

1 John J. Nelson (SBN 317598)  
2 MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON  
3 PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC  
4 280 S. Beverly Drive  
5 Beverly Hills, CA 90212  
6 Telephone: (858) 209-6941  
7 Email: jnelson@milberg.com  
8 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

9 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
10 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

11 WAYNE MITCHELL, individually and on  
12 behalf of all others similarly situated,

13 Plaintiff,

14 v.

15 META PLATFORMS, INC.,

16 Defendant.

Case No.

**JURY DEMAND**

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR:**

1. Violation of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 *et seq.*;
2. Violation of the Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 630 *et seq.*;
3. Invasion of Privacy (Intrusion Upon Seclusion);
4. Violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17200 *et seq.*;
5. Unjust Enrichment.

1 Plaintiff Wayne Mitchell, on behalf of himself and the Class defined below, brings this action  
2 against Meta Platforms, Inc. and alleges as follows:

3 **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

4 1. This class action seeks relief for all persons who used Meta’s Facebook or Messenger app  
5 and whose private browsing activity and communications were surreptitiously intercepted, monitored  
6 and recorded by Meta’s in-app internet browsers.

7 2. Beginning in April 2021, Apple’s iOS 14 update required Meta to obtain its users’  
8 informed consent before tracking their internet activity on apps and third-party websites. As a result,  
9 Meta lost access to its primary stream of revenue, derived from the user data it obtained from this  
10 tracking. Now, even when users do not consent to being tracked, Meta tracks Facebook users’ online  
11 activity and communications with external third-party websites by injecting JavaScript code into those  
12 sites. When a user clicks on a web link within the Facebook, Instagram, or Messenger app, Meta  
13 automatically directs them to the in-app browser Meta monitors instead of the user’s default browser.  
14 Meta does not tell its users this is happening or explain that they are being tracked.

15 3. The user information Meta intercepts, monitors, and records includes personally  
16 identifiable information, private health details, text entries, and other sensitive confidential facts.

17 4. Meta’s undisclosed tracking of citizens’ browsing activity and communications violates  
18 federal and state wiretap laws and other laws, entitling Plaintiff and Class members to damages. Plaintiff  
19 and Class members also seek injunctive relief and equitable remedies to stop Meta’s undisclosed and  
20 nonconsensual tracking practices.

21 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

22 5. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. because it is  
23 headquartered in this District.

24 6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action  
25 arises in part under federal law—the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 *et seq.*—and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
26 § 1332(d) because there are more than 100 Class members, the amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million  
27 (excluding interest and costs), and at least one Class member is a citizen of a state different from the state  
28 in which Meta is domiciled.



1 and valuable personal information when they register, including birthdates and email addresses.

2 13. The personal information Meta collects has substantial economic value. One study valued  
3 users' web-browsing histories at \$52 per year.

4 14. Meta is in the business of selling digital advertising space, which accounted for 97% of  
5 its revenue in 2021. Meta's business model heavily relies on its ability to target individual users, collect  
6 their information, understand their individual preferences and dislikes, and use the information to  
7 generate profit in the form of valuable targeted advertisements.

8 15. Meta's financial success is the result of connecting advertisers with its massive repository  
9 of personal data. Meta maximizes its profits by targeting ads to individuals who algorithms have  
10 determined may be personally interested in a certain advertised product or service. Meta thus collects  
11 extensive data about its users, continuously aggregates and analyzes this data, and deploys it to offer  
12 targeted advertising services to advertisers.

13 16. Meta's business model, which depends on its ability to collect and gather its users'  
14 information, has resulted in repeat violations of users' privacy rights over the years. Meta's tactics,  
15 though ever evolving, are always aimed at data mining, and its use of plug-ins, cookies, Facebook  
16 Beacon, the Facebook Like Button, Facebook Pixel, and related tools have led to dozens of private  
17 lawsuits and federal inquiries.

18 17. Meta has also shared its users' private messages and the details relating to their personal  
19 contacts without the users' consent. From 2010 to 2018, Facebook allowed more than 150 third parties,  
20 including Amazon, Microsoft, Netflix, and Spotify, to access this private information.


21 18. In 2019, Facebook agreed to pay a \$5 billion penalty and submit to new restrictions and a  
22 modified corporate structure to settle Federal Trade Commission charges that Facebook violated a 2012  
23 FTC order by deceiving users about their ability to control the privacy of their personal information.

24 **B. Meta tracks its users without their knowledge or consent by manipulating third-**  
25 **party websites and injecting JavaScript into its in-app browsers.**

26 19. A recent report by Felix Krause, a data privacy researcher and former Google engineer,  
27 revealed that Meta has been injecting code into third-party websites, a practice that allows Meta to track  
28 users and intercept data that would otherwise be unavailable to it. For example, if a user accessed the same


1 third-party website from their own web browser, such as the Safari app, Meta would not be able to track  
2 and intercept the users' communications with that website.

3 20. Krause developed [www.InAppBrowser.com](http://www.InAppBrowser.com) as a tool that can determine whether a  
4 particular in-app browser is injecting JavaScript code into third-party websites. This tool is essential for  
5 distinguishing Meta's practices from its competitors and demonstrates that Meta is actively using  
6 JavaScript code to undermine its user's privacy preferences. For example, Figure 1 demonstrates what  
7 happens when a user clicks on a web link from within Telegram, a popular messaging app that does not  
8 inject JavaScript Code onto third-party websites but still prompts users its own in-app browser instead of  
9 their default browser:



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17 (Figure 1.) As demonstrated by the image above, the InAppBrowser tool did not detect any JavaScript  
18 Events. Telegram, in other words, prompts its users to use its own in-app browser, but it does not track  
19 users' activity on or communications with third-party web pages.

20 21. Comparatively, Figure 2 below demonstrates what happens when the same third-party  
21 web link is clicked on from within the iOS Facebook app:



(Figure 2.) When the same HTML file (website) is opened from the iOS Facebook app, www.InAppBrowser.com detects and identifies several different JavaScript events, which indicates that Meta is purposely injecting JavaScript code onto third-party web pages.

22. Krause’s report, entitled “iOS Privacy: Instagram and Facebook can Track Anything you do on any Website in their In-App Browser,” describes how Meta uses JavaScript to alter websites and override its users’ default privacy settings by directing users to Facebook’s in-app browser instead of their pre-programmed default web browser.<sup>1</sup>

23. Injecting JavaScript into the code of third-party websites can allow a malicious actor to intercept confidential information communicated to those sites:<sup>2</sup>

### What is a JavaScript Injection Attack?

<sup>1</sup> <https://krausefx.com/blog/ios-privacy-instagram-and-facebook-can-track-anything-you-do-on-any-website-in-their-in-app-browser> (last accessed Sept. 6, 2022).

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.feroot.com/education-center/what-is-a-javascript-injection-attack/> (last accessed Sept. 6, 2022).

1 A JavaScript injection attack is a type of attack in which a threat actor  
2 injects malicious code directly into the client-side JavaScript. This allows  
3 the threat actor to manipulate the website or web application and collect  
4 sensitive data, such as personally identifiable information (PII) or payment  
5 information.

6 24. Meta is using this tool to gain an advantage over its competitors and, with respect to iOS  
7 users, preserve its ability to intercept and track their communications with third-party websites. Meta  
8 inserts code to track its users' in-app browsing activity without their knowledge or consent, even when  
9 users have declined to "opt in" to Meta's tracking and set their devices to block third-party tracking  
10 cookies.

11 **C. Meta intercepts and tracks its users' private interactions and communications with  
12 third-party websites, overriding users' privacy settings.**

13 25. When a Meta user, while visiting the Facebook app, clicks on a link to an external website  
14 (e.g., from a friend's wall post on their profile), Meta *automatically* reroutes the user to its own in-app  
15 web browser instead of the users' built-in web browser (such as the Safari app that is preloaded onto  
16 iPhones). As a result, third-party websites are rendered *inside* the app—enabling Meta "to monitor  
17 everything happening on external websites, without the consent from the user, [ ]or the website provider."<sup>3</sup>


18 26. The Facebook app injects Meta's JavaScript code into every third-party website a user  
19 visits from within Facebook's in-app browser. This allows to Meta to intercept, monitor and record its  
20 users' interactions and communications with third parties, providing data to Meta that it aggregates,  
21 analyzes, and uses to boost its advertising revenue.

22 27. There was never any pop-up window or other prominent notice given to Facebook users  
23 of Meta's tracking practice. The "Off-Facebook activity" settings tab within the Facebook app does not  
24 disclose the practice. At no point did Meta fairly or reasonably disclose to users its practice of  
25 intercepting, monitoring, and selling their activities and communications while using its in-app browser.  
26 Moreover, many users are unaware that they are accessing third-party websites from within Meta's in-

27  
28 <sup>3</sup> <https://krausefx.com/blog/ios-privacy-instagram-and-facebook-can-track-anything-you-do-on-any-website-in-their-in-app-browser> (last accessed Sept. 6, 2022).

1 app browser. This is because the appearance and functionality of the in-app browser mimics that of any  
2 other browser.

3 28. As demonstrated in Figure 3 below, this systematic process occurs whenever a user clicks  
4 on a link they received in their inbox (through the private messaging feature) or when they click on a link  
5 displayed on another Facebook account's "bio" or post. While the following flowchart refers to  
6 "Instagram," the same process occurs in the Facebook in-app browser and Messenger in-app browser:



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19 (Figure 3.) The image above depicts the systematic manner in which Meta injects JavaScript into  
20 external third-party webpages for the purpose of intercepting, tracking, monitoring, and collecting data  
21 about its users' interactions with external third-party webpages.

22 29. As a result of its JavaScript injection practices, Meta can surveil and extract details about  
23 its users' text selections and other communications with third-party websites:

24 This, in combination with listening to screenshots, gives Meta full insight  
25 over what specific piece of information was selected & shared. The [Meta]  
26 app checks if there is an element with the ID iab-pcm-sdk: According to this  
27 tweet, the iab likely refers to "In App Browser". If no element with the ID  
28 iab-pcm-sdk was found, [Meta] creates a new script element, sets its source  
to [https://connect.facebook.net/en\\_US/pcm.js](https://connect.facebook.net/en_US/pcm.js). It then finds the first script



1 element on [the] website to insert the pcm JavaScript file right before [Meta]  
2 also queries for iframes on [the] website.<sup>4</sup>

3 30. Stated less technically, by running custom scripts on third-party websites, Meta can and  
4 does intercept, view, monitor, and record all user interactions—every button and link they tap, as well as  
5 text selections, screenshots, form inputs (including passwords, addresses, and payment card numbers),  
6 other personally identifiable information, protected health details, and other private and confidential  
7 communications and data.

8 **D. Further details on Meta’s in-app tracking process and business.**

9 31. Meta acknowledged that it tracks Facebook users’ in-app browsing activity within hours  
10 of the practice having been reported to Meta in connection with its “Bug Bounty Program.” Meta later  
11 stated that the data obtained through this practice assists in “aggregating events” before such “events”  
12 are deployed in targeted advertising.

13 32. In contrast, Meta has not implemented this JavaScript code injection practice on the in-  
14 app browser of another of its properties, WhatsApp. This disparity in business conduct confirms that  
15 injecting JavaScript is not necessary for users’ security or for any other legitimate purpose. Instead, this  
16 practice deployed on Facebook serves only to benefit Meta and increase its revenue from ad impressions  
17 sold for display to Facebook users.

18 33. Meta’s injection of JavaScript coincides with recent privacy updates for iPhones and other  
19 iOS devices. In 2020, Apple announced that beginning in 2021, it would change how its iOS mobile  
20 operating systems handle users’ privacy preferences, thereby requiring apps to obtain users’ affirmative  
21 consent prior to be tracked across application or on external websites. After this Apple announcement,  
22 Meta began “waging a public relations effort to attack Apple ahead of new iOS data privacy changes that  
23 would make it harder for advertisers to track users, in a possible sign of just how much the social network  
24 views the move as a threat to its core business.”<sup>5</sup>

25 34. Facebook held press conferences and ran advertisements critical of Apple’s decision to

26 <sup>4</sup> <https://krausefx.com/blog/ios-privacy-instagram-and-facebook-can-track-anything-you-do-on-any-website-in-their-in-app-browser> (last accessed Sept. 6, 2022).

27 <sup>5</sup> <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/12/16/tech/facebook-apple-ios-privacy-rules/index.html> (last accessed  
28 Sept. 6, 2022).

1 require affirmative user consent: “In ads featured in The New York Times, Wall Street Journal and  
2 Washington Post, Facebook slammed Apple’s upcoming requirement for users to give explicit  
3 permission for apps to track them across the internet. Facebook said the move could be ‘devastating’ to  
4 millions of small businesses that advertise on its platform.”<sup>6</sup> WhatsApp likewise “criticized Apple over  
5 its move to display a summary of an app’s privacy practices before a user downloads it from the App  
6 Store, almost like a nutrition label for data collection.”<sup>7</sup>

7 35. In response, Apple stated in part, “We believe that this is a simple matter of standing up  
8 for our users. Users should know when their data is being collected and shared across other apps and  
9 websites, and they should have the choice to allow that or not.”<sup>8</sup> Apple also noted that “App Tracking  
10 Transparency in iOS 14 does not require Facebook to change its approach to tracking users and creating  
11 targeted advertising, it simply requires they give users a choice.”<sup>9</sup>

12 36. As of May 2021, shortly after Apple introduced iOS 14.5, 96% of Apple users in the  
13 United States had not consented to being tracked by apps on their iPhone. And, “[a]ccording to [Meta],  
14 empowering Apple’s users to opt out of tracking cost the company \$10,000,000,000 in the first year, with  
15 more losses to come after that.”<sup>10</sup> Hence “[w]ith web browsers and iOS adding more and more privacy  
16 controls into the users’ hands, it becomes clear why [Meta] is interested in monitoring all web traffic of  
17 external websites.”<sup>11</sup>

18 37. Meta began showing its users a screen that described the consequences of iOS 14.5 and  
19 the long-term impact it could have on Meta’s ability to provide apps and software. Through these and  
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23 <sup>6</sup> *Id.*

24 <sup>7</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>8</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>9</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>10</sup> <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/06/facebook-says-apple-too-powerful-theyre-right> (last accessed  
28 Aug. 24, 2022).

<sup>11</sup> <https://krausefx.com/blog/ios-privacy-instagram-and-facebook-can-track-anything-you-do-on-any-website-in-their-in-app-browser> (last accessed Sept. 6, 2022).

1 related communications strategies, Meta was “threatening that users will need to pay for their services.  
2 But only if users don’t allow the pair to track them from app to app after installing iOS 14.5.”<sup>12</sup>

3 **E. Meta’s conduct harmed Plaintiff and Class members.**

4 38. Meta does not inform Facebook users that clicking on links to third-party websites from  
5 within Facebook will automatically send them to Facebook’s in-app browser, as opposed to the user’s  
6 default web browser, or that Meta will monitor their activity and communications while on those sites.  
7 Because nothing alerts users as to these facts, they are unaware of the tracking and most do not even  
8 realize they are browsing the third-party website from within Facebook’s in-app browser. As a result,  
9 users freely engage with these sites, sharing all manner of personal facts and preferences, without having  
10 reason to know they are being tracked or are actually still within Facebook’s app.

11 39. Even users who may realize they are visiting websites from within Facebook’s in-app  
12 browser do not realize that doing so overrides their privacy settings and enables Meta to track, intercept,  
13 and monitor their activities on the websites as a consequence of Meta’s undisclosed practice of injecting  
14 JavaScript code. Meta’s JavaScript injection cannot be detected by a lay person, and nothing alerts users  
15 to Meta’s practice.

16 40. Users also reasonably expect that their communications with external third-party websites  
17 are not being intercepted and tracked because their default browser disables and blocks third-party  
18 cookies. Meta does not inform users that its in-app browser differs from Safari and other default browsers  
19 in regard to such privacy settings.

20 41. Moreover, Meta fails to disclose the consequences of browsing, navigating, and  
21 communicating with third-party websites from within Facebook’s in-app browser—namely, that doing  
22 so overrides their default browser’s privacy settings, which users rely on to block and prevent tracking.  
23 Similarly, Meta actively conceals the fact that it injects JavaScript that alters external third-party websites  
24 so that it can intercept, track, and record data that it otherwise could not access.

25 42. Plaintiff reasonably believed that his communications and interactions with third-party  
26 websites were confidential, solely between himself and external websites. Had Plaintiff known that Meta

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28 <sup>12</sup> <https://www.imore.com/facebook-and-instagram-threaten-charge-access-ios-145-unless-you-give-it-your-data> (accessed Aug.24, 2022).

1 could and would use its in-app browser to overcome Plaintiff’s default browser settings or otherwise  
2 override his privacy choices, Plaintiff would have changed his browsing behavior and/or avoided  
3 Facebook’s in-app browser altogether, particularly when such communications involved sensitive or  
4 other personally identifiable information, such as private health information and other confidential facts.

5 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the proposed Class, seeks legal and equitable remedies,  
6 both of which are appropriate and necessary to remedy past harm and prevent future harm.

7 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

8 44. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3)  
9 as representative of the following Class and constituent Subclasses:

10 **Class:** All persons in the United States with active Facebook accounts who visited a  
11 third-party external website on Facebook’s in-app browser during the Class Period.

12 **California Subclass:** All persons with active Facebook accounts who visited a third-  
13 party external website on Facebook’s in-app browser during the Class Period in  
14 California.

15 **iOS Subclass:** All persons with active Facebook accounts who, using an iOS device,  
16 visited a third-party external website on Facebook’s in-app browser during the Class  
17 Period.

18 Plaintiff reserves the right to modify these definitions and/or to propose additional subclasses as  
19 appropriate based on further investigation and discovery.

20 45. The “Class Period” is the time period beginning on the date that Meta began implementing  
21 on Facebook the practices described in the Complaint, and ending on the date of entry of judgement.

22 46. Meta and its officers, directors, employees, affiliates, legal representatives, predecessors,  
23 successors and assigns, and any entity in which any of them have a controlling are excluded from the  
24 Class. Additionally, Facebook users who assented to Facebook tracking their activity by tapping “yes”  
25 upon Apple’s launch of iOS 14.5 are excluded from the Class. Also excluded are persons employed by  
26 counsel in this action and any judge to whom this case is assigned, his or her spouse and immediate  
27 family members, and members of the judge’s staff.

1           47.    Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would  
2 be impracticable. The exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, but it is  
3 estimated to number in the millions. The identity of Class members is readily ascertainable from Meta’s  
4 records.

5           48.    Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class because Plaintiff used  
6 Meta’s platforms—including Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger—to view third-party websites that  
7 were embedded as URLs within the respective Meta applications, and all Class members were similarly  
8 affected by Meta’s wrongful conduct related thereto.

9           49.    Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class  
10 members. Plaintiff’s interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the Class members.  
11 Plaintiff is represented by attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation generally,  
12 and in digital privacy litigation specifically, who will vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the  
13 Class.

14           50.    Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate. Questions of law and fact common to  
15 the Class members predominate over questions that may affect only individual Class members because  
16 Meta has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class. The following questions of law and fact are  
17 common to the Class and predominate over any individual issues:

18               a.    Whether Meta intentionally tapped the lines of electronic communication between  
19 Class members and third-party websites they visited;

20               b.    Whether Facebook’s in-app web browser surreptitiously records Class members’  
21 private communications and personally identifiable information;

22               c.    Whether Class members have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to  
23 such information;

24               d.    Whether Meta’s invasion of Class members’ privacy rights is highly offensive to  
25 a reasonable person;

26               e.    Whether Meta violated state and federal laws by tracking Internet use and  
27 intercepting its users’ communications when they visited third-party websites;

28               f.    Whether Meta’s conduct resulted in a breach of confidentiality;

1 g. Whether Meta’s conduct misled Class members on the level of control that they  
2 had over their private communications derived from activity on the Facebook app; and

3 h. Whether Class members are entitled to damages, restitution and/or injunctive  
4 relief;

5 51. Superiority. A class action will permit numerous similarly situated persons to prosecute  
6 their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without unnecessary duplication  
7 of evidence, effort, or expense. A class action will provide injured persons a method for obtaining redress  
8 on claims that could not practicably be pursued individually. Plaintiff knows of no manageability or other  
9 issue that would preclude maintenance of this case as a class action.

10 52. Injunctive relief. Meta has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the  
11 Class, making injunctive and corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a  
12 whole.

13 **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**  
14 **VIOLATION OF THE WIRETAP ACT**  
15 **18 U.S.C. § 2510 *et seq.***  
16 **(On Behalf of the Class)**

17 53. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations by reference as if fully set forth herein and  
18 brings this count individually and on behalf of the Class.

19 54. The Wiretap Act, as amended by the Electronic Communications and Privacy Act of 1986,  
20 prohibits the intentional interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication.

21 55. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides a private right of action to any person whose wire, oral or  
22 electronic communication is intercepted.

23 56. Without Plaintiff and Class members’ knowledge or consent, Meta intercepted the  
24 contents of their electronic communications when they navigated from Facebook to third-party websites.

25 57. Plaintiff and Class members were unaware that Facebook was intercepting its users’  
26 electronic communications and tracking their communications and interactions with third-party websites.



1 section, is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred  
2 dollars (\$2,500).

3 63. At all relevant times, Meta's business practice of injecting JavaScript allowed it to access,  
4 intercept, learn the contents of and collect Plaintiff and Class members' personally identifiable  
5 information and other data, including information concerning their interactions with third-party websites,  
6 even when Plaintiff and Class members' default internet browsers and devices were set to block such  
7 actions.

8 64. Plaintiff, and each Class Member, during one or more of their interactions on the internet  
9 during the Class period, communicated with one or more third-party websites owned by entities based in  
10 California, or with one or more entities whose servers were located in California. Communications from  
11 the California web-based entities to Plaintiff and Class members, and from Plaintiff and Class members  
12 to the California web-based entities, were sent to California.

13 65. Plaintiff and Class members did not consent to any of Meta's actions in intercepting,  
14 reading, and learning the contents of their communications with such California-based entities. Meta read  
15 and learned the contents of Plaintiff and Class members' communications in transit and in an  
16 unauthorized manner. Meta failed to disclose that it is intercepting, tracking and learning the contents of  
17 such private conversations and activities when users visit external third-party websites from within the  
18 Facebook app.

19 66. Meta's conduct was intentional in that it purposefully installed code which allows it to  
20 eavesdrop and learn the content of its users' communications and other browsing activities that would  
21 otherwise be unavailable to Meta without engaging in this practice. Meta directly participated in the  
22 interception, reading, and/or learning of the contents of the communications between Plaintiff, Class  
23 members and California-based web entities.

24 67. The information Meta intercepts while Plaintiff and Class members are using its in-app  
25 browser includes personally identifiable information and other highly specific information and  
26 communications, including, without limitation, every button, keystroke and link a user taps, whether the  
27 user has taken any screenshots, text entries (including passwords and credit card information), and how  
28 much time a user spent on the website.





1 without limitation the right to visit and interact with various internet sites without that information being  
2 intercepted by Meta without Plaintiff's knowledge or consent.

3 76. Plaintiff and Class members have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of Meta's  
4 invasion of their privacy rights and are entitled to just compensation, including monetary damages.

5 **FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

6 **VIOLATION OF THE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW**

7 **Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 *et seq.*, ("UCL")**

8 **(On Behalf of the Class or, Alternatively, the California Subclass)**

9 77. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations by reference as if fully set forth herein and  
10 brings this count individually and on behalf of the Class or, alternatively, the California Subclass.

11 78. By engaging in the acts and practices described herein, Meta has committed one or more  
12 acts of unfair competition within the meaning of the UCL, and as a result, Plaintiff and the Class members  
13 have suffered injury in fact and lost money and/or property, namely, as described herein, the insertion of  
14 JavaScript on their devices and the invasion and lost value of their personally identifiable information  
15 and other data.

16 79. Meta's conduct violates federal and state statutes and, therefore, the unlawful prong of the  
17 UCL. Further, Meta's conduct is substantially unfair, predatory and contrary to California's legislatively  
18 declared public policy in favor of protecting the privacy and security of personal confidential information.

19 80. Plaintiff interacted with various third-party websites reasonably believing that their  
20 browsing activities—and any facts and information communicated to third-party websites—were secure  
21 and confidential (i.e., solely between himself and the third-party website). In actuality, without Plaintiff  
22 or Class members' knowledge or consent, Meta injected code into every web URL accessed through the  
23 in-app browser, which was capable of altering security and privacy settings previously set by Plaintiff  
24 and Class members. Through this conduct, Meta actively intercepted, viewed, and collected Plaintiff'  
25 and Class members' personally identifiable information so that it could be used for Meta's financial  
26 benefit. The information and data Meta intercepted includes highly sensitive and valuable personal  
27 information, including but not limited to personally identifiable information, confidential medical  
28 information, and other privileged communications and facts.





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Dated: September 15, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John J. Nelson  
John J. Nelson (SBN 317598)  
**MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON  
PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC**  
280 S. Beverly Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90212  
Telephone: (858) 209-6941  
Email: jnelson@milberg.com

Gary M. Klinger\*  
Alexandra M. Honeycutt\*  
**MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON  
PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC**  
227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100  
Chicago, Illinois 60606  
Telephone: 866.252.0878  
gklinger@milberg.com  
ahoneycutt@milberg.com

Nick Suciu, III, Esq.\*  
**MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON  
PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC**  
6905 Telegraph Rd., Suite 115  
Bloomfield Hills, MI 48301  
Tel.: (313) 303-3472  
Email: nsuciu@milberg.com  
Fax: (865) 522-0049  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff*