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6 SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
7 JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL,  
8 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
9 WASHINGTON, D.C.

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13 INTERVIEW OF: JULIE FARNAM

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Wednesday, December 15, 2021

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Washington, D.C.

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The interview in the above matter was held in room 5480, O'Neill House Office  
23 Building, commencing at 1:00 p.m.

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2 Appearances:

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5 For the SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE

6 THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL:

7

8 [REDACTED] SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

9 [REDACTED] INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

10 [REDACTED], INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

11 [REDACTED] INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

12 [REDACTED] PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

13 [REDACTED] RESEARCHER

14 [REDACTED] RESEARCHER

15

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18 For JULIE FARNAM:

19

20 LISA N. WALTERS, SENIOR COUNSEL, GENERAL LAW DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL

21 COUNSEL, UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

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2 Mr. [REDACTED] All right. This is an interview of Julie Farnam, conducted by the  
3 House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States  
4 Capitol, pursuant to House Resolution 503.

5 Ms. Farnam, could you please state your full name and spell your last name for the  
6 record?

7 Ms. Farnam. Julie Elizabeth Farnam, F-a-r-n-a-m.

8 [REDACTED] And I'd like to ask everyone in the room today to introduce  
9 themselves for the record, beginning with my colleague to the left.

10 [REDACTED] Good afternoon. [REDACTED] I'm a senior  
11 investigative counsel on the House select committee.

12 [REDACTED] And then to my right.

13 [REDACTED] [REDACTED], investigative counsel on the House select  
14 committee.

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] researcher on the House select committee.

16 [REDACTED] And I'm going to ask now that your counsel introduce herself for  
17 the record.

18 Ms. Walters. Lisa Walters, United States Capitol Police, Office of the General  
19 Counsel, senior counsel.

20 [REDACTED] This will be a staff-led interview, and members of course may  
21 choose to also ask questions if any of them join the call. Currently we don't have any.

22 My name is [REDACTED] and I am investigate counsel for the select committee.  
23 Before we begin, I'd like to describe a few ground rules.

24 There is an official reporter transcribing the record of this interview. Please wait  
25 until each question's completed before you begin your response, and we will try to wait

1 until your response is complete before we ask our next question.

2 The stenographer cannot record nonverbal responses, such as shaking your head,  
3 so it is important that you answer each question with an audible verbal response.

4 We ask that you provide complete answers based on your best recollection. If  
5 the question is not clear, please ask for clarification. If you do not know the answer,  
6 please simply say so.

7 I also want to remind you that it is unlawful to deliberately provide false  
8 information to Congress and that you will have an opportunity to review the transcript  
9 once it is completed.

10 EXAMINATION

11

BY 

12 Q So let's get started. I'm just going to start with some background  
13 questions.

14 Where do you work, Ms. Farnam?

15 5A I work at the United States Capitol Police.

16 Q And what is your current title there?

17 A I am acting director of Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division.

18 Q And what was your position back on January 6th of 2021?

19 A I was the assistant director of the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination  
20 Division.

21 Q Would you briefly describe your professional experience leading up to your  
22 time with Capitol Police?

23 A I started with the Capitol Police in October of 2020, and, prior to that, I  
24 worked at the Department of Homeland Security from September 2005 until October  
25 2020. Most of that time was spent at Citizenship and Immigration Services, which is a

1 component of DHS, although I did a couple years at ICE as well.

2 Q Okay. And what did you do for them during that time?

3 A My most recent job before I came over here, I was a division chief. I  
4 oversaw the Immigration Vetting Division. So under me I had two branches; one was  
5 the Intelligence Watch at USCIS, and the other was a branch that did classified vetting of  
6 immigration cases that had national security concerns.

7 Q Okay.

8 What does the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division, which for the  
9 record we can refer to as "IICD" -- what does IICD do within Capitol Police?

10 A So we are the intelligence arm of Capitol Police. So we research threats  
11 against Members of Congress as well as the Capitol complex. We complete intelligence  
12 assessments for a variety of things, whether it be demonstrations that are going to be  
13 happening on the Hill, events that Members will have in the field. And we hold  
14 briefings, intelligence briefings, things of that nature.

15 Q And I think you mentioned this, but when were you hired as the associate  
16 director of the IICD?

17 A The assistant director.

18 Q Assistant. Excuse me.

19 A Yes. In October 2020.

20 Q Had that position been occupied previously?

21 A No.

22 Q And was anyone else hired as part of the IICD shortly after you were?

23 A Yes. John Donohue was, as the director.

24 Q Okay. Of the --

25 A Of IICD, yes.

1 Q What was your understanding of how the division of labor would ideally be  
2 split between yourself and the director of IICD?

3 A I started a little bit before John Donohue. We call him "Jack." So I started  
4 a little before Jack. And, when he came on board, I was primarily responsible for the  
5 day-to-day supervision of the staff on IICD, whereas he had more of the strategic vision  
6 and role.

7 Q Okay. And what was your understanding as to why an assistant director  
8 was hired when that role hadn't been there previously?

9 A My understanding as to why they hired a new director and an assistant  
10 director with significant intelligence experience for both of us was to completely revamp  
11 the team in the division.

12 Q Under what circumstances had the prior director of IICD left?

13 A He retired.

14 Q Okay. And so that vacancy wasn't created as a response of this need to  
15 revamp, but they figured this was a good time to revamp, given the retirement. Is that  
16 fair?

17 A Yes, I think so.

18 Q In terms of how the division was split, as you just mentioned, between  
19 yourself and Mr. Donohue before January 6th, is that how it turned out in practice? I  
20 had asked you ideally how the split was supposed to go. Is that how it worked?

21 A For the most part.

22 Q Okay.

23 A I think I did a lot of the -- there was -- I shared in the vision, in implementing  
24 the vision, with Jack Donohue.

25 Q Okay. Was that a role that was larger than what you imagined originally?

1 Or was that part of what you thought, coming in, you would do?

2 A I think, generally speaking, for both of us -- and I can't speak for him,  
3 but -- the challenges facing the team were much more than what we had expected.

4 Q Okay. And I'll ask you a little bit about that --

5 A Uh-huh.

6 Q -- but let me ask you just a little bit more preliminarily questions.

7 A Uh-huh.

8 Q At the start of your tenure, how many people were assigned to the IICD  
9 unit? And can you break down how many were analysts and how many were agents?

10 A There were 11. And one was an agent, and she worked our midnight shift.

11 Q And was that --

12 A And she --

13 Q Oh, I'm sorry.

14 A Sorry. And she had been assigned there for a significant period of time, not  
15 as a task force officer, which we have now, but we didn't have then. There were -- it  
16 predated me, as to why she was reassigned there.

17 Q Okay. And so you said one agent. Does that mean the 10 others were  
18 analysts?

19 A Yes, that's correct.

20 Q And, at that time, you mentioned -- well, how did assignments out to Federal  
21 agencies, like DHS or FBI, work at that point? Did you have anyone assigned out to  
22 agencies?

23 A We had one person assigned to DHS, the National Operations Center, one of  
24 the analysts.

25 Q Can you name that person, please?

1 A Eric Orsini.

2 Q Okay. No one else within IICD was detailed out; is that fair?

3 A Sorry. There was -- I'm sorry. I want to amend my first answer. Tom  
4 Polisenno is an agent as well, and he was assigned to the National Joint Terrorism Task  
5 Force. And he was assigned to IICD permanently.

6 Q Okay. Does that make it 12, then, total?

7 A Yes. Uh-huh.

8 Q Perfect.

9 How does that work, if they are, as Mr. Orsini, out with DHS?

10 A Uh-huh. He is embedded with DHS, and he is to provide us information  
11 that he's seeing while he's there at DHS.

12 Same with Tom Polisenno, who's the agent at the NJTTF. The information that  
13 Polisenno provides is primarily classified, and he sends it to me via email on the high side.

14 Q Okay. And is the information-sharing both ways, or is it meant primarily to  
15 flow to Capitol Police?

16 A I'd say more with the NJTTF it was both ways. With DHS, it was -- I'll say,  
17 honestly, I don't think there was great information-sharing either way.

18 Q Okay. And were those your feelings before January 6th, or --

19 A Yes, it was.

20 Q Okay.

21 When you arrived at IICD, was it mainly, in your opinion, an intelligence-gathering  
22 operation, an intelligence-sharing operation, or both?

23 A Can I say neither?

24 Q Sure.

25 A It was more of an intelligence-consuming operation.



1 Q Okay. Can you describe that for me?

2 A So the team was not adequately trained on how to collect intelligence. So  
3 there was some of it but more at a higher level, like a simple level, if you will. So we  
4 were dependent on getting a lot of the intelligence from other people or other sources.

5 Q Okay.

6 A And sometimes those sources would be internal to Capitol Police and  
7 sometimes external.

8 Q That function, as primarily an intelligence-consuming but not one  
9 producing -- was that something you were aware of before you took the post, or did it  
10 take time for you to come to that realization?

11 A I was not aware of it beforehand. I came to that realization quite quickly.

12 Q And can you tell me how? How did you come to that realization?

13 A So the week that I started with Capitol Police was the week of Justice  
14 Barrett's confirmation hearing, so it was a very busy time and a very busy week. And,  
15 when I started, I would get taskings in. And, Norm, who was my predecessor, he was  
16 pretty hands-off. I didn't meet him right away. And, when I came on board, he  
17 seemed okay with me just taking over.

18 So we would get taskings in, and I'd send them out to the analysts. And, as I  
19 mentioned, we had a very small number of analysts. And the responses I would get  
20 back from several of the analysts were, "Well, I've never been trained in doing that," "I  
21 don't know how to do that," "That's not my job," "We don't do that here."

22 So it became apparent very quickly that we were not adequately serving the  
23 department.

24 Q In terms of Justice Barrett's confirmation hearings, what sort of products  
25 were you looking for the analysts to put out?

1           A    Not necessarily products, but we would get information about  
2 demonstrations or information about threats or things that were going to happen on  
3 Capitol Hill or near Capitol Hill -- we tend to have some involvement if there's protests in  
4 front of the Supreme Court -- and asking them to research those sorts of things, not  
5 necessarily to produce a formal product, but to research things that were coming in that  
6 needed research.

7           Q    Okay.

8           And, just for the record, you mentioned Norm. Is that Norm Ghrae? Was that  
9 the previous director of the IICD?

10          A    Yes.

11          Q    Okay.

12          Did you institute any changes upon arriving at IICD? And what were they, and  
13 what were the purpose behind those changes?

14          A    I instituted a lot of changes.

15          So some of the more significant changes that I instituted -- and it wasn't, like, my  
16 first week, but certainly before January 6th. They had not about issued their  
17 performance appraisal forms for FY '21 yet. They're normally issued in October but,  
18 come November, December, they hadn't been issued yet. So I issued them.

19          And, when I issued them, I included performance standards specific to their  
20 positions in the appraisal forms, which had not happened before. I didn't make them  
21 up. I stole them from DHS and what they use for their intelligence research specialists,  
22 or IRSes. So I included that in their performance appraisals, so what they would need to  
23 do in order to meet expectations for the year.

24          And then I sat down and met with each one of them individually and went over  
25 the expectations, made sure they were clear. All of the analysts signed for those forms,

1 those appraisal forms.

2 The other thing that I did that was a major change for them: The team was split  
3 up into two groups; one was called the Open Source Section, and the other one was  
4 called the Intelligence Analysis Section. But what I found out pretty quickly was Open  
5 Source did open source, but 95 percent of everything the team did was open source  
6 intelligence. So to have one team that said they weren't doing open source didn't make  
7 sense to me, especially where we were such a small team.

8 And so I had asked some of the analysts who were on that Intelligence Analysis  
9 team, you know, what they did, and they worked on assessments related to Members'  
10 travel or public congressional hearings. And so that concerned me a little bit, too,  
11 because we were in the middle of a pandemic and people weren't traveling a whole lot  
12 and there weren't any public hearings, so I wondered, what have you been doing for the  
13 past year?

14 And then I said, well, okay, if that's what you do, where do you get the  
15 information to include in your assessments? And they said, well, we go to the Open  
16 Source Section, and they do the research for us, and then we put that in our assessments.  
17 And, to me, that makes them editors; it does not make them analysts.

18 I also asked, because maybe I was just misunderstanding, and said, well, if that's  
19 open source, do you guys do the classified collection then? Because they do sit in a  
20 SCIF. And they said, no, we don't do that.

21 So I eliminated those two sections and merged them into one. And it was such a  
22 small team anyways, it made sense.

23 I later learned that some of the reasons behind splitting the team was because of  
24 conflicts between some of the team members, to the point where some of the team  
25 members had sued each other.

1 Q Can you tell me how many people were in this sort of specialized Open  
2 Source Section and then how many were in the Intelligence Analysis Section?

3 A I'd have to go back and look.

4 Q Was it roughly half and half?

5 A Roughly half and half, yes.

6 Q If you could respond to some criticism about whether disbanding the Open  
7 Source Section involved removing analysts from their specializations --

8 A Uh-huh.

9 Q -- and maybe a concern that they were asked to do things that they didn't  
10 feel they had specialization in.

11 A Yes. I have heard that criticism, particularly with Debbie McClellan. She  
12 was the de facto team lead on Open Source, and she did not take well to not having that  
13 lead role anymore, so much so that my very first meeting that I had with her -- never had  
14 met her, never had spoken to her -- she was belligerent, raising her voice, telling me that I  
15 didn't know what I was doing and that I needed to learn about the team before I tried to  
16 make changes.

17 And she didn't like the way I was assigning work, and she told me that was her job,  
18 to assign work. And she said I was the supervisor -- she was the supervisor of the Open  
19 Source Section. And I asked her, I said, well, do you approve leave in the system? Do  
20 you issue performance appraisals? And she didn't do any of those things. And I said to  
21 her, I said, my understanding is that you're not a supervisor. And she didn't take well to  
22 that.

23 So she was so angry and disrespectful during that first conversation, very first  
24 conversation, I ended up writing her up 11 days into my job. So that's not how I wanted  
25 to get started with the team.

1           But I've heard her criticism, particularly as it relates to January 6th and that she  
2 was concerned that she was asked to research things that she didn't normally do. On  
3 January 6th and prior to January 6th, her role was primarily looking up open source stuff.  
4 That's a nondescript word, "stuff," but concerning posts, things of that nature. She was  
5 also responsible for pushing out updates related to protests, which is something that she  
6 had done for, my understanding, years before January 6th.

7           So the duties that she was tasked with were very much in line with things she had  
8 previously done.

9           Q    Can you talk generally about how some of these changes were received by  
10 your team generally, not just with Ms. McClellan?

11          A    It depends. About half and half. Half were very receptive and were  
12 appreciative of the changes dealing with some of the issues the team had, and those  
13 analysts have really excelled over the past year or so.

14          There were others who outright refused to get on board with the changes. Ms.  
15 McClellan was one; Eric Hore (ph) was another; Shelly Redmon; Kelly Ray; Kristen Burreis,  
16 who was the agent assigned to midnights. She was actually reassigned after I got on  
17 board.

18          Q    Do you think any of these dynamics, the sort of division as you've laid it out,  
19 half the team being in support of some of the changes, half the team not --

20          A    Uh-huh.

21          Q    -- did any of that have an effect on the lead-up, the preparation, the  
22 intelligence stitching together, up to January 6th? Do you feel that that had any role to  
23 play?

24          A    No. And I say that because I don't think most of the people I listed there  
25 had the skills and the knowledge to be expert intelligence analysts to begin with. So I

1 think the problems were not so much the changes; the problems were their skill level,  
2 and they didn't have the skills.

3 Q After instituting this change, the major one being the, sort of, you know,  
4 putting together of the two teams --

5 A Uh-huh.

6 Q -- so, after the changes but before January 6th, would you say IICD was  
7 mainly at that period an intelligence-gathering operation, an intelligence-sharing  
8 operation, both, or neither?

9 A More neither. I mean, we did some collection. We did almost no sharing,  
10 to be honest. But mostly consumers.

11 Q Okay.

12 And so none of the -- did you put in any changes before January 6th that were  
13 geared at fixing what you thought was a problem, which was that you were primarily just  
14 consumers of information?

15 A I did. I did. I tried to start building relationships with our partners. I  
16 met with the Park Police, for example. I met with MPD. I met with some other Federal  
17 and law enforcement partners to try to start to build that relationship and to be able to  
18 share information more readily and more freely.

19 I also met with internal stakeholders within Capitol Police to get their feedback on  
20 IICD products, what changes they would like to see, how we can better support them.  
21 And then I incorporated some of those things in the changes that I made.

22 One of the other things that I did was I started to standardize a lot of the products  
23 that we did and develop templates to make sure that our products looked professional  
24 but, not only that, contained consistent-quality information. Because, a lot of times, the  
25 team was just sending their findings in an email, whereas, like, I wanted to have a record

1 of what we were finding and make it professional and then send it off to where it needed  
2 to go.

3 Q And is it fair to say, then -- because you said that, by the time you reach  
4 January 6th, you still feel as though IICD was neither an intelligence-gathering or -sharing  
5 operation -- that -- is it a function of just time, why those changes didn't revamp IICD to  
6 one of those two --

7 A Yes. It was only --

8 Q -- major roles?

9 A Sorry. It was only 72 days between the time I came on board and the time  
10 January 6th happened. So changes take time, especially significant changes, and I was  
11 making hard changes. And I recognize that a lot of people don't necessarily like change  
12 and that's going to take time, but I saw that they needed to be done. And,  
13 unfortunately, in the middle of making these major changes, we had an insurrection.

14 Q And do you think that focus that you were trying to change but that still was  
15 unfortunately the focus, the consuming, do you think that that had a role to play in the  
16 preparation for January 6th?

17 A Yes and no. I will say, when I came on board, I was reviewing a lot of the  
18 products that were coming out of IICD and I was doing a lot of the analytic work myself.  
19 So, with the January 3rd assessment, I wrote a good chunk of that on my own.

20 And so, yes, we were hampered. It would've been much easier to have 11  
21 analysts who were completely capable of doing this and it was just a matter of me, like,  
22 proofreading it, rather than me doing a good chunk of the work myself. So, for sure, I  
23 mean, that was a problem still.

24 Q In the lead-up to January 6th, how would you characterize the influence that  
25 IICD and intelligence more broadly had on the operational side of the department?

1           A    Not much influence.  And I think it's because IICD had such a bad  
2 reputation in the department.  And that was an earned reputation.  I'm not going to try  
3 to sugarcoat it.  Like, the team was dysfunctional.  It was underperforming.  Everyone  
4 knew it.  And the products that they were putting out prior to my arrival were not  
5 necessarily very good, so their products weren't taken very seriously.

6           Q    Okay.

7                   And so what was the process for sharing intelligence with leadership?  This is  
8 before January 6th, of course, leading up to it.

9           A    I would provide it to Chief Gallagher primarily.

10          Q    Okay.  What was the process for sharing intelligence with the rank-and-file,  
11 if there was one?

12          A    My understanding is that there wasn't.  Or, I should say, rather, my  
13 understanding is, Chief Gallagher would distribute our products to other leaders within  
14 the department, and they were supposed to discuss the contents at roll call.

15          Q    Okay.  So is Chief Gallagher, then, sort of your point of contact for both  
16 getting it up to leadership and, whatever would get down to the rank-and-file, it's  
17 through him --

18          A    Yes.

19          Q    -- was the process before January 6th?  Is that fair?

20          A    Yes.

21          Q    And I'm sorry, for the record, what was his position on January 6th?

22          A    He was deputy chief of the Protective Services Bureau.

23          Q    And is IICD under the Protective Services Bureau?

24          A    Yes.

25          Q    In your opinion, those processes, the way to get it to leadership and to



1 rank-and-file, did that play a role in the proper preparation and lead-up to January 6th?

2 A Can you repeat the question?

3 Q Yeah. It's in essence: Does the way that information is shared to  
4 leadership and, if at all, to rank-and-file, do you think that that process, the way it was  
5 done before January 6th, whether that played any sort of role in January 6th, in the  
6 preparation, in the lead-up to January 6th?

7 A Just my personal opinion --

8 Q Sure.

9 A -- is: For sure. I mean, I've heard it in post-January 6th. I attend roll  
10 calls quarterly. And those first couple roll calls were pretty rough, and officers were  
11 understandably quite angry. And one of the criticisms I heard -- and it's completely  
12 justified -- is that they never saw the assessment.

13 Q Okay.

14 My last sort of background, general question about IICD: How was the sharing of  
15 information within IICD? Was information-sharing encouraged among analysts? Or  
16 were analysts, who I understand are mostly working from home, were they siloed from  
17 one another as to -- and from what they were each seeing from one another, in the  
18 lead-up to January 6th?

19 A It was strongly encouraged that they work together. And we also, Jack  
20 Donohue and I, strongly encouraged them to work with other divisions within Capitol  
21 Police. And we told them multiple times, like, if you have a question for an agent who's  
22 working a case that you're assisting with, talk to the agent, call them.

23 So it was very encouraged. But, prior to both my arrival and Jack's arrival, that's  
24 not something they necessarily did. They stayed in their own -- like, just IICD, and there  
25 wasn't a lot of communication outside of the division.

1 Q And what was your understanding as to why that was when Norm Ghrae was  
2 in charge of IICD?

3 A My understanding is that Norm would not let them speak to others.

4 Q Okay. And that was -- your understanding, of course -- a formalized policy  
5 or just understood informally?

6 A I think understood informally. I didn't see any formal policy.

7 Q Okay.

8 [REDACTED] Unless anyone has any questions on this, the background?

9 [Discussion off the record.]

10 BY [REDACTED]

11 Q So what about the sharing of intelligence with your law enforcement  
12 partners? What was that like, from -- again, I know you weren't there -- from your  
13 understanding, before you got there, during Norm Ghrae, and then before January 6th  
14 with yourself and Mr. Donohue as the new heads?

15 A So, before I got there, my understanding is that there wasn't a lot of sharing,  
16 but with Jack and I coming on board, there was more sharing. Jack came from NYPD, so  
17 he had a lot of connections in the law enforcement community. I came from the  
18 Federal Government, so I had connections there. And so we worked to build those  
19 relationships and to share and be more collaborative with our intelligence partners.

20 Q Is it fair to say, given your earlier answer as to how IICD was still not sharing  
21 up to what you think it needed to -- did that -- by January 6th, it hadn't fully come to  
22 share with law enforcement to your expectations?

23 A Correct. Correct. But I will say, particularly on January 6th and the few  
24 days before January 6th -- or, really, between the MAGA II march, which was December  
25 12th, and January 6th, there was a lot of sharing with Jack and I and our intelligence

1 partners, like, maybe near-daily calls.

2 Q Okay.

3 I'd like to get to the threat assessment of January 3rd. You've alluded to it a little  
4 bit. It's exhibit 4, if you want to look at it. And it was -- that final one was completed  
5 on January 3rd of 2021.

6 A Yes.

7 Q You've alluded to it, but if you could formally tell me: What role, if any, did  
8 you play in the drafting and development of that document?

9 A So, with this assessment -- and there were a couple earlier  
10 versions -- initially, I had tasked Stephan Horan on my team to write a draft of it. He  
11 wrote a draft. I didn't particularly like it, and I rewrote it.

12 Separately, we were asked to update it maybe a week or so later. And I asked  
13 Debbie McClellan to write a draft, not giving her Stephan Horan's, because I wanted to  
14 see what she came up with on her own. And I also didn't like much of that either.

15 So, leading up to this one, I took the good pieces out of those two drafts that we  
16 had and put it together with what we have here. And some sections of it, like the last  
17 section, I wrote exclusively.

18 Q What about those initial assessments did you feel was not up to par?

19 A So I don't think they were well-written, number one. I don't necessarily  
20 think they included pertinent information or drew the correct conclusions.

21 Particularly with the one that Debbie did, a lot of it was -- she had a lot of good  
22 information there, but there was no analysis piece. So there were multiple pages of,  
23 okay, this Facebook page says that they're going to be coming, and this one does, and  
24 three people are interested, and six people liked it, or whatever it was. So it's good  
25 information, but I don't know if we needed, you know, 40 posts saying, like, all these

1 Facebook people are coming, rather than just saying there are multiple Facebook pages.

2 Both of them concluded that the protests -- or, a lot of them are calling for  
3 peaceful protests. I'd have to go back and look at Stephan's version to see if he  
4 mentioned armed individuals. I know Debbie's did not mention the words "violence,"  
5 "violent extremists," "White supremacists," "militia." Those were things that did not  
6 appear in the assessment, and, to me, that lacked, based on what I was seeing.

7 Q Okay. You may have mentioned this, I think, but did you use part of their  
8 assessments in crafting yours?

9 A Yes. I took different pieces that I thought should go into the final one.

10 Q Did Jack Donohue have any role or play a role in the drafting of that  
11 assessment?

12 A He didn't draft. I believe he reviewed.

13 Q What pieces of intelligence generally were you using in crafting this  
14 document? As in, what do you recall seeing that formed the basis for your assessment?

15 A Sorry, can I go back to the previous question?

16 Q Sure. Of course.

17 A So, on January 3rd, Chief Gallagher asked us to rewrite the conclusion.

18 Because he was saying, you know, we're seeing lots of bad things. So he sent that to  
19 both Jack and I, and both Jack and I wrote a conclusion.

20 And, when I sent mine, I sent it forward to Sergeant Cook, who is Chief Gallagher's  
21 assistant. And I said, "I wrote one. It might be too strongly worded. Jack also wrote  
22 one. I'll let you guys decide which one to put into the assessment." So Jack did draft  
23 something that didn't end up making it into the assessment.

24 Q Okay. Are you saying that ultimately, then, the paragraph that you drafted  
25 was the one that was selected and used in the assessment?

1 A Yes.

2 Q And, before that, when you had submitted the assessment first to Chief  
3 Gallagher, it did not include that overall analysis paragraph?

4 A It did have an overall analysis paragraph, but most of the IICD products prior  
5 to this one had kind of, like, standard language. Like, if you see -- it was, like, a "see  
6 something, say something"-type paragraph.

7 And the content of it was the same, where we said there's going to be White  
8 supremacists and they're going to be armed and everything, but that concluding  
9 paragraph was a little bit different.

10 Q Okay.

11 My next question was about what pieces of intelligence generally were you using  
12 in crafting the document. So what do you recall seeing that formed the basis of you  
13 putting together, in particular, that last paragraph?

14 A Uh-huh. So we saw a lot of social media posts talking about people coming  
15 armed. There were also meetings with the organizers of the events at the Ellipse and  
16 also at Freedom Plaza, so Cindy Chafian. We met with Kylie Kremer and Dustin Stanton,  
17 I think was his name, as well -- Kylie and Dustin being the organizers at the Ellipse that we  
18 were dealing with, and then Cindy Chafian being the Freedom Plaza organizer.

19 So, between our -- and then, you know, MPD was collecting things, as well, and  
20 sending them over to us. NTIC was, which is the D.C. fusion center; they were sending  
21 things to us. Park Police had some things. Secret Service had some things. So we  
22 were just compiling everything that we had together.

23 I will say, it was a lot of, not the same posts, but the same themes, like, people  
24 coming armed and were going to come to the Capitol.

25 And then we also had -- the President himself was promoting the Stop the Steal

1 protest. And it had a website, wildprotest.com. And so that was supposed to be on  
2 Capitol Grounds in Areas 8 and 9, which is over by the Supreme Court, but that was not a  
3 permitted event. So we were seeing that, as well, promoted.

4 And then also looking at websites like donald.win to see what people were saying.  
5 So all of that factored in to what we put in the assessment.

6 Q Okay. Anything in particular that stood out to you? You mentioned some  
7 specifics about armed and about coming to the Capitol. Was there any, sort of, pieces  
8 of intelligence that really stood out?

9 A We saw, you know, extremist groups, like the Proud Boys, for example,  
10 indicating that they were going to be coming. And just knowing what the MAGA I and  
11 MAGA II marches were and kind of the type of people they attracted, that helped to  
12 inform what we put in this assessment as well.

13 Q Okay.

14 And is there a reason that the threat assessment was final by January 3rd and was  
15 not continually updated as more intelligence came in on the 4th, the 5th, and the  
16 morning of the 6th?

17 A I think because a lot of the intelligence that came in after that was not  
18 necessarily new information or themes that weren't already captured in the assessment.

19 Q Okay. Was there a way in which updates could be communicated, if not  
20 formally, informally?

21 A Yes. We had a briefing on January 4th and then also one on the morning of  
22 January 6th.

23 I think, now -- like, I was new then. Now, I would just proactively write an  
24 updated assessment. Back then, like, I was only writing updates if one was requested.

25 Q Okay. And so is it fair to say none was requested later than January 3rd?

1 A Correct.

2 Q And so I'll read for the record that overall -- or, at least the sort of important  
3 part of the overall analysis paragraph that we just alluded to.

4 Quote, "This sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an  
5 incentive to become violent. Unlike previous post-election protests, the targets of the  
6 pro-Trump supporters are not necessarily the counterprotestors, as they were previously,  
7 but, rather, Congress itself is the target on the 6th."

8 Ms. Farnam, do you think that warning, particularly that Congress itself was the  
9 target and not counterprotestors like the previous two MAGA marches, do you think that  
10 warning was properly heeded by the leadership at Capitol Police?

11 A Probably not.

12 But I will say -- like, I don't mean to, like, throw anyone under the bus here, but I  
13 think it's such an unusual concept. It's not something that -- when we deal with  
14 protests, it's always protestors and counterprotestors. Like, what are they upset over?  
15 Or they're protesting a policy. We've never seen something where, like, Congress and  
16 the duties of Congress was being targeted.

17 You can get upset with a Member of Congress because you don't like their  
18 position on a certain bill. That's different than saying all of Congress, as they're trying to  
19 do their democratic duties, is the target.

20 Q Did you have any discussions, potentially with Chief Gallagher, about that in  
21 particular, the Congress being the target, in preparations for January 6th or discussions  
22 surrounding, you know, the use of the National Guard, anything like that?

23 A To the first question, I don't recall having any of those conversations.

24 For the second one, I did ask on Tuesday if the National Guard was going to be  
25 coming.

1 Q And who were you speaking with at that point?

2 A Chief Gallagher.

3 Q Okay. And what were you told?

4 A They would be assisting with traffic stops and street closures and things of  
5 that nature.

6 Q And, given what you had been seeing in terms of intelligence, did you have  
7 any sort of reaction, either personally -- I don't know if -- to him or internally, as to that  
8 answer?

9 A Yes, I definitely did. I said, I don't know if we need them to help with street  
10 closures. I wasn't asking because I was worried about whether or not someone can  
11 drive down a street.

12 Q Right.

13 Anything else about that conversation after you mentioned that?

14 A No. It was just very brief. It was in passing.

15 Q Okay.

16 I know on the morning of January 6th you were at the command center briefly.  
17 Is that correct?

18 A Yes, that's correct.

19 Q And that, in the morning, something caused you concern enough that you  
20 moved your -- or you asked your au pair to move your children. Can you tell me about  
21 that?

22 A Yes. So I went up probably just before lunchtime to the command center,  
23 just for a couple minutes, and I saw all the screens, and it was like before there's going to  
24 be a tornado. There was a lot of activity. Like, just the whole environment, the air  
25 was -- there was something amiss there.



1           So there was a lot of activity down at the Ellipse and down at Freedom Plaza, but,  
2 to me, it seemed like the rest of the city was pretty silent. And that was worrisome. It  
3 felt like there was going to be a storm.

4           And I was so concerned -- because my children were at a learning pod on Capitol  
5 Hill, because they weren't going to regular school because of the pandemic -- that I went  
6 downstairs and called my au pair and said, "Come get the kids now." And I remember  
7 her saying, "Well, can I have lunch first?" And I was like, "No, you can't. Come get  
8 them now." And she did, and she got them off Capitol Hill and out of the city.

9           Q    That warning -- the paragraph, right? -- became effectively the last  
10 substantive page of the threat assessment.

11          A    Uh-huh.

12          Q    It's page 13 of 15, where the last two pages are largely footnote citations.

13          A    Yes.

14          Q    In hindsight, do you think it would've been more -- it would've had more of  
15 an effect -- excuse me -- if it had appeared on the first page of the assessment?

16          A    Yes. But I think with a lot of intelligence reports the analysis comes at the  
17 end.

18               And I think part of -- and it's a valid criticism -- is helping -- and this is something  
19 that I've been working on since I've been here at Capitol Police, is helping them be better  
20 consumers of intelligence. Because the officers don't necessarily know what they're  
21 looking at, they don't understand intelligence, they don't know how to operationalize the  
22 intelligence.

23               But, I mean, I will say, for the first page of the assessment, the third bullet on the  
24 top of the first page, it says, "Some protestors have indicated they plan to be armed.  
25 There is also indication that White supremacist groups may be attending the protest." If

1 I saw that on the first page, that's concerning to me -- that would be concerning to me,  
2 and I, for sure, would want to read this report.

3 Q Okay.

4 If we could go to the second page of the assessment, it reads, quote, "The  
5 protests/rallies are expected to be similar to the previous Million MAGA March rallies in  
6 November and December 2020, which drew tens of thousands of participants."

7 Part of the, sort of, last paragraph is saying that January 6th, in your estimation,  
8 would have been different from the two previous MAGA marches, in which there was  
9 violence, but if there were skirmishes, most of it was counterprotestors and obviously  
10 nothing --

11 A Uh-huh.

12 Q -- to the scale that we saw on January 6th.

13 In hindsight, what do you think about that? Might that have undercut,  
14 particularly as it came earlier in the document, this paragraph, your later warning that  
15 this third demonstration might be different from the previous two?

16 A Yes. I agree. I think, you know, in retrospect, I would've rephrased that.

17 I think this one was talking specifically about the numbers and types of  
18 participants and not whether or not they were going to be more or less violent. And  
19 certainly that could've been phrased differently and phrased better to be more clear.

20 Q And I kind of want to point you, if you can, to exhibit 30. You'll see that this  
21 is the Civil Disturbance Unit, or CDU, Operational Plan created on January 5th. And, on  
22 its first page, listed is that paragraph noting that, you know, January 6th would be similar  
23 to the demonstrations on November 14th and December 12th of 2020.

24 A Uh-huh.

25 Q But, unfortunately, nowhere in the document does it reprint your

1 warning about how January 6th might be different.

2 Is that something you noticed? Is that something that, looking at it in hindsight,  
3 maybe may have been a mistake, that in the CDU Operational Plan they took that first,  
4 sort of, indication and not necessarily your last paragraph?

5 A Uh-huh. Yeah. I mean, this is the first time I'm seeing this, but, just  
6 looking at it quickly, I think this whole paragraph is misleading. Because it talks about  
7 antifa and counterprotestors, and that wasn't the concern at all. I don't even know if  
8 "antifa," that word, appears in the assessment. So this whole paragraph appears to me,  
9 in reading it the first time, to be misleading.

10 And I will say, one of the things that has changed is that there's consultation with  
11 my team and with me before these things are finalized now. And I have, like, rewritten  
12 some of the things that were going to be in it to make sure that the intelligence is  
13 accurate and the assessment is accurate.

14 But this -- this is misleading.

15 Q And so, before January 6th, did you or your team or Mr. Donohue, as far as  
16 you knew, have any role in crafting, in editing, in influencing the operational plans on the  
17 other side of the department?

18 A No, I never did.

19 Q Back to the threat assessment, if we could, which is No. 4, exhibit 4, it  
20 included language that, quote, "no groups are expected to march, and all are planning to  
21 stay in their designated areas," but also that, quote, "participants will gather at the Ellipse  
22 and march to the U.S. Capitol in support of President Trump."

23 A Uh-huh.

24 Q In hindsight, do you think that those findings are either confusing or at odds,  
25 or can they be reconciled?

1           A    I think they can be reconciled. I think that was referencing the permitted  
2 groups. And there were eight or nine for that day. And none of those permitted  
3 groups were expected to march.

4           Q    Okay. So you think the permitted groups at the U.S. Capitol were the ones  
5 that were not expected to march; the ones at the Ellipse are, according to the  
6 assessment.

7           A    Uh-huh.

8           Q    Okay.

9           The threat assessment also found that, quote, "the number of people who  
10 indicate they are going to the event listed on these social media postings is relatively  
11 low."

12          A    Yes.

13          Q    In hindsight, do you think that that properly conveyed the number of  
14 demonstrators to expect?

15          A    I think -- what page are you looking at?

16          Q    Oh, sure.

17          Oh, yeah. And I have it highlighted. It's page 3, right at the top.

18          A    Okay.

19          Q    Oh, no. Not at the top, though. Excuse me. It's on page 3.

20          [REDACTED] It says "no groups are expected to march."

21          [REDACTED] Yeah, but now we're at "the number of people who indicate they  
22 are going to the event."

23          BY [REDACTED]

24          Q    Ah, 5 -- excuse me -- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, in the middle. The paragraph starts with  
25 "IICD has identified."

1           A    Okay.  Yes.  And this is accurate.  We did identify about 40 social media  
2           postings, and all of them had, like, 10 people are going, 10 people are interested.  So  
3           that is accurate with regards to those social media postings.

4           Q    Right, but it does leave the impression that the number of attendees is going  
5           to be low.

6           A    I'd have to go back and -- not necessarily, because we do say on the previous  
7           page that these previous marches drew tens of thousands of participants.  That's on  
8           page 2.

9           Q    Right, the two previous MAGA marches?

10          A    Uh-huh.

11          [REDACTED] I'm going to move over to the conference call unless anyone has  
12          any questions about the threat assessment?

13          [REDACTED] I have a couple, if you don't mind.

14          [REDACTED] Go ahead.

15          BY [REDACTED]

16          Q    So, Ms. Farnam, going back to the paragraph that appeared at the bottom,  
17          you said earlier, if I recall, that Assistant Chief Gallagher had the opportunity to make  
18          some edits to earlier drafts of that assessment.  Was the placement of that paragraph  
19          part of those edits?

20          I guess I'm trying to get an understanding of was whether or not where it was  
21          placed deliberate or sort of as a result of multiple drafts moving back and forth.

22          A    No.  Like, that was always in that location in the assessment.

23          Q    And, in some of the products we've seen, they have what's known as a  
24          "BLUF" --

25          A    Uh-huh.

1 Q -- bottom line up front.

2 A Yes.

3 Q Is that paragraph -- would you consider that paragraph a BLUF or not?

4 A I think now it would be. Or we would take pieces of that. Like, Congress  
5 is going to be targeted, that might be important to put in the BLUF. But, at the time, we  
6 weren't doing BLUFs at all. And so I had to explain to the team what a BLUF was.

7 Q I see.

8 Thanks. Those were the questions I had.

9

BY 

10 Q I just have a question. I just wanted to take a step back on the collection  
11 versus consumer, the conversation from before. And I'm sure, coming into it, you're  
12 aware they weren't a collector under the IC community --

13 A Right.

14 Q So could you just explain, when you came to IICD, what you thought their  
15 role should be, knowing that they're not collectors as deemed by Title 50 or whatever?

16 A Right. I think, even though they're not collectors -- like, there's different  
17 types of collection, right?

18 Q Uh-huh.

19 A You know, we don't have human sources and things like that that the IC  
20 would. But, certainly, particularly where we are dealing primarily with open source,  
21 they should be proactively seeking out information, information about threats, and  
22 identifying those threats proactively.

23 And so, in that sense, we weren't doing that. And that's what I mean where we  
24 weren't necessarily collecting.

25 Q Okay. So were there any, kind of, guardrails in what they could do with

1 their open source searching? Meaning, I think what you're saying is, they could do  
2 more --

3 A Uh-huh.

4 Q -- but what could they have been doing?

5 A They could have been proactively searching some of the more concerning  
6 sites, like donald.win. There were a couple searches that we did, but they were  
7 assigned out to them. And if they --

8 Q Who does the assigning? Sorry to interrupt.

9 A I did the assigning.

10 Q So, as part of what the 11 folks underneath you were doing, you were also  
11 kind of mining and culling donald.win and whatever websites?

12 A We should've been doing that. There were a couple postings on  
13 donald.win, and I don't know how they came to my attention, but I specifically assigned  
14 those out to people on the team to research further.

15 But I think, you know, today, where we know some of the bad guys on the  
16 internet hang out, we will regularly review, like, Telegram, and we'll regularly review, like,  
17 Gettr and Parler and BitChute and Gab and some of the other, like, icky alternative social  
18 media sites. And we should be looking for that, because they are often posting  
19 concerning comments.

20 Q Uh-huh.

21 A But we weren't doing that as routine back then.

22 Q And how are these kind of research assignments memorialized, in the sense  
23 of -- obviously we see the special assessments; there's the daily intelligence reports. But  
24 what mechanism is there within IICD to say, hey, let's drill down on this?

25 A So, back then, there really wasn't anything. One of the things that I did

1 change was, I have a template form where they can capture their research and make sure  
2 that they were checking all the things they needed to check. And it had --

3 Q What are some of those things they need to check?

4 A So, when we get a threat or we identify a threat, we need to try to  
5 proactively identify who made the threat and then also get a picture of what their online  
6 footprint is. So we have maybe 10 or 12 different places they should be checking on the  
7 internet to see if we can find out more information about that individual.

8 And then there's an "analyst note" section where they should say, oh, well, this  
9 person actually has, you know, 10 threats on their website even though, you know,  
10 originally it only came to us with one threat, where they can explain more about what  
11 they found. Or, this appears to be their wife, and they work at this place.

12 So we have that form now, which didn't exist prior to that.

13 We also have a tracker now where any threat that we research we include on this  
14 tracker. And that's helpful, too, so if, you know, 2 months from now someone with the  
15 same social media handle comes up and has another threat, we can go back to that  
16 previous report we did and then just recheck the stuff that we had. So it's more  
17 efficient as well.

18 Q Okay. No, it sounds like you're implementing all the right things here.

19 I just want to take a bigger step back as we kind of look at the intelligence  
20 community, you know, the FBI, DHS, the Federal partners. There's a number of, you  
21 know, kind of, steps they have to take before they reach the threat assessment, before  
22 they're able to draw one.

23 A Right.

24 Q There's issues of First Amendment concerns and threshold predicates, all  
25 these things.



1 A Right.

2 Q Do you have those kinds of guidelines?

3 A Not in the sense that I think what you're talking about.

4 Q Okay.

5 A I mean, when we receive a threat or we identify a threat, we research it, and  
6 then we provide it over to our Investigations Division, and they will make the decision.  
7 So it might be more of a question for them, because they'll make a decision whether or  
8 not to pursue, like, a criminal investigation. Some of them might not rise to that level,  
9 but my team is tasked with still doing the preliminary scrub of it and then providing that  
10 information to the agents.

11 Q I see. I might come back to that, but that's helpful.

12 [REDACTED] Sounds good.

13 BY [REDACTED]

14 Q Let's move to a conference call that I know -- a briefing that you and Jack  
15 Donohue held on January 4th highlighting the warning from the January 3rd assessment.

16 A Uh-huh.

17 Q Who spoke at that briefing?

18 A I did.

19 Q Okay. And who was invited to attend?

20 A I don't know. I'd have to look at the calendar invite. I did not send the  
21 invite.

22 Q Okay. Do you recall generally who you were told you were speaking to?

23 A Capitol Police leadership.

24 Q Okay. So the idea was that it should've been sent to leadership.

25 A Yes.

1 Q You just don't know -- you can't tell me "inspectors and above," that sort of  
2 thing.

3 A I'd have to look.

4 Q Okay.

5 A And at the time, too, I was pretty new, so these names were not familiar to  
6 me. And a lot of them aren't here anymore, so I'd have to probably ask who those  
7 people were.

8 Q Okay. Did it go as high as Chief Sund, or you're not quite sure?

9 A My understanding is that Chief Sund was not invited.

10 Q Okay. Is there anyone, any name that you can tell me you know was  
11 invited?

12 A Chief Gallagher, Chief Pittman were there for sure. And I'm not sure who  
13 else.

14 Q And I actually do want to drill down on whether they actually attended.  
15 You said that they were there. Do you mean that you know that they attended or that  
16 they were invited?

17 A Well, I was sitting with Chief Gallagher, so I know he was definitely there.

18 Q Okay.

19 A And I do believe that Chief Pittman was there, because I think she asked me  
20 some questions after about it.

21 Q Okay. Because this was a conference call, right?

22 A Yes.

23 Q It wasn't a video --

24 A Yes.

25 Q -- call.

1 A Uh-huh.

2 Q Okay.

3 And you provided your contemporaneous notes to the committee,  
4 select committee, regarding what was spoken about at this briefing. They're exhibit No.  
5 31.

6 Were these before the call as preparation for what you were going to brief them  
7 or during the call as notes?

8 A No, no, no. I wrote them -- these were, like, my talking points for the call.

9 Q So, using those notes, if you want, as a reference, in essence, what did you  
10 relay to Capitol Police leadership in this briefing?

11 A So I said there were a couple big events that were going to happen on the  
12 6th. One was the Women for America First, the march for Trump, and the President  
13 was going to be speaking there at 11 o'clock. And they did have a permit for that event,  
14 and they amended the permit to say that there were going to be 20,000 people.

15 I'm not sure -- oh, "FOX News, 3 million." Kylie Kremer was on FOX News to talk  
16 about this event, and she's like, "Oh, we're going to have 3 million." I was like, you think  
17 you're going to have 3 million? So that's why that was there.

18 And then I talked about the Stop the Steal event, which was an unofficial event  
19 because it wasn't permitted. These are the Members of Congress that we believe were  
20 invited to attend. It was being promoted by the President.

21 And the two bottom things don't have anything to do with that. That was just  
22 something else.

23 And then I said: Supporters see this as the last opportunity to overturn the  
24 election. There was disappointment and desperation amongst the protestors, and this  
25 could be an incentive to become violent, because they have nothing left to lose. The

1 targets are not the counterprotestors; the target is Congress. The protests are heavily  
2 publicized. Stop the Steal has a propensity for attracting White supremacists, militia  
3 groups, groups like the Proud Boys. There are multiple social media posts saying that  
4 people are going to be coming armed, and it's potentially a very dangerous situation.

5 And then I mentioned that the counterprotestors have been really quiet; they're  
6 not organizing. And then, later, we learned that some of the groups -- well, one of the  
7 ones that had the permit just didn't show up. And then some of the other groups, like  
8 ShutDownDC, I think they put something out to their members saying they were going to  
9 go feed the homeless in, like, a different part of the city on that day.

10 Q And what was the response at the other end of the call?

11 A I did not receive any questions.

12 Q As far as you could tell, did anything change -- or was anything told to you  
13 that would be changed as a result of either your briefing or -- as a result of your briefing?

14 A I didn't have any visibility on that.

15 Q I want to run through some individual intelligence that was received by the  
16 IICD --

17 A Okay.

18 Q -- in the lead-up to January 6th -- well, actually, [REDACTED] has something.

19 BY [REDACTED]

20 Q I just want to go back to the call for a second.

21 So you stated that you didn't receive any response to the briefing points. How  
22 did that strike you at the time?

23 A It was something that I had noticed when I had other conversations with  
24 leadership, not specific to January 6th, that I was surprised by the lack of questions.

25 And that was where I first realized that I need to help them become better

1 consumers of intelligence, because -- and it's interesting now, too, because I do biweekly  
2 classified briefings, and in the mornings I do it with just Capitol Police leadership, and in  
3 the afternoons I do it with the Sergeant at Arms. And particularly General Gibson, she's  
4 got an intelligence background. And to hear the questions she asks versus the questions  
5 that I get in the morning, it's like night and day.

6 So we're working on it and, like, the difference between raw intelligence and  
7 finished intelligence and trying to educate them as to what those sorts of things are.

8 Q And if I could just go backwards a little bit, back to when you were  
9 discussing, sort of, what the teams do. And I apologize that I didn't ask this earlier.  
10 But I think I recall you saying that there's an open source side and there's a high side side,  
11 right --

12 A Uh-huh.

13 Q -- and that most of the collection that you do is on the open source side.

14 A Uh-huh.

15 Q On the high side, is there any collection going on there, or is it just to receive  
16 from partners that happen to be classified information?

17 A So, actually, neither. There was the Open Source, and there was the  
18 Intelligence Analysis side. The Intelligence Analysis side sat in a SCIF, but they did not do  
19 any collection of classified materials, which struck me as odd.

20 So we do get classified things from -- particularly from Tom Poliseno, who's at the  
21 NJTTF, but the team is limited in the classified databases they have access to. And I'm  
22 not confident that they know how to search -- because classified databases are a little  
23 quirky, and the way you search them is not necessarily like you search Google. And so I  
24 never got the sense that they had the knowledge on how to do, like, effective classified  
25 research.

1

Q Thank you, ma'am.

1 [1:58 p.m.]

2

BY [REDACTED]

3

4

5

Q I just want to clarify, actually. You mentioned that there were no questions for you, but I think a little earlier you did mention that you knew Chief Pittman was on the call because she had asked you questions.

6

7

8

9

A That would be after the fact. She was very involved in the planning for the 6th, and I know that she -- she would ask me questions about like numbers that I expected and things of that nature. So she did not ask questions on the call to clarify, but she did ask me questions after.

10

11

Q Okay. And that led you to believe that she was certainly on the call because of how she was interacting with you afterwards?

12

A Yes. Uh-huh.

13

14

15

[REDACTED] I'm curious whether you thought the information you provided, whether it was in the January 3rd special assessment or during that call, impacted any preparations going into the 6th?

16

Ms. Farnam. I don't know if it did or didn't.

17

[REDACTED] Okay. Go ahead.

18

BY [REDACTED]

19

20

21

Q Okay. I want to run through some individual intelligence received by IICD. If you turn to exhibit 1, you'll see an email forwarded -- one second -- an email forwarded to John Donahue, the director of IICD.

22

A Yes.

23

24

25

Q By an NYPD official as early as December 28th, 2020, noting, quote, assume you have, and this includes, the assessment includes, reference to social media postings such as protesters. These are social media postings saying protesters should start

1 marching into the Chambers; that they should show up with guns and threaten them with  
2 death; that -- regarding President Trump's tweet to attend the wild protests on  
3 January 6th, one user said, I read that as armed; that violent insurrection has always been  
4 the plan. Quote, Trump can't exactly openly tell you to revolt. This is the closest he'll  
5 ever get, but there is not enough cops in D.C. to stop what is coming. Quote, that there  
6 is -- this is war, and we're clearly in a post-legal phase of our society. Quote, be there on  
7 the 6th ready for 1776. Another quote says, fun fact: No revolution has ever been  
8 won without violence. And then another quote that talks about killing the opposition.

9 Do you recall seeing this particular piece of intelligence?

10 A I'm not sure. I'd have to go back and look.

11 Q Okay. Can you talk to me about how IICD was structured in terms of this  
12 was sent to -- at the time, before January 6th, if this was sent to Mr. Donahue, how would  
13 it have made its way either to yourself or to other members of the IICD so that it could be  
14 put into the threat assessment, the larger threat landscape picture in order to share with  
15 the leadership?

16 A He would've had to have forwarded the email to us.

17 Q Okay.

18 A And he may have. I just don't recall.

19 Q Okay. In the hindsight and in general, do you think the January 3rd  
20 assessment could've maybe used more listing of specific threats like these that would  
21 have flushed out what was forming the basis of the warning at the end of the  
22 assessment?

23 A Sure. Yeah.

24 Q Do you recall, you know, any of the intelligence I just read, any of the  
25 postings that I just read, do any of them stand out as either different or more alarming or



1 along the lines of what you had been seeing previously?

2 A They're along the lines of what we had seen.

3 Q Okay. If we can go to exhibit 2, you'll see an email from an HSEMA analyst  
4 on January 5th about a site requesting users to submit the addresses, work offices, and  
5 routes of, quote, enemies and Democratic Congressman.

6 Do you recall if you saw this particular piece of intelligence?

7 A I do believe I did. I know I'm not on this message, but I do recall seeing  
8 this.

9 Q Okay. And what was the process for something as late as January 5th,  
10 right, after the assessment was drafted and when this email was sent out for intelligence  
11 like this to be forwarded to IICD and/or to USCP leadership?

12 A So, with something like this, we would have sent it over to threats as well.  
13 It looks like they are not included on this message, so that's something that would go over  
14 to threats as well. And particularly with addresses of offices and residences, we would  
15 probably treat this as like a doxing almost and handle it that way.

16 Q Okay. And the email mentions actually from the analyst from HSEMA that  
17 the threat does not meet the threshold for a SAR, which is a Suspicious Activity Report.  
18 From your experience in intelligence and at DHS, do you have an opinion as to why that  
19 might be so?

20 A I don't know. They followed D.C.'s rules, and I don't know what their rules  
21 are exactly.

22 Q Okay. Can you talk to me a little bit about intelligence more broadly in  
23 terms of whether the focus has been on domestic terrorism and whether that's  
24 something that should change?

25 A It absolutely has not and it's been super frustrating even post-January 6th.

1 There's a hesitation -- and I get the hesitation because domestic terrorism is dealing with  
2 U.S. citizens and try not to collect on U.S. citizens.

3 And so that's been part of the hesitation and even today, it's frustrating because  
4 there's information that I want from the IC that I -- that I just don't get because it is  
5 involving domestic terrorism.

6 Q Let's turn to exhibit 3, and there it's the U.S. Capitol Police public  
7 information office inbox. It's forwarded on December 28th, 2020, online indications of  
8 storming the Capitol, and it was sent in by a civilian, Grace Spelman, a self-billed internet  
9 expert tracking far-right extremism.

10 Do you recall if you saw this particular piece?

11 A I don't recall this email.

12 Q Okay. Before January 6th, are you aware if the tips sent in to the public  
13 information office made their way to IICD? And if so, how?

14 A They didn't. I think it's relatively new that we receive them now, but we  
15 also have a new PIO.

16 Q Okay. So I suppose -- does that mean that the person in charge of manning  
17 this inbox, it would have been up to that person merely to get it rerouted to IICD?

18 A Yes. And that happens as a matter of course now, but, prior to January 6th,  
19 I don't think I ever received a message from our public information officer.

20 Q Okay.

21 [REDACTED] Can I ask a quick question, [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED] Go ahead.

23 [REDACTED] Ms. Farnam, earlier you mentioned you said would have handled  
24 this as a doxing, what does that mean?

25 Ms. Farnum. So doxing is where they take public officials, usually their personal

1 residences, and they publish that information on the internet, and it could be to  
2 encourage people to send them hate mail or to show up at their house, things of that  
3 nature.

4 And so, when we see Members of Congress' personal addresses -- and we have a  
5 system that we use to pick these up automatically -- we would -- we would -- we would  
6 do research -- my team would do research to try to identify who was doing the doxing,  
7 and then we would send that to investigations.

8 [REDACTED] Okay. Thank you, ma'am.

9 BY [REDACTED]:

10 Q If -- so go back to that example. Obviously, Capitol Police gets often or  
11 picks up on threats to Members of Congress throughout the year.

12 A Yes.

13 Q This one, in particular, is in relation to January 6th and the routes that  
14 Congressmen might take in order to try to block them or stop them.

15 A Uh-huh.

16 Q Do you think there was -- I see how, you know, individual threats need to be  
17 specific and are dealt with individually in terms of trying to track that person down.

18 A Uh-huh.

19 Q I know the investigation side does that.

20 A Uh-huh.

21 Q But was there an uptick in that sort of threat or in the lead up to January 6th,  
22 and is there some value in if you can't even track down that individual person and sort of  
23 seeing all the threats were generally strewn together a picture so that can influence how  
24 you prepare for the event?

25 A It would influence. I will say, I don't recall seeing a lot of these types of

1 things. I will say because I just reviewed all the emails that I got on January 6th, and  
2 there were a few pertaining to Senator McConnell that came in the night before. And  
3 those we were actively looking at before everything happened on the 6th, but generally  
4 speaking, I didn't see a ton of posts about Members' residence near the Capitol.

5 Q Okay.

6 A But we do handle these much differently now.

7 Q I guess whose role and would it be yours to sort of see the big picture as  
8 people are individually looking at specific threats, tracking down the people who are  
9 making the threats, whose job would it be to keep track of it more generally so that a  
10 picture can be stitched together?

11 A Probably me. Probably me. And we do see that now, and when we  
12 see -- I think this is a little bit of a unique situation in this exhibit, but we do see some like  
13 protest groups, and they'll target multiple Members all at the same time at their homes.  
14 And those now they're communicated to the larger leadership at the Capitol Police, in  
15 addition to investigations. And then we'll coordinate with the Sergeant at Arms Office.  
16 We'll coordinate with the Member's staff. I will coordinate with MPD if it's here in D.C.  
17 or wherever they may be living. And so we have a more systematic way of handling  
18 those sorts of threats now.

19 Q Okay. And my last question back on exhibit 3 was just, you know, this was  
20 just a sort of civilian tip. As far as you know, was the Capitol Police, was IICD receiving a  
21 number of civilian tips and intelligence regarding January 6th? Do you recall?

22 A I don't recall.

23 Q If we can turn to exhibit 5, and this is a thread where Chief Gallagher sends  
24 to Chief Pittman, January 5th, 2021, at 4:10 p.m. that the WashingtonTunnels.com had  
25 been receiving a dramatic uptick in new visits; that the site, TheDonald.win, had been

1 active in promoting photos of the tunnel system, and that USCP had identified numerous  
2 open source comments by groups of their intention of finding tunnel entrances and  
3 confronting or blocking Members of Congress, including setting up a perimeter to block  
4 entry or escape.

5 The threat includes also that same day at 4:55 p.m., Chief Pittman forwarding the  
6 intelligence to Chief Sund saying that they should hold a call regarding the intelligence.  
7 And some later correspondence with counsel from USCP appears to indicate that the call  
8 never happened. Were you aware of this particular intelligence involving the tunnels  
9 prior to January 5th?

10 A Yes. Not of this email, but of the intelligence, yes.

11 Q And, before January 5th, it had been something that --

12 A Yes. Yes.

13 Q Okay. Do you know if this intelligence was communicated by you or  
14 someone within IICD to leadership, including Chief Gallagher, Chief Pittman, or Chief  
15 Sund, prior to this email thread?

16 A I know it was sent to -- it was Captain Mitchell at the time. And she's the  
17 head of the Intelligence Division.

18 Q Okay. Because certainly -- it appears in this thread that, on January 5th, it's  
19 something that Chief Gallagher finds really problematic and serious and a warning, but on  
20 the day of January 5th, it appears to be when he realizes or gets this piece of intelligence?

21 A My team sent that forward in late December. I'd have to go back and look  
22 at the specific email to see who it went to. I know it went to Captain Mitchell -- she's  
23 not captain anymore; she's inspector, but -- to see who received it, but I know it was done  
24 in late December.

25 Q Okay. And can you tell me why this particular piece of intelligence didn't

1 make its way into the January 3rd threat assessment?

2 A I don't know why. I will say too, though, though, the maps of the tunnels  
3 existed online for a long time before January 6th. And should we have mentioned that?  
4 Yes. It was on Donald.Win. Probably we should have, but the fact that maps were in  
5 existence out on the internet was not a new thing.

6 Q Sure. I think it's the uptick in view is what Chief Gallagher seems to be  
7 alluding to there and views, excuse me, leading up to the January 6th.

8 If we can go to exhibit 6, Joint Terrorism Task Force Special Agent Usman Saleem  
9 sent an e-tip that had been sent to the FBI on December 28th, 2020. He sends it to  
10 Special Agent DeSesso and some colleagues, Mr. Delegan and Mr. Stori, over on the  
11 Investigations Division, right, U.S. Capitol Police. And the tip included protesters  
12 bringing arms on a bridge in Virginia, marching into D.C., joining the Proud Boys, and  
13 blocking roads with their cars.

14 First, can you tell me how the role of investigations, right -- so a separate sort  
15 of -- in the Intelligence Operations threat assessment and criminal, those are the three  
16 under investigations?

17 A Uh-huh.

18 Q How they separate in their role in what IICD does?

19 A So some of this has changed since the 6th. Like, Agent Saleem and  
20 Sergeant Delegan work for me now --

21 Q -- before 6th?

22 A And so they were the task force officers who were embedded in the FBI and  
23 where have you. And we didn't necessarily get a lot of information from them. And so  
24 that's part of the reason why they were realigned under IICD, to better enhance the  
25 communication and the flow and sharing of information. So, prior to that, I don't know

1 what happened to these -- this sort of information -- it didn't always come to me, I will  
2 say that.

3 Q Okay. Can you tell me just generally, though, what -- how are those three  
4 divisions conceived? Like, what do they do that's separate from IICD?

5 A So they do more of the criminal investigations part of it, and they do -- they'll  
6 do the subpoenas, they'll do meeting with the U.S. attorney's office and things like that,  
7 like, the criminal investigators -- similar to what like an 1811 would do in the executive  
8 branch. They do similar work there.

9 Q Okay. And so I know you said that something like this, unfortunately,  
10 before would not have made its way to you?

11 A Not necessarily.

12 Q Right. And I guess at that time the process wasn't formalized; it would just  
13 be forwarding it to you --

14 A Yes.

15 Q -- basically or to Jack Donahue. Is that fair?

16 A Yes.

17 Q Okay. And so -- and I think you've answered this, but how would you  
18 validate the level of information sharing between investigations and IICD before  
19 January 6th?

20 A It wasn't great.

21 Q And how, if at all, has that changed since January 6th?

22 A It's much better now. It's much, much better. I mean, I -- I sit right next  
23 to Inspector Mitchell, and it's a constant conversation. It's an eight-hour conversation  
24 every day. And then I have the task force officers under me now. So I meet with them  
25 regularly. I meet with the analysts one week and then the task force officers the other

1 week to get updates on the cases they're working on. And they send information all the  
2 time to us, and then I distribute it out to wherever it needs to go, whether it be  
3 leadership, whether it needs to be investigations, whether we need to do -- take more  
4 action on whatever it is. So it's much, much better now.

5 Q The folks still overriding the investigations, the ones who haven't been  
6 subsumed under your command, is there a process by which -- a more formalized process  
7 by which they can get information over to you or to IICD now?

8 A There is an SOP in the work, so it hasn't been officially formalized yet, but it  
9 is in the works.

10 Q You said a lot has changed that got better. Are there any still gaps that you  
11 see that you're still working to try to correct or you think should be corrected in terms of  
12 that information sharing between the two divisions?

13 A No. I think -- I think -- you know, it's a work in progress, and it's breaking  
14 down a lot of walls that were built before I got there. And so that's going to take some  
15 time, but as I get new analysts and the analysts that remain who were here before get  
16 used to communicating with the agents and the agents get to know who I am, that's -- it's  
17 getting better and better each day.

18 Q Last piece of specific --

19 [REDACTED] Can I?

20 [REDACTED] Go ahead.

21 [REDACTED] Followup question. So you mentioned that one week you meet  
22 with the analysts?

23 Ms. Farnam. Uh-huh.

24 [REDACTED] For sort of a SIT REP update and then next week with the task force  
25 officers. Are there any regular meetings where you meet with both sections together?



1 Ms. Farnam. Yes. I do have once a month, we have a full team meeting.

2 [REDACTED] Okay. Thank you.

3 BY [REDACTED]

4 Q We can turn to exhibit 12. And so here, on December 29th, 2020, the  
5 Protective Intelligence Operations Center at Secret Service forwards to the threat  
6 assessment inbox at Capitol Police that telegram user GFB said in a Neo-Nazi chat group  
7 that Trump supporters in D.C. on January 6th should march into the Capitol Building and  
8 make them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.

9 To whom would this tip -- we talked a little bit about investigations, and I know  
10 threat assessment is under that, to whom would this tips of threat assessments before  
11 January 6th where would it go?

12 A The threat assessment box, my understanding is that it is monitored by the  
13 sergeants in threats.

14 Q Okay. And do you recall seeing or being made aware of let's start with just  
15 this particular piece of intelligence?

16 A I don't recall it.

17 Q Okay. And is that -- sort of this threat assessment the same as we were  
18 talking about in terms of the criminal sections or the other sections of the investigations  
19 in which there was an issue of information sharing between the division and IICD?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Okay. Are there -- it appears, you know, there's threat assessment box;  
22 there's public information box; there's very many different ways for information to get  
23 into Capitol Police.

24 A Uh-huh.

25 Q Is that -- has that been a struggle in trying to make sure that all that

1 information is centralized and pulled in somewhere? And has that -- what has been the  
2 solution if that has been a struggle?

3 A I can't speak for the other divisions, but within IICD, we did have quite a few  
4 boxes. And so I've been working through eliminating some of them. I also did create  
5 email box specifically for threats so that we knew every single thing in that box needed to  
6 be worked and needed to be researched so it didn't get swallowed up by all the other  
7 emails that we get.

8 Q Okay. I'd like to talk to you about the demonstrations. So let's talk about  
9 the -- let's go to exhibit 10, actually, if we can.

10 A All right.

11 [REDACTED] Can I ask one more thing?

12 [REDACTED] Go ahead.

13 BY [REDACTED]

14 Q And this is kind of a big picture question, but we've heard in talking to some  
15 of the Federal partners as part of the intelligence assessments that there was a lack of  
16 specificity and a lack of credibility with what they were seeing --

17 A Uh-huh.

18 Q -- which led to not a federally issued joint intelligence bulletin about  
19 January 6th. It strikes me that, as [REDACTED] pointed out, you saw many of the same things  
20 that our Federal partners saw. And I think this was my question before, but I'm trying to  
21 articulate it better. What tools do you have or did you have to be able to draft that  
22 paragraph and that January 3rd special assessment so accurately in the sense of, what did  
23 you see that was credible, or is that even an assessment that you were making in stitching  
24 it together?

25 A I'm trying to think of how to articulate an answer. I think the IC -- going

1 back to your question about domestic terrorism -- the IC, I think, sometimes looks at  
2 things in a very narrow way. And so they don't necessarily give credibility to things that  
3 should be given credibility.

4 And so me coming at it -- I mean, this is the information I saw, and I had no reason  
5 to think that it was just aspirational, especially when you see it again and again and again  
6 and again. And so, for me, I think I had an obligation to accurately portray -- you know,  
7 the caveats aside of things that could have been phrased better in other parts of the  
8 report, but for that analysis section, I think I had an obligation to state it like I saw it.

9 Q And you didn't at any point think that it was in a bucket of this is just  
10 rhetoric?

11 A No, I didn't. I think -- some of the social media posts and they weren't in  
12 the assessment had like pictures of guns and weapons and knowing that, even with the  
13 MAGA I and MAGA II march, we had people who had been arrested for weapons charges  
14 and assault and things like that. Most of that happened after the actual event, but still it  
15 was attracting those sorts of people. And so, to me, it's something I took seriously.

16 Q And when -- I'm sure you're familiar with Chief Sund, who testified at a few  
17 hearings, and one of the first -- one of the things he mentioned was our Federal partners  
18 failed us on the intelligence. What's your reaction to that statement by the chief -- the  
19 former chief of the Capitol Police?

20 A I probably agree with that. I mean, when you look at all of our Federal  
21 partners, all of our law enforcement partners, how many other agencies wrote an  
22 assessment about January 6th? Zero. We were the only ones who wrote something.  
23 And I had only been there 72 days, and I dealt primarily with foreign nationals and foreign  
24 terrorist organizations. So my expertise was not domestic terrorists.

25 I can tell you all about them now a year later, but -- and so -- and maybe that was

1 part of it, too, is that I was coming at it from a different perspective and with fresh eyes  
2 and seeing these things -- like I said, domestic terrorism was not my area of expertise. I  
3 think Jack had more of an expertise coming from NYPD than I did, but I dealt with FTOs  
4 primarily. So maybe that was part of it too. Like, I'm seeing all these things.

5 If al-Qaida was saying those things, I would for sure be taking it seriously. So  
6 why not take it seriously when domestic groups are saying it?

7 Q And apart from kind of the silence that you received from the leadership on  
8 the call that ██████ talked about, was there any pushback to what you were seeing?

9 A No, there was no pushback.

10 Q It was silent?

11 A It was just silence.

12 ██████ Can I ask a followup question?

13

BY ██████

14 Q So we learned during the course of our investigation that, prior to  
15 January 6th, there were a number of interagency conference calls with other Federal law  
16 enforcement partners, Secret Service, DHS, were you and/or Jack part of any of those  
17 discussions?

18 A Yes.

19 Q And, during those meetings, was there -- did any other partner agencies talk  
20 about what they were seeing as the threat or what they thought the concerns were?

21 A Yes, there was some of that. There was a lot of discussion about the  
22 movement of people and where people were going to be in the city, where they were  
23 going to go, where they anticipated issues to be, but yes, there was some discussion  
24 about people saying they were coming armed.

25 Q And earlier you said that you all were the only ones who actually wrote an

1 assessment having had that information exposure from those meetings, did that  
2 contribute to your surprise that no one else wrote an assessment?

3 A Yes. Yes. I mean, some of those participants traditionally don't write any  
4 assessments, like, some of the law enforcement partners, but, yeah. On the Federal  
5 level, particularly, it would have been nice to have someone else back up like what we  
6 were seeing and what we were saying.

7 Q And from your perspective -- and I understand this is just probably your  
8 personal opinion but maybe informed by your experience as well -- who -- on the Federal  
9 side, who would you have expected to reasonably provide those kind of assessments?

10 A The FBI certainly and maybe DHS' INA as well.

11 [REDACTED] Thank you, ma'am.

12 Ms. Farnam. Can I just grab a water?

13 [REDACTED] Of course.

14 [REDACTED] We should have mentioned it, if anyone needs to take a break like  
15 for a bio break or just need a break, just let us know.

16 Ms. Farnam. I just need water for right now. Thanks.

17 BY [REDACTED]

18 Q I was going to ask about -- before we move on to the demonstrations, the  
19 information sharing and sort of the -- between you and Jack Donahue, how was that  
20 open -- was there an open line of communication between you two?

21 A Yeah. I mean, we did -- we did communicate regularly and his office was  
22 next to mine, uh-huh.

23 Q In terms of demonstrations, if you would turn to exhibit 10.

24 A Yep.

25 Q On January 1st, 2021, this is an email you forwarded that Jesus Lives

1 demonstration paperwork to Lawrence Cook, including a threat assessment that rates the  
2 religious group as remote. The threat of violence remote. Says quote: Ms. Reitkopp  
3 advised that neither she nor members of the demonstration have any intention of  
4 entering Congressional Office Buildings to lobby Members of Congress.

5 Can you tell me about these threat assessments devolving individual groups  
6 generally? So who drafted them within IICD?

7 A I'd have to go back and look.

8 Q I don't mean this particular example, I mean generally like who --

9 A Oh, the analysts. The analysts did.

10 Q Was that a practice that preceded your time?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Okay. And what was it -- so, when they included a threat assessment  
13 level -- remote, high, medium, low -- what was that based on?

14 A Their thoughts. We don't include it anymore, in part, because it's so  
15 subjective and there were -- there were discussions with some of the analysts over  
16 their -- because when I came on board, I was reading some of these, and I would change  
17 the threat assessment level. And I'm like, no, I think this one should be higher.

18 And, particularly, Debbie McClellan got upset with me one time. And she said:  
19 Well, when you change it, that changes the number of officers who have to work. And I  
20 was like, well, yeah.

21 And so there was concern that, if we didn't keep the threat level like remote or  
22 low, that was going to have operational impact.

23 And I was, like, we just need to stop doing that. And so today these assessments  
24 do not include a threat advisory level because they're too subjective.

25 Q And when did that change happen?

1           A    I'd have to go back and look.  It might have happened right before  
2   January 6th.

3           Q    Oh, okay.  Before?

4           A    It could've.  I'd have to go back and look.

5           Q    Okay.  This one's January 1st, I believe, for this group?

6           A    Then it might have been right after.  It was sometime in January.

7           Q    Okay.  And I guess is there some independent verification going on?  So  
8   here it sort of appears to be relying on self-reporting, but the person in charge says, oh, I  
9   have no intention of entering Congress.  Is it basically just self-reporting or was there  
10   independent verification that went into these assessments at the threat level?

11          A    So, with these assessments, there's a few steps that the analyst is supposed  
12   to be taking.  One, is they're supposed to call-up the event organizers and ask a series of  
13   questions, and we have the list of questions that they should be asking.  And  
14   then -- they're supposed to ask, you know, is civil disobedience expected?  Do you plan  
15   on getting arrested?

16                But then they're also supposed to be doing research to see if the group has  
17   demonstrated on Capitol Grounds previously and were there any issues when they were  
18   here.  And they should also be doing a search to see if they've done other  
19   demonstrations elsewhere and if they've had any problems.  And they should be  
20   checking their social media, their websites, whatever they may have to see what the  
21   group is about.

22          Q    And is that your understanding of what was taking place --

23          A    Yes.

24          Q    -- when you first joined --

25          A    Yes.

1 Q -- the IICD? Okay.

2 A We've tightened it up a little bit and we have some guidance documents, but  
3 generally speaking, yes.

4 Q Only if you recall -- in the middle of this exhibit, there are both the  
5 assessments for Moms for America as well as -- in which they were given -- it's Moms for  
6 America and Women for a Great America.

7 A Uh-huh.

8 Q I guess my question is, do you recall whether the assessments for either of  
9 those are different and it may be a function of you think it's just the subjective view of the  
10 analyst and so there really isn't any substance behind there, but as far as you recall, was  
11 there a difference in how you guys viewed Moms for America versus Women for a Great  
12 America?

13 A Just looking at it, I think we would rate that a little bit higher because they  
14 had participated in a previous "stop the steal" rally and those tend to attract individuals  
15 who cause trouble.

16 Q Can you talk a little bit about "stop the steal" and why, in particular, that  
17 group raised some alarms in your mind?

18 A So "stop the steal" they had participated and Ali Alexander, who is the  
19 organizer of "stop the steal." They had participated in the MAGA I and MAGA II  
20 marches, and they attract extremist groups. They attract conspiracy theorists. They  
21 attract people who wanted to overturn the election, and, in my opinion, that's dangerous.

22 Q And those were thoughts that you had prior to January 6th. Is that fair?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Let's talk about exhibit No. 19. And this is on December 16th of 2020.

25 A Uh-huh.



1 Q You forwarded an information paper --

2 A Uh-huh.

3 Q -- regarding events in December as well as a couple planned for January 6th.

4 And the only event that is noted as one of concern as opposed to remote concern is a  
5 Fuck the Police demonstration put by They Them Collective, which is a liberal progressive  
6 group.

7 Can you talk about how that one event drew a higher threat level than the others,  
8 if you know?

9 A So, just knowing historically with this group and the They Them Collective  
10 and the Youth Liberation Fund, those groups tend to engage in tactics -- they're  
11 not -- they can be violent, but definitely civil disobedience. They have confrontation  
12 with the police, and so that would raise the level for that one.

13 Q Okay. Some witnesses that we've spoken to have mentioned a sort of false  
14 sense of security with the demonstrators on January 6th because of a belief from past  
15 experience that the crowd would be pro-law enforcement. They had previously seen  
16 maybe the first two MAGA marches that they were not hostile to law enforcement and  
17 potentially because of the fact that they are groups, you know, pro-Trump demonstrators  
18 that they would not be adverse or in opposition necessarily to law enforcement.

19 Just generally, in your opinion, did that belief, that sort of false sense of security,  
20 affect the level of concern that pro-Trump demonstrators drew from police on  
21 January 6th?

22 A I can't say one way or the other, but it's something that I've heard for sure.  
23 Then they took their blue lives flags and stabbed police officers with it.

24 Q Right. So I guess, is it something that you've heard from your colleagues or  
25 it's not necessarily something that you've had experience hearing?

1 A Not necessarily having experience hearing in my professional role.

2 Q Okay. You've just heard it out in the ether of people talking about it?

3 A Yeah.

4 Q If we can turn to -- you have a question?

5 [REDACTED] Just related to that last question.

6 [REDACTED] Yeah. Go ahead.

7 [REDACTED] So, along the same lines in speaking with other folks at Capitol  
8 Police, particularly many of the officers who responded on that day, there was a general  
9 honest sense that, no matter what actually happened outside, that protesters would  
10 never actually come into the building.

11 Ms. Farnam. Yes.

12 [REDACTED] One, is that -- was that your sense when you got to that -- that that  
13 sort of was the prevailing thought; and, two, again, from your personal perspective, did  
14 that impact sort of how people were preparing for it?

15 Ms. Farnam. Yes to both questions. I don't think anyone conceived that they  
16 would break in to the Capitol. Did I think they were going to have violent confrontations  
17 with the police? Yes. Did I think they would be on Capitol Grounds outside of the  
18 Capitol Building? Yes. Did I think they would storm the building? Not necessarily.

19 [REDACTED] Thank you, ma'am.

20

BY [REDACTED]

21 Q Okay. So No. 26, exhibit 26. On December 31st of 2020, you raised  
22 concern that the permit request for One Nation Under God and Brian Lewis were just  
23 proxies for "stop the steal," and you were concerned about that because "stop the steal,"  
24 as you've mentioned, is generally known to use more violent tactics.

25 Can you tell us a little bit about what was made of this warning?

1           A    I don't think anything was. I don't know what the discussions were once it  
2 got sent forward, but I know that the permit wasn't revoked.

3           Q    Okay. If you were told, what were some of the concerns regarding having  
4 this sort of information affect whether I guess the permit was ultimately approved?

5           A    So the permit had already been approved at this point. So it was a matter  
6 of raising the concerns to see if the permit would be revoked. I could be wrong about  
7 the permit being approved, but either way, it didn't impact the issuance of the permit or  
8 the approval of the permit.

9           So, I mean, part of the concerns, as I outline here, is that they're in area 8 and  
10 "stop the steal" said they were going to be area 8. They didn't say area 8. They don't  
11 use those words. So they don't know what that is, but they had a map on their websites  
12 of where people should gather and where they had the map, and where they're showing  
13 people to gather was area 8. So that was that concern.

14           And then we had a meeting with Cindy Chafian, who was the Eighty Percent  
15 Coalition that morning that I sent the email, and she indicated that Ali Alexander who was  
16 the head of "stop the steal" would be speaking at the protests on the Capitol. And  
17 so -- and where he is advertising that he's going to be in area 8, that made me put the  
18 two things together.

19           Q    And you may not have been told, but what was your understanding of the  
20 concerns of possibly either reversing or denying the permit based on this?

21           A    My understanding is, one, we had never denied a permit; and, two, it's a  
22 First Amendment protected activity and we have to grant the permit.

23           Q    And is that just cultural, your understanding of why maybe the Capitol Police  
24 had never before denied a permit? It's just historical practice? What were the sort of  
25 values or virtues or thoughts undergirding why you had never before denied a permit?

1           A    That I can't really speak to.

2           Q    Is there anything different now about how permitting is contemplated in  
3 terms of if there are red flags raised with a particular group?

4           A    We still haven't denied a permit, but also things aren't fully opened up  
5 because of the pandemic, but we've -- when there have been concerns, I've raised them.  
6 And I think we've still granted the permits, but certainly, as a department, we're more  
7 prepared. Like, if we know that there's a group coming and they're going to be  
8 problematic -- like the Look Ahead America on September 18th, they were granted their  
9 permit, but we were prepared if things went south.

10          Q    Okay. And has there been more open discussion about the possibility of  
11 denying a permit?

12          A    There has been more discussion, yes.

13          Q    Okay.

14          A    And I do think it will probably happen some day. We just haven't gotten  
15 the right permit request yet.

16          Q    And I think you may have mentioned this, at least as September, but as far  
17 as January 6th, beside denying their permit, did this possibility, you know, that separate  
18 groups were far more coordinated and potentially just one single group particularly of a  
19 violent nature, did that affect the threat landscape or the operational plans if you know  
20 on January 6th?

21          A    I don't know about that, but I will say aside from the concerns that I raised  
22 about this one particular permit, I didn't share those concerns with the other people who  
23 had requested permits on that day.

24          Q    Okay. So, although these two you were troubled by their connections to  
25 "stop the steal," the other groups demonstrating you did not have those same concerns.

1 Is that what you mean?

2 A Correct. And I think one of them also had a permit for January 7th. And,  
3 like, after everything happened, they withdrew and cancelled. So that signals to me that  
4 they were legitimately demonstrating and weren't necessarily intending to be involved  
5 with the activities on January 6th.

6 Q Okay. So is it fair from your answer that you have a visibility into whether  
7 with these two particular demonstrations, there was either a heightened police  
8 presence -- there was something operational that changed as a result of your concern  
9 that they were serving as proxies for "stop the steal"?

10 A I don't know if they did.

11 Q Do you happen to know if, like, your concern was borne out on January 6th,  
12 as in were there issues with these particular demonstrations? Were they apparently  
13 more aligned with other more violent "stop the steal" demonstrators or -- was something  
14 borne out --

15 A Not that I'm aware of, no.

16 Q -- that you were aware of? Okay.

17 [REDACTED] Did you speak to anyone other than Cindy Chafian?

18 Ms. Farnam. Kylie Kremer and Dustin Stanton.

19 BY [REDACTED]

20 Q I'm going to move into just kind of moving forward now, you know,  
21 recommendations moving forward, things that have changed or should change.

22 A Uh-huh.

23 Q First, it's my understanding that, you know, some analysts in IICD sent  
24 internal emails criticizing the preparation for January 6th within the division --

25 A Yes.

1           Q    -- including a claim that, you know, analysts had been reporting for weeks  
2           that patriot groups are commenting on social media, their intention is to storm the U.S.  
3           Capitol with overwhelming numbers, but that they, the analysts, were in the dark about  
4           whether that information was briefed, quote, with the veracity it deserved and not just a  
5           one-time event assessment.

6           A    Uh-huh.

7           Q    What's your response to those criticisms?

8           A    So, with regards to the veracity one and I did receive that email from Eric  
9           Hoar.  He wasn't at any of the briefings so he can't speak to whether or not I briefed it  
10          with the veracity it deserved.  I assure you, I very much did, and I was one of the only  
11          people who did so.

12          With regards to the other criticisms, I know some of them come from Shelly  
13          Redmond and Kelly Ray.  Those two, in particular, were adamant that they did not do  
14          social media research and open-source research.  So, for Kelly Ray, in particular, I have  
15          six written examples where she says:  I don't do that.  I don't do open source.  This is  
16          not my area of expertise.

17          So, even if she did -- I don't recall seeing posts from her saying that this is going to  
18          be bad on January 6th.

19          And then with Shelly Redmond, there were also several written instances where  
20          she talks about how she doesn't have any expertise in social media.

21          So, for them to come forward and say, "Well, we knew about it all along and we  
22          told our leadership," that is inconsistent with the information that I had received from  
23          them in writing.

24          So there's that, and I will say, too, with all the analysts, but particularly those that I  
25          just mentioned, they were given opportunities to learn open-source intelligence

1 collection.

2 And post-January 6th, one of the things that I did -- and this was in the works  
3 before January 6th, too, I identified foundational trainings that all the analysts need to  
4 take because they did lack training and not all of that is their fault.

5 So some of the trainings that they are required to take now is a basic intelligence  
6 analysis course, analytic writing, critical thinking, counterterrorism, open-source  
7 intelligence, and then there's a couple internal ones as well.

8 And so, particularly with Kelly Ray, she was offered those courses several times,  
9 and it wasn't until she was put on a performance improvement plan that she -- and she  
10 was mandated to take it that she took it. So the skill level wasn't there for most of the  
11 analysts to forward that and to raise those concerns, and that coupled with the lack of  
12 desire to improve their professional skills.

13 So, I mean, the assessment is what it is and I think, given the circumstances, we  
14 did communicate that there were going to be armed individuals. We didn't say they  
15 were going to storm the Capitol, and in retrospect, we probably should have included  
16 that, but we did say it was going to be violent. We did say Congress was going to be  
17 targeted, and regardless of what the analysts may or may not have forwarded to me or to  
18 Jack Donahue, we wrote a good assessment. And the assessment could have been  
19 communicated within the department better, but we had the intelligence there, and the  
20 intelligence was there.

21 Q Do you feel that the analysts in IICD were kept in the loop about how what  
22 they were seeing was being communicated across the department and to the leadership?

23 A We probably could have done a better job at that. They were kept in the  
24 loop as far as the intelligence that was being collected because most of them were on a  
25 lot of the messages that showed, you know, the things that we just talked about. I don't

1 necessarily think that they knew about all the meetings that were happening outside of it.

2 Q And I think we answered this, but -- so I'll just give you another opportunity,  
3 did IICD, in your view, did you guys ring the alarm loud enough regarding the intelligence  
4 that you guys were seeing in the lead up to January 6th?

5 A We could've done better and I think, you know, me being new, not knowing  
6 who the players were, also I didn't want to ruffle too many feathers and, I think, if this  
7 happened today, like, I would have been much more vocal and much more adamant  
8 about ensuring that the correct steps were going to be taken.

9 We just had a demonstration recently -- I can't even remember which one it was,  
10 and we didn't have a planning meeting before it or one wasn't scheduled. And I was,  
11 like, are we going to schedule something for this? And then the next day we did have  
12 one. And I think I would have done that, you know, before January 6th, but I didn't feel  
13 like I was in a position where I could do that at that point.

14 Q And when you had written the paragraph for the overall analysis on the  
15 assessment, you had mentioned earlier that you were worried that -- you said, you know,  
16 to the effect of, if this is too strongly worded, let me know. Was that a function of just  
17 being new and being worried about that, or what was your concern? Why did you feel,  
18 like, maybe -- look, if it's too strongly worded, choose Jack's over mine?

19 A Uh-huh. Because it was strongly worded, and I saw what IICD was  
20 producing beforehand, and it wasn't written like that. And so I didn't know what the  
21 reception would be to that. I do stand by what I said in the paragraph, and in  
22 retrospect, it was definitely maybe not even strongly worded enough, but, yeah, I didn't  
23 know how it was going to be perceived by leadership.

24 [REDACTED] Can I ask a followup question?

25 [REDACTED] Go ahead.



1 [REDACTED] So, along the lines of criticism offered by analysts, one of the things  
2 that we've heard is that the changes that you talked about earlier in some of their minds  
3 contributed to why IICD folks had an inability to respond appropriately to January 6th. I  
4 just wanted to get your thoughts on that.

5 Ms. Farnam. The changes were necessary, and I think -- they had to be made.  
6 They had to be made. It was a failing team. It was an underperforming team. The  
7 issue became when people didn't want to get on board with the changes, and that was to  
8 the detriment of the division.

9 [REDACTED] Thank you, ma'am.

10 BY [REDACTED]

11 Q Since January 6th, what changes have been implemented for the better?

12 A So the daily report that used to be issued before January 6th -- actually,  
13 when I first came on board, that daily report it was long. It was like 10, 15 pages. It  
14 had different threat levels. It wasn't reviewed by a supervisor. It was just -- and no  
15 one read it. No one read it.

16 And a couple days after -- it was on November 9th, I believe, I met with the  
17 primary author of that report and I said: You know, I want your feedback on, like, what  
18 we could do differently with this report. And then we just got busy with other stuff.

19 And I know, in the beginning of December, Jack Donahue also sent that person an  
20 example of what NYPD does for their daily report, and he said: Oh, I want something  
21 more along those lines. And then January 6th happened, and for a while, we just  
22 stopped producing it.

23 So the daily report we produce now, it's about 4 pages or so. It has top line  
24 news. It has the demonstrations for today and tomorrow only in all of the city. It  
25 doesn't give any ratings as to this is high or low or whatever. It has the congressional

1 hearings for that day, and it has intelligence of note.

2 So very succinct. That report goes out to all the officers every single day, usually  
3 in the mornings. Sometimes I'm late, but usually in the morning. And then we have a  
4 daily intelligence briefing at noon every day that I give to the leadership and also to the  
5 police boards, so the Sergeant at Arms Office and AOC participate as well.

6 We've standardized a lot of the assessments we do. We have templates for most  
7 of the assessments that we do now. The templates also have questions on them that  
8 the analysts should ask so they don't miss something. So it really tries to walk them  
9 through what they need to collect.

10 And trying to think what else we do. We have better communication with our  
11 partners, both external and internal. And trying to think of some of the other things.  
12 Oh, I go to Roll Call Quarterly now and speak to the officers directly, and that's been  
13 helpful. The officers have cell phones now, and they do send me intelligence.

14 They're, like, you know: I saw this weird posting; I wanted to pass it along to  
15 you.

16 And so I think that's great that they have that, and they feel like they can reach  
17 out to me. So they have, and they do, so --

18 Q And what changes are there still left to accomplish in your mind?

19 A We still -- we're in the process of hiring a lot of new analysts. So that's  
20 helpful. We've hired some since January 6th, and we're hiring additional ones. The  
21 biggest gap right now is I am the only supervisor in IICD who has any sort of intelligence  
22 experience. So I'm a single point of failure, and I recognize that.

23 I have to -- I'm the one responsible for reviewing all the products, and I am always  
24 scared that I am going to miss something or I'm not going to read something closely  
25 enough or something's going to slip by me, because I have to review everything. And so

1 that's a problem. Although, we have two new supervisors that we just hired, so that  
2 should hopefully -- and that have extensive intelligence experience, so that should help  
3 alleviate some of that.

4 We need to improve our cyber intelligence capabilities as a department. I think  
5 it's something that we didn't give a lot of thought to, but we should. We need to work  
6 on our CI and insider threat issues, which, again, I don't think we've done -- given much  
7 attention to that. We need to improve our classified collection capabilities and  
8 consuming of classified materials because that's a gap there; we're really not doing that  
9 very much.

10 Trying to think. Oh, we don't have visibility into the dark web and the deep web,  
11 and so I'm working on finding a company that can help fill that gap for us.

12 Q Pardon if I sort of sum it up in a way that -- answer, however, you like. Was  
13 January 6th a failure of intelligence, in your mind? Was it a failure of heeding or  
14 properly using or posturing with that intelligence? Was it neither? What would you  
15 say was the failure there?

16 A I don't think it was a failure of intelligence; I think it was a failure to  
17 operationalize the intelligence.

18 Q What sort of recommendations should the select committee make to help  
19 avoid this from happening in the future, maybe more zoomed out, more general, if you  
20 have any? Because that is part of our charge is at the end of -- to put out some  
21 recommendations, things we think should change and if you have any lessons learned  
22 from January 6th that you think would be good for us to sort of incorporate into our  
23 report?

24 A I have a list.

25 Q Okay.

1           A     Okay.  So I think we should have some sort of regular conference or  
2 meeting with our law enforcement and Intelligence Community partners, like in an  
3 in-person, regular meeting because we don't do that.  We talk one-off and things like  
4 that.  And we have monthly meetings that are hosted by different agencies like MPD  
5 does one, NTIC does one, the COG does one.  And we will host one, and I have hosted  
6 some before a big event that's going to happen on the hill, but I would like to see some  
7 sort of, like, regular thing that Capitol Police host because that makes us seem more  
8 approachable, and I think it would enhance the sharing that we have.

9           I mentioned the supervisors with intelligence experience already.

10          The realignment of all the intelligence components within the Capitol Police, and I  
11 know that was one of the IGs recommendations.  That makes sense to me, because right  
12 now, even with the TFOs realigned with me, they're still -- they're still getting pulled in a  
13 couple different directions, and they still are in a lot of -- they still have one foot in the  
14 investigations division, and it makes it a little bit confusing and more of a gray area  
15 instead of, like, clear delineation as to what division they work for.

16          Having a robust cyber intelligence task force that includes members from the  
17 House Sergeant at Arms, the Senate Sergeant at Arms, and their IT people, the FBI, CISA,  
18 Capitol Police, and the AOC.  I started -- that's one of the things that I did, too.  I  
19 started bi-weekly meetings with the Intel people here on Capitol Hill, and they found that  
20 useful because I don't think there was much sharing of cyber intelligence prior to that.

21          I mentioned the development of a CI insider threat program and providing an  
22 education program for all of the Hill and also developing reporting mechanisms.  I know  
23 that the FBI has primacy on those sorts of cases, but we don't communicate or they don't  
24 communicate, we don't communicate how those things should be reported.

25          Have position-specific performance standards.  Like, I did that for IICD with our

1 analysts, but that was unusual, and I've gotten some pushback on that. But it makes  
2 sense to me that we would have position -- a specific performance standards.

3 We need to have better HR support, particularly when there's -- not to throw you  
4 under the bus -- OGC support when it comes to problematic employees because a lot of  
5 the issues with some of the analysts that I have on my team have existed for years before  
6 I ever came on board. And, if those problems had been dealt with adequately when  
7 they started to be a problem, we wouldn't be and IICD would not have been in the  
8 situation it was in on January 6th.

9 I mentioned the clear chain of command with the TFOs. Providing clear  
10 distinction between the intelligence analysts, and I know they're thinking about hiring  
11 criminal analysts, and just making sure that they're distinct and that they're different  
12 occupational series, so there isn't some, like, graying of what their roles are. Because if  
13 that gets eroded, then we're going to be back to square one.

14 And then the last thing I have is that we need to have original classification  
15 authority. There are things that the Capitol Police produce, like evacuation routes and  
16 maps and things like that, that should be classified, and they're not. And we don't have  
17 original classification authority, so we should have that.

18 [REDACTED] I want to turn to my colleagues, see if there are any questions  
19 before we wrap up.

20 [REDACTED] Couple of followup questions.

21 So, with specific reference to your recommendation about HR support and about  
22 problems having dealt with adequately before, from your perspective, is that an HR issue  
23 or could it have been the failure of people who are in management at the time not  
24 dealing with the issue?

25 Ms. Farnam. I think it's both. I think, you know, coming from DHS, when there

1 was a problem employee -- so every directorate at my previous agency, which is  
2 equivalent to the bureaus here at Capitol Police, they had a labor and employee relations  
3 specialist who was assigned that directorate. And, when there were problems, they  
4 were the person you called.

5 They walked you through the -- whatever it is, they helped you write if you're  
6 going to write someone up, if you're putting someone on a PIP, they would help you, and  
7 they would be with you hand in hand. And that saved time and money in the end.  
8 Because if you terminate an employee, to have all your ducks in a row beforehand  
9 instead of getting to the end of it and being like, oh, well, actually, you should've done  
10 this and that and that. And so it just is more efficient as an agency to have that  
11 assistance beforehand to give managers those assistance.

12 And, yes, there are always in any fields managers who don't want to have those  
13 conversations because no one likes having those conversations with difficult employees,  
14 but they need to be had. But to have that support because I feel -- it's very different  
15 here in Capitol Police than it was at DHS, and the way things are done with HR is different.  
16 And so, like, if I don't proactively go out and seek the answers, I won't have any support.

1 [2:58 p.m.]

2

BY [REDACTED]

3

4

5

Q Understood. I appreciate that. My final question is, how would you define the stature of the director or associate director for the IICD position within Capitol Police pre-January 6th and post-January 6th?

6

7

8

A It's almost, like, the pendulum has swung from one direction to the next. Like, before, no one really cared about intelligence, and now I do feel a lot of pressure, like: Julie what's going to happen.

9

10

11

12

I'm not clairvoyant. I can tell you what the intelligence says, what the intelligence that's available, and the intelligence that I have. But I can't predict, saying that this will definitely happen. But I do get a lot of pressure and a lot of questions now, like: Tell us. Do we put the fence up? Like it's pressure on me.

13

14

15

Q So it sounds like you feel like the people are listening more to what you say. Would you say people listening more to what IICD says even at the highest levels of the Capitol Police senior leadership team?

16

17

18

A Yes, definitely. And I get questions regularly now when people call me up and say: What do you think about this, and what are you hearing? What are you seeing?

19

20

21

[REDACTED] Thank you, ma'am.

22

BY [REDACTED]:

23

24

25

Q Ms. Farnam, this has been incredibly helpful. And I -- I'm going to apologize because I wants to do a little bit of a deeper dive on the permits and those meetings that you had.

1 A Uh-huh.

2 Q As you probably know, the committee is -- has a mandate and have broken  
3 up into different teams. And one of us is investigating kind of the rally organizers and  
4 attenders. So I wanted to just unpack those meetings that you had.

5 A Uh-huh.

6 Q I know you said you had meetings with Cindy Chafian and Kylie Kremer and  
7 Dustin Stockton.

8 A Yes.

9 Q Were they separate meetings?

10 A Kylie and Dustin was one meeting, and Cindy Chafian was a separate  
11 meeting. But we tended to have them, like, back to back.

12 Q Okay. And what -- it was my understanding before you said this --

13 A Uh-huh.

14 Q -- which is probably why now we're just talking this through --

15 A Uh-huh.

16 Q -- is that there was -- the permits would come through a different division.  
17 So why don't we just start with what the role IICD had in terms of vetting them.

18 A So the permits, these meetings, and I should have clarified, were with a  
19 bunch of different agencies. So MPD was on the meetings.

20 Q Uh-huh.

21 A NPS was on the meetings, and my understanding is the permits were issued  
22 by NPS. They weren't issued by Capitol Police.

23 Q Okay. So, even though National Park Service was issuing it because it was  
24 for The Ellipse, you still attended the meetings.

25 A Yes, we did, uh-huh.



1 Q And what -- how was that set up? Was it, like, a Zoom call or a --

2 A Yes.

3 Q Okay.

4 A I don't think it was Zoom but, like, Webex or something like that.

5 Q Okay. And Kylie Kremer and Devin --

6 A Stockton.

7 Q -- and Stockton were together, Dustin Stockton.

8 A Uh-huh.

9 Q Let's start. Who was the first kind of meeting? Would it have been Cindy  
10 Chafian?

11 A Probably, yes. And she was, as you know, she was the organizer for the  
12 MAGA I and MAGA II. And then they had a -- and she was associated with the Women  
13 for America First. And then they had a falling out, and that's why they split.

14 Q Right. I know that. How do you know that?

15 A I think Cindy Chafian was pretty candid about it. And then we knew that  
16 they had split because they were having two events and -- they were having two events.

17 Q For the 6th.

18 A Yes, uh-huh.

19 Q Did she mention that, though, during -- during kind of whatever the meeting  
20 was?

21 A Yeah, she made some snarky comments. And that's, like, the technical  
22 term for it. But, yeah, she had made some comments, and then I had asked. I  
23 remember asking --

24 Q Just for the record, who was the falling out with? Cindy Chafian fell out  
25 with --

1 A With Women for America First.

2 Q Okay. And who ran that?

3 A Women for America First for the 6th was or at least the organizing and the  
4 meetings that we had were with Kylie Kremer --

5 Q Okay.

6 A -- and Dustin Stockton.

7 Q Got it. Which is why they worked together.

8 A Yes, uh-huh.

9 Q What organization then was Cindy Chafian representing in terms of getting  
10 the permits for?

11 A She called her organization the Eighty Percent Coalition.

12 Q Okay.

13 A I think there was another organization in existence with the same name that  
14 was not affiliated with her because I remember googling it, and there wasn't a huge web  
15 presence for her organization.

16 Q And was there -- what kinds of questions are asked during this meeting in  
17 terms of the permits?

18 A So and this is pretty typical of any of them. We ask how many people are  
19 they expecting. There's a lot of, like, logistical questions, like where are you going to  
20 have Porta Potties and where's your stage going to be, things that don't necessarily  
21 interest me. But I'm interested, and I'm listening in because I want to know are  
22 Members of Congress going to be attending? Are they going to be coming to the  
23 Capitol? Who are your speakers going to be? Things of -- things like that are the  
24 things that interest me.

25 Q So, just because it was at The Ellipse, you still took an interest in what was

1 happening there.

2 A Correct, yes.

3 Q And I know you mentioned Ali Alexander. Who mentioned Ali Alexander?  
4 You never met with him. But who spoke of him?

5 A I don't recall who. I mean, I know he spoke at the MAGA I and MAGA II,  
6 and I know Cindy Chafian spoke about him in relation to those. So I don't remember  
7 who mentioned him.

8 Q Was he of interest to the IICD?

9 A Yes, very much so.

10 Q Were you guys tracking him in anyway?

11 A We were tracking "stop the steal." So indirectly tracking him.

12 Q Were you familiar with -- what organization did he lead?

13 A "Stop the steal."

14 Q What about did you learn of an organization called One Nation Under God?

15 A It sounds familiar, uh-huh. But I primarily associated him with the "stop  
16 the steal" movement.

17 Q But because the "stop the steal" did not have a permit --

18 A Uh-huh.

19 Q -- and I think [REDACTED] asked you these questions -- was that part of your  
20 concern, knowing that January 6th was essentially a "stop the steal" rally?

21 A Yeah, yes.

22 Q And what was your belief after speaking with Cindy Chafian and Kylie Kremer  
23 and Dustin Stockton?

24 A I mean, I was definitely worried. I know someone from MPD, I think it was  
25 Commander Glover, kind of, he -- he said something along the lines to Cindy Chafian:

1 Every single time you come in town, we have problems. And I want to make sure that  
2 you are making sure that your participants are going to behave themselves.

3 And he didn't say "behave themselves" but something along those lines.

4 Q Who said that?

5 A Commander Glover.

6 Q From Capitol Police?

7 A No. MPD.

8 Q Okay.

9 A Uh-huh.

10 Q And what was the response?

11 A And she's, like: All the problems were not my participants, people who  
12 participated in mine. I can't be responsible for what they do after the rallies. And  
13 something along those lines.

14 Q Was there any pointed question about Ali Alexander at any of those  
15 meetings?

16 A Not that I recall.

17 Q And how many meetings were there? There was one with Cindy Chafian.

18 A There were a couple. I'd have to go back and look at my calendar, but  
19 there was more than one.

20 Q That would be helpful. What -- was there an estimate of crowds during  
21 these conversations?

22 A Yes, there was.

23 Q And what was the outer number?

24 A I'd have to look. I know for I believe it was The Ellipse one they estimated  
25 20,000. It could have been the Freedom Plaza. I'd have to go back and look at my

1 notes.

2 Q Okay.

3 A Uh-huh.

4 Q That would be helpful.

5 A Uh-huh.

6 Q And were they all kind -- what was your sense? That they were  
7 coordinating with each other?

8 A Not at all, no.

9 Q Why do you say that?

10 A The impression that I got was that Cindy Chafian hated Kylie Kremer and  
11 Dustin Stanton.

12 Q And that's from what she said in the comments?

13 A I mean, yeah, there was that. And then there was the falling out, and there  
14 was a discussion as to what caused the falling out.

15 And I remember having to drop off the call and then calling up MPD, Shane  
16 Lamond, Lieutenant Lamond, and asking him, like: What happened? I had to cut out.  
17 It was, like: Drama and scandal.

18 And he said there was an argument over one of the bus rides at the last march,  
19 and that was the impetus for the falling out.

20 Q But was the impression for anyone during -- at the end of this that there was  
21 an overall organizer? Or did it seem like disparate groups were coming together on  
22 January 6th?

23 A Not an overall organizer, but there was an overall population they were both  
24 drawing from, and it was the same population, if that makes sense.

25 Q No, that totally makes sense.

1 A Uh-huh.

2 Q But there wasn't one -- was there a sense that there would be one event or  
3 different events going on at the same time?

4 A Different events, different events because Cindy Chafian had her own  
5 speakers -- and I forget who they were -- for the 6th. And then the President, of course,  
6 was the big speaker at The Ellipse.

7 Q When did it all come together? Did you -- did you realize it before  
8 January 6th?

9 A Yes, yes. I mean, I think we always knew, even with the division between  
10 Women for America First and Cindy Chafian, we always thought that it was going to be  
11 the same people, and the people may go between events. And it was always going to  
12 attract the same crowd, both events.

13 Q If we can -- yeah, if you could check your -- the notes, if they had given any  
14 sense of the crowd numbers, that would be helpful.

15 And then did you, after these conversations with -- well, let me go on to Kylie  
16 Kremer and Dustin Stockton. Was there anything unusual that you remember from  
17 those conversations?

18 A With Kylie and Dustin, I felt that they were being cagey, like they weren't  
19 giving us the full picture, because I know we asked pointed questions about, like, is the  
20 President coming? Who's been invited? What are the plans? And they were not  
21 forthcoming with that information.

22 Q Was there any follow up with that?

23 A There eventually was, but I think we did the follow up through Secret Service  
24 and not through them.

25 Q Did you learn that they were -- there was a separate security group that they

1 had hired or --

2 A I'd have to go back and look at my notes.

3 Q Okay.

4 A That doesn't sound unusual to me because a lot of -- like even Cindy Chafian  
5 had her own security. And most demonstrations that happen in the city, especially big  
6 ones, will hire security. So that's not unusual.

7 Q Okay. I think that -- I think there's probably more questions that I'm not  
8 covering. But we'll follow up with you about them.

9 But I think the big -- the big question was whether -- I guess did you have  
10 any -- knowing that Ali Alexander had not asked for a permit for "stop the steal"  
11 organization but having had these conversations with Kylie Kremer, Cindy Chafian, and  
12 such, did you feel that -- what did you think in terms of the anticipation or potential for  
13 violence?

14 A I thought there was going to be violence for sure. I mean, the groups that  
15 Women for America First, which at that time was Kylie and Dustin, and then Cindy  
16 Chafian and the groups that she attracted, and even just like the speakers they've  
17 had -- they had some, like, like Alex Jones. And Ali Alexander was one of the speakers  
18 previously. These are, this is my opinion, these are people who are not in touch with  
19 reality. And they have large followings, and their followers believe what they say.

20 Q Yes. That's -- I'm wondering whether and how that played out  
21 operationally for you all, the Capitol Police.

22 A I mean, I raised the concerns particularly with "stop the steal." And I know  
23 there were discussions about the map that they had on their website, indicating that they  
24 were going to be on Capitol Grounds. There was also a discussion about potential  
25 members speaking at the "stop the steal" event. And what operational decisions were

1 made in relation to that, I don't know. But I know it was communicated.

2 Q Do you remember the name Nathan Martin?

3 A I don't.

4 Q Okay. So, if we could just follow up with your notes, that would be great.

5 And the only other -- other thing that I have, because this is really -- this has been  
6 incredibly insightful, and I really do appreciate it. I'm just -- I just want you to be able to  
7 answer as much as you can, whether it's your training or your experience.

8 A Uh-huh.

9 Q And I know you said you mentioned you kind of came as this with fresh eyes,  
10 looking at this as domestic terrorism. But what was your training before for you to have  
11 been able to kind of get that paragraph particularly so right?

12 A This is going to be like anticlimactic because, like, I mean, I was traditionally  
13 an immigration officer. And so and that's, like, I started -- before the government. I  
14 worked for the International Rescue Committee in their Immigration Clinic. I worked at  
15 Emerson College in their international student -- students' office, doing the immigration  
16 work there. And I had an epiphany. Like why don't I do this for the government?  
17 And so I applied. I applied 2 weeks before I graduated grad school. And I was, like, if I  
18 don't get this job, I don't have a Plan B.

19 So, fortunately, I did, and then I had a 15-year career in immigration. And I will  
20 say, before I get into the intelligence part, there is a lot of crossover between the skills  
21 needed to be good at my job in immigration and the skills needed to be good at my job in  
22 intelligence. And that is be there's a lot of fraud, as you know, and there's lot of  
23 national security issues in immigration.

24 And so looking at information with a critical eye I think is what helped me become  
25 good at intelligence. And so I had worked for several years as the advisor to the



1 Director of Field Operations at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and then I  
2 switched over to the Fraud Detection and National Security Division about 3 years before  
3 I came over here.

4 And that's when I started to get into intel. And I was selected for that position  
5 not because of my great intelligence skills but because I was a good leader. And they  
6 had an underperforming team, a team that needed to be reorganized. And they  
7 thought I would be good at that. So they did send me down to FLETC in Charleston for,  
8 like, basic intelligence training. And I did that training.

9 And then I was very focused on training my analysts as well. So almost weekly I  
10 would have trainings for them, and sometimes they would be trainings on specific  
11 classified systems. We'd get the owners of the systems to come in and show us how to  
12 do searches and things like that. Sometimes they would be trainings on like we did a  
13 training on naming conventions in Iraq. So we would make sure that we were searching  
14 for names correctly and exhausting our searches.

15 And then some of them were, like, soft skills. Like I had emotional intelligence  
16 training and all of those things. So I was very focused on training, and I attended almost  
17 all of the trainings as well. And so I got to be quite good at what I did as far as finding  
18 information in the intelligence realm.

19 And I think, to be good at intelligence, you have to have two characteristics. One  
20 is you need to have a natural curiosity, and I do. My mom always told me I was nosey  
21 when I was little, and now I've made a career out of it. And then you also be -- have to  
22 be comfortable in the gray areas because there is nothing in intelligence that's black and  
23 white or very rarely.

24 And so taking those skills here to the Capitol Police, I think, looking at what I was  
25 seeing, it was -- I tend to be a very, like, logical person. And so I look at things from a

1 logical sense, and I don't try to fill in the gaps necessarily.

2 So what I saw is what I wrote and very -- I guess it's very literal. And, to be  
3 honest, I was sitting in my bed, writing that, and I wrote it in about less than 5 minutes.  
4 And I was, like: Okay, here it is. This is -- there wasn't -- I mean, I just wrote what I  
5 saw. There wasn't a whole lot of, like, analysis and thought, like let me wordsmith this.  
6 And it was just literally less than 5 minutes.

7 Q This is my final question, I promise. What should they have done? As  
8 everyone says, intelligence drives operations.

9 A Uh-huh.

10 Q What should they have done, Capitol Police, based upon that January 3rd  
11 special assessment?

12 A They should have -- they should have coordinated with partners better.  
13 They should have worked with Congress to see about either locking down the building or  
14 at -- which I don't think we've ever done but taken some of those steps to secure the  
15 building more than just having people outside of the building. They should have -- they  
16 should have been ready for war, and they weren't. They were -- they were very much  
17 outnumbered. That's what it came out to is they were outnumbered.

18 And so I think, if they had been better prepared and they had coordinated more  
19 with other partners, whether it be law enforcement partners or Congress as a partner, I  
20 think they would have been better prepared.

21 [REDACTED] Thank you. Thank you so much.

22 [REDACTED] So my final question just, is there anything I didn't ask you or that  
23 none of us asked you that you wish to share with the committee?

24 Ms. Farnam. I don't think so. Thank you.

25 [REDACTED] Thank you so very much. That will end our interview.

1 Ms. Farnam. Okay. Thank you.

2 [Whereupon, at 3:16 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing \_\_\_\_ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

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Witness Name

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Date