SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: CASSIDY HUTCHINSON

Monday, June 20, 2022
Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HT-64A/B, The Capitol,
commencing at 1:04 p.m.
Present: Representative Cheney.
Appearances:

For the SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL:

[REDACTED] SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

For CASSIDY HUTCHINSON:

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All right. Good afternoon. It’s June 20th, and this is a transcribed interview of Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson, conducted by the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol pursuant to House Resolution 503.

Ms. Hutchinson, I know we’ve met before, but if you don't mind introducing yourself for today.

Ms. Hutchinson. Cassidy Jacqueline Hutchinson, H-u-t-c-h-i-n-s-o-n.

Thank you very much.

And, Counsel, if you could introduce yourself today?

Mr. Hunt. Thank you, yes. Jody Hunt, J-o-d-y, H-u-n-t. Officially and formally Joseph but known as "Jody," so --

Thank you, Mr. Hunt.

And my name is I'm a senior investigative counsel for the select committee. And with me today is Representative Liz Cheney, who's vice chair for the select committee.

We have met a number of times before -- in February, March, and May -- and the ground rules today are going to be the same as they were then.

But, just to briefly go over them, I'll remind you that there's an official reporter transcribing the record of the interview. So please do wait until each question is complete before you start your answer, and we'll let you answer before we start our question.

The stenographer can't take down nonverbal responses, so please use audible and verbal responses rather than things like shaking your head.

And we do ask that you could provide complete answers based on your best
recollection. And if there's anything that's not clear, feel free to ask us for clarification.

And, finally, I do want to remind you that it's unlawful to deliberately provide false information to Congress.

Do you have any questions about that?

Ms. Hutchinson. No.

All right. Very good.

EXAMINATION

Q We do have some additional questions for you today, and it will be a combination of me and Ms. Cheney asking those questions. But I wanted to start about the President and his desire to go to the Capitol on January the 6th.

In one of our prior sessions, we did ask you about his desire to go to the Capitol on the 6th, as well as his conversation with Bobby Engel from the Secret Service as they walked to the limo after his Ellipse speech.

Did you talk to anybody about what happened in the Presidential limo with the President as they returned to the White House from the Ellipse?

A As I returned to the White House and walked into the West Wing, I went into Mr. Ornato's office, who was the deputy chief of staff, and I had a conversation with him and Bobby Engel, who was the special agent in charge of Mr. Trump's Secret Service detail.

Q And about how long after you returned to the White House did that conversation happen?

A We returned to the White House, and about 2 to 3 minutes later I walked into the West Wing and immediately walked into Mr. Ornato's office. So, best estimate, 5 minutes after everybody had arrived back at the White House.
Q Okay. And other than Mr. Ornato and Mr. Engel, was anybody else in that office?

A There's a possibility that Beau Harrison was in Mr. Ornato's office when that conversation happened. I don't recall specifically if he was there when the conversation started, but him and Mr. Ornato shared an office space.

Q All right.

So, when you went into that office, what was the conversation like with Mr. Ornato and Mr. Engel?

A So, when I walked up into the West Wing -- and I'm walking towards the chief of staff's office, and I see Tony standing kind of outside of the chief of staff suite looking around, and he waved me down.

I went into his office, and he shut the door. We turned the corner, and I saw Mr. Engel -- I saw Bobby sitting on the chair, and he was looking down, kind of looking a little lost and kind of discombobulated.

Tony said something to the effect of, "Did you hear what F'ing happened?" And I said, "No. I just got back from the rally." And I looked at Bobby, and I said, "What's going on? What happened?"

And Tony again said something to the effect of "This day is F'ing crazy" and looked at Bobby, I think expecting him to elaborate. And when Bobby hadn't said anything else, Tony had retold the story, I guess, as Bobby had relayed it to him, of what happened in the Beast, which was something along the lines of: When the President got into the Beast after the rally, he was under the impression that the OTR movement to the Capitol was still possible -- the off-the-record movement to the Capitol was still possible.

And when Bobby told him, no, that we were going back to the White House, the President kept pushing to go to the Capitol, saying, "I'm the F'ing President. You're
going to listen to what I’m telling you to do. We’re going to the Capitol." And Bobby kept reiterating, "It’s not safe, sir. We’re bringing you back to the White House. That’s final."

When the car started moving, I’m under the impression, from the story as Tony had retold it, it just made Mr. Trump irate, and he lunged forward into what I believe is the -- would be called the cab of the Presidential limo and went to grab at the steering wheel. And Bobby had said, "Sir, I’m going to need you to take your hand off. We’re going back to the White House. That’s final."

Mr. Trump again was extremely angry at that response and used his free hand, to my understanding, to then lunge at Bobby Engel.

Obviously he went back to the West Wing after that, so didn’t make the movement to the Capitol. I don’t know any conversations after that happened between Bobby and Mr. Trump in the car, but I know that Mr. Trump was still not happy, upon arriving back at the West Wing, that the movement didn’t happen.

Q Okay. And what you just told us, Mr. Ornato said that, correct?

A That's correct.

Q Did he say that in front of Bobby Engel?

A He did.

Q Did Bobby Engel ever correct Mr. Ornato, say that any of that did not happen?

A Not to my recollection. He might have chimed in at a point and made a comment about it, but I don’t remember him ever counteracting what Tony had told me.

Q Okay. So Bobby Engel didn’t say anything to cast doubt on anything that --

A No.

Q -- Mr. Ornato said.
A No. Not to my recollection, no.

Q Okay. Did Mr. Engel or Mr. Ornato ever, after that, come to you and say that what Mr. Ornato had told you was not true?

A He did not.

Ms. Cheney. Did they explain, Cassidy, given how the Beast -- the layout of the Beast, the distance that it would be, you know, for the President to have to get to lunge at the steering wheel? Did they just --

Ms. Hutchinson. He didn't --

Ms. Cheney. -- explain any specifics?

Ms. Hutchinson. I know that Mr. Trump would typically sit towards the front of the limo, because he would have conversations with the special agent in charge. He would do that with Tony when Tony had the same position that Bobby was in. So, from my -- I've never been in the Beast, but from what I understand, it's a relatively short distance at least to have the conversation.

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't know the actual distance, if he would've been able to grab the wheel or if he was just trying to lunge at it, but --

[Phone vibrating.]

Mr. Hunt. I don't think that's me. It is me. I'm sorry.

It's quite all right.

Mr. Hunt. Sorry. I had put the ringer off. I'll put it down there. Maybe it won't --

Q Was it your understanding that -- well, let me ask it this way: Do you know who was driving?
A I don't. Somebody -- this is vague, but somebody in the Transportation Services Division of the Secret Service, but I don't know the identity of the driver that day.

Q You mentioned OTR, and I think you also explained that's an off-the-record movement. You produced text messages to the committee that references the President wanting to do an OTR to the Capitol. That's the same OTR you mentioned in the prior session we had?

A That's correct.

Q All right.

And you said, when the President got back to the White House he was not happy. What makes you say that?

A So, prior to leaving the rally site, when he got off the stage and everybody was making the movement back to the motorcade, I overheard Mr. Meadows say to him then, as I had prior to Mr. Trump taking the stage that morning, that he was still working on getting an off-the-record movement to the Capitol. So, when Mr. Trump took the stage, he was under the impression via Mr. Meadows that it was still possible.

So, when he got off the stage, I had relayed to Mr. Meadows that I had another conversation with Tony; the movement was still not possible. Mr. Meadows said, "Okay."

And then, as they proceeded to go to the motorcade, Mr. Meadows had reiterated, "We're going to work on it, sir. Talk to Bobby. Bobby has more information." Mark got into his vehicle. To my understanding, Trump got into the Beast.

And after we had all arrived back at the White House later in the day, it had been relayed to me via Mark that the President wasn't happy that Bobby didn't pull it off for him and that Mark didn't work hard enough to get the movement on the books.
Ms. Cheney. And how did you -- so you were in Mr. Ornato's office with this conversation. How did you leave things when you left the office?

Ms. Hutchinson. I asked him if he had yet notified Mark of this, and he said, no, he -- Mark's door was shut -- he didn't know if he should interrupt, and he didn't know if he was in with anybody. I was like, "I think this is something that he should know."

And he said, "All right. Well, let me know if he has a minute."

So then I left and gone back to my office. Mark's door was still shut.

I know at some point that afternoon Tony had relayed it to him. To my understanding, he told me that he was going to relay it to him, and they did have a private conversation. I was not present for the private conversation, and I never confirmed with Tony afterwards whether he actually told Mark that. But he looked at me afterwards and said something along the lines of, "All good."

So, to me, that was an indication that he had informed Mr. Meadows of what happened in the Beast. But I didn't circle back to reconfirm that with him.

Q Do you know why Mr. Ornato told you?

A Mr. Ornato would frequently relay messages to me that he wanted to get to Mark. I don't know if that was the intention at that point or if it was more he was shocked.

He was somebody that we both -- we both had confided in each other and talked about many different things throughout my tenure working in the White House, and we had a relationship established in trust. So I'm not sure if he told me to relay it to Mark or if it was more just him expressing how unbelievable and unprecedented that event was.

Q Did you ever talk to Mr. Engel later that day?
I think Bobby and I had a conversation later in the day. When I was in the Eisenhower Building, I believe I saw him. But we never personally spoke about that incident again.

Q Did this issue about the President wanting to go to the Capitol come back up again that day?

A Not to my recollection. I believe, once we were back at the White House, from everything I understood at the time, he knew it wasn't going to be possible. He was just angry it wasn't going to be possible.

Q Did Mr. Meadows say anything else to you that afternoon about the President wanting to go to the Capitol?

A Not that afternoon.

Q Okay.

A Other than, you know, that he was angry that the movement didn't happen and he felt that Mr. Trump was angry at him. But nothing about potentially re-raising it later in the day.

Q And Mr. Trump being angry at him because he felt that Mr. Meadows hadn't done enough to make it happen?

A Yes, and that he had misled him.

Q "He," Mr. Meadows --

A Sorry.

Q -- misled the President?

A Yes. Correct. I apologize for not being clear. Mr. Trump felt that Mr. Meadows had also misled him in Mr. Meadows relaying that an off-the-record movement would potentially and likely be possible.

Q Okay.
Do you have anything else on that?

Ms. Cheney. Anything else on that, Cassidy, you want to share with us?

Ms. Hutchinson. No.

Q One of the things that we raised with you as well in the prior session is the President’s reaction to the crowd and crowd placement at the Ellipse on January the 6th. Did the President make any statements about the nature of the crowd that had gathered outside the magnetometers, outside of kind of the formal rally space, on the 6th?

A He did.

Q Tell us about that.

A When we were in the off-stage announce area tent behind the stage, he was very concerned about the shot, meaning the photograph that we would get, because the rally space wasn’t full.

One of the reasons, which I have previously stated, was because he wanted it to be full and for people to not feel excluded because they had come far to watch him at the rally, and he felt the mags were at fault for not letting everybody in.

But another leading reason and likely the primary reason is because he wanted it full, and he was angry that we weren’t letting people through the mags with weapons -- what the Secret Service deems as weapons and are -- are weapons.

He, at the White House, had conversations, that Mr. Ornato had relayed to me, in the Oval Office that he wanted the mags taken away to get everybody in.

But when we were in the off-stage announce tent, I was part of a conversation -- I was in the vicinity of a conversation where I overheard the President say something to the effect of, "You know, I don't F'ing care that they have weapons. They're not here to..."
hurt me. Take the F'ing mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from here. Let the people in. Take the F'ing mags away."

And the advance team on the ground had again relayed to him, as Tony had earlier that morning, that we can't; it's Secret Service protocol. And he said something to the effect of, you know, "F the Secret Service. I'm the President. Take the F'ing mags away. They're not here to hurt me."

Q  I want to go, I guess, back in time and unpack some of what you just said.

You said the first time that the President mentioned wanting the mags to be taken away was in the White House, in the Oval Office. How did you know that? Were you in the Oval with them?

A I was not. Mr. Ornato, I believe, either at one point had stepped into the Oval Office and had the conversation with him or he had the conversation with him on the phone that morning.

But, when I arrived at the White House that day, Mr. Ornato and I had several conversations, some of them with Mark, some of them privately. But he had relayed to me that the President was fired up about the mag situation.

And the mags -- magnometers (sic) -- I can never pronounce that word -- they had been an issue for us throughout the entire campaign, so it wasn't necessarily something that was a surprise. He was always flustered and angry at mags because we would always have to have overflow sections and he always blamed the mags for that, but it was just because of the capacity of our arenas.

In this particular instance, it wasn't the capacity of our space; it was the mags and the people that didn't want to come through. And that's what Tony had been trying to relay to him that morning: You know, "It's not the issue that we encountered on the campaign. We have enough space, sir. They don't want to come in right now. They
have weapons that they don't want confiscated by the Secret Service. And they're fine on The Mall. They can see you on The Mall. And they want to march straight to the Capitol from The Mall."

And the President had continued throughout the morning to express his frustrations about the mags to Mr. Ornato.

Before I left the White House, I had tried to convince Mr. Ornato to come down to the rally site with us in case the issue got raised again, and he said that he couldn't. He was going to stay back at the White House in case anything happened. But the advance team on the ground -- he had relayed to the advance team what he had relayed to the President, so everybody was on the same message with that.

I don't know if the message necessarily resonated with Trump, what Tony had said to him, and he thought that he could convince somebody on the ground once we got down there to change their minds and to try to bypass Tony's guidance, or if it was just an issue he wouldn't let go. You know, it could've gone either way. I'm not sure what the intentions were behind him continuing to press the issue as we got down to the tent.

Q Do you know where Mr. Ornato was getting information about people having weapons at the Ellipse?

A It's my understanding that he was in contact with -- and, no, I'm not using the proper terminology, because I didn't work advance operations, but -- the advance leads for the Secret Service and the advance leads for the White House. You know, I know that they also are in communication with other law enforcement agencies and other Secret Service personnel on the ground.

So I don't know the specific individuals, but it was his job to kind of facilitate all that conversation and make sure it was streamlined at the deputy-chief-of-staff level.

Q I think the last time we talked you mentioned that some of the weapons that
people had at the rally included flagpoles, oversized sticks or flagpoles, bear spray. Is there anything else that you recall hearing about that the people who had gathered on the Ellipse had?

A I recall Tony and I having a conversation with Mark, probably around 10:00 a.m., 10:15 a.m., where I remember Tony mentioning knives, guns in the form of pistols and rifles, bear spray, body armor, spears, and flagpoles.

Spears were one item, flagpoles were one item, but then Tony had relayed to me something to the effect of, "And these F'ing people are fastening spears onto the ends of flagpoles."

Q And did Mr. Ornato or is it your understanding that Mr. Ornato told the President that people with weapons who didn't want to go through the mags were also there to march to the Capitol that afternoon?

A Could you repeat your question?

Q Yes. Absolutely.

Is it your understanding that Mr. Ornato or somebody else told the President that the people who did not want to come through the mags, potentially because they had weapons, also wanted to march to the Capitol on January 6th?

A It's my understanding -- I don't know if he explicitly said, "They have weapons, and they want to use these weapons to march to the Capitol." But it's my understanding that it was just more of a consensus that it was widely known that the people were going to march to the Capitol, and that's how Tony had relayed it to the President, if that makes sense --

Q Okay.

A -- that, you know, the people both in the rally and outside on the National Mall or -- yeah, by the Washington Monument on The Mall were going to march to the
Capitol.

But I don’t -- I just -- I’m trying to be careful because I don’t want to attribute the weapons necessarily. Just that people had weapons and there were also people out there that were going to march to the Capitol.

Q    Sure.

Ms. Cheney. And I think, just to go back to what you described a minute ago, Cassidy, that, in the backstage discussion --

Ms. Hutchinson. Uh-huh.

Ms. Cheney. So, in the backstage discussion, do you remember who was in that discussion?

Ms. Hutchinson. I remember the President’s back was standing to -- his back would’ve been to the stage if the tent hadn’t been there, and Mr. Meadows was standing to the President’s right. I believe Ivanka Trump was standing next to Mr. Meadows.

Scavino was off to the back side, somewhat in the conversation but not really adding or contributing anything to it. And I believe Eric Herschmann and Don Jr. were also in that circle.

I was standing next to Mr. Meadows’ security detail, probably 2 to 3 feet behind Mr. Meadows.

Ms. Cheney. And, just to be clear: So he was told again in that conversation -- or was he told again in that conversation that people couldn’t come through the mags because they had weapons?

Ms. Hutchinson. Correct.

Ms. Cheney. And his response was to say they can march to the Capitol from the Ellipse?

Ms. Hutchinson. Something to the effect of, “Take the F’ing mags away.
They're not here to hurt me. Let them in. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol after the rally is over. They can march from -- they can march from the Ellipse. Take the F'ing mags away. Then they can march to the Capitol."

Ms. Cheney. Thank you.

Was he told, no, that couldn't happen, the mags had to say?

A He was. At one point -- and it was one of the advance leads on the ground. Max Miller and Bobby Peede were the advance leads on the ground that day. I believe it was Max Miller that had continued to reiterate to him that, "We can't take them away, sir. It's Secret Service protocol."

You know, he kept pressing it, and I think eventually he let it go. You know, he took the stage, and the mags stayed, but --

Do you remember the President's reaction when Mr. Miller or someone else told him that the mags needed to stay?

A He was angry still. I don't recall him dropping the issue. To be honest, I was kind of tuning in and out of the conversation too. I don't remember how quickly they switched gears and what topic was next, so if it kind of just naturally led into something else or if he just said, "Okay," and brushed it off.

But the last that I had heard about it was, he still was sort of pressing for it, and then he just kept going on something else a few minutes later.

We have a photo that we obtained from the Archives that shows the President in the off-stage announce area looking at a TV of what was happening at the rally.

Do you remember that?

A [Nonverbal response.]
Q Yes?
A Sorry. Yes.
Q Okay.
A I recall him watching a TV —
Q Okay.
A — and watching what was happening outside.
Q Was he commenting on the crowd or the crowd size when he was watching the TV, do you recall?
A Not that I personally heard.
Q So this would’ve been a separate conversation, not when he was watching the TV?
A Correct.
I remember seeing him looking at the TV. At this point, I was standing more towards the back of the tent, and I believe I was standing with Julia Radford, who was Ivanka's chief of staff at the time.
And in between this, too, Mark was kind of walking around. He had sent me out to look for Rudy Giuliani at one point.
So, like, I recall standing in the back of the tent to try to see if, you know, things were a little calmer in there and if it was an appropriate time for me to approach Mr. Meadows, but I wasn't around to hear any of his remarks.

Q Okay.

Ms. Cheney. Can you go back for just a minute, Cassidy, to this discussion around 10:00 or 10:15 with Tony and Mark? What was Mark's reaction, Mr. Meadows' reaction, to this list of weapons that people had in the crowd?

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm trying to find my --
Ms. Cheney. Take your time.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- section on this.

There was a point in one of my depositions where we had a discussion about this, and I was asked a question along the lines of, "Did Mr. Meadows express concern?" And the issue I took with the question was that Mr. Meadows didn't necessarily express concern, but he, rather, seemed sort of disconnected and aloof at it.

When Tony and I went in to talk to Mark that morning, Mark was sitting on his couch and on his phone, which was something typical. And, you know, if you're popping in between meetings, he was just catching up on stuff.

And I remember Tony just got right into it and was like, "Sir, I just want to let you know" and informed him, like, "This is how many people we have outside the mags right now, these are the weapons that we're known to have" -- it's possible he listed more weapons off that I just don't recall -- and gave him a brief but concise explanation, but also fairly thorough.

And I remember distinctly Mark not looking up from his phone. I remember Tony finishing his explanation and it taking a few seconds for Mark to say something, to the point where I almost said, "Mark, did you hear him?"

And then Mark chimed in and was like, "All right. Anything else?", still looking down at his phone. And Tony looked at me, and I looked at Tony, and Tony said, "No, sir. Do you have any questions?"

It's like, what are you hearing?

And I looked at Tony. And I was like, "Sir, he just told you about what was happening down at the rally," and he's like, "Yeah, yeah, I know."

And then he looked up and said, "Have you talked to the President?" And Tony said, "Yes, sir, he is aware too." And he said, "All right. Good."
And then he changed the subject to something else that was completely unrelated. I think it had to do with a potential Texas trip that we were going to take in a few days that wasn't planned yet, and he asked Tony if his team had been working on it. And Tony said, "We're still tracking it, sir." And then Mark said, "All right. Very good."

And then we just kind of took that as our cue to leave.

Ms. Cheney. So he asked Tony if Tony had informed the President.

Ms. Hutchinson. Yes.

Ms. Cheney. And Tony said, yes, he had.

Ms. Hutchinson. And he said, "All right," and then changed the subject.

But he -- I know Mark well -- knew Mark well. There wasn't a point in that conversation that I had perceived him to understand or interpret anything as a concern. It was more as a "thank you for letting me know and doing your job" type of reaction, not a "we should be doing something; what would you" -- not looking for advice or guidance on how we should approach the situation.

Ms. Cheney. Did he seem surprised?

Ms. Hutchinson. I wouldn't say he seemed surprised.

Ms. Cheney. Anything else in that conversation with Tony? Did he talk to you afterwards as you left Mr. Meadows' office?

Ms. Hutchinson. No. I believe at that point we had both walked out, and we might've said, you know, just a few words to each other, like, "All right," like, "Keep in touch," sort of ending that conversation on our end, and then he went back to his office.

We talked one more time before I went out to West Exec to wait for the motorcade, but it was just me reconfirming with Tony that he wasn't going to come down. Because I had Meadows' vehicles manifested in the motorcade, so I told Tony that he could ride down in Meadows' limos with me if he wanted to, and he had just
reconfirmed he was going to stay up at the White House.

But -- and, to the best of my recollection, those are the conversations I had with Tony prior to leaving for the Ellipse.

Ms. Cheney. And did he give you any reason why he wasn't going to the Ellipse?

Ms. Hutchinson. He had relayed to me something along the lines of, "I'm going back to the Secret Service in a few weeks. I don't need to be seen down there. I'll get myself into some trouble."

I don't know if he had conversations with the Director or whoever would be his new supervisor when he returned to the Service after January 20th, but, from the end of December throughout the month of January, Tony tried to take a step back and not be involved in the optics with Trump as much as he had been in the previous months.

Q What did you understand him to mean, when he said he might -- it could get himself into trouble -- or he could get himself into trouble by going down there?

A Tony was always hypersensitive to the fact that a lot of people in the Secret Service have seen his detail from the Secret Service to an employee of the White House as something that was highly controversial, as it'd never been done before. And people, for a long time, in the Secret Service had attributed him to being a Trump guy and a Trump loyalist.

So I remember, during this period after we had lost, you know, Tony was aware that he would have to go back, and I think that he didn't want to create further controversy by being a leading voice or being perceived by the Secret Service as a leading voice or somebody that was making decisions as we were trying to -- as individuals in the White House were trying to fight the results of the election.

Q Could we go back to the tent really quickly?
Was there anybody else in the tent? I think you mentioned Mr. Herschmann was there, Mr. Scavino was there. Did anybody have any reaction to the discussion about weapons being found or the President wanting magnetometers taken away?

A Not that I can recall. It's very poss- -- I wasn't in every conversation. The only reason I overheard him talking about the magnometers (sic) when I did -- the mags when I did is because I had just gotten back from looking for Rudy, because Mark asked me to go try to find Rudy. So I had walked back in through the entrance that I knew that Mark was standing close to, and I kind of just got caught in the crossfires of that conversation.

The only other commentary that I had really heard was from the advance side of the operations, though, where they had said, Sir, like, we can’t, and this is why.

It's possible that the conversation had been a couple minutes -- had been happening for a couple minutes before I had arrived. But, in my presence, that was the extent of the pushback that I listened to.

Q Okay.

Ms. Cheney. And did you -- so Mark asked to you go find Rudy. Did you find Rudy?

Ms. Hutchinson. I didn’t. I found a campaign staffer on the ground who I loosely knew was in charge of VIP operations, just because they were standing towards the front and that's typically where the VIP guests would be placed. So I remember saying to them -- and I don’t remember who it was, but I said, "If you see Rudy Giuliani, can you send him back to the tent?" And they said, "Okay."

And it was after Trump took the stage, is when Rudy came back to the tent.

Ms. Cheney. And do you know why Mr. Meadows wanted you to find Rudy?

Ms. Hutchinson. I don’t. I didn’t ask him. I, you know -- my best guess -- I
know you don’t want me to guess, but, knowing what I know, knowing what I knew at the
time, Mr. Meadows and Trump wanted to have a conversation with him. I’m not sure
about what, but -- you know.

Q  Probably election-related, I assume?
A  I don’t think they were talking about post-election plans. Post-January 6th,
I guess I should say.

Q  Do you remember anything that Mr. Giuliani said when he went to the tent?
A  The first thing I remember him saying to me was something to the effect
of -- he had a stack of papers with him. He said, "More evidence. We’re going to pull
this off. More evidence, Cassidy. Look. I told you. I told you this whole time." I
said, "Sir, you keep pushing it."

He walked away, and he said, "Where’s Mark?" I think at that point Mark was
still towards the front of the tent, and I said, "Up there."

They had a brief conversation. It could’ve been a few minutes after Rudy had got
to him in the tent, in case Mr. Meadows was wrapped up in a different one at the time.
So they talked for a little bit.

And then Mark went to the control vehicle, took a number of calls. Rudy hung
back, still, in the tent for the rest of -- for the remainder of the rally, which was pretty
much the whole thing. I remember he got back to the tent maybe 5 minutes after the
President took the stage.

Q  At that point, Mr. Giuliani had spoken at the rally. And one of the things
that he said -- don’t quote me, but it was something to the effect of, "We’re going to have
trial by combat."

Do you remember any discussions in the backstage area about the comments that
Mr. Giuliani made at the rally on the Ellipse?

A I don't remember the comments specific to Mr. Giuliani. But I remember, at one point, not hearing Mr. Trump say this -- somebody had relayed to me that he had just said this; I believe it was Eric Herschmann -- that Mr. Trump had continued to press the idea that he wanted to include lines in the speech, "We're going to fight like hell," "fight for Trump" -- more of the combative language that I understood Rudy to have used that morning.

I didn't understand it, though, to be connected and inspired by Rudy's speech that morning, though.

Q Did Mr. Herschmann say that he had been advocating one position or another -- include that language, don't include that language -- to Mr. Trump?

A Eric had been very vocal to me about how we would be F'ing idiots if we were to include language like that and it's not something that we should do. And he was fighting to keep it out of the President's speech that morning.

Q Did he say why?

A He didn't. I also just kind of -- I didn't ask, and I sort of just inferred that it was a bad idea because it was a dangerous idea.

Q Okay.

Anything further on that?

Q One of the things we discussed last time was the President's reaction to the rioters chanting, "Hang Mike Pence."

I'm hoping you can walk us through again as you were in the chief of staff's office and Mr. Meadows came back to talk to you about that.

So what do you remember Mr. Meadows coming back and saying? And who was
with him?

A If you all don't mind, I think it's best to put this a little bit in a timeline, just for clarity purposes, and if you have --

Ms. Cheney. Go ahead.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- further questions, it's totally fine to answer them that way.

That's perfect.

Ms. Hutchinson. So I remember Mark being alone in his office for quite some time. And, you know, I know we've spoken about Ben Williamson going in at one point, and I don't personally remember Ben going in. I don't doubt that he had gone in. But I remember him being alone in his office for most of the afternoon.

Around 2 o'clock to 2:05 -- I believe is where I had pinpointed it -- around 2 o'clock to 2:05, you know, we were watching the TV, and I could see that the rioters were getting closer and closer to the Capitol. Mark still hadn't popped out of his office or said anything about it.

So that's when I went into his office. I saw that he was sitting on his couch on his cell phone, same as the morning, where he was just kind of scrolling and typing.

I had said, "Hey, are you watching the TV, Chief?" Because his TV was small, and I -- you can see it, but I didn't know if he was really paying attention. I said, "Are you watching the TV, Chief?"

And he's like, "Yeah?"

I said, "The rioters are getting really close. Have you talked to the President?"

And he said, "No. He wants to be alone right now," still looking at his phone.

So I started to get frustrated, because, you know, I sort of felt like I was watching a -- this is not a great comparison, but -- a bad car accident that was about to happen, where you can't stop it but you want to be able to do something.
And I just remember -- I remember thinking in that moment, Mark needs to snap out of this, and I don’t know how to snap him out of this, but he needs to care.

And I just remember, I blurted out, I said, "Mark, do you know where Jim's at right now?"

And he looked up at me at that point and said, "Jim?"

And I said, "Mark, he was on the floor a little while ago giving a floor speech. Did you listen?"

He said, "Yeah. It was real good. Did you like it?"

And I said, "Yeah. Do you know where he’s at right now?"

He said, "Well, no, I haven’t heard from him."

And I said, "You might want to check in with him, Mark," and I remember pointing at the TV, and I said, "The rioters are getting close. They might get in."

And he looked at me and said something to the effect of, "All right, I’ll give him a call."

And I said, "Okay," and I walked out. And I just was like, I can't do anything else right now. I did what I could.

A couple minutes later -- from what I now understand from your timeline, the rioters broke into the Capitol 2:11, 2:12. No more than a minute, minute and a half later, I see Pat Cipollone barreling down the hallway towards our office.

And he rushed right in, looked at me, said, "Is Mark in his office?" And I said, "Yes."

And on a normal day he would've said, "Can I pop in," or, "Is he talking to anyone," or, "Is it an appropriate time for me to go chat with him," and myself or Eliza would go let him in or tell him no.

But after I had said yes, he just looked at me and started shaking his head and
went over, opened Mark's office door, stood there with the door propped open, and said something to the -- Mark was still sitting on his phone. I remember, like, glancing in. He was still sitting on his phone.

And I remember Pat saying to him something to the effect of, "The rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go down and see the President now."

And Mark looked up at him and said, "He doesn't want to do anything, Pat."

And Pat said something to the effect of -- and very clearly said this to Mark -- something to the effect of, "Mark, something needs to be done, or people are going to die and the blood's gonna be on your F'ing hands. This is getting out of control. I'm going down there."

And, at that point, Mark stood up from his couch, both of his phones in his hand. He had glasses on still. He walked out with Pat. He put both of his phones on my desk and said, "Let me know if Jim calls." And they walked out and went down to the dining room.

A couple minutes later, so likely around between 2:15 and 2:25 -- I know the tweet went out at 2:24. I don't remember if I was there when the tweet went out or if it happened right afterwards, but Jim had called. I answered the phone, said, "One second."

He knew it was -- I guess he knew it was -- I didn't introduce myself, but I -- I don't remember if he called my cell phone or if he had called one of Mark's. But I answered the phone and said, "One sec. Mark's down the hall. I'm gonna go hand the phone to him." And he said, "Okay."

So I went down. I asked a valet if Mark was in the dining room. The valet said, "Yes." I opened the door to the dining room, briefly stepped in to get Mark's attention, showed him the phone, like, flipped the phone his way so he could see it said
"Jim Jordan."

He had stepped to where I was standing there holding the door open, took the phone, talking to Jim with the door still propped open. So I took a few steps back. So I probably was 2 feet from Mark. He was standing in the doorway going to the Oval Office dining room.

They had a brief conversation, and, in the crossfires, you know, I had heard briefly, like, what they were talking about. But, in the background, I had heard conversations in the Oval dining room at that point talking about the "Hang Mike Pence" chants.

I'm not sure if this was at 2:23 or 2:25 or at 2:24, right as the tweet went out, but it was somewhere in that timeframe. And I remember hearing conversations about it, but I don't remember hearing personally the President taking a side on it.

It wasn't until Mark hung up the phone, handed it back to me, I went back to my desk. A couple minutes later, him and Pat came back, possibly Eric Herschmann too. I'm pretty sure Eric Herschmann was there, but I'm -- I'm confident it was Pat that was there.

I remember Pat saying something to the effect of, "Mark, we need to do something more. They're literally calling for the Vice President to be F'ing hung."

And Mark had responded something to the effect of, "You heard him, Pat. He thinks Mike deserves it. He doesn't think they're doing anything wrong."

To which Pat said something, "This is F'ing crazy. We need to be doing something more," briefly stepped into Mark's office.

And when Mark had said something -- when Mark had said something to the effect of, "He doesn't think they're doing anything wrong," knowing what I had heard briefly in the dining room, coupled with Pat discussing the "Hang Mike Pence" chants in the lobby of our office and then Mark's response, I understood "they're" to be the rioters.
in the Capitol that were chanting for the Vice President to be hung.

Ms. Cheney. And did you hear -- so Pat's response to that sequence you just walked through was to say, "We have to do something." Did they then go into Mark's office, or --

Ms. Hutchinson. Briefly. And I had trouble trying to pinpoint how long they were in there. They -- my memory is sharp, and I wish it was a camera -- a recorder. But I don't know if they were in there when the 2:38 tweet went out. They --

Ms. Cheney. Meaning in the dining room, or in --

Ms. Hutchinson. Correct.

Ms. Cheney. -- Mark's office?

Ms. Hutchinson. Because, from what I understand, the Vice President was moved to the secure location around 2:25, 2:26. Right before Mark and Pat had come back, Tony had popped his head in the office and let me know that Pence was just moved to a secure location. And then Tony was gone right when they got back. So it was right around that timeframe is when they had returned to our office, in my best estimate. I'm not sure if Tony told me the moment that Pence was secure or if he told me 2 minutes afterwards. So just for that timeframe. But they only were in Mark's office for a few moments, and then they went back down to the dining room.

Ms. Cheney. And did they shut the door when they went into --

Ms. Hutchinson. They did.

Ms. Cheney. -- Mark's office?

Ms. Hutchinson. And Mark's door would automatically shut, too, unless you propped it open. So he -- they just went in and let it swing shut.

Ms. Cheney. And who -- you said Eric Herschmann might have been with them then?
Ms. Hutchinson. I think I remember Eric walking in, but going right into Mark's office. Because when Mark had left his office, he didn't prop the door open, so he walked out and the door swung shut. I'm almost certain that I remember Eric walking in and just going directly to Mark's office, so the door would've shut by itself.

But he went in and out of the office so often that afternoon that I -- I'm confident he was there, but I -- just for the purposes of the record and you all's investigation process, I don't want to say definitively whether he was.

Ms. Cheney. And Ivanka? I think you mentioned that she came in at a --

Ms. Hutchinson. Ivanka was in and out that afternoon too. Again, I don't recall her being there in this timeframe, though.

Mr. Hunt. Can you -- excuse me. Can we specify? In and out of where?

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm sorry. In and out of the chief of staff's office.

So there's a -- I'm trying to draw the distinction. There's the chief of staff's office suite, which is the main, like, bullpen area when you first walk in. And then there's Mark's office, which would be -- well, now Mr. Klain's office -- right off to the side of the main office suite there.

Mr. Hunt. I just want to make sure we're talking about that, as opposed to the dining room. Because we've talked about both --


Mr. Hunt. -- so I just wanted to --

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. Ivanka was back and forth between the dining room and our office several times throughout that afternoon. I don't think that she was there for the portion about -- for the portion of the conversation where Mark and Pat had discussed the chants and the President not wanting to react to the chants.
Ms. Cheney. In terms of the time, Cassidy, do you recall, are there other markers in terms of when you saw Mr. Meadows go back and forth throughout the course of the afternoon?

Ms. Hutchinson. So the first time that I recall him going down to the dining room was with Pat after the rioters had broken into the Capitol.

He had returned to our office, again, around 2:25, probably closer to 2:30, spent a few moments in our office, then -- and then everybody retreated back to the dining room.

There is a point around 2:40, just by watching what was unfolding and kind of understanding where things could be headed that afternoon, that I went over to the Eisenhower Building to meet with our detail. Around 2:40, I believe, is my best estimate of when I walked over to the Eisenhower Building.

On a typical day, if I was going to go over there and brief them or talk to them about plans for the day, I would spend 25 to 30 minutes with them.

I understood -- at the moment, I didn't know it was 2:44 -- but, afterwards, I understood that Ashli Babbitt had been shot off the House part (ph), I believe 2:44, close to 2:44.

According to my texts, Tony had texted me at 2:49 p.m. saying that the White House was in condition yellow, which -- I immediately went back to the West Wing at that point with somebody on Mark's detail, because they have to stay with him at that point. So, around 2:52, I had returned to the West Wing.

When I had arrived back in the West Wing, Mark had walked into our office almost immediately after, because -- and I don't remember which guy on the detail it was that was going to stay with him for that shift, but -- or that portion of the shift, but they were walking down to the dining room, and then they caught him in the hallway and came into the office with him. So probably around between 2:52 and 2:55.
And Mark spent a little bit of time in the office then -- my best estimate would be 7 to 10 minutes -- and then went back down to the dining room.

Ms. Cheney. And when you -- when you -- well, let me stay on the timeline.

So, 7 to 10 minutes in the office, and then he went to the dining room.

Ms. Hutchinson. Right. And, sorry, I should've said it --

Ms. Cheney. It's okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- a little bit more clear. Then Trump's tweet went out at 3:13.

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Ms. Hutchinson. To the best of my recollection, Mark was in the dining room with him when that tweet went out. Because I remember him coming back a couple minutes after that tweet went out and having a conversation in the office.

And I believe he stayed in the office for a little bit -- and, again, maybe 5, 10 minutes -- and then went back to the dining room.

But every time Mark -- so there was about a roughly 15-minute period where I wasn't in the office, so I don't know if he came and went then. But throughout the afternoon, as he was back and forth, there would be points, too, where he was still in the dining room and others that were in the dining room with him, such as Ivanka Trump or Eric Herschmann, would leave the Oval dining room and come back and just use Mark's personal office in the chief of staff's office suite just for a couple minutes. I don't know if it was for a breather or to have a conversation away from the dining room.

So Mark wasn't always with the people that were coming back and forth in the office.

Ms. Cheney. Could I go back for just a second to the Jim Jordan phone call?

Ms. Hutchinson. Uh-huh.
Ms. Cheney.  So, when you went in and you handed the phone to Mr. Meadows, do you know anything about what Jim Jordan said to him?

Ms. Hutchinson.  No.  I took -- I understood that call to be more of a followup to me urging Mark to reach out to him, out of my concern that Mark wasn't concerned --

Ms. Cheney.  Uh-huh.

Ms. Hutchinson.  -- for what was going on.  And Jim is the one person that I -- and I knew Mark well.  If there's anybody that Mark really truly cares about, it's Jim Jordan.  So I, in that moment, knew -- you know, felt kind of bad doing it at the time, but -- to invoke his name to try to get Mark to snap out of it and show him that, you know, this is something that he should be concerned about.

I don't remember hearing anything in that conversation that raised an eyebrow. To the best of my recollection, it was, "I just wanted to check, buddy, are you doing okay? Everything okay up there?  All right.  Well, keep me posted.  Shoot me a text or give Cass a call if you need anything.  All right.  Bye."

So, you know, I didn't hear anything that related to what was going on in the West Wing.  It was maybe a 30- to 45-second phone call, maybe a minute, but it was very quick.

Ms. Cheney.  And when you went and gave Mr. Meadows the phone, you mentioned that you'd heard discussions about the chants.  Anything else that you --

Ms. Hutchinson.  No.  No.

Ms. Cheney.  -- heard that --

Ms. Hutchinson.  Other than, again, I -- you could hear the TV; I could hear Mark's conversation.  And just, like, as a personal rule at the time, I tried to tune out a lot of the conversation I would hear, just because of the proximity that I had, and I didn't ever want people to feel I was eavesdropping or trying to insert myself into the
conversation or into a moment.

But I remember hearing the "Hang Mike Pence," and I -- I don’t remember if I had seen a tweet about the chants or if somebody had told me about the chants, but I was aware of the chants prior to going down there.

So, once I had heard "Hang Mike Pence," in the dining room, that’s what piqued my interest, and I remember trying to listen a little closer. But, at that point, Mark was wrapping up his call. I didn’t want to be glancing over his shoulder, because it’s a narrow entryway to the dining room, so it would’ve been obvious if I was trying to listen a little closer. And then he just handed me the phone back and closed the door.

But I just remember hearing that being said a couple times before the door getting shut. I didn’t really hear much more.

Ms. Cheney. So was it said, like, the television, it was broadcast, or people --

Ms. Hutchinson. No. It was people -- it was people in the room.

Ms. Cheney. And do you know who else was in the room at that point?

Ms. Hutchinson. I don’t. I couldn’t see past Mark’s shoulders.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. I understood Pat Cipollone to be in the room because he had gone down there with Mark, and, you know, I’ve since learned who else was in there. But, in that moment, I didn’t see -- I didn’t physically see anybody with my own eyes that was in there.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Q Have you since learned that Mr. Scavino was in there?

A In that exact moment?

Q If you know.
A No. I mean, that exact moment, I'm not sure.

When Dan would go in there, too, there -- sometimes he would stand to -- there's a hallway that connects the Oval Office to the Oval dining room, and sometimes he would stand in the doorway right there. So you wouldn't have -- you couldn't see him from where I was standing.

And I don't remember Mark or Pat coming back and saying, Dan overheard this, or Dan -- you know, he participated in the conversation.

Q Okay.

A It's likely that he was. When the President was in the dining room, more often than not Dan was with him. But I just -- I can't confirm whether he was in that exact moment that I was standing there.

Q You mentioned being able to hear the TV. Do you remember whether it was live coverage of what was happening at the Capitol, as opposed to a replay of the President's speech, or something else altogether?

A I don't. I just remember hearing the muffles of the TV. And that was just contributing to the drowning out of different noise and conversations that I couldn't fully hear. It was obstructing my hearing from full accuracy.

Q Could you hear the President at all, even if just, kind of, tone of voice?

A I remember hearing him say "hang." And that might sound sort of ridiculous, but he has a very distinct voice. And I remember him -- I remember hearing him say "hang" one or two times. But I don't remember -- again, I don't remember really, like -- because that was what had, like, piqued my interest.

And then I had heard somebody else in the room -- I know that there was other men in the room, because Mark was on the phone, and the other people I heard wasn't Trump. I couldn't distinguish if it was Pat Cipollone or if it was potentially Scavino,
Eric Herschmann. But I remember hearing, like, the "Hang Mike Pence," again, one or two other times when I was standing there.

Q You mentioned that when Mr. Meadows, Mr. Cipollone, and possibly Mr. Herschmann came back to the chief of staff suite, that Pat Cipollone said that they needed to do something, do something more.

Do you remember ever learning what it was, or did Mr. Cipollone say what they needed to be doing?

A In that moment, no. I don't recall Pat saying -- you know, when he said, "We need to do something more," I don't recall him saying, you know, we need to put out a different statement, we need to put out a tweet, he needs to film a video, he needs to go live on TV.

Those were all ideas that I know later were entertained, but, in that moment, I only recall him saying something to the effect of: We need to be doing something more, that this wasn't enough; they're literally calling for the Vice President to be hung.

And that's when Mark, again, had said something to the effect of -- and he sounded quite exasperated -- I know my tone won't transfer to you lovely employees down there. But he had said something to the effect of, you know, "You heard him, Pat. He doesn't want to do anything more. He doesn't think they're doing anything wrong."

So it was more of the how he was saying it. And, you know, just, with what Pat had said before, I don't know if it was necessarily Mark disagreeing, but --

Ms. Cheney. You described for us, sort of, three different camps inside the White House. And, as I recall, you described sort of a group of people who said, "Well, let's blame antifa," and then another group of people who said, basically, "Let's not do anything," sort of the neutral position, and then a third group who were saying, "We have to tell them to stop. We have to tell them to go home."
And, you know, as you described, sort of, Pat and Mark's interactions here, can you give us any more information about, sort of, who might have been in those three groups or where you would say -- I think you said to us before that the President ultimately ended up neutral.

But, you know, would you say Mr. Cipollone -- could you put him in one of those groups?
[2:05 p.m.]

Ms. Hutchinson. I -- again, I'm hesitant to -- people might categorize themselves differently than how I would. But from what I had heard and understood at the time, you know, I think there might be some discrepancy where some people would please Mark.

I personally, knowing Mark, knowing what I overheard in conversations that I had had with him that afternoon and overheard him have without White House counsel, I believe that he would -- he took the more neutral stance.

You know, there were points that he wanted to take the blame about more privately, but I think he knew that that wasn't -- in the back of his mind, I think that he knew that that wasn't a really viable option; it was more of his personal opinion.

White House Counsel's Office wanted there to be a strong statement out to condemn the rioters. I'm confident in that. I'm confident that Ivanka Trump wanted there to be a strong statement to condemn the rioters. I don't know the private conversations she had with Mr. Trump, but I remember when she came to the office one time with White House Counsel's Office -- when she came through the chief of staff's office with White House Counsel's Office, she was talking about the speech later that day and trying to get her dad on board with saying something that was more direct than he had wanted to at the time and throughout the afternoon.

Again, and I personally would say that Mr. Trump ended up taking the more neutral route. I don't know if that helps answer your question.

Ms. Cheney. Yeah, it does. And we can -- we can come back to that as well.

Q. Just to clarify something, you just mentioned that Ivanka Trump wanted the
President to be more direct. What do you mean by that? Direct in what?

A From what I understood, and, again, this is just from hearing, it was -- I know I've said this and I don't want to sound like a broken record. But it was a chaotic afternoon. There were a lot of people back and forth. And I'm -- my memory isn't entirely perfect on, you know, how conversations progressed through the afternoon.

But I remember her saying at various points, you know, she wants him -- she wanted her dad to send them home. She wanted her dad to tell them to go home peacefully, and she wanted to include language that he necessarily wasn't on board with at the time.

Again, I'm not sure what was happening in the dining room. I wasn't in the dining room participating in these discussions. So this is me just picking up on what people were saying as they were back and forth.

You know, it's possible that she was privately advocating for something different. But in -- when she was in my presence, she had sided more with White House counsel, which was, you know, like, let's try to get him to call this off completely. This has gotten out of control.

Q And White House counsel being Pat Cipollone?

A Correct.

Q Do you remember any other conversations that people had when they came back from the Oval dining room or Oval Office and went into the chief of staff's suite?

A I'm sorry to ask you this. Could you be a little more specific, if possible?

Q Sure. Yeah. I think you mentioned -- I don't want to mischaracterize what you said, but I think you mentioned that some people were using the chief of staff's suite as a place to come and rest or just take a break.

A Yeah.
Q: And as they did that, do you remember anybody talking about what was going on in the Oval Office or what the President's reaction to what was happening?

A: Right now, nothing more than what I've already said. I'm sorry, I'm trying to remember. I'm going to make a note of that.

Q: Okay.

A: And I'll come back to it in case anything sparks my memory.

A lot of it was about the statement that he was putting out and whether or not a video was going to be filmed, what the video would say. I know that there was conversations about just what was happening. I remember at one point Eric Herschmann was leaning up against my desk, watching the TV, just being like this is un-fuck-- un-F'ing believable. But -- pardon me.

Q: No, that's quite all right. If that's what he said, that's okay.

A: But outside of just general commentary and discussions about statements and the President reacting on social media, I don't recall anything in this moment. But I've made a note in case I remember something else.

Q: Okay. Thank you for doing that.

I think, just to follow up on Ms. Cheney's questioning about there being, you know, three camps that you described, one being call it off announce it right now camp, the other more neutral, and then the final camp of those who wanted to blame it on groups that were not Trump supporters.

Who do you remember being in that last camp, the people who wanted to blame it on groups that weren't Trump supporters?

A: I remember there was one point -- and this would've been a little bit later in the afternoon, after the 3:13 tweet went out, the 3:13 tweet, which was the, I'm asking for everybody at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence. Remember we are
a party of law and order. Respect the law and our great men and women in blue.

Thank you.

Shortly after that tweet went out, I remember Mark coming back to the office and standing in the main office area, and he was alone this time, and he was watching the TV and had said to the room, it wasn't necessarily directed at one person, although he had turned around and looked at me and sort of passing looked at Eliza first who was behind me, said, did you see the President's tweet?

And Eliza was, like, Yes, I don't think he should have said that.

Mark was like, What didn't you like about it?

And she said something to the effect of, I think it needs to be said that this is antifa, and he needs to say that this isn't -- these aren't our people, because these aren't our people.

And herein Mark said, I agree but other people don't agree with me.

And they kept the conversation going for a few minutes. And I remember looking behind me, catty-corner, diagonal from me was Michael Haidet, who was the President's scheduler at the time. And I remember looking at Michael and kind of giving him a look like, is this a real conversation right now?

And I tried to bite my tongue, and then at one point I just -- interjecting, I was like, Do you guys actually think this is antifa?

And Eliza was like, These aren't our people.

And I looked at Mark and I looked at her, and I remember saying something to the effect of, I can't believe you guys are already blaming this on antifa. That's F'ing ridiculous. I don't know why you guys think that's helpful. Look at what's happening there right now. It doesn't matter who this is. What matters is that it's happening.

And she had kind of came back and said, Well, we shouldn't blame our people.
Like, our people are peaceful. Our people are this.

And Mark was, like, Yes, you know, our people aren't violent. Our people would never do something like this.

And there's sort of a heated argument in that moment to which I then removed myself from.

Ms. Cheney. A heated argument between you and Eliza and Mr. Meadows?

Ms. Hutchinson. Yes. And then at one point Michael Haidet had also chimed in and said, Look, until we know it's antifa, we probably shouldn't say it's antifa.

And, you know, I think at that point he was trying to simmer things a little bit.

Neither Michael nor I like conflict, but I was also just in a place where I just didn't -- it was unbelievable that that conversation was happening in this moment and I couldn't stop myself from saying anything about it.

So at that point, I mean, I had just removed myself from the conversation because, obviously, at that point the President hadn't put anything out that was antifa. And I didn't want to be present for any conversation that would further complicate things in case there was a conversation about trying to convince him to put something out about antifa.

I learned the next morning that, you know, Jason Miller -- Mark had told me that Jason Miller had sent him things overnight about calling antifa. And Mark had told me that he had heard from Members of Congress that night and that morning that it was definitely antifa and they have proof of it. He asked me what I had thought about it.

I just remember shaking his head and saying, I don't want to have this conversation with you, Mark.

And he said, Well, do you think the President should say something about antifa? It could have been rhetorical. He might have been looking for my advice, but I
gave him my opinion and I said no.

Ms. Cheney. That was the morning of the 7th.

Ms. Hutchinson. That was the morning of the 7th, yeah.

Q    That morning, after Mr. Meadows relayed the Members of Congress had suggested that, did he say which ones he spoke to?

A     No, he didn’t. He didn’t tell me, and I didn’t ask which ones he spoke, which ones had discussed antifa. I mean, I had an idea. But he didn’t say Congressman X, Y, and Z. He said I’m hearing from Members.

Q     Did anything that Mr. Meadows say to you suggest that he wanted to have the President issue any kind of statement about antifa or blaming it on somebody else other than his supporters?

A     In my conversations with Mark that day -- on the 7th or the 6th?

Q     Correct. The 7th?

A     On the 7th. In my conversations with Mark that day, I don’t recall him saying what he thought the President should do. I understood my conversations with him to be were his personal opinions were and how he would potentially handle the situation if he was -- not if he was the President but if he was in charge of being the person to respond to that.

But at no point did I ask him, you know, is this what you're going to advise the President? Is this how you would advise the President? It was more like, this is what I’m hearing. What are your thoughts on this?

I think that -- again, from knowing Mark, I think that he in the back of his mind knew, if he were to raise that with the President, there would be enough pushback to where he would be overruled. And he didn’t -- he was very reluctant to ever put him in
a situation -- put himself in a situation with the President where people would overrule him, because he wanted the President to perceive him as, you know, the guy kind of in charge of everything and that had the final word. And he didn't want the President to understand that he could be -- his decisions could be swayed by staff.

Ms. Cheney. So Mark was concerned he would be overruled by another member of his staff, not by the President?

Ms. Hutchinson. That's -- throughout his tenure, he sort of adopted that. I hope I'm being clear. He -- even though he might have one personal opinion, and if he did and was -- felt very strongly about it, he would personally and privately advise the President on it, absent other input.

But in a situation like this and in ones that, you know, he had -- they happened frequently where he'd just have discussions about what route to take on policy issues or reacting to events like January 6th. I think that he knew, if he were to walk into that Oval Office with the President and White House counsel, if Mark were to say, I think we should put out a statement about antifa, or however he would've phrased it, I think that he was cognizant enough at that time to know that enough voices would talk him out -- talk the President out of it. And Mark didn't want to look weak.

Does that help clarify?

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Anything further on this?

Ms. Cheney. I don't think so.

On Mr. Cipollone, are there other moments throughout the day that you recall interactions with Pat?

Ms. Hutchinson. I remember that morning --

Mr. Hunt. Which morning?
Ms. Hutchinson. I'm sorry.

Ms. Cheney. I should have said of the 6th.

Ms. Hutchinson. No. Thank you, Jody.

I remember the morning of the 6th, I don't recall if it was Pat Cipollone or Pat Philbin. But it was -- I ran into one of them when I was downstairs, about to walk on to West Exec to wait for the motorcade. And it was a conversation about the Capitol movement, and they had said something to me along the lines of make sure it doesn't happen.

And I had said, you know, I had the conversation with Tony. We know it's not going to happen. I said something like it's -- that would be a nightmare. That would be a disaster if we did it.

And then I think it was Pat Cipollone, because he could be a little sarcastic sometimes, and Pat said, We're going to get charged with every crime imaginable if we were to go up to the Capitol. We can't -- we can't do something like that.

And I just kind of laughed it off and, I'll make sure to the best of my abilities.

Ms. Cheney. Did he indicate any more, like, which crimes?

Ms. Hutchinson. In the days before January 6th, perhaps January 3rd, January 3rd or January 4th, Pat and I had a conversation because Tony and I -- Tony and I were having conversations that we knew were not going to progress into anything, but having con -- we were having conversations about potentially a potential scheduled movement to the Capitol where it would have been on the President's schedule. We knew that wasn't going to be possible.

We had a conversa- -- I had a conversation with Pat. I don't know if he had one privately with Tony as well. But I remember having a private conversation with Pat late in the afternoon of the 3rd or 4th that Pat was concerned it would look like we were
obstructing justice or obstructing the electoral college count -- and I apologize for
probably not being be very thorough with my legal terms here -- but that it would look
like we were obstructing what's happening on Capitol Hill. And he was also worried that
it would look like we were inciting a riot or encouraging a riot to erupt on the Capitol, at
the Capitol.

Ms. Cheney. And can you give us any more details about that? When he -- his
care about inciting a riot, did he go into any more details on either one of those
points?

Ms. Hutchinson. Not really. I tried to keep my conversations with Pat fairly
brief, and they normally just happened after he left a meeting with Mark and sometimes
we would just chat at my desk or I'd walk upstairs with him.

The conversation I'm thinking of, he knew that I had been talking to Tony about a
potentially scheduled movement. And I know that Pat was also aware at the time that
we weren't going to be able to do it. But it was -- I understood it more as Pat
approaching me, saying, If Mark raises this with you, it's a no. This is why I think it's a
no. Feel free to reiterate this to him. I think Mark knows this. But I just want to
make sure that, you know, things don't progress more about me having insight on it.

And I -- so he kept it fairly brief and I didn't, you know, I didn't push or press for
more details. I understood what he was getting at and didn't really think there was
much more clarity that I needed on my own end.

Ms. Cheney. And when you say, Cassidy, that you guys were planning for a
scheduled movement or you were -- maybe just explain that to us a little bit. This
wasn't an OTR at that point, but --

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't remember the specific date, and I've tried to fine-tune
my dates more. This is one that I can't -- I can't pin down exactly.
But as the rally planning had reached -- progressed and reached the later stages and the President goes on, the President wanted to go up to the Capitol. So perhaps December 30th, December 31st, Mark had raised with me, talk to Tony. See if we can get on the schedule to go to the Capitol. We do for the State of the Unions. Talk to him and see what we normally do.

So I had -- Tony wasn't back at the White House yet. He was still off on Christmas break. So I remember calling Tony, talking to him briefly about this. And I had said to him, I don't think this is a good idea. At this point, I didn't -- wasn't aware of how large the rally was going to be and I wasn't aware of all the details that had already been planned, you know. I just -- I wasn't -- I didn't know at the time. It was later stages of planning where permits had already been granted but not to where it had been elevated to my level as much as it was in the coming days.

But Tony had just commented back and said, you know, we can't do that. This will be nearly impossible. The State of the Union is entirely different than bringing him to the Capitol Building after a rally.

I said, I know. I know we probably can't do it, but I'm just telling you what Mark wanted me to relay to you.

And he said, All right. I'll handle it with chief.

A couple of days later, Mark had asked me if I had talked to Tony.

I said yeah. Why don't we get a call or something? He'll be back in a few days. I don't think we're going to be able to do it.

And Mark had asked why. And I just sort of explained to him and, you know, just said no.

All right. Well, let's keep trying.

So then when -- I don't know when him and Tony had the conversation that we
can't do a scheduled movement where it would have been on the schedule and planned for the day.

I don't believe Tony ever told Mark that it was possible as an off-the-record movement. Mark knew what off-the-record movements were, which is you can -- they're a little bit more sporadic. You can plan them with -- Secret Service would like at least an hour heads-up but they can make it happen sooner than that.

And Mark was aware of the protocol behind scheduling an off-the-record movement and how quickly you could get something together. So that was something more that he had took on his own. And Tony and I knew privately that that also wasn't going to be possible.

Ms. Cheney. When you were talking about a scheduled movement, did anyone say what the President wanted to do when he got here?

Ms. Hutchinson. No. Not that I can specifically remember. I remember -- I remember hearing a few different ideas discussed with -- between Mark and Scott Perry, Mark and Rudy Giuliani. I don't know which conversations were elevated to the President. I don't know what he personally wanted to do when he went up to the Capitol that day.

You know, I know that there were discussions about him having another speech outside of the Capitol before going in. I know that there was a conversation about him going into the House Chamber at one point.

And I remember the day of the 5th, when Mark had raised with me, if we couldn't go to the Capitol as an off-the-record -- if the President couldn't go to the Capitol as an off-the-record movement, and if it'd be possible if he could, was there a place to meet with the Vice President. I don't know if the President wanted to meet with the Vice President or if Mark wanted to meet with the Vice President.
So I just -- I remember hearing different ideas thrown around, but I don't know which ones were actively being pursued.

Ms. Cheney. And so do you remember, in terms of Mark's conversations with Representative Perry, any specifics there about --

Ms. Hutchinson. From what I remember in their conversations and what Scott had -- what Mr. Perry had told me afterwards is that he thought it'd be a good idea if the President made brief remarks at the Capitol. When he had a meeting with Mark, he -- I believe it was December 29th. They discussed that there were rally permits for outside the Capitol. I remember Mr. Perry saying that he thought it'd be a great idea if the President left the Ellipse, drove up to the Capitol, made remarks there before going into the Capitol.

Again, I don't know the intentions. I just know that he thought it'd look great for the President if he used both sites.

Q What about the conversation with Mr. Giuliani? Do you remember what that conversation was like between Mr. Meadows and Mr. Giuliani about going to the Capitol?

A Nothing with -- I'll make a note of that, but nothing really specific.

I remember Rudy, after they had a -- Rudy was meeting with Mark the night of January 2nd. And I remember, once Rudy left, he came up behind my desk and Mark's door was shut. He walked out with his group. He was, like, Are you going walk us out?

I want to chat with you.

I can walk out with you guys.

I got my coat. Walked out with them.

And he was asking, Are you excited about the 6th? It's going be a great day.
I'm excited. I'm going to be there. Are you going be there? We're going to go to the Capitol, Cass.

I'm curious. I said, What are we going to go to the Capitol for, Rudy?

He said, The boss is going to go. It's going to be great. He's going to look powerful. He's going to be -- he's going to be with all the Congressmen and all the Senators. He's like, it's a good idea. Talk to the chief about it. Talk to the chief about it.

So then I went back into the office, after they had left, and made sure that they all made it into their vehicles, they pulled off safely.

I went into Mark's office, and he was still on his phone. He left shortly after they left. I said to Mark, Rudy said these things to me. What's going on here? Anything I should know about?

This was -- he was, like, looking at his phone. He was like, Oh, it's all about the rally on Wednesday. Isn't that what he was talking to you about?

I said, Yeah. Yeah, sounds like we're going to the Capitol.

He said, Yeah. Are you talking with Tony?

I'm having a conversation, sir.

He said -- still looking at his phone. I remember he was scrolling. He was like, Yeah. You know, things might get real, real bad on the 6th.

And I remember saying to him, What do you mean?

He was like, I don't know. There's just going to be a lot of people here, and there's a lot of different ideas right now. I'm not really sure of everything that's going on. Let's just make sure we keep tabs on it.

And at that point I decided it was time to remove myself from the conversation and I left his personal office and just went back to my desk.
Q  Did he explain at all what he meant by things can get really bad?
A  No. And I did not ask further questions.
Q  Did Rudy Giuliani say why the boss is going to go, need to look powerful?
A  He didn't. And I didn't ask Rudy why he thought the President should go or why the President wanted to go. I just kind of left it. You know, anything I had to say was probably not going to flatter their personal opinions about the matter.
Q  The conversation --
A  I'm sorry. Go ahead.
Q  Ms. Cheney. No, no, go ahead.
Q  The conversation you had with Pat on or about January the 3rd, was that Pat Cipollone or Pat Philbin?
A  Cip, Pat Cipollone.
Q  It sounds like Mr. Cipollone at that point was already aware of the President's desire to go to the Capitol on the 6th, as the context for this conversation. Is that fair?
A  That's where I want to be careful. He knew that there were conversations about bringing the President to the Capitol. I'm not certain if he knew that the President wanted to go to the Capitol.
Q  I see.
A  Does that distinct -- I just --
Q  Hadn't heard it directly from the President --
A  Correct.
Q  -- but knew of the conversation.
A  Pat had never relayed to me, I know the President wants to go the Capitol.
It was my conversations were more he had talked to Mark about a movement to
the Capitol. So I just -- I want to just -- I know it's --

Q  Yeah, that’s fair.

A  But I --

Q  No, no. That’s completely fair.

Are you aware of any desire to keep the President's movement to the Capitol off
the record as opposed to just it's not possible to do a scheduled movement but wanted to
keep it secret?

A  Yeah. So that's what that OTR movement would have been. I mean, it
wouldn't have always stayed a secret, obviously.

Q  Yeah.

A  Typically, with off-the-record movements, they're not publicized until the
movement actually happens. So about -- we'd had them in the past. I hope -- if this
doesn't answer your question --

Q  Uh-huh.

A  -- please let me know. But with off-the-record movement in the past,
normally the White House press corps gets a 15, 20-minute heads-up to load into vans.
They don't know where they're going, and they'll proceed to the location. But the White
House and Secret Service has plans.

So but the off-the-record movement that day, it's my understanding that it would
have happened directly from -- it -- Mr. Meadows wanted the movement to happen
directly from the Ellipse. Instead of going back to the White House, off-loading
everybody, and then having us notify the press corps that they had to load back into the
van, it just would have been one swift movement from the Ellipse to the Capitol. So
nobody would have been notified officially until we had arrived at the Capitol.
Q   Got it.

A   And they hadn’t gone back to the White House, if that helps --

Q   It does help.

A   -- clarify.

Ms. Cheney. When you say nobody would have been notified officially, I mean, the press would have just been with you --

Ms. Hutchinson. Correct. And most staff too --

Ms. Cheney. I got it.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- unless staff were around in the vicinity of the conversation or had heard from the vans that there was going to be an off-the-record movement. But in other trips that we had done where we had made off-the-record stops at various local businesses in, like, places we were campaigning, there would be several people in the motorcade that were traveling with us that thought we were going directly back to the airport but we actually stopped at a local grocery store.

So not everybody -- just because you’re in the motorcade doesn’t mean that you’re aware of --

Ms. Cheney. You’re aware.

Ms. Hutchinson. Yeah, if that’s -- and I’m not trying to be too detailed with you guys. I’m just --

Q   No, that’s very helpful.

Are you aware of any desire to -- let me start over and give you some context.

During the speech on the Ellipse, the President said that he would meet with the people who were there in going to the Capitol with them.

Were you aware that the President intended to ask for that or call for that ahead
of time?

A I was aware that the President wanted that line or a line similar to that
embedded in his speech. I don't know who talked him off of it or how much he fought
against putting it in the speech. I knew he wanted to say it when he took the stage. I
was under the impression that it was not included in the version of the speech that was
going to be on the teleprompters. I don't know if it was added halfway through the
speech or if he just said it.

But, you know, from being down there and understanding what was happening
that morning, he -- whether it was going to be embedded in the speech as a specific
quote or not, there was a highlight of it that he was going to say it anyway.

Q Are you aware of any desire to keep the President's -- let me start over. I'm
sorry.

Do you know whether the President wanted to keep that request of his, to send
people to the Capitol, go with him to the Capitol, that part of it a secret before he actually
said to do it during the speech at the Ellipse?

That may not have been a great question.

A I just want to make sure I'm understanding, that he -- that he wanted to
keep it a secret that he also was going to go to the Capitol?

Q No, that he was going call for the rally attendees to go to the Capitol.

A No. It's -- to the best of my understanding and recollection, he had been
advocating for a couple of days for people to march to the Capitol.

Q Okay.

A I believe he put out a few tweets about it too. I don't -- I only have the
tweets from the 6th in front of me, but --

Q Okay. That's perfectly fine.
Ms. Cheney. But somebody had taken -- taken the line out of the speech?

Ms. Hutchinson. It's my understanding. I wasn't part of the speechwriting process. But I remember having a conversation with Eric Herschmann in the tent of, you know, he's all fired up because we don't have everything in there that he wants. And I remember getting -- at that morning I remember getting emails probably from 5 a.m. on with speech edits and different versions of the speech that were being passed around, and some were more widely approved than others.

Who was approving for, other than Mr. Herschmann, making suggestions not to include certain information in the speech?

Ms. Hutchinson. Eric was the only person that I had conversations with about the contents of the speech. Again, I wasn't involved in the speech or any process. But I remember getting several emails from Eric that morning that were blasted out just to everybody else that was on the listserv for the speech distribution.

Eric kept sending, Somebody fact-check this. This isn't right. Don't put that theory in here. That's not a constitutional way of approaching.

So he had a lot of commentary that morning, and at the White House him and I had a few conversations that morning. And specifically to the rhetoric of, you know, march to the Capitol, fight like hell, White House Counsel's Office, Eric Herschmann didn't want that in the speech.

You can't control the President, what he does when he's up there. But, you know, there was definitely a strong effort to try to limit the chance of that actually happening.

Okay.

Ms. Cheney. Do you remember anything else, Cassidy, that he -- that Eric didn't want in the speech?
Ms. Hutchinson. Not specifics. He didn't want violent rhetoric in the speech. He didn't want the Eastman theories tied into the speech. He didn't want, you know, some of the stolen claim, stolen election ballot details in the speech, like the Italian satellites theory, the Dominion voting machines. He didn't want specifics, and that's -- those were the items that he had responded to emails with somebody needs to fact-check this and more things along those lines. I don't remember anything else specific to other than what was controversial the weeks leading up to January 6th and especially the days before January 6th.

Ms. Cheney. Just to go back for one second, in terms of Pat Cipollone's legal concerns about what would happen if the President went to the Capitol, do you know if he conveyed those to Bobby Engel?

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm very sorry. I was making a note to see if I remember anything else about Eric's opinions on the speech. Could you repeat your question, please?

Ms. Cheney. So Pat Cipollone's concerns about the legality of going to the Capitol, do you know if he would have conveyed his concerns to Bobby Engel?

Ms. Hutchinson. From a -- the way that the information flowed in the West Wing, I don't think that Pat would have approach Bobby Engel about it. He would have approached Tony Ornato about it.

I don't know whether he had a conversation with Bobby or Tony, but it wouldn't have been a natural conversation for Pat to raise with Bobby just because he didn't frequently interact with Bobby. Bobby wouldn't go to senior staff meetings. Bobby wouldn't be in meetings with White House staff. He was in operations meetings, White House operation meetings with, you know, White House events, White House operations, and Secret Service, if that makes sense.
Ms. Cheney. Okay. Yeah, it does.

Mr. Hunt. If we’re getting close to moving to another subject here, could we take a short break?

Yes. I have one more followup here.

Mr. Hunt. Yeah, go ahead.

But that’s fine.

Q Did you ever learn, whether around the time of that January 3rd conversation or after, that Pat Cipollone had conveyed his legal concerns about a movement to the Capitol to the President?

A I’m not sure if he -- I’m not sure if he personally relayed his legal concerns to the President around that time. I know that it had come up because I remember Mark and Pat coming back one night and talking about a conversation they had with the President. But I don’t know at what stage the President was at, whether he thought it could still be scheduled or if he thought it could be off the record.

So, I mean, I just don’t know the details. I wasn’t physically present for a conversation Pat had with them.

Q When Mark and Pat came back together on this night that you just recalled, when was that, and what did they say?

A My best estimate would be the 3rd. I’m going to think about that one, and I’m just trying to think. The 2nd, the President was up in the residence. And he was down in the Oval Office the night of the 3rd. And the night of the 4th we were in Georgia. So I think it was the 3rd.

And, again, I don’t recall many specifics other than, you know, Mark saying to me later let’s see about maybe doing this off the record, and then hearing Pat later on
privately tell me, like, you know, this -- if we go up there, this is -- there's going to be legal implications, something to that effect.

Q  Reiterating what he had already told you, Pat Cipollone?
A  Right. Right. We didn't -- I just want it to be clear to you. We didn't have extensive and frequent conversations about this. The conversations we did, me and Pat personally had about this were brief, maybe two to three. You know, I was talking primarily with Ornato, and even my conversations with Ornato were fairly limited in scope just because we both were on the same page of we can't do this.

So I'm sure that Pat had a more full-throated conversations with Mark, potentially with Tony, potentially with the President, but not that I was present for. It was more, you know, me working with Tony, knowing it wasn't going to happen, and Pat making comments to me about his personal concerns with it.

I'm sorry. Point taken. Still something's going to happen. Appreciate it, though.

Any followup there?

Ms. Cheney. You want to -- no. We have some additional questions. But do you all want to take --

Mr. Hunt. Sure. If we can take a quick break?

Ms. Cheney. Yeah. Let me just see -- if you want to go in the room.

Mr. Hunt. Yeah, I want to go to the restroom. That's one thing I want to do, but we can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Okay. All right. Let's go back on the record.

It's June 20th, and this is -- we're resuming the interview of Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson.
In December of 2020, Attorney General Barr said the DOJ had found no widespread evidence of election fraud sufficient to change the outcome.

I believe we briefly hit upon this at one point. But are you aware of the President’s reaction to Attorney General Barr’s statement?

The day that the attorney general’s statement went out was December 1st, and the attorney general was already at the White House meeting with I believe White House Counsel’s Office.

When the President heard -- or I shouldn't say heard. When the President saw on TV, as he was sitting in the dining room eating lunch, that the attorney general had put this statement out, he was not happy with what the attorney general said and that he hadn't received a heads-up about the interview beforehand.

How did you learn about this?

I initially learned about his reaction because Mark got called down to the dining room, and then he was down there for a couple of minutes. I went down to check on him, who was the valet that day, I believe. There's a slight chance it could have been. I believe it was that day. I went down, and gave me a look of shock kind of.

He said, Did you see what the attorney general said?

And I said, Yes. Is the chief in the dining room?

You don’t want to go into the dining room right now.

I said, Okay. I wasn't going to. I just wanted to see if he was in there.

He said the President’s really, really angry at him.

And I said okay. I could hear the President yelling from where I was standing.

He said, I just brought him lunch and he took the plate and threw it at the wall.
I was like, Is that when Mark was in there?

He goes, No, that's probably why the chief was called down there.

And I remember just thinking, Oh, okay. And I just went back to my desk after that. And I know the attorney general was -- came down at one point and they had a conversation and --

Mr. Hunt. Can you clarify, when the attorney general came down, what are you referring to?

Ms. Hutchinson. Came down -- I'm sorry. When the attorney general was meeting with Pat Cipollone and Pat Philbin, I believe, in the White House Counsel's Office, which was one floor above the Oval Office and the dining room and the chief of staff's office.

So he came downstairs to the floor that all of the Oval Office and Oval Office dining room were on and had a conversation with the President. I wasn't present for any of the conversations. And, you know, I had learned through the day, it's been widely reported since, how the conversations unraveled and, you know, how Mr. Barr stood firm in what he had said.

The President still was very angry throughout the day, though, and the following couple of days.

Q When you went down towards the Oval, you said you could hear the President yelling. Could you hear anything that he was saying?

A No. I -- because I was talking to [redacted]. I just -- I probably could've if I stood there and listened. I just -- I was talking to [redacted] just kind of also wanted to get out of the crossfire of what was going on.

Q Did Mr. Meadows tell you what his conversations were that afternoon with
the President related to the attorney general?

A Nothing overly specific, just that the President wasn’t happy, and that I learned later on what’s now been reported about potentially firing Barr. You know, just I’m trying not to cloud my response with what was reported afterwards, because my conversations with Mark and White House counsel that they were fairly brief.

Q Did you talk to anybody else in the White House about the attorney general and his statement, the President’s reaction to it?

A I mean, just general conversations with White House Counsel’s Office, and not just Pat Cipollone; Pat Philbin. I remember at one point Liz Horning, who worked in White House Counsel’s Office, I talked to Liz about it. Mostly it was just speculating what was going to happen with Barr and how it was going to play out. We both really liked the attorney general, So we didn’t want anything to happen. We were hoping he was going to stay till the end, but --

Mr. Hunt. Can I inject here? I think it might be helpful to clarify a little bit of the timeframe, because I -- when you mentioned that -- where I sort of got off track there was when you mentioned that Barr came down and you said the White House Counsel’s Office. Are we talking about the same time? Could you just sort of put this in a sort of a timeframe so we understand what you’re saying?

Ms. Hutchinson. So I don’t know when the attorney general got to the White House that day. But when the President had reacted to -- and I’m not sure if the President knew the attorney general was meeting with the White House Counsel’s Office. But when the President had that reaction, it was because he was watching TV in the dining room as he was eating lunch. Had called Mark down.

It’s my understanding that Mark informed him that the attorney general was actually at the White House during that time, and that’s when the attorney general had
come downstairs. I believe the President wasn't ready to see him yet. So Barr was going to hold in the Roosevelt Room briefly and then decided to hold again up in the White House Counsel's Office before the President was ready to see him. I'm not sure what was the whole delay with the President seeing him. I'm not sure if it was because they were cleaning the dining room up a little bit or if they were -- if staff were trying to have a conversation with the President about not reacting super irrationally in that moment, hoping that the attorney general would stay till the end. I just -- I'm not sure of that.

Mr. Hunt. Yeah. I just -- sorry to inject here. I just wanted -- that's helpful. I was trying to get an understanding of going from the incident you described and his reaction to when the attorney general was there meeting with him. Was it a different day? Was it the same day? Was it the same time? I just thought that would be helpful. So that's all I wanted.

Yeah, no. Thank you for that.

Q Did you ever learn what the President told Attorney General Barr when they did meet that day?

A Not at the time. Afterwards, I heard and read.

Q Did you learn about it from public reporting or did you learn from some source within the White House?

A Mark had talked about it a little bit. I don't remember having a conversation with Mark or overhearing a conversation with Mark. That was Mark's sense of them -- he's not going to get fired right now. But I didn't really put much more thought into it, to be honest with you.

Q Do you know if Mr. Meadows was encouraging the President to keep
Attorney General Barr on rather than firing him, around that time?

A I'm not sure what he privately was counseling the President on. I know with White House Counsel's Office, he was encouraging the President to keep the attorney general in his position until the end. But there were points throughout this whole period.

Just to back up a little bit, throughout Mr. Meadows' tenure, he, in my opinion and from what I observed, was -- would work closely with the White House Counsel's Office and other senior advisors that the President would often listen to. And, you know, although he wasn't always on the same page as them, he didn't necessarily work against them or privately push for something different than the message that they were relaying and in just general meetings.

During this period, from what I -- what I was able to gather from my conversations with Mark and hearing what he would say to the President versus what he would say to White House counsel and to other senior aides often weren't all on the same page. So he might privately tell the President one thing or tell the White House counsel a different thing and the attorney general something entirely different.

So he was working to the interests of others, ultimately to the President, which it's not my responsibility to make the determination whether that was the right or wrong thing for him to do. But, you know, I know that he had worked with White House Counsel's Office during this period to encourage Barr to stay. I know that he was having conversations with other people about potentially replacing him with Jeff Clark. So, you know, I don't know what he wanted as chief of staff --

Q Okay.

A -- his official capacity.

Q Sure. So you only saw one aspect of it, and Mr. Meadows could have been
advising others differently. Is that fair?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A If I'm understanding.

Ms. Cheney. Well, I think she said actually that you saw him -- you saw multiple aspects of it.

Ms. Hutchinson. Right. Like, I -- I hadn't heard what he had privately said to the President. So I'm not sure what those conversations were. I heard him having conversations with Scott Perry, for instance, of potentially looking at Jeff Clark to fulfill that role. I had heard him having conversations with the White House Counsel's Office about wanting how it would be beneficial for Barr to stay until the end.

So that's why I'm just -- I'm not sure how he advised the President because I know that he was telling people different points of guidance.

Okay. And thank you for clarifying that. I'm sorry. I misstated it.

Ms. Hutchinson. That's okay.

You mentioned having heard Mr. Meadows talking to Scott Perry about replacing the attorney general, pushing Jeff Clark. Can you tell us about those conversations, what you remember him saying?

Ms. Hutchinson. My insight was fairly limited to that. I remember Scott reaching out to me at one point and asked if I had heard if Meadows gave Jeff Clark any more thought or something along those lines.

And I didn't know who Jeff Clark was and I raised it with Mark. And he said, I need to call Scott back about that. Do you know who Jeff Clark is?

And I said to him along the lines of, No. Is he going to replace Barr?
This is the first or second week of December.

He said, Well, let me just give Scott a call back about that. He thinks it's a good idea. I should just hear him out.

You know, I don't know how far those conversations progressed. I don't know how much Mark entertained them with Scott, but I know that he was having conversations with him about that as a possibility.

Okay.

Ms. Cheney. I think you mentioned before the topic of pardon, and one additional person that we wanted to ask about is Mr. Giuliani and any information you had about whether or not he requested a pardon or how that worked.

Ms. Hutchinson. I remember Rudy asking for a pardon. To be honest, I don't know who that was filtered through. I don't know how serious it was ever entertained. I just remember Mark raising it. I remember overhearing conversations with, especially Mark and White House Counsel's Office, and I remember hearing Mark at one point talking to the White House Counsel's Office. He said something to the effect of, The boss keeps following up on this. What's the status? Are we going to do it?

I wasn't involved in that necessarily, though.

Do you know if that was after January the 6th?

Ms. Hutchinson. It was. When I heard about it, it was after January 6th. I'm not sure if it was discussed prior to January 6th as well, but --

I do want to show you something. This is something that you've recently provided to us. We'll mark it exhibit 44. It's a document on it appears to be White House letterhead, and several handwritten paragraphs.

Tell us what that is.

Ms. Hutchinson. This was a document that I found last week. Sorry.
So I remember Mark handing this to me the evening of December 1st. And he had come back from the Oval Office. He handed it to me and said, Could you bring this up to White House Counsel’s Office? See if they’ll clear it. The President wants to put this out.

And I remember reading it. I remember he had made a misspell right here. And I remember this is December 1st because I remember it was the Barr day and I remember crossing off whatever it was that he had misspelled right here.

And I remember reading this document and looking at him and saying, You want me to go give this to White House Counsel’s Office? And I said, They’re not going to want this to go out.

He said, Well, the President wants it out. Can you go up there and see if they’ll clear it?

So I just said okay. I went up to the White House Counsel’s Office. Went to give it to Liz Horning for her to give to Pat. Pat had walked out of his office. I handed it to Pat and said, Mark wants you to see this and to let Scavino know it’s okay to push out.

Pat looked at it. He said something to the effect of, God, no.

I came down to the office. Talked to Mark. One of them put it on my desk and it -- as far as I know, it just kind of was done after that. I don’t know that they raised it again with the President or if they just never pushed it further, but --

Ms. Cheney. And so this was on December 1st?

Ms. Hutchinson. Uh-huh.

Ms. Cheney. And is this Mark’s handwriting?

Ms. Hutchinson. It is.

I’m sorry if you said this. But did Mr. Meadows say that the President had dictated this to him or is this just something that he had worked up and the
President wanted to send out?

Ms. Hutchinson. To the best of my recollection, he had come back from the Oval Office and had said something to the effect of, Can you bring this up to White House Counsel's Office? The President wants to push this out.

So I don't know if the President dictated it to him verbatim or if they had worked on it together in the Oval. I know it was, one, he came back from the Oval, but, two, it's not on the chief of staff's letterhead, which it would have been if he had drafted it in his office. So --

Ms. Cheney. And did Mr. Cipollone elaborate?

Ms. Hutchinson. No. I just -- it was an exasperated response and more of a I understood he was going to go down and talk to Mark about it.

Ms. Cheney. And do you think he did?

Ms. Hutchinson. He went into Mark's office and they had a conversation. I don't remember which one -- they both left the office at the same time and walked down to the Oval. I don't remember who put it on my desk, but one of them sat it on my desk and I just filed it after that.

Did this happen after the President found out about Attorney General Barr's statement --

Ms. Hutchinson. It did.

-- related to the election?

Ms. Hutchinson. It did. That happened in the midafternoon. This is evening time.

Ms. Cheney. So did you understand this to be a response that the President wanted to put out to the attorney general's press statement?

Ms. Hutchinson. Yes.
[3:10 p.m.]

Ms. Cheney. Did you understand this to be a response that the President wanted to put out to the Attorney General's press statement?

Ms. Hutchinson. Yes. Yes. As a reaction --

Ms. Cheney. A reaction?

Ms. Hutchinson. -- to the Attorney General's statement, unless I'm misinterpreting your -- he wasn't directing it at the --

Ms. Cheney. Right.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- Attorney General, but --

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Q Is there anything else about this note or this draft message that you can recall?

A Not -- not right now.

Q Was Mr. Meadows disappointed when he found out that this wouldn't be going out?

A I'm afraid (ph) you'd have to ask Mr. Meadows about that. I don't know if he was disappointed that it wasn't going to go out. He was disappointed in Mr. Barr's actions earlier that day.

Q Was it something that Mr. Meadows said that makes you think that?

A He had expressed to me that he was frustrated that he didn't have a heads-up from the Attorney General and that he had created problems for him that afternoon.

Q Problems with the President?
A From what I understood.

Q Anything further there?

Ms. Cheney. Nothing further on this.

Q Okay.

Q I believe we've briefly discussed the Willard Hotel and some of the President's outside advisors who were there in the days leading up to January 6th. Are you aware of any meetings that the President had with his advisors at the Willard?

A No. But there was -- the President, on January 5th, wanted to have a meeting at the White House with advisors that were at the Willard Hotel as well as several Members of Congress in the Oval Office on January 5th.

Q Okay. Let me stop you there. Who were the people from the Willard that the President wanted to meet with at the White House on the 5th, if you recall?

A It would've been the group that Rudy was with -- Mr. Giuliani.

Q And which Members of Congress did the President want to have in that meeting with them?

A I don't recall all of them. I remember Paul Gosar's name, Andy Biggs, Scott Perry, Marjorie Taylor Greene. Those are who I recall right now.

Q Do you know why the President wanted to meet with Mr. Giuliani and his team as well as those Members of Congress?

A I don't know. I never asked.

Q Did that meeting ever happen?

A It did not. It's my understanding that the meeting, or a meeting of similar nature, happened on the Hill that day, at the Capitol that day. And the meeting that
happened at the Capitol would have been the same or a very similar meeting to what
would’ve taken place in the Oval Office on the 5th.

Ms. **Cheney**. Did the President participate in some way in the meeting at the
Capitol?

Ms. **Hutchinson**. I’m not sure. He may have dialed in, but I’m not sure.

Ms. **Cheney**. Okay.

Q Who hosted that meeting, if you know, at the Capitol?

A I don’t know.

Q Do you know who was involved?

A I believe it was Mr. Waldron and Mr. Kerik that led it. I don’t know if Rudy
went.

I remember Mark talking to me at one point on the 4th about going to the Capitol.
And he said that Rudy invited him -- or he said something to the effect of, Rudy invited
him to a meeting at the Capitol. And I’d asked if it was the meeting that Mark wanted to
have at the White House, and he was like, "Similar, yeah."

He was like, "Do you think we should go?" I said, "I don’t know. What’s this
meeting about?" And he just sort of dropped it. I don’t recall him really answering the
question. And I didn’t re-raise it with him afterwards.

So he had mentioned it to me with Rudy’s name involved. I’m just not sure if
Rudy physically went to the meeting at the Capitol.

Q But your understanding is that Mr. Waldron and Mr. Kerik --

A That’s my understanding.

Q Did you see any of the materials or know the message that Mr. Waldron or
Mr. Kerik was going to convey in that meeting at the Capitol?
A: I understood it to be about January 6th and delaying the certification for the electoral college results.

I recall there being a PowerPoint that I had received. I don’t remember who sent it to me. But the PowerPoint was intended to be presented at either the White House or when it was at the Capitol.

I wasn’t at the Capitol meeting, so I’m not sure whether it was presented or not, but I remember the PowerPoint surfacing for that meeting.

Q: Okay.

Ms. Cheney. And do you know -- how do you know that the President wanted to meet with these people at the White House?

Ms. Hutchinson. Because on January 2nd or 3rd -- I believe it was January 2nd -- the President’s scheduler was out for the day. I know it was a Saturday, so Michael didn’t have to come in anyway, but he worked weekends frequently. But he sent me a list of questions that -- scheduling questions for the President that he wanted me to run by the chief, which normally he would do, but since he was out, he asked me to do it on his behalf.

And I remember seeing "January 5th, Oval meeting with Members of Congress plus Rudy & Co" or something along those lines. Because I remember talking to Mark about that, and he said, "I’ll talk to the President about that."

And then next I heard from Michael was that they weren’t doing it in the Oval Office and they were looking for a different location.

Ms. Cheney. Do you know why they made that decision?

Ms. Hutchinson. I don’t.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

If you’ll bear with me, I’m going to pull up a certain PowerPoint. I
want to see if you recognize it.

Ms. Cheney. While [ ] is doing that, can I ask you, Cassidy, are you aware of -- I'm just going to sort of run through a list of names -- conversations that Mr. Meadows had with Steve Bannon?

Ms. Hutchinson. [Nonverbal response.]

Ms. Cheney. And can you tell us about those?

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm sorry. Were you going to run through the conversations, or just ask if I -- sorry. Do I know conversations?

Ms. Cheney. No. I was just going to ask just specifically -- sorry -- for details about --

Ms. Hutchinson. Oh.

Ms. Cheney. -- those conversations.

Ms. Hutchinson. No. And --

Mr. Hunt. Can we specify a timeframe that you're thinking about?


Ms. Hutchinson. I don't know specifics with his conversations with Mr. Bannon and -- well, I'll leave it there.

I know that he had talked to him. Let me rephrase. I know that the President had asked Mark to speak with Steve Bannon, and I am aware that Mark told the President he would speak to Steve Bannon.

I never asked Mark whether he spoke to Steve Bannon, and he never told me whether he did or not. But normally I interpret that as no followup or, "You don't need to remind me. I did it on my own."

Ms. Cheney. Okay.
And Roger Stone. I think you mentioned to us that Mr. Navarro had been urging
Mark to speak with Mr. Stone?

Ms. Hutchinson. So I want to -- that was a point of clarification too. Let me
find the page.

So, regarding the conversations on January 5th, I want to clarify from the third
transcript, because I think I had lost my train of thought in certain points. It has to do
with events at the Willard Hotel, and the individuals there had kind of meshed together
and confused me a little bit, so, upon reflection of my transcript, there’s just a few things I
wanted to point out.

It’s my understanding that, on the 5th, Mr. Trump asked Mark to speak with
Roger Stone and with Mike Flynn. I understood that they were at the Willard Hotel,
because I thought and knew that they were speaking outside at the rally. So
Mr. Meadows had raised that the President had requested him to have these
conversations, and I -- that’s one incident and circumstance of the conversation.

And then the second item was Mark’s intended travel to the Willard Hotel the
night of the 5th. That was not to meet with Roger Stone and/or Mike Flynn. That was
to meet with Rudy Giuliani and Rudy Giuliani’s associates that had a hotel room at the
Willard Hotel, which was also a request of the President, but also something that Mark
had raised as a possibility with Rudy a few nights prior, that he would try to stop by that
night.

So, just -- I wanted to make sure that that’s clear, because I just didn’t want the --

Ms. Cheney. No, that’s helpful.

Ms. Hutchinson. And then, with the Peter Navarro angle with this, Peter had, at
a few points, come into our office with material regarding proving election fraud in the
2020 election. It’s my understanding that he never was a participant in the meetings
that Mr. Meadows would have in his office with either Scott Perry or Bernie Kerik, Rudy Giuliani, a lot of people that were in and out of our office at that time, nor did Peter have a formal meeting with the President on these matters.

Peter would frequently bring items to our office that I felt Mark didn't need to expand further on, so I normally would take the items from Peter and just, "Thank you."

The items throughout December/early January in particular, he would come and he would give his little speeches about why it was important and why we should be paying attention to it and why he needs to meet with the chief and President about it. And at one point I had sarcastically said, "Oh, is this from your QAnon friends, Peter?" Because Peter would talk to me frequently about his QAnon friends.

He said, "Have you looked into it yet, Cass? I think they point out a lot of good ideas. You really need to read this. Make sure the chief sees it."

And I sort of just left it at that.

Ms. Cheney. So he was -- was he being sarcastic when he said his "QAnon friends" or --

Ms. Hutchinson. I did not take it as sarcasm. Throughout my tenure working for the chief of staff, he would frequently bring in memos and PowerPoints on various policy proposals that -- he would then also expand on, you know, "Q is saying this."

I don't know that much about QAnon, so I -- Peter is probably the area of expertise on that one, but -- so, when he had brought in the election fraud stuff, it was more me sort of sarcastically raising it with him, but also trying to get an idea of, this definitely isn't something that I think is relevant to raise with Mark right now.

Ms. Cheney. And did Mr. Navarro mention Mr. Stone?

Ms. Hutchinson. Not that I can recall.

Ms. Cheney. Do you know if Mark talked to Roger Stone during this same time
Ms. Hutchinson. The only time I'm aware that Mark connected with Roger Stone -- and I didn't personally hear him connect with him, but it was relayed that they had connected, and there was no further action needed -- was the night of January 5th after the President asked him to reach out to Roger Stone.

Ms. Cheney. And then, just on that, the issues with the Willard, I think you mentioned before Mark wanting to go to the Willard that night, and you discouraged him.

But he had a phone call in the car on the way home? Can you tell us about that?

Ms. Hutchinson. I wasn't present for the phone call, but I understood, you know, after he -- after he understood that he wasn't going to make the movement to the Willard that night, that's when I had learned that the President had asked him to reach out to Mike Flynn and Roger Stone.

And then Mark had also relayed to me, "I'm just going to call into the Willard. We don't have to go."

And then I checked in with his security detail. Normally he would -- like, right when he would get in the car to go home, he would start making the calls, so, that way, he wouldn't lose his train of thought. And his detail told me that he made several calls in the car driving home that night.

Those are the only three calls that I was aware of at the time that he had to make. And I never had followup from either the President or Molly Michael or Eliza asking if they had connected. And Mark had never texted me or called me and asked for, like, any information, like, "I wasn't able to get through to the Willard. Can you get me somebody else?"

So I just understood that as he had completed all necessary calls and didn't need further action from a staff perspective.
All right. I do have a PowerPoint. I'll mark it as 45. And, for the record, this is Bates number MM001093.

I'll show you my computer there. It says --

Ms. Hutchinson. Can I --

-- "op change for 6 Jan," if I remember right. Tell me if you recognize that.

Ms. Hutchinson. Do you mind if I scroll a little --

Mr. Hunt. No, you're good.

Ms. Hutchinson. I recognize this. I don't recognize it all -- I didn't remember every single slide, but I recognize the formatting and some of the slides, but I just --

Q Was this the PowerPoint that you remember Mr. Waldron or Mr. Kerik having in relation to the briefing on the Hill?

A Yes. I don't know if this is the exact one. I don't remember every single slide and the contents of every single slide of the one, but something to this effect.

Q Okay.

A I remember some of these headlines, or, I guess, headers, and some of the graphics. This looks very similar to the one that I had received.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Did you ever hear anything about what happened in that meeting afterwards?

A I didn't.

Q Do you know -- you were speaking with Ms. Cheney just a moment ago about Mr. Navarro and QAnon. Do you know if Mr. Navarro ever raised anything related to QAnon with the President?

A It's my understanding that he never had any personal meetings with the
President during this period.

Do you know why?

I'm not sure.

What about with others? Do you know if Mr. Navarro talked about QAnon and their ideas with others in the White House?

White House staff?

Yeah.

I'm not sure.

What about Mr. Giuliani or Mr. Giuliani's team? Do you know if Mr. Navarro was in touch with them?

Peter had told me at one point that he was in touch with somebody on Rudy's team. I don't remember who.

Okay. Do you know if --

There sort of was a revolving door of personalities with all of this, and I'm not trying to be obtuse with you, but it could be sort of confusing and hard to keep track of all of them. But I remember him saying that he had been in touch with Rudy's team, or Team Rudy, about it.

I know that Peter had also had other meetings too. But I don't know when they happened, you know, how seriously they were taken, or --

When you say "other meetings," with Mr. Giuliani or his team?

I recall one instance where he had met with -- and I don't know how formal the meeting was, but -- with Mike Flynn as well.

Okay.

Ms. Cheney. I'm sorry. Who met with Mike Flynn?

Ms. Hutchinson. Sorry. I recall one instance where Mr. Navarro met with Mike
Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Q  Do you know what that was about?

A  Election fraud. Ideas for January 6th or how we could -- how the President could potentially use the power of the Presidency to prove that the election was stolen.

Q  Do you remember anything more specifically than just --

A  Seizing Dominion voting machines. I know that was a topic raised.

Q  That meeting with Mr. Navarro and General Flynn, was it just the two of them, or were there others involved as well?

A  I'm not sure. At the time, I wasn't sure.

Q  Okay.

Ms. Cheney. How'd you come to learn of the meeting?

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm thinking about the meeting that happened on December 18th that later was brought to the Oval Office.

Q  Do you remember Mr. Navarro having a role in that meeting, or is this something else?

A  It's my understanding Mr. Navarro never entered the Oval Office that evening for the meeting.

Q  Okay.

A  It's my understanding he met with the group earlier in the day.

Q  I see. So Mr. Navarro met with General Flynn and possibly others before General Flynn and the others went into the Oval and had the meeting with the President?

A  Correct.
And, to be clear, I didn’t personally have that conversation with Mr. Navarro.

There was one point in the early evening after I had learned that General Flynn, Sidney Powell, Pat Byrne, that group was already in the Oval Office, I had contacted Tony Ornato to figure out who WAVEd them onto campus. And Tony came back and let me know that it was -- I don’t know his name, but it was Peter Navarro’s executive assistant.

And Tony had called the executive assistant, and he had relayed to Tony that Peter had also met with this group earlier in the day; they’d already been on campus.

Q I see. Does Garrett Ziegler -- does that name --

A Yes. That’s his --

Q -- sound familiar?

A That was Peter’s -- yeah -- executive assistant.

Q Are you aware of any other meetings that Peter Navarro had related to election fraud --

A I’m not.

Q -- or the election? Okay.

Ms. Cheney. Cassidy, just in terms of this meeting in the Oval on the 18th, how did you become aware that it was actually happening?

Ms. Hutchinson. Would you mind if we took a break here really quick?

Ms. Cheney. Sure.

Of course. Yeah.

Ms. Cheney. You guys can -- let’s go off the record.

[Recess.]

Let’s go back on the record. We’re resuming the interview of Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson.

So, last time we met, you mentioned that there were a number of possibly
classified documents that Mr. Meadows and the HPSCI staff reviewed in late December, 
early January, and you mentioned that some of them were potentially related to 
elections.

A few questions on those.

Ms. Cheney. And we don’t want you to reveal any -- oh, sorry. Were you going 
to just say that?

Ms. Cheney. Sorry.

Nope.

Same warning. We don’t want you to reveal anything that’s classified.

Mr. Hunt. Yeah, I don’t want you to do that either.

Mr. Hunt. I don’t think you know anything, but okay.

Q Were any of the election-related information that could’ve been classified 
related to elections in the United States that you’re aware of?

A Not that I’m aware of.

Q Okay. As it related to other countries?

A I know of one other country specifically that it was related to. But, yes, 
generally speaking, there were a number of countries that he requested foreign election 
data to be pulled from.

Q And when you say "he" requested --

A Oh. Mr. Meadows.

Q What is the country that you recall that Mr. Meadows asked for foreign 
information about elections?
A Venezuela.

Q Did he say why he wanted information about Venezuela?
A He did not specify it to me.

Q Did you ever later learn why Mr. Meadows was interested in foreign election information related to Venezuela?
A I heard Mr. Meadows have a conversation with Mr. Giuliani several days before we received the information about how he was -- something to the effect -- Mark said something to the effect of, "I'm working on getting you that data, Rudy. You'll have it real soon."
And then he had asked me to check on the status of all the information that he had requested. And I just left it at that.

Q Okay.

Those conversations where Mr. Meadows was talking to Mr. Giuliani and then asking you, how far apart in time did they happen?
A I'm sorry. Could you repeat the --

Q Yeah. How long after did Mr. Meadows ask you to check on the documents that were requested, after the call with Mr. Giuliani?
A He had asked me to check on the status of the information on December 28th.

Q Okay.

A And I believe he had had the conversation on the phone with Rudy that morning -- that morning or early afternoon.

Q So there were a number of allegations that had been circulated in the post-election period about voting machines and voting machine software being linked to foreign countries and dictators.
Do you recall that ever coming up as a reason that Mr. Meadows wanted to obtain any classified information?

A. I never asked him why he wanted to obtain the classified information. And I'm not sure the Venezuela information in the binder that I saw -- which I opened it up, saw it said Venezuela, and then knew there were a number of other countries in that binder. I only saw Venezuela. I didn't read any of the data that was in there. And I'm not sure if he ever actually gave it to Mr. Giuliani.

Q. Okay.

A. But I recall Venezuela coming up in conversations as a country they were looking at in regard to the stolen election claims.

Q. Do you remember anything else about those conversations related to Venezuela, in these conversations about stolen election claims?

A. I remember Hugo Chavez's name coming up a few times, but I wasn't really paying attention to the nuanced details of why.

Q. Do you know who Mr. Meadows was talking to when Hugo Chavez's name came up?

A. Mr. Giuliani.

Q. Was that that same conversation that you just mentioned, the morning of --

A. It could've happened in two different conversations. I'm not sure.

Q. Do you remember hearing about Mr. Chavez or any other foreign countries and election information during meetings in the White House, so Mr. Meadows meeting with Mr. Giuliani in person as opposed to phone calls?

A. Not off the top of my head.

Q. Okay.

Ms. Cheney. Were these documents part of the documents that the HPSCI staff
had requested, or was this separate?

Ms. Hutchinson. It's my understanding that these documents arrived with the documents Mr. Meadows requested from HPSCI.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Again, without getting into any classified substance of any of those documents, are you aware of any other foreign countries or election-fraud-related claims that came up in these classified documents?

Ms. Hutchinson. Not that came up in these classified documents.

Okay.

Ms. Cheney. I think that's it on the classified documents.

Okay.

Is there anything else that we didn't cover last time, again, understanding we're not in a classified setting --

Ms. Cheney. I have another -- oh, okay, no. I have a question on something else, but go ahead if you're still --

Okay.

Understanding we're not in a classified setting, is there anything else about the classified documents that came over from HPSCI that you think we should know?

Ms. Hutchinson. Can we have one second?

Mr. Hunt. Yeah. I think maybe what you're getting at is -- and we can stay on the record here.

Yeah.

Mr. Hunt. There are a few things that she wants to clarify from her prior interviews --

UH-huh.
Mr. Hunt. -- and that is one place where she'll be doing some clarification. So we could do it then if you want, or --

Perfect. Why don't we do that all at the end?

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

Does that make sense?

Ms. Hutchinson. Yeah.

Mr. Hunt. Yeah. That would be fine with us.

Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Is that good?

Ms. Hutchinson. Yeah. That way, it's --

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

That's great.

Ms. Cheney. You mentioned previously -- and I think can maybe pull up the exact place -- a meeting that happened in the White House where I think you mentioned you'd heard the words "Oath Keepers" or "Proud Boys" had come up. And there were, I think you said, Members of Congress there.

I just wanted to see if you had any more details about that or any more recollection about how those words came up or who was in the meeting.

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm not trying to be a pest. Is there any way you would be able to pull up and maybe we could reference --

Of course.

Ms. Cheney. Of course.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- where it was?

Ms. Cheney. Yeah.

Yep. So, in your prior transcript, we asked you about Oath
Keepers. Can you recall --

Ms. Hutchinson. May?

Mr. Hunt. Do you know which transcript?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. It's page 87.

Mr. Hunt. Of the third?

Mr. Hunt. Of the third transcript. That's right.

Mr. Hunt. Uh-huh.

Oh, he's got it for you.

I have a big copy --

Ms. Hutchinson. Oh.

-- here, if you'd like.

Ms. Hutchinson. That's lovely. Yes.

So it's towards the bottom, line 19 on page 87.

Ms. Hutchinson. Can I flip?

Mr. Hunt. Uh-huh.

And take as much time as you need.

Ms. Hutchinson. Thank you.

Sure.

Ms. Hutchinson. Can you ask your question again, please?

Ms. Cheney. So, in terms of these discussions about the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys, do you have any more information or any more details about the discussions in the White House? You mentioned in particular there was a meeting with a number of Members of Congress where these topics were mentioned.

Ms. Hutchinson. In the December 21st meeting I was referencing in the transcript, I recall QAnon being raised. Again, I don't know many of the differences between all of
these groups and what they support or advocate for. I remember Marjorie Taylor Greene bringing QAnon up several times, though, in the presence of the President, privately with Mark.

And, you know, I remember Mark having a few conversations, too, about -- more specific to QAnon stuff and more about the ideas that they had with the election and, you know, not as much pertaining to planning of the January 6th rally.

I recall hearing the word "Oath Keeper" and hearing the word "Proud Boys" closer to the planning of the January 6th rally, when Mr. Giuliani would be around. But I have nothing more to elaborate on in terms of the context of those conversations and how they were perceived to be involved in activities on the 6th.

I just remember hearing Rudy talk about it, if Mark had the door open, you know, and Mark just kind of conversing with him, but nothing that I was listening to that would add much substance to what -- than has already been said.

Ms. Cheney. In terms of just the discussions with Mr. Giuliani and Mark around the 6th or about what would happen on the 6th, do you have any other recollections, not necessarily connected to the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers?

Ms. Hutchinson. Could you repeat the first part of your question, please?

Ms. Cheney. Any more specific recollections about discussions between Mark Meadows and Rudy Giuliani around planning for the 6th?

Ms. Hutchinson. They had several conversations about planning for the 6th. The one that -- the conversation that immediately jumps to mind and that was the most substantive that I heard was the meeting that happened January 2nd, where they had a call at the House Freedom Caucus that evening. And, again, this is a point that I believe it’s good to elaborate on.

But I had received a memo for that meeting that I recall having prior -- it was prior
to the call. Let me flip to the thing here.

    And this touched on what I was saying earlier. However, the call that night with
the House Freedom Caucus, it's my understanding that they hit three main points, the first
being rally plans, more informative in nature. And this is the part that the President had
participated in. You know, what time it was going to potentially start, what Members
were hearing from on Twitter or from constituents or whoever they spoke to.

    The second topic that I know was raised on that call were the potential speakers for
the January 6th rally, both at the Ellipse to headline the President and at various rally sites
that had been granted permits in Washington, D.C.

    And the third point that I'm aware of that was raised on that call was objecting to
the electoral college count that day on Capitol Hill.

    So this -- again, this call was between the President -- or the President dialed into it,
but Mark, Rudy, a few of Rudy's colleagues/associates had been part of the call, and then a
number of House Freedom Caucus members.

    I understood the goal of this call to be how they could go about delaying the
certification of the electoral college results on the Hill on January 6th. I wasn't dialed in
to the call for the whole time. I dialed in for the first 2 or 3 minutes.

    And I had a conversation with Rudy afterwards where he started talking about the
march to the Capitol. And that's when I raised to Mark, like, "What's going on with all of
this?" And he said something along the lines of, "Things could get real, real bad."

    Ms. Cheney. And you think this was -- Mr. Meadows said that to you around
January 2nd?

    Ms. Hutchinson. Yes. And that's the --

    Ms. Cheney. Day of the call?

    Ms. Hutchinson. Correct. And that's the most fulsome conversation that I'm
aware of that he had with Mr. Giuliani about the 6th. I know they talked in the days afterwards too.

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Ms. Hutchinson. To my recollection, I don’t know what they spoke about and --

Ms. Cheney. Meaning the days after January 2nd or the days after January 6th?

Ms. Hutchinson. Sorry. The 2nd.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. But I wasn’t privy to those conversations.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. But same topics.

Ms. Cheney. So, on the call, did you hear Members saying that their objective was to delay the certification of the results?

Ms. Hutchinson. I did.

Ms. Cheney. Do you know which Members?

Ms. Hutchinson. I don’t.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. I understood it to be more of a consensus with the Members dialed in to the call that that was just the ultimate goal.

Ms. Cheney. And do you know who was sort of the Member overseeing the call? Was there one -- was it Mr. Jordan? Was there --

Ms. Hutchinson. I believe it was Mr. Jordan and Mr. Brian Babin of Texas.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. And this was the meeting, too, that was going to be held in person at the Conservative Partnership Institute, and then they switched it to a phone call.

Ms. Cheney. And do you know why they did that?
Ms. Hutchinson. I think there just weren’t enough Members in town and it would be easier to have it as a call.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Q: Do you remember the idea of marching to the Capitol coming up on this call?

A: It did.

Q: Okay. Can you tell -- I know we explored that a little bit in the first time, but can you now put it into the timeline that you just laid out for what was happening?

A: So I wasn’t dialed into the entire call, and I didn’t get a very thorough call readout. But, from what I understood in my conversations with Rudy and his associates afterwards and a brief conversation with Mark and then just sort of inferring based on it all, a portion of the call was dedicated to talking about the Ellipse rally and the permit that had been granted for the rally at the Capitol Building that day. So, on one hand, it was a little logistical of which speaker should be put at the Ellipse versus the ones that will be at the Capitol that day.

And I remember Mr. Meadows hypothetically saying to the group on the phone, "Do you all think it would be good to put some tweets out soon?" Because the President had started talking, too, about the social media outreach with this and what phrasing to use and how to go about encouraging people to march to the Capitol.

And I don’t know details further than that and how they had planned for the movement to start or, you know, timing for everything. But I do know that that was a somewhat exhausted topic on that call.

Q: Okay.

Ms. Cheney. Did anybody ever, on this call or in other instances that you may have heard, talk about whether they had a permit to march?
Ms. Hutchinson. I don’t -- I only recall hearing about rally permits -- rally site permits.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Q Did you ever find out who got those rally site permits? Did you ever hear the name Ali Alexander come up, for example?

A I heard his name come up, but I wasn’t -- I wasn’t tracking the issue of permits, so I just wasn’t sure who had oversight on that. I talked to Tony about the Ellipse rally permit that we worked on, I believe, with the National Park Service, but everything else was out of my purview.

Q Was there something specific about that permit that you had discussed with Mr. Ornato?

A We had discussed that permit specifically because -- and excuse me if my numbers aren’t correct, but we had it originally granted for a smaller crowd size than what the President wanted. So he had followed up a few times to let me know, "We’re working on getting it extended," "We’ve gotten it extended." So I think it was 8,000 to 30,000 people who were permitted, and something similar to that perhaps, but --

Q And when you say "he" followed up, you’re talking about Mr. Ornato?

A Mr. Ornato.

Q Okay.

A I apologize.

Anything else there?

Ms. Cheney. I don’t think so.

Okay.

Just bear with us just a moment.
Ms. Hutchinson. One point that I forgot to mention, I'm sorry. On December 29th, when Scott Perry brought his group to meet with Mark in his office -- Bernie Kerik, Phil Waldron, Richard Higgins -- he made an offhand comment to me afterwards about how I should try to convince Mark to speak at the rally site at the Capitol that afternoon.

Q Did he say why?
A No.

Q Okay. Did you talk to Mr. Meadows about that?
A I asked if Mr. Perry raised it with him, and Mr. Meadows just said something to me, you know, to the effect of, "There's a lot of moving parts right now. People have a lot of ideas." So --

Q I don't believe Mr. Meadows ended up speaking anywhere on January 6th. Is that your understanding as well?
A That's my understanding as well.

Q Do you know if that was a specific decision that he made? He did not want to speak anywhere on the 6th?
A I'm not sure.

Q Okay.

[Note passed.]

Ms. Cheney. Sure.

Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't know how I feel about this.

Sure.

Ms. Cheney. It says, "Do you want to ask more about the meeting on
Right before we broke for that quick break, we were talking about the meeting on December 18th, and I think Ms. Cheney had asked something to the effect of, how were you learning about what was going on in the meeting on the 18th? So why don't we go back to that, and let us know or tell us how you were getting information. And were you at any point a participant in the meeting that happened on December 18th with Mr. Trump and his outside advisors?

A I know that I had something in here. Do you remember if we had that in our --

Mr. Hunt I don't remember.

Ms. Hutchinson My apologies.

Do you know if we did this in the first transcript?

We did talk about it. I believe it was in the second one.

Ms. Hutchinson The second? I'm sorry.

Oh, I found it.

Mr. Hunt You did find it?

Ms. Hutchinson Uh-huh. It should be point 5 on the transcript --

Mr. Hunt Okay. Uh-huh. All right. Got it. Yep.

Ms. Hutchinson To preface this, in reflection of my transcripts, I want to reiterate to make sure it was clear that I was not in the Oval Office for this meeting. I had stepped into the Oval secretary's office once or twice that evening. I spent the majority of my night at my desk in the West Wing, which is about 50 feet from the Oval
I learned about that meeting from, one, being in close proximity to it and, two, once the White House advisors had learned of the meeting and, in tandem, learned that Mr. Meadows was not present at the White House any longer, they were coming back and forth to me to relay information to Mr. Meadows, because there were points that he hadn't dialed in or he had hung up on.

So I want to make it clear just for the record that I wasn't in the Oval Office for that meeting.

Q Okay. So you were getting information from people as they were coming out?

A Correct. Correct.

Q All right. Who were the people giving you the information?

A I believe it was Eric Herschmann, Pat Cipollone, Pat Philbin, and Derek Lyons were the individuals present on the White House team.

Q It sounds like they were asking you to get information to Mr. Meadows, at least in part?

A Correct.

Q Do you know why they wanted to get information to him?

A So this was a point of clarification. We can go through it now too.

Mr. Hunt. Go ahead. Yeah.

Yeah.

Ms. Hutchinson. Earlier that day, which I learned about later -- so let me -- I'm trying to think of how to go in chronological order the best here.

Once I had learned of this meeting and learned how, you know, chaotic it had
gotten, I couldn't get a hold of Mr. Meadows. I had heard from the participants in the
meeting that they couldn't get a hold of Mr. Meadows. So I called Mr. Ornato. I had
been texting with Mr. Ornato a little bit, and then I had called Mr. Ornato to see if he
would be able to come back to the White House.

Mr. Ornato's initial reaction on the phone when we had a phone conversation
was, "Oh my F, do you know if they're talking about the Insurrection Act or martial law?"
And I said, "I don't know. All I know, Tony, is it's really bad down there. I can't get a
hold of Mark. Can you come back?" And he had said, "Keep trying to get a hold of the
chief."

So that transpired.

Mark got dialed into the meeting a few times as the Oval Office portion of the
meeting had continued. People were back and forth between the Oval Office and my
office and talking about it, needing a break.

There was one point -- and I'm not 100 percent certain who it was; I believe it was
Derek Lyons -- had come to my office and held up a piece of paper and said something to
the effect of, "Does the chief really need an F'ing reason to come back? Here it is. The
Insurrection Act. Get the chief back here," and went back to the Oval Office.

I had understood from Eric Herschmann coming to the chief of staff's office that
night, prior to Mr. Meadows' arrival back at the White House, that martial law was also
raised several times and using martial law to seize the Dominion voting machines.

I'm not sure any further context behind the Insurrection Act conversations, how
much they were actually pursued. It's my understanding that the President potentially
could have signed something in relation to the Insurrection Act that evening, but I never
saw ink on paper myself. This is just from what I had overheard my colleagues speaking
about that evening.
Ms. Cheney. That -- I'm sorry, Cassidy. That the President potentially did sign something? Is that what you mean?


Ms. Cheney. And do you know who said that to you?

Ms. Hutchinson. Again, my gut instinct is Derek Lyons, but I'm not 100 percent certain. And, again, my memory is good, but -- there was only a certain -- there were only, if I remember correctly, four people, four White House representatives in the Oval Office portion of the meeting. So I believe it was Derek. I'm not 100 percent sure on that, though.

Ms. Cheney. Do you think it was --

Ms. Hutchinson. I never saw the President's signature on anything. But just gathering from what I believe Derek had said earlier, from other conversations relating to martial law and the Insurrection Act, and then talking to Tony about how the Insurrection Act had been raised earlier in the day in the Oval Office, too, when Tony was in there for a period of time, I was just trying to piece some things together, more so to convince Mark that he needed to come back to the White House.

Eventually he was convinced and did come back to the White House -- not for the Oval Office portion, though. He came back for the portion when they moved up to the outer Oval later that evening.

Ms. Cheney. So, when Mr. Lyons was waving the paper in your office, do you know what that paper was?

Ms. Hutchinson. Again, just from the conversation that I -- brief conversation I had with him when he was standing in the doorway, he said something to the effect of, "Does the chief really need more of a reason to come back? Here it is. The Insurrection Act. Get him the F back here," something along those lines, that this is the
F’ing Insurrection Act, get him back here.

Ms. Cheney. And do you know if that was the document the President had signed?

Ms. Hutchinson. I’m not sure if that document was the one that he had signed. I never saw his signature on anything myself, so I’m not sure whether something was signed at all. I just recall hearing conversations about him potentially signing the Insurrection Act and how derailed things had gotten that night.

They didn’t want to have to continue the meeting past the Oval Office portion, that there was a reason that Mark and -- we’d called Rudy to be on the team White House on that one, and the reason we called them back is because the issues were not settled in the Oval Office, and they continued it in the residence that night.

Again, just to reiterate from the beginning, too, though, I wasn’t there for any portion of a substantive conversation where I could confirm details of this. I had gone over to the residence three times that night, once all the way upstairs to where they were meeting but not into the -- not into the yellow oval. I was going to pass a piece of paper in there, because Mark wanted me to let him know when it was midnight, and then I heard that they were still going for a little bit, so I decided not to enter the residence.

Ms. Cheney. And once the meeting moved up to the residence, were people still coming to see you? Or, once Mark showed up, that was --

Ms. Hutchinson. So, after the Oval Office portion of the meeting concluded, the President went over to the residence to have dinner. The other meeting participants -- we call them the "group of crazies" -- held in the Cabinet room. White House advisors held in Pat Cipollone’s office upstairs.

Once Mark had arrived back to the White House, him and I waited for a moment, a few moments, until Rudy got there. I walked Rudy and Mark over to the residence so
they could briefly meet with the President. And then I went back to get the White
House advisors -- Pat Cipollone, Pat Philbin, Derek Lyons, Eric Herschmann. I'm not sure
who brought over the other group.

Ms. Cheney. But somebody separately brought the other group from the
Cabinet room --

Ms. Hutchinson. Right.

Ms. Cheney. -- upstairs?

Ms. Hutchinson. And, then, to the best of my recollection, I was the last staffer
there that night, because, once the meeting had concluded, I got a notification on my
Secret Service radio, and I had the key to the Rose Garden, so I had to go over, unlock the
Rose Garden to let everybody out that was there through the West Wing. And that was
probably around 12:15, 12:20 that night.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Okay. Anything else about that meeting that you recall?

Ms. Hutchinson. No.

Ms. Cheney. So when you first realized it was going on was because -- was
it -- do you think it was Derek Lyons -- was that somebody had come to see you because
they couldn't get a hold of Mark?

Ms. Hutchinson. The first time I realized that those individuals were in the Oval
Office was when Molly Michael came to my office. Mark had already left at this point,
but Molly Michael had come -- and, when Mark would leave prior to the President going
upstairs for the evening, I would normally stay down in case the President needed
something.

So I was sitting at my desk just catching up on things. Molly had come down and
asked if I had a wine opener, and I said, no, but I would look for one. I found one, and
then I brought it down to the Oval secretary's office.

When you're in there, you can kind of glance in and see, and I saw that -- I recognized Flynn. And I remember thinking, like, "That's kind of weird." And then she's like, "The wine opener's for Scavino," so I gave Scavino the wine opener. And then I went back to my desk.

Less than 5 minutes later, I saw White House Counsel -- I saw Pat Philbin, Pat Cipollone, Eric Herschmann, and Derek Lyons barrel down the hallway, past my office, and down towards the Oval Office.

So that was the first point that I had recognized, "Okay, there's nobody in there from the White House. Mark's gone. What's going on right now?" And that's when I had reached out to Tony.

Mr. Hunt. Is it because they had heard there was wine?

Ms. Hutchinson. Well, funny enough, this was Derek's last day. He was offboarding. So I had thought that maybe they were having a celebration for Derek to celebrate his service at the White House.


Ms. Hutchinson. But it was not a celebration --

Ms. Cheney. No.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- for Derek. I don't think Derek would call it a celebration.

Ms. Cheney. So, when you say that they were "barreling," Cassidy, were they running?

Ms. Hutchinson. A brisk jog I think is appropriate. It was a very, very hurried movement, and it was clear that it was urgent, they were moving with urgency.

Ms. Cheney. And what time of day, approximately, was this?

Ms. Hutchinson. Eight o'clock at night? No. I could look at my texts with
Tony.

Ms. Cheney. We can look those up. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. I think I sent you the timestamped ones.

It was before dinner, though? The President went up for dinner?

Ms. Hutchinson. He ate dinner late, though.

Okay.

Ms. Cheney. And when you called Mr. Ornato and, you said, the first thing he said was, you know, "Are they talking about the Insurrection Act and martial law," were you surprised that that was the subject that he raised? Or --

Ms. Hutchinson. I said something to the effect of, "Are you F'ing serious? What do you mean, it was raised in the Oval Office earlier today?"

He was like, "I don't know what they were talking about. The boss called me in to talk about Mar-a-Lago logistics. He might want to bump it back a day, to stay at the White House a day longer. And I overheard him talking about it with people in there."

I never asked Tony who was in the Oval Office that he had raised it with.

Ms. Cheney. So Tony said that he heard Trump talking to somebody else about it?

Ms. Hutchinson. Correct.

Ms. Cheney. Okay. And did he say if he was talking about it on the phone or to people who were in the Oval Office?

Ms. Hutchinson. He had said he heard the boss talking about it in the Oval Office earlier that day.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Q In this hours-long meeting that went up until around midnight, did anybody
say what the President was doing while the different factions were kind of fighting it out?

A At points I had heard he was taking sides, and then at other points I had heard he was just sitting back and listening.

Q Do you know which sides he was taking?

A I recall, when the meeting first began, he believed -- from what was relayed to me, the President was -- I don't want to say -- could you ask your question again?

Q Yeah.

A Sorry.

Q So I guess I'll ask it like this: Are you aware of which side the President was taking initially? And did that ever change between the two factions?

So, on the one hand, you had General Flynn, Sidney Powell. On the other hand, you had the White House advisors -- Pat Cipollone, Derek Lyons, and others.

A I was aware that he had taken the side of Flynn and Powell and their guests from the start. I understand his opinion was swayed several times throughout the evening.

I remember the conversation I had with Mr. Meadows when he was on his way back to the White House. He had said something to me along the lines of, "I thought they'd be able to handle it without me there, but if I'm going to lose my job over this, I have to come back," which I later understood to be, you know, Sidney Powell being appointed special counsel, them potentially letting Mark go in his role and capacity as chief of staff.

But this was prior to the Oval Office -- the yellow Oval portion. So I'm not sure where the President stood, you know, consistently throughout the night.

Ms. Cheney. Do you know if anybody else talked to Mark Meadows to urge him to come back?
Ms. Hutchinson. I know he was dialed in a few times to the Oval Office portion of the meeting. The White House advisors had urged him over the phone to come back. Which was later followed by several of the White House advisors, back and forth to my office, asking if I could place a call to convince him to come back.

Ms. Cheney. And do you know where he was?

Ms. Hutchinson. He was at home. I had to send his Secret Service detail into his condo to wake him up.

Ms. Cheney. Okay. And his concern was that he was going to lose his job?

Ms. Hutchinson. That's correct.

Ms. Cheney. So just walk us through. You sent the detail in to wake him up. Then did he call you right after? Just sort of walk us through what happened.

Ms. Hutchinson. I sent his detail in to wake him up, and while I was on the phone with them, I had told them, I was like, "Just relay this message," because I wasn't sure if -- you know, sometimes when I had done that in the past, they had just said, "Sir, wake up, Cassidy is trying to get a hold of you," and then I wouldn't hear from him.

So I said -- I think it was -- I don't remember who was working that night. So I said, "Stay on the phone. I want to hear you tell him that he needs to come back to the White House. Cassidy said it's urgent. Cassidy said it could be a matter of national security." And I heard them tell him that, and he said, "I'll give her a call."

He called me when he was on his way to the White House and said, "Are they upstairs yet?" And I said, "No. Are you coming back?" He said, "We just got in the cars. I can't" -- something to the effect of, "I'm not going to lose my job over this."

Ms. Cheney. And do you know about how long it was from when they woke him up until he called you?

Ms. Hutchinson. No more than 20 minutes.
Ms. Cheney. And how did he know that they were discussing appointing her as a special counsel? Had somebody else talked to him?

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm not sure how other people were communicating with him. Again, I understand that he had been dialed in to the meeting several times. I understood that he hung up several times. And I had called him privately in those moments. Because Ms. Michael would call my desk line and say, "We lost the chief," so I would call Mark and say, "Did you lose connection?" He'd say, "I can't hear anything. The yelling's too loud. I don't need to be dialed in to this."

At one point, I think he just stopped answering calls to be dialed in, and I wasn't able to get a hold of him anymore.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

And then the meeting moved up to the residence. And I believe one of the text messages that you produced to us is a picture that you took of, was it Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Meadows?

Ms. Hutchinson. [Nonverbal response.]

Ms. Cheney. And so tell us: Once Mr. Meadows had escorted Mr. Giuliani out, did you talk to Mr. Meadows again?

Ms. Hutchinson. Mr. Meadows briefly went up to the White House Counsel's office, 3 to 5 minutes. They went in with the door shut.

Liz Horning was still there. She was up at her desk, working on, I believe, pardon items at that point. And we just exchanged a look.

And then Mark walked back out. I walked downstairs with him, and he said something to the effect of, "Let's not come in until maybe 10:00 or 11:00 tomorrow morning," because we were going to be in by 8:00 the next morning. And I thanked him, and he left. We didn't talk any more that night about the meeting.
[4:20 p.m.]

Ms. Cheney. Did you talk to anybody else that night about the meeting?

Ms. Hutchinson. I went back up to the White House Counsel's office after that meeting, and they then had a brief conversation with them, more just to check in and make sure everything was okay and they were fine. And I didn't press the issue much further. I think everybody was exhausted, and I was ready to go home too.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Anything else about the meeting?

Ms. Hutchinson. No.

Ms. Cheney. Did you want to walk through --

Q I do have one question, actually, about the meeting.

A Sure.

Q Did anyone tell you that the President ever tried to end the meeting?

A The only thing that I had heard about the President wanting to end the meeting, I understood it to be him requesting to recess the meeting so he could eat dinner.

Q Presumably, if the President wanted to end the meeting, telling people to leave, he had the authority to do that.

A Right.

Q Do you remember that ever coming up?

A I don't personally remember that coming up. He ended meetings frequently on his watch, though, so I don't think that he would've -- this one would've been different.
Q. Okay.

Ms. Cheney. And do you have any sense, Cassidy, of how long the group had been in the Oval Office when you saw the lawyers running down the hallway?

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't.

I don't know if you have timestamps of Mr. Meadows leaving campus --

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- but I understood that right after he left campus that day is when the group went in.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. Sans White House advisors.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. But I forget what time he left campus that day.

Ms. Cheney. We can look. Okay.

Okay. I only have one last section here.

So we did want to talk to you a little bit, to the extent that you're willing to --

Ms. Cheney. Wait. This is not substan- -- are we gonna --

Nope. Yeah, we're transitioning.

Ms. Cheney. Okay. Can we, just before we do that -- sorry -- there were a couple of other issues about Mr. Cipollone’s advice, and one had to do with fake electors. And I just wonder if you have any additional information about that or if you wanted to -- if that's a place to go back and give us any more details about what you heard Mr. Cipollone advise.

Ms. Hutchinson. Nothing to my recollection right now. I just, again, remember the issue being raised. He was aware that Members of Congress had been raising the issue. More of a passerby comment he had made to me of, "Let's not promote this.
There is absolutely no legal reason that we should pursue this." And I just left it there.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

And what about John Eastman? Any advice from Mr. Cipollone, Herschmann, Philbin in connection with Eastman?

Ms. Hutchinson. Yes.

Mr. Hunt. Can we go off the record just a minute?

Ms. Cheney. Sure. The camera's still on, just so you know.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Cheney. So, Mr. Cipollone.

Mr. Hunt. Back on the record?

Yep. Let's go back on the record of the transcribed interview of Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

Do you still remember the question, or do you want to -- can you --

Ms. Hutchinson. Could you just repeat the question, please?

Ms. Cheney. Mr. Cipollone, any discussions you had with him about his views of Mr. Eastman's, Eastman's proposals and plans?

Ms. Hutchinson. The conversions that I had with Mr. Cipollone about Eastman's proposals and plans -- so I had heard of the concepts that Mr. Eastman had discussed. I had not heard Mr. Eastman's name tied to those concepts until early January. So, throughout December, just for the point of clarity, I wasn't aware that, you know, those were John Eastman's ideas and concepts and theories that he had been constructing.

I don't have much to add on the Pat Cipollone side pre- my knowledge of it being John Eastman or post- my connection of John Eastman to those theories. You know, I, generally speaking, knew that Pat was not on board with this idea, but I didn't have any
personal conversations with him about it. He never raised it with me to talk to the chief about.

Ms. Cheney. Anything else on that?

Ms. Hutchinson. Not specific to Eastman and Pat. I have something later on to clarify, but I think we can --

Mr. Hunt. She thinks when this comes up --

Ms. Hutchinson. Yes.

Mr. Hunt. -- in the course of clarifying some of her testimony, this could arise, and so --


Great.

Ms. Cheney. How do you want to proceed? Do you want to go to clarification now?

Mr. Hunt. Are we -- yep. Yes, we can do if that y'all would like to do that at this point, if you'd like to proceed to that.

And in the course, of course, her clarifying her testimony, of course, if you have additional questions, of course --

Ms. Cheney. Great.

Mr. Hunt. -- follow up. And there may be some things that are somewhat redundant over things that you've covered here because we didn't know what you wanted to cover.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. So there could be some.

So I just wanted to go and state on the record in this regard that she does -- Ms. Hutchinson does have some things that she would like to clarify from her prior
testimony, to elaborate on in a way that she thinks will be helpful to the committee and
give some context to that and, in some respects, to correct.

As you might imagine, questions on these issues have been stressful for her, in
some ways, trying to recall and, in some respects, relive what happened a year and a half
ago. And she’s done her best to try to do that and to give the committee what it’s
asking for.

And, in reviewing the transcripts -- and she appreciates the opportunity that
you’ve given her to do that and also her new counsel to do that -- she was able to sort of
step back and see where she was asked things that, you know, may not have been clear,
for example, in terms of a timeline. Or perhaps her testimony might have been seen as
confusing, and she didn’t want it to be. She wants to be clear about it.

At other points, there may have been some events and things that she did not
recall at the time or identify before that she would now elaborate on, in looking at the
questions that you asked her.

And so I think that probably the best way to proceed is just to walk through where
she has noted things that she would like to correct or clarify or elaborate on. And then
if you want to ask questions, of course, then you can do that. That seems to make the
most sense.

So maybe --

Ms. Cheney. Great.

Mr. Hunt. -- if it’s okay with you, we just start at Transcript 1 and walk through.

Ms. Cheney. Great.

Mr. Hunt. So the first place that she has some clarifications is, generally, the
discussion in Transcript 1 at pages 28 to 37, where there was discussion of when she
learned that there would be a march to the Capitol. That was discussed there in
Transcript 1, but it was also, of course -- you asked questions about it today.

So I think, just for the sake of clarity, why don't you sort of go through in your mind the timeline?

Ms. Hutchinson thinks a lot chronologically --

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Mr. Hunt. -- and it helps put things -- helps her remember things.

So I think that might be helpful to you. So why don't you clarify that?

Ms. Hutchinson. Great.

So, in terms of the timeline for the question, "When do you first remember the idea that people would be marching up to the Capitol on January 6th came up?", the first time I heard of a potential event on January 6th was on December 19, 2020.

I had asked Mark that afternoon about the tweet that went out off of the President’s account at 1:43 a.m., paraphrasing: "Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!" I recall approaching Mr. Meadows about this tweet, asking him what it could potentially be about.

I recall Mr. Meadows responding something to the effect of, "I don't know. It looks like we're going to pull this off." At the time, I understood "this" referencing Trump staying in office.

The first time I remember hearing of a potential rally being planned was December 27, 2020. I remember receiving emails and I believe a call from Tony Ornato or potentially Bobby Peede -- because Bobby Peede was down in Mar-a-Lago with the President -- about planning a rally and if the chief and I were back at the White House yet. We originally were supposed to be back at the White House on December 27th but had pushed our arrival back until December 28th.

The first time I heard the concept of marching to the Capitol mentioned was on
December 29, 2020. And that's the first time I also heard that there were permits for rally sites at the Capitol Building.

I learned about this post- the Scott Perry meeting Mr. Meadows had with him in his office that afternoon. As I previously stated, Scott had mentioned me trying to convince Mark to speak at the rally site -- at the Capitol rally site. I asked Mark what Mr. Perry had been referring to, and he mentioned that to me. And he was somewhat aloof in his response and just said, "You know, there's a lot of moving parts right now. Let's just keep an ear on it. Keep your eyes on it."

The first time that I recall a more fulsome discussion on our end about this topic was January 2nd, which was the House Freedom Caucus call with the President, Rudy Giuliani, Mark, and several of Rudy Giuliani’s colleagues. The three main topics that I recall being mentioned on this phone call were general plans for the rally sites, both at the Ellipse and at the Capitol; who would speak at the rally sites; and the plans to object to the electoral college -- or the certification of the electoral college results.

I understood the goal of the call to discuss the delayed certification of the electoral college results. I'm not sure why or how they planned to go about delaying the electoral college results.

And this was the same evening that, you know, I had talked to Mark about what Rudy had said to me on the way out. And he had said something to the effect of, "Things might get real, real bad on January 6th."

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

And, in the same section, there's actually a word that I think was incorrect, either stated incorrectly at the time or recorded incorrectly, at page 35, line 23, that says -- the line said: "... and potentially having media circuits encourage people to go up to the Capitol."
What did you --

Ms. Hutchinson. I believe it should have said "media surrogates."

Ms. Cheney. Oh, surrogates.

Mr. Hunt. Surrogates.

Ms. Hutchinson. S-u-r-r-o-g --

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- a-t-e-s.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

Then later -- and I think we already talked about page 37, where you mentioned on January 2nd Mark's comment.

Ms. Hutchinson. Uh-huh.

Mr. Hunt. So that's clarified now.

Ms. Hutchinson. Can I elaborate a little bit on that?

Mr. Miller. Okay. Go ahead if you'd like to elaborate on that point.

Mr. Hunt. Which line, if you don't mind?

Mr. Hunt. This would be page 37, lines 11 to 22. And I think she just mentioned something that Mark Meadows had said.

The question had been -- there's discussion in this section about Mr. Meadows' concerns about violence and what he thought at the time or knew at the time, and she had just mentioned something he said.

But, if you want to elaborate on that, go ahead.

Ms. Hutchinson. Yeah. And he did go over it earlier, so I don't want to be too redundant.

But, you know, the word I had taken issue with in the original question was "concern." And I gave the explanation of, throughout this process, it was the lack
thereof concern that was the most surprising to me with all of this.

Mr. Hunt. Can you just clarify, the lack of concern? What do you mean?

Ms. Hutchinson. The lack of -- the lack of --

Mr. Hunt. Whose?

Ms. Hutchinson. Mark Meadows' lack of concern about things potentially getting violent on January 6th.

But, you know, also, as we go through the timeline of events and how they unfolded throughout this whole process, you know, I -- I was very close to Mark in proximity. I spent a lot of time with him every single day throughout his tenure as chief of staff and during this period.

I think it's important to make note of: During this period, he -- I perceived his goal with all of this, to keep Trump in office.

You know, he had very seriously and deeply considered the allegations of voter fraud, but when he began acknowledging that maybe there wasn't enough voter fraud to overturn the election, you know, I witnessed him start to explore potential constitutional loopholes more extensively, which I then connected with John Eastman's theories.

Mark said something to the effect, towards the end of -- towards the end of December, Mark had said something to me to the effect of, "I'll be the best chief of staff if I can keep him in office. That's what he wants, and that's what I want."

Mark was willing to pursue all of this to the last possible minute if that meant getting a key deliverable for the President and remaining in good standing with him.

So, wrapping that back to the "concern" portion of the question, I just wanted to make it clear that his concerns, the way I had perceived them, were primarily a Biden inauguration and not a second-term Trump Presidency.

Can I ask some followup on that?
Ms. Hutchinson. Uh-huh.

Q So, at the time in the days leading up to the 6th, there were lots of public reports about how things might go bad on the 6th, even the potential for violence. If I'm hearing you correctly, what stands out to you is that Mr. Meadows did not share those concerns or at least did not act on those concerns?

A "Did not act on those concerns" would be accurate.

Q Okay. But other people raised them to him? Like, in this exchange, you mentioned that Mr. Ornato pulled him aside.

A That's correct.

Q Did you ever learn anything else about what Mr. Ornato told Mr. Meadows, other than what was already -- you testified to in the earlier transcribed interview?

A I didn't.

Q Okay.

Another thing that you mentioned related to evidence of fraud. Did Mr. Meadows acknowledge to you that he had not seen sufficient evidence of fraud in the election in order to actually change the results?

A At times Mr. Meadows had acknowledged that perhaps we didn't have enough time to uncover all the voter fraud and we didn't have the resources. He had never acknowledged to me that there maybe wasn't enough fraud to overturn the election, in a personal capacity.

Q But he needed more time to look for it.

A Correct. He had acknowledged that other people had drawn that conclusion. But, from the opinions that he had expressed to me, it was more along the lines of, "We just need more time, and then we'll find it."
Q Hadn't found it yet.

A Correct.

And that's around when he started looking and having more fulsome conversations about the John Eastman theory of the Vice President rejecting the electoral college votes.

Mr. Hunt. Okay?

Okay.

Mr. Hunt. All right. Thank you.

Yes, on page 40, lines 8 through 24, there's discussion on the topics covered during the January 2nd call with the Freedom Caucus.

I think you've already talked about that today. So I think that's clarified and covered by what you testified to earlier today.

At page 43, lines 9 through 11, you were asked, "Was there discussion about it needing to happen" -- "it" being the rally -- "before the joint session started at 1:00 p.m. on January the 6th?"

You said, "Not to my recollection right now."

But you wanted to clarify that.

Ms. Hutchinson. After reviewing my transcripts and thinking further into this moment, I do recall conversations about having the rally prior to Congress convening on January 6th to certify the results of the election.

Do you remember why?

Ms. Hutchinson. At the time, I understood that to be -- I understood the reason to be the President's desired movement to the Capitol as Congress convened that day.

Ms. Cheney. That the President wanted to be at the Capitol in time for the joint session to convene?
Ms. Hutchinson. That's correct. Or around.

Ms. Cheney. And do you know who said that to you or who those conversations were with?

Ms. Hutchinson. When I had the conversations with Mark about the potential movement, I wasn't involved in planning the timing of the rally, but he had mentioned to me that Congress was gonna come in at 1:00, we want to try to get to the Capitol by then.

Is there anything else on that, the timing, getting potentially the President to the Capitol around 1 o'clock that afternoon, that stands out for you?

Ms. Hutchinson. Not right now.

Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Okay. On page 46 --

Ms. Cheney. Anything else on that one?

Mr. Hunt. Huh-uh.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. But this next one, I think, relates generally to it.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. But it's at page 46, lines 10 through 15. Ms. Hutchinson was asked whether a delay or idea of preventing the joint session from going forward on January the 6th was a topic that came up in meetings with Rudy Giuliani and Mr. Meadows. She responded, not that she was present for.

But, upon thinking more, she thinks she can elaborate a little bit on this question.

Ms. Hutchinson. Upon further reflection, I do recall that it was a topic of conversation between Mark and Rudy Giuliani -- Mark Meadows and Rudy Giuliani. I'm not sure why and what their intentions were behind it. I had heard various theories floated through this period, one of them being a potential 10-day delay in
invoking martial law to -- again, I'm not fully knowledgeable of the Eastman theory, but
the Vice President rejecting and sending it back to the States and doing a recount of
everything, of the election results.
So I'm not sure why and if there was one core reason they wanted to delay and
prevent it from going forward that day, but I know that there were several theories
discussed throughout this period.

Ms. Cheney. Did you hear them talk about a time period? You mentioned 10
days. They were trying delay for 10 days? Or just a delay in general?
Ms. Hutchinson. Yeah, I'm not sure where the 10 days comes in really. I just
remember hearing a 10-day delay, essentially buying themselves an extra 10 days past
January 6th if the electoral college were to be delayed or obstructed that day.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. The certification.

Q How many times do you remember this being a topic of conversation
between Mr. Meadows and Giuliani, approximately?
A Two specifically. One was January 2nd. I believe the next time they
talked about it was January 4th or the morning of January 5th.
Q Where were they for that, the 4th or 5th?
A I believe that one was a phone call.
Q And how do you know about that?
A Mark had talked to me afterwards.
I had gotten into work a little late on the 5th, because we arrived back from
Georgia late the night before. And I recall him telling me that he had talked to Rudy and
just loosely explained what they had talked about. And, you know, I took no action on it
or didn't press it any further.

He mentioned it to me for a reason relating to, like, a Member of Congress, in case they reached out to me about something. I don't remember which Member. But that's the reason that he had mentioned it to me in the first place.

Q So, around that time, the 4th and 5th, the President was meeting with the Vice President, along with John Eastman and others, to talk about the Vice President's role in the joint session.

Do you remember any of these conversations coming up and related to those meetings between the President and Vice President?

A I wasn't present for any of the meetings between the President and Vice President. So I don't have anything to add there.

Q Do you remember Mr. Meadows raising that the President would be meeting with the Vice President or had met with the Vice President to talk about this?

A I remember Mr. Meadows raising that the President and Vice President were meeting on these issues and with John Eastman.

I remember Mr. Meadows fairly quickly following up with me, saying that he was going to try to stay away from those meetings -- which, because I knew Mark well, I understood that as, he wanted to distance himself from those conversations because he knew that the President was likely to get news from the Vice President that was not going to please the President, and Mark wouldn't want to take a side during that conversation. He would rather have a conversation with the President afterwards to reassure him that he was still working on it, that he would still work with the Vice President's staff and they'll find a way to make it work.

He opted to distance himself from those meetings so he didn't have to take a side when there was a controversial conversation underway.
Q: Okay.

Mr. Hunt: All right.

Then, on page 52, Ms. Hutchinson was asked whether anyone, in addition to Mr. Ornato, had raised concerns to Mr. Meadows about potential violence on January 6th. And she -- it said, not that she could recall specifically right then.

But, upon reading her transcript, she had something to clarify.

Ms. Hutchinson: I remember the morning of January 4th, after Mr. Meadows and Tony Ornato had a conversation, perhaps a few hours later, I received a call from Robert O'Brien, the National Security Advisor. He had asked if he could speak with Mr. Meadows about potential violence, words of violence, that he was hearing that were potentially going to happen on the Hill on January 6th.

I had asked if he had connected with Tony Ornato, because Tony Ornato had a conversation with him -- with Mark about that topic. Robert had said, "I'll talk to Tony." And then, you know, I don't know if Robert ever connected with Mark about this issue. But he had reached out to intend to have a conversation with Mark.

Did he specify what he was seeing or hearing?

Ms. Hutchinson: He just said he wanted to make sure that the chief had been read in on the reports of potential for violence on January 6th. I didn't request further detail from him.

Did he mention the type of reports, even if not the contents or substance of them?

Ms. Hutchinson: Not to me he didn't.

Okay.

Mr. Hunt: Okay.

At page 54, lines 23 to 24, there's a name correction.
Go ahead, Cassidy.

Ms. Hutchinson. It just reads "Liz Fortny." Her last name is Horning, Horning.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

At page 60, line 25, through 61, line 1, Ms. Hutchinson was asked, "Was Meadows in the meeting?" This is a reference to a January 6th meeting in the Oval Office. And she responded, "I'm not sure. I was not in the West Wing at the time."

But she would like to clarify that answer.

Ms. Hutchinson. I went back and referenced my texts with Ms. Eliza Thurston, and at 11:11 a.m. on January 6th, Eliza had texted me that Mark was in the Oval Office.

And he remained in the Oval Office until they left and moved to West Exec to depart for the Ellipse, so around 11:39 a.m.

Q Did you ever find out what happened in that meeting?

A I had heard afterwards that the Vice President and him had a conversation. It infuriated Trump. And what I had heard was primarily about, you know, how he wanted to make edits to his speech and kept pressing the issue of going to the Capitol.

I'm not sure if all of that transpired in the Oval Office or if that's a combination of what I also witnessed and heard down at the tent and it was just a continuation, but that's what I had heard at the Oval Office meeting.

Q And who'd you hear that from?

A I had talked to Tony Ornato on the phone when I had gotten down there, and he had mentioned the Vice President's call. And then down at the tent, too, I talked to Eric Herschmann about the President's call with the Vice President.

Ms. Cheney. And what did Mr. Herschmann say to you about it?
Ms. Hutchinson. I believe something to the effect of, "This couldn't get F'ing worse if we wanted it to."

Ms. Cheney. And did you ask him what he meant?

Ms. Hutchinson. I just understood it. Eric and I were on similar wavelengths at this point of, this is not going in a good direction.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Did he give you details about the call itself between the President and --

Ms. Hutchinson. Not directly.

-- Vice President?

Mr. Hunt. Okay. At --

Can I just ask one followup?

Mr. Hunt. Sure. Go ahead.

Q You said 11:39 is the time when they left from West Exec?

A Yeah, I mean, that's just from my records of, like, texting Eliza. So it might not be exact to you all's timeline. I just filled that in there as my --

Q Okay. That's helpful. I was gonna ask you where you got that --

A Yeah.

Q Okay.

A She had texted me I believe at 11:39 and said, "They're on their way down to you."

Q Got it. Great.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

At, generally, pages 60 to 70 -- and this was, I think, largely already covered, but
just to make sure -- Ms. Hutchinson was asked, "Did you ever learn from speaking with
Mr. Meadows or anyone else in the White House that the President had placed a call to
the Vice President the morning of January 6th?"

She responded, "Yes. Mr. Meadows had spoken about it. Nothing specific
about it."

And I think she's already talked some about this.

Is there anything else you'd like to clarify on that that you haven't already?

Ms. Hutchinson. No, I think we've covered it.

The only thing -- after the call, there was a -- what we were referring to as the
violent rhetoric -- the "march to the Capitol," "I'll march with you," "fight for
Trump" -- the violent rhetoric is what several advisors had been working to keep out of
his speech that day. And, after the call, there was an increased emphasis from the
President of wanting that in his speech.

I believe we touched on that earlier, but just in case we hadn't, I just wanted to
make sure that was clear.

Q Just to break that down a little bit, so, after the call that the President had
with the Vice President, there was an increased desire to include certain language in the
President’s speech at the Ellipse?

A Correct.

Q And that is what you described as the -- what kind of rhetoric?

A The "march to the Capitol," "fight for Trump," "I'll be marching with you,"
where we were -- speechwriters and certain advisors were trying to keep that out of the
speech.

But there was also -- this was an ongoing conversation with the President for
several days. That morning and especially after the call, though, he wanted that rhetoric back in the speech with more of an emphasis than the previous drafts had had with it.

Q And forgive me if we've covered this, but who are you learning that from?

A Partially Tony Ornato, although me and Tony's conversations were primarily about the mag situation and how he didn't -- the President didn't think that people's weapons were there to hurt him.

And, again, White House Counsel. I had a brief conversation with Pat Cipollone on the ground floor of the West Wing prior to me going out to the motorcade.

And then Eric Herschmann in the offstage announce tent at the actual rally site.

Q Got it. Thank you.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

So, helpfully I think, today you guys had asked a lot of questions that relate to the issues that she wanted to clarify. So these next few are ones that I think you already covered today based on the questions that you asked of her.

But, generally, from pages 79 to 90, there's discussion about the setting on the Ellipse and the weapons and, sort of, who knew what at the time and the President's reaction and others.

So you've talked about that today. In looking that over, is there anything else, other than what you've testified to today, to clarify this section about his knowledge and the magnetometers or anything related to that?

Ms. Hutchinson. No, not that I'm seeing.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

I think you guys asked questions today that helped clarify her testimony from before on those questions.

There was a question at page 85, where Ms. Hutchinson was asked, "What was
his" -- meaning Mr. Meadows' "reaction," in talking about the dangerous items or items
to be deemed dangerous by the Secret Service.

And you said you didn't recall. Do you have anything to add to that? Or was
that covered today too?

Ms. Hutchison. I believe it was covered, but, just for the record, we can go over
it one more time.

This is in the same context as the "concern." I don't recall him having much of a
reaction. It's the lack of reaction that I remember. He was somewhat disengaged and
removed from the conversation regarding dangerous weapons.

And this goes off of the conversation that we had with Tony Ornato that morning
of, you know, "All right, keep me posted," and not looking up from his phone or really
expressing anything that was indicative of him being concerned or wanting to take action
on the items that he at this point definitely knew were in D.C., in the vicinity of the White
House and Congress and tens of thousands of rioters in D.C. that day.

Do you know if he shared the President's view that the people who
showed up in D.C. that day were not there to attack the President or be violent towards
the President?

Ms. Hutchison. Mr. Meadows had conveyed to me that he did not believe that
they were going to be violent towards us, "us" being -- Mr. Meadows had conveyed to me
that he did not believe that the protestors were there to be violent towards other Trump
supporters and Trump allies. He didn't believe that they were there to be violent at the
rally site.

Again, any source of violence that was going to break out I recall Mr. Meadows in
the days leading up to January 6th preemptively blaming on antifa clashing with the
rioters -- the Trump supporters that had come to D.C. for a protest.
Then, at pages 103 to 110 of her first transcript, she was generally asked questions about the President's reaction getting back in the Beast. And that's been covered today too. So her testimony today, which she wanted to clarify, was covered by the things you asked her today about that.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

Then, on page 123, there is a name correction. Ms. Hutchinson said on page 123, line 17, Johnny McEntee, but, on reflection, it's somebody else.

Ms. Hutchinson. Upon reflection, Nick Luna had traveled with us to Georgia that evening. It was not Johnny McEntee.

All right.

Ms. Cheney. Can I just go back for one second, just because it was happening around the same time, with respect to the Beast, or a little bit before that. But you mentioned that Mr. Meadows was taking calls in the control car.

Was there any additional detail you have about who he was talking to or --

Ms. Hutchinson. I had asked him at one point who he was speaking with or if there was anybody he needed to connect with, and he had said, no, that he had it all covered. I didn't pry any more.

He typically only took calls in the control vehicle if they were very private and he didn't want anybody else to hear them.

Ms. Cheney. Is there anything else in the control vehicle who can hear what he's saying?

Ms. Hutchinson. The military aide is typically in the control vehicle.
Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm not sure if the military aide was in the control vehicle at that moment.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. There were a few times on the campaign trail that he would ask -- and that was for a national security call, though. When we are on the campaign trail, if he were to ask the military aide to leave, it wasn't a personal call.

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Ms. Hutchinson. It would've been, like, a national security -- he had to get on the secure line.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. He was using his personal cell phone this day --

Ms. Cheney. I see.

Ms. Hutchinson. -- to make calls from the control vehicle.

Ms. Cheney. Okay. And you don't know if he asked the mil aide to --

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't know.


Mr. Hunt. Okay.

At pages 137 to 144 -- and this subject also comes up elsewhere in her transcript, but it was covered today in response to your questions, because there's been a lot of discussion in the transcripts and then again today about what happened in the particular time period from I think it was around 2:12 -- whatever happened in the afternoon of January 6th, generally in the 2:12 to 2:38 time range.

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

Mr. Hunt. So you asked her questions about that today, or at least this whole
time period was covered, and that would clarify the things that she said about that previously.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Then, I don't think this was covered today, but I could be wrong. On her first transcript at page 147, line 19, Ms. Hutchinson was asked, "Did you learn that the President was reluctant to send out a message to address the situation at the Capitol on January the 6th?"

And you wanted to clarify that response.

Ms. Hutchinson. Upon further reflection, I understood from my conversations with Mark Meadows and overhearing conversations between Mark and White House Counsel that Trump did not want to send out a message on January 7th.

Ms. Cheney. Sixth?

Ms. Hutchinson. Sixth? Is it 6th or the 7th?

Mr. Hunt. This is the 6th, I believe, isn't it?

Ms. Hutchinson. Oh, sorry. I have the 7th written in my --

Mr. Hunt. Oh, is it the 7th? I may be wrong. It's the 7th. Did I say the 6th?

Ms. Cheney. So you learned on the 7th --

Ms. Hutchinson. Yes.

Ms. Cheney. -- that he didn't want to send messages out on the 6th.

Ms. Hutchinson. The video on the 7th.

Mr. Hunt. Oh, this is about a video.

Ms. Cheney. Okay. So there's a video on the 7th.

Ms. Hutchinson. Correct.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. I learned from a conversation with Mark and overhearing
between him and White House Counsel and Eric Herschmann, as well, that Trump didn't necessarily think he needed to do anything more on the 7th than what he had already done on the 6th.

When he was convinced to put out a video on the 7th, I understand that he had a lot of opinions about what the context of that announcement were to entail. I had original drafts of the speech where, you know, there were several lines that didn't make it in there, about prosecuting the rioters or calling them violent. He didn't want that in there. He wanted to put in there that he wanted to potentially pardon them.

Again, this is just with the increased emphasis of his mindset at the time, which was, he didn't think that they did anything wrong. The people who did something wrong that day -- or the person who did something wrong that day was Mike Pence, by not standing with him.

He had continued to call the rioters the patriots, the peaceful protestors. He wanted to continue -- he wanted to blame antifa for any of the violence that day. He didn't believe that his supporters were responsible for any of the violence.

All this was factored in as the decision was made to put out a video. And, obviously, the final remarks reflect some of this, but not in totality.

Q  Who convinced him to do the video on the 7th?
A  I'm not sure who convinced him or if it was a group of people that convinced him.

Q  Who was in the group that you're aware of?
A  That I'm aware of, Mark, Ivanka, Jared Kushner, Eric Herschmann, Pat Cipollone, Pat Philbin. Those are the people that I'm aware of.

Q  Do you know why that group of people thought it was necessary for him to
release a statement?

A  I believe Kayleigh McEnany as well.

From what I understood at the time and from what the reports were coming in, there was a large concern of the 25th Amendment potentially being invoked, and there were concerns about what would happen in the Senate if it was, if the 25th was invoked. So the primary reason that I had heard, other than, you know, "We did not do enough on the 6th, we need to get a stronger message out there and condemn this, otherwise this will be our legacy," the secondary reason to that was, "Think about what might happen in the final 15 days of your Presidency if we don't do this. There's already talk about invoking the 25th Amendment. You need this as cover."

Q  Did that group of people who thought it was necessary to put this out understand that it was Trump supporters who did this? Is that why they were concerned that it would be the President's legacy? Or is there some other reason?

A  I don't want to attribute everybody in that conversation to being full supporters of it being the President's supporters. I know Mark had thoughts about whether they were the President's supporters or whether it was antifa or paid protesters to clash with MAGA supporters.

Q  And that goes back to the conversation with Eliza Thurston we --

A  Correct.

Q  -- talked about earlier.

A  And conversations that Mark also had on the phone that morning. He had talked to several Members of Congress that morning about that they were hearing it's antifa; we don't think it's MAGA at all.

I know his wife, Debbie, had called him at one point and said, "We have evidence that it wasn't MAGA. Make sure the President knows. All of our people were
peaceful."

I believe the vast majority of people in that conversation, though, knew that it was likely -- the violence was likely propagated by the President's supporters.

Q Did that inform at all the President's decision to tone down his remarks related to Department of Justice and prosecuting, if you know?

A I believe that caused him to take the more neutral route and not blame antifa. But he was also instructed to not say that he was going to pardon everybody for, like, the legal ramifications of doing so before he was to leave office.

And the goal of the speech was to calm everything down and not create more chaos and conflict -- again, going back to the 25th Amendment, and, you know, that would be seen as a highly controversial move.

Ms. Cheney. How did you hear about his desire to put the pardon language in?

Ms. Hutchinson. I had drafted the speech. That had come across my desk several times that morning, and I had seen one version where the pardon language was included in it, and then the next version had it taken out.

Ms. Cheney. And do you recall, was it a blanket pardon? Do you recall what the pardon language was?

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't recall what the pardon language was.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Q You said he was instructed not to include it. Who was instructing him not to include language about the pardon in that January 7th speech?

A I understood, from White House Counsel's office coming into our office that morning, that they didn't think it was a good idea to include that in the speech.

Q That being Pat Cipollone?
Mr. Hunt. Then, the last three clarifications that Ms. Hutchinson wanted to make on Transcript 1 I think have all been covered already by those discussions and today.

At pages 191 to 192, she was asked, "Based on your interactions with Mr. Meadows, did he agree with John Eastman and his theories that the Vice President would play what we're calling here 'the strategic role' on January 6th?"

Anything to add to that that you haven't already talked about?

Ms. Hutchinson. No.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. Nothing more to add.

Mr. Hunt. Then, we just talked about the video. It came up again on page 196. And she didn't recall in response to whether the President wanted to do the video.

She's just answered about what she --

Ms. Cheney. I just want to make sure we're clear on which video.

Mr. Hunt. Yeah.

Ms. Cheney. Because there's the video on -- so this -- the video on the night of the 6th is -- I'm sorry. Is this page 196?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, at 4 to 5 on 196. I think -- I have it as January 7th.

Ms. Hutchinson. Yeah.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. The one that I believe was referred to as the March for National Healing.

Ms. Cheney. Okay. So that's -- it's all on the 7th.
And there was no clarification -- and I apologize -- just in terms of the video on the 6th? We didn't ask you about that.

Mr. Hunt. Is there anything about the 6th video?

Ms. Cheney. The one that he put out at 4:17.

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm sure we've discussed it. And just to elaborate, if I hadn't already at that point, I recall him being reluctant to film the video on the 6th. I was not involved in any of the logistics or the planning for that video. I just remember seeing the video go out and feeling a little shocked after it went out.

But, you know, other than, you know, him continuing to express reluctance on filming that that afternoon, I don't have anything further to add. I wasn't part of those conversations.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

"Him" being the President?

Ms. Hutchinson. The President. I'm sorry.

Mr. Hunt. And then the last clarification on Transcript 1 was just related to a question about antifa. This is at page 198, lines 10 to 18.

And I think you've already covered this, as well, when you were previously asked, "Were you aware of any discussions about the need to include references to antifa when discussing the events of January 6th on the Capitol?"

And you've already now clarified. You previously said you weren't privy to the conversations, but now you've elaborated on that. Is there anything else you want to add?

Ms. Hutchinson. Other than what I've already said, and if I haven't already said it this way, you know, I am aware that the President at points wanted to blame antifa and believed it was antifa. And in my conversations with Mr. Meadows, I understand that
he also felt antifa was to blame.

Your understanding about the President and wanting to blame antifa, did that come up after the 6th?

Because I'll just represent to you, in the video on the 6th, he says, "We love you, we hear you, but it's time to go home."

So was that an evolution of his beliefs in wanting to place blame, or did that come up on the 6th as well?

Ms. Hutchinson. I wasn't in the Oval dining room with him throughout that afternoon. From what I recall, Mr. Meadows said that he was going to raise it with the President, "it" being the possibility it was antifa. I'm not sure if those conversations actually transpired on -- you know, as events were unfolding at the Capitol on the 6th.

Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. Would we be able to take a really brief break?

Sure. Let's go off the record.

[Recess.]
[5:22 p.m.]

Mr. Hunt. Back on the record? Thank you.

All right. Transcript 2, page 10, line 14 — or lines 12 to 13, I should say, you wanted to add a few names.

Ms. Hutchinson was asked about which speakers had raised concerns. And she thought that she needed to elaborate, and she had thought about additional names.

Ms. Hutchinson. Upon reflection, after reading the second transcript, I recall the names Alex Jones, Ali Alexander, and Roger Stone being raised as potential speakers that had created conflicting opinions in the West Wing in the days leading up to January 6th.

Q You said Alex Jones, Ali Alexander, and who's the other?

A Roger Stone.

Q Can you share what those concerns were, first with respect to Mr. Jones?

A All three of them -- I hate to blanket them together for you, but -- or bundle them together for you, but it might just be the easiest.

I just remember there being conversations about who should speak at the rally. You know, I had my opinions on it, more so with Members of Congress, because that's was raised to me. But I remember an instance where Eric Herschmann had come to talk to me about these particular individuals, to ask if the chief had conversations about them yet.

That was the first time that I had heard these names being mentioned in conjunction with the rally. And Eric had said, "Just go talk to the chief. He's been talking about these people for days with the boss. We need to figure this out."
At the time, I was only tracking Mo Brooks and trying to not make him a speaker on January 6th to headline the President.

So the next time I had seen Mark, I had said, "Hey, Eric stopped by. He wanted to talk to about you three of the speakers." I recall giving Mark their names, and he said, "All right, I'll go take care of it," and walked out. And that's the last that I heard of it.
Q Do you know what the President’s views on Mr. Jones, Mr. Alexander, and Mr. Stone were related to their appearance or speeches on the Ellipse?

A It’s my understanding that the President wanted them to speak at his rally site at the Ellipse on January 6th. I don’t know how or when the conversations evolved to moving them to a separate location. I wasn’t privy to those conversations at the time.

Q Other than Herschmann, who else was talking about these figures -- Mr. Jones, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Stone?

A The only person at the time who had raised it as a concern to me was Eric Herschmann.

Q Do you know how he learned about them as potential speakers?

A I’m not sure.

Q And when was the first time you remember this coming up?

A The conversation between me and Eric happened on January 5th, around the same time that I had been working on the Mo Brooks speaker situation.

Q What do you mean by that, working on the Mo Brooks situation?

A Mark had come back from the Oval Office at one point and asked if I could reach out to Mo Brooks about speaking at the rally on the 6th. I had said something to the effect of, That’s a horrible idea.

And he said, The President wants it. Can you just reach out to him, walked out of the room.

I had contacted Brian Jack. Brian Jack had heard something similar. And to my
understanding, Brian Jack had coordinated logistics from that point on.

Q   Did --

A    Brian Jack was the director of the Office of Political Affairs.

Q    Did you end up reaching out to Mr. Brooks or his staff?

A    Not to my recollection.

Q    Why did you think it was a horrible idea?

A    I believe that Mr. Brooks was, like a lot of these other people at this time,

promoting dangerous ideas about election fraud and stopping the steal. I believed that

he was not an appropriate person to headline the President ahead of this rally, and I

didn't believe that he had anything positive to add to the rally. And I didn't want a part

in coordinating it if they were going to move forward with Mr. Brooks as a speaker.

Q    And you expressed that it was a horrible idea. Did you express your

specific concerns to Mr. Meadows or others?

A    In the days prior to the 5th, I had. Not necessarily specific just to

Mr. Brooks. Contextwise, it might be helpful too. I -- Mark knew how I felt about a lot

of these people, so sometimes when I would just tell him, like, this is a horrible idea,

meaning Mr. Brooks speaking, he knew my opinions on it, because I had -- was very vocal

in my discontent with the idea. But, you know, that's what I had on that, unless you had

further questions.

Q    Okay.

Mr. Hunt. All right. On page 21, lines 1 through 13, the discussion is on

Ms. Pierson's knowledge that people would march to the Capitol after the rally.

And Ms. Hutchinson was asked: In other words, 4 days before the event, she

knew the President was going to tell people to march to the Capitol. Is that consistent

with what you understood the President planned to do?
And you wanted to clarify that.

Ms. Hutchinson. Upon reflection, I want to clarify for the record that, while I did not -- I did not recall and still do not recall Katrina Pierson having these concerns and raising them with Mark and the President, I recall the concept of marching to the Capitol being raised on January 2nd because of the House Freedom Caucus call that happened that evening.

So I just wanted it to be clear that I was aware of the concept of marching to the Capitol. I just wasn't aware that Katrina Pierson was involved in those efforts.

Mr. Hunt. All right. And then I think we talked just now a little bit about this, but on page 23, lines 1 to 5, this is discussion on the President’s knowledge of the conversations about Ellipse rally speakers. You wanted to clarify that.

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't know that I have too much more to add to that other than what was already -- has already been clarified, other than, in the days leading up to the 6th, the President was fine and -- with the idea of the more extreme speakers and supportive of the idea with them headlining him at the rally that day.

He was fond of the more militaristic rhetoric of, you know, fight like hell, march at the Capitol, fight for Trump. He believed, from my understand -- from my understanding, he believed that that rhetoric was good for his cause during that timeframe. You know, he had said different iterations of, you know, I want this rhetoric. I want these people to say these things.

Ms. Cheney. And did you have a sense of why he thought it was good for his cause?

Ms. Hutchinson. He believed that the people coming to Washington, D.C., on January 6th were doing so in their right to protest an illegitimate election, and he believed they had the right to fight for the cause because he didn’t believe that the
election should be stolen from him.

Mr. Hunt. Okay. And then the last clarification for Transcript 2 is at pages 133 to 143. I think this has largely been covered by questioning you had earlier today.

Ms. Hutchinson. I think we --

Mr. Hunt. But just to see if there’s anything there.

The questioning here was about the December 18th meeting that stretched into the morning of the 19th, and Ms. Hutchinson was asked: Is it your understanding that those were being considered or proposed in order to change the outcome of election and have Mr. Trump start a second term on January 20th?

Is there anything that’s not covered that you learned about what those proposals were in the meeting?

Ms. Hutchinson. Not that I haven’t already covered.

Mr. Hunt. Okay. All right. Transcript 3.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Good thing we went over it, then, right?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

December 18th.

Mr. Hunt. Exactly.

So on Transcript 3, page 5, line 2, it says, I did have a conversation, and it should be?

Ms. Hutchinson. I did not have a conversation.

Mr. Hunt. Did not. The word "not" is missing, but is important.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Seems like an important one.

Mr. Hunt. Yeah. And, also, I think we’ve talked about this many times, but just
to give her an opportunity to make sure there’s no inconsistency and people understand.

At page 6, when we’re talking about the meeting that took place on January 6th in the dining room, and at one point, she said she had stepped in. At another point, she said she wasn’t in the meeting. She wanted and wished to clarify what she meant by those two things.

Ms. Hutchinson. There was a brief moment where I had put my foot in the door to briefly step forward to show Mark the phone, and then I stepped backwards. So I want to make sure the record is accurate in the reflection that I was not in the meeting as a participant or a witness to any of this. I had briefly crossed into the Oval Office dining room that afternoon for the purposes of handing Mark the phone when Jim Jordan was on the line.

Understood.

Mr. Hunt. All right. Thank you. She felt it important to make that clear, so --

Of course. Appreciate that.

Mr. Hunt. Okay. Thank you.

And then the next one has been -- is at pages 11 to 14, but this has already been covered and -- again today. This is in reference to what she had heard about the hanging of the Vice President, and you asked a number of questions today.

Ms. Cheney. Yeah.

Mr. Hunt. And she wanted to clarify, but that’s been clarified based on your questions today.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Great.

Mr. Hunt. Okay? The next one is at page 16, where she mentioned a name, and the name is incorrect. She had mentioned -- she said in her transcript O’Brien, but
she meant somebody else.

Ms. Hutchinson. I intended to say Keith Kellogg, who is the Pres -- or Vice President's National Security Advisor.

Mr. Hunt. It's at page 16, line 1, is where I had it.

I see. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. Line 1 and 24, I think, right?

Mr. Hunt. Is it another place? Oh, yes. Two places. Page 16, line 1, I had it, and page 16, line 24. I could be off on my lines, but at page 16 where she said O'Brien twice, she meant --

Ms. Hutchinson. Yeah. I don't --

Mr. Hunt. -- Mr. Kellogg.

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't remember seeing O'Brien that day at all. I remember seeing him on the 7th. Ironically, he awarded Mark the National Security Medal of Honor on January 7th.

Ms. Cheney. Did you have any discussions with him about that?

Ms. Hutchinson. The inappropriate timing of it? I saw him come in with it, and I -- he just went right into Mark's office, and I have a photo of him, but --

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm sorry.

Mr. Hunt. All right. At page 20, there's a government acronym I guess we need to correct. It says, at page 20, line 1, PBD.

Ms. Hutchinson. It should be PPD, PDB, the Presidential Daily Brief.

Mr. Hunt. Well, actually, that's not even correct. That's PBD as in --

Ms. Cheney. It should be PDB.

Mr. Hunt. It should be actually PPD, which is something different.
Ms. Hutchinson. Right.

Mr. Hunt. Not the Presidential Daily Briefing.

Ms. Hutchinson. I was referring to PPD, the Presidential Protective Division.

Ms. Cheney. Oh. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. She caught that. You know how many government acronyms. I didn't catch that one.

Ms. Cheney. That's good. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. All right.

Ms. Hutchinson. There's not many more, I promise.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Yeah. Not many, but these are just little nits that are important.

Page 22, line 14, the transcript reads: So I put him through, in reference to a call.

Ms. Hutchinson. It would have been Ms. Thurston that put him through --

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. She put him through.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. The next is at page 23, line 20, all the way to 24-16, and this is discussion of Mr. Meadows attempting to contact Mr. Flynn, Mr. Giuliani, and Mr. Stone, and at the Willard Hotel. You've already talked about that today.

Ms. Hutchinson. I have.

Mr. Hunt. Is there anything else in this section that's not clarified from your discussion today?

Ms. Hutchinson. No. Just to reemphasize that the Stone and Flynn conversations were separate incidents than Mark's desired travel to the Willard Hotel to meet with Giuliani, Boris Epshteyn, Steve Bannon, whoever else was in Giuliani's war
Mr. Hunt. Okay. All right. Anything else, [person] on that?

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. Didn’t know what that meant.

Mr. Hunt. At page 35, line 17, she had referenced somebody named...
he's already testified today that -- that what she wanted to clarify there, which is that she thinks, but it could have been --

Ms. Hutchinson. It could have been.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. was with us that morning at the rally site.

Normally they would switch, so one would take the morning shift and one would take the afternoon shift and go up to the residence for the -- whatever shift the other one didn't have.

I'm almost certain it was working the butler's pantry the afternoon of the 6th, but just for continuity purposes, there's a slight possibility it also could have been . He was with us that day as well.

Mr. Hunt. Okay. Then, on page 44, line 23, this is the most interesting clarification in my mind. You can't imagine the amount of time Ms. Hutchinson and I spent talking about the distinction between a red manila envelope and a red manila folder, but go ahead, Ms. Hutchinson.

It matters.

Ms. Hutchinson. On page 43, line -- it does. -- line 23, reads red manila envelope. It should read red manila folder.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. An envelope --

Ms. Cheney. It's what we called a redwell, right?

Mr. Hunt. Yeah. That's what I said, but, no, this is, like, different.

Ms. Hutchinson. An envelope is the one that seals shut. The folder is the one that folds and doesn't have a seal.
Ms. Cheney. Right.

Ms. Hutchinson. So I wanted to make sure the distinction was clear because we were talking about documents.

Mr. Hunt. All right.

Ms. Hutchinson. Next clarification.

Mr. Hunt. Page 48, line 24, there's a name correction. It says "Liza."

Ms. Hutchinson. It should read "Eliza."

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Now, this next one is one that relates to the HPSCI discussion that has come up several times. And in reading the transcript -- this is at page 48, and it also relates to elsewhere in the transcripts talking about this. Ms. Hutchinson thought it would be very helpful to just step back and put this in sort of a chronological order.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. It helped her think about it this way. So she wants to clarify, even though I think all of the information is there already, it's just sort of making sure that everybody understands sort of the chronology of how it took place. But, also, I think we've established it doesn't really relate to the January 6th. This is talking about the HPSCI binder --

Ms. Cheney. Yes.

Mr. Hunt. -- related to [redacted]. So go ahead.

Ms. Hutchinson. So I would like to clarify the HPSCI timeline.

Mid-December, Mark sat down with Devin Nunes, who at the time was the ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and had requested a series of documents from Mr. Nunes. Those documents included a large binder on [redacted], which much of my previous testimony concerned.
The other topics had less documents. The topics included Russia, which is the subject I need to see human capital.

The second subject or the second topic was Russia. I'm not sure of the subject.

The third topic was information regarding Hunter Biden. And the -- I'm sorry.

The fifth topic, so Russia was -- Russia, two, three; Hunter Biden, four. Number five would have been the foreign election data specific to Venezuela, potentially other countries as well, although I'm only -- I only saw Venezuela in the beginning of that binder.

I want to emphasize for the record that I know the topics, but I do not know the contents of any of these materials. As I have earlier, I think it might be helpful to put all of this into the context of a timeline.

On Saturday, December 19, 2020, Devin Nunes brought [redacted], who at the time I believe was the staff director for the minority of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, or HPSCI.

They came to Meadows' office to meet with him to discuss getting documents from HPSCI and having HPSCI staff come into the White House to review those documents. This was the final meeting that Mr. Nunes attended on this matter.

On Wednesday, December 30th, the White House received the HPSCI documents.

On Saturday, January 2nd, 2021, [redacted] came to the White House independently and met with Mr. Meadows for a few hours to review the documents in his office.

On Sunday, January 3rd, 2021, [redacted] brought [redacted] who I understood to be then current HPSCI staffers, to the White House to meet with Mr. Meadows at 1 p.m.

The group met with Mr. Meadows for about 30 minutes in his office, and then
they reviewed the documents independently. When they finished, they briefly met with Mr. Meadows before he had to head to the Oval Office for a DOJ meeting related to Jeff Clark.

In the final --

Mr. Hunt. That's on January 3rd, correct?

Ms. Hutchinson. That's on January 3rd.

In the final week of the administration, Mr. Meadows took the binder that related to where HPSCI had made recommended redactions for material that needed to remain classified. Then he gave that binder to Sue Bai, at the time an NSC attorney. Copies of the binder were made, and some were given to the White House Counsel's Office. One copy of the binder was to be given to Leader McCarthy and one copy was to be given to Leader McConnell. Neither McCarthy nor McConnell received a copy of this binder.

Then Mr. Meadows wanted a copy of the binder to be given to John Solomon and to Mollie Hemingway. It is my understanding that both Mollie and John received their copies of the binder late in the day of January 19th.

Late in the evening of January 19th, around 10:30 or 11 o'clock p.m., Pat Philbin came down to my office and asked me for the binders, referring to the two binders that were to be given to Leader McCarthy and Leader McConnell. I then gave those binders to him.

The next morning, I understood -- the next morning, January 20th, I understood that the White House Counsel's Office was working on additional edits or redactions to the information in the binder. It is my understanding that when they finished their additional edits and redactions, they gave a copy to Mr. Meadows.

Somewhere between 11 o'clock and 11:30 a.m., I was outside talking to
Mr. Meadows' security detail, and Mr. Meadows came outside with the binder under his arm. He gave me his White House cell phone and asked me to turn it in. He then turned to his Secret Service detail and asked, How quickly can you get me to the Department of Justice? I will not be the chief of staff that does not get this done.

I understood "this" means declassify the contents of the binder under his arm.

I remember receiving United States Secret Service email notifications that he stopped at the Department of Justice for about 5 minutes before leaving DOJ and driving to his residence in Old Town.

Mr. Hunt. That just sort of puts all of that in the timeline from when it began until it culminated in the binders going -- or the binder going to DOJ on the -- at --

Ms. Hutchinson. So --

Mr. hunt. -- on the 20th of January 2021.

Ms. Cheney. Okay. Thank you.

So the binders that went to the two reporters did not -- had not been -- they'd been redacted to some extent by HPSCI, but they had not been reviewed by White House counsel?

Mr. Hunt. To the extent you know, you're aware of.

Ms. Hutchinson. [Nonverbal response.]

Ms. Cheney. Okay. And do you know what Mr. Meadows -- when Mr. Meadows said, I will not be the chief of staff who fails to get this done, his plan was to get the entire thing declassified? What's -- do we know?

Mr. Hunt. Can we -- can we just have one moment on this?


Mr. Hunt. Since we're talking about classified information here, can we just go off the record?
Ms. Cheney. Yeah.

Mr. Hunt. I'll just take a minute.

[Recess.]
[6:00 p.m.]

We can go back on the record.

Mr. Hunt. Back on the record.

And Ms. Hutchinson is clarifying a timeline of events that transpired with respect to a binder among the HPSCI documents that had been brought over.

And so if you want to just start back --

Ms. Hutchinson. Yeah.

Mr. Hunt. -- to help clarify, take the point that you think is most beneficial to help clarify this.

Ms. Hutchinson. Okay. So I'm going to backtrack a little bit just to the final week of the administration.

In the last week of the administration, Meadows took the binder that related to where HPSCI heavily recommended redactions for material that needed to remain classified.

Then he gave the binder to Sue Bai, an NSC attorney. Copies of the binder were made and some were given to the White House Counsel's Office. One copy of the binder was to be given to Leader McCarthy and one copy was to be given to Leader McConnell. Neither McCarthy nor McConnell received a copy of the binder.

Then Mr. Meadows wanted a copy of the binder to be given to John Solomon and to Mollie Hemingway. It is my understanding that both Mollie and John received their copies of the binder late in the day of January 19th.

Late in the evening of January 19th, around 10:30 or 11 o'clock p.m., Pat Philbin came down to the office and asked me for the binders, referring to the two binders that were to be given to Leader McCarthy and to Leader McConnell. I then gave them to
him.

He then asked me if Mark had already given the copies of the binder to Mollie Hemingway and John Solomon, which I responded yes, and he remarked, We need to get those binders back.

The next morning, I understood that we got the copies of Mollie and John's binders back, and I understood the White House Counsel's Office was working on additional edits or redactions to the information in the binders. It is my understanding that when they finished their additional edits and redactions, they gave a copy to Mr. Meadows.

Somewhere between 11 o'clock and 11:30 a.m. on January 20th, I was talking to Mr. Meadows' security detail outside on West Executive Avenue. Mr. Meadows came out with a binder under his arm. He gave me his White House phone and asked me to turn it in. He then asked his detail, How quickly can we get to DOJ? I will not be the chief of staff to not get this done.

I understood "this" to mean to deliver the binder -- right -- to deliver the binder.

Mr. Hunt. Deliver the binder to where?

Ms. Hutchinson. To the Department of Justice, the binder to the Department of Justice.

I remember receiving U.S. Secret Service email notifications that he stopped at DOJ for about 5 minutes before leaving DOJ and driving to his residence in Old Town.

Mr. Hunt. Okay.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

I have one question for you. I know you testified last time about Leader McCarthy not wanting the binder. What about Senator McConnell, do you know why he didn't receive a copy?
Ms. Hutchinson. I never reached out to his staff. Once I had the conversation with McCarthy about him not wanting a copy of the binder, I decided it wasn’t worth raising to Leader McConnell.

Ms. Cheney. And did you reach out to Mollie Hemingway --

Ms. Hutchinson. No.

Ms. Cheney. -- or John Solomon or did somebody else?

Ms. Hutchinson. I did not.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Ms. Hutchinson. I’ve never spoken to them.

Mr. Hunt. Okay. The next clarification is on page 73 of the third transcript from lines 10 to 13. Ms. Hutchinson was asked whether Scott Perry was at a meeting on December 29th, and she wants to clarify her answer.

Ms. Hutchinson. It had said, "He wasn’t at that meeting," where the transcript should read, "He was at that meeting" with Mr. Waldron, McGuire, and Higgins on the date December 29th.

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Ms. Hutchinson. Pretty sure it was the 29th.

Mr. -- excuse me. Scott Perry was at the meeting, just to clarify?

Ms. Hutchinson. He was. He was a participant in person at that meeting.

Mr. Hunt. Okay. Also on page 73 of Transcript 3, line 21, there’s just a typo of some kind or just a misunderstanding. It says, "tallying satellite."

Ms. Hutchinson. I believe the transcript should read "Italian satellite."
Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Then on page 74, line 21, also just a typo. It says, "Reacted with her." Should be --

Ms. Hutchinson. "Raised with her."

What page was that again?

Mr. Hunt. Page 74.

Okay.

Mr. Hunt. I think it's either line 21 or line 24.

Oh, 24.

Mr. Hunt. I'm sorry. 24.

Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Should be "raised" instead of "reacted."

Page 81, line 5, there's another small clarification. The transcript states, "He is still with POTUS," just to clarify who the "he" is.

Ms. Hutchinson. The "he" in that sentence is Pat Cipollone.

Mr. Hunt. Then on page 83, line 22, the transcript says "tenure."

Ms. Hutchinson. The transcript should read "knowledge."

Mr. Hunt. Page 88, line 12, there's a name -- this was discussion about listing Members of Congress at a meeting on December 21st at the White House, and she had a name that she recalled that was not -- she didn't recall at the time of her interview.

Ms. Hutchinson. Congressman Paul Gosar was also a part of that conversation.

Ms. Cheney. Can I ask you just on Members, Cassidy, you mentioned today that the call on January 2nd, that Mr. Babin helped to sort of oversee it. Was he in any of these other meetings that you recall?

Ms. Hutchinson. I recall him at the December 21st meeting. I don't recall him
coming to the White House after that.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. All right. Page 95, line 14, the word "marquis," and it's just an incorrect word.

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't know what that -- I'm trying to see where it's at.

Mr. Hunt. We looked at it several times. It says --

Ms. Hutchinson. It says, "His marquis was at the White House." I have no idea what that's referring to.

Ms. Hutchinson. We thought perhaps maybe motorcade.

Ms. Cheney. Yeah.

Ms. Hutchinson. Ratcliffe's motorcade was at the White House, but --

Mr. Hunt. I think that's possible. I can't think of what else it might be.

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm not sure "marquis." It's not a huge issue. I just --

Ms. Cheney. Who is this?

Ms. Hutchinson. Was this Ratcliffe, Director Ratcliffe?

Ms. Hutchinson. Uh-huh.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. Then on page 102, line 9, she refers to "the lazy management." It's actually another word.

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm going to butcher the pronunciation, "laissez-faire."

Mr. Hunt. Laissez-faire management.

Ms. Cheney. Not that far off.

Ms. Hutchinson. A little less diplomatic.

Mr. Hunt. Then on page 106, lines 8 to 25, there was discussion about
preemptive pardons that some Members might have sought, and she wanted to add a
name that she recalled.

Ms. Hutchinson. I would like to add Congressman Paul Gosar to the list that has
already been described in the third transcript.

Mr. Hunt. Then on page 114, line 6, also about pardons, I think you testified
earlier today to this one in response to a question, but you wanted to also add another
name here.

Ms. Hutchinson. Mr. Rudy Giuliani also sought a pardon.

Mr. Hunt. And we're close to the end.

Ms. Hutchinson. Two more.

Mr. Hunt. Page 120, line 23, the word -- the transcript states "vert," v-e-r-t.

That should be --

Ms. Hutchinson. I believe the transcript should read "very," v-e-r-y.

Mr. Hunt. Okay. And then the last one is on page 125, line 25 through
page 126, line 4. This paragraph is meant to all be in a particular voice, Mr. Meadows'
voice. So she wanted to clarify because there's a statement in there that if you don't
know and it's taken out of context, it could be seen as referring to her rather than to Mr.
Meadows.

So why don't you clarify that.

Ms. Cheney. Which page is this on?

Mr. Hunt. It's on page 125, line 25 to 126, line 4.

Ms. Cheney. I see. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. So why don't you clarify that.

Ms. Cheney. Oh, I see.

Ms. Hutchinson. Talking about seeking a preemptive pardon. "Some campaign
people are asking for a preemptive pardon. Heck, if all of these people are asking for a pardon, I want a pardon. Even the President might get a pardon."

I want to make it clear that Cassidy J. Hutchinson did not seek a pardon. So the quotation marks are to clarify that that was Mr. Meadows speaking to me.

Ms. Cheney. Got it.

Ms. Hutchinson. I don't want somebody to eventually read this transcript and think I sought a pardon. I did not.

Ms. Cheney. Okay.

Mr. Hunt. So, again, she's very appreciative that she had that opportunity.

Ms. Cheney. Thank you.

Mr. Hunt. And it does help. And when she was able to sort of put things in a chronological timeframe for herself, she could recall some things. And hopefully that was helpful, certainly helpful to her mind to be able to clarify.

Ms. Cheney. We appreciate that. Thank you very much.

Are there a couple of other questions on the record before we go off the record?

Just very quickly.

I did want to cover one area, which is -- and I understand this might be kind of a sensitive topic, but your prior attorney, I understand there was a possible arrangement with something called the Save America PAC.

Are you familiar with the Save America PAC?

Ms. Hutchinson. [Nonverbal response.]

Okay.

Mr. Hunt. You have to answer audibly.

Ms. Hutchinson. Yes. Are we on the record?

Mr. Hunt. We're on the record, yes.
Ms. Cheney. We are now, but if you want to --

Mr. Hunt. We’re okay on this part, I think.

And if you need any time --

Ms. Hutchinson. Thank you.

Of course.

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm sorry.

If you need any time where you’d like to talk to Mr. Hunt about any of these questions, that’s perfectly fine.

Ms. Hutchinson. I'm fine.

Q Do you have any insight as to how the Save America PAC was involved in paying any fees or if they were at all?

A I don’t -- I don’t specifically. Now, I can give context if you are --

Q Sure.

A -- wanting to hear it.

So my understanding with all of this, at the start of it when I had been connected with Stefan, I had asked him, one, for a contract because I wanted something tangible and I wanted to sign something that would solidify the attorney-client relationship, to which he responded, "For other people, we’re not doing that right now. If at the end you're still interested in doing something, I can maybe get something in writing to you," which felt a little counterproductive to me at the time, though I was grateful to be receiving legal help and assistance.

And I then followed that up with, "Okay. Can you let me know at least who’s paying for this? I would like to thank them for their help," and just kind of trying to learn a little bit more myself.
I was personally apprehensive about this relationship from the start, not to Stefan's fault, but because I had concerns of other people footing my legal bills and the potential implications that that may or may not have throughout this process. So I was being cautious. And when he had responded that he -- again, they weren't going to share that information and, you know, at the end of the investigation, if I still had questions or wanted to know, he would let me know. I still had questions, but I didn't really feel the need to press it further at that point.

The first few depositions transpired. And then we were in the process for the third interview, and he had called me, and this was the first point that he had sort of slipped and -- you know, the whole time I sort of assumed that it was Trump World or somebody in Trump World footing the legal bills, but I didn't have any specifications or reason to believe, other than just my gut instinct with it.

When we were in the process of coming in for a third interview, he had called me and said something to the effect of, "Well, you know, if you want to do this and if we're going to have to do this, we're going to have to have a subpoena. Trump World is not going to pay your legal bills if you don't have a subpoena to go on further into the interview."

So that was my first, like, where it had kind of -- I had known, but that was the proof, and it clicked with the funding was coming from Trump World. And it was the first instance where I felt officially justified in my -- I don't want to say fear -- my apprehension with the arrangement, because I didn't want the financing of an individual or a group to determine how I was going to handle this with the committee.

The subpoena for the third interview came, it went. And then when the conversation started happening for the SCIF portion -- the potential first SCIF portion of the interview and a live hearing, we had continued conversations to an extent where he
had, again, iterated to me that he wasn't sure whether Trump World would continue paying for the legal services I was being provided with if we were to go the route of the SCIF or a live hearing, which I had then interpreted in my conversations with him to mean a potential for a contempt charge would be the preferred option.

Q. Is that something that you had raised, the idea of a contempt charge?

Mr. Hunt. I want to be careful a little bit here --

Yeah.

Mr. Hunt. -- of going into your communications with him about it. But as long as we're talking about the financing piece of that --

Ms. Hutchinson. Yeah, yeah. My --

Mr. Hunt. -- and your understanding of who was financing and any concerns that gave you, I'm okay with you talking about it.

Ms. Hutchinson. Right. So without going to the legal advice or legal counsel part of it, of those discussions, I felt myself more in a position of I didn't want Trump World financing or money to determine or dictate how I was going to handle this moving forward. And I didn't want to be out of control of something that, you know, I wasn't going to agree with just because I felt like I was boxed into this agreement, financial agreement.

Q. Are you aware of any expectations that Save America PAC or others had with respect to coordinating any of your prior counsel's conduct with the committee that you feel comfortable sharing? And, again, I don't want to get anything beyond what it is that you and Mr. Hunt have discussed is okay.

A. I will say what I have to say and if you have further questions or want further clarifications, that's fine. But there's an increased emphasis in Trump World -- and I
hate to use the term -- you know, about loyalty and they're loyal to you as long as they feel you are to them.

So with all of that in consideration, you know, throughout my entire arrangement with Stefan, 80 percent of me -- 75 to 80 percent of me the whole time just had this bad gut instinct with it. And I remember thinking like, I felt like I had sold myself, and I felt boxed in and that I was under a microscope with them again where I had worked for the last year at that point to sort of distance myself, to no one's fault necessarily, but to take a step back and just recalibrate myself after the end of the administration. Sorry.

Yeah, I remember saying to my mom at one point -- she asked in the beginning, like, if I was happy -- because she knew that I had struggled to find counsel. And she was like, "Are you happy with your counsel?" And I remember looking at her and laughing. And she said, "Why are you laughing?" And I said to her, "No, Mom. I'm F'd," like, and I just hit this point of like -- I had no reason to believe it, other than I know how Trump World operates with the emphasis on loyalty and everybody being in each other's business all the time.

But then there's the other 20, 25 percent of me that, you know, I felt I was being too cynical, and I wanted to believe that people had good intentions and maybe they actually wanted to help me, although I kind of in the back of my mind didn't think that was the case. I didn't want to rule it out and let myself get to the mental place of being ungrateful for the help that I was getting.

Again, it was just as we had progressed through all of the depositions and feeling like I was under the microscope and with people reaching out about potential jobs and people saying that I was taken care of and that I was back under the wing of Trump World made me uncomfortable. But my tipping point with it was the potential limitations and guidance on how the money could be spent.
Q: Are you aware of any other witnesses who have appeared before the
committee who've been instructed or suggested that they take a certain approach
because of funding that they're receiving from Save America PAC or what you're calling
Trump World?

A: No, I'm not. To be honest, I haven't talked to my -- to my awareness.

There's one person I've talked to a little bit on and off throughout this, my friend Liz
Horning. I'm not sure if she's been subpoenaed. She never told me she's been
subpoenaed, so I don't know if she had retained counsel through Save America PAC.

Other than Liz, though, Ben Williamson I talked a few times in the beginning, but
we haven't talked since then. I'm not aware of anybody else that's even receiving funds
from Save America PAC or anybody in Trump's orbit.

So a lot of the people that I'm under the impression have testified are still
somewhat in the orbit still, though, where I think -- I don't know everybody, but I think
my situation is a little more unique where I'm not currently involved in Republican
politics, if we can call it that, or in a wing of, you know, Trump's PACs or any organizations
that he's currently chairing.

Q: Do you know who Susie Wiles is?

A: I do.

Q: Has she reached out to you at all as part of this process?

A: Susie Wiles emailed me once in the beginning with Stefan because Pam
Bondi had a conversation with her. Susie Wiles had emailed me and said that they were
working on it, working on getting me counsel. But I haven't talked to Susie since then.

Pam Bondi had reached out a few times saying that she had talked to Susie and they had
ideas about jobs for me. I never followed up on the conversations, though.

Q: And did they just know to reach out to you because the subpoena had been
Q And if there’s conversations that you don’t want to get into, that’s fine.

Mr. Hunt. Yeah. Can we go off the record for just a minute?

Yeah, that’s fine. That’s fine.

[Recess.]

All right. So let’s go back on the record.

And we are resuming the transcribed interview of Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson.

Q So just a final question or two.

You, Ms. Hutchinson, obviously worked very closely with Mr. Meadows while you were at the White House. And has he or anyone close to him reached out to you about your appearance before the select committee?

Mr. Meadows and I have not spoken since January 20th, 2021. However, the night before my second deposition, it’s my understanding that Mr. Meadows understood that to be my first deposition as my previous counsel had relayed to him and his attorneys. So the night before my second deposition, his current staffer, who also worked at the White House with him, Ben Williamson, gave me a call and said something to the effect of, "Mark let me know that you have your deposition tomorrow. He wants me to let you know that he’s thinking about you. He knows you’re a team player, you’re loyal, and you’re going to do the right thing when you go in for your deposition."

Q Did he say anything else about your appearance, either in that call or since then?

We have not had a follow-up conversation since then.

Q Have you had any outreach from other former colleagues or people close to
former colleagues about your appearance before the select committee?

A I have had -- I've been contacted by Pam Bondi and -- Pam Bondi, Justin Clark, and Alex Cannon.

Q And did they say anything about how you should interact with the select committee, either through testimony or document production, anything at all?

A What they have said to me is -- what they had said to me is, as long as I continue to be a team player, they know that I'm on the team, I'm doing the right thing, I'm protecting who I need to protect, you know, I'll continue to stay in good graces in Trump World. And they have reminded me a couple of times that Trump does read transcripts and just to keep that in mind as I proceeded through my depositions and interviews with the committee.

Q "Trump" meaning the former President reads transcripts that are available or --

A That's correct.

Q -- or could become available?

A That's correct. I'm sorry for not clarifying.

Ms. Cheney. Did they use the words "protect, who you need to protect"?

Ms. Hutchinson. Along those lines of protect our people. You know, you'll protect people, your good people.


I think that's all I have for today.

Ms. Cheney. That's all I have.

Thank you again for being here.

And I think at this point we can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 7:13 p.m., the interview was adjourned.]
Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

________________________
Witness Name

________________________
Date