UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

STATEMENT OF

JULY 15, 2023
1. My name is [Redacted] I am a Senior Special Agent (SA) in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). My curriculum vitae showing my education, professional training and service record with the FBI is attached. I have been a career counterintelligence agent. My work has focused on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international money laundering and foreign influence over the U.S. electoral process.

2. In the course of my service, I have become aware of highly suspicious suppression of investigations and intelligence gathering on the part of FBI management; these actions can have no legitimate national security basis and to the contrary could only be detrimental to its mission. The matters relate generally to the Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) in the context of foreign influence over U.S. elections and an apparent effort within FBI management to shield certain politically active figures and possibly also FBI agents who have a relationship with these figures.

3. I have served as the primary case agent on a variety of matters involving major financial crimes, transnational organized crime, public corruption and foreign counterintelligence (FCI). For more than [Redacted] my area of focus has been in Russian FCI for which the Bureau trained me to speak, read and understand Russian.

4. I worked with numerous other agencies at the headquarters level, including various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC). I worked directly with the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to my unit's role of designating enterprises and persons as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) for sanctions to have applied to them.

5. In this role, I handled the most complex and challenging source operations. To date, I have a clean record with
no negative formal administrative disciplinary actions filed against me, with an active Top Secret – Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS-SCI) security clearance.

6. Since joining the Bureau, this repeated relocation has caused considerable hardship for my family, because it required uprooting my children from their schools and my wife sacrificing her own career aspirations in order to follow me. I also worked long and unpredictable hours that did not allow me to be as present as I wished in order to assist with raising our children. Balancing work and home life is often challenging for special agents and requires sacrifice.

7. In 2017, around the time when the Mueller Special Counsel investigation was launched with a mandate to “to oversee the previously-confirmed FBI investigation of Russian government efforts to influence the 2016 presidential election and related matters,” I started specifically focusing on foreign influence investigations related to the RIS. I identified and recruited several confidential human sources with high-level direct access to some of the most powerful Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs, as well as individuals within these oligarchs’ transnational organized criminal networks, through which they and RIS agents operate.

8. Some of the sources I was operating told me they had direct access to persons who were of interest to the Mueller investigation, and I was requested to and did offer and assess the veracity of some of the information furnished by these sources for the Mueller investigation. My reporting was initially independent. Individuals working with the Mueller investigation became aware of my reporting and contacted me on their own initiative. I did not go out looking for derogatory information damaging to any politically exposed person, rather, my reporting derived from CHSs I was handling who had direct and high-level access to people of interest to the investigation. Because of

*Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein, Order Appointing Special Counsel, May 17, 2017.*
my expertise in Russian counterintelligence. The CHSs proactively volunteered information about people who they were concerned about within their own political parties. I understood through this interaction that I had become one of the principal agents engaged with Russia/Ukraine counterintelligence matters related to foreign influence operations targeting elected officials.

9. My reporting identified and described an extensive transnational criminal network operating as an adjunct of the RIS, which laundered billions of dollars derived from state funds intermingled with criminal activities. A significant portion of these funds flowed into Ukraine through the Russia-occupied Donbass region along the Russia/Ukraine border. In partnership with certain RIS-compromised Ukrainian oligarchs, these funds were laundered throughout the world utilizing a sophisticated criminal network composed of multiple shell companies and bank accounts. Through this network, hundreds of millions of dollars were laundered directly into the United States, where they were used to finance various covert operations.

10. During this period, I gradually came to understand that nearly all the reporting on RIS money laundering operations was viewed by senior figures at the Bureau as intensely politically sensitive. The concerns surrounding the Mueller investigation and the probe into Crossfire Hurricane launched by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General (IG) were plain enough, but other matters on which I was reporting appeared to be no less sensitive for reasons I could not always discern. In any event, those few of us who work in the counterintelligence field expect scrutiny and are generally prepared to justify our operations and to critically assess our sources. Skepticism is expected and careful vetting is important to assure the quality of the intelligence we collect.

11. In and around January 2019, one of my CHSs, hereafter referred to as Dynamo, facilitated a meeting during which two of his foreign contacts provided information about several large-scale international money laundering schemes involving embezzlement and transfer of state funds by officials abusing their positions in probable violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Both of these individuals were later recruit-

* Although I use the male pronouns as a default for all the sources discussed here, it should not be assumed that any of the sources are male.
12. In January, 2019, DYNAMO presentation included detailed information concerning several multi-million and multi-billion dollar schemes. The information was based on an extrapolation of open-source information from Ukraine, as well as insight from consulting work. One of the described scenarios alleged Hunter Biden (Hunter) had been given a lucrative position on the board of directors of the energy company, Burisma Holdings Limited (Burisma), and was likely involved in unreported lobbying and/or tax evasion. I recall having had a discussion with the co-handler of DYNAMO in which I expressed skepticism since the scenarios being described appeared to target only prominent businessmen and politicians who were his political adversaries. I sus-
pected at the time that this could have been an attempt by the RJS to push derogatory information into the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) that would give the opposing political party, which had been shown to be favored by the RJS, a narrative to attack the character of Joseph R. Biden (Biden), in the event Biden became the Democratic presidential nominee, which did in fact occur several months later. In fact, the derogatory information concerning the Bidens and Burisma quickly emerged in domestic U.S. media, suggesting that it was being provided for political influence rather than law-enforcement purposes.

13. At the Bureau, we are required to conduct our investigations in a fashion that is blind to partisan interests and to ensure that investigative actions are never impacted based on the potential damage to one political party or another. Notwithstanding that fact, there was some suspicion behind providing the information and the veracity of it, considering the fact the Mueller Special Counsel Investigation had laid bare Russia’s attempts to influence U.S. politics by flowing information through other former Soviet republics, particularly Ukraine. Typical disinformation operations are based on partial truths, and the only way to determine the veracity of the allegations is to conduct an independent investigation to attempt corroboration. Therefore, I took this reporting very seriously and submitted it to the appropriate case file, in which these considerations were memorialized.

14. After receiving the presentation from provided me a thumb drive with some supporting documentation, much of which was in the Ukrainian language, which I do not speak. After I submitted my FD-1023 reports on this information, I was put in touch with two agents working out of the Baltimore office on a case based in Delaware involving Hunter. I spoke on the phone with these agents, who were very interested in the information due to its relation to their ongoing investigation that was mostly involving allegations of Hunter’s involvement with drugs and prostitution. Information derived from had previously been found to be credible, so this was handled carefully and quickly transferred over to the agents in Baltimore and was serialized in their case file. While I transferred the information, I could not read the Ukrainian language, and it required translation in order to determine the viability of the electronic document’s presumed support of the allegations related to Hunter and Burisma, which were presented and summarized in a
PowerPoint presentation created and serialized in the case file. I had no involvement in the subsequent investigation concerning Burisma and the Bidens and never received any updates from these agents as to whether the information was corroborated, but I later learned from the media that some of the allegations appeared to have been true. Based on the level of corruption and the RIS’ past usage of Ukraine for influence operations, raw single-source information derived from Ukraine is always viewed with skepticism by members of the USIC with some specialty and experience in Ukrainian matters.

15. My supervisors were delighted that I had collected this information about Burisma, notwithstanding the obvious political sensitivity of the subject matter, and I was later asked to present my findings to the Assistant Director in Charge. By that time, I had learned about some disturbing allegations concerning activity involving President Donald Trump’s personal attorney, Rudolph W. Giuliani (Giuliani) and his ongoing ties with persons suspected of being assets of the RIS. When I started to describe my independent CHS reporting involving Giuliani forcefully interrupted me and ended my presentation.

16. Regarding my concerns Giuliani may have been compromised by the RIS, in 2019 and 2020, high quality CHS reporting on the Russian-Ukrainian oligarch, Pavlo Yakovich Fuks (Fuks), aka Pavel Yakovlevich Fuchs, described how Fuks had paid Giuliani $300,000 to serve as his U.S. lobbyist. The CHS also reported that Giuliani had gone to the city of Kharkiv, Ukraine, as early as November 2017, where he spent three days with Fuks, the now deceased mayor of Kharkiv, Hennadiy Adolfovych Kernes (Kernes), and Vitaliy Yuriyovych Khomutynnik (Khomutynnik), an oligarch with extensive criminal ties. In early 2017, Fuks directly told DYNAMO that he had paid Giuliani $300,000 (USD) to be his “lobbyist.” Later on, in 2019, Giuliani told DYNAMO he had received $300,000 (USD) and even had to “apply pressure” to get paid by Fuks. When asked by DYNAMO, Giuliani denied this payment was for lobbying, instead insisting it was for “security consulting.” By 2020, information collected by me through my CHSs, as well as other agents and analysts in the FBI, led to a determination described in peer reviewed intelligence information reports (IIRs) that Fuks was a co-opted asset of the RIS. However, in 2020 and 2021, it became increasingly apparent to me that my reporting on Fuks and his ties to Giuliani was negatively received by my
superiors, who were eager for the flow of information about Fuks and his relationship with Giuliani to stop.

17. The investigation had demonstrated Fuks, as an asset of the RJS, facilitated international money laundering through an established transnational criminal network on behalf of sanctioned entities. A few of these entities were the RJS, former Ukrainian President Yanukovych, Moscow-based oligarch Serhiy Vitaliyovych Kurchenko (Kurchenko), and one of Ukraine’s most influential oligarchs, Ihor Valeriyovych Kolomoyskiy (Kolomoisky). I requested that the Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials perform a secondary screening of Fuks the next time he attempted to enter the United States, and I provided CBP the derogatory information I had collected pursuant to my ongoing investigation of Fuks. My intelligence reporting led to an independent decision made by CBP to revoke Fuks’ U.S. B1/B2 visa after he attempted to enter the United States in Miami on December 19, 2017. During CBP’s inspection and interview of Fuks, it was determined Fuks misrepresented several material facts in his visa application in regards to his family, marriage, businesses and service in the Russian military, which he denied. Additionally, due to the ongoing FBI investigation and assessment that Fuks is a national security threat and his match to multiple lookouts ranging from customs export violations to ties with Transnational Criminal Organizations, Fuks was placed on the Organized Crime Watch List.1

18. Subsequently to having his U.S. visa revoked, DYNAMO’s contacts in the Ukraine’s PGO and other sub-CHSs residing in Ukraine informed DYNAMO that Fuks paid his representative, Andriy Telizhenko (Telizhenko), in or around 2019, to establish contacts with U.S. politicians. By that time, DYNAMO’s reporting had proven to be highly reliable. Telizhenko has since been sanctioned by OFAC for election interference and by Ukraine’s government for collaborating with Russia.4 On November 21, 2022, I submitted a detailed recommendation to add Fuks to OFAC’s SDN list. This 19-page summary report, which included 60 supporting exhibits comprising five years of my

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own reporting, as well as others, was submitted to the designated FBI detaille to the Department of the Treasury. I never heard back concerning this recommendation, despite my several inquiries to ascertain how it was received and whether any clarification or further information was needed.

19. My intelligence gathering relating to Fuks in 2020 and 2021 supplied important assistance to the FBI case agent supporting the criminal probe. Specifically, I provided the case agent with information from a foreign CHS, referred to here as Mr. X, who provided detailed information concerning specific money laundering transactions, bank account information and a voice recording of making business deals with OFAC-sanctioned and other members of the Russian State Duma.

20. My reporting from Dynamo and Mr. X relating to Fuks described in detail how he and Kolomiskiy, through fraud and manipulation, had seized control over revenue from the largest oil and gas field in Ukraine, Ukmafta Burinnia, the assets of which were recently seized by the Ukrainian government. This reporting described in detail how hundreds of millions of dollars had been laundered into the United States from OFAC-sanctioned Russia-based Kurchenko, who had a 50/50 profit sharing arrangement with Kolominsky. This work predated a full investigation that resulted in the indictment of two subjects in Tampa and Miami, Florida and was announced by the Department of Justice on Monday April 17, 2023. The information furnished by Dynamo and Mr. X proved accurate and reliable and was essential to this effort.

21. Fuks has acted as a key RJS asset in Kharkiv, Ukraine, at least from 2017 up until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. My investigations uncovered opera-

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5 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Seeks Forfeiture of Third Commercial Property Purchased with Funds Misappropriated from PrivatBank in Ukraine, Dec. 30, 2020,

6 U.S. Department of Justice Public Affairs Office, “President of Metalhouse LLC Indicted for Sanctions Evasion and International Money Laundering,” April 17, 2023,
tions run by Fuks designed to provide a predicate narrative for a Russian invasion and subjugation of Kharkiv—the same city Giuliani had visited. The predicate narrative involved artificial fomentation of racial tensions that allowed Russian President Vladimir Putin (Putin) to claim Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was “the de-Nazification of Ukraine” and for peaceful purposes. Putin believed that the city would be delivered to Russian forces by pro-Russian officials, but the resistance of Ukrainian defenders and loyal officials frustrated this expectation. Kernes, the mayor of Kharkiv and a close associate of Fuks’, had previously accepted money from Putin in anticipation of Russia’s attempt to acquire Kharkiv. When Kharkiv was not turned over to Russia prior to 2020, Kernes was then shot in the back, paralyzed, and later died, in a Berlin hospital on December 17, 2020. During this period, Fuks extended his de facto control over Kharkiv. In addition to his extensive dealings with Giuliani, Fuks also had dealings with Donald Trump (Trump) in the years before he stood as a candidate for president, engaging with him in discussions about a Trump Tower deal.7 Engaging with and attempting to influence politically exposed persons in the United States appears to have been a priority for Fuks over the last many years. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the attempted but failed Russian occupation of Kharkiv, Fuks faced criminal charges in Ukraine and fled the country.8 He currently appears to be resident in or around London, using a U.K. foreign investor visa.9

7 According to press accounts, Fuks offered Trump $10 million to name a Moscow real estate project he was developing “Trump Tower,” and Trump countered with a demand for $20 million. Avery Anapol, "Developer says Trump wanted $20 million for 2006 Moscow project," The Hill, Feb. 6, 2019.

8 Emily Tian, "Ukraine imposes sanctions on two business tycoons with ties to Rudy Giuliani," OCCRP, June 24, 2019.

9 Tom Burgis, "Oligarch hit by Ukrainian sanctions has UK residency and was given ‘golden visa,’" Guardian, June 30, 2023.
originated from the White House/Special Events/Intelligence Agencies national name check program, which was sent to me through the FBI New York Field Office (NYFO). Ostensibly, the purpose for this request was to vet Dynamo's attendance at a special event. To me, this appeared to be an attempt to discover if Dynamo was an FBI recruited source. This was a deep concern for me, since Dynamo had direct access to and had reported on individuals connected to the White House related to the Special Counsel investigation.

Around this same time, the recently formed FBI Headquarters-based Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) recommended that I close down Dynamo as an FBI CHS out of their concern he had been in contact with agents of disinformation. I knew that Dynamo had been in connection with agents of disinformation, because he frankly told me this and shared with me his conclusion that they were agents of disinformation who could not be trusted. The recommendation was baseless and suggested the FITF had not engaged in sufficient depth of their research of Dynamo and his relationships with sub-sources. In fact, Dynamo had become one of the FBI’s top CHSs whose reporting had been extensively corroborated through predicated investigations, with numerous well-documented high-impact successes related to countering foreign influence and public corruption on both sides of the political spectrum. That is, we had established with a high level of confidence that Dynamo had contacts with precisely the persons he claimed to have contacts; moreover, the quality of the information he furnished was exceptional, showed a consistently critical attitude towards the information he took in, and when tested, had stood up under the rigors of predicated full criminal investigations and legal process.

23. When the FITF attempted to terminate Dynamo as a CHS, I argued strongly against this recommendation and an agreement was reached that Dynamo would remain operational. Over the following two years, Dynamo went on to expose public corruption and RIS operations of epic proportions. To name just a few things Dynamo did during this time: identified two corrupt FBI special agents, which provided the principal predication for an investigation that corroborated this reporting and resulted in the retirement of these agents; reported on foreign influence operations involving Fuka, Teliženka, Giuliani and identified
several foreign agents who had not registered under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA); precipitated a $5 billion money laundering investigation resulting in indictment of two U.S. persons in Florida; provided key information that supported decisions to impose sanctions against Kolomoisky; provided information supporting restriction of U.S. visas for other criminal oligarchs attempting to gain entry into the United States; provided extensive intelligence concerning Russia and Ukraine disseminated in numerous IIR reports shared with the USIC; provided information allowing the identification and recruitment of many other CHSs in several countries; engaged in risky covert operations in support of numerous full FBI investigations. In my assessment, it is unlikely that any of these disruptions of national significance would have succeeded without the support DYNAMO provided. I later documented these successes in detail in a memo that I provided directly to the FITF.

24. While DYNAMO’s information initially focused on Russian organized crime figures and likely Russian intelligence figures involved in influence operations in the United States, over time, he began to furnish information surrounding high-profile U.S. figures who appear to have been caught up in some of these operations. In particular, this included corroborated reporting from DYNAMO describing how former New York City mayor Giuliani used funds he collected from political influencers to travel and conduct a series of interviews with former Ukrainian officials, some of whom were later sanctioned by OFAC for election interference. Nevertheless, I must stress that, as related to my own independent reporting from CHSs, Giuliani was himself never considered a subject, as I instead was focused on foreign organized crime figures and intelligence service assets or agents who chose to deal with him. In the midst of my reporting involving Giuliani, which had previously been identified by my supervisor as “high impact,” my management told me they received a call from a supervisor in NYFO, who they did not identify. This supervisor had taken issue with my reporting and work supporting overlapping investigative efforts in New York and Los Angeles—a routine function for
Agents. Thereafter, management started suppressing my reporting in an increasingly aggressive fashion, which included discriminatory acts against me, personally.

25. After my reporting precipitated and/or supported several sensitive investigative matters, I was reprimanded by Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) for reporting on certain investigative categories and individuals. The reprimand made clear that certain individuals were off limits and that no reports about them could be processed, even if based on credible allegations of criminal activity from validated sources. I never received an explanation as to which of these persons were off limits or considered prohibited sources, despite my need to know, having overlapping investigative efforts. Obviously, if the sensitivity arose from the activities of another group of investigators working the same matter, that would be understandable, but then my information would usually simply be channeled into the hands of others running the investigation.

I had regularly collaborated with case agents concerning the work of DYNAMO. However, that does not seem to have been the case here. The matters I was apparently running up against were so compartmentalized and sensitive that it was impossible for me to diligently do any de-confliction or collaboration. This was an unusual situation for me, especially since I had been very well accustomed to work with compartmentalized investigations involved support of the Special Counsel, insider threats and espionage investigations, as a career counterintelligence agent with that specific focus, who had worked at the headquarters level and managed the second largest source program in the Bureau.

26. Beginning on June 29, 2021, immediately following a multi-location search warrant operation to disrupt criminal operations, an investigation precipitated from my CHS reporting, I was suddenly hauled in for drug testing and then harassed on an almost daily basis with menial administrative matters. This resulted in suppression of my intelligence reporting. At the same time, I found my personal credibility was under continuous and baseless attack in ways that strongly suggest a sustained campaign to discredit me. I was subjected to administrative requirements that no other Agents on my squad of the same senior GS13-10 rank faced. I spent a significant amount of my time defending myself for trivial matters and pre-textual fabricated accusations. This all appears to
have been designed to block my work as an agent running CHSs with a particular focus on Russian/Ukrainian sources, and it had that effect.

27. While I do not know exactly what had raised alarms, the conduct of my supervisors and the timing of their actions made plain that reporting concerning Giuliani and a group of people surrounding him with existing or historical ties to the Bureau gave rise to this retaliatory action. I cannot identify exactly who those persons were. However, I later learned that at around the same time, former Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of Intelligence in NYFO, Charles McGonigall (McGonigall), still likely had influence over certain people in the New York office, which may or may not be related to suppressive efforts. McGonigall has since been prosecuted for taking money in return for trying to get sanctions lifted from the Russian oligarch, Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska (Deripaska), one of the many oligarchs mentioned in my reporting over the years. I only know that the reporting produced acute anxiety, coupled with an urgent desire to shut off my sources and me.

28. Agents had taken notice of my independent reporting from my sources concerning Giuliani, which demonstrated Giuliani had received hundreds of thousands of dollars from a group of political activists in California during the critical time leading up to the 2020 U.S. Presiden-

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* U.S. Department of Justice Public Affairs Office, Retired FBI Executive Charged with Concealing $250,000 in Cash Received from Former Intelligence Officer, Jan. 23, 2013, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/retired-fbi-executive-charged-concealing-250000-cash-received-former-intelligence-officer


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tial election. These activists had been getting sensitive information from two special agents who had been conducting database checks on their behalf. My reporting was extensively corroborated pursuant to additional investigative actions.

The money provided from this group funded Giuliani's efforts to secure from Ukrainian and likely also Russian sources information that Giuliani believed would affect the 2020 election. Despite these accomplishments and neutralization of insider threats, I was reprimanded by my ASAC and defamed by my management apparently because of this work and reporting. As their efforts to suppress this investigative work escalated, my direct management specifically told me in writing, that I was no longer allowed to do any reporting related to public corruption, criminal matters, anyone in the White House and any former or current associates of President Trump.

29. At this point I was in a difficult position, being threatened with disciplinary action for insubordination, because I continued to investigate unreported flows of foreign money into U.S. politics with no regard to any political party, which I believed to be my job. These reports came not because I was investigating political funding per se, but because the CHS I was running reported these acts to me. I believed and continue to believe that these acts appear to be criminal in nature and warrant investigation. This reporting was largely for the benefit of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Geoffrey Berman (Berman). On August 21, 2020, Berman was suddenly fired from his post just after a cooperating witness I was running undertook to tape conversations with Giuliani interviewing Ukrainian officials at the request of Berman’s office. I subsequently learned from reading Berman’s book, Holding the Line: Inside the Nation’s Preeminent US Attorney’s Office and its Battle with the Trump Justice Department, that Berman had been placed under extraordinary pressure by the White House and Attorney General William P. Barr, which aimed to protect President Trump and his personal attorney, Giuliani, Steve Bannon and other members of Trump’s inner circle from criminal exposure and political embarrassment, and that he connected his dismissal with extraordinary efforts to protect these men. I had no knowledge of these extraordinary facts at the time, but on subsequent reflection, the pressures that Berman faced and the pressure brought to bear on me were simultaneous and obviously closely related.
30. In 2020, I had also already recruited another CHS, referred to here as GANTUS, with access to numerous individuals who became main subjects of investigations concerning the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. GANTUS provided helpful information in furtherance of those investigations. In 2021, when my source had been diligently reporting on matters concerning the Capitol riots and other counterintelligence matters, I went on a vacation. Upon my return from vacation, I found my management had a series of meetings and decided, without consulting with me or allowing me to provide any input, to discontinue reporting from this source ostensibly because he had previously made inappropriate comments on social media. I was aware of and had already reported concerning these postings and knew they had been done in an attempt to garner trust from certain racially motivated violent extremists, which proved to be effective. I had already reported that this informant had previously been branded as a racist, which empowered him to infiltrate various tightly knit, dangerous and violent fringe groups.

31. Having worked high impact CHSs for well over a decade, I had never before seen a forced closure of an informant without at least allowing the handling agent to provide input. This was especially alarming to me, since I was actively reporting on numerous ongoing high-stakes investigations. It is not an unusual concept for the FBI to make contact with perceived "criminals" or even real criminals and flip them to report on their criminal associates. This is basic informant operational procedure.

32. The established mechanism for an FBI Special Agent to address compromised managers is to report the matter of concern confidentially to the FBI’s Inspection Division (INSD), which is supposed to work with the DOJ-IG to investigate credible allegations of misconduct. I have seen this process work before. It is effective, as long as the INSD is diligent and evenhanded in its inquiry and discipline of problematic managers. Due to a history of retaliation against employees who reported on abusive managers, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), a basic familiarity with which belongs to the annual training for all FBI employees. This statute makes it illegal for a manager to retaliate against an employee and violate the employees’ protections under this statute.
33. By the end of 2021, the suppression of my reporting and extreme micro-management became crippling, and I reported these facts to the FBI's Office of the Ombudsman, which recommended I file a whistleblower complaint with the INSD as well as with I did not want to become a whistleblower for fear of retaliation. When I was at my wits end and out of options, on January 7, 2022, however, I filed a whistleblower complaint under the WPA, describing in detail numerous acts of intelligence suppression of my reporting related to foreign influence and the Capitol riots, retaliatory acts and defamation of my own character through a hyperbolic narrative of administrative non-compliance my management had concocted, which never rose to the level of any formal administrative disciplinary action against me, due to lack of sufficient evidence of any wrongdoing committed by me. After filing that complaint, just as I feared, I endured even more aggressive suppression, bitter retaliation and intra-agency character attacks. As required per the FBI's annual whistleblower training, I reported in detail to the INSD all acts of reprisal against me contemporaneously as these events occurred, with numerous supporting exhibits and named witnesses. Even though these acts violated my protected status and were therefore illegal, to my knowledge, no actions were ever taken to correct ongoing reprisals and suppression of intelligence. With exception of an auto-reply from the INSD when I sent my periodic updates and a letter sent to me from the Internal Affairs Section of the INSD (which is worded exactly the same as letters sent to others who reported acts of misbehavior to the INSD), my management never acknowledged my complaint or conducted a bone fide inquiry or interview of me or any of the other Agents I mentioned who could have verified my claims.

34. About a month after I submitted my whistleblower complaint, within weeks before and following Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the FITF again pressed for discontinuance of reporting from DYNAMO. This time, my management mandated this action and used the FITF to avoid direct accountability for closing such an important human source, who had been reporting on several ongoing matters, to include a multinational threat to life matter. My management had been talking with representatives in the FITF without my involvement as DYNAMO's handler. Moreover, they required closure of not only DYNAMO, but also any source with the slightest contact with him or were recruited as a result of his reporting, and there were many other productive sources in that category who took years for me to develop. This included
confidential sources physically located in Ukraine, who had predicted Russia’s impending invasion under the premise of saving Ukraine from another revolution, and were continuing to report on relevant events as they unfolded in real-time during the invasion. Since the Ukrainian diaspora was relatively small, it was nearly impossible for me to identify and recruit new people who could report on this subject matter who had no connection whatsoever to DYNAMO.

35. All of this was transpiring as the White House was urgently attempting to assemble information on Ukraine, including Russia’s preparation for an invasion, the loyalty of inner circle figures within Ukraine to Russia or Ukraine, the roles played by various oligarchs and organized crime groups, and in particular, and a matter of acute concern, the relationship between President Volodymyr Zelensky (Zelensky) and his erstwhile patron Kolomoiskiy, who had become increasingly pro-Russian. On each of these points, DYNAMO and some of his sub-sources, had proven among the most credible sources developed by the USIC. The baffling decision to shut down DYNAMO and his sub-sources deprived U.S. decisionmakers at the highest levels of vital information that should have informed essential U.S. commitments undertaken as Russia invaded Ukraine. This included detailed information to the effect that Kolomoiskiy had installed his paid agents in a series of senior positions surrounding President Zelensky, details surrounding Kolomoiskiy’s funding of Zelensky’s presidential campaign, and other anecdotal information concerning Kolomoiskiy’s influence over Zelensky and his ambiguous attitude about the Russian invasion itself. It would have been helpful for the USIC and policy makers to have known that Kolomoiskiy had become increasingly pro-Russian following the Ohio investigation and him, that he made a 50/50 profit sharing agreement with OFAC-sanctioned Kurchenko who had been under RIS protection in Moscow. It would have been helpful to know that Andriy Yermak (Yermak), Zelensky’s Chief of Staff, would likely try to influence Ukraine’s response to a Russian invasion, which is ultimately what occurred and was blocked by General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces. I subsequently learned that much of the information I had collected from DYNAMO and sub-sources was read directly to the U.S. Ambassador in Kyiv following Russia’s invasion and was deemed to be high value intelligence. Nevertheless much of this information was kept out of normal intelligence reporting channels, apparently because senior figures within the Bureau thought it might embarrass figures in the NYFO.
36. At the meeting I attended during which the FITF was attempting to suppress my reporting by forcing closure of the majority of my productive CHSs, whose reporting had been extensively corroborated and successful in blunting foreign influence, the FITF’s Section Chief admitted to me that I was not the only field Agent whom they were asking to close their sources related to Russia/Ukraine matters just as the war erupted. I was extremely disturbed that they admitted there was a national suppressive effort lead by their small group of analysts, who lacked operational field experience, and whose judgment appeared to be driven entirely by high-level Bureau politics. When I questioned the wisdom of their request, the supervising analyst claimed their recommendation relied on highly classified information from the National Security Agency (NSA). I had read the classified Top Secret document they were relying on, which had numerous citations from documents that I myself drafted, and I knew it did not in fact support her conclusions. They then claimed they had additional information. When I asked to review this additional information and clearly articulated my need to know, they refused to share it with me even though I had the same TS-SCI security clearance they did. They even admitted they had no evidence of any wrongdoing and no examples of any false information intentionally provided by my confidential sources. The closure of DYNAMO and other sources was in fact “not for cause,” as specifically documented in the official case file, which I myself no longer have access to. Noted, the other two co-case handlers of DYNAMO were present at that meeting as well and could attest to these events.

37. Alarmingly, the CHS portfolio was effectively gutted just after I submitted my whistleblower complaint. This occurred exactly as Russia invaded Ukraine, when priority intelligence collection requirement solicitations from FBIHQ had been disseminated to all FBI Special Agents requesting reporting on Russia/Ukraine matters, which I had been doing with these same confidential sources. I believe that the intelligence that was suppressed could easily have influenced U.S. decisions surrounding the conflict. High-level figures at the Bureau had, however, apparently reached the conclusion that they wished to shut down or greatly limit intelligence collection relating to Ukraine, presumably because they believed it was threatening to persons they wished to protect.
38. After closure of my most prolific sources, within a few months, I recruited new CHSs who could report on similar matters related to public corruption and Russia/Ukraine matters. After this occurred, specifically and in writing, forbade me from reporting on public corruption and criminal matters and any former or current associates of Trump, even while my whistleblower complaint was still active alleging intelligence suppression under the watch of these same managers. I was the only Special Agent on my squad under that suppressive mandate and I was at that time the principal Agent reporting on those specific matters. I was told that I could no longer input information directly into commonly accessible data bases used to document source reporting. That is, I was told that I was to first send my drafts via email to my supervisor for review and editing prior to putting them into the designated system and routing them for official approval and serialization into the case file. Requiring a confidential source handling agent to first clear their reporting through their manager prior to inputting it into the official system and routing their reporting to them for official approval is NOT typical nor is it required per policy and is a case of extreme micromanagement and control of intelligence input, especially for one of the Bureau’s most senior counterintelligence Agents. It appeared to me that this editorial process was designed to block the inputting of any information which might compromise figures associated with the NYFO who were being aggressively protected.

39. After being prohibited from reporting on public corruption and criminal matters, my management told me they only wanted me to focus on Russian FCI, for which they admitted I had “a unique skill set.” I explained to them that, based on my more than 10 years of experience working Russian FCI, it is impossible to effectively work Russian FCI in isolation without also reporting on public corruption and organized crime. This requirement suggested that my managers had little serious understanding of how Russian FCI operated, of the intricate interrelationship between the RIS and Russian organized crime groups operating within the United States, of the channels used to finance Russian influence operations, or of the specific role played in influencing politically exposed persons in recent operations.9

40. My expressions of concern to Internal Affairs produced no changes. In October 2012, the same manager who had been a subject of my reporting
called me to his office, where he informed me that he was transferring me to the FBIHQ Transfer Unit. Within just a few weeks of his promotion, which gave him unilateral authority to transfer me against my wishes anywhere he wished, he removed me from my human intelligence squad, forced me to cease contact with all of my sources and placed me onto a surveillance squad that does not allow me to operate CHSs or do any more independent reporting. At the same time, workers in other branches of the USIC, including those in the FBIHQ Transfer Unit, were told that they were not permitted to communicate with me further, as they conveyed to me, after I had been working with them for years co-handling CHSs. This was the opposite from training and guidance I had received throughout my career that encourages maintaining of strong liaison contacts.

41. As he was forcing my removal from my squad and transfer, I made sure the A/SAC confirmed in writing that he was aware of my whistleblower complaint and the devastating impact his retaliatory action was having on my family due to the inflexible perpetual surveillance shift schedule and several extra hours of commute time. I also formally appealed to the FBIHQ Transfer Unit and requested a reasonable accommodation from FBIHQ for consideration of transferring me to a squad that operates closer to where I live, so that I could be present for my family and assist with care for my special needs daughter; these appeals were ignored and denied. Being on a surveillance squad, all of my actions are now tracked and I’m only in the office twice per month. It has now been several months since I was removed from my position. On several occasions I was contacted by CHSs I had previously run who wanted to be sure I knew that they had been contacted by other FBI agents who had an apparent assignment to developing a portfolio of disparaging information about me.

42. After having no other options, on November 28, 2012, I filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint. It was during the EEO complaint process that my management, for the first time, made some concessions by transferring me to another surveillance squad stationed closer to where I lived, so that I would not have to commute four hours per day. Management also offered me money to withdraw my whis-
A whistleblower complaint along with my EEO complaint, which was the first time they ever acknowledged the existence of the complaint. Specifically, on February 21, 2013, they tried to get me to drop my whistleblower complaint for a payment of $14,000. This offer was extended in the course of the mediation portion of the EEO settlement, and I was told that I was forbidden ever to allude to the fact that it was made. I refused to take the money to drop both complaints, so that I could keep my protected status under the law and hopefully force reform through my whistleblower complaint, which I still consider active. I continue to be devoted to the Bureau and its mission.

43. As of this time, I continue to be active within the Bureau and maintain an active TS-SCI security clearance in good standing. Working on surveillance missions with no relevance to my area of specialization and training. I do not fully understand why I have been singled out for this treatment nor who exactly is driving it, but my strong suspicion is that one or more of my sources provided truthful, accurate information that is harmful to a person or persons that higher ups in the Bureau are trying to shield.

Dated: July 15, 2013