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**THE CIVILIAN PUTSCH OF 2018:
DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF A CIVIL-MILITARY LEADERSHIP RIFT**

by

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Preface

The 1990's political correctness movement had a grave and detrimental impact upon the foundational institutional of the US Armed Forces with the impression being deeper than most are willing to admit. The results of this are manifest in numerous areas, ranging from the conduct of basic training to the exodus of captains from the US Army. Meanwhile, those who remain in the Armed Services, believe that they must apologize for being part of a martial and, often, conservative culture. One way we do penance for clinging to a divergent worldview is to not only entertain, but also study the extreme ideas of those who not only loath the nature of military culture but completely misunderstand the traditions of our Officer Corps.

One of the views we entertained at Air Command and Staff College encompassed the admonition from elite civilian academics that the US military is on a collision course with US civil culture, which, they suggest, may ultimately end in coup in the distant future. Obviously the mere thought of the military destroying the republic is not only repugnant but also completely contrary to its nature and ideals. However, those who believe that there is a lethal rift between the military and civil leadership have put forth an array of recommendations on how to "depoliticize" the military and suppress it to prevent it from attacking our civil government in the future.

The recommendations set forth by the civil-military relationship detractors are the focus of this research paper. It asserts the manner in which many elites recommend to

suppress the military is more likely to result in a civilian putsch, than a military coup (if the armed forces are not tampered with). In this vein, suppose the fears of the anti-military bloc are taken seriously, and the executive and judicial branches impose the recommended “safeguards” to limit the power/influence of the military. This research project asserts that these safeguards will set the stage for a Hitlerian Putsch, which leaves the military on the sidelines unwilling to save the republic.

I have no problem probing ideas “outside of the box” of which the “Coup of 2012” is one of those assertions designed to admonish the civil-military leadership about a perceived danger. Ensuring the survival of our republic is indeed both a noble and worthy cause to pursue, which I whole-heartedly support. However, the attitude in which we have handled the theory of “The Coup of 2012” and the related writings of elite academia, seems more out of obligation, and repentance (for our non-politically correct culture), than an honest assessment. The bottom line, the military does not represent a threat to the republic and requires a martial culture that differs from the civil society at large. There is no reason why we should regret this divergence and should ardently defend it from those who are willing to destroy it because of some misguided notion.

Abstract

Does a dangerous rift actually exist between the United States' military and civil governmental leadership? A considerable group of influential/elite academics believe that such a gap exists and suggest that it pose a dangerous threat to our very Republic. The alleged rift resulted from the following: divergence of cultures, "republicanization" of the officer corps, increased military involvement in domestic affairs (i.e. drug interdiction, disaster relief), the cultural clash between the military leadership and the Clinton administration and the strengthening of the military via the Goldwater-Nichols Act, etc. The selfsame proponents of the civil-military rift have set forth a series of safeguards and recommendations to reduce the threat they perceive from the "large," post-Cold War US military force. This research project differs with the supposition that an alleged civil-military governmental leadership gap is a threat to the republic or with the "safeguards" recommended reducing the likelihood of domestic military intervention in the national government. The findings of this project suggest that both the direction of contemporary US military culture and the recommendations of the academia, who fear the "increased" influence of the military have made the threat of a putsch more likely than a military coup.

Chapter 1

The Mythical Coup of 2012¹

You can depend on the troops, but can you count on the generals?

—Michael Shaara²

The year 2018 witnessed the destruction of the American Republic at the hands of a civilian led Putsch. This paper occurs after the Putsch and reflects the thoughts of a military officer who witnessed the events unfold. This narrative begins with a look into the mythical US military coup of 2012, which was a tool used to instill a fear of the military and gave momentum to efforts to irreparably damage the military's role in guarding the Constitution from foreign and domestic foes.

The Mythical Military Coup of 2012

It is hard to believe that people actually believed the stories on the threat that the military posed to the USA. The next several paragraphs recite the grossly misinterpreted elements used to give credence to the mythical threat that the military was to the republic.

The story of the mythical coup starts with the US Armed Forces expanding its influence in civil governmental affairs. At the forefront in 1993, was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, who resisted President Clinton's Balkan plans and efforts to grant homosexuals special status within the armed services.

He was accused of insubordination and undermining civilian control. In the end, Powell prevailed, strengthening the role that military leaders play in executive policy decisions.³

Meanwhile, the officer corps was closely aligned with the Republican Party. Surveys concluded that 64% of its leadership identified itself as republican,⁴ “and [was]...hard-right...conformable to the views of Rush Limbaugh.”⁵ This followed retired military officers endorsing Republican presidential candidates in 1996 and 2000.⁶

Despite this, public confidence in the military soared, compelling the populace to look upon the military to solve its woes. This included not only the drug-war but also domestic humanitarian missions and operations in Los Angeles⁷ and Washington, DC.⁸ Politically, Congress increased the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Unified Commands with the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.⁹ This corresponded with a paradigm shift in the military experience in Congress, which was at its lowest time in nearly 100 years. This gap¹⁰ increased the influence of military officers as unchallenged subject matter experts in all related issues.¹¹ America wanted relief from political scandals and decisive action in the drug war, which allowed an ambitious general to lead a coup against the constitution.

Naturally, the above coup never happened and was a fable propagated by key people in society. The elements cited as evidence of the impending doom were sorely misinterpreted to prove the threat that the military posed to the republic. It was necessary to provide the background to understand the setting we faced in the early Twenty-first Century. In the end, the civil-military experts demanded that measures had to be taken to

limit the power and influence of the armed forces to preserve civilian control and to safeguard the republic.

“Civil control must not be too narrowly construed. It means not simply the legal mastery of the military, but it involves also effective administrative management controlled by the civil leadership of government.”

—Louis Smith¹²

Notes

¹ Dunlap’s article “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012” appeared in the *US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY* and highlights his concern over the influence that the military leadership wielded in the government. He sees the military on a path that may lead to a coup.

² Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels*, (New York: Random House, 1974), 111. Shaara attributes this to Lee at Gettysburg in July 1863. Those fearing a civil-military rift, place the problem with the military’s leadership.

³ Richard Kohn claimed that Powell usurped and undermined civilian control by opposing gays and Bosnia.

⁴ Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, “Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society, *Digest of Findings and Studies*, Triangle Institute for Security Studies, June, 2000, pg. 3.

⁵ Thomas E. Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1997, 9.

⁶ William M. Arkin, “The Military Votes for Bush,” *The Washington Post*, 20 November 2000.

⁷ The deployment included elements from the USMC and the Army’s 7th Infantry Division (Light), from Fort Ord, California. These helped to quell violence during the 1992 “Rodney King Riots.”

⁸ Washington, DC National Guard units deployed to sections of the city plagued by high crime. It was thought that the mere presence of these soldiers would deter rampant criminal activity in the District

⁹ Public Law 99-433 of October 1, 1986.

¹⁰ See Annex A on the growing gap in military experience in Congress.

¹¹ Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, “Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society, *Digest of Findings and Studies*, Triangle Institute for Security Studies, June, 2000, 4.

¹² Louis Smith, *American Democracy & Military Power*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951), 12.

Chapter 2

The American Putsch of 2018¹

Governments, like clocks, go from the motion men give them... Wherefore governments rather depend upon men, than men upon governments. Let men be good, and the government cannot be bad... But if men be bad, the government will never be good. I know some say, "Let us have good laws, and no matter for the men that execute them." But let them consider that though good laws do well, good men do better; for good laws may lack good men... but good men will never lack good laws, nor allow bad ones.

—William Penn²

I, Colonel Nathan H. Greene, am writing this from a self-imposed exile in an isolated cavern in the George Washington National Forest near Lexington, Virginia. I took refuge here shortly after the putsch occurred when the dictator, Benedict Aurelius (the radical, popular and charismatic third party leader) abolished the Constitution, dismissed Congress and compelled the president to resign. While consolidating power, dictator Aurelius declared martial law and conducted a massive purge. The purge went deep and impacted nearly every family in the nation with millions perishing. Dictator Aurelius' form of political correctness was then imposed upon the populace with scores being sent to reeducation camps to adapt their views to his.

In this, the military was powerless to defend the republic with only a handful of military officers opposing the putsch. Aurelius killed most of these in subsequent police operations. Only a few pockets of resistance remain scattered across remote parts of the

US. Aurelius found military backing from the UN Reaction Force and the European Union's military, which were both eager to participate in the dismemberment of the US.

This story of the putsch and the marginalization of the military are the same tale. In fact, these two events had to culminate simultaneously; otherwise the Putsch would have failed. Even in hindsight, who would have known that 2018 would mark the end of the American Republic? The nation was enduring hard times in 2018 but nothing like the sacrifices of the Civil War, World War I, the Great Depression or World War II, although now the populace was morally depraved and relativistic.

However, things were grim for the US. Internationally, the US was paralyzed for six months by an attack called the "Pearl-Harbor of Space" where adversaries destroyed our vital space assets, while foreign automation hackers simultaneously launched a devastating "cyberwar" against our computer networks. As the country endeavored to recover from these assaults, the Sino-Russian Alliance attacked America's vital interests abroad, with massive Chinese offensives in Asia and the Pacific and a Russian Federation attack into the Middle East. These setbacks corresponded with the creation of a UN Army and a unified European Union military, which replaced the US as the technologically dominant global force. In the end, the competing interests of the United Nations and the European Union neutralized US hegemony. Economically, the European Union and China became aggressive rivals against US interests. Domestically, life was bleak with a rampant drug culture, hedonism and a plethora of "alternate" religions dominating the American youth. We were a people without vision or direction.

The US population lacked a common moral foundation and did whatever each “felt” was right. The government supported this debauchery, because of the so-called “wall of separation.” It was painful to see moral anarchy sweep this great nation. In this environment, it should have come to no surprise that the constitution and the republican form of government could not long endure in the hands of excessively ambitious men.

“We have no government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality... Our Constitution was made only for moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”

—President John Adams³

The insidious thing about the putsch was that the only institution in a position to prevent the destruction of the republic was the military. However, instead of defending the constitution and the republic, the leadership did nothing. They sat by during the adjournment of Congress, the removal of Supreme Court Justices and the forced resignation of the President. What *could* the military do? Why would it ignore the old oath to defend the constitution from all foes, foreign and domestic?

If the moral character of a people once degenerate, their political character must soon follow... These considerations should lead to an attentive solicitude... to be religiously careful in our choice of all public officers... and judge of the tree by its fruits.

—Elias Boudinot, a president of the Continental Congress

Now, more than ever before, the people are responsible for the character of their Congress. If that body be ignorant, reckless, and corrupt, it is because the people tolerate ignorance, recklessness, and corruption.

—President James A. Garfield⁴

Notes

¹ Putsch, German for “an attempt at revolution,” used to reflect 1930’s Germany where the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht did not challenge Hitler. The irony is that the

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desire of some in US academia to protect the government from a military coup may open the door to a civilian Putsch.

² David Barton, www.wallbuilders.com

³ David Barton, The Spirit of the American Revolution, www.wallbuilders.com

⁴ Both of these quotes provided by David Barton's research in the Wall Builders Organization, www.wallbuilders.com.

Chapter 3

The Path to the Putsch

The end of the Cold War has coincided with deterioration in the relationship between civilian authority and the military institution in the United States.¹

—Michael C. Desch

The putsch did not occur overnight, but was the culmination of decade old trends. This is the story of a nation that forgot its history, abandoned its roots and worshiped hedonism. In retrospect, it is now amazing how clear the warning signs in the 1990s and early 2000s. But, by the time we realized it, it was too late since the military was no longer in a position to defend the Republic. But the reality of this failure is evident as I transcribe this by flickering candle light in a damp Virginian cave.

Two trends transformed the military, which occurred along the lines of a classic encirclement (the maneuver of choice to defeat an adversary). On one flank, the foundational morality and traditions were under assault in what was called a culture war² where America embraced relativistic morality. The last institution to cling to the Judeo-Christian worldview was the military. The advocates of political correctness saw this as a threat and compelled the military to adopt and promote moral relativism. Until this occurred, the military was perceived as a dangerous, politically incorrect culture, which stood in the way of a larger cultural transformational agenda.³

The assault started with the insertion of homosexuality into the military. The military did not help itself during struggle with the Tailhook and Aberdeen scandals, which compelled the military to concede to prove their loyalty. Representative Pat Schroeder rejoiced in 1993 at “the sound of [the military] culture cracking.”⁴

On the other flank, civil-military experts accused the armed forces of headed toward a clash with civilian control. They asserted that if unchecked, our nation would face a military coup. One advocate inside the military was Colonel Dunlap’s frequently cited “Coup of 2012.” Before Dunlap, it was easy to ignore the writings of those, who had no practical understanding of military traditions and culture. In the end, these detractors succeeded and led the charge to marginalize the military, obscure its moral absolutes and to promote leaders, who did what was politically expedient (to protect their careers).

Making the Putsch: Changing the Military’s Culture

*...I would recommend to the post cold war U.S. military the example of the German Reichswehr... for rebuilding an efficient force.*⁵

—Michael C. Desch

*... a [Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff like] Powell and a Shalli [General Shalikashvili] and one or two or three others may not harm the Republic, but we could be playing with fire.*⁶

—Richard H. Kohn

The undermining the military’s culture occurred so slowly, that we really did not notice or understand it until was too late. The result of this assault translated into no moral standards or absolutes (i.e. do what is right in your own eyes). Moral anarchy swept the ranks, which completely undermined the force as a whole. The moral underpinnings of the US military were replaced by a neo-pagan worldview, transforming

it into a docile social service institution unable to pose any of the imagined threats to the republic. Because of this transformation, the Putsch of 2018 succeeded.

The Impact of the Politically Correct Military Culture

“All these blatant sham reformers, in the name of a new morality, preach the old vice and self-indulgence which rotted out first the moral fiber and then even the external greatness of Greece and Rome.”

—Theodore Roosevelt

The Army’s leadership guide (Field Manual 22-100) cites morality, character, values and ethics (loyalty, duty, selfless service and integrity) as the standards for all soldiers. These traits were the same elements upheld by General George Washington during the Revolutionary War and personify a commitment to a higher morality (with a concrete right and wrong) that has set of the US Armed Forces apart. However, the political correctness of the 1990s established moral relativism as the norm.

Before long, this led to social experimentation and the imposition of strict policies protecting aberrant sexual behavior in the ranks. Training standards were watered-down and emphasis of combat skills was reduced across the services since these reflected vestiges of the old macho-warrior spirit. Even the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was “updated”⁷ to better represent contemporary society. All of these changes were pursued without regard to the impact upon combat readiness and had the desired effect; a military that reflected the moral vacancy of its culture.

Erosion of Faith in the Military Leadership

*“An’ it’s Tommy this, an’ Tommy that, an’ anything you please; an Tommy ain’t a bloomin fool—you bet that Tommy sees.”*⁸

—Rudyard Kipling

The assault on the military's culture sparked a leadership crisis where subordinates distrusted their leaders and expressed it by leaving the force. The services attempted to fill these shortcomings with bonus money and Madison Avenue advertising gimmicks, all to little avail. A booming economy was blamed for the exodus, but this ignored the obvious impact of the "politically correct stigmatization of a warrior creed."⁹ This stirred cynicism in the ranks and caused many to think that the service leaders were not "fighting for them."¹⁰ The following are select remarks from Army Command and Staff College officers, which were recorded in 2000 during the Army's Chief of Staff sensing session with him, which reflect this mood:¹¹

"Perception seems to be that McMaster's book, *Dereliction of Duty*, could have been written about the current JCS and the current OPTEMPO... No one thinks a service chief would have the guts to take a stand, much less resign, on a matter of principle - last person perceived as having that kind of stand-up fortitude was Krulak."

"Very senior (top most) leadership needs to read McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty*," and evaluate themselves. Are they more concerned with pleasing the civilian leadership at the expense of the Army?"

"Zero defects: a real problem killed a lot of good officers

"Political correctness reigns; there are too many programs that appear to be in response to media scrutiny (values cards, homosexual sensitivity training)."¹²

Growing cynicism, coupled with a mass exodus of officers, caused a new breed of officers to lead the armed services. These looked to their careers first, and pursued decisions that were politically expedient instead of what was morally right.

The Compliant and “Apolitical” Military Leadership

Taylor and McNamara were telling [President Johnson] that he should make decisions based on his chances for reelection rather than the “national interest.”¹³

Unequivocal compliance became the seminal trait for a whole generation of leaders. One advocate said that the military must do everything it is told, regardless of the cost. Unfortunately, political correctness did eventually elevate the type of compliant leaders needed to fulfill the whim of any ambitious politician.

After this, two litmus tests were established for promotion; (1) adherence to political correctness, (2) “apolitical” orientation in the tradition of the German General Staff.¹⁴ Military leaders must carry out the orders of those placed above them, especially as it relates to civilian control over it. The difference is when a leader compromises his integrity in the name of a misplaced loyalty. Such disagreement should be done with all honesty, candor, respectfully and privately.

*...Intense hostility between political leaders and military chiefs is dysfunctional: so also, however, is total harmony...tension...is natural and even desirable.*¹⁵

—Samuel Huntington

Smaller and Outward

To reduce the “threat” that the military posed to the nation, the forces underwent severe reductions, with the residual built upon the German Reichswehr model. The bulk of the new military was kept occupied supporting an array of international missions with the UN Reaction Corps, Euro Corps, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.¹⁶ To stem criticism of placing US military members under foreign command and to supplant

further criticism of the President, the oath of office was altered from pledging to the defense of the Constitution, to pledging loyalty to an individual and read as:¹⁷

*“I swear this sacred oath, that I will render unconditional obedience to President of the United States, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and will be ready as a brave soldier to risk my life at any time for this oath.”*¹⁸

The Dangerous Partisan Republican American Army

*The long tradition of an apolitical military has given way to a new reality in which the elite military is... the most solidly Republican professional group in American society.*¹⁹

—Richard Kohn

*...With civilian control goes civilian responsibility. Kohn knows that something is wrong, but his solutions are directed at the symptoms, not the ills.*²⁰

—Lieutenant General William Odom

We were deceived by the facts cited to support the civil-military leadership rift theory. The problem, we were told, was based upon the “discovery” that 64% of officers were Republicans. Although this is only 14% higher than the civilian counter parts, leftist elites pointed to this as a dangerous ideological gap.²¹ This sparked concern from those on the opposite side of the political spectrum, which led to the negative labeling of these by elitist academia. Since the officers were conservative, naturally they were; partisans, homophobes, extremists, “hard right, Rush Limbaugh Republicans.”²²

The premise of a partisan officer corps was based off of historical ignorance. In 1954, Dr. Morris Janowitz surveyed a group of officers and discovered that 67% of them called themselves conservative.²³ The new survey ignores the simple explanation that history offers. Not long ago the south voted solidly Democrat in elections (“the Solid South”). This trend reversed in the 1960s after the left seized control of the Democrat

Party, which resulted in mass defections of Democrats to the Republican Party over the next twenty years. The mere fact that most officers are now Republicans is irrelevant in light of the defection of Southern Democrats and is a gross misinterpretation of the facts.

Despite this, the elites prevailed in their supposition, which equated Republican-Conservatism to partisan-extremists. Officers were indoctrinated to believe that cultural conservatism was dangerous and that they must abandon traditional ideals if they wished to succeed. A litmus test regarding political affiliation and social beliefs soon played a key, albeit unofficial, role in promotions and awards.²⁴ This was done in the name of diversity, tolerance and fair play. Kohn said it best,

...[the military] will have to rebuild the diversity of the officer corps, particularly with respect to prevailing attitudes and perspectives... with new sensitivity and sophistication...²⁵

End the Military Vote

If the military is given credit for a Bush victory, Democrat Party loyalists will likely hate the military even more than they already do.

—Professor at the Air University²⁶

It was unthinkable that the defenders of the republic would lose their vote even as, convicted felons²⁷ were given back their voting rights.²⁸ The measures initially took the form of restrictions and other “safeguards” to avoid fraud. However, this developed into concerted efforts to block officers from exercising the right to vote. The 2000 Presidential Election was the catalyst for this movement where the military vote decided the election. Thanks to military absentee ballots, Bush edged out Gore in Florida, securing the Electoral College votes needed for victory. Because of this, efforts were applied to make military voting difficult.²⁹ This had the desired impact, which was

ultimately designed to deprive the military the vote to protect the republic from their conservative ideas. The slogan we accepted was, “the military is so noble, that it is willing to sacrifice their own right to vote to protect the rights of others.”

“Dangerous” Political Endorsements by Retired Officers

Another problem, we were told, was when twenty-seven senior *retired* military officers endorsed the Republican Presidential Candidate in 2000. This included; the former Central Command Commander General Anthony Zinni, former USMC Commandants, Generals Charles Krulak and Carl Mundy, former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Jay Johnson, and former USAF Chief of Staffs, General Merrill McPeak and General Ronald Fogleman. This support³⁰ of so many retired senior officers caused uproar among the advocates of the civil-military rift theory. Professor Kohn stated the position succinctly,

“[the endorsements] marks a major step toward the politicization of the American military... [Since] four stars never really ‘retire’ but like princes of the church, embody the core culture and collectively represent the military authority as authoritatively as the active-duty leadership.”³¹

Kohn’s bottom line is that these retired officers should not be involved politically if they support republicans. Kohn was silent when twenty-one retired military officers endorsed Governor Clinton in 1992. These included the former CJCS himself, Admiral Crowe, former USAF Chief of Staff General Dugan and many more. This was further politicized when it was used to refute Clinton’s lack of military experience. Admiral Crowe went beyond the endorsement when, “[In the] 1992 presidential race I unexpectedly found myself an advisor to Governor Bill Clinton.”³² Kohn, et al demonstrate inconsistency in their criticism of retiree endorsements

Retired USMC Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor personifies this hypocrisy when he said in reference to the 2000 election, “to lend one’s name and title to a political campaign is a form of prostitution.”³³ General Trainor suggests that the involvement of former military officers in politics was a paradigm shift in the mythical existence of an “apolitical officer corps.”³⁴ Trainor failed to point out, however, that he was one of four senior retired officers (LTG Trainor (USMC), MG Perry Smith (USAF), and LTG Woodmansee (USA), who served as political-military advisors to Governor Clinton during the 1992 Presidential Election.³⁵

Despite the hypocrisy of the detractors, regulations were established to limit the political activity of retired officers, because they “represent the institutions that produced them.” It was initially a “two-year cooling off period” designed to give time and distance between the officer’s active service and retired life. This “cooling off” period was eventually extended to a lifetime prohibition to preserve the republic.³⁶

Lack of Civilian Governmental Leadership Experience

Concurrently, lack of military experience grew disproportionately in the civil governmental leadership sectors. In the 1950s, over 50% of Congress had military experience, however, by 1999 only 33% were veterans, (forty-three in the Senate and 136 in the House).³⁷ The decline in experience continued each year thereafter.³⁸

This military experience gap made the civil leadership easy prey to the advocates of the mythical crisis between the civil-military leadership. This meant that the civil leaders did not grasp the traditions of the military, which enabled the elite proponents to convince the leadership of the threat that the military posed to the Constitution. This experience gap was a catalyst in the changes that followed, resulting in the Putsch.

Misreading the Signs

“When disagreements arise between the Congress and the President over military policy both branches of government will draw the military into the dispute.”

—William J. Gregor³⁹

The civil-military rift advocates failed to read the indicators properly when they saw civil-military conflict. This friction was linked to the different political parties in control of congress and the presidency and not civil-military strife. For most of the 1990s, this division was a Democrat president and Republican congress. This separation of powers makes the civil-military rift appear deeper, especially if the military plays the executive and the legislative off of each other for funding.⁴⁰

Notes

¹ Michael C. Desch, “Soldier, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Spring 1998, 389.

² Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces Journal*, NOV, 2000, 10-12.

³ Feaver and Kohn, “Digest of Findings and Studies.”

⁴ Owens, 12

⁵ Michael C. Desch, “U.S. Civil-Military Relations in a Changing International Order.” The Reichswehr was the 100,000 German military force allowed by the Allies after WW I. Desch argues that it is a good model for the US to emulate in the Post Cold War downsizing. History shows that the Reichswehr played a role in the rise of Hitler, because it did not provide for the safety and security for Germany as a whole.

⁶ Richard H. Kohn, “The Crisis in Military-Civilian Relations,” *The National Interest*, No. 35, Spring 1994, 17.

⁷ MilitaryReport.com, 22 December 2000.

⁸ See Annex B for complete poem, which is used in military writings reflecting similar concerns.

⁹ William M. Arkin, “The Military Votes for Bush,” *The Washington Post*, 20 November 2000.

¹⁰ Reference Annex C

¹¹ All quotes taken directly from portions of the sensing session’s findings. See Annex A.

¹² See Annex C for further remarks from the sensing session.

Notes

¹³ H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, (New York: Harper Collins), 1997, 79.

¹⁴ Colonel T.N. Dupuy, A Genius for War, (Falls Church, VA, NOVA Publications, 1996) 334. Hitler also sought apolitical officers, since they offered blind Prussian loyalty and obedience would compel them to carry out all orders without reference to moral absolutes. In 1938, Hitler selected General Halder as the General Staff Chief, because of his public *reputation* as apolitical.

¹⁵ Samuel Huntington, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest*, Summer 1994.

¹⁶ Desch, "US Civil-Military Relations in a Changing International Order."

¹⁷ Annex D.

¹⁸ Copy of the Wehrmacht oath, written by Adolf Hitler, William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 227.

¹⁹ Feaver, Kohn, "Digest of Findings and Studies," Triangle Institute for Security Studies, 28 October 1999.

²⁰ William Odom, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest*, Summer 1994, 26.

²¹ Janowitz

²² Thomas E. Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1997.

²³ Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, (New York: Free Press), 1975

²⁴ Al Gore gave momentum to this idea during the 2000 Presidential Elections, when he stated that his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would have to pass a litmus test on homosexuality and military service.

²⁵ Kohn, "The Crisis in Military-Civilian Relations," 17. Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), page 4 provides the following techniques used in history to suppress the military. "...the assignment of political commissars...with the Russians, to serve with the troops and keep the military faithful to the party-line; the use of committees of public safety to inspect the military and shoot the disloyal or ineffectual pour encourager les autres, as among the French in day of Carnot; and the widespread employment of secret police to keep the military under ceaseless surveillance, with immediate and bloody action against any who appear faithless or wavering."

²⁶ William M. Arkin, "The Military Votes for Bush," *The Washington Post*, November 20, 2000.

²⁷ At least 5,000 convicted felons voted in Florida's 2000 election. No moves were taken to throw out these illegal votes. Editorial, *The Washington Times*, December 9, 2000.

²⁸ Sydney Freedberg, "4.2 Million Felons Have Lost Voting Rights," "System Doesn't Prevent Felons from Voting," *Miami Herald*, 13 FEB, 98 reported that over "100 convicted felons, muggers, con artists, drug traffickers and... killers voted in the Miami [1998 Mayoral] election." Over four million Americans cannot vote because of felony convictions. There are efforts underway to reverse this.

²⁹ Rowan Scarborough, "Daschle Blocks Bill on Military Voting," *The Washington Times*, December 12, 2000.

Notes

³⁰ “Once a person has retired from the military, they are more free than when they are on active duty to express their political views” Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, Pentagon spokesman.

³¹ Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces Journal*, November 2000, 10.

³² Admiral William Crowe, *The Line of Fire*, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1993), 339.

³³ Thomas E. Ricks, “Bush Endorsement Seen as Military Politicization,” *The Washington Post*, 24 September 2000

³⁴ Trainor ignores a list of retired officers, who played pivotal roles as the Chief Executive. Kohn and Trainor would condemn Washington, Grant and Eisenhower as well as those who ran for election (Hancock, McClellan, Fremont, Leonard Wood, etc).³⁴ If these were truly apolitical, surely their convictions would prohibit them from “prostituting” their name and institution in the political arena. The basis for Kohn’s criticism is really ideological. Trainor and Kohn apply their criticism against retirees involved in politics *expressly* because they disagree with whom is being endorsed.

³⁵ Admiral William J. Crowe, *The Line of Fire*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993).

³⁶ Thomas E. Ricks, “Bush Endorsement seen as Military Politicization,” *The Washington Post*, 22 September 2000, A23.

³⁷ Janet Parshall, “Modern Military-All Image, No Substance,” *Concerned Women for America*, August 1999.

³⁸ See Annex A for a depiction of the decline of military experience in Congress.

³⁹ William J. Gregor, “Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs,” John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard, August 1996.

⁴⁰ Deborah Avant, “Conflicting Indicators of “Crisis” in American Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 24, No 3, Spring 1998.

Chapter 4

Conclusion: Avoiding a Civilian Putsch and Military Coup

“Weasel words from mollicoddles will never do when the day demands prophetic clarity from great hearted... It is absolutely impossible for a Republic long to endure if it becomes either corrupt or cowardly.”

—Theodore Roosevelt

These are perilous times for post-republic America. Dictator Aurelius continues to consolidate power, receiving legitimacy and military muscle from the UN and Europe. The anti-Aurelius resistance did execute a militarily insignificant, although very symbolic raid to secure the original copy of the Constitution. The dictator responded in his usual brutal fashion and blamed traitors in the ranks, which resulted in another purge. Looking back it is easy to see where we went wrong. But now it is too late to do anything about it since the Putsch is already history. However, for the sake of posterity, here are the lessons learned:

A Firm Moral Foundation is Critical to Military Readiness & Effectiveness

“Of all the habits and disposition which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars.”

—George Washington

The loss of the moral compass had the worst impact upon our military. We must defend the moral, and time-proven, culture of the force from the assaults placed upon it by political correctness and aberrant sexual conduct. Moral absolutes were the foremost protector of civilian control over the military. When these were compromised, defending the Constitution and the tradition of civilian control was no longer sacred. The blurring of morality was the catalyst that compelled the military leadership to do nothing as our republic was dismantled. Moral relativity, combined with political correctness, eroded unit cohesiveness and undermined moral absolutes.

The Sacred Apolitical Cow

“Those of us in the Total Army who take an oath of service have sworn the “support and defend the Constitution of the United States.” By doing so, we stand shoulder to shoulder with the framers of the Constitution who mutually pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor. We do this freely because it is the Constitution, which guarantees all citizens the rights, and obligations, which are the essence of being an American. And it is the Constitution that our comrades have, in other times and in other places, sacrificed to preserve”.

—General John A. Wickham, JR. XIII Army Chief of Staff

The military is a vital guarantor of America’s form of government. This enduring legacy came through over 200 years of blood and sacrifice. Soldiers, as much as any other citizen, earned the right to vote, which must never be challenged or undermined even if it consistently votes along a particular party line.

Career advancement and political expedience must never take precedence over honor, truth and doing what is morally right. We should never advance or promote the career officer, who places himself above the unit (lacking selfless service). This type of officer was personified in Anton Myrer’s classic book, Once an Eagle. Courtney

Massengale was the officer who did whatever it took to secure promotion and advance his career. The self-centered political expedience advanced the Courtney Massengales of our generation to the detriment of the force. However, good examples of “successful” officers fitting this mold were difficult to find.

The hypocrisy of Kohn and Trainor, was already demonstrated in this regard. They advocate “apoliticalness” when it is against their politician. History illustrates that complete and blind apoliticalness should not be a prerequisite for promotion. The example is the German General Staff, which was so apolitical, that it did its utmost to pursue Der Fuhrer’s Final Solution. President Theodore Roosevelt said it best;

“The role of the leader is primarily to serve as moral compass pointing others towards the true north of justice and righteousness.”

—Theodore Roosevelt

Leaders Must Lead in Word and Deed with Truth and Honesty

“As soon as they [the civilian leadership] tell me it’s limited , it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they say its ‘surgical,’ I head for the bushes.”¹

—General Colin Powell on Bosnia

Weak, over-compliant leaders do the nation a disservice. If a course of action is dangerous, the decision-maker must be advised. The failure of the Joint Chiefs during the Vietnam era is indicative of what occurs when the military experts do not maintain candor and sound advice in their positions of power.

General Powell understood this since he felt the affects of this failure during his career. In reaction to it, he used candor and honesty when providing the president advice. This did not earn him wide praise from the civil-military relation detractors, but instead

secured their criticism. Despite this, Powell knew what could happen if he did not provide clear and honest advice to the civilian leadership since he experienced this firsthand as a junior officer in Vietnam.

His critics resorted to name-calling (“insubordination,” the rebellious general, etc.)² and demanded complete loyalty to their agenda. Detractors, such as Kohn, desire a military leadership that surrenders common sense and logic, much like the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Johnson Administration in the road to Vietnam. Here, the Service Chiefs accused Taylor (CJCS 1962-1964) and, later, Wheeler (CJCS 1964-1970)³, of being so loyal to President Johnson that he withheld crucial and honest advice from him, contributing to the strategic debacle in Vietnam.⁴ This included both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs lying to Congress and the American people because of their complete loyalty to the President. This is why the oath of office is so critical. We are sworn to defend the Constitution. By overzealous loyalty to a person, instead of the institution of the Republic, these violated the Constitution by lying to Congress. The dangerous type of compliant leadership is highlighted below;

“The president was lying, and he expected the Chiefs to lie as well... the president should not have placed the Chiefs in that position, the flag officers should not have tolerated it when it had... Because the Constitution locates civilian control of the military in Congress as well as in the executive branch, the Chiefs could not have been justified in deceiving the people’s representatives about Vietnam.”⁵

Candor and honesty should not be suppressed because of some sort of misguided idea of unbridled loyalty. Overly zealous commitment to “keep the boss happy” is unhealthy to an organization and does nothing but promote careerism at the cost of the troops. Providing expert advice is not disloyal or a threat to civilian control, but it is a duty. It is what the American people expect and the Republic requires and, it must, under

the Constitution, apply to the military's loyalty to both the Executive and Legislative branches of government.

The President

"...shall be Commander-in-Chief [of the armed forces]"

The Congress

"Has the sole power to declare war, raise and support [military forces] ..., provide for calling forth the militia ..., suppress insurrections and repel invasions.

—The Constitution of the United States of America⁶

"What [the military officer] isn't taught is how to cope with the accommodation required in the political process. There must be clearer and more rigid standards for the man in uniform whose responsibility ends in human life in contrast to standards for the man in civilian clothes who does not face the specter of death in his mind as he deliberates on actions that might be taken."

—Former JCS member General Harold K. Johnson (USA), 1973⁷

Huntington and Cochran outline five roles that the military may play in civil-military leadership relations: advisory, representative, executive, advocacy and substantive. These provide a guide to professionals on where not to cross the line into politics. Out of the five, advocacy and substantive are unacceptable since they are distinctly political in nature.⁸ The permissible apolitical functions include advisory, representative and executive. The Advisory role is when the military member provides expert advice to the civilian leadership. Representative is when the military member advances interests of his service within the government in what is believed to be in the betterment of the nation. Executive is when the military member executes civil leadership decisions.

The unacceptable political functions for military advisors are advocacy and substantive. Advocacy is occurs when the military member explains and defends

administration policy in Congress or in public. Substantive is when the military member engages in open political activity to overturn or reverse civil-leadership policy.

By evaluating these five roles, it is clear to see that becoming advocates of the administration policy politicized the JCS during the Johnson administration. In particular, they violated the Constitution by deceiving the Congress as to the direction of the war in Vietnam. The bottom line is that the military leadership must provide expert advice and always do the right thing.

Military Retirees and Political Activism

Retirees should be free to involve themselves in politics as much or as little as they desire. They earned this freedom more than many of their civilian counterparts. Challenging this right, because the retirees may maintain opposite political views does not pass the test of common sense. The assertion that when a retiree becomes politically active, he “prostitutes” his military service is contextually ignorant and historically unfounded. Retired USMC Commandant General Charles Krulak said it best when he responded to criticism of his recent political involvement,

“To remain silent is a crime... because I wore the uniform at one time that somehow I have no right to participate in the election of our officials.”⁹

“To suggest that, having officially taken off our uniforms for the last time, we somehow are not entitled to the same right to enjoy full and active participation in the selection of our elected officials as other citizens...is an insult to our service. That some attained senior rank in the military does not mean that they should lose part of their patrimony.”¹⁰

Admiral Crowe, the first retired CJCS to become politically active, while he endorsed Governor Clinton in 1992, stated:

“I was trained to believe that a professional military officer expresses his opinion, then carries out the orders of his political leaders regardless of

whether he agrees with them. If he feels he cannot do so in good conscience, he resigns his commission. But once he leaves active service, he is then completely free to express his opinion in any legitimate fashion and to participate fully in the country's political life."¹¹

Reflect the Moral of the Society?

"If [soldiers] abjure the military spirit, they destroy themselves first and their nation ultimately. If the civilians permit the soldiers to adhere to the military standard, the nations themselves may eventually find redemption and security in making that standard their own."

—Samuel Huntington¹²

Disassembling the military's moral standards to reflect the civil society at large is not a wise endeavor. The military needs moral absolutes and must instill these in their recruits, because of the nature of the organization. The desire to compromise the military culture, to make recruiting more palatable is absurd. Deborah Avant provides analysis on Huntington's answer to this dilemma, which is called "objective civilian control and addresses the clash between liberal society mores vs. a conservative military culture. "This...is facilitated by civilians who are willing to treat the officer corps as...politically neutral and resist subjugating it to their particular political interests."¹³

The military needs a firm moral foundation rooted in absolutes. It is illogical to conclude that if these values differ from civil society it is a threat to society. Those that undermined the military's traditional culture were more intent upon promoting their own relativistic worldview than protecting the nation from any real or perceived threats.

“Our profession involves deep moral values because we are dealing with matters of life and death—for ourselves, for those who serve shoulder to shoulder with us, for our families, and for adversaries and noncombatants.... What can make the Army great is simply the quality of leadership and the enrichment of values.”

—General John A. Wickham, JR. XIII Army Chief of Staff

America’s military requires moral and committed people to protect the republic. This must subjugate selfish ambition to what is better for the nation. Our forefathers entrusted us with safeguarding and promoting the Republic. Like Rome, domestic moral decay and slothfulness proved to be a more formidable adversary than foreign armies.¹⁴

Our nation entered a dangerous period in its history in which political ideology trumps what is best for the country. Extremists on both sides of the debate put the United States at risk by tampering with the moral absolutes of the military. These are the foundational traits that provide support to civilian control and foster combat readiness. Undermining the military’s moral foundation, to further a political agenda, illustrates a lack of understanding of what our nation needs to remain secure.

Thus concludes this humble memoir with the prayer that posterity, if again blessed with a republic, will do its utmost to defend from both foreign and domestic assaults. You will not hear from me again unless God predestines it since word has reached us that our enclave has been compromised and is surrounded by forces dedicated to the dictator. I am sealing this document with the hopes and prayers that a future generation will more diligently guard its freedoms from the selfish ambitions of those who would rather enslave men. Will Durant summed it up best, when he said,

“A great civilization is not conquered from without until it has destroyed itself within.”¹⁵

Appendix A

Military Experience in the United States Congress¹⁶



Political Landscape A Multitude of Players


- **Senate** (Mil experience: 40%)
 (AF experience: 6%)
 - 50 Republicans
 - 50 Democrats
 - 3,400 Personal Staffers
 - 340 Prof Staff Members
 - **House** (Mil experience: 31%)
 (AF experience: 7%)
 - 221 Republicans
 - 212 Democrats
 - 2 Independents
 - 6,200 Personal Staffers
 - 270 Prof Staff Members
 - **White House Staffers**
 - 77 that LL works with
 - **The States - Governors**
 - 29 Republicans
 - 19 Democrats
 - 1 Independent
 - 1 Reform
- (Total Washington Staff: 10,287)

Integrity - Service - Excellence



Political Landscape

Congressional Military Experience



Integrity - Service - Excellence

Appendix B

Rudyard Kipling "TOMMY," Barracks Room Ballads, 1892

I went into a public-'ouse to get a pint o' beer,
The publican 'e up an' sez, "We serve no red-coats here."
The girls be'ind the bar they laughed an' giggled fit to die,
I outs into the street again an' to myself sez I:
O it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, go away";
But it's "Thank you, Mister Atkins", when the band begins to play,
The band begins to play, my boys, the band begins to play,
O it's "Thank you, Mister Atkins", when the band begins to play.
I went into a theatre as sober as could be,
They gave a drunk civilian room, but 'adn't none for me;
They sent me to the gallery or round the music-'alls,
But when it comes to fightin', Lord! they'll shove me in the stalls!
For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, wait outside";
But it's "Special train for Atkins" when the trooper's on the tide,
The troopship's on the tide, my boys, the troopship's on the tide,
O it's "Special train for Atkins" when the trooper's on the tide.
Yes, makin' mock o' uniforms that guard you while you sleep
Is cheaper than them uniforms, an' they're starvation cheap;
An' hustlin' drunken soldiers when they're goin' large a bit
Is five times better business than paradin' in full kit.
Then it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, 'ow's yer soul?"
But it's "Thin red line of 'eroes" when the drums begin to roll,
The drums begin to roll, my boys, the drums begin to roll,
O it's "Thin red line of 'eroes" when the drums begin to roll.
We aren't no thin red 'eroes, nor we aren't no blackguards too,
But single men in barricks, most remarkable like you;
An' if sometimes our conduct isn't all your fancy paints,
Why, single men in barricks don't grow into plaster saints;
While it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, fall be'ind",
But it's "Please to walk in front, sir", when there's trouble in the wind,
There's trouble in the wind, my boys, there's trouble in the wind,
O it's "Please to walk in front, sir", when there's trouble in the wind.
You talk o' better food for us, an' schools, an' fires, an' all:
We'll wait for extry rations if you treat us rational.
Don't mess about the cook-room slops, but prove it to our face
The Widow's Uniform is not the soldier-man's disgrace.
For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Chuck him out, the brute!"
But it's "Saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot;
An' it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' anything you please;
An' Tommy ain't a bloomin' fool - you bet that Tommy sees!

Appendix C

Select Comments from Army Command and General Staff Students during the Chief of Staff of the Army Sensing Session Class of 2000

Talking with peers, most notably in the past six months, there seems to be an alarming number of bad leaders out there. Leaders who sugar coat things to higher; leaders who lie; leaders who are immoral; leaders who won't think twice about killing a career over an honest mistake or a difference of opinion; leaders who lead by fear and intimidation; leaders who care more about themselves than their soldiers/officers; leaders who look away at transgressions of others "for the good of the Army".

Public candor from senior leadership is a good thing. It shows commitment (whether you agree with the opinion or not) irregardless of political out-fall. A Flag officer shouldn't have to retire to be vocal and opinionated.

The current administration would deploy a division anywhere for political gain and the current military leadership (all services) will never take a stand - they aren't the ones doing more with less.

Perception seems to be that McMaster's book, Dereliction of Duty, could have been written about the current JCS and the current OPTEMPO. Example cited was the Chiefs finally telling Congress something was wrong when it couldn't be denied any longer (and when the troops in the field had already been saying it for years). No one thinks a service chief would have the guts to take a stand, much less resign, on a matter of principle - last person perceived as having that kind of stand-up fortitude was Krulak. Some students wondered if the CJCS has gone from being a war-fighter to a yes-man?

"You're only one incident away from the end of a career"

Over control of what and how we think.

Very senior (top most) leadership needs to read McMaster's "Dereliction of Duty," and evaluate themselves. Are they more concerned with pleasing the civilian leadership at the expense of the "Army."

Disbelief that the leadership did not know the effects of the BAH decision on the soldiers (Give a raise with one hand and take away tax free money with the other) They

targeted the senior enlisted and middle grade officers since they have too much invested to leave.

Brigadier General Hale. Double Standard—Battalion Commanders, Brigade Commanders, and General Officers have offenses “pushed under the carpet” that majors and below get nailed for—the group offered names and incidents they have seen. Spend “billions” to build the medium brigade, a need obvious to everyone since at least 1995, when the quality of life issues (housing, medical care, and too frequent moves) go unsolved.

Soldiers First, We Care For Soldiers, are empty slogans.

The perception of the erosion of benefits insures that currently serving military officers will not help the recruiting effort, especially of their own kids. Mixed results to the question: “Would you want your kid to serve in the military?”

“Creeping cynicism from a decade of broken promises.”

The Leadership still does not understand that the move away from the operational track. Clearly shown in the functional area surveys and signup. It was a clear signal of the dissatisfaction in the force over the Battalion Commander Brass Ring Syndrome and a desire by many officers to get job skills for life after the Army.

The downsizing of the force from 18 to 10 divisions (with inadequate draw down from TDA and national headquarters (READ: MDW)) has caused a “too much, too few” situation in which we all must do more than truly possible. Every suspense is NOW, little long range planning is done (or when done, appreciated), and low-density MOS soldiers are always gone. Why would one stay?

Political correctness reigns; there are too many programs that appear to be in response to media scrutiny (values cards, homosexual sensitivity training).

Trying to field a new force structure that is based on equipment that hasn’t been fielded yet appears to be a dangerous course of action.

There is a credibility gap between senior leaders and the rest of the Army and senior leadership is losing the confidence and trust of its subordinates; there are growing doubts about the trustworthiness of senior military and DOD civilian leadership. Service member suspicions of anthrax vaccinations, BAH changes, Gulf War syndrome, adequacy of retirement and health care, and the handling of senior officer ethical cases (MG Hale) are immediate examples of the effects of the growing credibility gap that has caused many in the Army to question senior leadership.

Appendix D

INTEGRITY

GENERAL CHARLES C. KRULAK, FORMER COMMANDANT USMC

“We study and discuss ethical principles because it serves to strengthen and validate our own inner value system...it gives direction to what I call our Moral Compass. It is the understanding of ethics that becomes the foundation upon which we can deliberately commit to inviolate principles. It becomes the basis of what we are...of what we include in our character. Based on it, we commit to doing what is right. We expect such commitment from our leaders.”

“But most importantly, we must demand it of our-selves. Sound morals and ethical behavior cannot be established or created in a day, a semester... or a year. They must be institutionalized within our character over time. They must become a way of life. They go beyond our individual services and beyond our ranks or positions; they cut the heart and to the soul of who we are and what we are and what we must be, men and women of character. They arm us for the challenges to come and they impart to us a sense of wholeness. They unite us in the calling we now know as the profession of arms. Of all the moral and ethical guideposts that we have been brought up to recognize, the one that, for me, stands above the rest.... The one that I have kept in the forefront of my mind...is integrity. It is my ethical and personnel touchstone. Integrity as we know it today stands for soundness of moral principal and character- uprightness – honesty.”

“Yet there is more. Integrity is also an ideal... a goal to strive for.... And for a man or woman to “walk in their integrity” is to require constant discipline and usage to us from an ancient Roman army tradition. During the time of twelve Caesars, the Roman army would conduct morning inspections. As the inspecting Centurion would come in front of each legionnaire, the soldier would strike with his fist the armor breastplate that covered his heart. The armor had to be strongest there in order to protect his heart from the sword thrusts and arrow strikes. As the soldier struck his armor, he would shout “integritas” (in-teg-ri-tas), which in Latin means wholeness, completeness, and entirety. The inspecting Centurion would listen closely for this affirmation and also for the ring that well kept armor would give off. Satisfied that the armor was sound and that the soldier beneath it was protected, he would then move on to the next man.”

“At about this same time, the Praetorians or Imperial Bodyguard were ascending into power and influence. Drawn from the best “politically correct” soldiers of the legions, they received the finest equipment and armor. They no longer had to shout “Integritas” to signify that their armor was sound. Instead, as they struck their breastplate, they would shout “Hail Caesar”, to signify that their heart belonged to the Imperial personage, not to their unit, not to an institution, not to a code of ideals. They armored themselves to serve the cause of a single man.”

“A century passed and the rift between the legion and the Imperial Bodyguard and its excesses grew larger. To signify the difference between the two organizations, the legionnaire, upon striking his armor, would no longer shout “Integritas”, but instead would shout “Integer” (In-te-ger). Integer means undiminished, complete, and perfect. It not only indicated that their armor was sound, it also indicated that the soldier wearing the armor was sound of character. He was not associated with the immortal conduct that was rapidly becoming the signature of the Praetorian guards. “

“The armor of integrity continued to serve the Legion well. For over four centuries they held the line against the marauding Goths and Vandals. But by 383 AD, the social decline that infected the republic and the Praetorian Guard had its effects upon the Legion. As a 4th Century Roman general wrote, ‘When, because of negligence and laziness, parade ground drills were abandoned, customary armor began to feel heavy, since the soldiers rarely, if ever, wore it. Therefore, they first asked the emperor to set aside the breastplates and mail and then the helmets. So our soldiers fought the Goths without any protection for the heart and head and were often beaten by archers. Although there were many disasters, which led to the loss of great cities, no one tried to restore the armor to the infantry. They took their armor off, and when the armor came off, so too came their integrity.’”

“It was a matter of a few years until the Legion rotted from within and was unable to hold the frontiers. The Barbarians were at the gates. Integrity... it is a combination of the words, “Integritas” and “Integer”. It refers to the putting on of armor, of building completeness.... a wholeness..... a wholeness in character. How appropriate that the word integrity is a derivative of two words describing the character of a member of the profession of arms.”

“However, as I mentioned earlier, this is not done instantly. It requires that integrity becomes a way of life... it must be woven into the very fabric of our soul. Just as was true in the days of Imperial Rome, you either walk in your integrity daily or you take off the armor of the “integer” and leave your heart and soul exposed... open to attack. My challenge to you is simple but often very difficult. Wear your armor of integrity.... Take full measure of its weight.... Find comfort in its protection.... Do not become lax.”

“And always, always remember that no one can take your integrity from you. You and you alone can give it away! The biblical book of practical ethics, better known as the

book of Proverbs, sums it up very nicely: “The integrity of the upright shall guide them, but the perverseness of transgressors shall be destroy them.” (Proverbs 11:3)”

-Remarks at JSCOPE 2000, January 27, 2000

Notes

¹ Colin Powell, “Why Generals Get Nervous,” *The New York Times*, 8 October 1992.

² Colin Powell, My American Journey, (New York: Random House, 1995) 572-573.

³ See Annex F for list and timetable of the Chairman’s of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

⁴ See McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty, 16-29, 43-50, 56, 60, 70, 79, 80, 135, 192-194, 223-225.

⁵ McMaster, 330-331.

⁶ NP 514.

⁷ McMaster, 300.

⁸ See Charles L. Cochran, Civil-Military Relations (New York, Free Press: 1974) 142-151 and Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press; 1979) 374-400.

⁹ Thomas Ricks, “Bush Endorsement...” *The Washington Post*, 22 September 2000, A23.

¹⁰ Owens, 10.

¹¹ Crowe, 342.

¹² Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957).

¹³ Deborah Avant, “Conflicting Indicators of “Crisis” in American Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Spring 1998, 377.

¹⁴ See Annex G for the text of a speech given by USMC Commandant Krulak on integrity and military service.

¹⁵ Will Durant, Caesar and Christ, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944, 665.

¹⁶ Slides from a presentation given at Air Command & Staff College

Appendix E

United States Military Officers and Politics

The Founding Fathers worried about the dangers of a large standing army. The zeitgeist¹ of our nation during the first 100 years of its history did not require a large standing army, except in time of war. The end of war continually witnessed the rapid demobilization of its standing forces. This pattern began to change after the Republic came “out of the woods.” The Spanish American War witnessed the nation’s first effort to secure colonial possessions, requiring a larger active force, but was deployed overseas. The pattern was set after World War II when the USA retained a large standing force to contend with international interests and the Cold War.

With this history in mind, the model offered to us, by the civil-military rift advocates is personified in the idyllic “Marshall-like” apolitical officer. This type of officer, we are told, is what must be emulated to ensure that the officer corps does not pose a threat to the nation. Earnestly desired by the civil-military rift proponents is a relatively modern innovation. This type of officer, we are told, must be so apolitical, that he does not even vote and should refrain from all political activity even after achieving retirement. Anything short of this, we are told, places the Republic at risk. The insinuation is that we generally have had such officers in the ranks throughout history, but this assertion does not hold up under the scrutiny of facts.

Attached are a series of political posters and photographs illustrating a counter to this supposition. There was a time, not all that long ago, when civil-military relations were perceived at risk when military officers sought election to the presidency. Some of these officers actively ran for election both while in uniform and on active duty. Such an act today would receive wide condemnation from across liberal academic circles. The detractors should inform themselves more thoroughly on the nation's history. Although the country currently has a large standing military, its present leadership is considerably less "political" than it was in other epochs in our history. These primary source political ads and photographs render proof of this. In these, there is a photo of General Leonard Wood during his campaign to win the Republican Nomination in 1920. He did this while on active duty and in full uniform! Contemporary civil-military rift proponents would suffer an aneurysm if that occurred today.

The low point in civil-military relations in this century came for the USA during the Truman/MacArthur confrontation.² In this case, the very political MacArthur clashed with the sitting president over an array of international issues related to the Korean War and submitted himself to disfavor from the same. Huntington's description of MacArthur provides noteworthy insight into the general's personality;

"As early as 1929 his name was mentioned in connection with the Presidency, and in 1944, 1948, and 1952 he was on the fringes of the presidential political arena... His articulate and varying views reflected a continuing quest for beliefs and policies which would satisfy his own ideological inclinations and at the same time inspire favorable popular response."³


Despite his own personal ambitions and attachment to partisan advocacy, MacArthur offered no resistance to being fired by the Commander in Chief.

Huntington explains that there is tradition, within the military, of both a line of political and apolitical officers. Huntington points out that there are two types of political officers; the “charismatic, inspirational, unbending” group in the tradition of “Scott, McClellan and MacArthur.” The other group of political officers encompasses the “Taylor, Grant and Eisenhower” tradition, with their “folksy, unpretentious, flexible and earthy” style. At the same time, there has been a truly apolitical military tradition in our history, which is represented by Sherman, Pershing and Ridgeway (after the writing of his book, Ridgeway proved to be very political during his tenure as the CJSC and should be moved to the “Eisenhower group”).⁴

The following Huntington quote provides an explanation of a long line of military officers not posing a threat to the Republic, even as they sought the presidency. This encompasses twenty-five major party nominees, as of the publication of his book in 1957. Add John F. Kennedy and George H. Bush to make a total of twenty-seven.

“Fifteen major party presidential nominees may be classified as military heroes. Nine were nonprofessional in the sense that the military career was neither their exclusive nor even, in the most instances, their primary occupation. These nine included Washington, Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Pierce, Fremont, Hayes, Garfield, Benjamin Harrison and Theodore Roosevelt. The six professionals were Taylor, Scott, McClellan, Grant, Hancock and Eisenhower.”⁵

The following includes photos of presidential candidates. These illustrations are representative and stand as stark evidence against the assertions of the advocates of the mythical civil-military leadership crisis. The images portray General McClellan, General Fremont, General Grant and General Wood.





GRAND NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC BANNER.

PEACE! UNION! AND VICTORY!



GRAND BANNER OF THE RADICAL DEMOCRACY,
FOR 1864.







FOR PRESIDENT



That Soldier-Statesman who commanded Colored Troops in Cuba and in this country, and who says "Colored Soldiers are great fighters—unsurpassed by any in the world. That man who says the Race Must Have Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities."

GENERAL LEONARD C. WOOD

One-time friend of Col. Roosevelt

General Wood neither hesitates nor equivocates when it comes to speaking out for the Colored Race.

Colored men owe it to themselves to stand by those who stand by them.

General Leonard Wood is the only candidate who has come out clearly and squarely in favor of *All Constitutional Rights and Privileges for the Race*.

General Wood embodies all that we seek in justice — He typifies Roosevelt's "All men up, not some up and some down."

General Wood has given public utterance to his views on the race problem—

Not one of the other candidates has.

General Wood has publicly declared his praise of the colored soldiers;

Not one of the other candidates has.

General Wood has publicly declared that the colored man must enjoy every right every other citizen enjoys;

No other candidate has done this—not even Senator Harding.

Notes

¹ Zeitgeist – (Webster definition) German for the spirit of the time; general trend or thought or feeling of an era.

² Walter Millis, Arms and the State, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), 264-275.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979), 369-370.

⁴ Huntington, 367.

⁵ Huntington, 158.

Appendix F

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Provided to give consistency to the illustrations used in this project.

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (USA)	16 AUG 1949-14 AUG 1953
Admiral Arthur W. Radford (USN)	15 AUG 1953-14 AUG 1957
General Nathan F. Twining (USAF)	15 AUG 1957-30 SEPT 1960
General L. Lemnitzer (USA)	01 OCT 1960-30 SEPT 1962
General Maxwell D. Taylor (USA)	01 OCT 1962-03 JUL 1964
General Earle G. Wheeler (USA)	03 JUL 1964-02 JUL 1970
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer (USN)	03 JUL 1970-30 JUN 1974
General George S. Brown (USAF)	01 JUL 1974-20 JUN 1978
General David C. Jones (USAF)	21 JUN 1978-18 JUN 1982
General John W. Vessey, Jr., (USA)	18 JUN 1982-30 SEP 1985
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., (USN)	30 SEP 1985-30 SEP 1989
General Colin L. Powell (USA)	01 OCT 1989-30 SEP 1993
General John M. Shalikashvili (USA)	25 OCT 1993-30 SEP 1997
General Henry Shelton (USA)	01 OCT 1997

Appendix G

Reichswehr as a Model for the US Armed Forces: a Reply to Desch

Michael Desch advocates the Reichswehr as a model for the Post Cold War US military. He asserts that this would safeguard the Republic, while granting a military force strong enough to provide national security. Contextually, Desch's selection of the Reichswehr for emulation is ideologically revealing and historically fatal.

The Reichswehr was what the German Army was permitted to look like after the Allied victory in World War I. Under the Versailles Treaty, the Reichswehr was limited to 100,000 men. General Hans von Seeckt spearheaded the reorganization of the German Army. His force served as the future structure of the transformation of the Reichswehr into the powerful Wehrmacht a few years later under Hitler.

The Reichswehr was incapable of contending with the political "gang" warfare that swept Germany prior to the NAZI seizure of power. In time, the Reichswehr "became a state within a state, exerting an increasing influence on the nation's foreign and domestic policies until a point was reached where the Republic's continued existence depended on the will of the officer corps."² The idea that the Reichswehr is a worthy model of emulation to safeguard the Republic is void of a sound understanding of history.

Notes

¹ AFSC PUB 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000, vi.

² William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 60.

Glossary

AOR	Area of Responsibility
CGSC	Command & General Staff College
CoS	Chief of Staff
DOD	Department of Defense
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
Zeitgeist	(Webster definition) German for the spirit of the time; general trend or thought or feeling of an era.

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