

Elections Misinformation Reporting Portal

Benefits to election officials

- A single place (i.e., the portal) for reporting mis- and disinformation across multiple social media platforms with a streamlined, consistent user experience.
- An ability to report activity that occurs on multiple platforms at the same time.
- Visibility of what's going on with mis- and disinformation in the election's community within and outside their jurisdictions, including to see trends and be able to strategically respond.

Benefits to social media platforms

- Consistent reports of mis- and disinformation that include a standard, consistently formatted set of information fields (type of report, screenshots, links, as well as narrative explanation of the concern).
- An ability to accept reports without having to vet the submitter, as those submitters will already be vetted by the election's community upon registration in the portal. This will enable them to respond more quickly to a given election official's first report.

Benefits to state-level elections offices and national associations (NASS, NASED)

- The ability to look across the elections jurisdictions to identify patterns and potential impact of misinformation activity. This will permit national-level organizations to help put priority on response actions and make decisions regarding media engagement in parallel with actions taken by the social media companies.
- An opportunity to focus efforts at the national level to improve the overall health of the election administration across the country.
- Redirecting resources spent on assisting election offices with reporting to those focused on remediation activities.

Benefits to voters

- More accurate election information available at any given time
- More rapid correction of erroneous information, leading to more voter confidence
- An overall healthier, more productive social media environment.



CISA CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Misinformation & Disinformation

The core of CISA's mission is to safeguard American's critical infrastructure. The nation has seen the corrosive effects of mis-, dis-, and mal-information (MDM) across a host of our critical infrastructure in recent years, impacting our election systems, telecommunications infrastructure, and our public health infrastructure. As there is no shortage of entities working on MDM issues, CISA is evaluating how to best engage in the space in an additive way, while safeguarding our credibility as an independent agency ahead of the next election cycle.

- **Where We Are.** CISA has a burgeoning MDM effort that focuses on building national resilience through public awareness. CISA engages with subject matter experts—researchers, think tanks, and public relations experts—to understand the threat of MDM, develop strategies to message to the public, and amplify trusted voices. These actions include directly engaging with social media companies to flag MDM, and creating a repository of factual guides and toolkits.
- **New Initiatives.** CISA is bringing on staff to address MDM related to the pandemic and incorporate lessons learned into longer-term strategies, as well as improving our ability to do analytics on narrative intervention. We are also working with federal partners to mature a whole-of-government approach to mitigating risks of MDM, framing which tools, authorities, and interventions are appropriate to the threats impacting the information environment.
- **Where We Want to Go in 2022.** Ahead of midterm elections in 2022, it will be critical to evaluate CISA's role in this space and ensure that the agency is providing additive value that fits within its unique capabilities and mission. One approach is to recognize CISA's responsibility for securing our election infrastructure – and ensuring CISA is a trusted resource in providing education on election processes and procedures to minimize misunderstanding and opportunities for MDM. CISA also wants to ensure it is set up to extract lessons learned from 2022 and apply them to the agency's work in the 2024.

Questions for the Committee

1. What should CISA's role be in the MDM space? How should it leverage its unique capabilities and mission to contribute to this space, without becoming duplicative of other efforts and remaining focused on its mission?
2. How would the Committee balance CISA's efforts between the need to build resilience to MDM, broadly, versus activities to address to MDM narratives, specifically? This distinction can be understood as broad public education and awareness campaigns versus rumor control, amplifying credible information, type efforts.
3. How can CISA inspire innovators to partner with the government in a way that catalyzes availability of trusted information without being seen as government "propaganda"?
4. What is the right model for CISA engagement with social media and other media entities?
5. How should CISA and the USG maintain situational awareness of MDM and detect efforts to manipulate the information environment? What is the balance between social listening, privacy, and protected speech?

From: [REDACTED]@reingold.com]
Sent: 5/24/2021 2:28:00 PM
To: [REDACTED]@twitter.com
CC: [REDACTED]@cdc.gov]; [REDACTED]@reingold.com]; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@cdc.gov]
Subject: RE: COVID Misinformation

Hi [REDACTED],

I hope you had a good weekend. I'm following up about the partner support portal enrollment for CDC. Does the Twitter account need to be connected to a cdc.gov email or is any account fine? Also, would there be any issues or complications stemming from flagging COVID misinformation on the portal using the existing census.gov accounts that have access? We'll want to have at least some CDC accounts whitelisted, but that backup may be helpful in the short-term.

Let us know any next steps we can take to make sure CDC is all set with the portal.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]
Reingold
[REDACTED]

reingold.com

We're on a mission. **Yours.**

From: [REDACTED] (CDC/OD/OADC)
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2021 8:50 AM
To: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Subject: RE: COVID Misinformation

Does it need to be the CDC account or my personal? If CDC, I'm going to have someone on staff enroll instead of me.

If personal is OK, it is: @[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2021 8:51 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cdc.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@reingold.com>; [REDACTED]@reingold.com>; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@census.gov>; [REDACTED]@cdc.gov>
Subject: Re: COVID Misinformation

Hi [REDACTED]-

I'd be glad to enroll you in our Partner Support Portal, which allows you a special, expedited reporting flow in the Twitter Help Center. It worked very well with Census colleagues last year.

You need a Twitter account (and to be logged into that account) to access the Partner Support Portal. What account (or accounts) would you like me to enroll?

Best,

On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 5:05 PM [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cdc.gov> wrote:

[REDACTED] - I don't think we have info on how to enroll but we'd be happy to get on if you can send some info.

Thanks.

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@twitter.com>

Sent: Monday, May 10, 2021 3:02 PM

To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cdc.gov>

Cc: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@reingold.com>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@reingold.com>; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@census.gov>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cdc.gov>

Subject: Re: COVID Misinformation

H [REDACTED] -

Thanks for sharing this - agree these are important trends to note; a quick scan shows that at least some of these have been previously reviewed and actioned. I will now ask the team to review the others.

[REDACTED] remind me: did you have a chance to enroll in our Partner Support Portal? In the future, that's the best way to get a spreadsheet like this reviewed.

Best,

On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 1:50 PM [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cdc.gov> wrote:

[REDACTED] -

We wanted to point out two issues that we are seeing a great deal of misinfo about - vaccine shedding and microchips. The below are just some example posts. We do plan to post something shortly to address vaccine shedding and I can send that link soon. Our census team copied here, has much more info on it if needed.

Also, we are standing up a BOLO COVID misinformation meeting and inviting all tech platforms. We are shooting for 12pm EST on Friday for our first meeting. I'll include you on the invite but if you'd like to propose an alternative approach or would like to me include others, just let me know.

Thanks!

Post Text	Link
<p>MAGNET STICKS TO AREA INJECTED BY THE VACCINE- ARE THE VACCINATED GETTING MICROCHIPPED? #justsayno</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>The ex VP of Pfizer came out predicting that there will be a human depopulation of the vaccinated people in 2 years. An even shorter lifespan after the booster. He believes it's eugenics. Many scientists are corroborating this.</p> <p>I'll be alive!</p> <p>Experimental vaccines!</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>THE BIG QUESTION IS WHY ARE THEY LYING...GOVERNMENTS SIGNED US AWAY TO NWO..DEPOPULATION..ALSO EXPERIMENTS IN AI..IN LAYMENS TERMS..TRYING TO TURN US INTO ROBOTS/ ANDROIDS....ALSO THEY WANT WORLD BANK OF OUR DNA .. VIA VAX</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>Agreed. But if the science is being followed, there's an awful lot of evidence that the vax crowd are shedding...maybe the non-vaxxed are safer this way...thoughts</p> <p>@crislerwyo</p> <p>?</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>COVID 'Vaccine Shedding', Evidence SARS-CoV-2 Spike Protein Can 'Alter Human Genes' & VAERS Truth</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>Thank Bill Gates for wanting depopulation. That's exactly what this vaccine is doing, and will continue to do over the next few years.</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>IM ALARMED BY THE AMOUNT OF WOMEN IN MY DM'S COMPLAINING ABOUT ABNORMAL BLEEDING AND MISCARRIAGES AFTER COMING IN CONTACT WITH SOMEONE WHOSE BEEN VACCINATED!!!!</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>Well hundreds of women on this page say they are having bleeding/ clotting after vaccination or that they bleed oddly being AROUND vaccinated women. Unconfirmed, needs more investigation. But lots of reports. COVID-19 Vaccine Side Effects</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>[Links to: https://www.infowars.com/posts/vaccine-shedding-causing-miscarriages-and-blood-clots-in-unvaccinated-females/]</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>So the #CDC now says that those who are "Fully Vaxxinated" can "Go outside & live freely" lol.. This is a joke</p> <p>Quick questions for those who were experimented on I MEAN -Took the shot, what were the ingredients in it? You did ASK right? .. Also, do you know what SHEDDING is?</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>Here is the official Pfizer trial protocols Concerning shedding by the vaccinated Fertility (male and female) contraception to be compulsorily used because shedding Adverse events and serious adverse events reporting And much more Dangers ore known</p>	<p>https://t</p>

<p>https://media.tghn.org/medialibrary/2020/11/C4591001_Clinical_Protocol_Nov2020_Pfizer_BioNTech.pdf</p>	
<p>For those of you who have questions about Spiked Protein SHEDDING: Pfizer admits in its own mRNA vaxx trial documentation that non-vaxxed people can be ENVIRONMENTALLY EXPOSED to the shot's spike proteins by INHALATION or SKIN CONTACT.</p> <p>https://themostrbeautifulworld.com/blog/skin-contact-covid</p>	<p>https://t</p>
<p>Pfizer acknowledges the existence of "SHEDDING" in their #mRNA vaccines, and is setting up this new trial to study these dangers.</p> <p>(Shedding is where unvaccinated people experience serious health issues just by being near to vaccinated people).</p> <p>https://media.tghn.org/medialibrary/2020/11/C4591001_Clinical_Protocol_Nov2020_Pfizer_BioNTech.pdf#page67</p>	<p>https://t</p>



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Sent: 10/27/2020 4:25:44 PM
To: [redacted] twitter.com]; [redacted] twitter.com]; [redacted]
[redacted] twitter.com]
CC: [redacted] hq.dhs.gov]; [redacted] cisaecurity.org
Subject: FW: Flagging Three Twitter Accounts Impersonating Colorado Government

Please see below report from Colorado. I've asked them if these accounts have already been reported, but these are screenshots from today.

Regards,
[redacted]

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From: [redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2020 4:17 PM
To: [redacted] cisaecurity.org; [redacted] cisa.dhs.gov> [redacted]
[redacted] cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: [redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US> [redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [redacted]
[redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US> [redacted]
[redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US> [redacted]
[redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [redacted]
[redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [redacted]
[redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [redacted] HQ.DHS.GOV>; [redacted]
[redacted] state.co.us>; [redacted] paletheagroup.com>; [redacted] srg.com>;
[redacted] state.co.us>; [redacted] state.co.us>; [redacted]
[redacted]@state.co.us>; [redacted] SOS.STATE.CO.US>
Subject: Flagging Three Twitter Accounts Impersonating Colorado Government

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EI-ISAC and CISA Partners,

Three Twitter accounts [redacted] popped up in the last couple of weeks impersonating the Colorado state government. As you may be aware, numerous other similar accounts have also been created impersonating other state and city jurisdictions in recent weeks. The MS-ISAC flagged a couple of them last week ([redacted]) but we don't know if the third one ([redacted]) is on everyone's radar. Has anyone engaged Twitter about these? Welcome any additional information you have.

These are concerning to us here in Colorado because of the recent FBI/CISA warnings about impersonation accounts spreading false information about the election. For the Colorado accounts:

- All three joined Twitter this month – October 2020
- All three have a URL link prominently labeled “Colorado.gov” that takes users to the official Colorado.gov website after passing through several other systems that could be harvest data or be more nefarious.
- All follow/are followed by up to a couple dozen other state/local government impersonation accounts – many also created recently.
- Several look like they were temporarily suspended by Twitter but at least some appear to be back online.

Below are screenshots taken today of the three accounts:





⋮ Follow




Smoke weed erry day. The official (unofficial) Twitter account of the State of Colorado.

📍 Colorado, USA colorado.gov 📅 Joined October 2020

21 Following 27 Followers



⋮ Follow



The (UN)official Colorado Twitter Account. This is a parody account.

📍 Colorado colorado.gov 📅 Joined October 2020

12 Following 56 Followers

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on social media platforms. The Department makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by recipients of this email. The Department may also share this information with local, state, and federal government agencies.



From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Sent: 10/29/2020 2:52:23 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]
CC: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org
Subject: Re: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000090: potential parody Twitter accounts related to Adams County, CO

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We will escalate. Thank you.

On Thu, Oct 29, 2020 at 2:37 PM [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Please see the below reporting from Colorado. These do not appear to be connected to the imposter/parody accounts previously shared.

Regards,
 [REDACTED]

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

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In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.

From: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 2:33 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000090: potential parody Twitter accounts related to Adams County, CO

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Misinformation report: two potential parody Twitter accounts related to Adams County, CO

From: [REDACTED] SOS.STATE.CO.US>
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 2:04 PM
To: [REDACTED] cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED] SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED] SOS.STATE.CO.US>
Subject: Flagging Twitter Accounts

EI-ISAC, CISA and Stanford Partners,

We want to highlight two accounts we found that could be used to imitate official accounts. We are unsure if there's any action that can be taken, but we wanted to flag them for consideration.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

These are concerning to us here in Colorado because of the recent FBI/CISA warnings about impersonation accounts spreading false information about the election. We have recently flagged three other accounts [REDACTED] that popped up in the last couple of weeks impersonating the Colorado state government and we wanted to highlight these new accounts for awareness.





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Thanks,



[Redacted signature block]
 [Redacted signature block]
 [Redacted signature block] SOS.STATE.CO.US

.....
 This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

From: [REDACTED] [cisa.dhs.gov]
Sent: 10/23/2020 6:06:42 PM
To: [REDACTED] [twitter.com]
CC: [REDACTED] [cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED] [twitter.com]; [REDACTED] [twitter.com]; [REDACTED] [hq.dhs.gov]
Subject: Re: Case #CIS-MIS000062: Misinformation regarding trading in ballots at an in-person voting center

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you, [REDACTED]

On Oct 23, 2020, at 6:05 PM, [REDACTED] [twitter.com] wrote:

Thank you for raising this to our teams. We have actioned these accounts under our civic integrity policy.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 9:57 AM [REDACTED] [cisa.dhs.gov] wrote:

Please see the below reporting from Maryland.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

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From: [REDACTED] [cisa.dhs.gov]
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 9:51 AM

To: S [redacted] cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted] cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]
<[redacted]hq.dhs.gov>; [redacted]2020partnership.atlassian.net; [redacted]
[redacted]@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000062: Misinformation regarding trading in ballots at an in-person voting center

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Misinformation tweet regarding trading in ballots at an in-person voting center

From: [redacted] maryland.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 9:39 AM
To: T [redacted] zerofox.com>; [redacted] cisecurity.org>; [redacted]
[redacted] twitter.com>; [redacted] fbi.gov; [redacted] oag.state.md.us>;
[redacted] twitter.com
Cc: [redacted] maryland.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted] maryland.gov>; [redacted] maryland.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted] maryland.gov>; [redacted] maryland.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted] maryland.gov>
Subject: Misinformation Report

Please see the following screenshot below posted 6 times to our official Maryland State Board of Elections Twitter handle, [redacted] at the following URLs. We have reported these tweets to Twitter for containing election misinformation.

Maryland voters cannot surrender or trade-in ballots at in-person vote centers. Any voters who requested or received a mail-in ballot wanting to vote in-person will have to vote provisionally.



[REDACTED]

HIDING INFO FROM VOTERS.TAKE UR MAIL IN WITH YOU TO THE POLLS, "SURRENDER" IT AND ASK FOR A REAL BALLOT....NOT A PROVISIONAL ONE. ALL VOTERS ARE FORCED TO VOTE PROVISIONAL UNLESSSSSS YOU TURN IN YOUR MAIL IN TO THE POLL WORKERS! IT'S A SCAM THEY DONT TELL YOU!DONT WANT U TO KNOW

Thank you,

[REDACTED]



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CONFIDENTIAL

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Sent: 10/22/2020 3:46:12 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]
CC: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov]
Subject: Re: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000058: Live canvass video on Twitter

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Thanks, [REDACTED] We will escalate for review.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

On Thu, Oct 22, 2020 at 12:33 PM Scully, [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:
Please see below report from Maryland.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

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From: [REDACTED]@ciscisecurity.org>
Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2020 12:02 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net; [REDACTED]@ciscisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000058: Live canvass video on Twitter

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Please see the report below from Maryland which includes an analysis from ZeroFox. Please also see the statement from the Montgomery County Board of Elections (https://twitter.com/md_sbe/status/1319260743850708992). https://montgomerycountymd.gov/Elections/Resources/Files/pdfs/Press%20Release/2020/CNVSS_ENG_102120.pdf

Best,

Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center

Center for Internet Security

[Redacted]

www.cisecurity.org

Follow us @CISecurity

From: [Redacted] [maryland.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@maryland.gov)>
Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2020 11:27 AM
To: [Redacted] [@fbi.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@fbi.gov)>; [Redacted]
[Redacted] [cisecurity.org](mailto:[Redacted]@cisecurity.org)>; [Redacted] [fbi.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@fbi.gov)
Subject: Fwd: Live Canvass Video on Twitter

Please see the analysis from our social media monitoring vendor below regarding propagation of misinformation related to a video showing ballot marking in a voting center in Montgomery County, MD.

Please contact me if you have any questions.

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [Redacted] [zerofox.com](mailto:[Redacted]@zerofox.com)>
Date: Thu, Oct 22, 2020 at 10:35 AM
Subject: Re: Live Canvass Video on Twitter
To: [Redacted] [maryland.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@maryland.gov)>
Cc: [Redacted] [zerofox.com](mailto:[Redacted]@zerofox.com)>, [Redacted] [maryland.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@maryland.gov)>, [Redacted] [maryland.gov](mailto:[Redacted]@maryland.gov)>, [Redacted] [zerofox.com](mailto:[Redacted]@zerofox.com)>, [Redacted] [zerofox.com](mailto:[Redacted]@zerofox.com)>, [Redacted] [zerofox.com](mailto:[Redacted]@zerofox.com)>

Hi [Redacted]

After additional analysis of this tweet as well as the networks of accounts retweeting it, we believe this content is likely being artificially spread by coordinated inauthentic behavior. The speed at which the video spread and the number of suspicious accounts that have retweeted the video are consistent with a coordinated inauthentic behavior rather than organic viral activity. It is likely that the coordinators of this activity were taking advantage of the livestream video opportunistically, rather than explicitly targeting the Maryland elections operations.

We believe the origin of the video to be the tweet from [REDACTED] and received over 7,000 retweets despite having less than 1,800 followers. Additionally, the [REDACTED] account [REDACTED] is also responsible for a considerable amount of the content's reach with more than 3,000 retweets albeit with a considerably larger follower base in excess of 42,000 followers. The large number of retweets [REDACTED]'s tweet received is abnormal compared to other tweeted content prior to the Montgomery County video. Furthermore, these two accounts do not appear to follow each other; however, they have 34 common followers, most of which display characteristics of inauthentic accounts. Automated or inauthentic behavior is generally characterized by:

- Recently created
- No profile image
- Excessive use of emojis and hashtags in bios
- Tweet counts not commensurate with account creation dates

We recommend sharing the joint inauthentic accounts with your Federal law enforcement partners to cross-reference their data. We've also attached a list of the accounts commonly connected between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] for further cross-reference.

It's possible we could attempt takedown requests for these two tweets that seemingly drove a lot of the reach with this video. Due to the characteristics of disinformation, it's possible Twitter would be compelled to review the case carefully. However, there is at least some possibility that if these tweets are removed, it will be leveraged in disinformation suggesting censorship or further propagating conspiracy theories.

Let us know if you would like us to take further action or conduct additional research. We will be sure to incorporate these findings into our EoW report for posterity.

Thanks,

On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 9:15 AM [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@maryland.gov> wrote:


FYI

On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 8:41 AM [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@maryland.gov> wrote:

I sent this one to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] yesterday. It has been liked and shared 11k times: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL



----- Forwarded message -----

From: [REDACTED]montgomerycountymd.gov>

Date: Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 6:58 PM

Subject: Re: Live Canvass Video on Twitter

To: [REDACTED]maryland.gov>

Cc: [REDACTED]maryland.gov>, [REDACTED]maryland.gov>, [REDACTED]maryland.gov>, [REDACTED]maryland.gov>, [REDACTED]montgomerycountymd.gov>

Will interview this gentleman tomorrow

Sent from my iPhone

On Oct 20, 2020, at 6:26 PM, Rachel Rachfal -SBE- [REDACTED]maryland.gov> wrote:



[EXTERNAL EMAIL]

Please see the video at [REDACTED] of canvassing in Montgomery County that has been liked and shared 7,000 times alleging fraud.

<image.png>



Maryland State Board of Elections



Take 10 minutes to be counted now – visit: <https://2020census.gov/>



For COVID-19 Information and resources, visit: www.montgomerycountymd.gov/COVID19

--

Kind regards,



 The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.

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Kind regards,



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.....

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.....

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 10/23/2020 10:28:40 AM
To: [REDACTED]fb.com]; [REDACTED]fb.com]; [REDACTED]fb.com]
CC: [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov]
Subject: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000062: Misinformation regarding trading in ballots at an in-person voting center

Good morning,

Not a Facebook issue, but wanted you to be aware.

Brian

From: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 9:51 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000062: Misinformation regarding trading in ballots at an in-person voting center

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Misinformation tweet regarding trading in ballots at an in-person voting center

From: [REDACTED]@maryland.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 9:39 AM
To: [REDACTED]@zerofox.com>; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org> [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED]@fbi.gov>; [REDACTED]@oag.state.md.us>; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@twitter.com
Cc: [REDACTED]@maryland.gov>; [REDACTED]@maryland.gov>; [REDACTED]@maryland.gov>
[REDACTED]@maryland.gov>; [REDACTED]@maryland.gov>
[REDACTED]@maryland.gov>; [REDACTED]@maryland.gov>
Subject: Misinformation Report

Please see the following screenshot below posted 6 times to our official Maryland State Board of Elections Twitter handle, [REDACTED] at the following URLs. We have reported these tweets to Twitter for containing election misinformation.

Maryland voters cannot surrender or trade-in ballots at in-person vote centers. Any voters who requested or received a mail-in ballot wanting to vote in-person will have to vote provisionally.



[REDACTED]

Replying to @md_sbe

HIDING INFO FROM VOTERS.TAKE UR MAIL IN WITH YOU TO THE POLLS, "SURRENDER" IT AND ASK FOR A REAL BALLOT....NOT A PROVISIONAL ONE. ALL VOTERS ARE FORCED TO VOTE PROVISIONAL UNLESSSSSS YOU TURN IN YOUR MAIL IN TO THE POLL WORKERS! IT'S A SCAM THEY DONT TELL YOU!DONT WANT U TO KNOW

Thank you,

[REDACTED]

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.....

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From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 6/2/2020 1:57:42 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
CC: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Subject: RE: Primary Election Day

[REDACTED]

Just to confirm what Brian said. Very quiet so far. Please let us know if any of the items passed to you today are worth understanding further or if something changes. Thanks

[REDACTED]

Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2020 1:41 PM
To: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Subject: RE: Primary Election Day

Hi [REDACTED]

It has been quiet on our end as well. As an FYI, we're expecting to receive some info from Colorado about fake accounts. Will send along once I get it.

[REDACTED] is on a call right now, so he may have more to add or a different perspective, but no issues on my end not doing a call.

Regards,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2020 1:37 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Subject: Re: Primary Election Day

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Hi [REDACTED] we just wanted to check in.

We are tracking the curfew issues and have our legal team reviewing specific city-curfews in the key primary states. Our enforcement teams are prepared on the issue.

We have received some escalations from external stakeholders, including the FBI.

Things seem generally quiet -- so if it works ok for you -- let's plan to not meet today. Please just let us know if anything comes up.

[REDACTED]

On Mon, Jun 1, 2020 at 4:25 PM [REDACTED] [twitter.com](#)> wrote:

Dear [REDACTED], hope you are well.

We are preparing for elections tomorrow. In case anything comes up urgently, please feel free to call me at [REDACTED] or reach us via email.

Should we plan to set up a mid-day check in? Does 2:30 work for you?

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

Sent: 11/6/2020 9:47:59 AM
To: CFITF [cfitf@hq.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED] [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Subject: RE: FW: Are these real?

Hey [REDACTED],

There are two reports in this email chain. One of Facebook posts with videos the State believes are false (we are seeing if we can find someone to help confirm they are false as we don't have that capability). That was the basis of the FYI for another group of folks. The specific report we are sharing with you all is the most recent link to a Twitter post. The FYI does not apply to the Twitter portion of the chain (unless I'm misreading things, which in my current state is possible). We are not allowed to edit the reporting emails, so it creates some challenges for us when we're forwarding such reports.

From: CFITF <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:41 AM
To: CFITF All <CFITFAll@hq.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: FW: Are these real?

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 2:40:46 PM (UTC+00:00) Monrovia, Reykjavik
To: CFITF; [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]@twitter.com; [REDACTED]@twitter.com; gov@twitter.com
Subject: Re: FW: Are these real?

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Also, have PA state officials provided additional information to you on the authenticity of video or circumstances underpinning it? It seems as if the correspondence flagging this issue to you said "FYI only at this point" and there isn't additional information from the state official.

Thank you,
[REDACTED]

On Fri, Nov 6, 2020 at 9:35 AM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:

Thank you CFITF. We only see one URL linking to a video, but no attached screenshots as were referenced in the email. Please let us know if there are additional materials you would like us to review?


Thanks,
[REDACTED]

On Fri, Nov 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM CFITF <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov> wrote:

Good morning Twitter – Please see the reporting below.

From: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:19 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Are these real?

See more below from PA. have we heard anything?



From: [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:16 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Are these real?

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Here's a little more. Any word on your side? We just got a request from a reporter. We know the one on our page was taken down, but it appears there are more floating out there.



From: [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 6:29 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Are these real?

I think I found a version of the video: <https://twitter.com/StateofusAll/status/1324556436135882753>



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 3:35 AM
To: [REDACTED]@pa.gov> [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@pa.gov> [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Subject: RE: Are these real?

Thank you for the notice. If you got screenshots or links can you send those?

From: [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 12:01 AM
To: [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@pa.gov> [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Are these real?

FYI only at this point

From: [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2020 11:36 PM
To: [REDACTED] (DHS)
Subject: Re: Are these real?

The only guess I have is, if this is real, they took live feed from "remaking" damaged ballots. I just have no idea where this might have come from...

From: [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2020 11:22:52 PM

To: [REDACTED] (DHS) <[REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>

Subject: Are these real?

[REDACTED]

Sorry to message late, but was going through the dos page and comments (old habits from EAC die hard) and came across these posts. Sorry to screenshot, but if you go to our page you should be able to see the comments on the post and go to the pages.

Are these making their way around the internet? Because there is no polling place I know of that has overhead cameras. Just don't want another "burning ballots" fake thing spreading.

Apologies for sending to you all first, but I didn't want to call an all hands meeting here when some of our folks are getting their first few real hours rest since Monday.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

Sent: 10/26/2020 6:56:27 PM
To: [redacted] [redacted].com]
Subject: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000072: Misinformation comment on Marion County, OR Facebook page
Attachments: 72.PNG; 72_2.PNG

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 6:38 PM
To: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; CISA Central <central@cisa.dhs.gov>; CFITF <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov>; tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000072: Misinformation comment on Marion County, OR Facebook page

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Misinformation comment posted on Marion County, OR Facebook page. Screenshots of original post, comment, and Marion County's response to the comment are attached.

From: [redacted]@co.marion.or.us>
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 6:19 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [redacted]@co.marion.or.us>; [redacted]@co.marion.or.us>; [redacted]@oregon.gov; [redacted]@oregon.gov
Subject: Facebook Comment

I was asked to forward the attached Facebook comment we received on the Marion County Facebook page. Included is the comment along with our response. Please let me know if you need any additional information.

Thanks,

[redacted]

[redacted]

Marion County | [redacted]

Email: [redacted]

Facebook: [facebook.com/MarionCountyOR](https://www.facebook.com/MarionCountyOR) | Twitter: @MarionCo_Board

.....





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
.....



Marion County,
Oregon
@MarionCountyOR

Home



 Follow
  Share
  Save
  ...


 Already voted, though some have made mention they won't get to because they got the wrong ballots and now suddenly the election office is "out of ballots" so many oregonians won't be able to vote as promised.

I don't care who you're voting for, this is just wrong!

Like · Reply · 1d

 Author


Marion County, Oregon  We have confirmed with the Marion County Clerk's Office that there are sufficient ballots for every voter that needs a replacement. They are still mailing ballots daily. The Senator Hearing Room (located at Courthouse Square, 555 Court St. NE, Salem) is now open for anyone that needs to come in for a replacement ballot.

Like · Reply · 17m



Marion County,
Oregon
@MarionCountyOR

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Marion County, Oregon

3d · 🌐

Watch for mail-in ballots soon – ballots were mailed Oct. 14. Displaced by wildfires, click to find out how to get a ballot and vote! 🗳️
<https://www.co.marion.or.us/.../Pages/Displaced-Voters.aspx...>



Ballots are on their way!

Sent: 10/1/2020 5:00:19 PM
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com]; [REDACTED]@fb.com]
Subject: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000024: Misinformation re: Sonoma County elections - Promoted by Russian Actors

Good afternoon [REDACTED]

This is not Facebook related reporting, but thought it would be of interest to your team.

Regards,
[REDACTED]

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 4:23 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; CISA Central <central@cisa.dhs.gov>; CFITF <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov>; Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000024: Misinformation re: Sonoma County elections - Promoted by Russian Actors

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[REDACTED]

We know many are already aware of this case but the impact seems to be escalating. Our hope is the platforms can do more to take down the misinformation. The EIP has been tracking this spread under ticket EIP-243 and has more examples.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@sos.ca.gov>
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 4:14 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Misinformation re: Sonoma County elections - Promoted by Russian Actors

Hello,

My name is [REDACTED], I'm the [REDACTED] for the California Secretary of State Office of Election Cybersecurity.

My email address is [REDACTED]@[sos.ca.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@sos.ca.gov).

We've been monitoring a situation in our state where an image of ballots was circulated as evidence of voter fraud - Sonoma County has explained that this was part of a routine process to discard old 2018 ballots, as allowed by law, and has nothing to do with the 2020 election.

<https://twitter.com/darhar981/status/1309533853967671297>

Debunked

here: https://twitter.com/CountyofSonoma/status/1309588979545645056?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1309588979545645056%7Ctwgr%5Eshare_3&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fobservers.france24.com%2Fen%2F20201001-debunked-viral-photos-mail-ballots-california-dumpster

While all posts around this topic are misinformation, we were just alerted to the fact that Russian Actors Amplified False Claim of Mail-in Ballots Discarded in Sonoma County Dumpster

On Oct. 1, 2020, Reuters and the security firm Graphika [reported](#) that actors associated with the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) established a pseudo news site called the Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens "NAEBC" (naebc[.]com) which attempted to influence U.S. voters ahead of the 2020 Presidential election.

It was observed that on Sept. 25, 2020, the NAEBC-associated user [REDACTED] on the platform Parler [amplified](#) the false narrative that mail-in-ballots were recently found in a dumpster in Sonoma County. [REDACTED] posted:

"More than a thousand mail-in-ballots found in a dumpster in California! The zip code "94928" on the ballots matches the county. This is why everyone should vote in person! #MAGA2020 #TRUMP2020 #KAG" (Figure 1).

We consider [REDACTED] post as evidence that Russian actors are amplifying reports of mail-in ballots.

-
-
- In addition to reposting articles from U.S.-based news outlets, [REDACTED] frequently posted articles from the NAEBC website, with the most recent NAEBC post on Oct. 1, 2020.
- This is an indication that [REDACTED] is closely affiliated or operated by the same actors who set up the NAEBC website.
-
-
-
- Our assessment that Russian actors are amplifying mail-in ballot errors and disinformation is consistent with American intelligence officials recent assessments, as [reported](#) by
- Representative Adam B. Schiff, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
-

Our monitoring software is investigating other NAEBC-affiliated accounts for potential investigatory leads into additional Russian information operations and any impact to California voters.




Figure 1: [REDACTED] amplified a false mail-in ballot narrative; the narrative was subsequently debunked as the mail-in ballots seen in the photo were from 2018

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From: [REDACTED] [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=7CA10604AEE04B1DAB53DC9F884130BD-[REDACTED]]
Sent: 10/29/2020 7:30:38 PM
To: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
CC: CFITF [cfitf@hq.dhs.gov]; misinformation@cisecurity.org
Subject: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000091: alleged fraud in Washington state elections
Attachments: [REDACTED].png

Good evening,

Please see the below report from Washington.

Thanks,
 [REDACTED]

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.

In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 7:26 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; CISA Central <central@cisa.dhs.gov>; CFITF <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov>; tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000091: alleged fraud in Washington state elections

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Misinformation report: two tweets alleging fraud in Washington state elections.

From: [REDACTED]@sos.wa.gov>
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2020 7:21 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@sos.wa.gov>; [REDACTED]@sos.wa.gov> [REDACTED]@sos.wa.gov>
Subject: Possible misinformation on Twitter

Hello,

I wanted to flag two tweets with possible misinformation about the election.

[https://twitter.com/\[REDACTED\]/status/1321738257399533571](https://twitter.com/[REDACTED]/status/1321738257399533571) -- "Ballots can appear whenever, from whomever" is false.

[https://twitter.com/\[REDACTED\]/status/1321759027508908033](https://twitter.com/[REDACTED]/status/1321759027508908033) -- The response to the above tweet includes the following sentence: "Washington State in 2004 judges ignored the real count and rewarded the Democrats." That is not a factual statement.

My name is [REDACTED] and I'm an [REDACTED] for the Washington Office of the Secretary of State. I can be reached via this email or the number listed in my signature block below. My cell phone is monitored after hours if I need to be reached urgently.

I am also copying Washington State Elections [REDACTED], Office of the Secretary of State [REDACTED], and our [REDACTED]

Please let me know if you have any questions or need additional information.

Thank you.



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From: [REDACTED]@fb.com]
Sent: 10/26/2020 6:58:26 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]
CC: [REDACTED]@fb.com]; [REDACTED]@fb.com]; CFITF [cfitf@hq.dhs.gov]
Subject: Re: Case #CIS-MIS000072: Misinformation comment on Marion County, OR Facebook page

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Thanks!

FACEBOOK

From: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, October 26, 2020 at 6:57 PM
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, CFITF <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000072: Misinformation comment on Marion County, OR Facebook page

Oops...sorry about that. Here you go [REDACTED]

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 6:38 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; CISA Central <central@cisa.dhs.gov>; CFITF <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov>; tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000072: Misinformation comment on Marion County, OR Facebook page

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Misinformation comment posted on Marion County, OR Facebook page. Screenshots of original post, comment, and Marion County's response to the comment are attached.

From: [REDACTED]@co.marion.or.us>
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 6:19 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@co.marion.or.us> [REDACTED]@co.marion.or.us>, [REDACTED]@oregon.gov;
Subject: Facebook Comment

I was asked to forward the attached Facebook comment we received on the Marion County Facebook page. Included is the comment along with our response. Please let me know if you need any additional information.

Thanks,



.....

This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

.....

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com]
Sent: 5/4/2022 3:48:11 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]
CC: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@fb.com]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@fb.com] [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Account Security

Hello Team CISA!

Hope you are all well.

In our conversation a few weeks ago, you mentioned that your team could potentially help connect us with local election offices. Is this something you are still able to help with? Additionally, we can provide a training for them on account security best practices if you think that could be helpful.


And as always, if there is anything we can do to be helpful in the meantime, please let us know!

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 at 12:37 PM
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com> [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Subject: Re: Account Security

Perfect thank you so much!

[REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 11:15:25 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Cc: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov> [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>;
[redacted]@fb.com> [redacted]@fb.com>;
[redacted]@fb.com> [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Subject: Re: Account Security

Got it – and no problem! I had our team design my email directly into the document (new version attached here) so everything is all in one place for you.

Best,



[redacted]

From: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Date: Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 12:45 PM

To: [redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]@fb.com>

Cc: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [redacted]

<[redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]
[redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]
[redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [redacted]
[redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Account Security

Hi [redacted] That could work, though we'd also welcome that as part of the document. Given we have a broader team that does trainings etc, it might be helpful for that info to be included in the doc. Though I understand there may be concerns with this approach.

Will take your steer, let me know what you think.

[redacted]



From: [redacted]@fb.com>

Sent: Monday, April 18, 2022 5:30 PM

To: [redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Cc: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>;

[redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]
[redacted]@fb.com> [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>

[redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Subject: Re: Account Security

Thanks [redacted]

Would it work to just provide my email when you share out this one pager, and let them know if they need anything (like a page verification) or have any content they want to escalate for review, they can reach out to me and I can get them to the right person to help?

Best,

 Meta

[redacted]

From: [redacted]@fb.com>

Date: Monday, April 18, 2022 at 11:50 AM

To: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Cc: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [redacted]
[redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]
<[redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]
[redacted]@fb.com>, [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Subject: Re: Account Security

Great! Many thank [redacted] for the quick reply & feedback.

[redacted]—who is cc'd on our team will loop in others from her team

Happy to move some of your colleagues to BCC as needed/defer to you to do that as [redacted] and her team work out the details.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 18, 2022, at 10:54 AM [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Thanks so much for sending [redacted]!

This looks great – the only thing I'd recommend adding is any steps for flagging or escalating MDM content, if possible. I think then that would make this a comprehensive product on both of the critical needs for officials – account security and MDM concerns. We discussed this a bit in our in-person meeting two weeks ago. Let me know if that's doable.

Thank you!

[redacted]



From: [redacted]@fb.com>
Sent: Friday, April 15, 2022 9:01 AM
To: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov> [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov> [redacted]
[redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]
[redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]@fb.com>
Subject: Account Security

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Good Morning!

As discussed during our meeting last week, I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on.

We would be grateful for any feedback and would be happy to set up a call to discuss. I am including [redacted] who you met during our meeting & are helping implement these procedures with key stakeholders. Also, [redacted] to help schedule a call to discuss, if helpful.

Many thanks for your collaboration & best for a great weekend!



From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Sent: 1/7/2021 10:58:39 PM
To: Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]
CC: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; gov@twitter.com
Subject: Re: FW: Election Related Misinformation

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you, [REDACTED] Both Tweets have been removed from the service.

Thank you,
[REDACTED]

On Thu, Jan 7, 2021 at 3:53 PM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:

Thank you, [REDACTED] We will escalate.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

On Thu, Jan 7, 2021 at 3:44 PM Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org> wrote:

[REDACTED] Twitter,

Please see this report below from the Arizona SOS office. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Cc: [REDACTED] I am not sure the best contact email to send this to at Twitter.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]


From: [REDACTED]@azsos.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 3:26 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@azsos.gov>; [REDACTED]@azsos.gov>
Subject: Election Related Misinformation

Hello,

I'm [REDACTED] communications director for the Office of the Arizona Secretary of State.

Email: [REDACTED]

I am flagging this twitter account for your review. @[REDACTED]



Of specific concern to the Secretary of State are the following tweets:

[https://twitter.com/\[redacted\]/status/1346451683384160257](https://twitter.com/[redacted]/status/1346451683384160257)

[https://twitter.com/\[redacted\]/status/1346233687160008704](https://twitter.com/[redacted]/status/1346233687160008704)

Reason: These messages falsely assert that the Voter Registration System is owned and therefore operated by foreign actors.

This is an attempt to further undermine confidence in the election institution in Arizona.

Thank you for your consideration in reviewing this matter for action.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature block]

.....
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.....

From: Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]
Sent: 11/11/2020 6:07:35 PM
To: gov@twitter.com
CC: CISA Central [central@cisa.dhs.gov]; CFITF [cfitf@hq.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov;
Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]
Subject: Fwd: Case #CIS-MIS000196: allegations of election fraud

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Twitter,

Please see below a Misinformation Report submitted by the Kentucky Secretary of State office.

Because today is a holiday, we are forwarding this report directly to you.

Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center

Center for Internet Security

Email: misinformation@cisecurity.org

www.cisecurity.org

Begin forwarded message:

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>

Date: November 11, 2020 at 4:49:18 PM EST

To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov, CISA Central <central@cisa.dhs.gov>, CISA CFITF <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov>, EIP <tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net>, Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>

Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000196: allegations of election fraud

Twitter account alleging election fraud: [https://twitter.com/\[REDACTED\]](https://twitter.com/[REDACTED])

From: [REDACTED]@ky.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, November 11, 2020 4:28 PM

To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>

Subject: Missinformation

This user is pushing miss information about election fraud that does not exist. looking at the entire account it looks like bot trolling activity if not an out right disinformation account.

[REDACTED]

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.....



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Fight for the things that you care about, but do it in a way that will lead others to join you - RBG
[#Resist](#) [#StrongerTogether](#) [#FBR](#)


 Waxhaw, NC  Joined May 2020


6,777 Following 7,140 Followers

Not followed by anyone you're following

[Tweets](#) [Tweets & replies](#) [Media](#) [Likes](#)

 Pinned Tweet

1d 

KENTUCKY NEEDS TO BE INVESTIGATED
 BALLARD - McConnell won by 74.64% of 4.2k votes - that's roughly 3,134 people.
 Ballard county has 2,285 registered republicans as of 10/10/2020
 @  [#VoterSuppression](#)
 1/4



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From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Sent: 11/11/2020 12:11:52 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]
CC: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]; CFITF [cfitf@hq.dhs.gov]; Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]
Subject: Re: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000195: allegations of election fraud with Dominion voting equipment in WA state

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you. All Tweets have been labeled, with the exception of two from @SeattleSuze. Those two Tweets were not found to violate our policies.

Thank you,
[REDACTED]

On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 7:25 PM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:
Thanks, [REDACTED] We will escalate.

On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 7:23 PM [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:
Good evening Twitter,

Please see the below report from Washington.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.

In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 7:17 PM

To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; CISA Central <central@cisa.dhs.gov>; CFITF <cfidf@hq.dhs.gov>; tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net; Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000195: allegations of election fraud with Dominion voting equipment in WA state

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Misinformation report: twelve (12) tweets alleging election fraud with Dominion voting equipment in Washington state.

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@sos.wa.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 7:03 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@sos.wa.gov>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@sos.wa.gov>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@sos.wa.gov>
Subject: Misinformation on Twitter

Hello,

I wanted to flag the following tweets that include misinformation and/or false allegations of election fraud. There is no evidence to back any of these claims. There have been no reports or indications of fraudulent activity in Washington state for the 2020 general election.

Franklin County is the only county in Washington state that uses a version of Dominion software and hardware. The system in use has been certified, and we are not aware of any issues.

No counties in Washington state use GEMS.

Additionally, each county conducts post-election audits in the days after the election that are publicly observable, which provides another layer of protection to ensure the results they certify later this month are accurate. At the end of the certification period, each county will publish a reconciliation report that discloses details about all of the ballots issued, received, counted, and rejected during this election.

<https://twitter.com/LuvMyCountry7/status/1326303394147921920>

<https://twitter.com/seattleSuze/status/1326208987348398080>

<https://twitter.com/seattleSuze/status/1326209828717436928>

<https://twitter.com/MatthewMacphe17/status/1326212450585210880>

<https://twitter.com/MatthewMacphe17/status/1326211588089470976>

<https://twitter.com/MatthewMacphe17/status/1326204530543882240>

<https://twitter.com/MatthewMacphe17/status/1326202866567049216>

<https://twitter.com/Katrina64718085/status/1326311025738575872>

<https://twitter.com/Maga2020Rules/status/1326187323566948352>

<https://twitter.com/lazalere/status/1326082445196681216>

<https://twitter.com/TerenaHimpel/status/1326006222034665472>

<https://twitter.com/LolaTwelve/status/1325934941503250433>

My name is [REDACTED] and I'm an [REDACTED] for the Washington Office of the Secretary of State. I can be reached via this email or the number listed in my signature block below. My cell phone is monitored after hours if I need to be reached urgently.

I am also copying Washington State Elections [REDACTED] Office of the Secretary of State Communications Director [REDACTED] and our Web and Social Media Coordinator [REDACTED]

Please let me know if you have any questions or need additional information.

Thank you.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Office of the Secretary of State
[REDACTED]



Secretary of State

Tim Wyma



.....

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.....

From: [REDACTED] fb.com]
Sent: 11/10/2020 12:17:57 PM
To: Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]; [REDACTED] cisa.dhs.gov]; CISA Central [central@cisa.dhs.gov]; CFITF [cfitf@hq.dhs.gov]; tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net
Subject: Re: Case #CIS-MIS000192: allegations that a deceased person voted in Monona County, Iowa

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This case has been closed out and the Secretary of State's office has been informed. Thanks!

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Date: Monday, November 9, 2020 at 5:29 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, Central CISA <central@cisa.dhs.gov>, "cfitf@hq.dhs.gov" <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov>, "tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net" <tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net>, Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED] fb.com>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000192: allegations that a deceased person voted in Monona County, Iowa

[REDACTED] and EIP, we have included Facebook in this report.

Misinformation report: Facebook post that a deceased person voted in Monona County, Iowa

<https://www.facebook.com/amy.zeitler>

From: [REDACTED] sos.iowa.gov>
Sent: Monday, November 9, 2020 6:05 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED] sos.iowa.gov>; [REDACTED] sos.iowa.gov>
Subject: RE: Facebook post

Slight correction on information from below. The voter's record was cancelled due to his death on 10/05/2009, NOT in 1999.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, November 9, 2020 5:02 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED] sos.iowa.gov>; [REDACTED] sos.iowa.gov>
Subject: FW: Facebook post

Good afternoon,

We received this email from a local election official about a FB post saying a deceased person voted. Attached is a screen shot of the post along with a scanned copy of the voter's cancelled VR record.

From: [REDACTED] sos.iowa.gov>
Sent: Monday, November 9, 2020 4:30 PM

To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@sos.iowa.gov>

Subject: FW: Facebook post

Are you reporting these or is comms?

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@mononacounty.org>

Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:10 AM

To: cyber <cyber@sos.iowa.gov>

Subject: Facebook post

Good Morning,

I reached out to [REDACTED] at Secretary of State's office and he informed me to get this information to you. I received a complaint about a Facebook post that implies a deceased person had voted. I have attached the post from Facebook and my record from I Voters to show you that the person is deceased and has been a canceled vote since 8/18/1999. We also do not have a precinct named ON204. My office received a call from this person's mother yesterday and she was upset. I then had another citizen come into my office wanting to know how this was posted on Facebook. We received another phone call this morning from the step father wanting to know how this is happening. I hope that you can assist with this matter.

[REDACTED]
*Monona County Auditor &
Commissioner of Elections
610 Iowa Ave
Onawa, IA 51040*

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@mononacounty.org>

"Believe you can and you're halfway there." - Theodore Roosevelt

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to helpdesk@sos.iowa.gov.

.....
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.....

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Sent: 11/6/2020 12:15:08 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]
CC: [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov]
Subject: Re: FW: Are these real?

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you so much! We have applied a label to the Tweet.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

On Fri, Nov 6, 2020 at 11:58 AM [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Hey [REDACTED],

Just came across this debunk of the video on Twitter --
<https://twitter.com/JaneLytv/status/1324756117415776257?s=20>.

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:53 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>
Subject: Re: FW: Are these real?

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thanks, [REDACTED] We recognize the PA Secretary of State might be busy at this moment. I am happy to escalate now without waiting for additional information.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

On Fri, Nov 6, 2020 at 9:51 AM [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Hey [REDACTED]

There are two reports in this email chain. One of Facebook posts with videos the State believes are false. That was the basis of the FYI for another group of folks. The specific report we are sharing with you all is the most recent link to a Twitter post. The FYI does not apply to the Twitter portion of the chain (unless

I'm misreading things, which in my current state is possible). We are not allowed to edit the reporting emails, so it creates some challenges for us when we're forwarding such reports.

On the video's authenticity, PA states in the very first email that they believe the video's are false. We are reaching out to partners to validate. Not sure we'll be able to get a validation, but can certainly pass along anything we get back.

Not sure this is helpful, so happy to chat if you'd like.

██████████

From: ██████████@hq.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:41 AM
To: ██████████@hq.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: FW: Are these real?

From: ██████████
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 2:40:46 PM (UTC+00:00) Monrovia, Reykjavik
To: ██████████
Cc: ██████████@twitter.com; ██████████@twitter.com; ██████████@twitter.com
Subject: Re: FW: Are these real?

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Also, have PA state officials provided additional information to you on the authenticity of video or circumstances underpinning it? It seems as if the correspondence flagging this issue to you said "FYI only at this point" and there isn't additional information from the state official.

Thank you,
██████████

On Fri, Nov 6, 2020 at 9:35 AM ██████████@twitter.com> wrote:

Thank you ██████████ We only see one URL linking to a video, but no attached screenshots as were referenced in the email. Please let us know if there are additional materials you would like us to review?

Thanks,
██████████

On Fri, Nov 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM ██████████@hq.dhs.gov> wrote:

Good morning Twitter – Please see the reporting below.

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:19 AM
To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Are these real?

See more below from PA. have we heard anything?

[REDACTED]

Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:16 AM
To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Are these real?

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Here's a little more. Any word on your side? We just got a request from a reporter. We know the one on our page was taken down, but it appears there are more floating out there.

[REDACTED]

PA Department of State

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 6:29 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Are these real?

I think I found a version of the video: <https://twitter.com/StateofusAll/status/1324556436135882753>

██████████

From: ██████████
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 3:35 AM
To: ██████████@pa.gov>; ██████████@pa.gov>
Cc: ██████████@pa.gov>; ██████████@pa.gov>
Subject: RE: Are these real?

Thank you for the notice. If you got screenshots or links can you send those?

██████████

From: ██████████@pa.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 12:01 AM
To: ██████████@pa.gov>; ██████████@pa.gov>
Cc: ██████████@pa.gov>; ██████████@pa.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Are these real?

FYI only at this point

██████████
PA Department of State
██████████

From: ██████████@pa.gov>
Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2020 11:36 PM
To: ██████████ (DHS)
Subject: Re: Are these real?

The only guess I have is, if this is real, they took live feed from “remaking” damaged ballots. I just have no idea where this might have come from...

██████████
PA Department of State

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@pa.gov>
Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2020 11:22:52 PM
To: [REDACTED] (DHS) [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>
Subject: Are these real?

[REDACTED]

Sorry to message late, but was going through the dos page and comments (old habits from EAC die hard) and came across these posts. Sorry to screenshot, but if you go to our page you should be able to see the comments on the post and go to the pages.

Are these making their way around the internet? Because there is no polling place I know of that has overhead cameras. Just don't want another "burning ballots" fake thing spreading.

Apologies for sending to you all first, but I didn't want to call an all hands meeting here when some of our folks are getting their first few real hours rest since Monday.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com]
Sent: 11/3/2020 7:07:19 PM
To: Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net
Subject: Re: Case #CIS-MIS000142: Voter in MI alleges submitting 300 ballots

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you for including me, I'm moving this through our processes now. I'll update you when I have more information.


Best,

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 5:52 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov
[REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net <[REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net>; Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000142: Voter in MI alleges submitting 300 ballots

[REDACTED] we have included Facebook in this report.

Misinformation report: citizen alleges on Facebook that he submitted 300 ballots

<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=1576601744>



From: MS-ISAC SOC
Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 6:39 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: MS-ISAC SOC [REDACTED]@msisac.org>
Subject: FW: Michigan Voter Misinformation//Facebook

Please see below. Thanks.



[REDACTED]

Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
 Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC)

[REDACTED]

24x7 Security Operations Center
 [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org - [REDACTED]



From: [redacted]@michigan.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 6:35 PM
To: [redacted]@msisac.org>
Subject: RE: Michigan Voter Misinformation//Facebook

Yes, please.

[redacted]
Michigan Bureau of Elections
[redacted]@Michigan.gov
[redacted]

From: MS-ISAC SOC [redacted]@msisac.org>
Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 6:32 PM
To: [redacted]@michigan.gov>; MS-ISAC SOC [redacted]@msisac.org>
Subject: RE: Michigan Voter Misinformation//Facebook

CAUTION: This is an External email. Please send suspicious emails to [redacted]@michigan.gov

[redacted]
Do we have your permission to share this with our federal partners by forwarding to our misinformation mailbox? Please see below.

Reports of Elections Infrastructure Misinformation ("Misinformation") submitted to the EI-ISAC via misinformation@cisecurity.org will be shared with the following organizations: (1) the applicable social media platform provider in order to address the Misinformation identified in the report; (2) the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency and the Election Integrity Partnership, for analysis of the Misinformation, in conjunction with other relevant information, to identify potential threats to election security; (3) with the National Association for Secretaries of State and National Association of State Elections Directors for situational awareness. The Misinformation may also be shared with other federal agencies, as appropriate, for situational awareness or in the context of a law enforcement investigation.



[REDACTED]
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC)

[REDACTED]
24x7 Security Operations Center

[REDACTED] [@cisecurity.org](https://www.cisecurity.org) [REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED] [@michigan.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@michigan.gov)>

Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 6:27 PM

To: MS-ISAC SOC [REDACTED] [@msisac.org](mailto:[REDACTED]@msisac.org)>

Subject: Michigan Voter Misinformation//Facebook

<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=1576601744>

Hello,

The link below is a Michigan voter who is spreading misinformation being Facebook saying he voted for 300 people. We have had local law enforcement contact him and he has pulled the post. Hours late (about an hour ago) he started posting it again. Is this something you all can assist with getting Facebook to pull down? We have received a number of complaints about this post per hour.

<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=1576601744>

Thank you!

[REDACTED]
Michigan Bureau of Elections

[REDACTED] [@Michigan.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@Michigan.gov)

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From: Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]
Sent: 11/3/2020 3:53:03 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net; Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]
CC: [REDACTED]@fb.com; [REDACTED]@fb.com
Subject: Case#CIS-MIS000133: Misinformation Facebook post regarding number of votes/voters in CO

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

[REDACTED], we have included Facebook in this report.

Misinformation report: Facebook post regarding number of votes/voters in Colorado

From: [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>
Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 3:44 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@sos.state.co.us>; [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>
Subject: Potential Foreign Mis/Dis Information on the Election Process – Facebook Post

Partners,

As part of the Colorado Department of State's (CDOS) efforts to counter foreign mis/dis information on the election process, we have been made aware of the following inaccurate information. We know this information is false because we've had 2,893,395 vote out of a possible 3,783,589 registered voters. This is not a call to action, but merely providing for you information.

<https://www.facebook.com/dpatric/posts/10223827649629519>



Disclaimer: Colorado Department of State is not the originator of the above information and is forwarding it, unedited, from its original source. The Department does not seek the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. The Department makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by recipients of this email. The Department may also share this information with local, state, and federal government agencies.

Thanks,



Jack Gross
 [Redacted]
 Department of State

.....
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.....

From: Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]
Sent: 11/2/2020 4:45:48 PM
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com]; Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]; [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov];
 [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net
Subject: RE: Case #CIS-MIS000105: votes allegedly being changed in election machines.

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you, [REDACTED].

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 4:45 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net
Subject: Re: Case [REDACTED]; votes allegedly being changed in election machines.

This has been closed out and the SoS has been informed. Thanks!

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Date: Monday, November 2, 2020 at 12:07 PM
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov" [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net"
 [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net>, Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000105: votes allegedly being changed in election machines.

Misinformation report: votes allegedly being changed in election machines.

[REDACTED] – attached and below is a misinformation post on Facebook on the Bullitt County Clerk's Office (KY). Could you please review?

<https://www.facebook.com/bullittcountyclerksoffice/photos/a.237424216303826/3537339692978912/>

[REDACTED] – we are forwarding this report directly to Facebook but still want you to be aware of the issue.

Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center
 Center for Internet Security
 Email: misinformation@cisecurity.org
www.cisecurity.org
 Follow us [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@ky.gov>
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 12:37 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: FW: Screenshot 2020-11-02 at 11.41.30 AM

Turning this in for review. - [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]
State Board of Elections
[REDACTED]
w: www.elect.ky.gov

Register Online to Vote

Find My Polling Place

Election Calendar

Contact Us

From: [REDACTED]@gmail.com [REDACTED]@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 11:45 AM
To: [REDACTED]@ky.gov>
Subject: Screenshot 2020-11-02 at 11.41.30 AM

[REDACTED] has asked me to forward this screenshot to you of a comment on our Facebook post this morning.

Thanks
[REDACTED]
Bullitt County Clerk Office

11:41 ↗



< Bullitt County Clerk's Office's Post ...

Center for official election resources and local updates.

[Get Voting Information](#)

Like Comment Share

Get more Likes, Comments and Shares
This post is performing better than 85% of other posts on your Page. Boost it to show it to more people.

656 people reached >

Boost Post

6

12 Shares

Most Relevant ▾

PROJECTS HAMMER & SCORE CARD - CHANGE VOTES IN THE ACTUAL ELECTION MACHINES - PLEASE INVESTIGATE & SHARE DATA TARGET STEAL 3%

9m Like Reply

Write a comment...



Sent from my iPhone

.....

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.....

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com]
Sent: 10/28/2020 11:46:36 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org]
CC: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org]; [REDACTED]@fb.com]; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@fb.com]; [REDACTED]@fb.com]
Subject: Re: Facebook/CIS Meeting

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Works for me - talk then!

Sent from my iPhone

On Oct 28, 2020, at 11:18 AM, [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org> wrote:

Sorry I missed this. Can we talk at 12 ET? We can call you on the [REDACTED] number.

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2020 10:41 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Subject: Re: Facebook/CIS Meeting

Thanks for following up! Tried to give [REDACTED] a call yesterday but know things are crazy. Feel free to call me at [REDACTED] (I'm around for the next 20 min if you happen to be free now!)

Sent from my iPhone

On Oct 28, 2020, at 9:54 AM, [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org> wrote:

Hi, [REDACTED] Just checking back on this.

Thanks!

From: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
Date: Monday, October 26, 2020 at 6:13 PM
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@fb.com>
Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@fb.com>

Subject: Re: Facebook/CIS Meeting

Sorry, I could have been much clearer!

Let us propose an approach that balances minimal touchpoints with the election official while getting to the official directly when it's necessary:

- 1) CIS gets a misinformation report
- 2) When that report involves fb, CIS forwards it to the regional, copying CISA
- 3) If fb needs more info, fb makes that request of CIS
- 4) If CIS has that info, we provide it back to fb. If not, or you need a statement directly from them, we loop fb in with the official.

The goal for us is to make sure we're getting you everything we need from the authoritative source in our initial report. So, again, if there have been deficiencies in our reporting, let us know the details of those issues. I think the flow above will also help us get to that goal.

Over the next 8+ days we are in near constant contact with many of these officials and we have touchpoints with them outside email, so even when we don't have the info it will often be faster for us to get it for you.

I completely understand that from your perspective this is adding an unnecessary step, but it became clear from our members today that there is a very real need for CIS to help manage contacts with the many platforms.

Thanks yet again,

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Date: Monday, October 26, 2020 at 4:17 PM

To: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>, [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@fb.com>

Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@fb.com>

Subject: Re: Facebook/CIS Meeting

Thanks [REDACTED] – just to make sure I understand, does this mean that you are not comfortable looping us directly in with the reporting authority?

<Image001.gif>

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@fb.com

From: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
Date: Monday, October 26, 2020 at 3:58 PM
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Subject: Re: Facebook/CIS Meeting

Thanks, [REDACTED]

We appreciate the call today. We think a direct line from CIS to Fb's regionals will be much more efficient for everyone and CISA is agreeable to that approach.

After talking with some of our members, we don't believe it is reasonable to leave CIS out of the loop for any part of the misinformation efforts. They were adamant that the one of the critical roles for CIS in this process is to broker the interactions and take work off of their very, very full plates. They expressed that excluding CIS from the process would make their jobs more difficult, take up more of their time, and weaken our efforts to ensure a fair election. They also felt that if there is information they did not feel comfortable sharing with CIS (or any other party) over e mail, it is their responsibility to remove that party from the email.

Our focus is on making life easier for them, not for ourselves or anyone else. We need to make that the priority. We urge you work directly through us and allow us to broker any additional information gathering from our members .

This will help us serve them best and will avoid the scenario where representatives from facebook, twitter, nextdoor, snap, tiktok, and others are all reaching out to them, potentially about a single report that they submitted to us, likely requesting the same or similar information.

To hasten action on misinformation, we believe it's best if Fb provides CIS with specific feedback on what you've found lacking in submissions so we can ensure that we have that information before we send it on to you. That will help your efforts as well as cross-platform efforts.

I'd be remiss to not mention that our members felt strongly about the importance of accountability in this process. With the extraordinary pace our members are carrying right now, CIS is in a better position to track which platforms have responded and how. It's in the nation's interest that we have an understanding of how various platforms are managing and responding to reports of misinformation submitted by authoritative sources. This is another role that CIS plays and one that our members have expressed is of utmost importance for this election and beyond .

I hope this is all agreeable to you. We're happy to have a follow up call if you'd like .

Thanks again,
[REDACTED]


From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Date: Monday, October 26, 2020 at 12:57 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>
Subject: Re: Facebook/CIS Meeting

Hi [REDACTED],

Thanks for taking the time to meet with us this morning! I'm attaching my team's regional divide to this email, and look forward to connecting later today after you've had a chance to connect with some of your stakeholders.

Best,

<image002.gif>



From: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>

Date: Friday, October 23, 2020 at 6:09 PM

To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Subject: RE: Facebook/CIS Meeting

That's great. I just accepted.

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 5:27 PM

To: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>

Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Subject: RE: Facebook/CIS Meeting

Hi Aaron –

How about 11a ET on Monday, October 26?

I've sent over a calendar hold with the below dial-in details for the call.

Best,

WAYS TO JOIN

Computer or Mobile

Facebook Meeting Room and Portal:

Use the touch panel in your room or Portal to enter the join code

Telephone:

Dial in

or

Dial an alternative number from

From: [redacted]@cisecurity.org>

Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 1:18 PM

To: [redacted]@fb.com>

Cc: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [redacted]@fb.com>

Subject: RE: Facebook/CIS Meeting

Sounds good. We are flexible on Monday outside of 12:30-2p ET. Let us know what times work for you.

Thanks,

From: [redacted]@fb.com>

Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 1:13 PM

To: [redacted]@cisecurity.org>

Cc: [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]@fb.com>; [redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [redacted]@fb.com>

Subject: Re: Facebook/CIS Meeting

Sorry — just getting to this.

My schedule has blown up a bit today so may need to punt until Monday.

[redacted] to help schedule and provide dial in.

Many thanks, all!

Sent from my iPhone

On Oct 23, 2020, at 12:01 PM, [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org> wrote:

[REDACTED]
Adding [REDACTED] on my side. We are free between 1-3pm ET today. How is 1pm ET for everyone?

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 10:04 AM

To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>

Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Subject: Re: Facebook/CIS Meeting

Many thanks, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who leads our outreach to State Election Officials and [REDACTED] to help schedule.

Let us know if you have some time later today or an afternoon early next week to discuss some refinements to the reporting structure.

Many thanks,
[REDACTED]

Sent from my iPhone

On Oct 23, 2020, at 9:51 AM, [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

[REDACTED]

I've spoken with [REDACTED] at CIS about getting together for a call to discuss reporting and he's open to having the conversation. I have cc'd him here to facilitate you all finding a time that works. Feel free to invite me (or not) if I can be helpful.

Regards,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Countering Foreign Influence Task Force
DHS/CISA/NRMC

[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov

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From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Sent: 10/8/2020 10:38:29 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]
CC: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Subject: Re: FW: Case#CIS-MIS000033: Misinformation tweet to vote in-person in Washington state

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hi [REDACTED], this Tweet has been actioned for violating our rules.

On Wed, Oct 7, 2020 at 8:07 PM [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Hi [REDACTED],

We received the below report from Washington.

Regards,
[REDACTED]

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>

Sent: Wednesday, October 7, 2020 8:04 PM

To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net

Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000033: Misinformation tweet to vote in-person in Washington state

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Misinformation tweet to vote in-person in Washington state

Begin forwarded message:

From: [redacted] <[redacted]@sos.wa.gov>
Date: October 7, 2020 at 7:48:49 PM EDT
To: Misinformation Reports <[redacted]@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [redacted] <[redacted]@sos.wa.gov>, [redacted] <[redacted]@sos.wa.gov>
Subject: Possible misinformation on Twitter

Hello,

I wanted to flag this tweet the Washington Office of the Secretary of State's official Twitter account was tagged in. I've attached a screenshot of the post itself, and it can be found here:
<https://twitter.com/JeffKis88392967/status/1313926786804113408>

The reason I am flagging this as potential misinformation is it's not clear if this tweet is a simple statement or recommendation to "conservatives," or if this is a directive. If it's the latter, that would not be true. In Washington state, voters may return their ballots by mail, by placing their ballot in an official ballot drop box, or by visiting a county voting center.

My name is [redacted] and I'm the [redacted] for the Washington Office of the Secretary of State. I can be reached via this email or the two numbers listed in my signature block below. My cell phone is monitored after hours if I need to be reached urgently. I am also copying Washington State [redacted] and our [redacted]

Please let me know if you have any questions or need additional information.

Thank you.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]



Secretary of State

Tim Wymore





[@secstatewa](#) All conservatives vote in person. Don't trust the mail

12:38 PM · Oct 7, 2020 · Twitter for iPhone



This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

.....

From: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org]
Sent: 10/7/2020 3:33:22 PM
To: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
CC: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov];
 [REDACTED]@twitter.com
Subject: RE: EI-ISAC & Other

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

[REDACTED]

It has not, goes out end of day. We will pull the link.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EI-ISAC
[@cisecurity.org](#)

24x7 Security Operations Center

[@cisecurity.org](#) - [REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Sent: Wednesday, October 7, 2020 12:37 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>;
 [REDACTED]@twitter.com
Subject: Re: EI-ISAC & Other

Hi [REDACTED] has the EI-ISAC notice gone out yet? We are not reaching critical mass so we are likely to postpone. (It is almost like these guys are administering an election out there!) If the note hasn't gone out, please pull the info about tomorrow's training. But feel free to leave in the information about PSP -- that work is ongoing. If it has gone out, we will just notify any folks who register ourselves.

Thanks so much!

On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 11:06 AM [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org> wrote:

Hi [REDACTED]

Yes, we keep events in our distribution until they happen so it will go out with our next product tomorrow afternoon.

██████████

██████████

██████████ EI-ISAC
 ██████████@cisecurity.org

██████████

24x7 Security Operations Center

██████████@cisecurity.org - ██████████



From: ██████████@twitter.com>

Sent: Monday, October 5, 2020 3:55 PM

To: ██████████@cisecurity.org> ██████████@cisa.dhs.gov> ██████████

██████████@cisa.dhs.gov>

Cc: ██████████@twitter.com

Subject: Re: EI-ISAC & Other

Hi ██████████ is it possible to send out the invitation to the training for state and locals again? Our RSVPs are essentially non-existent.

State and Local Election Officials: Please join Twitter on Thursday, October 8 from 3:30 - 4:30 pm EST for a training on creative and effective content strategies on Twitter in advance of the U.S. Election. You will hear the latest on product updates, best practices, and strategy for creating engaging content! Time for Q&A will be reserved at the end. RSVP here: <https://trainingforuselectionpartners.splashthat.com/>

On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 11:06 AM ██████████@twitter.com> wrote:

Thank you so much for sending it out. The ██████████@Twitter.com still absolutely works!

On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 10:52 AM ██████████@cisecurity.org> wrote:

Hi ██████████

Hopefully you've gotten some signups. I just learned a one pager another part of CIS shared with the community included the older [REDACTED]@twitter.com email. We'll be updating going forward to the PSP address but do we need to go back to folks that have that to correct or will that still work?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]-ISAC

[REDACTED]@cisecurity.org

[REDACTED]

24x7 Security Operations Center

[REDACTED]@cisecurity.org - [REDACTED]



From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
 Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 4:23 PM
 To: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
 Cc: [REDACTED]@twitter.com
 Subject: Re: EI-ISAC & Other

[REDACTED] -- apologies for the typo -- RSVP is in the first paragraph twice. Thank you in advance for fixing my hasty mistake :)

On Tue, Sep 29, 2020 at 4:17 PM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:

Hi [REDACTED] are you able to add these two updates to your weekly news alert that is distributed to state and local election officials? Thank you!

(1) State and Local Election Officials: Please join Twitter on Thursday, October 8 from 3:30 - 4:30 pm EST for a training on creative and effective content strategies on Twitter in advance of the U.S. Election. You will hear the latest on product updates, best practices, and strategy for creating engaging content! Time for Q&A will be reserved at the end. RSVP here: [RSVP link here: https://trainingforuselectionpartners.splashtat.com/](https://trainingforuselectionpartners.splashtat.com/)

(2) We are onboarding state and local election officials onto Twitter's Partner Support Portal. The Partner Support Portal is a dedicated way for critical stakeholders -- like you -- to flag concerns directly to Twitter. These concerns can include technical issues with your account and content on the platform that may violate our policies. Email PSPOnboarding@Twitter.com to enroll.

And please note the URL name -- it sometimes prompts an erroneous autocorrect. Please let me know if you have any questions!

Thank you,

[Redacted]

On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 1:22 PM [Redacted]@cisecurity.org> wrote:

[Redacted]

Please forgive for the delayed response. Typically, with private sector partners we would feature new initiatives in our weekly news alert (Wednesday afternoons) with a one paragraph summary. We typically link to some sort of public reporting, whether you have a release on PSP or a page where you've been directing sign-ups that we can point folks to. With regards to the training, we have an "upcoming events" section in the same product that we can include links for signup/webinar location or an email to contact.

Let me know,

Best,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]@cisecurity.org

[Redacted]@cisecurity.org

[Redacted]

24x7 Security Operations Center

[Redacted]@cisecurity.org - [Redacted]



From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:33 PM
To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
Subject: RE: EI-ISAC & Other

[REDACTED]

I have cc'd [REDACTED] the EI-ISAC on this email.

Also, if you have items that we can share through our channels we are happy to take a look.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

[REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:06 PM
To: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Subject: EI-ISAC & Other

Long lost friends, how are you? Hope you got in a few quick breaks this August.

Do you have contact information for the team at the EI-ISAC? We want to send a message to state and local election officials inviting them: (1) to be onboarded to the Partner Support Portal (previously this was reserved only for state-level; we are now expanding for locals) and (2) a training for best-practices on creating credible and engaging content.

Any other issues we should be connecting on?

Thanks,



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This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

From: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org
 Sent: 6/17/2020 12:58:15 PM
 To: [REDACTED]@twitter.com
 CC: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org]; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org]; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org]; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org]; [REDACTED]@nased.org]; [REDACTED]@sso.org]; [REDACTED]@sso.org]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
 Subject: RE: Reporting Portal with CIS, NASS, NASED and Twitter

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Sorry I am just getting this to you a few minutes before our meeting. We are looking forward to talking through these .

1. Will there be some sort of agreement or terms of reference that will align all participants (reporters, government entities, companies) on objectives and usage of the portal?

Yes, we'll establish Terms of Reference (or equivalent agreements) for the portal. Broadly speaking the objectives are:

- CIS: vet election officials to ensure that all information reported to the platforms comes from the authoritative source for that information.
- Election offices: submit report of misinformation that, as the official authority a certain information, can be stated as factually inaccurate
- Social media companies: process reports and provide timely responses, to include the removal of reported misinformation from the platform where possible
- National associations: maintain awareness of occurrences of misinformation and communicate with other partners as necessary
- Other partners: not on the critical path of the initial rollout; can be discussed as the platform evolves

2. Who will have access to view/analyze reported information? Will there be any restrictions in place to dictate what can be done with this information?

This will be covered in the agreements, which will limit use of data. Broadly speaking usage will be

- CIS: access to all information and ability to analyze and communicate about that information with election offices and social media companies
- Election offices: submit report of misinformation that, as the official authority a certain information, can be stated as factually inaccurate
- National associations: access to all information and ability to analyze and communicate about that information with election offices and social media companies
- Social media companies: Access to reports necessary to investigate and come to a decision
- Other partners: not on the critical path of the initial rollout; can be discussed as the platform evolves

3. Would other companies have access to see reports for other platforms? I believe our answer is no we will not share the reports. However, based on the set of reports, we may share indications of campaigns of misinformation across platforms. What if the report has content from multiple companies? We have it setup where the samples are separated by platform. The top-level report information would be shared with any platform where a sample was provided. We are open to handling this differently and look forward to your thoughts here.

4. What is the criteria used to determine who has access to the portal? The criteria has already been determined (elections officials vetted by CIS, NASS, NASED, DHS and social media platforms). Any others will be on a case-by-case basis with a specific formal terms of access agreement. How many individuals do you anticipate having access? There are roughly 9,000 elections offices. We expect as much as half may participate in the portal over time.

5. How long will reported information be retained? **Redacted Proprietary Information**

Redacted Proprietary Information

6. How long will the portal be in operation? Just through the 2020 presidential election? **The portal will be evaluated in January 2021 regarding demonstrated benefits, potential enhancements, and opinions by the elections community regarding continued operation.**

7. Companies' terms of service vary. How will individuals know what to report? **We will cover this in the Terms of Reference and in the instructions given to users as they use the platform. The elections officials will report suspected misinformation related to elections. The platforms will have to assess the misinformation, including applicability of specific terms of service for the platform.**

8. Will there be any quality checks in place? Will there be a review of reports before they are submitted to companies? Will all reports be treated with equal priority? **The reporting mechanism has requirements on which fields are required. This validation can be altered based on the "type" of report. We are open to adding more validation based on your feedback. We do not anticipate any manual review of the content itself. The reporter can set a priority, but we should discuss the implications of that to all involved.**

9. Will partners continue to use Partner Support Portal (PSP) or will everyone migrate to this reporting tool? **We'd like to encourage election officials to use the Reporting Portal, but we believe it makes sense to continue to operate the PSP in parallel through this election and evaluate it afterward.**

Thanks,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] [@cisecurity.org](https://twitter.com/cisecurity.org)



From: [Redacted]@twitter.com>
Sent: Tuesday, June 16, 2020 3:59 PM
To: [Redacted]@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [Redacted]@twitter.com>; [Redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [Redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [Redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [Redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [Redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [Redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [Redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [Redacted]@nased.org>; [Redacted]@sso.org>; [Redacted]@sso.org>; [Redacted]@twitter.com>; [Redacted]@twitter.com>; [Redacted]@twitter.com>
Subject: Re: Reporting Portal with CIS, NASS, NASED and Twitter

All,

Below are some of the questions we hope to discuss during our next call. Looking forward to it!

1. Will there be some sort of agreement or terms of reference that will align all participants (reporters, government entities, companies) on objectives and usage of the portal?
2. Who will have access to view/analyze reported information? Will there be any restrictions in place to dictate what can be done with this information?
3. Would other companies have access to see reports for other platforms? What if the report has content from multiple companies?
4. What is the criteria used to determine who has access to the portal? How many individuals do you anticipate having access?
5. How long will reported information be retained?
6. How long will the portal be in operation? Just through the 2020 presidential election?
7. Companies' terms of service vary. How will individuals know what to report?
8. Will there be any quality checks in place? Will there be a review of reports before they are submitted to companies? Will all reports be treated with equal priority?
9. Will partners continue to use Partner Support Portal (PSP) or will everyone migrate to this reporting tool?

On Fri, Jun 12, 2020 at 3:40 PM [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org> wrote:

[REDACTED]

Wednesday from 1-2 ET works for our team. I will send an invite.

I will also follow up separately with you on setting up accounts. Have a great weekend.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@cisecurity.org



From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>

Sent: Friday, June 12, 2020 2:29 PM

To: [redacted]@cisecurity.org>
 Cc: [redacted]@twitter.com>; [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]
 [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]
 [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [redacted]@cisecurity.org>;
 [redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [redacted]
 [redacted]@nased.org>; [redacted]@sso.org>; [redacted]@sso.org>; [redacted]
 [redacted]@twitter.com>; [redacted]@twitter.com>; [redacted]@twitter.com>

Subject: Re: Reporting Portal with CIS, NASS, NASED and Twitter

Hi [redacted]

Thanks again for this group's time yesterday. Can we schedule our next follow-up for next Wednesday from 1-2pm? We'll share some of our questions ahead of that call to help inform our discussion .

Also, would you be able to help us establish some log-ins for us to test out the tool?

Thanks!

On Wed, Jun 3, 2020 at 4:52 PM [redacted]@cisecurity.org> wrote:

That works for us here at CIS [redacted] will send an invite shortly.

Thanks,

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]@cisecurity.org



From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
 Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 4:08 PM
 To: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>
 Cc: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>;
 [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>; [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>; [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]@nased.org>; [REDACTED]@sso.org>; [REDACTED]@sso.org>

Subject: Re: Reporting Portal with CIS, NASS, NASED and Twitter

Hi [REDACTED]

Thank you for your patience. Would 3:30 next Thursday (6/11) work for a follow-up call?

Best,
[REDACTED]

On Mon, Jun 1, 2020 at 8:37 AM [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org> wrote:
[REDACTED]

I hope you are doing well. I know it is a busy week with the election tomorrow. When you can, please let us know a good time to reschedule our meeting from last week. We will have some updates to share about our beta testing with election officials and a possible nationwide training collaboration with the Belfer Center.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@cisecurity.org



From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
 Sent: Friday, May 22, 2020 4:30 PM
 To: [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>

Cc: [redacted]@twitter.com>; [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [redacted]
[redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [redacted]
[redacted]@cisecurity.org>; [redacted]@nased.org>; [redacted]@sso.org>; [redacted]
[redacted]@sso.org>

Subject: Re: Reporting Portal with CIS, NASS, NASED and Twitter

Hi [redacted]

Thank you for your email and for your time last week. We support your goals in establishing this tool, but still need to run some traps internally regarding options to receive the info and provide feedback. Happy to schedule a follow-up call next week, though we may still have more questions than feedback at that point. If that works for you all, let's aim for 4:30 pm EST.

Best,

[redacted]

On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 3:25 PM [redacted]@cisecurity.org> wrote:

[redacted]

Thank you so much for the call last Monday. I hope it proved helpful as you went back to your team at Twitter. With the elections nearing, we are eager to hear if you have anything you can share from your internal conversations. Are you available for a 30 min follow up call next week? We have a few time slots next Thursday if any of these work for you: 9-10am, 2-2:30pm, and 4-5pm (Eastern). If these don't work for you, we can shuffle some schedules around. Just let us know what works best for you.

Thanks,

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]@cisecurity.org



-----Original Appointment-----

From: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 9:31 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: Reporting Portal with CIS, NASS, NASED and Twitter

When: Monday, May 11, 2020 2:00 PM-3:00 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Where: WebEx invite just sent separately – please use that information

Sent a separate invite to use WebEx for the meeting. Please let me know if you don't receive the WebEx invite.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

.....

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This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com]
Sent: 3/13/2020 11:13:52 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]
CC: [REDACTED]@fb.com]
Subject: Re: Tweet regarding voting & COVID-19 - DISINFORMATION

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thanks, [REDACTED]!

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 13, 2020, at 10:55 AM, [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

[REDACTED]

Apparently the tweet I sent has been taken down. Please see the screenshot below with the tweet.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 10:51 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Tweet regarding voting & COVID-19 - DISINFORMATION

From OH in screen shot form and reported to CIOCC.

[REDACTED]
Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 10:39 AM
To: [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; [REDACTED]@msisac.org>; [REDACTED]@msisac.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>
Subject: Tweet regarding voting & COVID-19 - DISINFORMATION

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

The following disinformation regarding upcoming Ohio, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, and Wisconsin elections and COVID-19 was posted to twitter:

<https://twitter.com/coocbie/status/1238465759745134593?s=21>

<image.png>

<~WRD318.jpg>

[REDACTED]

Office of the Ohio Secretary of State

[REDACTED]

OhioSoS.gov



Thread



DEAR ALL BOOMERS,

Due to COVID-19, it should be in your highest interest to refrain from entering polling stations in Illinois, Florida, Ohio, Louisiana, and Wisconsin!!!

This is for your own safety.

I repeat, BOOMERS DO NOT VOTE

10:03 AM · 3/13/20 · [Twitter Web App](#)

6 Likes



25m



Tweet your reply



From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 10/26/2020 9:02:43 AM
To: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
CC: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov];
Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]
Subject: RE: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000067: Youtube video alleging conspiracy by election administration in Detroit, MI

Thanks [REDACTED].

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 12:40 AM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>;
Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Re: FW: [REDACTED] Youtube video alleging conspiracy by election administration in Detroit, MI

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thanks, [REDACTED]. We have taken enforcement action for violations of our policy on civic integrity.

Thanks!

On Sun, Oct 25, 2020 at 10:44 PM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:

Thanks, [REDACTED]. We will escalate.

On Sun, Oct 25, 2020 at 10:43 PM [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Good evening Team Twitter,

Please see the below and attached reporting from Detroit.

Regards,
[REDACTED]

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used

by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2020 10:35 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net; Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case # [REDACTED]: Youtube video alleging conspiracy by election administration in Detroit, MI

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Misinformation report: YouTube video, also shared on Twitter, alleging conspiracy by election administration in Detroit, MI

From: [REDACTED]@ferndalemi.gov>
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2020 10:16 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@ferndalemi.gov>; [REDACTED]@detroitmi.gov>; [REDACTED]@google.com>; [REDACTED]@michigan.gov>; [REDACTED]@twitter.com
Subject: Disinformation attack on Youtube and Twitter: "#DETROITLEAKS" video from 10/21/2020

Hello EI-ISAC,

My name is [REDACTED]. I am the [REDACTED] for the City of Ferndale, Michigan. My email address is [REDACTED]@ferndalemi.gov.

I am reporting a disinformation (misinformation) attack video that was posted on YouTube on October 21 and repeatedly posted on Twitter since then, targeting election administration by the City of Detroit and State of Michigan and alleging an organized conspiracy by City and State employees.

The video is titled:

#DETROITLEAKS: State Employees Train Poll Workers to Lie to Voters, Destroy Ballots, Stop Challengers [sic]

The title card (which shows on Youtube's search screens and on some links) is:
"The Vote Fraud Scheme To Steal Michigan"

I have attached a screenshot of this title card, as requested by EI-ISAC.

The video can be found here:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHeodzJ5cNM>

It was posted by this user:

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWs1lWcNra9Zf8Xew9mTsw>

It has been posted on Twitter multiple times since October 21, almost entirely by @bigleaguepol ("Big League Politics"), which is a far-right site that appears to primarily invent conspiracy theories and is operated by former Breitbart News employees. The tweets about the video use the same #DETROITLEAKS hashtag as the video title. This account 'teased' the video in a tweet on October 20.

The video takes what it alleges are recordings of "State Employees" (which are more likely City of Detroit Department of Elections employees, although they do not identify themselves in the audio), and misrepresents the audio by using on-screen commentary to misinform the viewer of the video.

- From 2:32 – 4:16, the person in the audio is describing the correct process for a provisional affidavit ballot (also colloquially called a "challenged ballot").
 - At 2:42, the on-screen text claims that *"Before 2020, NO challenged ballot would go into the tabulator."* This is not true. Provisional affidavit ballots, as well as challenged absentee ballots, have always been fed through the tabulator on Election Day. That is exactly why they are prepared as correctly described in the audio (ballot number written on the ballot and covered up with a removable sticker) —which makes the claim at 3:04 completely wrong. Provisional Affidavit ballots always get voted as normal and are placed into the tabulator. Provisional Envelope ballots are sealed individually inside their own envelope (not placed into the tabulator) and are returned to the City Clerk for processing in the following days. These processes are not new to 2020; they have been in place for over a decade.
 - At 3:55, the text incorrectly claims that *"all challenged ballots WILL be counted immediately on Election Night"*, which is wrong. Provisional Affidavit ballots are counted along with all others. Provisional Envelope ballots are not.
 - 4:12 attempts to cast doubt on the process of identifying and removing a ballot deemed uncountable — which would only happen under court order, as only Provisional Envelope ballots would wind up inside the tabulator or the sealed ballot container and need to be retrieved. The video claims *"This will NEVER happen. Unless MAYBE in a recount."* Recounts have little to do with Provisional Affidavit ballots, and the assertion that the justice system would never take action to reverse proven voter fraud is entirely baseless. It serves only to cause the voter to doubt the good intentions of the judiciary and the justice system.
- At 4:20, the video refers to the Clerk's Office Voter Registration Receipt as *"an easily-forged piece of paper"*. Again, this is a baseless accusation intended only to denigrate the legal election process and cause the video viewer to feel fear and doubt the security of Michigan's election.
- At 7:30, the video insinuates that simply using *"children"* (16- and 17-year olds, allowed under state law) as election inspectors is an intentional part of a conspiracy to intentionally undermine the election.
- At 9:04, the audio and the on-screen captions describe an absentee ballot that has been *"Sent and received"*, meaning the Clerk has received the voted ballot from the voter and recorded it as such. This would have happened multiple days prior to the election. At 9:14, the video immediately turns around and ignores that by presenting a hypothetical 'scenario' where the voter might not have returned that very same ballot. This is completely contradictory, and is a total misrepresentation of the audio from the actual training scenario that has been recorded. At 9:23, the trainer in the audio even specifically says *"You've already voted."*

This video is misinformation and disinformation because it repeatedly takes normal processes being correctly described as written in state law, and alleges in on-screen text that they are somehow problematic, or will not be followed. On multiple occasions, the on-screen text directly contradicts the audio. However, these are items that would likely only stick out to an election administrator; a member of the general public would follow the video's lead and assume that there is somehow a problem being described. Furthermore, the video makes outright false claims, alleging actions that are prohibited under Michigan election law.

Copied on this email are the following individuals and offices, per the directions from EI-ISAC:

- [REDACTED] City of Ferndale
- [REDACTED] City of Detroit Department of Elections
- Bureau of Elections at the Michigan Department of State
- Civics Outreach office at Google
- Government office at Twitter

This video is an attack on the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan, and by direct extension, all local election administrators in the state of Michigan, such as myself. This will disinform voters outside Detroit as easily as voters inside Detroit. Indeed, the choice of words throughout the video and in the calls to action at the end of the video infer that the video's audience is primarily people who are not Detroit residents. If that audience can be spurred to create unrest in Detroit, they can easily do the same in other jurisdictions, such as my jurisdiction as Detroit's immediate northern neighbor.

Thank you for your investigation and action. If I can be of any further assistance, please let me know and I will be happy to provide support.

Best,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

City of Ferndale

[REDACTED]

.....

This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

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From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 10/2/2020 7:28:36 PM
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com]; [REDACTED]@fb.com]
Subject: FW: Case #CIS-MIS000026: Facebook misinformation regarding absentee ballots mailed out in Scott County, IA.
Attachments: IMG_4219.PNG; IMG_4220.PNG; IMG_4221.PNG; IMG_4222.PNG

Good evening,

Because who doesn't like to start their weekend with some election related disinfo, I'm sharing a report from Scott County, IA. As usual, anything you can share on how you all handled the report is appreciated.

[REDACTED]

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

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From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Sent: Friday, October 2, 2020 6:09 PM
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@2020partnership.atlassian.net; Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000026: Facebook misinformation regarding absentee ballots mailed out in Scott County, IA.

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Misinformation report from Scott County, IA

From: [REDACTED]@msisac.org>
Sent: Friday, October 2, 2020 5:54 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: FW: Facebook misinformation

In response to your last email to eric.

From: [REDACTED]@sos.iowa.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 2, 2020 3:28 PM
To: [REDACTED]@msisac.org>; [REDACTED]@msisac.org>; [REDACTED]@iowa.gov>; [REDACTED]@dps.state.ia.us>; [REDACTED] FBI #4 (FBI) FBI #4 @fbi.gov>; [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@sos.iowa.gov>; [REDACTED]@sos.iowa.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Facebook misinformation

CONFIDENTIAL

Please see this report of possible misinformation posted on Facebook. We received it from the Scott County [REDACTED] I've confirmed that [REDACTED] is a registered voter in Scott County, IA.

Absentee ballots will not be mailed out in Iowa until Monday, October 5.

Forwarding for visibility.

Let me know if you have more questions.

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: [REDACTED]@sos.iowa.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 2, 2020 12:54 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Facebook misinformation

From: [REDACTED]@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, October 2, 2020 11:33 AM
To: [REDACTED]@sos.iowa.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Facebook misinformation

As per the incident report I am moving forward with inaccurate information posted on Facebook. Of course we have not mailed out ballots yet, therefore false information. Can you tell me what action will be taken

[REDACTED]

----- Forwarded message -----
From: [REDACTED]@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Oct 1, 2020, 8:57 PM
Subject: Facebook misinformation
To: [REDACTED]@gmail.com>

Sent from my iPhone

CONFIDENTIAL

CAUTION: This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [REDACTED]@sos.iowa.gov


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Verizon



1d · 👥



Like



Comment



Send



and 24 others



I wonder how many haters would send in all 3.... just wondering

1d Like Reply



Write a comment...





[Redacted]'s Post



[Redacted]
AMEN TO THAT....

1d Like Reply



[Redacted]
Good for you. My relatives called city hall and reported it. I told them to call the local TV stations and see if they put it on the air. Any bets?

1d Like Reply



View 4 previous replies...



[Redacted] registered independent or not, you are backing the Republican party of Trump this year, as evidenced by many of your posts and comments.

1d Like Reply



I vote on



Write a comment...





[Redacted]'s Post



Like Reply



[Redacted]
Good for you. My relatives called city hall and reported it. I told them to call the local TV stations and see if they put it on the air. Any bets?

1d Like Reply



[Redacted] They sure should! This reeks of corruption!

1d Like Reply



They only dwell on news that benefits one side. Plus they don't want Davenport or the state looking corrupt.

1d Like Reply



[Redacted] is a Republican so I guess that means it would benefit the



Write a comment...





[Redacted]s Post



Like Reply

[Redacted] is a Republican so I guess that means it would benefit the Republican party, not the Democrats, if she were to submit these illegitimate ballots, which she cannot do. Iowa hasn't even mailed ballots out yet. It seems to me that someone out there is purposely trying to stir up trouble and cause doubt. Maybe the ballots she received should have been brought to the attention of the county auditor.

1d Like Reply



[Redacted] If you're talking about this [Redacted] I'm a registered independent. Be sure of your facts before you state them.



Write a comment...

