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# **Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress**

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## Summary

Multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC) are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent.

Under annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item. Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP. There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting—10 U.S.C. 3501 (the text of which was previously codified at 10 U.S.C. 2306b). Under this statute, a program must meet several criteria to qualify for MYP.

Compared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%. In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract due to changes in the program independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting.

BBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC. BBC differs from MYP in the following ways:

- There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC.
- There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act.
- Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC, because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria.
- A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements.
- Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority—the authority to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract—does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature.
- BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties.

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# Introduction

## Issues for Congress

This report provides background information and issues for Congress on multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC),<sup>1</sup> which are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent.

Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP; and whether the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC. Congress's decisions on these issues could affect defense acquisition practices, defense funding requirements, and the defense industrial base.

## Terminology and Scope of Report

### Contracting Mechanisms and Funding Approaches

In discussing MYP, BBC, and incremental funding, it can be helpful to distinguish contracting mechanisms from funding approaches. The two are often mixed together in discussions of DOD acquisition, sometimes leading to confusion. Stated briefly

- **Funding approaches** are ways that Congress can appropriate funding for weapon procurement programs, so that DOD can then put them under contract. Examples of funding approaches include traditional full funding (the standard or default approach), incremental funding, and advance appropriations.<sup>2</sup> Any of these funding approaches might make use of advance procurement (AP) funding.<sup>3</sup>
- **Contracting mechanisms** are ways for DOD to contract for the procurement of weapons systems, once funding for those systems has been appropriated by Congress. Examples of contracting mechanisms include annual contracting (the standard or default DOD approach), MYP, and BBC. Contracting mechanisms can materially change the total procurement cost of a ship.

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<sup>1</sup> MYP is an established acronym for multiyear procurement. BBC is not an established acronym for block buy contracting, but is used in this CRS report for purposes of convenience.

<sup>2</sup> For more on these three funding approaches, see CRS Report RL31404, *Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background, Issues, and Options for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett, and CRS Report RL32776, *Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke. Advance appropriations, which are not to be confused with advance procurement (AP) funding (see footnote 3), are essentially a legislatively locked-in form of incremental funding. Unlike incremental funding, advance appropriations qualify under budgeting regulations as a form of full funding.

<sup>3</sup> AP funding is provided in one or more years prior to the year of procurement of a weapon system for the procurement of long-leadtime components—components with long construction times. Such components must be funded prior to the procurement of the remainder of the weapon system if they are to be ready for installation in the weapon system at the appropriate point in the construction process. AP funding is a permitted exception to the full funding provision. AP funding is not to be confused with advance appropriations (see footnote 2).

The use of a particular funding approach in a defense acquisition program does not dictate the use of a particular contracting mechanism. Defense acquisition programs consequently can be implemented using various combinations of funding approaches and contracting mechanisms. Most DOD weapon acquisition programs use a combination of traditional full funding and annual contracting. A few programs, particularly certain Navy shipbuilding programs, use incremental funding as their funding approach. A limited number of DOD programs use MYP as their contracting approach, and to date three Navy shipbuilding programs have used BBC at some point as their contracting approach. The situation is summarized in **Table 1**.

**Table 1. Contracting Mechanisms and Funding Approaches**

		Funding Approaches		
		Full funding	Incremental funding	Advance appropriations
Contracting mechanisms	Annual contracting	Most programs	A few programs (e.g., CVNs, LHAs, DDG-1000s, and SSBN-826s)	
	MYP	Selected programs		
	Block buy contracting	Virginia class (boats 1-4), Littoral Combat Ship (ships 5-26), and John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers (ships 1-6)		

**Source:** Table prepared by CRS.

**Notes:** Advance procurement (AP) can be used with any of the funding approaches. CVNs are nuclear-powered aircraft carriers; LHAs are large-deck amphibious assault ships; DDG-1000s are destroyers; SSBN-826s are Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (where incremental funding is to be used for the first two ships).

This report focuses on the contracting approaches of MYP and BBC and how they compare to annual contracting. Other CRS reports discuss the funding approaches of traditional full funding, incremental funding, and advance appropriations.<sup>4</sup>

## Background

### Multiyear Procurement (MYP)

#### MYP in Brief<sup>5</sup>

**What is MYP, and how does it differ from annual contracting?** MYP, also known as multiyear contracting, is an alternative to the standard or default DOD approach of annual contracting. Under annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year’s worth of procurement of a given kind of item. Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years’

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2 for citations to these reports. Appropriating funding for a program and placing a program under contract are steps in a larger sequence of budget-related events that includes authorization, appropriation, obligation, and outlays. For a general discussion of this sequence, see CRS Report 98-721, *Introduction to the Federal Budget Process*, coordinated by James V. Saturno.

<sup>5</sup> For an additional brief overview of MYP, see Department of Defense, “Multiyear (MY) Procurement,” undated, 11 pp., accessed October 15, 2020, at <https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/paic/Docs/multiyear.pdf>.

worth of procurement of a given kind of item, without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP.

To illustrate the basic difference between MYP and annual contracting, consider a hypothetical DOD program to procure 20 single-engine aircraft of a certain kind over the five-year period FY2023-FY2027, at a rate of 4 aircraft per year:

- **Under annual contracting**, DOD would issue one or more contracts for each year's procurement of four aircraft. After Congress funds the procurement of the first four aircraft in FY2023, DOD would issue one or more contracts (or exercise a contract option) for those four aircraft. The next year, after Congress funds the procurement of the next four aircraft in FY2024, DOD would issue one or more contracts (or exercise a contract option) for those four aircraft, and so on.
- **Under MYP**, DOD would issue one contract covering all 20 aircraft to be procured during the five-year period FY2023-FY2027. DOD would award this contract in FY2023, at the beginning of the five-year period, following congressional approval to use MYP for the program, and congressional appropriation of the FY2023 funding for the program. To continue the implementation of the contract over the next four years, DOD would request the FY2024 funding for the program as part of DOD's proposed FY2024 budget, the FY2025 funding as part of DOD's proposed FY2025 budget, and so on.

## **Potential Savings Under MYP**

*How much can MYP save?* Compared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%. In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract that was caused by developments independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting.

A February 2012 briefing by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) states that "MYP savings analysis is difficult due to the lack of actual costs on the alternative acquisition path, i.e., the path not taken."<sup>6</sup> The briefing states that CAPE up to that point had assessed MYP savings for four aircraft procurement programs—F/A-18E/F strike fighters, H-60 helicopters, V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and CH-47F helicopters—and that CAPE's assessed savings ranged from 2% to 8%.<sup>7</sup>

A 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that

DOD does not have a formal mechanism for tracking multiyear results against original expectations and makes few efforts to validate whether actual savings were achieved by multiyear procurement. It does not maintain comprehensive central records and historical information that could be used to enhance oversight and knowledge about multiyear performance to inform and improve future multiyear procurement (MYP) candidates. DOD and defense research centers officials said it is difficult to assess results because of the lack

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<sup>6</sup> Slide 10 from briefing entitled "Multiyear Procurement: A CAPE Perspective," given at DOD cost analysis symposium, February 15-17, 2012, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), May 14, 2012.

<sup>7</sup> Slide 12 from briefing entitled "Multiyear Procurement: A CAPE Perspective," given at DOD cost analysis symposium, February 15-17, 2012, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), May 14, 2012. Slide 12 also stated that these assessed savings were based on comparing CAPE's estimate of what the programs would cost under annual contracting (which the briefing refers to as single-year procurement or SYP) to the contractor's MYP proposal.

of historical information on multiyear contracts, comparable annual costs, and the dynamic acquisition environment.<sup>8</sup>

**How does MYP potentially save money?** Compared to annual contracting, using MYP can in principle reduce the cost of the weapons being procured in two primary ways:

- **Contractor optimization of workforce and production facilities.** An MYP contract gives the contractor (e.g., an airplane manufacturer or shipbuilder) confidence that a multiyear stream of business of a known volume will very likely materialize. This confidence can permit the contractor to make investments in the firm's workforce and production facilities that are intended to optimize the facility for the production of the items being procured under the contract. Such investments can include payments for retaining or training workers, or for building, expanding, or modernizing production facilities. Under annual contracting, the manufacturer might not have enough confidence about its future stream of business to make these kinds of investments, or might be unable to convince its parent firm to finance them.
- **Economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of selected long-leadtime components.** Under an MYP contract, DOD is permitted to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and to purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract. In the hypothetical example introduced earlier, using MYP could permit DOD to purchase, say, the 20 engines for the 20 aircraft in the first year or two of the five-year contract. Procuring selected components in this manner under an MYP contract is called an economic order quantity (EOQ) purchase.<sup>9</sup> EOQ purchases can reduce the procurement cost of the weapons being procured under the MYP contract by allowing the manufacturers of components to take maximum advantage of production economies of scale that are possible with batch orders.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Defense Acquisitions[.]: DOD's Practices and Processes for Multiyear Procurement Should Be Improved*, GAO-08-298, February 2008, p. 3. For additional discussion of the potential costs and benefits of MYP, see Scot A. Arnold and Bruce R. Hamon, *The Relative Cost and Benefits of Multi-year Procurement Strategies*, Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2013, IDA Document NS D-4893, 37 pp., accessed October 15, 2020, at <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/i/id/ida-nsd-4893-the-relative-costs-and-benefits-of-multi-year-procurement-strategies/ida-document-ns-d-4893.ashx>. See also Department of the Navy, *DASN(AIR) Multiyear Procurement (MYP) Guidebook*, v. 2.0, November 10, 2010, accessed October 15, 2020, at <https://www.secnavy.navy.mil/rda/Policy-OLD/dasnairmypguidebookv20november102010.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> The term EOQ is occasionally used in discussions of defense acquisition, somewhat loosely, to refer to any high-quantity or batch order of items, even those that do not take place under MYP or BBC. As a general matter, however, EOQs as described here occur only within MYP and block buy contracts.

<sup>10</sup> A 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on multiyear contracting lists five areas of savings, most of which are covered in the two general areas of savings outlined above. One of GAO's five areas of savings—limited engineering changes due to design stability—can also occur in programs that use annual contracting. The GAO report states the following:

Multiyear procurement can potentially save money and improve the defense industrial base by permitting the more efficient use of a contractor's resources. Multiyear contracts are expected to achieve lower unit costs compared to annual contracts through one or more of the following sources: (1) purchase of parts and materials in economic order quantities (EOQ), (2) improved production processes and efficiencies, (3) better utilized industrial facilities, (4) limited engineering changes due to design stability during the multiyear period, and (5) cost avoidance by reducing the burden of placing and administering annual contracts. Multiyear procurement also offers opportunities to enhance the industrial base by providing defense contractors a longer and more



***What gives the contractor confidence that the multiyear stream of business will materialize?*** At least two things give the contractor confidence that DOD will not terminate an MYP contract and that the multiyear stream of business consequently will materialize:

- For a program to qualify for MYP, DOD must certify, among other things, that the minimum need for the items to be purchased is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contract in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities.
- Perhaps more important to the contractor, MYP contracts include a cancellation penalty intended to reimburse a contractor for costs that the contractor has incurred (i.e., investments the contractor has made) in anticipation of the work covered under the MYP contract. The undesirability of paying a cancellation penalty acts as a disincentive for the government against canceling the contract. (And if the contract is canceled, the cancellation penalty helps to make the contractor whole.<sup>11</sup>)

## Permanent Statute Governing MYP

***Is there a permanent statute governing MYP contracting?*** There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting—10 U.S.C. 3501 (the text of which was previously codified at 10 U.S.C. 2306b).<sup>12</sup> The statute was created by Section 909 of the FY1982 Department of Defense Authorization Act (S. 815/P.L. 97-86 of December 1, 1981), revised and reorganized by Section 1022 of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (S. 1587/P.L. 103-355 of October 13, 1994), and further amended on several occasions since.<sup>13</sup> For the text of 10 U.S.C. 3501, see **Appendix A**.

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stable time horizon for planning and investing in production and by attracting subcontractors, vendors, and suppliers. However, multiyear procurement also entails certain risks that must be balanced against potential benefits, such as the increased costs to the government should the multiyear contract be changed or canceled and decreased annual budget flexibility for the program and across DOD's portfolio of weapon systems. Additionally, multiyear contracts often require greater budgetary authority in the earlier years of the procurement to economically buy parts and materials for multiple years of production than under a series of annual buys.

Government Accountability Office, *Defense Acquisitions[:] DOD's Practices and Processes for Multiyear Procurement Should Be Improved*, GAO-08-298, February 2008, pp. 4-5.

<sup>11</sup> Annual contracts can also include cancellation penalties.

<sup>12</sup> A codification note for 10 U.S.C. 3501 states

Pub. L. 116-283, §1822(b)-(1), which had initially directed the transfers of various subsections of section 2306b of this title [i.e., Title 10] to sections 3501 to 3511, was amended by Pub. L. 117-81, §1701(k)(2), by striking out subsecs. (b) to (l) and adding a new subsec. (b). After that amendment, such transfers were no longer directed. Instead, Pub. L. 116-283, §1822(b), as added by Pub. L. 117-81, directed the transfer of section 2306b of this title in its entirety to this section, thereby omitting what would have been sections 3502 to 3511 of this title. The transfer of section 2306b to this section was executed by transferring the text only of section 2306b, as the section designation and catchline had already been enacted by Pub. L. 116-283, §1822(a), as amended by Pub. L. 117-81, §1701(k)(1)(B).

<sup>13</sup> For additional discussion of the legislative origin of MYP, see Congressional Budget Office, *Alternative Strategies for Increasing Multiyear Procurement*, Staff Working Paper, pp. 10-12, accessed October 15, 2020, at [https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/99th-congress-1985-1986/reports/doc16a\\_2.pdf](https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/99th-congress-1985-1986/reports/doc16a_2.pdf), and David R. Sutton, *Multiyear Procurement: A Desktop Guide*, Naval Postgraduate School thesis, June 1997, pp. 7-10, accessed October 15, 2020, at <https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/8709/multiyearprocure00sutt.pdf>.

***Under this statute, what criteria must a program meet to qualify for MYP?*** 10 U.S.C. 3501 states that to qualify for MYP, a program must meet several criteria, including the following:

- **Significant savings.** DOD must estimate that using an MYP contract would result in “significant savings” compared with using annual contracting.
- **Realistic cost estimates.** DOD’s estimates of the cost of the MYP contract and the anticipated savings must be realistic.
- **Stable need for the items.** DOD must expect that its minimum need for the items will remain substantially unchanged during the contract in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities.
- **Stable design for the items.** The design for the items to be acquired must be stable, and the technical risks associated with the items must not be excessive.

10 U.S.C. 3501 includes provisions requiring the Secretary of Defense or certain other DOD officials to find, determine, or certify that these and other statutory requirements for using MYP contracts have been met, and provisions requiring the heads of DOD agencies to provide written notifications of certain things to the congressional defense committees 30 days before awarding or initiating an MYP contract, or 10 days before terminating one. 10 U.S.C. 3501 also requires DOD MYP contracts to be fixed-price type contracts.

***What is meant by “significant savings”?*** The amount of savings required under 10 U.S.C. 3501 to qualify for using an MYP contract has changed over time; the requirement was changed from “substantial savings” to “significant savings” by Section 811 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015).<sup>14</sup> The joint explanatory statement for the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act states the following regarding Section 811:

*Amendment relating to multiyear contract authority for acquisition of property (sec. 811)*

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 806) that would strike the existing requirement that the head of an agency must determine that substantial savings would be achieved before entering into a multiyear contract.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes with an amendment that would require that significant savings would be achieved before entering into a multiyear contract.

The conferees agree that the government should seek to maximize savings whenever it pursues multiyear procurement. However, the conferees also agree that significant savings (estimated to be greater than \$250.0 million), and other benefits, may be achieved even if it does not equate to a minimum of 10 percent savings over the cost of an annual contract. The conferees expect a request for authority to enter into a multiyear contract will include (1) the estimated cost savings, (2) the minimum quantity needed, (3) confirmation that the design is stable and the technical risks are not excessive, and (4) any other rationale for entering into such a contract.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> For a discussion of the earlier evolution of the savings requirement under 10 U.S.C. 3501, including a figure graphically summarizing the legislative history of the requirement, see Government Accountability Office, *Defense Acquisitions[:] DOD’s Practices and Processes for Multiyear Procurement Should Be Improved*, GAO-08-298, February 2008, pp. 21-22, including Figure 3 on p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> Joint explanatory statement for H.R. 1735, the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act, page 126 (PDF page 127 of 542). H.R. 1735 was vetoed by the President. A revised FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act, S. 1356, was then passed and enacted into law. There was no new joint explanatory statement for S. 1356. For the parts of S. 1356 that were unchanged from H.R. 1735, the joint explanatory statement for H.R. 1735 in effect serves as the joint explanatory statement for S. 1356.

In addition, 10 U.S.C. 3501 states the following:

If for any fiscal year a multiyear contract to be entered into under this section is authorized by law for a particular procurement program and that authorization is subject to certain conditions established by law (including a condition as to cost savings to be achieved under the multiyear contract in comparison to specified other contracts) and if it appears (after negotiations with contractors) that such savings cannot be achieved, but that significant savings could nevertheless be achieved through the use of a multiyear contract rather than specified other contracts, the President may submit to Congress a request for relief from the specified cost savings that must be achieved through multiyear contracting for that program. Any such request by the President shall include details about the request for a multiyear contract, including details about the negotiated contract terms and conditions.<sup>16</sup>

***What is meant by “stable design”?*** The term “stable design” is generally understood to mean that the design for the items to be procured is not expected to change substantially during the period of the contract. Having a stable design is generally demonstrated by having already built at least a few items to that design (or in the case of a shipbuilding program, at least one ship to that design) and concluding, through testing and operation of those items, that the design does not require any substantial changes during the period of the contract.

### **Potential Consequences of Not Fully Funding an MYP Contract**

***What happens if Congress does not provide the annual funding requested by DOD to continue the implementation of the contract?*** If Congress does not provide the funding requested by DOD to continue the implementation of an MYP contract, DOD would be required to renegotiate, suspend, or terminate the contract. Terminating the contract could require the government to pay a cancellation penalty to the contractor. Renegotiating or suspending the contract could also have a financial impact.

### **Effect on Flexibility for Making Procurement Changes**

***What effect does using MYP have on flexibility for making procurement changes?*** A principal potential disadvantage of using MYP is that it can reduce Congress’s and DOD’s flexibility for making changes (especially reductions) in procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances, at least without incurring cancellation penalties. In general, the greater the portion of DOD’s procurement account that is executed under MYP contracts, the greater the potential loss of flexibility. The use of MYP for executing some portion of the DOD procurement account means that if policymakers in future years decide to reduce procurement spending below previously planned levels, the spending reduction might fall more heavily on procurement programs that do not use MYP, which in turn might result in a less-than-optimally balanced DOD procurement effort.

### **Congressional Approval**

***How does Congress approve the use of MYP?*** Congress approves the use of MYP on a case-by-case basis, typically in response to requests by DOD.<sup>17</sup> Congressional approval for DOD MYP

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<sup>16</sup> 10 U.S.C. 3501, subsection (i)(4).

<sup>17</sup> The Anti-Deficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341) prohibits the making of contracts in advance of appropriations. A multiple-year commitment may be made when authorized by Congress by entering into a firm commitment for one year and making the government’s liability for future years contingent on funds becoming available.

contracts with a value of more than \$500 million must occur in two places: an annual DOD appropriations act<sup>18</sup> and an act other than the annual DOD appropriations act.<sup>19</sup>

In annual DOD appropriations acts, the provision permitting the use of MYP for one or more defense acquisition programs is typically included in the title containing general provisions, which typically is Title VIII. As shown in the tables in **Appendix B**, since FY2011, it has been Section 8010.

An annual national defense authorization act (NDAA) is usually the act other than an appropriations act in which provisions granting authority for using MYP contracting on individual defense acquisition programs are included. Such provisions typically occur in Title I of the NDAA, the title covering procurement programs.

Provisions in which Congress approves the use of MYP for a particular defense acquisition program may include specific conditions for that program in addition to the requirements and conditions of 10 U.S.C. 3501.

## **Frequency of Use of MYP**

*How often is MYP used?* MYP is used for a limited number of DOD acquisition programs. As shown in the **Appendix B**, annual DOD appropriations acts since FY1990 typically have approved the use of MYP for zero to a few DOD programs each year.

An August 28, 2017, press report states the following:

The Pentagon's portfolio of active multiyear procurement contracts is on track to taper from \$10.7 billion in fiscal year 2017—or more than 8 percent of DOD procurement spending—to \$1.2 billion by FY-19, according to data recently compiled by the Pentagon comptroller for lawmakers.

However, there are potential new block-buy deals in the works, including several large Navy deals.

According to the Multiyear Procurement Contracts Report for FY-17, which includes data current as of June 27, seven major defense acquisition programs are being purchased through multiyear procurement contracts, collectively obligating the U.S. government to spend \$16 billion across the five-year spending plan with \$14.5 billion of the commitments lashed to FY-17 and FY-18.<sup>20</sup>

A February 2012 briefing by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) shows that the total dollar value of DOD MYP contracts has remained more or less stable between FY2000 and FY2012 at roughly \$7 billion to \$13 billion per year. The briefing shows that since the total size of DOD's procurement budget has increased during this period, the portion of DOD's total procurement budget accounted for by programs using MYP contracts has declined from about 17% in FY2000 to less than 8% in

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<sup>18</sup> 10 U.S.C. 3501, subsection (l)(3).

<sup>19</sup> 10 U.S.C. 3501, subsection (i)(1).

<sup>20</sup> Jason Sherman, "Active Multiyear Procurement Portfolio Dwindling, New Potential Deals on Deck," *Inside the Navy*, August 28, 2017.

FY2012.<sup>21</sup> The briefing also shows that the Navy makes more use of MYP contracts than does the Army or Air Force, and that the Air Force made very little use of MYP in FY2010-FY2012.<sup>22</sup>

A 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated the following:

Although DOD had been entering into multiyear contracts on a limited basis prior to the 1980s, the Department of Defense Authorization Act, [for fiscal year] 1982,<sup>23</sup> codified the authority for DOD to procure on a multiyear basis major weapon systems that meet certain criteria. Since that time, DOD has annually submitted various weapon systems as multiyear procurement candidates for congressional authorization. Over the past 25 years, Congress has authorized the use of multiyear procurement for approximately 140 acquisition programs, including some systems approved more than once.<sup>24</sup>

## Block Buy Contracting (BBC)

### BBC in Brief

**What is BBC, and how does it compare to MYP?** BBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year.<sup>25</sup> BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC.

BBC differs from MYP in the following ways:

- There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC.
- There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act.
- Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria.
- A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements. The BBC contracts that were used by the Navy for procuring Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), for example, covered a period of seven years (FY2010-FY2016).
- Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature. To provide EOQ authority as part of a BBC contract, the provision granting authority for using BBC in a

<sup>21</sup> Slide 4 from briefing entitled "Multiyear Procurement: A CAPE Perspective," given at DOD cost analysis symposium, February 15-17, 2012, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), May 14, 2012.

<sup>22</sup> Slide 5 from briefing entitled "Multiyear Procurement: A CAPE Perspective," given at DOD cost analysis symposium, February 15-17, 2012, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), May 14, 2012.

<sup>23</sup> S. 815/P.L. 97-86 of December 1, 1981, §909.

<sup>24</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Defense Acquisitions[:] DOD's Practices and Processes for Multiyear Procurement Should Be Improved*, GAO-08-298, February 2008, p. 5.

<sup>25</sup> Using the hypothetical example introduced earlier involving the procurement of 20 aircraft over the five-year period FY2018-FY2022, DOD would follow the same general path as it would under MYP: DOD would issue one contract covering all 20 aircraft in FY2018, at the beginning of the five-year period, following congressional approval to use BBC for the program, and congressional appropriation of the FY2018 funding for the program. To continue the implementation of the contract over the next four years, DOD would request the FY2019 funding for the program as part of DOD's proposed FY2019 budget, the FY2020 funding as part of DOD's proposed FY2020 budget, and so on.

program may need to state explicitly that the authority to use BBC includes the authority to use EOQ.

- BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties.

Given the one key similarity between BBC and MYP (the use of a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement), and the various differences between BBC and MYP, BBC might be thought of as a less formal stepchild of MYP.

***When and why was BBC invented?*** BBC was invented by Section 121(b) of the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997), which granted the Navy the authority to use a single contract for the procurement of the first four Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines. The 4 boats were scheduled to be procured during the five-year period FY1998-FY2002 in annual quantities of 1-1-0-1-1. Congress provided the authority granted in Section 121(b) at least in part to reduce the combined procurement cost of the four submarines. Using MYP was not an option for the Virginia-class program at that time because the Navy had not even begun, let alone finished, construction of the first Virginia-class submarine, and consequently could not demonstrate that it had a stable design for the program.

When Section 121(b) was enacted, there was no name for the contracting authority it provided. The term block buy contracting came into use later, when observers needed a term to refer to the kind of contracting authority that Congress authorized in Section 121(b). As discussed in the next section, this can cause confusion, because the term block buy was already being used in discussions of DOD acquisition to refer to something else.

### **Terminology Alert: Block Buy Contracting vs. Block Buys**

***What's the difference between block buy contracting and block buys?*** In discussions of defense procurement, the term “block buy” by itself (without “contracting” at the end) has sometimes been used to refer to something quite different from block buy contracting—namely, the simple act of funding the procurement of more than one copy of an item in a single year, particularly when no more than one item of that kind might normally be funded in a single year. For example, when Congress funded the procurement of two aircraft carriers in FY1983, and another two in FY1988, these acts were each referred to as block buys, because aircraft carriers are normally procured one at a time, several years apart from one another. This alternate meaning of the term block buy predates by many years the emergence of the term block buy contracting.

The term block buy is still used in this alternate manner, which can lead to confusion in discussions of defense procurement. For example, for FY2017, the Air Force requested funding for procuring five Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) for its EELV Launch Services (ELS) program, and sometimes referred to this as a block buy.

At the same time, Navy officials sometimes refer to the use of block buy contracts for the first four Virginia-class submarines, and in the LCS program, as block buys, when they might be more specifically referred to as instances of block buy *contracting*.

### **Potential Savings Under BBC**

***How much can BBC save, compared with MYP?*** BBC can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by amounts less than or perhaps comparable to those of MYP, if the authority granted for using BBC explicitly includes authority for making economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of components. If the authority granted for using BBC does not explicitly include authority for making EOQ purchases, then the savings from BBC will be less. Potential savings under BBC might also be less than those under MYP if the BBC contract does not include a cancellation

penalty, or includes one that is more limited than typically found in an MYP contract, because this might give the contractor less confidence than would be the case under an MYP contract that the future stream of business will materialize as planned, which in turn might reduce the amount of money the contractor invests to optimize its workforce and production facilities for producing the items to be procured under the contract.

## **Frequency of Use of BBC**

*How frequently has BBC been used?* Since its use at the start of the Virginia-class program, BBC has been used very rarely. The Navy did not use it again in a shipbuilding program until December 2010, when it awarded two block buy contracts, each covering 10 LCSs to be procured over the six-year period FY2010-FY2015, to the two LCS builders.<sup>26</sup> (Each contract was later amended to include an 11<sup>th</sup> ship in FY2016, making for a total of 22 ships under the two contracts.) A third example is the John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler program, in which the Navy used a block buy contract to procure the first six ships in the program.<sup>27</sup>

A fourth example, arguably, is the Air Force's KC-46 aerial refueling tanker program, which employed a fixed price incentive fee (FPIF) development contract that included a "back end" commitment to procure certain minimum numbers of KC-46s in certain fiscal years.<sup>28</sup>

## **Using BBC Rather than MYP**

*When might BBC be suitable as an alternative to MYP?* BBC might be particularly suitable as an alternative to MYP in cases where using a multiyear contract can reduce costs, but the program in question cannot meet all the statutory criteria needed to qualify for MYP. As shown in the case of the first four Virginia-class boats, this can occur at or near the start of a procurement program, when design stability has not been demonstrated through the production of at least a few of the items to be procured (or, for a shipbuilding program, at least one ship).

## **MYP and BBC vs. Contracts with Options**

*What is the difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options?* The military services sometimes use contracts with options to procure multiple copies of an item that are procured over a period of several years. The Navy, for example, used a contract with options to procure Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships that were procured over a period of several years. A contract with options can be viewed as somewhat similar to an MYP or block buy contract in that a single contract is used to procure several years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item.

There is, however, a key difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options: In a contract with options, the service is under no obligation to exercise any of the options, and a service can choose to not exercise an option without having to make a penalty payment to the contractor. In contrast, in an MYP or block buy contract, the service is under an obligation to continue implementing the contract beyond the first year, provided that Congress

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<sup>26</sup> For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, *Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

<sup>27</sup> For further discussion, see CRS Report R43546, *Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

<sup>28</sup> For more on the KC-46 program, see CRS Report RL34398, *Air Force KC-46A Pegasus Tanker Aircraft Program*, by Jeremiah Gertler.

appropriates the necessary funds. If the service chooses to terminate an MYP or block buy contract, and does so as a termination for government convenience rather than as a termination for contractor default, then the contractor can, under the contract's termination for convenience clause, seek a payment from the government for cost incurred for work that is complete or in process at the time of termination, and may include the cost of some of the investments made in anticipation of the MYP or block buy contract being fully implemented. The contractor can do this even if the MYP or block buy contract does not elsewhere include a provision for a cancellation penalty.<sup>29</sup>

As a result of this key difference, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC.

## Issues for Congress

Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; and whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP.

### Frequency of Using MYP and BBC

***Should MYP and BBC in the future be used more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used?*** Supporters of using MYP and BBC more frequently in the future might argue the following:

- Since MYP and BBC can reduce procurement costs, making greater use of MYP and BBC can help DOD get more value out of its available procurement funding. This can be particularly important if DOD's budget in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) terms remains flat or declines in coming years, as many observers anticipate.
- The risks of using MYP have been reduced by Section 811 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), which amended what is now 10 U.S.C. 3501 to strengthen the process for ensuring that programs proposed for MYP meet certain criteria (see "Permanent Statute Governing MYP"). Since the value of MYP contracts equated to less than 8% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2012, compared to about 17% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2000, MYP likely could be used more frequently without exceeding past experience regarding the share of DOD's procurement budget accounted for by MYP contracts.

Supporters of using MYP and BBC less frequently in the future, or at least no more frequently than now, might argue the following:

- Using MYP and BBC more frequently would further reduce Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in DOD procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances. The risks of

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<sup>29</sup> Source: Telephone discussion with Elliott Branch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition & Procurement, October 3, 2011, and email from Navy Office of legislative Affairs, October 11, 2011. Under the termination for convenience clause, the contractor can submit a settlement proposal to the service, which would become the basis for a negotiation between the contractor and the service on the amount of the payment.



reducing flexibility in this regard are increased now because of uncertainties in the current strategic environment and because efforts to reduce federal budget deficits could include reducing DOD spending, which could lead to a reassessment of U.S. defense strategy and associated DOD acquisition programs.

- Since actual savings from using MYP and BBC rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify, it is not clear that the financial benefits of using MYP or BBC more frequently in the future would be worth the resulting further reduction in Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances.

A September 7, 2022, press report stated:

The U.S. Defense Department needs to sign long-term deals with manufacturers of the missiles and bombs heavily needed by U.S. forces and allies, the Pentagon's top weapons buyer said Wednesday [September 7].

Multiyear contracts could persuade weapons makers to improve and expand their factories, said Bill LaPlante, defense undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment.

"What really matters is contracts," LaPlante said at a conference sponsored by Defense News. "We buy munitions and many of these things in a single year."...

"We do multi-year contracts for ships [and] we do it for airplanes, [but] we don't do it for these other munitions," LaPlante said. "We need to do it because that'll stabilize the supply chain. That'll send a signal to industry to say: 'They're in it for the long haul and we can make the commitment'."...

The Pentagon needs to "shift gears" to meet the new demand to resupply weapons being donated to Ukraine and prepare for possible conflicts with China, but "the clutch isn't engaged yet," Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet said during a July earnings call.

"The 'clutch engaged' means there are contracts in place," Taiclet said.

LaPlante said he's spoken to Taiclet and other CEOs in the past month about what he sees in weapon demands in Ukraine and elsewhere around the globe "so that they can have a sight picture so they can start making their investments." Congress ultimately has the final say about whether the Pentagon can sign multi-year contracts with companies, he said.

"We in the department and with the Hill, need to give a better plan" to industry, LaPlante said. "This is what I think they're asking for and I agree with it."<sup>30</sup>

A September 14, 2022, press report stated:

The Army's top acquisition official said today he's "not uncomfortable" with the state of Army munitions stockpiles in the wake of months of arms transfers to Ukraine, but said the Army is doggedly working with industry—including potentially offering multi-year procurement contracts—to boost the production of certain weapons systems to keep Kyiv armed and the US well stocked.

Doug Bush, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology, told reporters that he spends the bulk of his time working to expand US production of 155mm artillery, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) or Javelins that have so critical to Ukraine's recent successes against Russia. Specifically, Bush said the Army was aiming to "dramatically

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<sup>30</sup> Marcus Weisgerber, "US Should Place Multiyear Munitions Orders to Protect Supply, Pentagon Arms Chief Says," *Defense One*, September 7, 2022. See also Lee Hudson, "LaPlante Wants Multiyear Contracts for Missiles," *Politico Pro*, September 7, 2022.

increase” production of GMLRS and is “doubling or more than doubling” production rates for HIMARS launchers.

To accomplish that, Bush said, the Army is leaning on congressional support, and also on the defense industry. For that latter, Bush said the Army—and the Pentagon—was considering the use of multi-year procurement contracts that could help assuage contractor fears of unstable markets for the systems. Bush’s comments came after the Pentagon’s chief weapons buyer, Bill LaPlante, signaled the Defense Department was open to multi-year arrangements.

“Industry, if they have a guaranteed five-year production run for something, they can actually buy in quantity and manage supply lines more efficiently, so yes,” Bush said. “We have to ask and Congress has to approve, but multi-year for certain things would certainly make a lot of sense in my view, but there’s a lot of other people who are going to contribute to that decision.”<sup>31</sup>

A September 28, 2022, opinion piece arguing in favor of making greater use of multiyear contracting stated:

In recent guidance, Pentagon contracting officers were advised to provide “extraordinary contractual relief” to companies on fixed-price contracts now suffering inflation. With the gross domestic product chain-type price index at 8.9%, this help is welcome, especially for smaller companies.

However, a better solution to inflationary woes is not just added flexibilities from the Defense Department, but added dollars from Congress — and sustained funding. Congressional appropriators should heed the calls of Bill LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, and give the feds greater authority to negotiate multiyear procurement contracts for munitions and missile systems. This authority eliminates the need to negotiate contracts each year, keeping production lines hot, saving taxpayer dollars and improving our ability to replenish stocks emptied by the war in Ukraine....

... Forced into year-by-year planning, the defense industry is likely not to make necessary capital investments beyond a one-year horizon. The Pentagon doesn’t incentivize companies to improve capacity and drive down costs....

With America’s munitions stockpiles reaching an “uncomfortably low” level and the Army planning to “nearly triple” artillery shell production, House and Senate appropriators should meet the moment and allow multiyear procurement contracts for more than capital assets like ships. Congress should allow them for the weapons that warfighters use daily—the bombs, missiles, rockets and other munitions that pack a punch in our arsenal.<sup>32</sup>

An October 17, 2022, opinion piece arguing in favor of making greater use of multiyear contracting stated:

As the war in Ukraine drags on, we are relearning lessons that we should never forget: Wars aren’t short, and the United States cannot and should not assume we will fight only one war at a time. By failing to retain these lessons, we run the unnecessary risk of catastrophic outcomes just to save a few dollars. In war, nations need bullets (and more) to win. Weapon systems and technology are necessary, but not sufficient to kill the enemy. In the end, something has to go “boom.”

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<sup>31</sup> Andrew Eversden, “Army Acquisition Chief ‘Not Uncomfortable’ with US Stockpiles, Considers Multi-Year Deals,” *Breaking Defense*, September 14, 2022.

<sup>32</sup> Mackenzie Eaglen and Bill Greenwalt, “Multiyear Contracts Could Solve Plenty of Pentagon Problems,” *Defense News*, September 28, 2022.

Yet, except for Desert Storm, which was quick and “clean” for the United States, we seem to run low on munitions each time we go to war. Then, we scramble to find ways to accelerate what has become a drawn-out process that takes three years to produce a run of new munitions. Instead of scrambling when fighting begins, the Pentagon should get its act together now and take the following four actions to ensure that our warfighters, and those of our allies, have what they need to win wars.

First, eliminate the use of indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts with the munitions sector. This arcane contract vehicle between the Pentagon and munitions suppliers does shorten the contracting process in times of need. However, it also results in the Pentagon asking industry to produce munitions on too short of notice, resulting in the three-year lead times we see today. Instead of signing IDIQ contracts, the Pentagon should purchase munitions by committing to five-year block buys. These would put real dollars to real quantities, enabling industry to advance-purchase long lead items. With the steady flow of income, the private sector would be willing to invest in capacity....

Given the Pentagon’s strategy of planning for only one war, we are going to have to buy a lot more munitions. In fact, we should at least double spending on munitions for the next five to 10 years—and we should do so by committing to five-year block buys that will lock in the sustained funding that industry needs to invest in workforce development and industrial production.<sup>33</sup>

## **Adequacy of Information Submitted for MYP Contracts**

### ***Do the military services submit to Congress adequate information regarding MYP contracts?***

An August 2022 GAO report addressing this question in relation to Navy MYP contracts stated

The Navy used multiyear procurement—a special method to contract for multiple years of requirements in a single contract—for seven critical weapon system programs in fiscal years 2021 and 2022. This contracting method can save the government money through procurement efficiencies but can include future financial commitments. GAO reviewed the seven programs and found that the budget requests for three programs included quantity reductions when compared to their multiyear contracts or previous Navy plans. This hampered their efforts to meet warfighting needs:

- DDG 51 destroyers. The budget request for fiscal year 2022 included funds to procure one of the two ships in the program’s multiyear contracts. Instead of requesting funding for the second ship, the Navy requested \$33 million to cover the government’s cancellation liability for reducing its procurement to one ship in fiscal year 2022.
- V-22 aircraft. The budget request for fiscal year 2022 included funds to procure eight of the 11 aircraft in the program’s multiyear contract for the budget year. The Navy used additional aircraft funded but not procured in fiscal year 2021 to offset the reduced request and meet the stated contract quantity for fiscal year 2022.
- Virginia class submarines. The budget request in fiscal year 2021 included funding for one submarine. This met the multiyear contract quantity but departed from previous multiyear procurement plans, the steady practice of procuring two of the submarines each year, and congressional direction.

Navy officials told GAO that affordability was the primary driver leading to the reduction in quantities requested for DDG 51 and V-22 in the fiscal year 2022 budget. However, GAO found that Department of Defense financial management regulation does not require the Navy to notify the congressional defense committees of its rationale for budget decisions that do not support the procurement quantities stated in multiyear contracts. The lack of such notification can hamper the ability of the committees to oversee programs and

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<sup>33</sup> John Ferrari, “Four Steps the Pentagon Can Take to Fix the Munitions Industrial Base,” *The Hill*, October 17, 2022.

make decisions without having to request supplemental information and explanations from the Navy.

The Navy included additional quantities for the DDG 51, V-22, and Virginia class programs in unfunded priorities lists provided to the defense committees. Congress ultimately decided to fund the procurement of additional quantities.<sup>34</sup>

## **Permanent Statute for BBC**

***Should Congress create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute (10 U.S.C. 3501) that governs the use of MYP?*** Supporters of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following:

- Such a statute could encourage greater use of BBC, and thereby increase savings in DOD procurement programs by giving BBC contracting a formal legal standing and by establishing a clear process for DOD program managers to use in assessing whether their programs might be considered suitable for BBC.
- Such a statute could make BBC more advantageous by including a provision that automatically grants EOQ authority to programs using BBC, as well as provisions establishing qualifying criteria and other conditions intended to reduce the risks of using BBC.

Opponents of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following:

- A key advantage of BBC is that it is *not* governed by a permanent statute. The lack of such a statute gives DOD and Congress full flexibility in determining when and how to use BBC for programs that may not qualify for MYP, but for which a multiyear contract of some kind might produce substantial savings.
- Such a statute could encourage DOD program managers to pursue their programs using BBC rather than MYP. This could reduce discipline in DOD multiyear contracting if the qualifying criteria in the BBC statute are less demanding than the qualifying criteria in 10 U.S.C. 3501.

## **Coast Guard Use of MYP and BBC**

***Should the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC?*** Although the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast Guard is a military service and a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces at all times (14 U.S.C. 1), and 10 U.S.C. 3501 provides authority for using MYP not only to DOD, but also to the Coast Guard (and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as well). In addition, Section 311 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (S. 140/P.L. 115-282 of December 4, 2018) provides permanent authority for the Coast Guard to use block buy contracting with EOQ purchases of components in major acquisition programs. The authority is now codified at 14 U.S.C. 1137.

The Navy in recent years has made extensive use of MYP and BBC in its ship and aircraft acquisition programs. The Coast Guard, like the Navy, procures ships and aircraft. In contrast to the Navy, however, the Coast Guard has never used MYP or BBC in its ship or aircraft acquisition programs. Instead, the Coast has tended to use contracts with options. As discussed

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<sup>34</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Multiyear Procurement[.] Navy Should Provide Congress More Complete Information on Budget Request Decisions*, GAO-22-105966, August 2022, Highlights page.

earlier, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC. CRS in recent years has testified and reported on the possibility of using BBC or MYP in Coast Guard ship acquisition programs, particularly the Coast Guard's 25-ship Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program and the Coast Guard's three-ship polar icebreaker program.<sup>35</sup>

## Legislative Activity for FY2023

### MYP Contracts in DOD's FY2023 Budget Submission

DOD's FY2023 budget submission requests continued funding for implementing several MYP contracts initiated in fiscal years prior to FY2023, and highlights the following proposed new MYP contract that would begin in FY2023:

- A proposed MYP contract for FY2023-FY2027 for up to 10 Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.<sup>36</sup>

### FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 7900/S. 4543)

#### House

**Section 112** of H.R. 7900 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 117-397 of July 1, 2022) states

SEC. 112. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR ARLEIGH BURKE CLASS DESTROYERS.

(a) FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.—

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(A) The DDG Flight III destroyer is the most capable large surface combatant in the world-wide inventory of the Department of Defense.

(B) The Department plans to retire 18 large surface combatants over the next five years.

(C) Under the future-years defense plan, the Department plans to procure two DDGs per year over the next five years.

(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) the loss of aggregate fire power due to the retirement of 18 large surface combatants over the next five years is cause for concern;

(B) the Department should continue to procure large surface combatants at the fastest possible rate based on industrial base capacity; and

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<sup>35</sup> For additional discussion, see CRS Testimony TE10004, *The Status of Coast Guard Cutter Acquisition Programs*, by Ronald O'Rourke; CRS Report R42567, *Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report RL34391, *Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

<sup>36</sup> Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, *Program Acquisition Cost By Weapon System, United States Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request*, April 2022, p. 6-5.

(C) the Department should maximize savings and provide stability to the large surface combatant industrial base through the use of multiyear procurement contracts for the maximum number of ships, realized at a consistent number of ships per year.

(b) **AUTHORITY FOR MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT.**—Subject to section 3501 of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more multiyear contracts for the procurement of up to 15 Arleigh Burke class Flight III guided missile destroyers.

(c) **AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE PROCUREMENT.**—The Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more contracts, beginning in fiscal year 2023, for advance procurement associated with the destroyers for which authorization to enter into a multiyear procurement contract is provided under subsection (b), and for systems and subsystems associated with such destroyers in economic order quantities when cost savings are achievable.

(d) **CONDITION FOR OUT-YEAR CONTRACT PAYMENTS.**—A contract entered into under subsection (b) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract for a fiscal year after fiscal year 2023 is subject to the availability of appropriations or funds for that purpose for such later fiscal year.

(e) **LIMITATION.**—The Secretary of the Navy may not modify a contract entered into under subsection (b) if the modification would increase the target price of the destroyer by more than 10 percent above the target price specified in the original contract or the destroyer under subsection (b).

**Section 114** of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states

**SEC. 114. AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN PROCUREMENTS FOR THE SHIP-TO-SHORE CONNECTOR PROGRAM.**

(a) **CONTRACT AUTHORITY.**—The Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more contracts, beginning with fiscal year 2023, for the procurement of up to 25 Ship-to-Shore Connector class craft and associated material.

(b) **LIABILITY.**—Any contract entered into under subsection (a) shall provide that—

(1) any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose; and

(2) that total liability of the Federal Government for termination of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated to the contract at time of termination.

**Section 115** of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states

**SEC. 115. AUTHORITY TO PROCURE AIRFRAMES AND ENGINES FOR CH-53K KING STALLION HEAVYLIFT HELICOPTERS.**

(a) **CONTRACT AUTHORITY.**—During fiscal years 2023 and 2024, the Secretary of the Navy may enter into—

(1) a single contract for the procurement of up to 30 airframes in support of the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter program; and

(2) a single contract for the procurement of up to 90 engines in support of such program.

(b) **LIABILITY.**—Any contract entered into under subsection (a) shall provide that—

(1) any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose; and

(2) that total liability of the Federal Government for termination of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated to the contract at time of termination.

H.Rept. 117-397 states

*Advanced Low-Cost Munitions Ordnance*

The committee continues to support the development and production of the Advanced Low-Cost Munitions Ordnance (ALaMO), a guided 57mm projectile with fire-and-forget capability. This projectile has the potential to counter the growing threats posed by small boat swarms, unmanned aerial systems, and other emerging threats. The Committee is also aware that the ALaMO round has been tested to confirm its effectiveness, providing confidence that the munition program is ready to enter full rate production in 2023. Furthermore, the Navy's affordability objective for the ALaMO round has faced an unstable production profile throughout its low-rate initial production phase. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to House Committee on Armed Services by March 31, 2023 on the ALaMO inventory objective, an assessment of the most efficient procurement rate to meet the inventory objective, and savings, if any, that could be achieved through multiyear procurement. (Page 14)

## Senate

**Section 122** of S. 4543 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 117-130 of July 18, 2022) states

**SEC. 122. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR ARLEIGH BURKE CLASS DESTROYERS.**

**(a) AUTHORITY FOR MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT.—**

Subject to section 3501 of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more multiyear contracts for the procurement of up to 15 Arleigh Burke class Flight III guided missile destroyers.

**(b) AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE PROCUREMENT.—**The Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more contracts, beginning in fiscal year 2023, for advance procurement associated with the destroyers for which authorization to enter into a multiyear procurement contract is provided under subsection (a), and for systems and subsystems associated with such destroyers in economic order quantities when cost savings are achievable.

**(c) CONDITION FOR OUT-YEAR CONTRACT PAYMENTS.—**A contract entered into under subsection (a) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract for a fiscal year after fiscal year 2023 is subject to the availability of appropriations or funds for that purpose for such later fiscal year.

**(d) CONTRACT REQUIREMENT.—**

**(1) IN GENERAL.—**The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that a contract entered into under subsection (a) includes a priced option to procure an additional such destroyer in each of fiscal years 2023 through 2027.

**(2) OPTION DEFINED.—**In this subsection, the term “option” has the meaning given that term in section 2.101 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (or any successor regulation).

Regarding Section 122, S.Rept. 117-130 states

**Multiyear procurement authority for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (sec. 122)**

The committee recommends a provision that would provide the Secretary of the Navy with the authority to enter into one or more multiyear contracts for the procurement of up to 15 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. The provision would also require the Secretary to negotiate priced options to procure one destroyer in each of fiscal years 2023 through 2027 in addition to the destroyers procured under such contract or contracts.

The committee notes this would be the fifth multiyear contract for the Arleigh Burke-class program. The Navy estimates that each of the previous four multiyear procurement contracts (fiscal years 1998–2001, 2002–2005, 2013–2017, and 2018–2022) achieved savings of greater than \$1.0 billion, as compared to annual procurements.

In exercising the authority provided by this provision, the committee expects the Navy to request a minimum of two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers annually in fiscal years 2023 through 2027 consistent with the procurement profile in the fiscal year 2023 budget request, negotiate an additional priced option ship in each of these years as would be required by this provision, and achieve contract savings not less than previous Arleigh Burke-class multiyear procurement contracts. (Page 6)

**Section 123** of S. 4543 as reported by the committee states

**SEC. 123. BLOCK BUY CONTRACTS FOR SHIP-TO-SHORE**

**CONNECTOR PROGRAM.**

(a) **BLOCK BUY CONTRACT AUTHORITY.**—Beginning in fiscal year 2023, the Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more block buy contracts for the procurement of up to 10 Ship-to-Shore Connector class craft and associated material.

(b) **LIABILITY.**—Any contract entered into under subsection (a) shall provide that—

(1) any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose; and

(2) the total liability of the Federal Government for termination of the contract shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated to the contract at the time of termination.

(c) **CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.**—A contract may not be entered into under subsection (a) unless the Secretary of the Navy certifies to the congressional defense committees, in writing, not later than 30 days before entry into the contract, each of the following, which shall be prepared by the milestone decision authority for such program:

(1) The use of such a contract is consistent with the Chief of Naval Operations' projected force structure requirements for such craft.

(2) The use of such a contract will result in significant savings compared to the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts. In certifying cost savings under the preceding sentence, the Secretary shall include a written explanation of—

(A) the estimated end cost and appropriated funds by fiscal year, by craft, without the authority provided in subsection (a);

(B) the estimated end cost and appropriated funds by fiscal year, by craft, with the authority provided in subsection (a);

(C) the estimated cost savings or increase by fiscal year, by craft, with the authority provided in subsection (a);

(D) the discrete actions that will accomplish such cost savings or avoidance; and

(E) the contractual actions that will ensure the estimated cost savings are realized.

(3) There is a stable design for the property to be acquired and the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive.



(4) The estimates of both the cost of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a contract authorized under subsection (a) are realistic, including a description of the basis for such estimates.

(5) The use of such a contract will promote the national security of the United States.

(d) MILESTONE DECISION AUTHORITY DEFINED.—In this section, the term “milestone decision authority” has the meaning given the term in section 4251(d) of title 10, United States Code.

Regarding Section 123, S.Rept. 117-1309 states

**Block buy contracts for Ship-to-Shore Connector program (sec. 123)**

The committee recommends a provision that would permit the Navy to enter into one or more block buy contracts for up to 10 Ship-to-Shore Connector class craft.

The committee notes the Navy has stated this proposal would promote industrial base stability, production efficiencies, and cost savings when compared to a base contract plus options via annual procurement cost estimate.

Consistent with committee precedent and other multi-year procurement authorities, this provision would authorize up to the number of craft that would be procured in the future years defense program. (Pages 6-7)

**Section 124** of S. 4543 as reported by the committee states

**SEC. 124. PROCUREMENT AUTHORITIES FOR JOHN LEWISCLASS FLEET REPLENISHMENT OILER SHIPS.**

(a) CONTRACT AUTHORITY.—

(1) PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZED.—In fiscal year 2023 or 2024, the Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more contracts for the procurement of not more than eight John Lewis-class fleet replenishment oiler ships.

(2) PROCUREMENT IN CONJUNCTION WITH EXISTING CONTRACTS.—The ships authorized to be procured under paragraph (1) may be procured as additions to existing contracts covering such program.

(b) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—A contract may not be entered into under subsection (a) unless the Secretary of the Navy certifies to the congressional defense committees, in writing, not later than 30 days before entry into the contract, each of the following, which shall be prepared by the milestone decision authority for such program:

(1) The use of such a contract is consistent with the Department of the Navy’s projected force structure requirements for such ships.

(2) The use of such a contract will result in significant savings compared to the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts. In certifying cost savings under the preceding sentence, the Secretary shall include a written explanation of—

(A) the estimated end cost and appropriated funds by fiscal year, by hull, without the authority provided in subsection (a);

(B) the estimated end cost and appropriated funds by fiscal year, by hull, with the authority provided in subsection (a);

(C) the estimated cost savings or increase by fiscal year, by hull, with the authority provided in subsection (a);

(D) the discrete actions that will accomplish such cost savings or avoidance; and

(E) the contractual actions that will ensure the estimated cost savings are realized.

(3) There is a reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period the Secretary of the Navy will request funding for the contract at the level required to avoid contract cancellation.

(4) There is a stable design for the property to be acquired and the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive.

(5) The estimates of both the cost of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a contract authorized under subsection (a) are realistic.

(6) The use of such a contract will promote the national security of the United States.

(7) During the fiscal year in which such contract is to be awarded, sufficient funds will be available to perform the contract in such fiscal year, and the future-years defense program (as defined under section 221 of title 10, United States Code) for such fiscal year will include the funding required to execute the program without cancellation.

(c) **AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE PROCUREMENT.**—The Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more contracts for advance procurement associated with a ship or ships for which authorization to enter into a contract is provided under subsection (a), and for systems and subsystems associated with such ships in economic order quantities when cost savings are achievable.

(d) **CONDITION FOR OUT-YEAR CONTRACT PAYMENTS.**—A contract entered into under subsection (a) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract for a fiscal year is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose for such fiscal year.

(e) **MILESTONE DECISION AUTHORITY DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “milestone decision authority” has the meaning given the term in section 4251(d) of title 10, United States Code.

**Section 130** of S. 4543 as reported by the committee states

**SEC. 130. BLOCK BUY CONTRACTS FOR CH-53K HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTER PROGRAM.**

(a) **BLOCK BUY CONTRACT AUTHORITY.**—During fiscal years 2023 and 2024, the Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more block buy contracts for the procurement of airframes and engines in support of the CH-53K heavy lift helicopter program (in this section referred to as the “program”).

(b) **LIABILITY.**—Any contract entered into under subsection (a) shall provide that—

(1) any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose; and

(2) the total liability of the Federal Government for termination of the contract shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated to the contract at the time of termination.

(c) **CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.**—A contract may not be entered into under subsection (a) unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees, in writing, not later than 30 days before entry into the contract, each of the following, which shall be prepared by the milestone decision authority (as defined in section 4251(d) of title 10, United States Code) for the program:

(1) The use of such a contract will result in significant savings compared to the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts. In certifying cost savings under the preceding sentence, the Secretary shall include a written explanation of—

- (A) the estimated obligations and expenditures by fiscal year for the program without the authority provided in subsection (a);
  - (B) the estimated obligations and expenditures by fiscal year for the program with the authority provided in subsection (a);
  - (C) the estimated cost savings or increase by fiscal year for the program with the authority provided in subsection (a);
  - (D) the discrete actions that will accomplish such cost savings or avoidance; and
  - (E) the contractual actions that will ensure the estimated cost savings are realized.
- (2) There is a reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period the Secretary of Defense will request funding for the contract at the level required to avoid contract cancellation.
- (3) There is a stable design for the property to be acquired and the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive.
- (4) The estimates of both the cost of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a contract authorized under subsection (a) are realistic.
- (5) The use of such a contract will promote the national security of the United States.
- (6) During the fiscal year in which such contract is to be awarded, sufficient funds will be available to perform the contract in such fiscal year, and the future-years defense program submitted to Congress under section 221 of title 10, United States Code, for such fiscal year will include the funding required to execute the program without cancellation.
- (7) The contract will be a fixed price type contract.

**Section 806** of S. 4543 as reported by the committee states

SEC. 806. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENT IN CONNECTION WITH REQUESTS FOR MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR LARGE DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS.

Section 3501(i)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

- (1) by striking “shall include in the request the following:” and all that follows through “(A) A report” and inserting “shall include in the request a report”; and
- (2) by striking subparagraph (B).

Regarding Section 806, S.Rept. 117-130 states

**Modification of reporting requirement in connection with requests for multiyear procurement authority for large defense acquisitions (sec. 806)**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 3501 of title 10, United States Code, to streamline the process for submitting a request to carry out a defense acquisition program using multiyear contract authority. (Page 191)

S.Rept. 117-130 also states

**CVN-82/83 procurement authority report**

The committee notes the future years defense program accompanying the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2023 forecasts 2 years of advance procurement (AP) for the fifth ship in the Gerald R. Ford-class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, CVN-82, in fiscal years 2026 and 2027 with incremental funding presumably beginning in fiscal year 2028.

The committee further notes that the fiscal year 2023 30-year shipbuilding plan recognizes the importance of stability and predictability to the fragile Navy shipbuilding industry, particularly the Navy's nuclear shipbuilding industry, and notes other nuclear shipbuilding programs have utilized 3 years of AP as an additional tool to stabilize the industrial base.

The committee remains supportive of acquisition strategies that maximize benefits to operational commanders while simultaneously protecting the interests of the taxpayer. For example, the multiple-ship procurement of CVN-80 and CVN-81 will provide significant upgrades to the overall capability of the Navy's aircraft carrier fleet as well as nearly \$4.0 billion in reduced costs when compared to single ship procurements.

The committee is also aware of the benefit to the associated workforce and supplier base when aircraft carrier build intervals are optimized to avoid the "peaks and valleys" associated with extended or varying procurement profiles.

Therefore, not later than March 1, 2023, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees that compares potential acquisition strategies and cost saving options associated with the next two aircraft carriers to be procured in the Ford-class, CVN-82 and CVN-83. This report shall include potential funding profiles, potential costs and benefits for the Navy, benefits to the shipbuilder, and benefits to suppliers for the following scenarios:

- (1) CVN-82 and CVN-83 as single ship procurements, versus a combined block buy procurement that includes economic order quantity authority;
- (2) 2 versus 3 years of AP funding for CVN-82 and CVN-83; and
- (3) 4 versus 5 year build intervals for CVN-82 and CVN-83. (Pages 25-26)

## **FY2023 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 8236/S. 4663)**

### **House**

**Section 8010** of H.R. 8236 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 117-388 of June 24, 2022) states

SEC. 8010. None of the funds provided in this Act shall be available to initiate: (1) a multiyear contract that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of \$20,000,000 in any one year of the contract or that includes an unfunded contingent liability in excess of \$20,000,000; or (2) a contract for advance procurement leading to a multiyear contract that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of \$20,000,000 in any one year, unless the congressional defense committees have been notified at least 30 days in advance of the proposed contract award: Provided, That no part of any ap appropriation contained in this Act shall be available to initiate a multiyear contract for which the economic order quantity advance procurement is not funded at least to the limits of the Government's liability: Provided further, That no part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be available to initiate multiyear procurement contracts for any systems or component thereof if the value of the multiyear contract would exceed \$500,000,000 unless specifically provided in this Act: Provided further, That no multiyear procurement contract can be terminated without 30-day prior notification to the congressional defense committees: Provided further, That the execution of multiyear authority shall require the use of a present value analysis to determine lowest cost compared to an annual procurement: Provided further, That none of the funds provided in this Act may be used for a multiyear contract executed after the date of the enactment of this Act unless in the case of any such contract—

- (1) the Secretary of Defense has submitted to Congress a budget request for full funding of units to be procured through the contract and, in the case of a contract for procurement of

aircraft, that includes, for any aircraft unit to be procured through the contract for which procurement funds are requested in that budget request for production beyond advance procurement activities in the fiscal year covered by the budget, full funding of procurement of such unit in that fiscal year;

(2) cancellation provisions in the contract do not include consideration of recurring manufacturing costs of the contractor associated with the production of unfunded units to be delivered under the contract;

(3) the contract provides that payments to the contractor under the contract shall not be made in advance of incurred costs on funded units; and

(4) the contract does not provide for a price adjustment based on a failure to award a follow-on contract.

Funds appropriated in title III of this Act may be used for multiyear procurement contracts for the Arleigh Burke Class Guided Missile Destroyer.

In H.R. 8236 as reported by the committee, the paragraph that makes appropriations for the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account (i.e., the Navy's shipbuilding budget) includes this provision:

*... Provided further, That funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act for Columbia Class Submarine (AP) [advance procurement] may be available for the purposes authorized by subsections (f), (g), (h) or (i) of section 2218a of title 10, United States Code, only in accordance with the provisions of the applicable subsection.*

Regarding the above provision, 10 U.S.C. 2218a is the statute that governs the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), a fund used for executing procurement funding for the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program.<sup>37</sup> Subsection (f) of 10 U.S.C. 2218a grants the Navy authority to enter into EOQ contracts for “the procurement of parts, components, and systems (including weapon systems) common with and required for other nuclear powered vessels [i.e., nuclear-powered attack submarines and/or nuclear-powered aircraft carriers] under joint economic order quantity contracts,” while subsection (i) grants the Navy authority to enter into “multiyear contracts (including economic ordering quantity contracts), for the procurement of critical contractor-furnished and Government-furnished components for critical components” of ballistic missile submarines and other nuclear-powered vessels.

## Senate

**Section 8010** of S. 4663 as released by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 28, 2022, states the following:

SEC. 8010. None of the funds provided in this Act shall be available to initiate: (1) a multiyear contract that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of \$20,000,000 in any one year of the contract or that includes an unfunded contingent liability in excess of \$20,000,000; or (2) a contract for advance procurement leading to a multiyear contract that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of \$20,000,000 in any one year, unless the congressional defense committees have been notified at least 30 days in advance of the proposed contract award: Provided, That no part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be available to initiate a multiyear contract for which the economic order quantity advance procurement is not funded at least to the limits of the Government's liability: Provided further, That no part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be available to initiate multiyear procurement contracts for any

<sup>37</sup> For more on the NSBDF, see CRS Report R41129, *Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

systems or component thereof if the value of the multiyear contract would exceed \$500,000,000 unless specifically provided in this Act: Provided further, That no multiyear procurement contract can be terminated without 30-day prior notification to the congressional defense committees: Provided further, That the execution of multiyear authority shall require the use of a present value analysis to determine lowest cost compared to an annual procurement: Provided further, That none of the funds provided in this Act may be used for a multiyear contract executed after the date of the enactment of this Act unless in the case of any such contract—

- (1) the Secretary of Defense has submitted to Congress a budget request for full funding of units to be procured through the contract and, in the case of a contract for procurement of aircraft, that includes, for any aircraft unit to be procured through the contract for which procurement funds are requested in that budget request for production beyond advance procurement activities in the fiscal year covered by the budget, full funding of procurement of such unit in that fiscal year;
- (2) cancellation provisions in the contract do not include consideration of recurring manufacturing costs of the contractor associated with the production of unfunded units to be delivered under the contract;
- (3) the contract provides that payments to the contractor under the contract shall not be made in advance of incurred costs on funded units; and
- (4) the contract does not provide for a price adjustment based on a failure to award a follow-on contract.

Funds appropriated in title III of this Act may be used for multiyear procurement contracts for up to 15 DDG– 51 Arleigh Burke Class Guided Missile Destroyers.

In S. 4663 as released by the committee, the paragraph that makes appropriations for the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account (i.e., the Navy’s shipbuilding budget) includes this provision:

*... Provided further, That funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act for Columbia Class Submarine (AP) may be available for the purposes authorized by subsections (f), (g), (h) or (i) of section 2218a of title 10, United States Code, only in accordance with the provisions of the applicable subsection.*

Regarding the above provision, 10 U.S.C. 2218a is the statute that governs the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), a fund used for executing procurement funding for the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program.<sup>38</sup> Subsection (f) of 10 U.S.C. 2218a grants the Navy authority to enter into EOQ contracts for “the procurement of parts, components, and systems (including weapon systems) common with and required for other nuclear powered vessels [i.e., nuclear-powered attack submarines and/or nuclear-powered aircraft carriers] under joint economic order quantity contracts,” while subsection (i) grants the Navy authority to enter into “multiyear contracts (including economic ordering quantity contracts), for the procurement of critical contractor-furnished and Government-furnished components for critical components” of ballistic missile submarines and other nuclear-powered vessels.

The explanatory statement for S. 4663 released by the committee states (emphasis added)

The Committee is aware that a number of potential tools exist to address these challenges, including the use of **multi-year contracts**, use of advance procurement funding, and procuring critical long-lead items to shorten production and delivery timelines. However, the Committee notes that none of these authorities and associated funds were included in

<sup>38</sup> For more on the NSBDF, see CRS Report R41129, *Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

the fiscal year 2023 President's budget request, and that most acquisition program managers did not recommend their use....

... The Committee expects the Department in the fiscal year 2024 President's budget request to seek greater use of **multi-year procurement contracts**, advanced procurement, government-furnished equipment, and long-lead procurement, as well as a more strategic approach to investment and management of the individual missile and ammunition acquisition programs and associated workforce. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the congressional defense committees not later than 30 days after the submission of the fiscal year 2024 President's budget request on initiatives included in the request and the associated FYDP that address [the] DIB [defense industrial base] and supply chain.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Explanatory statement for S. 4663 released on July 28, 2022, pp. 6-7.

## Appendix A. Text of 10 U.S.C. 3501

The text as of May 3, 2022, of 10 U.S.C. 3501 (which was previously codified at 10 U.S.C. 2306b)<sup>40</sup> is as follows:

§3501. Multiyear contracts: acquisition of property

(a) In General.—To the extent that funds are otherwise available for obligation, the head of an agency may enter into multiyear contracts for the purchase of property whenever the head of that agency finds each of the following:

(1) That the use of such a contract will result in significant savings of the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts.

(2) That the minimum need for the property to be purchased is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated contract period in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities.

(3) That there is a reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period the head of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level required to avoid contract cancellation.

(4) That there is a stable design for the property to be acquired and that the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive.

(5) That the estimates of both the cost of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear contract are realistic.

(6) In the case of a purchase by the Department of Defense, that the use of such a contract will promote the national security of the United States.

(7) In the case of a contract in an amount equal to or greater than \$500,000,000, that the conditions required by subparagraphs (C) through (F) of subsection (i)(3) will be met, in accordance with the Secretary's certification and determination under such subsection, by such contract.

(b) Regulations.—(1) Each official named in paragraph (2) shall prescribe acquisition regulations for the agency or agencies under the jurisdiction of such official to promote the use of multiyear contracting as authorized by subsection (a) in a manner that will allow the most efficient use of multiyear contracting.

(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Department of Defense.

(B) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Coast Guard, except that the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense shall apply to the Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Navy.

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<sup>40</sup> A codification note for 10 U.S.C. 3501 states

Pub. L. 116–283, §1822(b)–(l), which had initially directed the transfers of various subsections of section 2306b of this title [i.e., Title 10] to sections 3501 to 3511, was amended by Pub. L. 117–81, §1701(k)(2), by striking out subsecs. (b) to (l) and adding a new subsec. (b). After that amendment, such transfers were no longer directed. Instead, Pub. L. 116–283, §1822(b), as added by Pub. L. 117–81, directed the transfer of section 2306b of this title in its entirety to this section, thereby omitting what would have been sections 3502 to 3511 of this title. The transfer of section 2306b to this section was executed by transferring the text only of section 2306b, as the section designation and catchline had already been enacted by Pub. L. 116–283, §1822(a), as amended by Pub. L. 117–81, §1701(k)(1)(B).



(C) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

(c) Contract Cancellations.-The regulations may provide for cancellation provisions in multiyear contracts to the extent that such provisions are necessary and in the best interests of the United States. The cancellation provisions may include consideration of both recurring and nonrecurring costs of the contractor associated with the production of the items to be delivered under the contract.

(d) Participation by Subcontractors, Vendors, and Suppliers.-In order to broaden the defense industrial base, the regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable-

(1) multiyear contracting under subsection (a) shall be used in such a manner as to seek, retain, and promote the use under such contracts of companies that are subcontractors, vendors, or suppliers; and

(2) upon accrual of any payment or other benefit under such a multiyear contract to any subcontractor, vendor, or supplier company participating in such contract, such payment or benefit shall be delivered to such company in the most expeditious manner practicable.

(e) Protection of Existing Authority.-The regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable, the administration of this section, and of the regulations prescribed under this section, shall not be carried out in a manner to preclude or curtail the existing ability of an agency-

(1) to provide for competition in the production of items to be delivered under such a contract; or

(2) to provide for termination of a prime contract the performance of which is deficient with respect to cost, quality, or schedule.

(f) Cancellation or Termination for Insufficient Funding.-In the event funds are not made available for the continuation of a contract made under this section into a subsequent fiscal year, the contract shall be canceled or terminated. The costs of cancellation or termination may be paid from-

(1) appropriations originally available for the performance of the contract concerned;

(2) appropriations currently available for procurement of the type of property concerned, and not otherwise obligated; or

(3) funds appropriated for those payments.

(g) Contract Cancellation Ceilings Exceeding \$100,000,000.-<sup>(1)</sup> Before any contract described in subsection (a) that contains a clause setting forth a cancellation ceiling in excess of \$100,000,000 may be awarded, the head of the agency concerned shall give written notification of the proposed contract and of the proposed cancellation ceiling for that contract to the congressional defense committees, and such contract may not then be awarded until the end of a period of 30 days beginning on the date of such notification.

<sup>(2)</sup> In the case of a contract described in subsection (a) with a cancellation ceiling described in paragraph (1), if the budget for the contract does not include proposed funding for the costs of contract cancellation up to the cancellation ceiling established in the contract, the head of the agency concerned shall, as part of the certification required by subsection (i)(1)(A),<sup>1</sup> give written notification to the congressional defense committees of-

(A) the cancellation ceiling amounts planned for each program year in the proposed multiyear procurement contract, together with the reasons for the amounts planned;

(B) the extent to which costs of contract cancellation are not included in the budget for the contract; and

(C) a financial risk assessment of not including budgeting for costs of contract cancellation.

(h) Defense Acquisitions of Weapon Systems.-In the case of the Department of Defense, the authority under subsection (a) includes authority to enter into the following multiyear contracts in accordance with this section:

(1) A multiyear contract for the purchase of a weapon system, items and services associated with a weapon system, and logistics support for a weapon system.

(2) A multiyear contract for advance procurement of components, parts, and materials necessary to the manufacture of a weapon system, including a multiyear contract for such advance procurement that is entered into in order to achieve economic-lot purchases and more efficient production rates.

(i) Defense Acquisitions Specifically Authorized by Law.-(1) In the case of the Department of Defense, a multiyear contract in an amount equal to or greater than \$500,000,000 may not be entered into under this section unless the contract is specifically authorized by law in an Act other than an appropriations Act.

(2) In submitting a request for a specific authorization by law to carry out a defense acquisition program using multiyear contract authority under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall include in the request the following:

(A) A report containing preliminary findings of the agency head required in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a), together with the basis for such findings.

(B) Confirmation that the preliminary findings of the agency head under subparagraph (A) were supported by a preliminary cost analysis performed by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.

(3) A multiyear contract may not be entered into under this section for a defense acquisition program that has been specifically authorized by law to be carried out using multiyear contract authority unless the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing, not later than 30 days before entry into the contract, that each of the following conditions is satisfied:

(A) The Secretary has determined that each of the requirements in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a) will be met by such contract and has provided the basis for such determination to the congressional defense committees.

(B) The Secretary's determination under subparagraph (A) was made after completion of a cost analysis conducted on the basis of section 3226(b) of this title, and the analysis supports the determination.

(C) The system being acquired pursuant to such contract has not been determined to have experienced cost growth in excess of the critical cost growth threshold pursuant to section 4374 of this title within 5 years prior to the date the Secretary anticipates such contract (or a contract for advance procurement entered into consistent with the authorization for such contract) will be awarded.

(D) A sufficient number of end items of the system being acquired under such contract have been delivered at or within the most current estimates of the program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost for such system to determine that current estimates of such unit costs are realistic.

(E) During the fiscal year in which such contract is to be awarded, sufficient funds will be available to perform the contract in such fiscal year, and the future-years defense program for such fiscal year will include the funding required to execute the program without cancellation.

(F) The contract is a fixed price type contract.

(G) The proposed multiyear contract provides for production at not less than minimum economic rates given the existing tooling and facilities.

(4) If for any fiscal year a multiyear contract to be entered into under this section is authorized by law for a particular procurement program and that authorization is subject to certain conditions established by law (including a condition as to cost savings to be achieved under the multiyear contract in comparison to specified other contracts) and if it appears (after negotiations with contractors) that such savings cannot be achieved, but that significant savings could nevertheless be achieved through the use of a multiyear contract rather than specified other contracts, the President may submit to Congress a request for relief from the specified cost savings that must be achieved through multiyear contracting for that program. Any such request by the President shall include details about the request for a multiyear contract, including details about the negotiated contract terms and conditions.

(5)(A) The Secretary may obligate funds for procurement of an end item under a multiyear contract for the purchase of property only for procurement of a complete and usable end item.

(B) The Secretary may obligate funds appropriated for any fiscal year for advance procurement under a contract for the purchase of property only for the procurement of those long-lead items necessary in order to meet a planned delivery schedule for complete major end items that are programmed under the contract to be acquired with funds appropriated for a subsequent fiscal year (including an economic order quantity of such long-lead items when authorized by law).

(6) The Secretary may make the certification under paragraph (3) notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the conditions of such certification are not met, if the Secretary determines that, due to exceptional circumstances, proceeding with a multiyear contract under this section is in the best interest of the Department of Defense and the Secretary provides the basis for such determination with the certification.

(7) The Secretary may not delegate the authority to make the certification under paragraph (3) or the determination under paragraph (6) to an official below the level of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.

(j) **Defense Contract Options for Varying Quantities.**-The Secretary of Defense may instruct the Secretary of the military department concerned to incorporate into a proposed multiyear contract negotiated priced options for varying the quantities of end items to be procured over the period of the contract.

(k) **Multiyear Contract Defined.**-For the purposes of this section, a multiyear contract is a contract for the purchase of property for more than one, but not more than five, program years. Such a contract may provide that performance under the contract during the second and subsequent years of the contract is contingent upon the appropriation of funds and (if it does so provide) may provide for a cancellation payment to be made to the contractor if such appropriations are not made.

(l) **Various Additional Requirements With Respect to Multiyear Defense Contracts.**-(1)(A) The head of an agency may not initiate a contract described in subparagraph (B) unless the congressional defense committees are notified of the proposed contract at least 30 days in advance of the award of the proposed contract.

(B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following contracts:

(i) A multiyear contract-

(I) that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of \$20,000,000 in any one year of the contract; or

(II) that includes an unfunded contingent liability in excess of \$20,000,000.

(ii) Any contract for advance procurement leading to a multiyear contract that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of \$20,000,000 in any one year.

(2) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear contract for which the economic order quantity advance procurement is not funded at least to the limits of the Government's liability.

(3) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear procurement contract for any system (or component thereof) if the value of the multiyear contract would exceed \$500,000,000 unless authority for the contract is specifically provided in an appropriations Act.

(4) Each report required by paragraph (5) with respect to a contract (or contract extension) shall contain the following:

(A) The amount of total obligational authority under the contract (or contract extension) and the percentage that such amount represents of-

(i) the applicable procurement account; and

(ii) the agency procurement total.

(B) The amount of total obligational authority under all multiyear procurements of the agency concerned (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)) under multiyear contracts in effect at the time the report is submitted and the percentage that such amount represents of-

(i) the applicable procurement account; and

(ii) the agency procurement total.

(C) The amount equal to the sum of the amounts under subparagraphs (A) and (B), and the percentage that such amount represents of-

(i) the applicable procurement account; and

(ii) the agency procurement total.

(D) The amount of total obligational authority under all Department of Defense multiyear procurements (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)), including any multiyear contract (or contract extension) that has been authorized by the Congress but not yet entered into, and the percentage that such amount represents of the procurement accounts of the Department of Defense treated in the aggregate.

(5) The head of an agency may not enter into a multiyear contract (or extend an existing multiyear contract), the value of which would exceed \$500,000,000 (when entered into or when extended, as the case may be), until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report containing the information described in paragraph (4) with respect to the contract (or contract extension).

(6) The head of an agency may not terminate a multiyear procurement contract until 10 days after the date on which notice of the proposed termination is provided to the congressional defense committees.

(7) The execution of multiyear contracting authority shall require the use of a present value analysis to determine lowest cost compared to an annual procurement.

(8) This subsection does not apply to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or to the Coast Guard.

(9) In this subsection:

(A) The term "applicable procurement account" means, with respect to a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension), the appropriation account from which payments to execute the contract will be made.

(B) The term “agency procurement total” means the procurement accounts of the agency entering into a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension) treated in the aggregate.

(m) Increased Funding and Reprogramming Requests.-Any request for increased funding for the procurement of a major system under a multiyear contract authorized under this section shall be accompanied by an explanation of how the request for increased funding affects the determinations made by the Secretary under subsection (i).

## Appendix B. Programs Approved for MYP in Annual DOD Appropriations Acts Since FY1990

This appendix presents, in three tables, programs approved for MYP in annual DOD Appropriations Acts since FY1990. **Table B-1** covers fiscal years since FY2021. **Table B-2** covers FY2011 through FY2021, and **Table B-3** covers FY1990 through FY2010.

**Table B-1. Programs Approved for MYP in Annual Appropriations Acts Since FY2021**

Fiscal Year	Bill/Law	Section on MYP	Program(s) Approved for MYP
2022	H.R. 2471/P.L. 117-103	Section 8010 of Division C	UH/HH-60M Black Hawk helicopter AH-64E Apache helicopter

**Source:** Table prepared by CRS based on text of bills.

**Table B-2. Programs Approved for MYP in Annual DOD Appropriations Acts From FY2011 Through FY2021**

Fiscal Year	Bill/Law	Section on MYP	Programs(s) Approved for MYP
2021	H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260	Section 8010 of Division C	[none]
2020	H.R. 1158/P.L. 116-93	Section 8010 of Division A	[none]
2019	H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245	Section 8010 of Division A	Standard Missile-3 IB Standard Missile-6 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Aircraft variants E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) Aircraft C-130J, KC-130J, HC-130J, MC-130J, AC-130J Aircraft SSN Virginia Class Submarines and Government-furnished equipment
2018	H.R. 1625/P.L. 115-141	Section 8010 of Division C	V-22 Osprey aircraft variants (may not exceed five years) up to 13 SSN Virginia Class Submarines and Government-furnished equipment DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class Flight III guided missile destroyers, the MK41 Vertical Launching Systems, and associated Government-furnished systems and subsystems
2017	H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31	Section 8010 of Division C	AH-64E Apache Helicopter and UH-60M Blackhawk Helicopter
2016	H.R. 2029/P.L. 114-113	Section 8010 of Division C	[none]
2015	H.R. 83/P.L. 113-235	Section 8010 of Division C	[none]
2014	H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76	Section 8010 of Division C	E-2D Advanced Hawkeye SSN 774 Virginia class submarine KC-130J, C-130J, HC-130J, MC-130J, AC-130J aircraft, and government-furnished equipment

Fiscal Year	Bill/Law	Section on MYP	Programs(s) Approved for MYP
2013	H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6	Section 8010 of Division C	F/A-18E, F/A-18F, and EA-18G aircraft Up to 10 DDG-51 destroyers, as well as the AEGIS Weapon Systems, MK 41 Vertical Launching Systems, and Commercial Broadband Satellite Systems associated with those ships Virginia class submarines and government-furnished equipment CH-47 Chinook helicopters V-22 Osprey aircraft variants
2012	H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74	Section 8010 of Division A	UH-60M/HH-60M and MH-60R/MH-60S Helicopter Airframes MH-60R/S Mission Avionics and Common Cockpits
2011	H.R. 1473/P.L. 112-10	Section 8010 of Division A	Navy MH-60R/S helicopter systems

**Source:** Table prepared by CRS based on text of bills.

**Table B-3. Programs Approved for MYP in Annual DOD Appropriations Acts from FY1990 Through FY2010**

Fiscal Year	Bill/Law	Section on MYP	Program(s) Approved for MYP
2010	H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118	Section 8011 of Division A	F-18 aircraft variants
2009	H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329	Section 8011 of Division C	SSN Virginia class submarine
2008	H.R. 3222/P.L. 110-116	Section 8010 of Division A	Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter M1A2 Abrams System Enhancement Package upgrades M2A3/M3A3 Bradley upgrades SSN Virginia Class submarine
2007	H.R. 5631/P.L. 109-289	Section 8008 of Division A	C-17 Globemaster F-22A MH-60R Helicopters MH-60R Helicopter mission equipment V-22 Osprey
2006	H.R. 2863/P.L. 109-148	Section 8008 of Division A	UH-60/MH-60 helicopters C-17 Globemaster Apache Block II Conversion Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/PNVIS)
2005	H.R. 4613/P.L. 108-287	Section 8008	Lightweight 155mm Howitzer
2004	H.R. 2658/P.L. 108-87	Section 8008	F/A-18 aircraft E-2C aircraft Tactical Tomahawk missile Virginia Class submarine
2003	H.R. 5010/P.L. 107-248	Section 8008	C-130 aircraft FMTV F/A-18E and F engine

<b>Fiscal Year</b>	<b>Bill/Law</b>	<b>Section on MYP</b>	<b>Program(s) Approved for MYP</b>
2002	H.R. 3338/P.L. 107-117	Section 8008 of Division A	UH-60/CH-60 aircraft C-17 F/A-18E and F engine
2001	H.R. 4576/P.L. 106-259	Section 8008	Javelin missile M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicle DDG-51 destroyer UH-60/CH-60 aircraft
2000	H.R. 2561/P.L. 106-79	Section 8008	Longbow Apache helicopter Javelin missile Abrams M1A2 Upgrade F/A-18E/F aircraft C-17 aircraft F-16 aircraft
1999	H.R. 4103/P.L. 105-262	Section 8008	E-2C aircraft Longbow Hellfire missile Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
1998	H.R. 2266/P.L. 105-56	Section 8008	Apache Longbow radar AV-8B aircraft Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
1997	H.R. 3610/P.L. 104-208	Section 8009 of Section 101(b) of Title I of Division A	Javelin missiles Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Mk19-3 grenade machine guns M16A2 rifles M249 Squad Automatic Weapons M4 carbine rifles M240B machine guns Arleigh Burke (DDG-15 [sic:51] class destroyers
1996	H.R. 2126/P.L. 104-61	Section 8010	UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter Apache Longbow helicopter M1A2 tank upgrade
1995	H.R. 4650/P.L. 103-335	Section 8010	MK19-3 grenade machine guns M16A2 rifles M249 Squad Automatic Weapons M4 carbine rifles
1994	H.R. 3116/P.L. 103-139	Section 8011	[none]
1993	H.R. 5504/P.L. 102-396	Section 9013 <sup>a</sup>	Defense Support Satellites 23, 24 and 25 Enhanced Modular Signal Processor
1992	H.R. 2521/P.L. 102-172	Section 8013	MK-48 ADCAP Torpedo UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter Army Tactical missile



1991	H.R. 5803/P.L. 101-511	Section 8014	Line of Sight-Rear (Avenger)—Pedestal Mounted Stinger Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) LCAC Landing Craft LHD Amphibious Ship MK-45 Gun Mount/MK-6 Ammo Hoist NAVSTAR Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Defense Support Program Satellites 22 and 23
1990	H.R. 3072/P.L. 101-165	Section 9021 <sup>a</sup>	M-1 tank engines M-1 tank fire control Bradley Fighting Vehicle Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles Maverick Missile (AGM-65D) SH-60B/F helicopter DDG-51 destroyer (two years)

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**Source:** Table prepared by CRS based on text of bills.

a. In H.R. 5504/P.L. 102-396 and H.R. 3072/P.L. 101-165, the general provisions title was Title IX.

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