

other words, I was not reading the conclusions of any security officer. The reason for that was that in this project there were so many things that the security officer would not know the significance of that I felt I had to do it myself. Of course, I have been criticized for doing all those things myself and not having a staff of any kind; but, after all, it did work, and I did live through it.

Q. General, in the light of your experience with security matters and in the light of your knowledge of the file pertaining to Dr. Oppenheimer, would you clear Dr. Oppenheimer today?

A. I think before answering that I would like to give my interpretation of what the Atomic Energy Act requires. I have it, but I never can find it as to just what it says. Maybe I can find it this time.

Q. Would you like me to show it?

A. I know it is very deeply concealed in the thing.

Q. Do you have the same copy?

A. I have the original act.

Q. It is on page 14, I think, where you will find it, General. You have the same pamphlet I have.

A. Thank you. That is it. The clause to which I am referring is this: It is the last of paragraph (b) (i) on page 14. It says:

"The Commission shall have determined that permitting such person to have access to restricted data will not endanger the common defense or security," and it mentions that the investigation should include the character, associations, and loyalty.

My interpretation of "endanger"—and I think it is important for me to make that if I am going to answer your question—is that it is a reasonable presumption that there might be a danger, not a remote possibility, a tortured interpretation of maybe there might be something, but that there is something that might do. Whether you say that is 5 percent or 10 percent or something of that order does not make any difference. It is not a case of proving that the man is a danger. It is a case of thinking, well, he might be a danger, and it is perfectly logical to presume that he would be, and that there is no consideration whatsoever to be given to any of his past performances or his general usefulness or, you might say, the imperative usefulness. I don't care how important the man is, if there is any possibility other than a tortured one that his associations or his loyalty or his character might endanger.

In this case I refer particularly to associations and not to the associations as they exist today but the past record of the associations. I would not clear Dr. Oppenheimer today if I were a member of the Commission on the basis of this interpretation.

If the interpretation is different, then I would have to stand on my interpretation of it.

Mr. ROBB. Thank you, General. That is all.

Mr. GRAY. I would like to ask a question, General Groves. This relates to a question Mr. Garrison asked about the urgencies, whether the urgencies had been stepped up with respect to having these weapons ready toward the end of the war.

My recollection is that you said that there was not any acceleration as far as you were concerned?

The WITNESS. No. My mission as given to me by Secretary Stimson was to produce this at the earliest possible date so as to bring the war to a conclusion. That was further emphasized by his statement that any time that a single day could be saved I should save that day. The instructions to the project were that any individual in that project who felt that the ultimate completion, insofar as he understood it, was going to be delayed by as much as a day by something that was happening, it was his duty to report it direct to me by telephone, skipping all channels of every kind. So that urgency was on us right from the start.

Mr. GRAY. And any instructions with respect to that which went to the laboratory at Los Alamos would have come then from you?

The WITNESS. That is correct. I think, for your information, while the laboratory officially was under General Nichols, because the whole district was under Nichols, by an understanding between Nichols and myself, because that left me doing nothing but telling Nichols what to do, and it was beyond his capacity to do everything, in general a division of direct responsibility was made, and Nichols took over essentially Oak Ridge and the general administration.

With respect to Los Alamos, it was directly my responsibility in every way, everything that happened. The orders were issued direct. We tried to keep