



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

March 30, 2023

The Honorable Jack Reed
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, I am forwarding to you the Department of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 President's Budget.

This plan highlights the future path the Navy is evaluating in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to build a modernized naval force that makes needed contributions to advance the Joint Force's ability to campaign effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. The Navy is conducting a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report (BFSAR) utilizing the recently approved Department of Defense Planning Scenario for the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This analysis will not be completed until June 2023, and does not inform this report. As such, this report only focuses on Presidential Budget 2024 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) adjustments to the PB2023 30-year shipbuilding plan and directly related adjustments beyond the FYDP. The 2022 NDS driven BFSAR analysis will inform the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

I am sending similar letters to the other congressional committees required by statute and look forward to working with you in building and sustaining the fleet the United States needs to meet the requirements of the NDS. As always, if I may be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Carlos Del Toro".

Carlos Del Toro

Enclosure:
As stated

Copy to:
The Honorable Roger F. Wicker
Ranking Member



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

March 30, 2023

The Honorable Mike D. Rogers
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, I am forwarding to you the Department of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 President's Budget.

This plan highlights the future path the Navy is evaluating in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to build a modernized naval force that makes needed contributions to advance the Joint Force's ability to campaign effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. The Navy is conducting a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report (BFSAR) utilizing the recently approved Department of Defense Planning Scenario for the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This analysis will not be completed until June 2023, and does not inform this report. As such, this report only focuses on Presidential Budget 2024 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) adjustments to the PB2023 30-year shipbuilding plan and directly related adjustments beyond the FYDP. The 2022 NDS driven BFSAR analysis will inform the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

I am sending similar letters to the other congressional committees required by statute and look forward to working with you in building and sustaining the fleet the United States needs to meet the requirements of the NDS. As always, if I may be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Carlos Del Toro".

Carlos Del Toro

Enclosure:
As stated

Copy to:
The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

March 30, 2023

The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chair:

Per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, I am forwarding to you the Department of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 President's Budget.

This plan highlights the future path the Navy is evaluating in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to build a modernized naval force that makes needed contributions to advance the Joint Force's ability to campaign effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. The Navy is conducting a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report (BFSAR) utilizing the recently approved Department of Defense Planning Scenario for the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This analysis will not be completed until June 2023, and does not inform this report. As such, this report only focuses on Presidential Budget 2024 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) adjustments to the PB2023 30-year shipbuilding plan and directly related adjustments beyond the FYDP. The 2022 NDS driven BFSAR analysis will inform the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

I am sending similar letters to the other congressional committees required by statute and look forward to working with you in building and sustaining the fleet the United States needs to meet the requirements of the NDS. As always, if I may be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Carlos Del Toro".

Carlos Del Toro

Enclosure:
As stated

Copy to:
The Honorable Susan Collins
Vice Chairman



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

March 30, 2023

The Honorable Kay Granger
Chair
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Chair:

Per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, I am forwarding to you the Department of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 President's Budget.

This plan highlights the future path the Navy is evaluating in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to build a modernized naval force that makes needed contributions to advance the Joint Force's ability to campaign effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. The Navy is conducting a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report (BFSAR) utilizing the recently approved Department of Defense Planning Scenario for the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This analysis will not be completed until June 2023, and does not inform this report. As such, this report only focuses on Presidential Budget 2024 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) adjustments to the PB2023 30-year shipbuilding plan and directly related adjustments beyond the FYDP. The 2022 NDS driven BFSAR analysis will inform the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

I am sending similar letters to the other congressional committees required by statute and look forward to working with you in building and sustaining the fleet the United States needs to meet the requirements of the NDS. As always, if I may be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Carlos Del Toro".

Carlos Del Toro

Enclosure:
As stated

Copy to:
The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro
Ranking Member



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

March 30, 2023

The Honorable Jon Tester
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, I am forwarding to you the Department of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 President's Budget.

This plan highlights the future path the Navy is evaluating in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to build a modernized naval force that makes needed contributions to advance the Joint Force's ability to campaign effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. The Navy is conducting a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report (BFSAR) utilizing the recently approved Department of Defense Planning Scenario for the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This analysis will not be completed until June 2023, and does not inform this report. As such, this report only focuses on Presidential Budget 2024 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) adjustments to the PB2023 30-year shipbuilding plan and directly related adjustments beyond the FYDP. The 2022 NDS driven BFSAR analysis will inform the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

I am sending similar letters to the other congressional committees required by statute and look forward to working with you in building and sustaining the fleet the United States needs to meet the requirements of the NDS. As always, if I may be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Carlos Del Toro".

Carlos Del Toro

Enclosure:
As stated

Copy to:
The Honorable Susan Collins
Ranking Member



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

March 30, 2023

The Honorable Ken Calvert
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, I am forwarding to you the Department of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 President's Budget.

This plan highlights the future path the Navy is evaluating in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to build a modernized naval force that makes needed contributions to advance the Joint Force's ability to campaign effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. The Navy is conducting a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report (BFSAR) utilizing the recently approved Department of Defense Planning Scenario for the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This analysis will not be completed until June 2023, and does not inform this report. As such, this report only focuses on Presidential Budget 2024 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) adjustments to the PB2023 30-year shipbuilding plan and directly related adjustments beyond the FYDP. The 2022 NDS driven BFSAR analysis will inform the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

I am sending similar letters to the other congressional committees required by statute and look forward to working with you in building and sustaining the fleet the United States needs to meet the requirements of the NDS. As always, if I may be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Carlos Del Toro".

Carlos Del Toro

Enclosure:
As stated

Copy to:
The Honorable Betty McCollum
Ranking Member

Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2024

Prepared by:

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities - OPNAV N9

2000 Navy Pentagon

Washington, DC 20350-2000

Approved for Release by:

Office of the Secretary of the Navy

March 2023

The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense is approximately \$190,000 in Fiscal Years 2022 - 2023. This includes \$20,000 in expenses and \$170,000 in DoD labor.

Generated on 2023Mar23 RefID: 9-AACDD6D

Table of Contents

I.	Reporting Requirement.....	3
II.	Submission of the Report.....	3
III.	Analytic Efforts Supporting Force Structure Requirements.....	3
IV.	Plan Objectives – Priorities, Fiscal Environment, and Force Structure Adjustments	4
V.	PB2024 Shipbuilding Plan FYDP Overview	7
VI.	The Future Navy Fleet to Support Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO).....	7
VII.	Unmanned Platforms	8
VIII.	Industrial Base	9
IX.	Summary.....	11
	Appendix 1: PB2024 Shipbuilding Plan (FY2024-FY2028).....	13
	Appendix 2: Annual Funding for Ship Construction.....	19
	Appendix 3: Annual Funding for Sustainment	22
	Appendix 4: Planned Ship Decommissioning, Dismantling, and Disposals	24
	Appendix 5: Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Plan	27
	Appendix 6: Estimated Total Cost of Construction for Each Vessel.....	32
	Contained in the Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2024 (Limited Distribution)	

Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year (FY) 2024

I. Reporting Requirement

This report is submitted per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code. Appendices 1 - 6 provide supporting details. Appendix 6 is controlled under limited distribution. The classified appendix provided in the PB2023 report is not included this year because there are no substantive updates given the limited changes to the plan this year¹.

II. Submission of the Report

This report is the Department of the Navy's (DON) 30-year shipbuilding plan for FY2024 through FY2053. The FY2024 President's Budget (PB2024) provides planned funding to procure the ships included in the FY2024-FY2028 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) detailed specific reporting requirements if the final ship of the class is proposed in the FYDP. The DON is not procuring the final ship of a class in the PB2024 FYDP. Unless otherwise noted, funding levels are constant year (CY) 2023 dollars.

III. Analytic Efforts Supporting Force Structure Requirements

Multiple threat-informed analyses conducted by the Department of Defense (DoD) as well as external entities underscore the need for a larger, more capable Navy; however, no analysis has yet been informed by the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). In order to provide definitive force structure analysis and recommendations aligned to the 2022 NDS, the Navy is conducting a Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement Report (BFSAR) utilizing the recently approved DoD Planning Scenario, as required by the NDAA for FY2022. This analysis will not be completed until June 2023, and will not inform this report.

Therefore, this report will focus on PB2024 FYDP adjustments to the PB2023 30-year shipbuilding plan and directly related adjustments beyond the FYDP. The 2022 NDS driven BFSAR analysis will inform the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

The Department continues to evaluate industrial base health for both new construction and in-service Fleet readiness, capacity, and capability. Timely industrial base delivery of systems and platforms within cost estimates is a key consideration as it quickly enhances warfighting performance and controls cost growth. Improvements in today's production enable greater capability and capacity for developing future platforms, such as the future large surface combatant (DDG(X)) and the next generation attack submarine (SSN(X)). The DON, working with industry partners, will deliberately reduce execution risk through improved cost estimation, prototyping, and land-based testing systems to de-risk critical technologies and ensure that new programs deliver expected capabilities. Additionally, with the simultaneous construction of the Columbia Class SSBN and two

¹ The classified appendix will be reviewed annually for substantive changes and will be reissued to provide valuable insight into the Navy's future capabilities when warranted.

Virginia Class SSNs, the Department is investing heavily in the nuclear industrial base to reduce production risk, stabilize critical suppliers, and help enable recruitment and retention of the skilled production workforce.

Lastly, the department recognizes the significant strategic opportunity presented by the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) trilateral security pact to make a positive contribution to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region by enhancing deterrence. Based on the Tri-Lateral Agreement announcement of March 2023, the Navy anticipates building additional *Virginia* class SSNs in the 2030s as replacements for submarines sold to Australia. The full impact of AUKUS upon the Navy's shipbuilding plan cannot be characterized in this year's report given the conclusion of the March 2023 Tri-Lateral Agreement coincided with the finalization of this report coupled with additional studies that will continue this summer. The Navy is committed to AUKUS and will continue to engage with Congress and industry as analysis of the Optimal Pathway refines future SSN workload.

IV. Plan Objectives – Priorities, Fiscal Environment, and Force Structure Adjustments

In order to deliver a ready and lethal Navy within available resources, the Navy has utilized a consistent process with well-defined priorities in budget submissions. These priorities include:

- Prioritize recapitalization of the SSBN fleet with the *Columbia* class SSBN.
- Prioritize readiness to deliver a combat-credible forward force in the near-term.
- Invest in increased lethality/modernization with the greatest potential to deliver non-linear warfighting advantages against China and Russia in mid-to-far-term.
- Grow warfighting capacity. As stated in Section III, the ongoing 2022 NDS informed BFSAR analysis will provide the warfighting requirement to inform the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

The once-in-a-generation recapitalization of the Nation's most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, the SSBN force, comes at the same time as the Navy modernizes for future threats, placing strain across the Navy's budget. The Navy will only grow ready, lethal, warfighting capacity at a rate supported by the fiscal guidance and our ability to sustain that capacity in the future. Therefore, this plan does not resource capacity beyond what can be reasonably sustained – manning, training, maintenance, ordnance, operations, and future modernization.

Assuming limited budget growth, the two low ranges of this plan do not procure all platforms at the desired rate (e.g., DDGs, SSNs, and FFGs at two ships per year), which industry needs to demonstrate the ability to achieve, but does maximize capability within projected resources, industrial factors, and technology constraints to build the most capable force. Overall, this approach accepts risk in capacity in order to field a more capable and ready force.

PB2024 includes decisions to decommission a total of 11 ships in FY2024, with three decommissioning after their expected service lives. This decision frees up additional resources for shipbuilding and other priorities discussed above. Legacy platforms that are extremely expensive to repair and maintain and that cannot stay relevant in contested seas—must be retired in order to invest in essential capabilities the Navy needs for our national security. The planned decommissionings include 10 combatant ships discussed below and one SSN:

- 5 Guided Missile Cruisers (CG) - The DON assesses that it is best supported by investing in warfighting readiness, capabilities or capacity other than these legacy platforms. CGs have been the Navy's premier air defense command and control platforms for over three decades and this mission is now transitioning to Flight III DDGs. Based on their material condition, these five ships have reached the end of their useful service lives. The average age of these five CGs will be 34.2 years at planned decommissioning. The ships have a large vertical launch capacity; however, the ships are in poor material condition due to their age, and there are ongoing concerns with the legacy sensor, capability, and hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) system reliability. The substantial costs to repair and modernize these ships, outweighs the potential warfighting contributions of these platforms over their limited remaining service life. The Navy acknowledges that some of these are CG Modernization ships with significant sunk costs, and no return on the investment. However, it is not economical or fiscally responsible to complete them given the magnitude of the challenges associated with modernizing these ships in the manner chosen and the extensive remaining work to make them ready for sea. These five CGs are prioritized hull by hull based on their reported material condition and weighed against the time and resources necessary to return them to service. This approach has shaped a reasonable understanding of which of the CGs have the worst return on investment if maintained and which of the ships should be decommissioned before the others during FY2024. The Navy is applying lessons learned from these modernization availabilities to help plan future mid-life DDG modernization efforts.
- 2 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) – PB2024 continues to focus the LCS class on mine countermeasures (MCM) and surface warfare (SUW), eliminating the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission for the class. The warfighting requirement is for 15 *Independence* class LCSs dedicated to the MCM mission. LCS 6 and LCS 8 were originally SUW designated ships; however, PB23 reset the LCS program to have only six *Freedom* class LCS dedicated to SUW. Dedicating each of the classes to a specific mission set enables hull form and fleet concentration areas to align, simplify and streamline manning, training, and sustainment activities. A total inventory of 17 *Independence* class LCS leaves the Navy with two of those ships as excess to need supporting the wrong mission set; consequently, the two oldest *Independence* class ships are planned for decommissioning in FY2024. Additionally, neither of these ships have completed lethality and survivability upgrades. These two ships will be replaced with new *Independence* class ships that are delivering in the FYDP with more capability. As a result, LCS 6 and LCS 8 are proposed for Foreign Military Sale disposition.
- 3 Dock Landing Ships (LSD) These legacy ships are in poor material condition due to their age and high rate of operations and require significant resources to continue to repair, maintain, and operate. The substantial costs to repair and modernize these ships outweighs the potential warfighting contributions of these platforms over their limited remaining service life. Shifting resources to other capabilities better supports the amphibious fleet, and provides more operational capability to the Navy and Marine Corps. The DON assesses that it is best supported by investing in warfighting readiness, capabilities, or capacity other than these legacy platforms.

The Department is conducting an LPD 17 Flt II amphibious ship cost/capability study (additional detail in Appendix 1) to inform PB2025's way ahead with respect to this platform.

Appendix 1 summarizes PB2024 FYDP funding for ship construction (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy – SCN) and illustrates the acquisition, delivery, retirement, and inventory over the next 30 years for three alternatives beyond the FYDP that mirror the profiles from the PB2023 shipbuilding plan, two reflecting a budget with limited growth matched to planned, but not yet achieved, industrial capacity and one reflecting a larger force with additional resources beyond the FYDP. Each alternative assumed industry eliminates excess construction backlog and produces future ships on time and within budget. The procurement profiles for PB2024, Alternative 1, and Alternative 2, were constrained to 2.1% SCN growth after the FYDP. Alternative 3 was predicated on what the Department assesses the industrial base could support with significant additional investment not reflected in this plan, without funding constraints.

The primary differences between the baseline PB2024 and Alternative 2 is the focus on procuring more SSNs and unmanned vessels within the constrained TOA (USVs are not shown since they are not battle force, but consume SCN TOA). Alternative 2 continues procuring Virginia class submarines along with the future SSN(X) in the out years as opposed to the PB2024 profile, which ceases procurement of Virginia class submarines when SSN(X) begins. Alternative 2 also continues to procure DDG 51 Flt IIIs longer than PB2024, delays the shift to DDG(X), and procures fewer of both. This enables a larger SSN force and procurement of a larger combat logistics force due to savings created by continuing to buy the less expensive SSN and fewer DDG(X). The savings also allows procurement of up to one-third more non-battle force ships, such as LUSVs, which are not shown in these inventory tables. Further analysis of the AUKUS Optimal Pathway will refine the impacts to Alternative 2.

Alternative 3 represents procuring to a larger Navy. This alternative shifts CVNs to 4-year centers and not only shifts to the future SSN(X) and DDG(X) but also procures the platforms at a consistent rate of at least two per year.

Evolving operational concepts and rapid technological changes make single-point predictions after approximately 10 years unreliable. Accordingly, Appendix 1 highlights potential ranges of procurement and inventory options in the three alternatives for key battle force platforms beyond 10 years, dependent on resource availability, technology development, and threat considerations. As the Administration works with Congress to refine future years' plans and the analysis as the ongoing BFSAR concludes, the composition and potential ramp-up of battle force procurement beyond FY2028 will be adjusted accordingly.

Appendix 2 depicts costs for the three battle force ship procurement profiles outside the FYDP consistent with Appendix 1. At the low end of the ranges (i.e., limited growth), the modest increase in the two battle force options beyond the FYDP is a result of two new programs: the Light Amphibious Warship program delivering Medium Landing Ships (LSM), and Next Generation Logistics Ship program delivering Replenishment Oiler, Light (T-AOL). The LSM is categorized as an expeditionary vessel and is grouped in the support vessels category while the T-AOL is included in the combat logistics force category. These smaller ships are critical enablers of the USMC Force Design and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), but do not bring the same level of global, multi-mission responsiveness as their larger and more capable counterparts. The higher range would require additional prioritization in ship procurement funding to reflect better the ongoing analytic work discussed in Section III of this report and would produce a larger, more capable Navy. As previously stated, the Navy will focus first on maintaining readiness of the Fleet. Regardless of the profile selected, the Navy should not resource capacity beyond what can be reasonably sustained. Projected sustainment costs for this force are detailed in Appendix 3.

V. PB2024 Shipbuilding Plan FYDP Overview

The PB2024 shipbuilding plan includes procurement of 9 manned ships in FY2024 and 55 manned battle force ships within the FYDP. Based on the corresponding projected funding levels in the FYDP, the battle force inventory will be 291 manned ships by FY2028. The two low range options achieve 311-312 manned ships in FY2035, and ultimately 323-327 manned ships in FY2045. The higher range option achieves 326 manned ships in the mid-2030s, and ultimately 363 manned ships by FY2045. The above inventory levels are traditional manned battle force ships. In addition, it is estimated that the Navy could achieve 89-149 unmanned platforms by FY2045. Future force levels will be adjusted as the capabilities of unmanned platforms develop and are integrated into the battle force.

Full FYDP details of the FY2024 shipbuilding plan are in Appendix 1.

VI. The Future Navy Fleet to Support Distributed Maritime Operations

The concepts of DMO and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) / Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) require a balanced and different mix of traditional battle force ships as well as new unmanned, amphibious, and logistic platforms. Previous warfighting analysis validated that a progressive evolution of existing platforms combined with revolutionary introduction of new technologies results in a more survivable and more lethal force than previous force structures. The Department is committed to continually analyzing, testing, and experimenting with novel concepts and capabilities to ensure they will provide an optimal mix of capability to the warfighters of tomorrow.

DMO addresses challenges to sea control and access in contested and “informationalized” environments. This concept describes required capabilities to execute DMO with massed effects. DMO provides the intellectual framework necessary to evolve our fleet to meet the challenges of the future.


To realize these concepts, the Department continues to experiment and analyze a range of solutions to provide lethal capability for sea control and power projection within the framework of DMO. Study areas include, but are not limited to, aircraft carrier force structure, DDG(X), SSN(X), T-AOL, LSM, amphibious ship mix and force structure, and expanded missions for developing unmanned platforms. This analysis and experimentation, in support of warfighting concepts, is informed by operationally relevant metrics including, but not limited to, capacity, lethality, survivability, operational reach, and affordability.

The metrics in Figure 1 below highlight the capacity of potential future fleets to generate aircraft sorties, carry Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes in surface or undersea platforms, and employ undersea torpedoes. The shaded areas within each graph represents the potential trade space in the first two profiles of Table A1-5 within each of the platform types. The gold line on the graph represents the additional warfighting capacity gained by pursuing the third profile in Table A1-5. Procurement pace and volume of platforms will evolve based on technological maturation, operating concepts, threat projections and industrial base capacity.^{1,2}

¹ The reduction in torpedo capacity is indicative of the “submarine trough” in the mid-2030s.

² The steep reduction in undersea VLS capacity reflects the retirement of the four SSGNs in the latter part of the 2020s.

Figure 1. Key Naval Platform Metrics



VII. Unmanned Platforms

The DON released the Unmanned Campaign Framework and chartered the Unmanned Task Force to innovate and adapt new technologies with which to build a more lethal and distributed naval force. To compete and win in an era of strategic competition, the Department is committed to investing in advanced autonomy, highly reliable HM&E systems, networks, and enabling systems to create integrated human-machine teaming across the fleet. As these systems advance in capability, they will become key supporting elements through all phases of warfare and in all warfare domains.

Looking out three FYDP's in to the 2030s and beyond, Navy is laying the foundation of the Hybrid Fleet with investments in enabling technologies, material reliability, resilient networks, and autonomy. Efforts are proceeding incrementally with the development and fielding of unmanned capabilities using robust land and sea-based testing to minimize the risk of new technology and ensure systems can deliver on schedule to meet warfighting requirements. These systems are evaluated in war-games, exercises, fleet battle problems, and limited real-world operations to derive employment plans and concepts of operation. Platform development and subsystem technical maturation is following a Systems Engineering Framework approach across six lines of effort: reliable HM&E systems; automated communications systems; integrated combat system; common control system; sensory perception and autonomy; platform and payload prototyping. Learning from land-based testing, functional prototypes, and

innovative Fleet initiatives such as Task Force 59 will support continued refinement of platform requirements, technical maturation, capabilities development, and procurement program planning.

Since the PB2023 shipbuilding plan, the Navy has completed the Distributed / Offensive Surface Fires Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and approved the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) as the AoA preferred alternative. The development of the draft LUSV Capability Development Document is in progress.

PB2024 reflects the initial procurement of LUSV in FY25, ramping up to three LUSV per year by FY2027. By the end of FY24, Navy will operate up to seven USV prototypes: four Overlord USVs (OUSV), two Sea Hunter Medium Displacement USVs, and a MUSV prototype. The Orca XLUUV test and evaluation asset (XLE0) was christened in Q3FY22, and five operational prototype systems are scheduled to be delivered to the fleet by the end of the FYDP.

VIII. Industrial Base

The Navy's new construction and repair industrial base builds the Future Fleet and sustains today's Fleet. Sustaining and modernizing this vital shipbuilding base is a national security imperative that both energizes and challenges the Navy and the Nation. Strategic guidance and priorities, particularly as they affect the composition and size of the shipbuilding account, strongly influence plans across the shipbuilding plan. Nevertheless, over many decades, the foundation of a healthy shipbuilding base remains the Navy's commitment to stable, executable acquisition profiles that promote development and retention of highly-skilled workforces and investment in world-class manufacturing and shipbuilding facilities while maintaining a proper return on investment.

Within the overall industrial base, including both shipyards and suppliers, varying levels of capacity and risk exist. Nuclear powered ship production, a unique capability with little to no opportunity for commercial or dual use production, is provided by two private shipyards that are currently facilitized and certified to construct nuclear powered ships and will be at capacity for the next 15-plus years building *Columbia* class SSBNs, *Virginia* class SSNs, next generation SSNs, and *Ford* class CVNs. Industrial base funding was provided in FY2023 to increase infrastructure, reduce production risk, help stabilize the more than 350 critical suppliers, and help enable recruitment, training and retention of the skilled production workforce. The PB2024 request includes funding to continue these efforts. The non-nuclear shipbuilding industrial base that produces surface combatants, amphibious ships, combat logistics, and support vessels, while recovering from a number of perturbations, has the capacity to meet the force structure ranges of this plan, bolstered by the FY2023 funding Congress provided for Large Surface Combatant Shipyard infrastructure and *Constellation* class FFG industrial base and workforce development. The Navy is working with these shipbuilders to manage platform transitions and facilitate the use of excess capacity to support the nuclear powered shipbuilding programs through strategic outsourcing initiatives. Furthermore, the unmanned surface and undersea vessels described in this plan can be supported by the existing shipbuilding industrial base, while providing opportunities for existing shipyards and existing boat and craft builders, while also providing potential for new entrants.


This shipbuilding plan assumes resource levels that are relatively steady or moderately grow throughout the 30-year plan as shown in Appendix 2. Reduced procurement levels, inefficient profiles, and production gaps that could impact specific portions of the shipbuilding

industrial base are sources of potential risk. The Navy is mindful that as fleet composition evolves to meet warfighting requirements, alternative opportunities for the industrial base must be examined. These opportunities include adjusting procurement profiles to mitigate “peaks and valleys” beyond the FYDP, as possible, and ensuring ample competitive opportunities for current and future platforms (i.e., T-AGOS 25, AS(X), LSM, T-AOL), and a potential FFG 62 second source for construction once the design and technical data package is mature and risks have been reduced and validated. These opportunities allow the industrial base to adapt while maintaining the capacity to deliver the capability the nation needs.

The Navy recognizes the “boom and bust” profiles of the last 60-plus years resulted in sharp peaks followed by significant valleys, and sometimes breaks, in production. Today’s shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base is at a level of fragility in the supplier and labor force, amplified by COVID and inflationary impacts, such that without consistent and continuous commitment to steady and executable acquisition profiles the industrial base will continue to struggle and some elements may not recover from another “boom/bust” cycle. The trends provided by recent shipbuilding plans provided insight into why workforce experience and efficiency has become more difficult to reconstitute, and how that fundamentally contributed to longer, more expensive shipbuilding timelines. The buildup in the 1950s and 1980s, followed by “bust” periods of little production, each led to the loss of portions of our shipbuilding industrial capacity. The “boom” periods also led to large-scale block obsolescence as types/classes of ships reached (or will reach) the end of their service lives simultaneously, ultimately driving the need for another “boom” to recover. Given projected funding levels and industrial capacity, the ability to recapitalize older ships with new ones is constrained resulting in transient decreases in overall inventory in some platforms. The Navy is addressing these challenges head-on through collaboration with industry and government stakeholders and investments in the sustainment and expansion of initiatives in key maritime regions and supply-base centers of gravity. The Navy is invested in ensuring a skilled workforce is available today, and in the future, to support Navy shipbuilding and repair capacity needs, and will continue to maximize the use of the American workforce to build and sustain our forces. The strategy, however, requires a “whole of government” approach to develop a healthy blue-collar workforce.

The Navy recognizes that industry requires consistency in work orders under contract, or “backlog”, to invest in the facilities, capital equipment, workforce and processes to deliver affordable ships at rate. During the 1-2 years between contract funding and the formal start of the construction milestone, shipbuilders order long lead-time material from suppliers, develop and update construction build plans, and start steel cutting and early component fabrication that enable an optimized and efficient production flow once formal construction starts (reflected in Figure 2).

Figure 2. Notional Contract Award to Delivery Timeline



With the support of Congress and working with local, state and national organizations, the Navy and its shipbuilders are identifying opportunities to generate resiliency and productivity at our shipyards, within the shipbuilding workforce, and in the supply chain for both new construction as well as in-service maintenance providers. Congress has consistently appropriated funding in support of increasing industry capacity and supplier health. The ~\$2.4B industrial base investment proposed in the PB2023 FYDP for new construction, supports a generational increase in demand, which includes: supplier development, ship builder/supplier infrastructure, workforce development, technology advances, and strategic sourcing of material across the submarine and large surface combatant industrial base. The FY 2024 Budget proposes an additional ~\$2.2B across the FYDP to improve Virginia-class SSN maintenance. The Navy will continue to collaborate with industry to execute this funding and continue to collaborate with Congress and industry on strategies to positively affect shipbuilding base health.

IX. Summary

The PB2024 shipbuilding plan includes procurement of 9 manned ships in FY2024 and 55 manned battle force ships within the FYDP. This report focused on PB2024 FYDP adjustments to the PB2023 30-year shipbuilding plan and directly related adjustments beyond the FYDP.

In order to deliver a ready and lethal Navy within available resources, the Navy has utilized a consistent process with well-defined priorities in budget submissions. These priorities include:

- Prioritize recapitalization of the SSBN fleet with the Columbia class SSBN.
- Prioritize readiness to deliver a combat-credible forward force in the near-term.
- Invest in increased lethality/modernization with the greatest potential to deliver non-linear warfighting advantages against China and Russia in mid-to-far-term.
- Grow warfighting capacity. As stated in Section III, the ongoing 2022 NDS informed BFSAR analysis will provide the warfighting requirement to inform the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

The once-in-a-generation recapitalization of the Nation's most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, the SSBN force, comes at the same time as the Navy modernizes for future threats, placing strain across the Navy's budget. The Navy will only grow ready, lethal, warfighting capacity at a rate supported by resources and our ability to sustain that capacity

in the future. Assuming limited budget growth, the two low ranges of this plan do not procure all platforms at the desired rate (e.g., DDGs, SSNs, and FFGs at two ships per year), which industry needs to demonstrate the ability to achieve, but do maximize capability within projected resources, industrial factors, and technology constraints to build the most capable force. The two low range options achieve 311-312 manned ships in FY2035, and ultimately 323-327 manned ships in FY2045. Overall, this approach of assumed limited budget growth accepts risk in capacity in order to field a more capable and ready force.

This era of strategic competition requires a larger, modernized, capable, globally forward deployed, and lethal multi-domain Navy to face pacing threats in all domains. The Navy is moving forward building advanced platforms such as *Ford* class aircraft carriers, DDG 51 Flt III, FFG 62, SSN 774 with the Virginia Payload Module while advancing the development of future capable aircraft and combatants like FA-XX, SSN(X) and DDG(X). Difficult choices must be made to ensure the Navy best meets Joint Force operational requirements. These choices include divesting ships that are expensive to repair and maintain and provide less relevant capability to our pacing warfighting requirements. It also requires prioritizing promising technologies that need to be fielded quickly and at scale to be operationally relevant in the coming years. Careful prioritization in the near-term, in accordance with the National Security Strategy and the 2022 National Defense Strategy, will result in a Navy battle force that is more ready, sustainable, and lethal.

Appendix 1

PB2024 Shipbuilding Plan (FY2024-FY2028)

Table A1-1 includes the President’s Budget (PB2024) funding for the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) portion of the 30-yr shipbuilding plan.

Table A1-1. PB2024 FYDP funding for New Construction Battle Force Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)

Ship Type	(\$M)	FY2024		FY2025		FY2026		FY2027		FY2028		FYDP	
		\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty
CVN 78 ¹		1,916		3,083		3,081		3,854		3,845	1	15,780	1
DDG 51		4,483	2	4,410	2	4,172	2	4,220	2	4,609	2	21,894	10
FFG 62		2,174	2	1,037	1	1,933	2	1,041	1	2,058	2	8,243	8
SSN 774		10,346	2	9,964	2	8,670	2	8,090	2	7,553	2	44,621	10
SSBN 826 ²		5,834	1	7,276		8,468	1	8,788	1	8,729	1	39,095	4
LHA(R) ³		1,830		79		367		3,479	1			5,755	1
LSM (Medium Landing Ship) ⁴				188	1	150	1	297	2	296	2	931	6
T-AO 205		815	1			1,632	2	861	1	1,752	2	5,061	6
T-AOL (Next Gen Logistics Ship) ⁴						150	1	156	1	159	1	465	3
T-AGOS 25				434	1	417	1	421	1	427	1	1,699	4
AS(X) ⁵		1,733	1			1,101	1					2,834	2
Total New Construction⁶		29,131	9	26,470	7	30,141	13	31,207	12	29,428	14	146,378	55

Notes:

1. Funding reflects the two-CVN procurement for CVN 80 and CVN 81 and Advance Procurement (AP) for CVN 82 in FY2026-27 with the first year Full Funding (FF) in FY2028. A decision on CVN 82/83 two-ship buy is needed NLT FY2025.
2. FY2024-25 represents incremental full funding for the second ship and the first year of AP for the third ship. Funding in FY2026 and out is for annual serial production. Other funding shown is AP and economic order quantity funding across the class.
3. Reflects incremental procurement FF in FY2024 to support LHA 9 construction start in FY2023 and AP funding FY2025-26 for LHA 10 with procurement in FY2027.
4. These future platforms are under development. As the platform and capabilities are further defined, the procurement costs will be refined.
5. New ships planned for future procurement or for replacement of legacy ships are annotated with (X) until their class has been named, such as AS(X).
6. Funding for sustainment (maintenance, personnel, operations, etc.) is in addition to funding for new construction shipbuilding (SCN), and is phased with delivery of battle force ships within the FYDP.

Notable FYDP procurement activity in the PB2024 budget submission includes:

- Full Funding (FF) for the second *Columbia* class SSBN in FY2024-25 and serial production of one SSBN per year beginning in FY2026.
- FF requirements for CVN 80 and CVN 81 and Advance Procurement (AP) funding for CVN 82 in FY2026-27 with the first incremental of FF in FY2028. A decision on CVN 82/83 two-ship procurement is needed no later than FY2025.
- Funding 10 *Virginia* class Block VI submarines in the FYDP to support multi-year procurement of ten SSNs from FY2025 to FY2029. The DON is closely monitoring the submarine construction program while building two Virginia payload module SSNs and the *Columbia* class SSBN program moving into serial production in FY2026. Continues the \$2.4B added across the FY 2023 FYDP to increase capacity

in the submarine industrial base, as this production rate will require significantly increased and sustained shipbuilding performance. Trade studies and technology development efforts have started for SSN(X) with planned lead boat construction in the mid-2030s.

- Program funding for 10 DDG 51 class destroyers at a steady rate of two ships per year across the FYDP including eight of the ten ships in the FY2023 to FY2027 MYP. Delays procurement of DDG(X) to FY2032. Pursuing an FY2032 construction start for DDG(X) sustains DDG 51 Flight III production while reducing execution risk through land-based testing of the integrated power system and new hull form.
- Continuing the FFG 62 procurement profile to 2/1/2/1/2 FY2024-2028 due to affordability and required demonstration of production capacity. These changes in small surface combatant procurement manage execution risk in the FFG program for the FY2024 FYDP as the shipyard ramps up efforts on the lead ship, started in FY2022, while also completing existing orders for other ship classes.
- The preponderance of full funding for LHA 9 in FY2024. The FYDP includes AP funding added in FY2025-2026 and FF for LHA 10 added in FY2027. The Navy has started an Amphibious Ship Study to assess cost/capability tradeoffs to LPD Flt II, with study completion expected in June 2023.
- Funding six T-AO 205 class ships across the FYDP including two ships in FY2026 and FY2028.
- Beginning serial production of T-AGOS 25 ships in FY2025.
- Funding for two AS(X) ships in FY2024 and FY2026.

Long-Range Naval Vessel Inventory

Balance across readiness, modernization and capacity must be maintained to field credible naval power. Resources for operations, modernization and sustainment in addition to the supporting manpower, training, infrastructure, networks and stable procurement profiles are required to maintain the naval force.

Tables A1-2 thru A1-3 depict the procurement and delivery plans, Table A1-4 shows the retirement plan, which drive the battle force inventories shown in Table A1-5. Tables A1-3 and A1-5 assume industry eliminates excess construction backlog and produces future ships on time and within budget. The first two alternatives provide warfighting commanders ready and lethal platforms with no real budget growth.

As stated in Section III of this report the procurement profiles outside the FYDP are based the FY2023 shipbuilding plan, updated for the ships estimated cost increases, service life adjustments, FY2023 appropriations, and PB2024 decisions. The third alternative is based on showing a potential path to a larger Navy. It is however, constrained by the Navy's assessment of current industrial base capacity, and requires additional resources beyond the FYDP to procure those platforms.

The inventory tables indicate the projected number of ships in service on the last day of each fiscal year:

- Each provides capacity and a mix of ships supporting capabilities required by Combatant Commanders.

- The first two profiles add risk outside the FYDP to the submarine and surface combatant industrial base as procurement rates are less than two per year due to a greater prioritization on other ship classes.
- Continues to include future plans for introducing new or evolved platforms such as the next generation attack (SSN(X)) and large payload-based submarines, small and large surface combatants (DDG(X)), logistics, and support ships.
- The Department continues to review opportunities to accelerate new construction platforms and to assess the ability to extend existing platforms that have a satisfactory Lifecycle Health Assessment to achieve the force necessary to support the Combatant Commanders.

Table A1-2. Long-Range Procurement Profiles^{1, 2, 3, 4}

PB2024

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53
Aircraft Carrier					1					1					1					1					1					1
Large Surface Combatant	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2
Small Surface Combatant	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Attack Submarines	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
Ballistic Missile Submarines	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1																		
Large Payload Submarines																				1			1					1		
Amphibious Warfare Ships				1					1				1					1		1		1	1		1		1	1		1
Combat Logistics Force	1		3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1						1		2	2	4	3	3	1	1	1	1	2
Support Vessels	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1					1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	4
Total New Construction Plan	9	7	13	12	14	11	10	10	10	11	8	10	9	8	8	6	6	7	7	7	9	11	11	10	13	9	10	11	9	14

Alternative 2 to PB2024

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53
Aircraft Carrier					1					1					1					1					1					1
Large Surface Combatant	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2
Small Surface Combatant	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Attack Submarines	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	2
Ballistic Missile Submarines	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1																		
Large Payload Submarines														1			1					1				1			1	
Amphibious Warfare Ships				1								1								2		1	1		2	1	1	1	1	1
Combat Logistics Force	1		3	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	2					1	1		1	2	3	3	3	1	1	1	2	2
Support Vessels	1	2	3	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1					1		1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Total New Construction Plan	9	7	13	12	14	11	10	9	10	10	9	10	10	8	9	7	7	10	8	9	8	10	12	11	13	10	9	11	12	11

¹ A decision on CVN 82/83 two-ship buy is required no later than FY2025 and will be evaluated during upcoming force structure and industrial base studies. The Department is reviewing Large and Small Surface Combatant and Attack Submarine procurement quantities in FY2029-2033.

² The ability of the industrial base to support Alternative 3 has not been independently assessed.

³ The profiles shown in Tables A1-2 through A1-5 do not reflect future adjustments to support the AUKUS trilateral agreement. Future Procurement Profiles, Battle Force Delivery, Retirement and Inventory Plans will be updated in future reports after further analysis refines future SSN workload. Based on the March 2023 Tri-Lateral announcement, the Navy anticipates building additional *Virginia* class SSNs in the 2030s as replacements for submarines sold to Australia.

⁴ Amphibious ship inventories reflect a pause in the current LPD line. The analytic results of the medium deck amphibious ship study and the BFSAR will be reflected in future shipbuilding plans.

Alternative 3 to PB2024

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	
Aircraft Carrier					1				1				1				1				1				1					1	
Large Surface Combatant	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Small Surface Combatant	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Attack Submarines	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Ballistic Missile Submarines	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1																			
Large Payload Submarines															1														1		
Amphibious Warfare Ships				1			1				1			1	1	1	1		1	1		1		1		1		1		1	
Combat Logistics Force	1		3	2	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2					1	1		2	2	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	2
Support Vessels	1	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	1		1	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	2
Total New Construction Plan	9	7	13	12	14	13	13	12	14	13	13	11	13	10	11	10	12	10	11	7	10	10	12	12	13	11	11	11	11	11	

Table A1-3. Battle Force Delivery Plans

PB2024

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53
Aircraft Carrier		1			1				1					1					1					1					1	
Large Surface Combatant	3	2	2	4	2	4	1	3	4	2	4	4	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2
Small Surface Combatant	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Attack Submarines	1	2	2	1		3	1	2	3	2	2	2	4	3	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
Ballistic Missile Submarines					1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1											
Large Payload Submarines																														
Amphibious Warfare Ships	1		2		1	2				1						1				1						1	1	1	1	1
Combat Logistics Force	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	1							1	2	2	4	3	3	1	1
Support Vessels	1	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1							1	1	1	2	2	2
Total	10	12	14	11	12	16	8	13	19	12	13	12	12	11	11	8	7	8	7	6	6	6	7	10	10	11	11	12	10	10

Alternative 2 to PB2024

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53
Aircraft Carrier		1			1				1					1					1					1					1	
Large Surface Combatant	3	2	2	4	2	4	1	3	4	2	4	4	1	1	1	2		2	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2
Small Surface Combatant	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Attack Submarines	1	2	2	1		3	1	2	3	2	2	2	4	4	2	2	1	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	2
Ballistic Missile Submarines					1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1												
Cruise Missile Submarines																					1					1			1	
Amphibious Warfare Ships	1		2		1	2				1										1					1	1	1	1	1	
Combat Logistics Force	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	4	3	2	2	3	3	3	3						2		1	2	3	3	3	1	1
Support Vessels	1	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	3	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1					1		1	1	2	2	2	2
Total	10	12	14	11	12	16	8	13	18	11	14	12	12	12	9	10	5	8	8	7	8	8	8	9	11	11	13	11	11	

Alternative 3 to PB2024

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53
Aircraft Carrier		1			1				1					1				1					1				1			1
Large Surface Combatant	3	2	2	4	2	4	1	3	4	2	4	4	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2
Small Surface Combatant	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Attack Submarines	1	2	2	1		3	1	2	3	2	2	2	4	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Ballistic Missile Submarines					1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1												
Cruise Missile Submarines																							1				1			1
Amphibious Warfare Ships	1		2		1	2				1				1						1			2	1		1	1	1	1	
Combat Logistics Force	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	4	2	2	2	3	3	3	3						2		2	2	3	3	3	1	1
Support Vessels	1	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	5	4	4	4	2	2	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	1		1	1	2	2	3	3	3
Total	10	12	14	11	12	16	8	13	20	13	16	15	14	14	11	13	10	11	9	11	9	14	7	10	10	15	11	13	10	13

Table A1-4. Battle Force Retirement Plan

PB2024 Retirement Plan

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	
Aircraft Carrier			-1	-1					-1					-1				-1		-1				-1		-1				-1	
Large Surface Combatant	-5	-3	-3	-2	-2	-3	-7	-6	-4	-3	-3						-2	-4	-3	-3	-4	-4	-2	-2	-2	-3	-2	-2	-1	2	
Small Surface Combatant	-2	-8	-1	-4															-2	-3	-1	-2	-2	-4	-3	-3	-1	-1	-1	-1	
Attack Submarines	-1	-3	-3	-1	-1	-2	-3	-1		-3	-1	-2		-1	-4	-1	-2	-3		-2	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-2	-2	-2	
Cruise Missile Submarines			-2		-2																										
Ballistic Missile Submarines				-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1		-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1												
Amphibious Warfare Ships	-3	-2	-1			-1			-1	-1		-3	-1	-1	-1	-1						-1					-2		-2	-1	
Combat Logistics Force		-1	-2	-2		-3	-1			-1	-2	-1	-1	-1	-1								-1	-2	-2	-3	-3	-3	-2	-1	
Support Vessels		-2	-2			-2	-1	-2	-1	-3	-3	-1	-2	-1	-1	-2	-2				-2		-1	-1	-1	-2	-3	-2	-1	-3	-4
Total Naval Force Retirements	-11	-19	-15	-11	-6	-12	-13	-10	-8	-11	-10	-8	-5	-6	-8	-4	-7	-9	-7	-10	-6	-9	-8	-12	-12	-15	-10	-9	-9	-10	

Table A1-5. Resultant Battle Force Inventories and Trade Space

PB2024

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	
Aircraft Carrier	11	12	11	10	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	10	9	9	9	9	10	9	
Large Surface Combatant	85	84	83	85	85	86	80	77	77	76	77	81	83	84	86	87	86	84	83	82	80	78	78	78	78	76	76	76	76	78	
Small Surface Combatant	33	26	26	23	24	26	27	29	31	32	34	35	36	37	39	40	42	44	44	43	44	44	44	42	41	40	41	42	43	44	
Attack Submarines	50	49	48	48	47	48	46	47	50	49	50	50	54	56	53	54	53	52	53	53	54	55	56	57	58	58	58	58	60	60	
SSGNs/Large Payload Submarines	4	4	2	2																							1	1	1	2	2
Ballistic Missile Submarines	14	14	14	13	13	12	11	11	11	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	13	13	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	
Amphibious Warfare Ships	29	27	28	28	29	30	30	30	29	29	29	26	25	24	24	24	24	23	24	24	24	23	23	21	21	20	20	21	19	19	
Combat Logistics Force	31	31	31	30	32	30	31	33	37	38	38	39	40	41	42	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	44	44	44	43	43	
Support Vessels	36	39	42	46	50	52	54	55	58	58	57	58	58	59	60	60	60	61	61	59	59	58	57	57	56	54	54	55	54	52	
Total Naval Force Inventory	293	286	285	285	291	295	290	293	304	305	308	312	319	324	327	331	331	330	330	326	326	323	322	320	318	314	315	318	319	319	

Alternative 2 to PB2024

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53
Aircraft Carrier	11	12	11	10	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	10	9	9	9	9	10	9
Large Surface Combatant	85	84	83	85	85	86	80	77	77	76	77	81	82	83	84	86	84	82	80	79	77	74	74	73	73	71	71	71	71	73
Small Surface Combatant	33	26	26	23	24	26	27	29	31	32	35	36	37	38	39	40	42	44	45	44	46	46	47	45	44	43	44	46	46	47
Attack Submarines	50	49	48	48	47	48	46	47	50	49	50	50	54	57	55	56	55	54	56	57	58	60	61	62	64	66	66	66	69	69
Cruise Missile Submarines	4	4	2	2																		1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	4
Ballistic Missile Submarines	14	14	14	13	13	12	11	11	11	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	13	13	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Amphibious Warfare Ships	29	27	28	28	29	30	30	30	29	29	29	26	25	24	23	23	23	22	23	23	23	22	22	21	21	20	21	21	20	20
Combat Logistics Force	31	31	31	30	32	30	31	33	37	39	39	40	42	44	46	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	51	50	49	49	49	49	48	47
Support Vessels	36	39	42	46	50	52	54	55	57	55	54	55	55	55	55	54	53	54	54	52	52	51	51	50	49	47	47	48	48	47
Total Naval Force Inventory	293	286	285	285	291	295	290	293	303	303	307	311	318	324	325	331	329	328	329	326	328	327	327	324	323	319	322	325	327	328

Alternative 3 to PB2024

Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53
Aircraft Carrier	11	12	11	10	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	11	10	10	10	10	11	10	10	9	10	10	10	10
Large Surface Combatant	85	84	83	85	85	86	80	77	77	76	77	81	83	84	85	87	87	85	84	84	82	81	81	82	82	82	82	82	83	85
Small Surface Combatant	33	26	26	23	24	26	27	29	31	32	35	37	39	41	43	45	47	49	49	48	49	49	49	47	46	45	46	48	48	49
Attack Submarines	50	49	48	48	47	48	46	47	50	49	50	50	54	56	53	54	54	53	55	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	61	61	63	63
Cruise Missile Submarines	4	4	2	2																			1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3
Ballistic Missile Submarines	14	14	14	13	13	12	11	11	11	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	13	13	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Amphibious Warfare Ships	29	27	28	28	29	30	30	30	29	29	29	26	25	25	24	24	24	24	24	24	25	25	26	27	25	25	24	24	25	23
Combat Logistics Force	31	31	31	30	32	30	31	33	37	38	38	39	41	43	45	48	48	48	48	48	48	50	49	49	49	49	49	49	48	48
Support Vessels	36	39	42	46	50	52	54	55	59	60	61	64	64	65	67	68	69	71	74	75	78	78	77	77	76	75	75	77	76	74
Total Naval Force Inventory	293	286	285	285	291	295	290	293	305	307	313	320	329	337	340	349	352	354	356	357	360	365	364	362	360	360	361	366	365	367

Appendix 2

Annual Funding for Ship Construction

Funding is in FY2023 constant dollars. In Figure A2-1, the first two graphics depict the estimated funding required to achieve the first two profiles of battle force inventories depicted in Appendix 1, Table A1-5, and assume industry produces future ships on time and within budget. The SSBN force was last recapitalized from FY1974 to FY1989. The fiscal impact of the *Columbia* class increased significantly in FY2021 with procurement of the lead SSBN. The impact grows across the FYDP to FY2026 when annual full procurements are required to support serial production through FY2035. This strategic nuclear investment represents the Navy's most important program and presents our largest fiscal challenge over the next 15 years. As discussed in Section IV, these two profiles, although similar and both cost constrained, depict potential inventory ranges that can be achieved through varying the type of ships being procured. Alternative 2 to PB2024 continues procuring *Virginia* class submarines along with the future SSN(X) as opposed to shifting totally to the future SSN(X) and procures less future large surface combatants (DDG(X)). This approach enables a larger SSN force and procurement of a larger combat logistics force. It also allows procurement of more non-battle force ships such as LUSVs that are not shown in these inventory tables.


The cost to procure a larger Navy represented by the third profile in Table A1-5, is shown in the third graphic of Figure A2-1, and assumes industry produces future ships on time and within budget. The high range represents an average of \$4.4B per year in real growth beyond the FYDP in FY2023 constant dollars. The increased procurement level, informed by industrial base capacity and on-time and on-budget performance, achieves 320 manned battle force ships in the mid-2030s, and ultimately achieves 365 manned battle force ships in FY2045. The analytic work being conducted in the BFSAR will be reflective of the warfighting requirements of the 2022 NDS and inform future force structure requirements for the FY2025 shipbuilding plan.

The cost to sustain a larger Navy is in addition to that required for procurement and is phased within the appropriate accounts (i.e., manpower, support, training, infrastructure) to match ship deliveries. Appendix 3 illustrates the projected cost of owning and operating (operations and sustainment) the fleet at the ranges that represent no real budget growth. This appendix does not include the funding associated with Appendix 5, which discusses the growing logistics requirement, non-battle force ships, and sealift recapitalization.

Next generation ships and submarines are in the early stages of requirements definition. Accordingly, cost estimates and their impact on overall force mix will be determined within the ongoing work of the force structure assessment. The baseline acquisition profiles reinforce long-term workforce stability for thoughtful, agile modernization, and a clearer forecast of when to transition between classes of ships.

Figure A2-1. Annual Funding for Ship Construction (FY2024-2053)

PB2024



Alternative 2 to PB2024





Figure A2-1. Annual Funding for Ship Construction (FY2024-2053) (Cont.)

Alternative 3 to PB2024



Appendix 3

Annual Funding for Sustainment

NDA FY2019 directed reporting cost considerations of owning and operating a larger force. The priorities stated in the body of this report require the DON ensure operations and sustainment accounts are funded properly to achieve a ready and capable force.

Scaled operations and sustainment funding to support the size of the fleet is essential to maintain and repair the battle force. Appropriately phased sustainment funding must be consistent with the size of the battle force. To be capable, ready, and lethal, the Navy must remain balanced across the elements of readiness, modernization, and force structure. When the life of a ship is extended, the sustainment requirement grows as the age of the ship increases. Moreover, sustainment resources programmed to shift from a retiring ship to a new ship must now stay in place for the duration of the extension. The sustainment requirement grows until equilibrium is reached at the desired higher force inventory, when deliveries match retirements and all resourcing accounts reach steady-state at a higher, enduring cost. Sustainment funding must also be reallocated from other Navy programs during the year of execution for any proposed ship decommissioning that Congress does not approve.

The sustainment costs in Figures A3-1 through A3-3 represent the funding programmed in the FYDP with FY2028 funding levels inflated forward using Office of the Secretary of Defense indices applied to the inventory alternatives shown in Appendix 1, Table A1-5. Included in this sustainment estimate are personnel, planned maintenance, and baseline operations, which represent those costs tied directly to owning and operating a ship. Funding is shown in then-year dollars (TY\$). Figures A3-1 through A3-3 do not capture all costs. For example, long-range costs such as modernization and ordnance (threat and technology driven), infrastructure and training (services spread across many ships), and aviation detachments are not included. Similar to procurement, estimates become less accurate further into the future.

Figure A3-1. PB2024 Annual Funding for Sustainment (FY2024-2053)¹




Figure A3-2. Alternative 2 Annual Funding for Sustainment (FY2024-2053)¹





Figure A3-3. Alternative 3 Annual Funding for Sustainment (FY2024-2053)¹



¹ Shows funding estimated for personnel, maintenance, and operations programmed in the FYDP for the ships in the battle force. Beyond the FYDP, the funding is inflated from FY2028, scaled by projected ship types and quantities in the battle force.

Appendix 4

Planned Decommissioning, Dismantling, and Disposals during FY2024-FY2028 Future-Years Defense Program (FYDP)

This addendum report complies with the Senate Armed Services Committee request for additional information regarding decommissioning and disposal of naval vessels. Table A4-1 lists the battle force ships to be inactivated within the FYDP. The table also identifies the planned disposition for each ship and the age of the ship in the year the ship is inactivated. The Expected Service Lives (ESL) for the ship classes have been certified by the Naval Sea Systems Command Senior Technical Authority.

Table A4-1. Ships planned to be inactivated¹ during the FYDP

Inactivation Year (FY) – Total Ships	Ship Name/Designation/Hull Number	Disposition ²	Age ³	ESL
2024 - 11 Ships	USS ANTIETAM (CG 54)	LSA	37	35
	USS LEYTE GULF (CG 55)	LSA	37	35
	USS COWPENS (CG 63)	LSA	33	35
	USS SHILOH (CG 67)	LSA	32	35
	USS VICKSBURG (CG 69)	LSA	32	35
	USS JACKSON (LCS 6)	FMS	9	25
	USS MONTGOMERY (LCS 8)	FMS	8	25
	USS SAN JUAN (SSN 751)	RECYCLE	36	33
	USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42)	DISMANTLE	38	40
	USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44)	DISMANTLE	35	40
	USS TORTUGA (LSD 46)	DISMANTLE	34	40
2025 - 19 Ships	USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CG 58)	OCIR	36	35
	USS NORMANDY (CG 60)	OCIR	35	35
	USS LAKE ERIE (CG 70)	OCIR	32	35
	USS WICHITA (LCS 13)	FMS	7	25
	USS BILLINGS (LCS 15)	FMS	6	25
	USS INDIANAPOLIS (LCS 17)	FMS	6	25
	USS ST LOUIS (LCS 19)	FMS	5	25
	USS HELENA (SSN 725)	RECYCLE	38	33
	USS PASADENA (SSN 752)	RECYCLE	36	33
	USS TOPEKA (SSN 754)	RECYCLE	36	33
	USS RUSHMORE (LSD 47)	OCIR	34	40
	USS ASHLAND (LSD 48)	DISMANTLE	33	40
	USNS LEROY GRUMMAN (T-AO 195)	OSIR	36	35
	USS SENTRY (MCM 3)	DISMANTLE	36	30
	USS DEVASTATOR (MCM 6)	DISMANTLE	35	30
	USS GLADIATOR (MCM 11)	DISMANTLE	32	30
	USS DEXTROUS (MCM 13)	DISMANTLE	31	30
	USNS CATAWBA (T-ATF 168)	FMS	45	40
	USNS SALVOR (T-ARS 52)	DISMANTLE	39	40

2026 - 15 Ships	USS NIMITZ (CVN 68)	RECYCLE	51	50
	USS PRINCETON (CG 59)	OCIR	37	35
	USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CG 62)	OCIR	37	35
	USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64)	OCIR	35	35
	USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3)	DISMANTLE	14	25
	USS NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750)	RECYCLE	37	33
	USS SCRANTON (SSN 756)	RECYCLE	35	33
	USS ALEXANDRIA (SSN 757)	RECYCLE	35	33
	USS OHIO (SSGN 726)	RECYCLE	44	42
	USS FLORIDA (SSGN 728)	RECYCLE	44	42
	USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45)	OCIR	36	40
	USS MOUNT WHITNEY (LCC 20)	OCIR	55	68
	USNS JOHN ERICSSON (T-AO 194)	LSA	35	35
USNS PECOS (T-AO 197)	DISMANTLE	36	35	
USNS GRASP (T-ARS 51)	DISMANTLE	40	40	
2027 - 11 Ships	USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER (CVN 69)	RECYCLE	50	50
	USS CHOSIN (CG 65)	OCIR	36	35
	USS CAPE ST GEORGE (CG 71)	OCIR	34	35
	USS ANNAPOLIS (SSN 760)	RECYCLE	35	33
	USS HENRY M JACKSON (SSBN 730)	RECYCLE	43	42
	USNS HENRY J KAISER (T-AO 187)	DISMANTLE	40	35
	USNS JOHN LENTHALL (T-AO 189)	DISMANTLE	40	35
	USS PATRIOT (MCM 7)	DISMANTLE	36	30
	USS PIONEER (MCM 9)	DISMANTLE	35	30
	USS WARRIOR (MCM 10)	DISMANTLE	34	30
USS CHIEF (MCM 14)	DISMANTLE	33	30	
2028 - 6 Ships	USS BARRY (DDG 52)	OCIR	35	35
	USS JOHN PAUL JONES (DDG 53)	OCIR	35	35
	USS ASHEVILLE (SSN 758)	RECYCLE	37	33
	USS MICHIGAN (SSGN 727)	RECYCLE	46	42
	USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)	RECYCLE	44	42
	USS ALABAMA (SSBN 731)	RECYCLE	43	42

Notes:

1. U.S. Navy vessels are commissioned ships that are decommissioned and removed from active status. USNS vessels are non-commissioned vessels that are placed out of service.
2. Out of Commission in Reserve (OCIR) and Out of Service in Reserve (OSIR) ships will be retained on the Naval Vessel Register (NVR) as reactivation candidates. Logistics Support Assets (LSA) and ships designated for Foreign Military Sale (FMS) are not retained in the NVR.
3. Identifies the age of the vessel at retirement.

Ships planned for dismantling during the FYDP

Prior to final disposition, ships reaching the end of their service lives are evaluated for additional use through intra-agency or inter-agency transfer, foreign military sales (FMS), fleet training, or weapons testing. Ships designated for FMS are retained in a hold status for no more than two years in accordance with Navy policy. The Navy intends to dismantle the ships listed in Table A4-2 within the FYDP. Specific dates will be determined when the ships are contracted for scrapping or recycling.

Table A4-2. Ships Planned for Disposal by Dismantling

Ex-SAFEGUARD (ARS 50)	USNS HENRY J KAISER (T-AO 187)
Ex-GRAPPLE (ARS 53)	USNS JOHN LENTHALL (T-AO 189)
Ex-NAVAJO (ATF 169)	USNS PECOS (T-AO 197)
Ex-MOHAWK (ATF 170)	USNS GRASP (T-ARS 51)
Ex-SIOUX (ATF 171)	USNS SALVOR (T-ARS 52)
Ex-APACHE (ATF 172)	USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3)
Ex-CARR (FFG 52)	USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42)
Ex-ELROD (FFG 55)	USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44)
Ex-KAUFFMAN (FFG 59)	USS TORTUGA (LSD 46)
Ex-FREEDOM (LCS 1)	USS ASHLAND (LSD 48)
Ex-INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2)	USS SENTRY (MCM 3)
Ex-CHARLESTON (LKA 113)	USS DEVASTATOR (MCM 6)
Ex-MOBILE (LKA 115)	USS PATRIOT (MCM 7)
Ex-EL PASO (LKA 117)	USS PIONEER (MCM 9)
Ex-FORT MCHENRY (LSD 43)	USS WARRIOR (MCM 10)
Ex-ZEPHYR (PC8)	USS GLADIATOR (MCM 11)
Ex-SHAMAL (PC 13)	USS DEXTROUS (MCM 13)
Ex-TORNADO (PC-14)	USS CHIEF (MCM 14)
Ex-CANON (PG 90)	
Ex-WALTER S DIEHL (T-AO 193)	

Table A4-3 lists the ships that will be used for fleet training in support of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), Valiant Shield, Atlantic Thunder and UNITAS training exercises that will occur during the FYDP. The training will include using selected decommissioned ships as targets for live-fire weapons employment, referred to as a “sinking exercise” (SINKEX). The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) guidelines authorize SINKEXs when: (1) the event is required to satisfy Title 10 requirements for ship survivability or weapons lethality evaluation; or (2) the event supports major joint or multi-national exercises or evaluation of significant new multi-unit tactics or tactics and weapons combinations.

Table A4-3. Ships Planned for use in Future Fleet Training Exercises

Ex-KLAKRING (FFG 42)	Ex-DUBUQUE (LPD 8)
Ex-TARAWA (LHA 1)	Ex-JUNEAU (LPD 10)
Ex-SIMPSON (FFG 56)	Ex-DE WERT (FFG 45)
Ex-PELELIU (LHA 5)	Ex-CLEVELAND (LPD 7)

Summary

Per the annual Ship Disposition Review conducted on February 22, 2023, Navy will inactivate 62 ships within the FYDP (Table A4-1): 14 will be designated OCIR / OSIR; 17 will be recycled; 18 will be slated for dismantlement; and 13 are assigned a FMS or LSA disposition. This will bring the total number of ships designated for dismantlement to 38 (Table A4-2, 20 previously inactivated ships and 18 ships added during the FYDP). Eight ships are designated for fleet training support (SINKEX) (Table A4-3).

Appendix 5

Auxiliary and Sealift Shipbuilding Plan

Auxiliary and sealift vessels provide support to the joint force, battle force, shore-based facilities, and broader national security missions.

Auxiliary Force Structure

Non-battle force auxiliary ships are operating platforms designed for unique United States military and federal government missions including oceanographic and hydrographic surveys, underwater surveillance, missile tracking and data collection, acoustic research, and submarine support. Tables A5-1 and A5-2 depict current and required inventories.

Table A5-1. Auxiliary vessels owned and operated by DON

Type	Current Inventory	Required Inventory
Oceanographic survey ships (AGS)	6	8
Navigation test support ship (AGS)	1	1
Submarine escort ships (AGSE)	4	4
Hospital ships (AH)	2	2
Cable repair ships (ARC)	1	2
High speed transport (HST)	1	-
Total	15	17

Table A5-2. Auxiliary vessels procured by DON and operated by other services/agencies

Type	Current Inventory	Required Inventory
Missile range instrumentation ship (AGM)	2	2
Oceanographic research ships (AGOR)	6	6
Total	8	8

Strategic Sealift Force Structure

Strategic sealift is a key enabler of DMO and joint power projection. Sealift ships transport approximately 90 percent of Army and Marine Corps combat equipment and supplies in support of major combat operations. Organic (U.S. government-owned) sealift includes: afloat prepositioning (PREPO) vessels, forward-deployed in full operating status (FOS); surge sealift vessels, maintained in a reduced operating status (ROS) in the continental United States (CONUS); and special capability vessels providing cargo transfer and support functions. With an average vessel age over 40 years, recapitalization of the fleet is necessary to maintain required sealift capabilities. Table A5-3 lists inventory contributing to organic strategic sealift.

Table A5-3. Organic Strategic Sealift Inventory

Type	Current Inventory	Required Inventory
Prepositioning Roll-On/Roll-Off (AK/AKR)	15	19
Surge Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO)	51	55
Special Capability – Crane ships (ACS)	4	4
Special Capability – Aviation logistics ships (AVB)	2	2
Special Capability – Offshore petroleum distribution (AG)	1	1
Total	73	81

PREPO vessels operate under Military Sealift Command (MSC) supporting joint warfighting requirements. The FY2024 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) sealift fleet consists of five Roll-On/Roll-Off (AK/AKR) vessels positioned forward in FOS, two vessels loaded at Blount Island Command in ROS-5, and three vessels unloaded in CONUS in ROS-5. The FY2024 Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) consists of five Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMRS) (AKR) positioned forward in FOS. This Appendix excludes four special capability ships (AKE/ESD) included in the battle force command/support ships category.

Navy resources the procurement, operations, and sustainment of ten (AK/AKR) vessels designated to support the Marine Corps. Army resources operations and sustainment for five (AKR) ships meeting service specific requirements. DON has initiated a new construction acquisition plan to meet future MPF requirements. Current projection is for lead ship delivery to begin in FY2032, and current AK vessel retirements to begin in FY2030.

Surge sealift vessels operate under MSC and the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD) supporting joint requirements. The FY2024 Surge fleet consists of 51 RORO vessels, and 7 special capability (ACS/AVB/AG) vessels. By the end of FY2024, 7 of the used vessels procured in FY2021-FY2023 will be ready for tasking, 7 RORO vessels will have transitioned from MSC’s Surge Sealift fleet to MARAD’s Ready Reserve Force (RRF), 3 AKs will transition in FY2025 from PREPO to surge sealift RORO, and 2 additional used RORO vessels will be procured in FY2024 enter the RRF.

The requirement for RORO surge sealift capacity is 10.6M square feet, recapitalization requirements are determined by amount of square feet required per year, not specifically the number of ships. Due to the recent purchase of five used vessels that exceed required minimum square footage needed per vessel, the recapitalization program is on track to replace aging capacity. FY2024 will continue to search and purchase vessels exceeding the minimum square footage requirement within programmed funds to continue meeting recapitalization capacity requirements.

PB2024 continues Navy’s commitment to recapitalize surge sealift requirements through procurement and conversion of used commercial RORO ships; replacing cargo capacity lost as ships retire from service. Required inventory reflects the number of vessels necessary to meet total surge capacity, assuming future procurements meet minimum RORO operational requirements. As the fleet is recapitalized, current inventory will vary depending on the cargo capacity of individual vessels in the fleet.

Procurement Activity

To recapitalize surge sealift fleet, Navy is funding MARAD to acquire used commercial

RORO vessels. MARAD has contracted a commercial Vessel Acquisition Manager (VAM) to facilitate vessel procurements. Vessel conversions necessary to meet operational requirements and life-cycle sustainment work will be completed by the U.S. commercial repair industry.

A Joint Petroleum Over the Shore (JPOTS) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is in progress with an estimated completion of Q2 FY2023. This AoA may inform the recapitalization plan for the existing offshore petroleum distribution (AG) capability.

A crane ship (ACS) AoA kickoff occurred in Q4 FY2022 with an estimated completion of Q1 FY2024 to inform the best alternative to acquire ACS vessels with expected procurement to occur in FY2029 and FY2030 to align with retirements.

Table A5-4 provides sealift buy-used procurement and conversion funding. Used vessels are commercial RORO ships procured with SCN funds, and modified as necessary to meet military cargo carriage requirements with Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN). Funding is transferred to MARAD by General Provision. Early fiscal year procurements are converted/modified in the same year, while late procurements are converted/modified the following year.

Table A5-4. PB2024 FYDP funding – SCN, OMN, and RDT&E Long Range Auxiliary and Sealift Plan

Ship Type	(\$M)	FY24		FY25		FY26		FY27		FY28		FYDP	
		\$	Qty										
Cable Repair Ship						768	1						
Surge RORO (Used Vessels) SCN Procurement	142	2	149	2	152	2	158	2	161	2	762	10	
Surge RORO (Used Vessels) OMN Conversion	42		43		45		45		46		221	0	
PREPO (New Con) RDTEN		2		2		3		17		3		27	

Table A5-5 depicts new construction shipbuilding procurements for auxiliary and sealift ships.

Table A5-5. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Procurement Plan – New Construction Vessels

		Table A5-5 Long Range Auxiliary and Sealift Procurement Plan - Shipbuilding																														
Ship Type	Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)							1			1	1		1	1	1					1									1			
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)									1																							
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																			2	2												
Hospital ships (AH)									1	1																						
Cable repair ships (ARC)				1			1																									
High speed transport (HST)																																
Crane Ships (ACS)																																
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																																
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)							1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1												3	5	1	2		
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)																																
Surge (RORO)																																
Total Procurement - New		0	0	1	0	0	3	1	3	3	2	1	2	2	1	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	1	3	0	0

Table A5-6 depicts used vessel procurements for auxiliary and sealift ships. The current profile of 2 used RORO ship procurements per year does not replace cargo capacity at the rate required by planned vessel retirements, which will create some risk in mission execution, 4 ships at the minimum operational requirement square footage threshold ships would meet the requirement.

Table A5-6. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Procurement Plan – Used Vessels

		Table A5-6 Long Range Auxiliary and Sealift Procurement Plan - Used Vessels																															
Ship Type	Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53		
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)																																	
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)																																	
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																																	
Hospital ships (AH)																																	
Cable repair ships (ARC)				1																													
High speed transport (HST)																																	
Crane Ships (ACS)							2	2																									
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																																	
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)																																	
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)											1	1																					
Surge (RORO)		2	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	1						1	1	1								
		2	2	3	2	2	6	6	4	5	5	4	4	3	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

Tables A5-7 and A5-8 depict associated delivery plans for shipbuilding and used vessels, respectively; assuming construction and conversion efforts remain on plan.

Table A5-7. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Delivery Plan – New Construction Vessels

		Table A5-7 Long Range Auxiliary and Sealift Delivery Plan - Shipbuilding																															
Ship Type	Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53		
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)				1							1	1	1		1	1	1							1									
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)											1																						
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																							2	2									
Hospital ships (AH)												1	1																				
Cable repair ships (ARC)								1																									
High speed transport (HST)																																	
Crane Ships (ACS)																																	
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																																	
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)										1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1											3	5				
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)																																	
Surge (RORO)																																	
Total Delivery - New		0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	3	1	3	3	1	2	2	1	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	3	5	0		

Table A5-8. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Delivery Plan – Used Vessels

		Table A5-8 Long Range Auxiliary and Sealift Delivery Plan - Used Vessels																															
Ship Type	Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53		
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)																																	
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)																																	
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																																	
Hospital ships (AH)																																	
Cable repair ships (ARC)					1																												
High speed transport (HST)																																	
Crane Ships (ACS)							2	2																									
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																																	
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)																																	
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)											1	1																					
Surge (RORO)		3	3	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	1					1	1	1									
Total Delivery - Used		3	3	2	3	2	6	6	4	5	5	4	4	3	2	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

Table A5-9 shows the retirement plan that, along with the delivery plan, drives the total auxiliary and sealift force inventory in Table A5-10. Executing this plan, for both new construction and procurement of used vessels, will be contingent on the availability of funding.

Table A5-9. Auxiliary Vessel and Sealift Retirement Plan

Table A5-9 Long Range Auxiliary and Sealift Retirement Plan																																
Ship Type	Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)								-1	-1	-1	-1	-1													-1							
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)																																
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																																
Hospital ships (AH)																																
Cable repair ships (ARC)																																
High speed transport (HST)																																
Crane Ships (ACS)																																
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																																
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)																																
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)																																
Surge (RORO)																																
Total Retirements		0	-2	-1	-1	-3	-4	-9	-12	-2	-5	-3	-5	-6	-2	-2	-2	0	0	-1	0	-2	-2	-1	0	-4	-3	-4	-3	-2		

Table A5-10. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Inventory

Table A5-10 Long Range Auxiliary and Sealift Inventory																															
Fiscal Year	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)	6	6	7	7	7	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
Hospital ships (AH)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Cable repair ships (ARC)	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
High speed transport (HST)	1	1	1	1																											
Crane Ships (ACS)	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)	15	15	12	12	12	12	12	12	13	14	15	15	14	15	16	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	15	12	12	
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Surge (RORO)	51	54	57	58	59	61	63	59	55	57	58	59	60	60	61	61	59	59	59	60	61	62	62	62	62	58	57	56	56	55	
Total Auxiliary and Sealift Inventory	88	91	92	94	94	95	98	94	88	94	96	98	98	96	98	100	100	100	100	100	101	102	101	101	102	98	95	91	91	94	