

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

v.

ZACKEY RAHIMI

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (N.D. Tex.):

United States v. Rahimi, No. 21-cr-83 (Sept. 27, 2021)

United States Court of Appeals (5th Cir.):

United States v. Rahimi, No. 21-11001 (Feb. 2, 2023)

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this case.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., *infra*, 1a-41a) is not yet published in the Federal Reporter, but is available at 2023 WL 2317796.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on March 2, 2023. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are reproduced in the appendix. App., *infra*, 81a-82a.

STATEMENT

1. Respondent Zackey Rahimi was a drug dealer who “mostly sold marijuana and occasionally sold cocaine.” C.A. ROA 211. In December 2019, Rahimi and his girlfriend C.M. had an argument in a parking lot in Arlington, Texas. *Id.* at 217. C.M. tried to leave, but Rahimi grabbed her wrist, knocking her to the ground. *Ibid.* He then dragged her back to his car, picked her up, and pushed her inside, causing her to hit her head on the dashboard. *Ibid.* Realizing that a bystander had seen him, he retrieved a gun and fired a shot. *Ibid.* In the meantime, C.M. escaped the car and fled the scene. *Ibid.* Rahimi later called her and threatened to shoot her if she told anyone about the assault. *Ibid.*

In February 2020, after giving Rahimi notice and an opportunity for a hearing, a Texas state court granted C.M. a restraining order, which was valid for two years. C.A. ROA 12-18. The court found that Rahimi had “committed family violence” and that such violence was “likely to occur again in the future.” *Id.* at 13. The court accordingly prohibited Rahimi from committing family violence and from threatening, harassing, or approaching C.M. or her family. *Id.* at 13-14. The order also suspended Rahimi’s handgun license, prohibited him from possessing a firearm, and warned him that possessing a firearm while the order remained in effect may be a federal felony. *Id.* at 14, 16. Rahimi signed an acknowledgement that he had “received a copy of this protective order in open court at the close of the hearing in this matter.” *Id.* at 18.

Rahimi, however, defied the restraining order. In August 2020, he tried to communicate with C.M. on social media and approached her house in the middle of the night, prompting state police to arrest him for vio-

lating the order. C.A. ROA 218. And in November 2020, he threatened another woman with a gun, leading the State of Texas to charge him with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. *Id.* at 219.

Rahimi then participated in a series of five shootings in December 2020 and January 2021. First, after someone who had bought drugs from him “started talking ‘trash’” on social media, he went to the man’s home and fired bullets into it using an AR-15 rifle. C.A. ROA 209. The next day, after colliding with another vehicle, he alighted from his car, shot at the other driver, fled, returned to the scene, fired more shots at the other car, and fled again. *Ibid.* Three days later, Rahimi fired a gun in the air in a residential neighborhood in the presence of young children. *Id.* at 210. A few weeks after that, a truck flashed its headlights at Rahimi when he sped past it on a highway; in response, Rahimi slammed his brakes, cut across the highway, followed the truck off an exit, and fired multiple shots at another car that had been traveling behind the truck. *Ibid.* Finally, in early January, Rahimi pulled out a gun and fired multiple shots in the air after a friend’s credit card was declined at a fast-food restaurant. *Ibid.*

Police officers identified Rahimi as a suspect in those shootings and secured a search warrant for his home. C.A. ROA 210. A search of his room uncovered a .45-caliber pistol, a .308-caliber rifle, pistol and rifle magazines, ammunition, approximately \$20,000 in cash, and a copy of the restraining order. *Id.* at 211.

2. A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Texas indicted Rahimi for violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2). C.A. ROA 19-22. Section 922(g)(8), which Congress enacted in 1994, prohibits a person who is subject to a domestic-violence restraining order from pos-

sessing a firearm in or affecting commerce. At the time of Rahimi’s conduct, a knowing violation of Section 922(g)(8) was punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2) (2018).¹

To trigger Section 922(g)(8), a restraining order must satisfy three conditions. First, a court must have issued the order after giving the person subject to it notice and an opportunity to be heard. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)(A). Second, the order must forbid the person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an “intimate partner,” the person’s child, or an intimate partner’s child. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)(B); see 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(32) (defining “intimate partner”). Third, the order must either (1) include a finding that the person poses a “credible threat” to the physical safety of the intimate partner or child or (2) explicitly prohibit the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the intimate partner or child. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)(C).

The restraining order in this case satisfied each of those requirements. Rahimi received notice and an opportunity to be heard. C.A. ROA 12. C.M. was Rahimi’s intimate partner because they had a child together. *Id.* at 13. And the order both contained a finding that Rahimi posed a credible threat to C.M.’s physical safety and prohibited the threatened use of physical force against C.M. *Id.* at 13-14.

Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment on its face. C.A. ROA 41-59. The district court denied the motion, observing that the Fifth Circuit had upheld

¹ Congress has since increased the maximum punishment to 15 years of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(8); see also Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004, 136 Stat. 1313, 1329.

the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(8) in *United States v. McGinnis*, 956 F.3d 747 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1397 (2021). App., *infra*, 78a-80a. Rahimi then pleaded guilty. C.A. ROA 68-69, 160. The court sentenced him to 73 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. *Id.* at 96.

3. The Fifth Circuit at first affirmed, reasoning that its decision in *McGinnis* foreclosed Rahimi’s Second Amendment challenge. App., *infra*, 73a n.1; see *id.* at 72a-77a. But after this Court decided *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), the Fifth Circuit withdrew its opinion. App., *infra*, 70a-71a. After receiving supplemental briefing on *Bruen*, the court reversed. *Id.* at 42a-69a. A month later, the court withdrew that opinion and issued an amended opinion that again reversed. *Id.* at 1a-41a.

The Fifth Circuit held that Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment on its face. App., *infra*, 7a-27a. The court began by reasoning that Rahimi fell “within the Second Amendment’s scope.” *Id.* at 8a. It acknowledged that this Court has described the right to keep and bear arms as a right belonging to “‘ordinary, law-abiding citizens,’” but it interpreted that phrase to exclude only “‘felons,’” “‘the mentally ill,’” and other “‘groups that have historically been stripped of their Second Amendment rights.” *Id.* at 8a-9a (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit concluded that, although Rahimi was “hardly a model citizen,” he was not a “convicted felon” or otherwise excluded from the Second Amendment’s scope. *Id.* at 10a-11a.

The court of appeals stated that, because Rahimi presumptively fell within the Second Amendment’s scope, the government bore the burden of identifying historical analogues to Section 922(g)(8)—that is,

longstanding regulations “that imposed ‘a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense’ that were also ‘comparably justified.’” *Id.* at 17a (quoting *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2132-2133). The court then rejected each of the analogues the government offered. For example, the government cited a 17th-century English statute disarming individuals judged to be dangerous, but the court concluded that the statute was “not a forerunner of our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Id.* at 18a. The government cited colonial and early state laws disarming categories of individuals legislatures “considered to be dangerous,” but the Fifth Circuit distinguished those laws on the ground that they operated on a categorical basis, while Section 922(g)(8) rests on individualized findings. *Id.* at 19a. The government also cited colonial and state laws under which a person who was found to pose a threat to someone else could bear arms only if he posted a surety. *Id.* at 24a-25a. But the Fifth Circuit emphasized that surety laws imposed only a “partial restriction” on the right to keep and bear arms, while Section 922(g)(8) “works an absolute deprivation of the right.” *Id.* at 26a.

Judge Ho issued a concurring opinion. App., *infra*, 29a-41a. He found Section 922(g)(8) “difficult to justify” because it disarms individuals “based on civil protective orders” rather than “criminal proceedings.” *Id.* at 36a. He expressed concern that such orders are susceptible to “abuse.” *Id.* at 37a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

“Firearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination.” *United States v. Hayes*, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (2009). More than a million acts of domestic violence occur in the United States every year, and the presence of a firearm increases the chance that violence

will escalate to homicide. *United States v. Castleman*, 572 U.S. 157, 160 (2014); see *id.* at 159-160. “All too often, * * * the only difference between a battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun.” *Id.* at 160 (brackets and citation omitted).

In Section 922(g)(8), Congress sought to address that problem by disarming individuals who are subject to domestic-violence restraining orders. That prohibition comes into operation only if a court finds, after notice and a hearing, that a person poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner or child or expressly forbids the person from using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against the intimate partner or child. And the prohibition lasts only as long as the restraining order remains in effect.

The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded that Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment—not just as applied to a particular defendant, but on its face. That holding was profoundly mistaken. Governments have long disarmed individuals who pose a threat to the safety of others, and Section 922(g)(8) falls comfortably within that tradition. The Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision misapplies this Court’s precedents, conflicts with the decisions of other courts of appeals, and threatens grave harms for victims of domestic violence. This Court should grant certiorari and reverse.

A. The Court Of Appeals Erred In Holding That The Second Amendment Precludes Congress From Disarming Individuals Subject To Domestic-Violence Restraining Orders

1. The Second Amendment guarantees that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” That right, however, is “not unlimited.” *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).

This Court has recognized, for example, that the Second Amendment allows the government to ban “dangerous and unusual weapons,” *id.* at 627 (citation omitted), and to exclude weapons from “sensitive places,” *id.* at 626. So too, the Second Amendment allows the government to disarm dangerous individuals—that is, those who would pose a serious risk of harm to themselves or to others if allowed to possess a firearm.

The Second Amendment “codified a right ‘inherited from our English ancestors.’” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 599 (citation omitted). In England, a 17th century statute empowered the government to “seize all arms in the custody or possession of any person” who was “judge[d] dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdom.” Militia Act 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 13. The use of that statute “continued unabated” after the adoption of the 1689 English Bill of Rights, which expressly guaranteed the right to keep and bear arms. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, *Glorious Revolution to American Revolution: The English Origin of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms*, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 405 (2019).

Colonial and early state legislatures likewise disarmed individuals who “posed a potential danger” to others. *NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives*, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1196 (2014). Some early laws categorically disarmed entire groups deemed dangerous or untrustworthy, such as those who refused to swear allegiance. *Ibid.*; see, e.g., Act of May 1, 1776, ch. 21, § 1, 1776 Mass. Acts 479; Act of June 13, 1777, ch. 21, § 4, 1777 Pa. Laws 63; Act of May 28, 1777, ch. 3 (Va.), reprinted in 9 William Waller Hening, *The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year*

1619, at 281-283 (1821). Other laws called for case-by-case judgments about dangerousness. See, *e.g.*, Act for Constituting a Council of Safety, ch. 40, § 20, 1777 N.J. Laws 90 (empowering officials to “take from such Persons as they shall judge disaffected and dangerous to the present Government, all the Arms, Accoutrements and Ammunition which they own or possess”). Still other laws disarmed individuals who had demonstrated their dangerousness by engaging in particular types of conduct, such as carrying arms in a manner that spreads fear or terror among the people. See, *e.g.*, Act for the Punishing of Criminal Offenders, 1692 Mass. Laws 11-12; Act for the Punishing Criminal Offenders, 1696-1701 N.H. Laws 15.

Precursors to the Second Amendment proposed in the state ratifying conventions likewise suggest that legislatures may disarm certain categories of individuals, including those who are dangerous. A proposal presented at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, for instance, stated that “no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.” 2 Bernard Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* 665 (1971) (emphasis added). A proposal presented by Samuel Adams at the Massachusetts ratifying convention likewise provided that Congress may not “prevent the people of the United States, *who are peaceable citizens*, from keeping their own arms.” *Id.* at 681 (emphasis added).

Post-ratification practice points in the same direction. In the mid-19th century, many States enacted laws requiring “those threatening to do harm” to “post bond before carrying weapons in public.” *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2148

(2022); see, e.g., Mass. Rev. Stat. ch. 134, § 16, 750 (1836); Me. Rev. Stat. ch. 169, § 16, 709 (1840); Mich. Rev. Stat. ch. 162, § 16, 162 (1846). Those statutes show that individuals who were “reasonably accused of intending to injure another or breach the peace” could properly be subject to firearm restrictions that did not apply to others. *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2148-2149. Or as one early scholar wrote, the government may properly restrict a person’s right to carry firearms when there is “just reason to fear that he purposes to make an unlawful use of them.” William Rawle, *A View of the Constitution of the United States of America* 126 (2d ed. 1829).

The understanding that dangerous individuals could be disarmed persisted after the Civil War. In 1866, for example, a federal Reconstruction order applicable to South Carolina provided that the “rights of all loyal and well-disposed inhabitants to bear arms will not be infringed,” but that “no disorderly person, vagrant, or disturber of the peace, shall be allowed to bear arms.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 908-909 (1866). A circular issued by the Freedman’s Bureau at around the same time explained that a person “may be disarmed if convicted of making an improper or dangerous use of weapons.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2152 (citation omitted).

In keeping with that history, this Court explained in *Heller* that the right to keep and bear arms belongs only to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” 554 U.S. at 635. And in *Bruen*, the Court stated that the Second Amendment protects the right of “an ordinary, law-abiding citizen” to possess and carry arms for self-defense. 142 S. Ct. at 2122. Those descriptions suggest that the government may properly disarm citizens who are dangerous, irresponsible, or unlikely to abide by the law.

Section 922(g)(8) fits squarely within the longstanding tradition of disarming dangerous individuals. Section 922(g)(8) applies only if the restraining order either (1) includes a finding that the individual poses a “credible threat to the physical safety” of an intimate partner or child or (2) expressly prohibits the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against the intimate partner or child. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)(C). Everyone who satisfies the first criterion, by definition, poses a danger to others. And in adopting the second criterion, Congress reasonably concluded that courts would specifically prohibit the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force only if “evidence credited by the court reflected a real threat or danger of injury to the protected party.” *United States v. Emerson*, 270 F.3d 203, 262 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002). The Texas law that authorized the restraining order against respondent, for example, empowers a court to prohibit a person from “committing family violence” if that person has been “found to have committed family violence” and the court determines that an order is “necessary or appropriate to prevent or reduce the likelihood of family violence” in the future. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 85.022(a) and (b)(1) (West Supp. 2019).

2. In concluding that Section 922(g)(8) lacks adequate historical support, the Fifth Circuit missed the forest for the trees. The court overlooked the strong historical evidence supporting the general principle that the government may disarm dangerous individuals. The court instead analyzed each historical statute in isolation and dismissed each one on the ground that it differed from Section 922(g)(8) in some way. For example, the court discounted many laws because they rested on “categori[cal]” judgments of dangerousness or unsuita-

bility to possess firearms rather than individualized findings. App., *infra*, 19a. The court discounted other laws because they sought to protect “society generally,” not to prevent harm to “identified individuals.” *Id.* at 24a. And it disregarded still other laws because they disarmed individuals only after criminal convictions, not after civil proceedings. *Ibid.*

As an initial matter, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was wrong on its own terms. Although some historical laws disarmed categories of individuals legislatures considered dangerous, other laws disarmed those who had been found dangerous on a case-by-case basis. See pp. 8-10, *supra*. And it would be bizarre if legislatures could disarm dangerous individuals based on categorical presumptions, but not based on individualized judicial findings after notice and a hearing. Similarly, although some early laws disarmed those who posed a threat to society at large, others applied to those who posed threats to identified victims. See pp. 8-10, *supra*. Finally, the Fifth Circuit was wrong to suggest that the government cannot disarm dangerous individuals who have not yet been convicted of crimes. As the laws discussed above show, legislatures have long disarmed “dangerous people who have not been convicted of felonies.” *Kanter v. Barr*, 919 F.3d 437, 454 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).

More fundamentally, the Fifth Circuit’s mode of analysis was flawed. Although courts interpreting the Second Amendment must consider text, history, and tradition, they should not focus on whether the law at issue has “a historical *twin*.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. To the contrary, this Court emphasized that “even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass

constitutional muster.” *Ibid.* Section 922(g)(8) is “analogous enough” to its “historical precursors” because it imposes similar burdens for similar reasons. *Ibid.* Like them, it allows ordinary, law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms while disarming individuals who pose a danger to others. Indeed, Section 922(g)’s temporary disarmament imposes a significantly lesser burden than those precursor laws, and does so for an especially compelling reason—preventing acute and demonstrated threats of domestic violence.

B. This Court Should Review The Decision Below

1. This Court’s review is warranted because the Fifth Circuit held an important federal statute unconstitutional on its face. Judging the constitutionality of a federal statute is “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.” *Blodgett v. Holden*, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of Holmes, J.). Accordingly, “when a lower court has invalidated a federal statute,” the Court’s “usual” approach is to grant certiorari. *Iancu v. Brunetti*, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019). Indeed, the Court applies a “strong presumption in favor of granting writs of certiorari to review decisions of lower courts holding federal statutes unconstitutional.” *Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela*, 574 U.S. 1006, 1007 (2014) (statement of Thomas, J., respecting the denial of the application for a stay).

This Court has thus recently and repeatedly reviewed decisions invalidating federal statutes even in the absence of a circuit conflict. See, e.g., *Haaland v. Brackeen*, No. 21-376 (argued Nov. 9, 2022); *Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety*, 142 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2022); *United States v. Vaello Madero*, 142 S. Ct. 1539, 1542 (2022); *Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc.*, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2345-2346 (2020)

(plurality opinion); *Allen v. Cooper*, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (2020). The Court should follow the same course here.

2. This Court’s review also is warranted because the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this case conflicts with two court of appeals decisions that predated *Bruen* but that remain good law today. In the years preceding *Bruen*, the courts of appeals had “coalesced around a ‘two-step’ framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2125. At the first step, the government could justify the challenged regulation by showing that it fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment as originally understood; at the second step, it could justify the regulation by showing that it survived strict or intermediate scrutiny. See *id.* at 2126. In *Bruen*, this Court recognized that the first step was “broadly consistent with *Heller*,” but rejected the second step as “one step too many.” *Id.* at 2127.

Before *Bruen*, the Third and Eighth Circuits both upheld Section 922(g)(8) under the first step of that two-part framework. In *United States v. Boyd*, 999 F.3d 171, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 511 (2021), the Third Circuit found “longstanding historical support” for the principle that “‘legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns.’” *Id.* at 186 (citation omitted). It then concluded that “those who are subject to domestic violence protective orders covered by § 922(g)(8) fall within the historical bar of presumptively dangerous persons.” *Ibid.* Similarly, in *United States v. Bena*, 664 F.3d 1180 (2011), the Eighth Circuit cited “historical support” for disarming “citizens who are not law-abiding and responsible.” *Id.* at 1183. The court concluded that Section 922(g)(8) is consistent with the “tradition” of limiting the right to keep and bear arms to “peaceable” citizens. *Id.* at 1184. Because those

decisions applied the historical approach that *Bruen* endorsed, rather than the tiers-of-scrutiny approach that *Bruen* rejected, they remain controlling precedents in the Third and Eighth Circuits. The decision below directly conflicts with those decisions.²

3. The exceptional importance of the question presented underscores the need for this Court’s review. “[D]omestic abuse is a serious problem in the United States.” *Georgia v. Randolph*, 547 U.S. 103, 117 (2006). Tens of millions of Americans “will, in the course of their lifetimes, be the victims of intimate-partner abuse.” *Ibid.* And the presence of a gun in a house with a domestic abuser increases the risk of homicide sixfold. See *Castleman*, 572 U.S. at 160.

The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the Second Amendment forecloses Congress’s effort to address that danger through Section 922(g)(8). That holding has led to the suspension of criminal prosecutions under Section 922(g)(8) in the nine judicial districts within the Fifth Circuit. It has cast doubt on the enforceability of Section 922(g)(8) state-law counterparts in Louisiana and Texas. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:79(A)(4) (Supp. 2023); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 46.04(c) (West Supp. 2022). And if allowed to stand, it would thwart Congress’s considered judgment that persons who have been found to be a threat to their intimate partners or children should not be permitted to acquire or possess firearms. Given the significant disruptive consequences

² Three other courts of appeals, including the Fifth Circuit itself, previously upheld Section 922(g)(8) under intermediate scrutiny. See *United States v. Chapman*, 666 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2012); *United States v. McGinnis*, 956 F.3d 747, 758 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1397 (2021); *United States v. Reese*, 627 F.3d 792, 801-804 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011).

of the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the government is filing this petition for a writ of certiorari on a highly expedited schedule—a little more than two weeks after the issuance of the Fifth Circuit’s final amended opinion—in order to allow the Court to consider the petition before it recesses for the summer.

4. Finally, this Court should grant review so that it can correct the Fifth Circuit’s misinterpretation of *Bruen*. In *Bruen*, the Court emphasized that its historical test did not create a “regulatory straightjacket” and that the government retains substantial power to regulate firearms to protect public safety. 142 S. Ct. at 2133. Justice Alito emphasized the limits of the Court’s holding, writing that it “decides nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm or the requirements that must be met to buy a gun.” *Id.* at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Kavanaugh, too, wrote that, under the Court’s decision, the Second Amendment “allows a ‘variety’ of gun regulations.” *Id.* at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citation omitted).

The Fifth Circuit’s decision contradicts those assurances. The Fifth Circuit treated even minor and immaterial distinctions between historical laws and their modern counterparts as a sufficient reason to find the modern laws unconstitutional. If that approach were applied across the board, few modern statutes would survive judicial review; most modern gun regulations, after all, differ from their historical forbears in at least some ways. This Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari to clarify that, contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s view, the Second Amendment allows the government to disarm dangerous individuals, including those subject to domestic-violence restraining orders.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

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MARCH 2023

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-11001

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

ZACKEY RAHIMI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

Filed: Mar. 2, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CR-83-1

Before JONES, HO, and WILSON, *Circuit Judges*.

CORY T. WILSON, *Circuit Judge*:

Our prior panel opinion, *United States v. Rahimi*, 59 F.4th 163 (5th Cir. 2023), is WITHDRAWN and the following opinion is SUBSTITUTED therefor:

The question presented in this case is *not* whether prohibiting the possession of firearms by someone subject to a domestic violence restraining order is a laudable policy goal. The question is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), a specific statute that does so, is constitutional under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. In the light of *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), it is not.

(1a)

Zackey Rahimi levies a facial challenge to § 922(g)(8). The district court and a prior panel upheld the statute, applying this court's pre-*Bruen* precedent. See *United States v. Rahimi*, No. 21-11001, 2022 WL 2070392 at *1 n.1 (5th Cir. June 8, 2022). Rahimi filed a petition for rehearing en banc; while that petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided *Bruen*. The prior panel withdrew its opinion and requested supplemental briefing on the impact of that case on this one. Considering the issue afresh, we conclude that *Bruen* requires us to re-evaluate our Second Amendment jurisprudence and that under *Bruen*, § 922(g)(8) fails to pass constitutional muster. We therefore reverse the district court's ruling to the contrary and vacate Rahimi's conviction.

I.

Between December 2020 and January 2021, Rahimi was involved in five shootings in and around Arlington, Texas.¹ On December 1, after selling narcotics to an individual, he fired multiple shots into that individual's residence. The following day, Rahimi was involved in a car accident. He exited his vehicle, shot at the other driver, and fled the scene. He returned to the scene in a different vehicle and shot at the other driver's car. On December 22, Rahimi shot at a constable's vehicle. On January 7, Rahimi fired multiple shots in the air after his friend's credit card was declined at a Whataburger restaurant.

Officers in the Arlington Police Department identified Rahimi as a suspect in the shootings and obtained a

¹ The facts are drawn from the Pre-Sentence Report, which the district court adopted, and the factual resume, to which Rahimi stipulated.

warrant to search his home. Officers executed the warrant and found a rifle and a pistol. Rahimi admitted that he possessed the firearms. He also admitted that he was subject to an agreed civil protective order entered February 5, 2020, by a Tarrant County state district court after Rahimi's alleged assault of his ex-girlfriend. The protective order prohibited Rahimi from, *inter alia*, "[c]ommitting family violence," "[g]oing to or within 200 yards of the residence or place of employment" of his ex-girlfriend, and "[e]ngaging in conduct . . . including following the person, that is reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass" either his ex-girlfriend or a member of her family or household. The order also expressly prohibited Rahimi from possessing a firearm.²

A federal grand jury indicted Rahimi for possessing a firearm while under a domestic violence restraining order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person[] who is subject to a court order that[:] (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging

² The validity of the underlying protective order, and Rahimi's breach of it, are not before us, though the order's underlying prohibitions, e.g., restraining Rahimi from committing family violence, from using or threatening use of physical force, from following, harassing, annoying, abusing, or tormenting his ex-girlfriend, and from going within 200 yards of his ex-girlfriend or her family (including their child), are plainly lawful and enforceable.

in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.
 . . .

Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional, but he acknowledged that *United States v. McGinnis*, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020), foreclosed his argument.³ The district court denied Rahimi’s motion, and he pled guilty.

On appeal, Rahimi renewed his constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(8).⁴ Rahimi again acknowledged that his argument was foreclosed, and a prior panel of this court agreed. *See Rahimi*, 2022 WL 2070392 at *1 n.1. But after *Bruen*, the prior panel withdrew its opinion, ordered supplemental briefing, and ordered the clerk to expedite this case for oral argument before another panel of the court. Rahimi now contends that *Bruen*

³ The Government urged Rahimi’s argument was also foreclosed by *United States v. Emerson*, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).

⁴ Rahimi also asserted that the district court erred when it ordered his federal sentence to run consecutively to sentences for his state crimes because the underlying conduct of the state sentences was relevant conduct for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The prior panel affirmed the district court. Because we conclude that § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional and vacate Rahimi’s sentence, we do not further address the sentencing issue here.

overrules our precedent and that under *Bruen*, § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional. We agree on both points.

II.

Under the rule of orderliness, one panel of the Fifth Circuit “‘may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our *en banc* court.’” *In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc.*, 19 F.4th 787, 792 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting *Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr.*, 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)). The Supreme Court need not expressly overrule our precedent. “Rather, a latter panel must simply determine that a former panel’s decision has fallen unequivocally out of step with some intervening change in the law.” *Id.* “One situation in which this may naturally occur is where an intervening Supreme Court decision fundamentally changes the focus of the relevant analysis.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). That is the case here, as the Government concedes.

In *Emerson*, we held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms—the first circuit expressly to do so. 270 F.3d at 260. But we also concluded that § 922(g)(8) was constitutional as applied to the defendant there. *Id.* at 263. “*Emerson* first considered the scope of the Second Amendment right ‘as historically understood,’ and then determined—presumably by applying some form of means-end scrutiny *sub silentio*—that § 922(g)(8) [was] ‘narrowly tailored’ to the goal of minimizing ‘the threat of lawless violence.’” *McGinnis*, 956 F.3d at 755 (quoting *Emerson*, 270 F.3d at 264).

After *D.C. v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), courts coalesced around a similar “two-step inquiry for analyzing laws that might impact the Second Amendment.” *McGinnis*, 956 F.3d at 753 (internal quotation marks omitted). First, we “ask[ed] whether the conduct at issue [fell] within the scope of the Second Amendment right.” *Id.* at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the conduct fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment right, then the challenged law was constitutional. *Id.* But if the conduct fell within the scope of the right, then we proceeded to the second step of the analysis, which applied either intermediate or strict scrutiny. *Id.* at 754, 757 (expressly applying means-end scrutiny). In *McGinnis*, this court upheld § 922(g)(8) using this two-step framework. The initial panel in this case did likewise, citing *McGinnis. Rahimi*, 2022 WL 2070392 at *1 n.1.

Enter *Bruen*. Expounding on *Heller*, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30. In that context, the Government bears the burden of “justify[ing] its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Id.* at 2130. Put another way, “the [G]overnment must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” *Id.* at 2127. In the course of its explication, the Court expressly repudiated the circuit courts’ means-end scrutiny—the second step embodied in *Emerson* and applied in *McGinnis*. *Id.* at 2128-30. To the extent that the Court did not overtly overrule *Emerson* and *McGinnis*—it did not cite those cases but dis-

cussed other circuits' similar precedent—*Bruen* clearly “fundamentally change[d]” our analysis of laws that implicate the Second Amendment, *Bonvillian Marine*, 19 F.4th at 792, rendering our prior precedent obsolete.

III.

Our review of Rahimi’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(8) is de novo. See *United States v. Bailey*, 115 F.3d 1222, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997). First, the court addresses the Government’s argument that Rahimi is not among those citizens entitled to the Second Amendment’s protections. Concluding he is, we then turn to whether § 922(g)(8) passes muster under *Bruen*’s standard.⁵

A.

According to the Government, *Heller* and *Bruen* add a gloss on the Second Amendment that restricts its applicability to only “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635, and “ordinary, law-abiding citizens,” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2122. Because Rahimi is neither responsible nor law-abiding, as evidenced by his conduct and by the domestic violence restraining order issued against him, he falls outside the ambit of the Sec-

⁵ The Government also argues that because *Bruen* endorsed “shall-issue” licensing schemes, and Texas’s shall-issue licensing scheme (since modified to allow “constitutional carry,” see 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 809 (West)) included the requirement that an applicant not be under a domestic violence restraining order, it follows that § 922(g)(8) is constitutional. Of course, the *Bruen* Court did not rule on the constitutionality of 43 specific state licensing regimes because that was not the issue before the Court. See *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9. Rather, the Court merely blessed the general concept of shall-issue regimes. *Id.*

ond Amendment. Therefore, argues the Government, § 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to Rahimi.

The Second Amendment provides, simply enough:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

U.S. CONST. amend. II. *Heller* explained that the words “the people” in the Second Amendment have been interpreted throughout the Constitution to “unambiguously refer[] to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” 554 U.S. at 580. Further, “the people” “refer[] to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.” *Id.* (citing *United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez*, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)). For those reasons, the *Heller* Court began its analysis with the “strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans,” *id.* at 581, and then confirmed that presumption, *id.* at 595. *Heller*’s exposition of “the people” strongly indicates that Rahimi is included in “the people” and thus within the Second Amendment’s scope.

To be sure, as the Government argues, *Heller* and *Bruen* also refer to “law-abiding, responsible citizens” in discussing the amendment’s scope (*Bruen* adds “ordinary, law-abiding citizens”). And there is some debate over the extent to which the Court’s “law-abiding” qualifier constricts the Second Amendment’s reach. *Compare Kanter v. Barr*, 919 F.3d 437, 451-53 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J. dissenting), *abrogated by Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111, *with Binderup v. Att’y Gen.*, 836 F.3d 336, 357 (3d

Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). As summarized by now-Justice Barrett, “one [approach] uses history and tradition to identify the scope of the right, and the other uses that same body of evidence to identify the scope of the legislature’s power to take it away.” *Kanter*, 919 F.3d at 452 (Barrett, J., dissenting). The Government’s argument that Rahimi falls outside the community covered by the Second Amendment rests on the first approach. But it runs headlong into *Heller* and *Bruen*, which we read to espouse the second one.

That reading, in turn, leads us to conclude that, in context, *Heller* simply uses “law-abiding, responsible citizens” as shorthand in explaining that its holding (that the amendment codifies an individual right to keep and bear arms) should not “be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings. . . . ” 554 U.S. at 626-27; *accord Range v. Attorney Gen.*, 53 F.4th 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2022) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by convicted felons, because “the people” categorically “excludes those who have demonstrated disregard for the rule of law through the commission of felony and felony-equivalent offenses”), *reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated*, 56 F.4th 992 (3d Cir. 2023). In other words, *Heller*’s reference to “law-abiding, responsible” citizens meant to exclude from the Court’s discussion groups that have historically been stripped of their Second Amendment rights, i.e., groups whose disarmament the Founders “presumptively” tolerated or would have tolerated. *See* 554 U.S. at 627, n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regula-

tory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”). *Bruen*’s reference to “ordinary, law-abiding” citizens is no different. *See* 142 S. Ct. at 2134.

From the record before us, Rahimi did not fall into any such group at the time he was charged with violating § 922(g)(8), so the “strong presumption” that he remained among “the people” protected by the amendment holds. When he was charged, Rahimi was subject to an agreed domestic violence restraining order that was entered in a civil proceeding. That alone does not suffice to remove him from the political community within the amendment’s scope. And, while he was *suspected* of other criminal conduct at the time, Rahimi was not a convicted felon or otherwise subject to another “longstanding prohibition[] on the possession of firearms” that would have excluded him. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626-27; *see Range*, 53 F.4th at 273 (concluding that *Heller*, *McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill.*, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), and *Bruen* support that criminals, as a group, “fall[] outside ‘the people’ . . . and that § 922(g)(1) is well-rooted in the nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation”).⁶

⁶ This discussion is not to cast doubt on firearm restrictions that attach during criminal proceedings prior to conviction. *E.g.*, 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (prohibiting person under indictment from shipping, transporting, or receiving any firearm); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B)(viii) (allowing judicial officer to require person released on pretrial bond to “refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon”). Those restrictions are not before us. We simply hew carefully to the Supreme Court’s delineation of who falls within, and without, the overarching class of “law-abiding, responsible citizens” covered by the Second Amendment.

Indeed, the upshot of the Government’s argument is that the Second Amendment right can be readily divested, such that “a person could be in one day and out the next: . . . his rights would be stripped as a self-executing consequence of his new status.” *Kanter*, 919 F.3d at 452 (Barrett, J., dissenting). But this turns the typical way of conceptualizing constitutional rights on its head. And the Government’s argument reads the Supreme Court’s “law-abiding” gloss so expansively that it risks swallowing the text of the amendment. *Cf. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (“The constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is not ‘a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.’” (quoting *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 780)).

Further, the Government’s proffered interpretation of “law-abiding” admits to no true limiting principle. Under the Government’s reading, Congress could remove “unordinary” or “irresponsible” or “non-law-abiding” people—however expediently defined—from the scope of the Second Amendment. Could speeders be stripped of their right to keep and bear arms? Political nonconformists? People who do not recycle or drive an electric vehicle? One easily gets the point: Neither *Heller* nor *Bruen* countenances such a malleable scope of the Second Amendment’s protections; to the contrary, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans,” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 581. Rahimi, while hardly a model citizen, is nonetheless among “the people” entitled to the Second Amendment’s guarantees, all other things equal.

B.

Which brings us to the question of whether Rahimi’s right to keep and bear arms may be constitutionally restricted by operation of § 922(g)(8). The parties dispute Rahimi’s burden necessary to sustain his facial challenge to the statute. The Government contends that Rahimi “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Rahimi contests that assertion, asserting during oral argument that the Government’s interpretation of *Salerno* has fallen out of favor, though he contends that in any event, he has satisfied *Salerno*’s standard.

Bruen instructs how to proceed. The plaintiffs there levied a facial challenge to New York’s public carry licensing regime. 142 S. Ct. at 2122. To evaluate the challenged law, the Supreme Court employed a historical analysis, aimed at “assess[ing] whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” *Id.* at 2131. Construing *Heller*, the Court flatly rejected any means-end scrutiny as part of this analysis, *id.* at 2129, such that if a statute is inconsistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding, then it falls under any circumstances. *Cf. Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 745; *Freedom Path, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Serv.*, 913 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir. 2019) (“A facial challenge to a statute considers only the text of the statute itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual.” (cleaned up)).

Bruen articulated two analytical steps: First, courts must determine whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct[.]” 142

S. Ct. at 2129-30. If so, then the “Constitution presumptively protects that conduct,” and the Government “must justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of fire-arm regulation.” *Id.* at 2130. “Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s unqualified command.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

To carry its burden, the Government must point to “historical precedent from before, during, and even after the founding [that] evinces a comparable tradition of regulation.” *Id.* at 2131-32 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e are not obliged to sift the historical materials for evidence to sustain [§ 922(g)(8)]. That is [the Government’s] burden.” *Id.* at 2150.

The Government need not identify a “historical *twin*”; rather, a “well-established and representative historical *analogue*” suffices. *Id.* at 2133. The Supreme Court distilled two metrics for courts to compare the Government’s proffered analogues against the challenged law: *how* the challenged law burdens the right to armed self-defense, and *why* the law burdens that right. *Id.* (citing *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 767, and *Heller*, 544 U.S. at 599). “[W]hether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified are central considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

As to the degree of similarity required, “analogical reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check.” *Id.* “[C]ourts should not uphold every modern law that

remotely resembles a historical analogue, because doing so risks endorsing outliers that our ancestors would never have accepted.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). On the other hand, “even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” *Id.* The core question is whether the challenged law and proffered analogue are “relevantly similar.” *Id.* at 2132.

When the challenged regulation addresses a “general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.” *Id.* at 2131. Moreover, “if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.” *Id.*

C.

Rahimi’s possession of a pistol and a rifle easily falls within the purview of the Second Amendment. The amendment grants him the right “to keep” firearms, and “possession” is included within the meaning of “keep.” *See id.* at 2134-35. And it is undisputed that the types of firearms that Rahimi possessed are “in common use,” such that they fall within the scope of the amendment. *See id.* at 2143 (“[T]he Second Amendment protects only the carrying of weapons that are those ‘in common use at the time,’ as opposed to those that ‘are highly unusual in society at large.’”) (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627)). Thus, *Bruen*’s first step is met, and the Second Amendment presumptively protects Rahimi’s right to keep the

weapons officers discovered in his home. *See id.* at 2126.

But Rahimi, like any other citizen, may have forfeited his Second Amendment rights if his conduct ran afoul of a “lawful regulatory measure[]” “prohibiting . . . the possession of firearms,” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626-27 & 627 n.26, that is consistent with “the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms,” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2127. The question turns on whether § 922(g)(8) falls within that historical tradition, or outside of it.

To reiterate, the statute makes it unlawful

for any person[] who is subject to a court order that[:] (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition. . . .

§ 922(g)(8); *see McGinnis*, 956 F.3d at 758 (stating that § 922(g)(8)’s purpose is to reduce “domestic gun abuse”). Distilled to its essence, the provision operates to deprive

an individual of his right to possess (i.e., “to keep”) firearms once a court enters an order, after notice and a hearing, that restrains the individual “from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner” or the partner’s child. The order can rest on a specific finding that the restrained individual poses a “credible threat” to an intimate partner or her child. Or it may simply include a general prohibition on the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force reasonably expected to cause bodily injury. The covered individual forfeits his Second Amendment right for the duration of the court’s order. This is so even when the individual has not been criminally convicted or accused of any offense and when the underlying proceeding is merely civil in nature.

These characteristics crystallize “how” and “why” § 922(g)(8) “burden[s] a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. In particular, we focus on these key features of the statute: (1) forfeiture of the right to possess weapons (2) after a civil proceeding⁷ (3) in which a court enters a protective order based on a finding of a “credible threat” to another specific person, or that includes a blanket prohibition on the use, of threatened use, of physical force, (4) in order to protect that person from “domestic gun abuse.” The

⁷ The distinction between a criminal and civil proceeding is important because criminal proceedings have afforded the accused substantial protections throughout our Nation’s history. In crafting the Bill of Rights, the Founders were plainly attuned to preservation of these protections. *See* U.S. Const. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. It is therefore significant that § 922(g)(8) works to eliminate the Second Amendment right of individuals subject merely to civil process.

first three aspects go to *how* the statute accomplishes its goal; the fourth is the statute's goal, the *why*.

To sustain § 922(g)(8)'s burden on Rahimi's Second Amendment right, the Government bears the burden of proffering "relevantly similar" historical regulations that imposed "a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense" that were also "comparably justified." *Id.* at 2132-33. And "when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is created equal. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them." *Id.* at 2136 (internal quotation marks omitted). We thus afford greater weight to historical analogues more contemporaneous to the Second Amendment's ratification.

The Government offers potential historical analogues to § 922(g)(8) that fall generally into three categories: (1) English and American laws (and sundry unadopted proposals to modify the Second Amendment) providing for disarmament of "dangerous" people, (2) English and American "going armed" laws, and (3) colonial and early state surety laws. We discuss in turn why each of these historical regulations falters as "relevantly similar" precursors to § 922(g)(8).

1.

The Government relies on laws of varying antiquity as evidence of its "dangerousness" analogues. We sketch these chronologically, mindful that greater weight attaches to laws nearer in time to the Second Amendment's ratification.

Under the English Militia Act of 1662, officers of the Crown could "seize all arms in the custody or possession

of any person” whom they “judge[d] dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdom.” 13 & 14 Car. 2, c.3, § 13 (1662). Citing scholarship, the Government thus posits that “by the time of American independence, England had established a well-practiced tradition of disarming dangerous persons—violent persons and disaffected persons perceived as threatening to the crown.” Joseph G.S. Greenlee, *The Historical Justification for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons from Possessing Firearms*, 20 WYO. L. REV. 249, 261 (2020).

But the Militia Act’s provenance demonstrates that it is not a forerunner of our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Under Charles I (who reigned 1625-1649), the Crown and Parliament contested for control of the militia. Nelson Lund, *The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms*, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996). After the resulting civil war and Oliver Cromwell’s interregnum, the monarchy was restored in 1660 when Charles II took the throne. Charles II began using the militia to disarm his political opponents. *Id.* (citing J. MALCOLM, *TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT* (1994) 35-38 (1994)). The Militia Act of 1662 facilitated this disarmament, which escalated under the Catholic James II once he took the throne in 1685. *Id.*; see *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 593 (noting that the disarmaments “caused Englishmen . . . to be jealous of their arms”). After the Glorious Revolution, which enthroned Protestants William and Mary, the Declaration of Rights, codified as the 1689 English Bill of Rights, qualified the Militia Act by guaranteeing “[t]hat the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law.” 1 W. & M., ch. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441. “This right,” which *restricted* the

Militia Act's reach in order to prevent the kind of politically motivated disarmaments pursued by Charles II and James II, "has long been understood to be the predecessor to our Second Amendment." *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 593. This understanding, and the history behind it, defeats any utility of the Militia Act of 1662 as a historical analogue for § 922(g)(8).

The Government next points to laws in several colonies and states that disarmed classes of people considered to be dangerous, specifically including those unwilling to take an oath of allegiance, slaves, and Native Americans. See Robert H. Churchill, *Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment*, 25 Law & Hist. Rev. 139, 157-60 (2007). These laws disarmed people thought to pose a threat to the security of the state due to their perceived lack of loyalty or societal status. See *Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives*, 700 F.3d 185, 200-01 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing relevant scholarship), *abrogated by Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2126-30. "While public safety was a concern, most disarmament efforts were meant to prevent armed rebellions. The early Americans adopted much of that tradition in the colonies." Greenlee, *supra*, at 261.

But we question at a threshold level whether colonial and state laws disarming categories of "disloyal" or "unacceptable" people present tenable analogues to § 922(g)(8). Laws that disarmed slaves, Native Americans, and disloyal people may well have been targeted at groups excluded from the political community—i.e., written out of "the people" altogether—as much as they were about curtailing violence or ensuring the security

of the state. Their utility as historical analogues is therefore dubious, at best. In any event, these laws fail on substance as analogues to § 922(g)(8), because out of the gate, *why* they disarmed people was different. The purpose of laws disarming “disloyal” or “unacceptable” groups was ostensibly the preservation of political and social order, not the protection of an identified person from the threat of “domestic gun abuse,” *McGinnis*, 956 F.3d at 758, posed by another individual. Thus, laws disarming “dangerous” classes of people are not “relevantly similar” to § 922(g)(8) such that they can serve as historical analogues.

Finally, the Government offers two proposals that emerged in state ratification conventions considering the proposed Constitution. A minority of Pennsylvania’s convention authored a report in which they contended that citizens have a right to bear arms “unless for crimes committed, *or real danger of public injury.*” 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, *THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY* 662, 665 (1971) (emphasis added). And at the Massachusetts convention, Samuel Adams proposed a qualifier to the Second Amendment that limited the scope of the right to “peaceable citizens.” *Id.* at 681.

But these proposed amendments are not reflective of the Nation’s early understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment right. While they were influential proposals, *see Heller*, 554 U.S. at 604, neither became part of the Second Amendment as ratified. Thus, the proposals might somewhat illuminate the scope of firearm rights at the time of ratification, but they cannot counter the Second Amendment’s text, or serve as an analogue for § 922(g)(8) because, *inter alia*, they were

not enacted. *Cf. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2137 (“[T]o the extent later history contradicts what the text [of the Second Amendment] says, the text controls.”).

2.

The Government also relies on the ancient criminal offense of “going armed to terrify the King’s subjects.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2141 (alteration and emphasis omitted). This common law offense persisted in America and was in some cases codified. *Id.* at 2144. The Government offers four exemplars codified in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the state of Virginia, and the colonies of New Hampshire and North Carolina.

The Massachusetts law provided “[t]hat every justice of the peace . . . may cause to be staid and arrested all affrayers, rioters, disturbers or breakers of the peace, and such as shall ride, or go armed offensively . . . and upon view of such justice or justices, confession of the party or other legal conviction of any such offence, shall commit the offender to prison . . . and seize and take away his armor or weapons. . . . ” 1 Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, 52-53 (1869) (1692 statute) (cleaned up). Similarly, the New Hampshire statute authorized justices of the peace “upon view of such justice, confession of the party, or legal proof of any such offense . . . [to] cause the [offender’s] arms or weapons to be taken away. . . . ” Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Province of New-Hampshire: In New-England; with Sundry Acts of Parliament, 17 (1771) (1701 statute); *see Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2142-43 (noting that Massachusetts and New Hampshire laws “were substantively identical”). Virginia’s law differed slightly: “[N]o man . . . [shall] go [or ride armed

by night or by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places, in terror of the country, upon pain of being arrested and committed to prison by any justice on his view, or proof of others, there to a time for so long a time as a jury, to be sworn for that purpose by the said justice, shall direct, and in like manner to forfeit his armour to the Commonwealth. . . . ” Revised Code of the State of Virginia: Collection of All Such Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, of a Public and Permanent Nature, as Are Now in Force, 554 (1819) (1786 statute). North Carolina’s colonial law was contained within its constable’s oath, which required constables to “arrest all such persons as, in your sight, shall ride or go armed offensively, or shall commit or make any riot, affray, or other breach of his Majesty’s peace. . . . ” Collection of All of the Public Acts of Assembly of the Province of North-Carolina: Now in Force and Use, 131 (1751) (1741 statute) (cleaned up). While similarly aimed at curbing “going armed offensively,” the North Carolina law did not provide for forfeiture.

These proffered analogues fall short for several reasons. An overarching one is that it is doubtful these “going armed” laws are reflective of our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, at least as to forfeiture of firearms. *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2142 (“[W]e doubt that *three* colonial regulations could suffice to show a tradition of public carry regulation.”). North Carolina’s law did not provide for forfeiture, so it quickly falls out of the mix. And fairly early on, Massachusetts and Virginia dropped forfeiture as a penalty, going the way of North Carolina and thereby undercutting the Government’s reliance on those laws. Indeed, Massachusetts amended its law to remove the forfeiture provision in 1795, just four years after the ratification of the

Second Amendment. 2 Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, from November 28, 1780 to February 28, 1807, 653 (1807) (statute enacted Jan. 29, 1795). Virginia had done so by 1847, shortly before the Commonwealth re-codified its laws in 1849. *See Code of Virginia: With the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Rights and Constitution of Virginia*, 756 (1849).⁸ It is unclear how long New Hampshire’s “going armed” law preserved its forfeiture provision, but assuming *arguendo* it persisted longer than the others, one outlier is not enough “to show a tradition of public carry regulation.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2142.

And on substance, the early “going armed” laws that led to weapons forfeiture are not relevantly similar to § 922(g)(8). First, those laws only disarmed an offender after criminal proceedings and conviction. By contrast, § 922(g)(8) disarms people who have merely been civilly adjudicated to be a threat to another person—or, who are simply governed by a civil order that “by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii), whether or not there is a “credible threat to the physical safety” of anyone else, § 922(g)(8)(C)(i). Rahimi’s domestic violence restraining order satisfied both conditions; but it bears emphasis that the order at issue here was entered by agreement, in a civil proceeding, after Rahimi apparently waived hearing (the order states no formal hearing was held, and no record was created),

⁸ By the 1849 code, Virginia’s going armed law had evolved into its anti-riot law (chapter 195) and surety law (chapter 201). *See id.* Neither chapter provided for forfeiture of an offender’s weapons.

and without counsel or other safeguards that would be afforded him in the criminal context. These distinctions alone defeat the “going armed” laws as useful analogues for § 922(g)(8).

Moreover, the “going armed” laws, like the “dangerousness” laws discussed above, appear to have been aimed at curbing terroristic or riotous behavior, i.e., disarming those who had been adjudicated to be a threat to society generally, rather than to identified individuals. And § 922(g)(8) works to disarm not only individuals who are threats to other individuals but also every party to a domestic proceeding (think: divorce court) who, with no history of violence whatever, becomes subject to a domestic restraining order that contains boilerplate language that tracks § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). In other words, where “going armed” laws were tied to violent or riotous conduct and threats to society, § 922(g)(8) implicates a much wider swath of conduct, not inherently dependent on any actual violence or threat. Thus, these “going armed” laws are not viable historical analogues for § 922(g)(8).

3.

Lastly, the Government points to historical surety laws. At common law, an individual who could show that he had “just cause to fear” that another would injure him or destroy his property could “demand surety of the peace against such person.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 252 (1769). The surety “was intended merely for prevention, without any crime actually committed by the party; but arising only from probable suspicion, that some crime [wa]s intended or likely to happen.” *Id.* at 249. If the party of whom surety was demanded refused to

post surety, he would be forbidden from carrying a weapon in public absent special need. *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2148-49 (discussing operation of historical surety laws). Many jurisdictions codified this tradition, either before ratification of the Bill of Rights or in early decades thereafter.⁹

The surety laws come closer to being “relevantly similar” to § 922(g)(8) than the “dangerousness” and “going armed” laws discussed *supra*. First, they are more clearly a part of our tradition of firearm regulation. And they were “comparably justified,” *id.* at 2133, in that they were meant to protect an identified person (who sought surety) from the risk of harm posed by another identified individual (who had to post surety to carry arms). Put simply, the *why* behind historical surety laws analogously aligns with that underlying § 922(g)(8).¹⁰

⁹ *E.g.*, 1 Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, 52-53 (1869) (1692 statute); Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Province of New-Hampshire: In New-England; with Sundry Acts of Parliament, 17 (1771) (1701 statute); 2 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, pg. 23 (1896) (1700 statute); 1 Laws of the State of Delaware from the Fourteenth Day of October, One Thousand Seven Hundred, to the Eighteenth Day of August, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Ninety-Seven, pg. 52 (1797) (1700 statute); Acts and Laws of His Majesties Colony of Connecticut in New-England 91 (1901) (1702 statute); *see also Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2148 (stating that at least ten jurisdictions enacted surety laws between 1836 and 1871).

¹⁰ The parties spar somewhat over the required granularity of the underlying problem in comparing § 922(g)(8) to proffered analogues. Rahimi contends more generally that domestic violence was, and remains, a persistent social ill that society has taken numerous actions against—though not disarmament. The Government counters that “crime statistics from the founding era are hard

Aspects of *how* the surety laws worked resemble certain of the mechanics of § 922(g)(8) as well. The surety laws required only a civil proceeding, not a criminal conviction. The “credible threat” finding required to trigger § 922(g)(8)(C)(i)’s prohibition on possession of weapons echoes the showing that was required to justify posting of surety to avoid forfeiture. But that is where the analogy breaks down: As the Government acknowledges, historical surety laws did not prohibit public carry, much less possession of weapons, so long as the offender posted surety. *See also id.* at 2149 (noting that there is “little evidence that authorities ever enforced surety laws”). Where the surety laws imposed a conditional, partial restriction on the Second Amendment right, § 922(g)(8) works an absolute deprivation of the right, not only publicly to carry, but to *possess* any firearm, upon entry of a sufficient protective order. And, as discussed *supra*, § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) works that deprivation based on an order that “prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” whether there is a “just cause to fear” any harm, or not. At bottom, the historical surety laws did not impose “a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense,” *id.* at 2133, as § 922(g)(8).

* * *

to come by,” but that “there is reason to doubt that domestic *homicide* was as prevalent at the founding as it is in the modern era.” To be sure, historical surety laws were not targeted to domestic violence or even more specifically to domestic homicide. But somewhat abstracting the laws’ justifications, as we do above the line, strikes us as consistent with *Bruen*’s instruction that “even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” 142 S. Ct. at 2133.

The Government fails to demonstrate that § 922(g)(8)'s restriction of the Second Amendment right fits within our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Government's proffered analogues falter under one or both of the metrics the Supreme Court articulated in *Bruen* as the baseline for measuring "relevantly similar" analogues: "how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen's right to armed self-defense." *Id.*¹¹ As a result, § 922(g)(8) falls outside the class of firearm regulations countenanced by the Second Amendment.

IV.

Doubtless, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) embodies salutary policy goals meant to protect vulnerable people in our society. Weighing those policy goals' merits through

¹¹ Accord David B. Kopel & Joseph G. S. Greenlee, *The Federal Circuits' Second Amendment Doctrines*, 61 ST. LOUIS L.J. 193, 244 (2017) ("[T]here is simply no tradition—from 1791 or 1866—of prohibiting gun possession (or voting, jury service, or government service) for people convicted of misdemeanors or subject to civil protective orders."); Carolyn B. Ramsey, *Firearms in the Family*, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1257, 1301 (2017) ("Historical support for the exclusion of domestic violence offenders from Second Amendment protection appears rather thin."); Keateon G. Hille, *The Second Amendment: From Miller to Chovan, and Why the Marzzarella Framework is the Best Shot Courts Have*, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 377, 392 (2015) (acknowledging that the "prohibition on firearms possession by domestic violence misdemeanants is not longstanding" and advocating for a means-ends test); Allen Rostron, *Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment*, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 741 (2012) ("If longstanding tradition is the key common characteristic of the items on the *Heller* list, modern legal innovations like the ban on guns for domestic violence misdemeanants, however much they may reduce risks and benefit society, do not qualify.").

the sort of means-end scrutiny our prior precedent indulged, we previously concluded that the societal benefits of § 922(g)(8) outweighed its burden on Rahimi's Second Amendment rights. But *Bruen* forecloses any such analysis in favor of a historical analogical inquiry into the scope of the allowable burden on the Second Amendment right. Through that lens, we conclude that § 922(g)(8)'s ban on possession of firearms is an "outlier[] that our ancestors would never have accepted." *Id.* Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional, and Rahimi's conviction under that statute must be vacated.

REVERSED; CONVICTION VACATED.

JAMES C. HO, *Circuit Judge*, concurring:

The right to keep and bear arms has long been recognized as a fundamental civil right. Blackstone saw it as an essential component of “the natural right” to “self-preservation and defence.” *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 593-94 (2008) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139-40 (1765)). And the Supreme Court has repeatedly analogized the Second Amendment to other constitutional rights guaranteed to every American. See, e.g., *Johnson v. Eisentrager*, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (describing the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments as the “civil-rights Amendments”); *Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.*, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 n.10 (1961) (comparing “the commands of the First Amendment” to “the equally unqualified command of the Second Amendment”); *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126, 2130 (2022) (quoting *Konigsberg*).

But lower courts have routinely ignored these principles, treating the Second Amendment as “a second-class right.” *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion). So the Supreme Court has now commanded lower courts to be more forceful guardians of the right to keep and bear arms, by establishing a new framework for lower courts to apply under the Second Amendment.

“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30. “The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Id.* at 2130.

“[T]his historical inquiry that courts must conduct will often involve reasoning by analogy—a commonplace task for any lawyer or judge. Like all analogical reasoning, determining whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation requires a determination of whether the two regulations are ‘relevantly similar.’” *Id.* at 2132. This framework “is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check.” *Id.* at 2133. It requires the government to “identify a well-established and representative historical *analogue*, not a historical *twin*.” *Id.*

Our court’s decision today dutifully applies *Bruen*, and I join it in full. I write separately to explain how respect for the Second Amendment is entirely compatible with respect for our profound societal interest in protecting citizens from violent criminals. Our Founders firmly believed in both the fundamental right to keep and bear arms and the fundamental role of government in combating violent crime.

I.

“[T]he right to keep and bear arms . . . has controversial public safety implications.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2126 n.3 (quotations omitted). But it’s hardly “the *only* constitutional right” that does. *Id.* (quotations omitted, emphasis added). To the contrary, “[a]ll of the constitutional provisions that impose restrictions on law enforcement and on the prosecution of crimes fall into the same category.” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 783 (plurality opinion).

So any legal framework that involves any of these constitutional provisions can have significant and con-

trouversial public safety consequences. A framework that under-protects a right unduly deprives citizens of liberty. But a framework that over-protects a right unduly deprives citizens of competing interests like public safety.

Take, for example, the exclusionary rule. *See Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Since its inception, the rule has been sharply criticized for over-protecting the accused and releasing dangerous criminals into our neighborhoods. It's often said that nothing in the Constitution requires the criminal to "go free because the constable has blundered." *Herring v. United States*, 555 U.S. 135, 148 (2009) (quoting *People v. Defore*, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926)). "The exclusionary rule generates substantial social costs" by "setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large." *Hudson v. Michigan*, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (cleaned up).

The same can be said about *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court has "repeatedly referred to the *Miranda* warnings as 'prophylactic' and 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.'" *Dickerson v. United States*, 530 U.S. 428, 437-38 (2000) (citations omitted). What's more, "[i]n some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him." *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).

So it's easy to see why decisions like *Mapp* and *Miranda* have been criticized for over-protecting constitutional rights and harming public safety.

But there’s a big difference between the first criticism and the second, at least as far as the judiciary is concerned. It’s our duty as judges to interpret the Constitution based on the text and original understanding of the relevant provision—not on public policy considerations, or worse, fear of public opprobrium or criticism from the political branches. *See, e.g., McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 783 (plurality opinion) (finding “no case in which we have refrained from holding that a provision of the Bill of Rights is binding on the States on the ground that the right at issue has disputed public safety implications”); *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.*, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2278 (2022) (“[W]e cannot allow our decisions to be affected by any extraneous influences such as concern about the public’s reaction to our work.”); *Mance v. Sessions*, 896 F.3d 390, 405 (5th Cir. 2018) (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Constitutional rights must not give way to hoplophobia.”).

And that’s precisely the problem here: Members of the Supreme Court have repeatedly criticized lower courts for disfavoring the Second Amendment.¹ The

¹ *See, e.g., Silvester v. Becerra*, 138 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (bemoaning “lower courts’ general failure to afford the Second Amendment the respect due an enumerated constitutional right”); *Peruta v. California*, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (lamenting “distressing trend” of “the treatment of the Second Amendment as a disfavored right”); *Friedman v. City of Highland Park*, 136 S. Ct. 447, 447 (2015) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (criticizing “noncompliance with our Second Amendment precedents” by “several Courts of Appeals”); *Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco*, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2799 (2015) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“lower courts, including the ones here, have failed to protect [the Second

Supreme Court has now responded by setting forth a new legal framework in *Bruen*. It is incumbent on lower courts to implement *Bruen* in good faith and to the best of our ability.

Bruen calls on us to examine our Nation’s history and traditions to determine the meaning and scope of the Second Amendment. It’s hardly the first time that the Supreme Court has looked to history and tradition to interpret constitutional provisions.² And it surely won’t be the last.

Amendment right]”); *id.* at 2802 (“A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”) (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634).

² See, e.g., *Myers v. United States*, 272 U.S. 52, 109-76 (1926) (noting that “the power of removal of executive officers . . . was presented early in the first session of the First Congress,” known as the “decision of 1789,” and also surveying English and colonial history and subsequent Congressional and Executive practice); *Marsh v. Chambers*, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983) (noting that “[t]he opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country” and surveying colonial history, the deliberations of the First Congress, and “unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years”); *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 43-50 (2004) (examining the “historical background” of the Confrontation Clause, noting that “[t]he right to confront one’s accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman times,” and surveying English history and colonial and early state practice); *United States v. Stevens*, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (reviewing “historic and traditional categories” of speech that government has been allowed to regulate “[f]rom 1791 to the present”); *Timbs v. Indiana*, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687-89 (2019) (observing that “[t]he Excessive Fines Clause traces its venerable lineage back to at least 1215” and surveying authorities from English history and colonial practice).

II.

Those who commit violence, including domestic violence, shouldn't just be disarmed—they should be detained, prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated. And that's exactly why we have a criminal justice system—to punish criminals and disable them from engaging in further crimes.

The Constitution presumes the existence of a criminal justice system. *See, e.g.*, U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI (setting forth various rights of the accused in criminal proceedings); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments). That system allows the government to deny convicted criminals a wide range of liberties that it could not deny to innocent, law-abiding citizens. For example, the government cannot deprive innocent citizens of their liberty of movement. *See, e.g., Williams v. Fears*, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); *City of Chicago v. Morales*, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999). But it can certainly arrest and incarcerate violent criminals.

Arrest and incarceration naturally entail the loss of a wide range of liberties—including the loss of access to weapons. *See, e.g., Chimel v. California*, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”); *State v. Buzzard*, 4 Ark. 18, 21 (1842) (Ringo, C.J.) (“Persons accused of crime, upon their arrest, have constantly been divested of their arms, without the legality of the act having ever been questioned.”).

The Supreme Court has also made clear that our Nation's history and traditions include “longstanding pro-

hibitions on the possession of firearms by felons”—and that such measures are “presumptively lawful.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626 & n.26. *See also McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 786 (plurality opinion) (“We made it clear in *Heller* that our holding did not cast doubt on such long-standing regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,’” and “[w]e repeat those assurances here. . . . [I]ncorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”). So the government can presumably disarm dangerous convicted felons, whether they’re incarcerated or not, without violating the Second Amendment.

The Second Amendment is not “a second-class right.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2156. It is not “subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” *Id.* That principle guides us here: The government can impose various restrictions on the rights of dangerous convicted felons, consistent with our Nation’s history and traditions—and that includes the right to keep and bear arms.

III.

The power to incarcerate violent criminals is not just constitutionally permissible—it’s imperative to protecting victims. After all, anyone who’s willing to break the law when it comes to domestic violence is presumably willing to break the law when it comes to guns as well. The only way to protect the victim may be to detain as well as disarm the violent criminal.

For example, the government can detain and disarm, not just after conviction, but also before trial. Pre-trial detention is presumed by the Excessive Bail Clause and the Speedy Trial Clause. And it plays a significant role

in protecting citizens from violence, including domestic violence. *See, e.g., United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (permitting “the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who . . . pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community”).

In addition, the government can detain and disarm, based not just on acts of violence, but criminal threats of violence as well. *See, e.g., United States v. Ackell*, 907 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2018) (upholding criminal stalking law); *United States v. Gonzalez*, 905 F.3d 165 (3rd Cir. 2018) (same); *United States v. Osinger*, 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014) (same); *United States v. Petrovic*, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2012) (same); *see also People v. Counterman*, 497 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2021) (same), *cert. granted sub nom. Counterman v. Colorado*, 143 S. Ct. 644 (2023). After all, to the victim, such actions are not only life-threatening—they’re life-altering, even if they don’t eventually result in violence.

IV.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) disarms individuals based on civil protective orders—not criminal proceedings. As the court today explains, there is no analogous historical tradition sufficient to support § 922(g)(8) under *Bruen*.

Moreover, there are additional reasons why disarmament based on civil protective orders should give us pause. Scholars and judges have expressed alarm that civil protective orders are too often misused as a tactical device in divorce proceedings—and issued without any actual threat of danger. That makes it difficult to justify § 922(g)(8) as a measure to disarm dangerous individuals.

A.

“Many divorce lawyers routinely recommend pursuit of civil protection orders for clients in divorce proceedings . . . as a tactical leverage device.” Jeannie Suk, *Criminal Law Comes Home*, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 62 n.257 (2006). See also, e.g., Randy Frances Kandel, *Squabbling in the Shadows: What the Law Can Learn from the Way Divorcing Couples Use Protective Orders as Bargaining Chips in Domestic Spats and Child Custody Mediation*, 48 S.C. L. REV. 441, 448 (1997) (civil protective orders are deployed as “an affirmative element of divorce strategy”).

That’s because civil protective orders can help a party in a divorce proceeding to “secure [favorable] rulings on critical issues such as [marital and child] support, exclusion from marital residence and property disposition.” *Murray v. Murray*, 631 A.2d 984, 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). Protective orders can also be “a powerful strategic tool in custody disputes.” Suk, *supra*, at 62.

That makes civil protective orders a tempting target for abuse. Judges have expressed “concern[] . . . with the serious policy implications of permitting allegations of . . . domestic violence” to be used in divorce proceedings. *Murray*, 631 A.2d at 986. See also *City of Seattle v. May*, 256 P.3d 1161, 1166 n.1 (Wash. 2011) (Sanders, J., dissenting) (noting “the growing trend to use protection orders as tactical weapons in divorce cases”). And for good reason. “[N]ot all parties to divorce are above using [protective orders] not for their intended purpose but solely to gain advantage in a dissolution.” Scott A. Lerner, *Sword or Shield? Combating Orders-of-Protection Abuse in Divorce*, 95 ILL.

BAR J. 590, 591 (2007). Anyone who is “willing to commit perjury can spend months or even years . . . planning to file a domestic violence complaint at an opportune moment in order to gain the upper hand in a divorce proceeding.” David N. Heleniak, *The New Star Chamber: The New Jersey Family Court and the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act*, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1009, 1014 (2005). So “[a] plaintiff willing to exaggerate past incidents or even commit perjury can have access to a responsive support group, a sympathetic court, and a litany of immediate relief.” Peter Slocum, *Biting the D.V. Bullet: Are Domestic-Violence Restraining Orders Trampling on Second Amendment Rights?*, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 639, 662-63 (2010).

Moreover, these concerns are exacerbated by the fact that judges are too often ill-equipped to prevent abuse. Family court judges may face enormous pressure to grant civil protective orders—and no incentive to deny them. For example, family court judges may receive mandatory training in which they’re warned about “the unfavorable publicity” that could result if they deny requests for civil protective orders. *Id.* at 668. As one judge has noted, “[a] newspaper headline can be death to a municipal court judge’s career.” *Id.* at 667 n.213 (quotations omitted). So “the prospect of an unfavorable newspaper headline is a frightening one.” *Id.* To quote another judge: “Your job is not to become concerned about all the constitutional rights of the [defendant] you’re violating as you grant a restraining order. Throw him out on the street, give him the clothes on his back and tell him, ‘See ya’ around.’” *Id.* at 668. Yet another judge said: “If there is any doubt in your mind about what to do, you should issue the restraining order.” *Id.*

As a result, “[r]estraining orders . . . are granted to virtually all who apply.” *May*, 256 P.3d at 1166 n.1 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted). So there’s a “tremendous” risk that courts will enter protective orders automatically—despite the absence of any real threat of danger. *Heleniak, supra*, at 1014. *See generally* *Slocum, supra*. In one case, for example, a family court judge granted a restraining order on the ground that the husband told his wife that he did not love her and was no longer attracted to her. *See Murray*, 631 A.2d at 984. “There was no prior history of domestic violence,” yet the judge issued the order anyway. *Id.* Another judge issued a restraining order against David Letterman on the ground that his presence on television harassed the plaintiff. *See* Todd Peterson, *David Letterman Fights Restraining Order*, PEOPLE (Dec. 21, 2005).

These orders were later rescinded. But the defendants were nevertheless prohibited from possessing a firearm while the orders were in effect, as a result of § 922(g)(8).

B.

Moreover, the consequences of disarming citizens under § 922(g)(8) may be especially perverse considering the common practice of “mutual” protective orders.

In any domestic violence dispute, a judge may see no downside in forbidding *both* parties from harming one another. A judge “may think that mutual restraining orders are not substantially different from regular restraining orders—after all, the goal is to keep the parties away from one another so that the violence will not continue.” Jacquie Andreano, *The Disproportionate*

Effect of Mutual Restraining Orders on Same-Sex Domestic Violence Victims, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1047, 1054 (2020). “Judges may also feel that issuing a mutual restraining order saves time because they do not have to hear testimony and make a finding regarding which party is a primary aggressor or even that one party has committed domestic violence.” *Id.*

But “[t]hese judicial assessments have often led to the issuance of *unmerited* mutual restraining orders, namely in situations where one party is the abuser and the other party is a victim.” *Id.* (emphasis added). As a result, “both parties are restrained *even if only one is an abuser.*” *Id.* at 1055 (emphasis added). *See also* Elizabeth Topliffe, *Why Civil Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders Are Not*, 67 Ind. L.J. 1039, 1055-56 (1992) (“[J]udges often issue a mutual protection order without any request from the respondent or his lawyer. . . . [J]udges and lawyers . . . may be tempted to resort to mutual protective orders frequently. However, when they do this in cases where there truly is one victim and one batterer, they ignore some of the real difficulties of mutual protection orders.”). *See generally* DAVID HIRSCHL, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: WHAT RESEARCH SHOWS ABOUT ARREST AND DUAL ARREST RATES (2008).

The net result of all this is profoundly perverse, because it means that § 922(g)(8) effectively disarms *victims* of domestic violence. What’s worse, victims of domestic violence may even be put in greater danger than before. Abusers may know or assume that their victims are law-abiding citizens who will comply with their

legal obligation not to arm themselves in self-defense due to § 922(g)(8). Abusers might even remind their victims of the existence of § 922(g)(8) and the entry of a mutual protective order to taunt and subdue their victims. Meanwhile, the abusers are criminals who have already demonstrated that they have zero propensity to obey the dictates of criminal statutes. As a result, § 922(g)(8) effectively empowers and enables abusers by guaranteeing that their victims will be unable to fight back.

* * *

We must protect citizens against domestic violence. And we can do so without offending the Second Amendment framework set forth in *Bruen*.

Those who commit or criminally threaten domestic violence have already demonstrated an utter lack of respect for the rights of others and the rule of law. So merely enacting laws that tell them to disarm is a woefully inadequate solution. Abusers must be detained, prosecuted, and incarcerated. And that's what the criminal justice system is for. I concur.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-11001

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

ZACKEY RAHIMI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

Filed: Feb. 2, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CR-83-1

Before JONES, HO, and WILSON, *Circuit Judges*.

CORY T. WILSON, *Circuit Judge*:

The question presented in this case is *not* whether prohibiting the possession of firearms by someone subject to a domestic violence restraining order is a laudable policy goal. The question is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), a specific statute that does so, is constitutional under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. In the light of *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), it is not.

Zackey Rahimi levies a facial challenge to § 922(g)(8). The district court and a prior panel upheld the statute, applying this court’s pre-*Bruen* precedent. *See United*

States v. Rahimi, No. 21-11011, 2022 WL 2070392 at *1 n.1 (5th Cir. June 8, 2022). Rahimi filed a petition for rehearing en banc; while the petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided *Bruen*. The prior panel withdrew its opinion and requested supplemental briefing on the impact of that case on this one. Considering the issue afresh, we conclude that *Bruen* requires us to re-evaluate our Second Amendment jurisprudence and that under *Bruen*, § 922(g)(8) fails to pass constitutional muster. We therefore reverse the district court’s ruling to the contrary and vacate Rahimi’s conviction.

I.

Between December 2020 and January 2021, Rahimi was involved in five shootings in and around Arlington, Texas.¹ On December 1, after selling narcotics to an individual, he fired multiple shots into that individual’s residence. The following day, Rahimi was involved in a car accident. He exited his vehicle, shot at the other driver, and fled the scene. He returned to the scene in a different vehicle and shot at the other driver’s car. On December 22, Rahimi shot at a constable’s vehicle. On January 7, Rahimi fired multiple shots in the air after his friend’s credit card was declined at a Whataburger restaurant.

Officers in the Arlington Police Department identified Rahimi as a suspect in the shootings and obtained a warrant to search his home. Officers executed the warrant and found a rifle and a pistol. Rahimi admitted that he possessed the firearms. He also admitted

¹ The facts are drawn from the Pre-Sentence Report, which the district court adopted, and the factual resume, to which Rahimi stipulated.

that he was subject to an agreed civil protective order entered February 5, 2020, by a Texas state court after Rahimi's alleged assault of his ex-girlfriend. The protective order restrained him from harassing, stalking, or threatening his ex-girlfriend and their child. The order also expressly prohibited Rahimi from possessing a firearm.²

A federal grand jury indicted Rahimi for possessing a firearm while under a domestic violence restraining order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person[] who is subject to a court order that[:] (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.
. . .

² The validity of the underlying protective order, and Rahimi's breach of it, are not before us.

Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional, but he acknowledged that *United States v. McGinnis*, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020), foreclosed his argument.³ The district court denied Rahimi’s motion, and he pled guilty.

On appeal, Rahimi renewed his constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(8).⁴ Rahimi again acknowledged that his argument was foreclosed, and a prior panel of this court agreed. *See Rahimi*, 2022 WL 2070392 at *1 n.1. But after *Bruen*, the prior panel withdrew its opinion, ordered supplemental briefing, and ordered the clerk to expedite this case for oral argument before another panel of the court. Rahimi now contends that *Bruen* overrules our precedent and that under *Bruen*, § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional. We agree on both points.

II.

Under the rule of orderliness, one panel of the Fifth Circuit “may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our *en banc* court.” *In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc.*, 19 F.4th 787, 792 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting *Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr.*, 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)). The Su-

³ The Government urged Rahimi’s argument was also foreclosed by *United States v. Emerson*, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).

⁴ Rahimi also asserted that the district court erred when it ordered his federal sentence to run consecutively to sentences for his state crimes because the underlying conduct of the state sentences was relevant conduct for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The prior panel affirmed the district court. Because we find § 922(g)(8) unconstitutional and vacate Rahimi’s sentence, we do not further address the sentencing issue here.

preme Court need not expressly overrule our precedent. “Rather, a latter panel must simply determine that a former panel’s decision has fallen unequivocally out of step with some intervening change in the law.” *Id.* “One situation in which this may naturally occur is where an intervening Supreme Court decision fundamentally changes the focus of the relevant analysis.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). That is the case here, as the Government concedes.

In *Emerson*, we held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms—the first circuit expressly to do so. 270 F.3d at 260. But we also concluded that § 922(g)(8) was constitutional as applied to the defendant there. *Id.* at 263. “*Emerson* first considered the scope of the Second Amendment right ‘as historically understood,’ and then determined—presumably by applying some form of means-end scrutiny *sub silentio*—that § 922(g)(8) [wa]s ‘narrowly tailored’ to the goal of minimizing ‘the threat of lawless violence.’” *McGinnis*, 956 F.3d at 755 (quoting *Emerson*, 270 F.3d at 264).

After *D.C. v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), courts coalesced around a similar “two-step inquiry for analyzing laws that might impact the Second Amendment.” *McGinnis*, 956 F.3d at 753 (internal quotation marks omitted). First, we “ask[ed] whether the conduct at issue [fell] within the scope of the Second Amendment right.” *Id.* at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the conduct fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment right, then the challenged law was constitutional. *Id.* But if the conduct fell within the scope of the right, then we proceeded to the second step of the analysis, which applied either intermediate or strict

scrutiny. *Id.* at 754, 757 (expressly applying means-end scrutiny). In *McGinnis*, this court upheld § 922(g)(8) using this two-step framework. The initial panel in this case did likewise, citing *McGinnis*. *Rahimi*, 2022 WL 2070392 at *1 n.1.

Enter *Bruen*. Expounding on *Heller*, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30. In that context, the Government bears the burden of “justify[ing] its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Id.* at 2130. Put another way, “the [G]overnment must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” *Id.* at 2127. In the course of its explication, the Court expressly repudiated the circuit courts’ means-end scrutiny—the second step embodied in *Emerson* and applied in *McGinnis*. *Id.* at 2128-30. To the extent that the Court did not overtly overrule *Emerson* and *McGinnis*—it did not cite those cases but discussed other circuits’ similar precedent—*Bruen* clearly “fundamentally change[d]” our analysis of laws that implicate the Second Amendment, *Bonvillian Marine*, 19 F.4th at 792, rendering our prior precedent obsolete.

III.

Our review of *Rahimi*’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(8) is de novo. See *United States v. Bailey*, 115 F.3d 1222, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997). First, the court addresses the Government’s argument that *Rahimi* is not among those citizens entitled to the Second Amendment’s protec-

tions. Concluding he is, we then turn to whether § 922(g)(8) passes muster under *Bruen*'s standard.⁵

A.

According to the Government, *Heller* and *Bruen* add a gloss on the Second Amendment that restricts its applicability to only “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635, and “ordinary, law-abiding citizens,” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2122. Because Rahimi is neither responsible nor law-abiding, as evidenced by his conduct and by the domestic violence restraining order issued against him, he falls outside the ambit of the Second Amendment. Therefore, argues the Government, § 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to Rahimi.

There is some debate on this issue. Compare *Kanter v. Barr*, 919 F.3d 437, 451-53 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J. dissenting), *abrogated by Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111, with *Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S.*, 836 F.3d 336, 357 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). As summarized by now-Justice Barrett, “one [approach] uses history and tradition to identify the scope of the right, and the other uses that same body of evidence to identify the scope of the legislature’s power to take it away.” *Kanter*, 919 F.3d

⁵ The Government also argues that because *Bruen* endorsed “shall-issue” licensing schemes, and Texas’s shall-issue licensing scheme (since modified to allow “constitutional carry,” see 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 809 (West)) included the requirement that an applicant not be under a domestic violence restraining order, it follows that § 922(g)(8) is constitutional. Of course, the *Bruen* Court did not rule on the constitutionality of 43 specific state licensing regimes because that was not the issue before the Court. See *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9. Rather, the Court merely blessed the general concept of shall-issue regimes. *Id.*

at 452 (Barrett, J., dissenting). The Government’s argument that Rahimi falls outside the community covered by the Second Amendment rests on the first approach. But it runs headlong into *Heller* and *Bruen*, which we read to espouse the second one.

Unpacking the issue, the Government’s argument fails because (1) it is inconsistent with *Heller*, *Bruen*, and the text of the Second Amendment, (2) it inexplicably treats Second Amendment rights differently than other individually held rights, and (3) it has no limiting principles. We briefly examine each deficiency.

The Second Amendment provides, simply enough:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

U.S. CONST. amend. II. *Heller* explained that the words “the people” in the Second Amendment have been interpreted throughout the Constitution to “unambiguously refer[] to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” 554 U.S. at 580. Further, “the people” “refer[] to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.” *Id.* (citing *United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez*, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)). For those reasons, the *Heller* Court began its analysis with the “strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans,” *id.* at 581, and then confirmed that presumption, *id.* at 595. *Heller*’s exposition of “the people” strongly indicates that Rahimi is included in “the people” and thus within the Second Amendment’s scope.

To be sure, as the Government argues, *Heller* and *Bruen* also refer to “law-abiding, responsible citizens” in discussing the amendment’s reach (*Bruen* adds “ordinary, law-abiding citizens”). But read in context, the Court’s phrasing does not add an implied gloss that constricts the Second Amendment’s reach. *Heller* simply uses the phrase “law-abiding, responsible citizens” as shorthand in explaining that its holding (that the amendment codifies an individual right to keep and bear arms) should not “be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings. . . .” *Id.* at 626-27; *see also id.* at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”). In other words, *Heller*’s reference to “law-abiding, responsible” citizens meant to exclude from the Court’s discussion groups that have historically been stripped of their Second Amendment rights. *Bruen*’s reference to “ordinary, law-abiding” citizens is no different. *See* 142 S. Ct. at 2134.

The Government’s reading of *Heller* and *Bruen* also turns the typical way of conceptualizing constitutional rights on its head. “[A] person could be in one day and out the next: the moment he was convicted of a violent crime or suffered the onset of mental illness, his rights would be stripped as a self-executing consequence of his new status.” *Kanter*, 919 F.3d at 452 (Barrett, J., dissenting). This is “an unusual way of thinking about rights [because i]n other contexts that involve the loss of a right, the deprivation occurs because of state action, and state action determines the scope of the loss (subject, of course, to any applicable constitutional con-

straints).” *Id.* “Felon voting rights are a good example: a state can disenfranchise felons, but if it refrains from doing so, their voting rights remain constitutionally protected.” *Id.* at 453. The Government fails to justify this disparate treatment of the Second Amendment.

Perhaps most importantly, the Government’s proffered interpretation lacks any true limiting principle. Under the Government’s reading, Congress could remove “unordinary” or “irresponsible” or “nonlaw abiding” people—however expediently defined—from the scope of the Second Amendment. Could speeders be stripped of their right to keep and bear arms? Political nonconformists? People who do not recycle or drive an electric vehicle? One easily gets the point: Neither *Heller* nor *Bruen* countenances such a malleable scope of the Second Amendment’s protections; to the contrary, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans,” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 581. Rahimi, while hardly a model citizen, is nonetheless part of the political community entitled to the Second Amendment’s guarantees, all other things equal.

B.

Which brings us to the question of whether Rahimi’s right to keep and bear arms may be constitutionally restricted by operation of § 922(g)(8). The parties dispute Rahimi’s burden necessary to sustain his facial challenge to the statute. The Government contends that Rahimi “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Rahimi contests that assertion, asserting during oral argument

that the Government’s interpretation of *Salerno* has fallen out of favor, though he contends that in any event, he has satisfied *Salerno*’s standard.

Bruen instructs how to proceed. The plaintiffs there levied a facial challenge to New York’s public carry licensing regime. 142 S. Ct. at 2122. To evaluate the challenged law, the Supreme Court employed a historical analysis, aimed at “assess[ing] whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” *Id.* at 2131. Construing *Heller*, the Court flatly rejected any means-end scrutiny as part of this analysis, *id.* at 2129, such that if a statute is inconsistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding, then it falls under any circumstances. *Cf. Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 745; *Freedom Path, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Serv.*, 913 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir. 2019) (“A facial challenge to a statute considers only the text of the statute itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual.” (cleaned up)).

Bruen articulated two analytical steps: First, courts must determine whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct[.]” 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30. If so, then the “Constitution presumptively protects that conduct,” and the Government “must justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Id.* at 2130. “Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s unqualified command.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

To carry its burden, the Government must point to “historical precedent from before, during, and even af-

ter the founding [that] evinces a comparable tradition of regulation.” *Id.* at 2131-32 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e are not obliged to sift the historical materials for evidence to sustain [§ 922(g)(8)]. That is [the Government’s] burden.” *Id.* at 2150.

The Government need not identify a “historical twin”; rather, a “well-established and representative historical *analogue*” suffices. *Id.* at 2133. The Supreme Court distilled two metrics for courts to compare the Government’s proffered analogues against the challenged law: *how* the challenged law burdens the right to armed self-defense, and *why* the law burdens that right. *Id.* (citing *McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill.*, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) and *Heller*, 544 U.S. at 599). “[W]hether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified are central considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

As to the degree of similarity required, “analogical reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check.” *Id.* “[C]ourts should not uphold every modern law that remotely resembles a historical analogue, because doing so risks endorsing outliers that our ancestors would never have accepted.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). On the other hand, “even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” *Id.* The core question is whether the challenged law and proffered analogue are “relevantly similar.” *Id.* at 2132.

When the challenged regulation addresses a “general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.” *Id.* at 2131. Moreover, “if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.” *Id.*

C.

Rahimi’s possession of a pistol and a rifle easily falls within the purview of the Second Amendment. The amendment grants him the right “to keep” firearms, and “possession” is included within the meaning of “keep.” *See id.* at 2134-35. And it is undisputed that the types of firearms that Rahimi possessed are “in common use,” such that they fall within the scope of the amendment. *See id.* at 2143 (“[T]he Second Amendment protects only the carrying of weapons that are those ‘in common use at the time,’ as opposed to those that ‘are highly unusual in society at large.’”) (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627)). Thus, *Bruen*’s first step is met, and the Second Amendment presumptively protects Rahimi’s right to keep the weapons officers discovered in his home. *See id.* at 2126.

But Rahimi, like any other citizen, may have forfeited his Second Amendment rights if his conduct ran afoul of a “lawful regulatory measure[]” “prohibiting . . . the possession of firearms,” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626-27 & 627 n.26, that is consistent with “the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms,” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2127. The question

turns on whether § 922(g)(8) falls within that historical tradition, or outside of it.

To reiterate, the statute makes it unlawful

for any person[] who is subject to a court order that[:] (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition. . . .

§ 922(g)(8); *see McGinnis*, 956 F.3d at 758 (stating that § 922(g)(8)'s purpose is to reduce "domestic gun abuse"). Distilled to its essence, the provision operates to deprive an individual of his right to keep and bear arms once a court finds, after notice and a hearing, that the individual poses a "credible threat" to an intimate partner or her child and enters a restraining order to that effect. The covered individual forfeits his Second Amendment right for the duration of the court's order. This is so even when the individual has not been criminally convicted of any offense and when the underlying proceeding is merely civil in nature.

These characteristics crystallize “how” and “why” § 922(g)(8) “burden[s] a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. In particular, we focus on these key features of the statute: (1) forfeiture of the right to possess weapons (2) after a civil proceeding⁶ (3) in which a court enters a protective order based on a finding of a “credible threat” to another specific person, (4) in order to protect that person from “domestic gun abuse.” The first three aspects go to *how* the statute accomplishes its goal; the fourth is the statute’s goal, the *why*.

To sustain § 922(g)(8)’s burden on Rahimi’s Second Amendment right, the Government bears the burden of proffering “relevantly similar” historical regulations that imposed “a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense” that were also “comparably justified.” *Id.* at 2132-33. And “when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is created equal. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.” *Id.* at 2136 (internal quotation marks omitted). We thus afford greater weight to historical analogues more contemporaneous to the Second Amendment’s ratification.

⁶ The distinction between a criminal and civil proceeding is important because criminal proceedings have afforded the accused substantial protections throughout our Nation’s history. In crafting the Bill of Rights, the founders were plainly attuned to preservation of these protections. *See* U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. It is therefore significant that § 922(g)(8) works to eliminate the Second Amendment right of individuals subject merely to civil process.

The Government offers potential historical analogues to § 922(g)(8) that fall generally into three categories: (1) English and American laws (and sundry unadopted proposals to modify the Second Amendment) providing for disarmament of “dangerous” people, (2) English and American “going armed” laws, and (3) colonial and early state surety laws. We discuss in turn why each of these historical regulations falter as “relevantly similar” precursors to § 922(g)(8).

1.

The Government relies on laws of varying antiquity as evidence of its “dangerousness” analogues. We sketch these chronologically, mindful that greater weight attaches to laws nearer in time to the Second Amendment’s ratification.

Under the English Militia Act of 1662, officers of the Crown could “seize all arms in the custody or possession of any person” whom they “judge[d] dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdom.” 13 & 14 Car. 2, c.3, § 13 (1662). Citing scholarship, the Government thus posits that “by the time of American independence, England had established a well-practiced tradition of disarming dangerous persons—violent persons and disaffected persons perceived as threatening to the crown.” Joseph G.S. Greenlee, *The Historical Justification for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons from Possessing Firearms*, 20 WYO. L. REV. 249, 261 (2020).

But the Militia Act’s provenance demonstrates that it is not a forerunner of our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Under Charles I (who reigned 1625-1649), the Crown and Parliament contested for control of the militia. Nelson Lund, *The Past and Fu-*

ture of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996). After the resulting civil war and Oliver Cromwell's interregnum, the monarchy was restored in 1660 when Charles II took the throne. Charles II began using the militia to disarm his political opponents. *Id.* (citing J. MALCOLM, *TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT* (1994) 35-38 (1994)). The Militia Act of 1662 facilitated this disarmament, which escalated under the Catholic James II once he took the throne in 1685. *Id.*; see *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 593 (noting that the disarmaments "caused Englishmen . . . to be jealous of their arms"). After the Glorious Revolution, which enthroned Protestants William and Mary, the Declaration of Rights, codified as the 1689 English Bill of Rights, qualified the Militia Act by guaranteeing "[t]hat the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law." 1 W. & M., ch. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441. "This right," which *restricted* the Militia Act's reach in order to prevent the kind of politically motivated disarmaments pursued by Charles II and James II, "has long been understood to be the predecessor to our Second Amendment." *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 593. This understanding, and the history behind it, defeats any utility of the Militia Act of 1662 as a historical analogue for § 922(g)(8).

The Government next points to laws in several colonies and states that disarmed classes of people considered to be dangerous, specifically including those unwilling to take an oath of allegiance, slaves, and Native Americans. See Robert H. Churchill, *Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment*, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 157-60 (2007). These

laws disarmed people thought to pose a threat to the security of the state due to their perceived lack of loyalty or societal status. See *Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives*, 700 F.3d 185, 200-01 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing relevant scholarship), *abrogated by Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2126-30. “While public safety was a concern, most disarmament efforts were meant to prevent armed rebellions. The early Americans adopted much of that tradition in the colonies.” Greenlee, *supra*, at 261.

Despite some facial similarities in *how* these “dangerousness” laws worked—like § 922(g)(8), they operated to disarm covered people—there were also material differences. For one, they disarmed people by class or group, not after individualized findings of “credible threats” to identified potential victims. Even more, *why* they disarmed people was different. The purpose of these “dangerousness” laws was the preservation of political and social order, not the protection of an identified person from the specific threat posed by another. Therefore, laws disarming “dangerous” classes of people are not “relevantly similar” to § 922(g)(8) such that they can serve as historical analogues.

Finally, the Government offers two proposals that emerged in state ratification conventions considering the proposed Constitution. A minority of Pennsylvania’s convention authored a report in which they contended that citizens have a right to bear arms “unless for crimes committed, *or real danger of public injury.*” 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, *THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY* 662, 665 (1971) (emphasis added). And at the Massachusetts convention, Samuel Adams proposed a qualifier to the Second Amendment that lim-

ited the scope of the right to “peaceable citizens.” *Id.* at 681.

But these proposed amendments are not reflective of the Nation’s early understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment right. While they were influential proposals, *see Heller*, 554 U.S. at 604, neither became part of the Second Amendment as ratified. Thus, the proposals might somewhat illuminate the scope of firearm rights at the time of ratification, but they cannot counter the Second Amendment’s text, or serve as an analogue for § 922(g)(8) because, *inter alia*, they were not enacted. *Cf. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2137 (“[T]o the extent later history contradicts what the text [of the Second Amendment] says, the text controls.”).

2.

The Government also relies on the ancient criminal offense of “going armed to terrify the King’s subjects.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2141 (alteration and emphasis omitted). This common law offense persisted in America and was in some cases codified. *Id.* at 2144. The Government offers four exemplars codified in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the state of Virginia, and the colonies of New Hampshire and North Carolina.

The Massachusetts law provided “[t]hat every justice of the peace . . . may cause to be staid and arrested all affrayers, rioters, disturbers or breakers of the peace, and such as shall ride, or go armed offensively . . . and upon view of such justice or justices, confession of the party or other legal conviction of any such offence, shall commit the offender to prison . . . and seize and take away his armor or weapons. . . . ” 1 Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the

Massachusetts Bay, 52-53 (1869) (1692 statute) (cleaned up). Similarly, the New Hampshire statute authorized justices of the peace “upon view of such justice, confession of the party, or legal proof of any such offense . . . [to] cause the [offender’s] arms or weapons to be taken away. . . . ” Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Province of New-Hampshire: In New-England; with Sundry Acts of Parliament, 17 (1771) (1701 statute); see *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2142-43 (noting that Massachusetts and New Hampshire laws “were substantively identical”). Virginia’s law differed slightly: “[N]o man . . . [shall] go [or ride armed by night or by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places, in terror of the country, upon pain of being arrested and committed to prison by any justice on his view, or proof of others, there to a time for so long a time as a jury, to be sworn for that purpose by the said justice, shall direct, and in like manner to forfeit his armour to the Commonwealth. . . . ” Revised Code of the State of Virginia: Collection of All Such Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, of a Public and Permanent Nature, as Are Now in Force, 554 (1819) (1786 statute). North Carolina’s colonial law was contained within its constable’s oath, which required constables to “arrest all such persons as, in your sight, shall ride or go armed offensively, or shall commit or make any riot, affray, or other breach of his Majesty’s peace. . . . ” Collection of All of the Public Acts of Assembly of the Province of North-Carolina: Now in Force and Use, 131 (1751) (1741 statute) (cleaned up). While similarly aimed at curbing “going armed offensively,” the North Carolina law did not provide for forfeiture.

These proffered analogues fall short for several reasons. An overarching one is that it is dubious these

“going armed” laws are reflective of our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, at least as to forfeiture of firearms. See *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2142 (“[W]e doubt that *three* colonial regulations could suffice to show a tradition of public carry regulation.”). North Carolina’s law did not provide for forfeiture, so it quickly falls out of the mix. And fairly early on, Massachusetts and Virginia dropped forfeiture as a penalty, going the way of North Carolina and thereby undercutting the Government’s reliance on those laws. Indeed, Massachusetts amended its law to remove the forfeiture provision in 1795, just four years after the ratification of the Second Amendment. 2 Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, from November 28, 1780 to February 28, 1807, 653 (1807) (statute enacted Jan. 29, 1795). Virginia had done so by 1847, shortly before the Commonwealth re-codified its laws in 1849. See Code of Virginia: With the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Rights and Constitution of Virginia, 756 (1849).⁷ It is unclear how long New Hampshire’s “going armed” law preserved its forfeiture provision, but assuming *arguendo* it persisted longer than the others, one outlier is not enough “to show a tradition of public carry regulation.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2142.

And on substance, the early “going armed” laws that led to weapons forfeiture are not relevantly similar to § 922(g)(8). First, those laws only disarmed an offender after criminal proceedings and conviction. By contrast, § 922(g)(8) disarms people who have merely been

⁷ By the 1849 code, Virginia’s going armed law had evolved into its anti-riot law (chapter 195) and surety law (chapter 201). See *id.* Neither chapter provided for forfeiture of an offender’s weapons.

civilly adjudicated to be a threat to another person. Moreover, the “going armed” laws, like the “dangerousness” laws discussed above, appear to have been aimed at curbing terroristic or riotous behavior, i.e., disarming those who had been adjudicated to be a threat to society generally, rather than to identified individuals. Thus, these “going armed” laws are not viable historical analogues for § 922(g)(8).

3.

Lastly, the Government points to historical surety laws. At common law, an individual who could show that he had “just cause to fear” that another would injure him or destroy his property could “demand surety of the peace against such person.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 252 (1769). The surety “was intended merely for prevention, without any crime actually committed by the party; but arising only from probable suspicion, that some crime [wa]s intended or likely to happen.” *Id.* at 249. If the party of whom surety was demanded refused to post surety, he would be forbidden from carrying a weapon in public absent special need. *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2148-49 (discussing operation of historical surety laws). Many jurisdictions codified this tradition, either before ratification of the Bill of Rights or in early decades thereafter.⁸

⁸ *E.g.*, 1 Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, 52-53 (1869) (1692 statute); Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Province of New-Hampshire: In New-England; with Sundry Acts of Parliament, 17 (1771) (1701 statute); 2 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, pg. 23 (1896) (1700 statute); 1 Laws of the State of Delaware from the Fourteenth Day of October, One Thousand Seven Hundred, to the Eighteenth Day of

The surety laws come closer to being “relevantly similar” to § 922(g)(8) than the “dangerousness” and “going armed” laws discussed *supra*. First, they are more clearly a part of our tradition of firearm regulation. And they were “comparably justified,” *id.* at 2133, in that they were meant to protect an identified person (who sought surety) from the risk of harm posed by another identified individual (who had to post surety to carry arms). Put simply, the *why* behind historical surety laws analogously aligns with that underlying § 922(g)(8).⁹

Aspects of *how* the surety laws worked resemble certain of the mechanics of § 922(g)(8) as well. The surety laws required only a civil proceeding, not a criminal conviction. The “credible threat” finding required to trigger § 922(g)(8)’s prohibition on possession of weapons

August, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Ninety-Seven, pg. 52 (1797) (1700 statute); Acts and Laws of His Majesties Colony of Connecticut in New-England 91 (1901) (1702 statute); *see also Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2148 (stating that at least ten jurisdictions enacted surety laws between 1836 and 1871).

⁹ The parties spar somewhat over the required granularity of the underlying problem in comparing § 922(g)(8) to proffered analogues. Rahimi contends more generally that domestic violence was, and remains, a persistent social ill that society has taken numerous actions against—though not disarmament. The Government counters that “crime statistics from the founding era are hard to come by,” but that “there is reason to doubt that domestic *homicide* was as prevalent at the founding as it is in the modern era.” To be sure, historical surety laws were not targeted to domestic violence or even more specifically to domestic homicide. But somewhat abstracting the laws’ justifications, as we do above the line, strikes us as consistent with *Bruen*’s instruction that “even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” 142 S. Ct. at 2133.

echoes the showing that was required to justify posting of surety to avoid forfeiture. But that is where the analogy breaks down: As the Government acknowledges, historical surety laws did not prohibit public carry, much less possession of weapons, so long as the offender posted surety. *See also id.* at 2149 (noting that there is “little evidence that authorities ever enforced surety laws”). Where the surety laws imposed a conditional, partial restriction on the Second Amendment right, § 922(g)(8) works an absolute deprivation of the right, not only publicly to carry, but to *possess* any firearm, upon entry of a sufficient protective order. At bottom, the historical surety laws did not impose “a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense,” *id.* at 2133, as § 922(g)(8).¹⁰

* * *

The Government fails to demonstrate that § 922(g)(8)’s restriction of the Second Amendment right fits within our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Government’s proffered analogues falter under one or both of the metrics the Supreme Court articulated in *Bruen* as the baseline for measuring “relevantly similar” analogues: “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.”

¹⁰ *Accord* David B. Kopel & Joseph G. S. Greenlee, *The Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment Doctrines*, 61 St. Louis L.J. 193, 244 (2017) (“[T]here is simply no tradition—from 1791 or 1866—of prohibiting gun possession (or voting, jury service, or government service) for people convicted of misdemeanors or subject to civil protective orders.”); Carolyn B. Ramsey, *Firearms in the Family*, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 1257, 1301 (2017) (“Historical support for the exclusion of domestic violence offenders from Second Amendment protection appears rather thin.”).

Id. As a result, § 922(g)(8) falls outside the class of firearm regulations countenanced by the Second Amendment.

IV.

Doubtless, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) embodies salutary policy goals meant to protect vulnerable people in our society. Weighing those policy goals' merits through the sort of means-end scrutiny our prior precedent indulged, we previously concluded that the societal benefits of § 922(g)(8) outweighed its burden on Rahimi's Second Amendment rights. But *Bruen* forecloses any such analysis in favor of a historical analogical inquiry into the scope of the allowable burden on the Second Amendment right. Through that lens, we conclude that § 922(g)(8)'s ban on possession of firearms is an "outlier[] that our ancestors would never have accepted." *Id.* Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional, and Rahimi's conviction under that statute must be vacated.

REVERSED; CONVICTION VACATED.

JAMES C. HO, *Circuit Judge*, concurring:

The right to keep and bear arms has long been recognized as a fundamental civil right. *See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager*, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (describing the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments as the “civil-rights Amendments”); *Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.*, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 n.10 (1961). Blackstone saw it as essential to “the natural right” of Englishmen to “self-preservation and defence.” *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 593-94 (2008) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139-40 (1765)).

But the Second Amendment has too often been denigrated as “a second-class right.” *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010). In response, the Supreme Court has called on judges to be more faithful guardians of the text and original meaning of the Second Amendment. *See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). Our court today dutifully follows the framework recently set forth in *N.Y. State Rifle*. It recognizes the absence of relevant historical analogues required to support the Government’s position in this case. I am pleased to concur.

I write separately to point out that our Founders firmly believed in the fundamental role of government in protecting citizens against violence, as well as the individual right to keep and bear arms—and that these two principles are not inconsistent but entirely compatible with one another.

Our Founders understood that those who commit or threaten violence against innocent law-abiding citizens may be arrested, convicted, and incarcerated. They

knew that arrest and incarceration naturally entails the loss of a wide range of liberties—including the loss of access to arms.¹

So when the government detains—and thereby disarms—a member of our community, it must do so consistent with the fundamental protections that our Constitution affords to those accused of a crime. For example, the government may detain dangerous criminals, not just after conviction, but also before trial. Pre-trial detention is expressly contemplated by the Excessive Bail Clause and the Speedy Trial Clause. And it no doubt plays a significant role in protecting innocent citizens against violence. *See, e.g., United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (permitting “the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who . . . pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community”).

Our laws also contemplate the incarceration of those who criminally threaten, but have not (yet) committed, violence. After all, to the victim, such actions are not only life-threatening—they’re life-altering. *See, e.g., United States v. Ackell*, 907 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2018) (upholding criminal stalking law); *United States v. Gonzalez*, 905 F.3d 165 (3rd Cir. 2018) (same); *United States v. Osinger*, 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014) (same); *United States v. Petrovic*, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2012) (same);

¹ *See, e.g., Chimel v. California*, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”); *State v. Buzzard*, 4 Ark. 18, 21 (1842) (Ringo, C.J.) (“Persons accused of crime, upon their arrest, have constantly been divested of their arms, without the legality of the act having ever been questioned.”).

see also People v. Counterman, 497 P.3d 1039 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021) (same), *cert. granted*, _ U.S. _ (2023).

In sum, our Founders envisioned a nation in which both citizen and sovereign alike play important roles in protecting the innocent against violent criminals. Our decision today is consistent with that vision. I concur.

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-11001

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

ZACKEY RAHIMI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

Filed: July 7, 2022

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CR-83-1

ORDER

Before KING, COSTA, and HO, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM:

The opinion filed on June 8, 2022, *United States v. Rahimi*, No. 21-11001, 2022 WL 2070392 (5th Cir. June 8, 2022), is hereby WITHDRAWN. The Clerk is directed to expedite this case and set it for oral argument on the next available calendar. The pending petition for rehearing en banc is hereby DISMISSED as moot. The parties shall file additional briefing addressing the

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effect of *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen* on this case on a schedule set by the Clerk's office.

So ORDERED.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-11001

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

ZACKEY RAHIMI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

Filed: June 8, 2022

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CR-83-1

Before KING, COSTA, and HO, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM:¹

Zackey Rahimi, after being charged with various state offenses, pleaded guilty to a violation of federal law for possessing a firearm in contravention of a restraining order. The district court ordered Rahimi's federal sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently with certain state-case sentences but to run consecutively with

* Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5.4.

other state-case sentences because the acts involved in the latter were not “relevant conduct” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Rahimi appeals, challenging the finding that certain acts were not relevant conduct. We find no clear error and affirm.

I.

Zackey Rahimi was suspected to have participated in a series of shootings that occurred between December 2020 and January 2021. As a result, police officers obtained a warrant to search his residence, and when they executed the warrant, they found a pistol and a restraining order issued on February 5, 2020. The order restrained Rahimi from possessing a firearm and warned him that possession of a firearm or ammunition while the order was in effect could be a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2).

A federal grand jury indicted Rahimi for possession of firearms in violation of sections 922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2).¹ Later, Rahimi pleaded guilty. At sentencing, the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) detailed Rahimi’s lengthy criminal history. Relevant to this appeal are the state charges that were pending against him for offenses that occurred from December 2019 to November 2020. Three pending state charges resulted from Rahimi’s use of a firearm in the physical assault of

¹ Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that section 922(g)(8) on its face violates the Second Amendment and the district court denied the motion. Rahimi appeals this decision but acknowledges that it is foreclosed by our binding precedent. *United States v. McGinnis*, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020), *cert. denied*, 141 S. Ct. 1397 (2021).

his girlfriend in December 2019,² and another state charge arose from an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of a different woman in November 2020. Rahimi objected to the PSR, arguing that the pending charges described relevant conduct to the instant offense such that the sentence for the instant federal offense should be ordered to run concurrently to the state sentences. The district court overruled the objection, adopted the PSR, and ordered the federal sentence to run consecutively to the pending charges because they were not relevant conduct. Rahimi appeals, arguing that the district court clearly erred by concluding the pending charges were not relevant conduct.

II.

A determination of relevant conduct is a finding of fact that is reviewed for clear error. *United States v. Brummett*, 355 F.3d 343, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2003). A district court has the discretion to order its sentences of imprisonment be served concurrently or consecutively to anticipated state terms of imprisonment. *Setser v. United States*, 566 U.S. 231, 236 (2012). A determination of relevant conduct is “not clearly erroneous as long as [it is] ‘plausible in light of the record as a whole.’” *United States v. Ortiz*, 613 F.3d 550, 557 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting *United States v. Rhine*, 583 F.3d 878, 885 (5th Cir. 2009)).

The sentencing guidelines provide that “the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the anticipated term of imprisonment” if an-

² The charges included terroristic threat of a family/household member, discharge of a firearm in certain municipalities, and family violence assault causing bodily injury.

other offense is “relevant conduct . . . under the provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(e). “Relevant conduct is defined as ‘all acts and omissions’ that . . . [are] part of the ‘same course of conduct’ as the offense of conviction.” *Ortiz*, 613 F.3d at 557 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)). Two or more offenses may constitute as the same course of conduct “if they are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” § 1B1.3, cmt. (n.5(B)(ii)). Relevant factors include “the degree of similarity of the offenses, the regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time interval between the offenses.” *Id.*

III.

Rahimi argues that the pending charges are relevant to the instant federal charge because they are all a part of a pattern of ongoing (i.e., similar) conduct involving a firearm and domestic violence. He contends that the temporal proximity favors a finding of relevant conduct because the November 2020 conduct occurred just two months before the search of his residence (resulting in the instant charge) and the December 2019 conduct was little more than a year prior to the instant offense. Last, Rahimi argues that the number of similar crimes involving firearm possession shows regularity.

However, we conclude that the record as a whole supports the district court’s finding that the pending state charges are not a part of the same course of conduct as Rahimi’s possession of a firearm in violation of a restraining order. First, although the record shows some regularity to Rahimi’s violent use—and thus possession—of a firearm, we have previously held that a 10-

month lag between a past act and the instant offense is “not strong” evidence of temporal proximity for purposes of section 1B1.3. *United States v. Davis*, 967 F.3d 441, 442 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Second, Rahimi’s December 2019 conduct involved the domestic assault of his girlfriend in a public parking lot. When warned by his passenger about the presence of another witness, Rahimi fired a shot at the witness. The instant offense involves no public violence or domestic assault and so bears little resemblance to the December 2019 events.

Similarly, Rahimi’s November 2020 conduct involved the violent use of a firearm in furtherance of an assault. Indeed, Rahimi’s possession of a firearm in that instance was also a violation of the February 2020 restraining order, but “[a]s we have previously cautioned . . . courts must not conduct this [similarity] analysis at such a level of generality as to render it meaningless.” *United States v. Rhine*, 583 F.3d 878, 888 (5th Cir. 2009). Rahimi’s violent use of the firearm in November is meaningfully different from merely possessing a firearm. *Cf. United States v. Horton*, 993 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 142 S. Ct. 382 (2021) (finding meaningful differences in the location of the conduct and amount of drugs at issue on different occasions). Because the similarity and temporal-proximity factors are strained,³ the district court’s finding that these previous acts are not relevant conduct is “plausible in light of

³ *See Davis*, 967 F.3d at 442 (finding no relevant conduct when the temporal proximity was “not strong” and the other two factors were “arguably absent”).

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the record as a whole,” and accordingly is not clearly erroneous. *Rhine*, 583 F.3d at 885.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORTH WORTH DIVISION

No. 4:21-cr-00083-P

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ZACKEY RAHIMI (01)

Filed: June 3, 2021

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Zackey Rahimi's Motion to Dismiss Indictment Under FED. R. CR. P. 12 (b)(3)(B). ECF No. 17. Having considered Rahimi's Motion to Dismiss Indictment ("Motion"), the Government's Response, briefing, and applicable law, the Court finds that Rahimi's Motion to Dismiss Indictment should be and is hereby **DENIED**.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) restricts an individual's access to firearms and ammunition if that individual is subject to a specific court order. The court order prevents that individual from engaging in conduct that would place an intimate partner or child in fear of bodily injury. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Defendant asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is a facially unconstitutional restriction on a person's Second Amendment right to bear arms. Motion at 1. Defendant contends that either by a means-

ends or by a historical-traditional analysis, the restrictions placed on the Second Amendment are unconstitutional. *Id.* at 2. Defendant concedes that his argument is currently foreclosed in this jurisdiction by *United States v. McGinnis*, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020). *Id.* at 1.

In *McGinnis*, the Fifth Circuit determined that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is not facially unconstitutional. 956 F.3d at 751. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a two-step approach to analyze laws that might impact the Second Amendment. *Id.* at 753. *First*, the court asks whether the conduct at issue falls within the scope of the Second Amendment right. *Id.* *Second*, if the law falls within the scope of the Second Amendment, what level of scrutiny should be applied. *Id.* In *McGinnis*, the Fifth Circuit did not address the first issue but instead concluded the appropriate level of scrutiny to judge the statute was intermediate scrutiny, which the statute passed. *Id.* at 756. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that while the Second Amendment, at its core, protects law-abiding, responsible citizens' right to possess firearms, those subject to court orders described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) are not considered "responsible citizens" protected by the core of the Second Amendment. *Id.* at 757. The court held that intermediate scrutiny applied because the core of the Second Amendment was not targeted. *Id.*

Intermediate scrutiny asks whether there is a reasonable fit between the law and an important government objective. *Id.* at 758. The Fifth Circuit found that the goal of reducing domestic gun abuse is a compelling government interest and that the statute was reasonably adapted to that interest. *Id.* The court

ruled that the statute already rests on an established link between domestic abuse and gun violence, and the prohibition was only temporarily placed on those found to have posed a threat of future abuse to their partner or child. *Id.* After surviving intermediate scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit held that the statute did not facially violate the Second Amendment. *Id.* at 759.

Both parties agree that *McGinnis* controls this dispute. Motion at 1; Response at 1, ECF No. 19. Furthermore, both parties agree that *McGinnis* forecloses the arguments within Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment. Motion at 1; Response at 1. Because this Court is bound by the Fifth Circuit's precedence in *McGinnis* and because both parties accept the arguments made within Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment are foreclosed, the Court finds that Rahimi's Motion to Dismiss Indictment should be and is hereby **DENIED.**

SO ORDERED on this 3rd day of June, 2021.

/s/ MARK T. PITTMAN
MARK T. PITTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX F

1. U.S. Const. Amend. II provides:

A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

2. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) provides:

Unlawful acts

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—

(8) who is subject to a court order that—

(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;

(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and

(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or

(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury;

* * *

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

3. 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2) (2018) provides:

Penalties

(2) Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)(6), (d), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (o) of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.