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## Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)

### Background

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) is an Army-led, joint-service program designed to replace a portion of each service's light tactical wheeled vehicle fleets. The JLTV FoV consists of two variants: the four-seat Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) (**Figure 1**) and the two-seat Combat Support Vehicle (CSV) (**Figure 2**). The CTV is to support the General Purpose, Heavy Gun Carrier and Close Combat Weapon Carrier missions. The CSV is to support the Utility/Shelter Carrier mission. The JLTV is transportable by a range of lift assets, including rotary-wing aircraft. Its maneuverability enables activities across the spectrum of terrain, including urban areas, while providing inherent and supplemental armor against direct fire and improvised explosive device threats.

### Current Program Status

The JLTV is currently being produced by Oshkosh Defense, headquartered in Oshkosh, WI. In August 2015, the Army awarded Oshkosh a \$6.7 billion low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. In June 2019, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology) approved Army JLTV full-rate production (FRP). The Army plans for a follow-on full-rate production contract to be awarded to a single vendor in the fourth quarter of FY2022. It is planned to be a competitive five-year contract with five one-year options for about 30,000 JLTVs and 10,000 JLTV trailers. The Army began fielding LRIP JLTVs to units in April 2019, and Marine Corps units received their first LRIP JLTVs in February 2019.

**Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP)** is a programmatic decision made when manufacturing development is completed and there is an ability to produce a small-quantity set of articles. It also establishes an initial production base and sets the stage for a gradual increase in production rate to allow for Full-Rate Production (FRP) upon completion of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).

**Full-Rate Production (FRP)** is a decision made that allows for government contracting for economic production quantities following stabilization of the system design and validation of the production process.

### JLTV CTV

**Figure 1. JLTV Combat Tactical Vehicle Variant (CTV)**



Source: <https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-tactical-vehicle/>, accessed December 30, 2020.

### JLTV CSV

**Figure 2. JLTV Combat Support Vehicle Variant (CSV)**



Source: <https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-tactical-vehicle/>, accessed December 30, 2020.

## Budgetary Information

**Table I. FY2023 DOD JLTV Budget Request**

Funding Category	Total Request (\$M)	Total Request (Qty.)
<b>RDT&amp;E USA</b>	9.4	—
<b>RDT&amp;E USMC</b>	2.9	—
<b>Procurement USA</b>	734.9	2,909
<b>Procurement USAF</b>	60.8	138
<b>Procurement USN</b>	28.6	18
<b>Procurement USMC</b>	222.3	656

**Source:** Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 3-2.

**Notes:** RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; \$M = U.S. dollars in millions; Qty. = FY2023 procurement quantities.

## Foreign Military Sales

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notes approved JLTV sales to the United Kingdom (\$1.035 billion for 2,747 JLTVs) and Lithuania (\$170.8 million for 500 JLTVs).

## JLTV Follow-On Contract

The Army originally planned to award a follow-on full-rate JLTV production contract to a single vendor in the fourth quarter of FY2022. Reportedly, the Army pushed back the due date for companies to bid on the JLTV follow-on contract to July 15, 2022, based on requests from industry. The Army plans to award the single vendor contract in December 2022. Because the Army owns the technical data for the JLTV, it is able to conduct a competition to see if any vendors can build the vehicle at a lower price than Oshkosh, which was awarded the LRIP contract in 2015. The follow-on contract is reportedly estimated to be worth over \$7.3 billion over a decade.

## Potential Issues for Congress

### Potential Post Follow-On Contract JLTV Cost Increase

Reportedly, the JLTV could become more expensive after the follow-on contract is awarded in December 2022. Army FY2023 budget documents suggest there might be “higher estimated unit costs for the competitive follow-on contract,” which could lead to a higher price per vehicle in FY2023 than in FY2022. If a new manufacturer other than Oshkosh is chosen in December 2022, the new manufacturer reportedly could face higher costs than Oshkosh during the first year of its contract, as it would not have Oshkosh’s experience building the JLTV. In such a case, it is anticipated costs would decrease significantly after the first year of the contract. The Army further notes that JLTV cost elements could also fluctuate beyond the first year of the new contract based on unpredictable prices and strong commodity-related inflation. Given the potential for JLTV

cost increase, Congress might review JLTV costs after the Army awards the follow-on contract in December 2023.

## Future of JLTV Procurement

The Army’s current modernization strategy is primarily focused on six modernization priorities that do not include the JLTV. Furthermore, the Army announced in January 2022 that under the Army 2030 Force Design Initiative, the Army would either redesignate existing divisions or create new divisions into five new types of divisions:

- Standard Light;
- Standard Heavy;
- Penetration;
- Joint Force Entry Air Assault; and
- Joint Force Entry Airborne.

The Army also announced in May 2022 that it would create a new Alaska-based division, the 11<sup>th</sup> Airborne Division, by activating new units and reconfiguring two Alaska-based Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). With the creation of new division types and an additional division in Alaska, it is possible that the Army’s requirement for JLTVs could change significantly.

With the Marine Corps downsizing in accordance with its March 2020 Force Design Initiative and adoption of a more expeditionary posture (possibly requiring fewer JLTVs), original JLTV procurement plans for both the Army and Marine Corps might no longer be accurate. Despite the Army’s intent to lower costs by competing a follow-on contract with another vendor by FY2022, slowing production rates and extended procurement timelines could act to increase costs if current JLTV requirements are no longer valid. In addition, different versions of the JLTV produced by another vendor could result in additional operations and maintenance costs that can result from a mixed fleet of vehicles. Taken collectively, these issues might merit DOD and policymakers examining the future of JLTV procurement to help determine the current requirement for JLTVs and associated cost implications.

For a more detailed historical discussion of the JLTV Program, see CRS Report RS22942, *Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress*, by Andrew Feickert.

For additional information on Army 2030, see CRS In Focus IF11542, *The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure Initiatives*, by Andrew Feickert.

For additional information on Marine Corps Force Design 2030, see CRS Insight IN11281, *New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Force Design 2030*, by Andrew Feickert.

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