steady progress.
- Both sides shared the importance of continuing to closely work together and further expedite the cooperation to mitigate impact on Okinawa this year, which marks the 50th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.

**Recent Japan-U.S. Bilateral Meetings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting/Venue</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Summary of the outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 4, 2022</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C.</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Kishi, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin</td>
<td>• The Ministers severely condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, stating that it is a unilateral change to the status quo by force that poses serious challenge to the international order and such actions are absolutely unacceptable. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to work together to support Ukraine as much as possible.</td>
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<td>May 23, 2022</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting Tokyo</td>
<td>Prime Minister Kishida, President Biden</td>
<td>• Prime Minister Kishida extended his sincere welcome to President Biden’s visit to Japan as it demonstrates the continued commitment of the U.S. to the Indo-Pacific region under any circumstances, and President Biden stated that he hopes to demonstrate the unwavering U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region through this visit to Japan.</td>
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<td>• As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine shakes the very foundations of international order, the two leaders reaffirmed the need to resolutely defend free and open international order based on the rule of law. The two leaders also recognized that the Indo-Pacific is a region of vital importance to global peace, security and prosperity, and concurred that Japan and the United States will lead the international community towards the realization of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”</td>
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<td>• Regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to promoting support for Ukraine and imposing sanction measures against Russia, in continued close coordination with the G7 and the international community. The two leaders concurred that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate towards strong international solidarity.</td>
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<td>• The two leaders concurred on the importance of clearly demonstrating that any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, such as the recent aggression, should not be tolerated in any region, and that such attempts should have significant cost.</td>
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<td>• The two leaders discussed the possible impact of the situation in Ukraine on the Indo-Pacific region and concurred to be attentive to developments such as the recent China-Russia joint military exercises. The two leaders strongly opposed any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas and economic coercion, expressed serious concern about the development in Hong Kong and the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and concurred to continue to work closely together in addressing issues related to China.</td>
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<td>• The two leaders confirmed that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element in security and prosperity in the international community, and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.</td>
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<td>• The two leaders condemned North Korea’s nuclear and missile development activities, including its ICBM-class ballistic missile launches. The two leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and urged North Korea to abide by its obligations under these resolutions. The two leaders concurred to further strengthen cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, including security cooperation.</td>
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<td>• Prime Minister Kishida expressed his appreciation for President Biden’s meeting with the family members of the abductees by North Korea. He asked for full understanding and cooperation again for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and gained further support from President Biden.</td>
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<td>• The two leaders concurred to swiftly strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. President Biden reiterated the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, and the two leaders concurred to communicate more closely between Japan and the U.S. to ensure that extended deterrence remains unwavering.</td>
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<td>• They reiterated their opposition to any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands.</td>
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<td>• Prime Minister Kishida stated his determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities and secure substantial increase of its defense budget needed to effect it, which received strong support from President Biden.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Meeting/Venue</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Summary of the outcome</td>
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| June 27, 2022 | Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting Elmau      | Prime Minister Kishida, President Biden | • The Japanese side emphasized the significance of the President Biden’s visit to Japan in May. The two leaders confirmed their commitment to continue close coordination toward further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”  
  • The two leaders concurred in working together for the success of the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic “2+2”) at the Ministerial level to be held in July.  
  • The two leaders confirmed their commitment to continue close coordination regarding their response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In this regard, the two leaders also discussed responses to rising oil prices, such as putting a price cap on Russian oil.  
• The Ministers had a wide range of discussions on the challenging security environment surrounding the Japan-U.S. Alliance.  
• The Ministers once again strongly condemned China’s ballistic missile launches in early August including the landing of missiles inside Japan’s EEZ as a grave issue related to the security of Japan and the safety of its people. The Ministers reiterated the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and expressed the view that they would call for the peaceful resolution of cross-straits issues. The Ministers confirmed that they would not condone unilateral changes to the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region, and that both sides would cooperate closely and seamlessly to that end.  
• The Ministers confirmed that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is an outrage that undermines the foundation of international order. They confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to work together to carry on support for Ukraine.  
• Regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues, the Ministers welcomed the Japan-U.S.-ROK training during the missile warning exercise Pacific Dragon in August. The Ministers confirmed that they would further advance even closer Japan-U.S.-bilateral and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation in order to promptly respond to North Korea’s provocative actions in a concerted manner.  
• The Ministers concurred that they would strengthen cooperation with partner countries in the region and beyond to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific.  
• Minister Hamada expressed his determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities through formulation of new NSS, etc., examining all options including the so-called “counterstrike capabilities.” Minister Hamada also stated that the MOD was working to secure substantial increase of the defense budget needed to effect it. Secretary Austin expressed his strong support for these efforts. The Ministers confirmed that the strategies of Japan and the United States share the same direction and that they would align their respective strategies even more closely to strengthen the Alliance.  
• Secretary Austin reaffirmed that the U.S. commitment to providing extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States would broaden discussions including at the ministerial level on efforts to ensure that extended deterrence of the United States including nuclear capabilities remains credible and resilient.  
• The Ministers agreed upon the importance of strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as part of strengthening the Alliance’s ability to deter and respond to threats. The Ministers welcomed the progress towards the temporary deployment of USAF MQ-9s to MSDF Kanoya Air Base.  
• Minister Hamada stated that the temporary deployment of MQ-9s contributes to the deepening of ISR activities by unmanned aerial vehicles of SDF. The Ministers concurred that Japan and the United States would jointly analyze information acquired by Japanese and the U.S. assets including MQ-9s.  
• The Ministers concurred that Japan and the United States would further accelerate cooperation in the area of equipment and technology to ensure technological edge of the Alliance. From such perspective, the Ministers agreed to continue joint analysis on counter-hypersonic technology and based on its progress, to begin consideration of joint research on technologies and components. The Ministers also concurred to further accelerate cooperation in unmanned aerial vehicles that have the potential to collaborate with manned aircraft such as F-X, as well as efforts to strengthen supply chains, etc.  
• The Ministers concurred that information security and cybersecurity is crucially important to deepening Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. Minister Hamada explained that Japan would work to fundamentally strengthen cyber security.  
• The Ministers confirmed that the understanding and cooperation from local communities as well as safe and environment-friendly operations of the U.S. Forces are important for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan and their daily activities. The Ministers concurred that Japan and the United States would work closely together for the steady progress of the realignment initiatives of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko as well as facility development of Mageshima. The Ministers confirmed that the understanding and cooperation from local communities including Okinawa.  
  |  
• At the outset, the two leaders shared the recognition that the security environment surrounding us is becoming increasingly severe due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, North Korea’s repeated provocative actions, and continuing unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas. They then shared the recognition that the strong Japan-U.S. relationship has a significant role to play in regional peace and stability and beyond, and concurred to work together to ensure peace and prosperity in the region and the international community, further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and promoting efforts to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”  
• The two leaders exchanged their views on regional issues. (1) The two leaders concurred on working closely together in addressing issues related to China. They also confirmed the importance of peace and stability in the region. (2) The two leaders concurred that North Korea’s ballistic missile launches in an unprecedented frequency and manner are absolutely unacceptable, and confirmed their commitment to continue close coordination between Japan and the United States as well as among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK towards the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the UNSC’s. Prime Minister Kishida also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the United States for the resolution of the abductions issue, and gained full support from President Biden. (3) The two leaders, regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, confirmed their commitment to impose strong sanctions against Russia and to support Ukraine, in solidarity with the G7 and other like-minded countries, while further reaching out to the Global South. They also confirmed that they have a serious concern about Russia’s nuclear threat, which is absolutely unacceptable, let alone the use of such weapons.  
• Prime Minister Kishida explained that Japan is in the process of formulating a new NSS by the end of this year amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. Prime Minister Kishida reiterated his determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities and to secure a substantial increase of defense budget needed to effect it, which received strong support from President Biden.  
  |  
| November 13, 2022 | Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in Phnom Penh | Prime Minister Kishida, President Biden |  
• The two leaders confirmed that they would work closely together in addressing issues related to China. They also confirmed the importance of peace and stability in the region.  
• The two leaders concurred that North Korea’s aggressive behavior, including its repeated provocations and missile launches, is absolutely unacceptable and called for a resolute response. They underscored the importance of maintaining and strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities, including through defense cooperation with the United States.  
• During the meeting, the leaders discussed North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and agreed on the need to maintain and strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities to deter and respond to such threats. They committed to continue close coordination on these issues.  
• The leaders also exchanged views on other regional issues, including the situation in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. They reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining regional peace and stability and working towards a shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.  
• The meeting concluded with a strong message of solidarity and cooperation between Japan and the United States, underscoring the importance of the Alliance in a rapidly changing security environment.  
  |
### Japan-U.S. Alliance

#### Chapter 2

#### Part III

#### Section 1 Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting/Venue</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Summary of the outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| November 13, 2022 | Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in Phnom Penh         | Prime Minister Kishida, President Biden                                     | • While welcoming the progress made on the IPEF and the economic “2+2,” the two leaders shared the recognition that engagement of the United States in the economic order and economic security in the region is becoming increasingly important. Prime Minister Kishida urged the United States to return to the TPP at an early time, from a strategic perspective. Prime Minister Kishida also conveyed Japan’s thoughts on the U.S. credits for clean vehicles.  
• The two leaders concurred to continue close coordination between Japan and the United States towards the success of the G7 Hiroshima Summit Meeting in 2023. |
| January 11, 2023 | Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting / Washington D.C. | Minister of Defense Hamada, Foreign Minister Hayashi, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken | • At the beginning of the meeting, the United States side expressed its sincere welcome to the visit of the two Japanese ministers to the United States and its great pleasure that this Japan-U.S. “2+2” could be held face-to-face for the first time in two years in a timely manner, immediately after the release of the strategic documents of the two countries. They also stated that the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance has never been higher than ever amidst an increasingly severe security environment, and they also stated that they would like to demonstrate the unwavering U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region to achieve a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The Japanese side stated that this is an excellent opportunity to have discussion on further deepening of the Alliance, while aligning the two countries’ perceptions of the security environment, based on both countries’ strategic documents. They added that they are fully committed to continuously strengthening the Alliance and sincerely look forward to working closely with the two Secretaries. They also stated that the strategies do not end when they are formulated, and it is important to work together to promptly implement their respective strategies.  
• Japan and the United States welcomed the release of their respective National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies, and affirmed unprecedented alignment of their vision, priorities, and goals.  
• The Japanese side stated that, it would reinforce its defense capabilities by acquiring new capabilities and enhancing its warfighting sustainability early under the substantially increased defense budget. In response, the United States side stated that this is an important initiative to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities, and stated that the United States strongly supports this initiative.  
• The U.S. side restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear, and reaffirmed Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands.  
• The Japanese side stated that Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and security roles to proactively create a peaceful and stable international environment, and to enhance a free and open international order based on the rule of law. Then both sides aligned their perspectives on the security environment as follows.  
• Japan and the United States concurred that China’s foreign policy-based actions aimed at reshaping the international order for its own benefit are of serious concern to the United States and Japan, and pose the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, and whole international society.  
• The U.S. side also reiterated its strong opposition to China’s intensified attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan’s longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands.  
• Japan and the United States recognized that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.  
• Japan and the United States strongly condemned North Korea’s unprecedented number of unlawful and reckless ballistic missile launches over the past year. The Japanese side stated that if North Korea, which has announced its policy of mass production of tactical nuclear weapons and other initiatives, decides to conduct another nuclear test, this test needs to be recognized as an event that is completely different from the previous six nuclear tests. In addition, the U.S. side expressed its full support for the abductions issue.  
• Japan and the United States strongly condemned Russia’s brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war against Ukraine. The Japanese side stated that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region is indivisible, and that as the G7 chair this year, Japan will lead the discussion on how to respond to Russia and support Ukraine.  
• The Japanese side stated that the strategies of both countries are aligned in that both sides seek to fundamentally reinforce their own defense capabilities to enhance deterrence, to increase investment for this purpose, and to strengthen cooperation with allies and like-minded countries. The both sides discussed measures to maximize Alliance deterrence and response capabilities and capabilities.  
• The Japanese side stated that it is necessary to achieve a more effective division of roles and missions between Japan and the United States based on fundamentally reinforced Japan’s defense capabilities. Japan and the United States reemphasized the necessity to further enhance bilateral coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism in order to cope with the full spectrum of possible situations in a timely and integrated manner. The U.S. side welcomed Japan’s decision to establish a permanent joint headquarters.  
• Japan and the United States decided to deepen bilateral cooperation towards the effective employment of Japan’s counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the United States.  
• Japan and the United States decided to deepen bilateral coordination, including on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and flexible deterrent options.  
• The Japanese side stated that cooperation in equipment and technology is important both for maintaining the technological edge and for swiftly achieving the reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities, and that it is necessary to further accelerate such cooperation. The U.S. side expressed its willingness to make efforts with Japan towards maintaining their technological edge.  
• The Japanese side stated that deepening cooperation in the space and cyber domains is a core element in modernizing the Alliance. Both sides committed to deepening cooperation on space-related capabilities. In addition, Japan and the United States consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Japanese side stated that this is an important achievement in terms of strengthening the deterrence capabilities of the Alliance.  
• The Japanese side stated that, with regard to multilateral cooperation, the Japanese side committed to further increasing the number of allies and like-minded countries to strengthen deterrence.  
• Japan and the United States took time to have in-depth discussions on extended deterrence as one of the agenda, based on the release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.  
• Japan and the United States reaffirmed the critical importance of ensuring U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient.  
• Furthermore, Japan and the United States concurred to deepen the substantive discussions at the Extended Deterrence Dialogue as well as through various senior-level meetings. |
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<th>Date</th>
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<th>Summary of the outcome</th>
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| January 11, 2023 | Japan-U.S. Security Consulting Committee ("2+2") Meeting / Washington D.C. | Minister of Defense Hamada, Foreign Minister Hayashi, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken | - Japan and the United States affirmed the need to optimize Alliance force posture based on improved operational concepts and enhanced capabilities to address increasing security challenges in the region, including for the defense of the Southwestern Islands of Japan. They also concurred on the importance of steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Henoko which is the only solution that avoids its continued use.  
- Japan and the United States concurred to readjust the force posture of U.S. Forces in Japan in light of the current severe security environment. Facing a severely contested environment, Japan and the United States confirmed that the forward post of U.S. Forces in Japan should be upgraded to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities. In line with such policy, Japan and the United States reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (RRC) as outlined by the SCC on April 27, 2012, will be readjusted so that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa and the 12th Marine Regiment by 2025. This effort will be carried out while maintaining the basic tenets of the 2012 Realignment Plan, with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities.  
- The Japanese side expressed appreciation for the dedicated activities of U.S. Forces in Japan to address the severe security environment. The Japanese side also introduced the steady progress of the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility and the facility development on Magashima. Japan and the United States also reconfirmed the steady implementation of ongoing projects supporting realignment of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan and the importance of relationships with local communities, and underlined their commitment to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henoko area and in adjacent waters as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. They also welcomed the progress and future prospects for the development of the SDF facility on Magashima.  
- Japan and the United States confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral coordination for the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa, and the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. The Japanese side requested the U.S. side for safe operations of the U.S. Forces with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities, appropriate responses to incidents and accidents, and sharing information in a timely manner, including on environmental issues. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States will work in close cooperation. |
| January 12, 2023 | Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C. | Minister of Defense Hamada, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin | - The Ministers concurred that they would promptly implement the respective new NSS and NDS and discussed concrete measures based on the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting.  
- Minister Hamada expressed his strong resolve, under its new strategies, to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike, at an early stage through a substantial increase of its defense budget. Secretary Austin expressed his strong support for such efforts of Japan. |
| January 12, 2023 | Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C. | Minister of Defense Hamada, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin | - The Ministers confirmed that they would direct to promptly have intensive discussions on roles and missions of the Alliance based on the fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities of Japan. The Ministers confirmed the necessity of deepening discussions on effective operation of counterstrike capabilities under the bilateral cooperation, joint efforts to deter the occurrence of contingencies from peace time, and prompt and effective bilateral coordination at every phase, among others.  
- Secretary Austin reaffirmed that the U.S. commitment to providing extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. The Ministers confirmed that they would deepen efforts to ensure that extended deterrence of the United States including nuclear capabilities remains more credible and resilient, including discussions at Japan-U.S. "2+2."  
- The Ministers welcomed the temporary deployment of U.S. Air Force MQ-9s to MSDF Kanoya Air Base as well as the commencement of Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC) from the perspective of strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.  
- Recognizing the vital importance of ensuring the technological edge of the Alliance for the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance, the Ministers concurred that they would further deepen cooperation in equipment and technology areas. As a framework that forms such foundation, the Ministers signed the Memorandum of Understanding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects as well as Security of Supply Arrangement towards strengthening supply chain security and promoting cooperation. In addition, the Ministers shared the progress for discussions towards joint research and development in counter-hypersonic technology, high-power microwaves and autonomous systems.  
- The Ministers share the recognition that information security and cybersecurity are fundamental to the Alliance, and confirmed that they would continue to strengthen their collaboration. Minister Hamada expressed his resolve to thoroughly implement measures to fundamentally strengthen security in such area.  
- The Ministers agreed to implement the U.S. Forces posture initiatives confirmed in the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting which will substantially strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance, and confirmed that they would continue consultations for realizing such initiatives. Minister Hamada highlighted the importance of mitigating impact on Okinawa and the Ministers concurred that the understanding and cooperation from local communities is important for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces and their daily activities. |
| January 13, 2023 | Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Washington D.C. | Prime Minister Kishida, President Biden | - At the outset, Prime Minister Kishida expressed his pleasure to meet with his close friend, President Biden, on his first visit to Washington, D.C. as Prime Minister of Japan in the new year 2023. In the meeting, President Biden welcomed Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to the United States and stated that the partnership between the two leaders and the Japan-U.S. Alliance are stronger than ever.  
- Prime Minister Kishida stated that as Japan and the United States face the most severe and complex security environment in recent years, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including the possession of counterstrike capabilities, and substantially increase its defense budget, based on the new NSS and other documents released last December, and President Biden reiterated his full support.  
- Prime Minister Kishida expressed his high appreciation for the U.S. National Security Strategy released last October, and President Biden reiterated his unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan. The two leaders then welcomed the national security strategies of the two countries are aligned with each other and renewed their determination to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including seeking to create synergies in the implementation of the strategies.  
- The two leaders instructed to further deepen concrete consultations regarding Japan-U.S. cooperation on the security front, taking into account the discussions at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") on January 11.  
- The two leaders exchanged views on the regional issues, based on the viewpoint that any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia, must not be tolerated. |
Meeting / Venue | Participants | Summary of the outcome
--- | --- | ---
**January 13, 2023**
Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Washington D.C. | Prime Minister Kishida
President Biden | • (1) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together in addressing issues related to China. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges. Furthermore, the two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
• (2) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together between Japan and the United States as well as among Japan, the United States, and the ROK towards the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions on strengthening regional deterrence, including security cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK, and on resolutions at the UN Security Council. Prime Minister Kishida also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the United States for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and once again gained full support from President Biden.
• (3) Regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders concurred on continuing to strongly promote sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine in close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded countries. They also reaffirmed their views that Russia’s nuclear threat is absolutely unacceptable, and Russia should never use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Prime Minister Kishida explained that, at the G7 Hiroshima Summit, he would like to demonstrate the G7’s vision and determination to uphold the international order based on the rule of law and also discuss the Indo-Pacific substantially. In addition, Prime Minister Kishida stated that as the Prime Minister of Japan, the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, he hopes to join with the G7 leaders, including President Biden, in sending a pledge from Hiroshima to the world that humanity will never repeat the scourgery of nuclear weapons. The two leaders then concurred on working together towards a world without nuclear weapons, while taking into account the severe security environment. Furthermore, the leaders shared the view that it is important for the G7 to work in solidarity in such areas as the global economy, including energy and food security, economic security, and global issues such as climate change, health and development. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment that Japan and the United States will work closely together towards the success of the G7 Hiroshima Summit.
• The two leaders showed the view that the Japan-U.S. economic relations were elevated to a strategic stage in 2022, with the launch and progress of the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic "2+2") and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The two leaders then concurred that, with Japan holding the G7 Presidency and the United States holding the APEC Chair this year, the two countries will lead the international community towards sustainable and inclusive economic growth and maintaining and strengthening a rules-based, free and fair international economic order, while also utilizing this year’s Economic "2+2.”

**January 13, 2023**
Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Washington D.C. | Prime Minister Kishida
President Biden | • In addition, Prime Minister Kishida once again conveyed Japan’s thoughts on the U.S. credits for clean vehicles.
• Furthermore, the two leaders shared the recognition that U.S. engagement in the regional economic order is becoming increasingly important, and concurred on cooperating for the progress of IPEF negotiations. Prime Minister Kishida, meanwhile, conveyed Japan’s position on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from a strategic perspective. The two leaders also concurred on promoting DFFT (Data Free Flow with Trust).
• The two leaders concurred on strengthening supply chain resilience among like-minded countries to handle economic security challenges, including economic coercion.
• Furthermore, the two leaders shared the importance of working together towards strengthening energy security.
• The two leaders concurred on further promoting Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of outer space.
• The two leaders shared the recognition that commitment to a free and open international order based on the rule of law has never been more important.
• Prime Minister Kishida then stated that he will strengthen efforts to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).” In response, President Biden expressed his support for Prime Minister Kishida’s initiatives and reiterated the unwavering U.S. commitment to the region.
• The two leaders concurred that Japan and the United States will continue to promote endeavors to realize a FOIP to ensure the peace and prosperity of the region and the international community.
• The two leaders reconfirmed unprecedented Japan-U.S. cooperation, rooted in the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific and a peaceful and prosperous world, and guided by the shared values, including the rule of law, and issued the Joint Statement of Japan and the United States.

**May 18, 2023**
Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Hiroshima | Prime Minister Kishida
President Biden | • At the outset, Prime Minister Kishida expressed his pleasure to once again meet with President Biden since his visit to Washington D.C. in January. Prime Minister Kishida also stated that the two leaders’ shared commitment to the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and that our multilayered cooperation is not limited to security and economy, but to all fields. In response, President Biden stated that Japan and the United States share fundamental values, and that this Alliance is stronger than ever.
• Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan is working closely with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), one of the leading universities in the United States, to conduct a feasibility study to establish a “Global Startup Campus” in central Tokyo (Meguro / Shibuya) in order to create an ecosystem of innovation and startup in the field of deep tech. The two leaders concurred that it is important for Japan and the United States to coordinate closely to ensure the peace and prosperity of the region and the international community.
• The two leaders exchanged views on Japan-U.S. security cooperation, and concurred to continue to cooperate for further strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, based on the outcomes of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") and the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in January. The two leaders reaffirmed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the region, and that our multilayered cooperation is not limited to security and economy, but to all fields. In response, President Biden stated that Japan and the United States share fundamental values, and that this Alliance is stronger than ever.
• President Biden reiterated the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, backed by the full range of their capabilities, including nuclear, and, in this context, the two leaders reaffirmed their intent to ensure full bilateral coordination throughout every phase of a developing situation. The two leaders commended the robust and in-depth consultations on U.S. extended deterrence at the latest Japan-U.S. "2+2" and Extended Deterrence Dialogue meetings, and reaffirmed the importance of further strengthening such consultations.
• The two leaders exchanged views on the regional issues, based on the viewpoint that any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia, must not be tolerated.
• (1) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together in addressing issues related to China. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges. Furthermore, the two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
• The two leaders also concurred on the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges. Furthermore, the two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting/Venue</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Summary of the outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 18, 2023</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Summit</td>
<td>Prime Minister Kishida,</td>
<td>(2) Prime Minister Kishida, touching upon his visit to the ROK earlier this month, expressed his intention to work</td>
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<td>Meeting / Hiroshima</td>
<td>President Biden</td>
<td>on further advancement of Japan-ROK relations. In response, President Biden welcomed improvement in Japan-ROK</td>
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<td>relations. The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together between Japan and the United States</td>
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<td>as well as among Japan, the United States, and the ROK toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea in</td>
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<td>accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions in strengthening regional deterrence, including security</td>
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<td>cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK, and on responses at the UN Security Council. Prime</td>
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<td>Minister Kishida also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the United States for the immediate</td>
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<td>resolution of the abductions issue, and once again gained full support from President Biden.</td>
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<td>(3) Regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders concurred on continuing severe sanctions</td>
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<td>against Russia and strong support for Ukraine in close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded countries.</td>
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<td>(4) The two leaders confirmed the importance of engagement with and support for the so-called “Global South”.</td>
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<td>Looking towards the G7 Hiroshima Summit from the 19th, the two leaders concurred to coordinate closely to</td>
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<td>demonstrate to the world the G7’s unwavering solidarity in addressing the issues of the international society</td>
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<td>and the region.</td>
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<td>The two leaders shared the recognition that U.S. engagement in the economic order of the region is becoming</td>
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<td>increasingly important and had a discussion on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Kishida conveyed Japan’s views and efforts on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific</td>
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<td>Partnership (CPTPP).</td>
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<td>The two leaders shared the importance of promoting and protecting critical technologies. The two leaders</td>
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<td>welcomed a planned signing of partnerships between Japanese and U.S. universities and companies in the areas</td>
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<td>of quantum and semiconductor and concurred on expanding cooperation into the areas of biotechnology and AI.</td>
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<td>Furthermore, the two leaders shared the importance of working together towards strengthening energy security.</td>
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<td>The two leaders also concurred on further materializing economic security cooperation through the Japan-U.S.</td>
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<td>Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic “2+2”).</td>
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</table>
Section 2 Strengthening the Joint Deterrence and Response Capabilities of Japan and the United States

Japan’s NDS and the United States’ National Defense Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through integrating all approaches and means.

Accordingly, from the viewpoint of reinforcing readiness and resiliency, imposing costs on opponents, and deterring invasion against Japan, Japan will further deepen discussion with the United States on their respective roles, missions, and capabilities, and further reinforce the joint deterrence capabilities of both countries in an integrated manner.

Specifically, Japan will further deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-domain operations including space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum as well as to improve interoperability. Regarding Japan’s counterstrike capabilities, Japan will work with the United States to establish a cooperative posture, including in information gathering, in order to employ their joint capabilities more effectively. Furthermore, Japan will reinforce collaboration in such areas as air-defense; anti-surface warfare; anti-submarine warfare; mine warfare; amphibious operations; airborne operations; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT); protection of assets and facilities; and logistics support.

In order to effectively realize the division of roles and missions between Japan and the United States in light of the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities, Japan will ensure close operational coordination with the United States through Japan-U.S. bilateral planning. In addition, Japan will work to improve allied response capabilities, including readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical exercises and training.

In addition, in order to ensure that U.S. extended deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible and resilient, Japan will further actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence, including those at the ministerial level.

In order to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts as well as to deter various contingencies from occurring, Japan further expands and evolves operations such as bilateral flexible deterrent options (FDO) and joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as to the joint measures between Japan and the U.S. in peacetime. In order to effectively conduct these operations, Japan will actively makes such efforts as promoting the participation of like-minded countries and others and the SDF protecting U.S. assets such as vessels and aircraft.

Furthermore, as part of efforts to strengthen allied deterrence and response capabilities, Japan will, on a regular basis, increase the joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities and promote the mutual deployment of both countries’ units to both Japanese and U.S. facilities for training or other purposes.

1 Cooperation in the Space and Cyber Domains

The NDS states that Japan and the United States will further deepen efforts to enhance cooperation and interoperability for the smooth implementation of Japan-U.S. joint cross-domain operations, including in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum domains.

In particular, it was confirmed at the January 2023 Japan-U.S. SCC (“2+2”) that both sides consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and that affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

In addition, Japan and the United States have continued to exchange information on topics such as the use of AI in the area of security and multilateral challenges.
2 Integrated Air and Missile Defense

Regarding the response to airborne threats coming to Japan, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft, Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been enhanced by conducting Japan-U.S. joint air defense/missile defense exercises in addition to sharing operational information and establishing response procedures. In addition, Japan and the United States are cooperating in the event of North Korea’s repeated ballistic missile launches by utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM).

In the Missile Defense Review (MDR) released in October 2022, the United States clearly indicated the importance of cooperation with allies, including Japan. See Chapter 1, Section 4-2 (Responses to Missile Attacks)

3 Bilateral Training and Exercises

Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises in peacetime not only contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing bilateral response capabilities by improving interoperability, including mutual understanding of tactics and communication, but are also beneficial for improving tactical skills for each participant. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side learns from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities.

In addition, conducting bilateral training at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises. See Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Training and Exercise Initiatives); Reference 29 (Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2022)

4 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities

With regard to joint ISR activities, it is important to implement such activities broadly in the Asia-Pacific region with cooperation between Japan and the United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of both countries.

The expansion of these bilateral ISR activities will function as deterrence, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure throughout all phases from peacetime to contingencies.

As part of these efforts, the temporary deployment of the U.S. Forces’ MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to the Kanoya Air Base of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) began in November 2022. In addition, the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC) was established at Yokota Air Base in order to jointly analyze information collected by Japanese and U.S. information gathering assets, including MQ-9. See Column “Temporary Deployment of U.S. Forces’ UAV MQ-9 to Kanoya Air Base”

Ceremony for the start of operations of the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell
Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistics support based on the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996 and revised in 1999 and 2004. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations (UN). Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, international peace cooperation assignments, international disaster relief activities, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so.1

Following the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016, ratified by the Diet in April 2017, and entered into force. This has enabled the same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA, such as settlement procedures, to be applied to the provision of supplies and services that had become possible under the Legislation for Peace and Security, so that since April 2017 food and fuel have been provided to the U.S. Forces engaged in information collection and other activities.

1 The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlifts); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage services; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance services; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (provision of weapons is not included).
The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas also means increasing bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enables closer operational coordination, enhanced interoperability, and improved flexibility and resiliency during bilateral activities. The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of bilateral training and exercises as well as enhance interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in case of a disaster.

Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities, Japan and the United States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for training. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command Headquarters to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the then GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, the development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration.

Moreover, securing ammunition storage is an important issue for acquiring the various types of ammunition necessary to ensure and maintain sufficient war fighting sustainability, and specific coordination has begun for additional joint/shared use of ammunition storage by the SDF within the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, a facility and area of the USFJ.

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**Fig. III-2-2-1 Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)**

**Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services**

In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of the operations.

**Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese and U.S. activities</th>
<th>Situations that will have an important influence</th>
<th>Situations threatening international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint U.S. bilateral drills</td>
<td>Armed Attack Situations</td>
<td>Survival-Threatening Situations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral drills with Japan &amp; U.S. participation</td>
<td>Anticipated Armed Attack Situations</td>
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<td>Disaster relief</td>
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<td>Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.</td>
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<td>International disaster relief activities</td>
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<td>U.S. Forces staying temporarily at Self-Defense Forces facilities for regular duties</td>
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<td>Guarding operation</td>
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<td>Counter-piracy operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detection of ballistic missiles, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Removal of underwater mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>protection of Japanese nationals overseas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training and surveillance activities</td>
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<td>U.S. Forces staying temporarily at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties</td>
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<td>Peace Keeping Operation</td>
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<td>Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security</td>
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<td>International humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>From SDF conducting international peace cooperation operations to U.S. Forces responding to disasters</td>
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</table>

*1 Activities that came under the scope of the agreement due to the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security.
*2 Provision of ammunition for all activities and situations other than armed attack situations, etc., falls under the scope of the new agreement.
In November 2015, based on the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, the Japanese and U.S. governments established the ACM in order to seamlessly and effectively implement a well-aligned Japan-U.S. response to address any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response.

Based on the framework shown in Fig. III-2-3-1 (The Defense Budget of Major Countries (FY2022)), the ACM coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness.

The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a largescale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of this ACM makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels.

Since the establishment of the ACM, Japan and the United States have been utilizing the ACM to coordinate...
closely, including in response to the Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands.

The NDS calls for Japan to further upgrade the overall coordination functions between Japan and the United States centered on the ACM and to promote closer operational coordination by leveraging the ACM and others to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others centered around the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

### 2 Closer Operational Coordination

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. Forces exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate smooth coordination, and to support international activities.

#### 1 Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. governments established the BPM in November 2015 for the purpose of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the Guidelines to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security.

In the development of bilateral plans, this BPM performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through the BPM.

**Fig. III-2-3-2 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM))**

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**Legend:**
- Coordination
- Command under the BPM
- JSDF/USF chain of command

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The NDS states that Japan will reinforce the foundational elements that support effective allied response in all phases.

## 1 Information Security and Cybersecurity

In order to further reinforce information sharing at all levels, Japan will fundamentally reinforce efforts related to information security and cybersecurity so that Japan and the United States can fully employ their capabilities.

In the January 2023 Japan-U.S. SCC ("2+2"), both sides emphasized the foundational importance of cybersecurity and information security for the Alliance, and concurred to intensify collaboration to counter increasingly sophisticated and persistent cyber threats.

## 2 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In order to ensure the Alliance’s technological edge, interoperability, readiness, and warfighting sustainability, Japan will further reinforce defense equipment and technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint research in cutting-edge technology, joint development and production of defense equipment, improvement in mutual interchangeability, shared use and reinforcement of various networks, expansion of production and maintenance capabilities of U.S. military equipment in Japan, and reinforcement of supply chains.

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with the United States based on the mutual cooperation principle under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America, while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and industrial bases.

In view of the progress in technology cooperation system between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. Instead, in 1983, Japan signed the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America signed in 2006. Under these frameworks, Japan has decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in January 2022, Japan and the United States concluded the framework Exchange of Notes on Cooperative Research, Development, Production and Sustainment as well as Cooperation in Testing and Evaluation. Based on this Exchange of Notes, Japan will advance cooperation with the United States on emerging technologies. Both countries consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at these forums.

Additionally, Japan concluded a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Arrangement with the United States in June 2016, and the defense ministers of the two countries later signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP MOU) at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in the same month. The MOU promotes measures based on reciprocity (providing information necessary to tender bids for businesses of the other country, protecting submitted corporate information, waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the other country, etc.).
concerning the procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense authorities. The expiration of the Arrangement and the MOU was extended in May 2021.

At the “2+2” and the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in January 2023, the Ministers signed a framework for (1) accelerating joint research and development\(^5\) and (2) strengthening supply chain cooperation,\(^6\) and (3) confirmed substantial progress in the framework for streamlining foreign military sales (FMS).

Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States Regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains the production, sustainment and maintenance of common equipment (F-35 fighter aircraft and Ospreys) between Japan and the United States.

See Reference 30 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects; Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation)

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\(^{5}\) Memorandum of Understanding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Department of Defense of the United States of America

\(^{6}\) Security of Supply Arrangement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan
Under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the presence of the USFJ functions as deterrance, while on the other hand, given the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts. In particular, the realignment of the USFJ is a very important initiative for mitigation of the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, and further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Therefore, the MOD will advance the realignment and other initiatives and make continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of the local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas.

1 Significance of the Stationing of the USFJ

Given the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, it is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and agile actions in case of emergency in Japan and the surrounding areas even in peacetime, so that the Japan-U.S. Alliance based on Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements functions enough as a deterrent power that contributes to the peace and stability of the defense of Japan and the region.

Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the U.S. Forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Also, it is essential to realize the stable stationing of the USFJ in order to make a swift joint response to an armed attack on Japan based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In addition, the actions of U.S. Forces for the defense of Japan are conducted not only by the USFJ but also by timely reinforcements. The USFJ is supposed to be the basis for them.

While Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the duty of the U.S. to defend Japan, the U.S. is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan based on Article 6 for the purpose of maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East. Therefore, though the duties of each side are not the same, they are balanced overall.

2 Measures concerning the Stationing of the USFJ

The Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the USFJ, including the furnishing of facilities and areas for use by the USFJ (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the USFJ. In addition, the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment enhances cooperation for environmental stewardship relating to the USFJ, and the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component clarifies the scope of the civilian component, etc.

(1) Furnishing of USFJ Facilities and Areas

Japan furnishes USFJ facilities and areas under the provision of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the governments of Japan and the United States.

The Government of Japan concludes lease contracts with owners of private and public lands of USFJ facilities and areas to ensure the stable use. However, if there is no approval by the landowners, the Government obtains usage rights under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, by compensating any loss by the landowners.

There are some facilities and areas temporarily furnished to the USFJ in accordance with the SOFA
when the U.S. Forces use SDF facilities for a limited period, for example, during Japan-U.S. bilateral training.

(2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJ

The SOFA stipulates that the manpower (labor) required by the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan.

As of the end of FY2022, there were 25,897 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “USFJ employees”) at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as clerks at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security guards and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They support the smooth operations of the USFJ.

The Government of Japan hires these USFJ employees in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the USFJ by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc.

(3) Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship

In September 2015, the governments of Japan and the United States signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship relating to the USFJ, supplementary to the SOFA, which came into force on the same day. This supplementary agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning the issuance and maintenance of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) and the establishment and maintenance, etc., of procedures for access to USFJ facilities and areas.

(4) Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component

In January 2017, the governments of Japan and the United States signed the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component, which came into force on the same day. This Supplementary Agreement clarifies the scope of the civilian component, which is addressed only by
a general provision in SOFA, in addition to developing criteria used in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the civilian component, and stipulates the procedures for notification and review, etc., together with the exclusion of ordinary residents from the civilian component.

3 USFJ-Related Costs

USFJ-related costs include Host Nation Support, or HNS (cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ), costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report to mitigate the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that contribute to mitigating the impact on the local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.

4 HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ)

HNS (Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ) plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economic situation, Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs for USFJ local employees in FY1978. Then in FY1979, it started to bear costs for the Facilities Improvement Program, or FIP.

In addition, as labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions surrounding both countries, there arose a concern that the employment stability of the employees would be undermined, and then the activities of the USFJ could be affected. Therefore, in 1987, Japan and the United States concluded an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement, or SMA) as exceptional, limited, and provisional measures relating to the cost sharing principle of the SOFA.

Based on this SMA, Japan started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the SMA was revised later on, the costs shared by Japan have expanded to cover labor costs including base pay, and utilities costs from FY1991, training relocation costs from FY1996, and training equipment and materials procurement costs from FY2022.
Chapter 2 Efforts for the Realignment of the USFJ

Part III Japan-U.S. Alliance

Section 5 Efforts Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ

1 USFJ Realignment Plan

(1) Background and Overview
“The United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) was set forth in May 2006. Subsequently, the following factors were set forth: (1) the necessity of implementing measures to realize visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa promptly and steadily; (2) the necessity of balancing the Realignment Plan and the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and (3) the reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam demanded by the U.S. Congress. The Realignment Plan was coordinated during the April 2012 “2+2” Meeting in light of those factors.

The 2006 Roadmap stated that among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements. However, the United States decided to alter the composition of the units and to deploy the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistics support elements, in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. In addition, the governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).

(2) Readjustment of the USFJ Realignment Plan
In order to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in response to the increasingly severe security environment, during the “2+2” Meeting in January 2023, Japan and the United States decided to optimize the posture of the U.S. forces by further enhancing the force posture of the USFJ to have more versatile, resilient, and mobile capabilities, and by readjusting the Realignment Plan that was adjusted in 2012. Specifically, it was agreed that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa, and that the 12th Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025.

In readjusting the Realignment Plan, the basic tenets of the current Realignment Plan are maintained, with utmost consideration to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. Specifically, Japan and the United States have confirmed that (1) the number of U.S. Marine Corps personnel in Okinawa after the realignment will remain to be approximately 10,000; (2) the realignment will not affect the lands scheduled to be returned in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, nor will it affect the progress of the FRF at Camp Schwab; and (3) there will be no change in the commencement of the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam, which will begin in 2024.

Combined with the enhanced capabilities and posture of the SDF, this initiative will greatly enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Japan will continue to hold close consultations to further optimize the posture of the USFJ.

2 Progress of the Realignment of the USFJ
Various efforts have been made for the realignment of the USFJ, including the relocation of carrier-based aircraft from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni, and the relocation of KC-130 air refueling aircraft from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni as well as their

REFERENCE: Policies regarding U.S. Forces in Japan
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/index.html

REFERENCE: Facility development on Mageshima
Fig. III-2-5-3  Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (1)

### 1 Realignment in the Kanto Area

- Establishment of the bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base
- Partial return of airspace, (returned on September 25, 2008) and placing the JASDF air traffic controllers besides the Yokota RAPCON facility (started on May 18, 2007), etc.
- Deliberation on civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the U.S.)

#### [U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot]
- Establishment of facilities due to the realignment of U.S. Army Japan Headquarters (Facilities including the Training Center)
  - Operations of the Training Center started in August 2011.
  - Development of the Training Assistance Center completed.
- Return of part of the land in front of JR Sagamihara Station (approx. 17 ha)
- Joint use of West Open-air Storage Area (approx. 35 ha) (Joint use started on December 2, 2015)

### 2 Realignment in Okinawa

#### [Joint/Shared Use]
- Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training
  - Implemented on March 17, 2008
- JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

#### [Land Returns]
- Formulated a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan) for returning of significant land area south of Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa
  - Announced the Consolidation Plan on April 5, 2013
- Return of a portion of Facilities and Engineering Compound (approx. 11 ha) on March 31, 2020
- Return of an area near Gate 5 (approx. 2 ha) on March 31, 2019
- The Makiminato Service Area (lands along national route 58) includes the laundry area (0.2 ha) that was returned on May 31, 2021.
- Return of Camp Kuwae (Lester) (total return, approx. 68 ha)
- Return of MCAS Futenma Housing Area (approx. 51 ha) on March 31, 2015

#### [Legend]
- Implemented
- Continuing

- 20km

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A replacement facility will be constructed in the Urasoe-Pier district under the Naha Port and Harbor Plan

- Naha Port (total return, approx. 56 ha)
- Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training
- JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

- Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 (total return, approx. 16 ha)
- Naha Port (total return, approx. 56 ha)
- A replacement facility will be constructed in the Urasoe-Pier district under the Naha Port and Harbor Plan

- Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (total return, approx. 274 ha)
  - Return of north access road (approx. 1 ha) on August 31, 2013
  - Return of lands along national route 58 (approx. 4 ha) on March 31, 2018
  - Return of area near Gate 5 (approx. 2 ha) on March 31, 2018

- Camp Kuwae (Lester) (total return, approx. 68 ha)

- Military POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 (total return, approx. 16 ha)

- MCAS Futenma (total return, approx. 481 ha)

- Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training

- Operations of air-refueling aircraft
- MCAS Iwakuni
  - Relocation to MCAS Iwakuni completed on August 26, 2014
- Return of lands along eastern side (approx. 4 ha) on July 31, 2017
- Return of lands around Samashita Gate (approx. 0.1 ha) on December 20, 2020

- Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps
- III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), approx. 3,000 personnel and their dependents will relocate to Guam and other areas

- Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training

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MCAS Futenma (total return, approx. 481 ha)

- Relocation within Okinawa
- Operation capability for Ospreys and others
  - Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas

- Relocation of operations outside Okinawa
- Contingency use function for aircrafts
  - Tsuiki and Nyutabaru Air Bases
  - Return of lands along eastern side (approx. 4 ha) on July 31, 2017
  - Return of lands around Samashita Gate (approx. 0.1 ha) on December 20, 2020
rotational deployment to Kanoya Air Base.

The MOD is continuing promotion of efforts to improve the SDF facilities on Mageshima that will be used for field-carrier landing practice (FCLP), return of land south of Kadena including MCAS Futenma, and relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel stationed in Okinawa to Guam.
3 Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP)

The May 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. The MOD has acquired most of the land on Mageshima, Nishinoomote City, Kagoshima Prefecture, and has been explaining the facility development to the local communities of Kagoshima Prefecture, Nishinoomote City, Nakatane Town, and Minamitane Town.

The United States also welcomed the Government of Japan’s decision to develop SDF facilities on Mageshima in the joint statement issued in January 2022. The FY2022 budget included funds for facility development of the runways and parking apron on Mageshima.

In January 2023, the MOD released the environmental impact assessment report prepared based on the view of the Governor of Kagoshima Prefecture, who had taken into account the opinions of the mayors of Nishinoomote City, Nakatane Town and Minamitane Town, and others, and started the construction work within Mageshima. In March of the same year, construction work also began on the maritime area around Mageshima, and efforts of developing facilities are steadily progressing.

4 Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma

Although over 25 years have passed since Japan and the United States agreed on the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma, it has not been achieved yet. The MOD believes that the return must not be postponed any longer.

The fundamental idea shared by the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa is that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools, in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture.

There is no change to the Government of Japan’s view that the current plan to relocate MCAS Futenma to Henoko, Nago City is the only solution to avoid continued use of the Air Station. This has been confirmed by the Japanese and U.S. governments on repeated occasions, including at the “2+2” Meetings and joint statements at Japan-U.S. summit meetings.

In order to achieve the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible, the Government of Japan will continue to make all efforts to provide careful explanations to local residents in Okinawa building upon years of persistent dialogue.

The return of MCAS Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa, including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area (approximately 476 ha, a land area around 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome).

1) Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the Impact on Okinawa

The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it involves reduction in the base’s functions and area in Okinawa, and contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

a. Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma

The relocation of MCAS Futenma involves the return of the entire area by relocating three functions: (1) operation of the Osprey and other aircraft, (2) operation of air refueling aircraft, and (3) accepting transient aircraft in contingencies. Of these three functions, (2) and (3) involve relocation out of Okinawa Prefecture, while (1) involves relocation to Camp Schwab.

The relocation of “(2) operation of air refueling aircraft” to MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture was completed in August 2014. With regard to “(3) accepting transient aircraft in contingencies,” Japan and the United States agreed in October 2018 to develop facilities that would be necessary for relocating the function to Tsuiki Air Base in Fukuoka Prefecture and Nyutabaru Air Base in Miyazaki Prefecture. The construction work was completed by March 2023 except for the runway extension work at Tsuiki Air Base.

b. Reduction in Area

The area required for the land reclamation to build the FRF is approximately 150 ha, less than one-third of the approximately 476 ha of MCAS Futenma, and the FRF will be equipped with a significantly shorter runway at 1,200 m (1,800 m including the overruns) compared to the current runway length of 2,740 m at MCAS Futenma.

c. Reduction in Noise and Risks

Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which enables the flight path for takeoff and landing to be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the local community. In MCAS Futenma, flight paths used
daily for training and other purposes are located over residential areas, whereas flight paths in the FRF will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks. For example, while more than 10,000 households are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near MCAS Futenma, there will be zero households requiring such insulation around the FRF.

(2) Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility
Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on the realignment have been made towards realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the concern of the residents living in the vicinity.

The SCC ("2+2") joint statement compiled in October 2005 calls for locating the FRF in an L-shaped configuration. However, after that, based on consultations and agreement with the local governments including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the June 2006 Roadmap that the FRF be located in a V-shaped configuration. With regard to construction of this replacement facility, a Memorandum of Basic Understanding was exchanged between then Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine and then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga in May 2006.

After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, at the "2+2" Meeting held in May 2010, the governments of Japan and the United States confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters. Subsequently, at the "2+2" Meeting held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a V shape.

During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa that is located in a crucial area for the security of Japan, cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the security environment in East Asia.

Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps, such as mobility and readiness, would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marines units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. This is because the U.S. Marine Corps conducts integrated operations of air, ground, logistics support, and command elements.

Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be located within Okinawa Prefecture.

(3) Promotion of the FRF Construction Project
a. Progress of Landfill Work
The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the Landfill Permit Request on public waters to Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Nakaima approved this in December 2013.

After the construction began, then Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Onaga revoked the landfill permit, which led to litigation between the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture. However, landfill work began in the waters south of Camp Schwab in December 2018. In August 2021, the landfill work from sea level to 4.0 m was completed. We have been making steady progress on landfill work. (As of May 2023)

b. Consideration on Soil Improvement Work, Etc.
Regarding the soil foundation of the landfill area, a study was conducted on the stability of seawalls and other structures in the waters north of Camp Schwab in light of the results of a boring survey, etc. As a result, it was confirmed that it is possible to implement the construction of seawalls and landfill work while ensuring the required stability through soil improvement work via prevailing

REFERENCE: Comparison of the scales of MCAS Futenma and the FRF
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibegun/frf/index.html#kibohikaku
and adequately proven construction methods used for construction projects such as Tokyo International Airport and Kansai International Airport. This was also confirmed by the Technical Review Committee on Futenma Replacement Facility Construction Project, a committee that has been held since September 2019 consisting of experts in the fields of geotechnical, structural, coastal, and pavement engineering.

In addition, in December 2019, the Okinawa Defense Bureau announced that, based on the results of the studies that had been conducted so far, it would take nine years and three months from the commencement to the completion of construction according to the revised plan, and about 12 years to complete the “admin procedures” described in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and a fund of about 930 billion yen.

c. Environmental Protection Initiatives

An environmental impact assessment was conducted for approximately five years from 2007 for the FRF construction project. For this assessment, the MOD received 1,561 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, made all the required revisions, and appropriately reflected them in the content of the environmental impact assessment report.

The assessment report states that because corals inhabiting the landfill area will be lost due to the landfill work, corals will be transplanted to the extent possible as a preservation measure. Some of the targeted corals for preservation have been transplanted with the permission of the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. Preservation measures will also be taken for the remaining targeted corals in the future. The project employs a greater scope for preservation so as to be more careful in transplanting corals than that employed during the landfill work for the construction of the second runway at Naha Airport.

d. Landfill Permit Revision Request on Public Waters

Hearing experts’ insights on the environment and other aspects, after due consideration, in April 2020, the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture the Landfill Permit Revision Request given the additional implementation of the soil improvement work, etc., based on the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface.

In November 2021, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture
disapproved the Permit Revision Request on the grounds that surveys of the soil foundation and environmental protection measures at the planned landfill area were inadequate. In response, in December 2021, the Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a request for review with the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism under the Administrative Complaint Review Act. In April 2022, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism determined revocation of the disapproval by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, and also issued an instruction for correction based on the Local Autonomy Act to approve the Permit Revision Request.

Dissatisfied with this determination and the instruction for correction, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture respectively filed requests for review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council in May 2022. In response to the dismissal by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council of the request for review regarding the determination in July 2022, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit with the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court in August 2022 to revoke the Government’s involvement (the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism). In addition, in response to the decision by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council that the instruction for correction was not illegal, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit in the same month with the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court to revoke the Government’s involvement (the instructions for correction by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism). Regarding these lawsuits, in March 2023, the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court rendered respective judgments dismissing the lawsuit by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture over the determination and the instruction for correction. The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding these lawsuits. In addition, in September 2022, due to dissatisfaction with the determination of the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit with the Naha District Court to revoke the determination based on the Administrative Case Litigation Act. Thus, three lawsuits are pending between the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture regarding the Permit Revision Request (as of May 2023).

5 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base

The May 2006 Roadmap stated that, following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated,
thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the relocation to the FRF from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three categories, namely (1) land eligible for immediate return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad.

(1) Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy to dedicate all strength toward mitigating the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of land areas south of Kadena, including Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City of which Okinawa has particularly made a strong request for the return and coordinated with the United States. As a result, both countries announced the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (Consolidation Plan) in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specific years of return.

The return of all land according to the plan will enable the return of approximately 70% (approximately 1,048 ha, the equivalent of 220 Tokyo Domes) of six USFJ facilities for exclusive use located in densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa. In the Consolidation Plan, it is confirmed between Japan and the United States that this plan will be implemented as soon as possible, and that the Government will continue to make the utmost efforts to return the land south of Kadena, at an early date.

(2) Progress in the Return of Land

Since the announcement of the Consolidation Plan in April 2013, efforts have been made to return the land. By March, 2020, the return of all areas that were designated as “land areas to be returned as soon as required procedures are completed” in the Consolidation Plan (shown in red in Fig. III-2-5-7 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (image))) was realized. The use of returned lands is being promoted incrementally. For example, at the former site of the West Futenma Housing Area, which was returned in March 2015, the formation of Okinawa Health Medical Center requested by the local community is being promoted.

In addition, returns have been realized ahead of the schedule in the Consolidation Plan for some areas where there were strong demands for return by the local community. This has resulted, for example, in the opening of the entire stretch of Ginowan City road 11 in March 2021 on land along the east side of MCAS Futenma, which has improved local traffic. Furthermore, in May 2022, Prime Minister Kishida visited the Lower Plaza Housing area of Camp Zukeran and announced that Japan and the United States will agree to open the area as a green space for public use ahead of its return to Japan.

All-out initiatives are being continuously made by the Government to steadily implement the return of land areas south of Kadena Air Base under the Consolidation Plan in a manner that visibly mitigates the impact on Okinawa.
Fig. III–2–5–6  Results of the Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Returned</th>
<th>Transferred</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Areas eligible for immediate return in the</td>
<td>Makiminato Service Area (entrance road on</td>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>Approx. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive plan</td>
<td>the north side)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp Zukeran (Nishi Futemna residential</td>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>March 2018</td>
<td>Approx. 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>area)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Makiminato Service Area (area near Gate 5)</td>
<td>March 2019</td>
<td>March 2021</td>
<td>Approx. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp Zukeran (a portion of the facility</td>
<td>March 2020</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>Approx. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>engineering department district)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas eligible for return after relocation</td>
<td>MCAS Futemna (Lands along the east side)</td>
<td>July 2017</td>
<td>March 2019</td>
<td>Approx. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of functions within Okinawa in the</td>
<td>Camp Zukeran (Lands along national route 58)</td>
<td>March 2018</td>
<td>September 2019</td>
<td>Approx. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive plan</td>
<td>Camp Zukeran (Lands near Samashita Gate)</td>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td>Approx. 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Makiminato Service Area (Lands along national route 58) laundry area)</td>
<td>May 2021</td>
<td>May 2021</td>
<td>Approx. 0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The asterisk (*) on the graph refers to future transfers scheduled.

Fig. III–2–5–7  Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (image)

(Notes) 1 The timing and year are based on the best case scenario. The timing may be postponed depending on the progress of the efforts, including relocation to outside of Japan.
2 Land area of each area is an approximate figure and may be slightly modified based on the results of future surveys, etc. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
3 Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns.
4 The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (West-Futenma Housing area) was listed as 52 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 51 ha according to actual measurements.
5 The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound, etc.) was listed as 10 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 11 ha based on the area to be returned in the JC agreement of September 2013.
6 MCAS Futemna (lands along the east side and near Samashita Gate) and Makiminato Service Area (lands along national route 58) were returned ahead of schedule as a result of a separate Japan-U.S. agreement. Note that the Makiminato Service Area (lands along national route 58) includes the laundry area (0.2 ha) that was returned on May 31, 2021.
7 Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed in May 2022 that the two countries will prepare the transformation of the Lower Plaza Housing Area of Camp Zukeran (Foster) into a park area filled with greenery for public use before the return.
8 JC-Japan-U.S. Joint Committee
6 Relocation of the Marine Corps to Guam

Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006, the governments of Japan and the United States held a series of consultations on the reduction of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.

(1) Timing and Size of Relocation

The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III MEF and their approximately 9,000 dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land return south of Kadena from the progress on the FRF and to adjust the composition of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam.

As a result, the MAGTF is to be located in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, with approximately 9,000 personnel relocated to locations outside of Japan. Meanwhile, the end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa is to be consistent with the level of approximately 10,000 personnel envisioned in the Roadmap.

Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to facilitate progress in implementing the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa of April 2013.

In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in January 2023, it was confirmed that the relocation from Okinawa to Guam would begin in 2024.

(2) Costs of the Relocation

Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated US$10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide US$6.09 billion, including US$2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the United States would fund the remaining US$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement). The Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions.

As part of measures based on this Agreement, the Government of Japan has been providing cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation to the projects for which Japan has provided financial support since FY2009.9

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were adjusted and it was agreed that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation was US$8.6 billion (in U.S. FY2012 dollars). With regard to Japan’s financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution of up to US$2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement. It was also confirmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized.10

Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been provided to the U.S. Government under cash contribution, while the United States would fund the remaining US$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement). The Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions.

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Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been provided to the U.S. Government under

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9 As for projects for which Japan provides financial support, cash contributions totaling approximately 372.1 billion yen (including the use of interest generated from the funds provided) have been provided to the U.S. side using the budgets from FY2009 to FY2022.

10 In line with this, the special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (investment and loan) that had been prescribed by the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan were abolished by an act revising part of the act that was enacted on March 31, 2017.
the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of US$2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by Japan and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the United States, and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown.

At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol Amending the Guam International Agreement was also signed to add the stipulations concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training areas by the SDFs. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at US$2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars).

(3) Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures

As for the environmental impact assessment for Guam, the required procedures were conducted to reflect the revisions to the project made by the adjustments to the
plan for realignment, and the assessment was completed in August 2015.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), is now being implemented.

(4) Progress of the Guam Relocation Project

While the environmental impact assessment for Guam was being conducted, the Government of the United States implemented infrastructure development projects at the Andersen Air Force Base and the Apra area of the Naval Base Guam as projects unaffected by the assessment. The U.S. Government is currently implementing relocation construction work in all project areas, following the lifting of the freeze on the Guam relocation funds pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act and the completion of the environmental impact assessment for Guam.

![Image](image_url)

7 Other Realignment Initiatives

(1) Training Relocation

a. Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)

Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas – Kadena, Misawa (Misawa City and Tohoku Town in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni – would participate for the time being in bilateral training at SDF facilities, the Aviation Training Relocation (ATR) has been underway since 2007. The MOD has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the training relocation.

The ATR contributes to enhancing interoperability between the two countries, and also to relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

In addition to assisting the USFJ, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to ensure the safety and security of the local community, such as the establishment of a liaison office, facilitating communication with related government agencies, and response to requirements from the local community. These efforts have been contributing to successful training relocation.

![Image](image_url)

b. Training Relocation for MV-22

The Government of Japan and the United States Government decided in the “2+2” joint statement of October 2013, to utilize the opportunities to participate in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region to reduce the amount of time that MV-22s are deployed and used for the training in Okinawa so that training outside of Okinawa Prefecture, including mainland Japan, can be increased while maintaining the deterrence of the Alliance. Based on above, both governments have been moving forward with the training of the MV-22 deployed at MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture, etc.

In September 2016, it was agreed at the Joint Committee to relocate the training activities of Tilt-Rotor/Rotary Wing aircraft, such as AH-1, CH53, and the MV-22 that are currently deployed at MCAS Futenma out of Okinawa Prefecture at Japan’s expense in order to further promote training outside of Okinawa to mitigate the impact of training activities there.

In FY2022, the MV-22 and other aircraft were included in Japan-U.S. bilateral training upon being relocated to maneuver areas and other locations in Hokkaido Prefecture in October 2022, in Nagasaki, Kumamoto, and Kagoshima prefectures in November of the same year, and in Kumamoto, Oita, and Kagoshima prefectures from February to March 2023. From the date of the agreement up to March 2023, a total of 18 exercises, in addition to the ones mentioned above, have been conducted in Guam as well as in Japan at the maneuver areas in Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Gunma, Kanagawa, Niigata, Shizuoka, Shiga, Kagawa, and

![Image](image_url)

### Time of reaching agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of reaching agreements</th>
<th>Overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>In the “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” it is confirmed that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas-Kadena, Misawa and MCAS Iwakuni would participate in bilateral training with the SDF at SDF facilities in Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January and October 2011</td>
<td>At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to include Guam as a new training relocation site and to expand the scale of training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>At the Joint Committee, both governments agreed to add air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range (Misawa City and Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral and other training at SDF facilities, etc.
Miyazaki prefectures.

The MV-22's amount of time deployed and training in Okinawa will continue to be reduced by relocating exercises held in mainland of Japan and Guam, and the government will continue to promote initiatives that contribute to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

Furthermore, with regard to the safety of MV-22s, prior to the deployment of MV-22s to MCAS Futenma in 2012, Japan established an analysis and assessment team composed of aircraft pilots and experts from inside and outside the Government and confirmed the safety of MV-22 independently. In addition, when Japan made the
decision to introduce Ospreys in 2014, the Government reconfirmed their safety by collecting and analyzing all kinds of technical information, not only in the preparation phase, but also after the decision of introduction.

Furthermore, the MOD has dispatched GSDF Osprey personnel to the U.S. Marine Corps’ training programs since 2016, in which they reaffirmed that the Osprey is a reliable aircraft that allows for stable maneuvering and maintenance by operating and maintaining the actual airframe.

Additionally, the CV-22 has the same propulsion system as the MV-22 and both aircraft have a common basic structure. Therefore, the safety of both aircraft is at the same level.

Japan considers that ensuring safety is of prime importance in operations of the U.S. Forces, and on various occasions, the Minister of Defense requested the U.S. Secretary of Defense and other high-ranking officials to give consideration to local communities and ensure safety. The Government of Japan will continue to ask for the maximum consideration for safety.

Reference 34 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces)

C Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in Case of Disaster

In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central part of the Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV-22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to support Operation Damayan. The MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access, and transported several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of relief materials in a day. In April 2014, an MV-22 aircraft deployed in Okinawa was dispatched for search and rescue activities when a passenger ship sank in an accident off the coast of Jindo in the ROK. Furthermore, in response to the large earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22s deployed in Okinawa were dispatched to the country to transport personnel and supplies.

In Japan as well, when the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred in 2016, MV-22s were dispatched to deliver daily necessities to the disaster-stricken areas.

In this manner, the MV-22 is capable of conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities immediately and over a large range when large-scale disasters occur because of its high performance and multifunctionality. It has also been used for disaster prevention drills since 2014. In September 2016, two MV-22s participated in the comprehensive disaster prevention drills of Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and conducted delivery drills for isolated islands. Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, including search and rescue missions, both immediately and over a large range, in the case of a large-scale disaster.

As such, it is expected that the superior capabilities of the Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well.

Reference 34 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces)

8 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the USFJ

In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the USFJ based on the May 2006 Roadmap, the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act) was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, and other systems were established based on the law.

In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since these developments may affect the employment of USFJ employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to include education and skills training, which is to help retain their employment.

The Realignment Special Measures Act was supposed to cease to be effective as of March 31, 2017. However, since there remain realignment projects that require implementation, on March 31, 2017, an act revising part of the Act including a 10-year extension of the time limit to March 31, 2027 was enacted.

Reference 35 (Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan)
3 Measures Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ

1 Optimization of the Posture of the USFJ

(1) Reorganization of the U.S. Marine Corps Unit in Okinawa into a Marine Littoral Regiment

As part of the optimization of the USFJ force posture, the 12th Marine Regiment located at Camp Hansen in Okinawa will be reorganized into the 12th MLR by 2025. While the main capability of the 12th Marine Regiment is artillery firepower as an artillery unit, the reorganized MLR will have a variety of capabilities, including anti-ship strike capabilities with anti-ship missiles, air defense capabilities, logistics support capabilities, and ISR capabilities.

(2) Establishment of the Composite Watercraft Company at Yokohama North Dock

In April 2023, the U.S. Army’s Composite Watercraft Company was established at Yokohama North Dock to strengthen the maritime mobility of U.S. Forces in emergency situations, including disasters. The established unit will contribute to strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance transportation capabilities in Japan and improve the mobility of the U.S. Forces in the region.

2 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa

In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to potential conflict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but at the same time has the advantage of having a certain distance from these areas that would not heighten military tension there unnecessarily. In addition, Okinawa, comprising a large number of small islands, is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands having a total length of some 1,200 km and close to key sea lanes for Japan, which depends on marine transportation for over 99% of its overall international trade. Furthermore, its location is extremely important from the perspective of security, as Okinawa serves as a strategically important target for neighboring countries in both making access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent.

Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, including the U.S. Marine Corps, which can deal with a wide range of missions with high mobility and readiness, along with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities and areas such as air bases, maneuver areas, and logistics facilities. As of January 1, 2023, approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture and approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints.

(1) Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km2 for exclusive use as USFJ facilities and areas. On the other hand, USFJ facilities and areas were strongly requested to be realigned, consolidated and reduced, on the grounds that their concentration in Okinawa seriously affect the lives of the people in Okinawa.

Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, centering on those subject to strong local requests, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required coordination and procedures toward the return of land. Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that efforts would also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa Issues: the return of Naha Port (Naha City), the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104.

Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing...
that the impact should be shared by the whole nation.
In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, as well as the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) between Japan and the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

(2) Outline of the SACO Final Report
The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, noise reduction, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the SOFA procedures, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km²) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km².

(3) Return of a Major Portion of the Northern Training Area
The condition for returning the Northern Training Area was to relocate seven helipads in the area to be returned to the preexisting training area. However, the Government of Japan reached an agreement with the U.S. side to give considerations for the natural environment and to relocate not all seven but the minimum number of six helipads necessary, and proceeded with the construction work. The relocation of the helipads completed in
Fig. III-2-5-12 Location of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Okinawa (As of March 31, 2022)


**Kadena Air Base**
- 18th Wing
  - F-15 fighter
  - KC-135 air refueling aircraft
  - HH-60
  - E-3 early warning and control aircraft, etc.

**Fleet Activities Okinawa**
- Patrol Squadron
  - P-8A patrol aircraft, etc.

**3rd Marine Logistic Group Headquarters**
- 1-1 Air Defense Artillery
  - Patriot PAC-3

**White Beach Area**
- Port facility
- Oil storage facility

**Makiminato Service Area**
- 3rd Marine Logistics Group Headquarters

**Camp Hansen**
- 12th Marine Regiment (Artillery)
  - 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit Headquarters

**Camp Schwab**
- 4th Marine Regiment (Infantry)

**Camp Courtney**
- 11th Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters
  - 3rd Marine Division Headquarters

**Marine Aircraft Group 36**
- CH-53 helicopter
- AH-1 helicopter
- UH-1 helicopter
- MV-22 Osprey, etc.

(Note) Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.

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**Fig. III-2-5-13** Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report (image)

- Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield
- Camp Hansen
- Senaha Communication Station
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
- Torii Communication Station
- Kadena Air Base
- Camp Kuwae
- Makiminato Service Area
- Naha Port

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**Fig. III-2-5-14** Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Facilities/Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>353</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>276</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- June 1971: (At the conclusion of the Agreement on the Return of Okinawa)
- May 1972: (On return)
- End of FY1980: 46
- End of FY1990: 43
- As of January 2023: 31

Facilities and areas involved in land return
Facilities and areas involved in land return (Cancellation of joint use)
Destination sites of other facilities relocation programs
December 2016, and the return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area located in the villages of Kunigami and Higashi, was achieved based on the SACO Final Report.

The returned land accounts for approximately 20% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa. The return is the largest one since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland, and had been an issue for 20 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996.

Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces, the MOD took measures to remove obstacles (such as soil contamination survey, etc.) so that the landowners, etc., could use returned lands effectively and appropriately, and transferred the land to the landowners in December 2017. In addition, in July 2021, the northern part of the main island of Okinawa, including the returned lands, was inscribed in the World Natural Heritage Site as part of the Amami-Oshima Island, Tokunoshima Island, Northern part of Okinawa Island, and Iriomote Island.

3 The USFJ in Kanagawa Prefecture

(1) Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka

The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capability of the Fleet.

The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered vessels anchoring in Japan’s ports, including the USS Ronald Reagan, which is forward-deployed at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture),

Fig. III-2-5-15 Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2022)

(Note) Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.

12 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need refueling and they are able to maintain high speeds necessary for the operations of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational capabilities.
adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repair of the nuclear reactor and refueling will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan will continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety.

(2) Realignment, etc. of USFJ Facilities and Areas

With regard to the realignment of facilities and areas of the USFJ in Kanagawa Prefecture, the release of facilities and areas including Kamiseya Communication Station and Fukaya Communication Site has already been realized based on the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004.

Meanwhile, more than 10 years have passed since the
initial agreement, and security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe. Therefore, there have been changes in the U.S. Navy’s posture and capabilities, as represented by the increased operations of U.S. vessels at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. In light of such circumstances, the following were agreed at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2018: (1) development of facilities for satisfying the U.S. Navy’s facility requirements; (2) start of negotiations on joint use of Negishi Dependent Housing Area to conduct site preparation works; and (3) cancellation of the construction of family housing units in the Yokohama portion of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. Subsequently, joint use of Negishi Dependent Housing Area was agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2019.

See 401 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2023
In situations where the need for international cooperation in the security and defense fields is increasing in an unprecedented manner, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are required to actively contribute to ensuring the security of Japan, the peace and stability of the region, and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the entire international community. The first defense objective of the NDS is to shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force, in cooperation with Japan’s ally, like-minded countries, and others.

Therefore, the NDS calls for Japan to promote efforts that contribute to realizing the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) from the perspective that it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration with not only its ally but also as many countries as possible.

Furthermore, it is essential to deepen cooperation and coordination with its ally and like-minded countries in order to counter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, and to safeguard the security environment of Japan.

Japan will also more actively promote its efforts to solve global security issues, including securing the freedom and safety of maritime navigation and overflight, coordination and cooperation with relevant countries in relation to the use of the space and cyber domains, international peace cooperation activities, arms control and disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

For the implementation of these efforts, Japan will, while placing the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the key pillar of its security policy, proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country. In doing so, Japan will further promote institutional frameworks such as Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), and Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology from the perspective of effectively promoting the enhancement of collaboration with like-minded countries and others.

See Fig. III-3-1 (MOD’s Approach Under the Vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”)
defense cooperation and exchanges, so that it can build mutual trust and work together to solve regional security issues.

It is also necessary to further coordinate with each other from peacetime to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to be able to receive support from like-minded countries in the event of a contingency.

Defense cooperation and exchanges have been delivered in the forms of high-level dialogues and exchanges; bilateral training and exercises; capacity building, in which human resource development and technical support are provided to other countries in the fields of security and defense; and defense equipment and technology which is conducted in order to promote Japan’s security, contribution to peace, and international cooperation.

The MOD/SDF has long strived to alleviate any feelings of confrontation and tension, and to foster a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere by building face-to-face relationships through bilateral dialogues and exchanges. In addition, the MOD/SDF has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means, including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, capacity building, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and the development of institutional frameworks such as the ACSA.

Furthermore, multilateral regional security cooperation and dialogues are in the process of evolution from those that focus on dialogue to those that focus on cooperation that seeks to build regional order. It is important to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in a multilayered and practical manner in order to create a desirable security environment.

At the G7 Hiroshima Summit chaired by Prime Minister Kishida in May 2023, the leaders agreed on the importance of the rule of law and the principles of the UN Charter in a session that included the leaders of the invited countries and President Zelenskyy of Ukraine. In addition, at the Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting held on the occasion of the Hiroshima Summit, Prime Minister Kishida conveyed Japan’s intention to newly provide around 100 SDF vehicles such as trucks, and approximately 30,000 emergency rations to Ukraine, and the two leaders shared the view to coordinate even more closely.

At the Presidency Press Conference following the Hiroshima Summit, Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan would continue to lead the discussions in the G7 from the perspective of upholding the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and strengthening Japan’s engagement with its international partners.

### 2 Approach under the Vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP)

#### (1) Characteristics of the Indo-Pacific Region

A free and open maritime order, which relies on the rule of law, is the foundation for the stability and prosperity of the international community. The Indo-Pacific region is at the center of the world vitality, and home to more than half the world population. It is important to establish this region as a free and open global commons to ensure the peace and prosperity of the entire region.

Meanwhile, there are various challenges exist for realizing FOIP within the region, including the vicinity of Japan, such as a rapid military modernization and intensified military activities.

#### (2) Aspects of MOD’s Approach

Given this situation, the MOD/SDF is, for example, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to ensure that Japan can continue stable use of major sea lanes. In addition, the MOD/SDF is promoting mutual understanding and confidence-building with countries
### MOD’s Approach Under the Vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

#### Background
- In August 2016, then Prime Minister Abe unveiled the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept in his keynote address at TICAD VI in Kenya.
- Japan’s fundamental aim is to foster regional stability and prosperity by improving connectivity between Asia and Africa through a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
- Prime Minister Kishida announced Japan’s new plan for a FOIP in his policy speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) held in India in March 2023.

#### Characteristics of the Indo-Pacific Region
- The Indo-Pacific region is the center of global economic dynamism and home to the largest share of the world’s population. Key sea lanes are located in the Indo-Pacific area; as a result, regional stability is essential to Japan’s security and prosperity.
- Meanwhile, there are various challenges within the region, including rapid military modernization and intensified military activities.
- All countries in the region are taking measures to respond to these rapid changes in the environment.

#### Aspects of MOD’s Approach
- There are many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.
- Creating a favorable security environment for Japan by leveraging defense cooperation and exchange activities.

#### New Pillars of Cooperation for FOIP
1. Principles for peace and rules for prosperity
2. Addressing challenges in an Indo-Pacific way
3. Multilayered connectivity
4. Extending efforts for security and safe use of the “sea” to the “air”

- Japan is pursuing “Free and Open Indo Pacific” Vision through a coordinated whole-of-government approach.
Defense cooperation and exchanges

"Defense cooperation and exchanges" refers to efforts to strengthen bilateral and multilateral defense relations by using various tools, which are significant initiatives for securing the peace and stability of Japan and the international community.

Purpose of defense cooperation and exchanges

- To create a security environment desirable for Japan
- To deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential
- To prevent contingencies through promoting confidence-building and mutual understanding

Tools for defense cooperation and exchanges

Tool 1: Cooperation and exchanges among people

On such occasions as "2+2" Meetings, defense ministerial meetings, chief of staff-level meetings or other high-level meetings, working-level consultations among defense authorities, and multilateral international conferences, participants frankly exchange views on defense policies, regional situations, defense cooperation and exchanges, etc., thereby developing mutual understanding and confidence-building among them and further promoting defense cooperation and exchanges thereafter. Exchanges of students and interchange in education and research aim to facilitate understanding of defense policies and statuses of military units of other countries and promote relations of trust through network building.

Tool 2: Cooperation and exchanges among assets

Through goodwill exercise, mutual visits of naval ships and aircraft (calling at ports and airports), exchange events among units, and other measures, mutual trust with partner countries is developed and cooperative relationships are promoted. In joint training and exercises, the SDF will enhance the skills of each unit and strengthen nation-to-nation defense relationships through by increasing collaborative capacity with foreign military assets.

Tool 3: Capacity building

Capacity building aims to improve the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time, and help their military forces play roles in contributing to international peace and regional stability. It is conducted through activities such as seminars and practical training in various fields, the provision of technical guidance, and by facilitating opinion exchanges and the observation of education and training programs etc.

Tool 4: Defense equipment and technology cooperation

Through overseas transfers of equipment, joint research and development, participation in international exhibitions, and holding of the Defence Industry Forum, Japan seeks to maintain and strengthen its industrial base, enhance capacity of both the SDF and military forces of partner countries, and strengthen and maintain defense cooperation with those partner countries.

(Reference) Conclusion of agreements regarding defense cooperation

Through concluding such agreements as Reciprocal Access Agreements, Agreements concerning Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, Information Security Agreements, the framework of cooperation has been materialized and institutionalized with the aim of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges more smoothly and consistently.
that modernize their military forces and intensify their military activities to prevent contingencies and ensure Japan’s security. Furthermore, for countries in the region that are taking steps to respond to changes in the environment, the MOD/SDF is trying to contribute to regional peace and stability by supporting their efforts through defense cooperation and exchanges.

(3) Expansion of FOIP

With the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone, Japan’s policy is to deepen cooperation with like-minded countries and further promote efforts towards realizing FOIP through Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) initiatives, etc. With respect to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacific Island countries, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin American countries, cooperation will be strengthened to realize FOIP while utilizing a wide range of means. For example, Quad Leaders’ Meeting held on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, the leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment to the common vision of FOIP.

Specifically, the MOD/SDF is working to maintain the stable use of sea lanes by establishing good relations with countries in the aforementioned regions and ensuring that the SDF has stable access to their ports and airports. The MOD/SDF is also promoting defense cooperation and exchanges, such as bilateral/multilateral exercise and capacity building, to enable these countries to play a more effective role for the stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

The United States, which is the ally of Japan, Australia, India, European countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, Canada, and New Zealand, are countries that not only share fundamental values with Japan but also have geographic and historical ties to the Indo-Pacific region.

The MOD/SDF has been encouraging these countries to engage more in the Indo-Pacific region and promoting
defense cooperation and exchanges so that more effective cooperation can be achieved than unilateral efforts by Japan.

Japan’s FOIP vision is inclusive and MOD/SDF will enhance cooperation with all countries that share its values.

2 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Various Countries

In promoting security cooperation and exchanges, it is important to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges using optimal combinations of various cooperative means, while considering matters such as regional situations, the situations of partner countries and their relationships with Japan.

1 Australia

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia

Australia is a special strategic partner for Japan in the Indo-Pacific region as both Japan and Australia are allied with the United States and share not only fundamental values but also security strategic interests.

With the background of the deepening defense cooperation between Japan and Australia, the two countries announced the new Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in October 2022 to respond to the changing security environment and to uphold and reinforce the free and open international order. Japan and Australia have also developed the foundation for cooperation, such as the Japan-Australia ACSA,1 the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, and the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA).2

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi held a meeting in Tokyo with Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles. Recognizing the critical importance of the defense relationship between Japan and Australia as special strategic partners with common security challenges and interests in the Indo-Pacific region, the ministers agreed to continue to pursue defense cooperation in an ambitious and positive

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1 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) establish the basic conditions for the reciprocal provision of supplies or services necessary for joint training, United Nations peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian assistance, response to major disasters, and other activities.

2 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) facilitates the implementation of cooperative activities between the force of both countries, such as bilateral/multilateral exercise and disaster relief activities, by establishing procedures and the status of the forces of one country when they visit the other country to conduct cooperative activities.
manner, including the following six points.

• Further strengthening of defense cooperation facilitated by the Japan-Australia RAA
• Improvement of interoperability by enhancing exercises and activities in various domains
• Acceleration of coordination between the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) and the Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) to build a long-term framework to promote science and technology cooperation by leveraging each country’s strengths and promoting cooperation in science, technology, and strategic capabilities
• Promotion of cooperation in the space and cyber domains
• Strengthening of each other’s industrial base through supply chain cooperation
• Strengthening of coordination for Japan-Australia activities, such as for cooperation with Pacific and ASEAN partners

Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed by the prime ministers of Japan and Australia outlined the direction of bilateral security and defense cooperation for the next ten years. Following that, at the Tenth Japan-Australia “2+2” Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”) held that December, the four ministers concurred to identify bilateral cooperation that should be implemented as soon as possible, and to implement it promptly.

As core members of cooperation among like-minded countries in the region, Japan and Australia will continue to cooperate closely towards the realization of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” while leveraging the efforts of Japan, the United States, Australia, and other countries in a multilayered manner.
expressed his recognition that security cooperation between Japan and Australia was ready to move into the next era, and expressed his intention to explore ways to improve the effectiveness of defense cooperation between the two countries. The four ministers agreed to identify bilateral cooperation that should be implemented as soon as possible and to implement it promptly, based on the common understanding among the leaders. The four ministers also confirmed that they would further discuss the direction of Japan-Australia cooperation against the background of the ongoing process of reviewing strategic documents in Japan and Australia.

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held the Japan-Australia Prime Ministers’ Informal Talks with Prime Minister Albanese on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. During the talks, Prime Minister Kishida stated that it was clear that Japan and Australia shared a common strategic awareness and a direction of the way forward, which was encouraging. The two leaders also welcomed the progress in security cooperation between Japan and Australia under the direction set out in the new Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed last October, and expressed their expectations for the early entry into force of the RAA, which will also contribute to the implementation of the Declaration.

(3) Initiatives of Each Service
Since April 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan has held seven meetings with General Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force of Australia. During the meetings, the two sides agreed to further deepen coordination and cooperation between Japan and Australia, which is the core of security in the Indo-Pacific region. They also agreed to strengthen cooperation between Japan and Australia under the “Special Strategic Partnership”, for the realization of peace and stability of the international community as well as FOIP.

Since April 2022, the Chief of Staff, GSDF has met three times with Lieutenant General Stuart, Chief of Army of Australia. During the meetings, the two sides agreed to continue active multilayered defense cooperation, including joint training and joint support for capacity building, in order to uphold and reinforce FOIP. In particular, the February 2023 meeting resulted in the signing of the roadmap for Japan-Australia army defense cooperation.

In addition, as part of various types of bilateral/multilateral training, the GSDF has continued to conduct field training between the GSDF Special Operations Group and the Australian Army’s Special Operations Command. This is a symbol of the development and deepening of army-to-army cooperation to the stage where units with the highest level of skills can conduct exchanges and has contributed to further strengthening of cooperation between Japan and Australia. Furthermore, in April 2022, the GSDF dispatched its first liaison officer to the Australian Army to strengthen mutual understanding and deepen interoperability through personnel exchange.

In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF attended the Indo Pacific Sea Power Conference (IP22) held by the Royal Australian Navy. During the conference, the participants exchanged views on security issues in the Indo-Pacific region and confirmed the direction for strengthening future cooperation.

In September of the same year, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held a meeting with Air Marshal Chipman, Chief of Air Force of Australia, during his visit to Australia to observe the Australian Air Force exercise (Pitch Black 22). During the meetings, the two sides agreed to further strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges between the air forces of Japan and Australia for realizing FOIP.

(4) Cooperative Relationship, etc., among Japan, Australia, and the United States
Japan and Australia share fundamental values and cooperate closely to resolve the various challenges the Indo-Pacific region and the international community face. In order to ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation, and to contribute to the peace and stability of the region, it is important for Japan
and Australia, and their common ally, the United States, to proactively promote trilateral cooperation.

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi held a Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, during which the ministers committed to work together to take concrete, practical steps to ensure the security, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.

In October of the same year in Hawaii, Defense Minister Hamada held another Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting for the second time that year, and the ministers agreed to continue to promote trilateral cooperation. In particular, the three countries reaffirmed that they would expand and strengthen trilateral exercises and activities, promote defense equipment and technology cooperation, and effectively exchange information with the view to enhancing trilateral interoperability.

In addition, trilateral exercises among Japan, the United States and Australia, as well as multilateral exercises involving the aforementioned three countries as well as other countries, continue to be held.

In May 2022, the GSDF conducted Southern Jackaroo 22 (field training with the U.S. Marine Corps and Australian Army) in Australia to improve interoperability and other aspects. In August of the same year, the Chief of Staff, GSDF participated in the Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior Leaders Seminar, where he met with the top leader of the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and the Australian Army, as well as the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, which was participating as an observer. At the meeting, the leaders agreed to promote multilateral cooperation and accelerate efforts for realizing FOIP on the basis of relationships of trust built among them.

MSDF’s units for the Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD22) participated in Noble Partner 22 (Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise), and implemented several exercises within a multilateral framework that included Japan, the United States, Australia, the ROK, and Canada, to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation with the navies, etc.

The ASDF participated for the first time in a Royal Australian Air Force exercise (Pitch Black 22). On the occasion of this exercise, the Chief of Staff, ASDF visited the site and exchanged views with the top leaders of the participating countries’ air forces, including the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces and the Chief of Air Force of Australia, on the enhancement of joint training and further promotion of cooperation. In addition, Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercises and bilateral/multilateral training on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) were conducted under the Guam-based multilateral field training exercise Cope North 23 to further improve interoperability.

Japan will continue its efforts to improve interoperability while coordinating views on the situation and policy direction, through various opportunities with the United States and Australia.

2 India

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India

India is increasing its influence with its population (the world’s second largest), its high economic growth, and its latent economic power. Located in the center of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, India is an extremely important country for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India share fundamental values as well as common interests in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world, and have established the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have promoted cooperation in maritime security and various other areas, while utilizing some frameworks including the “2+2” meeting.

Moreover, Japan and India have signed the “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India”, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information, and the Japan-India ACSA. These agreements have strengthened the relationship between the two partners, which are capable of dealing with regional and global issues, as well as the foundation of this partnership.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In September 2022, Defense Minister Hamada held a meeting with Defense Minister Singh of India. The two ministers welcomed the improving interoperability between the two countries and confirmed that they would...
continue to work together on defense equipment and technology cooperation. They also exchanged views on the regional situation, including the situation in Ukraine, and affirmed that they would vigorously promote defense cooperation and exchange. On the same day, Defense Minister Hamada participated in the 2nd Japan-India “2+2” in Tokyo, in which the ministers confirmed that the two countries would cooperate towards the common goal of realizing FOIP. The ministers also discussed the importance of cooperation with ASEAN, and confirmed their continued support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality, as well as the importance of concrete cooperation for FOIP as well as India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). In addition, the ministers shared the recognition regarding the continuation of discussions with the view to realizing concrete cooperation in the areas of defense equipment and technology cooperation, coordination to launch the Joint Service Staff Talks to strengthen cooperation between the Japan Joint Staff and the Indian Integrated Defense Staff, and strengthening discussions in the field of economic security, including cyber.

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-India Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Modi on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Both leaders emphasized the points such as the importance of upholding the principles of the UN Charter including sovereignty and territorial integrity, that unilateral change of the status quo by force must never be allowed. This video teleconference also enabled building a strong relationship between the top leaders of the GSDF and the Indian Army. In February to March 2023, the GSDF conducted the first bilateral field training exercise Dharma Guardian in Japan to further strengthen cooperation between the GSDF and the Indian Army.

In July 2022, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a video teleconference with Admiral R Hari Kumar, Chief of the Naval Staff of India to confirm the direction of strengthening future cooperation between the MSDF and Indian navy. Furthermore, during FY2022, the MSDF conducted a total of four Japan-India bilateral exercises, including JIMEX 2022.

In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held a meeting with Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari, Chief of the Air Staff of India during his visit to Japan, in which they agreed to further activate Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges. The Japan-India bilateral air exercise Veer Guardian 23 in January 2023 as well as the Japan-India bilateral transport aircraft training Shinyuu Maitri 23 in March 2023 were each conducted for the first time in Japan.

Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (FY2019 and Beyond))

3 European Countries

European countries share fundamental values with Japan and play a central role in initiatives to address common challenges to global security, with a primary focus on
non-traditional security areas, such as counter-terrorism and combating illicit ship-to-ship transfers, as well as international peace cooperation activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with these countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with these challenges, and this is important for both Japan and European countries.

See Reference 44 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (FY2019 and Beyond))

(1) The United Kingdom

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation with the United Kingdom by working together on global issues, such as international peace cooperation activities, counterterrorism, counter-piracy operations and cybersecurity as well as by exchanging information on regional situations.

The Japan-U.K. strategic partnership has been further facilitated and strengthened through the past four Japan-U.K. “2+2” meetings, as well as the signing of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement, and the Japan-U.K. ACSA.

In December 2022, the joint leaders’ statement by the Prime Ministers of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy on the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft was announced.

In addition, in January 2023, Prime Minister Kishida signed the Japan-U.K. RAA with Prime Minister Sunak of the United Kingdom in London. The RAA will facilitate the implementation of cooperative activities between the forces of both countries, further promote bilateral security and defense cooperation, and strongly support peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Progress in Japan-U.K. defense cooperation, including cooperation on the next-generation fighter aircraft and the signing of the Japan-U.K. RAA, symbolizes the two countries’ relations that are closer and stronger than ever before.

Furthermore, at the Japan-U.K. Leader’s Working Dinner held with U.K. Prime Minister Sunak, who visited Japan to attend the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, the two leaders issued the joint statement entitled “Japan-U.K. Hiroshima Accord,” which states that the two countries will maximize the cooperation opportunities provided by the joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft; expand joint exercises and other activities utilizing the Japan-U.K. RAA to increase interoperability; enhance bilateral activities to a higher level with a view to the possible application of the SDF’s asset protection measure; and that the two countries will consult each other on important regional and global security issues and consider measures in response. Based on this document, the two leaders concurred to deepen Japan-U.K. relations in a wide range of areas and affirmed to make further efforts in security and defense cooperation as each other’s closest security partners in Europe and Asia.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In October 2022, Defense Minister Hamada held a video teleconference with Secretary of State for Defence Wallace of the United Kingdom, in which they welcomed the deepening of Japan-U.K. defense cooperation in all services. Notably, both ministers reaffirmed their views to accelerate consultations towards agreement on the full scope of next-generation fighter collaboration.

In March 2023, U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Wallace visited Japan and a Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. Defense Minister Hamada explained the new security strategies and other matters, and Defence Secretary Wallace expressed his strong support. Defense Minister Hamada also welcomed the “Integrated Review Refresh 2023,” announced on March 13 2023 (Local time), indicated that the U.K.’s approach to increase engagement to the Indo-Pacific will be put as a permanent pillar of the U.K.’s international policy. Defense Minister Hamada also referred to the importance of AUKUS efforts to enhance security and defense cooperation among the U.K., the U.S. and Australia for the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific, and expressed his support to such efforts including Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. Furthermore, the two ministers concurred to explore further items of cooperation ahead to improved interoperability, by utilizing the Japan-U.K. RAA after its entry into force.

Prior to attending the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May
2023, U.K. Prime Minister Sunak visited JS Izumo anchored in Yokosuka, attended honor guard ceremony on the flight deck of JS Izumo and toured inside the vessel.

c. Initiatives of Each Service
The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held meetings with Admiral Sir Radakin the U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff at the Raisina Dialogue in April 2022, the NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting in May 2022, the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, and the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference in July 2022. During the meetings, the two sides exchanged views on the overall security environment, including the situation in Ukraine. Recognizing that the security of Europe and Asia is inseparable, they confirmed the importance of Japan-U.K. cooperation for peace and stability in the two regions. They also agreed to further deepen defense cooperation and exchange efforts between the two countries in a wide range of fields such as bilateral/multilateral exercise and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

In July 2022, the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited the United Kingdom, where he held meetings with Minister of State for Defence Procurement Quinn and General Sir Sanders, Chief of the General Staff of the United Kingdom. In November 2022, the GSDF conducted Vigilant Isles 22 (FY2022 field training with the British Army) in Japan, and promoted mutual understanding and trust with the British Army. The British Army has also participated for the first time in parachute training, etc. conducted by the GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade in January 2023.

In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a meeting in Australia with Admiral Sir Key, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff. During the meeting, the two sides confirmed that they would materialize the fact that Japan-U.K. defense cooperation and contribute to the realization of FOIP and to peace and stability in the international community. In addition, in June 2022, the MSDF conducted bilateral exercise with the Royal Navy in the Atlantic Ocean on the occasion of a port call to the United Kingdom by the Training Squadron.

In April of the same year, during the Space Symposium held in the United States, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held a meeting with Air Marshall Smyth, then Director of the U.K. Ministry of Defence Space Directorate, to share security issues related to space utilization. They also agreed to further strengthen Japan-U.K. cooperation in the space domain.

In addition, in July 2022, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held meetings with then Minister of State for Defence Quinn; Admiral Sir Radakin, Chief of the Defence Staff; Air Chief Marshal Sir Wigston, then Chief of the Air Staff; and others from the United Kingdom to exchange views regarding regional affairs, defense policy, and defense cooperation and exchanges on the margins of the Global Air and Space Chiefs’ Conference held in the United Kingdom. In March 2023, the Chief of Staff, ASDF and Air Chief Marshal Sir Wigston, then Chief of the Air Staff of the United Kingdom signed the Terms Of Reference on Japan-U.K. Space Engagement Talks.

(2) France

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with France
France is a major power that has influence not only in Europe and Africa, but also around the world. It is the only EU member state that maintains a constant military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, with territories across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It also historically has had a close relationship with Japan and is positioned as Japan’s special partner.

Japan and France have continued high-level exchanges such as the Japan-France “2+2,” and have concluded the Japan-France Agreement on the Security of Information, the Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, and the Japan-France ACSA.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
In January 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-France Summit Meeting with President Macron in Paris. He explained the new NSS, stated that he would like Japan and France, as like-minded countries, to further strengthen cooperation, and gained the understanding of President Macron. Prime Minister Kishida also stated that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific are inseparable, and that he welcomed the progress in substantive cooperation, such as reciprocal visits of assets and bilateral exercises between Japan and France. President Macron referred to the review of strategies in France, and stated that he would like to deepen cooperation between the two countries. In May 2023, the 7th Japan-France “2+2” Meeting was held, during which the ministers praised the regularity and quality of operational interactions between the French Armed Forces and the SDF, particularly in the Indo-Pacific
region, through joint bilateral and multilateral port calls and exercises. In addition, at the Japan-France Summit Meeting held that same month on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit, the leaders agreed to advance concrete cooperation in areas such as cyber and space, as well as to advance concrete cooperation such as joint exercise. Regarding the situation in East Asia, they also affirmed that they would continue to coordinate in addressing issues related to China, and in dealing with North Korea, including on the nuclear and missile issues as well as the abductions issue.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with General Thierry Burkhard, French Chief of the Defence Staff, in France. During the meeting, the two sides exchanged views on regional affairs, including Ukraine, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in a wide range of fields. Since May of the same year, the SDF has conducted training for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) during the MARARA 22 and Equateur 22 exercises to promote mutual understanding and trust with the participating countries.

In September of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a video teleconference with Admiral Pierre Vandier, Chief of Staff of the French Navy. The two sides exchanged views regarding security issues of the Indo-Pacific region and France, which has overseas territories in the region, and confirmed the direction for strengthening future cooperation.

In addition, since May of the same year, the MSDF also conducted bilateral exercise with French forces stationed in French Polynesia and New Caledonia, such as Oguri-Verny 22 and LA PEROUSE 22. LA PEROUSE 23 was conducted in March 2023.

The Chief of Staff, ASDF participated in the Space Symposium and other events held in the United States, and held meetings with General Stéphane Mille, Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force and Brigadier General Michel Friedling, then Commander of the French Joint Space Command. During the meeting, the two sides shared about regional affairs and the direction of defense cooperation and exchanges among the air and space forces, and agreed on further promotion.

(3) Germany

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with Germany

Germany is a partner with which Japan shares fundamental values and cooperates in addressing issues in the international community as a member of the G7 and other organizations. Germany is increasing its involvement in the Indo-Pacific region based on the Indo-Pacific Guidelines formulated in 2020. Japan and Germany have concluded the Japan-Germany Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the Japan-Germany Agreement on the Security of Information. In addition, high-level and other exchanges between the two countries are progressing, such as the Japan-Germany “2+2”.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In November 2022, the 2nd Japan-Germany “2+2” meeting was held, in which both sides agreed to promote concrete efforts to strengthen cooperation towards the realization of FOIP and deepen bilateral security, including economic security, and defense cooperation. The two sides also agreed on the importance of strengthening cooperation between Japan and NATO as well as developing security and defense cooperation between Japan and the EU.

In March 2023, Defense Minister Hamada held a Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting with Defence Minister Boris Pistorius of Germany, who was the first German Defence Minister to visit Japan in about 16 years. During the meeting, the two ministers agreed to closely cooperate to realize further deployment of German forces to the Indo-Pacific region, as well as joint exercise and unit-to-unit exchanges between Japan and Germany in this context. The ministers also agreed to work towards the development of a legal framework to promote joint activities between the SDF and the German
forces, and to deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation.

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held talks with Chancellor Scholz of Germany on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Regarding the situation in East Asia, the two leaders affirmed that they would continue to coordinate in addressing issues related to China, and in dealing with North Korea, including on the nuclear and missile issues as well as the abductions issue.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with General Eberhard Zorn, then Chief of Defence of the German Armed Forces, during the NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting held in Belgium. During the meeting, they exchanged views on promoting further defense cooperation and exchanges with German forces engaged in the Indo-Pacific region, following the deployment of the frigate Bayern to Japan, in order to realize FOIP. In addition, in March 2023, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff made an official visit to Germany. During talks with General Zorn, then Chief of Defence of the German Armed Forces, they confirmed that coordination between Japan, Germany, and other like-minded countries was essential in order to protect the rule-based international order.

In July 2022, the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited Germany and met with Lieutenant General Alfons Mais, Inspector of the German Army, and visited test and trial units. During the meeting, the two sides agreed to continue to promote concrete coordination for multilayered exchanges, such as high-level exchanges and exchanges of personnel in specialized fields, in order to strengthen relationships of trust. In addition, during the visit to the units, the Chief of Staff, GSDF was able to gain an understanding of the efforts of the German Army with regard to testing on the latest digitized ways of warfare.

In June of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a video teleconference with Vice Admiral Jan Christian Kaack, Inspector of the German Navy. The two sides exchanged views on security issues both countries faced and confirmed the direction of strengthening future cooperation.

In September of the same year, Lieutenant General Ingo Gerhartz, Inspector of the German Air Force visited Japan by personally piloting a German Air Force Eurofighter. During the visit, the two sides strengthened their cooperation through joint flights by Japanese and German fighter aircraft and other means. The two sides also agreed to cooperate even more closely for realizing FOIP in a video teleconference in June of the same year and a meeting in March 2023.

(4) Italy

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Italy

Both Italy and Japan are G7 member countries, and Italy is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. The two countries have been promoting institutional development for facilitating defense cooperation, including concluding the Japan-Italy General Security of Military Information Agreement and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, as well as signing the Memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In April 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi held a meeting with then Italian Minister of Defence Guerini. With regard to regional affairs, the two ministers concurred on sending out messages to strongly oppose any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force and that complying with international law is critical. They also agreed on the recognition that it is important to strongly promote fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

In November 2022, Defense Minister Hamada held a telephone conference with Italian Minister of Defence Crosetto. The two ministers affirmed that Japan and Italy would continue to communicate between their defense authorities. They also concurred to accelerate next-generation fighter collaboration and affirmed to further develop bilateral defense cooperation to realize FOIP.

Based on these meetings, the joint statement by the
leaders of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy on the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft was announced in December of the same year.

In January 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Italy Summit Meeting with Italian Prime Minister Meloni in Rome. The two leaders welcomed the trilateral agreement by Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom to jointly develop the next-generation fighter aircraft, and agreed to upgrade Japan-Italy relations to “Strategic Partners”. Prime Minister Kishida also explained Japan’s new NSS, and stated that he would like Japan and Italy, as like-minded countries, to further strengthen cooperation, which was understood and welcomed by Prime Minister Meloni. The two leaders agreed to launch a Political-Military Dialogue and to further promote cooperation in the security field.

In February Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Suzuki paid a courtesy call on Italian Minister of Defence Crosetto. Then, in March, during the Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting held when Italian Minister of Defense Crosetto visited Japan, the two ministers affirmed that they would conduct advance further defense cooperation and exchanges.

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a meeting with Prime Minister Meloni on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit, during which the two leaders shared the view to deepen discussions on concrete cooperation through the Political-Military Dialogue and other channels. Regarding the situation in East Asia, they affirmed to continue to coordinate closely in addressing issues related to China and in dealing with North Korea, including on nuclear and missile issues as well as the abductions issue.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In October 2022, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Credendino, Chief of the Italian Navy during the Trans-Regional Seapower Symposium held by the Italian Navy in Italy. The two sides exchanged views on security issues both countries faced and agreed on the direction of strengthening future cooperation.

In November of the same year, the ASDF flew the first flight of KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft to Italy for overseas flight training, and conducted unit-to-unit exchanges with the Italian Air Force’s aerial refueling unit at Pratica Di Mare Air Force Base. In March 2023, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Lieutenant General Goretti, Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force to confirm the implementation of defense cooperation and exchanges between the Japanese and Italian air forces in a wide range of fields and at various levels.

(5) Netherlands

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with Netherlands

The Netherlands has a historical relationship with Japan that is over 400 years old, and is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. With the Netherlands, then Netherlands Minister of Defence Hennis-Plasschaert visited Japan in December 2016 for a Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting, in which the two ministers signed a memorandum regarding defense cooperation and exchanges.

b. Initiatives of Each Service

Since May 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan has held two meetings with General Eichelsheim, the Netherlands Chief of Defence. During the meeting, the two sides agreed to continue to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and the Netherlands in order to realize peace and stability of the international community as well as FOIP. The two sides also confirmed matters including the Netherlands’ continued engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

In October 2022, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met in Italy with Vice-admiral Tas, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy. The two sides exchanged views on security issues in the Indo-Pacific region and confirmed the way forward on strengthening future Japan-Netherlands relations.

Since July 2022, the Chief of Staff, ASDF has held two meetings with Lieutenant General Luyt, then Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force and confirmed that defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries’ air forces are progressing.
(6) Spain

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Spain

Spain is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. The two countries have agreed to further enhance the relationship between their defense authorities based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges signed in November 2014. Japan newly dispatched a defense attaché in March 2022.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2022, MSDF training ships conducted bilateral exercise with the Spanish Navy to promote mutual understanding. In addition, in the same year, the MSDF’s Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) and air units (DAPE) respectively conducted bilateral exercise in the Gulf of Aden with the Spanish Navy and Air Force (EU Naval Force) and strengthened cooperation.

(7) NATO

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with NATO

NATO is a partner that shares fundamental values and responsibility for global security challenges with Japan. In 2014, Japan and NATO signed the Japan-NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between Japan and NATO (IPCP) (revised in 2018 and 2020). Based on the IPCP, female SDF personnel were dispatched to NATO Headquarters for the first time from 2014 as part of the Japan-NATO cooperation in the field of women, peace, and security. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF participate in the annual meeting of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP). Currently, SDF personnel are dispatched to the NATO Headquarters International Military Staff, Cooperative Security Division (NHQIMSCS) as staff members for cooperation with international organizations/NGOs, where they have been involved in coordinating cooperation projects between NATO and the United Nations, African Union (AU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NGOs, and others.

Furthermore, the MOD sent a liaison officer to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and a liaison officer to the NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM).

In 2018, the Mission of Japan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established as an additional role of the Embassy of Japan in Belgium.

In April 2022, Japan teamed up with the United Kingdom to participate in the cyber defense exercise Locked Shields 2022 organized by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). In October of the same year, Japan completed the process for participation in CCDCOE activities, and the MOD officially participated in the CCDCOE’s activities.

In June of the same year, Prime Minister Kishida became the first Prime Minister of Japan to ever participate in a NATO Summit. During the Summit, Prime Minister Kishida spoke about Japan’s policy to develop cooperation in the fields of cyber, emerging technologies, and maritime security by accelerating work to substantially upgrade the Japan-NATO cooperation document.

In January 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a meeting with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, who was visiting Japan. Prime Minister Kishida expressed his intention to participate in the NATO Chiefs of Defense meetings on a regular basis, and confirmed that Japan
and NATO would promote close communication.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi received a courtesy call from Admiral Bauer, Chair of the Military Committee of NATO, and shared recognition of the importance of close Japan-NATO cooperation under the severe security environment.

In June of the same year, MSDF training ships conducted bilateral exercise with the Standing NATO Maritime Group to strengthen cooperation.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan was the first in this position to participate as an Asia-Pacific partner in the “Asia-Pacific Session” of the NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting held by the NATO Military Committee, and was able to promote mutual understanding with NATO member countries. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff also held bilateral meetings with the chiefs of staff of NATO member states and exchanged views on a wide range of fields, including future defense cooperation and exchanges. In addition, in June and July 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff held a meeting with NATO Military Commander Chair Bauer, during which they confirmed that Japan and NATO would work even more closely together.

In July of the same year, the Chief of Staff, ASDF visited NATO Headquarters to meet with NATO Military Committee Chair Bauer, and was also the first Chief of Staff, ASDF to attend a meeting of the NATO Military Committee. During the meeting, the sides exchanged views on the increasingly severe security environment and agreed on the importance of strengthening cooperation between Japan and NATO towards realizing FOIP.

In addition, the Chief of Staff, ASDF also briefed the NATO Military Committee on the security environment in the Indo-Pacific, stating that challenges to the rule-based international order are a common issue for the international community. In January 2023, the Secretary General of NATO visited the ASDF Iruma Air Base and confirmed close cooperation between Japan and NATO.

(8) EU

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the EU

Japan shares fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law with the EU. Since the provisional application of the Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement began in 2019, Japan and the EU have been steadily expanding cooperation in the fields of security and defense. The EU is strengthening its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, such as with the announcement of the Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in 2021, as well as the Strategic Compass in March 2022 that includes a policy of increasing the frequency of naval exercises and port calls and patrols with partner countries. Amidst this, the MOD/SDF are actively and independently advancing cooperation to ensure that the EU’s commitment to the region is irreversible.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with General Robert Brieger, Chairman of the European Union Military Committee during the NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting held in Belgium.

In March 2023, State Minister of Defense Ino attended the Schuman Security and Defence Forum held for the first time by the EU. At the plenary session, he spoke as a panelist and expressed that he would like to strengthen cooperation with the EU in the fields of security and defense, under the recognition that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is now inseparable.
Republic of Korea (ROK)

(1) Significance of Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

The cooperation between Japan and the ROK is increasingly important as the security environment surrounding the two countries is becoming severe and complex, including the nuclear and missile issues of North Korea, requirement to response to large-scale natural disasters, counterterrorism, counter-piracy, and maritime security.

In March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Korea Summit Meeting with President Yoon Suk-yeol of the ROK in Tokyo. The two leaders shared the view that enhancing Japan-ROK relations was an urgent task in the current strategic circumstances and that they would further advance the relationship based on the platform on which their friendly and cooperative bilateral relations had been built since the normalization of diplomatic relations. In addition, the two leaders agreed to activate communication between their governments in a wide range of fields, including politics, economy and culture, and specifically, to resume the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue, etc. in order to promote cooperation mutually beneficial for Japan and the ROK. They also agreed on the importance of advancing Japan-ROK security cooperation in light of North Korea’s recent intensification of nuclear and missile activities.

In May 2023, the two leaders held a Japan-ROK Summit Meeting in Seoul, where they welcomed the fact that dialogue and cooperation between the two governments were moving forward in a wide range of areas in line with the result of their meeting in March, including the resumption of the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue. They also concurred on the importance of advancing deterrence and response capabilities through Japan-ROK bilateral and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral security cooperation.

Later that month, the two leaders held a Japan-ROK Summit Meeting on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit, where they reiterated that they valued the progress of dialogue and cooperation between the two governments, including in the economic and security fields. The two leaders confirmed close Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation in dealing with issues regarding North Korea and affirmed that they would continue to promote cooperation toward the realization of FOIP.

There are currently issues between the defense authorities of Japan and the ROK, such as the incident of an ROK naval destroyer directing its fire-control radar at a SDF aircraft in December 2018. However, amidst the recent major trend of further developing Japan-ROK relations, the MOD/SDF will maintain close communication with the ROK side to resolve pending issues between the defense authorities.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In September 2022, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka held the first Japan-ROK vice minister-level talk in six years with Vice Defense Minister Shin Beom-chul of the ROK during the Seoul Defense Dialogue held in Seoul. During the talk, the two sides confirmed the increasing importance of Japan-ROK cooperation as well as Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as the security environment surrounding the two countries is becoming severe and complex, including the situation surrounding North Korea’s nuclear development and
missiles. In addition, they confirmed that Japan, the ROK, and the United States would promote trilateral cooperation to address the issue of North Korea. They also agreed to continue communication between the defense authorities of Japan and the ROK.

In November of the same year, the ROKS “Soyang” (AOE-51) participated in the International Fleet Review 2022 held by Japan. Through this International Fleet Review, the MSDF sought to foster trust building and promote friendship and goodwill among the navies of the participating countries, including the ROK.

Following the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon of the ROK in March 2023, during which the two leaders agreed on the early resumption of the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue, the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue was held in April 2023 for the first time in about five years. During the Dialogue, both sides exchanged views on the response to North Korea and the strengthening of Japan-ROK bilateral and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation, including cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and agreed to communicate closely in order to strengthen Japan-ROK security and defense cooperation.

(3) Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Relationship

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting with ROK Defense Minister Lee Jong-Sup and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. During the meeting, the ministers discussed close cooperation towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of permanent peace and also shared deep concerns about North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The three ministers also shared recognition of the importance of confidence building among the countries in the region, including the implementation of trilateral missile warning and ballistic missile search and tracking training, and the identification of further trilateral actions for the purpose of addressing ballistic missile launches by North Korea. The ministers also agreed on the importance of deepening cooperation on key issues to realize FOIP, including information sharing, high-level policy consultations, and joint exercise.

In November of the same year, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in Phnom Penh. During the meeting, the leaders shared the recognition that bilateral and trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK are becoming increasingly important in the face of North Korea’s provocations which are unprecedented both in their frequency and their manner, and a looming possibility of further provocations. They also agreed to take resolute actions, including enhancement of regional deterrence capabilities such as security cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK. In addition, the leaders expressed the intention to share North Korean missile warning data in real time.

In April 2023, the 13th Defense Trilateral Talks were held in the United States. During the Talks, the three representatives reaffirmed ongoing work to fully leverage the existing intelligence frameworks, including the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement (TISA) among the defense authorities of Japan, the United States, and the ROK, in line with the commitment to share North Korea missile warning data in real time expressed at the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in November 2022. The representatives also exchanged views of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and consulted on concrete ways to deepen U.S.-Japan-ROK security cooperation, such as the regularization of missile defense exercises and anti-submarine exercises to deter and respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and the resumption of trilateral exercises, including maritime interdiction and anti-piracy exercises.

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida exchanged views for a short time with President Biden of the United States and President Yoon Suk-yeol of the ROK, who were visiting Japan for the G7 Hiroshima Summit. During this exchange of views, the three leaders concurred on bringing Japan-U.S.-ROK coordination to a new height, building on their respective strengthened
bilateral relationships. The leaders also concurred on further enhancing strategic coordination among the three countries not only to respond to North Korea but also to maintain a free and open international order based on the rule of law. They then concurred on advancing concrete cooperation among the three countries in various areas, including trilateral security cooperation, such as real-time sharing of warning data of North Korean missiles, strengthening of dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, economic security, and engagement with Pacific Island countries.

(4) Initiatives of Each Service

In August 2022, the Chief of Staff, GSDF exchanged views on the strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific region on the occasion of the Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior Leaders Seminar, including with General Park Jeong-hwan, Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, who was attending as an observer.

The MSDF participated in Pacific Dragon 2022 (Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada missile warning exercise) and Pacific Vanguard 22 (Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada multilateral exercise) in August 2022 as well as a Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise in September to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation with the navies of these countries. In October of the same year, the MSDF conducted Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise, ballistic missile information sharing drills in the waters surrounding Japan, and various tactical drills in the Sea of Japan in light of the situation, including the launch of a ballistic missile by North Korea that passed over Japan. These exercises promote trilateral cooperation to address regional security challenges. They also demonstrate the commitment of Japan, the United States, and the ROK to protect their common security and prosperity and to strengthen the rules-based international order.

(5) Japan-ROK GSOMIA

In light of the increasingly serious situation surrounding North Korea, in November 2016, the GSOMIA was concluded between Japan and the ROK to further promote bilateral cooperation in order to exchange and share classified information regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. This agreement serves as a framework to appropriately protect classified military information shared between the Japanese and ROK governments. In August 2019, the Government of the ROK notified the Government of Japan of its intention to terminate the GSOMIA in writing. However, in November 2019, the ROK Government notified Japan that it would cease its termination of the agreement. In March 2023, the Government of the ROK withdrew its notice of termination and officially notified Japan of confirmation that the agreement remained in force.

Canada and New Zealand share fundamental values with Japan and play a central role in initiatives to address common challenges to global security, with a primary focus on non-traditional security areas, such as counter-terrorism and combating illicit ship-to-ship transfers, as well as international peace cooperation activities. Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with these countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in these challenges and this is important for all of Japan, Canada, and New Zealand.

(1) Canada
a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with Canada

Japan and Canada are both G7 members, fellow Pacific nations, and strategic partners that share fundamental values. The relationship between Japanese and Canadian defense authorities has deepened dramatically over the past few years, as exemplified by the 2019 joint statement on defense cooperation, the entry into force of the Japan-Canada ACSA, the Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KADEX” that has been conducted annually since 2017, and other multilateral exercises. Furthermore, Japan newly dispatched a defense attaché in December 2022.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2022, then Minister of Defense Kishi held...
a Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting with Canadian Minister of National Defence Anand on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. The two ministers agreed that Russia’s recent aggression against Ukraine shakes the very foundation of the international order, including not only Europe but also Asia, and is completely unacceptable. They also agreed that it is extremely important for countries that share fundamental values to make a unified response.

In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Canada Summit Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. During the Meeting, the two leaders exchanged their views on the situation in East Asia and concurred that they would continue close coordination in addressing issues related to China and responding to North Korea including the nuclear and missiles issue and the abductions issue. They also welcomed the steady progress on implementing “Japan-Canada Action Plan for contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific region” that was announced by Japan and Canada in 2022, such as holding the official negotiation on General Security of Military Information Agreement.

**c. Initiatives of Each Service**

In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with General Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada, during the NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting held in Belgium. At the meeting, the two sides shared recognition of the situation, including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and agreed that attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force were an issue common to the international community and should not be tolerated. In addition, during an official visit to Canada in October 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff held a meeting with General Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff, during which they concurred to further deepen defense cooperation and exchanges between the SDF and Canadian Armed Forces toward the realization of FOIP.

In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a meeting in Australia with Admiral Baines, then Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy. The two sides confirmed further strengthening of cooperation between the Japanese and Canadian navies. In addition, the MSDF has strengthened cooperation through participation of Pacific Dragon 2022 (Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Missile Defense Exercise) around Hawaii, a Japan-Canada-New Zealand trilateral exercise in the Pacific Ocean, Pacific Vanguard 2022 (Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada multilateral exercise) on and around Guam, KAEDEX 22 (Japan-Canada bilateral exercise) off the coast from Malaysia to Singapore and Noble Raven 22 (Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral exercise) and Noble Mist 22 (Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada multilateral exercise) in the South China Sea, etc.

In April of the same year, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held a meeting with Lieutenant-General Meinzinger, then Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force, during the Space Symposium held in the United States. In September of the same year, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held a meeting with Lieutenant-General Kenny, Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force, at the International Air Chiefs Conference held in the United States. During the various meetings, the participants exchanged views on strengthening cooperation with the Royal Canadian Air Force, including in the field of space.

**(2) New Zealand**

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with New Zealand

New Zealand is an important strategic cooperative partner that shares fundamental values with Japan in the Indo-Pacific region, where the strategic environment is becoming increasingly severe. The defense authorities of Japan and New Zealand actively conduct high-level exchanges, joint exercise, and unit-to-unit exchanges. Japan newly dispatched a defense attaché to New Zealand in March 2022.

During the Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in April 2022, the two leaders announced that they agreed to launch formal negotiations on General Security of Military Information Agreement.
b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2022, then Minister of Defense Kishi held a meeting with then New Zealand Minister of Defence Henare at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, in which both sides concurred in further promoting defense cooperation in the Pacific Islands Region in order to realize FOIP. They also reaffirmed their continued close cooperation amid Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that undermines the foundations of international order. Regarding the situations in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, the ministers expressed their will to strongly oppose any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force and any action to increase tensions.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In July 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff held a meeting in Australia with Air Marshal Kevin Short, Chief of Defence Force of New Zealand. During the meeting, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff welcomed the deepening of Japan-New Zealand relations through joint exercise and personnel exchanges, including the collaboration between the SDF and the New Zealand military in international disaster relief activities for the Kingdom of Tonga. He also confirmed the importance of closer cooperation between Japan and New Zealand in order to realize FOIP.

In June of the same year, during the PALS 22 (Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium) held in Tokyo, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with Rear Admiral James Gilmour, Commander of the Joint Forces New Zealand, to exchange views on the role of amphibious forces in disaster relief operations such as tsunami. The Chief of Staff, MSDF also held a talk with Commander Gilmour. The two sides confirmed further strengthening of cooperation between the navies of Japan and New Zealand.

In August of the same year, the MSDF conducted Japan-Canada-New Zealand trilateral exercise to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries.

6 Northern Europe and the Baltic States

(1) Finland

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Finland

Finland is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. In 2019, then Defense Minister Iwaya signed a Memorandum on Japan-Finland Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with then Defence Minister Niinistö of Finland.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In October 2022, Defense Minister Hamada held a meeting with Defence Minister Kaikkonen of Finland and affirmed as the international community is facing a severe security environment, the unity between countries sharing in common values is essential.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In September 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff held a meeting with General Timo Kivinen, Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces, in which both sides agreed that Japan and Finland would continue to cooperate to contribute to maintaining the rules-based international order.

(2) Sweden

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Sweden

Sweden is a partner that shares fundamental values with Japan.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

December 2022 marked the signing and entry into force of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the first such agreement with a Nordic country.

(3) Denmark

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Denmark

Denmark is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

With Denmark, in 2019, then Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conference with then Defense Minister Trine Bramsen of Denmark to exchange views on matters such as bilateral defense exchanges and the security situation surrounding both countries.

(4) Estonia

Estonia is a partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. Estonia is implementing advanced initiatives as one of the world’s leading IT countries, and cooperation...
with the MOD/SDF is progressing in the field of cyber defense. In addition, Estonia takes an important role in the view of Japan-NATO cooperation, including being the location of the CCDCOE.

7 Central and Eastern European Countries

(1) Ukraine

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with Ukraine

Ukraine is a partner that shares fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law with Japan. With Ukraine, during then Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Petrenko’s visit to Japan in 2018, Japan signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges and held the Japan-Ukraine Security Meeting.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Japan has been providing non-lethal equipment and goods, such as bulletproof vests, protective masks and protective clothing sequentially after March 2022, responding to the request of the Government of Ukraine for the provision of equipment, etc. after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In March of the same year, then Defense Minister Kishi held his first video teleconference with Minister of Defense Reznikov of Ukraine. Furthermore, the 2nd Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministers’ Video Teleconference was held in April of the same year. At the meeting, Defense Minister Reznikov again expressed deep appreciation for Japan’s humanitarian assistance and provision of equipment and other supplies to Ukraine by the MOD/SDF. In response to it being revealed that atrocities, including the mass killing of innocent civilians, were committed in an area near Kyiv which was occupied by the Russian forces, then Defense Minister Kishi stated that such acts were a grave breach of international humanitarian law and absolutely unacceptable, and that Japan condemned them. He also stated that Russia had to be held strictly accountable. He stated again that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that began in February 2022 clearly undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and was a serious violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations which forbid the use of force. He also stated that such a unilateral change to the status quo by force shook the foundations of the international order and was absolutely unacceptable.

In addition, in May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, who was visiting Japan to attend the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Prime Minister Kishida conveyed Japan’s intention to newly provide around 100 SDF vehicles such as trucks and approximately 30,000 emergency rations to Ukraine, based on the request from the Ukrainian side, as well as Japan’s decision to accept injured Ukrainian soldiers at the SDF Central Hospital. In response, President Zelenskyy expressed his gratitude. Also in May, based on a request from Ukraine, Japan announced that it would accept two injured Ukrainian soldiers with lower leg amputations (in which the leg was amputated from the knee down) to provide them with the necessary medical treatment at the SDF Central Hospital, with the Japanese side bearing the costs in principle.

c. Other

In April 2022, the government of Japan permitted 20 refugees from Ukraine who had difficulties making a passage to Japan by themselves despite their willingness...
to escape to Japan to take passage in the government plane returning Foreign Minister Hayashi, who visited Poland as an emissary of the prime minister, to Japan. In addition, a transport plane of the ASDF picked up humanitarian supplies stockpiled in Dubai by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and transported them to Poland and Romania after May 2022, based on the Execution Plan for the International Peace Cooperation Activities Helping Ukrainian Victims decided by the Cabinet in April that year.

In March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida visited Ukraine for the first time since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and held a Summit Meeting in Kyiv with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine. During the Summit Meeting, Prime Minister Kishida expressed his respect for the courage and perseverance of the Ukrainian people standing up to defend their homeland and democracy, and stated that as chair of the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May, Japan would demonstrate its determination to uphold the international order based on the rule of law. President Zelenskyy sincerely welcomed Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to Ukraine, expressed his appreciation for Japan’s position on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and stated his willingness to further advance cooperation with Japan. In addition, the two leaders agreed to start coordination for the conclusion of General Security of Military Information Agreement.

(2) Poland
a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Poland
Poland is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. Cooperation with Poland is being advanced in accordance with the “Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategic Partnership,” including in the areas of politics and security. In February 2022, the memorandum of understanding on Japan-Poland defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. In addition, the newly formulated NDS clearly states that Japan will reinforce collaboration with Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland.
b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with General Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces during the NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting held in Belgium. During the meeting, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff expressed gratitude for the acceptance of the transport plane for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The two sides exchanged views mainly on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and agreed that attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force are an issue common to the international community and must not be tolerated. In addition, in February 2023, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff paid an official visit to Poland, where he met with General Andrzejczak, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The two chiefs concurred to further strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Poland.

(3) Czech Republic
a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is a strategic partner that shares fundamental values with Japan. In 2017, the first memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchanges with a Central or Eastern European country was signed. The newly formulated NDS clearly states that Japan will reinforce collaboration with Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic.
b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
In January 2023, State Minister of Defense Ino became the first Japanese State Minister of Defense to visit the Czech Republic. He had a meeting with First Deputy Minister of Defence Šulc, among other activities. During the meeting, the two sides exchanged views on regional affairs, including the situation in Ukraine, as well as bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and agreed to continue to closely cooperate.

8 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN countries
ASEAN countries have high potential as growth centers with continuous high economic growth. In addition, ASEAN countries are situated in strategically important areas that occupy key points on Japan’s sea lanes, and they play an important role in ensuring peace and
prosperity for both Japan and whole of the region.

Given such importance of ASEAN countries, there is great significance in the MOD/SDF strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges with each ASEAN country while supporting efforts to reinforce ASEAN centrality, unity, and resilience as the foundation for regional cooperation from the view of realizing FOIP. This will also lead to the creation of a desirable security environment for Japan.

Based on this principle, Japan is promoting confidence building and mutual understanding through high-level and working-level exchanges as well as capacity building, bilateral/multilateral training, and defense equipment and technology cooperation with ASEAN countries. In addition to bilateral cooperation, Japan also conducts cooperation within multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Vientiane Vision, which Japan announced in 2016 was the first guideline for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, which presented an overall picture of the priority area of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. In 2019, at the 5th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Thailand, then Defense Minister Kono announced the Vientiane Vision 2.0, an updated version of the Vientiane Vision, and the ASEAN ministers welcomed it. The MOD will continue to actively promote such bilateral and multilateral cooperation going forward.

Section 1-3 (Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation); Section 1-5 (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building); Reference 47 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Member States (FY2019 and Beyond)); Reference 57 (Vientiane Vision 2.0)

(2) Indonesia

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Indonesia

As for relations with Indonesia, during the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in March 2015, then Prime Minister Abe and President Joko agreed to strengthen the Strategic Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy and reaffirmed their intention to hold a Japan-Indonesia “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting. Japan and Indonesia actively engage in defense cooperation and exchanges at various levels and fields.

In addition, in May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Summit Meeting with President Joko, who was visiting Japan to attend the G7 Hiroshima Summit. Prime Minister Kishida mentioned the importance of defending a free and open international order based on the rule of law, and President Joko stated that he agreed with Prime Minister Kishida’s views.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi held a meeting with Defence Minister Prabowo when he participated in the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Cambodia. During the meeting, the ministers reaffirmed that the two countries would continue to closely cooperate while the foundation of the international order has been shaken by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In July 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with Defence Minister Prabowo when he participated in the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference held in Australia. During the meeting, the two sides confirmed the importance that the two maritime nations further develop defense cooperation and exchanges in order to maintain a free and open maritime order that supports regional peace and prosperity and to realize FOIP.

In August of the same year, at the official invitation of the Indonesian Army, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with General Dudung, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army. The two sides shared their recognition of the geopolitical commonalities between Japan and Indonesia, and agreed to further deepen defense cooperation and exchanges between the GSDF and the Indonesian Army by conducting high-level exchange and bilateral exercise in a multilayered manner. In July to August of the same year, the GSDF participated for the first time in Garuda Shield 22 (field training with the armies of the United States and Indonesia). Furthermore, from August to October of the same year, as part of the United Nations Triangular Partnership Programme (UNTPP), 26 GSDF personnel were dispatched to Indonesia for training in the operation of heavy machinery for Indonesian engineering personnel, contributing to their acquisition of knowledge and skills necessary for infrastructure development, camp construction, and other matters for PKO.

In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF met with Admiral Margono, then Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy in Australia, to confirm the direction
of strengthening future cooperation. In February 2023, the MSDF conducted a goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy.

In December 2022, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held a meeting with Air Chief Marshal Fadjar Prasetyo, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force. During the meeting, the Chief of Staff, ASDF expressed his belief that ASEAN’s AOIP and Japan’s FOIP share many fundamental commonalities and that it is possible to cooperate towards achieving each of them.

(3) Vietnam

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Vietnam

Vietnam is a coastal country facing the South China Sea. Japan and Vietnam have developed cooperation and exchanges between their defense authorities. The 2021 Defense Ministerial Meeting was an opportunity to promote high-level exchanges and others under “Japan-Vietnam Defense Cooperation at the New Level” to contribute more actively not only to Japan-Vietnam bilateral relations but also the peace and stability of the region as well as the international community.

In addition, in May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida held a Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Chinh, who was visiting Japan to attend the G7 Hiroshima Summit. The two leaders confirmed that they would cooperate in dealing with the situations in the East and South China Seas and North Korea.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi held a meeting with General Giang, Minister of National Defence of Vietnam when he participated in the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Cambodia. During the meeting, the two ministers welcomed the progress made in cooperation in various areas, including capacity building, and agreed to continue cooperation in the future.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In May 2022, Lieutenant General Nghia, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army was officially invited to meet with the Chief of Staff, GSDF. The two sides agreed to promote multi-layered defense cooperation and exchanges between the armies of Japan and Vietnam, including capacity building such as for HA/DR and PKO.

In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a meeting in Australia with Rear Admiral Hung, the Deputy Commander of the Vietnam People’s Navy to confirm the direction of strengthening future cooperation.

In June of the same year, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made an official visit to Vietnam, where he held a meeting with Lieutenant General Kha, then Commander of Air Defence-Air Force, Vietnam People’s Army. The two sides agreed to more strongly promote various types of cooperation between the air forces of the two countries.

(4) Singapore

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Singapore

In 2009, Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia to sign a memorandum on defense exchanges with Japan. Since then, various cooperative relationships have been progressing steadily based on this memorandum.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2022, then Minister of Defense Kishi participated in the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where he also held a meeting with Minister of Defence Ng and signed the revised Memorandum on Defence Exchanges between the Japan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Defence, Republic of Singapore. The two ministers agreed to take this opportunity to further develop defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. They also welcomed the start of official negotiations for the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In June 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff participated in the Shangri-La Dialogue and held a meeting with Lieutenant General Ong, then Chief of Defense Force, Singapore. During the meeting, the two sides exchanged views on the current situation in the Indo-Pacific region, and confirmed that they would continue to strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges as strategic partners.

In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a meeting in Australia with Rear Admiral Beng, then Chief of Navy of the Republic of Singapore Navy, to confirm the direction of strengthening future cooperation. In August of the same year, the Republic of Singapore Navy made a port call in Yokosuka Port to conduct a goodwill exercise.

In July of the same year, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held a meeting in the United Kingdom with Major-General Khong, Chief of Air Force, Republic of Singapore Air Force.
Force. During the meeting, the two sides shared their recognitions of regional affairs and exchanged views on the F-35B, which both sides are introducing.

(5) The Philippines

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the Philippines

Between Japan and the Philippines, a coastal state in the South China Sea and an ally of the United States, there are frequent mutual visits by naval vessels, working-level exchanges including Military-Military Consultation, and service-to-service exchanges along with high-level exchanges.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In April 2022, then Minister of Defense Kishi participated in the first “2+2” between Japan and the Philippines, in which the ministers agreed to begin consideration on a framework for facilitation of mutual visits and reciprocal provision of supplies and services in the field of logistics support.

In February 2023, the Terms of Reference (TOR) between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Activities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in the Republic of the Philippines was signed, which simplifies procedures for the SDF to visit the Philippines for activities related to HA/DR. Furthermore, that same month, Minister of Defense Hamada held a meeting with Department of National Defense officer-in-charge Senior Undersecretary Galvez, during which they agreed to continue considering ways to further enhance and facilitate cooperation such as exercises between the SDF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

c. Initiatives of Each Service

In July 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan participated in the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference held in Australia and held a meeting with General Centino, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. During the meeting, the two sides welcomed the progress of cooperation between the two countries in various fields, including high-level exchanges, service-to-service exchanges, bilateral/multilateral exercise, and defense equipment and technology cooperation, such as the export of air surveillance radar systems.

In April of the same year, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a video teleconference with Lieutenant General Brawner, Commanding General of the Philippine Army. In June of the same year, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with the Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps in conjunction with PALS 22 held in Tokyo. Furthermore, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army and Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps were officially invited to Japan by the Chief of Staff, GSDF, and they, and confirmed their shared view of further strengthening cooperation between the Philippine and Japanese armies, including high-end cooperation such as high-level exchanges, joint exercises, expert exchanges, and capacity building. In December of the same year, the Commander of the Philippine Army and the Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps visited YS-83 (Japan-U.S. bilateral regional army command post exercise), and the first high-level talks between Japan, the United States, and the Philippines were held in conjunction with it. At the same talks, the three sides agreed to hold regular high-level talks between Japan, the United States, and the Philippines in the future. They also agreed on the specific direction for Japan-U.S.-Philippines defense cooperation, including mutual dispatch of observers to Japan-U.S. and U.S.-Philippines joint exercise, and built a strong relationship of trust between the five top leaders of the armies of Japan, the United States, and the Philippines.

In October of the same year, the GSDF participated in Kamandag 22 (a field training exercise with the marine corps of the United States and the Philippines) and conducted training related to disaster relief and other activities. In the same month, an engineer unit was invited to Japan and was provided capacity building in the field of HA/DR. The invited personnel were representatives of the unit that the JSDF provided Life Saving System under the ODA in 2021. They improved their skills in
the handling procedures of the equipment. In addition, it was confirmed that the efforts for the military have been steadily producing results, including the dispatch of the unit equipped with the JSDF Life Saving System to southeastern Turkey in February 2023 for lifesaving activities in the wake of the earthquakes that occurred there.

In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a meeting in Australia with then Rear Admiral Valencia, Chief of Naval Staff of the Philippines to confirm the direction of strengthening future cooperation. Moreover, in April and November of the same year, the MSDF conducted goodwill exercises with the Philippine Navy, and in October of the same year, the SDF participated in Exercise SAMA SAMA / LUMBAS 2022, multilateral exercise organized by the United States, Australia, and the Philippines.

In June of the same year, the ASDF and the Philippine Air Force conducted Doshin-Bayanihan 2-22 (Japan-Philippines bilateral exercise on HA/DR) in the Philippines to improve HA/DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation. In conjunction with this exercise, the Chief of Staff, ASDF visited the Philippines, where he held a meeting with Major General Canlas, then Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force, inspected the joint force, and participated in the Air Force Symposium organized by the Philippine Air Force. From October of the same year, ASDF accepted personnel from the Philippine Air Force and provide them with education in connection with the transfer of air surveillance radar systems to the Philippine Air Force. Furthermore, in December of the same year, the first dispatch of ASDF fighter jets (F-15s) to a Southeast Asian country was made to the Philippines, aiming to promote mutual understanding.

(6) Thailand
a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Thailand
With Thailand, Japan has longstanding defense cooperation and exchanges based on the traditionally good relationship between the two countries, including the commencement of the dispatch of Defense Attachés and consultations between their defense authorities from early years. At the National Defense Academy, a Thai student became the first foreign student to be accepted in 1958. Since then, Thailand has sent the largest cumulative number of students to the academy.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
Japan and Thailand signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and it entered into force during Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to Thailand in May 2022.

c. Initiatives of Each Service
In June 2022, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with the Commander of the Royal Thai Marine Corps during PALS 22.

In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a meeting in Australia with Admiral Nilsamai, then Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy to confirm the direction of strengthening future cooperation.

(7) Cambodia
a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Cambodia
In 1992, Cambodia became the first country to which Japan sent an SDF unit for UN PKO. As indicated by Japan’s capacity building for Cambodia since 2013 and other programs, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have made steady progress.

b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi participated in the 7th ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Cambodia, where he held a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Thia Banyu. During the meeting, the two ministers reaffirmed that the two countries would continue to work closely together while the foundations of the international order has been shaken by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

c. Initiatives of Each Service
In June 2022, the GSDF dispatched personnel to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces PKO training school as a capacity building project to provide education on surveying techniques.

In March 2023, the MSDF conducted a goodwill exercise with the Cambodian Navy.

(8) Myanmar
In response to the coup d’état by Myanmar’s armed forces that occurred in 2021, a joint statement signed in the same year by the chiefs of staffs of 12 countries, including Japan and the United States, condemned the use of military force by the national armed forces and related security agencies against the civilian population
and called for the armed forces to stop the violence.

(9) Laos
In March 2023, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oka paid a courtesy call on General Chansamone, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence in Laos, in which the two sides exchanged views on capacity building projects and other matters, and agreed to continue promoting Japan-Laos defense cooperation and exchanges.

Within FY2022, the GSDF provided a total of four capacity building projects to the Lao People’s Army in the field of HA/DR.

(10) Malaysia
a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with Malaysia
Japan has already signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchanges with Malaysia, a coastal country facing the South China Sea, as well as the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology.

b. Initiatives of Each Service
In November 2022, the GSDF shared knowledge related to the HA/DR field and conducted other activities as part of its capacity building project to the Malaysian Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces personnel, and others. This project was started with the aim of incrementally establishing disaster response capabilities in Malaysia. Knowledge sharing and high-level consultations at the army headquarters level were conducted with relevant ministries and agencies, including the MOD/SDF, and local governments to promote the project in the future.

In May of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a meeting in Australia with Admiral Reza, then Chief of Navy, Malaysia, to confirm the direction of strengthening future cooperation.

In February 2023, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held a meeting in Australia with General Asghar, Chief of the Royal Malaysian Air Force, in which both sides strengthened mutual understanding and their relationship of trust, and confirmed the importance of defense cooperation and exchanges between the air forces of Japan and Malaysia.

(11) Brunei
a. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi participated in the ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Cambodia, where he held a meeting with the Honorable Pehin Halbi, Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office of Brunei. The two ministers agreed to continue to further strengthen the relations between the defense authorities of Japan and Brunei through various programs including high-level exchanges, port calls, visits by aircraft, and bilateral exercise. In addition, during the visit of the Honorable Brigadier General (Rtd) Razak, then Deputy Minister of Defence of Brunei, to Japan in February 2023, he held a meeting with State Minister of Defense Ino and signed the Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of Brunei Darussalam on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges. The two sides also agreed to further strengthen the relations between the defense authorities of Japan and Brunei through the newly established Defense Policy Dialogue at the vice-ministerial level between the two countries’ defense authorities and other means.

b. Initiatives of Each Service
In June 2022, in conjunction with PALS 22, the Chief of Staff, GSDF held a meeting with the Commander of the Royal Brunei Land Forces.

9 Mongolia
(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Mongolia
Relations with Mongolia were elevated to a “special strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” in November 2022, and progress is being made in a wide range of fields of defense cooperation and exchanges.

(2) Initiatives of Each Service
In July 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with Lieutenant General Ganzorig Dovchinsuren, Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces, during the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference held in Australia. At the meeting, the two sides welcomed the steady progress in cooperation between the two countries, which would celebrate the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2022, based on the Japan-Mongolia Memorandum of Cooperation on
Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, and confirmed that they would further promote cooperation and coordination in the PKO field and other fields.

Japan also actively implemented the capacity building program in 2022. Specifically, Japan contributed to the success of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Mongolia by providing advice in the field of civil engineering related to PKO and the HA/DR (military medicine) field.

In November 2022, on the occasion of the first official visit to Japan by Commander of Air Force Ganbat, Mongolian Armed Forces, the Chief of Staff, ASDF signed a memorandum of understanding with CAF Ganbat on defense cooperation and exchanges between the Japanese and Mongolian air forces and agreed to strengthen future relations.

10 Asian Countries

(1) Sri Lanka

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is an important country located at a key point on the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. In recent years, Japan has strengthened bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges with Sri Lanka.

b. Initiatives of Each Service

In May 2022, the MSDF conducted goodwill exercise with the Sri Lankan Navy. In January 2023, Japan also participated in CARAT 2023, multilateral exercise held by the U.S. Navy and the Sri Lankan Navy.

(2) Pakistan

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pakistan

Located at the junction of South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia, Pakistan is an important state for stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and it faces an important sea lane for Japan. Pakistan is a pro-Japanese country that has traditionally had a friendly relationship with Japan. Building on this relationship, the two countries have promoted defense cooperation and exchanges.

b. Initiatives of Each Service

The Chief of Staff, MSDF held meetings with Admiral Niazi, Chief of the Naval Staff of the Pakistan Navy, during the Indo Pacific Sea Power Conference 2022 (IP22) in May 2022 and WPNS in November 2022 to confirm future direction of strengthening cooperation.

In addition, in February 2023, the MSDF participated in AMAN 23, multilateral naval exercise hosted by Pakistan.

(3) Bangladesh

a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Bangladesh

Located at the junction of South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia, Bangladesh is an important state for stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and it faces an important sea lane for Japan.

b. Initiatives of Each Service

In July 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with Lieutenant General Waker, Principal Staff Officer, Armed Forces Division, during the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference held in Australia.

In May 2022 at IP22, and in November 2022 at WPNS, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a meeting with Admiral Iqbal, Chief of Naval Staff of the Bangladesh Navy.

In February 2023, the Chief of Staff, ASDF held a meeting with Air Chief Marshal Hannan, Chief of Air Staff of the Bangladesh Air Force, on the occasion of his first visit to Japan, in which both sides exchanged views on defense cooperation and exchanges between their air forces.

11 Pacific Island Countries

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries

Pacific Island countries are important countries that share the importance of a free, open, and sustainable maritime order based on the rule of law as maritime nations, as well as bear strong historical relationships with Japan. At the 9th Pacific Alliance Leaders Meeting (PALM) held in 2021, then Prime Minister Suga announced the Pacific Bond (KIZUNA) Policy to strengthen cooperation between Japan and Pacific Island countries.

In addition, the NDS states that Japan, as an important partner, will engage in cooperation including capacity building through collaboration with its ally and like-minded countries. The NDS also clearly states that Japan will consider cooperation with organizations other than military forces such as coast guard.
(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi held a meeting with the Hon. Seruiratu, then Minister for Defence, National Security and Policing of the Republic of Fiji, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Both sides shared the view to further promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries and to cooperate closely for the realization of a FOIP.

In July of the same year, then Defense Minister Kishi held a video teleconference with the Hon. Hu’akavameiliku, Prime Minister and Minister for His Majesty’s Armed Forces of the Kingdom of Tonga.

(3) Initiatives of Each Service

In July 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with Brigadier Lord Fielakepa, Chief of the Defense Staff of His Majesty’s Armed Forces of the Kingdom of Tonga during the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference held in Australia. During the meeting, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff again conveyed heartfelt sympathy for the damage caused by the volcanic eruption in the Kingdom of Tonga in January of the same year. In addition, the two sides confirmed

Voice of a Personnel Member of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) Land Element Who Participated in a Capacity Building Program

Sergeant, Engineer Battalion, PNGDF
Sergeant Robin Pokaiyeh,
Heavy Machinery Maintenance Supervisor

Amidst the global Covid-19 pandemic and as part of an ongoing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) related capacity building project, the Japan Ministry of Defense / Japan Self-Defense Forces has been delivering training in the field of heavy engineering equipment (HEE) maintenance for personnel of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force Engineer Battalion’s (PNGDF Engr Bn) Heavy Workshop. The training began in 2021 with a five-day online activity for basic maintenance techniques.

In July 2022, three colleagues and I (as the team leader) participated in a three-week training activity on bulldozer maintenance at the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Engineer School.

Over the years, the PNGDF Engr Bn has purchased or acquired HEE and vehicles made in Japan. Therefore, it was very fitting for the personnel, who are responsible for managing and maintaining such equipment, to undergo training in Japan.

This experience has not only greatly enhanced us by providing in-depth knowledge and skills, but also a better understanding about maintaining the latest equipment and components, as well as their functions and principle of operations.

The training that we received has made our work comparatively easier, and more effective and efficient with all HEE and vehicles. In addition, it has been implemented and utilized in our workshops, and likewise, on domestic road construction projects currently being undertaken by the PNGDF Engr Bn.

The training was conducted professionally by courteous, well-experienced, qualified and knowledgeable Japanese instructors. We also built person-to-person relationships, mateship and strong bonds through the activity. The bilateral training enhances participants’ skill level, and therefore, will contribute to the successful handling of future HA/DR operations in PNG. Furthermore, it is sure to further strengthen the existing bilateral relationship between Japan and PNG.

PNGDF Engr Bn personnel learning about the structure and function of diesel engines during practical engine maintenance training. (The author is center.)

Commemorative photo with JGSDF Engineer School instructors at the Closing Ceremony of the HEE Maintenance Training Course. (The author is 4th from the left in the front line.)
that they would continue to cooperate towards realizing FOIP as fellow maritime nations.

Similarly, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan also held a meeting with Major General Kalouniwai, Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces. During the meeting, the two sides highly appreciated the excellent cooperation between the SDF and the Republic of Fiji Military Forces in the international disaster relief activities for the Kingdom of Tonga, and confirmed that they would continue to cooperate towards the realization of FOIP as fellow maritime nations.

In June 2022, the Chief of Staff, GSDF met with Commander Vosawale, Support Commander of the Republic of Fiji Navy, during PALS 22 held in Tokyo. The two sides concurred on deepening defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Fiji through multilateral cooperation through the symposium and capacity building to Fiji. Japan implements capacity building programs with Papua New Guinea and Fiji, which has strengthened relations by providing technical guidance in the fields of engineering and military medicine as well as training military bands.

During IPD 22 from June to October 2022, the MSDF conducted goodwill exercise respectively with the Republic of Fiji Navy, Kingdom of Tonga Navy, Federated States of Micronesia Border Control and Maritime Surveillance Operation Center, the Coast Guard Agency of the Republic of Palau Coast Guard Agency, Solomon Islands Maritime Police, and Vanuatu Police Force Maritime Wing. During these exercises, including multilateral exercise, the MSDF made port calls in various countries to further promote defense cooperation and exchanges.

The ASDF participated in Operation Christmas Drop, the HA/DR multilateral training conducted in the Federated States of Micronesia and other areas. In addition, in January 2023, when ASDF U-4 multi-purpose support aircraft visited the Republic of Palau for overseas flight training, Vice President Sengebau Senior and others were invited to an inspection tour of the aircraft. The Vice President expressed support for Japan’s FOIP vision and the efforts based on it.

**12 Middle Eastern Countries**

(1) **Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Middle Eastern Countries**

Since peace and stability in the Middle East are extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan, from the perspective of stable use of sea lanes as well as energy and economy, the MOD/SDF has been promoting high-level exchanges and unit-to-unit exchanges to build and strengthen cooperative relations with countries in the region. The MOD/SDF conducted the FY2022 Indo-Pacific and Middle East Deployment (IMED) from January to May 2023 involving MSDF minesweepers, demonstrating Japan’s deep commitment to the stability and prosperity of the region.

(2) **United Arab Emirates (UAE)**

Japan and the UAE signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges in 2018. Since then, the two countries have continued to deepen bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, through high-level exchanges by defense ministers and chiefs of staff, periodical holding of military-to-military dialogues and air-to-air cooperation.

May 2023 marked the signing of the Agreement between Japan and the UAE concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the first time such agreement with a Middle Eastern country.

(3) **Israel**

In August 2022, Defense Minister Hamada held a meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Gantz during his visit to Japan. The two ministers signed the revised “Memorandum on Defense Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel.” The two ministers also agreed to continue strengthening
defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries, including defense equipment and technology cooperation and service-to-service cooperation.

In July of the same year, the Chief of Staff, ASDF met with Major General Bar, Commanding Officer of the Israeli Air Force on the margins of the Global Air and Space Chiefs’ Conference held in the United Kingdom. The two sides agreed to continue developing defense cooperation and exchanges between their air forces.

(4) Iran
In April 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi held a video teleconference with Minister of Defense and Logistics Ashtiani, in which both ministers agreed to continue communication among their defense authorities.

(5) Egypt
Japan has confirmed the importance of promoting bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges with Egypt through high-level exchanges, including the visit to Egypt by the State Minister of Defense.

(6) Oman
Japan and Oman signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation in 2019. In addition to high-level mutual visits, Japan and Oman have been continuing navy-to-navy cooperation, including port calls and training. In June 2022, the MSDF conducted training of sailing in formation with the Royal Navy of Oman.

(7) Qatar
Japan and Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges in 2015. Since the first Defense Ministerial Meeting in 2019, the two countries have continued to deepen defense cooperation and exchanges, including high-level exchanges by defense ministers and chiefs of staff.

(8) Saudi Arabia
Japan signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges with Saudi Arabia in 2016. The two countries have continued to deepen defense cooperation and exchanges, including video teleconference by the defense ministers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, MSDF held a meeting in Australia with Vice Admiral Ghofaily, Commander of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces to confirm the direction of strengthening future cooperation.

(9) Turkey
In 2012, Japan and Turkey signed a Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges.

In May 2022, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan held a meeting with General Güler, Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces during the NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting held in Belgium. During the meeting, the two sides confirmed the need for the international community to cooperate in response to the situation in Ukraine.

In October of the same year, the MSDF’s Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement conducted bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Turkish Navy.

(10) Bahrain
Japan signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges with Bahrain in 2012, and the two countries have conducted high-level exchanges and other activities. From February to March 2023, the MSDF IMED21 units made a port call in Bahrain and took part in the international maritime exercise IMX/CE23 organized by U.S. Navy in the waters surrounding Bahrain.

(11) Jordan
Japan signed a memorandum of understanding on defense exchanges with Jordan in 2016, and the two countries continue to hold politico-military dialogues.

In December 2022, the SDF conducted its first integrated deployment and action training in the Middle East region in Jordan.

In February 2023, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan made an official visit to Jordan, where he was granted an audience with His Majesty King Abdullah II, and paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Al-Khasawneh and others. He also held a meeting with General Hnaity, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan, and confirmed future defense cooperation and exchanges.

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Djibouti
Djibouti is an important country as it is the only country where the SDF has an overseas facility that is used for
counter piracy. The facility has been used to transport supplies to the unit dispatched to UNMISS as well as for education as part of Japan’s disaster response capacity building for Djibouti. Japan will work on securing the long-term and stable use of this operation facility in order to reinforce its operational platform in the region including African countries, for activities including the rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In February 2023, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff made an official visit to Djibouti and held a meeting with General Zakaria, Chief of the General Staff of the Djibouti Armed Forces. During the meeting, they exchanged opinions on the future direction of defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Djibouti. In addition, from November 2022 to January 2023, the GSDF provided education in the field of facilities as part of the disaster response capacity building program for Djibouti. In May 2022, the MSDF conducted goodwill exercise with the Djibouti Navy.

15 China

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China

Japan will build a “constructive and stable relationship” with China through communication at various levels, in which Japan asserts its position and calls for responsible actions while continuing dialogue, including on issues of concern, and cooperation on matters of common interests.

The MOD/SDF will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international codes of conduct, and improve transparency regarding its strengthening of military capabilities buildup and its defense policies, while also conveying the concerns Japan has in a candid manner. Japan will also make use of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan-China, including the hotline, in order to avoid unexpected contingencies between the two countries.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Japan-China defense exchanges stagnated following the Government of Japan’s acquisition of ownership of the three Senkaku Islands (Uotsurijima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island) in September 2012, but have gradually resumed since the latter half of 2014.

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi held a Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting with then Chinese State Councilor and Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. At the meeting, then Defense Minister Kishi pointed out that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was a clear violation of international law, including the UN Charter, and that unilateral changes to the status quo by
force shook the foundation of the international order, not only in Europe but in Asia as well, and were absolutely unacceptable. Then Defense Minister Kishi called on China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to play a responsible role in maintaining peace and security in the international community.

In addition, regarding the situation in the East China Sea, then Defense Minister Kishi again strongly urged China to exercise self-restraint with regard to continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, including the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, as well as continuous activities of concern by China, including training by the aircraft carrier Liaoning in the waters near Japan. Regarding the situation in Taiwan, then Defense Minister Kishi stated that Japan’s basic position on Taiwan had not changed, and that the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait were extremely important not only for Japan but also for the international community.

Regarding the South China Sea issue, then Defense Minister Kishi called for China to heed seriously the concerns shared by the international community, including the militarization of the South China Sea such as runway construction on disputed landforms, and conveyed that Japan strongly opposes attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force and any actions that heighten tension. Furthermore, then Defense Minister Kishi stated that it was necessary to have candid communication especially when there were concerns about Japan-China relations, and both sides agreed to continue to promote dialogue and exchanges between the defense authorities of Japan and China.

In November of the same year, the 14th round of Japan-China high-level consultations on maritime affairs was held online, during which Japan expressed its serious concerns about the situations in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and strongly urged China to be self-restraint in its actions.

Furthermore, in February 2023, the Japan-China Security Dialogue was held in Tokyo for the first time in about four years, and both sides had a frank exchange of views on security policies. Japan reiterated its serious concerns about the situation in the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands, and the increased military activities by China around Japan, including China’s collaboration with Russia. Japan also clearly reiterated its position on the balloon-type flying object detected in Japanese airspace. In addition, Japan clearly conveyed its position in regard to the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, both sides concurred to continue and strengthen communication between China and Japan in the fields of security and defense by utilizing frameworks for various dialogue between the two countries on multiple levels, such as the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs.

(3) Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China

Utilization of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism began in June 2018. The “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” has been developed (1) to promote mutual understanding and confidence between Japan and China and to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and exchange; (2) to avoid unexpected collisions; and (3) to prevent unforeseen circumstances in the sea and air from developing into military clashes or political or diplomatic issues. The mechanism’s main components include (1) annual and expert meetings between the two countries’ defense authorities; (2) a hotline between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities; and (3) on scene communication measures between vessels and aircraft of the SDF and the People’s Liberation Army.

The hotline between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities was established in March 2023 and became operational later that year in May with the first call between Minister of Defense Hamada and State Councilor and Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu.

Russia

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that began in February 2022 clearly undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, is a serious violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, which forbid the use of force, and is an absolutely unacceptable act. Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force shake the foundations of the international order, and on this basis, the Government of Japan condemns Russia to the utmost degree.

The Government of Japan handles the relationship
with Russia appropriately while emphasizing the 
solidarity of the G7 and taking the Ukrainian situation 
into account. At the same time, it is also necessary to 
maintain the minimum essential contacts with Russia, 
as it is one of Japan’s neighbors, in order to avoid 
unforeseen circumstances or unnecessary conflicts.

### 3 Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation

#### 1 Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue Initiatives

Multilateral framework initiatives, especially the ASEAN 
Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), have made steady 
progress and served as an important foundation for 
dialogue and cooperation and exchanges on the security 
of the Indo-Pacific region. Japan places importance on 
such multilateral frameworks and is contributing to the 
strengthening of cooperation and mutual confidence 
with countries in the region.

(1) Initiatives under the ADMM-Plus

ASEAN holds the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
(ADMM), a ministerial level meeting among defense 
authorities in the ASEAN region, and the ADMM-Plus, 
which includes eight other countries outside of ASEAN, 
including Japan (so-called “Plus Countries”).

The ADMM-Plus is an invaluable framework that 
brings together defense ministers from all ASEAN 
member states and Plus Countries to discuss security 
issues and defense cooperation and exchanges in the 
region and the international community. The MOD/SDF 
has been actively participating in this framework.

In November 2022, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of 
Defense Onoda attended the 9th ADMM-Plus held in 
Cambodia and expressed Japan’s determination to make 
utmost efforts to uphold a rules-based, free and open 
international order and to actively engage in the regional 
cooperation centered on ASEAN. She also strongly 
condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and 
North Korea’s ballistic missile launches, and strongly 
pointed out that China has been attempting to unilaterally 
change the status quo by force.

Under the ministerial level ADMM-Plus, there are 
(1) the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting-Plus 
(ADSM-Plus), (2) the ADSOM-Plus Working Group 
(ADSM-Plus WG), and (3) the Experts’ Working 
Groups (EWGs). As of 2023, Japan serves as the chair 
of the PKO EWG with Vietnam and is contributing in 
sharing practical and expert knowledge on PKO and the 
promotion of cooperation.

(2) The ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure 
(ADI)

In December 2021, then Minister of Defense Kishi 
announced Japan’s entry to the ASEAN Direct 
Communications Infrastructure (ADI). The ADI is a 
permanent hotline to facilitate communication between 
the defense ministers of ASEAN countries, including 
during emergencies. Use of the hotline has been extended 
to Plus Countries as well. In March 2023, Japan became 
the first among the Plus Countries to enter into the ADI. 
Because the ADI is useful for building confidence and 
managing crises in the region, the MOD/SDF intends to 
utilize the ADI to promote closer communication with 
ASEAN, and contribute more actively to peace and 
stability in the region with all parties.

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6 The ARF, a forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently comprises 25 countries, one area, and one organization as members and holds various inter-governmental meetings that are attended by both foreign affairs and defense officials to exchange opinions on the regional situation and the security area. The 25 countries and one area are the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995) and Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996), New Zealand, PNG, the ROK, Russia, the United States and Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), and Sri Lanka (since 2007). The organization member is the EU.

7 Japan served the co-chair of the EWG on Military Medicine in the first cycle (2011 to 2013), co-chair of the EWG on HAV/DR in the second cycle (2014 to 2016), actively participated in each EWG in the third cycle (2017 to 2019), and is serving as co-chair of the EWG on PKO with Vietnam in the fourth cycle (2021 to 2024).
Regarding the ARF, in which mainly diplomatic authorities are engaged, concrete efforts have been made in recent years for specific initiatives in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peace building. The MOD/SDF has been making active contributions to this forum.

In addition to the Ministers’ meeting at the foreign minister level, the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers’ meeting in 2002, the ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogues (DOD) has been held ahead of the main meeting.
(4) Multilateral Security Dialogues Organized by the MOD/SDF

a. ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting and Vientiane Vision 2.0

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi visited Cambodia to attend the 7th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting and held bilateral meetings with the participating countries.

At the meeting, then Defense Minister Kishi stated that Japan would strongly promote various initiatives under the Vientiane Vision 2.0. He also announced initiatives to tackle new security issues, including holding a seminar in the field of environment to share knowledge and exchange views gained by the Climate Change Taskforce. The ASEAN ministers welcomed Japan’s initiatives and expressed their expectations for the further promotion of practical defense cooperation.

The Vientiane Vision 2.0 presents an overall picture of the priority areas of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. It retains the basic framework of the initial Vision, including its objectives, direction, and means of cooperation, but introduces three new pillars: firstly, establishing three principles of Japan-ASEAN cooperation which are “heart-to-heart cooperation,” “tailored and lasting cooperation,” and “equal and open cooperation;” secondly, introducing the concept of “resilience” to clarify the connection between our efforts and ASEAN’s centrality and unity; and thirdly, pursuing synergies between the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

In the field of environmental security, recognizing that climate change is a security threat, the Japan-ASEAN Seminar on Climate Change and Security was held for the first time in March 2023 to effectively address this common challenge. During the seminar, Japan explained the Ministry of Defense Response Strategy on Climate Change, which was formulated in August 2022. The participating countries also exchanged views on the impact associated with climate change such as natural disasters and efforts being taken by their respective militaries.

In the field of cybersecurity, the Japan-ASEAN Cyber Security Training Program for Defense Authorities was implemented for the first time in February 2022.

In the field of HA/DR, Japan has conducted the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR. In February 2023, the 5th round of this program was held. Invited disaster response officials from ASEAN member states’ militaries and the ASEAN Secretariat, participated in seminars, a tabletop exercise and visited disaster prevention drill facilities in order to strengthen multinational coordination in the event of large-scale natural disasters.

In February of the same year, the 3rd Professional Airmanship Program (PAP) was conducted in Japan, inviting air force officers and officials from ASEAN countries. These initiatives have further promoted mutual understanding and confidence building between the MOD/SDF and participants from ASEAN, and sharing of professional and practical knowledge in the field of HA/DR.

In the field of maritime security, in March of the same year, the 4th Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program was conducted, inviting naval officers and officials from ASEAN countries. Seminars on international law and various training programs were held.

In sum, Japan contributes to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region by supporting participants from ASEAN countries to improve capacity, foster mutual understanding and build networks through such efforts as sharing of international law recognition and various seminars and training programs on maritime security and HA/DR.

b. Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum

The 12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum was held in Tokyo in March 2023, for the first
time in about four years. Japan explained its new NSS formulated in December 2022 and expressed the commitment to maintain and reinforce the free and open international order and to strengthen cooperation with like-minded countries and others, in order to realize FOIP.

(5) Others
a. International Conferences Hosted by Private Organizations

International conferences on security include not only intergovernmental conferences but also meetings organized by private organizations in which various people, such as government officials, scholars, and journalists, participate to discuss medium- to long-term security issues.

Major international conferences organized by private bodies include the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)\(^{11}\) and IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)\(^{12}\) organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the Munich Security Conference,\(^{13}\) one of the most prestigious meetings on security in Europe and the United States. By actively participating in these conferences, Japan’s Defense Minister and MOD officials build trust and share understanding with high-level officials of various countries and send out positive messages through meetings with defense ministers and representatives from other countries and delivering speeches at plenary sessions.

In June 2022, then Defense Minister Kishi attended and gave a speech at the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue. In his speech, he first pointed out that the lessons drawn from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine can be applied to the Indo-Pacific region, which has latent issues synonymous with the invasion. He asserted that Japan is located right at the frontline facing to actors who provoke such problems and emphasized the need to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities and further elevate the Japan-U.S. Alliance, in order to even more closely follow the path of a peace-loving nation.

In addition, then Defense Minister Kishi mentioned building truly mutually beneficial partnerships that support the centrality and unity of ASEAN, reinforcing the international-law-based-rules through various regional frameworks, developing the Japan, the United States, Australia and India cooperation framework into a more tangible initiative, and promoting cooperation with countries outside of the region, beginning with European countries. He also stated that he was confident that even if a crisis hits the Indo-Pacific, the international community can act as one to rebuff such an attempt to disregard the rules, and delivered a strong message that no one should underestimate the strong solidarity of the countries protecting the rules-based international order.

b. Initiatives of Each Service
(a) Joint Staff

The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of Japan participated as an Asian partner in the Asia-Pacific Session of the NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting held by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Military Committee in May 2022. At this session, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff made a short statement, in which he referred to the situation in Ukraine and emphasized that Japan welcomed European countries’ engagement in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region amidst the situation in which attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force were continuing in the region.

In July of the same year, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff participated in the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) Conference co-hosted by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Australian Defence Force, and in the South Pacific CHODs Conference hosted by the Australian Defence Force, in which he was able to share his recognition of the situation and security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, he worked to build mutual relationships of trust and further advance defense cooperation and exchanges.

(b) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

In June 2022, the Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium 2022 (PALS 22) was held, co-hosted by the Chief of Staff, GSDF and the Commander of the

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11 This is a multilateral conference hosted by IISS, a private U.K. think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related issues and regional defense cooperation. It has been held in Singapore every year since 2002 and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, named after the hotel where it takes place. The conference was canceled in 2020 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

12 An international conference hosted by the IISS, where foreign and defense authorities and other stakeholders mainly from Middle Eastern countries exchange views on security issues. It is held annually in Manama, Bahrain.

13 This is one of the most prestigious international security meetings organized by private bodies in Europe and the United States and has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962. Usual participants in the meeting include officials at the ministerial level from major European countries as well as top leaders, ministers, and lawmakers from countries in the world, and key executives of international organizations.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. At the Symposium, participants shared the recognition that HA/DR is the greatest common factor in the Indo-Pacific region, that amphibious forces play an important role, that amphibious forces play a central role in “joint,” “interagency,” and “multi-national” cooperation, and that there are other common challenges.

(c) Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
In November 2022, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) was hosted by the Chief of Staff, MSDF. The Symposium was held in conjunction with the International Fleet Review and other events with participation by more than 20 countries, and fostered confidence-building, friendship, and goodwill among the navies of the countries.

In addition, in May of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF strengthened relations with the navies of relevant countries by participating in the Indo Pacific Sea Power Conference 2022 hosted by the Royal Australian Navy and the Trans-Regional Sea Power Symposium (T-RSS) hosted by the Italian Navy, and visiting NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command Naples.

(d) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)
In April 2022, at the invitation of the United States, the Chief of Staff, ASDF participated in the Space Symposium, the Space Chief Forum, and the International Honor Roll. During various meetings, he exchanged views on issues in the Indo-Pacific region and the space domain, and promoted defense cooperation and exchanges among air and space forces.

In addition, he participated in the Global Air and Space Chiefs’ Conference (GASCC), International Air Chiefs Conference (IACC), and other meetings to strengthen mutual understanding and relationships of trust through exchanges of views with the chiefs of staffs of the air forces of various countries.

2 Promoting Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation Initiatives

(1) Pacific Partnership
The Pacific Partnership (PP) is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide medical care, conduct facility repair activities, and engage in cultural exchange to strengthen cooperation between countries participating in the initiative and facilitate international peace cooperation activities through cooperation with governments, military forces,
international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in those countries. In 2022, Japan conducted exchanges with the militaries of participating countries through medical treatment on U.S. Navy hospital ships and HA/DR seminars in Vietnam, the Republic of Palau, and the Solomon Islands, and strengthened cooperation with participating countries, organizations, and others.

(2) Multilateral Exercises
The multilateral relationships have recently shifted from the phase for confidence-building to the phase for developing more concrete and practical cooperative relationships. Various multilateral training and exercises have been actively conducted as important initiatives to effectively help this shift.

In particular, in the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF has actively participated in multilateral training and exercises in non-traditional security fields, such as HA/DR and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), in addition to traditional training conducted in preparation for combat situations. It is important to participate in such multilateral exercises so as not only to the skill level of the SDF, but also to create a cooperative platform with relevant countries. In light of this perspective, the MOD/SDF intends to continue to actively engage in such training.

4 Cooperation in Use of Space and Cyber Domains
In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. Rapid expansion in the use of the space and cyber domains is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which makes the establishment of international rules and norms a security agenda. The MOD/SDF will swiftly achieve superiority in space and cyber domains by strengthening coordination and cooperation with relevant countries through information sharing, consultation, exercise, and capacity building, while promoting measures concerning the development of international norms.
Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building

1 Significance of Capacity Building

Capacity building is an initiative to actively create regional stability and enhance the global security environment by improving recipient countries’ own capacities through continuous human resource development and technical support on a steady-state basis in fields related to security and defense.

By implementing these programs with other countries, in particular those in the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF is creating a desirable security environment for Japan by helping the partner countries’ forces, etc., to adequately fulfill roles in maintaining international peace and regional stability.

Such activities have the effects of (1) strengthening bilateral relationships with partner countries, (2) strengthening relationships with countries such as the United States and Australia by providing capacity building through cooperation with them, and (3) enhancing trust in the MOD/SDF and Japan as a whole by raising awareness at home and abroad of Japan’s proactive and independent efforts to realize regional peace and stability.

The MOD/SDF will implement capacity building programs effectively by fully cooperating with diplomatic policies and combining various means to maximize these effects, while also tapping into the knowledge accumulated by the SDF to date.

2 Specific Activities

The MOD/SDF have provided capacity building in such areas as HA/DR, PKO, and maritime security to 16 countries and one organization mainly in the Indo-Pacific region.

The MOD/SDF’s capacity building programs are aimed at improving the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time. Some programs are carried out by dispatching MOD/SDF officials to the partner country, by inviting the partner country’s officials to Japan, or a combination of both.

With the dispatch method, SDF officials with technical knowledge are dispatched to the partner country to help said country’s forces and their related organizations improve their capacity through seminars, lectures, and technical guidance. With the invitation method, the partner country’s officials are invited to the MOD/SDF’s units and organizations to improve their capacity and to share knowledge of current human resources development efforts by the MOD/SDF through seminars, lectures, practical exercises, and training programs.

In addition, online lectures and practical training have been introduced as a new means of capacity building from 2021, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In FY2022, a total of 34 dispatch, invitational, and online programs were conducted for 13 countries and one organization.

Specifically, some of the dispatch programs conducted by the MOD/SDF provided knowledge sharing and practical skill-building support in the fields of air rescue, underwater unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal, and underwater medicine for Viet Nam; ship maintenance for the Philippines; PKO (engineering) for Cambodia; HA/DR (military medicine) and PKO (engineering) for Mongolia; military band training for Papua New Guinea; engineering and vehicle maintenance for Timor-Leste; and HA/DR (engineering and search and rescue/military medicine) for Laos PDR.

The implemented invitational programs included knowledge sharing and practical skill-building support in the fields of air rescue, underwater unexploded ordnance disposal, and cybersecurity for Viet Nam; ship maintenance, flight medicine, and HA/DR for the Philippines; military medicine for Fiji; HA/DR (military medicine) for Mongolia; HA/DR (engineering equipment maintenance) for Papua New Guinea; military medicine for Kazakhstan; HA/DR (engineering and search and rescue/military medicine) for Laos PDR; HA/DR for Malaysia; HA/DR and Japanese language education support for Indonesia, and HA/DR for ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat.

The online programs included a seminar on the field of air rescue for the Sri Lanka Air Force.

Furthermore, in Africa, the MOD/SDF has been supporting the Djibouti Armed Forces with its capacity building program for strengthening disaster response capacity, including training on the operation of engineering equipment. From December 2022 to January 2023, 14 SDF personnel were dispatched to train 16
3 Collaboration with Related Countries

The MOD also conducts capacity building for third party countries in collaboration with the United States, Australia, and other countries.

Specific quadrilateral cooperation by Japan, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand includes participation by the SDF, U.S. forces, and others in the “Hari’i Hamutuk” capacity building exercise for Timor-Leste organized by Australian forces, during which technical guidance on engineering and vehicle maintenance was provided to engineering units of the Timor-Leste forces.

It is important for Japan and other countries providing capacity building to work effectively and efficiently by closely coordinating with and mutually complementing each other.

Fig. III-3-1-4

Recent Capacity Building Initiatives (from April 2022 to March 2023)

Capacity Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity building</th>
<th>Dispatch</th>
<th>Invitation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... Project aiming to improve the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time through the dispatch of SDF personnel, and invitation of personnel from recipient countries, etc.</td>
<td>Dispatch SDF personnel or others with expert knowledge to partner countries to conduct seminars, exercises and lectures, and provide technical guidance, etc., with the aim of improving the capabilities of military forces and related knowledge of recipient countries.</td>
<td>Invite officials of partner countries to the MOD, SDF units or other related organization to enhance the capacity of partner countries’ officials through training such as seminars, exercises, lectures, education drills, etc., while sharing knowledge about MOD and SDF personnel development initiatives.</td>
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Some examples of countries and fields in which capacity building has been provided (April 2022-March 2023)

Viet Nam
- Underwater unexploded ordnance disposal,
  - Air rescue,
  - Underwater medicine,
  - Cybersecurity

Philippines
- HA/DR
  - Aviation medicine,
  - Vessel maintenance

Mongolia
- PKO (engineering),
  - HA/DA (military medicine)

Timor-Leste
- Vehicle maintenance and engineering

PNG
- Military band training
  - HA/DR (engineering equipment maintenance)

Fiji
- Military medicine

are collaborative projects with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.
Section 2 Ensuring Maritime Security

Japan’s NDS states that for Japan, a maritime nation, reinforcing the maritime order and ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight are extremely important for peace and security.

To this end, the MOD/SDF will promote maritime security cooperation to realize the vision of FOIP together with coastal states in the Indo-Pacific.

In order to secure the stable use of sea lanes, Japan will make the necessary efforts to conduct counter-piracy operations and ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in cooperation and collaboration with relevant organizations.

1 Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security

(1) The Fundamental Idea of the Government

The NSS states that, as a maritime nation, Japan will work with its ally, like-minded countries, and others to promote efforts to ensure the freedoms of navigation and overflight and to ensure safety, as well as maintain and develop the international maritime order based on universal values, including the rule of law. Specifically, the NSS calls for Japan to enhance maritime surveillance, bilateral trainings and exercises, and overseas port calls, as well as conduct counter-piracy and intelligence gathering activities.

Furthermore, the NSS states that Japan will ensure freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea and other waters, promote peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law, strengthen relations with coastal states along the sea lanes, actively utilize the Arctic sea route, and continue to actively utilize the SDF facility in Djibouti.

In addition, the fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, approved by the Cabinet in April 2023, continues to take a broad view on ocean policy from the perspective of maritime security. It promotes government-wide efforts for “comprehensive maritime security,” as well as measures necessary for the “maintenance and development of an international maritime order,” mainly through Japan’s own efforts to “secure our national interests in our country’s territorial waters” and by strengthening ties with ally, like-minded countries, and others.

Concerning the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), which China and ASEAN are continuing to discuss, Japan has expressed its position that the COC should conform with international law including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and not infringe on the legitimate rights and interests of all parties of the South China Sea.

(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The MOD/SDF is conducting counter-piracy operations to secure stable use of sea lanes and information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In addition, the MOD/SDF has taken opportunities to appeal to the international community on the importance of the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and has been consistently appealing to ensure the “rule of law” in maritime areas, which are essential to our prosperity. The MOD/SDF also points out that attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force are continuing in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and communicate the importance of efforts by all parties towards the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea based on international law, including UNCLOS.

2 Counter-Piracy Operations

1 Significance of Counter-Piracy Operations

Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law
enforcement agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by itself, the SDF is to take action as well.

For Japan and the international community, off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are extremely important sea lanes, connecting Europe and the Middle East with East Asia. Successive UN Security Council resolutions have been adopted since the resolution adopted in June 2008 in response to the frequent occurrence of and rapid increase in piracy incidents with the purpose of acquiring ransoms by detaining hostages caused by pirates, who are armed with machine guns and rocket launchers. These resolutions have requested that various countries take actions, particularly the dispatch of warships and military aircraft, to deter piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

To date, approximately 30 countries, including the United States, have dispatched their warships off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. As part of counter-piracy initiatives, the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) was established in 2009, and is continuing its activities.

The number of piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden currently continues to be low due to such successful efforts by the international community. However, the root causes of piracy, such as Somalia’s unstable internal security and poverty, have not yet been solved. In addition, considering the fact that Somalia’s capability to crack down on piracy is also still insufficient, if the international community reduces its counter-piracy efforts, the situation could be easily reversed.

2 Japanese Initiatives

(1) Legislation Concerning Counter-Piracy Operations

In 2009, following the order for Maritime Security Operations for the purpose of protecting Japan-related vessels from acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, two destroyers began providing direct escort to Japan-related vessels, while P-3C patrol aircraft also commenced warning and surveillance operations in the same year.

Japan subsequently enacted the Anti-Piracy Measures Act in the same year. This legislation made it possible to protect the vessels of all nations from the acts of piracy. Moreover, it also enabled the use of weapons to a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in order to halt boats engaging in the acts of piracy, such as approaching private vessels.

1 The number of destroyers was changed to one from December 2016.

See Reference 15 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)
(2) Activities by the SDF

a. Dispatch of the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) and Other Units

The SDF dispatches the DSPE, the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE), and the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DGPE) to carry out counter-piracy operations.

The DSPE strives to ensure the safety of ships navigating in the area by using a destroyer in two different manners - direct escort of private vessels across the Gulf of Aden, and zone defense in allocated areas in the Gulf of Aden. There are JCG officers aboard the destroyer.\(^3\)

The DAPE conducts counter-piracy activities using two P-3C patrol aircraft. The unit conducts warning and surveillance operations in the flight zone that is determined in coordination with the CTF-151 Headquarters and confirms any suspicious boats. At the same time, the unit also provides information to the MSDF destroyer, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, and immediately confirms the safety of the surrounding area.

\(^3\) Eight JCG officers are aboard the MSDF destroyer and conducting judicial law enforcement activities, including arresting and interrogating pirates, as required.

if requested. The information gathered by MSDF P-3Cs is constantly shared with other related organizations, and contributes significantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected as pirate ships.

In order to improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the DAPE, the DGPE carries out activities such as maintenance of the installation set up in the northwest district of Djibouti International Airport.

Additionally, the Airlift Squadron operates ASDF transport aircraft to carry out air transport of materials required by the DAPE and the DGPE, and airlifts, etc., are organized as needed.

b. Dispatch of Personnel to the CTF-151 Headquarters, Etc.

In order to strengthen coordination with the units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations and enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counter-piracy operations, the MOD has dispatched SDF personnel to the CTF-151 and CMF headquarters since August 2014. Of these, the SDF dispatched a CTF-151 commander for the first time in 2015, followed by respective dispatches in 2017, 2018, and 2020.
c. Achievements
As of March 31, 2023, the DSPE has escorted 4,068 vessels (including 121 vessels escorted based on orders for maritime security operations). Under the protection of the SDF destroyers, not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and these vessels have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden.

As of March 31, 2023, the DAPE has conducted the following activities: aircraft have flown 3,089 missions with their flying hours totaling 22,190 hours; and information was provided to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy operations on 15,972 occasions. The activities conducted by the DAPE account for approximately 90% of the warning and surveillance operations carried out in the Gulf of Aden by the international community.

3 Praise for Japan’s Endeavors
The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been highly praised by the international community. For example, national leaders and others have expressed their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly well-received by the UN Security Council Resolution. Moreover, the MSDF destroyers, which are engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains and ship owners of the vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. Additionally, the Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other groups expressed appreciation for protection of Japan-related vessels and asked for continuation of efforts in fighting against piracy.

3 Training-Centered Initiatives
The MSDF not only endeavors to improve its tactical skills through bilateral/multilateral training with Indo-Pacific coastal states, but also strives to contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, promote mutual understanding, and strengthen relationships of trust.
In the Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD22), the deployed units conducted multilateral training with the navies of various countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and also made port calls at ports in Indo-Pacific region coastal countries.

In addition, the DSPE and DAPE are conducting bilateral/multilateral training with the EU and other organizations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden with the aim of improving their tactical skills and strengthening cooperation with the armed forces of each country.

Strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the Indo-Pacific region through the bilateral/multilateral exercise and port calls contributes to maintaining maritime security, which has extremely high significance.

The MOD/SDF has implemented capacity building in maritime security for Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Brunei and Sri Lanka to help them enhance their MDA and other capabilities. Such programs contribute to strengthening cooperation with partner countries that share common strategic interests with Japan.

The fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that maritime security cooperation among defense authorities will be strengthened through bilateral and multilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges at various levels to maintain and develop the free and open ocean supported by a maritime order governed by law and rules. In response to this, the MOD has been working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS).

**Cooperation in Maritime Security**

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**REFERENCE:** Counter-piracy efforts

**URL:** [https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/overseas.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/js/activity/overseas.html)

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4 The DSPE conducted bilateral/multilateral exercise with the U.S. Navy in June 2022, the EU Naval Force (French Navy) in September 2022, the Spanish Navy and Turkish Navy in October 2022, the French Carrier Strike Group (French Navy and U.S. Navy (with the U.S. Navy only from January 9 to 14)) in January and February 2023, and countries participating in AMAN 23, multilateral exercise organized by the Pakistan Navy in February 2023 (U.S. Navy, Italian Navy, French Navy, etc.). The DAPE conducted joint exercise with the EU Naval Force (Spanish Air Force) in November 2022.
Section 3 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

The MOD/SDF are proactively conducting international peace cooperation activities and other activities in tandem with diplomatic activities.

1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities

International peace cooperation activities as primary missions by MOD/SDF include international peace cooperation assignments such as cooperation in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKO), international disaster relief activities in response to large-scale disasters overseas, and cooperation and support activities in response to Joint International Peace Response Situation.

See Part II, Chapter 6 (Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others); Chapter 1, Section 8 (SDF Activities since Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security); Fig. III-3-3-1 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF); Reference 15 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 60 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 61 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments)

Fig. III-3-3-1 International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF

International Peace Cooperation Assignments
Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations”

International Disaster Relief Activities
Activities based on the “Act Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams”

Cooperation and Support Activities, etc., for the Armed Forces of Foreign Countries
Activities in accordance with the “Act Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, in Situations that the International Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and Security”

Cooperation in Efforts toward the Reconstruction of Iraq
Activities based on the “Act Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq” (Ended in February 2009)

Activities to Respond to International Terrorism
Activities based on the Act Concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Ended in January 2010)

Legend: □ Activities based on time-limited acts □ Activities based on permanent acts

2 Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately Carry Out International Peace Cooperation Activities

To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future operations. For this reason, all the three branches of the SDF, namely the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, designate dispatch stand-by units and always maintain a state of readiness. In addition, engineering units, staff officers, and others as well as C-2 and C-130H transport aircraft are registered with the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) to enable the UN Headquarters to grasp the PKO dispatch preparation status of each country more specifically.

Meanwhile, the SDF is enhancing information-gathering abilities and protection abilities, which are required for the SDF units to carry out their missions while ensuring the safety of personnel and units in international peace cooperation activities, etc.. Furthermore, in order to respond to various environments and prolonged missions, the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport, deployment, and information communication, as well as developing a structure of logistic and medical support for conducting smooth and continuous operations.

With regard to the education necessary for engaging in international peace cooperation activities, the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, which belongs to the Ground Component
Command, provides training for GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, as well as supports their training. In addition, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of the Joint Staff College offers not only basic education courses on international peace cooperation activities, but also specialized education to train personnel who can be appointed as contingent commanders of UN PKO missions and staff officers of mission headquarters. These specialized courses are conducted by using UN standard training materials and foreign instructors.

Furthermore, since FY2014, the JPC has also provided education for personnel from foreign militaries and other Japanese ministries and agencies. This initiative represents the approach taken by the MOD/SDF, which emphasizes the necessity of collaboration and cooperation with other related ministries and foreign countries, based on the current situation of more multi-dimensional and complicated international peace cooperation activities. The initiative aims to contribute to more effective international peace cooperation activities by enhancing collaboration in the field of education.

### 3 Welfare and Mental Health Measures for Dispatched SDF Units

The MOD/SDF is implementing various family support and mental health support measures for dispatched SDF personnel and their families to alleviate any anxieties they may go through during the dispatch. For example, depending on the characteristics of the duties of the unit to be dispatched, the MOD/SDF provide SDF personnel with necessary measures such as the following: (1) education before the dispatch on necessary knowledge on how to reduce stress; (2) mental health checks before, during, and after the dispatch; (3) counseling on anxieties and concerns during the dispatch, conducted by staff specially trained for carrying out mental health care; (4) dispatch of a mental health care team mainly including a medical officer with expertise on mental health care; (5) stress reduction education upon returning to Japan; and (6) special medical checkup after returning to Japan.

### 2 Initiatives to Support UN PKO and other activities

As a means to promote peace and stability in conflict regions around the world, UN PKO have expanded their missions in recent years to include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC), the promotion of political processes, providing assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights, and other fields, in addition to such traditional missions as ceasefire monitoring. As of the end of March 2023, there are 12 UN PKO missions ongoing.

International organizations, such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments, and NGOs conduct relief and restoration activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries. Japan has been promoting international peace cooperation assignments in various regions, including Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan for more than 25 years, and these activities have been highly praised both inside and outside of Japan.

Currently, Japan dispatches staff officers to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).

Japan will actively contribute to international peace cooperation activities through such activities as dispatch of personnel to mission headquarters and capacity building in Japan’s fields of expertise by using accumulated experience so far and working on human resource development.
1 Dispatch to the MFO

(1) Significance of Dispatch to the MFO
In August 1981, the MFO was established by the Protocol to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty as an organization to undertake the tasks and responsibilities of the UN force and observer mission stipulated in the treaty. Since 1982, when its activities started, by facilitating dialogue and confidence building between Egypt and Israel, the MFO has contributed to peace and stability in the Middle East, which is a foundation of peace and prosperity for Japan.

Amidst this, the MFO requested that Japan send staff officers to its headquarters, and, with a view to making proactive contributions to international peace efforts, Japan has been dispatching two staff officers to the MFO as Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security since April 2019.

In addition, the MFO has major needs for the renewal and repair of its facilities. In February 2023, the MFO requested the dispatch of additional personnel from Japan to work on the facilities. In May of the same year, two additional staff officers were dispatched for facilities work.

This request was the result of an evaluation of the capabilities and achievements of the personnel Japan has dispatched thus far. The dispatch of additional staff officers is very meaningful, as it will allow Japan to externally demonstrate its knowledge and capabilities in

REFERENCE: 30th anniversary of participating in UN PKO: The journey and development of the GSDF’s international activities
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/about/pko30/index.html
the field of facilities, which is one of the strengths of the SDF, and to further contribute to peace and stability in the Middle East by participating in the maintenance of facilities that form the basis of MFO activities.

(2) Activities by Staff Officers and Others
The two officers dispatched before are engaging in liaison and coordination between governments of the two countries or other relevant organizations and the MFO as a Deputy Chief of Liaison and an Assistant Liaison Operation Officer at the MFO Headquarters, which is located in the south camp at Sharm El-Sheikh in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula.

The two additional staff officers dispatched recently work as members of the Force Engineering Office (FEO) of the Support Branch, which is responsible for preparing plans and managing progress related to the renewal of various facilities of the MFO.

Additionally, in order to help the officers dispatched to the MFO carry out activities smoothly and effectively, one liaison and coordination personnel is dispatched to Cairo city, Egypt, to liaise and coordinate with the relevant organizations.

These activities express Japan’s commitment to more active involvement in the peace and stability of the Middle East. This is also expected to promote collaboration with the other countries dispatching officers, including the United States, and create opportunities for human resources development.

(2) Activities by Staff Officers and Others
Four GSDF personnel (a logistics officer, intelligence officer, engineering officer, and air operations officer) currently carry out duties at the UNMISS headquarters. Specifically, the logistics officer procures and transports goods needed in UNMISS activities, the database officer collects and compiles information on security conditions, the engineering officer plans and proposes UNMISS engineering activities, and the air operations officer creates flight plans, etc., for run by UNMISS.

Additionally, liaison staff members have been dispatched to the liaison office in the Embassy of Japan in South Sudan to support activities of the Japanese staff officers. These people help interactions between the South Sudan government and the International Peace Cooperation Corps in South Sudan with the aim of ensuring smooth and efficient cooperation with UNMISS.

They will continue to contribute to activities as UNMISS members.
3 Dispatch of MOD Personnel to the UN Secretariat

The MOD/SDF dispatches personnel to the UN Secretariat for the purpose of actively contributing to the UN efforts to achieve international peace and for the purpose of utilizing their experiences in Japan’s PKO activity. As of March 2023, two of the SDF personnel (chief level and action officer level) are involved in the military planning for UN peacekeeping mission and competency assessment of each personnel member of various countries at the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and one SDF personnel and one administrative official (both action officer level) are working on the United Nations Triangular Partnership Programme (UNTPP) at the UN Department of Operational Support (DOS).

4 Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Training Centers

To support PKO undertaken by African and other countries, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to PKO training centers in Africa and other countries that provide education and training for UN peacekeepers to contribute to peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of the centers.

5 Support to the UNTPP

Japan has so far earned unquestionable trust in the areas of engineering and transport that are essential for promoting smooth peacekeeping operations. To continue to support the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions and implement high quality activities, Japan expressed its active support at the PKO Summit in September 2014, and it was embodied by the UNTPP.

The UNTPP was founded using funds from Japan as a project to support training for military engineers and the procurement of heavy equipment by the UN DOS. From the start of the program to March 2023, a total of 184 GSDF personnel have been dispatched to Africa to provide 10 training sessions for a total of 312 members from eight African countries.

Considering that 30% or more of PKO personnel are from Asia, Japan decided to implement the program for the first time in Asia and the surrounding area. The program provides training on heavy engineering piloting for engineering personnel. From August 2022, 26 GSDF personnel were dispatched to the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre to contribute to the acquisition of knowledge and skills necessary for infrastructure development and building camps in PKO for Indonesian military engineers. From the start of the program until March 2023, a total of 92 GSDF personnel were dispatched to provide a total of four training sessions for 76 personnel from nine countries in Asia and the surrounding area.

In addition, the UN decided to extend the scope of support under this program to the field of sanitation, given that strengthening sanitation capacity to ensure the safety of deployed personnel has become an issue in UN peacekeeping operations. In response, the UN Field Medical Assistant Course (UNFMAC), which aims to train personnel who can provide first aid before medics or medical personnel provide specialized treatment in areas of PKO operations, was established. In June 2022, the second UNFMAC pilot was held at the UN Regional Service Centre Entebbe in Uganda, and one GSDF officer was dispatched as an instructor to provide education to 21 personnel.

Furthermore, as part of the UNTPP, Japan is hosting an online Construction Process Management Course for
engineering personnel. This course provides education on construction management and problem solving methods for UN PKO missions. In September 2022, four GSDF instructors provided education for 20 engineering personnel from Cambodia, Thailand, and Mongolia.

6 Cooperation for the Activities Helping Ukrainian Victims

The UNHCR requested that humanitarian relief supplies stockpiled at the UNHCR warehouse in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) be transported to countries surrounding Ukraine (Republic of Poland and Romania). In response, on April 28, 2022, the Cabinet approved the Execution Plan for the International Peace Cooperation Assignments Helping Ukrainian Victims, and then Defense Minister Kishi issued the SDF Operation Order for the International Peace Cooperation Assignments Helping Ukrainian Victims. In response, humanitarian relief supplies were transported from Dubai to Poland and Romania by SDF aircraft from May to June. As for recent activities, a total of approximately 103 tons of humanitarian relief supplies (blankets, plastic sheets, solar lamps, and kitchen sets) were transported over a total of eight flights, comprising six flights by C-2 transport aircraft and two by KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft. Furthermore, UNHCR expressed gratitude for this cooperation, and Ukrainian government officials expressed gratitude and high appreciation.

3 International Disaster Relief Activities

In recent years, the role of military affairs has become more diverse, and opportunities for military to use their capabilities in HA/DR are growing. To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has also engaged in international disaster relief activities proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the global security environment.

To this end, the SDF maintains its readiness to take any necessary actions based on prepared disaster relief operation plans. In consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief activities, which fully utilize its functions and capabilities, while taking into consideration specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries.

1 Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law

Since the enforcement of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (Japan Disaster Relief Team Law) in 1987, Japan has been engaged in international disaster relief activities upon requests from the governments of affected countries or the international organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law was partially amended to allow the SDF to participate in international disaster relief activities and to transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose.

2 International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF and SDF’s Posture

Responding to specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and the scale of disaster situations in these countries, the SDF’s capabilities in international disaster relief activities encompass (1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transport of relief items, patients and personnel by helicopter and other means; and (3) water supply activities using water-purifying devices. In
addition to such cooperation, the SDF uses transport aircraft and ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area, and conducts search operations by MSDF fixed-wing patrol aircraft.

The Ground Component Command regional units of the GSDF and other relevant GSDF units maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief activities in an independent manner anytime when needed. The Self Defense Fleet of the MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF also constantly maintain their readiness to transport personnel and their supplies to disaster affected areas.

### 3 International Disaster Relief Activities, etc. for the Earthquake Disaster in the Republic of Turkey

An earthquake with its epicenter in southeastern Turkey occurred on February 6, 2023 caused severe damage in the country, including more than 50,000 people killed.

At the request of the Government of Turkey, Japan dispatched the Japan Disaster Relief and Rescue Team, a medical team, and others led by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The MOD first transported approximately 15.4 tons of equipment and other items necessary for the Japan Disaster Relief and Rescue Team and medical team operating in the affected area from Japan to Turkey from February 13 to 17 by a B-777 special transport aircraft.

Furthermore, based on a request for cooperation from the Government of Turkey and NATO, one KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft transported emergency relief supplies from Pakistan to Turkey: one KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft departed Japan on March 14 and transported a total of approximately 89.5 tons of tents and tent insulation equipment on four occasions on March 17, 19, 21, and 23.

The Minister of Defense issued an order on March 24, 2023 to terminate the international disaster activities, in which about 60 personnel were engaged. This was the first international disaster relief activity undertaken by the SDF in cooperation with NATO. The Government of Turkey and NATO expressed high appreciation and gratitude for this activity, which result in further deepening relations not only with Turkey but also with NATO.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and missiles that can deliver them, as well as the proliferation of not only conventional arms but also goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use, pose a pressing challenge to the peace and stability of the international community. Moreover, many countries are working on the regulation of certain conventional weapons, considering the need to maintain a balance between humanitarian perspectives and defensive needs.

In order to deal with these issues, the international frameworks for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation have been developed under which Japan has played an active role.

Japan’s NSS describes arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, including for weapons of mass destruction, etc., as one of the key measures among efforts to strengthen a free and open international order. In addition, Japan’s NDS also states that Japan will cooperate to improve the effectiveness of international organizations and multilateral export control regimes.

### 1 Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

Japan actively participates in international initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in regard to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles that can deliver them, and associated technologies and materials.

Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the field of chemical protection since the negotiating stage. Following the entry of the CWC into force, Japan has dispatched GSDF experts on protection against chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established to continuously implement verification measures. The 8th GSDF officer in total was newly dispatched in September 2022. In addition, small quantities of the chemical substances under the regulation of the CWC are synthesized for protection research at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City). Thus, in accordance with the CWC regulations, the school has submitted annual reports and undergone inspections 12 times in total since the establishment of the OPCW, and it has been confirmed that there are no problems.

Moreover, the whole of the Japanese Government is also working on projects to destroy abandoned chemical...
weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC. The MOD/SDF has seconded GSDF and other personnel to the Cabinet Office to be in charge of this project, and since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 19 occasions.

In addition, MOD officials are dispatched to major meetings such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group (AG), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which are international export control regimes, and have made proposals to contribute to non-proliferation of key technologies from security perspectives. Moreover, Japan has been cooperating to enhance the effectiveness of regulations and decisions, such as by dispatching SDF personnel to training conducted by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

Japan has concluded various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), based on humanitarian perspectives and security needs. In addition, Japan has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention\(^1\)), which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention, the disposal of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF was completed in February 2015.

The MOD dispatches personnel to Group of Governmental Experts meetings related to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and other events as necessary under the CCW framework. Discussions related to LAWS are under way from the perspectives of their characteristics, human-machine interactions, international law, and other matters. Japan is continuing its active involvement in the discussions, while also considering the standpoints of national security.

Furthermore, Japan has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international community that focus on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines by submitting annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional stocks to the Secretariat of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty\(^2\)).

Japan also submits an annual Confidence-Building Measures report in relation to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

In addition, the MOD/SDF provides an annual report under the frameworks of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the UN Report on Military Expenditures, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT\(^3\)), which aim to increase the transparency of military preparedness and military expenditure. The MOD/SDF also dispatches personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings and other meetings for reviewing and improving these systems.

### 2 International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Deeply concerned about the development of WMDs and missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, the United States announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)\(^4\) in May 2003 and sought the participation of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken based on PSI, including PSI interdiction exercises aimed at improving the ability to thwart the proliferation of WMDs and related items and meetings to consider issues on policies and legislations.

The MOD/SDF collaborates with relevant

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1. The United States, China, Russia, and others have not yet concluded the Convention.
2. The United States, China, Russia, the ROK, India, and others have not yet concluded the Convention.
3. The United States, Russia, and others have not yet concluded the Treaty.
4. An initiative that seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent, and considers measures that participating countries can jointly take while complying with existing domestic and international laws, in order to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and related materials.
organizations and countries, dispatching MOD officials and SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation in these exercises. In August 2022, personnel of the GSDF Chemical School participated with other personnel from related organizations in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) training “Fortune Guard 22” implemented in the United States. The participants shared their efforts in PSI activities and discussed international cooperation during the tabletop training and port training.

Based on the proliferation cases in the areas surrounding Japan, and from the perspectives of preventing the proliferation of WMDs and improving the response capability of the SDF, the MOD/SDF strives to strengthen nonproliferation frameworks including PSI by holding various relevant exercises and meetings and participating in the same kind of activities which other countries hold.

REFERENCE: Initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation
Part IV Reinforcing Common Bases, etc.

Chapter 1 Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability, etc.

Chapter 2 Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities

Chapter 3 Measures Related to Training and Exercises

Chapter 4 Initiatives to Live in Harmony with Local Communities and the Environment
Rapid advances in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security, and nations are developing cutting-edge technologies that could become so-called “game changers” which dramatically alter the future character of warfare.

In addition, the development of new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) has expanded the character of warfare not only in the ground, maritime, and air domains but also in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, as well as the cognitive dimension. In response to this change, each nation is actively engaged in research and development to ensure its technological superiority.

On the other hand, Japan’s defense production and technology bases have been exposed to challenging conditions resulting from growing issues, such as supply chain risks and a series of withdrawals from the industry.

In light of these circumstances, the NDS states that defense production and technology bases are indispensable foundation for a country to secure the research, development, production and procurement of defense equipment in a stable manner on its own and to incorporate the cutting-edge technology necessary for new ways of warfare into defense equipment; they are a virtually integral part of defense capability itself, and with this in mind, Japan will promote initiatives to reinforce these bases.

**Section 1 Reinforcing Defense Production Base**

Based on the recognition in the NDS, etc. that equipment and the defense industry are inseparable, and in this context, the defense production and technology bases are a virtually integral part of defense capability itself, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will be working on various initiatives, such as introducing a new profit margin calculation method to secure appropriate profits for the defense industry; reinforcing industrial security, including cybersecurity; and promoting the transfer of defense equipment and technology, including reviewing the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. In addition, as part of efforts to develop the necessary legislation for the reinforcement of these bases, the “Bill on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology bases” was submitted at an ordinary Diet session in 2023.

**Current Situation of Japan’s Defense Industry**

The defense industry comprises the human resource, physical, and technological bases that are essential for the production, sustainment, and maintenance of defense equipment required for the MOD/SDF’s activities. In Japan, these bases are mostly made up of companies (the defense industry) that manufacture and repair defense equipment and associated items. Therefore, a broad range of companies that possess special and advanced skills, technologies, and facilities are involved in this industry.

On the other hand, the defense business is not the primary business in many companies. Furthermore, unit costs and maintenance/sustainment costs tend to increase due to low-volume, high-mix production and the sophisticated and complicated nature of defense equipment. For this reason, Japan’s defense industry faces issues such as difficulties in maintaining and passing on skills and techniques and the withdrawal of some companies from the defense business as a result of declining work due to a decrease in procurement volume.

In addition, various risks have become more apparent, such as cyber attacks on defense-related companies, as

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1 For example, it is said that approximately 1,100, 1,300, and 8,300 companies are involved in the manufacture of fighter aircraft, tanks, and destroyers, respectively.
well as supply chain risks, including the risk of disruption to the supply of raw materials due to the imposition of export restrictions by other countries and the risk of information theft through parts of concern.

In addition, as the realignment of the Western defense industries and international joint development are making progress, Japan formulated the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in April 2014. However, improvement of international competitiveness has become a challenge for Japan’s defense industry, because the industry has developed based on the production of defense equipment only for the SDF.

### 2 Efforts to Maintain and Reinforce Defense Production and Technology Bases

#### 1 Past Initiatives

Based on the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” formulated in June 2014, the MOD has implemented various measures that contribute to the maintenance and reinforcement of the defense production and technology bases, such as improving the contract system, including the enactment of the Long-term Contract Act, and the establishment of ATLA, which integrated the organizations involved in defense equipment procurement.

In addition, the following new measures have also been adopted by ATLA: (1) reinforcement of the defense technology base to maintain technological superiority in the future and achieve advanced capabilities ahead of other countries (see Section 2); (2) formulation of the Acquisition Strategic Plan for promoting project management and improvement of the contract system (see Section 4); (3) efforts to fundamentally reinforce the defense production and technology bases in line with the NDS, etc. (see Paragraph 2 below); and (4) participation of Japanese companies in the international F-35 fighter aircraft program and defense equipment and technology cooperation involving joint research and development with other countries (see Section 3).
The following efforts will be undertaken in line with the NDS, etc., to maintain and strengthen the ability of Japan’s defense industry to produce advanced equipment and ensure high operational rates.

(1) “Bill on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology bases”

The “Bill on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology bases” was submitted at the 211th Diet session to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense production and technology bases based on the current state of its defense industry (see Paragraph 1 of this Section). The Bill provides for (1) effective identification of risks by requiring companies to make efforts to respond to supply chain surveys; (2) fiscal measures and financial support for the efforts of companies to strengthen supply chains, enhance the efficiency of the manufacturing process, strengthen cybersecurity, ensure business succession, etc.; (3) support for changing the specifications and performance of defense equipment to facilitate equipment transfer; (4) outsourcing of the management and operation of manufacturing facilities, etc., owned by the Government to equipment manufacturers, etc., in the absence of other means even after adopting the measures described in (2) and (3); and (5) measures to protect the confidentiality of equipment contracts, etc.

(2) Other Efforts Besides the Bill

Besides the above Bill, a wide range of other efforts will be undertaken to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense production base.

(a) Building a Strong and Sustainable Defense Industry

In the interest of making the defense business more attractive, Japan will establish a robust policy for implementing measures aimed at eliminating factors that put pressure on corporate profits, including building a framework for applying the appropriate expense ratios based on the budget and nature of the business. A new profit margin calculation method that properly evaluates the defense industry’s cost management and quality control efforts has also been introduced.

Additionally, in equipment procurement, it is imperative to place greater emphasis on maintaining and reinforcing its domestic infrastructure and strive for technological, qualitative, and production-time improvements while ensuring predictability for companies. Therefore, it will continue to improve contracting methods by actively adopting proposal-based bidding and reviewing general competitive bidding in which only a single bid has been received over multiple years.

Furthermore, in order to revitalize the defense industry through promoting the entry of new suppliers, it is holding matching events for the defense industry as part of its efforts to promote the entry of new participants from small and medium enterprises, including startup companies.

(b) Responding to Various Risks

(i) Building resilient supply chains

In addition to conducting supply chain surveys based on the Bill and introducing fiscal measures and financial support aimed at mitigating the risks identified, Japan also aims to promote cooperation with other countries to build mutually complementary supply chains.

The “Security of Supply Arrangement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan” was signed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in January 2023. This Arrangement is a framework that seeks to ensure a stable mutual supply of industry resources (supplies and services, etc.) among the signatory countries and contribute to the establishment of a resilient and diversified supply chain for defense equipment.

(ii) Strengthening industrial security

For Japan’s defense industry to participate in international businesses, it is necessary to respond to increasing threats of cyber attacks. With the aim of strengthening information security measures, the MOD has developed the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense

REFERENCE: Development of the Defense Industrial Cybersecurity Standard

URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/cybersecurity.html

2 By the end of FY2022, the MOD has conducted supply chain surveys of 69 major defense equipment items.
Industry, new information security standards applicable to contractors handling the MOD’s “information to be protected” that includes control measures on par with the standards that U.S. Department of Defense contractors are obligated to meet. The standards came into effect in April 2023. In order to steadily implement the standards across the defense industry, measures will be taken to cover the cost of cybersecurity measures adopted by the defense industry and to develop a defense security gateway (cloud-based).

In addition, the “Defense Industrial Security Manual” will be created to consolidate the rules and regulations pertaining to defense industrial security in a centralized manner so as to further the industries to participate in defense procurement and to enhance the credibility of Japan’s information security to facilitate international transactions.

(iii) Strengthening the management of sensitive technologies and intellectual property

The MOD is working to prevent technology leakage through means such as conducting prompt and proper assessments of technological sensitivity based on the importance and superiority of the technologies for which the MOD is responsible. In order to prevent leakages of sensitive technologies, the MOD, in cooperation with related ministries and agencies, is promoting studies on countermeasures against reverse engineering, such as the blackboxing of technologies.

Through the application of more appropriate contract provisions regarding intellectual property, the MOD will accurately grasp intellectual property generated through R&D, etc., to promote the clarification of public or private belongings and prevention of leakages of key technologies to abroad. The ministry will also present options regarding the opening or closing of intellectual properties based on the characteristics of the technology and promotes appropriate management for each option.

In addition, the MOD will work with the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Office, and other related ministries and agencies to prevent leakages of technologies under the system of non-disclosure of selected patent applications, one of the economic security measures adopted by the Government.

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3 This refers to information that has been classified as “Sensitive” or “Restricted” or information that has been created using such information or which is analogous to such information, and which the MOD has designated as information that requires protection by companies.

4 A method of acquiring useful technical information by disassembling the equipment of other parties and analyzing its configuration and technology.

(c) Expanding Sales Channels for the Defense Industry

(i) Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

Leveraging the transfer of defense equipment and technology as a strategic tool for foreign and defense policy will contribute to strengthening the resiliency of the defense industry.

From this perspective, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems will be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In addition, the Government will take the lead in promoting the appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology under further cooperation between the public and private sectors by establishing a fund and allocating the necessary grants to adjust the specifications and performance for equipment and technology transfer to ensure suitability from the perspective of national security.

(ii) Further participation of Japan's defense industry in the sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment

With regard to imported procured equipment, including equipment procured through foreign military sales (FMS), Japan intends to pursue the sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment by Japanese companies and further promote international joint
Cooperation between the MOD and the industry is imperative to maintain and reinforce Japan’s technology and industrial bases that serve as the essential foundation for the production, operation, and sustainment and maintenance of equipment.

In this context, then Defense Minister Kono, the Commissioner of ATLA, and executives of the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) began exchanging opinions from October 2019 and discussed issues and improvement measures for the defense industry and defense equipment policy at the working level. In order to reinforce the defense production and technology bases, the MOD has conducted exchanges of views with the defense industry (major prime contractors) since February 2022 and brought together the Minister of Defense with the presidents of major prime contractors on two different occasions since April 2022. In addition, the MOD has continued to strengthen public-private cooperation and coordination through sharing problems and challenges that both sides have identified by holding a total of four exchanges of views between the Commissioner of ATLA and the heads of the defense divisions of various companies as well as a total of five working-level exchanges between the public and private sectors.

See Section 4-6 (Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement)
Japan’s defense production and technology bases are essential infrastructures for securing the stable research and development, production, and procurement of defense equipment in Japan and for incorporating the cutting-edge technologies necessary for new ways of warfare into this defense equipment, thus making these bases virtually equivalent to Japan’s defense capability itself.

In recent years, however, the environment surrounding defense production and technology bases has become more severe: companies are withdrawing from the defense industry one after another, weakening Japan’s domestic production system, while issues such as the aging of manufacturing facilities, supply chain risks, and the threat of cyber attacks are becoming more apparent.

The NDS approved by the Cabinet last December calls for a variety of initiatives to reinforce these bases, including the introduction of a new profit margin calculation method to ensure appropriate profits for the defense industry, research and development that will lead to early and fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, active utilization of advanced civilian technologies, and the promotion of defense equipment and technology transfers, including a review of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment Technology, its Implementation Guidelines and other systems.

In addition, as part of efforts to develop the necessary legislation for the enhancement of these bases, the Ministry of Defense (the MOD) submitted the “Bill on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases” (hereinafter, “this Bill”) at an ordinary Diet session in 2023.

In addition to clarifying the position of the defense industry, this Bill stipulates a survey of the supply chain for defense equipment, financial measures to reinforce the bases, measures to facilitate equipment transfers, measures to strengthen the protection of sensitive information on defense equipment, and measures for outsourcing of the management and operation of manufacturing facilities, etc. Owned by the Government, among other measures.

Through these efforts, the MOD will further reinforce Japan’s defense production and technology bases.
In order to acquire defense equipment required for the new ways of warfare, the use of our domestic technologies is extremely important. The development of scientific technologies and innovations based on the country’s advanced technological capabilities is at the source of Japan’s economic and social development and constitutes a key element of its comprehensive national power integral to its national security. In addition, the active utilization of Japan’s advanced technological capabilities developed by both its public and private sectors over the years in the area of national security without being held back by existing approaches is an essential activity for strengthening Japan’s architecture for national defense.

As competition among major countries intensifies in terms of conducting research on cutting-edge technologies and leveraging its results for applications in national security, each country has focused on reinforcing its technology base for the purpose of national security by investing heavily in R&D aimed at the early operationalization of technologies that could become so-called “game changers” which dramatically alter the future character of warfare.

Although Japan’s research and development expenditures for the MOD have trailed those of the United States and other countries, these expenditures have remained at the same level as the United Kingdom and grown significantly in recent years due to their importance. On the other hand, while the distinction between technologies developed for civilian use and for security purposes has become increasingly blurred in practice, it is important to work strategically to ensure technological superiority as a nation by actively leveraging the results of research and development in science and technology in Japan’s public and private sectors for the research and development of defense equipment. Therefore, it is necessary to further promote research and development domestically and develop and strengthen the technology base for the technology areas on which Japan should focus.
In the cases of defense equipment and technology cooperation, such as equipment procurement and international joint development, it is important to maintain the leading role by owning important cutting-edge technology and other important technologies. This requires not only research and development by the MOD, but also the promotion of research and development by both the public and private sectors together.

![Fig. IV-1-2-1 (Current Status of Research & Development Expenditure)](image)

2 Direction for Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

In the past, defense equipment, etc., has been typically created through research and development projects launched by the MOD itself, but with the rapid progress of cutting-edge science and technology, it has been difficult to distinguish between defense and civilian technologies. As such rapid progress in science and technology fundamentally alters the paradigm of security, it is important to bring together the advanced technological capabilities of Japan’s public and private sectors and utilize them broadly and actively in the area of national security without being held back by conventional approaches. Therefore, Japan will further reinforce its defense technology base by also focusing on research and development conducted outside the MOD and taking steps to identify, nurture, and leverage promising cutting-edge technologies for the early development of equipment, etc.

- Identification of promising technologies
  In order to identify cutting-edge technologies, the MOD is engaged in efforts to collect and analyze information on technologies on a routine basis and, through the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security (see 4-2), widely seek research projects from universities, research institutes, and startup companies to discover innovative and emergent technologies with the potential to be utilized for future defense applications. In addition, since cooperation with startup companies and research institutes in Japan is essential for identifying cutting-edge civilian technologies and actively leveraging the results in the area of national security, we will encourage the broad participation of leading researchers, including those from academia while obtaining the necessary understanding and cooperation from the relevant parties.

  Through the Advanced Technology Bridging Research (see 4-2), the MOD is promoting efforts aimed at identifying and nurturing promising cutting-edge technologies at an early stage and applying them to the research and development of equipment, etc., by raising the level of technological maturity.

- Measures aimed at early deployment
  In order to expedite the research and development of equipment and achieve early deployment, the MOD is engaged in “Efforts to Facilitate the Early Practical Use of Game-Changers” (see 4-2) as an initiative to improve cutting-edge technologies to the point where they can be used in the research and development of equipment.

3 Initiatives for Research and Development

1 Strengthening the Research and Development System

In recent years, civilian technologies have made remarkable progress, and it is thought that these advanced technologies could alter the future of warfare. The U.S., China and other countries are competing with one another to invest heavily in nurturing civilian technologies, which will likely result in not only economic competitiveness but also advantages in terms of security. In addition, technologies, particularly cutting-edge technologies, have the potential to be utilized across a variety of fields. For these reasons, based on the concept of “dual use” in the sense of civilian technology that can be used for defense purposes, it can be said that it is gradually becoming more difficult to divide technologies into defense use or civilian use and segment civilian technologies that can also be used for defense applications under the concept of “dual use,” which has been the conventional line of thought. The world is moving into an era in which all

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1 Technologies that can be used for both civilian and defense purposes
advanced civilian technologies can be used for security purposes, including defense, and should be regarded as such. By focusing on the technologies that our nation possesses across a wide range of fields and by advancing and utilizing these technologies, Japan will be able to create superior defense equipment.

In order to fundamentally reinforce its capabilities to incorporate cutting-edge civilian technologies and produce innovative equipment that will revolutionize future ways of warfare, Japan will establish a new research institute in ATLA in FY2024 or after and expand the infrastructure for studying and promoting the utilization of cutting-edge technologies in an integrated manner that takes into account policy, operational, and technical aspects.

In order to establish a technology think tank function in ATLA, an activity unit comprising the Agency’s researchers (technical officers in research positions) and front-line private-sector researchers (special research officers) with expertise in cutting-edge technologies was established in April 2021. The main mission of this function is to study and analyze technologies that will be important for the future defense of Japan and to devise new ways of warfare and game-changers. This function serves to promote new initiatives based on collaboration between the public and private sectors, in which technical officers in research positions match future ways of warfare to the technologies required to achieve them, and special research officers study and provide advice on these technologies.

2 Shortening Research and Development

As technological progress is about to fundamentally alter the paradigm of security, major states have endeavored to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge technologies. The MOD is also working to greatly shorten research and development periods by focusing research on promising technological fields and streamlining the research and development process in order to ensure technological superiority in strategically important equipment and technology fields, such as technologies in new domains and potentially game-changing cutting-edge technologies such as AI.

Specifically, the MOD has been making efforts to greatly shorten the research and development periods of Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles intended for the defense of remote islands, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) with convertible mission modules, stand-off electronic warfare aircraft, and other equipment through the use of initiatives such as a block approach, in which the research and development of equipment is conducted step by step, and modularization. In addition, the MOD is working to improve efficiency in testing and evaluation for research and development into future submarines by utilizing test-bed submarines that are type-modified versions of existing submarines. New technologies such as AI and lasers are the subject of demonstrations by ATLA to enable users to imagine how these technologies will be used, while a concrete image of future equipment is being developed by collecting information on their technical feasibility from private companies and other parties at an early stage and fully analyzing the information.

In addition, the introduction of the so-called “agile” method, a new research and development method in which prototypes are quickly deployed to units with improvements to achieve a higher degree of completion being made as operational feedback is received, will dramatically shorten research and development periods.

3 Development of the Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft

For the defense of Japan, it is vital that Japan continues to employ superior, state-of-the-art fighters which can ensure air superiority well into the future. In that sense, as the F-2 fighter is scheduled to begin its retirement around 2035, it is imperative that the next-generation fighter aircraft be developed in a Japan-led manner; ensuring freedom of modification for timely and appropriate upgrades in the future and securing domestic production and technology bases for high readiness. It is also a
Securing “air superiority” is a prerequisite for executing various operations for the defense of a country. That is why countries are competing to develop and procure superior fighter aircraft, including through international joint development.

To this end, the Ministry of Defense (the MOD) has initiated a Japan-led development of the next-generation fighter aircraft in 2020 with the possibility of international cooperation in sight, pursuing potential joint development with the United Kingdom and Italy.

The next-generation fighter aircraft represent the culmination of cutting-edge technology, capable of advanced network-centric warfare never before seen in fighter aircraft beyond the so-called 5th generation fighters. Besides the advantages of sharing development costs, joint development of this aircraft will also allow fundamental strengthening of security and defense cooperation among the participating nations. It guarantees cooperation for many generations to come, considering that the fighters remain in operation for several decades after development. Beyond defense field, this program is also expected to have a broad ripple effect on society as a whole such as developing the next generation of internationally active engineers.

In light of its significance, it is no exaggeration to say that the joint development of this next-generation fighter aircraft with the United Kingdom and Italy, countries that share the same values as Japan, will become a cornerstone for global stability and prosperity linking the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Reflecting this concept, the program was named the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) and was publicly announced in a joint statement by the leaders of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy at the end of last year.

Half a year passed since the start of the joint development program, and the engineers and operators from the three governments and companies are enthusiastically engaged in discussions—in Tokyo and Komaki, in London and Warton, and in Rome and Turin—with the goal of developing the next-generation fighter aircraft by 2035, while looking to ensure the freedom of modifications for the future and the further advancement of domestic defense production and technology bases. Moreover, the first ever meeting among the Japanese, U.K., and Italian defense ministers was held in Tokyo in March this year.

The remaining time before reaching the 2035 milestone of deploying the first aircraft, when the F-2 is expected to retire, may seem plenty but that is not necessarily the case in the context of fighter development. To meet this schedule, the three countries will need to overcome a variety of challenges. The MOD is determined to bring together the best team from public and private entities across Japan in order to ensure the success of this major program, keeping in mind that no matter what challenges lie ahead, “the airplane takes off against the wind.”
Deputy Director, Project Management Division (Aircraft), Department of Project Management, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency
TAKEUCHI Wakano, Defense Official

As the security environment intensifies, the Ministry of Defense (the MOD) must also change its approach. This Japan-U.K.-Italy cooperation program is one of the MOD’s new, unprecedented initiatives. The GCAP carries the dreams of thousands of people involved in the project, including administrative officials such as myself, technical officials managing the project from an engineering perspective, ASDF operators, and industry staff who design and manufacture the aircraft. I will continue my work, looking forward to the day when this fighter aircraft takes off.

precondition that the fighter maintains its capability to effectively counter numerically superior opponents. To realize this intention, the MOD concluded a FY2020 project contract with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. in October 2020 for the company to become the prime contractor in charge of holistic integration of the fighter, and the development has begun.

Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy then conducted a joint analysis on the extent of commonality of the aircraft, and on the basis of the results, the three nations agreed to develop a common platform. This joint development program was officially announced by the leaders of the three nations as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)\(^2\) in December 2022. The program enables the three nations to jointly develop an advanced fighter aircraft which ensures future air superiority by bringing together technological advantages and sharing costs and risks. This cooperation will not only encourage further cooperation among the industries of each country but also maintain and reinforce Japan’s defense industrial and technology bases by increasing the number of mass-produced next-generation fighter aircraft, nurturing the next generation of engineers with international experience, and introducing advanced development and manufacturing methods such as digital design.

Furthermore, this cooperation between the three countries, which share fundamental values and are allies of the United States, will serve as the foundation for broader cooperation with the United Kingdom and Italy for generations to come and contribute significantly to
the peace and stability in both the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. In December of the same year, the United States also announced that it supports Japan’s security and defense cooperation with likeminded allies and partners, including with the United Kingdom and Italy on the trilateral joint development. Japan and the United States have also agreed to launch a concrete collaboration by the end of 2023 on autonomous systems such as UAVs that could complement Japan’s next fighter program among other platforms.

### 4 Active Utilization of Civilian Technology

#### 1 Strengthening Technology Cooperation with Relevant Domestic and Overseas Entities and Collaboration with Relevant Ministries and Agencies

ATLA and domestic research institutions such as national research and development agencies proactively engage in research collaborations and technological information exchanges in order to ensure that advanced civilian technologies are incorporated and that research and development is conducted efficiently.

Domestically, in order to create superior defense equipment through the utilization of cutting-edge technologies and conduct research and development efficiently and effectively, the MOD has been collaborating closely with the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (CSTI) and other relevant ministries and agencies on a regular basis based on the Integrated Innovation Strategy 2022 (Cabinet Decision on June 3, 2022). The ministry also actively participates in the Council for Integrated Innovation Strategy Promotion established to promote the strategy in order to further enhance collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, national research and development agencies, industry, universities, and other parties.

#### 4 Utilization of Cutting-Edge Technologies

In order to secure technological superiority in the future and realize advanced capabilities ahead of other countries, it is imperative for Japan to conduct research and development that incorporates a wide range of advanced civilian technologies and invest heavily in technologies that can be directly linked to defense applications, aiming to acquire technologies at an early stage.

For example, Japan has embarked on research and development of cutting-edge technologies with the potential to become game-changers, including combat support UAVs that harness AI, high power microwave (HPM) irradiation technology capable of countering multiple drones, high-energy lasers and railguns capable of responding to airborne threats more swiftly and at a lower cost, as well as equipment that takes advantage of unmanned and labor-saving operations, such as unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV), etc.
and development, and it is important for the entire Government to work together based on this strategy. Specifically, the Government will intensively offer strong support for cutting-edge technology with multiple applications, such as AI and quantum technology, through programs, such as the Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program (K-Program). The research and development results obtained will smoothly reinforce security-related areas. Furthermore, a framework will be established to expedite the development of technologies with the potential to contribute to the reinforcement of defense capabilities by matching the research and development needs of the MOD with the research and development projects conducted by the relevant ministries and agencies.

Outside Japan, the MOD will continue to actively promote technological and engineer exchanges with allies and like-minded countries, as well as consider diverse possibilities through continued exchange of opinions at various opportunities.

**2 Identifying and Developing Innovative Technologies and Their Seeds**

The MOD implemented a competitive research funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” to publicly seek and commission basic research in target areas, which is expected to contribute to future research and development in defense areas. A total of 142 research projects have been awarded as of FY2022. This program will continue to promote the discovery and development of innovative and emergent technologies in FY2023 as well.

In the basic research areas, free thinking of researchers leads to innovative and creative results. For this reason, it is necessary to assign maximum value to freedom of research when sponsoring research, so that, for example, researchers will be able to publish all of their research results to have a wide range of academic discussions. Hence, in this program, the MOD will not intervene in research, restrict contractors’ publication of research results, or designate research results as confidential, never providing any confidential data to researchers. In actuality, some research results have already been published through oral presentations, publications, etc.

Active utilization of advanced civilian technology through such programs is not only essential for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals into the future but is also beneficial for the development of Japan’s science, technology, and innovation in non-defense areas as well, similar to how investment in innovative technology by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States facilitated advances in science and technology as a whole, including civilian technology such as the development of the Internet and GPS. From this perspective, the MOD intends to promote relevant measures and strives to raise awareness of this program that contributes to ensuring the freedom of study and its sound development.

Advanced Technology Bridging Research was launched in FY2020 to expedite the identification and development of promising, advanced technologies from the results of basic research under the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security and other sources, enhance their level of technological maturity, and apply them to the research and development of equipment. Advanced Technology Bridging Research will be conducted with a vastly expanded scope in FY2023 with the aim of helping to develop equipment that will become game-changers in the future.

In addition, in order to accelerate the research and development of equipment, the MOD launched its “Efforts to Facilitate the Early Practical Use of Game-Changers” starting in FY2022 as an initiative to commission private companies to conduct research and improve their advanced technologies to the point where they can be used in the research and development of equipment.

**3 New Measures for Early Deployment**

A new framework will be established for programs that are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective in areas that could directly affect the SDF’s current and future ways of warfare so that they can be deployed in five years and achieve full-scale operation in approximately ten years.
Fig. IV–1–2–3

FY2022 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Title</th>
<th>Brief Summary</th>
<th>Representative Institution for the Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study on graphene resonant mass sensor for detection of viruses in aerosol particles</td>
<td>In this study, we conducted fundamental research on a highly sensitive resonant mass sensor using DNA aptamer –functionalyzed suspended graphene, which can detect virus contaminants in bioaerosols in the air, leading to visualization of viruses in the environment.</td>
<td>Toyo Roshi University of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Research on the Dissimilar Materials Bonding for the Airframe Structure of Near-Future-Aircrafts</td>
<td>The objective of this study is to realize a reliable dissimilar material bonding structure by investigating the bonding mechanism at the adhesive interface, exploring the mechanism by which adhesive strength takes effect/loss, establishing inspection techniques in an environment that simulates actual operation, and verifying the durability of the dissimilar adhesive bonding.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated development of new infrared luminescence materials by fusion of data science and single particle diagnostic technique</td>
<td>In order to realize new high brightness and broadband light sources suitable for optical sensing technologies, this research aims to develop innovative phosphor materials by combining the single-particle diagnostic, data science and smart laboratory technologies.</td>
<td>RIKEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of space lasers for satellite motion control using laser propulsion method</td>
<td>In this study, we develop a picosecond laser and a femtosecond laser that are available in space towards the altitude control of satellites and the removal of space debris using the laser propulsion, which is generated by laser ablation and optimized through various experimental irradiation conditions, in a short amount of time.</td>
<td>National Institute for Quantum Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of biological effects using microfluidic chips</td>
<td>In this research, we develop a biophotonics platform built on high-speed microfluidics, which allows monitoring the cell environment in high precision.</td>
<td>Coalta Electric Co., Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Position Estimation Method by Image Analysis for Underwater Autonomous Navigation System</td>
<td>In this research, a non-acoustic position estimation for autonomous underwater vehicles combining two methods is proposed: Motion Estimation from the Structure from Motion (SIM) and Relative self-motion Estimation from Image (RIE) using Artificial Intelligence (AI) to process image feature values by image maps. The proposed method will be established, implemented, and validated for accuracy.</td>
<td>OSEA Consultants, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental research for electromagnetic pulse protective (EMP) elements and their systematics with both high-speed response and low break down voltage for high-speed microelectronics</td>
<td>The target of this research is to develop non-ohmic elements with low parallel capacitance and low break down voltage in the circuits, aiming at electromagnetic pulse (EMP) protection for high-speed digital microelectronics. In addition, this research includes technical demonstration at simple mounting circuit and simulation at several use cases for practical implementation.</td>
<td>SoftBank Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and development of optical tracking technology for realizing laser communication for underwater vehicles</td>
<td>We will develop an “innovative brain dynamics imaging method” that visualizes whole-brain neural population activity, including deep brain activity, with high temporal and spatial resolution in a non-invasive way. To realize this innovation technology, we will develop a ME-SEEG current source estimation method that utilizes a whole-brain network dynamic model.</td>
<td>National Institute of Earth Science and Disaster Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation of the charge/discharge mechanism of a high-performance lithium-ion battery for vehicles</td>
<td>This research aims to achieve both high strength/ductility and low magnetic hysteresis in soft magnetic materials through optimization of magnetic properties localized at lattice defects such as dislocations, as well as real-space imaging of such localized magnetism.</td>
<td>Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiphysics Simulation of Laser Powder Bed Fusion</td>
<td>This research aims to achieve both high strength/ductility and low magnetic hysteresis in soft magnetic materials through optimization of magnetic properties localized at lattice defects such as dislocations, as well as real-space imaging of such localized magnetism.</td>
<td>National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on quantum cascade devices with wavelength and spatial selectivity</td>
<td>We are developing the surface-emitting quantum cascade lasers and surface-receiving quantum cascade detectors using photonic crystals that control the wavelength and propagation of light. We will realize the combined operation of the two devices to achieve high brightness and high-sensitivity mid-infrared detection.</td>
<td>Toshiba Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Performance Textured Piezoelectric Ceramic for Undersea Communication and Sensing</td>
<td>In this research, we will challenge the orientation of PZT-based (PbZrO3-PbTiO3) piezoelectric ceramic materials and lead-free piezoelectric ceramic materials that can be driven with high power for application to underwater acoustic transducers. This will lead to smaller size and higher acoustic performance of the transducers used for underwater wireless acoustic communication and sensing.</td>
<td>NEC Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New methods of estimating sea water temperature and salinity</td>
<td>This research aims to establish a data assimilation and data prediction method that efficiently uses new area sea-surface observation data for simulation and dramatically improves the accuracy of initial value determination by using a new machine learning method for estimating sea water temperature and salinity profile.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic research on high-frequency devices using innovative Sic heterojunction technology</td>
<td>In this research, based on the silicon carbide (SiC) heterojunction technology newly developed by AIST, high electron mobility transistors (HEMTs) for next-generation high-speed communications will be fabricated to elucidate the factors governing the properties of the two-dimensional electron gas at the junction interface in the atomic level. We also aim to deploy this junction technology to large diameter wafers and demonstrate the operation of SiC-HEMTs.</td>
<td>National Institute of Materials Science (NIMS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of portable solid-state quantum light sources for wireless quantum communication system</td>
<td>We will develop high-performance quantum light sources, which are useful for the next-generation quantum communication technology. With the use of semiconductor quantum dots, we will develop a portable quantum light source, which will open new doors without the need of a massive cryostat.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of mass production process for high heat resistant continuous zirconia fibers as reinforcement for CMC</td>
<td>This research focuses on rechargeable batteries using organic cathode materials which can contribute to considerable weight reduction compared to currently commercialized lithium-ion batteries. The objective of the research is to elucidate charge-discharge mechanism and achieve superior performance both in cycle life and high specific energy. One of the applications of the battery to be developed is an unmanned aircraft capable of prolonged flight durations.</td>
<td>SoftBank Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground monitoring using optical fiber DAS</td>
<td>Aiming to improve the accuracy of the ground risk assessment method for sedimentary plains where large cities are located, an analysis method that combines optical fiber Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) with microtremor survey and seismic interferometry will be developed.</td>
<td>National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligent brain dynamics imaging using the brain network model</td>
<td>We will develop an “innovative brain dynamics imaging method” that visualizes whole-brain neural population activity, including deep brain activity, with high temporal and spatial resolution in a non-invasive way. To realize this innovation technology, we will develop a ME-SEEG current source estimation method that utilizes a whole-brain network dynamic model.</td>
<td>National Institute for Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP), National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on the improvement of heat resistance and air tightness of seal systems applied to aerospace vehicles</td>
<td>This research aims to realize a reliable dissimilar material bonding structure by investigating the bonding mechanism at the adhesive interface, exploring the mechanism by which adhesive strength takes effect/loss, establishing inspection techniques in an environment that simulates actual operation, and verifying the durability of the dissimilar adhesive bonding.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Study of Multi-mode Coaxial Thruster for Small Satellites</td>
<td>To achieve the size, weight, and cost reduction of in-space propulsion systems, basic research of a novel thruster enabling both modes of high-thrust operation and high-specific impulse operation is conducted.</td>
<td>Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design of defect magnetism for safety-critical soft magnets</td>
<td>This research aims to achieve both high strength/stability and low magnetic hysteresis in soft magnetic materials through optimization of magnetic properties localized at lattice defects such as dislocations, as well as real-space imaging of such localized magnetism.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visualization of spin-polarized Dirac electrons and spin diffusion length in graphene</td>
<td>This research aims to achieve both high strength/stability and low magnetic hysteresis in soft magnetic materials through optimization of magnetic properties localized at lattice defects such as dislocations, as well as real-space imaging of such localized magnetism.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on innovative image processing technology applicable to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)</td>
<td>In this study, we aim to generate and develop a new image processing algorithm that automatically and reliably detect marine vessels, etc., those are too dark to be distinguished by humans, from optical images captured by satellites at night. As a result, it enables Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) regardless of the time of day or night.</td>
<td>Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D of fish robot that swims with fins with EHD pumps</td>
<td>Imus will develop the prototype of a fish robot with a silent and energy-saving swimming system which is suitable for various purposes such as ocean research, rescue work for maritime accidents, and marine defense. The main tasks for the fish robot R&amp;D are to develop the EHD actuator for practical use and to develop the oscillating fin propulsion mechanism.</td>
<td>Mius company limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
State-of-the-art technologies such as artificial intelligence and next-generation information and communication technologies are rapidly developing. These technologies are believed to potentially transform the future of warfare. In order to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, it is imperative to operationalize equipment that incorporate such technologies as soon as possible.

Therefore, it is more important than ever for Japan to actively leverage cutting-edge technologies for promptly operationalizing equipment through proposals from defense-related companies and others, as well as through close collaboration with start-up companies, domestic research institutions, and academia.

The MOD is currently undertaking an enterprise for promptly operationalizing equipment incorporating state-of-the-art technologies on a trial basis under a cross-ministry team of policy officials, equipment operators, and researchers. Based on the newly formulated NDS and DBP, the MOD will further enhance the effectiveness of our effort while accelerating the utilization of state-of-the-art technologies.
Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense technology and industrial bases, as well as to the promotion of our national security, peace and international cooperation.

Based on the previous NSS, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology\(^1\) and their Implementation Guidelines were formulated in April 2014 as clear principles adapted to the new security environment. Under the principles, the MOD will contribute to peace and international cooperation more than ever, while actively promoting measures necessary for maintaining the peace and stability of the region and firmly defending Japan through active defense cooperation with the United States, which is Japan’s ally, and other countries.

The promotion of overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology has also been outlined in the Three Documents. It describes that such transfer is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force.

From this perspective, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems will be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In doing so, the necessity, requirements, and transparency of related procedures for the transfer of defense equipment and technology will be adequately considered while maintaining the Three Principles themselves. In addition, to smoothly promote such transfers, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology through joint public and private efforts by implementing measures, including establishing a fund to provide grants as necessary to adjust the specifications and performance in order to transfer appropriate equipment and technology from the perspective of national security.

Since the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology was formulated in 2014, Japan has conducted international joint research, etc., mainly with the United States, but also with the United Kingdom, Australia, and other developed countries, having the high technological levels and industrial competitiveness in the civilian goods manufacturing field as a backdrop, in addition to the transfer of finished products. Japan has also received inquiries from other countries regarding the transfer of equipment such as naval vessels, aircraft, radars.

\(^1\) The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers play a role in contributing to peace and international cooperation, as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that technology is also provided in addition to goods, the term “transfer” was adopted rather than “export.”
to (1) cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, (2) cases that contribute to the security of Japan, or other cases. For these cases, the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. In addition, it has been decided that important cases would be deliberated at the National Security Council and along with this, information concerning the cases that were deliberated would be disclosed.

2 In December 2018, the number of F-35A fighter aircraft to be procured was changed from 42 to 147, of which 42 can be replaced by fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL).

(3) Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-Purpose Use or Transfer to Third-Party Countries (the Third Principle)

Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige the government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate for the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, cases involving participation in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases where parts are delivered to a licenser, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of the control system at the destination.

Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

1 Joint Research and Development, etc.

Since 1992, Japan has implemented 25 joint research projects and one joint development project with the United States. At present, five joint research projects ((1) Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures, (2) High-Temperature Case Technologies, (3) Next Generation Amphibious Technologies, (4) Mission Partner Gateway eXtended, and (5) Modular Hybrid Electric Vehicle System) are in implementation. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in September 2022, the two countries agreed to start studying the possibility of a Japan-U.S. joint research project on counter-hypersonic technologies at the level of elemental technology and component based on the progress of their joint analysis, with the study currently expedited mainly by the MOD, ATLA, and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

In December 2022, Japan and the United States reached an agreement to launch a concrete collaboration by the end of 2023 on autonomous systems capabilities such as UAVs that could complement Japan’s next fighter program among other platforms.

2 In December 2018, the number of F-35A fighter aircraft to be procured was changed from 42 to 147, of which 42 can be replaced by fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL).
manufacturing process in preparation for the acquisition of F-35A fighter aircraft from FY2013 onwards. So far, the Japanese companies have participated in Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) for the airframe and engines, and the manufacture of related parts.

In light of the severe financial conditions, the MOD decided in principle that it would resort to importing completed aircraft for procurement in FY2019 and after, but this would be reviewed if less expensive means were available. Subsequently, however, as a result of cost reduction efforts by the manufacturers and others, it was confirmed that FACO by domestic companies would make the price lower than importing completed aircraft. For this reason, for procurements from FY2019 to FY2027, the MOD has decided to procure F-35A fighters for which domestic companies performed FACO.\(^3\)

In addition, as F-35 fighter aircraft are operated worldwide, the U.S. Government decided to establish maintenance depot (regional MRO&U Capability) mainly for airframes and engines in the North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific regions.

The regional MRO&U in the Asia-Pacific region for Japan’s F-35 fighter airframes selected by the U.S. Government in December 2014 began operations at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Komaki South Plant located in Aichi Prefecture from July 2020. Moreover, with regard to the regional MRO&U Capability for engines, the U.S. Government announced its decision in December 2014 that initial capability will be provided by Australia by early 2018, with Japan providing additional capability at least 3-5 years later,\(^4\) and preparations to begin operations are currently underway.

The participation in the production of F-35 fighters by Japanese industries continuously, the establishment of maintenance depots for airframes, engines and others within Japan, and the contribution to maintenance in the Asia-Pacific region not only maintain, cultivate, and reinforce Japan’s defense production and technology bases but are also significant from the perspectives of securing the operational support system for F-35A fighter aircraft in Japan, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening equipment cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

\(\text{(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of the Common Maintenance Base for Ospreys of Japan and the U.S.}\)

In October 2015, Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.\(^5\) was selected as the maintenance company for the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys deployed at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. From February 2017, the PMI has been performed at GSDF Camp Kisarazu, with the maintenance of five aircraft completed as of the end of March 2023 and four aircraft currently under maintenance.

The MOD intends to establish a common maintenance base for both Japan’s and the United States’ Ospreys by allowing the maintenance company to use the hangar at GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys and to carry out future aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Ospreys (V-22) at the same camp in view of the (1) smooth introduction of the V-22,\(^6\) (2) smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements; and (3) enhanced efficiency in maintenance. The establishment of a common maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu would be extremely significant in that it will contribute to mitigating the burden on Okinawa as well as to the “strengthening of the infrastructure for the repair and maintenance of common equipment” stated in the Japan-U.S. Guidelines.

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3 In December 2019, December 2020, December 2021, and December 2022, it was decided to opt for manufacturing arrangements involving domestic companies for F-35A fighter aircraft procurements in FY2019 and FY2020, FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023 through FY2027, respectively, as such arrangements were confirmed to be more cost-effective.

4 The regional MRO&U for engines in Japan is planned to be located at IHI Corporation (Mizuho Aero-Engine Works in Tokyo).

5 The company was renamed SUBARU Corporation on April 1, 2017.

6 The GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. As a temporary measure until the completion of maintenance facilities in Saga Airport, the aircraft will be temporarily deployed at Camp Kisarazu.
Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Other Countries, etc.

Considering that cooperation in defense equipment is an initiative that spans more than half a century from its conception to retirement, Japan will strengthen initiatives for equipment and technology cooperation, including overseas transfer of defense equipment and international joint development, and strive to enhance its partners’ military capabilities and strengthen mid- and long-term relationships with those countries. In particular, Japan will effectively promote these initiatives by combining them with other efforts, such as defense cooperation and exchanges, training and exercises, and capacity building. In this regard, Japan will consider transferring equipment that has reached a considerable number of years in service and has limited expandability to like-minded countries through early decommissioning or early removal from service.

See Fig. IV-1-3-1 (Main Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Other Countries) (image); Reference 40 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements)

(1) Australia

With Australia, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology went into effect in December 2014.

In November of the same year, the Arrangement concerning the Placement of Scientists and Engineer Personnel was signed, creating the framework for the cooperation of scientists and engineers. Based on this framework, Japan began dispatching its scientists and engineers to the Defence Science and Technology Group
the Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation six times so far. The countries have held the Joint Working Group on Defence cooperation including dual use technologies, both equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries, including the second Japan-India Defence Industry Forum, which was held in Bengaluru in February 2019.

(3) United Kingdom
With the United Kingdom, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology was signed and went into effect in July 2013. The Japan-U.K. High-Level Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation Steering Panel held its first meeting in July 2014 and has held regular meetings since then.

In July 2013, the two countries also launched the Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project, which was the first time Japan had engaged in such bilateral research with a country other than the United States. The Cooperative Research was completed successfully in July 2017, with three other research projects having been launched and completed successfully as well. The Japan-U.K. Cooperative Research Project on the Demonstration of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile and a new Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project were launched in December 2018 and in July 2021, respectively. The Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile and a new Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project were launched in December 2018 and in July 2021, respectively. The Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile and a new Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project were launched in December 2018 and in July 2021, respectively. The Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile and a new Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project were launched in December 2018 and in July 2021, respectively. The Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile and a new Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project were launched in December 2018 and in July 2021, respectively. The Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile and a new Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project were launched in December 2018 and in July 2021, respectively.

Japan demonstrated its technical capability through the participation of the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft at the Avalon International Airshow held in Australia in February 2023.

The third meeting of the Japan-Australia Steering Committee for Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation was held in May 2022, following the previous meetings in October 2017 and June 2019. At the meeting, the participants deepened discussions on measures for the further promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation between the countries in an effort to move ahead with the cooperation.

Furthermore, in November 2021, the first Australia-Japan Space and Cyber Symposium was held to deepen mutual understanding on the countries’ respective industries and defense equipment technologies, particularly in the fields of space and cyberspace.

(2) India
Japan has considered defense equipment and technology cooperation with India an important field of cooperation based on the special strategic global partnership between Japan and India. At the Japan-India summit meeting in December 2015, both countries signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which went into effect in March 2016.

To form the case of defense equipment and technology cooperation including dual use technologies, both countries have held the Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation six times so far. The Cooperative Research on the Visual SLAM Based GNSS Augmentation Technology for UGV Robotics was launched by Japan and India in July 2018.

Progress has been made in discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries, including the second Japan-India Defence Industry Forum, which was held in Bengaluru in February 2019.

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respectively, in January 2014, and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology\textsuperscript{13} between the two countries went into effect in December 2016. Moreover, at the Fourth Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) held in January 2018, the two countries confirmed their intention to expeditiously begin cooperation on the Feasibility Study for Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities, with the cooperative research on this front initiated in June of the same year.

ATLA also set up a booth and exhibited at Eurosatory 2022 in June 2022.

**ATLA Booth at Eurosatory 2022**

**Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (2) (France)**

**(5) Germany**

The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology\textsuperscript{14} was signed between Japan and Germany and went into effect in July 2017.

**Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (3) (Germany)**

**Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (4) Italy**

**(6) Italy**

With Italy, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology\textsuperscript{15} went into effect in April 2019. In January 2019, the two countries held the “Japan-Italy Defense Industry Forum” in Europe for the first time, and established a framework for director-level meetings on defense equipment and technology cooperation.

With regard to the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy have agreed to develop a common platform. The leaders of the three nations have announced it as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), and a trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting was held in March 2023.

**Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-6 (2) (Sweden)**

**(7) Sweden**

The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology\textsuperscript{16} was signed between Japan and Sweden and went into effect in December 2022.

**Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-7(1) (Ukraine); Reference 64 (Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)**

**(8) Ukraine**

In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 and based on the request of the Ukrainian Government to provide equipment, etc., the MOD partially revised the Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology at the meeting of the National Security Council on March 8, 2022, in order to provide non-lethal supplies within the scope of the Three Principles in accordance with the Self-Defense Forces Law, and provided the Ukrainian Government with bulletproof vests, helmets, winter battle dress uniforms, tents, cameras, hygiene products and medical supplies, emergency rations, binoculars, lighting devices, personal equipment, protective masks, protective clothing and small drones from March 2022 via SDF aircraft and other means. Additional civilian vehicles (vans), etc. were also provided based on the request of the Ukrainian Government. Furthermore, at the Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting in May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida conveyed to President Zelenskyy that Japan would newly provide around 100 SDF vehicles such as trucks and approximately 30,000 emergency rations to Ukraine based on the latter’s request.

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\textsuperscript{13} Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

\textsuperscript{14} Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

\textsuperscript{15} Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Italian Republic concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

\textsuperscript{16} Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
Handover Ceremony of SDF vehicles to Ukraine

(9) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Countries

Japan and ASEAN member states have exchanged views regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security, through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions. Participating countries have expressed their expectation for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these issues. In the “Vientiane Vision” announced by Japan at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in November 2016, it was stated that Japan’s defense equipment and technology cooperation with ASEAN countries would be promoted with a focus on the following three points: (1) equipment and technology transfer, (2) human resources development, and (3) holding seminars on defense industries.

In terms of the specific initiatives implemented, Japan and Indonesia held the second Japan-Indonesia “2+2” in Tokyo in March 2021. The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology was signed by both countries and went into effect immediately.

Japan and Vietnam signed the Terms of Reference (TOR) for regular consultations concerning defense equipment and technology cooperation at the Japan-Vietnam Defense Vice-Ministerial Level Meeting in November 2016. Concerning the specific fields of cooperation, the Memorandum between Japan and Vietnam Defense Authorities on the Orientation of Promotion of Defense Industry Cooperation was signed during the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting in May 2019. Following this, during then Minister of Defense Kishi’s visit to Vietnam in September 2021, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology\(^\text{18}\) was signed by both countries and went into effect.

In December 2022, ATLA set up a booth and exhibited at the Vietnam International Defense Exhibition 2022, and the Japan-Vietnam Defense Industry Forum was held.

With Singapore, the two countries agreed at the Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting in June 2022 to start negotiations for the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

With the Philippines, after the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology between Japan and the Philippines went into effect in April 2016, a total of five training aircraft (TC-90) of the MSDF were delivered to the Philippine Navy by March 2018, with pilot training support provided by the MSDF and maintenance and repair assistance provided by a Japanese company. In addition, parts and maintenance equipment of utility helicopters (UH-1H) that became unnecessary for the GSDF were also delivered to the Philippine Air Force by September 2019. These two transfers are cases of applying the provision of the SDF Law that went into effect in June 2017 that enables the MOD to grant or transfer equipment no longer needed by the SDF (see Paragraph 2 below).

Further, in January 2019, a framework was established for regular consultations of the Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation.

In August 2020, a contract was concluded between

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the Department of National Defense of the Philippines and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Inc., which would supply four air surveillance radar systems for approximately US$100 million. This was the first case of an overseas transfer of finished equipment since the 2014 establishment of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. The fixed radar was manufactured in Japan and exported to the Philippines in November 2022. The necessary work for delivery will be carried out going forward. In addition, the ASDF has also provided technical education for personnel of the Philippine Air Force.

In November 2017, Japan and Thailand agreed to promote future defense equipment and technology cooperation, including the early conclusion of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, and this was signed and went into effect on Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to Thailand in May 2022.  

With Malaysia, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology was signed and went into effect in April 2018.

(10) Middle Eastern Countries
The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology was signed between Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in May 2023, marking the first of such agreement with a Middle Eastern nation.

Israel and Japan signed a Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technology in September 2019 to ensure the appropriate protection of such classified information provided between Japanese and Israeli defense authorities.

With regard to Jordan, Japan loaned a retired GSDF Type-61 main battle tank without charge to Jordan in 2019, while an armored vehicle developed in Jordan was donated to the GSDF by Jordan. In response to this exchange, a ceremony was held at the MOD, where a memorandum of understanding was signed and exchanged. The GSDF Type-61 main battle tank loaned to Jordan was then unveiled at the Jordan Royal Tank Museum along with the installation of an explanatory panel.

Surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment, it has become even more important for Japan that the nations which have a cooperative and friendly relationship with Japan in terms of security and defense have appropriate capabilities. It is also critical to develop a foundation that will serve as the basis for the international community to cooperate towards improving the security environment.

Among these friendly nations, some have difficulties in acquiring an adequate level of defense equipment on their own because of the scale of their economy and fiscal situation. Some of these states have been requesting to use SDF equipment that is no longer in use.

Under these circumstances, to respond to the needs of such friendly nations, the MOD established a special provision under Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act in the SDF Act, which came into force in June 2017. The provision enables the MOD to grant or transfer SDF equipment that is no longer in use to the governments of developing states at a lower price than the current price.

REFERENCE: Training support accompanying the transfer of warning and control radars

19 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
20 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Malaysia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology
23 Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act (Act No. 34 of 1947) states that governmental assets, unless otherwise provided for, may not be exchanged and used as other means of payment, or transferred or leased without reasonable consideration.
Even in the case of granting or transferring equipment at a lower price than the current price as per this provision, whether or not to transfer such equipment, and to which government such equipment is to be transferred, will be determined case-by-case in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and other regulations. In addition, the Government of Japan and partner countries must conclude an international agreement to prevent extra-purpose use and transfer to third-parties without the prior consent of Japan.

4 Adapting Defense Equipment for External Use

With regard to aircraft, since there is much in the technology base shared between the defense and civilian sectors, taking measures to contribute to the revitalization of the civilian sector will contribute to maintaining and activating the industrial base of Japanese aircraft, as well as to maintaining and reinforcing the defense industrial base of Japan. It is from this perspective that the MOD has been considering the civilian use of aircraft that it has developed.

So far, it has compiled guidelines on designing a system for the civilian use of defense equipment and established an application system for companies interested in such use. In response to applications from companies, it has disclosed technical data on the F7-10 engine of the P-1 patrol aircraft and on the US-2 search and rescue amphibious aircraft for the purpose of civilian use. ATLA and IHI Corporation, a company that manufactures the F7-10 engine, signed a contract in 2016 as the first instance of civilian use of the F7-10 engine for sales to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). The engine was delivered to JAXA in 2019.

Considering there have been inquiries about equipment other than aircraft from foreign governments since the establishment of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the term was changed from “Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use” to “Adapting Defense Equipment for External Use,” for which rules of procedure were established in 2018. In 2019, technical data, etc., for adapting defense equipment for external use concerning the automatic flight control computer processing unit and ship landing assist system of the SH-60K (upgraded capability) were disclosed in response to applications from companies.

5 Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions

ATLA participates in international defense equipment exhibitions to introduce Japan’s defense equipment policies and advanced technology. These initiatives help foreign government officials to better understand Japan’s equipment policies and technology, and contribute to building bases for the promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation.

In light of the fact that international joint development and production of equipment has become mainstream, Japan’s exhibition at Eurosatory 2022 focused on creating a broader appeal through its superior technological capabilities at the component level, including the components of radars and combat vehicles. This concept was created based on the idea of actively pursuing cooperation not only through the transfer of finished products but also through the supply of components and parts.

In addition, at the VIETNAM DEFENSE EXPO 2022, Japan’s superior technological capabilities which
is exemplified by its ship machinery, etc., was widely disseminated through static displays on maritime domain, transportation, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief/maritime domain awareness. On the domestic front, DSEI Japan 2023 was held in March 2023, and information about Japan’s initiatives aimed at fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities and strengthening international cooperation as described in the NDS was disseminated along with a display of an actual utility helicopter (UH-2), hands-on activities such as a decontamination VR theater and the tasting of combat rations, and exhibits on the joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft by Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy.

6 Public-Private Collaboration for Appropriate Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment

With regard to the overseas transfer of defense equipment, the DBP states that the Government will take the lead in promoting the appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology under further cooperation between the public and private sectors. In cooperation with trading companies and manufacturing companies, ATLA has conducted Feasibility Studies to grasp the potential needs of target countries and carried out activities for proposals since FY2020.

The ATLA has held the Defense Industry Forum, in which defense authorities and companies from both countries meet to exchange views on the overseas transfer of defense equipment between Japan and the partner country, with six countries so far: Indonesia (held in August 2017), India, Vietnam, Australia, Italy, and the Philippines.

As part of the ATLA’s efforts to enhance knowledge within the public and private sectors regarding overseas transfers to other countries, it holds webinars on the overseas transfer of defense equipment in Japan to create opportunities for learning about cases from the private business sector involving other countries and the current status of defense equipment and technology cooperation. Besides holding webinars of India, Vietnam, and Malaysia since its first webinar in December 2020, the MOD also held a webinar in October 2022 for learning about systems and experiences of equipment exporters in the western countries which has extensive experience in the export of equipment.

Additionally, the ATLA developed a portal site in March 2022 designed to provide a platform for sharing information on the overseas transfer of defense equipment between the public and private sectors, which has long been requested by the defense industry. The portal site provides information on countries’ procurement systems and Japan’s defense equipment transfer system for defense-related companies that are working on overseas transfers.

7 Preventing Leakage of Key Technologies for Defense Equipment

In promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation internationally, the MOD will work to strengthen industrial security and the management of sensitive technologies and intellectual property in order to prevent the leakage of key technologies for defense equipment.

REFERENCE: Guides and promotional videos (in English) disseminated overseas by ATLA to promote defense equipment and technology cooperation
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/en/policy/defense_equipment.html#guides_and_movies
Section 4 Equipment Optimization Efforts

1 Initiatives for Construction of Optimized Equipment Structure

In order to acquire sufficient capabilities for cross-domain operations in view of the aging population with a declining birth rate and the severe fiscal situation, it is essential to further promote initiatives to optimize equipment structure.

The DBP stipulates the suspension of use of equipment whose importance has decreased and the review of projects with low cost-effectiveness. In particular, with regard to the GSDF, in order to optimize the air structure, the air units of divisions and brigades will be abolished with some exceptions, and helicopter functions will be concentrated in each district unit. In addition, the functions of the AH-1S anti-tank helicopter, AH-64D combat helicopter, and OH-1 observation helicopter will be transferred to utility/attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and reconnaissance UAVs, and the use of these helicopters will be discontinued. In doing so, the minimum functions necessary for the defense of remote islands and for countering guerillas and special forces will be maintained by arming existing helicopters, etc.

The MSDF will review the number of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) to acquire in conjunction with the acquisition of long-endurance UAVs to enhance offshore surveillance capabilities over a wider sea area. The MSDF will also revise the number of patrol helicopters (SH-60K (upgraded version)) to procure due to a review of the shipboard requirements, including installation of fighter aircraft (F-35B) on Izumo-class destroyers. In addition, the use of multi-purpose aircraft (U-36A) will be discontinued since its training support will be outsourced to private companies.

With regard to the ASDF, in order to optimize aircraft types, the use of the search and rescue aircraft (U-125A) and other aircraft tasked with initial response will be discontinued with the introduction of a new type of emergency locator transmitter that can easily locate survivors.

2 Initiatives to Make the Most of Limited Human Resources (Labor-Saving and Automation)

In view of the severe security environment surrounding Japan and the rapid development of the aging population with a declining birth rate, it is important to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost. Based on the DBP, Japan will robustly promote automation, labor-saving, and optimization to account for its aging population with a declining birth rate.

The DBP calls for reviewing existing equipment systems and personnel assignments in order to promote unmanned and labor-saving defense equipment. Regarding the acquisition of technologies related to unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), etc., research will be conducted on technologies such as UUV-UUV control to enhance operational capabilities in the underwater domain. Research will also be conducted on operational support technology to control multiple unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) from a manned vehicle, autonomous driving technology, etc., along with research and development on combat support unmanned aircraft that will be collaborating with manned aircraft such as the next-generation fighter aircraft.
2 Initiatives for Labor Saving

The DBP stipulates increasing the number of labor-saving frigates (FFM)\(^1\) at an early date, as well as the continuation of research on technologies related to underwater surface vehicles (USV) in order to further reduce personnel and achieve unmanned waterborne vessels.

3 Project Management throughout Equipment Life Cycle

1 Acquisition of Defense Equipment through Focused Project Management

As defense equipment is becoming more sophisticated and complex, its entire life cycle (concept study, research and development, mass production, deployment, operation and maintenance) cost has a tendency to increase in recent years. It has become extremely important to streamline acquisition throughout the life cycle of equipment and to establish a systematic management to realize the streamlining in order to efficiently acquire equipment of assured quality at appropriate cost in a required timeline as planned. Therefore, since the establishment of ATLA in October 2015, the Department of Project Management...

REFERENCE: Project management
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/soubiseisaku_project.html

\(^1\) New destroyers that combine improved multi-mission capabilities with compact hulls
in ATLA undertakes project management throughout the life cycle of equipment upon selecting important equipment, and promotes efforts to realize the optimized equipment acquisition.

Specifically, the MOD has selected 22 items for major programs designated for project management and 13 items for semi-major programs for project management as of the end of March 2023. For major programs designated for project management, the MOD designates a Project Manager (PM) dedicated to each specific major program, following which project management for that program is conducted by an Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is composed of officials from relevant divisions within the MOD.

For each of the 35 major and semi-major programs designated for project management as of the end of March 2023, the MOD has formulated an Acquisition Strategy and an Acquisition Plan (hereinafter referred to as “Designated Item Plans”), which specify the basic matters necessary to systematically implement project management until the present, such as the purpose of the acquisition program, acquisition policy, and life cycle cost.

Furthermore, in principle, ATLA annually reviews the implementation status of the Designated Item Plans and endeavors to promote appropriate project management that reflects the latest status by conducting analysis and evaluation, on the basis of which the Designated Item Plans are reviewed as necessary. In March 2023, analysis and evaluation of the acquisition program were implemented for the 35 major and semi-major programs which had been designated for project management.

### 2 Initiatives to Promote and Strengthen Project Management

#### (1) Past Initiatives

The following initiatives have been implemented to promote and strengthen project management.

**a. Cost and Schedule Management Using WBS**

For certain kinds of equipment, etc., produced in Japan, the MOD promotes the introduction of a management method to visualize the progress of work and cost generated by component (Work Breakdown Structure (WBS))\(^2\). Since April 2020, efforts have been made for the public and private sectors to jointly manage costs and schedules through the use of an incentivized risk-sharing management contract system, which allows for the early detection of cost increases and schedule delays and for action to be taken promptly (see 4-3).

**b. Method for More Accurate Cost Estimate**

Life cycle cost has been estimated based on actual cost data of similar equipment developed or introduced in the past. However, as a larger amount of cost data is needed for a more accurate estimate, the MOD promotes the establishment of a cost database by collecting cost data and accumulating them into a database.

**c. Accumulation and Development of Expertise**

For further improving the management skills of PMs and enhancing human resources among those who engage in project management, the MOD provides opportunities to study project management methods from overseas and the private sector on a regular basis.

#### (2) Future Initiatives

In order to further promote effective and efficient equipment acquisition, the MOD needs to enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of project management throughout equipment life cycles. Therefore, the DBP stipulates that further efforts for effective and efficient acquisition of equipment will include cost reduction through planned and stable acquisition of equipment by expanding the application of long-term contracts, improving the predictability of companies and promoting efficient production, procurement in consideration of the supply-demand situation of equipment including that of other countries, and narrowing down the SDF’s own unique specifications that cause costs to rise.

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\(^2\) A semi-major program is an acquisition project of a specific equipment with a limited application of project management without the designation of a PM or IPT but which focuses on the risks in functions, performance, costs, schedules, and other risk factors in a manner equivalent to the case of equipment of major programs designated for project management.

\(^3\) WBS is a hierarchical structure used to implement project management that systematically divides the project into manageable units, for which the schedule and cost of each deliverable (component, service, etc.) are allocated.
Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters

1 Reviewing Acquisition Systems

In order to promptly respond to changes in the surroundings, the MOD has been reviewing acquisition systems through meetings of the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007 and the Contract Systems Study Group comprising experts since 2010. Since FY2016, a special research officer system has been adopted to properly implement the review results in practice.

2 Long-Term Contracts, etc.

The production of defense equipment requires a significant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain amount is to be procured in bulk, a contract for more than five years is needed in many cases. With regard to defense equipment and services, economies of scale tend not to work mainly due to the following reasons: (1) the MOD is the only customer; and (2) companies that provide such defense equipment, etc., are limited. In addition, it is difficult for companies to systematically move forward with their businesses with a high degree of predictability, a trait that is peculiar to the defense industry.

For these reasons, although the period of expenditure for acts that incur national debt is limited to five years in principle under the Public Finance Act, this period has been extended to a maximum of ten years for specific equipment through the enactment of the Long-term Contract Act. The introduction of this change regarding long-term contracts will make stable procurement possible, leading to the realization of the systematic improvement of defense capability. At the same time, for companies, given that the procurement amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel and equipment, as well as cost reductions due to bulk orders, will be made possible.

3 Measures to Lower Procurement Costs and Incentivize Companies to Reduce Cost

With regard to the procurement of defense equipment, the cost is tending to increase because a large variety of equipment has no market price. Based on those characteristics, it is necessary to achieve both the reduction of procurement cost and improvement of companies’ incentives to reduce cost simultaneously.

In order to achieve this, ATLA has applied the incentivized risk-sharing management contract system to the next-generation fighter aircraft project and the stand-off electronic warfare aircraft project since April 2020, under which the public and private sectors jointly manage the performance and progress of the contract and the cost, with a view to implementing prompt and efficient procurement and enhancing predictability for companies.

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4 This is a system of conducting research that contributes to the procurement system of defense equipment by inviting experts, such as associate professors from universities specializing in the areas of concern, on a part-time basis to effectively review the procurement system based not only on the viewpoints of MOD personnel involved in actual operations but also on theories proposed in the fields of business administration and economics.

5 “Economies of scale” refer to the cost advantage that arises from an increased output of a product. For example, the cost per unit can be reduced with the bulk purchase of materials.

6 “Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specific Defense Procurement” (enacted in April 2015. An act for its partial revision to extend the effective period by five years was enacted in March 2019.)

7 Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative
of its scope of application and other approaches to encouraging such efforts are constantly being considered.

5 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement and Other Related Initiatives

1 Effective and Efficient Maintenance and Replenishment

With regard to periodic maintenance of defense equipment, the MOD has been working to improve efficiency by extending the maintenance interval, after making sufficient efforts to ensure safety. Moreover, the MOD is working to expand umbrella contracts such as Performance Based Logistics (PBL) with a view to improving the operational availability of equipment and keeping long-term costs under control.

2 Achieving Further Efficiency in the Acquisition of Defense Equipment

In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high performance equipment, along with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, the MOD/SDF will efficiently secure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capability. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment lifecycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. In addition, by incorporating advanced civilian technologies, the MOD/SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment for areas that could directly affect the SDF’s current and future ways of warfare and are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective.

*(Reference)* Examples of FMS procurement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
<th>Fiscal Year, Budget (Yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-35A</td>
<td>Lockheed Martin</td>
<td>FY2023: 106.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-35B</td>
<td>Lockheed Martin</td>
<td>FY2023: 143.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-15 capabilities improvement</td>
<td>Boeing</td>
<td>FY2023: 113.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-2D</td>
<td>Northrop Grumman</td>
<td>FY2023: 194.1 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. IV-1-4-2 Trends in Amount Budgeted for Equipment, etc. Acquired through FMS (Contract Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen)

- 2018 budget
- 2019 budget
- 2020 budget
- 2021 budget
- 2022 budget
- 2023 budget

Major equipment acquired through FMS

 Gazelle

 [Ground Self-Defense Force]
 V-22 Osprey

 [Maritime Self-Defense Force]
 SM-6
 SM-3 Block IB
 SM-3 Block IIA
 Tomahawk

 [Air Self-Defense Force]
 F-15 capabilities improvement
 F-35A
 F-35B
 AIM-120 (air-to-air missile)
 KC-46A (aerial refueling/transport aircraft)
 E-2D (airborne early warning aircraft)
 Global Hawk

* The amount of FMS
3 Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency

The MOD implements measures for making contracts more appropriate and strengthening checking functions to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials.

As part of its efforts to achieve more appropriate public procurement across the whole government, the MOD continues to carry out the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system and make bidding procedures more efficient. In addition to these, based on the lessons learned from past incidents such as overcharging and falsification of the results of equipment testing by defense-related companies, measures such as strengthening system investigation, reviewing penalties, and ensuring the effectiveness of supervision and inspection have been steadily implemented to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. Through these measures, the MOD strives to prevent the recurrence of misconduct, enhance fairness and transparency, and ensure proper contracting.

In addition, ATLA carries out multilayered checks on the contracts it administers through both internal and external checking systems and checks and balances within the organization. Specifically, ATLA will further enhance internal inspections by the Inspection and Audit Department as well as defense inspections conducted by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance and deliberations by the Defense Procurement Council, which is composed of external experts. Moreover, ATLA has also improved its education department and strives to enhance compliance awareness by providing thorough education pertaining to compliance for ATLA personnel.

6 Advancing Initiatives Aimed at Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement

FMS is a form of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), etc., that enables U.S. allies and partners to purchase defense equipment and services from the U.S. government. The characteristics of FMS include: (1) prices are estimates, (2) payments are made in advance in principle and balanced out after fulfillment, and (3) delivery dates are estimates. FMS is critical to reinforcing the defense capabilities of Japan.

Meanwhile, there are FMS-related various issues, such as late delivery and late case closure. As the FMS procurement amount is hovering at a high level in recent years, the governments of Japan and the U.S. have been actively working together to make improvements in these issues.

Specifically, ATLA and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) have held the Security Cooperation Consultative Meeting (SCCM) to discuss the issues over FMS procurement seven times since 2016.

At the 7th SCCM held in January 2023, Japan and the U.S. agreed to continue strengthening case management between them in terms of late delivery and late case closure in view of the increase of FMS procurement going forward, and to advance efforts aimed at reducing the number of late delivery and late case closure while improving the transparency in pricing.

In addition, in April 2023, ATLA and the U.S. Department of Defense concluded a framework to confirm reciprocal and free-of-charge quality assurance services for defense products, etc. This framework waives quality assurance fee for FMS procurement, which reduces FMS procurement costs and strengthens collaborative relations within Japan-U.S. Alliance in procurement, thereby advancing the effectiveness of FMS procurement.

8 Unlike the automatic bid system, which focuses only on price, this is a system in which the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of both the price and other elements. This method is adopted when it is appropriate to evaluate technological elements, etc.
Section 5 Initiatives for Economic Security

1 Basic Concept

Economic security is to ensure Japan’s national interests, such as peace, security, and economic prosperity, by carrying out economic measures. In the face of various threats imposed through economic means, Japan needs to comprehensively, effectively, and intensively execute necessary economic measures to enhance Japan’s autonomy and to secure the superiority and indispensability concerning our technologies and others. Such concept of economic security has been newly included in the NSS.

2 Developments within the Japanese Government

To date, Japan has promoted a wide range of initiatives that contribute to strengthening economic security within its existing legal framework, including strengthening measures based on the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act.

In May 2022, the Act for the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures was established to comprehensively and effectively promote economic measures related to ensuring national security. The act developed frameworks for strengthening the resiliency of supply chains, ensuring the safety and reliability of critical infrastructure, public-private collaboration on important cutting-edge technologies, and non-disclosure of selected patent applications. The Act partially came into effect in August 2022, and in April 2023, the Director-General for Economic Security was established in the Cabinet Office based on the Act.

At the same time, the Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program (hereinafter “K Program”) was established in FY2021. Led by the Cabinet Secretariat and the Cabinet Office, other relevant ministries and agencies join, K program implements research and development projects on advanced technologies, including AI, quantum technology, and others, to meet the country’s needs. The results of the research are intended not only for civilian use but also for public use, including for national security. In 2022, the Research and Development Vision (First Round) was decided. It defines the key technologies, based on which R&D proposals were solicited in turn. In addition, an expert panel was established in February 2023 and has discussed ways to strengthen Japan’s information security, including security clearances. In addition to these measures, various measures related to economic security will be consistently considered and reviewed. In particular, the government will continuously assess the risks that exist in each industry, and implement other necessary security measures in a whole-of-government manner.

3 Initiatives of the MOD

As inter-state competition intensifies in domains that cross the border between security and the economy, it is extremely important to enhance Japan’s autonomy and safeguard Japan’s superiority and indispensability through economic security measures, such as preserving and fostering advanced technologies, as well as maintaining and reinforcing Japan’s defense production and technology bases as a virtually integral part of defense capability in accordance with the NDS.

The MOD, as the government agency in charge of security, actively participates in government-wide initiatives by sharing its knowledge and needs related to maintaining and reinforcing Japan’s defense production and technology bases, which has been amassed over the

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1 The provisions of the Act have come into effect in stages, started with the General Provisions, Framework for Ensuring Stable Supply of Key Products, and Framework for Enhancing Development of Advanced Critical Technologies and on August 1, 2022.
years. Specifically, in addition to dispatching personnel to the Office of the Director-General for Economic Security in the Cabinet Office, the MOD contributes to resolve economic security challenges by fundamentally strengthening its internal systems, including the expansion of its staff, to proactively offer its knowledge and needs related to security to government-wide initiatives, such as the K Program, technology information control, and the screening of foreign investment.

See Part I, Chapter 4, Section 1-6 (Trends concerning Economic Security)
Reinforcing Human Resource Base

The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. The MOD/SDF will reinforce the human resource base to create an environment that enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride.

In light of the severe recruitment environment of SDF personnel, the changes taking place across the entire society, such as trends in the private-sector labor market and changing attitudes toward working styles, need to be taken into consideration when considering measures to reinforce the human resource base of the SDF. Given these circumstances, an “Expert Panel on Reinforcing the Human Resource Base of the MOD/SDF” consisting of experts from outside the MOD was established in February 2023 under the purview of the Minister of Defense, and deliberations are currently underway. The panel has held two meetings as of March 31, 2023.

1 Enhancing Recruitment Efforts

1 Recruitment

In order for the MOD/SDF to execute their various missions properly, it is vital to stably secure excellent human resources even in the severe recruiting environment with a decreasing number of people eligible for recruitment due to a declining birth rate. For this reason, it is necessary to recruit those with a strong desire to join the SDF by sufficiently explaining to potential applicants the missions, roles, and duties of the SDF.

The Provincial Cooperation Offices based in 50 locations throughout Japan recruit and employ SDF personnel, etc., attentively and perseveringly with the cooperation of obtaining local governments, schools, recruitment counselors, and others. Moreover, local governments carry out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel.
personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, including announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, with the MOD bearing the requisite cost. At the same time, the MOD is strengthening collaboration with local governments to ensure necessary cooperation including information provision on recruitment targets, which is indispensable for smooth administrative activities regarding the recruitment.

In addition, MOD/SDF is making efforts to reduce the burden on individuals taking examinations by making part of the recruitment examination for general candidates for enlistment (Upper) and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel online from FY2022.

2 Employment

(1) Uniformed SDF Personnel

Based on a voluntary system that respects individuals’ free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories. The upper age limit for the recruitment of general candidates for enlistment (Upper) and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel was raised in 2018 from “under 27” to “under 33” in order to secure diverse human resources from a broader range, including people with work experience in private companies.

In addition, the SDF scholarship student system\(^1\) will be expanded in order to secure qualified human resources at an early stage based on the DBP.

Furthermore, in terms of utilizing human resources from the private sector, efforts have been made to strengthen mid-career recruitment, including recruiting individuals with national qualifications and licenses for specialized skills as publicly recruited officers and recruiting more former SDF personnel who had previously departed the SDF mid-career. In addition, a new SDF personnel system that allows for flexible working styles is under consideration in order to incorporate human resources

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\(^{1}\) A system aimed at securing human resources in academic fields such as science and engineering by providing university students who intend to serve in the SDF in the future with a monthly loan of a fixed amount (¥4,000 yen/month).
Among the employees of the MOD, special national government employees are called “SDF personnel,” including administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others.

SDF personnel are designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law.

Personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees due to the need to maintain the SDF’s strength. With consideration given to the knowledge, experience, physical strength, and other factors necessary to perform the duties of the respective ranks, the SDF has an “Early Retirement System” where the majority of uniformed personnel retire in their mid-50s and a “Fixed-Term System” where one term lasts two or three years.

(2) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel

There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel—administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others—in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD/SDF. Civilian personnel are mainly recruited from those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Comprehensive and General Service National Public Employees conducted by the National Personnel Authority (NPA) and those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Ministry of Defense Specialists conducted by the MOD.

Administrative officials are engaged in defense-
related policy planning in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA); analysis and evaluation at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH); and administrative works at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country.

Technical and engineering officials are engaged in policy planning related to defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.) and physical infrastructure such as defense equipment at the Internal Bureaus of the MOD and ATLA; analysis and evaluation at the DIH; and constructing various defense facilities, carrying out research and development, efficient procurement, maintenance and development of a range of equipment, providing mental health care for SDF personnel, and other duties at SDF bases, Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations nationwide.

Instructors conduct advanced research on defense and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, and other organizations.

In response to the “Directive for Organization and Allocation of Personnel Expenses in FY2023 to Proceed with the Core Issues of the Cabinet Office” (decision by the Prime Minister on July 29, 2022), which stated “strengthening diplomacy, national security, and economic security,” the MOD has increased the number of defense officials.

It is essential to secure the required number of uniformed SDF personnel promptly depending on situational changes in the event of a crisis. To secure the required number promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains the following three systems: the SDF Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and the Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel system.4

SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel upon the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders, and carry out logistical support and base guard duties. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel and are assigned to carry out their mission together with active-duty uniformed SDF personnel as part of frontline units following the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders. Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, some of whom are recruited among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training. Also, since the system was established in FY2001, the technical categories for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel have been gradually expanded, with system protection personnel (cyberspace) and nursery teachers added to the list in FY2022.

Since SDF Reserve Personnel and others are engaged in their respective jobs under normal circumstances, the understanding and cooperation of the companies that employ these personnel are essential for them to attend regular training, etc.

For this purpose, the MOD provides a special subsidy to the companies that employ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and take necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days a year, by taking into consideration the burden on such companies.

Moreover, in order to secure their understanding and cooperation regarding the duties of SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, employers are provided with a subsidy in the event that (1) SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel respond to a defense operation call-up order, civil protection dispatch call-up order, or disaster relief call-up order, etc., or if (2) they have no choice but to leave their regular occupations due to injuries during their duties, etc.

In addition, a special subsidy for companies that cooperate with the training of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel is paid to companies that employ individuals who, after being Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training as SDF Reserve Personnel, and which take the necessary...

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4 Many other countries also have reserve personnel systems.
In a disaster relief mission against COVID-19 in 2020, 10 SDF Reserve Personnel with medical qualifications such as doctors and nurses were called up and engaged in activities such as medical support at SDF hospitals and other facilities.

Based on the DBP, the roles to be played by SDF Reserve Personnel and others will be reviewed so that they can effectively supplement regular SDF personnel amidst the changing operational environment and diversifying missions of the SDF. Upon doing so, the MOD/SDF will expand the recruitment of civilians with no experience in the SDF and review the current system in light of age limits, training periods, and other issues. In view of this, the upper age limit for the continued appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel who possess certain skills was abolished in March 2023 on a trial basis.

Also, the MOD is promoting the use of SDF Reserve Personnel in a wide range of fields, such as the appointment of retired SDF pilots who are re-employed in the private sector through the re-employment system as SDF Reserve Personnel.

### Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDF Reserve Personnel</th>
<th>SDF Ready Reserve Personnel</th>
<th>Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic concept</strong></td>
<td>Serving as SDF Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability</td>
<td>Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel in the GSDF or MSDF upon completion of education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eligibility</strong></td>
<td>Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel</td>
<td>Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>Leading pilots and lower SDF Reserve Personnel: 18 to under 55 years old</td>
<td>Leading pilots and lower SDF Reserve Personnel: 18 to under 55 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted: Under the age of two years added to respective retirement age</td>
<td>Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of three years added to respective retirement age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td>Employed by screening, based on application</td>
<td>Employed by screening, based on application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rank designation</strong></td>
<td>Former SDF Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle</td>
<td>Former SDF Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former SDF Reserve Personnel and Former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle</td>
<td>Former SDF Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former SDF Reserve Personnel</td>
<td>Not designated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Term of service</strong></td>
<td>Three Years/One term</td>
<td>Three Years/One term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td>Although the Self-Defense Forces Law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year as a standard</td>
<td>30 days per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promotion</strong></td>
<td>Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)</td>
<td>Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefits, allowances, and other terms</strong></td>
<td>Training Call-up Allowance: ¥6,100/day*</td>
<td>Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400-14,200/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month</td>
<td>Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* The Training Call-up Allowance of ¥8,300/day supports the training of SDF Reserve Personnel who are former candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel in order for them to become SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special subsidy for companies cooperating with training of SDF Reserve Personnel</strong></td>
<td>Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥560,000/personnel</td>
<td>Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Provided when an SDF Reserve Personnel who is a former candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as an SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Call-up duty and other duties</strong></td>
<td>Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up</td>
<td>Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment, civil protection call-up</strong></td>
<td>Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up</td>
<td>Education and training call-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REFERENCE:** Overview of systems related to SDF reserve personnel

**URL:** [https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/reserve/](https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/reserve/)
MIYAMAE Kazuyuki, Ready Reserve Leading Private, 101st Ammunition Battalion, JSDF Western Army Logistic Support Troop

After completing my term of service in the Self-Defense Forces (the SDF) in 2020, I started working for TC Japan. Yet even after leaving the SDF, I wanted to continue directly helping people in need in times of disaster, so I volunteered to become a member of the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.

Because my job is national in scope and requires me to travel often, it can be difficult for me to participate in training because of my schedule. With the cooperation and agreement of my colleagues, however, the company has made arrangements to enable me to participate. When I participate in training and see the ex-colleagues with whom I had undergone tough training in the past, I am instantly transported back to those days, and it fills me with great nostalgia and joy. I was able to overcome the tough training during my time in service thanks to those fellows. From them, I learned the importance of valuing others, and I still keep that feeling with me today. I think the reason I can openly express my gratitude to my superiors and colleagues at the company has a lot to do with the fact that I am an SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.

I would like to continue being an SDF Ready Reserve Personnel in order to maintain the physical and mental strength and principles that I gained in the SDF.

ABE Makoto, Representative Director, TC Japan

TC Japan was established in Oita City, Oita Prefecture, and owns Daiei No. 88, which is one of the Japan’s largest advanced and state-of-the-art piling vessels, among other equipment. We operate in a wide range of fields, including offshore and general civil engineering, and aim to be a company that can contribute to the community and society through a variety of businesses.

Currently, we have two SDF Ready Reserve Personnel in the company who completed their term of service as uniformed SDF personnel and entered the workforce as “new SDF graduates.” During their time in the SDF, they acquired basic social skills required for members of the workforce, such as discipline, responsibility, ability to execute, and teamwork, and became immediate assets to our team. Currently, they belong to the company’s offshore civil engineering division. Although they sometimes spend long periods of time across Japan, the company pays for their return home from training. With the cooperation of their colleagues, including the sharing of their tasks, our company will provide as much backup to them as possible. We intend to keep contributing to society through the employment of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.
3. Measures to Achieve Effective Use of Human Resources, etc.

1. Effective Use of Human Resources

With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the authorized number of SDF personnel has been on a decline. On the other hand, there has been the need for more skilled personnel and personnel with expertise in order to respond to the sophistication of equipment as well as the diversification and internationalization of SDF missions.

In light of such circumstances, the mandatory early retirement age of SDF personnel was raised by one year after 2020 in order to ensure further utilization of older human resources with rich knowledge, skills, and experience. Based on the DBP, the retirement ages of personnel from the rank of Ichii (Captain (Ground Self-Defense Force [GSDF], Air Self-Defense Force [ASDF])/Lieutenant (Maritime Self-Defense Force [MSDF])) to Isso (Master Sergeant (GSDF, ASDF)/Petty Officer 1st Class (MSDF)) will be raised by one year in 2023, while the retirement ages of personnel from the rank of Issa (Colonel (GSDF, ASDF)/Captain (MSDF)) to Sansa (Major (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Commander (MSDF)) as well as those from the ranks of Niso (Sergeant First Class (GSDF)/Technical Sergeant (ASDF)/Petty Officer 2nd Class (MSDF)) to Sanso (Sergeant (GSDF)/Staff Sergeant (ASDF)/Petty Officer 3rd Class (MSDF)) will be raised by one year from 2024 onward. In addition, in order to further promote the reappointment of retired SDF Personnel (after their retirement age but before reaching the age of 65) in 2023, a portion of vessel crew operations and aircraft piloting tasks were made available to reappointed personnel.

At the same time, the MOD/SDF is creating a support system for AI application through the outsourcing of advisory functions regarding matters such as the promotion of AI application, etc., while building a necessary environment for AI application by educating MOD/SDF personnel with outsourced courses, etc., with the aim of promoting manpower saving and automation.

In addition, a crew system of rotating shift duty among multiple teams of crew has been introduced on some vessels in order to ensure an adequate operating ratio with a limited number of personnel.

![Fig. IV-2-1-4 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Designation</th>
<th>Mandatory Retirement Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sho, 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)</td>
<td>Shoho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)</td>
<td>Issa, 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)</td>
<td>Nisa, 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sansa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)</td>
<td>Ichii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Nii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)</td>
<td>Juni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Socho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Isso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Niso, 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sansa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Bros (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Leading Bros (ASDF)</td>
<td>Shicho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Private Second Class (ASDF)</td>
<td>Ishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private (GSDF), Seamen Apprentice (MSDF), Armored Third Class (ASDF)</td>
<td>Ishi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes) 1 The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ASDF Chief of Staff, is 62.
2 The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, musician, military police officer, or information analyst, is 60.

2. Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among MOD Personnel

The suicide counts among MOD personnel was 79 in FY2022. The fact that MOD personnel have lost their precious lives to suicide is truly tragic for the families of the deceased. It is also a huge loss to the organization.

![Fig. IV-2-1-5 (Changes in the Number of Suicide Deaths among MOD Personnel)](image)
4 Improving Living and Working Environments

1 Initiatives to Improve Living and Work Environments

The NDS calls for the continued improvement of the living and work environments to enable all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride. Specifically, to ensure readiness, the SDF will expedite its acquisition and renewal of the necessary barracks and housing and promote measures against aging and earthquake proofing of SDF facilities. Additionally, it will work to steadily renew worn-out living-related and work equipment and secure the requisite amount of daily consumables.

In addition, in order to improve the education, living, and work environments for female SDF personnel, women’s quarters will be set up in buildings and on vessels and submarines, while women’s restrooms and bathrooms will be built or renovated at training areas and other locations.

2 Initiatives to Support Families

In addition to exchanges between units and personnel’s families, as well as between the families, the MOD in cooperation with relevant external groups and organizations is also actively working to develop a family support system to be implemented in the event of large-scale natural disasters and other events, which will include receiving cooperation in confirming the safety of
the family members of SDF personnel.

In addition, the MOD is promoting various types of support measures for the families of SDF personnel. For units dispatched overseas or to vessels for operations expected to continue for an extended period of time, the MOD has been creating a communication environment that allows the personnel and their families to get in direct contact. Moreover, for units dispatched overseas, the MOD has been implementing a range of support measures for the families of the personnel, including supporting additional shipments of comfort items sent from families to SDF personnel on dispatch, holding briefing sessions and establishing consultation desks (family support centers) for families, and creating a website for the families of SDF personnel.

5 Human Resource Development

Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential for the execution of the units’ duties. For this purpose, the respective SDF training units and schools provide opportunities for phased and systematic education according to ranks and duties to nurture necessary qualities and instill knowledge and skills.

In addition, based on the DBP, the GSDF High Technical School will transform into a combined school of each SDF service as well as into a coeducational school. MOD/ SDF will strengthen education on joint operations of each SDF service as well as education and research including the cyber domain in each SDF service and at the National Defense Academy. At the same time, MOD/SDF will promote integration of educational programs and promote utilization of state-of-the-art technologies.

Furthermore, education requires considerable human, time, and economic commitment, including securing instructors with special skills as well as improving equipment and educational facilities. In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or that it is difficult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, the MOD/SDF commissions education to external institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic companies and research institutes.

6 Improvement of Treatment and Re-employment Support

1 Improvement of Treatment

Because SDF personnel execute their missions in a challenging environment, efforts have been made to improve their treatment based on the special nature of their missions and work environments. In FY2022, the scope of allowances paid to SDF personnel who carry out dangerous transport missions using helicopters and provide emergency life-saving treatment under challenging circumstances was expanded, while measures were adopted to alleviate the burden on personnel on long-term duties. In FY2023, allowances will be newly paid to radar site personnel who perform warning and surveillance duties under harsh working conditions.

The DBP stipulates that, through conducting surveys on overtime work performed by SDF personnel, etc., the treatment of SDF personnel will be improved in light of not only the special nature of their missions and work environment but also the increase in the number of new missions. It also calls for reviewing the future salaries of SDF personnel by studying the salary systems of military personnel in other countries.

In addition, a survey on the working hours of SDF personnel has been conducted since April 2023. At the same time, to ensure that SDF personnel can execute their missions with high morale and pride, measures related to honors and privileges, including the appropriate commendation of achievements, will be promoted.

2 Commemorating Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty

Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950, SDF personnel have endeavored to complete their noble missions to protect the peace and independence of Japan with a strong sense of responsibility, regardless
of danger. During this time period, however, more than 2,000 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty.

In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out by the respective units to which SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty belonged in order to express condolences. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the personnel who perished in the line of duty and to express the deepest respect and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the Memorial Service for members of SDF personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister. Achievements of 35 SDF members (16 GSDF, 15 MSDF, and 4 ASDF members) who lost their lives in the line of duty were recognized in a Memorial Service in FY2022.7

### 3 Dealing with Retirement and Re-employment of SDF Personnel and Related Matters

In order to maintain the SDF’s strength, most uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s, while fixed-term uniformed SDF personnel retire in their 20s or mid-30s. For many uniformed SDF personnel, re-employment is essential to safeguard their livelihood. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to provide re-employment support for active uniformed SDF personnel in order to relieve their anxiety about the future and allow them to devote themselves to their duties.

The DBP also states that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of uniformed SDF personnel after their retirement. It also calls for the MOD/SDF to further improve and strengthen re-employment support such as by enhancing the career guidance system and job training opportunities and by strengthening cooperation with relevant organizations and private companies.

Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness, and responsibility gained through their work performance, education and training. Furthermore, they have various qualifications and licenses acquired through their duties and vocational training. Therefore, they are making positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, including manufacturing and service industries, as well as finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, in addition to the areas of disaster prevention and risk management at local governments.

Specifically, as of the end of March 2023, a total of 640 retired SDF personnel work as crisis management officers and others at local governments’ disaster prevention bureaus: 46 prefectural bureaus have 107 of them in total, and 455 municipal bureaus have 533. Since strengthening cooperation between the MOD/SDF and local governments will help to reinforce the crisis management capabilities of local governments, efforts are also being made to strengthen re-employment support in this regard.

Furthermore, the MOD offers disaster prevention and crisis management education for retiring SDF personnel who seek employment in disaster prevention departments of local governments. An individual who completes the course is certified as a regional disaster prevention manager by the Cabinet Office upon request. The requirement for this certification is a rank of at least Ichii or a rank of Nii (First Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF)) with the effective work experience of an Ichii (Captain (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant (MSDF)).

In March 2022, the MOD and the specified non-profit organization Japan Bousaisi Organization came to an agreement to establish a special exception for uniformed SDF personnel in the certification process for disaster prevention officers, with the goal of reinforcing regional disaster prevention capabilities.

In order to increase the number of SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, in addition to maintaining and increasing the number of uniformed SDF personnel under the fixed-term system, it is decided that a scholarship would be provided to support the education of individuals who enter a university in Japan after completing their tenure as fixed-term uniformed SDF personnel and who are appointed SDF Reserve Personnel while at university.

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7 The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, led by the Minister of Defense and with the attendance of surviving family members and the Prime Minister. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.
Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of SDF personnel, the following three regulations, as are the cases in other national government employees have been put in place to ensure public trust regarding the fairness of official duties: (1) regulation on requesting re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel and on requesting information; (2) regulation on seeking employment opportunities at companies in which the retired personnel had a stake whilst in office; and (3)
regulation on requests (lobbying) by re-employed personnel. Compliance with these regulations is monitored by bodies comprised of academic experts with no history of serving as SDF personnel. Any violation of these regulations will be strictly dealt with through the imposition of penalties.

Additionally, for the purpose of the appropriate implementation of centralized management and disclosure of re-employment information by the Cabinet, it has been decided that information on the re-employment status of retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions (equivalent to the position of Senior Coordinator in the MOD or higher) is to be published every fiscal year by the Cabinet.

**REFERENCE:** Re-employment support (assistance) by the MOD

**URL:** https://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/syogu/engo/index.html
INAZAWA Yuya, Ground Service Department, ANA Chubu Airport Co., Ltd. (Completed his term of service as Airman 1st Class, Aircraft Maintenance)

After completing my term of service as a member of ASDF personnel, I joined the Ground Service Department of ANA Chubu Airport Co., Ltd. ANA requires us to perform high quality and accurate work within the limited period of time between arrival and departure, with safety as our top priority. To be the most “on-time airline,” each individual needs to think and act on their own, rather than waiting for instructions from superiors and seniors, in order to ensure that flights depart on time.

Currently, I am devoting myself to my daily work at Chubu Centrair International Airport, to earn the trust of my superiors and seniors as soon as possible. I want to improve so that I can convey the “appeal of the skies” as an ex-member of ASDF personnel.

OKAMOTO Shinji, Manager, Personnel Section, General Affairs Department, ANA Chubu Airport Co., Ltd.

We are an ANA Group company that provides ground support services for aircraft, mainly for ANA flights, at Chubu Centrair International Airport. Under our management vision of “becoming an unwavering force that supports the ANA Group through airport handling that transcends boundaries,” each and every one of us is tackling our own challenges and growing independently, while fulfilling our expected roles.

We have hired retired SDF Personnel in the past, and they are now playing an active role in their respective departments. Leveraging his past experiences and strengths in the SDF, Inazawa is currently working as a member of the Ground Service Department, performing duties related to aircraft arrivals and departures. I have high expectations that he will make use of his trademark brightness and can-do spirit to achieve even more from now on.

MIKAMOTO Katsushi, Crisis Management Disaster Prevention Planning Director, Crisis Management Disaster Prevention Section, Kumamoto Governor’s Office, Kumamoto Prefectural Government

Kumamoto Prefecture has experienced large-scale disasters numerous times in the past and has a high awareness of disaster prevention. As a former member of the SDF, I work with high expectations and a sense of tension in my duties, which include training and improving preparedness during normal times and coordinating rescue efforts in the event of a disaster. The knowledge and skills I acquired through rigorous training and disaster relief operations and the relationships I built during my time as the uniformed SDF personnel have been extremely valuable and have served as a great source of support for me these days. In preparation for potential disasters in the future, I intend to be even more creative and ingenious than before, and to do my utmost to ensure the safety and security of Kumamoto residents in cooperation with the SDF and other related organizations.

KABASHIMA Ikuo, Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture

Since FY2014, Kumamoto Prefecture has hired individuals with experience as uniformed SDF personnel as Crisis Management Disaster Planning Directors. These individuals have played an indispensable role in Kumamoto Prefecture’s response to disasters, taking the lead with me during the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake and the 2020 Kyushu floods.

Based on our experience of the 2020 Kyushu floods, since 2021, we have been conducting practical training with the participation of all municipalities under the supervision of Planning Director Mikamoto. The training, which utilizes the experience and knowledge of the SDF in several areas, has been highly evaluated by related organizations and has helped to strengthen Kumamoto Prefecture’s disaster prevention capabilities. Former SDF personnel are valuable in Japan, a disaster-prone country, and I expect them to play an even more active role in improving disaster preparedness throughout the country.
Section 2 Building an Organizational Environment of Zero Tolerance for Any Harassment

The MOD/SDF has gained greater expectations from Japanese people in recent years, and it is indispensable for us to gain their support and trust all the time to fully exercise our ability to complete our duties. In order to meet their expectations to this end, the SDF personnel are required to be an invariably disciplined existence more than ever.

Although the MOD/SDF has taken various measures such as thorough instructions on service discipline in order to foster well-disciplined personnel, disciplinary action has been taken in recent years for a number of cases of harassment. In order to exert organizational strength and respond decisively to a wide range of situations, the SDF must create a working environment that enables SDF personnel, who are the core of Japan’s defense capability, to perform their tasks confidently with high morale and peace of mind. Harassment, in particular, must not be tolerated, as it destroys mutual trust among SDF personnel and shakes the very foundation of the organization.

1 Response to Harassment Incidents

The Honors and Discipline Division of the Bureau of Personnel and Education has set up a consultation hotline for MOD/SDF personnel. The annual number of consultations was 109 when the hotline was permanently established in FY2016 and has since increased to 1,397 in FY2022.

Power harassment, in particular, which accounts for 80% of the total number of such consultations, is a major problem; such harassment could lead to a violation of the dignity and human rights of MOD/SDF personnel, suicide incidents, and adversely affect the work environment. Power harassment is caused by inadequate knowledge of it and the communication gap between superiors and their subordinates. In order to resolve and prevent these issues, the MOD/SDF has (1) provided classroom training and remote learning to enhance understanding and raise awareness of power harassment among MOD/SDF personnel; (2) conducted education to promote understanding and enhance leadership capabilities among MOD/SDF personnel (particularly those in managerial positions); and (3) taken measures to improve and strengthen the consultation system.

In order to eradicate disciplinary violations, such as assault, battery, and power harassment, the standards of disciplinary actions were tightened in March 2020. The number of cases of harassment for which disciplinary action taken was 173 in FY2021. The number of personnel disciplined for harassment following the introduction of disciplinary actions was 16 in FY2019, 34 in FY2020, and 49 in FY2021.

![Fig. IV-2-2-1](image-url)

**Fig. IV-2-2-1** The Number of the Personnel Subject to Have Taken Disciplinary Action for The Substantiated Harassment Case

- Dismissal: 
  - FY2019: 16
  - FY2020: 9
  - FY2021: 11
- Suspension: 
  - FY2019: 45
  - FY2020: 70
  - FY2021: 49
- A Reduction in pay:
  - FY2019: 19
  - FY2020: 34
  - FY2021: 45
- Reprimand: 
  - FY2019: 5
  - FY2020: 108
  - FY2021: 5
of disciplinary action was 372 in FY2021. Of these, 15 cases were resulted in the most severe disciplinary action of dismissal¹ (all disciplined for sexual harassment).

Furthermore, as some personnel who reluctant to seek advice at the MOD/SDF consultation desk, a consultation desk staffed by psychological counselors and others outside of the MOD/SDF on weekends, holidays, and after-hours will be established in addition to the existing consultation desk staffed by lawyers.

However, despite the various harassment prevention measures that have been adopted so far, there have been cases in which concerns raised during consultations were not adequately followed up on.

For example, there was a case of a former GSDF personnel who had lodged a complaint that they were subject to sexual harassment during training and on a daily basis at their unit, but the information was not reported to the commanding officer, and the facts of the case were not properly investigated. Following an investigation conducted by a higher-level unit, it was determined in September 2022 that sexual harassment, including sexual violence, had indeed occurred, and disciplinary action for those involved was taken in December of the same year on the basis of further investigation. This incident suggests that the effects of the MOD’s existing harassment prevention measures have yet to permeate the entire organization, the fact that is extremely serious and deeply regrettable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>FY2018</th>
<th>FY2019</th>
<th>FY2020</th>
<th>FY2021</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Harassment</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>1,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity Harassment</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation Desk for Each Institution</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>1,468</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>2,122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The types of disciplinary action include dismissal, demotion, suspension, a reduction in pay, and reprimand. The disciplinary action taken is determined based on a comprehensive evaluation of the causes, motives, and circumstances of the disciplinary violation, the position and rank of the offender, as well as the impact of the disciplinary violation both inside and outside the unit.

2 Directive of the Minister of Defense on Measures to Eradicate Harassment

On September 6, 2022, Defense Minister Hamada issued a directive on measures to eradicate harassment, in which all personnel were once again made aware of harassment consultation desks and advisors and instructed to seek consultation and report any harassment accordingly. It also called for an urgent review of the current status of harassment-related consultations and the appropriate follow-up in all cases, as well as a special defense inspection of the entire MOD/SDF and the establishment of an expert committee to conduct a fundamental review of harassment prevention measures.
3 Special Defense Inspection on Harassment

In response to the directive, it was decided that the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance would receive reports on harassment cases from MOD/SDF personnel as part of a special defense inspection. The Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance received 1,414 reports as of the deadline of November 30, 2022, and has proceeded to conduct interviews with those who submitted reports to grasp the basic facts of the harassment incidents, as well as notified the components where the incidents occurred based on the wishes of those interviewed to have the concrete details of the incidents investigated.

In addition, the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance will conduct its own specific investigations in some cases, including those for which it is deemed necessary to ascertain the facts in the course of the special defense inspection in order to achieve the purpose of the special defense inspection while following up on the progress of the investigation in other cases regarding which the respective components have been notified.

4 Fundamental Review of Harassment Prevention Measures

Based on the directive of the Minister of Defense described above, the MOD established the MOD Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention and Measures on November 1, 2022, to conduct an objective and fundamental review of the harassment prevention measures of the MOD/SDF, raise awareness internally, and work to create an organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment of any kind. The committee held its first meeting on December 15 of the same year and its second meeting on February 6, 2023. In response to the committee’s recommendations on new harassment prevention measures, new measures will be implemented and made known to all MOD/SDF personnel. In addition, the measures will be constantly reviewed to ensure that they remain relevant to the times so as to create an organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment of any kind.

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2 This figure is subject to change based on the inspection’s findings following future investigations.
The Harassment Issue from a Medical Standpoint

SEKIYA Junpei
Member of the MOD Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention and Measures,
Chairman of the Medical Corporation Enyukai,
Psychiatrist, Occupational Physician

According to the finding of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s “Workplace Harassment Survey” published in FY2020, the rate of workers who have experienced any type of harassment at least once in the past three years is 31.4% for power harassment and 10.2% for sexual harassment. The results of this survey indicate that about one in three workers have experienced power harassment and about one in ten workers have experienced sexual harassment. Thus, harassment in a workplace occurs frequently. It has been reported that its effects on victims’ psychological distress such as lowered self-confidence, guilt, and feelings of worthlessness, as well as physical and mental disorders such as sleep disturbances, concentration difficulties, and depressed mood. In addition, harassment has been reported to increase victims’ risk of developing depression and ischemic heart disease. It is also important to note that people who witness harassment have also been shown to experience negative effects on their health, motivation, and sense of well-being which are associated with serious damage to the organization itself such as increased absenteeism and turnover throughout the organization, as well as organizational breakdown and reduced productivity. The MOD/SDF is the organization that plays the most fundamental and important role in the nation’s existence: national defense. We believe that it is important to continue to strive tirelessly to foster a climate that does not encourage, accept, or tolerate harassment within our organization, so that our organization can always perform to its fullest potential.

REFERENCE: Promotion of harassment prevention measures
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/harassment/index.html
Japan is in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, and the situations that require a response by the MOD/SDF are increasing in number and becoming longer in duration. On the other hand, Japan faces rapid declining and aging of population with low fertility rate, making it more important than ever to secure SDF personnel who are the core of defense capabilities. Under these circumstances, it is expected that an increasing number of MOD personnel, both male and female, who are responsible for various duties, will face time and commuting constraints for childcare, nursing care and other reason due to major changes in the social structure.

Amid such challenging circumstances, ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires creating an environment that enables staff to be sound both mentally and physically, maintain high morale, and fully demonstrate their abilities.

To this end, the MOD/SDF will promote better work-life balance and the active participation of female personnel based on the NSS, etc.

Specifically, the MOD/SDF established the “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance at the MOD” (hereinafter the “Action Plan”) in 2015 in order to promote work-life balance and the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel in a unified manner. In 2021, the MOD/SDF established a new action plan based around the pillars of reform of promoting work-life balance and promoting women’s active participation. In March 2023, the MOD/SDF is further advancing initiatives through revising the Action Plan focused on the (1) promotion of telework, (2) transition to paperless work, (3) rigorous management of working hours, (4) promotion of paternity leave, and (5) establishment of a workplace environment in which all personnel can work comfortably.

1 Working Style Reform to Promote Work-Life Balance

1 Value and Mentality Reform

In order to implement working style reform, focus needs to be placed especially on reforming the values and mentality of staff in managerial positions regarding working style. The MOD/SDF has been issuing messages from its leaders and conducting seminars and lectures aimed at raising awareness of working style reforms and the concept of work-life balance. With the increase of personnel facing time/ commuting constraints for child/family care, the MOD/SDF is also promoting correction of long working hours and encouraging taking leave to ensure proper work-life balance so that every member can exert his/her full potential.

In addition, the MOD/SDF is conducting initiatives for “management reform” aimed at enhancing the management ability of administrative staff.

2 Working Style Reform in the Workplace

Efforts aimed at the promotion of work-life balance will lead to effective initiatives and the creation of a culture in which personnel consider specific measures for improving their workplace environment based on the actual conditions of their workplace. Based on this perspective, the MOD has been holding the “Competition for Initiatives to Promote Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” with awards presented to particularly outstanding Defense initiatives, which are then introduced within the MOD to help other personnel reform their working styles.

3 Flexible Working Hours and Location

In light of workload fluctuations and the time constraints faced by individuals, the MOD/SDF has introduced an early/late shifts and a flextime system to allow for the flexible selection of working hours. In April 2023, further flexibility was introduced, including a reduction in core hours under the flextime system.

In addition, some personnel are now able to telework, while the telework environment has also continued to be improved through the promotion of digitalization, including the computerization of documents as well as the installation of more terminals.

4 Rigorous Management of Working Hours

Through the systemization of working hour management, surveys conducted on overtime work, etc., efforts are being made to rectify the long working hours that may be detrimental to the physical and mental health and welfare of personnel.

5 Development of an Environment that Enables Personnel to Play an Active Role while Engaging in Childcare and Nursing Care

The MOD/SDF has developed various schemes that enable its personnel to balance work with their childcare/nursing care commitments, such as hiring fixed-term staff who take over those on childcare or other leave. In particular, the MOD/SDF is working to enable all male personnel with to take paternity leave or time off work. As part of the efforts, the MOD/SDF is encouraging all male personnel with a new born child to take paternity leave or time off work for a total of one month or more.

The MOD/SDF is also developing an environment that enables its personnel to balance work life with their family life through various initiatives, such as by providing explanations on systems related to childcare and nursing care, introducing role models, and creating “childcare forms” to help managers and the human resources department better understand the details of the situation surrounding their staff’s childcare. A system has also been established to allow SDF personnel who retired mid-career due to childcare or nursing care commitments to be re-employed.

6 Ensuring Childcare Services

Developing an environment in which SDF personnel are able to devote themselves to their duties without worrying about childcare or other concerns is important in maintaining a permanent state of readiness. The MOD/SDF has set up workplace nurseries at camps and bases in eight locations across Japan. In addition, in the event of situations where a quick response is required such as disaster relief, the MOD promotes support measures to provide temporary childcare in SDF camps and bases for children of SDF personnel.

2 Reform to Promote Women’s Participation

For the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel, the MOD/SDF has been making various efforts to advance the careers of motivated and qualified female personnel by setting up specific goals with regard to the recruitment and promotion of female personnel under the Action Plan.

1 Significance of Promoting Active Engagement of Female SDF Personnel and Personnel Management Policy

With SDF duties becoming increasingly diverse and complex, SDF personnel are required more than ever to have multifaceted capabilities, including higher levels of knowledge, decision-making ability, and skills. In addition, under a severe recruitment environment due to

MOVIE: Activities of female ASDF personnel members
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzUcZITk_bs
the declining birth rate and continuing trend of higher education, it is anticipated that the number of SDF personnel with time and location restraints, including those involved in childcare, nursing care, and other responsibilities, will significantly increase.

In light of these changes, the SDF is required to evolve from a conventional organization with an emphasis on homogeneity among the members, into an organization that is capable of incorporating diverse human resources in a flexible manner.

At present, the largest human resource that the SDF has not been able to fully utilize is women, who account for half of the population targeted for recruitment. Promoting the active engagement of female SDF personnel has the following significance: (1) securing useful human resources; (2) utilizing diverse perspectives; and (3) reflecting values of the nation. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has decided to open up a path for female personnel with motivation, ability, and aptitude to have opportunities to demonstrate their abilities in various fields, with the aim of doubling the ratio of female SDF personnel.

In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person’s motivation and ability/ aptitude.

2 Removal of the Assignment Restriction of Female SDF Personnel

The MOD/SDF has completely removed the assignment restriction of female SDF personnel with the exception of units to which female personnel cannot be assigned for reasons of maternity protection (namely, part of the GSDF Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit [chemical] as well as Tunnel Company Units).

As a result, the assignment of female personnel to vocations, such as fighter pilots, paratroopers, and submarine crew members, is currently underway.

3 Expansion of the Recruitment and Promotion of Female Personnel

Under the Action Plan, efforts will be made for the systematic expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel based on the numerical targets specified for recruitment and promotion.

(1) Female SDF Personnel

As of the end of March 2023, the number of female SDF personnel is about 20,000 (about 8.7% of the total SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2013 when female SDF personnel made up about 5.5% of the total SDF personnel), this is a rise of 3.2 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female SDF personnel has been on the rise in recent years.

Regarding the recruitment of female SDF personnel, the targets for the proportion of newly employed
female SDF personnel among total newly employed SDF personnel in and after FY2021 and the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel by FY2030 have increased to at least 17% and 12%, respectively. In addition, the MOD/SDF will improve education, living, and work environments for female SDF personnel in line with the increasing number of female SDF personnel recruited.

In addition, with regard to promotion, the MOD/SDF aims to increase the proportion of women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher to at least 5% by the end of FY2025.

See Fig. IV-2-3-1 (Changes in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel)

(2) Female Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Female Civilian Personnel

As of the end of March 2023, the number of female civilian personnel—administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others—is approximately 5,400 (about 26.9% of the total civilian personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2013 when females made up about 23.5% of the total civilian personnel), this is a rise of 3.4 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female civilian personnel has been on the rise in recent years.

With regard to recruitment, in line with the overall government target, the MOD has set the goal of ensuring that women account for over 35% of recruits in and after FY2021. Regarding promotion targets to be achieved by the end of FY2025 include increasing the proportion of women of the unit chief level at the MOD proper or its equivalent to 35%, the division director at local organizations/ division deputy director level at the MOD proper or its equivalent to 10%, the division director level at the MOD proper or its equivalent to 6%, and designated official or equivalent to 5%.

Fig. IV-2–3–1 Changes in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel

(Note) As of the end of March 2023, the total number of female SDF personnel is 19,886 (approximately 8.7% of the total number of the SDF personnel)

MOVIE: Female MSDF personnel members who also value their own time while working
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tsk6VA6LP4

MOVIE: Activities of female GSDF personnel members following their dreams
URL: https://youtu.be/-bcA9G417vU
The NDS stipulates that, from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency, the SDF medical force, which has been placing importance on sustaining the health of SDF personnel, will transform into an organization that saves the lives of SDF personnel who carry out their missions in a contingency in spite of danger.

Under circumstances where the SDF’s missions are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it is important to accurately address the needs of various medical activities, such as providing medical support in disaster relief operations and international peace cooperation activities, as well as capacity building in the medical field.

The MOD/SDF, therefore, is enhancing and strengthening its medical capabilities so that they can appropriately respond to various emergency events and carry out its multiple missions in Japan and abroad.

### 1 Establishing a Seamless Medical Care and Evacuation Posture

In order to improve the life-saving rate of injured SDF personnel on the front line, it is necessary to strengthen the respective functions of first aid at the front line, medical evacuation, and destination SDF hospitals.

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#### 1 Enhancement of Medical Functions in Various Emergency Situations

In response to injured SDF personnel at the frontline, Frontline Medics first provide emergency life support to the personnel while damage control surgery (DCS) is performed at medical bases equipped with the field operation system, etc. The casualty is then safely and promptly transported to an SDF hospital, which is the final destination for complete cure.

For this reason, the GSDF and MSDF have been...
educating and training SDF personnel who are licensed as Licensed Practical Nurses and Emergency Life-Saving Technicians so that they are able to provide lifesaving procedures to SDF personnel who have been injured in the course of executing their missions near the scene of injury while promoting their designation and deployment to units as frontline medics. In FY2022, training has been started for the ASDF as part of efforts to further reinforce first aid capabilities on the frontline.

In addition, the SDF will enhance education and training tailored to the characteristics of the units and equipment of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, which include war injury treatment on board ships and aircraft while promoting the development of training equipment for medical transport by air and teaching materials for improving first aid capability. The SDF will also promote development of medical training infrastructure necessary for combat injury education and common to all SDFs.

In addition to the above, the SDF will work on the establishment of a new system to autonomously secure and stockpile blood products. Most deaths in war are due to exsanguination from bomb wounds, and other similar causes. To prevent such deaths, it is extremely important to secure blood products for transfusions. For this reason, the FY2023 budget will include the installation of related equipment at the SDF Central Hospital and the conduct of the necessary reviews.

**2 Enhancing the Functions of SDF Hospitals and Establishing Medical Bases**

The role of SDF hospitals is to admit and treat injured SDF personnel and other persons transported from their area of activity in various emergency situations. In peacetime, these hospitals also provide medical care to SDF personnel and their families, etc. These hospitals also play the role of educational institutions that train medical personnel to maintain and enhance their skills.

In the southwestern region of Japan, the geographical characteristics of its many remote islands make it necessary to strengthen the functions of Naha Hospital and other hospitals that serve as medical bases.

**2 Securing and Training Medical Personnel**

The MOD/SDF is working to secure and nurture medical officers and maintain and improve their medical skills by enhancing clinical education after graduation from the NDMC and other institutions, promoting various initiatives for ensuring more opportunities for medical officers to engage in medical practice, and helping them acquire and improve specialized knowledge and skills in areas such as infectious diseases and emergency medicine.

Similar measures are taken for nursing officers to maintain and improve their knowledge/skills through practice at external hospitals, etc.

Moreover, medical personnel and medical staff, such as radiological technologists, clinical technologists, and emergency life-saving technicians, are educated and trained at SDF hospitals, schools and other relevant institutions so that the SDF can perform diverse

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4 First aid treatment for those with symptoms such as airway obstruction and tension pneumothorax caused by injuries, and other treatments such as administration of analgesic for pain relief.
missions and missions under special circumstances, including international peace cooperation activities and large-scale disasters.

### 3 Strengthening the Function of the NDMC

As the only educational institution of the MOD/SDF for the training of SDF personnel who are physicians (medical officers), SDF personnel who are public health and registered nurses (nursing officers), and technical officers, the NDMC plays the role of training and producing primary medical staff as well as maintaining and improving their skills.

The DBP stipulates that the NDMC will strengthen education and research, including combat trauma care capabilities improvement. Specifically, it calls for strengthening education for medical and nursing officers in areas such as trauma surgery and treatment, as well as promoting the necessary research in defense medicine to advance the quality of the SDF’s medical services in areas such as the treatment of trauma and burns, infectious disease control, and mental health.

In particular, research and development of platelet substitute has a potential to be useful for combat casualty care if it is clinically available.

In addition, a system will be established to provide highly advanced medical care at the NDMC Hospital to allow it to play the role of admitting severely injured SDF personnel who cannot be treated at SDF hospitals.

The operation of the NDMC Hospital will also be fundamentally reformed to transform it into a clinical site for medical officers, etc., to treat such war injury.

### 4 Improving Preparedness Necessary for International Cooperation

The MOD/SDF has dispatched instructors for the United Nations Field Medical Assistant Course (UNFMAC) as a part of the UN Triangular Partnership Programme (UNTPP), participated in medical care, etc., in overseas disaster areas as part of international disaster relief activities. They are also have actively conducted capacity building and joint exercises in submarine medicine, aviation medicine, disaster medicine, and other medical fields for the benefit of various countries, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.

In addition, it has been reinforcing its capability to respond to infectious diseases by training personnel who can contribute to overseas activities, improving equipment for transporting infectious disease patients, and providing the necessary facilities and equipment to units, the NDMC Hospital, and the SDF Central Hospital to treat patients suffering from Category I Infectious Diseases, which are classified as the most dangerous among known infectious diseases.

Moreover, the MOD/SDF has been developing the systems necessary for various international cooperation initiatives, which include upgrading mobile medical systems that are effective for overseas medical activities and dispatching SDF personnel to the medical departments of international organizations, the U.S. Department of Defense, etc.

### 5 Response to COVID-19

In response to the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) infection, the MOD/SDF has been accepting COVID-19 patients at SDF hospitals and the National Defense Medical College Hospital (NDMC Hospital) since February 1, 2020. 4,821 COVID-19 patients in total (as of 5:00 p.m. on March 31, 2023) have been admitted by the SDF Central Hospital, SDF district hospitals in Sapporo, Ominato, Misawa, Sendai, Maizuru, Iruma, Yokosuka, Fuji, Hanshin, Kure, Fukuoka, Sasebo, Kumamoto, Beppu, and Naha, as well as the NDMC Hospital. The SDF Central Hospital and the NDMC Hospital, in particular, have been assigned as Designated
Medical Institutions for Category I Infectious Diseases\(^5\) (each possessing two hospital beds in conformity with standards specified by the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare and outfitted with depressurized rooms, etc., capable of handling Category I Infectious Diseases\(^6\) by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and Saitama Prefecture and have extended the admission of patients to their general wards in response to the increase in the number of patients.

In order to accelerate vaccination against COVID-19, the SDF established and operated SDF large-scale vaccination centers in Tokyo and Osaka from May to November 2021, administering a total of 1.96 million doses of the vaccine. In response to the Omicron variant, the SDF established large-scale vaccination sites in Tokyo and Osaka in January and February 2022, respectively, whose operations ended in March 2023. During this period, a total of 520,000 doses of the vaccine were administered.

Experience from regular training was put to good use in the SDF’s response to COVID-19. For example, the SDF Central Hospital and the NDMC Hospital regularly conduct drills for responding to infectious diseases and have established procedures for admitting patients and cooperating with the relevant institutions in the event of a Category I infectious disease outbreak.

In addition, the SDF Central Hospital conducted a mass casualty admission exercise in July 2022 based on the hypothetical scenario of the occurrence of an earthquake hitting Tokyo directly, with the goal of improving its ability to respond to various contingencies and strengthening cooperation with related external medical institutions. The exercise involved the participation of the Ground Component Command, the GSDF Eastern Army, the GSDF Medical School, Japan Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), the Tokyo Fire Department, etc., as part of ongoing efforts to strengthen cooperation with the relevant institutions and enhance the SDF Central Hospital’s capabilities as a medical institution in compliance with the requirements of a disaster base hospital.

\(^5\) Designated Medical Institutions for Class I Infectious Diseases are medical institutions designated by the governor for the hospitalization of patients of Class I and Class II infectious diseases and infectious diseases such as novel influenza. (Article 6, Act on the Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Medical Care for Patients with Infectious Diseases [Act No. 114 of 1998]).

\(^6\) Ebola haemorrhagic fever, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, smallpox, South American haemorrhagic fever, plague, Marburg virus disease, and Lassa Fever (Article 6, Act on the Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Medical Care for Patients with Infectious Diseases [Act No.114 of 1998]).
The NDS stipulates that, for the SDF to fully exert its capabilities and respond to the severe strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required, including in domains such as space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum, and that these functions will be fundamentally reinforced. Moreover, the NDS calls for closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies, particularly those in the defense industry, as well as reviewing and reinforcing the research system of the MOD/SDF led by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) and reinforcing its function as an intellectual base.

1 Efforts for Reinforcing Policy-Making Function

In view of the need to fundamentally reinforce strategic and agile defense policy planning and making functions in line with the NDS, a consultation framework will be established to obtain policy advice from experts.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to comprehensively advance, from a strategic perspective, the SDF’s future ways of warfare and the utilization and nurturing of cutting-edge technologies and application of those technologies to defense equipment necessary for future SDF operations, while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies, particularly those with the defense industry as their core.

In addition, the MOD’s research and educational institutions have been working to further improve the quality of their research on a routine basis and to reflect the results in Japan’s policy-making. Promoting public understanding of knowledge and information about Japan’s national security policies, including the results of such research, has become critical. Accordingly, the MOD/SDF has been working to:

1. strengthen the research system of the MOD/SDF through networking and institutional collaboration with research and educational institutions, universities, think-tanks, etc., in Japan and abroad;
2. provide policy-making departments, etc., with high-quality research results backed by advanced expertise and research capabilities;
3. disseminate highly trustworthy information based on the aforementioned research results, etc.; and
4. contribute to the promotion of security education by dispatching instructors to educational institutions, etc., holding public symposiums, etc., in order to reinforce its intellectual base through NIDS and various schools, among other initiatives.

2 Efforts by the National Institute for Defense Studies

The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) conducts policy-oriented research and studies primarily on security and military history by taking advantage of its unique position as a national academic research and educational institution focused on national security. It also functions as a university-level national defense educational institution for the training of senior SDF officials, etc. In addition, NIDS manages and publishes a large volume of data on military history as a facility possessing historical materials, etc., in accordance with the Public Records and Archives Management Act, and serves as the largest research center on military history in Japan.

NIDS also emphasizes international exchange and conducts research exchanges with defense universities, security research institutes, etc., in other countries with the main objective of improving the quality of its research and education and contributing to national security by strengthening relations of trust with said countries. On the occasion of its 70th anniversary in 2022, NIDS held the “NIDS International Symposium on Security Affairs” on the theme of the state of great power competition, particularly between the United States, China, and Russia; the “NIDS International Forum on War History” on the theme of war and
information; as well as the inaugural “Connections Japan,” an international conference on policy simulation. This conference was held to create opportunities for sharing cutting-edge knowledge and initiatives launched in Japan and abroad in the field of policy simulation, which is being utilized around the world as a means of forecasting future conditions and testing policy planning and formulation, and it will continue to be held in the future as part of efforts to address policy-related issues and reinforce Japan’s intellectual base.

In addition, NIDS proactively disseminates information by publishing major research results on its website and issuing various publications, such as the “NIDS China Security Report” and “Security & Strategy,” which have been published annually to date. Researchers at NIDS have also published many books, articles, and essays on their research findings, some of which have received awards for the outstanding research conducted.

3 Efforts by Other Institutions

The National Defense Academy of Japan (NDA) is responsible for training and educating individuals who are expected to become SDF officers, providing more advanced training and education for SDF personnel, etc., and conducting the research needed to perform these functions.

In its role, the NDA conducts a large volume of academic and defense policy-related research, and upholds a high standard of research. Since FY2022, it has conducted basic defense-related research, etc., with greater attention paid to dual-use technologies than it has done so previously and provided feedback on the results to other organizations within the MOD (ATLA, etc.).

In addition, the results of the NDA’s research that is mainly centered on the themes handled by the Center for Global Security are widely disseminated outside the academy through presentations at seminars and colloquia held by the NDA as well as through online publications, such as the Global Security Seminar Series and the Global Security Study Series.

SDF Command and Staff Colleges, etc., periodically hold various security-related seminars and symposiums that are attended by researchers, etc., from industry (companies), government (national and local), and academia (universities, etc.), which contributes to research and studies regarding Japan’s national security in the future through discussions and the exchange of opinions from a variety of different perspectives.

The colleges also strive to obtain knowledge and information necessary for research and studies to maintain and improve the quality of their education and research by hosting visiting researchers as well as participating in exchanges, etc., with educational and research institutions, etc., in Japan and overseas. In addition, the colleges proactively disseminate information by publishing major research results on their websites, issuing various publications, and through other means.

REFERENCE: Publications issued by NIDS
URL: www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/index.html

1 The Center for Global Security is a department established within the Institute for Advanced Studies and is responsible for planning, drafting, and implementing research and joint research projects related to global security (research conducted jointly with ATLA, etc.), as well as disseminating the results of such global security-related research externally.

2 The JGSDF Training Evaluation Research and Development Command publishes “Ground Defense,” the JMSDF Command and Staff College publishes the “Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Command and Staff College Review,” and the Air Command and Staff College publishes “Air & Space Power Studies,” etc.
In order for the SDF to fulfill its mission of defending our nation, it is essential for all personnel and every unit to maintain a high level of training and improve upon their skills at all times from peacetime.

The MOD/SDF actively conducts various high-level bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and works to further improve deterrence and response capabilities.

At the same time, stabilizing the security environment surrounding Japan while reinforcing its deterrence and response capabilities is indispensable for maintaining peace in Japan. To this end, the MOD/SDF is actively promoting bilateral/multilateral exercises with Japan’s ally, like-minded countries, and others in the wider Indo-Pacific region as part of its efforts to achieve the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” In addition to strengthening partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, which is closely connected to Japan’s national security, the MOD/SDF is working to strengthen cooperation in responding to global security challenges and destabilizing factors to which it is difficult for any individual country to respond.

Fig. IV-3-1-1 (Major Training and Exercises Undertaken by Japan and based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance)
Training that Contributes to Reinforcing Japan’s Capability to Respond to Various Contingencies

(1) Joint Training of the SDF

It is of paramount importance that the SDF be prepared to seamlessly and fully demonstrate its deterrence and response capabilities through repeated training involving joint operations of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF on a routine basis.

To this end, the SDF has been conducting SDF joint exercises since 1979 to rehearse joint operations by alternating between field training exercises and command post exercises almost every year.

In addition, in order to respond to large-scale disasters and various other disasters in an expeditious and appropriate manner, the SDF organizes various disaster prevention drills while also actively participating in disaster prevention drills organized by the Japanese Government and local governments as part of its efforts to strengthen cooperation with various ministries and agencies, local governments, etc.

Furthermore, the SDF has been conducting training regularly so that it can promptly rescue or transport Japanese nationals overseas, in emergency situations.

[SDF Joint Exercise (JX) for FY2022]

From January to February 2023, the SDF conducted its joint exercise for FY2022 as a command post exercise. The exercise was conducted in a comprehensive manner based on a series of hypothetical scenarios ranging from gray-zone situations to armed attack situations in order to respond to armed attacks in various domains, including in the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains. This was the first large-scale exercise to be conducted since the formulation of the new NSS and in view of Japan’s approach to the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities going forward, and the lessons learned from the exercise will contribute to this fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.

[Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR)]

In order to maintain and enhance its disaster response capabilities, the SDF conducts disaster drills revolving around its command and staff activities in the event of a large-scale earthquake, the coordination between major units, and its coordination with disaster prevention organizations as well as the U.S. Forces in Japan. During the exercise, the SDF tested its response plan based on the hypothetical scenario that a Nankai Trough earthquake had occurred.

[Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX) and Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX), a Japan-U.S. Bilateral Integrated Disaster Response Exercise]

The SDF conducted field training exercises and desk studies on responding to sudden large-scale disasters on remote islands to maintain and enhance the SDF’s ability to respond to disasters on remote islands as well as strengthen collaboration with the U.S. Forces and relevant disaster prevention organizations. This was the first time the SDF conducted an exercise that deployed units to Kozushima Island, Tokyo, using the GSDF’s V-22 Osprey aircraft, as well as a rescue exercise that used security dogs that had been certified as search and rescue dogs.

[Drills for Medical Treatment Activities Following a Large-Scale Earthquake]

The SDF participated in a drill organized by the Cabinet Office involving medical treatment activities to be carried out in the aftermath of a large-scale earthquake. In this drill, the SDF rehearsed various actions for disaster relief and coordination procedures with disaster prevention organizations to maintain and reinforce its disaster response capabilities.

[Training on the Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas]

A training on the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas was conducted in February 2023 for the purposes of improving the joint operational capabilities for the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas and strengthening cooperation with related organizations. By drawing on the experience of missions involving the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas in
Afghanistan, the training covered a series of activities ranging from preparation for deployment in Japan to deployment to overseas destinations using actual personnel and equipment in cooperation with related organizations.

**Joint Deployment and Action Training (Middle East and Africa), Furnace Darter (FD)**

A joint deployment and action training was conducted in December 2022 for the purposes of training the Deployed Joint Task Force in actions ranging from post-deployment to the protection and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas and strengthening cooperation between the SDF, related organizations, the U.S. Forces, etc. This training was conducted in an actual operating environment in the Middle East/Africa and focused on the actions of the units after their deployment outside Japan by utilizing the SDF’s overseas activity base in Djibouti.

**2) Training of Each SDF Service**

A high-level of training by each SDF is a fundamental prerequisite for being able to fully exert joint defense capabilities. As such, each SDF continuously conducts individual training for its troops and organizational training for its units, forming the foundation of a strong SDF.

a. GSDF

The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) conducts maneuver and deployment training in which rapid deployment divisions and brigades are mobilized nationwide and field training exercises at the regional army level to improve its response capabilities for various contingencies and other situations.

In addition, it conducts parachute drop training from U.S. Air Force and other aircraft in Japan and overseas, training for amphibious operations, and live-fire training for medium-range SAM/SSM units to enhance various tactical skills necessary for joint cross-domain operations.

b. MSDF

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) uses a training system that enhances proficiency in stages, as a specific period that takes account of the timing of crewmember rotations and naval vessel inspections and repairs is determined as the cycle, which is then divided into multiple stages. Under this system, the MSDF conducts trainings in which vessels coordinate with each other and with aircraft, as well as maritime field training exercises in which units all over Japan are mobilized, as part of efforts to enhance responsiveness. In addition, the MSDF conducts mine warfare training in Japan and...
deployment training that leverages superior U.S. training infrastructure with the cooperation of the U.S. Navy in order to improve various tactical skills.

c. ASDF

The ASDF focuses on enhancing the professional expertise of its personnel in phases in order to fully utilize equipment with cutting-edge technologies, such as fighter aircraft, radars, surface-to-air guided missiles, etc. It also conducts unit-specific training and training on inter-unit coordination procedures involving units, such as fighter units, air warning and control units, and surface-to-air guided missile units, as well as comprehensive training that includes air transport units and air rescue units.

For example, the ASDF conducts the field training exercise Air Defense Command Comprehensive Training, in which all relevant units in Japan are mobilized, as well as PAC-3 maneuver and deployment training, overseas flight training, etc., to enhance maneuver and deployment capabilities and operational readiness. In addition, the ASDF is strengthening its mission execution capabilities through Patriot live-fire training in the United States and training that leverages the Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Center (AATTC) in the United States.

2 Training that Contributes to Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Alliance is essential to Japan’s national security, and Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises play a significant role in enhancing Japan’s deterrence and response capabilities. The SDF has consistently conducted joint training involving different SDF services as well as Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercises (field training exercises and command post exercises) to improve the SDF’s tactical skills and strengthen collaboration with the U.S. Forces, demonstrating Japan and the United States’ unified commitment to and capacity for achieving peace and stability in the region.

(1) Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises

Since 1986, the SDF has been conducting the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercises “Keen Sword” (field training exercise) and “Keen Edge” (command post exercise) to rehearse SDF operational procedures and the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan for armed attack situations, etc., as well as to improve the readiness of the SDF and the interoperability of Japan and the United States. In FY2022, the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercise “Keen Sword 2023” (field training exercise) was conducted to rehearse SDF operational procedures and the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan from gray-zone situations to armed attack situations, etc. A total of 26,000 SDF personnel and 10,000 U.S. military personnel participated in this exercise, making it the largest-scale exercise in FY2022. The armed forces of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom also participated in some of the training under the command of the U.S. Forces to rehearse coordination procedures. In addition, Japan-U.S. joint response drills against ballistic missiles were also conducted to maintain and enhance the SDF’s joint operation capabilities and Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities.

(2) Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises of Each SDF Service

a. GSDF

In recent years, the GSDF has strengthened its operational and strategic coordination with the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines both centrally and at the Pacific level. Bilateral exercises, in conjunction with high-level exchanges, have continued to evolve and develop as part of ongoing efforts to fundamentally strengthen the Japan-U.S. joint response posture.

In FY2022, the results of individual bilateral/multilateral training exercises conducted were built upon and further refined through coordination. In particular, the results of Orient Shield 2022 conducted with the U.S. Army and those of Resolute Dragon 2022 conducted with the U.S. Marines were significantly developed through their synergy with the Japan-U.S. bilateral regional army command post exercise “YS-83.”
[Orient Shield 2022]
The GSDF conducted a training aimed at reinforcing Japan-U.S. coordination capabilities in light of its cross-domain operations and the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations. This training involved the deployment throughout Kyushu of both Japan and the United States’ missile units and electronic warfare units that collect information through the electromagnetic spectrum, including the deployment of the U.S. Army’s High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) unit on the Amami-Oshima Island for the first time, as part of the cross-domain anti-ship combat training that was conducted by combining combat means across multiple domains. A simulation exercise involving Japan-U.S. joint targeting was conducted through integration with these sites. A new unit, the Multi-Domain Task Force, participated in the exercise from the U.S. mainland for the first time. The training also encompassed combat support such as logistics and medical services to further develop the coordination between the various services of the armed forces of Japan and the United States.

[Resolute Dragon 2022]
The GSDF rehearsed a series of operations for the defense of remote islands, with a focus on cross-domain operations and coordination based on the U.S. Marines’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). For this training, multiple training areas in Hokkaido were designated as remote islands, and the GSDF performed a
series of actions ranging from receiving the U.S. Marines deployed on the islands to guiding them to combat areas. The U.S. Marines also underwent their first soft field landing training using transport aircraft mounted with HIMARS at the Kenebetsu Takeoff and Landing Site. At the same time, joint anti-ship combat training was also conducted in view of the characteristics of remote islands. Japan and the United States endeavor to provide mutually complementary logistics and medical support services to improve the sustainability of combat operations on remote islands while limiting the damage sustained.

[Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army Command Post Exercise (YS-83)]

The GSDF rehearsed coordination procedures involving its cross-domain operations, the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations, and the U.S. Marines’ EABO. For this training, the participating units were expanded from one regional army to the Ground Component Command and two regional armies. In addition to these two regional armies, the Ground Component Command (which commands overall combat operations, including units under its direct chain of command, such as the 1st Airborne Brigade and the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, as well as cooperating MSDF and ASDF units) and the U.S. I Corps (the counterpart in this exercise) served as the headquarters for Japan’s and the United States’ joint task forces, respectively. By having the two GSDF regional armies and the U.S. Army and Marines conduct operations in their respective areas of responsibility, the training integrated various operations for which the joint task forces and individual units were responsible.

The exercise successfully strengthened the coordination between the various services of the armed forces of Japan and the United States through the dramatic development of the interoperability of the two countries. Besides involving the naval and air forces of Japan and the United States, this exercise also successfully enhanced integration and multilateral participation with the visit of the Commanding General of the Philippine Army and the Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps, in addition to around 30 observers from the Australian armed forces. The high-level exchanges conducted during the exercise enabled participants to establish a common view on the future evolution of bilateral/multilateral exercises and further strengthen cooperation with other countries.

b. MSDF

The MSDF has traditionally conducted bilateral exercises with the U.S. Navy proactively, and is working to enhance the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. joint response as well as cross-domain operation capabilities through Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises with naval vessels and aircraft, anti-submarine special exercises, minesweeping special training, medical special training, and Japan-U.S. medical bilateral training.

For example, the MSDF has consistently conducted bilateral exercises with U.S. carrier strike groups to further reinforce the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and demonstrate that the two countries are acting in concert.

c. ASDF

The ASDF is working to reinforce the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through bilateral exercises with the U.S. Air Force, such as “Red Flag-Alaska,” the U.S. Air Force exercise that the ASDF has been participating in since 1996, and the bilateral exercise “Cope North,” which has been conducted in Guam since 1999. In addition, the ASDF is working to enhance the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. joint response as well as cross-domain operation capabilities through air combat training, intercept training, defensive counter air training, tactical attack training, aerial refueling training, search and rescue training, and navigation and formation training with the U.S. Navy and Marines, as well as other Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises.

For example, in 2022, the SDF and the U.S. Forces conducted a bilateral exercise amid an increasingly challenging security environment that included the repeated launch of ballistic missiles, including ICBM-class ballistic missiles, by North Korea. This bilateral exercise affirmed the readiness of the SDF and the U.S. Forces under the robust Japan-U.S. Alliance, demonstrated both domestically and internationally the strong will and close cooperation between Japan and the United States when responding to various contingencies, and sought to further reinforce joint operation capabilities. The SDF and the U.S. Forces will continue to cooperate closely in peacetime to safeguard the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the region while maintaining the necessary posture to swiftly respond to various contingencies.
3 Multilateral Exercises Involving Japan, the United States, and Third-Party Countries

Each SDF service is actively engaged in high-level multilateral training exercises with the participation of not only the United States but also third-party countries. By conducting training with Australian and European forces, the SDF has been working to enhance its tactical skills and strengthen its coordination and interoperability with the armed forces of other countries to reinforce Japan’s deterrence and response capabilities.

[Pacific Vanguard 2022 (Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Multilateral Exercise)]
The GSDF and MSDF conducted a multilateral exercise involving the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marines, Royal Australian Navy, ROK Navy, and Royal Canadian Navy (which was participating for the first time) in Guam and in the surrounding waters and airspace. During the exercise, gunfire liaison personnel from the GSDF and the U.S. Marines rehearsed how to jointly coordinate the naval gunfire of the naval forces of various countries, including the MSDF. The MSDF also rehearsed surface and ground fire, as well as anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare. The exercise sought to reinforce the joint operation capabilities of ground and naval forces and strengthen cooperation between participating countries.

[Malabar 2022 (Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Multilateral Exercise)]
The MSDF conducted a multilateral exercise involving the U.S. Navy, Indian Navy, Royal Australian Navy, and Royal Australian Air Force in the southern waters and airspace of the Kanto Area. The MSDF participated in the exercise with its destroyers, replenishment ships, etc., to rehearse anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, offshore supply operations, etc., as part of efforts to improve its interoperability with other participating countries. This year marked Malabar’s 30th anniversary. Malabar has major significance given the fact that it has been consistently conducted under the framework of the four countries at the heart of the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and efforts will be made to continue strengthening the relationships between the participating countries.

4 Bilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries

[Vigilant Isles 2022 (Field Training Exercise with the British Army)]
The GSDF conducted a bilateral exercise with the British Army. The exercise involved training on infiltration by reconnaissance units, joint gunfire support, etc., and sought to promote mutual understanding and trust between Japan and the United Kingdom.

[Dharma Guardian 2022 (Field Training Exercise with the Indian Army)]
The GSDF conducted its first-ever bilateral exercise with the Indian Army in Japan. The exercise involved various actions related to counter-terrorism and sought to promote mutual understanding and trust between Japan and India.

[Veer Guardian 2023 (Bilateral Fighter Training with the Indian Air Force)]
The ASDF conducted intercept training and various other tactical trainings with the Indian Air Force at the Hyakuri Air Base and in the surrounding airspace. This was the first bilateral fighter training conducted in Japan with the aim of promoting mutual understanding between the air forces of Japan and India and further advancing defense cooperation between the two countries.

[Japan-Germany Bilateral Exercise]
The ASDF conducted its first-ever bilateral exercise with the German Air Force in Japan. The exercise sought to promote mutual understanding between the air forces of Japan and Germany, further strengthen defense cooperation between the two countries, and improve the tactical skills of the ASDF.
5 Multilateral Exercises with Like-Minded Countries and Others

[Garuda Shield 2022 (Field Training Exercise with the U.S. Army and Indonesian Army in the United States and Indonesia in FY2022)]

The GSDF participated in Garuda Shield 2022, a field training exercise involving the U.S. Army and the Indonesian Army, marking the first time it has participated in a exercise with the Indonesian Army. During the exercise, the GSDF conducted long-distance maneuvers from Guam, United States, and parachute drops in Sumatra, Indonesia, before rehearsing ground combat to improve its operational capabilities for accomplishing missions regardless of location. Based on its recognition of Indonesia, a major power in Southeast Asia, as an important strategic partner, Japan has also actively held summit meetings and “2+2” defense ministerial meetings with Indonesia. In light of this, the successful conduct of this exercise was extremely significant in terms of the synergistic effects it would have on strengthening cooperation between the two countries on a political level.

[Khaan Quest 2022 (Multilateral Exercise)]

The GSDF participated in a multilateral exercise organized by Mongolia and the United States in Mongolia. This exercise’s goal was to improve capabilities associated with UN Peacekeeping Operations, and the GSDF has dispatched units for the exercise since 2015. During the exercise, the GSDF participated in command post training as well as field training exercises, such as facility protection and patrols, through which it sought to preserve various capabilities that are useful when dispatched for UN Peacekeeping Operations, acquire and accumulate the relevant expertise, and promote mutual understanding and strengthen relationships of trust with the armed forces of various participating countries.

[The Indo-Pacific Deployment 2022 (IPD22)]

The MSDF dispatched various surface, submarine, and air units (including three destroyers, one submarine, and three aircraft) to the Indo-Pacific region for a four-month period from June to October 2022, during which they visited 11 countries and conducted 30 joint exercises and goodwill exercises. IPD is a highly significant exercise as it embodies Japan’s will to continuously engage the Pacific Island countries and demonstrates its stance of proactive pacifism.

Some of the units deployed for IPD participated in the multilateral exercise “RIMPAC 2022,” during which they conducted missile launch training and HA/DR exercises in the surrounding waters and airspace of the Hawaiian islands. As one of the world’s largest multilateral exercises involving more than 20 countries from both inside and outside the Indo-Pacific region, IPD is highly significant in promoting mutual understanding and strengthening trust among participating countries. As the training waters and firing sites available had few constraints, the GSDF’s surface-to-ship missile units also participated in the exercise and conducted a Japan-U.S. joint anti-ship firing exercise using live ammunition in coordination with the MSDF, U.S. Army, and others.

In addition, the MSDF also participated in LA PEROUSE 2022 (Japan-France-Australia trilateral exercise) in the vicinity of New Caledonia, during which it conducted tactical exercises such as anti-air warfare with French forces stationed in French New Caledonia and the Royal Australian Navy. The MSDF also held JIMEX 2022 (Japan-India bilateral exercise) on the occasion of the exercise’s 10th anniversary with the Indian Navy from the Andaman Sea to the Bay of Bengal, during which it conducted tactical exercises, such as anti-aircraft firing, anti-submarine warfare, etc. Furthermore, it participated in KAKADU 2022 (a multilateral exercise organized by the Royal Australian Navy) in the vicinity of Darwin, during which it conducted anti-surface warfare training, etc., while strengthening cooperation with the naval forces of over 20 participating countries.

[The Indo-Pacific and Middle East Deployment (IMED23)]

The MSDF dispatched minesweeper carriers and other vessels to the Indo-Pacific region and the Middle East from January to May 2023, during which they visited...
ports in Bahrain, Cambodia, and other countries while conducting joint exercises and goodwill exercises with the naval forces of those countries and others. Through this dispatch, Japan demonstrated its deep commitment to stability and prosperity in the region.

[Doshin-Bayanihan 2-22 (Japan-Philippines Bilateral Exercise on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief)]

The ASDF conducted a bilateral exercise with the Philippine Air Force with the aim of improving its HA/DR capabilities and strengthening cooperation with the Philippine Air Force. The exercise involved the conduct of airdrop exercises from the transport aircraft of both countries as well as joint loading and unloading drills.

[Christmas Drop (Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Exercise in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc.)]

The ASDF participated in a HA/DR exercise conducted by the U.S. Air Force in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. The ASDF dispatched transport aircraft to participate in the exercise, during which airdrop training was conducted to drop daily necessities and other donated goods collected by the U.S. military into the waters in and around the Andersen Air Force Base, Republic of Palau, and Federated States of Micronesia to improve the ASDF’s HA/DR capabilities and strengthen cooperation with the participating countries.
Section 2 Establishing the Respective Training Environments

1 Training Environment

Given the increasingly severe security situation surrounding Japan, it is important to work to establish units and other organizations and enhance the quality of the training so that the SDF can exert its capabilities to the fullest.

Because of this, SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet it is necessary to further enhance the training environment in order to maintain and enhance the readiness of the SDF. It is against this background that the SDF is promoting initiatives to enhance the training infrastructure in Japan and abroad to conduct efficient and effective training and exercises.

As part of these efforts, the MOD is working to expand the establishment and utilization of domestic maneuver areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere.

Furthermore, the SDF is also facilitating expanded joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas located in Japan by the SDF while accounting for relations with local communities.

Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas, and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas, such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively.

Elsewhere, facilities are in the process of being established on Mageshima, Kagoshima Prefecture, where the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces will be able to conduct training and other activities.

1 GSDF

Maneuver areas and ranges are unevenly located and do not have sufficient space. Thus, it is challenging for the GSDF to conduct exercises with large units or artillery training with extended-range cannons for example. These constraints tend to grow as equipment is modernized. There are also constraints imposed by the urbanization of the areas surrounding maneuver areas and ranges.

Due to the circumstance, the GSDF conducts live-fire training of surface-to-air guided missile units and surface-to-ship guided missile units in the United States and the like, as it cannot be conducted in Japan.

In addition, it conducts field training exercises at the division and regional army levels by maximizing the use of limited domestic maneuver areas, and also conducts more practical training outside of SDF facilities and areas while obtaining the understanding and cooperation of local communities.

2 MSDF

The timing and location for using sea areas for training are limited by such factors as weather, ocean conditions, marine traffic, and fisheries. Because of this, for example, training that must be conducted in relatively shallow sea areas, such as minesweeping training and submarine rescue training, is being conducted in places such as parts of Mutsu Bay and the Sea of Suonada.

The MSDF also strives to conduct training systematically and efficiently so that a large number of units will be able to produce training results in a short amount of time.

3 ASDF

Currently, since much of the training airspace surrounding Japan is not broad enough, the performance and features of aircraft cannot be fully demonstrated in some trainings. In addition, long trips to and from the training airspace are required in the case of some bases. Furthermore, in operating airports, it is necessary to take great care regarding aircraft noise in conducting early
morning and nighttime flight training. Because of this, the ASDF strives to ensure that its training is systematic and efficient. In the Iwo-To training airspace, for example, aircraft are dispatched successively from the units to conduct training intensively, focusing on training that cannot be conducted sufficiently on the mainland and other exercises.

In addition, it conducts bombing and gunnery training with live ammunition by such means as joint use of USFJ bombing and gunnery areas. Other efforts are being made to utilize the overseas training environment such as the live-fire training for Patriot missiles by anti-aircraft units in the United States.

Reference 70 (List of Maneuver Areas)

2 Initiatives for Safety Management, etc.

The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF constantly strive as one for safety management, such as by implementing the highest level of safety measures and precautions during routine training.

In January 2022, an F-15 fighter aircraft from the JASDF Komatsu Air Base (Ishikawa Prefecture) crashed into the Sea of Japan shortly after takeoff from Komatsu Air Base for night flight training, resulting in the death of two personnel. In June 2022, an investigation into the accident found that one of the main causes of the crash was the possibility that the pilot had suffered from spatial disorientation (in which one’s spatial awareness differs from physical space in reality). In addition, it was also deemed possible that the pilot might have been so focused on radar operations that he was unaware of the aircraft’s orientation until moments before the crash.

In light of this accident, robust efforts will be taken to prevent its recurrence by strengthening education and training related to spatial disorientation while enhancing flight safety through physical means, including the timely and appropriate installation of alarms and other safety devices that serve to alert pilots to any abnormalities in the aircraft’s orientation.

In April 2023, a UH-60JA helicopter (with 10 crew members) from the JGSDF Vice-Camp Takayubaru (Kumamoto Prefecture) was involved in an accident in which it disappeared from radar when flying over the ocean north-northwest of Miyakojima Island, Okinawa, during an aerial reconnaissance. A search is being conducted for the crew and the helicopter, and an investigation into the cause of the accident is underway.

Any accident that may cause injury to Japanese nationals, damage their property, or lead to the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be prevented at all costs. After thoroughly investigating the causes of these accidents, the MOD/SDF will ensure that each and every member of SDF personnel is reminded of the latest safety management guidelines. At the same time, the MOD/SDF as a whole will make every effort to ensure safety in the operation of vessels, aircraft, vehicles, etc., through conducting safety education for SDF personnel and the steady maintenance of equipment, etc., so as to ensure that public confidence is not undermined.
Various activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are hard to implement without the understanding and cooperation of each and every person and local governments. Therefore it is necessary to further deepen the trust between regional society and people, and the SDF.

Section 1  Measures to Harmonize with Local Communities and the Environment

The NDS provides that in order to enable the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan to seamlessly and effectively conduct activities on a daily basis, the MOD will strive to gain the understanding and cooperation of local governments and residents in the areas around the SDF and the U.S. Forces facilities.

To this end, the NDS provides that the MOD/SDF will actively engage in public relations activities on a regular basis regarding the policies and activities of the MOD/SDF, and also the roles of the U.S. Forces in Japan on a regular basis, and coordinate to accommodate the requests and situations of local communities, while fulfilling accountability. At the same time, the MOD/SDF will continue to promote measures to improve the living environment of areas around defense facilities including those against noise to further strengthen the cooperation for the defense of Japan.

Furthermore, in some communities, the existence of SDF units themselves are a major contribution to the communities’ maintenance and vitalization, and in other communities, the SDF’s emergency patient transportation support the community healthcare. In conducting unit reorganization, establishing as well as administering camps and bases, the MOD/SDF will give due consideration to regional characteristics so as to gain understanding of local governments and residents.

1  Supporting Civilian Life

The MOD/SDF conducts activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fields, in response to requests from local governments and relevant organizations. Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and confidence.

The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance and other dangerous explosives found throughout Japan. In FY2022, there were 1,372 cases (approximately 41.9 tons). In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approximately 34% of the total number of cases. The MSDF clears and disposes of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives; in FY2022, there were 3,779 pieces (approximately 2.7 tons) handled.

The SDF not only tries to have interactions with local residents by doing things like opening its camps and bases to the public to the extent that they do not interfere with unit activities, but also provides transportation and other assistance at a variety of athletic events. In addition, it supports regional medical treatment efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF hospitals as well as conducting urgent transport for emergency patients from isolated islands.

REFERENCE: Cooperation between the MOD and local communities
URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/sesaku/index.html
Furthermore, the MOD/SDF promotes various measures in line with national and other policies that contribute to the local economy by ensuring opportunities for local small and medium-sized enterprises to receive orders while taking efficiency into account. Such measures include the promotion of separated/divided ordering, ensuring competition among companies within the same qualification and grade divisions, and the introduction of the open counter method.

**Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF**

*(1) Cooperation on Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Re-employment Support*

Amid the harsh recruitment and employment environment, the cooperation from local governments and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to support the re-employment of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at relatively young ages.

*(2) Support for and Cooperation with SDF Activities*

The SDF camps and bases maintain close relations with regional society, and therefore, various forms of support and cooperation from the local community are indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities, including education and training, and disaster relief. Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international peace cooperation operations and other duties receive support and cooperation from the relevant organizations for the procedures involved.

The MOD/SDF are further strengthening cooperation with relevant entities such as local governments, police and fire services in order to ensure immediate and sure activities by the SDF in various contingencies.

**Measures for Securing the Understanding and Cooperation of Local Governments and Local Residents**

Regional Defense Bureaus established in eight locations nationwide make efforts to build cooperative relationships with their respective local communities, through collaboration with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation Offices. In FY2022, the bureaus provided local communities with explanations on a variety of training and exercises, including Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises, the development of SDF facilities on Mageshima, the temporary deployment of the U.S. Forces’ UAV MQ-9 to Kanoya Air Base, etc. In addition, in order to promote understanding of Japan’s defense policy in general, seminars on defense-related issues were held for local residents and explanations regarding the Defense White Paper and the NSS formulated in December 2022 were provided to local governments and other organizations.

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1 “Basic Policy Regarding Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises on Contracts with the Government, etc., in FY2023” (Cabinet decision on April 25, 2023)
2 For example, this is a method in which grouping of products, etc., takes place when the order is put up for general competitive bidding before a successful bidder is determined for each group.
3 This means that out of the bidding participation eligibility categorized into grade A-D, there is competition between grade C or D only, which comprise mostly small and medium enterprises.
4 A method in which the ordering party publicly announces the procurement details, etc., without specifying the counterparty and solicits quotations from a wide range of interested parties.
Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

1 Features of Defense Facilities and Projects Related to Harmony with the Surrounding Areas

(1) Measures around Defense Facilities
Defense facilities are diverse in their use, and often require large volumes of land. In addition, as of January 1, 2023, approximately 29% of the land area and 30 of the 76 facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the USFJ are jointly used by the SDF in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, with the purpose of enhancing the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. Meanwhile, problems related to restricted establishment and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many of the defense facilities. Also, another problem is that frequent aircraft operations such as takeoffs and landings cause noise and other issues, impacting the living environment of local residential communities.

With that being said, defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable for Japan’s national security. Therefore, in order for the facilities to exert their full function, it is necessary to maintain the conditions for their constant and stable utilization by ensuring harmony between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas and by obtaining the understanding and cooperation of local residents.

For that purpose, the MOD has taken measures to prevent, reduce or mitigate aircraft noise and other impacts caused by activities of the SDF or the USFJ, or by the existence/operations of airfields and other defense facilities in the surrounding areas since 1974 based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Act), etc.

In addition, in order to relieve the impact caused by the existence and operation of defense facilities, subsidies are provided for the development of facilities for stabilizing the everyday lives of residents while Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants are given to municipalities around defense facilities that have particularly significant impact on the living environment. Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants are utilized not only for the development of facilities but also for so-called “soft projects” such as aid for medical expenses.

In 2023, in order to respond with greater precision to the operational modes of specified defense facilities and their impact on surrounding areas, the criteria...
for the calculation of Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants was reviewed, and a new training grant for training of the SDF, the U.S. Forces, etc., at defense facilities other than specified defense facilities was established in view of the diversification of training, etc. In addition, the subsidiary framework has been revised to take into account the actual circumstances of the operation of the SDF, impact on the local area, requests from local communities, etc., by further extending the subsidized projects for the development of facilities for stabilizing the everyday lives of residents based on the requests of local governments, etc.

In response to the requests by the relevant local governments, the MOD continues to study how the measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas should be in an attempt to make them more suitable, effective and efficient, in consideration of the severe fiscal situation.

(2) Grants, etc., to Promote the USFJ Realignment

Over the course of a period of time before and after the implementation of USFJ realignment\(^5\) (10 years in principle), realignment grants\(^6\) are provided to help cover the expenses of projects\(^7\) that contribute to improving the quality of life of residents in local municipalities affected by the realignment and stimulate local industries. These grants are provided in accordance with the progress of the realignment after the Minister of Defense has designated the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment.

As of April 2023, 12 municipalities affected by eight defense facilities are eligible to receive the realignment grants. In order to promote the realignment, additional measures are taken with budgetary provision.

(3) Other Measures

(1) Compensation for Fisheries

The MOD defines the confined water for training, etc. carried out by the SDF or the USFJ using water surface based on laws or a contract and compensates for losses incurred from the restriction.

(2) Base Subsidy, etc.

The MOD provides cooperation by doing such things as providing various information also for the subsidy for municipalities where national defense facilities are

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\(^5\) Approximately 5.5 billion yen in the FY2023 budget

\(^6\) Under the Act on Special Measures for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the United States Forces in Japan, changes in the composition of naval fleets that operate in concert with air wings subject to the realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, with a nuclear aircraft carrier) are treated in the same way as the realignment.

\(^7\) There are 14 specific projects as stipulated in Article 2 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the Act on Special Measures for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the United States Forces in Japan, including education, sports, and cultural projects.
located (“Base Subsidy”), and the Adjustment Grants for municipalities where defense facilities are located (“Adjustment Grants”), both of which are under the defense facilities-related subsidy system under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

The Base Subsidy was established in view of the fact that the facilities used by the U.S. Forces and the SDF such as airports have a significant impact on the finances of municipalities. The subsidy generally takes the form of a substitute for fixed property tax and is granted to municipalities where these facilities are located.

The Adjustment Grants are provided to municipalities where USFJ properties are located in view of the fact that such properties are exempt from fixed property tax, and U.S. military personnel and civilian employees are exempt from municipal tax, etc.

### 2 Efforts to Develop Understanding and Cooperation Concerning the Stationing of the USFJ

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, maintaining the presence of the USFJ and its readiness is vitally important for ensuring the security of Japan. For stable stationing of the USFJ, it is essential to obtain the understanding and cooperation of local governments and residents in the vicinity of defense facilities. Various efforts will continue to be undertaken tirelessly in this regard.

#### (1) Coordination with Local Governments, etc., for Unit Operations of the USFJ

The MOD is working to promote understanding among local communities regarding the maintenance of USFJ facilities and unit operations by providing prior explanation to the relevant local governments and residents in the event of any USFJ realignment, training, unit deployment, new equipment deployment, etc.

#### (2) Ensuring Safety during USFJ Operations

Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations. The Government has been fully communicating its approach to the U.S. side,
including at summit and ministerial levels, with the two countries cooperating to ensure safe operations as a top priority.

In the event of a crash or missing parts, etc., of a U.S. military aircraft, the MOD requests the United States to promptly provide information and adopt rigorous measures for safety management and recurrence prevention. The MOD then promptly explains the obtained information to the relevant local governments, etc., and adopts measures to ensure prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage incurred.

In addition, Japan and the United States have established guidelines\textsuperscript{8} for aircraft accidents and will take prompt and appropriate action in response to the situation in the scenario of a crash of a U.S. military aircraft outside of the facilities/areas of the U.S. Forces within Japan.

In addition, with regard to accidents/incidents caused by the consumption of alcohol by U.S. military personnel, etc., the MOD has requested the U.S. side on multiple occasions to tighten discipline and conduct personnel education.

The U.S. side, for its part, has taken measures such as putting in its place guidelines for off-duty activities (liberty policy), including imposing restrictions on the consumption of alcohol at night as well as curfews for U.S. military personnel under the age of 19. Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate to prevent the recurrence of incidents related to drinking.

(3) Promoting Exchange between the USFJ and Local Residents

The MOD holds a Japan-U.S. exchange program to deepen mutual understanding between Japan and the United States with the understanding and cooperation of the local governments and U.S. Forces. Under the program, residents living near USFJ facilities and areas together with USFJ personnel enjoy sports, music and cultural exchanges.

The USFJ also has initiatives to deepen mutual understanding with people of the local communities, which include opening up of its bases (Friendship day) and information provision through websites and social media.

5 Participation in National Events

The SDF presents ceremonies including guards of honor, lining up and gun salutes to the Emperor, state guests and others at national events. A guard of honor to state guests from foreign countries at their welcome reception is essential for diplomatic protocol.

On September 27, 2022, approximately 1,390 SDF personnel participated in the state funeral of former Prime Minister ABE Shinzo to perform guard of honor, line-up, funeral salutes, and music.

6 Support for the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition

The SDF has been providing transportation for personnel and supplies and other cooperation for the scientific research in Antarctica conducted by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) since 1965, when Antarctic research was resumed, with the icebreaker JS Fuji, since 1983 with

\textsuperscript{8} Official title: Guidelines regarding Off-Base U.S. Military Aircraft Accidents in Japan.
icebreaker JS Shirase, and since 2009 with the second-generation icebreaker JS Shirase.

For the 64th Antarctic Research Expedition from November 2022 to April 2023, the SDF provided support for the transportation of a total of 142 people and approximately 1,120 tons of supplies, support for sea and land observations, and support for base construction.

![See Reference 74 (Achievements of Antarctic Research Expedition)](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/drone/list.html)

### 7 Civil Engineering Consignments from Third Parties

The SDF receives consignments of civil engineering projects, etc., conducted by the state and local governments when the projects conform to the purpose of the SDF training. The GSDF, since its establishment, has received 8,271 consignments of civil engineering projects from third parties.

![See Reference 75 (External Construction Project Achievements)](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/drone/list_zaibeigun.html)

### 8 Other Initiatives

#### 1 Response to Laser Irradiation and Kite Flying towards SDF and U.S. Forces Aircraft

There have been cases of SDF and U.S. Forces aircraft being interfered by laser irradiation and kite flying during flight operations. These extremely dangerous and malicious acts could disrupt a pilot’s ability to operate the aircraft, which could result in a catastrophe, such as plane crash. Therefore, the MOD works closely with relevant local governments to disseminate information to local residents regarding the risks involved in these acts by putting up posters and requesting to report to the police. Additionally, the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Act was revised in December 2016, making these interference acts subject to regulation as well as fines and other penalties.

#### 2 Response to Flight Activities over Defense Facilities and Surrounding Airspace, including Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

In recent years there have been terror small drones, including commercial drones, some of which are targeted at military facilities. Given such circumstances, there is a possibility of drone terror attacks in Japan on SDF/USFJ facilities and areas, which if attacked, would seriously affect the function of the national security defense foundation. To address such concerns, the Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs around and over Key Facilities (commonly known as the “Drone Act”) came into effect on June 13, 2019, to prohibit small drones from flying over and around SDF/USFJ facilities and areas designated by the Minister of Defense. As of the end of March 2023, 260 SDF facilities, including areas of SDF Headquarters and 45 USFJ facilities and areas have been designated as No Drone Zone.

REFERENCE: List of designated defense-related facilities under the Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs around and over Key Facilities

List of SDF facilities: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/drone/list.html

List of USFJ facilities and areas: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/drone/list_zai.html
3 Response to the Act on Review and Regulation of Real Estate Usage

In line with the previous iteration of the NSS formulated in December 2013, which called for Japan to review issues related to the use of land in areas such as the areas surrounding defense facilities from the standpoint of national security, the MOD has been conducting research since FY2013 to ensure a systematic understanding of the situation of land ownership in areas surrounding defense facilities.

In July 2020, the Basic Policies on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2020 (so-called “Basic Policies 2020”; approved by the Cabinet on July 17, 2020) called for the Government to ascertain the status of land ownership through information gathering by the relevant ministries and agencies from the standpoint of national security, examine the approach to land use and management, and adopt the necessary measures. In response to this Cabinet decision, the Advisory Panel on Assessment of the Actual State of Land Use was established under the Cabinet Secretariat, and the Act on the Review and Regulation of the Use of Real Estate Surrounding Important Facilities and on Remote Territorial Islands (so-called “Important Real Estate Review Act”) was drafted based on the recommendations of the Advisory Panel. The Act was promulgated on June 23, 2021, and came into effect on September 20, 2022.

A Basic Policy to prevent the use of real estate that impedes the functions of important facilities and remote territorial islands was approved by the Cabinet in September 2022, and the first area designation was publicly announced in December 2022. The areas surrounding some defense-related facilities have been designated as “monitored areas” and “special monitored areas.”

This Act has major significance from the perspective of ensuring that defense-related facilities, which constitute the foundation of Japan’s national defense, are able to function properly. The MOD will adopt the appropriate measures in this regard in cooperation with the Cabinet Office.
Under the Act on the Review and Regulation of the Use of Real Estate Surrounding Important Facilities and on Remote Territorial Islands, the Cabinet Office designates areas around facilities that are important for national security ("important facilities") and areas within remote territorial islands as "monitored areas" or "special monitored areas," and reviews the use of real estate and buildings in these areas. If the Cabinet Office identifies any acts that impede the functions of important facilities and remote territorial islands (adverse acts), it recommends or orders the real estate user to stop the adverse acts.

The designation of areas is as follows. "Monitored areas" are areas within a range of approximately 1,000 meters from the premises of important facilities or areas within remote territorial islands, if it is particularly necessary to prevent real estate (land and buildings) in those areas from being used for adverse acts. "Special monitored areas" are monitored areas covering special facilities and remote territorial islands that are particularly important or vulnerable to impediment, and that are difficult to be substituted with other important facilities or remote territorial islands.

This law went into full effect on September 20, 2022, and the first area designation (Public Notice of Cabinet Office No. 121 of 2022) was publicly announced on December 27, 2022. The designation included 15 defense-related facilities located in the prefectures of Hokkaido, Shimane, and Nagasaki.

- Important facilities: Defense-related facilities (facilities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan), Japan Coast Guard facilities, and facilities related to their daily life

[Website of the Cabinet Office]  
https://www.cao.go.jp/tochi-chosa

[Call Center for the Act]  
Tel: 0570-001-125 (Weekday hours: 9:30–17:30)
A sense of crisis regarding the sustainability of the global environment has been mounting internationally. Countries around the world have been making efforts on this front following the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the United Nations and the Paris Agreement, an international framework on climate change, in 2015.

Japan has also formulated the Fifth Basic Environment Plan, which was approved by the Cabinet in 2018, and has been working to realize a sustainable society while expressing its intention to further accelerate initiatives in Japan and abroad. In addition, the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures and the Climate Change Adaptation Plan were approved by the Cabinet in October 2021, and specific climate change measures aimed at achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 as well as the targets for FY2030 are underway.

In response to the acceleration of domestic and overseas efforts, the MOD, as a member of the Government, also needs to respond to various climate change and environmental issues and contribute to their resolution while implementing measures with a greater focus on the coexistence of SDF/USFJ facilities/areas with the surrounding areas.

In addition, it is inevitable that the issue of climate change will have an even greater impact on future MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, and defense equipment, as well as on the security environment surrounding Japan, including responses to future energy shifts, all of which must be addressed in an appropriate manner.

Part I, Chapter 4, Section 7 (Impact of Climate Change on the Security Environment and the Military)

1 Efforts Related to MOD/SDF Facilities

As a member of the Government, the MOD has complied with the laws and regulations related to the environment and strived to be thorough in protecting the environment and to reduce the burden on the environment. It will work to promote initiatives related to the environment under the “Policy of the Ministry of Defense on Consideration for the Environment.” In FY2021, the MOD established the Environmental Policy Division in its Internal Bureau to take charge of the overall environmental policy of the MOD/SDF, and in FY2022, the MOD established environmental affairs offices in Regional Defense Bureaus across Japan as part of its efforts to develop the necessary infrastructure to address environmental issues in a centralized and effective manner and to continue working to promote further measures.

1 The Ministry of Defense’s Response Strategy on Climate Change

The growing trend toward viewing climate change as a security issue is spreading among defense organizations globally, including the UN Security Council. In May 2021, the MOD established the MOD Climate Change Taskforce to evaluate and analyze the impact of climate change on Japan’s national security and to extensively study the measures required to address this issue.

In August 2022, the MOD formulated the Ministry of Defense’s Response Strategy on Climate Change. This document sets forth the specific measures that the MOD should promote going forward to appropriately adapt and respond to the direct and indirect effects of climate change.
change in the future. The MOD will promote measures aimed at addressing climate change while maintaining and reinforcing Japan’s defense capabilities in line with the document.

### 2 Procuring Renewable Energy Electricity

As the largest consumer of electricity among government institutions (accounting for approximately 40% of the total government consumption), the MOD/SDF, which has approximately 250,000 SDF personnel and operates facilities and various equipment all around Japan, has actively promoted the procurement of electricity generated by renewable energy sources (hereinafter “renewable energy electricity”) for MOD/SDF facilities since FY2020 in order to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and other goals.

In FY2023, the MOD held 969 contracts related to the procurement of electricity for its facilities, etc., nationwide, of which 50 facilities, etc., procured renewable energy electricity. Furthermore, 36 facilities, etc., procured 100% of their electricity from renewable energy sources. The amount of renewable energy electricity procured in FY2023 is expected to be around 90 million kWh (annual electricity consumption of more than 20,000 general households). This means that approximately 7% of all electricity expected to be used by the MOD/SDF in FY2023 (approximately 1.29 billion kWh) will be procured in the form of renewable energy electricity. The amount of renewable energy electricity procured in FY2023 declined significantly from the previous fiscal year due to further spikes in the price of electricity as a result of the tight supply and demand of electricity and the rising prices of LNG and crude oil due to the fallout from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. However, as a member of the Government, the MOD will continue to make efforts to increase the ratio of renewable energy electricity.

#### Fig. IV–4–2–1 (FY2023 List of Facilities That Have Introduced Renewable Energy (Top 10 Facilities by Estimated Energy Consumption on a Contract Basis))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of facility, etc.</th>
<th>Estimated energy consumption</th>
<th>Renewable energy ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSDF Camp Mishuku</td>
<td>13,911,336kWh</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA Radar area of ASDF Hofukita Air Base</td>
<td>11,476,000kWh</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF Matsushima Air Base</td>
<td>7,849,000kWh</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Systems Research Center (Meguro area)</td>
<td>7,496,651kWh</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF Camp Jinmachi</td>
<td>6,535,000kWh</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF Komatsu Air Base (Residential area)</td>
<td>6,185,532kWh</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF Komatsu Air Base (Operational area)</td>
<td>5,779,402kWh</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF Camp Moriyama</td>
<td>5,343,636kWh</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF Camp Nerima</td>
<td>4,952,098kWh</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF Hofukita Air Base</td>
<td>4,883,000kWh</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3 Balancing Renewable Energy Electricity and Security

The introduction of renewable sources of energy, including wind power, is being promoted in response to the issue of climate change, and wind power generation facilities are expected to increase. Depending on the location and height of these wind power generation facilities, they may potentially impact the activities of the SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan by blocking radio waves emitted by warning and control radars and making it difficult to detect aircraft and missiles, etc. Because of this potential impact, the MOD/SDF coordinates with project operators and other related parties meticulously from the early stages of project planning.

Furthermore, the NDS stipulates the need for Japan to establish an effective mechanism to balance its defense requirements with socioeconomic activities such as the installation of wind power generation facilities so that its defense-related facilities can function fully through

**REFERENCE:** Impact of wind power generation facilities on the operations of the SDF/USFJ and Requests to related business operators

unimpeded utilization of sea, airspace, and radio wave. In line with this, the MOD will continue to promote measures to balance renewable energy electricity with Japan’s national security while avoiding any adverse impact on the activities of the SDF/USFJ due to the installation of wind power generation facilities.

The MOD has established the Action Plan for PFOS Disposal for aqueous film-forming foam containing PFOS and is expeditiously working on the replacement and disposal of PFOS, which it aims to complete by the end of FY2023.

In addition, the analysis results of water in the dedicated tanks of SDF facilities nationwide where aqueous film-forming foam containing PFOS was or may have been used in the past were made public in July 2022. Following this investigation, the water in tanks in which PFOS, etc., has been detected will continue to be managed appropriately, and its disposal has been carried out progressively since FY2022.

USFJ is committed to the appropriate environmental management to protect the environment in the surrounding areas and ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel and residents in the surrounding areas according to the Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship and the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) established by USFJ.

In USFJ facilities and areas, efforts are made to save utilities, which include changes to energy-efficient heating/ventilation/air-conditioning equipment; installation of motion sensors for lights-out during absence; installation of solar panels; reduction of the period to use cooling/heating equipment and review of the preset temperature; and control of lighting and lights-out for night lighting, for example.

USFJ has been briefed on the completion of the replacement of aqueous film-forming foam at all U.S. Army facilities in Honshu as well as at all U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines facilities in Japan. USFJ as a whole is progressively replacing the aqueous film-forming foam in its possession.

In addition, the Government, together with the relevant local governments and in accordance with the Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship, entered the respective facilities at U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, during a leakage of wastewater containing PFOS and other substances in May 2022 and at Atsugi Air Base during a leakage of water containing aqueous film-forming foam in September 2022. The MOD will continue to cooperate closely with the relevant ministries and agencies, related local governments, and the U.S. side, and take necessary measures.

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1 PFOS is an organic fluorine compound with water-repellent, oil-repellent, and heat-resistant properties that has hitherto been used in aqueous film-forming foam, semiconductors, and metal plating.
In Japan, the progression of climate change is predicted to cause more severe and more frequent disasters and extreme temperatures in the future. In turn, this is anticipated to impact bases and other facilities, defense equipment, SDF operations, and the health of SDF personnel, as well as to cause various restrictions, obstacles, and hindrances to the activities of the SDF. Climate change also poses a security risk to many parts of the world, as it may lead to water and food shortages and the deterioration of living conditions, which in turn could lead to the large-scale displacement of populations, conflicts over limited land and resources, and the exacerbation of social and political tensions. Thus, the issue of climate change has become a security issue that affects Japan, including our response to future energy shifts.

In August 2022, the MOD formulated the “Ministry of Defense Strategy on Climate Change” with the objective of appropriately addressing the future direct and indirect impacts of climate change in order to enable the MOD and the SDF to continue to fulfill their missions and roles regardless of the environment expected in the future. This strategy identifies ten specific measures for the MOD to promote in the future with the aim of addressing climate change while simultaneously maintaining and reinforcing Japan’s defense capabilities.

Under this strategy, the MOD intends to simultaneously address climate change and maintain and enhance defense capabilities, based on the belief that addressing climate change is an opportunity for Japan to become more resilient and better equipped with more efficient facilities and equipment for the future.

In November 2022, the ASDF used Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF)* for the first time when operating government aircraft. (SAF was also used for operations in January 2023.)

*Fuel made mainly from biomass-derived raw materials and used cooking oil
As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible publicity relations activities in a proactive manner for gaining the trust and cooperation of the public.

Hence, the MOD/SDF will be more proactive in undertaking public relations activities in a variety of ways that are easily comprehensible to the public.

In addition, given that understanding and support from foreign countries are also of utmost importance for the SDF to conduct its operations successfully, it is essential that the MOD strengthens efforts to provide information to the international community about MOD/SDF initiatives, including SDF activities abroad.

### 1 Providing Information Both Domestically and Internationally

The MOD/SDF conducts active PR activities through official websites, Social Networking Services and video distribution, utilizing the Internet.

The MOD has also been making great efforts to furnish accurate information in a more extensive and timely fashion by creating brochures and PR videos, as well as providing assistance in editing the PR magazine “MAMOR,” and cooperation on media coverage, lectures and talks, etc.

Furthermore, as MOD/SDF’s activities reach out worldwide, it is important to accurately publicize those activities to the international community and secure the understanding and trust of the respective countries. As efforts for this purpose, the MOD/SDF is providing information in English and, is further upgrading the MOD’s English-website and actively distributing timely, easy-to-understand information through social media in English. Moreover, the MOD/SDF engages in PR activities toward the international community by various means, such as providing coverage opportunities for the overseas media, providing an English version of the Defense White Paper, and issuing the English PR pamphlet “Japan Defense Focus” (JDF).

### 2 Events and PR Facilities

The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise, cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and Blue Impulse demonstration flights by the ASDF. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on occasions such as the anniversary of the unit’s foundation. Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the SDF’s anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is

Blue Impulse conducts its first demonstration flight over a remote island in Okinawa (Miyakojima Island)
In FY2022, the year marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF), the MSDF held its first fleet review in seven years since FY2015. This particular fleet review, however, was positioned as an International Fleet Review co-hosted by the 18th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which is the only multilateral naval cooperation framework in the region. As the current chair of the WPNS, Japan hosted the International Fleet Review in Japan for the second time in 20 years.

On November 6, 38 naval vessels and 34 aircraft, including 18 naval vessels and six aircraft from 13 WPNS member countries, participated in the review in Sagami Bay under clear autumn skies. Prime Minister Kishida Fumio was welcomed aboard the Destroyer JS “Izumo” for the review, and he was joined onboard by the chiefs of the naval staffs of the WPNS member countries and ambassadors and military officers stationed in Japan from various countries. By live-streaming this event to the entire world, the high morale of the MSDF and the strength of Japan’s collaboration and solidarity with the participating navies were widely communicated to people in Japan and abroad.

Furthermore, since this year’s event took place without spectators, the 16-day period from October 29 to November 13 was designated “Fleet Week,” during which time public relations events such as open ship tours, concerts with military bands, and a parade in Yokosuka City were intensively held to gain public understanding and confidence in the MSDF and in the navies of the countries participating in the International Fleet Review.

The MOD has also actively opens its PR facilities to the public. The number of visitors who participated in tours of the MOD’s PR facilities at Ichigaya district (Ichigayadai Tour), where the underground bunker of the Imperial General Headquarters is now open to the public, reached approximately 478,100 as of the end of March 2023. Each SDF service also has PR facilities and archives, and other facilities open to the public.

### 3 Enlistment Experience Programs
The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours for women as well as undergraduate and graduate students, and Enlistment Experience Programs for groups.

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1. The SDF Marching Festival had been canceled in FY2020 and FY2021 in view of the COVID-19 situation but was held in FY2022 after the necessary safety precautions to prevent COVID-19 transmission.
2. Application for various SDF Life Experience Tours are accepted through the MOD/SDF website.
companies, and other organizations.3 These programs are intended to promote participants’ understanding of the SDF by offering opportunities to experience the daily life and training of the SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel.

Democracy, which is the most important system of the country, is founded on the principle that the public has access to accurate information, thereby making appropriate judgment and exercise of sovereignty. Administrative documents held by the government are of the utmost importance for the public’s access to accurate information. For this reason it is an important responsibility for the government, including the MOD/SDF, to manage information in an appropriate manner and appropriately respond to the public’s disclosure requests for administrative documents.

The MOD/SDF takes it seriously that the issues over daily reports in South Sudan and Iraq brought about the public’s distrust in the MOD/SDF. The MOD/SDF is making full effort to prevent recurrence in line with the “Measures for Ensuring Appropriate Management of Public Records” (Adopted by the Ministerial Council on the Management of Administrative Documents and Related Matters on July 20, 2018), which compiles the measures necessary for proper management of public records and archives by the entire government. The MOD/SDF is also working for proper management and responding to disclosure requests for administrative documents by reforming the awareness of personnel and the organizational culture, the checking framework, for example.

Reference 77 (Record of Disclosure of Administrative Documents by the Ministry of Defense [FY2022])

The MOD is promoting initiatives for EBPM in coordination with its policy evaluation system, etc. under the Director-General for Evidence-based Policymaking, who is in charge of EBPM initiatives.

These tours are designed for participants to experience everyday life of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. They are held upon request by private companies and other organizations through the Provincial Cooperation Offices.
3 Initiatives for the Personal Data Protection System

In light of respecting individual rights and interests in line with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information, the MOD takes measures to manage the security of personal information under its control and responds appropriately to requests for the disclosure of such information.

4 Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower Protection System

The MOD sets up a system to handle whistleblowing made by its officials, employees and outside workers, establishing internal and external contact desks to deal with whistleblowing and to protect whistleblowers.
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