

Executive Registry

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

2016/3

21 May 1985

Executive Director

NOTE FOR: D/ICS

SUBJECT : SSCI's National Intelligence
Strategy



I believe Jim discussed this subject with you at the staff meeting this morning before he left on his trip.

Thought you might like a copy of the package he sent forward. Object here was to respond quickly. If DCI signs Attachment C, expect whole problem will go over to you.



STAT

STAT

ER

SECRET

Executive Registry
85-2016/2

21 May 1985

NOTE FOR: DCI

VIA : DDCI

FROM : ExDir

SUBJECT : National Intelligence Strategy

1. Bob Gates led a discussion at our Friday morning meeting with the Deputies re your interest in trying to get out front with respect to Senator Durenberger's proposed hearings on a national intelligence strategy, and on possible additional steps to improve security and personnel policies (Tab A). As you probably know, we now have a letter from Durenberger to you (Tab B) stating that he plans to start the process of working out such a strategy. Since this must be a community affair, ultimately the IC Staff needs to coordinate the overall effort. We obviously stand ready to support that in any necessary way. I would propose to be the focal point for the support needed within CIA.

2. Since Senator Durenberger has obviously put the train in motion and seems to have specific ideas on what he wants to do, I am not sure we know how to get out in front of it. My best suggestion at the moment would be for you to respond quickly to Durenberger's letter, saying that we think he has constructive ideas and we stand ready to work with him to support them. A suggested draft is attached at Tab C.



25X1

Atts: a/s

cc: DDI w/attns
 D/ICS w/attns

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Executive Registry
85-2016/2

FROM: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

EXTENSION NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. ER

21 May 85

2.

D/OA

AB

3. DDCI *can*

4.

5. DCI

EXDM
DDCI prefers to have DICS follow up w/ Bernie McMahon, as discussed @ twos/DCI signature Staff
my on

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

DCI
 EXEC
 REG

B-227

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Executive Registry

85-
2016/1

17 May 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

FROM: DCI

Bob:

This relates to the work I asked you to do the other day on an intelligence strategy which could be used in responding to this letter.



William J. Casey

Attachment:

Ltr to DCI, dtd 10 May 85,
from Senator Dave Durenberger

ER

Executive Registry
85- 2016

ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
CHIC HECHT, NEVADA
MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY

SAM BORN, GEORGIA
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, MISSOURI
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO

BERNARD F. McMAHON, STAFF DIRECTOR
ERIC D. NEWSOM, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

May 10, 1985


The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:


A principal goal of the Intelligence Committee this year is the establishment of guidelines for a comprehensive national intelligence strategy -- a standard for measuring the state of American intelligence, if you will. As you know only too well, accurate, timely and relevant information is critical in making the difficult choices in national security and in building a cohesive, effective foreign policy. But the current budget pressures can adversely affect the intelligence process, especially if we operate with an incomplete understanding of the relationships among requirements, capabilities, costs and performance. Only with a long-range strategy supported by Congressional oversight can we jointly resist these pressures.

Developing an intelligence strategy will not be easy. Experience with defense decisionmaking shows that the process can be expected to evolve over several years. In the process, we will be working closely with you, as well as other key decisionmakers in government and non-governmental experts, to insure our effort will be of signal benefit to the national intelligence process for years to come.

Sincerely,



Dave Durenberger
Chairman




B-227

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt		X		
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL		X		
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE					

Remarks



Executive Secretary
16 May 1985
Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
CHIC NECHT, NEVADA
MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY

LLOYD BENTSEN, TEXAS
SAM NUNN, GEORGIA
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, MISSOURI
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

Executive Registry
85- 2016

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO

BERNARD F. McMAHON, STAFF DIRECTOR
ERIC D. NEWSOM, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

May 10, 1985


The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

A principal goal of the Intelligence Committee this year is the establishment of guidelines for a comprehensive national intelligence strategy -- a standard for measuring the state of American intelligence, if you will. As you know only too well, accurate, timely and relevant information is critical in making the difficult choices in national security and in building a cohesive, effective foreign policy. But the current budget pressures can adversely affect the intelligence process, especially if we operate with an incomplete understanding of the relationships among requirements, capabilities, costs and performance. Only with a long-range strategy supported by Congressional oversight can we jointly resist these pressures.

Developing an intelligence strategy will not be easy. Experience with defense decisionmaking shows that the process can be expected to evolve over several years. In the process, we will be working closely with you, as well as other key decisionmakers in government and non-governmental experts, to insure our effort will be of signal benefit to the national intelligence process for years to come.


Sincerely,



Dave Durenberger
Chairman



B-227



Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied