

October 6, 2022

(U) NATIONAL SECURITY MEMORANDUM/NSM-13

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
THE UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: (U) Memorandum on U.S. International Counterterrorism
Policy

(U//~~FOUO~~) This National Security Memorandum (NSM) sets forth policy guidance for the United States' efforts to counter international terrorism. It defines the strategic approach, principles, and lines of effort that shall guide departments and agencies' international counterterrorism (CT) planning and programs.

(S//NF) This NSM supersedes and revokes [REDACTED] the 2018
National Strategy to Counter Terrorism. It is consistent
with [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] which remain in effect. This NSM also supplements, but does not rescind, [REDACTED]

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which remain in effect. It is consistent with the Biden Administration's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and complements the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. It also complements region-specific and global U.S. strategies – such as the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability – that seek to improve governance, reduce instability, and address human rights abuses that can enable terrorism to flourish.

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~~(S//NF)~~ This NSM is consistent with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The National Security Council (NSC) staff, through the NSM-2 process, will coordinate the development of guidance to departments and agencies with responsibilities in counterterrorism to ensure a seamless integration between this policy framework and other relevant policies.

I. (U) Strategic Environment and Approach

~~(S//NF)~~ Foreign terrorist groups pose a persistent threat to the United States, our allies and partners, and U.S. interests overseas. While U.S. and partner CT efforts over the past two decades have significantly degraded the threat these groups pose to the U.S. Homeland, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and conduct operations in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East where internal conflicts, weak governance, and violent extremist ideologies fuel their expansion. At the same time, Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and their militant proxies have stepped up their use of violence aimed at reducing U.S. presence and influence in the Middle East. And in Australia, Canada, Europe, and New Zealand, foreign Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs) are recruiting and mobilizing online and building transnational ties to promote violence. Countering this increasingly diverse and geographically dispersed

international terrorism threat remains an important U.S. national interest and Administration priority.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Against the backdrop of this varied terrorism threat, the United States faces a growing range of other national security challenges, from the increasing strength and assertiveness of strategic competitors such as China and Russia to climate change to the emergence of new cyber threats and disruptive technologies. Ensuring that we continue to protect our vital interests from terrorism while also allocating resources to other high-priority national security issues will require adjustments to the CT approach we have pursued since September 11, 2001.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Our most vital CT interest has been and must remain the protection of the Homeland and U.S. persons and facilities overseas.¹ We have made significant progress toward this objective over the last two decades, including building a strong and effective CT enterprise that collaborates and innovates across the U.S. Government and has integrated capabilities with key allies and partners. Overseas, U.S. and partner CT operations have made strides in degrading al-Qa'ida's and ISIS's leadership, freedom of movement, and access to the recruits, materiel, and technical expertise that enable terrorist attacks, including those carried out across national boundaries. At the same time, we have strengthened our defenses by building a robust watchlisting, screening, and vetting enterprise; reducing barriers to information sharing; expanding Federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement CT capabilities and authorities; and engaging local leaders to help address radicalization to violence in their communities.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As we position the U.S. CT enterprise for the future, we must take into account lessons learned from our years of effort against terrorism, focusing on those programs, capabilities, partnerships, and actions that have provided the greatest CT impact while avoiding the repetition of past mistakes. In particular, we must avoid undertaking large-scale, U.S.-led nation-building efforts in the name of CT and instead employ tailored approaches, including those that reduce threats directly or incentivize and equip local authorities to take more responsibility for countering terrorists, providing security for

¹ (U//~~FOUO~~) For the purposes of this NSM, U.S. persons refers to U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. U.S. facilities refers to U.S. Government-owned or run facilities, such as embassies and military bases.

their own citizens, and addressing issues that fuel radicalization to violence in their own countries.



(U//~~FOUO~~) Going forward, we must set realistic and achievable goals, while focusing the majority of our limited CT resources and capabilities on the terrorist threats that most directly endanger the U.S. Homeland and U.S. persons and facilities overseas. To offset a reduced overseas CT posture and fewer CT resources – a trend that has been ongoing since 2018 – we must continue to bolster our defenses at home, strengthen our bilateral, multilateral, and international partnerships overseas, and improve our ability to warn of emerging terrorist threats. We must maintain pressure on terrorist groups overseas, albeit in a more prioritized way, while using diplomatic leadership and engagement with international organizations to help develop and set CT global legal and policy standards that respect democratic principles and the rule of law.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The next section sets forth a set of principles that will guide our CT efforts to ensure that we advance our CT goals within the context of our broader foreign policy and national security objectives.

II. (U) Guiding Principles

(U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. CT policy, planning, and programs shall be guided by the following principles. We will:

1. (S//~~NF~~) **Rigorously prioritize CT efforts:** As set forth in Section III below, we will prioritize intelligence collection, CT operations, and resources on disrupting and degrading those terrorists posing the most direct threat to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. persons and facilities overseas.

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The  and targeted prioritization of U.S. CT efforts and resources will help optimize our CT posture and align it with other U.S. national security priorities.

2. (S//~~NF~~) **Prioritize partnerships and U.S. international CT leadership:** We will work by, with, and through local, regional, and international partners to achieve our CT

(B)(1) objectives and maintain U.S. leadership in international CT efforts wherever possible, while preserving the capability and authority to [REDACTED] when necessary and lawful to disrupt threats to the U.S. Homeland or U.S. persons or facilities overseas. Our commitment to working with bilateral and multilateral partners, as well as non-governmental actors, will help to spread the CT resource burden, leverage complementary CT capabilities and efforts, and produce more enduring results by empowering partners to assess, prevent, and mitigate terrorism threats in their own countries and regions.

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ Promote civilian-led, non-kinetic approaches where possible and effective: U.S.-led or U.S.-enabled lethal action will remain an important CT tool, but we will prioritize nonlethal and non-kinetic options whenever such approaches can provide effective solutions. This means promoting civilian-led law enforcement or administrative actions against terrorists and their supporters, investment in security and law enforcement capabilities and cooperation to enable such action, and an increased focus on proactively addressing the drivers of radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment. The latter will require innovative terrorism prevention programming² tailored to local communities and environments, targeted strategic communications efforts, and expanded efforts to limit terrorist use of the internet.


- (B)(1) 4. ~~(S//NF)~~ Set realistic and achievable objectives: We will manage terrorism risk while acknowledging the impossibility of eliminating terrorism in all places and in all of its forms. If country-specific [REDACTED] action plans are created (as described in Section V), they will be nested under this NSM and integrated into broader U.S. policies, strategies, and plans as relevant. They will necessarily take into account local drivers of terrorism – including armed conflict, poor governance, and weak state capacity – but must be realistic about what U.S. power and influence alone can achieve. We will assist partners, but we will not nation-build in the name of countering terrorism. Our international CT efforts can and must be done in a more focused, less resource-intensive way.

² (U//FOUO) For the purposes of this NSM, prevention programs include activities undertaken in preventing and countering violent extremism aimed at minimizing radicalization and mobilization to violence, including efforts to address underlying grievances.

5. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Critically assess our CT approach, programs, and capabilities:** We will periodically review and measure progress against our CT objectives and make adjustments as necessary. We must be dispassionate in eliminating ineffective, inefficient, or duplicative processes and programs; steadfast in preserving and improving critical capabilities; and proactive in developing new CT tools and seeking new CT authorities where existing tools or authorities are inadequate or outdated.

6. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Optimize Intelligence Community (IC) CT Collection and Analysis:** We will align our intelligence collection, exploitation, processing, and analysis efforts to support priority CT objectives—

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7. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Synchronize CT policy development and efforts with broader U.S. foreign policy and national security policy development and goals:** While we will [redacted] the scope of our CT-focused efforts, we will also seek to leverage complementary U.S. and partner-led diplomacy, conflict resolution, stabilization, development, and political reform efforts to address local drivers of terrorism more effectively. Likewise, we will seek opportunities to leverage our CT partnerships —

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— to advance other U.S. priorities from [redacted] to strengthening the rule of law and promoting democratic practices.

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8. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Execute the CT mission in a manner consistent with U.S. values:** U.S. values will remain the lodestar for our CT efforts. We will take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to the civilian population and other protected persons. We will take measures to promote respect for human rights and compliance with the law of war by the recipients of U.S. support and to mitigate risk that U.S. support will be used in violation of the law. U.S. CT efforts will be conducted with transparency and in a manner consistent with

all applicable laws. To promote U.S. leadership in the shaping of global CT practices, our actions must serve as a positive example to others. This includes demonstrating to partners that respect for human rights and the rule of law can serve their national security and CT goals.

III. (U) Prioritization Framework

(S//NF) We will employ a risk-based³ prioritization framework to inform policy decision-making and resourcing to ensure a focus on our highest-priority CT objectives.

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[REDACTED]

while recognizing that local conditions—such as the absorptive capacity of partners and the proximity of U.S. assets—may necessitate flexibility.

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[REDACTED]

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³ (U//FOUO) For the purposes of this NSM, terrorism risk is measured as a function of terrorist intent and capability (i.e., threat) to target the U.S. Homeland or U.S. persons or facilities overseas; U.S. exposure or vulnerability; and the willingness and capability of host-country governments to mitigate terrorist threats within their borders.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(S//NF) The threat assessment underpinning this framework will be conducted by the IC semi-annually and will be used to inform policy guidance from the NSC-led Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). The NSC staff will organize quarterly CSG meetings to assess and update, as necessary, prioritization guidance based on shifts in terrorism risk or other policy decisions.

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[REDACTED]

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(S//NF) This prioritization framework will help inform the National Intelligence Priority Framework [REDACTED] and related intelligence priority guidance for the IC to promote consistency across U.S. CT efforts.

IV. (U) Lines of Effort

(S//NF) Drawing on the aforementioned guiding principles and prioritization framework, we will operationalize our CT approach through the LOEs and priority actions described in this section.

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(S//NF) LOE 1 - Strengthen Defenses:

[REDACTED] we must continually seek ways to strengthen our defensive CT capabilities. We must ensure that U.S. Government departments and agencies have the necessary lawful capabilities, authorities, and information to prevent known or suspected terrorists or any other individuals with a nexus to terrorism, consistent with applicable law, from

entering the United States, as well as the means to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute foreign terrorists and their supporters already located inside the United States. This will require innovation in the sources and methods we use to collect, exploit, and share identity information and Homeland-related terrorism reporting; in the investigative tools and capabilities available to law enforcement; and in the training and hiring of relevant analysts, investigators, and enforcement personnel. While focusing the majority of our efforts on detecting and disrupting active and emerging foreign terrorist threats to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. persons or facilities overseas, we must also work to get ahead of the problem by reducing terrorist radicalization to violence and recruitment, enhancing violent extremist disengagement and reintegration, and strengthening government, private sector, civil society, and individual preparedness and resiliency to terrorist attacks.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 1.1: Ensure the U.S. Government has a robust capability to collect intelligence on international terrorism threats to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. persons or facilities overseas, and to share that intelligence with relevant U.S. departments and agencies and international partners, as appropriate.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 1.2: Bolster identity intelligence collection - [REDACTED] - analysis, and infrastructure to prevent known or suspected terrorists or any other individuals with a possible nexus to terrorism from traveling internationally and entering the United States.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 1.3: Ensure law enforcement has appropriate capabilities and authorities to lawfully address threats to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. persons or facilities overseas - to include capabilities and authorities, as deemed necessary and feasible, to lawfully access the devices, data, and communications of suspected international terrorists.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Priority Action 1.4: Enhance terrorism prevention efforts inside the United States by leveraging best practices and investing in strategies that have demonstrated effectiveness or hold data-driven promise for effectiveness in the future.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 1.5: Promote government, private sector, civil society, and individual preparedness for and

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resilience to terrorist attacks within the United States through critical infrastructure protection, emergency response and recovery planning, increased information sharing, and strategic communications.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 1.6: Protect U.S. persons and facilities overseas by aligning U.S.-provided security resources to threats as they evolve, working to improve host country willingness and capability to provide security, and by investing in technologies for identifying and mitigating threats against U.S. facilities overseas.

~~(S//NF)~~ LOE 2 - Build and Leverage Partner Capacity: Foreign partnerships, already a key component of U.S. CT strategy and efforts, will take on increased importance

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Strengthening the military, intelligence, law enforcement, border security, counter-terrorist finance, and justice sector capabilities of our partners to identify, disrupt, degrade, and share information on terrorists and their support networks will be paramount, as will bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to build their political will to do so. We will work with partner governments, non-governmental and international organizations, civil society and community leaders (ensuring the inclusion of women, minorities, and faith groups), and the private sector, where appropriate, to enhance local prevention, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs. We will prioritize partner capacity building efforts in line with our prioritization framework and tailor them according to assessed country-specific CT needs, absorptive capacity, and political dynamics. Across all of our partner capacity building efforts, we will work to cultivate local ownership, accountability, and good stewardship of any resources or capabilities transferred.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 2.1: Engage private sector, non-governmental, and governmental partners - from local to multilateral levels - to promote ongoing awareness of evolving terrorist threats and bolster partner governments' political will to keep CT as a priority national security objective in their countries, regions, or portfolios.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 2.2: Where foreign governments or other local partners are willing to cooperate on mutual CT goals, help build locally appropriate, accountable, trusted, and responsible partner military forces and security sector institutions to identify, prevent, disrupt, degrade,

investigate, respond to, and prosecute terrorist activity by using the full range and coordination of their CT capabilities, while adhering to applicable laws.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 2.3: Assist partner countries in boosting judicial system capacity and developing legislation and regulatory regimes—in line with international standards and best practices—to criminalize, effectively investigate, and prosecute terrorist and terrorism-related activity within their borders while protecting human rights, civil society actors, and independent media organizations. As part of this effort, we will also assist partner countries with sentencing and prison-related programs for convicted terrorists.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 2.4: Expand and leverage partner intelligence collection capabilities and information sharing mechanisms, [REDACTED]

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 2.5: Drawing on international best practices, develop locally-tailored prevention, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs with partner countries, sub-national entities, or other local and international partners to minimize terrorist radicalization, recruitment, mobilization to violence, and recidivism.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 2.6: Coordinate capacity-building efforts within the U.S. Government, with multilateral organizations, and with key allies, partners, and well-resourced donor countries to strategically deploy resources, maximize unity of effort, and tap into unique skills or partner relationships.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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~~(S//NF)~~ LOE 3 - Strengthen Our Capacity to Warn: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] we must strengthen our ability

(B)(1) to provide early warning of shifts in the intent or capability of [redacted] groups to attack the U.S. Homeland or U.S. persons or facilities overseas. We will build a layered I&W architecture that incorporates a wide spectrum of information types and sources - including expanded use of open source and non-traditional sources of information - and increases collaboration with partners, [redacted]

(B)(1) • ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 3.1: Establish and monitor an IC-wide set of indicators of change in terrorist intent and capability to attack the U.S. Homeland or U.S. persons or facilities overseas.

(B)(1) • ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 3.2: Optimize I&W collection and analysis against terrorists in [redacted] augment [redacted] on CT issues with increased use of open source information, reports from U.S. diplomatic and military staff in the field, financial network analysis, detainee debriefings, and CEM exploitation.

• ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 3.3: Increase partner I&W capabilities for collecting, analyzing, and sharing early warning information.

~~(S//NF)~~ LOE 4 - Narrowly Focus Direct Action CT Operations:

(B)(1) [redacted] the United States will maintain a direct action capability for use against terrorist groups [redacted] that pose a threat to the U.S. Homeland or U.S. persons or facilities overseas. We will focus these efforts first and foremost on disrupting and degrading their external operations capabilities, their ability to strike U.S. targets, and their development, acquisition, or use of WMD and other advanced weapons or technologies. We will work by, with, and through local and international partners where possible, but will also maintain and employ [redacted] U.S. direct action capabilities, if necessary. [redacted]

(B)(1) [redacted] in a manner consistent with all applicable laws, and [when approved] the PPM Governing Direct Action CT Operations Outside Areas of Active Hostilities, where applicable. U.S. CT direct action operations should be calibrated to the scope, scale, and trajectory of threats in the countries where such actions are employed and in a manner consistent with broader U.S. policy goals in those countries.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 4.1: [REDACTED]

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 4.2: [REDACTED]

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 4.3: Ensure detention and long-term disposition solutions for captured individuals are planned for and implemented in a manner consistent with all applicable laws, the PPM Governing Direct Action CT Operations Outside Areas of Active Hostilities, when approved and where applicable, and existing DoD and other U.S. Government policy and guidance related to detention, in consultation with the Department of Justice when appropriate.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 4.4: Monitor and disrupt – including through direct action CT operations, where necessary – terrorist development, acquisition, or use of advanced weapons, including WMD; new or emerging lethal and disruptive technologies; or novel methods to conceal explosives or chemicals for attacks on aviation or transportation sector targets.

~~(S//NF)~~ LOE 5 - Deter and Disrupt State Supported Terrorism: States that support terrorism do so to impose costs on their adversaries in a deniable manner that limits the risks of retaliation and escalation relative to conventional, overt uses of force. Countering state support to terrorism therefore requires, in part, raising the real and perceived risks of such activity. It requires a robust effort to identify, disrupt, and publicly expose state-supported terrorism activities; a diplomatic and strategic messaging effort to convey U.S. red-lines to state supporters of terrorism and to build

⁴ ~~(S//NF)~~ Specific targeting criteria will be governed by the PPM Governing Direct Action CT Operations Outside Areas of Active Hostilities, where applicable, or other relevant country plans.

international support against state-supported terrorism; and a willingness to credibly threaten and impose costs against states that support terrorism, potentially including the use of force, when permissible under domestic and international law, to defend and protect the safety of the U.S. Homeland or U.S. persons or facilities overseas.

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 5.1: Enhance efforts to identify and disrupt state support to terrorist actors [REDACTED] including on the key leadership of state-supported terrorist operational units; facilitation, fundraising, travel, and procurement activities; and plotting efforts.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 5.2: Working with international partners where possible, develop and clearly communicate a range of credible military, diplomatic, and economic measures to deter states from conducting terrorist attacks or supporting attacks by state or non-state actors and to hold them accountable after engaging in such activities.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 5.3: Work through the United Nations (UN), other multilateral institutions, and international coalitions to reinforce international obligations, commitments, and norms related to countering terrorism, and strengthen international consequences for countries that support terrorist activity.

~~(S//NF)~~ LOE 6 - Degrade Transnational Enablers of Terrorism: Many terrorist groups rely on the transnational movement of fighters, money, and materiel to acquire resources for their activities, and on the dissemination of propaganda and disinformation to spread their influence. This LOE focuses on

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The transnational-level priority actions in this LOE complement and magnify related actions at the country level identified in the other LOEs, including disrupting terrorist travel (priority actions 1.2, 2.2, 5.1), financing (2.2, 5.1), procurement (5.1), and radicalization and recruitment (1.4, 2.4, [REDACTED]). Within this LOE, we will prioritize actions against those enablers that most directly contribute to terrorists' external

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operations capabilities, including the travel of (especially Western) foreign terrorist fighters or operatives, the facilitation of weapons or explosives precursors, and the dissemination of terrorist media designed to enable or inspire independent attacks.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 6.1: Focus intelligence collection and analysis on identifying the primary methods, means, and locations terrorists use for the transnational movement of money, people, and weapons or precursor components to determine and pursue the most feasible and highest impact disruption options.

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 6.2: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] work with the UN and other multilateral organizations to strengthen and implement relevant UN Security Council resolutions and enforcement mechanisms.

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 6.3: [REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 6.4: Disrupt and degrade transnational terrorist finance by strengthening global implementation and enforcement of anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism standards, enhancing regulation and oversight of the informal financial sector and of digital assets, pursuing targeted financial sanctions against terrorist operatives and financiers, and improving financial information sharing with foreign governments and the private sector.

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 6.5: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] law enforcement or other action, as appropriate and lawful, against individuals involved in producing material that solicits acts of

terrorism; enhanced information-sharing with private sector media companies to help them identify terrorist content that may violate companies' terms of service; and the use of strategic communications, including the amplification of credible messengers, to discredit terrorist groups and their propaganda.

~~(S//NF)~~ LOE 7 - Integrating CT with other U.S. foreign policy and national security efforts: While our CT efforts will be focused first and foremost on disrupting and degrading threats to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. persons or facilities overseas, we will work to ensure our CT approach complements and mutually reinforces broader U.S. goals in a given country or region, such as peacebuilding, stabilization, and governance. Our CT efforts contribute to these broader efforts by building more effective host nation military, intelligence, and security services; developing strong personal and institutional relationships with host nation counterparts; and promoting U.S. global leadership and a rules-based approach to security that strengthens the rules-based international order [REDACTED]

(B)(1) [REDACTED] In turn, U.S. peacebuilding, governance, and stabilization efforts – done within the context of U.S. country, regional, and issue-specific strategies – can support our CT aims by addressing some of the underlying conditions and local grievances that enable terrorists to flourish, thereby helping to secure our CT gains and to prevent moderate or low-level CT threats [REDACTED] from growing into larger problems. While the United States has always tried to make CT and other U.S. foreign policy objectives mutually reinforcing, our approach going forward will be more intentional and more closely integrated through interagency planning processes.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 7.1: Ensure interagency CT strategies, policies, and initiatives are appropriately coordinated, aligned, and integrated with other U.S. national security and foreign policy strategies, policies, and initiatives.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 7.2: Leverage U.S., allied, partner, and multilateral peacekeeping, stabilization, governance, and development efforts being pursued within regional or issue-specific strategies to advance complementary terrorism-prevention objectives.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 7.3: Maintain U.S. engagement with and support for international coalitions, joint task forces,

and other international institutions or forums that help bolster U.S. CT leadership and joint capabilities while simultaneously building political capital and influence to advance other U.S. policy objectives.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Priority Action 7.4: Increase U.S. diplomatic engagement at the UN and other multilateral forums to shape international CT laws, norms, and best practices and to build and sustain international will to confront terrorism within a rules-based framework.

V. (U) Implementation and Governance

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The NSC staff, in collaboration with departments and agencies and with the support of the National Counterterrorism Center's Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (NCTC/DSOP), will prepare an International CT Policy Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) within 90 days of the issuance of this NSM for consideration by the Deputies Committee. The SIP will identify specific tasks - with assigned department and agency roles, measures of effectiveness, and timelines - to operationalize each of the LOEs and priority actions contained in this NSM, including engagement with the Congress as needed. The NSC staff, in consultation and collaboration with departments and agencies, may develop complementary country or terrorist group-specific Action Plans that provide tailored CT policy guidance for high priority countries or terrorist groups, drawing on the objectives, principles, LOEs, priority actions, and tasks set forth in this NSM and the SIP.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterterrorism will host semi-annual CSG meetings to measure progress on execution of the SIP tasks, assess the overall effectiveness of the CT approach set forth in this NSM, and recommend any necessary adjustments. As part of its assessment, the CSG will consider whether the interagency is appropriately aligned to fulfill the priority actions and tasks identified in this NSM and the accompanying SIP, and will raise any shortfalls or gaps to the attention of Deputies. The NSC staff will support the CSG by organizing bi-monthly sub-CSGs to oversee the SIP's implementation, identify challenges and opportunities, and prepare progress reports for the CSG in advance of each semi-annual CSG meeting. The NSC staff may request the assistance of individual departments and agencies in conducting assessments to inform these processes. NCTC/DSOP will conduct an annual independent assessment on the implementation of this NSM and the effectiveness of this CT

approach in protecting the United States and U.S. persons and facilities overseas from terrorist threats.

VI. (U) General Provisions

- a. (U) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
 1. (U) The authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
 2. (U) The functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
- b. (U) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable laws and subject to the availability of appropriations.
- c. (U) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.