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United States District Court
Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BIOSCIENCE ADVISORS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 21-cv-00866-HSG

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART MOTION TO
DISMISS**

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Now before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants United States Securities and Exchange Commission; Gary Gensler, in his official capacity as Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission; National Archives and Records Administration; and David S. Ferriero, in his official capacity as the Archivist of the United States, for which briefing is now complete. *See* Dkt. Nos. 33 (“Mot.”), 35 (“Opp.”), 37 (“Reply”). For the reasons detailed below, the Court **GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART** the motion.¹

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves two Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claims challenging the National Archives and Records Administration’s (“NARA”) approval and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) adoption of a records disposition schedule providing for the disposition of certain temporary records three years after the entry of a confidential treatment order. The remaining two causes of action allege the destruction of records in violation of the Federal Records Act and the denial of requested documents under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).

¹ The Court finds the motion appropriate for disposition without oral argument and deems the motion submitted. *See* Civil L.R. 7-1(b).

1 **A. Statutory Background**

2 **i. The Federal Records Act**

3 “The Federal Records Act is a collection of statutes governing the creation, management,
4 and disposal of records by federal agencies.” *Pub. Citizen v. Carlin*, 184 F.3d 900, 902 (D.C. Cir.
5 1999) (citing 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-18, 2901-09, 3101-07, 3301-24). The Act requires that federal
6 agencies “make and preserve records containing adequate and proper documentation of the
7 organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the agency . .
8 . to protect the legal and financial rights of the Government and of persons directly affected by the
9 agency’s activities.” 44 U.S.C. § 3101. “The Federal Records Act entrusts the Archivist, who is
10 the head of NARA, to provide ‘guidance and assistance to Federal agencies’ to ensure that such
11 federal records are properly preserved.” *Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Nat’l*
12 *Archives & Recs. Admin.*, 2021 WL 950142, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021) (“*Crew IP*”) (quoting 44
13 U.S.C. § 2904(a)).

14 “The Archivist works cooperatively with federal agencies to determine which records an
15 agency must preserve in the archives and which records may be segregated and disposed because
16 of their ‘temporary value.’” *Id.* (quoting 44 U.S.C. § 3102(3)). “Agency heads request
17 ‘disposition authority’—permission to discard records—from the Archivist and submit to the
18 Archivist plans to dispose of records that are no longer ‘needed by [the agency] in the transaction
19 of its current business and that do not appear to have sufficient administrative, legal, research, or
20 other value to warrant their further preservation.’” *Id.* (quoting 44 U.S.C. § 3303(2)). These plans
21 can include “schedules proposing the disposal” of records that lose their “administrative, legal,
22 research, or other value” over time and do not qualify for permanent retention. 44 U.S.C. §
23 3303(3). After preparing a proposed schedule, the agency head then submits the schedule to the
24 Archivist for approval. 36 C.F.R. §§ 1220.12, 1225.12(i). The Archivist “examine[s] the lists and
25 schedules” and, following a public notice and comment period, determines if any of the records
26 “have sufficient, administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant their continued
27 preservation” “after the lapse of the period specified.” 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a). If the answer is no,
28 the Archivist may then empower the requesting agency to dispose of the records in accordance

1 with the proposed schedule. *Id.* § 3303a(a)(1)-(2).

2 In addition to the use and approval of records schedules, the Federal Records Act also “sets
3 forth a structure whereby the Archivist and agency heads are to work together to ensure that
4 documents are not unlawfully destroyed.” *Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. U.S.*
5 *S.E.C.*, 916 F.Supp.2d 141, 145 (D.D.C. 2013) (“*Crew P*”). For example, each agency head:

6 shall notify the Archivist of any actual, impending, or threatened
7 unlawful removal, defacing, alteration, corruption, deletion, erasure,
8 or other destruction of records in the custody of the agency, and with
9 the assistance of the Archivist shall initiate action through the
10 Attorney General for the recovery of records the head of the Federal
11 agency knows or has reason to believe have been unlawfully removed
12 from that agency, or from another Federal agency whose records have
13 been transferred to the legal custody of that Federal agency.

14 44 U.S.C. § 3106(a). If the agency head does not initiate such an action, the Archivist “shall
15 request the Attorney General to initiate such action, and shall notify the Congress when such a
16 request has been made.” *Id.* § 3106(b).

17 **ii. The Freedom of Information Act**

18 Under FOIA, each agency is required to make public various records upon request, subject
19 to certain exceptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552. If an agency improperly withholds agency records in
20 response to a FOIA request, the party making the request may ask the district court to “to enjoin
21 the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records
22 improperly withheld from the complainant.” *Id.* § 552(a)(4)(B).

23 **B. SEC’s 2019 Amendment and 2020 Records Disposition Schedule**

24 **i. The 2019 Amendment**

25 In April 2019, the SEC amended the disclosure requirements set out in Regulation S-K for
26 material contracts and other exhibits filed under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The
27 amendment (the “2019 Amendment”) permitted registrants to self-redact portions of confidential
28 filings if such redactions were “both not material and would likely cause competitive harm to the
registrant if publicly disclosed.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (version effective January 31, 2022) (“Rule
601”). Previously, the only procedures for obtaining confidential treatment for exhibits filed
under the Exchange Act and Securities Act were set out in Exchange Act Rule 24b-2 (“Rule 24b-

2”) and Securities Act Rule 406 (“Rule 406”), which require registrants to submit a detailed application to the SEC identifying the particular text for which confidential treatment is sought, a statement of the legal grounds for the exemption, and an explanation of why, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, disclosure of the information was unnecessary for the protection of investors. *Id.* §§ 240.24b-2(b)(2), 230.406(b)(2). Upon receipt of an application, known as a “confidential treatment request” or “CTR,” SEC staff evaluate whether the request appears appropriate and whether to issue comments on the application. *Id.* §§ 240.24b-2(b)(2), 230.406(b)(2).

ii. The 2020 Schedule

Following the 2019 Amendment, the SEC developed a proposed records disposition schedule for “[m]aterials submitted in support of a request for confidential treatment pursuant to Rules 406 and 24b-2” and submitted the proposal to NARA for appraisal and approval. *See* Records Schedule DAA-0266-2019-0002, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/independent-agencies/rg-0266/daa-0266-2019-0002_sf115.pdf.² The proposed schedule (the “2020 Schedule”) provided that all temporary materials justifying a request for confidential treatment of information (and submitted under Rules 406 or 24b-2) were to be disposed of three years after the entry of a confidential treatment order. *Id.* at 3; *id.* at 6 (“This item covers materials voluntarily submitted by an entity requesting confidential treatment of business information following the optional method of a traditional/legacy confidential treatment request allowed by Rules 406 and 24b-2. This type of submission is no longer required by the Commission but remains as an option for use at the discretion of the registrant at the time of a filing.”). On November 25, 2019, a NARA staff appraiser prepared a memorandum evaluating and recommending approval of the SEC’s proposed schedule. *See* NARA-19-0018-0003 (the

² The Court takes notice of the SEC’s proposed schedule under the incorporation by reference doctrine because its contents are alleged in the complaint, the complaint “necessarily relies” on the documents, the document’s authenticity is uncontested, and the document’s relevance is uncontested. *See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg*, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010); *United States v. Ritchie*, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even if a document is not attached to a complaint, it may be incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.”).

1 “Appraisal”), *available at* <https://www.regulations.gov/document/NARA-19-0018-0003>.³

2 As background to the record schedule, the Appraisal’s “Additional Background
3 Information” section stated in relevant part:

4 Records schedule item DAA-0266-2014-0001-0001, Unredacted
5 Exhibits made certain CTR materials filed with the Commission
6 permanent records because by law, they had to be managed and
7 maintained separately in paper form from the related electronically
8 filed Registration Statements. In 2016, the SEC initiated a review of
9 rules found in 17 CFR Chapter II pursuant to Section 610 of the
10 Regulatory Flexibility Act. The review led to changes in SEC
11 regulations which eliminated the requirements for registrants to
12 request confidential treatment of portions of registration submissions.
13 As a result, unredacted exhibits are no longer required to be submitted
14 to the Commission, and item DAA-0266-2014-0001-0001 is rendered
15 obsolete and is superseded by item DAA-0266-2019-0002-0001 of
16 this proposed schedule. The revised regulations continue to allow
17 entities to submit an elective confidential treatment request. If such a
18 request should occur, documents received by the Commission would
19 be authorized for disposal under item DAA-0266-2019-0002-0001

20 Appraisal at 6. Finally, the Appraisal set out the following “Appraisal Justification”:

21 * Previously approved as temporary.
22 Confidential Treatment Request (CTR) Supplemental Materials,
23 DAA-0266-2016-0001-0001
24 * Similar records have been approved as temporary.
25 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Petitions for Confidential
26 Treatment of Regulatory Filings, N1-180-00-001 / 313/a

27 *Id.* at 7.

28 Less than one month later, on December 18, 2019, NARA published a notice in the Federal
Register, inviting public comment on the proposed records schedule. *See* Records Schedules;
Availability and Request for Comments, 84 Fed. Reg. 69,395 (Dec. 18, 2019).⁴ After publication
of the notice, which drew no comments, the Archivist approved the schedule on February 20,
2020. *See* NARA-19-0018 Consolidated Reply for All Schedules in This Notice (No Comments
Received), *available at* <https://www.regulations.gov/document/NARA-19-0018-0007>.⁵

³ The Court takes notice of the Appraisal under the incorporation by reference doctrine. *See Coto Settlement*, 593 F.3d at 1038; *Ritchie*, 342 F.3d at 908.

⁴ The Court takes notice of NARA’s Federal Register publication under the incorporation by reference doctrine. *See Coto Settlement*, 593 F.3d at 1038; *Ritchie*, 342 F.3d at 908.

⁵ The Court takes notice of NARA’s approval of the 2020 Schedule under the incorporation by reference doctrine. *See Coto Settlement*, 593 F.3d at 1038; *Ritchie*, 342 F.3d at 908.

1 **C. Bioscience Advisors, Inc.**

2 Plaintiff Bioscience Advisors, Inc. is a private company that tracks SEC filings submitted
3 with confidential treatment requests (including those submitted under Rules 406, 24b-2, and 601).
4 After the confidential treatment orders expire, Plaintiff requests copies of the unredacted exhibits
5 from the SEC through FOIA requests and incorporates the information they contain into its
6 commercial database of biopharmaceutical industry financial updates, deal announcements, and
7 searchable contracts. According to Plaintiff, in 2020 the SEC began responding to Plaintiff’s
8 FOIA requests by stating that the requested filings were unavailable and presumptively subject to
9 the 2020 Schedule.

10 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in February 2021. *See* Dkt. No. 1. After Defendants filed a
11 partial motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 24, the parties stipulated to the filing of an amended complaint
12 that would moot Defendants’ motion, Dkt. No. 30, which the Court granted. Dkt. No. 31. In May
13 2021, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint.⁶ Dkt. No. 32 (“Compl.”). Defendants now move to
14 dismiss.

15 **II. LEGAL STANDARD**

16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain
17 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A
18 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
19 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the
20 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
21 *Mendondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr.*, 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule
22 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
23 its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible
24 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
25 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

26 _____
27 ⁶ The Complaint alleges that after exhausting its administrative appeals, Plaintiff “received notice
28 from the SEC of its ‘right to seek judicial review of [the SEC’s] determination by filing a
complaint’ in federal court.” Compl. ¶ 46. Defendants do not contest Plaintiff’s right to seek
judicial review.

1 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the
2 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
3 *Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless,
4 courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
5 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” *In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig.*, 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.
6 2008).

7 **III. DISCUSSION**

8 Plaintiff brings four claims. Plaintiff’s first cause of action challenges NARA’s approval
9 and the SEC’s adoption of the 2020 Schedule as arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Compl.
10 ¶¶ 47-54. Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that NARA’s enactment of the 2020 Schedule
11 does not comply with the Federal Records Act. *Id.* ¶¶ 56-60. Plaintiff’s third cause of action
12 alleges that the Archivist and SEC Chair failed to enforce the Federal Records Act by notifying the
13 Attorney General of the unlawful destruction of documents. *Id.* ¶¶ 61-66. Finally, Plaintiff’s
14 fourth cause of action alleges that the SEC’s failure to provide the records Plaintiff requested
15 violated FOIA. *Id.* ¶¶ 67-73. Defendants move to dismiss all claims. *See generally* Mot.

16 **A. “Arbitrary and Capricious” under the APA (Claim One)**

17 Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that (1) NARA’s approval and (2) the SEC’s
18 adoption of the 2020 Schedule were each arbitrary and capricious under the APA.⁷ Compl. ¶¶ 49,
19 54.

20 “When presented with a motion to dismiss [an APA claim] for failure to state a claim, the
21 district court may, in appropriate circumstances, reach the merits even in the absence of the
22 administrative record, as when the parties’ arguments can be resolved with reference to nothing
23 more than the relevant statute and its legislative history.” *Banner Health v. Sebelius*, 797
24 F.Supp.2d 97, 112 (D.D.C. 2011). But “in recognition of the dangers associated with proceeding

26 ⁷ Plaintiff’s opposition brief challenges the SEC’s proposal of the 2020 Schedule for the first time
27 in this litigation. Opp. at 15. The Court will not consider this contention because it was not
28 alleged in the Complaint. *McMichael v. Napa Cnty.*, 709 F.2d 1268, 1273 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983)
 (“Because none of the state law claims were included in the complaint, we need not consider
 them.”).

1 with judicial review ‘on the basis of a partial and truncated record’ without the consent of the
 2 parties, when the arguments raised go to the question of whether the agency has adhered to the
 3 standards of decisionmaking required by the APA, the United States Court of Appeals for the
 4 District of Columbia Circuit has advised that the ‘better practice’ is to test the parties’ arguments
 5 in the context of a motion for summary judgment and with reference to the full administrative
 6 record.” *Id.* at 112-13 (citing *Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala*, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226
 7 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); *see also Walter O. Boswell Mem’l Hosp. v. Heckler*, 749 F.2d 788, 792
 8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“If a court is to review an agency’s action fairly, it should have before it neither
 9 more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision.”); *Occidental Petroleum*
 10 *Corp. v. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n*, 873 F.2d 325, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[I]n order to allow for
 11 meaningful judicial review, the agency must produce an administrative record that delineates the
 12 path by which it reached its decision.”).

13 Given the allegations, the Court has some doubt as to whether Plaintiff can successfully
 14 show that NARA’s approval and the SEC’s adoption of the 2020 Schedule were arbitrary and
 15 capricious. However, pending presentation of the full administrative record, the Court exercises
 16 its discretion at this stage “to decline to reach the ultimate question of whether the agency’s
 17 decisionmaking process was arbitrary or capricious.” *Banner Health*, 797 F.Supp.2d at 113
 18 (collecting cases); *see also City of Columbus v. Trump*, 453 F.Supp.3d 770, 796 (D. Md. 2020)
 19 (“The Court will require the Secretary [of the Department of Health and Human Services] to
 20 produce the administrative record before reaching the merits of these arguments.”).

21 Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first claim.

22 **B. Compliance with the Federal Records Act under the APA (Claim Two)**

23 Plaintiff’s second claim mounts another procedural challenge to the 2020 Schedule,
 24 arguing that the Schedule should be set aside as “not in accordance with law [the Federal Records
 25 Act].” Compl. ¶¶ 55-60. In particular, Plaintiff argues that NARA’s approval of the 2020
 26 Schedule violates the Federal Records Act because it permits the destruction of documents while
 27 they still have “objective, quantifiable market value in addition to administrative, legal, and
 28 research value, and [] will hold that value for much longer than the three-year retention period in

1 the Policy.” *Id.* ¶ 60. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

2 For an APA claim to survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must allege facts that could
3 plausibly lead the court to find the contested 2020 Schedule “not in accordance with law’ because
4 [it] permit[s] the destruction of record material that should be maintained” under the Federal
5 Records Act. *Armstrong v. Bush*, 924 F.2d 282, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §
6 706(2)(A)).

7 To determine whether federal records have archival value, NARA has promulgated an
8 “Appraisal Policy” that “sets out the strategic framework, objectives, and guidelines that [it] uses
9 to determine whether Federal records have archival value.” Nat’l Archives & Records Admin.,
10 Appraisal Policy of the National Archives § 1 (Sept. 2007), [https://www.archives.gov/records-](https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/scheduling/appraisal#policy)
11 [mgmt/scheduling/appraisal#policy](https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/scheduling/appraisal#policy) (“NARA Appraisal Policy”). As a “beginning point for
12 appraisal,” the NARA Appraisal Policy categorizes the evidence it collects into:

- 13 (1) records that document the rights of citizens and enable citizens to
14 establish their identities, protect their rights, and claim their
entitlements;
- 15 (2) records that document actions of Federal officials and enable them
16 to explain past decisions, form future policy, and be accountable for
consequences; and
- 17 (3) records that document the national experience and provide the
18 means for evaluating the effects of Federal actions on the nation and
for understanding its history, science, and culture, including the man-
made and natural environment.

19 *CREW II*, 2021 WL 950142, at *2 (simplified) (quoting NARA Appraisal Policy).

20 Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must at this stage, the
21 Court concludes that Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim for relief. The Complaint alleges that
22 the records at issue contain information that enables Plaintiff to “provide a database of financial
23 updates, deal announcements, and searchable contracts that was widely referenced by the
24 biopharmaceutical business community,” and that “[t]hese exhibits, obtained long after any risk of
25 harm from disclosure had passed, provided valuable insights into the industry for researchers and
26 industry players about the details of deals that had been conducted in past years.” Compl. ¶ 21.
27 These allegations are sufficient to plausibly contend that the documents at issue have value
28 warranting their continued preservation by the government beyond the 2020 Schedule’s three-year

1 retention period.

2 Defendants seek dismissal because Plaintiff’s claim is focused on records with “objective,
3 quantifiable market value.” Mot. at 20. Neither the Federal Records Act nor NARA’s
4 promulgated appraisal policy, Defendants argue, takes into consideration market or commercial
5 value of federal records. *Id.* at 20-21. Instead, Defendants contend that the focus of documents
6 warranting preservation is “on the preservation of records that serve an important function in
7 documenting the government’s actions—not simply any document with ‘objective, market value’
8 or even some form of commercial ‘research value.’” *Id.* at 20. Defendants further argue that
9 “courts have generally understood this mandate to apply to historical research rather than
10 commercial research—and in particular, historical research related to the government itself.” *Id.*
11 at 20-21 (“[T]he unredacted exhibits that are at issue in this case have no bearing on the
12 ‘documentary history of the federal government’ . . . or any other historical interest.” (internal
13 citation omitted)).

14 At this early stage when no factual record has been presented, the Court is unpersuaded.
15 The SEC is a “a federal agency whose mission is to protect investors nationwide and to regulate
16 the securities markets.” *See Morris v. United States Sec. & Exch. Comm’n*, No. 19-CV-887
17 (APM), 2019 WL 4575607, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019), *aff’d sub nom. Morris v. Sec. & Exch.*
18 *Comm’n*, No. 19-5274, 2020 WL 2610606 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 21, 2020); *Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*
19 *v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n*, 606 F.2d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[T]he SEC . . . is, of course, the
20 agency charged with administering the federal statutes mandating disclosure of corporate
21 information.”). As Plaintiff suggests, “[p]ractically every element of the SEC’s work could be
22 characterized as ‘commercial’ . . . Virtually all the records created and collected by the SEC have
23 ‘commercial value,’ and deal with ‘commercial’ subjects.” *Opp.* at 19. The fact that records have
24 commercial or market value does not categorically exclude them from the reach of the Federal
25 Records Act. The Act does not set out an exclusive list of categories of value warranting
26 preservation, and accounts for this by requiring the Archivist to determine whether documents
27 “have sufficient administrative, legal, research, *or other value*” warranting their continued
28 preservation. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a). Thus, even assuming that the records at issue bear no value

1 outside of their commercial or market value, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law on a
2 motion to dismiss that the disputed records necessarily fall outside of the protections of the
3 Federal Records Act.

4 Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's second claim.

5 **C. Enforcement Action under the APA and the Federal Records Act (Claim**
6 **Three)**

7 The APA permits private enforcement of the Federal Records Act when a plaintiff seeks
8 judicial review of (1) the adequacy of an agency's recordkeeping guidelines; or (2) the Archivist's
9 and agency head's pursuit of (or failure to pursue) enforcement actions seeking redress for the
10 unlawful removal or destruction of records. *Armstrong*, 924 F.2d at 296; *see also* 44 U.S.C. §§
11 2115(b), 3106(a). Plaintiff's third cause of action invokes the latter theory. Compl. ¶¶ 61-66.
12 Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's claim on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff has already obtained
13 all of the allegedly destroyed documents, rendering its claim moot; and (2) the Complaint does not
14 sufficiently plead a claim.

15 Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim under the Federal Records Act. The Complaint alleges
16 that the "Plaintiff has notified the SEC and NARA repeatedly that SEC staff are destroying (and/or
17 claim to have destroyed) documents that are subject to preservation under the Policy," and that
18 "[n]either the SEC Chair nor the Archivist has initiated an investigation into these violations of the
19 FRA, nor have they invited the Attorney General to initiate an enforcement action." Compl. ¶ 65.
20 These allegations are sufficient at this stage to plead that the Archivist and SEC Chair did not take
21 required action to prevent the unlawful destruction of documents. *Armstrong*, 924 F.2d at 296
22 n.12 ("[T]he agency head and Archivist are required to take action to prevent the unlawful
23 destruction or removal of records and, if they do not, private litigants may sue under the APA to
24 require them to do so.").

25 Defendants raise a mootness argument, contending that Plaintiff's claim should be
26 dismissed because Plaintiff has already obtained all of the allegedly destroyed records. Mot. at 22.
27 Instead of initiating the enforcement action that Plaintiff requested under Federal Records Act, the
28 SEC simply returned three documents to Plaintiff – an action which, according to Defendants,

1 moots Plaintiff’s claim. However, since the Complaint alleges that neither the SEC Chair nor the
 2 Archivist have asked the Attorney General for help and Defendants have not shown that such a
 3 request could not lead to recovery of additional documents, Plaintiff’s claim is not moot. *See Jud.*
 4 *Watch, Inc. v. Kerry*, 844 F.3d 952, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reversing trial court’s dismissal of
 5 Federal Records Act enforcement proceedings action on mootness grounds); *id.* at 955 (“[T]he
 6 [SEC] has not explained why shaking the tree harder—e.g., by following the statutory mandate to
 7 seek action by the Attorney General—might not bear more [documents] still.”)

8 Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third claim.

9 **D. Denial of Records under FOIA (Claim Four)**

10 Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges that the SEC has improperly denied an unspecified
 11 number of FOIA record requests. Compl. ¶¶ 67-73. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s
 12 claim because Plaintiff does not describe any of its FOIA requests “with sufficient detail for
 13 Defendants to determine with confidence which requests are being challenged.” Mot. at 26.

14 Construed as a claim under FOIA, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action fails to state a claim for
 15 relief. The Complaint details one FOIA denial in support of Plaintiff’s claim: “Plaintiff was
 16 provided with amendments to contracts wherein the amendments were subject to confidentiality
 17 orders coterminous with the original contract, but Plaintiff was denied access to the original
 18 contracts.” *Id.* ¶ 69. Outside of this single example, Plaintiff does not identify – let alone with
 19 sufficiently specific detail – any requests purportedly denied in violation of FOIA. *See Marshall*
 20 *v. Cuomo*, 192 F.3d 473, 485 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s dismissal of FOIA claim
 21 based on its finding that plaintiff “failed to identify the specific documents requested, when they
 22 were requested, to whom those requests were directed, or the extent of [agency’s] responses”);
 23 *Carroll v. Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 2012 WL 1454858, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2012) (“Absent a
 24 description of the documents sought, as well as details of the refusal to turn over the requested
 25 information, it is impossible to determine if [plaintiff] has stated a viable claim.”).

26 Plaintiff counters that “[t]he sheer numerosity of accumulating FOIA violations here
 27 makes listing every violative act in a pleading impracticable.” Opp. at 21. But Plaintiff’s
 28 numerosity argument fails to meet Defendants’ specificity concerns. It is undisputed that an

1 action asserting a large number of FOIA violations is permissible. *See Yagman v. Pompeo*, 868
2 F.3d 1075, 1081 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Indeed, the statute itself puts no restrictions on the quantity
3 of records that may be sought. Rather, it explicitly contemplates unusually large requests,
4 affording reviewing agencies additional time to search for a voluminous amount of separate and
5 distinct records which are demanded in a single request.” (simplified) (internal citations omitted)).

6 Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth claim.


7 **IV. CONCLUSION**

8 The Court **GRANTS IN PART** and **DENIES IN PART** Defendants’ motion as follows:

- 9 1. Defendants’ motion is **DENIED** as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action.
- 10 2. Defendants’ motion is **DENIED** as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action.
- 11 3. Defendants’ motion is **DENIED** as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action.
- 12 4. Defendants’ motion is **GRANTED** as to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action. Because
13 the Court cannot conclude that amendment would be futile, this claim is dismissed
14 with leave to amend. If Plaintiff can cure the pleading deficiencies described
15 above, it must file any amended complaint within 21 days from the date this order
16 is filed.
- 17 5. The parties are further **ORDERED** to appear at a case management conference on
18 March 1, 2022 at 2:00 p.m. to discuss setting an expedited summary judgment
19 briefing schedule. The parties will be advised closer to the hearing whether it will
20 take place telephonically or in person. A joint case management conference
21 statement is due by February 22, 2022.

22 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

23 Dated: 2/8/2022

24 
25 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
26 United States District Judge