




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

DECEMBER 19, 2022



Management Advisory: DoD Restoration Costs to Repair Facilities After Supporting Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome

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**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

December 19, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

**SUBJECT: Management Advisory: DoD Restoration Costs to Repair Facilities
After Supporting Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome
(Report No. DODIG-2023-040)**

The purpose of this management advisory is to inform DoD leadership of the circumstances that arose from the substantial restoration activities at the temporary housing sites that supported Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) and Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). The audit team conducted the work on this advisory with integrity, objectivity, and independence, as required by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General.

The DoD installation restoration activities presented in this advisory were identified while conducting fieldwork in support of our ongoing "Audit of DoD Reporting on Obligations and Expenditures in Support of Operation Allies Welcome" (Project No. D2022-D000FI-0095.000). The objective of this audit is to determine whether the DoD properly recorded OAW obligations and expenditures for their intended purpose. Because the circumstances identified in this advisory are not directly related to our announced audit objective, we are issuing this advisory and will issue another product related to DoD's reporting on obligations and expenditures in support of OAW.

The audit team conducted several interviews to understand the DoD's financing of restoration activities, the OAW financial reporting process, and the costs incurred to support the mission. The audit team also visited Camp Atterbury to view the damage to facilities sustained during the OAW mission. DoD Components dedicated significant resources and infrastructure to support the OAW mission. However, DoD Components encountered challenges in obtaining funds to restore damaged facilities, equipment, and resupply consumables.

The interagency partners, as well as the commands directly and indirectly responsible for the relocation of Afghan evacuees, should read this advisory to be aware of the challenges and opportunities related to the restoration activities for DoD installations during OAR and OAW. Additionally, this management advisory serves as a lessons learned for future operations related to using DoD installations for humanitarian aid.

We considered management's comments on a discussion draft copy of this management advisory when preparing this final memorandum. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships concurred with the recommendations, but also stated that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer need to be the action officers for four of the five recommendations. As a result, we updated the recommendations to reflect the action officers identified by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships. We request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships provide formal comments on the recommendations in response to the final memorandum.

A written response is required. If you have any questions, please contact me at



A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Lorin T. Venable".

Lorin T. Venable, CPA
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Financial Management and Reporting

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Operation Allies Refuge

On July 14, 2021, the President announced OAR with the Department of State (DOS) as the lead Federal agency, to support the relocation of Afghan evacuees who previously supported the U.S. Government and were in the process of completing their Special Immigrant Visa applications.¹ Applicants' immediate family members were also included in the relocation effort. During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom's Sentinel, the U.S. Government employed Afghans in supporting roles to assist in these operations. Due to that employment, some Afghans, their families, and close friends faced serious and ongoing threats.

According to a statement by the President on August 30, 2021, the DoD executed the largest airlift in U.S. history, evacuating more than 120,000 people from Afghanistan in just 17 days. The DOS activated the Afghanistan Coordination Task Force and requested and received DoD support in the form of temporary housing, sustainment, and other support at suitable DoD facilities both within and outside the continental United States.²

Operation Allies Welcome

On August 29, 2021, the President announced that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would serve as the lead Federal agency for OAW and coordinate efforts across the U.S. Government to resettle vulnerable Afghans in the United States, including those who worked for the U.S. and Coalition forces since 2001.³ The DHS processed and screened Afghans in coordination with the DoD, the DOS, and other Federal agencies. The DOS and the Department of Health and Human Services were responsible for the final resettlement and integration efforts.

DoD Roles and Responsibilities Supporting OAR and OAW

Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017 explains that the Secretary of Defense cannot sign a memorandum of agreement with another Federal agency to provide a vacant facility for temporary housing support unless the Secretary first submits to Congress a certification that doing so will not negatively affect military training, operations, readiness, or other military requirements, including National Guard and Reserve readiness. On July 19, 2021, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to make this certification. In August and September 2021, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed USNORTHCOM and the U.S. European Command to provide temporary housing, sustainment, and support both within and outside the continental

¹ In 2014, Congress amended the Special Immigrant Visa program to provide U.S. visas for translators and interpreters who performed "sensitive and trusted activities" for the U.S. Government in Afghanistan.

² The DOS led the Afghanistan Coordination Task Force that included experts from various U.S. Government agencies, including the DoD, the DHS, and the Department of Health and Human Services.

³ OAR was the operation to airlift at-risk Afghan evacuees, who supported the DoD, out of Afghanistan. OAW was an effort across the U.S. Government to support these Afghan evacuees as they resettled in the United States.

U.S. for Afghan evacuees.⁴ The Deputy's direction specified that the DoD would provide support, on both a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis, to the DOS in accordance with the Economy Act of 1932, as amended.⁵ In addition, the DoD directive stipulated that before any construction activities, DoD installations must first provide the DOS with a permit authorizing use of the area to house Afghan Special Immigrant Visa applicants.

The DoD transported Afghan evacuees and Special Immigrant Visa applicants to intermediate staging bases located in several countries, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, Italy, Bahrain, and Germany. These staging bases served as emergency processing centers. Afghan evacuees were screened at the staging bases before being transported to DoD-provided temporary housing facilities at eight DoD installations—Fort Bliss, Texas; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JBMDL), New Jersey; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Lee, Virginia; Marine Corps Base (MCB) Quantico, Virginia; and Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico. The Afghan evacuees and Special Immigrant Visa applicants departed the DoD installations and were resettled in their new communities across the nation.

The Secretary of Defense directed DoD installations not to use Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds for expenses related to restoring facilities that were used for the OAW mission or for replenishing consumed DoD stock (such as mattresses) until after all DoD support to Afghans at any DoD support location was complete.⁶ Additionally, the Secretary required DoD installations to verify that such support was not already accounted for elsewhere.

Directives for Restoration Costs

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a February 8, 2022 policy memorandum, instructed installations to develop restoration cost estimates while the DoD was simultaneously creating policies for what would be allowable costs for reimbursement. Specifically, the Deputy Secretary of Defense instructed DoD Components to submit restoration estimates for DoD installations for review and approval by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships. The DoD restoration cost estimates were reviewed by a group of DoD restoration reviewers that included the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

⁴ Office of Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Northern Command, "Authorization to Provide Support to Department of State Through Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in the United States to Afghan Special Immigration Visa Applicants, Their Families, and Other Individuals at Risk," August 24, 2021.

Office of Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Commander, U.S. European Command, "Authorization to Provide Support to Department of State Through Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in the United States to Afghan Special Immigration Visa (SIV) Applicants, Their Families, and Other Individuals at Risk," September 21, 2021.

⁵ The Economy Act of 1932, as amended (31 U.S.C. § 1535) permits one Federal agency to request support of another so long as requested services cannot be provided more cheaply or conveniently by contract.

⁶ Summary of Authorities and Decisions: DoD Support to Afghan Evacuation, October 7, 2021.

In support of OAW, the DoD used OHDACA funds to establish, maintain, and operate facilities both inside and outside the continental U.S. and provide temporary shelters, food, potable water, hygiene facilities, latrines, basic medical care, specialty medical care, medical supplies, immunizations, medical equipment, sanitation requirements, and bedding.

for Global Partnerships, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (USD[C]/CFO), Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]), and DoD Office of General Counsel (OGC). The DoD restoration reviewers determined whether OHDACA funds could be used for restoration. These DoD restoration reviewers coordinated with the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to finalize the OAW restoration amounts. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) personnel provided a directive on the OHDACA funding requirements. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency was responsible for approving the use of the funds by sending the funds to the Military Services. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment is responsible for developing and executing policies, guidance, and procedures for construction, operations and maintenance, and repair of DoD facilities. These responsibilities include real property maintenance; facility operations; military construction; and facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization.

Development of Restoration Cost Estimates

Eleven DoD installations submitted estimates to reset facilities, equipment, and consumables to pre-OAW conditions. DoD Components developed an initial estimate on March 25, 2022, totaling \$362.6 million. The DoD restoration reviewers made multiple assessments resulting in reduced estimates that we received in May 2022. Table 1 provides the restoration cost estimates for each DoD Component, showing the estimated restoration for facilities, equipment, and replacement of consumable items used.⁷

Table 1. Initial DoD OAW Restoration Cost Estimates From March 25, 2022 (in Millions)

DoD Component	Facilities	Equipment/Consumables	Total
Army	\$174.90	\$13.91	\$188.81
Navy	3.21	0.12	3.33
Air Force	63.0	87.14	150.14
Marine Corps	16.37	3.98	20.35
Total	\$257.48	\$105.15	\$362.63

Source: The Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Air Force.

The DoD restoration reviewers identified costs that were not in accordance with a directive for OHDACA funding, and reduced the estimate from \$362.6 million to \$270.4 million. Ramstein Air Base (AB) saw the greatest difference in its request, with the DoD restoration reviewers denying most of the estimated \$25 million reimbursement from damages to the airfield (used

⁷ A facility is a real property entity consisting of buildings, structures, pavement, camps, airfields, staging areas, relief centers, utilities, and associated lease and rental agreements. Equipment is personal property with an expected service life of two years or more that is functionally complete for its intended purpose, durable, and nonexpendable. Examples include vehicle and safety equipment. Consumables are items ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use. Examples include medical supplies, office supplies, cleaning supplies, field rations, mattresses, tents, cots, and furniture.

as a staging area during the evacuation) and \$41.1 million in equipment. The DoD restoration reviewers approved \$2.2 million for Ramstein AB for equipment and resupply of consumable items. A description of the damages from Air Force officials explained that the damage by guests was unrepairable. Air Force officials described tables, chairs, and cots broken by guests and tents and cots ruined by spray paint, human biological matter, and holes. The Air Force described materials as “completely depleted, such that no materials remain available for other real world missions.” In another example, Holloman AFB also experienced a reduction in its request related to medical equipment with a value of \$18 million. The DoD restoration reviewers denied \$84.1 million of the Air Force’s total request primarily because the Air Force began replacing damaged items before restoration directive was in place. Figure 1 shows the Ramstein AB tents when they were in use by Afghan evacuees during OAR and OAW.



Figure 1. Tents used by evacuees at Ramstein Air Base
Source: 86th Airlift Wing, Ramstein AB.

In addition, the DoD restoration reviewers denied \$2.5 million of the Navy’s initial restoration estimate because its installations at Naval Station (NS) Rota, Spain and Naval Air Station (NAS) Sigonella, Italy, did not provide a permit to DOS to temporarily house Afghan evacuees, while the Navy hosted refugees at two intermediate staging bases. DoD restoration reviewers determined that OHDACA funds were not authorized for construction activities outside the scope of DOS-permitted areas; therefore, the costs to restore Navy facilities were removed from the estimate.

The final restoration estimate across DoD Components decreased from \$270.4 million to \$259.5 million because the DoD restoration reviewers determined that OHDACA was not authorized to fund construction activities for facilities and roads that were not within scope of the DOS permit. The initial estimates included costs to repair roads damaged by the heavy

flow of traffic to access DOS-permitted areas. Therefore, the DoD restoration reviewers removed construction costs to repair roads and facilities outside of the DOS-permitted areas from the final estimate. Table 2 provides the final DoD restoration cost estimate by DoD installation. In May 2022, DoD restoration reviewers approved \$259.5 million in OHDACA funding for restoration and repair activities at DoD installations that supported OAW.

Table 2. Final OAW Restoration Cost Estimates for DoD Installations, as of May 12, 2022 (in Millions)

Army Location	Facilities	Equipment/ Consumables	Total	Total Number of Afghan Evacuees
Fort Bliss	\$0.35	\$0.22	\$0.57	11,472
Fort Lee	0.63	0.00	0.63	3,108
Fort McCoy	140.96	4.60	145.56	12,706
Fort Pickett	19.97	6.23	26.20	10,492
Camp Atterbury	13.10	2.85	15.95	7,192
Army Total	\$175.01	\$13.90	\$188.91	44,970
Navy Location	Facilities	Equipment/ Consumables	Total	Total Number of Afghan Evacuees
NS Rota	\$0.00	\$0.72	\$0.72	Temporary Location*
NAS Sigonella	0.00	0.09	0.09	Temporary Location
Navy Total	\$0.00	\$0.81	\$0.81	0
Air Force Location	Facilities	Equipment/ Consumables	Total	Total Number of Afghan Evacuees
Holloman AFB	\$5.83	\$1.30	\$7.13	7,324
JBMDL	47.6	0.10	47.70	16,503
Ramstein AB	0.00	2.20	2.20	Temporary Location
Air Force Total	\$53.43	\$3.60	\$57.03	23,827
Marine Corps Location	Facilities	Equipment/ Consumables	Total	Total Number of Afghan Evacuees
MCB Quantico	\$9.60	\$3.10	\$12.70	5,081
Marine Corps Total	\$9.60	\$3.10	\$12.70	5,081
Totals	\$238.04	\$21.41	\$259.45	73,878

* NS Rota, NAS Sigonella, and Ramstein AB are all outside the continental United States locations that were used as temporary staging locations for Afghan refugees before arrival in the United States. We did not include these locations in the total number of evacuees, as it would mean double counting individuals.

Source: USD(C)/CFO.

On June 10, 2022, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy signed a policy memorandum authorizing the use of OHDACA funds limited to specified repair and restoration activities as a result of humanitarian assistance (HA) in support of OAR and OAW. The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy's policy memorandum mentioned that OHDACA funds are not to be used for military construction without review and approval from the USD(P) in coordination with the DoD restoration reviewers.

The policy memorandum limits use of OHDACA funds to repair and restoration activities on DoD installations that had permitted DOS use related to OAW. DoD-permitted sites are only authorized to repair and restore activities that the DoD deems necessary to bring the permitted areas to conditions that existed prior to OAW. OHDACA funds cannot be used to improve or upgrade facilities with the exception that it is a necessary collateral effect of the authorized construction or repair activity. Finally, the policy mentioned that OHDACA funds may be used to repair or replace equipment consumed in the course of providing humanitarian support to DOS.

Impacts to Military Readiness

The DoD first provided directives to Components in February 2022 and approved estimates and issued more directives in June 2022, which was 5 months after refugees left some installations. In addition, there were at least \$2.5 million in damages to Navy installations that did not have permits to house refugees, leading to costs that will have to be paid for with non-OHDACA funding. DoD installations that supported the OAW mission incurred damages to facilities and equipment, and used consumables that impacted military readiness levels at those installations.

DoD installations reported that facilities and equipment were overused, damaged, and remained in various degrees of disrepair, resulting in a costly maintenance effort. DoD installations need to restore their facilities and equipment to a condition that enables them to conduct trainings, prepare for future events, and return to normal base operations. For example in March 2022, Indiana National Guard personnel moved a training exercise from Camp Atterbury, Indiana, to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, due to damages at Camp Atterbury caused by supporting the OAW mission.

Army Damage Assessment

The Army reported and received approval for \$188.9 million in OHDACA funding to restore Fort Bliss, Fort Lee, Fort McCoy, Fort Pickett, and Camp Atterbury to pre-OAW conditions. Fort Bliss received approval for \$575,000 in OHDACA funds to restore facilities and replace mattresses and beds. Fort Lee received approval for \$632,000 in OHDACA funds to repair or replace doors, ceiling tiles, and electrical systems. Fort Pickett received approval for \$26.2 million in OHDACA funds to clean and paint interior and exterior facilities, repair walls, doors, plumbing, HVAC systems, fire alarm systems, and replace consumables.

Camp Atterbury received approval for \$16 million in OHDACA funds to replace mattresses and furniture and repair floors, doors, windows, plumbing, fire alarm systems, and landscaping. Figure 2 shows some of the damages to Camp Atterbury facilities.



Figure 2. Images of structural damages sustained at facilities that housed Afghan Refugees at Camp Atterbury, Indiana
Source: The Indiana National Guard.

Fort McCoy's Restoration Estimate

The DoD restoration cost reviewers approved Fort McCoy's restoration cost estimate of \$145.6 million, which represents 56.1 percent of the total restoration costs for all 11 sites listed and 77 percent of the Army's restoration cost estimate. As depicted in Table 2, Fort McCoy housed 12,706 Afghan refugees, or 17.2 percent of the total amount of Afghan refugees housed on DoD installations. The majority of the costs in the Fort McCoy estimate come from reported significant damages to the 213 buildings housing Afghan refugees. Fort McCoy reported that all of the barracks needed repairs or replacement of walls, ceilings, floors, doors, bathrooms, plumbing, electrical systems, heating, ventilation, air conditioning systems, and exterior siding.

Fort McCoy's barracks used during OAW were built in the 1940s, during World War II. Figure 3 is an example of the barracks that housed Afghan evacuees during OAW and an example of the plumbing issues that were commonly found after the conclusion of the OAW mission.



Figure 3. Fort McCoy Barracks used during OAW and a clogged pipe
Source: Fort McCoy.

During audit work for the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) management advisory on Fort McCoy, installation/base personnel provided the audit team, in November 2021, a restoration cost estimate of \$150 million. During that review, the DoD OIG audit team requested supporting documentation for the estimate, and Fort McCoy personnel responded that there was no supporting documentation for the \$150 million.⁸ In June 2022, Army officials provided the audit team a spreadsheet detailing restoration costs for each of the 213 barracks. Each of the Fort McCoy barracks damage descriptions was the same for 212 out of the 213 buildings. For all but one building, Fort McCoy's restoration cost estimate was \$633,793 per building. The total cost estimate to repair or restore the Fort McCoy barracks is \$134.8 million. For comparison, Fort Pickett and Camp Atterbury housed Afghan refugees in permanent structures and had \$42 million in damages combined while housing 17,684 Afghan refugees. Fort McCoy's reported cost estimate is over three times the reported cost of Fort Pickett and Camp Atterbury combined, while housing only 12,706 Afghan refugees. Due to the high costs of the Fort McCoy estimate, we have concerns over whether the reported damages to the barracks and other structures at Fort McCoy were a result of the OAW mission or were pre-existing to OAW.

On June 14, 2022, Fort McCoy signed an agreement with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for \$138.8 million, funded with OHDACA funds, for the repair and restoration of the 212 Fort McCoy barrack buildings.⁹ Subsequently, USACE issued a \$2 million contract to assess whether damages to the barracks were caused by the OAW mission and to develop cost proposals for housing repairs, replacement, and renovation for the 212 existing barracks used for Afghan refugee family dwelling.

The intent of the agreement with USACE was to restore the barracks to pre-OAW condition to the maximum extent possible. According to the terms of the Fort McCoy permit with DOS, and rules placed on the usage of OHDACA funds, Fort McCoy must be diligent in its use of OHDACA funds to restore the barracks and other Fort McCoy buildings to a July 2021 standard, before its OAW mission. Any repairs, restoration, or reconstruction beyond that standard should be funded with either Operations and Maintenance or Military Construction funds. Similarly, all DoD installations must consider whether conditions related to facility repairs existed before the OAW mission and should not use OHDACA funds if they determine that the facility conditions existed before the OAW mission. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships should review the USACE contractor's assessment of whether damages incurred to the Fort McCoy barracks happened during the OAW mission and determine whether the usage of OHDACA funds is in-line with the purposes of OHDACA funds. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, in coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships, should develop

⁸ Report No. DODIG-2022-063, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin," February 15, 2022.

⁹ Fort McCoy will restore 212 of 213 buildings through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers agreement. Fort McCoy will restore the remaining built in 2011 through Fort McCoy's existing contracts.

policy for future humanitarian aid operations that require DoD installations to perform assessments of buildings that will be used before the housing of DOS-supported operations. The assessments will form the basis for restoration reimbursement after the DOS supported operation is complete.

Air Force Damage Assessment

The Air Force initially reported \$150.1 million in restoration costs at Holloman AFB, JBMDL, and Ramstein AB, Germany. The Air Force reported damages, such as tents and cots that were broken, stained with spray-paint, or contaminated with human biological matter. In addition, the Air Force reported depleted medical supplies and materials, structural damage to the airfield asphalt and infrastructure, broken water systems (sinks, toilet, and floor drains), and broken or missing locks, doors, windows, and fixtures. JBMDL officials reported that guests damaged facility water systems by forcing large items into pipes, causing clogs. Air Force officials stated these clogged water systems were so excessive that the facility managers could not repair the clogs with conventional plumbing tools. DoD restoration reviewers removed items worth \$93.1 million from the Air Force's restoration costs request because items were not in permitted areas, and the Air Force began replacing damaged items before restoration directives were in place. The DoD approved the Air Force's final estimate of \$57.0 million in OHDACA funding to repair 42 facilities and replace consumables, as reflected in Table 2.

Navy Damage Assessment

The Navy initially reported \$3.3 million to restore facilities, equipment, and consumables at NS Rota and NAS Sigonella. However, the DoD only approved \$810,000 in OHDACA funds on the final estimate to replace consumables because the Navy did not issue permits to the DOS to support OAW; therefore, the costs to restore the facilities were removed.

Marine Corps Damage Assessment

The Marine Corps initially reported \$20.3 million in restoration costs at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. The initial estimate included damaged roadways; however, these costs were removed from the final estimate based on the DoD restoration reviewers' determination that OHDACA was not authorized for construction activities for facilities and roads that were not within scope of the DOS permit. The DoD approved \$12.7 million in OHDACA funding on the final estimate to restore roofing, heating, ventilation, air conditioning systems, floors, walls, fixtures, and a parade deck, and to replace tents, mattresses, doors, walls, and safety equipment.

Conclusion on Restoration Funding in Support of OAR and OAW

DoD installations sustained millions of dollars in damages and depleted supplies that affected their normal operations and military readiness. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities mentioned in a June 2022 memorandum related to the use of OHDACA funds for restoration activities that restoration cost directives were needed for installations to mitigate adverse impacts to military readiness, summer training, and exercises. Although the magnitude of restoration costs was unforeseen, DoD personnel coordinated and approved \$259.5 million in OHDACA funds to repair facilities and equipment, and replace consumables to pre-OAW conditions. However, based on the initial estimates compared to the final estimate, DoD Components involved with OAW will need to pay \$103.1 million from their own operation and maintenance or military construction appropriations to cover OAW damages.

The DoD should have risk assessment procedures in place to identify and plan for future temporary housing and facility usage operations, such as OAW and OAR, so installations can return to normal operations in a timelier manner. As OHDACA funds are authorized for repair and restoration activities, DoD Components must limit the use to damages that occurred as a result of the operation being supported. The DoD should oversee the restoration projects to ensure the funds are used within OHDACA parameters. Additionally, DoD installations must ensure they have permits in place before hosting interagency temporary housing and facility usage agreements, or they risk not being reimbursed for repair and restoration of the facilities. The DoD should also develop a plan for restoring and funding the restoration of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps facilities, equipment, and consumables used during OAR and OAW, but not approved for OHDACA funding, and provide that plan to the DoD OIG.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships review the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers contractor's assessment of whether damages incurred to the Fort McCoy barracks during the Operation Allies Welcome mission and determine whether the usage of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds are in-line with the purposes of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds. Any repairs, restoration, or reconstruction beyond that standard should be funded with either Operations and Maintenance or Military Construction funds.

Recommendation 2

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, in coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships:

- a. develop risk assessment procedures to identify and plan for future temporary housing and facility usage operations, such as those experienced during Operation Allies Welcome and Operation Allies Refuge, so installations can return to normal operations in a timelier manner.**
- b. create policies to ensure that DoD installations have permits in place before hosting interagency temporary housing and facility usage agreements, or they risk not being reimbursed for repair and restoration of the facilities.**
- c. develop policy for future humanitarian aid operations that require DoD installations to perform assessments of buildings that will be used before the housing of Department of State supported operations. The assessments will form the basis for restoration reimbursement after the Department of State supported operation is complete.**

Recommendation 3

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, in coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships develop and implement a plan for restoring and funding the restoration of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps facilities, equipment, and consumables used during Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome but not approved for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funding and provide that plan to the DoD Office of Inspector General.



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