

Delegating Direct Democracy: Interparty Legislative Competition and the Adoption of the Initiative in the American States

DANIEL A. SMITH and DUSTIN FRIDKIN *University of Florida*

Between 1898 and 1918, voters in 20 American states adopted constitutional amendments granting citizens the power of the initiative. The embrace of direct democracy by voters invites inquiry into why some state legislatures opted to delegate to citizens the power of the initiative, while others did not. Drawing on an original data set, this article uses Event History Analysis hazard models to explain the puzzle of why legislatures might devolve institutional power to citizens. Our longitudinal, macrolevel analysis of socioeconomic and political forces reveals that political considerations—interparty legislative competition, party organizational strength, and third parties—are the most powerful predictors of a legislature’s decision to refer the initiative to the ballot. Although several of our findings comport with the conventional wisdom explaining the adoption of the initiative during the Progressive Era, others are surprising, offering us new theoretical insights into why and when legislative bodies might be willing to divest themselves of their institutional power.

This article attempts to fill a scholarly void by addressing one of the most momentous institutional changes of the Progressive Era in the United States—the decision by some state legislatures to devolve broad lawmaking powers to citizens. In 1898, South Dakota voters became the first in any American state to approve a constitutional amendment granting citizens the power of the initiative.¹ By 1918, voters in twenty states had followed suit, adopting similar direct democracy mechanisms at the polls. However, before citizens could amend their state constitutions to grant themselves a direct role in the lawmaking process, they were largely at the mercy of their state legislatures to refer a measure to the ballot giving them that opportunity.² The embrace of the initiative by voters at the polls, then, poses an important question to scholars

of institutional development and legislative behavior: Why did some state legislatures choose to devolve institutional power by delegating to citizens the power of the initiative, while others did not? In our examination of the macrolevel conditions that precipitated one of the most momentous delegations of institutional power by state legislatures, we find that political conditions, most notably, interparty legislative competition, as well as party organizational strength and the presence of third parties, are crucial to any understanding of why some legislatures willingly acceded power to citizens.

In explaining why some American states adopted direct democracy reforms during the Progressive Era, this article has broad theoretical implications for scholarship on legislative behavior, institutional change, and the development of the American state. We begin by briefly addressing some concerns with the historiography of the Progressive Era, temporality, and case selection in regard to the question of the adoption of the initiative in the American states. We then offer a theory of interparty legislative competition to help explain why legislatures might delegate institutional power to citizens. In many respects, our analysis challenges the dominant historical narrative of why the plebiscitary process was adopted in some American states a century ago, as we argue that the initiative was not the by-product of an endogenous, uniquely western political culture or particular set socioeconomic conditions, as other scholars have suggested (Goebel 2002; Magleby 1984; Persily 1997; Price 1975; Schmidt 1989).³ Although today the initiative is employed with great frequency in states west of the Mississippi, we argue that the mechanism of direct democracy was not the consequence of a regional brand of populism. Rather, once the dynamics of interparty legislative competition and other political considerations are accounted for, we

Daniel A. Smith is Associate Professor, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-7325. E-mail: dasmith@polisci.ufl.edu

Dustin Fridkin is a doctoral candidate, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-7325. E-mail: dfridkin@polisci.ufl.edu

We want to thank Fred Boehmke, Brenda Chalfin, Larry Dodd, Michael Heaney, Simon Jackman, Thad Kousser, Bryon Moraski, Beth Rosenson, Richard Scher, Ben Smith, Jordan Ragusa, Caroline Tolbert, Ken Wald, and, especially, Larry Kenny, Michael Martinez, and Won-ho Park for their timely feedback and methodological acumen. We also appreciate the faculty and graduate students at the University of Iowa who provided constructive comments as part of the Bose Lecture Series. Larry Kenny, Lee Ann Banazak, and Jocelyn Crowley generously shared with us their historical data. We extend our sincere thanks, too, to Karen Orren and her fellow APSR editors, and the three reviewers who provided us with invaluable insights. Finally, Smith wants to thank Richard White and the Bill Lane Center for the Study of the American West at Stanford University for generous institutional support.

¹ The initiative allows citizens to place either a statutory or a constitutional amendment measure on the ballot for fellow citizens to adopt or reject after they collect via petition a specified number of valid signatures. Many of these same state legislatures also referred to the ballot the popular referendum, which allows citizens to reject laws passed by the legislature using a similar process as the initiative, as well as the power to recall elected officials.

² As documented here, in a few states constitutional amendments to permit direct democracy (including the initiative) were placed before voters via constitutional conventions or the admission into the Union.

³ Goebel (2002, 132), for example, asserts that the reform movement, “never very strong to begin with, evaporated around 1920. As a result, direct democracy would remain a regionalized phenomenon tied to the specific political cultures of the American West.”

find that lawmakers in the West were no more likely than those in other states to cede to citizens the institution of direct democracy. After detailing our empirical findings, we conclude by discussing how our macrolevel analysis of the adoption of the initiative raises some methodological questions about the conduct of historical research, as well as informs the scholarly debate over institution building during the Progressive Era in the American states.

Empirically, our findings are grounded in an original data set that we compiled from primary and secondary sources from the Populist and Progressive eras. We use an Event History Analysis (EHA) hazard model to test alternative hypotheses for why and when some state legislatures decided to refer the initiative to the ballot. In fleshing out the historical record, we examine an array of factors that may have conditioned the decision of some state legislatures to surrender their agenda-setting and policy-making authority to the citizenry. Our longitudinal, cross-state, macrolevel analysis suggests that, all else equal, political factors are the most powerful predictors for the legislative decision to devolve power. Although some of our empirical findings comport with the conventional story told by historians of why the initiative was adopted in some states, our emphasis on interparty competition in state legislatures is novel, providing new insights into why and when legislatures might be willing to divest themselves of their institutional power.

ADOPTING DIRECT DEMOCRACY: TEMPORALITY AND CASE SELECTION CONCERNS

Although much of the groundwork for the building of the new American state at the national level was laid during the Progressive Era (Carpenter 2001; Kolko 1963; Link and McCormick 1983; McDonagh 1992; Sklar 1998; Skocpol 1992; Skowronek 1982; Wiebe 1967), with few exceptions (Hays 1964; Huthmacher 1962), little scholarly attention has focused on the seemingly contradictory devolution of institutional power to citizens at the subnational level that resulted from the adoption of direct democracy reforms. Most notably, scholars have yet to adequately explain why nearly half the state legislatures decided to divest themselves of their monopoly control over lawmaking during this era, a development that appears to run against the expansive tide of institutionalization that centralized and consolidated governing authorities. This countercurrent has escaped the scrutiny of scholars examining the origins of the administrative state and progressive politics at the subnational level during the period (Clemens 1997; Mattson 1998; Sanders 1999; Thelen 1969), as well as scholars examining the popular adoption of direct democracy reforms during the Progressive Era (Cain and Miller 2001; Ellis 2002; Goebel 2002; Milkis and Tichenor 1994; Persily 1997; Piott 1992, 2003; Schmidt 1989; Smith and Tolbert 2004; Spoonholtz 1973; Tolbert 2003). Because the initiative spread rapidly across much of the West

in the early twentieth century (Figure 1), scholars have concluded that younger states with a strong history of populism and antimonopoly sentiments, more homogenous populations (e.g., fewer blacks or foreigners), more radical (but weaker) political parties, and stronger interest groups were the most likely to adopt the initiative.

Although piquing our interest in the reasons why citizens in some states adopted direct democracy, these studies have limited explanatory power for two reasons. First, the question of why some voters adopted the initiative is temporally a second-order concern. Before citizens had the opportunity to approve or reject the power of the initiative at the polls, an amendment to the state constitution first had to be placed on the statewide ballot. In most states, the decision to refer such an amendment was left in the hands of the state legislature. Thus, analyses of the popular vote to adopt the initiative (Anderson 2005; Bowler and Donovan 2006; Bowler, Donovan, and Lawrence 2005; Bridges and Kousser 2005) elide the question of why some state legislatures initially referred a constitutional amendment to the ballot allowing citizens the right to vote to adopt the initiative. In short, why did some legislatures seemingly act against their institutional self-interest by choosing to devolve power to citizens?

Second, as rich and detailed as they may be, historical case studies (Goebel 2002; Piott 2003; Schmidt 1989; Spoonholtz 1973) of states that adopted the initiative during the Progressive Era suffer from an inherent bias in case selection that limits their generalizability, as they retell the story of the diffusion of the initiative by drawing exclusively on the experiences of those states that adopted the mechanism (Geddes 1990). With few exceptions, scholars have not investigated why constitutional amendments allowing citizens to vote on direct democracy were *kept off* the ballot in more than half of the states.⁴ The history of why the initiative was not adopted in Alabama, Indiana, or Vermont, to note a few, has yet to be told, and there is no compelling explanation for why a state like Missouri, for example, adopted direct democracy reforms, while neighboring Kansas (a hotbed of populist sentiment) did not. Although it is a truism that the recounting of the past reflects the views of the victor and highlights triumphal events, attempts at explaining why a reform did not spread evenly across the states would seem to invite a more detailed consideration of the null cases. Accounting for the conditions that led to a state legislature's decision *not* to place a referendum on the ballot seems vital if we are to explain the spread of the initiative. For us, the key to explaining the timing and spread of the initiative across the American states is to examine the socioeconomic and political conditions in *all* states.

⁴ For exceptions, see Kerber's (1994) study of the failure of the initiative in Florida and Goebel's (2002) brief discussion of failure of reform in New Jersey. In his encyclopedic account of the adoption of direct democracy in sixteen states, Piott (2003, 51–53, 229) offers only two footnotes describing the failed efforts in a few states that did not adopt the initiative.

FIGURE 1. State Adoption of the Initiative, 1898–1918





FIGURE 2. Legislature’s Determinative Vote to Refer Initiative to Ballot, 1897–1918



THE TIMING OF THE LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL OF THE INITIATIVE TO THE BALLOT

Figure 2 documents the first time a state legislature between 1897 and 1918 referred a constitutional amend-

ment granting citizens the power of the initiative to the statewide ballot. Notably, the map highlights several states that are typically omitted from lists of direct democracy adopters. Texas, for example, is included among the 20 states, although in 1914 the statewide electorate rejected an amendment placed on the ballot

by the state legislature the previous year that would have granted citizens the power of the initiative. Likewise, Minnesota is included in Figure 2. The Minnesota legislature referred a measure on the ballot in 1913, only to have it rejected at the polls the following year because the measure failed to attract a majority of all those who voted in the election, as was required by the state constitution (Schmidt 1989, 18). Florida, which eventually adopted the initiative in 1968, is also included in Figure 2. In 1911, the state legislature approved by a wide margin a legislative referendum granting citizens the power of the initiative, but over the summer the governor conspired to keep the measure off the November ballot (Kerber 1994). Several legislatures, including those in Minnesota, Missouri, and Mississippi, referred direct democracy amendments to the ballot multiple times (Galbreath 1912, 84–87; Schmidt 1989, 16–17). For our purposes here, though, our inquiry is limited to the conditions that led to a state legislature's initial decision to devolve power to the citizenry.⁵

Although they are not highlighted in Figure 2, our analysis includes three states that adopted the initiative by means other than legislative referral. Citizens in Michigan (1908), Ohio (1912), and Massachusetts (1918) voted to adopt the initiative after delegates to their respective state constitutional conventions placed the reform mechanism on the statewide ballot. Although the legislatures in these states never placed a referendum on the ballot, we nevertheless include them in our study, because lawmakers could have referred a measure to the ballot prior to the action of the constitutional conventions. Our analysis excludes two states entirely—Oklahoma (1907) and Arizona (1911)—as they entered the Union with constitutions that incorporated the power of the initiative.⁶ Legislative action in Oklahoma and Arizona was thus preempted by statehood; lawmakers were not afforded the opportunity to devolve power to citizens because the initiative was part of their original state constitutions. As such, the two cases offer no analytic leverage on the question of legislative devolution of power.

INTERPARTY LEGISLATIVE COMPETITION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

In explaining why some state lawmakers decided to refer to the statewide ballot an amendment providing for direct democracy, we suggest that legislative competition between the parties may have played a key role in the decision of lawmakers to devolve institutional power to citizens. Highlighting the importance of interparty legislative competition has a long-standing

⁵ As with the legislative requirement to have successive votes prior to a constitutional amendment being placed on the ballot, we are not particularly concerned whether a state's legislative rules and procedures required a supermajority vote on a proposed referendum. Several states had such a requirement, but party leaders and individual legislators likely took such supermajority requirements into consideration when deciding to place a referendum on the ballot.

⁶ Alaska and Hawaii did not exist as states during the time period of study (1897–1918).

tradition in the study of subnational politics in the United States. Beginning with the seminal work of Key (1949), there is broad scholarly agreement that competition between the two major parties in the American states has been instrumental in the passage of political reforms (Cnudde and McCrone 1969; Key 1956; Keyssar 2002; Mayhew 1986; Morehouse and Jewell 2004; Rosenson 2005; Sharkansky and Hofferbert 1969; Shefter 1994; Skocpol et al. 1993; Ware 2002).⁷ As Key (1956) observed, state governments produce different kinds of public policies, depending on the dynamics of party strength, organization, and interparty competition. In particular, heightened competition among parties may lead to public policies that are more representative of the desires of the whole population of a state, rather than just those of the ruling elites. For Key and others who have empirically tested this proposition (Alt and Lowry 1994; Barrilleux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993; Mayhew 1986), low levels of party competition or the possibility of electoral defeat may inoculate majority party legislators from having to represent the median voter. Increased interparty competition, however, may force legislators to pay attention to the demands of their constituents.

In contrast to scholarship examining the development (and suppression) of minority rights in legislatures (Binder 1997; Dion 1997), our study focuses instead on the positive, proactive role that minority parties can play when it comes to institutional reform. Going beyond explanations of changes in public policy to the alteration of political institutions, we argue that as a majority party's control over the state legislature becomes attenuated, it may become easier for the minority party (and/or third parties) to induce majority party members to cater to the median voter, even if it means supporting institution-weakening reforms.⁸ Of course, this begs another question of why any party, including minority and third parties, might support reforms—even with the goal of short-term political gain—that may conceivably weaken the political institution they seek to control. Because power in legislatures is not evenly distributed among legislators, but rather accrues to those in the majority party (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rhode 1991), we argue that members of minority parties may have a strong rationale for pursuing institution-weakening reforms. Insofar as a legislature can be construed as an instrument of the majority party, any weakening of the power of the legislature is simultaneously a weakening of the power of the majority

⁷ Shefter (1994) argues, in contrast, that states with one-party systems following the realigning election of 1896 were actually more likely to adopt progressive reforms because there was more flexibility within the dominant parties to experiment with new ideas.

⁸ Although there is an open debate in the political science literature concerning the extent to which parties do (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rhode 1991) or do not (Krehbiel 1998) matter when explaining the behavior of legislators, and though we think that this conversation is interesting and important, we do not address it directly here as we do not have detailed data on internal legislative party cohesion, the preferences of individual legislators, or each state's legislative rules over time. As such, we are content to remain more or less silent on these matters.

party.⁹ By attempting to dilute the institutional power of the legislature itself, in the short term, minority parties may be able to undercut some of the power of the majority party.

Minority parties, in fact, occasionally do pursue institution-weakening reforms (Scarow 1997). They are most likely to be successful in such attempts when there is popular support for such reforms.¹⁰ As Theriault (2005) shows, minority parties are sometimes able to score points by simultaneously attacking the majority party and the institution it controls, especially in times of intense electoral competition between the parties. Insofar as perceived political vulnerability persuades legislators to pay attention to preferences of the median voter, and assuming that electoral competition increases legislators' sense of vulnerability, then heightened interparty competition might simultaneously enhance the relative position minority parties while increasing the likelihood of members of the majority party to change their policy positions (Geddes 1991).

Not only might catering to the preferences of the median voter increase the willingness of the minority party to pursue institutional reforms, but also if the reforms are politically salient to the electorate, such support for institutional change may induce vulnerable members of the majority party to support the reforms of minority and third parties.¹¹ Indeed, as Key (1949) observed more than a half-century ago, increased levels of electoral competition can force established parties and party leaders to become more attentive to popular opinion. Although their evaluations of median public opinion may or may not be accurate, parties—and especially minority parties—often attempt to adapt their

positions such that they become more harmonious with what they perceive to be the public will, even if it diminishes their own institutional power. Recent cross-national research bolsters this proposition. Elites who are not part of a governing coalition are significantly more likely to support direct democracy, whereas those members of a winning party coalition “are significantly less supportive of expanding the scope of direct democracy in their nation” (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2002, 747).

WHY DELEGATE? THE POPULIST DILEMMA FACING STATE LEGISLATURES

Understood as a particular instance of delegation of lawmaking authority, the initiative is not unique. Indeed, as Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) document, the devolution of institutional power by legislative bodies has occurred with some frequency—both internally to committees and externally to executive agencies. Typically, the association between lawmakers and bureaucrats is modeled as a principle–agent relationship (de Figueiredo 2003). Delegation of power from legislators to bureaucracies, Lupia and McCubbins (2000, 304) reason, is likely “a necessary component of modern democracy,” an inevitable response to increasing workloads and complexity. Although there is potential for dysfunction, the principle–agent relationship between legislators and bureaucrats is one that generally seems to work.

When it comes to the legislative delegation of power to citizens, however, lawmakers may have fewer reasons—if they have any at all—to expect that citizens will act as their agents. Indeed, by giving citizens a direct role in shaping public policy, legislators would seem to functionally abandon their monopolistic control over lawmaking. We have suggested that this is more likely to happen when interparty legislative competition is intense. However, given all that political scientists have learned about the attitudes, goals, and behavior of legislators, we should not accept this appearance at face value. The inclination of legislative bodies to delegate authority to citizens may be conditioned by legislators' primordial drive to win and retain office (Mayhew 1974) or interest in obtaining personal and institutional power (Dodd 1977). Indeed, legislatures often tailor their institutions to facilitate these ends (Fiorina 1989). Although legislators are in one sense the ostensible agents of their constituents, they can control the behavior of their principles (citizens), including setting “rules governing voter qualifications, campaign contributions, the form of the ballot, the role of the political parties, and virtually everything else they want to regulate” (Moe 1990, 223). If and when legislators decide to delegate institutional power to citizens, we might reasonably assume that such a decision is not foisted unwittingly or unwillingly on them. Rather, we should assume that the decision to refer the initiative to a statewide ballot is based on legislators' beliefs that doing so will benefit their chances of reelection and/or retaining legislative power. Our argument, then, is that

⁹ The asymmetric distribution of legislative power allows members of the majority party to achieve their legislative goals through their control of committee systems and internal rules (Cox and McCubbins 1993) and the party's capacity to discipline its members, particularly those who might be likely to go against the will of the majority (Rhode 1991). When majorities are large, this is accomplished with relative ease, and some level of dissent and compromise might be tolerable.

¹⁰ Outside the American context, scholars have documented how interparty legislative competition can lead to greater support for institutional change generally, and support for direct democracy specifically. Unpacking a puzzle similar to the one we address in this article, Scarow (1997, 451) argues that political parties are sometimes “willing to sacrifice long-term benefits in hopes of making short-term electoral gains.” As in the United States a century ago, German political parties (in the minority and majority) at the tail end of the twentieth century supported local direct democracy reforms even though they realized that it could damage their own institutional power. Because interparty competition may undermine previous understandings, erode the standing of previously established parties, and force leaders to respond to changed conditions, Scarow (1997, 461) argues that legislators may become willing to support plebiscitary change if they believe that in so doing they will be able to restore equilibrium to, and their position within, the political system.

¹¹ There are two possibilities here. First, a majority party might, if it is scoring points by pursuing institution-weakening reforms, try to head an issue off by pursuing such reforms itself, thereby ensuring its continued majority status. Second, vulnerable members of the majority party might, particularly if their party's leadership and disciplinary apparatuses are weak, defect to the minority party's position if by doing so they will be more likely to achieve reelection. We discuss these possibilities further in the discussion.

although the decision to cede lawmaking power to citizens may potentially have institution-weakening and destabilizing effects, it should be understood as an effort by legislators to either defend or increase their own personal and institutional power, especially in times of heightened interparty competition.

EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS HAZARD MODEL: DATA AND METHOD

We use a discrete time EHA model to explain the timing of political and socioeconomic conditions that led to the referral of the initiative to citizens by state legislatures. EHA is well suited to isolate the conditions that led to the occurrence of an event at a particular time because it allows us to consider multiple types of events simultaneously (Berry and Berry 1990; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999). Specifically, it allows us to test our hypothesis that legislative party competition in a given year increased the likelihood that state lawmakers referred a measure to the ballot that year. Although we expect a state legislature to relinquish its institutional power because of increased legislative party competition, our model is able to control for other macrolevel conditions that may also impact the decision.

To answer the question why 20 state legislatures decided to devolve institutional power to citizens by granting them the initiative, we collected annual data from 1897 to 1918 for several time-varying covariates in 46 states. We used a number of historical and contemporaneous sources to document legislative action, including various issues of the *Direct Legislation Record* (later published in the periodical *Equity*), the official organ of the Direct Legislation League, as well as other histories of the period (Beard and Schultz 1912; Coker 1916; Connors 1917; Foxcroft 1911; Galbreath 1912; Garner 1907; Goebel 2002; Haynes 1919; Kerber 1994; Kettleborough 1914; Lapp 1916; Phelps 1914; Piott 2003; Schmidt 1989; Wilcox 1912).

Our data set begins in 1897, the year South Dakota's legislature became the first in the nation to place the initiative on the ballot via a legislative referendum. The data set has no "left-truncated" observations because no state legislature referred a referendum granting citizens the initiative prior to 1897. For reasons mentioned previously, Oklahoma and Arizona are excluded from the data set, but New Mexico enters it in 1912, the year it was granted statehood, as its constitution did not provide for the initiative.¹² Observations in the data set end in 1918, when Massachusetts voters adopted the initiative (Evans 1918). For reasons yet to be fully explained by scholars, but often explained away with a reference to World War I and the end of the Progressive Era (Goebel 2002; Hofstadter 1955), it would be more than 40 years before another state referred a measure to the ballot granting citizens the power of the initiative (Cronin 1989; Hamilton 1970; Magleby 1984; Schmidt

1989). It is conceivable, of course, that lawmakers in any of the other states could have referred an initiative question to the ballot after 1918.¹³ Thus, observations for these states are right censored, that is, the full event history of these states is unobserved in the data set.

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE AS AN EVENT

We are interested in estimating the probability that a state legislature decides to refer the initiative question to the voters at a particular point in time, conditional on its not having done so previously. The probability is, of course, unobserved (Berry and Berry 1990). Rather, for each state and each year, we simply observe whether a legislature refers a constitutional amendment providing for an initiative to the citizens. The hazard rate, then, is the likelihood of the power of the initiative being referred to the ballot by a state legislature.¹⁴ State legislatures that voted in a given year to place a referendum on the ballot are coded 1; those that did not are coded 0. Thus, prior to a state legislature's action, the dependent variable for every state in every year is coded 0. A state drops out of the data set the year following the legislative referendum (or in the case of Massachusetts, Michigan, and Ohio, the year that a constitutional convention placed a measure on the ballot) because the state legislature is no longer "at risk" of delegating institutional power.¹⁵ Thus, the data set has a total of 789 observations clustered among the 46 states (or "subjects"). By assuming the distribution of the baseline hazard is not fixed, a Cox model is akin to a conditional logit model because it measures the relative impact of the covariates that may have influenced a legislature's decision to refer a measure, although unlike a conditional logit model, the Cox EHA model is duration dependent (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).¹⁶

¹³ The power of initiative was included in Alaska's constitution when it became a state in 1959. Citizens in Florida and Mississippi adopted the initiative as part of their new constitutions in 1968 and 1992, respectively. Illinois voters adopted a restrictive form of the initiative via a constitutional convention in 1970, and Wyoming voters adopted the initiative via a legislative referendum in 1968 (Magleby 1984; Schmidt 1989; Smith and Tolbert 2004).

¹⁴ It is possible that some legislators understood their vote to refer the initiative to the ballot in purely symbolic terms, viewing the devolution of power to citizens as a charade. Some state legislators may have caved to popular demands and voted to place a referendum on the ballot, knowing full well they retained some power to thwart the circulation of ballot petitions. In this analysis, we are not interested in the particular motives of state lawmakers.

¹⁵ For the purposes of this study, any subsequent legislative referrals of the initiative to the ballot in a state are excluded from the analysis because we are interested in the conditions that lead to the *first* incidence of institutional power being devolved to citizens.

¹⁶ A Cox Proportional Hazard model is appropriate for EHA when dealing with a semiparametric hazard rate and right-censored, discrete data with the possibility of tied cases. The default Cox Proportional Hazard model in STATA 9 uses the Breslow approximation method. We ran identical models (not shown) using the Efron approximation for ties. There were no statistical or substantive differences with the two estimations.

¹² New Mexico's 1912 constitution permitted the popular referendum, but not the initiative.

POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE DEVOLUTION OF POWER

In testing our primary hypothesis concerning the impact of interparty competition on the likelihood of a legislature devolving institutional power, we control for several other macrolevel, time-varying political and socioeconomic covariates that scholars have identified as important factors shaping a state's adoption of the initiative. Appendix A provides descriptive statistics for each of the explanatory variables discussed here.

Political Pressures

Foremost among the various political pressures that may have led a state legislature to place a referendum on the ballot is interparty legislative competition. As a majority party's control over the state legislature becomes more tenuous, it may become easier for the minority party (and third parties) to convince members in the majority to cater to the median voter, even if doing so means supporting institution-weakening reforms. To test our interparty legislative competition hypothesis, we calculate the percentage of seats held by Republicans, Democrats, and third parties in both chambers of a legislature for each year of our study (Burnham 1992). Our covariate, which we refer to as majority party surplus, measures the percentage of seats in both chambers greater than 50% controlled by the majority party. On average, the majority party surplus was 22.5% among the 20 state legislatures that referred the initiative to the ballot in a given year; in contrast, of the remaining 769 data points in which a state legislature in a given year did not refer a measure to the ballot, the majority party surplus average was 26.7%. As such, as the percentage of a majority party's seats decreases (i.e., approaches 50%), we expect a legislature to be more likely to refer to the ballot a measure devolving institutional power.

The legislative referral of the initiative to the ballot in Montana is a case in point. Although first endorsed by mining unions in the 1890s as a means to apply pressure on a recalcitrant state legislature, the push for a referendum became politically viable following a struggle over mineral rights between mine operators. After a protracted political battle, which included the creation of the Anti-Monopoly Party, two of Montana's copper barons stopped production, leaving several thousand mine workers unemployed, angry, and politicized. Fearing retribution of unionized mine workers, all of the state's political parties endorsed the initiative in the run-up to the 1904 elections. The following year, a highly factionalized legislature (an internally divided Republican Party controlled both chambers, but with narrow margins) voted to refer to the ballot an amendment to the state constitution granting citizens the power of the initiative. In 1906, voters overwhelmingly approved the referendum (Piott 2003, 51–60).

A second measure of interparty legislative competition is the presence of third parties in a state legislature. Historians have documented how third parties at the turn of the twentieth century were instrumental

in a range of reforms besides direct democracy (Argersinger 1980; Ware 2002). Between 1896 and 1920, the national platform of nearly every third party (including the Populists, Silver Republicans, Silver Democrats, Progressives, and Socialists) officially endorsed or upheld most of the tenets of direct democracy (Piott 2003).¹⁷ We measure third party strength by the share of seats held by third parties in a given year in both chambers of a state legislature,¹⁸ expecting that state legislatures with higher percentages of minor parties will be more likely to support an institutional reform that might coincidentally weaken the major parties.

In addition to lawmakers, several scholars have argued that some governors helped push through direct democracy reforms (Allswang 2000; Goebel 2002; Piott 2003; Smith and Lubinski 2002). Governors, for the most part,¹⁹ had a limited formal role in placing referendums on the ballot, but several publicly supported direct democracy reforms. Although third party governors often supported the initiative, many Republican and Democratic governors did so as well.²⁰ For example, Democrats George Donaghey of Arkansas, John Shafroth of Colorado, and James H. Hawley of Idaho spearheaded direct democracy efforts in their states, as did Republicans George Hunt of Arizona, Hiram Johnson of California, and John Burke of North Dakota (Allswang 2000; Goebel 2002; Piott 2003; Smith and Lubinski 2002). In California, Governor

¹⁷ Expectations of legislative support for the initiative of the two major political parties are much less obvious. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state Republican and Democratic parties did not cohere to the policy positions of the national parties (Epstein 1986). Across the states, Republican and Democratic platforms differed on a range of topics, including their positions on direct democracy, with several Democratic and Republican state parties advocating the adoption of the initiative and referendum and others adamantly opposed (Allswang 2000; Goebel 2002; Haynes 1919; Piott 2003; Smith and Lubinski 2002). In several states during the lead-up to the 1912 presidential election, the Republican Party was deeply fractured, with progressive Lincoln-Roosevelt Leagues supporting the adoption of plebiscitary reforms. As Thomas West, the Democratic state representative who sponsored Florida's 1911 constitutional amendment, stated on the House floor, "the Socialists had the initiative and referendum in their platform this year in Florida, the Democrats had it in theirs in Ohio, and Governor Hiram Johnson, of California, a Republican, is a warm endorser of it" (Kerber 1994, 302).

¹⁸ We also operationalized third party legislative strength with a dummy variable coded 1 if the balance of power was controlled by a third party and 0 otherwise. The results using the two measures are consistent, but are slightly stronger using the percentage of third party legislative seats. The percentage of third party legislative seats varies considerably across the states; between 1897 and 1918, the balance of power of at least one chamber of the state legislature was controlled by third parties in 20 of 46 states.

¹⁹ A few governors convened legislative special sessions to force the consideration of direct democracy reforms. For example, Colorado's democratic governor, John Shafroth, called an August 1910 special session of the legislature, instructing legislators "to reconsider the legislative proposals that had been blocked in the previous session" (Piott 2003, 121; Smith and Lubinski 2002).

²⁰ Partisan support for the initiative was no means limited to the Populist Party in particular, or third parties in general. In the 1912 presidential election, for instance, the national Democratic, Progressive, and Socialist parties all endorsed direct democracy in their platforms; the Republican Party was a holdout. Many state Republican parties, however, endorsed the reform mechanisms (Piott 2003).

Johnson, in 1910, led the charge within his own party against the “stand-pat” Republicans, campaigning on a direct democracy platform and advocating the reform in his 1911 state of the state address (Allswang 2000). To test whether third party governors were instrumental in the legislative referral of the initiative, we use a dummy (indicator) variable, coded 1 if the governor belongs to a third party and 0 otherwise. Although we expect legislatures in states with a third party governor to be more likely to place a referendum on the ballot than those states with a Republican or a Democratic governor, we would not be surprised if the statistical relationship was weak.²¹

It is also possible that some state legislatures were more open to the devolution of institutional powers to citizens because state political parties were organizationally weak. As Mayhew (1986, 204–6) shows, states that achieved statehood more recently had less entrenched traditional political party systems than more established states because the “historical antecedents of the *pattern* of traditional [party] organization” predated the 1820s. Arguing that “local patterns of ‘traditional party organization’ go back to the turn of the century and before,” Mayhew (1986, 8–9) suggests that traditional party organizations are “durable” and are useful in understanding both institutional and policy changes in the American states. Specifically with regard to the adoption of direct democracy, Price (1975, 248) contends that the initiative spread most rapidly across western states “because the political institutions and channels for doing things were not as firmly rooted in tradition” as they were in eastern states. We expect legislatures in newer states to be less circumscribed by the accretions of party tradition, and thus more likely to consider a major institutional change, such as devolving new powers to citizens. Following Mayhew (1986), we use the number of years since statehood as a proxy for party organizational strength, anticipating that younger states with less mature party organizations will be more likely to place a referendum on the ballot.

Several scholars have suggested that interest group pressure may have led some state legislatures to enact direct democracy reforms (Goebel 2002; Piott 2003; Smith and Lubinski 2002). As with other Progressive reforms, such as mothers’ pensions and woman suffrage (Banaszak 1996; Clemens 1997; McDonagh and Price 1985; Sanders 1999; Skocpol et al. 1993; Wyman 1974), interest group pressure may have hastened the legislative approval of a referendum giving citizens the initiative. Gauging interest group strength, much less lobbying efforts for direct democracy reforms, is

difficult,²² but advocates in many states did assemble diverse coalitions to push for the reforms (Goebel 2002; Piott 2003; Spoonholtz 1973). To assess interest group strength, we use as proxies state-level membership data by year for two groups—the Grange (Tontz 1964) and the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) (Banaszak 1996)—both of which agitated for the adoption of direct democracy reforms. The Grange, known formally as the Patrons of Husbandry, was considered to be in many states “‘the mother of organizations,’ laying a foundation of organizing skills and activist networks for the associations that followed” (Clemens 1997, 156). Like other agrarian interests (e.g., the Farmer’s Alliance), the Grange was a powerful advocate of direct democracy and other progressive reforms (Sanders 1999), and it had an especially strong presence in states west of the Mississippi (Crowley and Skocpol 2001). In contrast, NAWSA’s singular mission was woman suffrage; the initiative was viewed by the organization as a purely instrumental means toward that end (Banaszak 1996, 10). We expect legislatures in states with higher per capita membership in the two groups to be more responsive to their lobbying efforts, and thus more likely to place a referendum on the ballot.

The decision of some state legislatures to devolve institutional power to citizens may also have been influenced by the decisions of nearby states to adopt the process, as scholars of policy diffusion might hypothesize (Berry and Berry 1990; Gray 1973; Mooney 2001; Skocpol et al. 1993). Direct democracy was by no means an alien concept to lawmakers during the Progressive Era. Talk of direct democracy abounded during the 1892, 1896, and 1912 presidential campaigns, and the initiative was a topic of intense conversation among lawmakers of all political persuasions across the United States (Piott 2003). To test whether a legislature may have been persuaded by a neighboring state to place its own referendum on the ballot, we calculate the percentage of neighboring states that adopted the initiative for each year, generating a running average of these percentages for each state (Mooney 2001).²³ Although in a federalist system “proposals that might have been generated elsewhere” may have been “seized upon by regional politicians,” as Sanders (1999, 3) suggests, the opposite may also have been true. Witnessing the deleterious effects of direct democracy in neighboring states may have dissuaded proximate state legislatures from following suit. We expect a state’s proximity to neighboring states that had adopted the initiative to have a negligible impact on the likelihood of a legislature placing a referendum on its own statewide ballot.

²¹ We also created a dichotomous measure of gubernatorial support by drawing on a historical biography of governors (Kallenbach 1977), coded 1 if the governor was described as having explicitly supported the initiative and 0 if he was not. Of the hundreds of governors included our data set, Kallenbach identified only 11 as having supported direct democracy; only two were members of a third party. The variable is highly significant, but concerns over the lack of variation and possible endogeneity (a governor’s support may have been a function of legislative referral of the initiative to the ballot) led us to omit the variable.

²² Although we have the date that a Direct Legislation League chapter was formed in a state, by 1900, most states had a chapter, offering us little variance or explanatory leverage across the states (Piott 2003, Anderson 2005).

²³ Following Berry and Berry (1990), we alternatively ranked all states by order of adoption of the initiative and calculated a simple count of the number of adjacent states that adopted the mechanism. There are no substantive differences using either measure.

Finally, it is possible that a state's broader political ideology may have affected a legislature's decision to devolve institutional power to citizens. Scholars often cite antimonopoly sentiments as a precursor to the adoption of the initiative (Cain and Miller 2001; Goebel 2002; Ellis 2002; Piott 1992; 2003). Admittedly, there are many different ways to capture state political ideology, but most are not possible for the period under study. Drawing on data from Poole and Rosenthal (1997), we create a measure of state political ideology by calculating the average D-NOMINATE score of a state's U.S. senators in a given year, which ranges from -1 (most liberal) to $+1$ (most conservative). All else equal, we expect that as a state's political ideology becomes more liberal, the likelihood of a state legislature placing a referendum on the ballot will increase.

Socioeconomic Pressures

Besides political factors, direct democracy scholars have suggested that states that adopted the initiative during the Progressive Era held in common several socioeconomic conditions.²⁴ Drawing on U.S. Census data (1890–1920), and following Lott and Kenny (1999), we use a simple linear interpolation to provide yearly estimates of several socioeconomic variables. Most notably, scholars have argued that states that adopted the mechanism had predominantly homogenous white populations (Goebel 2002; Piott 2003; Price 1975; Schmidt 1989). The importance of race has been cited by several scholars for the peculiar timing and western geographic distribution of the states that adopted the initiative. In particular, some scholars have highlighted the reluctance of southern states to adopt the initiative due to what was known euphemistically at the time as the “Negro Question.”²⁵ Although some southern reformers were more enlightened than others, the forces of white supremacy were such that reforms intended to expand citizen participation were simply not politically feasible in parts of Dixie that

²⁴ We also ran a version of the model that included a set of institutional reforms (woman franchise, home rule, direct primary), but because it is not clear that extending suffrage to women is usefully conceptualized as an example of a legislature delegating power, and due to concerns over the endogeneity of home rule and direct primaries (the reforms may have been caused by another factor that may also be correlated with propensity to adopt the initiative), we removed them from both our historical account and subsequent empirical analyses.

²⁵ Parallel arguments were made regarding uneducated citizens. Wary of devolving power to citizens who were seen as ill prepared to become lawmakers for a day, some Progressive reformers contended that devolving institutional power did not mean giving power to all citizens; after all, at the heart of the Progressive creed was the belief that a technical cadre of experts ought to control political institutions (Hofstadter 1955). Historians have postulated that states with poorly educated and illiterate populations were less likely to adopt direct democracy because state legislatures had less reason to trust the wisdom of the voters (Goebel 2002, 92). The illiteracy rate at the time was highly correlated with race; the percentage of African Americans and the rate of illiteracy in a state are highly correlated ($r = .917$) and significant ($p < .001$). Separate models, substituting the two covariates, reveal substantively identical results.

were determined to keep the Democratic Party (and, by extension, state politics) “lily white” (Keyssar 2002; Kousser 1974; Milkis and Tichenor 1994; Mowry 1940). Having successfully established white hegemony in the Democratic Party, Goebel (2002, 97) argues that southern lawmakers simply saw no reason to experiment with “an untested device whose impact on the political situation could not be gauged.” Thus, because of white supremacist sentiments, we expect legislatures in states with higher black populations to be less likely to refer a ballot measure.

In addition to race, direct democracy scholars have argued that states with higher percentages of foreigners were less likely to adopt the initiative because lawmakers supposedly feared that recent immigrants would gain too much political influence via the plebiscitary mechanism (Goebel 2002; Huthmacher 1962; Price 1975; Schmidt 1989; Tolbert 2003). Nativist sentiments may well have led some state lawmakers to oppose the adoption of the initiative because the process had the possibility of empowering otherwise marginalized immigrant groups. A counterargument, however, can also be made. Published in 1892, James W. Sullivan's influential book, *Direct Legislation by the Citizenship through the Initiative and Referendum*, provided a detailed account of the Swiss origins of the initiative and quickly became an essential reference for reformers across the United States (Goebel 2002, 32–34; Smith and Tolbert 2004, 21–22). Because the institutional design recommended by reformers had a distinct European origin, many Old World émigrés—and the lawmakers who represented them—were likely familiar with direct democracy, and thus less receptive to nativist arguments. We expect legislatures in states with sizeable foreign-born populations to be no less likely to refer a measure to the voters.

Because direct democracy was first championed in the late nineteenth century by agrarian populists, scholars have suggested that states in the midst of industrialization were less likely to adopt the initiative (Clemens 1997; Goebel 2002; Piott 2003; Price 1975; Schmidt 1989; Tolbert 2003).²⁶ Forged by agrarian frustrations and anxieties at the dawn of the industrial era, these scholars argue that reform efforts were built on rural anger against the monopolies controlled by railroads and other corporations and trusts. Following this logic, it is possible that legislators in industrializing states with growing manufacturing sectors may have been less likely to delegate authority to citizens via the initiative because the process might have enabled a forsaken and underrepresented ethnic urban working

²⁶ Direct democracy scholars tend to overlook the long-standing tradition of Populism in Southern politics. As Key (1949) points out, although the South during the early 1900s was largely a one-party region, there was considerable intraparty competition within the Democratic Party and some third party presence. The Democratic Party in several southern states was so factionalized along class lines that these states nearly resembled two-party systems. It is perhaps not coincidental that states Key identifies as having weaker parties due to severe internecine splits within the Democratic Party either came very close to adopting direct democracy reforms (e.g., Florida, Texas) or indeed did so (e.g., Mississippi).

class to sidestep recalcitrant legislatures (Huthmacher 1962, 321–341). We expect legislatures in states with a growing percentage of workers employed in manufacturing to be less likely to refer a measure to the ballot.²⁷

Finally, using two dummy variables, we consider regional variations in the decision of a legislature to devolve power to citizens. In an alternative specification of our model, we include dummy variables for the 10 western and 11 southern states in the data set. Along with others who note that “the theoretical rationale for the inclusion of the South dummy has never been clear” (Matsusaka 2004, 24), we are skeptical of the impact of the regional dummy variables. However, it is possible that in the variable years since statehood, our proxy measure for party organizational strength overestimates the strength of the Democratic Party in the South (Key 1949), so the inclusion of the dummy variables may compensate for this possible measurement error. Another possible measurement issue concerning the South is the fact that the nation’s black population was heavily concentrated in southern states. Our decision to include these regional dummy variables is influenced by the pervasiveness of the argument that support for direct legislation via the initiative was a uniquely western phenomenon. For reasons discussed previously, we do not expect legislatures in western or southern states to be any more or less likely to refer an amendment to a statewide vote than states in the Northeast and Midwest, which are grouped together as the reference category.

FINDINGS

Table 1 provides EHA models explaining the legislative decision to refer a measure to the ballot giving citizens the opportunity to adopt the initiative. The estimated coefficients in each model are exponentiated and are expressed in the form of hazard ratios. The hazard rate represents the ratio of change in the hazard (legislative passage of the referendum) for a one-unit change in a corresponding covariate. For example, if a hazard ratio is equal to one, the predictor covariate has no effect. If the hazard ratio is less than one, say, 0.96, it means a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable decreases the likelihood of the hazard occurring by 4 percentage points. The two models control simultaneously for the theorized political and socioeconomic variables; the only difference is that Model 1B includes the two regional dummy variables while Model 1A does not.

It is clear from Model 1A that majority party surplus was a key factor in a state legislature’s decision not to devolve institutional power. For every one percentage point increase in majority party surplus, the like-

lihood of legislative referral, *ceteris paribus*, decreases by nearly three percentage points. In other words, if the majority party’s share of seats drops from 61% to 51%, the likelihood of referral increases by roughly nearly 28 percentage points, all else equal. Our proxy for party organization strength indicates that for each additional year since a state’s inception, the chance of a legislature placing a referendum on the ballot decreases considerably. This comports with Mayhew’s (1986) account that newly admitted states had less institutionalized parties, and thus, their state legislatures may have been more willing to consider institutional changes. The share of legislative seats controlled by third parties is in the predicted direction, although it narrowly fails to reach statistical significance ($p = .058$). This null finding is likely due to the fact that third parties controlled, on average, less than 3% of all seats over the period covered in the data set.

We find mixed results in Model 1A for our expectation that interest group membership played a significant role in the decision of state legislatures to place referendums on the ballot, and no support for the third party governor or diffusion covariates. Per capita state membership in the Grange is significant and is positively related to the hazard. For every one-point increase in the per capita membership level, legislative support for referring a measure increases by 11 percentage points, indicating that as Grange membership increased, the pressure on legislatures to refer to voters an amendment allowing the initiative also increased. In contrast, the coefficient for per capita membership in NAWSA is less than one, but not statistically significant. This null finding may reflect the fact that NAWSA membership was strongest in New England and the Middle Atlantic states, and that the national organization targeted its financial resources in states where the legislatures were likely to adopt woman suffrage. Indeed, one of the reasons for the organization’s successes was its ability to redistribute resources from areas where its membership was strong but its chances for victory slim, to areas where its membership was weaker but its chances for winning better (Clemens 1997, 89–90). Finally, it appears that a state’s political ideology, as measured by the ideology of the state’s sitting U.S. senators, had no discernable impact on the likelihood of a legislature delegating institutional power to citizens, indicating that a purely ideological explanation for the expansion of citizen lawmaking is perhaps unwarranted.

With regard to the socioeconomic macrolevel conditions, Model 1A reveals that only a state’s racial composition is a significant predictor, holding other variables constant. Contrary to historical accounts, and our expectations, legislatures in states with sizable black populations were just as likely, if not more so, to refer the initiative to the ballot as other legislatures. A one-point increase in the percent of a state’s black population actually increases the likelihood of a legislative referral by five percentage points. With respect to a state’s foreign population, we find that lawmakers in states with sizeable foreign-born populations were no more or less willing to devolve institutional power to citizens, all else

²⁷ The bivariate correlation of the change in the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing is inversely related to the percentage of rural population in a state ($r = -.793$; $p < .001$) and is positively related to a state’s population density ($r = -.791$; $p < .001$). For theoretical reasons, we use the change in the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing in our models.

TABLE 1. EHA Models for Legislative Referral of Initiative

Independent Variables	Model 1A Hazard Ratio (Rb. Std. Err.)	Model 1B Hazard Ratio (Rb. Std. Err.)
<i>Political Variables</i>		
Majority Party Surplus (Percent Majority Party Seats >50%)	.972 (.011)	.961 (.015)
Percent Third Party Legislative Seats	1.036 (.020)	1.037 (.019)
Third Party Governor	.255 (.254)	.233 (.238)
Years since Statehood (Party Organizational Strength)	.948 (.013)	.944 (.016)
Grange per capita Membership	1.111 (.030)	1.116 (.035)
NAWSA per Capita Membership	.447 (.383)	.464 (.404)
Average U.S. Senators' D-Nominate (State Political Ideology)	.317 (.266)	.725 (.748)
Diffusion (Percent of Adjoining States That Adopted)	.992 (.011)	.986 (.012)
<i>Socioeconomic Variables</i>		
Percent Population Black	1.050 (.025)	1.008 (.016)
Percent Foreign Born	1.047 (.034)	1.065 (.039)
Annual Change in Percent Workers in Manufacturing	.888 (.063)	.906 (.050)
South (Dummy)	—	22.357 (36.974)
West (Dummy)	—	1.842 (1.288)
Wald X ²	40.29	70.08
Log Pseudolikelihood	-52.218	-50.424
Number of Observations	789	789

Note: Figures are estimated hazard ratios, robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses to correct for heteroskedasticity. Breslow method used for ties. Number of subjects, 46; number of failures, 20. **Bold** indicates $p < .05$.

equal. Finally, we find that the change in the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing does not appear to significantly affect the likelihood of a state legislature deciding to refer an amendment to voters. These findings cast some doubt on the argument that racially and ethnically homogenous states and those experiencing rapid change in the manufacturing sector were more likely to adopt the initiative, and instead reinforce our main contention that legislatures devolving authority were responding to political pressures.

The findings of Model 1B, which include the two regional dummy covariates, bolster the findings of Model 1A. Most notably, the significance and substantive magnitude of majority party surplus and years since statehood covariates hold when the regional variables are added. State legislatures with lower majority party surpluses were more likely to place a referendum on the ballot. Although it is perhaps surprising that the West dummy variable fails to reach statistical significance, it is likely that any effects of the covariate are mitigated by the relative infancy of western states, as measured by

years since statehood.²⁸ The South dummy variable is also not significant, indicating that the 11 former Confederate legislatures were no more or less likely than others to place a measure on the ballot when holding other variables constant.²⁹ With the regional dummy controls, we find that third party legislative strength is significant; for every additional percentage of legislative seats held by third parties, a state legislature was nearly 4 percentage points more likely to refer a measure to the ballot. We also find that when the regional variables are included, legislatures in states

²⁸ In a separate EHA model (not shown), when years since statehood is interacted with the dummy variable West, we find that the hazard ratio of the interacted term is significant and greater than one (1.07), with the overall model remaining unchanged.

²⁹ In a separate EHA model (not shown) that excludes the 11 ex-Confederate states, we find that a decrease in majority party surplus leads to a nearly identical increase in the likelihood of a legislature placing a measure on the ballot, with no other substantive changes to the model.

experiencing a rapid rise in the annual percentage of workers employed in manufacturing were less likely to refer a measure to the ballot, but that a state's percentage of black population was not a significant predictor.³⁰

To check the robustness of our findings, we aggregated our EHA dataset two different ways: first into five-year averages for each state, and second into a single observation for each state. For both new units of analysis, we calculate the mean values for each independent variable and create a new dummy dependent variable, coded 1 if a state legislature referred a measure to the ballot, and coded 0 if it did not at any time during the newly created unit of analysis. Appendix B provides the estimations of the resulting logit models, which predict the likelihood of a state legislature referring a referendum to the ballot. Although these alternative specifications may raise questions concerning the robustness of some of our causal variables—including the impact of majority party surplus—we think considerable caution should be exercised when interpreting them. Most notably, because we are principally interested in the longitudinal dynamics of state legislation, and not necessarily the cross-sectional differences among states, there is little theoretical justification for restricting the variance found in the dependent variable, which occurs when yearly data are aggregated over time. Logit models that use means of the covariates over multiple years do not precisely test our key hypothesis that greater interparty legislative competition in a given year increases the likelihood that state lawmakers will refer to citizens a measure devolving authority in that year.³¹ Furthermore, there appears to be little methodological justification for aggregating the data as there is no indication that the yearly state-level data are “suspicious or perhaps measured poorly” (Gill 2006, 334). Unlike the EHA hazard models, which are specifically designed to isolate the conditions that lead to the occurrence of an event at a particular time (Beck 1998; Berry and Berry 1990; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999), the aggregated logit models remove nearly all the temporal variation of the socioeconomic and political variables within the states by squeezing the overall number of observations.

DISCUSSION

Today, in 24 American states, the initiative is arguably the most important political institution available to citizens. The reason why some states adopted the initiative a century ago, though, remains largely shrouded

³⁰ We also estimated the EHA model (not shown) by interacting the regional dummy control for South with the percentage of black population, but neither the interaction term nor the base terms approached statistical significance, with the overall model remaining unchanged.

³¹ It is, of course, plausible that the referral of the initiative resulted from the buildup of interparty legislative competition over time, rather than in a given year. If this is the case, we think EHA models are especially appropriate because the hazard ratios are duration dependent (Beck 1998).

in mystery. Our macrolevel historical analysis sheds some much needed light on why some state legislatures decided to devolve institutional power to citizens.

Although we are sensitive to concerns about possible endogeneity, our findings offer considerable support for a political, rather than a purely socioeconomic or regional, explanation for the genesis of direct democracy in the American states. In the midst of rapid national and subnational state building, we find the size of the majority party's surplus of seats and the relative youth of state political parties to be driving forces in the decision of state legislatures to devolve institutional power. Reinforcing Piott's (2003) historical study of the adoption of the initiative in 16 states, we show that interparty legislative competition was central to a legislature's decision to place a referendum on the ballot. Due to the legacy of gerrymandering and the fact that the partisan competition of state legislatures often did not reflect that of a state's population (David and Eisenberg 1961), we discount the possibility that our measure of majority party surplus is an endogenous by-product of a common set of socioeconomic conditions. This is not to say that socioeconomic factors were not important in a state legislature's consideration of devolving lawmaking authority to citizens, as is apparent with our findings that the percentage of African Americans living in a state and the change in the percentage of a state's workforce employed in the manufacturing sector had conditional effects. All else equal, though, we find little support for the claim that southern legislatures were more apprehensive toward the initiative than other state lawmaking bodies because of the mechanism's potential to mobilize African Americans. Indeed, the positive findings with regard to a state's black population in Model 1A and the null findings with regard to the South dummy variable in Model 1B seem to reflect the fact that the state legislatures of Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, and Texas all referred constitutional amendments to the voters, a part of the historical story that is rarely told.³²

Our findings also suggest that the decision of some legislatures to delegate power to citizens by way of the initiative was not the by-product of a unique western culture (Goebel 2002). As Model 1B reveals, we find scant support for one of the most pervasive claims today—that direct democracy was a western phenomenon and reflected a contagion of agrarian

³² Our findings raise the possibility that the overwhelming success of the disenfranchising Jim Crow laws in the South ironically may have allayed some southern legislators' concerns about granting citizens lawmaking powers. The possibility of blacks in the South obtaining political power via the initiative was a nonissue, as they were effectively disenfranchised (Keyssar 2002; Kousser 1974). In contrast, state lawmakers in the North may have been more reticent to place a referendum on the ballot because they lacked comparable legal barriers to thwart illiterate, uneducated, and foreigner-born citizens from becoming empowered via the initiative. As Hofstadter (1955, 176) chronicles in his revisionist account of the Progressive Era, legislative resistance in northern states to democratizing reforms was especially heightened when the “native Yankee-Protestant American encountered the immigrant.” Whatever the reason for the distrust of citizen lawmaking in the North, it is notable that only one state legislature in the North—Maine's—referred the initiative to a statewide ballot.

Populism (Bowler and Donovan 2006; Bridges and Kousser 2005; Price 1975). Although we do find that the membership density of the Grange in a state affected the legislature's decision to place a referendum on the ballot, there is little evidence that legislatures acted because neighboring states did so. Thus, it seems more than a mere coincidence that lawmakers in states with heightened interparty legislative competition today—Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania (Bibby and Holbrook 2004)—have introduced numerous bills calling for the adoption of the initiative (National Conference of State Legislatures 2007). A new wave of state legislatures granting citizens the power to adopt direct democracy mechanisms may yet be on the horizon.

Paralleling Ware's (2002) argument regarding the adoption of the direct primary during the same period and Theriault's (2005) investigation of recent congressional reforms, our findings suggest that the initiative was not imposed unwillingly (or unwittingly) on state lawmakers. Rather, the fact that legislatures with greater interparty legislative competition were more apt to delegate power to citizens likely reflects the desire of the median legislator's desire to remain in office.³³ The willingness of minority parties to cede institutional power due to citizen demands may strengthen their standing vis-à-vis the majority party. "Minority parties are in constant search for the issue that will propel them into the majority," Theriault (2005, 134) concludes, because by "defending 'the people' against 'the politicians,' minority parties can ride populist politics to victory."

Of course, for such a momentous shift in institutional power to succeed, there must be a level of political pressure sufficient to convince some members of the majority party to defect (Whittington and Carpenter 2003). Otherwise, the minority party *qua* minority party would not be able to pass legislation. As our analysis reveals, party organizational strength should not be underestimated in this regard. Legislatures in states with weaker party organizations were much likely to respond to statewide popular demands and relinquish institutional power to citizens. As with many of the institutional transformations at the national level that were orchestrated during the Progressive Era (Carpenter 2001; James 2000; Skowronek 1982), we

³³ One of the most pronounced arguments in the direct democracy literature is the argument that one of the benefits of the initiative is its capacity to act as a pressure valve (Gerber 1999; Matsusaka 2004; Smith 1998). When difficult issues become salient, legislators may see a benefit in declining to take a position on it. This is particularly true when they can defer the issue to a popular vote via the initiative. Direct democracy thus gives legislators the ability to "punt" when they find themselves in a difficult political position. This kind of dynamic may have been present at the moment when legislators made the initial decision to refer to the statewide ballot constitutional amendments, allowing voters a direct role in the lawmaking process. At a time when a number of fiercely controversial issues were on the political table—for example, prohibition, woman suffrage, the single tax, the direct legislation of senators—legislators may have considered the initiative process a potentially convenient means for avoiding taking sides on questions that might have been divisive and thus threatening.

also find that reform-minded chief executives of all political stripes—not just those who ran on a third party label—were instrumental in the push for direct democracy in the American states. From an institutionalist perspective, then, it is perhaps obvious that some governors would have been favorable toward the initiative. Relatively speaking, the initiative diminishes the powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive branch.³⁴ One needs only to appreciate the recent strategic efforts of California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to use the initiative to advance his policy agenda, thereby circumventing an oppositional state legislature.

We would be remiss not to speculate that some lawmakers may have been willing to seemingly delegate power to citizens because they knew they could later reestablish their control over the initiative process (Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins 2004; Gerber, et al. 2001). As Piott (2003) documents, leaders of many state legislatures were optimistic that they would be able to control citizen lawmaking after it was adopted, thereby mitigating negative consequences that might arise in the delegation of power to citizens. Indeed, some legislatures were quite successful in their endeavors to inhibit the citizen initiative during the period. The legislatures of Utah and Idaho, for example, thwarted the use of the initiative for dozens of years after citizens adopted the mechanism, by refusing to pass enabling legislation (the approved constitutional amendments were not self-executing). Judson King (1913), the president of a national advocacy group in favor of direct democracy, The National Popular Government League, characterized the statewide initiative in both states as "worthless," and the process in six other states (South Dakota, Montana, Oklahoma, Maine, Nebraska, Washington) as "defective." Thus, while appearing to cede authority to citizens, several state legislatures were able to partially insulate and preserve their institutional powers.³⁵

Casting an eye toward the historiography of direct democracy in the United States, it is quite possible that some of our divergent findings reflect our macrolevel examination of the socioeconomic and political conditions prevalent in all states, when compared along side studies that only scrutinize states that adopted the initiative. By looking systematically over time and across all states, we are able to test several hypotheses for why some state legislatures decided to delegate power to citizens and others did not. Until recently, historians and political scientists have investigated the push for the initiative in piecemeal fashion, or they have plumbed the secondary question of why some states adopted

³⁴ Although the initiative may be a useful weapon for some governors to wield against recalcitrant state legislatures, it is equally true that governors potentially sacrifice some of their own institutional power when the initiative is adopted. For example, governors are generally unable to veto successful initiatives (Matsusaka 2008).

³⁵ In fact, the South Dakota and Utah legislatures initially withheld enabling legislation after voters adopted the initiative, thus preventing it from being used. Citizens did not qualify an initiative in South Dakota until 1908 and in Utah until 1958 (see Piott 2003, 31; Schmidt 1989, 16–17).

the initiative. As such, the research design of these studies effectively disregards macrolevel political and socioeconomic conditions that were prevalent in states that did *not* adopt the initiative. By ignoring counterfactual conditions of “nonevents,” the impressions left by studies focusing exclusively on states that adopted the initiative may be inherently biased, with scholars advancing spurious assertions disguised as explanation (Megill 1989). We leave it to historians and other political scientists to further unearth and recount the socioeconomic and political dynamics occurring within states that did not adopt the initiative during the period. But it is perhaps understandable that most scholars tend not to share Donald Rumsfeld’s interest in probing “known unknowns” as well as “unknown unknowns” because it is much easier to document and explain “known knowns.” By ignoring null cases, however, scholars may be unintentionally ascribing unwarranted causality to some macrolevel conditions while overlooking others that may be crucially important.

Finally, by fleshing out the relative impact of several factors over time on the likelihood that a state legislature would “fail” to protect its institutional powers, we hope our study adds to the literature on institutional change (Dodd and Jillson 1994; March and Olsen 1984; Orren and Skowronek 2004; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). A legislature’s decision to place a referendum on the ballot granting citizens the opportunity to adopt the initiative is a momentous devolution of institutional power. Given that we generally assume legislators want to retain institutional power, our study may help isolate some of the socioeconomic and political conditions, most notably, interparty legislative competition, which at a given moment in history may impel legislators to act in a fashion that some may see as contrary to their institutional self-interest. It is our hope that scholars will continue to investigate and theorize about the conditions that induce legislative bodies to delegate authority to the citizenry beyond the arena of citizen lawmaking.

APPENDIX A

Independent Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>Political Variables</i>				
Majority Party Surplus (Percent Majority Party Seats >50%) <i>Source: Burnham 1992</i>	26.57	15.16	0	50
Percent Third Party Legislative Seats <i>Source: Burnham 1992</i>	2.59	9.01	0	100
Third Party Governor <i>Source: Burnham 1992</i>	.04	.19	0	1
Years since Statehood (Party Organizational Strength) <i>Source: Mayhew 1986</i>	83.82	38.03	0	131
Grange per Capita Membership <i>Source: Tontz 1964</i>	2.75	7.03	0	50.49
NAWSA per Capita Membership <i>Source: Banaszak 1996</i>	.30	.53	0	6.14
Average U.S. Senators’ D-Nominate (State Political Ideology) <i>Source: Poole and Rosenthal 1997</i>	.08	.39	-.79	.70
Diffusion (Percent of Adjoining States That Adopted) <i>Source: Piott 2003; Schmidt 1989</i>	12.89	20.85	0	100
<i>Socioeconomic Variables</i>				
Percent Population Black <i>Source: Lott and Kenny 1997</i>	12.69	17.39	.06	58.81
Annual Change in Percent Workers in Manufacturing <i>Source: Lott and Kenny 1997</i>	.84	2.37	-7.44	9.68
Percent Foreign Born <i>Source: Lott and Kenny 1997</i>	13.50	10.50	.21	37.39
<i>Region Dummy Variables</i>				
South (Dummy)	.27	.44	0	1
West (Dummy)	.14	.35	0	1

APPENDIX B

TABLE B1. Aggregated Logit Models for Legislative Referral of Initiative

Independent Variables	Model 1A Data Aggregated by State (5-Year Intervals)	Model 1B Data Aggregated by State (5-Year Intervals)	Model 2A Data Aggregated by State	Model 2B Data Aggregated by State
<i>Political Variables</i>				
Majority Party Surplus (Percent Majority Party Seats >50%)	-.022 (.020)	-.023 (.028)	1.925 (.113)	-.761 (.102)
Percent Third Party Legislative Seats	.027 (.042)	.035 (.047)	5.274 (.168)	2.927 (.227)
Third Party Governor	-2.420 (1.73)	-2.572 (1.733)	—	—
Years since Statehood (Party Organizational Strength)	-.035 (.010)	-.028 (.013)	-2.590 (.048)	-1.446 (.038)
Grange per Capita Membership	.087 (.025)	.087 (.028)	5.512 (.157)	4.220 (.118)
NAWSA per Capita Membership	-.425 (.707)	-.525 (.699)	60.349 (3.109)	-33.415 (3.202)
Average U.S. Senators' D-Nominate (State Political Ideology) Diffusion (Percent of Adjoining States That Adopted)	-2.096 (.944)	-1.748 (1.738)	-248.389 (10.281)	-142.422 (6.310)
	.021 (.010)	.022 (.009)	-581 (.045)	-1.181 (.043)
<i>Socioeconomic Variables</i>				
Percent Population Black	.036 (.031)	.015 (.038)	-.472 (.195)	-.093 (.184)
Percent Foreign Born	.060 (.054)	.069 (.054)	4.674 (.165)	3.587 (.147)
Annual Change in Percent Workers in Manufacturing South (Dummy)	-.101 (.103)	-.127 (.114)	4.340 (.346)	11.301 (.356)
West (Dummy)	—	1.453 (2.522)	—	—
		.862 (.726)		54.851 (1.679)
Wald χ^2	50.08	63.86	63.86	
Log Pseudolikelihood	-45.755	-44.960	-5.381 e ⁰⁷	-1.214 e ⁰⁶
Number of Observations	179	179	46	46

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for heteroskedasticity. Probabilities based on two-tailed tests. For Models 1A and 1B, standard errors adjusted by clustering cases by state. In Models 2A and 2B, the third party governor variable is dropped due to "quasicomplete separation" because the covariate perfectly predicts some, but not all, of the observations (Zorn 2005, 157), and in Model 2B, the South dummy variable is dropped due to multicollinearity. **Bold** indicates $p < .05$.

REFERENCES

- Allswang, John. 2000. *The Initiative and Referendum in California, 1898–1998*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Alt, James E., and Robert C. Lowry. 1994. "Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States." *American Political Science Review* 88 (December): 811–28.
- Anderson, Melissa Cully. 2005. "Exploring the Conditions Under Which Legislatures Cede Authority: Legislative Consideration of Initiative Mechanisms, 1898–1916." Paper presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 7–9.
- Argersinger, Peter. 1980. "A Place on the Ballot: Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws." *American Historical Review* 85 (April): 287–306.
- Banaszak, Lee Ann. 1996. *Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Culture, and the Struggle for Woman Suffrage*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Barrilleux, Charles, Thomas Holbrook, and Laura Langer. 2002. "Electoral Competition, Legislative Balance, and American State Welfare Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (April): 415–27.
- Beard, Charles, and Birl Shultz, eds. 1912. *Documents on the State-Wide Initiative, Referendum and Recall*. New York: Macmillan.
- Beck, Nathaniel. 1998. "Modeling Space and Time: The Event History Approach." In Elinor Scarbrough and Eric Tanenbaum. *Research Strategies in the Social Sciences: A Guide to New Approaches*. ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Berry, Frances Stokes, and William Berry. 1990. "State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 84 (June): 395–415.
- Bibby, John, and Thomas Holbrook. "Parties and Elections." In *Politics in the American States*. 8th ed. ed. Virginia Gray and Russell Hanson. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Binder, Sarah A. 1997. *Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bowler, Shaun, and Todd Donovan. 2006. "Direct Democracy and Political Parties in America." *Party Politics* 12: 649–69.
- Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan, and Jeffray Karp. 2002. "When Might Institutions Change? Elite Support for Direct Democracy in Three Nations." *Political Research Quarterly* 55: 731–54.
- Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan, and Eric Lawrence. 2005. "Choosing Direct Democracy: On the Creation of Initiative Institutions in the American States." Paper presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 31–September 4.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, and Bradford Jones. 2004. *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*. Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press.
- Bridges, Amy, and Thad Kousser. 2005. "What Went on Out West? Explaining Geographic Patterns in the Adoption of Direct Democracy." Paper presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the Social Science History Association, Portland, OR, November 3–6.
- Burnham, Walter Dean. 1992. "Partisan Division of American State Governments, 1834–1985" [Computer file]. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. ICPSR 0016.
- Cain, Bruce, and Kenneth Miller. 2001. "The Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative Government." In *Dangerous Democracy? The Battle over Ballot Initiatives in America*. ed. Larry Sabato, Bruce Larson, and Howard Ernst, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputation, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Clemens, Elisabeth. 1997. *The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890–1925*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cnudde, Charles, and David McCrone. 1969. "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States." *American Political Science Review* 63 (September): 858–66.
- Coker, Frederick W. 1916. "Interworkings of State Administration and Direct Legislation." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 64 (March): 122–33.
- Connors, Arthur. 1917. "Direct Legislation in 1916." *American Political Science Review* 11 (February): 92–110.
- Cox, Gary, and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cronin, Thomas. 1989. *Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Crowley, Jocelyn Elise, and Theda Skocpol. 2001. "The Rush to Organize: Explaining Associational Formation in the United States, 1860s–1920s." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (October): 813–29.
- David, Paul, and Ralph Eisenberg. 1961. *Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote: A Statistical Investigation of Long-Term Trends in State Legislative Representation*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
- de Figueiredo, Rui J. P. 2003. "Budget Institutions and Political Insulation: Why States Adopt the Item Veto." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2677–2701.
- Dion, Douglas. 1997. *Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Dodd, Lawrence C. 1977. "Congress and the Quest for power." in *Congress Reconsidered*. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Dodd, Lawrence C., and Calvin Jillson, eds. 1994. *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Ellis, Richard. 2002. *Democratic Delusions: The Initiative Process in America*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Epstein, Leon. 1986. *Political Parties in the American Mold*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Evans, Lawrence. 1918. "Massachusetts Constitutional Convention." *American Political Science Review* 12 (February): 115–18.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1989. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Foxcroft, Frank. 1911. "Initiative-Referendum in the United States." In *Selected Articles on the Initiative and Referendum*, ed. E. M. Phelps. New York: H.W. White.
- Galbreath, C. B. 1912. "Provisions for State-Wide Initiative and Referendum." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 43: 81–109.
- Garner, J.W. 1907. "Primary vs. Representative Government." *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association* 4: 164–74.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1990. "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics." *Political Analysis* 2: 131–50.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1991. "A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 85 (June): 371–91.
- Gerber, Elisabeth. 1999. *Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gerber, Elisabeth, Arthur Lupia, and Mathew McCubbins. 2004. "When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement." *Journal of Politics* 66: 43–68.
- Gerber, Elisabeth, Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Roderick Kiewiet. 2001. *Stealing the Initiative*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Gill, Jeff. 2006. *Essential Mathematics for Political and Social Research*. New York: Cambridge.
- Goebel, Thomas. 2002. *A Government by the People: Direct Democracy in America, 1890–1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gray, Virginia. 1973. "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study." *American Political Science Review* 67 (December): 1174–85.
- Hamilton, Howard. 1970. "Direct Legislation: Some Implications of the Open Housing Referenda." *American Political Science Review* 64 (March): 124–37.
- Haynes, George H. 1919. "How Massachusetts Adopted the Initiative and Referendum." *Political Science Quarterly* 34 (September): 454–75.
- Hays, Samuel P. 1964. "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era." *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 55 (October): 157–69.
- Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. *The Age of Reform*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Holbrook, Thomas, and Emily Van Dunk. 1993. "Electoral Competition in the American States." *American Political Science Review* 87: 955–62.
- Hosmer, David, and Stanley Lemeshow. 1999. *Applied Survival Analysis: Regression Modeling of Time to Event Data*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Huthmacher, J. Joseph. 1962. "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 49 (September): 231–41.
- James, Scott C. 2000. *Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884–1936*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kallenbach, Joseph. 1977. *American State Governors, 1776–1976*. Dobbs's Ferry, NY: Oceana Press.
- Kerber, Stephen. 1994. "The Initiative and Referendum in Florida, 1911–1912." *Florida Historical Quarterly* 72 (January): 302–15.
- Kettleborough, Charles. 1914. "Initiative and Referendum." *American Political Science Review* 8 (May): 251–57.
- Key, V. O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Knopf.
- Key, V. O. 1956. *American State Politics: An Introduction*. New York: Knopf.

- Keysar, Alexander. 2002. *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- King, Judson. 1913. "Adoption of the State-Wide Initiative and Ref." Washington, DC: Bureau of Information, The National Popular Government.
- Kolko, Gabriel. 1963. *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900–1916*. New York: The Free Press.
- Kousser, J. Morgan. 1974. *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880–1910*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lapp, John A. 1916. "The Initiative and Referendum in 1915." *American Political Science Review* 10: 320–27.
- Link, Arthur, and Richard McCormick. 1983. *Progressivism*. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson.
- Lott, John R., and Lawrence W. Kenny. 1999. "Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 107 (December): 1163–98.
- Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2000. "Representation or Abdication? How Citizens Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed." *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (May): 291–307.
- Magleby, David. 1984. *Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- March, James, and Johan Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *American Political Science Review* 78 (September): 734–49.
- Matsusaka, John. 2004. *For the Many or the Few: The Initiative, Public Policy, and American Democracy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Matsusaka, John. 2008. "Direct Democracy and the Executive." In *Direct Democracy's Impact on American Political Institutions*. ed. Shaun Bowler and Amihai Glazer. New York: Palgrave.
- Mattson, Kevin. 1998. *Creating a Democratic Public: The Struggle for Urban Participatory Democracy During the Progressive Era*. University Park: Penn State Press.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Mayhew, David. 1986. *Placing Parties in American Politics: Organization, Electoral Settings, and Government Activity in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- McDonagh, Eileen L. 1992. "Representative Democracy and State Building in the Progressive Era." *American Political Science Review* 86: 938–50.
- McDonagh, Eileen L., and H. Douglas Price. 1985. "Woman Suffrage in the Progressive Era: Patterns of Opposition and Support in Referenda Voting, 1910–1918." *American Political Science Review* 79: 415–35.
- Megill, Allan. 1989. "Recounting the Past: 'Description,' Explanation, and Narrative in Historiography." *The American Historical Review* 94 (June): 627–53.
- Milkis, Sidney M., and Daniel J. Tichenor. 1994. "'Direct Democracy' and Social Justice: The Progressive Party Campaign of 1912." *Studies in American Political Development* 8 (Fall): 282–340.
- Moe, Terry M. 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations* 6: 213–53.
- Mooney, Christopher Z. 2001. "Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion." *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (March): 103–24.
- Morehouse, Sarah M., and Malcolm E. Jewell. 2004. "States as Laboratories: A Reprise." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7: 177–203.
- Mowry, George. 1940. "The South and the Progressive Lily White Party of 1912." *The Journal of Southern History* 6 (May): 237–47.
- National Conference of State Legislatures. 2007. Initiative & Referendum Legislation database. www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/initiative.cfm. (November 2007).
- Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. 2004. *The Search for American Political Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Persily, Nathaniel A. 1997. "The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West." *Michigan Law and Public Policy Review* 2: 11–41.
- Piott, Steven L. 1992. "The Origins of the Initiative and Referendum in America." *Hayes Historical Journal* 11 (Spring): 5–17.
- Piott, Steven L. 2003. *Giving Voters a Voice: The Origins of the Initiative and Referendum in America*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Price, Charles. 1975. "The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis and Reassessment of a Western Phenomenon." *Western Political Quarterly* 28: 243–62.
- Rhode, David. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rosenson, Beth. 2005. *The Shadowlands of Conduct: Ethics and State Politics*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Sanders, Elizabeth. 1999. *Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877–1917*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Scarrow, Susan. 1997. "Party Competition and Institutional Change." *Party Politics* 3: 451–72.
- Schmidt, David. 1989. *Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Sharkansky, Ira, and Richard Hofferbert. 1969. "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy." *American Political Science Review* 63 (September): 867–79.
- Shefter, Martin. 1994. *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sklar, Martin. 1998. *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Skocpol, Theda et al. 1993. "Women's Associations and the Enactment of Mothers' Pensions in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 87 (September): 686–701.
- Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Daniel A. 1998. *Tax Crusaders and the Politics of Direct Democracy*. New York: Routledge.
- Smith, Daniel A., and Joseph Lubinski. 2002. "Direct Democracy during the Progressive Era: A Crack in the Populist Veneer?" *Journal of Policy History* 14: 349–83.
- Smith, Daniel A., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 2004. *Educated by Initiative: The Effects of Direct Democracy on Citizens and Political Organizations in the United States*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Spoonholtz, Lloyd. 1973. "The Initiative and Referendum: Direct Democracy in Perspective, 1898–1920." *American Studies* 14 (Spring): 43–64.
- Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds. 1992. *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Thelen, David P. 1969. "Social Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism." *Journal of American History* 56 (September): 323–41.
- Therault, Sean M. 2005. *The Power of the People: Congressional Competition, Public Attention, and Voter Retribution*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Tolbert, Caroline. 2003. "Cycles of Democracy: Direct Democracy and Institutional Realignment in the American States." *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (Fall): 467–89.
- Tontz, Robert L. 1964. "Memberships of General Farmers' Organizations, United States, 1874–1960." *Agricultural History* 38 (July): 143–56.

- Ware, Alan. 2002. *The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and Transformation in the North*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Whittington, Keith, and Daniel P. Carpenter. 2003. "Executive Power in American Institutional Development." *Perspectives in Politics* 1 (September): 495–513.
- Wiebe, Robert H. 1967. *The Search for Order*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Wilcox, Delos F. 1912. *Government by All the People, or, the Initiative, the Referendum and the Recall as Instruments of Democracy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Wyman, Roger E. 1974. "Middle Class Voters and Progressive Reform: The Conflict of Class and Culture." *American Political Science Review* 68 (June): 488–504.
- Zorn, Christopher. 2005. "A Solution to Separation in Binary Response Models." *Political Analysis* 13: 157–70.